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The dataset generation failed
Error code: DatasetGenerationError
Exception: TypeError
Message: Couldn't cast array of type string to null
Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1492, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
fill_builder_info(builder, hf_endpoint=hf_endpoint, hf_token=hf_token, validate=validate)
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 683, in fill_builder_info
) = retry_validate_get_features_num_examples_size_and_compression_ratio(
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 602, in retry_validate_get_features_num_examples_size_and_compression_ratio
validate(pf)
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 640, in validate
raise TooBigRowGroupsError(
worker.job_runners.config.parquet_and_info.TooBigRowGroupsError: Parquet file has too big row groups. First row group has 2023556413 which exceeds the limit of 300000000
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1995, in _prepare_split_single
for _, table in generator:
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 797, in wrapped
for item in generator(*args, **kwargs):
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/parquet/parquet.py", line 97, in _generate_tables
yield f"{file_idx}_{batch_idx}", self._cast_table(pa_table)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/parquet/parquet.py", line 75, in _cast_table
pa_table = table_cast(pa_table, self.info.features.arrow_schema)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2302, in table_cast
return cast_table_to_schema(table, schema)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2261, in cast_table_to_schema
arrays = [cast_array_to_feature(table[name], feature) for name, feature in features.items()]
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2261, in <listcomp>
arrays = [cast_array_to_feature(table[name], feature) for name, feature in features.items()]
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1802, in wrapper
return pa.chunked_array([func(chunk, *args, **kwargs) for chunk in array.chunks])
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1802, in <listcomp>
return pa.chunked_array([func(chunk, *args, **kwargs) for chunk in array.chunks])
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2075, in cast_array_to_feature
casted_array_values = _c(array.values, feature.feature)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1804, in wrapper
return func(array, *args, **kwargs)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2116, in cast_array_to_feature
return array_cast(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1804, in wrapper
return func(array, *args, **kwargs)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1962, in array_cast
raise TypeError(f"Couldn't cast array of type {_short_str(array.type)} to {_short_str(pa_type)}")
TypeError: Couldn't cast array of type string to null
The above exception was the direct cause of the following exception:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1505, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
parquet_operations, partial, estimated_dataset_info = stream_convert_to_parquet(
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1099, in stream_convert_to_parquet
builder._prepare_split(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1882, in _prepare_split
for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 2038, in _prepare_split_single
raise DatasetGenerationError("An error occurred while generating the dataset") from e
datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationError: An error occurred while generating the datasetNeed help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
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f2d_294/html/0001-01.html | <section class="casebody" data-case-id="32044061409587_0001" data-firstpage="1" data-lastpage="7">
<section class="head-matter">
<h4 class="parties" id="b49-4" data-blocks='[["BL_49.3",49,[190,822,550,175]]]'>UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Howell F. BURCH, Appellee.</h4>
<p class="docketnumber" id="Al8" data-blocks='[["BL_49.4",49,[377,1015,174,26]]]'>No. 18679.</p>
<p class="court" id="b49-6" data-blocks='[["BL_49.5",49,[186,1081,559,68]]]'>United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.</p>
<p class="decisiondate" id="b49-7" data-blocks='[["BL_49.6",49,[341,1173,246,32]]]'>Aug. 24, 1961.</p>
<p class="attorneys" id="b50-9" data-blocks='[["BL_50.9",50,[219,1370,743,128]]]'>
<a id="p2" href="#p2" data-label="2" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*2</a>William C. Calhoun, U. S. Atty., William T. Morton, Asst. U. S. Atty., Augusta, Ga., for appellant.</p>
<p class="attorneys" id="b50-10" data-blocks='[["BL_50.10",50,[217,1515,743,78]]]'>Carl K. Nelson, Dublin, Ga., for appellee.</p>
<p class="judges" id="b50-11" data-blocks='[["BL_50.11",50,[218,1623,744,128]]]'>Before JONES and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and CONNALLY, District Judge.</p>
</section>
<article class="opinion" data-type="majority">
<p class="author" id="b50-12" data-blocks='[["BL_50.12",50,[259,1802,608,36]]]'>JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.</p>
<p id="b50-13" data-blocks='[["BL_50.13",50,[217,1855,744,719]],["BL_50.14",50,[1011,248,748,351]]]'>This case involving the seizure and condemnation of property allegedly used in the manufacture of illicit whiskey raises one primary question for our consideration. That is whether an earlier acquittal of Burch in a criminal prosecution involving possession of the same property made the subject of this libel of forfeiture operates as a bar to the present action on principles of res judicata, or more properly collateral estoppel. Consideration of this question, though, branches into two distinct inquiries. First, whether the fact that the criminal prosecution was terminated on a motion for judgment of acquittal based on lack of evidence to connect appellee with the conspiracy makes collateral estoppel ineffective as a bar as to this action. Second, whether the forfeiture statute is remedial or punitive in nature and the effect that inquiry has on the availability of collateral estoppel as a defense.</p>
<p id="b50-15" data-blocks='[["BL_50.15",50,[1012,633,746,948]]]'>This forfeiture proceeding originated as a libel <em>in rem </em>against 307 bags of sugar under <a href="/citations/?q=26%20U.S.C.%20%C2%A7%207302" class="citation" data-index="0" data-cite="26 U.S.C. § 7302">26 U.S.C.A. § 7302</a> in the Southern District of Georgia. The libel alleged that Burch had possessed this large quantity of sugar with the purpose and intent that it be used in the manufacture of illicit whiskey in violation of <a href="/citations/?q=26%20U.S.C.%20%C2%A7%205686" class="citation" data-index="1" data-cite="26 U.S.C. § 5686">26 U.S.C.A. § 5686</a>(b). Burch filed a claim to the sugar. While the forfeiture proceeding was pending in Georgia, Burch was indicted, along with 15 others, in the Southern District of Florida for unlawfully conspiring to violate the internal revenue laws by manufacturing, possessing, selling, etc., illicit whiskey.<a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_1" id="ref_footnote_1_1">1</a> Sixty-nine overt acts were alleged at least three of which related to the acquisition, transportation and storage' of the identical sugar which is the subject matter of the present forfeiture action.</p>
<p id="b50-16" data-blocks='[["BL_50.16",50,[1010,1608,747,719]]]'>On the trial of the criminal action in Florida the District Judge granted a motion for judgment of acquittal made by Burch. The motion under F.R.Crim. P. 29(a), 18 U.S.C.A. was based on the total lack of proof connecting Burch with the conspiracy. Thereafter, Burch amended his answer in the forfeiture proceeding in Georgia raising the defense of res judicata and setting forth the indictment and judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. Pursuant to this plea he filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion from which the Government brings this appeal.</p>
<p id="b50-17" data-blocks='[["BL_50.17",50,[1011,2356,743,217]],["BL_51.1",51,[115,220,747,403]]]'>In the trial court, and here, Burch rests on Coffey v. United States, 1886, <a href="/us/116/0436-01" class="citation" data-index="2" data-cite="116 U.S. 436" data-case-ids="3516839" data-case-paths="/us/116/0436-01">116 U.S. 436</a>, <a href="/us/116/0436-01" class="citation" data-index="3" data-cite="116 U.S. 436" data-case-ids="3516839" data-case-paths="/us/116/0436-01">6 S.Ct. 437</a>, <a href="/us/116/0436-01" class="citation" data-index="4" data-cite="116 U.S. 436" data-case-ids="3516839" data-case-paths="/us/116/0436-01">29 L.Ed. 684</a>. On that approach there are two subsidiary inquiries. They may appear to be separate, but <a id="p3" href="#p3" data-label="3" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*3</a>as both are concerned in a way with the Coffey case and especially the manner in which it is treated and distinguished by later cases, they are closely related. The first inquiry concerns the nature of the forfeiture proceeding as criminal or civil, punitive or remedial. The second relates directly to the vitality of Coffey as a controlling precedent.</p>
<p id="b51-5" data-blocks='[["BL_51.4",51,[113,667,751,1323]],["BL_51.5",51,[911,219,744,130]]]'> A libel of forfeiture under <a href="/citations/?q=26%20U.S.C.%20%C2%A7%207302" class="citation" data-index="5" data-cite="26 U.S.C. § 7302">26 U.S.C.A. § 7302</a> is, nominally, at least, a civil action. This is not, of course, determinative of its true nature — that is, whether the action is really civil as opposed to criminal, or as it is sometimes expressed remedial rather than punitive. The distinction may be of decisive importance. If the forfeiture action is criminal (punitive) then a determination in the one might bar re-examination of the same issue in the other. On the other hand, if it is a civil, that is remedial, suit there is considerable doubt that res judicata would act as a bar to the maintenance of it. This is so because an acquittal in a criminal action is considered “merely * * * an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.” Helvering v. Mitchell, 1938, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="6" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">303 U.S. 391</a>, at page 397, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="7" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">58 S.Ct. 630</a>, 632, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="8" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">82 L.Ed. 917</a>. As to the issues raised, it does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence test which applies in civil proceedings.<a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_2" id="ref_footnote_1_2">2</a> United States v. National Ass’n of Real Estate Boards, 1950, <a href="/us/339/0485-01" class="citation" data-index="9" data-cite="339 U.S. 485" data-case-ids="362545" data-case-paths="/us/339/0485-01">339 U.S. 485</a>, 492-494, <a href="/us/339/0485-01" class="citation" data-index="10" data-cite="339 U.S. 485" data-case-ids="362545" data-case-paths="/us/339/0485-01">70 S.Ct. 711</a>, <a href="/citations/?q=94%20L.%20Ed.%201007" class="citation" data-index="11" data-cite="94 L. Ed. 1007">94 L.Ed. 1007</a>; United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile 98 4 Door Sedan, 4 Cir., 1955, <a href="/f2d/222/0668-01" class="citation" data-index="12" data-cite="222 F.2d 668" data-case-ids="49582" data-case-paths="/f2d/222/0668-01">222 F.2d 668</a>, at page 673; see 30A Am. Jur., Judgments § 472 et seq. at 512.</p>
<p id="ACO" data-blocks='[["BL_51.6",51,[912,370,745,266]]]'>This approach would require that we categorize this particular action, at least for the purposes of this inquiry, as civil (remedial) or criminal (punitive) in nature. Under the existing case law, this is a none too easy task.</p>
