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CoAStaL NLP Group 28

[ "holding that possession of a pipe bomb is a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 3142f1", "holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc 2113a is a crime of violence", "holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc 16", "holding for the purposes of 18 usc 924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc 924e2b", "holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 16" ]

[ "recognizing that even if a plaintiff claims certain information constitutes trade secrets its claim may not depend on that determination", "holding that included among trade secrets employee may not appropriate from employer is certain information such as lists of customers", "holding that supplier lists can be trade secrets under indianas uniform trade secrets act which uses the same definition of a trade secret as montana", "recognizing that customer lists may be protectable trade secrets", "recognizing a legitimate need to protect an employee from disclosing an employers trade secrets or other confidential information to a competitor" ]

[ "holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter", "holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions", "holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision", "recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one", "holding that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one" ]

[ "holding that plaintiff stated a 349 claim where plaintiff alleged facts plausibly suggesting that defendant intentionally registered its corporate name to be confusingly similar to plaintiffs commscope trademark", "holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract", "holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference", "holding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for inducement to breach a contract where she had not alleged facts sufficient to show the existence of an enforceable underlying contract", "holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity" ]

[ "holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did nothing to alter the rule that judges cannot depart below a statutorily provided minimum sentence except upon the governments motion on the basis of substantial assistance", "holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence in plea agreement accepted before decision in united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law", "holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not alter the standard of review for the interpretation and application of the guidelines", "holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 does not provide a basis for a sentence reduction under 18 usc 3582c", "holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing" ]

[ "holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity", "holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate", "holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision", "holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment", "recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue" ]

[ "holding no right to recover for economic loss resulting from defendants injury to a third party with whom plaintiff has contractual business relationship", "holding commercial fishermen may recover for pollution resulting from defendants oil spill", "holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed", "holding that impact in the district resulting from the defendants conduct that occurred outside the district must be deliberate not incidental", "holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent" ]

[ "holding the real estate sale proceeds", "holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate", "holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate", "holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate", "holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate" ]

[ "recognizing that a plaintiff may be able to establish that the statute is unconstitutional by showing that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep citation omitted", "holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence", "holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute", "holding that person challenging statute as facially vague must show that the challenged law is unconstitutional in every possible application", "holding that a statute may be facially challenged only by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep " ]

[ "holding that section 12309 is a condition precedent to the accrual of rights against a municipality", "holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state", "recognizing that the notice required by section 28430 is a condition precedent to the recovery of attorneys fees pursuant to section 12057lb in hospitals suit against the state", "holding that section 28430s notice requirement is a condition precedent for fees in action by taxpayer against dor pursuant to section 213015", "holding that the notice requirement is a condition precedent for attorneys fees from section 12069 proceedings in action by plaintiff against state" ]

[ "holding that a resentencing court may reconsider a defendants criminal history category as long as the appellate court did not expressly or implicitly limit the remand to only a portion of the sentence", "holding that this court may reconsider an erroneous ruling as long as the appeal is current", "holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages", "recognizing that a reviewing court should not reconsider credibility determinations made by the alj as long as they find some support in the record", "holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending" ]

[ "holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms", "holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified", "holding that the defendant must renew a motion for a change of venue after voir dire to preserve the issue for appeal", "holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived", "holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue" ]

[ "holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless", "holding that codefendants statement was not properly admitted because a reasonable person in declarants position might even think that implicating someone else would decrease his practical exposure to criminal liability at least as far as sentencing goes", "holding that discrepancy between declarants testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement", "holding that appellants statement i think i need a lawyer is just as ambiguous as the statement made by the defendant in davis", "holding that when the testimony relating each of the statements by codefendants was admissible against at least one of the codefendants the statements were not rendered inadmissible because each statement would be hearsay as to the other two defendants" ]

[ "holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced", "holding that 3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject ", "holding that 5g13c applied because the defendants case involved multiple undischarged terms of imprisonment only one of which was used to enhance his instant sentence", "holding that the term of imprisonment for purposes of application note 5 is the sentence imposed by the state court and that it shall not be decreased to reflect a suspension of any part of the sentence", "holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of 5g13b is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing" ]

[ "holding that a draft rap constituted a final remedial design", "holding that employees conviction for possession of a controlled substance constituted gross misconduct", "holding that director of taxation may select remedial option", "holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error", "holding that exemption 7c categorically applies when a third party requestor seeks fbi rap sheets" ]

