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+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court's nonsuit ruling does not expressly address the negligence per se, negligent hiring, or <mask> and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA) causes of action. Doe does not assert this is error or a basis for reversal. (See Jones v. Jacobson (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1, 19, fn. 12, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 522 [\"issues and arguments not addressed in the briefs on appeal are deemed forfeited\"].) At oral argument, the parties agreed it was unnecessary to specifically address these causes of action (or, in the case of negligence per se, a theory) in this opinion because the issues of foreseeability and causation applied to all of the negligence-based causes of action. Additionally, the CANRA claim was encompassed within the negligence cause of action because the failure to report was alleged to be a breach of duty underlying that cause of action."], "id": "e922399b-2f75-4138-84b0-b2331b7c1013", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioners are parents of children enrolled in the City School District of the City of New York and a teacher in such District. They have brought these proceedings challenging the November 29, 2010 determination (Decision) of the Commissioner of respondent New York State Department of Education in which *560the Commissioner granted the November 17, 2010 letter request of the Mayor, that a Certificate be issued to Ms. Cathleen Black upon completion of training in <mask> and school violence prevention. In that letter, the Mayor detailed Ms. Black\u2019s lifetime achievements, which achievements included little experience in the educational field. The Mayor stated, however, that Ms. Black, the former president and then chairperson of Hearst Magazines, is an exceptionally qualified candidate for the position of Chancellor of the New York City public schools, noting accomplishments and experience attained over the course of a long career commencing in 1972. Said accomplishments and achievements included: (i) becoming president and publisher of USA Today in 1983; (ii) assuming the presidency of the American Newspaper Publishers Association in 1991; (iii) service as a Trustee of the University of Notre Dame, Trinity University and The Kent School; (iv) service on the boards of IBM, the United Way and the Coca-Cola Company; and (v) service as a board member of the Advertising Council and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Mayor further noted that in the public and nonprofit arena Ms. Black has, inter alia, served on the New York Forum, recently traveled to Detroit with First Lady Michelle Obama to promote youth leadership and mentoring and received the New Orleans Citizenship award for her leadership in helping New Orleans recover and rebuild in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina."], "id": "39f58972-39c3-4561-9728-3756f15486de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["1 Mother is not a party to this appeal. The officer also interviewed Mother and both children, and took photos of R.M.\u2019s injuries. Mother brought R.M. to the hospital the following day, where doctors diagnosed him with \u201c \u2018injury due to physical assault, bruising, contusion of right chest wall, [and] closed fracture of one rib of right side.\u2019 \u201d A <mask> pediatrician opined that punches and kicks to R.M.\u2019s chest and abdomen area could have been deadly or led to internal injuries, liver laceration or bruising, bruising to the intestine and other organs, or a pulmonary hemorrhage. Further, it was unlikely the injuries were caused by another child. D.M. was also examined by a child abuse pediatrician. Although his exam was normal, D.M. expressed during the exam that he felt unsafe with Father. On March 8, 2021, Mother filed a restraining order to prevent Father from contacting her or the children. In addition to the most recent incident of physical abuse against R.M., Mother described two prior incidents when Father physically abused the children. Specifically, in October 2018, Mother observed Father punch D.M. in the head twice and call him a \u201c \u2018momma\u2019s boy.\u2019 \u201d The children had also disclosed to her in December 2020 that Father had punched D.M. in the head and called him \u201c \u2018stupid,\u2019 \u201d and that their stepmother picked up R.M. and threw him down. The application further indicated that Father had a history of physically and verbally abusing Mother during their prior relationship. She alleged that Father had thrown things at her, dislocated her thumb, and caused bruising all over her body. She also reported that she suffered a miscarriage in 2014 after Father repeatedly hit and kicked her. Based on the information Mother provided in the application, a temporary restraining order was granted and a hearing was set for mid-March."], "id": "8954c6f9-8230-4e5a-b22e-b2bb594a3934", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The police officers knew that claimant, who was 10 years older than his live-in girlfriend, the mother of the deceased child, had been living with her at the rented cabin since before Kenneth\u2019s birth. The officers were also aware that claimant was not the child\u2019s father but had contributed $105 per month to the household and had fed and cared for the children since moving in with their mother. Certainly, the officers had obtained enough information to deduce that although claimant had not taken on an official imprimatur of fatherhood, his past activities, which were closely connected to the deceased child\u2019s welfare, constituted a reasonable basis for them to conclude *95that claimant had accepted responsibility for the child\u2019s general welfare. In fact, Investigator Kovac testified that as a result of his investigation, he believed that claimant was acting as the child\u2019s guardian. Although these activities did not equate to a legal finding of acting in loco parentis\u2014the necessary ingredient required for conviction for <mask> based on acts of omission\u2014it does relate to the arresting officers\u2019 belief or state of mind in evaluating probable cause. It is also well to note that although this claim was filed on August 11, 1993, claimant, on March 9, 1994, admitted in Family Court, Ulster County, that he was a person legally responsible for all three of the Manon children and, in that same proceeding, he consented to the entry of a finding of neglect in the case of Kenneth Manon. Although these admissions were made after his arrest and acquittal, at this stage of this proceeding, they do constitute some evidence of justification for the arresting officers\u2019 belief at the time of the arrest that claimant\u2019s relationship to Kenneth amounted to an acceptance of responsibility for the child\u2019s welfare. At this junction of claimant\u2019s quest for justice it appears that had the truth of claimant\u2019s relationship to Kenneth, as admitted to in the Family Court proceedings, been known at the time of the criminal proceedings, claimant would be elsewhere and definitely not prosecuting this claim. Suffice it to say that if an arraignment or indictment which occurs subsequent to an arrest without a warrant constitutes some proof of the presence of probable cause in deciding the issue of justification for the arrest without a warrant (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d, supra, at 458), more persuasive evidence of the presence of probable cause emanates from subsequent in-court admissions made by the offending party to essential elements of the charges upon which the initial arrest was made."], "id": "3e6c0f92-41f7-4890-8d0b-4d8288a788d6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Lastly, because the proceedings regarding the mother remain ongoing, this Court reminds the circuit court of its duty to establish permanency for the children. Rule 39(b) of the Rules of Procedure for <mask> and Neglect Proceedings requires: At least once every three months until permanent placement is achieved as defined in Rule 6, the court shall conduct a permanent placement review conference, requiring the multidisciplinary treatment team to attend and report as to progress and development in the case, for the purpose of reviewing the progress in the permanent placement of the child."], "id": "16b8426f-67ff-4192-83ab-017c16eebd76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cNotwithstanding section four hundred fifteen of this title,[2] section one thousand forty-six of the family court act,[3] or, except as set forth herein, any other provision of law to the contrary, an unfounded report shall not be admissible in any judicial or administrative proceeding or action; provided, however, an unfounded report may be introduced into evidence: (A) by the subject of the report where such subject is a respondent in a proceeding [brought] under article ten of the family court act or is a plaintiff or petitioner in a civil action or proceeding alleging the false reporting of <mask> or maltreatment; or (B) in a criminal court for the purpose of prosecuting a violation of subdivision three of section 240.55 of the penal law. Legally sealed unfounded reports shall be expunged ten years after the receipt of the report.\u201d"], "id": "dda30429-751f-4543-b87f-77a7d1dc46d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In the instant case, three children said to have been the victims of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of their father with whom they lived were referred from the emergency room to a pediatrician who specialized in <mask>. The doctor, who testified at trial, performed thorough individual examinations to determine the state of the children\u2019s health and prescribe any necessary treatment. During the examination, as she noted physical injuries to each of their bodies, she asked with respect to that injury, \u201cWhat happened, how did this mark get there?\u201d3 Such queries were necessary because the physician treating child abuse not only attends to physical injury, but must also evaluate the need for additional treatment, including mental health referrals. (103 Pediatrics No. 1 [Jan. 1999].) In other words, the treating physician, \u201cmust be attentive to treating the emotional and psychological injuries which accompany this crime. * * * The exact nature and extent of the psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often depend on the identity of the abuser.\u201d (United States v Renville, 779d 430, 437 [8th Cir 1985]; see also, People v Moten, 2001 WL 985815, 2001 Mich App LEXIS 2641 [Mich Ct App, Aug. 28, 2001] [child victim\u2019s statements to doctor advising of the assault and identifying the defendant as the assailant were for purposes of medical treatment and diagnosis and necessary to develop a comprehensive treatment plan for the child].)"], "id": "e50d1cc5-fede-412d-8928-5ddb47e0a365", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cTwo-thirds of reported nonfamily abductions involve sexual assault. Of the 2.4 million reported cases of <mask> in 1989, 380,000 involved sexual abuse . . . The Justice Department has reported that over 85 percent of nonfamily abductions involved force and over 75 percent involved a weapon. Of the homicides that occur from stranger abductions, almost 40 percent involved rape or another sexual offense, and those are only the cases in which the circumstances were known . . . Under the Jacob Wetterling bill, the type of crimes that would trigger the registration requirement include the kidnaping or false imprisonment of a minor . . . .\u201d *847Representative Ramstad of Minnesota similarly commented that JWA was needed to establish a national registration system for child abductors and child molesters. (140 Cong Rec H2510-06 [Apr. 20, 1994]; see also Report by Comm on Judiciary, HR Rep No. 103-392, 103rd Cong, 1st Sess [1993] [referring to a 1990 study by the Department of Justice finding that two thirds of reported nonfamily abductions involved sexual assault].)"], "id": "ced3c5ae-3ec6-453e-bc7d-2045d9c27440", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Subsequent to Brown (supra), two appellate courts of this State have determined that the holding in Brown applies in the context of Family Court <mask> proceedings and criminal proceedings (see, People v Roselle, 193 AD2d 56 [2d Dept 1993]; Nelson v Dufficy, 104 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1984], lv denied 64 NY2d 610; People v Bosilkofski, 134 AD2d 869 [4th Dept 1987])."], "id": "723d4af2-3f15-4689-988f-7ffff4cf62ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In June of 2020, the DHHR filed a <mask> and neglect petition against petitioner and the mother based upon allegations of drug abuse. Specifically, the DHHR alleged that then nine- year-old C.D. reported the parents abused drugs. According to C.D., the parents \u201cw[ould] stay awake for days at a time and then sleep for long periods of time,\u201d would not feed the children or change the youngest child\u2019s diaper, and frequently invited guests into their home to smoke things out of pipes. Other family members also reported that the parents abused drugs. The DHHR alleged that petitioner sold the family\u2019s food stamps for drugs and tested positive for methamphetamine earlier that month. As such, the DHHR concluded that the parents failed to provide the children with necessary food, clothing, supervision, and housing, and that the parents were not sufficiently motivated to provide for the needs of the children on an ongoing basis."], "id": "df0488e3-5393-4786-9b6d-d7aeeea6e8fa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["It is clear that Social Services Law \u00a7\u00a7 419 and 420 are complementary. To \u201cencourage\u201d reporting of suspected <mask> or neglect immunity is granted in section 419 when a party, in good faith, reports suspected abuse or neglect because there are criminal and civil penalties for the failure to report suspected abuse or neglect under section 420. It is also clear that with the exception of Social Services Law \u00a7 420, the Legislature has declined to grant any other private right of action for money damages. This court refuses to find an \u201cimplicit\u201d private right of action, as asserted by the plaintiff, which the Legislature has not granted."], "id": "2b24efc8-26be-4790-a273-1808dc77c28c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["case from September 2019 to the time of the termination hearing, except during her maternity leave, which lasted from November 2020 until March 1, 2021. Housh testified that the family had two prior court-involved cases which Candice was able to resolve. She provided that when the current case began in September 2019, DHHS offered family support services, visitation services, referrals to treatment facilities, structured decisionmaking assessments (which are a tool that DHHS uses to determine children\u2019s safety), and a substance abuse evaluation. Housh testified that Candice posed a safety risk to the children because, when Candice was intoxicated, she was unable to provide them with adequate supervision, parenting, and care. The month after the January 2020 dispositional hearing, Candice was arrested for child neglect after she, while vis- ibly intoxicated, attempted to contact Serenity at a recreation center. Candice\u2019s visitations were temporarily suspended with the provision that visitations could take place in a therapeutic setting while Candice was sober. Following a hearing in early March, the court ordered that Candice \u201cshall have a minimum of once weekly supervised parenting time with the minor chil- dren [and that Candice] shall not use or be under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances during her parenting time and may be required to undergo testing prior to any visit tak- ing place.