<p id="b51-13" data-blocks='[["BL_51.7",51,[905,669,752,1318]],["BL_52.1",52,[226,210,746,1038]]]'> Save for a few carefully delineated areas, it is not at all clear what, if any, suits for forfeiture of property, or for payment of multiple damages to the Government should more properly be regarded as punitive rather than civil. However, the weight of authority seems to support the proposition that forfeiture <em>m rem </em>actions, such as the present one, are essentially civil in nature, and should not be burdened with the attributes of a criminal action. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 1931, <a href="/us/282/0577-01" class="citation" data-index="13" data-cite="282 U.S. 577" data-case-ids="6932841" data-case-paths="/us/282/0577-01">282 U.S. 577</a>, 580, <a href="/us/282/0577-01" class="citation" data-index="14" data-cite="282 U.S. 577" data-case-ids="6932841" data-case-paths="/us/282/0577-01">51 S.Ct. 282</a>, <a href="/us/282/0577-01" class="citation" data-index="15" data-cite="282 U.S. 577" data-case-ids="6932841" data-case-paths="/us/282/0577-01">75 L.Ed. 558</a>; Helvering v. Mitchell, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="16" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">supra,</a> <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="17" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">303 U.S. 391</a>, at page 400, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="18" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">58 S.Ct. 630</a>; United States v. 42 Jars, etc., D.C.D.N.J.1958, <a href="/f-supp/160/0818-01" class="citation" data-index="19" data-cite="160 F. Supp. 818" data-case-ids="342579" data-case-paths="/f-supp/160/0818-01">160 F.Supp. 818</a>, at page 821; United States v. 20 Strings Seed Pearls, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1929, <a href="/f2d/34/0142-01" class="citation" data-index="20" data-cite="34 F.2d 142" data-case-ids="1762759,1763114" data-case-paths="/f2d/34/0142-01,/f2d/34/0142-02">34 F.2d 142</a>; but see United States v. 38 Cases, etc., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1951, <a href="/f-supp/99/0460-01" class="citation" data-index="21" data-cite="99 F. Supp. 460" data-case-ids="1398310" data-case-paths="/f-supp/99/0460-01">99 F. Supp. 460</a>, at page 464. But the standards by which this question is to be determined are not entirely clear. One factor emphasized as important is the existence of express criminal penalties for the same wrongful act within the same statutory scheme imposing the sanction of forfeiture. United States ex rel. Mar<a id="p4" href="#p4" data-label="4" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*4</a>cus v. Hess, 1943, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="22" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">317 U.S. 537</a>, at page 549, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="23" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">63 S.Ct. 379</a>, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="24" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">87 L.Ed. 443</a>; United States v. 38 Cases, etc., D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1951, <a href="/f-supp/99/0460-01" class="citation" data-index="25" data-cite="99 F. Supp. 460" data-case-ids="1398310" data-case-paths="/f-supp/99/0460-01">99 F.Supp. 460</a>, at page 463. This, some courts reason, demonstrates legislative intent that the additional forfeiture or payment provisions are meant only to compensate the Government for its loss or to protect some aspect of the public interest from future harm. Of significance too may be the relationship between the harm suffered by the Government and the loss to the claimant from the forfeiture. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="26" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">supra,</a> <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="27" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">317 U.S. 537</a>, at page 554, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="28" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">63 S.Ct. 379</a> (concurring); Helvering v. Mitchell, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="29" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">supra,</a> <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="30" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">303 U.S. 391</a>, at page 401, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="31" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">58 S.Ct. 630</a>. The intrinsic nature of the enforcement procedures prescribed in the statute are also relevant factors in this regard. Helvering v. Mitchell, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="32" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">supra,</a> <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="33" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">303 U.S. 391</a>, at page 402, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="34" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">58 S.Ct. 630</a>.</p>
<p id="b52-4" data-blocks='[["BL_52.4",52,[227,1267,743,127]]]'>That brings us to the second inquiry concerning the binding character today of the Coffey decision.</p>
<p id="b52-5" data-blocks='[["BL_52.5",52,[226,1412,745,715]]]'>Burch correctly emphasizes that the facts of Coffey are indeed quite similar to his. A suit was instituted for the forfeiture of certain materials allegedly used to violate the liquor laws. Subsequently a criminal action based on the same facts was prosecuted by a trial before a jury. The jury returned a general verdict of not guilty and judgment of acquittal was entered. The forfeiture proceedings were later reopened resulting in a judgment for the Government. On appeal, the Supreme Court ordered the libel dismissed holding that the criminal action barred a suit for forfeiture based on the same facts.</p>
<p id="b52-6" data-blocks='[["BL_52.6",52,[228,2153,742,307]],["BL_52.7",52,[1020,209,748,1222]]]'>The Coffey decision has been the subject of a great deal of controversy, and no little criticism. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="35" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">supra,</a> <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="36" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">317 U.S. 537</a>, at page 554, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="37" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">63 S.Ct. 379</a>. As the Third Circuit characterized it, the case has received a distinctly “unfavorable press.” United States v. One Dodge Sedan, 3 Cir., 1940, <a href="/f2d/113/0552-01" class="citation" data-index="38" data-cite="113 F.2d 552" data-case-ids="1023489" data-case-paths="/f2d/113/0552-01">113 F.2d 552</a>, at page 553 and notes 1 and 2. In a figure indigenous to the usual assertion of it the Fourth Circuit remarked, “A lot of water has gone over the dam, and a great deal of whiskey has come from the stills since the Coffey decision nearly seventy years ago.” United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile 98 4 Door Sedan, 4 Cir., 1955, <a href="/f2d/222/0668-01" class="citation" data-index="39" data-cite="222 F.2d 668" data-case-ids="49582" data-case-paths="/f2d/222/0668-01">222 F.2d 668</a>, at page 670. Both cases expressed considerable doubt as to the continued vitality of Coffey but happily found distinguishing factors to avoid either its doctrine or a determination of its current force. Other courts have shown a similar reluctance to apply literally the holding of Coffey. United States v. One DeSoto Sedan, D.C.E.D.N.C.1949, <a href="/f-supp/85/0245-01" class="citation" data-index="40" data-cite="85 F. Supp. 245" data-case-ids="683680" data-case-paths="/f-supp/85/0245-01">85 F.Supp. 245</a>; United States v. Gramer, 9 Cir., <a href="/f2d/191/0741-01" class="citation" data-index="41" data-cite="191 F.2d 741" data-case-ids="479348" data-case-paths="/f2d/191/0741-01">191 F.2d 741</a>, <a href="/citations/?q=27%20A.L.R.%202d%201132" class="citation" data-index="42" data-cite="27 A.L.R. 2d 1132">27 A.L.R.2d 1132</a>; United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, D.C.W.D.Pa.1952, <a href="/f-supp/108/0286-01" class="citation" data-index="43" data-cite="108 F. Supp. 286" data-case-ids="313328" data-case-paths="/f-supp/108/0286-01">108 F.Supp. 286</a>; United States v. Physic, 2 Cir., 1949, <a href="/f2d/175/0338-01" class="citation" data-index="44" data-cite="175 F.2d 338" data-case-ids="1173730" data-case-paths="/f2d/175/0338-01">175 F.2d 338</a>; United States v. 20 Strings Seed Pearls, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1929, <a href="/f2d/34/0142-01" class="citation" data-index="45" data-cite="34 F.2d 142" data-case-ids="1762759,1763114" data-case-paths="/f2d/34/0142-01,/f2d/34/0142-02">34 F.2d 142</a>.</p>
<p id="b52-9" data-blocks='[["BL_52.10",52,[1020,1454,748,759]]]'>On the other hand, Coffey has at various times been applied by other courts. The Tenth Circuit is apparently committed to the proposition that it still exists as the controlling authority in these cases. United States v. One 1956 Ford Fairlane Tudor Sedan, 10 Cir., 1959, <a href="/f2d/272/0704-01" class="citation" data-index="46" data-cite="272 F.2d 704" data-case-ids="1962629" data-case-paths="/f2d/272/0704-01">272 F.2d 704</a>. On other occasions courts without an examination of the merits of the doctrine and the case law that it has generated have applied it on principles of stare decisis. This is illustrated by the opinion of the Fourth Circuit just five years before its recent expression quoted above. United States v. One DeSoto Sedan, 4 Cir., 1950, <a href="/f2d/180/0583-01" class="citation" data-index="47" data-cite="180 F.2d 583" data-case-ids="1251414" data-case-paths="/f2d/180/0583-01">180 F.2d 583</a>.</p>
<p id="b52-10" data-blocks='[["BL_52.11",52,[1021,2244,747,216]],["BL_53.2",53,[79,224,747,951]]]'>Burch echoes what these Courts point out. Attacked and critized as it is, the fact remains that Coffey has never been expressly overruled by the Court which handed it down.<a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_3" id="ref_footnote_1_3">3</a> It must be recognized <a id="p5" href="#p5" data-label="5" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*5</a>though that on several occasions it has been distinguished on rather fine grounds by that Court. Helvering v. Mitchell, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="48" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">supra,</a> <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="49" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">303 U.S. 391</a>, at page 405-406, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="50" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">58 S.Ct. 630</a>; Murphy v. United States, 1926, <a href="/us/272/0630-01" class="citation" data-index="51" data-cite="272 U.S. 630" data-case-ids="1501279" data-case-paths="/us/272/0630-01">272 U.S. 630</a>, at page 631, <a href="/us/272/0630-01" class="citation" data-index="52" data-cite="272 U.S. 630" data-case-ids="1501279" data-case-paths="/us/272/0630-01">47 S.Ct. 218</a>, <a href="/us/272/0630-01" class="citation" data-index="53" data-cite="272 U.S. 630" data-case-ids="1501279" data-case-paths="/us/272/0630-01">71 L.Ed. 446</a>; Stone v. United States, 1897, <a href="/us/167/0178-01" class="citation" data-index="54" data-cite="167 U.S. 178" data-case-ids="3595182" data-case-paths="/us/167/0178-01">167 U.S. 178</a>, at pages 186-188, <a href="/us/167/0178-01" class="citation" data-index="55" data-cite="167 U.S. 178" data-case-ids="3595182" data-case-paths="/us/167/0178-01">17 S.Ct. 778</a>, <a href="/us/167/0178-01" class="citation" data-index="56" data-cite="167 U.S. 178" data-case-ids="3595182" data-case-paths="/us/167/0178-01">42 L.Ed. 127</a>; United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 1950, <a href="/us/339/0485-01" class="citation" data-index="57" data-cite="339 U.S. 485" data-case-ids="362545" data-case-paths="/us/339/0485-01">339 U.S. 485</a>, at page 493 note 6, <a href="/us/339/0485-01" class="citation" data-index="58" data-cite="339 U.S. 485" data-case-ids="362545" data-case-paths="/us/339/0485-01">70 S.Ct. 711</a>, <a href="/citations/?q=94%20L.%20Ed.%201007" class="citation" data-index="59" data-cite="94 L. Ed. 1007">94 L.Ed. 1007</a>. And as we pointed out in note 2, supra, some of the language in Coffey seems absolutely irreconcilable with later decisions. This probably accounts for Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s reference to the “uncritical language in earlier cases,” citing Coffey, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="60" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">supra,</a> <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="61" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">317 U.S. 537</a>, at page 554, <a href="/us/317/0537-01" class="citation" data-index="62" data-cite="317 U.S. 537" data-case-ids="304067" data-case-paths="/us/317/0537-01">63 S.Ct. 379</a>, 389.</p>
<p id="b53-4" data-blocks='[["BL_53.5",53,[74,1211,749,810]],["BL_53.6",53,[877,224,744,81]]]'>Despite the preoccupation of counsel with these interesting questions and the sometimes troublesome difficulties inherent in them which our brief review reflects, we find it unnecessary to resolve them specifically. As to the first inquiry on the nature of the forfeiture proceedings as criminal rather than civil we may assume in considering res judicata or collateral estoppel principles that this action is of a nature which would, if meeting other requirements, be properly barred by the previous criminal acquittal. As to the second inquiry concerning Coffey we may assume its continued vitality as a precedent. Nevertheless, for the reasons we now discuss, the acquittal in the criminal ease does not bar the present forfeiture action. It may properly be maintained.</p>