[ "holding that a three to four month period between the protected activity is not enough to show very close temporal proximity", "holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation", "recognizing temporal proximity when agency had knowledge of employees protected activity", "holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity", "holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection" ]

[ "holding that a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense of a greater crime if the lesser crime contains an essential element not included in the greater crime", "holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime", "holding that the crime of rape is a lesser included offense of the crime of felony murder in the perpetration of rape and that since the latter crime included all of the elements of the former consecutive sentences were therefore improper", "holding that reviewing court in a proper case may modify a judgment of conviction below and affirm it as a conviction of a lesser degree of the offense charged or of a lesser crime included therein where the errors do not affect the conviction of the lesser offense ", "holding that an offense is factually lesser included if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense" ]

[ "holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them", "holding unpleaded claims or defenses that are tried by express or implied consent of parties are treated as if they had been raised by pleadings even in summary judgment proceedings", "holding an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by implied consent where the issue is presented considered and ruled upon by the trial court without objection", "holding that an issue cannot be tried by the parties consent pursuant to rule 15b2 where one of the parties opposes trial by moving for summary judgment", "holding order nonfinal where parties agreed to reserva tion on issue ripe for adjudication and tried by parties" ]

[ "holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection", "holding that the plaintiff had to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the supervisors who took the adverse action against the plaintiff knew about the protected activity prior to taking that action", "holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity", "holding in the title vii context that the plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him know of the employees plaintiffs protected activity", "holding that the plaintiff failed to show retaliation where there was no evidence that the employees who disciplined him knew of his protected activity" ]

[ "holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail", "holding prejudicial effect of prosecutors comment not rendered harmless by courts general instruction that the arguments of counsel are not evidence", "holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence", "holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify", "holding that district court acted within its discretion in denying motion for mistrial when prosecutor commented on matter not in evidence in closing argument because comment was not sufficiently prejudicial when taken together with the courts later jury instruction that the jurys recollection of the evidence controlled and that the attorneys arguments were not evidence " ]

[ "holding he who seeks equity must do equity ", "holding that the formula in section 522f2a creates equity for purposes of lien avoidance even if debtors otherwise have no equity in the property", "holding that an insufficient pleading in equity is a nullity", "holding that an action for specific performance lies in equity", "holding that when the company seeks cancellation or rescission it must as a condition of obtaining relief do equity by returning or tendering back the premium paid with interest" ]

[ "holding that a defendants counterclaim that is based on the breach of the same maritime insurance contract as the main claim cannot be granted a jury trial because the resolution of the defendants claim would dispose of all or part of the plaintiffs action the net result would be to resolve the case in a jury trial despite the plaintiffs 9h election", "holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc 1367a", "holding that a challenge to part b determinations in an order involving both part a and part b must begin in district court", "holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim", "holding that a counterclaim which appears as part of the defendants answer not as part of the plaintiffs complaint cannot served as the basis for arising under jurisdiction" ]

[ "holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari", "holding that even a remand by the supreme court for reconsideration in light of an intervening court opinion does not require the court to consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari", "holding it is settled that the supreme court may consider questions raised on the first appeal after which the court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari as well as those that were before the court of appeals upon the second appeal after which the court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari internal quotation marks omitted", "holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available", "recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review" ]

[ "holding in a ease where debtor elected for reasons of ill health and in order to meet present needs to take pension benefits in one lumpsum payment three weeks before filing bankruptcy petition that the proceeds would retain the exempt status provided by 522d10e because they were a tangible reflection of the debtors right to receive a payment under a pension plan ", "holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan", "holding that the son of a pension plan participant who had not been designated to receive any of his fathers pension benefits stood no closer to beneficiary status than any other person", "holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan", "holding that a debtors obligation to repay a pension plan loan is a debt because the plans right to offset the obligation against future benefits constitutes a method of enforcement sufficient to create a right to payment" ]

[ "holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference", "holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference", "holding that the district courts credibility assessments are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error", "recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference", "holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight" ]

[ "holding that under georgia law a creditors refinancing of a promissory note destroyed the purchase money nature of the creditors security interest in a wall unit which served as collateral", "holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract", "holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest", "holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing", "holding that in georgia pursuant to 9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58" ]