\u201d After Candice\u2019s February 2020 arrest for <mask>, she entered a short-term residential treatment program. While in short-term residential treatment, Candice suffered a relapse, but she was able to successfully complete the program. She then transitioned to the residential \u201cProject Mother Child\u201d program. In June, the court permitted Candice to move from supervised visitation to monitored visitation, which allowed Candice and the children to walk from Candice\u2019s inpatient residential facility to nearby stores. While in the residential program, Candice relapsed and was intoxicated during at least two of her monitored visitations with her children. One of - 607 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 30 Nebraska Appellate Reports IN RE INTEREST OF SERENITY A. & CANJERRICA D. Cite as 30 Neb. App. 602"], "id": "1198ccd9-9d50-4bc0-a94a-6c8d544bd128", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, a government agency can be held liable for negligent acts and omissions involving a protected class of individuals, in this case children in registered family day-care facilities, regardless of whether the alleged acts or omissions are ministerial or discretionary in character, as there is a special duty owed to such children. In the instant case, there was a special relationship between the DOH (the city agency responsible for registering family day-care providers), the ACS (the city agency responsible for both investigating complaints of <mask> and maltreatment and for furnishing lists of registered day-care providers to parents), and the \u201cprotected class\u201d of children, including Briana, whose working parents rely on the registration requirements to locate safe day-care providers."], "id": "b018aea4-effc-4479-b02a-228995d802c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In order to establish a prima facie case of <mask> or neglect, ACS had only to present evidence of an injury to a child that would not ordinarily occur absent an act or omission of the parent or other person responsible for the care of the child, and that the parent or other such person was the child\u2019s caretaker when the injury occurred (see Family Ct Act \u00a7 1046 [a] [ii]; Matter of Philip M., 82 NY2d 238, 243 [1993]). \u201cUpon presentation of such proof, the burden of going forward shifts to the parent or other person responsible for care of the child to offer a reasonable and adequate explanation of how the child sustained the injury\u201d (Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N.Y. v Hyacinth L., 210 AD2d 329, 330-331 [1994])."], "id": "7b82d2d9-274e-4758-bbd4-33f49baf3d02", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The testimony of the teachers was that in late January, 1982 the child came to them and said \u201cshe was having problems at home. Her father was touching her and making her do things.\u201d About three weeks later, she came to *835the teacher again crying that the \u201csame things are going on.\u201d The school counselor then called the child\u2019s mother and filed the <mask> complaint."], "id": "242d3aea-32ee-463c-a78b-2fbaed92fc2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In December of 2020, the DHHR filed a <mask> and neglect petition alleging that petitioner committed acts of domestic violence against the mother in the presence of the children, then two-year-old K.E. and five-year-old B.E. The DHHR alleged that the mother stated petitioner \u201cfrequently physically abuse[d] her\u201d and that petitioner was serving parole for a \u201cfleeing with reckless indifference\u201d conviction. A Child Protective Services (\u201cCPS\u201d) worker interviewed petitioner, who denied physical violence with the mother. Petitioner asserted that the"], "id": "04cece16-746d-4901-8245-85b46b70dc2d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The CPS investigators in both People v Wilhelm (34 AD3d 40, 46-47 [2006]) and People v Greene (306 AD2d 639, 641 [2003]) were part of countywide teams, that included police officers, assigned to investigate allegations of <mask>. Ms. *341Kurlander was not a part of any such joint venture. The use of formal teams made up of police, CPS investigators and prosecutors was undoubtedly ended by decisions like Wilhelm and Greene \u2014 decisions that ordered the suppression of statements given to team members. The obvious alignment of interests between these parties, however, remains unchanged. Ms. Kurlander was subpoenaed by the District Attorney\u2019s office to testify in criminal proceedings against the defendant. She had not sought to interview the defendant at the time she responded to the subpoena. Ms. Kurlander spoke to an Assistant District Attorney and learned that the prosecution of the defendant had stalled because of the mother\u2019s recantation of allegations previously made against the defendant. Ms. Kurlander told the prosecutor that she would see the defendant the next day and advise his office of the results of the interview. The defendant\u2019s admissions were immediately reported to the District Attorney\u2019s office. The investigator\u2019s jailhouse interview with the defendant fulfilled her statutory obligation to investigate the reported child abuse; I find that she also went intending to aid the prosecution if she could."], "id": "a499e694-05f8-4c8f-a106-124f68e0865f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["However, in a May 24, 1973 letter from the Hospital Association of New York State in support of Assembly Bill 6514A, the Association expressed reservations concerning \u201cimposing civil liability for the damages proximately caused by failure to report suspected cases of <mask>.\u201d The Association stated, \u201cWe are fearful lest frivolous and unnecessary litigation be initiated against hospitals and their personnel.\u201d (Bill Jacket, L 1973, ch 1039, at 38.)"], "id": "61b3e960-d1ab-4eaa-bc14-119ba89fbfb8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The record details the extensive services provided to respondent and the children, born in January 1983 and July 1984, by petitioner from as early as September 1987. Child Protective Services subsequently became involved with this family as a result of a report from the State Central Register for <mask> and Maltreatment on February 2, 1988. The report was indicated for inadequate guardianship in March 1988. Other reports were subsequently made and indicated against respondent for lack of supervision and inadequate guardianship."], "id": "5593a2fd-898c-476b-aff3-851649980b35", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Multiple witnesses testified regarding the LAUSD policies, code of conduct, and training on sexual harassment and <mask>. Garcia testified that administrators and teachers received semi-annual training on the policies and reporting requirements. She also discussed training on the code of conduct, including that employees should avoid touching or having physical contact with students that is not age appropriate or within the scope of their employment. As mandated reporters, the teachers and administrators were required to report any suspected abuse by filing a Suspected Child Abuse Report (SCAR) with the child abuse unit of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), as well as an LAUSD incident report."], "id": "7bc58877-c0c2-4f37-af6d-af326415f177", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\"Aaron is seen at least twice per month w/ facial bruises. [Mother] gives varying excuses. Today Aaron had a couple [of] fading bruises on his forehead, as well as fading bruises around his mouth & cheek appearing to be fingerprints. \"[Mother\u2019s] explanation of these bruises is that [child] was choking & fell out of a chair. Bruises are inconsistent w/ [mother\u2019s] explanation. Source concerned because [child] too frequently has facial bruises of [unknown] origin. \"[Mother] often said that Aaron is bad & he has the devil in him. Source feels Aaron doesn\u2019t misbehave. Aaron appears nervous & withdrawn. Jennifer is also seen w/ bruises but not frequently.\u201d After receiving the call and deciding that the information could reasonably constitute a report of <mask>, the SCR worker filled out the report form and immediately took steps to convey the information to the CPU in the county where the suspected abuse was occurring (Social Services Law \u00a7 422 [2]). Unfortunately, she apparently thought that Canandaigua was located in Oneida County, rather than Ontario County, and either did not refer to the reference guides available to assist workers in verifying locations around the State or misread the information contained therein. The report of suspected abuse was therefore relayed to Joseph A. Cantar ana, a CPU worker in Oneida County. In a tragic coincidence, Mr. Cantar ana was *1023also unfamiliar with the location of Canandaigua and apparently did not consult any of the maps or other resources that were available to him. The mistake was not discovered until the following morning, January 24, when Mr. Cantar ono\u2019s report was given to his supervisor; he was directed to immediately notify SCR that the report had been sent to the wrong county."], "id": "fe815918-950d-4b10-893e-801fe673dd56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Significantly, the Legislature provided that unfounded reports of <mask> be expunged, not sealed. The two words are not synonymous. \u201cThe word \u2018expunge\u2019 is described as a term expressive of cancellation or deletion, implying not a legal act, but a physical annihilation\u201d. (35 CJS, Expunge, at 343.) On the other hand, when a record is sealed it is merely segregated to ensure its confidentiality to the extent specified in the controlling statute. Thus, in considering the intent of the Legislature when it used the word \u201cexpunged\u201d in Social Services Law \u00a7 422 (5), the court is obliged to follow one of the primary rules of statutory construction, which is to ascertain intent from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to an artificial construction (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 94)."], "id": "a0acdcbb-db7f-42f1-8d7f-e6c4039dbbe2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["As stated above, the contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing finally began *878on February 6, 2015. During the extended hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony from three medical experts: Dr. Barnes, Dr. Hyman, and Dr. Albin. Dr. Barnes-a Stanford-based pediatric radiologist and pediatric neuroradiologist-testified at mother's request that there could be a *314number of explanations for Andrew's injuries other than abuse, including birth trauma, vitamin D deficiency, or vascular or bone fragility disorders such as Ehlers Danlos syndrome (EDS).4 Based on the imaging, Dr. Barnes found birth injury to be the most likely explanation, along with some type of vascular or bone fragility disorder, but he could not rule out <mask> as a possible cause. He explained the different ages of bleeding found in Andrew's brain by hypothesizing that there could be rehemorrhage on top of an older injury. However, Dr. Barnes testified without reviewing the minor's medical records, other than certain select radiology reports, without viewing images of the infant's external injuries (in particular the bruising that could be used to help date the skull fracture ), and without access to any follow-up testing, including the second skeletal survey of the minor. In addition, Dr. Barnes indicated that it is rare to make a determination of child abuse based on review of imaging alone. Rather, a finding of child abuse is a \"more holistic determination\" made by all of the relevant experts coming together, including those involved in the social aspects of a case."], "id": "687e979a-9df9-40d8-9632-c7a1777df2fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": [". A provisional certificate (the more junior of the two certificates) is valid for five years and requires a Bachelor\u2019s degree with credits in the teacher\u2019s content area, professional education credits, passage of the State\u2019s liberal arts and science test, passage of the State\u2019s assessment of teaching skills, graduation from an approved teaching program (or satisfaction of an alternative transcript review) and completion of a <mask> and prevention course. Requirements for a permanent certificate (which is valid for life) are satisfaction of the requirements for a provisional certificate, a Master\u2019s degree, two years of teaching or a one-year internship, passage of a test in a subject area if applicable to their teaching, and passage of the performance portion of the assessment of teaching skills in which the individual is videotaped teaching. To teach without certification under a temporary license, an individual need only have a Bachelor\u2019s degree and be nominated by a district that has exhausted its supply of certified teachers."], "id": "a219e5b0-5c32-47a5-afd5-39b90bf4018b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "CHILD ABUSE", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["VIOLATION OF CERTAIN COURT ORDERS OR CONDITIONS OF BOND IN A FAMILY VIOLENCE, <mask> OR NEGLECT, SEXUAL ASSAULT OR ABUSE, STALKING, OR TRAFFICKING CASE (a) A person commits an offense if, in violation of a condition of bond set in a family violence, sexual assault or abuse, stalking, or trafficking case and related to the safety of a victim or the safety of the community, an order issued under Chapter 7A, Code of Criminal Procedure,6 an order issued under Article 17.292, Code of Criminal Procedure,7 an order issued under Section 6.504, Family Code,8 Chapter 83, Family Code, if the temporary ex parte order has been served on the person,9 or Chapter 85, *308Family Code,10 or an order issued by another jurisdiction as provided by Chapter 88, Family Code,11 the person knowingly or intentionally: ... (2) communicates: (A) directly with a protected individual or a member of the family or household in a threatening or harassing manner[.] Id. \u00a7 25.07(a)(2)(A).12 By its terms, the statute applies only in the very limited context of situations where, at the time of the challenged conduct, a defendant was actively subject to one of these seven types of judicial conditions or orders in a family violence, sexual abuse, stalking, or trafficking case that expressly prohibited him from communicating in threatening or harassing manner with a protected person."], "id": "491e745e-98d0-4461-9bf8-e4c85926afca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In Biondo v Ossining Union Free School Dist. (66 AD3d 725 [2d Dept 2009]), the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the complaint based upon the immunity granted pursuant to Social Services Law \u00a7 419, finding that there were issues of fact regarding whether defendants had reasonable cause to report suspected <mask>, ultimately deemed unfounded by Child Protective Services. In Biondo, a school district employee reported suspected abuse when she observed the mother slap her son\u2019s hand so hard it left a red mark. Further, the employee claimed that the mother seemed irritable and angry and was physically aggressive with her son during the class. Although the procedural posture of Biondo is different than this case, it is relevant that the employee in Biondo actually observed the behavior which formed the basis for suspecting abuse and filing the report. Here, the defendants did not observe anything that caused them to suspect that Diana G-D was being abused."], "id": "d6e0d072-a7e7-49d3-bfaa-e5eb75fdbd31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["An action was commenced against, inter alia, the appellants City of Glen Cove (hereinafter the City) and the City of Glen Cove Police Department (hereinafter the Police Department) alleging that the Police Department was negligent in its handling of a report of <mask>. Prior to commencement of the action, a notice of claim had been served on the City which, in turn, was forwarded to its insurer, the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff denied coverage based on an exclusionary clause in the insurance policy, stating that \"This insurance does not apply to activities of any law enforcement personnel and/or agency.\u201d After the summons and complaint *703in the underlying action were forwarded to the plaintiff, it reserved its right to deny coverage, although it retained counsel to defend the action. The plaintiff then commenced this action seeking a declaration, inter alia, that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the City or the Police Department in the underlying negligence action. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment and the appellants cross-moved for the same relief. The Supreme Court granted the motion and denied the cross motion."], "id": "d6c7b98d-77cd-4909-a584-60262c8473a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Section 1112 of the Family Court Act provides that \u201cAn appeal from an intermediate or final order or decision in a <mask> proceeding may be taken as of right to the appellate division of the supreme court and shall have preference over all other matters. Pending the determination of such appeal, such order or decision shall be stayed where the effect of such order or decision would be to discharge the child \u201d. CPLR 7002 (subd. [a]) on the other hand provides that \u2018 \u2018 a party in a child abuse proceeding subsequent to an order of the family court, may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of * * * detention and for deliverance \u201d, and CPLR 7009 (subd. [a], par. 2) provides for service of notice, before a hearing is held on the writ, 1 \u2018 where a person is detained by order of the family court * * * upon the judge who made the order \u201d, Evidence from consideration of those provisions together is the fact that habeas corpus is not intended and cannot be used as a means of appeal from the Family Court order. Since article 10 of the Family Court Act places jurisdiction in child abuse proceedings in the Family Court, that court rather than this is the proper forum to determine whether a child is \u201c abused\u201d within the meaning of section 1012 of the Family Court Act. Moreover, both the wording of section 1112 and the rule against improper co-ordinate review (see People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, 25 N Y 2d 497, 502) require that any error in the Family Court\u2019s determination of that question be corrected by the Appellate Division. It is, then, only when and *140to the extent that the Family Court acts without or in excess of its statutory authority or in violation of constitutional rights that the habeas corpus court can review and modify or undo the Family Court\u2019s act (see People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, supra, pp. 502-503 and Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 NY 2d 159, 165-166)."], "id": "3b41dd27-abda-4138-acf7-848f2e6db833", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Before we address Charlotte's contentions minor's counsel may receive or inspect RFA information under sections 317 and 827, we examine her arguments that minor's counsel is entitled to such information as a member of a <mask> multidisciplinary personal team under section 10850.1 and that minor's counsel may obtain such information pursuant to subpoena, court order, or other judicial process pursuant to Civil Code section 1798.24, subdivision (k)."], "id": "6a4d4baa-d84b-4553-8e48-22c84d71bddf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["New York State, in particular, went beyond the language proposed by the NCCUSL drafters of the UCCJEA, enacting additional provisions that confer special protection for victims of domestic violence. In a statement of legislative intent that introduces the UCCJEA, the Legislature mandated that issuance and enforcement of child custody and visitation should be accomplished \u201cin a manner that ensures that the safety of the children is paramount and that victims of domestic violence and <mask> are protected.\u201d (Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 75 [2]; see also Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law art 5-A, 2004 Pocket Part, at 41.) New York\u2019s statutory scheme requires a moving party to indicate, for example, whether \u201cany proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings relating to domestic violence . . . and, if *811so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding.\u201d (Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 77-g [2] [e].) By implication, therefore, enforcement of a valid out-of-state decree may be affected by a new domestic violence proceeding."], "id": "05faca65-05e1-4ed9-9311-591a32dbbb9a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Guy P. De Phillips, J. The Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York instituted <mask> proceedings against Gina C., the sole named respondent, with respect to two children \u2014 Travis S., born April 18, 1984, and Jessica C., born December 7, 1985. It is alleged that the child Travis sustained a spiral fracture of the right femur on or about March 3, 1986 while in the care of the respondent who at that time was his regular babysitter. Additionally, it is claimed that respondent\u2019s explanation of the injury is \"inconsistent with the nature of the injury\u201d. Respondent is the mother of the child Jessica. It is undisputed that respondent is no longer the baby-sitter for Travis and that apart from the aforementioned injury to Travis, there is no allegation of respondent\u2019s abusing or neglecting her child, Jessica, or Travis. It is also stipulated that respondent is unrelated to Travis and performed her baby-sitting services in her own home, not in Travis\u2019 home, on a weekly basis consisting of two days per week for some 15 months for varying daily periods of up to eight hours per day. The parents of Travis have not been named as respondents. After issue was joined and prior to fact finding, respondent orally moved to dismiss these two child abuse petitions on the ground that under these circumstances she is not a properly named respondent within the contemplation of Family Court Act article 10. Petitioner contends that the court has and should retain jurisdiction over Gina C., the baby-sitter, as a properly named respondent because she was the \"person responsible for [Travis\u2019] care at the relevant time\u201d (Family Ct Act \u00a7 1012 [g]) and a finding of abuse or neglect as to Travis would justify a derivative finding of abuse or neglect as to respondent\u2019s own child, Jessica (Family Ct Act \u00a7 1046 [a] [i])."], "id": "95c24dcc-bdcb-4de7-bed9-8fd242c4c8e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["DHS took emergency custody of Easter's four children on December 8, 2015, because there was suspected <mask> in connection with the broken leg of one of the children. The accompanying affidavit explained in part that the child stated his father hurt him, and that Easter corrected the child stating that the father had tried to help him. The children were subsequently adjudicated dependent-neglected. The trial court found the explanations concerning the child's broken leg were unsatisfactory. In addition, Easter tested positive for THC. The goal of the case was reunification, but after nineteen months, DHS filed its petition to terminate Easter's rights. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition, finding it was in the children's best interest and that DHS had proved three statutory grounds (\"failure to remedy,\" \"subsequent factors,\" and \"aggravated circumstances\"). The father's *435parental rights were also terminated, but he is not involved in this appeal."], "id": "eb269c5e-d8ab-4cd5-9ba0-9a4a7ae9811a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Once a petitioner in a <mask> case has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent to rebut the presumption of parental culpability (see, Matter of Philip M., 82 NY2d 238). The mother\u2019s failure to come forward at the fact-finding hearing with any explanation to rebut the presumption of parental culpability justified the Family Court in \"draw[ing] the strongest inference against [her] that the op*788posing evidence in the record permitted]\u201d (Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs, v Philip De G., 59 NY2d 137, 141). Mangano, P. J., Altman, Hart and Florio, JJ., concur."], "id": "e5dda0bc-fc22-42ee-83d5-4ce6c4af8dba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["By twice expressly declining the offer of the administrative law judge (hereinafter ALJ) to adjourn the hearing in order to call a Orange County Department of Social Services caseworker to testify, the petitioner waived judicial review of her claim that she was denied the opportunity to examine the caseworker (see Matter of Gray v Adduci, 73 NY2d 741 [1988]; Matter of McMoore v Bezio, 67 AD3d 1218 [2009]; Matter of Davis v Brack, 63 AD3d 1457, 1458 [2009]; Matter of Frederick G. v New York State Cent. Register of <mask> & Maltreatment, 53 AD3d 1075, 1077 [2008]; Matter of Butler v McCall, 221 AD2d 892, 893 [1995])."], "id": "532f79bc-d4a2-4fe3-a5ed-4f88fcf5008d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["*529In 1989, in case number MCR97449, appellant was placed on probation after being convicted of one misdemeanor count of evading a peace officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.1. In 1996, in case number *93SCR22536, appellant was convicted after a jury trial of one felony count of criminal threats under section 422 and three misdemeanor counts: <mask> under section 273a, subdivision (b), vandalism under section 594, subdivision (a), and being under the influence of a controlled substance under Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a). He was denied probation and sentenced to prison."], "id": "8282cc81-ff1d-4623-8703-99b208b20372", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["has suffered an incident of <mask>, shall as soon as possible make a report of the suspected abuse to the agency designated under subsection (d) of this section.\u201d On its face, this is a broad provision: It applies to covered professionals on all federal lands and in all federal facilities and requires a report as soon as possible no matter where the suspected child victim resides, is cared for, or may have been abused. The express incor- poration of subsection (d), however, gives rise to doubt about the scope of subsection (a)\u2019s reporting requirement, because subsection (d) appears to require the Attorney General to designate an agency to receive reports only \u201c[f]or all Federal lands and all federally operated (or contracted) facilities in which children are cared for or reside.\u201d The central question, then, is whether the cross-reference to subsection (d) limits subsection (a)\u2019s otherwise broad language, and if so, in what way. 3 You suggest that it would be reasonable to read the reporting require- ment as applying \u201conly with regard to suspected abuse of children resid- ing or cared for on Federal lands and in federally operated and contracted facilities,\u201d because \u201c42 U.S.C. \u00a7 13031(a) requires reporting only to agencies as designated under subsection (d), and subsection (d) provides for designation only of agencies to receive and investigate reports for Federal reservations in which children are cared for or reside.\u201d VA Letter at 2. In other words, you maintain that, because subsection (d) specifies agencies to receive reports only for \u201cFederal lands and . . . facilities in which children are cared for or reside,\u201d Congress intended to require reports only for suspected abuse of children who reside or are cared for on federal lands or in federal facilities. Moreover, it might be argued that when the Attorney General designates an agency to receive reports for federal lands and facilities in which children are not cared for and do not reside, he is not making designations \u201cunder\u201d subsection (d), because that provision expressly addresses designations only for federal lands and facilities \u201cin which children are cared for or reside.\u201d This construction of section 13031, in your view, would appropriately align the location of the"], "id": "6e647295-a789-48e5-9a53-095e23881a8d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Father Father testified that Mother called the doctor around 10:00 to 11:00 a.m. on April 6, 2020 when they realized E.S. was not moving his arm normally. Father never asked Mother if something happened the night before because nothing seemed out of ordinary and there were no issues. He recalled Mother gave E.S. a bath on the evening of April 5, 2020, and that he swaddled him before E.S. fell asleep. He never questioned Mother about how E.S. was injured. Father had not heard E.S. wake up during the night. Dr. Janet Arnold-Clark Dr. Janet Arnold-Clark, a board-certified general pediatrician and board-certified <mask> pediatrician, was found by the court to be an expert in the area of general and child abuse pediatrics as well as an expert in the diagnosis and treatment of suspected child abuse. She testified the type of force required to cause this type of injury is \u201cabusive force [or] at least more force than would be seen in normal handling.\u201d She explained how clavicle fractures are one of the most common accidental injuries in children who are able to move on their own; but for a three-month-old child who is not mobile, the two causes for such an injury are \u201ca direct blow to a shoulder\u201d or \u201csqueezing.\u201d Dr. Arnold-Clark opined that \u201can injury with enough force to cause a fracture would be a very significant event. And after that significant event, the child would immediately cry, would immediately show distress; and from that point on would be in pain whenever the arm is manipulated or the area was touched.\u201d She said that \u201cevery time you change a onesie in a three-month- old if they have a fracture, the baby will cry and be fussy. And that will let the family know that they need to seek care.\u201d She"], "id": "40ef5b56-3b90-4478-9990-a225db4615f6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["According to a June 4, 1973 memorandum from the Department of Social Services in support of Assembly Bill 6514A, which includes enactment of Social Services Law \u00a7 413, the Department of Social Services believed that the law is intended to address the issue of \u201cthe difficulty in obtaining an accurate measure of the [child abuse] problem.\u201d It believed there were more instances of <mask> than reported. The objective of the new legislation was to accurately report such abuse. (Bill Jacket, L 1973, ch 1039, at 8.)"], "id": "08b63447-3ace-4e0f-ad55-428813eeb811", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["At the fact-finding hearing, the stepmother testified that on or about January 10, 1993, the victim revealed that during visitation respondent touched her rectum and vagina. As a result thereof, a call was placed to the <mask> \"hotline\u201d *751on January 14, 1993 which commenced an investigation. The caseworker assigned as a result of that investigation testified that the victim told her that her mother had touched her in the vaginal and anal areas and had inserted her finger inside of her vagina. The victim further told the caseworker that when respondent did such acts to her, it hurt."], "id": "eba2a326-9e89-48b7-81ae-3116cb60b914", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, even in the absence of the specific provisions of the Social Services Law requiring limited disclosure by the hospital and the EMT of what they reasonably believed was evidence of <mask> or maltreatment, there was a common-law obligation recognized by the Tarasoff exception for both the hospital and the EMT to make whatever disclosures would be necessary to determine if the life of the defendant\u2019s newborn baby was in danger."], "id": "59231334-dfc2-44c2-a749-f872e3770617", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["About three hours after the infant was brought to the emergency room, he was air lifted to Sutter Medical Center in Sacramento, where he would die 10 days later. The coroner's report lists the cause of death as \"[n]on-accidental trauma in a child\" and notes the infant \"was possibly shaken.\" The Stockton Police Department investigated the death as a homicide and the San Joaquin District Attorney's Office charged the infant's father, one of the plaintiffs herein, with four felony counts, including <mask> resulting in death. Eventually, in May 2012, the father entered a plea of no contest to felony child abuse."], "id": "76f86626-9889-4878-b653-888ab68f09ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cSome declaim that the institutions of marriage and family are weak these days and, in fact, stand threatened. Any trial court judge who regularly *483hears divorce, <mask> and domestic violence cases deeply shares this concern. It is not difficult, however, to identify both the causes of the present situation and the primary future threat. They come from inside the institution, not outside of it. Not to be too harsh, but they are a shortage of commitment and an excess of selfishness. Before the Court stand eight couples who credibly represent that they are ready and willing to make the right kind of commitment to partner and family for the right kinds of reasons. All they ask is for the state to make them able . . . \u201cThere is no worthwhile institution that they would dishonor, much less destroy.\u201d (Andersen v King County, 2004 WL 1738447, *8, 12 [Wash Super Ct, Aug. 4, 2004].) Excluding same-sex couples from marrying may, in fact, undermine the State\u2019s interest in providing optimal environments for child-rearing, in that children of those families are then not afforded the same legal, financial and health benefits that children of married couples receive."], "id": "1c82943a-f49c-4eee-8b3e-278ac86c4712", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["However, in a May 24, 1973 letter from the Hospital Association of New York State in support of Assembly Bill 6514A, the Association expressed reservations concerning \u201cimposing civil liability for the damages proximately caused by failure to report suspected cases of <mask>.\u201d The Association stated, \u201cWe are fearful lest frivolous and unnecessary litigation be initiated against hospitals and their personnel.