<p id="b53-12" data-blocks='[["BL_53.9",53,[870,340,752,1691]],["BL_54.1",54,[254,220,746,219]]]'> Res judicata, broadly defined to encompass collateral estoppel as well, is a judicial rule which operates to prevent redetermination of an issue already litigated between the same parties in a previous action.<a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_4" id="ref_footnote_1_4">4</a> An issue is considered as having been put to rest as to the parties involved by the first valid judicial ruling on it. It may not thereafter be redetermined. But by its very definition for the first judgment to collaterally estop the raising of an issue in a later suit, it must actually have been determined in the earlier litigation. This requirement flows naturally from the purposes which the doctrine sought to achieve. It is intended to prevent re-litigation of an issue already judicially determined. Before there can be a relitigation there must first be the original litigation concluded by a final adjudication. When an issue is not determined in the earlier proceeding, though it may have been raised and argued by the parties, it is a permissible subject of controversy in the later proceeding. The Supreme Court has made these requirements clear. “* * * [T]he inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action; not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action.” United States v. International Building Company, 1953, <a href="/us/345/0502-01" class="citation" data-index="63" data-cite="345 U.S. 502" data-case-ids="372554" data-case-paths="/us/345/0502-01">345 U.S. 502</a>, at page 505, <a href="/us/345/0502-01" class="citation" data-index="64" data-cite="345 U.S. 502" data-case-ids="372554" data-case-paths="/us/345/0502-01">73 S.Ct. 807</a>, 809, <a href="/citations/?q=97%20L.%20Ed.%201182" class="citation" data-index="65" data-cite="97 L. Ed. 1182">97 L.Ed. 1182</a>; Seaboard <a id="p6" href="#p6" data-label="6" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*6</a>Air Line Ry. Co. v. George F. McCourt Trucking, Inc., 5 Cir., 1960, <a href="/f2d/277/0593-01" class="citation" data-index="66" data-cite="277 F.2d 593" data-case-ids="703646" data-case-paths="/f2d/277/0593-01">277 F.2d 593</a>, at pages 596-597; Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, 5 Cir., 1935, <a href="/f2d/75/0331-01" class="citation" data-index="67" data-cite="75 F.2d 331" data-case-ids="961287" data-case-paths="/f2d/75/0331-01">75 F.2d 331</a>; 30A Am.Jur., Judgments §§ 371, 373, 374.</p>
<p id="b54-4" data-blocks='[["BL_54.4",54,[242,486,758,1321]]]'> Under these rules the precise .question with which we are here confronted becomes quite clear. We must ascertain whether the disposition of this action “would require relitigation of specific fact issues which have already been judicially determined.” Adams v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, <a href="/f2d/287/0701-01" class="citation" data-index="68" data-cite="287 F.2d 701" data-case-ids="1997584" data-case-paths="/f2d/287/0701-01">287 F.2d 701</a>, at page 703. The precise nature of this inquiry is exemplified by cases involving submission of the issues to a jury under a general charge in response to which it returns a general verdict. Sealfon v. United States, 1948, <a href="/us/332/0575-01" class="citation" data-index="69" data-cite="332 U.S. 575" data-case-ids="365183" data-case-paths="/us/332/0575-01">332 U.S. 575</a>, <a href="/us/332/0575-01" class="citation" data-index="70" data-cite="332 U.S. 575" data-case-ids="365183" data-case-paths="/us/332/0575-01">68 S. Ct. 237</a>, <a href="/citations/?q=92%20L.%20Ed.%20180" class="citation" data-index="71" data-cite="92 L. Ed. 180">92 L.Ed. 180</a>; Yawn v. United States, 5 Cir., 1957, <a href="/f2d/244/0235-01" class="citation" data-index="72" data-cite="244 F.2d 235" data-case-ids="407966" data-case-paths="/f2d/244/0235-01">244 F.2d 235</a>. Ascertaining just what issues have been resolved by the jury in its general verdict frequently presents some difficulties. But difficult or not the answer must be found for it is only those issues which were “necessarily determined” which are barred from re-examination in a subsequent action. United States v. Sealfon, supra, <a href="/us/332/0575-01" class="citation" data-index="73" data-cite="332 U.S. 575" data-case-ids="365183" data-case-paths="/us/332/0575-01">332 U.S. 575</a>, at page 580, <a href="/us/332/0575-01" class="citation" data-index="74" data-cite="332 U.S. 575" data-case-ids="365183" data-case-paths="/us/332/0575-01">68 S.Ct. 237</a>; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. George F. McCourt Trucking, Inc., <a href="/f2d/277/0593-01" class="citation" data-index="75" data-cite="277 F.2d 593" data-case-ids="703646" data-case-paths="/f2d/277/0593-01">supra,</a> <a href="/f2d/277/0593-01" class="citation" data-index="76" data-cite="277 F.2d 593" data-case-ids="703646" data-case-paths="/f2d/277/0593-01">277 F.2d 593</a>, at page 597. In this case we encounter none of those difficulties.</p>
<p id="b54-6" data-blocks='[["BL_54.5",54,[248,1856,746,765]],["BL_54.6",54,[1050,220,744,82]]]'>The criminal indictment brought against Burch alleged the identical acts made the basis of the present complaint against the goods. But it did so only as overt acts in the furtherance of a conspiracy, not as substantive crimes in themselves. The sole crime charged was the conspiracy. Burch’s connection with the conspiracy, therefore, was a vital element of the Government’s case, and it was on this element that its ease failed. The question of the truthfulness of the alleged overt acts or the sufficiency of the evidence to establish them was never reached. The Judge simply held that as there was no evidence to connect Burch with the conspiracy the sole crime with which they were charged was not proved and the motion to acquit must be granted.</p>
<p id="b54-8" data-blocks='[["BL_54.7",54,[1044,341,751,1624]]]'>The Court hardly could have made it clearer that he was not ruling on whether Burch did, or did not, do the alleged overt acts, but on the lack of evidence showing any connection with a conspiracy. During the hearing on the motion the Judge stated this to counsel for the Government. “Well, suppose you assume that they bought this sugar for an illegal purpose, that is, to be used in connection with the illicit manufacture of liquor. Suppose you assume that the proof shows that. I am assuming more than the proof shows. * * * How does that connect them with the conspiracy?” A few moments later the Court made this comment. “ * * * They went down there and bought a pretty large quantity of sugar under very suspicious circumstances, as far as the proof shows. I don’t think any jury would think they were buying it to make candy, but, even if you assume all of that, you still have got to connect them with this conspiracy.” The next morning counsel for the Government stated that it had “gone over the evidence, or possibly the lack of it, to connect Mr. Burch and Mr. Vaughn with this conspiracy; and the Government at this time will interpose no objection to a directed verdict of acquittal * * In reply the Judge stated, “The Court has come to the same conclusion. That was going to be the ruling of the Court this morning.” And so it was, as the formal judgment reflected.</p>
<p id="b54-12" data-blocks='[["BL_54.8",54,[1043,2039,746,582]],["BL_55.1",55,[71,248,748,1004]]]'>Thus the case is clearly one where the issue sought to be raised has not been previously adjudicated. Even were this not so clear, however, a different result would not be compelled. This is so because Burch has failed to demonstrate affirmatively that the issue was previously decided. In other words, if doubt exists he loses. In United States v. International Building Co., supra, the Supreme Court could not ascertain whether the question of alleged tax deficiencies caused by incorrect depreciation methods <a id="p7" href="#p7" data-label="7" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*7</a>had been adjudicated in a suit involving the same taxpayer during earlier years. “There is no showing either in the record or by extrinsic evidence * * * that the issues raised by the pleadings were submitted to the Tax Court for determination or determined by that court. They may or may not have been agreed upon by the parties.” <a href="/us/345/0502-01" class="citation" data-index="77" data-cite="345 U.S. 502" data-case-ids="372554" data-case-paths="/us/345/0502-01">345 U.S. 502</a>, at page 505, <a href="/us/345/0502-01" class="citation" data-index="78" data-cite="345 U.S. 502" data-case-ids="372554" data-case-paths="/us/345/0502-01">73 S.Ct. 807</a>, at page 809. Nevertheless the Court held that determination of the issue in the later action was entirely proper. “[T]he inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action; not what might have been thus litigated and determined.” <a href="/us/345/0502-01" class="citation" data-index="79" data-cite="345 U.S. 502" data-case-ids="372554" data-case-paths="/us/345/0502-01">345 U.S. 502</a>, at page 505, <a href="/us/345/0502-01" class="citation" data-index="80" data-cite="345 U.S. 502" data-case-ids="372554" data-case-paths="/us/345/0502-01">73 S.Ct. 807</a>, at page 809. Dixie Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Holland, 6 Cir., 1958, <a href="/f2d/255/0304-01" class="citation" data-index="81" data-cite="255 F.2d 304" data-case-ids="681807" data-case-paths="/f2d/255/0304-01">255 F.2d 304</a>, at page 310; Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, 5 Cir., 1935, <a href="/f2d/75/0331-01" class="citation" data-index="82" data-cite="75 F.2d 331" data-case-ids="961287" data-case-paths="/f2d/75/0331-01">75 F.2d 331</a>.</p>
<p id="b55-4" data-blocks='[["BL_55.5",55,[71,1278,747,862]]]'>For us to prevent inquiry into the fact of possession and use of the sugar would be to ignore the positive basis on which the judgment of acquittal was granted. More important, it would allow an abuse of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, hindering rather than aiding the effective administration of justice. A similar concern has caused the Supreme Court to say, “ * * * unless we can say that [there was] an adjudication of the merits, the doctrine of estoppel by judgment would serve an unjust cause: it would become a device by which a decision not shown to be on the merits would forever foreclose inquiry into the merits.” United States v. International Building Company, supra, <a href="/us/345/0502-01" class="citation" data-index="83" data-cite="345 U.S. 502" data-case-ids="372554" data-case-paths="/us/345/0502-01">345 U.S. 502</a>, at page 506, <a href="/us/345/0502-01" class="citation" data-index="84" data-cite="345 U.S. 502" data-case-ids="372554" data-case-paths="/us/345/0502-01">73 S.Ct. 807</a>, at page 809.</p>
<p id="b55-6" data-blocks='[["BL_55.6",55,[71,2165,747,539]],["BL_55.7",55,[868,249,743,81]]]'>Finally, the fact that the criminal indictment charged only a conspiracy affords further reasons in support of the result wre reach. As this Court pointed out in the circumstances of Herman v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, <a href="/f2d/289/0362-01" class="citation" data-index="85" data-cite="289 F.2d 362" data-case-ids="1989274" data-case-paths="/f2d/289/0362-01">289 F.2d 362</a>, at page 368, a general jury verdict favorable to the defendant in a conspiracy prosecution “ * * * does not mean that the overt act did not occur; it means merely that the jury did not find [the defendants] guilty of the commission of an offense. Such a finding does not make the act itself disappear.”</p>
<p id="b55-8" data-blocks='[["BL_55.8",55,[867,350,743,127]]]'>The critical facts in the libel of forfeiture have not previously been determined. They are ripe for a trial.</p>
<p id="AYN" data-blocks='[["BL_55.9",55,[908,495,437,31]]]'>Reversed and remanded</p>
<aside data-label="1" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_1">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_1">1</a>
<p id="b50-18" data-blocks='[["BL_50.18",50,[227,2625,1457,68]]]'>. The indictment specified <a href="/citations/?q=26%20U.S.C.%20%C2%A7%C2%A7%205174" class="citation" data-index="86" data-cite="26 U.S.C. §§ 5174">26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5174</a>, 5606, 5008, 7206, 5686(b), 5632, 5216, 5105, 5691.</p>
</aside>
<aside data-label="2" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_2">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_2">2</a>
<p id="b51-6" data-blocks='[["BL_51.8",51,[114,2041,700,630]],["BL_51.9",51,[956,2043,654,293]]]'>. The doubt begins at this precise point. And its source is Coffey v. United States, 1886, <a href="/us/116/0436-01" class="citation" data-index="87" data-cite="116 U.S. 436" data-case-ids="3516839" data-case-paths="/us/116/0436-01">116 U.S. 436</a>, <a href="/us/116/0436-01" class="citation" data-index="88" data-cite="116 U.S. 436" data-case-ids="3516839" data-case-paths="/us/116/0436-01">6 S.Ct. 437</a>, <a href="/us/116/0436-01" class="citation" data-index="89" data-cite="116 U.S. 436" data-case-ids="3516839" data-case-paths="/us/116/0436-01">29 L.Ed. 684</a>, which held a criminal acquittal on a jury verdict conclusive in a later forfeiture <em>in rem </em>action. The Court stated “It is urged as a reason for not allowing such effect to the judgment, that the acquittal in the criminal case may have taken place because of the rale requiring guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that, on the same evidence, on the question of preponderance of proof, there might be a verdict for the United States, in the suit <em>in rein. </em>Nevertheless, the fact or act has been put in issue and determined against the United States; * * *. There could be no new trial of the criminal prosecution after the acquittal in it; and a subsequent trial of the civil suit amounts to substantially the same thing, with a difference only in the consequences following a judgment adverse to the claimant.” 116 U.S. at page 443, 6 S.Ct. at page 440.</p>