[ "recognizing cause of action for wrongful death", "holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute", "holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother", "holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action", "holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action" ]

[ "holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error", "holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment", "holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed", "holding at the governments urging that a similar error was an error in both the trial and sentencing", "holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error" ]

[ "holding that criticism of judicial action already taken even though the cases were still pending on other points or might be revived by rehearings was not enough to satisfy the clearandpresentdanger standard", "holding that courts should order reinstatement under the adea whenever it is an appropriate remedy because reinstatement best serves congress purpose in enacting the adea and an award of front pay is always somewhat speculative", "holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy", "holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect", "holding that reinstatement is prospective even though it contemplated changing the result of an action already taken" ]

[ "holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation", "holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion", "holding trial court abused discretion by assessing sanctions without supporting evidence", "holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend", "holding trial court abused its discretion by modifying custody without applying extraordinary burden test" ]

[ "holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment", "holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises", "holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district are acting in conjunction with school officials", "holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours", "holding search was conducted by school official where school resource officer did not search the bag himself or conduct any investigation on his own and therefore applying the tlo reasonableness standard" ]

[ "holding that tax courts miller opinion will no longer be followed", "holding that once a respondent refuses to supply information commerce no longer focuses on the true margin but rather on determining an adverse margin that will induce future cooperation", "holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant", "holding that aggravation was warranted where respondent admitted and the referee found that the respondent had lied in correspondence to the pcc", "holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening" ]

[ "holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis", "holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim", "holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since 951 requirements were satisfied", "holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force", "holding a gun to the head of a child and threatening to pull the trigger is plainly excessive force so closely analogous case is not needed to put police officer on notice" ]

[ "holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify", "holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error", "holding that prosecutors allegedly improper closing arguments regarding burden of proof defendants failure to testify and other allegations did not case serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury verdict or the fairness of the trial", "holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify", "holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge" ]

[ "holding that section 1961 applied where the parties agreement failed to specify that the selected interest rate applied to either judgements or judgment debts", "holding that walsh was entitled to postjudgment interest on child support arrearage but vacating and remanding the arrearage judgment because the judgment did not state the interest rate or specify that the interest was fully or partially waived as required by section 1602c", "holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury", "holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case", "holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment" ]

[ "holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still", "holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution", "recognizing that in boeme justice kennedy forcefully asserted the judicial prerogative to interpret the constitution in language that might be understood to implicate rfras applications to federal as well as state law but also that other language in the opinion indicates that the court situated its judicial supremacy concerns squarely in the context of the fourteenth amendment and state sovereignty", "holding that to hold the same constitution that specifically recognizes felon disenfranchisement under 2 of the fourteenth amendment but also prohibits disenfranchisement under another amendment would be to interpret the constitution in an inconsistent manner", "holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state" ]

[ "holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable", "holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct ", "holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence", "holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause", "holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause" ]

[ "holding that conflicts of constitutional magnitude can arise from cases of successive representation", "holding that the failure to optout precluded challenge to adequate representation based upon purported conflicts of interest between subclasses", "holding that there is a qualified first amendment right of access to proceedings and documents relating to disqualification of a judge in a criminal case and to conflicts of interest between attorneys in a criminal case", "holding that pslra barred rico claims based on pension fund scheme involving failure to disclose conflicts of interest and commission arrangements", "holding where challenge was waived that appellate review is precluded" ]

[ "holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient", "holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation", "holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain", "holding a filing under wishart equipment co insufficient to identify the debtor horace wishart", "holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation" ]

[ "holding that arbitration award of postaward interest at 8 accruing from the 31st day after service of this award until final payment of the award was insufficient to displace federal rate", "holding that rule 60a is the proper vehicle for correcting a judgment in order to provide for an award of prejudgment interest where among other things governing law would make the interest award automatic or the district court clearly intended to make the interest award in its prior order", "holding that arbitral award of 10 interest to the date or dates of payment merged into the judgment", "holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict", "holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due" ]

[ "holding that the court could reasonably assume that no rational class member would have purchased the product had he known of the alleged misrepresentation", "holding that a person cannot reasonably rely on a misrepresentation when the contents of a written instrument contradict the alleged misrepresentation", "holding inference appropriate where no rational class member would have acted if there had been adequate disclosure", "holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action", "holding that contractor could not show that it reasonably relied upon alleged misrepresentation" ]