\u201d (Bill Jacket, L 1973, ch 1039, at 38.)"], "id": "cb0443c6-2ae2-4798-85a8-9de74e684991", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["*830In support of the adoption petition, the petitioner submitted reports from the New York State Central Register of <mask> and Maltreatment and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (see, Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 112 [2], [7]; 22 NYCRR 205.58), which indicated that there were no reports in New York of any criminal activity, child abuse, or child maltreatment by the petitioner. However, the petitioner could not obtain similar reports from New Jersey, since New Jersey refused to release this information to anyone except its own State agencies. In view of the petitioner\u2019s failure to submit these reports from the State of New Jersey, the Family Court denied the adoption petition and dismissed the proceeding."], "id": "a771664f-df57-4246-9f4e-ed68363c0288", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Shortly after the children were returned to mother, the Department received two <mask> emergency referrals. On June 12, 2017, it was reported that mother had disclosed that she made D.D. consume chili peppers or drink chili juice as a form of punishment for negative behavior. It was also reported that mother had reached into F.V.'s shirt to retrieve a phone and bus passes during a heated dispute. When the case carrying social worker and the emergency response social worker attempted to investigate the reported incidents, mother refused to allow the emergency response social worker in her home and did not allow them access to the children. She refused to speak to the emergency response social worker without her attorney present."], "id": "de56ae24-1ec2-4eee-a55c-817ef36785c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cSection 390 [of the Social Services Law] is a detailed statute, with 13 subdivisions and many more subparts, occupying 10 pages of McKinney\u2019s Consolidated Laws. It specifies which child care providers shall be licensed and which only registered (Social Services Law \u00a7 390 [2] [a]-[c]); sets out some prerequisites for registration (id. \u00a7 390 [2] [d] [ii] [B]); requires OCFS [Office of Children and Family Services] to establish, by regulation, requirements for licensed and registered providers (id. \u00a7 390 [2-a]); provides for inspections and investigations (id. \u00a7 390 [3] [a], [d], [e] [iii]; [4] [a]); requires certain information to be available to the public (id. \u00a7 390 [8]); authorizes OCFS to prevent noncompliant providers from caring for children (id. \u00a7 390 [3] [e] [ii]); provides for denial, suspension and revocation of licenses and registrations for violations of law (id. \u00a7 390 [10]); and requires OCFS to establish civil penalties for such violations (id. \u00a7 390 [11]). Social Services Law \u00a7 389 (1) imposes criminal liability for willful violations of the provisions of the Social Services Law, including section 390. But there is no statutory provision for governmental tort liability. It is fair to infer that the Legislature considered carefully the best means for enforcing the provisions of Social Services Law \u00a7 390, and would have created a private right of action against erring government agencies if it found it wise to do so. This is not a case where the Legislature has simply prohibited or required certain conduct, and left the mechanism of enforcement to the courts (see e.g. Negrin v Norwest Mtge., 263 AD2d 39, 47-48 [2d Dept 1999]). \u201cWe addressed a similar issue in Mark G. v Sabol (93 NY2d 710 [1999]). The plaintiffs there, children alleging that they had suffered abuse or neglect in the foster homes where they had been placed by New York City child welfare officials, sought recov*993ery from the City, relying on provisions of the Social Services Law designed to protect foster children and to prevent <mask> generally. Emphasizing the detailed, comprehensive nature of the statutes the plaintiffs relied on, we rejected their claim that those statutes implied a private right of action. \u2018[I]t would be inappropriate,\u2019 we said, \u2018for us to find another enforcement mechanism beyond the statute\u2019s already \u201ccomprehensive\u201d scheme. . . . Considering that the statute gives no hint of any private enforcement remedy for money damages, we will not impute one to the lawmakers\u2019 (93 NY2d at 720-721). We reach a like conclusion here.\u201d (McLean, 12 NY3d at 200-201 [emphasis supplied].) In McLean the Court of Appeals acknowledged that this rule of law can have seemingly unfair results, by stating in relevant part: \u201c[This] well settled rule of law denies recovery in cases like this, and that rule, by its nature, bars recovery even where a government blunder results in injury to people deserving of the government\u2019s protection.\u201d (Id. at 204.)"], "id": "087e5751-91ff-45e1-bcbf-d7530c8244ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In each case, the trial court must determine whether the physical or psychological well-being of the <mask> victim or witness before it is sufficiently threatened, and is thus sufficiently important, to outweigh the defendant's right to face the child abuse victim in court. ( Craig , supra , 497 U.S. at pp. 852-853, 110 S.Ct. 3157 ; Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1505-1506, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727.) A criminal defendant's constitutional right to face-to-face confrontation can never be lightly dismissed or overridden, given that it is at \" 'the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.' \" ( Coy , supra , 487 U.S. at p. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 2798.)"], "id": "9a56e7d4-fc0b-4d21-8c98-a8cfc201465d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Social Services Law \u00a7 424 requires that \"all\u201d reports of suspected <mask> receive an investigation within 24 hours after receipt of the report. The city recognizes this obligation as its papers show that it is seeking to obtain 100% compliance. However, it appears from the latest report referred to above, that the city still fails to comply in a significant number of cases. Although these cases may well constitute reports showing the least risk of danger to a child, the Legislature has not given the city the option of deciding which cases to investigate though, of course, prudence would dictate that the reports that appear most serious be given priority."], "id": "4a73e97f-0273-4b1c-afc4-f06d6e1d13f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Cantrell sought to impeach Ms. Claeys's video-recorded direct examination in two ways. First, Cantrell wanted to introduce the testimony of Pastor Greg Mills, who would have testified about the events that ensued after Ms. Claeys told him that her new husband was selling drugs and abusing her children. According to Pastor Mills, Ms. Claeys was hostile toward Cantrell's family after her first husband died, and she had the mistaken impression that Cantrell, rather than Pastor Mills, called the Department of Humans Services (DHS) to report the alleged <mask> and drug use. Second, Cantrell sought to introduce portions of the deposition in which she cross-examined Ms. Claeys about the contents of the report and her mistaken belief that Cantrell made the report to DHS. Applying Arkansas Rule of Evidence 608(b), the circuit court granted Toyota's motion in limine regarding Pastor Mills's testimony and denied Cantrell's request to cross-examine Ms. Claeys about the details of the report. Cantrell now argues that the circuit court abused its discretion because Pastor Mills's testimony about the events underlying the DHS report, as well as Ms. Claeys's misplaced hostility toward Cantrell, was admissible evidence of Ms. Claeys's bias against her."], "id": "2089aace-12ef-40f3-94ba-be3a51f7c0ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cTwo-thirds of reported nonfamily abductions involve sexual assault. Of the 2.4 million reported cases of <mask> in 1989, 380,000 involved sexual abuse . . . The Justice Department has reported that over 85 percent of nonfamily abductions involved force and over 75 percent involved a weapon. Of the homicides that occur from stranger abductions, almost 40 percent involved rape or another sexual offense, and those are only the cases in which the circumstances were known . . . Under the Jacob Wetterling bill, the type of crimes that would trigger the registration requirement include the kidnaping or false imprisonment of a minor . . . .\u201d *847Representative Ramstad of Minnesota similarly commented that JWA was needed to establish a national registration system for child abductors and child molesters. (140 Cong Rec H2510-06 [Apr. 20, 1994]; see also Report by Comm on Judiciary, HR Rep No. 103-392, 103rd Cong, 1st Sess [1993] [referring to a 1990 study by the Department of Justice finding that two thirds of reported nonfamily abductions involved sexual assault].)"], "id": "4ade553a-2c9a-420e-a86b-ec407ca1dd19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Deborah and Israel were the subjects of a report of suspected <mask> or maltreatment against their son. Following an investigation, it was determined that \"some credible evidence of alleged abuse or maltreatment exist[ed]\u201d and the report was marked \"indicated\u201d (Social Services Law \u00a7 412 [12]). After a lengthy fair hearing held at the Getmans\u2019 request pursuant to section 422 (8) of the Social Services Law, the Administrative Law Judge determined that the charges of alleged abuse or maltreatment were not supported by some credible evidence as to either parent, and directed that the records be expunged from the central registry and otherwise (Social Services Law \u00a7 422 [8] [c]). Petitioner thereafter instituted this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to restore the indication of child abuse as against her estranged husband, Israel Getman."], "id": "dbb9d2ce-0e12-4b57-99af-85af32b15dca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["A motion to dismiss one of these proceedings (\u201cJohn\u201d) is expressly based upon failure to allege that the parent \u201chas been adjudicated\u201d a narcotic addict in a proceeding prior to the one at bar, and that therefore the petition fails to state a 'cause of action. This motion is denied. We hold that the Legislature intended by the words \u201c has been adjudicated a narcotic addict \u201d, that the Family Court can so adjudicate in the proceeding before us. (\u00a7 1012.) The phrase \u201chas been adjudicated \u2019 \u2019 means adjudicated prior to our finding of <mask>, not prior to the filing of the child abuse petition herein, and therefore this petition is not premature. Preferably, section 1012 should be amended, to conform with this construction, to read \u201c is a narcotic addict \u2019 \u2019. This intent is evidenced, even as the article now reads, by the cognate section 1019 which provides that \u201c upon the filing of a petition under this article which contains an allegation that\u201d the child\u2019s custodian \u201cis addicted to the use of narcotic drugs, the court shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine the sufficiency of such allegation and if the court, at the conclusion of such hearing, determines that the temporary removal of such child from his home is in the best interest of the child, an order shall be entered providing for the temporary placement of the child.\u201d If thereafter this court must await a jury\u2019s verdict and judgment of narcotic addiction from another court, our further proceedings would be virtually unnecessary and meaningless because under Mental Hygiene Law such persons are required to be removed from the community until they are no longer addicted. Indeed, *351section 206-b of the Mental Hygiene Law forbids that \u2018 \u2018 facts or proceedings relating to * * * certification or treatment of any snch narcotic addict be used against him in any proceeding in any court \u2019 Consequently, if Family Court cannot adjudicate the issue of narcotic addiction, no court can for purposes of child abuse. (Mental Hygiene Law, \u00a7\u00a7 207, 208 et seq.) Moreover, a substantial number of our drug addiction petitions proceed to admissions of such allegations in open court, after appropriate warnings; surely these are cases further illustrating that Family Court final adjudications of narcotic addiction are intended to be appropriate. Several such parents asked this court for help and are now required to remain at Stuyvesant Square Residential Center of the Salvation Army for a period not to exceed 18 months; others can be considered for intake by Odyssey House, by Phoenix Centers, and other licensed establishments for residential care for this malady."], "id": "33c12411-cb40-4a5c-8e12-246dc63e0a76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["*965Regarding the state's interest in protecting child witnesses, Craig reasoned that a state's interest in \" 'the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment,' \" or in \" 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' \" is not just an important state interest, but a \" 'compelling' \" one, and such interest, \"may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court.\" ( Craig , supra , 497 U.S. at pp. 852-853, 110 S.Ct. 3157.) Craig thus held that \"if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity , the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a <mask> case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.\" ( Id . at p. 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157, italics added.)"], "id": "6b5ccd1f-92d8-4afc-817e-4b75699d472b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["John R. LaCava, J. This is a CPLR article 78 proceeding in which petitioner seeks to have <mask> investigation records expunged from the offices of the New York State Central Register (Central Register) and the Westchester County Department of Social Services, Child Protective Services (CPS) which relate to an investigation into alleged child abuse by the petitioner against his daughter and son. Incidental to that relief, he also seeks an order prohibiting all respondents from interfering with contact and visitation between himself and his children. In relation to a prior expungement of his records, he also seeks to compel the Central Register to fully explain the circumstances surrounding that prior expungement. Lastly, petitioner seeks counsel fees."], "id": "460d276d-aa09-4274-b5ae-9a8fd34b5e63", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[defendant\u2019s private interest, his liberty interest in not being stigmatized as a sexually violent predator, is substantial (see, E.B. v Verniero, 119d 1077, 1107 [3d Cir]; Doe v Pataki, 3 F Supp 2d 456, 469 [SD NY]). The ramifications of being classified and having that information disseminated fall squarely within those cases that recognize a liberty interest where there is some stigma to one\u2019s good name, reputation or integrity, c\u00f3upled with some more \u2018tangible\u2019 interest that is affected or a legal right that is altered. (Matter of Lee T.T. v Dowling, 87 NY2d 699, 708 [1996] [placing petitioners\u2019 names on Central Register of <mask> and Maltreatment foreclosed future child care employment, and. satisfied \u2018stigma plus\u2019 test] . . .).\u201d Indeed, as our High Court had noted in Matter of Lee T.T. v Dowling,"], "id": "dfca84f7-60b1-42ad-8ee0-4a678ad71366", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["A petition for <mask> was initiated in Family Court as to defendant\u2019s two older children on January 17, 1995 and subsequently as to defendant\u2019s newborn child. Understandably, a hearing on that petition, which is based solely on allegations arising out of Lucesita\u2019s death, has been adjourned. The outcome of this case may have a significant impact on the Family Court proceeding. In any hearing pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act \"proof of the abuse or neglect of one child shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse or neglect of any other child of * * * the respondent.\u201d (Family Ct Act \u00a7 1046 [a] [i].) The preponderance of the evidence required for a finding that Lucesita was abused would of course be supplied by a conviction herein (see, Family Ct Act \u00a7 1046 [b]). Accordingly, the risk of a conviction here impacts not only on defendant but on her young children as well."], "id": "9ed7cad5-dc47-4e83-920e-9a84fb4a0c29", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The possible harm to a child from a professional misdiagnosis in such circumstances has already been noted. The potential harm to the alleged abuser is equally great. In Rossignol v Silvernail (185 AD2d 497, 499), the Appellate Division, Third *572Department, referred to being labeled a child abuser as \"one of the most loathsome labels in society\u201d, and pointed out the \"physical and psychological ramifications\u201d that may be \"attendant to * * * addressing, defending and dealing with\u201d such accusations. Rossignol also noted that, once made, \"such charges are difficult to escape\u201d (supra, at 500). More recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the inclusion of one\u2019s name on the New York State Register of <mask> and Maltreatment, which identifies those reported to be suspected of child abuse or neglect, is potentially damaging to one\u2019s reputation. By \"branding [one] as a child abuser\u201d, such listing \"certainly calls into question [one\u2019s] 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.