<p id="A7" data-blocks='[["BL_51.10",51,[954,2344,655,328]]]'>While this case has never been expressly overruled, this statement is difficult to reconcile with the decision in Helvering v. Mitchell, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="90" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">supra,</a> that “The difference in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata.” <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="91" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">303 U.S. 391</a>, at page 397, <a href="/us/303/0391-01" class="citation" data-index="92" data-cite="303 U.S. 391" data-case-ids="6141190" data-case-paths="/us/303/0391-01">58 S.Ct. 630</a>, at page 632.</p>
</aside>
<aside data-label="3" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_3">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_3">3</a>
<p id="b52-7" data-blocks='[["BL_52.8",52,[228,2509,697,142]],["BL_52.9",52,[1069,2508,652,138]],["BL_53.1",53,[117,2078,657,328]]]'>. There have been occasions, of course, in which courts have thought it permissible to decline to apply a decision as a currently binding precedent even though it has not been formally overruled. Rarely ever done, these courts base this on such circumstances as the many changes which have occurred in the law since the deci<a id="p5" href="#p5" data-label="5" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*5</a>sion was rendered and the inroads made on its principles over the intervening years. See, Browder v. Gayle, D.C.M.D. Ala. (3-judge district court) 1956, <a href="/f-supp/142/0707-01" class="citation" data-index="93" data-cite="142 F. Supp. 707" data-case-ids="4271532" data-case-paths="/f-supp/142/0707-01">142 F.Supp. 707</a>, at page 716 and note 14, affirmed <a href="/us/352/0903-01" class="citation" data-index="94" data-cite="352 U.S. 903" data-case-ids="6266391,6266656" data-case-paths="/us/352/0903-01,/us/352/0903-02">352 U.S. 903</a>, <a href="/citations/?q=77%20S.%20Ct.%20145" class="citation" data-index="95" data-cite="77 S. Ct. 145">77 S.Ct. 145</a>, <a href="/us/352/0903-01" class="citation" data-index="96" data-cite="1 L. Ed. 2d 114" data-case-ids="6266391" data-case-paths="/us/352/0903-01">1 L.Ed.2d 114</a>; Columbia General Investment Corp. v. S. E. C., 5 Cir., 1959, <a href="/f2d/265/0559-01" class="citation" data-index="97" data-cite="265 F.2d 559" data-case-ids="1980348" data-case-paths="/f2d/265/0559-01">265 F.2d 559</a>, at page 562 and note 7.</p>
</aside>
<aside data-label="4" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_4">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_4">4</a>
<p id="b53-9" data-blocks='[["BL_53.7",53,[71,2450,700,177]],["BL_53.8",53,[914,2083,655,510]]]'>. The differences between res judicata and collateral estoppel should be kept in mind. While the former in its broad sense encompasses the latter, there are clear distinctions between the two. Collateral estoppel operates to prevent relitigation of issues actually litigated between the same parties in a suit on a <em>different </em>cause of action. Res judicata, strictly speaking, applies when a second suit on the <em>same </em>causo of action arises between the same parties. It precludes the litigation in the second suit not only of all issues that were raised in the first but of all issues that <em>could have been raised </em>by the parties in that proceeding. For a good analysis of this distinction see Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, 5 Cir., 1935, <a href="/f2d/75/0331-01" class="citation" data-index="98" data-cite="75 F.2d 331" data-case-ids="961287" data-case-paths="/f2d/75/0331-01">75 F.2d 331</a>.</p>
</aside>
</article>
</section> |
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Howell F. BURCH, Appellee.
No. 18679.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 24, 1961.
William C. Calhoun, U. S. Atty., William T. Morton, Asst. U. S. Atty., Augusta, Ga., for appellant.
Carl K. Nelson, Dublin, Ga., for appellee.
Before JONES and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and CONNALLY, District Judge.
| [
"JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge."
] | [] | [] | [] | JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.
This case involving the seizure and condemnation of property allegedly used in the manufacture of illicit whiskey raises one primary question for our consideration. That is whether an earlier acquittal of Burch in a criminal prosecution involving possession of the same property made the subject of this libel of forfeiture operates as a bar to the present action on principles of res judicata, or more properly collateral estoppel. Consideration of this question, though, branches into two distinct inquiries. First, whether the fact that the criminal prosecution was terminated on a motion for judgment of acquittal based on lack of evidence to connect appellee with the conspiracy makes collateral estoppel ineffective as a bar as to this action. Second, whether the forfeiture statute is remedial or punitive in nature and the effect that inquiry has on the availability of collateral estoppel as a defense.
This forfeiture proceeding originated as a libel in rem against 307 bags of sugar under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7302 in the Southern District of Georgia. The libel alleged that Burch had possessed this large quantity of sugar with the purpose and intent that it be used in the manufacture of illicit whiskey in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 5686(b). Burch filed a claim to the sugar. While the forfeiture proceeding was pending in Georgia, Burch was indicted, along with 15 others, in the Southern District of Florida for unlawfully conspiring to violate the internal revenue laws by manufacturing, possessing, selling, etc., illicit whiskey. Sixty-nine overt acts were alleged at least three of which related to the acquisition, transportation and storage' of the identical sugar which is the subject matter of the present forfeiture action.
On the trial of the criminal action in Florida the District Judge granted a motion for judgment of acquittal made by Burch. The motion under F.R.Crim. P. 29(a), 18 U.S.C.A. was based on the total lack of proof connecting Burch with the conspiracy. Thereafter, Burch amended his answer in the forfeiture proceeding in Georgia raising the defense of res judicata and setting forth the indictment and judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. Pursuant to this plea he filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion from which the Government brings this appeal.
In the trial court, and here, Burch rests on Coffey v. United States, 1886, 116 U.S. 436, 6 S.Ct. 437, 29 L.Ed. 684. On that approach there are two subsidiary inquiries. They may appear to be separate, but as both are concerned in a way with the Coffey case and especially the manner in which it is treated and distinguished by later cases, they are closely related. The first inquiry concerns the nature of the forfeiture proceeding as criminal or civil, punitive or remedial. The second relates directly to the vitality of Coffey as a controlling precedent.
A libel of forfeiture under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7302 is, nominally, at least, a civil action. This is not, of course, determinative of its true nature — that is, whether the action is really civil as opposed to criminal, or as it is sometimes expressed remedial rather than punitive. The distinction may be of decisive importance. If the forfeiture action is criminal (punitive) then a determination in the one might bar re-examination of the same issue in the other. On the other hand, if it is a civil, that is remedial, suit there is considerable doubt that res judicata would act as a bar to the maintenance of it. This is so because an acquittal in a criminal action is considered “merely * * * an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.” Helvering v. Mitchell, 1938, 303 U.S. 391, at page 397, 58 S.Ct. 630, 632, 82 L.Ed. 917. As to the issues raised, it does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence test which applies in civil proceedings. United States v. National Ass’n of Real Estate Boards, 1950, 339 U.S. 485, 492-494, 70 S.Ct. 711, 94 L.Ed. 1007; United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile 98 4 Door Sedan, 4 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 668, at page 673; see 30A Am. Jur., Judgments § 472 et seq. at 512.
This approach would require that we categorize this particular action, at least for the purposes of this inquiry, as civil (remedial) or criminal (punitive) in nature. Under the existing case law, this is a none too easy task.
Save for a few carefully delineated areas, it is not at all clear what, if any, suits for forfeiture of property, or for payment of multiple damages to the Government should more properly be regarded as punitive rather than civil. However, the weight of authority seems to support the proposition that forfeiture m rem actions, such as the present one, are essentially civil in nature, and should not be burdened with the attributes of a criminal action. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 1931, 282 U.S. 577, 580, 51 S.Ct. 282, 75 L.Ed. 558; Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. 391, at page 400, 58 S.Ct. 630; United States v. 42 Jars, etc., D.C.D.N.J.1958, 160 F.Supp. 818, at page 821; United States v. 20 Strings Seed Pearls, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1929, 34 F.2d 142; but see United States v. 38 Cases, etc., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1951, 99 F. Supp. 460, at page 464. But the standards by which this question is to be determined are not entirely clear. One factor emphasized as important is the existence of express criminal penalties for the same wrongful act within the same statutory scheme imposing the sanction of forfeiture. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 1943, 317 U.S. 537, at page 549, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443; United States v. 38 Cases, etc., D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1951, 99 F.Supp. 460, at page 463. This, some courts reason, demonstrates legislative intent that the additional forfeiture or payment provisions are meant only to compensate the Government for its loss or to protect some aspect of the public interest from future harm. Of significance too may be the relationship between the harm suffered by the Government and the loss to the claimant from the forfeiture. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra, 317 U.S. 537, at page 554, 63 S.Ct. 379 (concurring); Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. 391, at page 401, 58 S.Ct. 630. The intrinsic nature of the enforcement procedures prescribed in the statute are also relevant factors in this regard. Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. 391, at page 402, 58 S.Ct. 630.
That brings us to the second inquiry concerning the binding character today of the Coffey decision.
Burch correctly emphasizes that the facts of Coffey are indeed quite similar to his. A suit was instituted for the forfeiture of certain materials allegedly used to violate the liquor laws. Subsequently a criminal action based on the same facts was prosecuted by a trial before a jury. The jury returned a general verdict of not guilty and judgment of acquittal was entered. The forfeiture proceedings were later reopened resulting in a judgment for the Government. On appeal, the Supreme Court ordered the libel dismissed holding that the criminal action barred a suit for forfeiture based on the same facts.
The Coffey decision has been the subject of a great deal of controversy, and no little criticism. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra, 317 U.S. 537, at page 554, 63 S.Ct. 379. As the Third Circuit characterized it, the case has received a distinctly “unfavorable press.” United States v. One Dodge Sedan, 3 Cir., 1940, 113 F.2d 552, at page 553 and notes 1 and 2. In a figure indigenous to the usual assertion of it the Fourth Circuit remarked, “A lot of water has gone over the dam, and a great deal of whiskey has come from the stills since the Coffey decision nearly seventy years ago.” United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile 98 4 Door Sedan, 4 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 668, at page 670. Both cases expressed considerable doubt as to the continued vitality of Coffey but happily found distinguishing factors to avoid either its doctrine or a determination of its current force. Other courts have shown a similar reluctance to apply literally the holding of Coffey. United States v. One DeSoto Sedan, D.C.E.D.N.C.1949, 85 F.Supp. 245; United States v. Gramer, 9 Cir., 191 F.2d 741, 27 A.L.R.2d 1132; United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, D.C.W.D.Pa.1952, 108 F.Supp. 286; United States v. Physic, 2 Cir., 1949, 175 F.2d 338; United States v. 20 Strings Seed Pearls, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1929, 34 F.2d 142.
On the other hand, Coffey has at various times been applied by other courts. The Tenth Circuit is apparently committed to the proposition that it still exists as the controlling authority in these cases. United States v. One 1956 Ford Fairlane Tudor Sedan, 10 Cir., 1959, 272 F.2d 704. On other occasions courts without an examination of the merits of the doctrine and the case law that it has generated have applied it on principles of stare decisis. This is illustrated by the opinion of the Fourth Circuit just five years before its recent expression quoted above. United States v. One DeSoto Sedan, 4 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 583.