[ "holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal", "recognizing attempted fraud as a lesserincluded offense of fraud in violation of article 14 for the government of the navy", "holding that under the pre1986 jurisdictional limitation a claim by the state which discovered the fraud investigated the fraud disclosed the fraud to the federal government and which was the original source of the information was jurisdictionally barred", "holding that the issue of fraud was precluded because the previous jury necessarily considered fraud as the basis for chapter 93a liability", "holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud" ]

[ "holding that a fiftynine minute detention to wait for a drug dog was reasonable where the officer requested the dog immediately after developing reasonable suspicion", "holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding consent where two agents testified that the defendant orally consented but the defendant denied having orally consented and would not sign a written consent form", "holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act", "holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert", "holding that defendant voluntarily consented where defendants only basis for coercion was that the officers said that if he did not consent they would get a warrant which would take a while" ]

[ "holding that revocation of benefits provided by the employee and labor relations manual did not implicate userra", "holding an employee manual did not create contract restricting the employmentatwill relationship", "holding enforceable employee manual that was distributed to all employees", "holding that there was no employment contract where personnel manual provided that after three months an employee became a permanent employee where there was no additional expression as to duration", "holding employee manual binding based in part on its widespread distribution" ]

[ "holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment", "holding in part as a general rule a trial courts judgment becomes final thirty days after its entry unless a party files a timely notice of appeal or specified posttrial motion", "holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment", "holding attorney may not wait more than thirty days from the entry of final judgment give notice of nonrepresentation and then seek to enforce a hen not noticed before the entry of the final judgment", "holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence" ]

[ "holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent", "holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent", "holding that the legislatures manifest intent will be rejected only where the party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statute is actually criminally punitive in operation", "recognizing language of statute as clearest indicator of legislative intent", "holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute" ]

[ "holding that newly discovered evidence must be that which existed at the time of trial but for an excusable reason was not discoverable until later", "holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment", "holding that a plaintiff has the burden of proof to show newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency", "holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed", "holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence" ]

[ "holding that the phrase party aggrieved should be given a practical rather than hypertechnical meaning", "holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language", "holding that federal court decisions construing and applying the federal arbitration act may be regarded as persuasive authority in construing and applying corresponding provisions of our local arbitration act", "holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed", "holding that party is aggrieved from date of notice but construing rule 15a" ]

[ "holding interactive website did not create general jurisdiction", "holding that the defendant maintained a passive website and was therefore not subject to general jurisdiction", "holding that a passive website that merely makes information available is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction", "holding that a nonresident defendant who knowingly sent false information about billing commissions into massachusetts via us mail in order to deceive the plaintiff into accepting a lower percentage than was due him was subject to specific jurisdiction", "holding that absence of evidence that appellee internet company directed advertising towards pennsylvanians via its website and the initiation by appellant to receive information via mail precluded a finding of general jurisdiction" ]

[ "holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed", "holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees", "holding the dismissed defendant was not precluded from obtaining its reasonable attorney fees under 1317201 even though the action was still pending against another defendant", "holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment", "holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages" ]

[ "holding employee had cause of action against her employers when nonemployee harassed her and employers failed to take corrective action", "holding employer could be hable for sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees including employers customers", "holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations", "holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor", "holding employer may be hable when its employee is sexually harassed by employers patrons and employer either ratifies or acquiesces in harassment by not taking immediate andor corrective action" ]

[ "holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim", "holding that conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based citations omitted", "holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient", "holding conclusory assertions of intent to cause insufficient without supporting facts", "holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim" ]

[ "recognizing that the only record of grand jury testimony is the court reporters certified transcript not her tape recording of the proceeding", "holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object", "holding in the pretrial context that a reporters record is required only if evidence is introduced in open court for nonevidentiary hearings it is superfluous", "holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due", "holding that it is not" ]

[ "holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable", "holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under 1292a1", "holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable", "holding injunction ordering prison to submit plan for reformation of unconstitutional prison conditions not appealable as interlocutory order under 28 usc 1292a1", "holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable" ]

[ "holding that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted", "holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises", "holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises", "holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises", "holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted" ]