\u2019 [Board of Regents v] Roth, 408 U.S. [564], at 573 [1972].\u201d (Valmonte v Bane, 18d 992, 1000.)"], "id": "83011d6f-dfa1-46cb-87cf-114df6a2d6db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In order to seek judicial review of an administrative determination, the individual must demonstrate some direct, harmful effect and a personal interest worthy of judicial protection. As stated by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Dairylea Coop. v Walkley (38 NY2d 6, 9 [1975]): \"A petitioner need only show that the administrative action will in fact have a harmful effect on the petitioner and that the interest asserted is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected by the statute.\u201d The main thrust of the petition herein is in the nature of mandamus seeking to compel the CPS to employ certain techniques to ascertain and \"indicate\u201d <mask>. Of course, this relief is based upon the broad assertion that CPS failed to fully comply with the statutorily imposed duty to thoroughly investigate reports of child abuse and to take any necessary action to protect the child subjected to such abuse. To a certain degree, the petition also seeks relief in the nature of certiorari, petitioner believing that the \"unfounded\u201d determination is arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence."], "id": "6fe44ca9-f958-4f80-82ce-490a200e7868", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["A fair reading of the relevant statutes, as amended since first enacted in 1973, supports such a conclusion. This court had previously noted, \"The legislative policy of precluding the physician-patient privilege in instances of alleged <mask> is so strong that a person who willfully fails to report a case of suspected child abuse shall be guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor. [Social Services Law, Section 420 (1).]\u201d (People v Gearhart, slip opn, supra, at 5.) To that, the following indicators must also be added. First, the report required to be made by the physician must contain, among other things, the name of the suspected abuser and any statements he or she may have made. Further, the report is specifically made admissible in evidence \"in any proceedings relating to child abuse or maltreatment.\u201d (Social Services Law \u00a7 415 [emphasis added]; Agatstein, op. cit., at 124-125.) The statute also contains an immunity provision to insulate the reporter from any civil or criminal liability which might otherwise be a result of his or her report. (Social Services Law \u00a7 419.) This indicates that \"reports concerning statements made by the perpetrator are contemplated, even though they would otherwise be privileged.\u201d (State v Fagalde, 85 Wash 2d, at 736, 539 P2d, at 90, supra; see also, People v Stritzinger, supra, at 752.) Finally, access to these reports (and thus to statements, if any) is given to both Grand Juries, and District Attorneys (Social Services Law \u00a7 422 [4] [A] [f], (l] [as amended by L 1985, ch 677, \u00a7 10]). The purpose for that amendment was unmistakably stated by Governor Cuomo upon approving the Child Abuse Prevention Act of 1985: \"[to] improve the ability of law enforcement officials to investigate and prosecute child abuse cases\u201d (1985 McKinney\u2019s Session Laws of NY, at 3315)."], "id": "b7ba20dc-fd02-4e05-96d5-bef42f2b1b56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, the letters cannot be viewed as correcting a \u201cminor breach of school policy.\u201d (Holt, 52 NY2d at 633.) New York City Board of Education Chancellor\u2019s Regulation A-750 (Sept. 5, 2000) concerns reports of suspected <mask>. The regulation makes every school employee a mandated reporter and requires the employee to report suspected child abuse to the principal immediately. (Answer, exhibit 4, \u00a7 1.1.1.a.) The regulation also requires every employee to report suspected sexual abuse to the SCI, and states that: \u201c[t]he knowing failure of an employee ... to report said misconduct is cause for removal from office or employment.\u201d (Answer, exhibit 4, \u00a7 1.4.) Moreover, section 3.2 of the regulation states: \u201c[u]nder Social Service[s] Law, the willful and knowing failure to report child abuse may result in criminal action or civil liability if the employee has reasonable cause to suspect it. It may also result in Board disciplinary action against the employee.\u201d Here, both the principal\u2019s and the SCI\u2019s accusations that the petitioners endangered the welfare of children by failing to report alleged inappropriate touching could not only be detrimental to their careers, but also expose them to criminal and civil liability. Such serious allegations require that petitioners be afforded the due process protections available under Education Law \u00a7 3020-a. (See Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., 204 AD2d at 446 [letter that alleged sexual harassment without due process protections must *616be expunged]; see also Myers v Chester Union Free School Dist., 300 AD2d 287 [2d Dept 2002]; Jones-Hardwick v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 2007 NY Slip Op 33768[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2007, Acosta, J.].)"], "id": "353935a1-b1f3-4d92-bdf5-e8367405e239", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["We affirm Kipple\u2019s convictions for child enticement and for witness tampering, and we also affirm Kipple\u2019s sentences for child enticement. We vacate Kipple\u2019s sentence for witness tam- pering and remand the cause for further proceedings. BACKGROUND Kipple\u2019s convictions were based on allegations that he invited two girls under the age of 14 into his home, specifically his bedroom, and took photographs of them wearing swimsuits provided by him. The girls testified that they did odd jobs around Kipple\u2019s home and were paid in cash and gifts and that eventually, the performance of these odd jobs also included posing for photographs. These accounts were corroborated by the testimony of a third girl that said the same thing had hap- pened to her. Kipple was originally charged with four counts of pos- session of a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, 1 one count of <mask>, 2 and one count of tampering with a witness. 3 Kipple\u2019s motion to suppress the photographs and videos that provided the basis for the charges against him was granted. Thereafter, Kipple was charged with two counts of crimi- nal child enticement 4 and one count of witness tampering. Following a jury trial, Kipple was convicted. He was sentenced to 12 to 12 months\u2019 imprisonment for each child enticement conviction and 12 to 60 months\u2019 imprisonment for the wit- ness tampering conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. No direct appeal was filed. Kipple then retained counsel that filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging the inef- fectiveness of counsel in failing to file an appeal, as well as Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-813.01 (Supp. 2015). Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-707 (Reissue 2016). Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-919 (Reissue 2016). Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-311(1)(b) (Reissue 2016). - 658 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. KIPPLE Cite as 310 Neb. 654"], "id": "0509933c-a03c-4c86-8197-1c4026753530", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Based on their investigation and review of these findings with the District Attorney, the arresting officers could not be said to have acted without reasonable cause simply because the legal requirement of a finding of in loco parentis was required to support a conviction for the crime charged. In analyzing the facts on this issue, we must remember, based on the autopsy report, that the arresting officers had information indicating that the deceased child had also been physically injured. The report stated that \"[r]eactive new bone of left humerus and 4th and 5th left ribs signifies response to previous bony injury\u201d (see, exhibit B). No explanation of these injuries was provided either by the mother or by claimant. Certainly, reasonable cause is heightened by these facts especially when claimant refused to answer questions in order to protect himself. If these injuries were caused by claimant, it follows that in loco parentis would not be a necessary element in establishing the crime of <mask> (see, People v Stanley, 135 AD2d 910, 911; Penal Law \u00a7 260.10 [1]). There is no question but that claimant held himself out as the deceased child\u2019s mother\u2019s \"significant other\u201d, which could also lead a reasonable person to believe that such commitment also caused to exist some duty to the mother\u2019s children who shared with claimant a common household, at least for being aware of the starving child\u2019s plight and take some action to avoid the inevitable consequences from nonaction. In analyzing reasonable cause, can we not, as reasonable people, say that nonaction, under the present circumstances, arises to a finding of behavior which would likely be injurious \"to the physical * * * welfare of a child\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 260.10 [1]). In loco parentis need not be established for a conviction based on violation of said provision (see, People v Stanley, 135 AD2d, supra, at 911)."], "id": "a7868ef4-71a0-446b-90a4-ab2aceb789b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The respondent contends that the petitioner, as a person reporting an allegation of <mask>, is not a person that the statutes seek to protect and, thus, has no standing to pursue any judicial review of the CPS determination. Petitioner argues that as the mother of a child suspected of being the subject of child abuse and a person directly concerned with the welfare of the child, she has an inherent interest in the determination of the report and may be an aggrieved person due to the result of the determination."], "id": "e7df5f27-22f7-478b-94e6-5af2f0ed3dcb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": [" The record evidence, which included the hearing testimony and the progress notes of the investigating caseworker, established that, on October 25, 2018, a report was made to the Central Register of <mask> and Maltreatment stating that petitioner was refusing [*2]to allow the child \u2014 who was then 16 years old \u2014 into the home. The next day, a DSS caseworker spoke by phone with petitioner, the child's older sister and the sister's next door neighbor. At that point, it was disclosed that the child left petitioner's home in the summer of 2017, when she was 15 years old, and moved in with the sister. The sister and the child relocated to Fair Haven, Vermont in early 2018. The sister explained that the child left her home the week before, after she confronted the child over concerns of promiscuous behavior and the use of marihuana. The child then stayed with a friend for a few days but, after an argument, moved in with the neighbor."], "id": "a0624c48-a548-4856-aaf9-c0c8c54e6ccd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, during summation the prosecutor made remarks which included vouching for the credibility of the People\u2019s medical expert (see, People v LaDolce, 196 AD2d 49, 57) by characterizing him as a \"responsible expert\u201d, reference to defendant\u2019s failure to offer any medical evidence, which impermissibly tended to shift the burden of proof to defendant (see, People v Poladian, 189 AD2d 911, 912, lv denied 81 NY2d 891), and appeals to the jury \"to send a message [to the community]\u201d and \"to do their duty for <mask> victims\u201d, comments which tended to lead the jury away from the issues (see, People v Ashwal, 9 NY2d 105, 110)."], "id": "dd064bf0-ca8c-4c9e-a753-b1eb64a25914", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["such reports are received by social services or health care agencies, and involve allegations of sexual abuse, serious physical injury, or life-threatening neglect of a child, there shall be an immediate refer- ral of the report to a law enforcement agency with authority to take emergency action to protect the child. All reports received shall be promptly investigated, and whenever appropriate, investigations shall be conducted jointly by social services and law enforcement personnel, with a view toward avoiding unnecessary multiple inter- views with the child. Consistent with this directive, the Attorney General has issued a regula- tion designating the agencies authorized to receive and investigate reports of <mask> submitted under section 13031(a). That rule, which appears as 28 C.F.R. \u00a7 81.2 (2010), provides: Reports of child abuse required by 42 U.S.C. 13031 shall be made to the local law enforcement agency or local child protective ser- vices agency that has jurisdiction to investigate reports of child abuse or to protect child abuse victims in the land area or facility in question. Such agencies are hereby respectively designated as the agencies to receive and investigate such reports, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 13031(d), with respect to federal lands and federally operated or contracted facilities within their respective jurisdictions, provided that such agencies, if non-federal, enter into formal written agree- ments to do so with the Attorney General, her delegate, or a federal agency with jurisdiction for the area or facility in question. If the child abuse reported by the covered professional pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 13031 occurred outside the federal area or facility in ques- tion, the designated local law enforcement agency or local child pro- tective services agency receiving the report shall immediately for- ward the matter to the appropriate authority with jurisdiction outside the federal area in question. Att\u2019y Gen. Order No. 2009-96, 61 Fed. Reg. 7704 (Feb. 29, 1996). Under section 13031, \u201cthe term \u2018child abuse\u2019 means the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, or negligent treatment of a child.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 13031(c)(1). Section 13031 further explains that \u201cthe term \u201csexual abuse\u201d includes the employment, use, persuasion, induce- ment, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another"], "id": "02392dc6-66f9-4728-a464-db5b8020cba4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In child protective proceedings, by logical extension of the doctrine, it is also the function of the trial court to determine not only whether neglect or far more serious <mask> exists but that it is likely to exist. The court sitting as parens patriae cannot be limited in these types of proceedings to conditions *698already existing or which has happened in the past. Indeed this court could not be fulfilling its proper function if it limited its necessarily broad sweeping horizon of child health, safety and welfare to the past and present situation only when the warning flags from the storms of abuse and neglect are still flying, and to borrow and paraphrase a familiar saying from another branch of the law, there is abundant evidence of a \u201c clear and present danger \u201d to children. (Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52.)"], "id": "17c7db4c-402a-4df2-b8b7-f0876bce4286", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cDuring the investigation it was discovered that since Ms. Theroulde had two prior indicated cases in 1997 and 1998, she shouldn\u2019t have been licensed as a Day Care Provider in 1999. Also, in this current case, Ms. Theroulde used a lack of judgment by placing Briana on a bed instead of a crib, where she would have been more secured. Also, her shaking the baby cause [sic] further damages in addition to the fall off the bed. Ms. Theroulde\u2019s lack of supervision and inadequate guardianship caused Briana to sustain serious internal head injuries. OCI recommends that Ms. Theroulde\u2019s Day Care Center be closed down to prevent any more children from being abused or maltreated.\u201d (Appell aff in opp, exhibit 6.) Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in or about September 2000, asserting, among other things, that the City was negligent by issuing a registration certificate to defendant Theroulde\u2019s day-care facility despite prior incidents of <mask> and maltreatment, and by including the day-care facility on a list provided by ACS to Ms. McLean (Shakeri aff in support, exhibit B).3"], "id": "134f3c70-f2bc-4236-aed7-366039d1ab4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["federally operated (or contracted) facility\u201d who are engaged in certain activities\u2014individuals the statute calls \u201c[c]overed professionals\u201d\u2014to report suspected incidents of <mask>. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 13031(a)\u2013(b) (2006). Specifically, section 13031(a) provides that [a] person who, while engaged in a professional capacity or activity described in subsection (b) of this section on Federal land or in a federally operated (or contracted) facility, learns of facts that give reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse, shall as soon as possible make a report of the suspected abuse to the agency designated under subsection (d) of this section. 1 Section 13031(d) directs the Attorney General to designate the agency or agencies to which the reports described in subsection (a) should be made. It states: For all Federal lands and all federally operated (or contracted) fa- cilities in which children are cared for or reside, the Attorney Gen- eral shall designate an agency to receive and investigate the reports described in subsection (a) of this section. By formal written agree- ment, the designated agency may be a non-Federal agency. When"], "id": "79fbdbec-b8a4-4060-855d-09b656e7e868", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Likewise, in State v. Snow , 437 S.W.3d 396 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014), the court found evidence sufficient to support a defendant's conviction of first-degree <mask> where a child suffered a head injury which a physician testified was not the result of accident or rough play, and the defendant told law enforcement that \"the only persons present in the home when [the child] was injured were Defendant, Mother, and Mother's two [infant] children.\" Id. at 401. In Snow , as in Ashcraft , the Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for abuse of a child, despite a lack of direct evidence connecting the defendant with the crime. Id. at 402."], "id": "8d0701e9-bbd1-40fe-b35e-4cdfbae18d27", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The statutory language in the relevant sections of the Social Services Law, together with the legislative history and intent behind their enactment and subsequent amendments, make it abundantly clear that the main thrust , of these laws has been to increase the awareness and remediation of <mask> and neglect, a problem which inexorably alters the lives of innocents and debases our society as a whole. However, it is also clear that, in our attempt to increase vigilance and decrease the incidence of child abuse, some individuals and families have been made to suffer anguish, humiliation and loss of respect and even jobs in some instances, by baseless complaints lodged by individuals with personal agendas totally unrelated to their concern for a child\u2019s safety or welfare."], "id": "2f80e6ed-f93a-4945-a15e-0e43119b7a2a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The word \u201cexpunge\u201d does indeed have a plain and ordinary meaning. Although described above, if a further definition is needed, it may be found in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 522 (5th ed 1979), where it defines \u201cexpunge\u201d as follows: \u201cTo destroy; blot out; obliterate * * * efface designedly; strike out wholly. The act *627of physically destroying information \u2014 including criminal records \u2014 in files, computers, or other depositories\u201d. Accordingly, the court holds that when the Society expunged the unfounded reports of suspected <mask> they were in effect destroyed. Therefore, since the records now sought are considered to have been destroyed, they are no longer available to the parties for their use in the instant action. Nor may the defendant father attempt to recreate the records by deposing the Society\u2019s investigator, inasmuch as that would constitute an impermissible circumvention of the express purpose of the statute (see, Memorandum of Assemblyman Albert Vann, 1981 NY Legis Ann, at 308)."], "id": "7bf0cd14-9166-4f09-a005-5e482c7ebcfc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["More persuasive is the People\u2019s reliance on Social Services Law \u00a7 415 which requires immediate \u201c[r]eports of suspected <mask> or maltreatment\u201d from persons or officials required to make such reports (i.e., \u201cmandated reporters\u201d such as physicians, registered nurses, emergency medical technicians, and hospital personnel engaged in the admission, examination, care or treatment of persons [Social Services Law \u00a7 413 (1)]). Social Services Law \u00a7 415 also states that"], "id": "41cf433b-70cb-4fbc-bd14-e86d5ef14554", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["HDWC is authorized to operate, supervise, assist and provide foster care services in the City of New York. Defendant Administration for Children\u2019s Services (ACS) is responsible for the child welfare divisions of the Human Resources Administration/Department of Social Services in the City of New York. The agency was previously known as the Child Welfare Administration. It is responsible for the investigation of <mask> complaints and for the removal of children and placement in protective custody. A foster care placement and temporary discharge of custody to a parent was monitored by *896HDWC (or another foster care agency under contract with the City), and a child permanently placed back into the custody of a parent, post-foster care, was monitored by ACS."], "id": "a571fb5a-9a4e-47d3-ae1a-5a1289083b72", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Section 419 does, however, apply to the City\u2019s investigation of <mask> complaints against plaintiff\u2019s mother. Regardless, there are issues of material fact regarding whether the City\u2019s caseworkers committed gross negligence or willful misconduct in their handling or mishandling of plaintiffs case, which would override the claim of statutory immunity. (See Van Emrik v Chemung, 220 AD2d at 953.) Starting with the fact that one of the City\u2019s caseworkers was disciplined for his failure to remove the children, the record submitted by the City, scanty as it is, paints the picture of an overburdened and disorganized agency that failed to protect plaintiff and her siblings. The court cannot decide as a matter of law, based on the record submitted by the movant, that the City\u2019s failure did not result from gross negligence or willful misconduct."], "id": "3f704030-b03b-4ccc-b64e-c7227562a8fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In August of 2019, the DHHR filed a <mask> and neglect petition alleging that the mother abused and neglected then-one-year-old twins, M.M.-1 and T.M. The DHHR alleged that the mother abused controlled substances during her pregnancy with the twins and then left the children in the care of an inappropriate guardian. The DHHR made no allegations that petitioner had abused or neglected the children. In December of 2019, the mother gave birth to S.M. That child remained with the parents until the DHHR amended the petition in March of 2020. In the"], "id": "f9b6df0c-7bbf-467b-b9a4-30fd9254f57a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The respondents hereunder are not therefore criminal defendants as would require the reasonable doubt standard of proof applicable in criminal cases or in juvenile delinquency cases in the Family Court. By definition, under the Family Court Act, an act of juvenile delinquency is one which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. A finding of neglect or <mask> is not a crime under article 10 of the Family Court Act. If and when the respondents become criminal defendants by operation of section 1014 of the Family Court Act, which allows the Family Court to transfer any proceedings originated under this article to an appropriate criminal court or to the appropriate District Attorney if it concludes, upon a hearing, that the processes of the Family Court are inappropriate or insufficient, the respondents will be entitled to the constitutional guarantee applicable to a criminal proceeding including the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The respondents\u2019 contention that the mere possibility of referral from the Family Court to the criminal court requires the application of reasonable doubt standard, is legally untenable."], "id": "0a0dac1f-e143-49b3-b39e-189f7ae2df8a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Here, it was within the jury's purview to resolve credibility issues and the issue of whether Greg's injuries were the result of <mask> or a medical condition. \"A child's unexplained, non-accidental fractures of various ages support a reasonable inference that the child's caregivers knew of the injuries and their cause.\" In re L.M.M. , 522 S.W.3d 34, 45 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (quoting In re J.D. , 436 S.W.3d 105, 114 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ). According to Reeder, Greg had suffered, at a minimum, three different incidents of abuse while in the care of Mother and Father. Further, while there was conflicting testimony on the issue of nutritional neglect, Reeder testified that Greg gained weight soon after his removal, which indicated that he was failing to thrive as a result of nutritional neglect. We conclude that the evidence referenced above was sufficient for a jury to form a firm belief or conviction that Father engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Greg with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered his physical well-being. See In re J.D. , 436 S.W.3d 105, 114, 116 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (finding evidence sufficient under Ground E where (1) the child sustained two fractures at different times when in the parent's care, (2) the injuries were not accidental, but were caused by extreme force, (3) bone disease was ruled out, and (4) the parent was the primary caretaker, because the child would have screamed in pain so that the caretaker should have been aware of the injury); see also In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573-74 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (discussing Ground D)."], "id": "84502426-dfaa-4fc0-8ca6-4f8d848a081f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["L.B. contends the section 300, subdivision (j) finding is not supported by substantial evidence because: (1) the parents' past use of corporal punishment on Jordan does not support a reasonable inference D.B. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm; (2) there is no evidence to show the parents had ever inappropriately disciplined or physically harmed D.B.; (3) the parents admitted error, were remorseful, and had learned effective parenting techniques and addressed <mask> issues through services; (4) the parents did not begin using corporal punishment on Jordan until he was five years old and they hit him only a total of 10 times; (5) D.B. was not at risk because he would not be the same age as Jordan was when the abuse started for more than three years; and (6) there were no other risk factors in the home."], "id": "83bf79ca-a93a-4a76-9be6-d901815b1b05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The text of section 13031(a) imposes a reporting duty on a covered professional \u201cwho, while engaged in a professional capacity or activity described in subsection (b) . . . , learns of facts that give reason to sus- pect that a child has suffered an incident of <mask>.\u201d \u201c[C]hild abuse,\u201d in turn, is defined as \u201cthe physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or ex- ploitation, or negligent treatment of a child.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 13031(c)(1). The statute further provides that \u201cthe term \u2018sexual abuse\u2019 includes the employment [or] use . . . of a child to engage in . . . sexual exploitation of children,\u201d and that \u201cthe term \u2018exploitation\u2019 means child pornography or child prostitution.\u201d Id. \u00a7 13031(c)(4), (6). Under these definitions, cov- ered professionals must report suspected abuse if they learn of facts giving reason to suspect that a child \u201chas suffered an incident of [em- ployment or use to engage in child pornography],\u201d 7 or \u201chas suffered an incident of [child pornography].\u201d Although section 13031 does not define the term \u201cchild pornography,\u201d it is defined elsewhere in the U.S. Code as any visual depiction, . . . whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where\u2014"], "id": "9aa122af-424a-4bfc-802f-286f8391c6f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant father subsequently made another report of <mask> allegedly committed by the mother. Specifically, the father alleged that the mother left one of the children alone for two hours. This report was also investigated by the Society, but it, too, was held to be unfounded. The Assistant Attorney-General appearing for the Department of Social Services has submitted an affidavit averring that the litigants will receive a similar letter from the Department advising them that the second investigatory report will also be expunged, if it has not already been done."], "id": "2ab580af-7686-4d4e-8d07-f402ceb87b3b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Due to the prior <mask> and neglect proceeding in J.L., the circuit court heard respondent father\u2019s appeal from the DVPO\u2019s denial. At a February 10, 2021, hearing, J.L.-1 testified that, on January 25, 2021, petitioner mother \u201cthreatened to either kill herself or just kill me\u201d and that petitioner mother \u201cthreaten[ed] to use a gun.\u201d J.L.-1 further stated that she was afraid to be at petitioner mother\u2019s home. The circuit court offered petitioner mother the opportunity to cross-examine J.L.-1, but she declined to do so. The circuit court asked J.L.-1 if she believed that it was also unsafe for J.L.-2 to live with petitioner mother. J.L.-1 indicated that it was unsafe for both herself and her brother."], "id": "88e5edf0-0a82-48e1-aeb5-26ce3469dc9b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Both sentences of Social Services Law \u00a7 419 must be read in pari materia with Social Services Law \u00a7 420 and in context as component parts of Social Services Law, article 6, title 6 (Child Protective Services). Title 6 is a comprehensive framework providing for the reporting and investigation of <mask> and placement, care and treatment of children. Section 419 is a general immunity provision. Section 420 is the only section specifying conduct to which immunity does not attach. Social Services Law \u00a7 420 imposes civil and criminal liability for knowing and willful failures to report child abuse or maltreatment.7 Social Services Law \u00a7 420 uses the same \u201c[a]ny person, official or institution\u201d language as Social Services Law \u00a7 419. This parallelism confirms that Social Services Law \u00a7 420 is a specific statutory exception to Social Services Law \u00a7 419, and demonstrates the breadth of immunity granted by Social Services Law \u00a7 419. Social Services Law \u00a7 420 evinces a legislative recognition that, absent a distinct, specific, limited enactment, no private right of action for money damages exists from the good faith job performance of anyone involved in statutory child care activities.8 The good faith requirement means that Social Services Law \u00a7 419 immunity is qualified, not absolute; the presumption effectively frees the subject person, official or institution from having to prove good faith."], "id": "5b1d664d-81d3-4c6b-97f2-1d0fd2b55409", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["On July 11, 2017, the Department filed separate supplemental petitions under section 387 to remove the children from mother's custody. The *989petitions alleged the above-described <mask> referrals, and also alleged that mother refused the Department access to the children to investigate, prevented the Department from completing face-to-face intensive supervision visitation with the children, and terminated court-ordered case plan services for the children. The petitions further alleged that mother failed to report her arrest for driving under the influence and that she transported F.V. without proof of a valid driver's license."], "id": "84f46fef-e5fe-4177-932f-00b53bfb408f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["*852The CPS records at issue herein might or might not contain information regarding the crime with which the defendant is charged. However, to rule that their use for purposes of investigating or prosecuting is precluded would render the Penal Law useless. For example, it would be ludicrous to maintain that even though an investigation revealed no <mask> occurred