Burch echoes what these Courts point out. Attacked and critized as it is, the fact remains that Coffey has never been expressly overruled by the Court which handed it down. It must be recognized though that on several occasions it has been distinguished on rather fine grounds by that Court. Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. 391, at page 405-406, 58 S.Ct. 630; Murphy v. United States, 1926, 272 U.S. 630, at page 631, 47 S.Ct. 218, 71 L.Ed. 446; Stone v. United States, 1897, 167 U.S. 178, at pages 186-188, 17 S.Ct. 778, 42 L.Ed. 127; United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 1950, 339 U.S. 485, at page 493 note 6, 70 S.Ct. 711, 94 L.Ed. 1007. And as we pointed out in note 2, supra, some of the language in Coffey seems absolutely irreconcilable with later decisions. This probably accounts for Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s reference to the “uncritical language in earlier cases,” citing Coffey, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra, 317 U.S. 537, at page 554, 63 S.Ct. 379, 389.
Despite the preoccupation of counsel with these interesting questions and the sometimes troublesome difficulties inherent in them which our brief review reflects, we find it unnecessary to resolve them specifically. As to the first inquiry on the nature of the forfeiture proceedings as criminal rather than civil we may assume in considering res judicata or collateral estoppel principles that this action is of a nature which would, if meeting other requirements, be properly barred by the previous criminal acquittal. As to the second inquiry concerning Coffey we may assume its continued vitality as a precedent. Nevertheless, for the reasons we now discuss, the acquittal in the criminal ease does not bar the present forfeiture action. It may properly be maintained.
Res judicata, broadly defined to encompass collateral estoppel as well, is a judicial rule which operates to prevent redetermination of an issue already litigated between the same parties in a previous action. An issue is considered as having been put to rest as to the parties involved by the first valid judicial ruling on it. It may not thereafter be redetermined. But by its very definition for the first judgment to collaterally estop the raising of an issue in a later suit, it must actually have been determined in the earlier litigation. This requirement flows naturally from the purposes which the doctrine sought to achieve. It is intended to prevent re-litigation of an issue already judicially determined. Before there can be a relitigation there must first be the original litigation concluded by a final adjudication. When an issue is not determined in the earlier proceeding, though it may have been raised and argued by the parties, it is a permissible subject of controversy in the later proceeding. The Supreme Court has made these requirements clear. “* * * [T]he inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action; not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action.” United States v. International Building Company, 1953, 345 U.S. 502, at page 505, 73 S.Ct. 807, 809, 97 L.Ed. 1182; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. George F. McCourt Trucking, Inc., 5 Cir., 1960, 277 F.2d 593, at pages 596-597; Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, 5 Cir., 1935, 75 F.2d 331; 30A Am.Jur., Judgments §§ 371, 373, 374.
Under these rules the precise .question with which we are here confronted becomes quite clear. We must ascertain whether the disposition of this action “would require relitigation of specific fact issues which have already been judicially determined.” Adams v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, 287 F.2d 701, at page 703. The precise nature of this inquiry is exemplified by cases involving submission of the issues to a jury under a general charge in response to which it returns a general verdict. Sealfon v. United States, 1948, 332 U.S. 575, 68 S. Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180; Yawn v. United States, 5 Cir., 1957, 244 F.2d 235. Ascertaining just what issues have been resolved by the jury in its general verdict frequently presents some difficulties. But difficult or not the answer must be found for it is only those issues which were “necessarily determined” which are barred from re-examination in a subsequent action. United States v. Sealfon, supra, 332 U.S. 575, at page 580, 68 S.Ct. 237; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. George F. McCourt Trucking, Inc., supra, 277 F.2d 593, at page 597. In this case we encounter none of those difficulties.
The criminal indictment brought against Burch alleged the identical acts made the basis of the present complaint against the goods. But it did so only as overt acts in the furtherance of a conspiracy, not as substantive crimes in themselves. The sole crime charged was the conspiracy. Burch’s connection with the conspiracy, therefore, was a vital element of the Government’s case, and it was on this element that its ease failed. The question of the truthfulness of the alleged overt acts or the sufficiency of the evidence to establish them was never reached. The Judge simply held that as there was no evidence to connect Burch with the conspiracy the sole crime with which they were charged was not proved and the motion to acquit must be granted.
The Court hardly could have made it clearer that he was not ruling on whether Burch did, or did not, do the alleged overt acts, but on the lack of evidence showing any connection with a conspiracy. During the hearing on the motion the Judge stated this to counsel for the Government. “Well, suppose you assume that they bought this sugar for an illegal purpose, that is, to be used in connection with the illicit manufacture of liquor. Suppose you assume that the proof shows that. I am assuming more than the proof shows. * * * How does that connect them with the conspiracy?” A few moments later the Court made this comment. “ * * * They went down there and bought a pretty large quantity of sugar under very suspicious circumstances, as far as the proof shows. I don’t think any jury would think they were buying it to make candy, but, even if you assume all of that, you still have got to connect them with this conspiracy.” The next morning counsel for the Government stated that it had “gone over the evidence, or possibly the lack of it, to connect Mr. Burch and Mr. Vaughn with this conspiracy; and the Government at this time will interpose no objection to a directed verdict of acquittal * * In reply the Judge stated, “The Court has come to the same conclusion. That was going to be the ruling of the Court this morning.” And so it was, as the formal judgment reflected.
Thus the case is clearly one where the issue sought to be raised has not been previously adjudicated. Even were this not so clear, however, a different result would not be compelled. This is so because Burch has failed to demonstrate affirmatively that the issue was previously decided. In other words, if doubt exists he loses. In United States v. International Building Co., supra, the Supreme Court could not ascertain whether the question of alleged tax deficiencies caused by incorrect depreciation methods had been adjudicated in a suit involving the same taxpayer during earlier years. “There is no showing either in the record or by extrinsic evidence * * * that the issues raised by the pleadings were submitted to the Tax Court for determination or determined by that court. They may or may not have been agreed upon by the parties.” 345 U.S. 502, at page 505, 73 S.Ct. 807, at page 809. Nevertheless the Court held that determination of the issue in the later action was entirely proper. “[T]he inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action; not what might have been thus litigated and determined.” 345 U.S. 502, at page 505, 73 S.Ct. 807, at page 809. Dixie Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Holland, 6 Cir., 1958, 255 F.2d 304, at page 310; Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, 5 Cir., 1935, 75 F.2d 331.
For us to prevent inquiry into the fact of possession and use of the sugar would be to ignore the positive basis on which the judgment of acquittal was granted. More important, it would allow an abuse of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, hindering rather than aiding the effective administration of justice. A similar concern has caused the Supreme Court to say, “ * * * unless we can say that [there was] an adjudication of the merits, the doctrine of estoppel by judgment would serve an unjust cause: it would become a device by which a decision not shown to be on the merits would forever foreclose inquiry into the merits.” United States v. International Building Company, supra, 345 U.S. 502, at page 506, 73 S.Ct. 807, at page 809.
Finally, the fact that the criminal indictment charged only a conspiracy affords further reasons in support of the result wre reach. As this Court pointed out in the circumstances of Herman v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, 289 F.2d 362, at page 368, a general jury verdict favorable to the defendant in a conspiracy prosecution “ * * * does not mean that the overt act did not occur; it means merely that the jury did not find [the defendants] guilty of the commission of an offense. Such a finding does not make the act itself disappear.”
The critical facts in the libel of forfeiture have not previously been determined. They are ripe for a trial.
Reversed and remanded | [
"\n \n . The indictment specified 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5174, 5606, 5008, 7206, 5686(b), 5632, 5216, 5105, 5691.\n ",
"\n \n . The doubt begins at this precise point. And its source is Coffey v. United States, 1886, 116 U.S. 436, 6 S.Ct. 437, 29 L.Ed. 684, which held a criminal acquittal on a jury verdict conclusive in a later forfeiture in rem action. The Court stated “It is urged as a reason for not allowing such effect to the judgment, that the acquittal in the criminal case may have taken place because of the rale requiring guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that, on the same evidence, on the question of preponderance of proof, there might be a verdict for the United States, in the suit in rein. Nevertheless, the fact or act has been put in issue and determined against the United States; * * *. There could be no new trial of the criminal prosecution after the acquittal in it; and a subsequent trial of the civil suit amounts to substantially the same thing, with a difference only in the consequences following a judgment adverse to the claimant.” 116 U.S. at page 443, 6 S.Ct. at page 440.\n While this case has never been expressly overruled, this statement is difficult to reconcile with the decision in Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, that “The difference in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata.” 303 U.S. 391, at page 397, 58 S.Ct. 630, at page 632.\n ",
"\n \n . There have been occasions, of course, in which courts have thought it permissible to decline to apply a decision as a currently binding precedent even though it has not been formally overruled. Rarely ever done, these courts base this on such circumstances as the many changes which have occurred in the law since the decision was rendered and the inroads made on its principles over the intervening years. See, Browder v. Gayle, D.C.M.D. Ala. (3-judge district court) 1956, 142 F.Supp. 707, at page 716 and note 14, affirmed 352 U.S. 903, 77 S.Ct. 145, 1 L.Ed.2d 114; Columbia General Investment Corp. v. S. E. C., 5 Cir., 1959, 265 F.2d 559, at page 562 and note 7.\n ",
"\n \n . The differences between res judicata and collateral estoppel should be kept in mind. While the former in its broad sense encompasses the latter, there are clear distinctions between the two. Collateral estoppel operates to prevent relitigation of issues actually litigated between the same parties in a suit on a different cause of action. Res judicata, strictly speaking, applies when a second suit on the same causo of action arises between the same parties. It precludes the litigation in the second suit not only of all issues that were raised in the first but of all issues that could have been raised by the parties in that proceeding. For a good analysis of this distinction see Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, 5 Cir., 1935, 75 F.2d 331.\n "
] | [] |
f2d_294/html/0007-01.html | <section class="casebody" data-case-id="32044061409587_0002" data-firstpage="7" data-lastpage="11">
<section class="head-matter">
<h4 class="parties" id="b55-10" data-blocks='[["BL_55.11",55,[868,1029,740,219]]]'>J. C. STEWART, G. C. Martin, M. B. Sharron and G. C. Ralls, Appellants, v. DAY & ZIMMERMANN, INC., et al., Appellees.</h4>
<p class="docketnumber" id="b55-12" data-blocks='[["BL_55.12",55,[1148,1267,176,26]]]'>No. 18749.</p>
<p class="court" id="b55-13" data-blocks='[["BL_55.13",55,[957,1336,559,70]]]'>United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.</p>
<p class="decisiondate" id="b55-14" data-blocks='[["BL_55.14",55,[1113,1428,248,34]]]'>Sept. 12, 1961.</p>
<p class="attorneys" id="b56-9" data-blocks='[["BL_56.9",56,[254,1531,739,129]]]'>
<a id="p8" href="#p8" data-label="8" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*8</a>John D. Raffaelli, Texarkana, Tex., John D. Raffaelli, of Raffaelli & Keeney, Texarkana, Tex., for appellants.</p>
<p class="attorneys" id="b56-10" data-blocks='[["BL_56.10",56,[254,1676,742,174]]]'>Norman C. Russell, Atchley, Russell & Hutchinson, Texarkana, Tex., LeRoy Autrey, Texarkana, Ark., for appellee Day & Zimmermann, Inc.</p>