[ "holding that although the defendant was paroled rather than released unconditionally his state sentence was discharged for purposes of deciding whether the federal judge could impose a concurrent sentence", "holding that prosecutorial delay that was extreme or sinister could support a departure if the defendant was required to serve a state sentence which could have been concurrent with the federal sentence had the federal prosecution proceeded sooner", "holding that a federal sentence commences when the attorney general receives the convicted defendant into custody for service of that sentence", "holding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when the offense for which he was tried could result in the imposition of a jail sentence", "holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 1983 claims" ]

[ "holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing", "holding that trial court did not err in denying juveniles motion to dismiss for failing to complete adjudicatory hearing within statutory time limit where adjudicatory hearing began within thirty days of arraignment but prosecutor requested a continuance when one of his subpoenaed witnesses did not appear", "holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing", "holding that trial court did not err", "holding that the trial court did not err by failing to hold an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal because the appellant was afforded a full opportunity to respond to the motion" ]

[ "holding that the general federal regulatory scheme governing indian mineral leases did not establish federal jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement made under such a lease when the plaintiffs claim sounded only in general contract law", "holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored", "holding that reasonableness analysis applies in general jurisdiction case under federal circuit law", "holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates", "holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added" ]

[ "holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her", "holding that homosexual advances by male coworker were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable", "holding that where male teacher asked female teacher out for a drink asked her to perform tasks she perceived as secretarial and struck her in a fight purported harassment was not genderbased and was not sufficiently severe or pervasive", "holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment", "holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters" ]

[ "holding petitioner must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim", "holding that when the prejudice from a sixth amendment violation is limited to the admission into evidence of the mental health testimony harmless error analysis applies", "holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis", "holding that the doctrine of harmless error applies when a due process violation is alleged and affirming a conviction when defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice", "holding that harmless error test is satisfied when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction" ]

[ "holding that credibility determinations are for the jury", "holding that the ijs or bias credibility determinations are not questioned if they are substantially reasonable", "holding that the credibility determinations by the board are virtually unreviewable", "holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence", "holding that ijs and bias finding of applicants lack of credibility was substantially supported by the inconsistencies regarding the date of spouses alleged sterilization" ]

[ "holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it", "holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application", "holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions", "holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds", "holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen" ]

[ "holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion", "holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting 90403 fla stat", "holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction", "holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge", "holding that witness testimony about prior drug purchases from defendant was highly probative of brookins guilt and was not outweighed by any danger of undue prejudice" ]

[ "holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless", "holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted", "holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel", "holding that in a seconddegree murder prosecution defendant was required to provide statutory notice of his intent to rely upon the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance eed notwithstanding his stated intention to support that defense with lay testimony only the notice requirements goals of preventing unfair surprise and allowing the prosecution an opportunity to obtain evidence from any source were implicated whether defendant sought to establish mental infirmity through expert or lay testimony", "holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge" ]

[ "holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court", "holding that when the claim was duly established as a valid claim against the estate the laws of limitation could no longer apply while the estate was being administered under the probate law", "holding that a lawsuit by a third party creditor against the estate is a core proceeding", "holding that bank as coexecutor of estate breached its fiduciary and statutory duties to creditor when it failed to pay creditors claim against estate and instead paid claims of bank and other creditors", "recognizing that the party can instead file a claim against the estate" ]

[ "holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student", "holding that imposing the traditional warrant and probablecause requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration of the illinois probation system because the process of obtaining a warrant would delay the officers ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the probationer and would facilitate the probationers evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct", "holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school", "holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant requirement", "recognizing the existence of the special relationship" ]

[ "holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party", "holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue", "holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract", "holding that majority shareholder who guaranteed debt was not a third party beneficiary and thus lack standing to bring action for tortious interference of corporations contract with defendant", "holding that borough that guaranteed debt owed by municipal sewage authority to engineering firm lacked standing because it was not party to the contract" ]

[ "holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client", "holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney", "holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved", "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference where the relief defendant refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them", "holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one" ]

[ "recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket", "recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record", "recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice", "holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings", "holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket" ]

[ "holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm", "holding that an officer did not employ excessive force in shooting a suspect who turned out to be unarmed because at the time of the shooting the officer had a reasonable belief that the suspect posed a threat and was armed", "holding that deadly force was reasonable where a suspect who had been behaving erratically swung a knife at an officer", "holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon", "recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat" ]