and, therefore, the report was categorized as unfounded, if the subject of the investigation was found to have committed another crime, he or she would be immune from legal consequences because the evidence in those records could not be accessed. To come to such a conclusion would be tantamount to holding that the Legislature enacted laws and then proceeded to create impediments to their enforcement, thus rendering them a nullity."], "id": "a053bebe-54b6-4c85-b640-e3b005e6c13c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Dr. Sandra Murray, a pediatrician specializing in <mask> pediatrics, also opined that Savannah's injuries were not accidental. She testified that Savannah weighed 9 pounds, 12 ounces at the time of the autopsy and that Savannah had lost weight during the six weeks before her death. Dr. Murray opined that the failure to take Savannah to a doctor to address her weight loss contributed to her death."], "id": "33ffd4f0-9d63-45a8-a46a-c75399b9bc24", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Due process further requires a review procedure should the child\u2019s representative wish to request a review. The procedure would have to provide the opportunity to be heard in person and to present evidence to a neutral hearing body or officer with a written statement of determination to be provided in a timely manner by the hearing body or officer indicating the basis of the decision rendered (see, Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471 [1972]). There is no reason alleged victims of <mask> should not have rights similar to those accorded alleged perpetrators of child abuse or alleged parole violators."], "id": "90b70971-c723-42d2-b35e-54604b5ef52e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Significantly, after the plaintiff child was seriously injured, when ACS investigated defendant Theroulde\u2019s maltreatment of Briana, ACS concluded that DOH should not have renewed the registration of defendant Theroulde\u2019s day-care facility in February 1999, given that two prior \u201cindicated\u201d incidents of <mask> and maltreatment had been reported against her in 1997 and 1998 (Appell aff in opp, exhibit 6). It is undisputed that DOH had received written notice from ACS of the September 1998 incident of child maltreatment by defendant Theroulde prior to renewing her registration as a family day-care provider."], "id": "c59ff419-a6c4-48d9-bdb4-d4b76ae71853", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["As further illustration, we note that the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions omit alternative elements for misconduct in office. MPJI-CR 4:23 (2021). While not binding on this Court, the Pattern Jury Instructions seek \u201cto make [jury] instructions as accurate statements of the law as possible[.] . . .\u201d MPJI-CR intro. (2021). When this Court recognizes alternative elements of a crime, the Pattern Jury Instructions generally place these alternative elements in brackets. MPJI-CR intro. (2021). For example, this Court in Twigg v. State, 447 Md. 1, 13, 133 A.3d 1125, 1133 (2016), recognized that the <mask> statute has alternative elements. Accordingly, the Pattern Jury Instruction for the crime of child sexual abuse lists the alternative elements in brackets: \u201cthat the defendant sexually abused (name) by acts or attempted acts including [rape] [incest] [sodomy] [other sexual offense] [unnatural or perverted sexual practices] [sexual exploitation] [sexual molestation][.]\u201d MPJI-CR 4:07.2 (2021). misconduct in office] have been used, such as, official misconduct, misbehavior in office,"], "id": "69451515-a94b-404f-9aff-767a05a34e69", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In support of his contention that sections 413 and 415 of the Social Services Law do not, and were never intended to, carve into the privileged communications statutes an exception for <mask> cases, the defendant has submitted an affirmation and memorandum of law by his attorney, Michael G. Dowd, Esq., and an amicus curiae brief from the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers1 (by Jonathan C. Scott, Esq.). Through those submissions, the defendant argues: (1) that, in People v Bass (140 Misc 2d 57 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1988]), Justice Irene J. Duffy specifically ruled that Social Services Law \u00a7 413 does not limit the physician-patient privilege in criminal cases (whereas, in People v Gwaltney [140 Misc 2d 74 (Sup Ct, Queens County 1988)], a case cited by this court in its prior decision herein, \"the issue of privilege was never raised\u201d); (2) that, exceptions to the long-standing and wide-ranging physician-patient privilege in New York must be specifically created by the Legislature, and not by the courts through radical statutory interpretation or judicial fiat; (3) that, the admission of a physician\u2019s testimony in a criminal case involving child abuse is against public policy in that it would prevent treatment by health care professionals of persons who could be prevented by that intervention from again *251committing an act of abusing a child. It is asserted that, the ultimate effect of this court\u2019s prior holding will be to transform those best able to prevent further acts of child abuse (physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers) into key prosecution witnesses, and thereby prevent those child abusers who are \"aware of the law\u201d from seeking psychiatric or other help, and will force attorneys representing clients accused of child abuse to advise those clients \"to not seek medical or psychiatric help\u201d; (4) that, a statutory duty to report suspected child abuse to some social services agency is, and was intended by the Legislature to be, distinct from the evidentiary privilege applicable in a judicial proceed- ' ing. It is argued that the Legislature intended that the privilege would not be applicable only to child protective proceedings under the provisions of the Family Court Act (see, Family Ct Act \u00a7 1046 [a] [vii]). This interpretation, it is contended, is the proper one because, inter alia, the true purpose for the enactment of the Child Protective Services title of the Social Services Law was to provide a method of interdiction through which an allegedly abused or maltreated child can be quickly removed from harm\u2019s way; it was not meant to provide a vehicle for the criminal prosecution of the alleged abuser (see, Social Services Law \u00a7 411; mem of Attorney-General, May 3, 1979, re: L 1979, ch 81); and (5) that, constitutional due process is violated by suspension of the physician-patient privilege, in that \"unsuspecting targets of the State\u201d will be seeking medical or psychiatric help from \"a health care professional turned quasi-police agent\u201d."], "id": "a4396833-588c-45be-b0c1-c17591b94ec8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["\"At the time Assembly Bill 2124 was drafted, multiple diversion programs and one deferred entry of judgment program already existed. The best known of these programs are deferred entry of judgment and pretrial diversion programs for defendants accused of specified narcotics-related offenses. (\u00a7\u00a7 1000-1000.[6].) Other programs include: (1) diversion for individuals suspected of physical <mask> or neglect (\u00a7 1000.12); (2) diversion of defendants with cognitive developmental disabilities (\u00a7\u00a7 1001.20-1001.34); (3) diversion of suspected traffic violators, commonly referred to as 'traffic school' (\u00a7 1001.40); (4) diversion for individuals suspected of writing bad checks (\u00a7\u00a7 1001.60-1001.67); diversion for parents suspected of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of section 272 (\u00a7\u00a7 1001.70-1001.75); and (5) diversion for members of the United States military who might be suffering from service-related mental health issues (\u00a7 1001.80). In addition, the Legislature authorized counties to create a general misdemeanor diversion program. (\u00a7\u00a7 1001.50-1001.55.)\" ( People v. Superior Court (Sanchez-Flores) (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 692, 696, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 414.)"], "id": "d6375445-c60d-40d0-9d17-951e0a1a8ff9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In 1996, in yet another effort to increase the accountability of agencies responsible for <mask> investigations, the law was once again amended by chapter 12 of the Laws of 1996. What commonly became known as \u201cElisa\u2019s Law\u201d (in memory of a child victim of abuse who had \u201cfallen between the cracks\u201d) was enacted. The purpose behind the new law was to allow greater latitude in child abuse investigations, in the hope that a more thorough followup would prevent repeat incidents of serious child abuse. Elisa\u2019s Law also caused a number of other laws related to child protection, including the Mental Hygiene Law, the Domestic Relations Law and the Family Court Act to be amended. Social Services Law \u00a7 422 (5) was also amended to permit agencies to access old records when the same child was involved in a subsequent report, to ascertain whether a pattern existed which indicated repeated abuse. Whereas, originally, section 422 (5) provided that unless an investigation revealed some credible evidence of the alleged abuse or maltreatment, the record was to be expunged, the 1996 amendment changed the expungement directive to one for legal sealing of unfounded reports. It also added provisions allowing the unsealing of unfounded reports during investigation of subsequent allegations involving the same child, and provided that unfounded reports would not be admissible as evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding. {Ibid.) However, the Legislature saw fit to retain Social Services Law \u00a7 422 (4) (A) *848unchanged, except for the addition of three agencies which had not been previously included, which would be allowed access to those records. Section 422 (4) (A) (e) and (Z), which gave access to the courts and District Attorneys, were left unchanged."], "id": "f7e90305-0ac7-401b-97aa-dbf81246923c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["However, a careful analysis of the issues that arise in cases involving child sexual or physical abuse reveals that the identity of the perpetrator plays a central role in the treatment of the victim. In these cases, the abuser is often a household member, or someone else the child knows and trusts, who serially abuses the victim over an extended period of time, with increasing frequency and degree. Where the abuser is in a trusted or loving relationship with the victim, grave psychological consequences are visited on the abused in addition to the physical injury inflicted. (See, Roland C. Summit, M.D., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 <mask> & Neglect 177-193 [1983]; David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual Abuse, 4 The Future of Children No. 2 [1994]; Child Maltreatment, US Dept of Health & Human Servs [1999].) Given that a pediatrician\u2019s primary obligation is to protect the child patient (103 Pediatrics No. 1 [Jan. 1999]), determining the identity of the person who inflicted the injuries is of paramount significance to the treat*574ment and protection of that child.2"], "id": "23db5312-54e9-412b-8498-af9b9a1f8345", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Dr. Katherine Canty Dr. Katherine Canty was deemed qualified to testify as an expert in <mask> pediatrics and expert diagnosis of suspected child abuse. She testified she examined E.S. on April 6, 2020 and felt \u201can area on the left clavicle that was slightly protuberant . . . [and] bulging out.\u201d The skeletal survey showed \u201ca healing fracture of his left clavicle.\u201d Dr. Canty opined that in \u201cnonmobile children\u201d like E.S., \u201cthe primary mechanism by which a clavicle fracture occurs is either through forces applied to the shoulder, such as forceful squeezing or compression at the shoulder, or from local impact to the clavicle such as when a child is either thrown or slammed against a solid object.\u201d She believed the fracture happened within a seven-day period before her examination of E.S. on April 6, 2020. When she interviewed Mother about the cause of the fracture, Mother could not explain how it happened. The first Dr. Canty heard of Mother\u2019s assertion that she tightly squeezed E.S. between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on April 4 or 5, 2020 was upon reading the jurisdiction/disposition report submitted by DCFS. However, Dr. Canty did not believe Mother\u2019s explanation was consistent with a clavicle fracture because E.S. did not have any reaction to the injury. \u201cI would expect an infant with a fracture to exhibit pain symptoms . . . [such as] affective crying and fussiness.\u201d \u201c[I]t would be obvious to a caregiver both at the time that the injury happened and then, with normal observation, a pattern of discomfort . . . [and] some kind of awareness that the child was in pain or had some kind of injury.\u201d She concluded: \u201c[I]n the absence of characteristics that I feel would be typical of an infant\u2019s reaction to pain, without those characteristics, I do not feel that the history provided is consistent and can explain [E.S.\u2019s] fracture; and, therefore, in the"], "id": "875ffe09-1912-4f12-b12e-63e804a89ad8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Upon determining that there was \"some credible evidence\u201d supporting a report of <mask> against the petitioner, the respondent Commissioner upheld the petitioner\u2019s inclusion on the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (hereinafter Central Register) (see, Social Services Law \u00a7 422 [8] [c] [ii]). We conclude that the respondent\u2019s determination must be annulled and the petitioner\u2019s name expunged from the Central Register."], "id": "96187ba7-7f76-4f17-81da-77ce3a4ebbe9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["1 Mother is not a party to this appeal. The officer also interviewed Mother and both children, and took photos of R.M.\u2019s injuries. Mother brought R.M. to the hospital the following day, where doctors diagnosed him with \u201c \u2018injury due to physical assault, bruising, contusion of right chest wall, [and] closed fracture of one rib of right side.\u2019 \u201d A <mask> pediatrician opined that punches and kicks to R.M.\u2019s chest and abdomen area could have been deadly or led to internal injuries, liver laceration or bruising, bruising to the intestine and other organs, or a pulmonary hemorrhage. Further, it was unlikely the injuries were caused by another child. D.M. was also examined by a child abuse pediatrician. Although his exam was normal, D.M. expressed during the exam that he felt unsafe with Father. On March 8, 2021, Mother filed a restraining order to prevent Father from contacting her or the children. In addition to the most recent incident of physical abuse against R.M., Mother described two prior incidents when Father physically abused the children. Specifically, in October 2018, Mother observed Father punch D.M. in the head twice and call him a \u201c \u2018momma\u2019s boy.