<p class="attorneys" id="b56-11" data-blocks='[["BL_56.11",56,[254,1864,741,263]]]'>L. N. D. Wells, Jr., George Schatzki, Dallas, Tex., Jim Lindsey, Texarkana, Tex., Mullinax, Wells, Morris & Mauzy, Dallas, Tex., of counsel, for appellee Local 50, International Guards Union of America.</p>
<p class="judges" id="b56-12" data-blocks='[["BL_56.12",56,[255,2155,741,83]]]'>Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and CAMERON and JONES, Circuit Judges.</p>
</section>
<article class="opinion" data-type="majority">
<p class="author" id="b56-13" data-blocks='[["BL_56.13",56,[297,2294,489,37]]]'>CAMERON, Circuit Judge.</p>
<p id="b56-14" data-blocks='[["BL_56.14",56,[254,2348,742,218]],["BL_56.15",56,[1045,236,747,673]]]'>Appellants were four guards employed by appellee Day & Zimmermann, Inc., operators of the Lone Star Ordnance Depot, near Texarkana, Texas. They were members of Local 50, International Guards’ Union of America. When they were laid off from wqrk by the employer and after efforts to have the grievance arbitrated by the Union with the employer had proved abortive they filed this action for damages against the employer and the Union <a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_1" id="ref_footnote_1_1">1</a> and for reinstatement to their positions with back pay. They claimed that they had been laid off out of line of seniority, contrary to the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining contract, between the employer and the Union, and as the result of a conspiracy between the employer and the Union to breach the collective agreement.</p>
<p id="b56-16" data-blocks='[["BL_56.16",56,[1045,932,744,127]]]'>The portions of the collective bargaining agreement governing this controversy are these:</p>
<blockquote id="b56-17" data-blocks='[["BL_56.17",56,[1088,1080,660,261]]]'>“Section 8.1. Seniority Rating. The seniority of each guard is his relative position with respect to other guards based on the length of his service as a guard in the Safety and Security Division.</blockquote>
<blockquote id="b56-18" data-blocks='[["BL_56.18",56,[1086,1360,662,220]]]'>“Section 8.2. Promotions to Supervisory Position. Employees promoted to supervisory positions within the Guard Department shall continue to accrue seniority * * *.</blockquote>
<blockquote id="b56-19" data-blocks='[["BL_56.19",56,[1087,1598,662,199]]]'>“Section 8.3. Layoffs. In the event of a reduction in force, guards with the greatest seniority in the Guard Department shall be retained; * * <em>*»</em>
</blockquote>
<p id="b56-21" data-blocks='[["BL_56.20",56,[1047,1834,745,395]]]'>The appellants were employed subsequent to Guards Lann, Gunter, W. L. Martin and Pickens. In 1953, when the Union was certified as collective bargaining agents for the guards, Lann et al had been promoted to supervisory positions, and thus were not at that time within the bargaining unit. The appellants were then members of the unit.</p>
<p id="b56-22" data-blocks='[["BL_56.21",56,[1047,2254,744,306]],["BL_57.1",57,[105,246,748,127]]]'>Guard Officers Lann et al were demoted into non-supervisory guard positions and this displaced non-supervisors having less seniority. In 1959, under a reduction in forces, the four appellants were laid off. Appellants complained that the retention of Lann et al was <a id="p9" href="#p9" data-label="9" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*9</a>wrongful and asserted that those four should have been laid off and the appellants retained.</p>
<p id="ARJ" data-blocks='[["BL_57.4",57,[103,404,747,216]]]'>, . , , „... . „ . The trial court, sitting without a jury, , . , ,. „ . .. „„„„„ heard the testimony of ten witnesses and entered its findings, in minute detail, of the facts upon which its conclusions infra were based.<a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_2" id="ref_footnote_1_2">2</a>
</p>
<p id="APc" data-blocks='[["BL_57.5",57,[99,649,750,729]],["BL_57.6",57,[902,246,746,220]]]'>Based upon these findings the trial court concluded that appellants were laid off pursuant to a good faith interpretation given the contract by the Company and the Union, and that the layoff was consistent with the accepted practices of the past; that the bargaining agreement had been correctly interpreted by the parties, that the Union was under no obligation of law to submit the grievanees to arbitration, and that the Company and Union had not acted in collusion; that the employment of appellants had been terminated in accordance with the contract, and that the appellants were estopped to challenge the correctness of the seniority accorded to Lann et al. We are of the opinion that the findings of fact by the court were supported by the evidence before it, and that its conclu- . sions of law were justified.</p>
<p id="Abp" data-blocks='[["BL_57.14",57,[896,511,750,873]],["BL_58.1",58,[267,242,758,257]]]'>The basic problem facing the eourt below was the determination of the meaning of the contract provisions quoted supra. Appellants analyze these sections of the contract in the light of the provisions of the contract as a whole in an effort to show that the phrase “Employees promoted to supervisory positions within the Guard Department” did not include within its terms the four employees who had been so promoted prior to the time the initial contract was executed. No authority is cited as furnishing a precedent for what seems to us a strained construction. Appellee the employer cites many cases as furnishing support for its argument that the four guards were in their seniority rights by tbe quoted sections of the contract. But <a id="p10" href="#p10" data-label="10" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*10</a>• none of the cases is close enough in point to warrant discussion. The court below accepted the argument of the employer and the Union as to the meaning of the sections <a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_3" id="ref_footnote_1_3">3</a> and we agree with its conclusion.</p>
<p id="b58-4" data-blocks='[["BL_58.4",58,[269,543,752,866]],["BL_58.5",58,[1074,243,746,264]]]'>Appellants take the position that it was improper for the court below to consider testimony of prior or contemporaneous construction by the parties of the questioned provisions of the contract. They cite a number of Texas cases supporting the rule that, if the words of a contract are clear and free from ambiguity, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, alter, amend or add to the terms of the writing.<a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_4" id="ref_footnote_1_4">4</a> Nobody questions that principle of law, but we are dealing here with a trial before the court without a jury and with a sharply contested issue as to whether the seniority which should accrue to employees promoted to supervisory position should have application only to those promotions which should be made after the contract had been entered into. The court found that the contract, interpreted by its four corners, carried the meaning that the questioned language applied to all employees whether their promotion took place before or after the signing of the first contract.</p>
<p id="b58-10" data-blocks='[["BL_58.11",58,[1065,538,749,867]]]'>It added as a separate finding the conclusion, inescapable from the evidence, that the parties had uniformly construed the contract as having the meaning the court below gave it, had discussed changing the language so as to make it conform to the appellants’ present contentions, and that the appellants themselves were well aware of the interpretation given the language by the parties and of the discussions about a possible change in the language. No harm accrued to the appellants by the fact that the court heard this testimony, because the decision was already against them, and properly we think, on the meaning of the contract without the evidence of construction by the parties.<a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_5" id="ref_footnote_1_5">5</a>
</p>
<p id="At" data-blocks='[["BL_59.4",59,[100,255,751,720]]]'>
<a id="p11" href="#p11" data-label="11" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*11</a>Appellants argue earnestly that they were entitled to have their grievances submitted to arbitration by the Union. They present many details of their controversy with the Union, and would have us hold that they were the vietims of extremely unfair treatment arismg from their contention that the Union ¿>2 • i , ... officials and representatives were acting in collusion with the employer. There is no doubt that there was difference of opinion among the union members as to whether the Union should sponsor and press the appellants’ claims through the arbitration and other procedures provided in the contracts.</p>
<p id="Amc" data-blocks='[["BL_59.5",59,[100,1006,748,675]]]'>But the trial court heard the testimony and concluded that there was no collusion between the Union representatives and the employer, and that appellants had failed to show any evidence of conspiracy or fraud between them. We agree with the conclusions of the trial judge and feel, as we are sure he did, that union officials should be given a wide latitude in deciding intra-union disputes and that courts should be slow to- intervene m them, but should, on the other hand, invest their decisions and actions with a presumption of honesty and fairness’</p>
<p id="A32" data-blocks='[["BL_59.6",59,[100,1705,774,220]]]'>We agree with the sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, <a href="/us/345/0330-01" class="citation" data-index="0" data-cite="345 U.S. 330" data-case-ids="372924" data-case-paths="/us/345/0330-01">345 U.S. 330</a>, 338, <a href="/us/345/0330-01" class="citation" data-index="1" data-cite="345 U.S. 330" data-case-ids="372924" data-case-paths="/us/345/0330-01">73 S.Ct. 681</a>, 686, <a href="/citations/?q=97%20L.%20Ed.%201048" class="citation" data-index="2" data-cite="97 L. Ed. 1048">97 L.Ed. 1048</a>, which the Union quotes in its brief:</p>
<blockquote id="A6g" data-blocks='[["BL_59.7",59,[140,1941,661,81]],["BL_59.8",59,[938,255,669,865]]]'>“* * * The bargaining representative * * * is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of all whom it represents, * * * Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms 0f any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and dasses flf j The mere ex- , . istence of such differences does not _ . _,, mak® them mvalld’ The comPlete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to comPlete S°od faith and honesty of Pur“ pose in the exercise of its discretion.” <a class="footnotemark" href="#footnote_1_6" id="ref_footnote_1_6">6</a>
</blockquote>
<p id="AJL" data-blocks='[["BL_59.13",59,[896,1158,747,680]]]'>A number 0f the points raised by appellants were dealt with by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the recent case of Henderson et al. v. Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, 1961, <a href="/citations/?q=296%20F.2d%20677" class="citation" data-index="3" data-cite="296 F.2d 677">296 F.2d 677</a>. We have considered all of the specifications of error relied upon by the appellantS) and we think <em>they </em>are <em>with. </em>ou¿ merit We think that this record reveals that employer and the Union acted with restraint and maturity in the handling of the claims of these appellants, and that they were accorded all of the rights to which, under the contract and the law, they were entitled.</p>
<p id="ArK" data-blocks='[["BL_59.14",59,[896,1871,742,87]]]'>The judgment of the lower court was, in our opinion; right and it is</p>
<p id="AE8" data-blocks='[["BL_59.15",59,[936,1990,164,30]]]'>Affirmed.</p>
<aside data-label="1" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_1">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_1">1</a>
<p id="b56-23" data-blocks='[["BL_56.22",56,[265,2615,1462,68]]]'>. Initially both the International Union and the Local were sued, but the action against International was abandoned.</p>
</aside>
<aside data-label="2" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_2">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_2">2</a>
<p id="A2z" data-blocks='[["BL_57.7",57,[96,1427,698,254]]]'>. The court found <em>inter </em>aUa: That appellants were hired subsequent to Guards Lann, Gunter, Martin and Pick-ens -whose elevation to supervisory capacity, and subsequent reduction to guard status furnishes the basis of appellants’ case;</p>
<p id="AaS" data-blocks='[["BL_57.8",57,[135,1690,654,332]]]'>That the Union was certified as bargaining agent March IS, 1953, after the appellants and the other guards mentioned had been employed, and after Lann et al had been promoted to supervisory positions; that renewal contracts between the employer and the Union were entered into July 23, 1953, March 18, 1954, March 18, 1955, May 15, 1956 and May 15, 1958;</p>
<p id="A4P" data-blocks='[["BL_57.9",57,[130,2028,656,403]]]'>That the contracts provided that those guards serving as general officers upon the date of certification would continue to accrue seniority under the contract from their original date of hire and that consistently since the original contract, both the employer and the Union had interpreted the contract “so as to permit continuance of accrual of seniority by guard officers during the tenure of their service as officers;”</p>
<p id="A2R" data-blocks='[["BL_57.10",57,[127,2439,654,259]],["BL_57.11",57,[935,1432,655,293]]]'>That all guards serving as officers had continued to accrue seniority and their seniority had been shown on the posted seniority lists; that during intermittent cutbacks in the size of the work force, guard officers Lann et al had been “bumped back” into non-supervisory guard positions and had always been carried on seniority lists, their authority dating from the original hire; that appellants jlaa knowledge of these procedures through the quarterly posting of seniority lists, as required by the contracts, and that they were informed of what had transpired;</p>