[ "holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under 2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider", "holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal", "holding that unauthorized motion for rehearing to set aside default heard by trial court will be considered as motion for reconsideration", "holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment", "holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing" ]

[ "holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation", "holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc 523a5", "holding that since a parents child support obligation is not a debt within the prohibition of 38 the obligation of the defaulting parent may be enforced by means of the courts contempt power including imprisonment pending the purging of the default", "holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or", "holding that the trial court had not erred in including the cost of health insurance covering both the custodial parent and the parties child in determining the noncustodial parents childsupport obligation" ]

[ "holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment", "holding that the conditions delineated in canon 3c1a alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the due process clause", "holding that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the acca violates the constitutions guarantee of due process", "recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution", "holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause" ]

[ "holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity", "holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him", "holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity", "holding that because a waiver of immunity is altogether voluntary on the part of the tribe and thus the tribe may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted the issue must be determined in the forum that the tribe has chosen for determination of the viability of claims against it to wit arbitration", "holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity" ]

[ "holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under 1983", "holding that uc hastings was immune under the eleventh amendment from suit on plaintiffs 1983 claims and granting motion to dismiss", "holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981", "holding college school district immune from suit in federal court under eleventh amendment", "recognizing that section 1983 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment" ]

[ "holding that where officers had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense seizing defendants luggage for 38 minutes under terry did not mature into an unlawful arrest", "holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest", "holding that a defendants response to even an invalid arrest or terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest", "holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had dispelled the officers reasonable suspicion", "holding that totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs and therefore officer was justified in seizing truck" ]

[ "recognizing that competing interests of parents children and the state requires additional analysis", "recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children", "holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents", "recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child", "recognizing the supreme courts subtle yet crucial extension of valid state interests to include protecting children not actually depicted" ]

[ "holding in the context of a non 212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance", "holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense", "holding that under ohio law fraud claim failed because there was no evidence of reliance", "holding detrimental reliance claim was subject to tenyear prescriptive period", "holding that each class member was not required to prove justifiable reliance when an inference of reliance arises if a materially false representation was made to persons whose acts thereafter were consistent with reliance upon the representations" ]

[ "recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca", "holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government ", "holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant", "holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia", "holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege" ]

[ "holding in a case involving not intraunion politics but rather a matter of an employer requiring the union to carry out the penalty provision of a collective bargaining agreement that the statutory term otherwise disciplined is narrowly confined to regulatory actions that affect a union members rights or status as a member of the union that the sanctions imposed were employmentrelated rather than internal union related and that the safeguards in 411a5 were not available for such action", "holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred", "holding that a vermont civil union is not the equivalent of a marriage", "holding that as long as alleged breach of a continuing duty occurred within six years of the filing of the lawsuit the claim is timely", "holding that the institution of marriage as a union of man and woman uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family is as old as the book of genesis" ]

[ "holding that some of the claims raised in the plaintiffs complaint were not properly raised in its 60day citizen suit notice thus the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims", "holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims", "holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine", "holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute", "holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims" ]

[ "holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits", "holding that a partial adjudication on the merits followed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the remaining claims is not a final judgment that gives rise to appellate jurisdiction", "holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata", "holding that the dismissal without prejudice of the prior actions on grounds of mootness does not serve as a final adjudication on the merits so as to bar this action", "holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits" ]

[ "holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse", "holding that a provider of transientaccommodations may use selfhelp to evict a nonpaying lodger", "holding that continued possession and unrestricted use constitutes regular use", "holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under 2l12bla", "holding that it may not" ]

[ "recognizing that where representative plaintiff and other members of class share an interest in prevailing on similar legal claims particular differences in amount of damages claimed or of availability of certain defenses against class representative may not render his or her claims atypical", "recognizing general rule", "recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law", "recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim", "holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class" ]

[ "recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify", "holding that admitting evidence of a defendants prior statement to an investigator proffered by the commonwealth did not violate the defendants fifth amendment rights by forcing him to testify to dispute it", "holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify", "holding district court did not violate sixth amendment by admitting defendants outofcourt statement", "recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify" ]

[ "holding that a judgment on appeal constitutes the law of the case as to particular issues decided and is applicable throughout subsequent stages of the case", "holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds", "holding that it may be decided as a matter of law", "holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator", "recognizing in a takings case that issues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment" ]