<p id="A6f" data-blocks='[["BL_57.12",57,[926,1731,662,931]]]'>That in February, 1959, the employer gave notice to appellants of the termination of their service because of cutback in employed force, and they filed a grievanee with the employer protesting their termination upon the claim that such action violated their seniority rights based upon their contention that they had more seniority than Lann et al; that appellants, as individuals, demanded arbitration of their grievances, but the demand was rejected by the employer, because the contract did not afford individual employees the right to arbitrate; that in March, 1959, the Union requested arbitration, but the employer denied the request, because it was not filed within the time provided by the contract; that this request for arbitration was made by the Union, although it did not agree with the substance of the grievances; and that the Union had initially declined to seek arbitration, both because it believed the grievanees lacked merit and because of the expense involved in arbitration.</p>
</aside>
<aside data-label="3" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_3">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_3">3</a>
<p id="b58-5" data-blocks='[["BL_58.6",58,[269,1459,693,74]]]'>. The trial judge stated spontaneously after hearing the oral arguments:</p>
<blockquote id="b58-6" data-blocks='[["BL_58.7",58,[307,1537,655,520]]]'>“Now I find it hard to believe that anyone could take the position that a particular class, in this instance the guards, would be discriminated against if they received promotion in their class. And therefore, you could not count the period which they are promoted to supervisor in their seniority. I can’t conceive for the life of me, any fair reasoning, how anybody can take that position that you would be discriminated against, if you received promotion in your particular class. And the Court will have to conclude that a supervisor is a promotion from a guard.”</blockquote>
<p id="Aec" data-blocks='[["BL_58.8",58,[306,2061,652,222]]]'>Referring to his estimate of the contention of appellants that the Company should have given seniority to appellants while disregarding the rights of others who were previously employed, the trial judge stated:</p>
<blockquote id="b58-8" data-blocks='[["BL_58.9",58,[296,2286,661,404]],["BL_58.10",58,[1110,1456,654,328]]]'>“Now to the Court’s way of thinking that would be the most unfair position that a company could possibly take. And 'to follow that line of reasoning, the plaintiffs themselves who are members of the contracting group of 1953, say yes, we favor seniority for those in our group who go up to supervisors. We favor that for ourselves, but we don’t favor it for anybody else. Now, does that smack of fairness? Does that smack of good reasoning? Does that smack of logic? It’s all right, we will claim seniority for ourselves, but no seniority for anyone else, because they are not part of the contracting group. Notwithstanding the fact, that they are the same class of people. They are guards and supervisors. That’s what you are dealing with, guards and supervisors * <em>*</em>
</blockquote>
</aside>
<aside data-label="4" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_4">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_4">4</a>
<p id="b58-12" data-blocks='[["BL_58.12",58,[1063,1818,697,178]]]'>. E. g., Bauer v. Taylor, Tex.Civ.App. Eastland, <a href="/sw2d/118/0826-01" class="citation" data-index="4" data-cite="118 S.W.2d 826" data-case-ids="10244726" data-case-paths="/sw2d/118/0826-01">118 S.W.2d 826</a>, writ refused; and Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, <a href="/tex/134/0574-01" class="citation" data-index="5" data-cite="134 Tex. 574" data-case-ids="2319526" data-case-paths="/tex/134/0574-01">134 Tex. 574</a>, <a href="/sw2d/136/0800-01" class="citation" data-index="6" data-cite="136 S.W.2d 800" data-case-ids="10238615,2319526" data-case-paths="/sw2d/136/0800-01,/tex/134/0574-01">136 S.W.2d 800</a>, <a href="/citations/?q=127%20A.L.R.%201217" class="citation" data-index="7" data-cite="127 A.L.R. 1217">127 A.L.R. 1217</a>.</p>
</aside>
<aside data-label="5" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_5">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_5">5</a>
<p id="b58-13" data-blocks='[["BL_58.13",58,[1062,2024,695,254]]]'>. The Union points out that, in the handling of collective bargaining contracts, the practice of the parties has been uniformly accorded great significance. It quotes from Werne, Law and Practice of the Labor Contract, Callaghan & Co., 1957, Vol. 1, at page 195:</p>
<blockquote id="b58-14" data-blocks='[["BL_58.14",58,[1104,2287,653,250]]]'>“Where past practice has established a meaning for language that is subsequently used by the parties in a new agreement, it is a well settled principle of arbitration that the language will be presumed to have the meaning given it by such practice.”</blockquote>
<p id="b58-15" data-blocks='[["BL_58.15",58,[1102,2549,653,142]],["BL_59.1",59,[142,2073,653,258]]]'>And the Union cites further Vol. 6, Labor Law Reporter, § 51, 732; International Shoe Co., 31 Labor Arbitration Reports 739; Hoke, Inc., 3 Labor Arbi<a id="p11" href="#p11" data-label="11" data-citation-index="1" class="page-label">*11</a>tration Reports 748; Diamond Alkali, 2 Labor Arbitration Reports 720; and Columbia Steel Co., 5 Labor Arbitration Reports 638, as sustaining the right of the court to consider the course of dealing between the parties in interpreting the clauses in a labor agreement.</p>
</aside>
<aside data-label="6" class="footnote" id="footnote_1_6">
<a href="#ref_footnote_1_6">6</a>
<p id="A2K" data-blocks='[["BL_59.9",59,[95,2376,698,182]]]'>. We approve also language quoted in the Union’s brief from the case of Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, D.C., <a href="/f-supp/171/0782-01" class="citation" data-index="8" data-cite="171 F. Supp. 782" data-case-ids="436202" data-case-paths="/f-supp/171/0782-01">171 F.Supp. 782</a>, 791, 793, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, <a href="/f2d/273/0614-01" class="citation" data-index="9" data-cite="273 F.2d 614" data-case-ids="1959982" data-case-paths="/f2d/273/0614-01">273 F.2d 614</a>:</p>
<blockquote id="AEU" data-blocks='[["BL_59.10",59,[139,2565,652,104]],["BL_59.11",59,[938,2075,654,218]]]'>“The philosophy of the Union in retaining control over disputes and of the Company in requiring the same is sound. A contrary procedure which would allow each individual employee to overrule and supersede the governing body of the Union would create a condition of disorder and instability which would be disastrous to labor as well as to industry. * * *</blockquote>
<blockquote id="A0A" data-blocks='[["BL_59.12",59,[937,2302,654,328]]]'>“ * * * The principal purpose of the-grievance procedure is not to provide a framework within which individual desires and complaints can be taken up with the employer; rather, it is to provide a framework within which the employees may <em>bargain collectively </em>to determine how the general principles of the agreement are to be applied to day-to-day problems.”</blockquote>
</aside>
</article>
</section> |
J. C. STEWART, G. C. Martin, M. B. Sharron and G. C. Ralls, Appellants, v. DAY & ZIMMERMANN, INC., et al., Appellees.
No. 18749.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 12, 1961.
John D. Raffaelli, Texarkana, Tex., John D. Raffaelli, of Raffaelli & Keeney, Texarkana, Tex., for appellants.
Norman C. Russell, Atchley, Russell & Hutchinson, Texarkana, Tex., LeRoy Autrey, Texarkana, Ark., for appellee Day & Zimmermann, Inc.
L. N. D. Wells, Jr., George Schatzki, Dallas, Tex., Jim Lindsey, Texarkana, Tex., Mullinax, Wells, Morris & Mauzy, Dallas, Tex., of counsel, for appellee Local 50, International Guards Union of America.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and CAMERON and JONES, Circuit Judges.
| [
"CAMERON, Circuit Judge."
] | [] | [] | [] | CAMERON, Circuit Judge.
Appellants were four guards employed by appellee Day & Zimmermann, Inc., operators of the Lone Star Ordnance Depot, near Texarkana, Texas. They were members of Local 50, International Guards’ Union of America. When they were laid off from wqrk by the employer and after efforts to have the grievance arbitrated by the Union with the employer had proved abortive they filed this action for damages against the employer and the Union and for reinstatement to their positions with back pay. They claimed that they had been laid off out of line of seniority, contrary to the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining contract, between the employer and the Union, and as the result of a conspiracy between the employer and the Union to breach the collective agreement.
The portions of the collective bargaining agreement governing this controversy are these:
“Section 8.1. Seniority Rating. The seniority of each guard is his relative position with respect to other guards based on the length of his service as a guard in the Safety and Security Division.
“Section 8.2. Promotions to Supervisory Position. Employees promoted to supervisory positions within the Guard Department shall continue to accrue seniority * * *.
“Section 8.3. Layoffs. In the event of a reduction in force, guards with the greatest seniority in the Guard Department shall be retained; * *
The appellants were employed subsequent to Guards Lann, Gunter, W. L. Martin and Pickens. In 1953, when the Union was certified as collective bargaining agents for the guards, Lann et al had been promoted to supervisory positions, and thus were not at that time within the bargaining unit. The appellants were then members of the unit.
Guard Officers Lann et al were demoted into non-supervisory guard positions and this displaced non-supervisors having less seniority. In 1959, under a reduction in forces, the four appellants were laid off. Appellants complained that the retention of Lann et al was wrongful and asserted that those four should have been laid off and the appellants retained.
, . , , „... . „ . The trial court, sitting without a jury, , . , ,. „ . .. „„„„„ heard the testimony of ten witnesses and entered its findings, in minute detail, of the facts upon which its conclusions infra were based.
Based upon these findings the trial court concluded that appellants were laid off pursuant to a good faith interpretation given the contract by the Company and the Union, and that the layoff was consistent with the accepted practices of the past; that the bargaining agreement had been correctly interpreted by the parties, that the Union was under no obligation of law to submit the grievanees to arbitration, and that the Company and Union had not acted in collusion; that the employment of appellants had been terminated in accordance with the contract, and that the appellants were estopped to challenge the correctness of the seniority accorded to Lann et al. We are of the opinion that the findings of fact by the court were supported by the evidence before it, and that its conclu- . sions of law were justified.
The basic problem facing the eourt below was the determination of the meaning of the contract provisions quoted supra. Appellants analyze these sections of the contract in the light of the provisions of the contract as a whole in an effort to show that the phrase “Employees promoted to supervisory positions within the Guard Department” did not include within its terms the four employees who had been so promoted prior to the time the initial contract was executed. No authority is cited as furnishing a precedent for what seems to us a strained construction. Appellee the employer cites many cases as furnishing support for its argument that the four guards were in their seniority rights by tbe quoted sections of the contract. But • none of the cases is close enough in point to warrant discussion. The court below accepted the argument of the employer and the Union as to the meaning of the sections and we agree with its conclusion.
Appellants take the position that it was improper for the court below to consider testimony of prior or contemporaneous construction by the parties of the questioned provisions of the contract. They cite a number of Texas cases supporting the rule that, if the words of a contract are clear and free from ambiguity, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, alter, amend or add to the terms of the writing. Nobody questions that principle of law, but we are dealing here with a trial before the court without a jury and with a sharply contested issue as to whether the seniority which should accrue to employees promoted to supervisory position should have application only to those promotions which should be made after the contract had been entered into. The court found that the contract, interpreted by its four corners, carried the meaning that the questioned language applied to all employees whether their promotion took place before or after the signing of the first contract.
It added as a separate finding the conclusion, inescapable from the evidence, that the parties had uniformly construed the contract as having the meaning the court below gave it, had discussed changing the language so as to make it conform to the appellants’ present contentions, and that the appellants themselves were well aware of the interpretation given the language by the parties and of the discussions about a possible change in the language. No harm accrued to the appellants by the fact that the court heard this testimony, because the decision was already against them, and properly we think, on the meaning of the contract without the evidence of construction by the parties.
Appellants argue earnestly that they were entitled to have their grievances submitted to arbitration by the Union. They present many details of their controversy with the Union, and would have us hold that they were the vietims of extremely unfair treatment arismg from their contention that the Union ¿>2 • i , ... officials and representatives were acting in collusion with the employer. There is no doubt that there was difference of opinion among the union members as to whether the Union should sponsor and press the appellants’ claims through the arbitration and other procedures provided in the contracts.
But the trial court heard the testimony and concluded that there was no collusion between the Union representatives and the employer, and that appellants had failed to show any evidence of conspiracy or fraud between them. We agree with the conclusions of the trial judge and feel, as we are sure he did, that union officials should be given a wide latitude in deciding intra-union disputes and that courts should be slow to- intervene m them, but should, on the other hand, invest their decisions and actions with a presumption of honesty and fairness’
We agree with the sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 686, 97 L.Ed. 1048, which the Union quotes in its brief:
“* * * The bargaining representative * * * is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of all whom it represents, * * * Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms 0f any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and dasses flf j The mere ex- , . istence of such differences does not _ . _,, mak® them mvalld’ The comPlete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to comPlete S°od faith and honesty of Pur“ pose in the exercise of its discretion.”
A number 0f the points raised by appellants were dealt with by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the recent case of Henderson et al. v. Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, 1961, 296 F.2d 677. We have considered all of the specifications of error relied upon by the appellantS) and we think they are with. ou¿ merit We think that this record reveals that employer and the Union acted with restraint and maturity in the handling of the claims of these appellants, and that they were accorded all of the rights to which, under the contract and the law, they were entitled.
The judgment of the lower court was, in our opinion; right and it is
Affirmed. | [
"\n \n . Initially both the International Union and the Local were sued, but the action against International was abandoned.\n ",
"\n \n . The court found inter aUa: That appellants were hired subsequent to Guards Lann, Gunter, Martin and Pick-ens -whose elevation to supervisory capacity, and subsequent reduction to guard status furnishes the basis of appellants’ case;\n That the Union was certified as bargaining agent March IS, 1953, after the appellants and the other guards mentioned had been employed, and after Lann et al had been promoted to supervisory positions; that renewal contracts between the employer and the Union were entered into July 23, 1953, March 18, 1954, March 18, 1955, May 15, 1956 and May 15, 1958;\n That the contracts provided that those guards serving as general officers upon the date of certification would continue to accrue seniority under the contract from their original date of hire and that consistently since the original contract, both the employer and the Union had interpreted the contract “so as to permit continuance of accrual of seniority by guard officers during the tenure of their service as officers;”\n That all guards serving as officers had continued to accrue seniority and their seniority had been shown on the posted seniority lists; that during intermittent cutbacks in the size of the work force, guard officers Lann et al had been “bumped back” into non-supervisory guard positions and had always been carried on seniority lists, their authority dating from the original hire; that appellants jlaa knowledge of these procedures through the quarterly posting of seniority lists, as required by the contracts, and that they were informed of what had transpired;\n That in February, 1959, the employer gave notice to appellants of the termination of their service because of cutback in employed force, and they filed a grievanee with the employer protesting their termination upon the claim that such action violated their seniority rights based upon their contention that they had more seniority than Lann et al; that appellants, as individuals, demanded arbitration of their grievances, but the demand was rejected by the employer, because the contract did not afford individual employees the right to arbitrate; that in March, 1959, the Union requested arbitration, but the employer denied the request, because it was not filed within the time provided by the contract; that this request for arbitration was made by the Union, although it did not agree with the substance of the grievances; and that the Union had initially declined to seek arbitration, both because it believed the grievanees lacked merit and because of the expense involved in arbitration.\n ",
"\n \n . The trial judge stated spontaneously after hearing the oral arguments:\n “Now I find it hard to believe that anyone could take the position that a particular class, in this instance the guards, would be discriminated against if they received promotion in their class. And therefore, you could not count the period which they are promoted to supervisor in their seniority. I can’t conceive for the life of me, any fair reasoning, how anybody can take that position that you would be discriminated against, if you received promotion in your particular class. And the Court will have to conclude that a supervisor is a promotion from a guard.”\n Referring to his estimate of the contention of appellants that the Company should have given seniority to appellants while disregarding the rights of others who were previously employed, the trial judge stated:\n “Now to the Court’s way of thinking that would be the most unfair position that a company could possibly take. And 'to follow that line of reasoning, the plaintiffs themselves who are members of the contracting group of 1953, say yes, we favor seniority for those in our group who go up to supervisors. We favor that for ourselves, but we don’t favor it for anybody else. Now, does that smack of fairness? Does that smack of good reasoning? Does that smack of logic? It’s all right, we will claim seniority for ourselves, but no seniority for anyone else, because they are not part of the contracting group. Notwithstanding the fact, that they are the same class of people. They are guards and supervisors. That’s what you are dealing with, guards and supervisors * *\n \n ",
"\n \n . E. g., Bauer v. Taylor, Tex.Civ.App. Eastland, 118 S.W.2d 826, writ refused; and Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R. 1217.\n ",
"\n \n . The Union points out that, in the handling of collective bargaining contracts, the practice of the parties has been uniformly accorded great significance. It quotes from Werne, Law and Practice of the Labor Contract, Callaghan & Co., 1957, Vol. 1, at page 195:\n “Where past practice has established a meaning for language that is subsequently used by the parties in a new agreement, it is a well settled principle of arbitration that the language will be presumed to have the meaning given it by such practice.”\n And the Union cites further Vol. 6, Labor Law Reporter, § 51, 732; International Shoe Co., 31 Labor Arbitration Reports 739; Hoke, Inc., 3 Labor Arbitration Reports 748; Diamond Alkali, 2 Labor Arbitration Reports 720; and Columbia Steel Co., 5 Labor Arbitration Reports 638, as sustaining the right of the court to consider the course of dealing between the parties in interpreting the clauses in a labor agreement.\n ",
"\n \n . We approve also language quoted in the Union’s brief from the case of Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, D.C., 171 F.Supp. 782, 791, 793, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 273 F.2d 614:\n “The philosophy of the Union in retaining control over disputes and of the Company in requiring the same is sound. A contrary procedure which would allow each individual employee to overrule and supersede the governing body of the Union would create a condition of disorder and instability which would be disastrous to labor as well as to industry. * * *\n “ * * * The principal purpose of the-grievance procedure is not to provide a framework within which individual desires and complaints can be taken up with the employer; rather, it is to provide a framework within which the employees may bargain collectively to determine how the general principles of the agreement are to be applied to day-to-day problems.”\n "
] | [] |
f2d_294/html/0012-01.html | "<section class=\"casebody\" data-case-id=\"32044061409587_0003\" data-firstpage=\"12\" data-lastpag(...TRUNCATED) | "\n UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Donald TILLERY v. Angelo C. CAVELL, Warden, Western State Pe(...TRUNCATED) | [
"\n FORMAN, Circuit Judge."
] | [] | [] | [] | "FORMAN, Circuit Judge.\n\nThis is an appeal by Angelo C. Cavell, Warden of the Western State Penite(...TRUNCATED) | ["\n \n . It was agreed at the hearing that pending these proceedings Mr. Cavell was succe(...TRUNCATED) | [] |
f2d_294/html/0024-01.html | "<section class=\"casebody\" data-case-id=\"32044061409587_0004\" data-firstpage=\"24\" data-lastpag(...TRUNCATED) | "\n UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alvin B. SAWYER, Appellant.\n Nos. 8263-8265.\n (...TRUNCATED) | [
"BOREMAN, Circuit Judge."
] | [] | [] | [] | "BOREMAN, Circuit Judge.\n\nIn No. 8265, Alvin B. Sawyer and codefendants, William Edward Griffin an(...TRUNCATED) | ["\n \n . On cross-examination, Swain testified in response to questions as follows:\n (...TRUNCATED) | [] |
f2d_294/html/0032-01.html | "<section class=\"casebody\" data-case-id=\"32044061409587_0005\" data-firstpage=\"32\" data-lastpag(...TRUNCATED) | "\n James HODGSON v. LLOYD BRASILEIRO PATRIMONIO NACIONAL, Appellant, v. MURPHY-COOK & CO.\n N(...TRUNCATED) | [
"STALEY, Circuit Judge.",
"PER CURIAM.",
"BIGGS, Chief Judge"
] | [
"Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and McLAUCHLIN, KALODNER, STALEY and HASTIE, Circuit Judges."
] | [] | [] | "STALEY, Circuit Judge.\n\nOn this appeal we are called on to determine a shipowner’s right to ind(...TRUNCATED) | ["\n \n . The shipowner refers us to Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 1960, (...TRUNCATED) | [] |
f2d_294/html/0036-01.html | "<section class=\"casebody\" data-case-id=\"32044061409587_0006\" data-firstpage=\"36\" data-lastpag(...TRUNCATED) | "\n Leslie TAYLOR and Kevin Taylor, minors, by Wilbert Taylor and Hallie Taylor, their parents an(...TRUNCATED) | [
"CLARK, Circuit Judge.",
"MOORE, Circuit Judge"
] | [] | [] | [] | "CLARK, Circuit Judge.\n\nThis is a class action brought by eleven Negro children through their pare(...TRUNCATED) | ["\n \n . The Board makes much of a decision in its favor in an adversary proceeding broug(...TRUNCATED) | [] |
f2d_294/html/0052-01.html | "<section class=\"casebody\" data-case-id=\"32044061409587_0007\" data-firstpage=\"52\" data-lastpag(...TRUNCATED) | "\n Ray H. SCHULZ and Doris L. Schulz, Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Appellee.(...TRUNCATED) | [
"CROCKER, District Judge."
] | [] | [] | [] | "CROCKER, District Judge.\n\nTwo questions arise on appeal from the Tax Court: (1.) Whether the amou(...TRUNCATED) | ["\n \n . § 188. “Different taxable years of partner and partnership. If the taxable ye(...TRUNCATED) | [] |
f2d_294/html/0056-01.html | "<section class=\"casebody\" data-case-id=\"32044061409587_0008\" data-firstpage=\"56\" data-lastpag(...TRUNCATED) | "\n Albert Gordon MacRAE and Sheila MacRae, Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Res(...TRUNCATED) | [
"JERTBERG, Circuit Judge."
] | [] | [] | [] | "JERTBERG, Circuit Judge.\n\nBefore us is a petition for review of a decision of the Tax Court of th(...TRUNCATED) | ["\n \n . Internal Revenue Code of 1939:\n Ҥ 23. Deductions from gross income.\n (...TRUNCATED) | [] |
f2d_294/html/0060-01.html | "<section class=\"casebody\" data-case-id=\"32044061409587_0009\" data-firstpage=\"60\" data-lastpag(...TRUNCATED) | "\n GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. John A. CALLAHAN, Commissioner of Labor an(...TRUNCATED) | [
"\n WOODBURY, Chief Judge."
] | [] | [] | [] | "WOODBURY, Chief Judge.\n\nThe appellant, General Electric Company, is a New York corporation engage(...TRUNCATED) | ["\n \n . “* * * When the board has knowledge that a strike or lockout, which involves a(...TRUNCATED) | [] |
f2d_294/html/0067-01.html | "<section class=\"casebody\" data-case-id=\"32044061409587_0010\" data-firstpage=\"67\" data-lastpag(...TRUNCATED) | "\n Leo TAFARELLA, Appellant, v. Tracy A. HAND, Warden, Appellee.\n No. 6660.\n United Stat(...TRUNCATED) | [
"PER CURIAM."
] | [] | [] | [] | "PER CURIAM.\n\nPetitioner is here on appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing his petitio(...TRUNCATED) | ["\n \n . In addition to cases cited in Tafarella v. Hand, supra, construing 62-1304, see (...TRUNCATED) | [] |
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