[ "holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation", "holding that even though speech was motivated by personal grievances it would still be protected conduct if it dealt with public concerns", "holding that speech addressing a private interest within a letter containing matters of public interest was protected and noting that we have emphasized that speech of public importance is only transformed into a matter of private concern when it is motivated solely by the speakers personal interests quotations omitted", "holding that public speech motivated by personal displeasure with policies was not covered by the first amendment", "recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment" ]

[ "recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner", "recognizing differing elements and standard of proof between medical malpractice and fraud", "holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal", "holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612", "holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional" ]

[ "holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk", "recognizing that the governments failure to prevail is a factor that may be considered", "holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered", "holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment", "holding that guidelines although advisory and only one factor among others to be considered in arriving at a reasonable sentence are entitled to substantial weight in the sentencing decision" ]

[ "holding that an employers sewing room a work area ceased to be a work area during lunch because the employer permitted employees to take their lunch in the sewing room and provided no alternate facility", "holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work", "holding in an employees action to recover for injury sustained during work against the employer and other defendants did not state an intentional tort claim against contractor", "holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa", "holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work" ]

[ "holding in non 17200 case that common law claims duplicative of the flsa are preempted", "holding that any assignment of antitrust claims as a matter of federal common law must be an express assignment because an express assignment entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability", "holding that article 4a of the ucc preempts common law claims where they are inconsistent or duplicative", "holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act", "holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed" ]

[ "holding that individual liability under 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation", "holding that a claim for municipal liability under 1983 requires inter alia proof of an underlying constitutional violation", "holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom", "holding that a city may not be held liable under 1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers", "holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under 1983" ]

[ "holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty", "holding that once movant established right to summary judgment burden shifts to nonmovant to demonstrate otherwise", "holding that in order for the movant to prevail on a summary judgment motion movant must either factually refute the affirmative defenses or establish that they are legally insufficient", "holding that where interest was supposed to have run from the date of judgment but movant never asked for it and had accepted full payment of the judgment without it movant had forever waived his right to receive it", "holding that in a traditional motion for summary judgment the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue after the movant has facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law" ]

[ "holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed", "recognizing that generally with supposed unilateral contracts if the offeror expressly reserves the power to revoke the offer until the offerees performance is complete then the offer is illusory and cannot give rise to a unilateral contract but noting exceptions", "holding that the offerors signature on the offerees conditional acceptance bound the offeror to all the terms therein", "holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell", "holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged" ]

[ "holding that the exclusivity provision included in 403 of title iv plainly bars title i relief when an individual union member challenges the validity of an election that has already been completed", "holding that because the proper defendant in a title vi case is an entity rather than an individual plaintiff could not be sued in his individual capacity under title vi", "holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii", "holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original", "holding that there is no individual liability under title vii" ]

[ "holding that school officials could prevent a student from distributing invitations in a public elementary school a nonpublic forum because the restraint was reasonable", "holding that the courthouse lobby was a nonpublic forum", "holding that a federal charity drive a nonpublic forum could limit participation to a number of select charities as long as the restriction was reasonable and viewpointneutral", "holding that a statesponsored televised election debate was a nonpublic forum and state officials could exercise broad editorial discretion in deciding which candidates to invite as long as the decisions were reasonable and viewpointneutral", "holding that a courthouse was a nonpublic forum but an unenclosed courthouse plaza was a designated public forum" ]

[ "holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others", "holding that no meaningful distinction exists between those who leave their native country and those who already outside decline to return", "holding that government may not prefer those who believe in no religion over those who do believe", "holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it", "holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony" ]

[ "holding that because plaintiff no longer has available administrative remedies his action must be dismissed with prejudice", "recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a 1983 action", "holding that state court judgment affirming an administrative decision did not bar a subsequent federal action for additional relief because of national policy that title vii remedies be available to supplement state remedies for employment discrimination", "holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted", "holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix" ]

[ "holding that the failure to object at trial customarily means that a party has not preserved the claim on appeal", "holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review", "holding that a plaintiff who did not object to the trial courts memorandum opinion giving defendants more on their counterclaim than they had requested had not preserved that issue for appeal", "holding that a claim was not preserved for review where the defense failed to object on the specific grounds advanced on appeal", "holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it " ]

[ "recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment", "holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause", "holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment", "holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment", "holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person" ]