\u2019 \u201d The children had also disclosed to her in December 2020 that Father had punched D.M. in the head and called him \u201c \u2018stupid,\u2019 \u201d and that their stepmother picked up R.M. and threw him down. The application further indicated that Father had a history of physically and verbally abusing Mother during their prior relationship. She alleged that Father had thrown things at her, dislocated her thumb, and caused bruising all over her body. She also reported that she suffered a miscarriage in 2014 after Father repeatedly hit and kicked her. Based on the information Mother provided in the application, a temporary restraining order was granted and a hearing was set for mid-March."], "id": "fffeb9e0-113f-44a4-ad35-0c3b0e608aff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["The individual defendants, Detective Brimlow, Detective Doppman and Caseworker Lauro, were not parties to the prior action. Consequently, they do not seek dismissal on the grounds of res judicata. Rather, they claim that they are shielded from plaintiff\u2019s Federal civil rights claim on the grounds of qualified immunity. Again, the conduct at issue is the interrogation and physical examination of the then three-year-old plaintiff without parental consent or court approval, in the context of a <mask> investigation. Plaintiff argues in opposition that because of a decision changing the law in August 1990, the qualified immunity defense is not available to these defendants."], "id": "9b5a2941-f3db-4523-875c-cc7c0d96bc62", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant hospital is a mandated reporter of certain suspected <mask> or maltreatment under Social Services Law \u00a7 413. Pursuant to its legal obligation, defendant filed a report *251of suspected abuse regarding a 17-year-old girl treated at the hospital for injuries allegedly inflicted by her father.1 In the course of the preliminary investigation, a caseworker with Schuyler County Child . Protective Services (CPS) requested the girl\u2019s medical records from defendant. The request was denied."], "id": "e1899aa7-aac9-42d6-b627-362944484f75", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["In short, Nave alleged that Dr. Feinberg and Rouse received reports of <mask> during an interview with one of the children during the course of the custody evaluation but failed to disclose the abuse reports to her or to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (the Cabinet) pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 620.030. Nave also disputed the contents of the custody report provided to the Cabinet, alleging that it concealed information related to abuse and to her and Patten's psychological testing results."], "id": "b79b6243-7412-4a74-abba-41ab7fb43a94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abuse", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Such statute provides, inter alla, that reports of the respondent Commission shall be confidential and shall only be made available to \"any person engaged in a bona fide research purpose, provided, however, that no information identifying the subjects of the report or other persons named in the report shall be made available to the researcher unless it is absolutely essential to the research purpose and the department gives prior approval\u201d. Petitioner contends that as a professional journalist engaged in investigative research for the purpose of writing an article on <mask> in a particular psychiatric facility, she is within the exception of confidentiality provided by the statute. Respondents interpreted the statute as being limited to academic or scientific research and denied petitioners\u2019 Freedom of Information Law request."], "id": "87bc2cff-c296-41de-b6fc-28c7a87eabd7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abandonment", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["On May 20, 2021, the [court] granted LCCYS a verbal order for emergency protective custody, finding that under the circumstances of <mask>, LCCYS\u2019s immediate taking of custody was necessary to preserve the life and well-being of [Child] and her sibling. The [c]ourt at that time found 1) LCCYS had made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal by attempting to locate the children\u2019s parents, and 2) given the inability to find Mother, the lack of preventive services was reasonable."], "id": "9868d1b4-f592-4657-8091-d3384d10068f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child abandonment", "legal_topic": "Children", "masked_sentences": ["Generally, acts or omissions that constitute significant impairment include, but are not limit to, physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior by a parent. In re S.T. , 508 S.W.3d at 492 ; In re De La Pena , 999 S.W.2d at 528 ; May , 829 S.W.2d at 376-77 ; see also In re R.L. , 2017 WL 1496955, at *15. \"Other considerations may include parental irresponsibility, a history of mental disorders and suicidal thoughts, frequent moves, bad judgment, <mask>, and an unstable, disorganized, *82and chaotic lifestyle that has put and will continue to put the child at risk.\" In re S.T. , 508 S.W.3d at 492 ; see also In re R.L. , 2017 WL 1496955, at *15. The material time to consider is the present , and evidence of past conduct may not, by itself, be sufficient to show present unfitness. In re S.T. , 508 S.W.3d at 492 ; see also May , 829 S.W.2d at 377 (\"If the parent is presently a suitable person to have custody, the fact that there was a time in the past when the parent would not have been a proper person to have such custody is not controlling.\"); In re M.W. , 959 S.W.2d at 666. Moreover, evidence that a non-parent would be a better custodian of the child is \"wholly inadequate.\" Whitworth , 222 S.W.3d at 623 ; see also Lewelling , 796 S.W.2d at 167 (\"It is no longer adequate to offer evidence that the nonparent would be a better custodian.\"); In re De La Pena , 999 S.W.2d at 529 (\"There is no dispute that [nonparent] ha[s] provided a caring and nurturing home for [the child]. However, in order for [her] to gain custody of [the child], she must show more.\")."], "id": "b88b2b35-cc4b-4c1a-b819-ecad07d4f621", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\"[T]he crimes of <mask>, and complementary statutory provisions, were created because the harm suffered by identity theft victims went well beyond the actual property obtained through the misuse of the person's identity. Identity theft victims' lives are often severely disrupted. For example, where a thief used the victim's identity to buy a coat on credit, the victim may not be liable for the actual cost of the coat. However, if the victim was initially unaware of the illicit transaction, the damage to the person's credit may be very difficult to repair. The perpetrator could commit other crimes by using the victim's identity, causing great harm to the victim. Thus, identity theft in the electronic age is an essentially unique crime, not simply a form of grand theft.\" ( Id. at p. 808, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 34.) Our analysis of the statute and the cases interpreting it lead us to conclude Sanders violation of the \"identity theft\" statute was not a theft as it relates to the cardholder. It was an unlawful use, one of several unlawful uses set forth in the statute. To the extent there was a theft within the scope of the Proposition 47 limitations in section 490.2, it was against the property interest of the merchants who were defrauded by appellant's presentation of the card as belonging to her, a false pretense."], "id": "33579dea-236d-4269-b9f4-1baa55973dc1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b621 We are guided by our decision in Spears, which recognized that attorney fees are appropriately ordered as restitution when an attorney is reasonably necessary to remedy the harm caused by the criminal conduct. Spears, 184 Ariz. at 291\u201392. Thus, just as in the probate proceedings at issue in Spears, attorneys may be reasonably necessary to rectify harms directly caused by criminal conduct in several scenarios, including financial fraud, embezzlement, or <mask>. Similarly, when a victim retains an attorney to enforce her rights in the criminal proceedings, the court should order payment of those fees as restitution when attorneys are reasonably necessary to enforce these rights. Setting this standard accommodates constitutional and legislative directives that restitution reimburse a victim for losses caused by criminal conduct and simultaneously avoids any STATE V. REED Opinion of the Court"], "id": "abdb41ed-cbd3-4415-bca1-7bbc5f4aecec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The court finds that this defendant, charged with the nonviolent offenses of falsifying business records and <mask> (all no greater than class E felonies), is eligible to participate in the judicial diversion program. The court is not issuing a broad ruling that all nonviolent offenses, or all E felonies, are statutorily eligible for diversion. Rather, the court, in its guided discretion, has determined that this defendant is eligible, for the reasons stated above."], "id": "b3530035-61c2-42ba-9a71-360c8edaa6f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["For his part, defendant argues the overall statutory scheme of Proposition 47 shows the electorate did not intend to limit the underlying crimes for which resentencing on a second degree commercial burglary conviction would be appropriate. Pointing to the fact that Proposition 47 bars one who has been convicted of both forgery and <mask> from having their forgery conviction considered a misdemeanor even where the value of the forgery was below $950, defendant contends that the lack of a similar limitation on charges related to shoplifting offenses demonstrates a clear intent not to limit which offenses are eligible to qualify as a shoplifting offense. We disagree. The limitations added to the forgery statute serve to differentiate minor offenses of forgery, where a misdemeanor conviction has been deemed appropriate, from crimes such as identity theft, where the electorate has chosen to ensure that greater punishments remain available. That such a provision was added does not detract from the ability of the electorate to similarly limit the scope of relief available by utilizing specific words in a *683statute rather than unique clauses. Here, the evidence is persuasive that the electorate's choice of the word \"larceny\" was an inherently limiting phrase to the meaning of the crime. Once utilized, there was no reason to additionally limit the scope of the offense. In contrast, no similarly limiting word could be used to differentiate forgery without the use of identity theft, from forgery involving the use of identity theft. As such, it was reasonable for the electorate to approve of additional limiting language and the decision to do so bears no relationship to the definition of larceny in the shoplifting statute. *571Given the broader support for the conclusion that larceny, as used in the shoplifting statute, should be understood to encompass its historical definition, neither inclusion of the shoplifting statute in the burglary section of the Penal Code, nor the general similarities between the language used to define the crime and the offense of burglary, nor the existence of limiting factors with respect to the crime of forgery are compelling evidence that the word larceny should be understood to mean theft generally. As such, the proper interpretation of larceny as used in the shoplifting statute is the historical definition of the crime."], "id": "e890f826-68d9-4c3b-966a-cfc8ee3a2c00", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant argues that the only crime he intended to commit when he entered the bank was felony check forgery (\u00a7 475, subd. (c)), a crime that was charged but dismissed pursuant to his plea to second degree burglary. The Barba court noted that while the crimes of <mask> and forgery had \"some overlap,\" \"the statutes are concerned with remedying two different wrongs.\" (Barba, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 225, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 371.) Thus, the crime of forgery is committed when a person possesses either a real or a fictitious check. Section 475, subdivision (c), defining forgery, provides, \"Every person who possesses any completed check, money order, traveler's check, warrant, or county order, whether real or fictitious, with the intent to utter or pass or facilitate the utterance or passage of the same, in order to defraud any person, is guilty of forgery.\""], "id": "cf0ef74e-9d73-4480-81cf-53ae89f70d60", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["-16- 7578 Providence laid up in the bed, you know, after surgery and at their disposal, there\u2019s nothing I can do. Fairly read, Guy\u2019s testimony indicates that both experiences made him feel helpless, not that the two experiences were indistinguishable. And at other points in his testimony Guy clearly attributed specific harm to the disclosure, including \u201cparanoia\u201d and \u201cconspiracy issues\u201d; a mental condition that was less balanced and caused him to be less \u201cat ease\u201d than before the disclosure; and a decision to not apply for Medicaid since his information was revealed because of the resulting distrust. Finally it is not the case, as Providence argues, that Guy\u2019s attempt to recover damages for future therapy was doomed by his failure to obtain mental health treatment since the assault. Guy testified that he had contacted multiple therapists and even met with one, but the meeting was unsuccessful because the disclosure had impaired his ability to trust. Guy also testified about his desire to see a therapist in the future. And although true that Guy had not applied for Medicaid in order to facilitate mental health treatment, Guy testified that the reason he had not applied for Medicaid was that his experience with Providence made him wary of sharing his medical information. A jury might conclude that Guy did not need money for psychiatric care because he did not have a history of receiving such care. But it could also conclude that Guy did not obtain this care at least in part because of the paranoia and mistrust caused by Providence, and that Guy should not be penalized for suffering from the very paranoia and mistrust for which he now seeks redress. Finally, even if a jury concluded that Guy did not need damages for future therapy, it could still conclude that he needed damages for home security and an <mask> prevention system, as he requested at trial."], "id": "9a8e6165-5620-48e8-8eeb-5c7ccf94f176", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Proposition 47 amended section 473, the general forgery sentencing statute, so that it now contains two subdivisions. Subdivision (a) preserves the prior \"wobbler\" language and states: \"Forgery is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.\" (\u00a7 473, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) spells out exceptions to this general proviso and states in relevant part: \"Notwithstanding subdivision (a), any person who is guilty of forgery relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order, where the value of the check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, except that such person may instead be punished pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if that person has one or more prior convictions. ... This subdivision shall not be applicable to any person who is convicted both of forgery and of <mask>, as defined in Section 530.5.\" (\u00a7 473, subd. (b).)"], "id": "027c03cd-4f22-4510-a75f-4a31ecc58b14", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The public interest here clearly outweighs the private interests of the parties as Ms. Caminite has failed to demonstrate that public access to the court documents filed in this proceeding would likely result in harm to a compelling interest of the movant (see Mancheski v Gabelli Group Capital Partners at 502). Moreover, in considering whether to seal the record in a guardianship proceeding, the privacy rights of, and the best interests of, the alleged incapacitated are paramount, and not the interests or privacy rights of other litigants (see Matter of Linda E. [Justin B.] at 702-703). Although the legislature should reevaluate Mental Hygiene Law \u00a7 81.14 in view of the broad impact of HIPAA on guardianship proceedings, the unfortunate ease of international <mask>, and the number of sister states which presumptively seal court records in guardianship proceedings, good cause has not been established to seal the record here."], "id": "e1b08812-16f9-4515-a80e-d866ab374571", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Here the facts of Brayton's <mask> crime are similar to Gonzales , Garrett and Jimenez . Brayton used a stolen driver's license belonging to another person to obtain a $107.07 store credit. She obtained the credit by the false representation that she was the person named in that driver's license. In Gonzales , entering a bank to cash a stolen check fell within the purview of the resentencing provision. In Garrett , using another person's credit card to purchase property constituted misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. Similarly, here it was Brayton's use of another person's driver's license that allowed her to obtain the credit."], "id": "eae6c769-9695-4183-98f6-0e99e2ba309a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["In March 2019, while Jimenez was still pending, we issued an opinion resolving defendant\u2019s appeal by holding that, as the Attorney General had acknowledged, her conviction for burglary had to be reduced to shoplifting under new section 459.5, subdivision (a), and further holding that, as the Attorney General had disputed, her five convictions for <mask> and mail theft in violation of section 530.5, subdivisions (a), (c), and (e) also had to be reduced to misdemeanors in violation of section 459.5, subdivision (a), or of section 490.2. The California Supreme Court granted review of this case and deferred briefing pending its decision in Jimenez. In March 2020, the court decided Jimenez, holding that Proposition 47 does not apply to convictions for unlawfully obtaining and using personal identifying information in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a), and that such convictions may not be reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting (\u00a7 459.5). (Jimenez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 58\u201359.) 2 Jimenez did not address mail theft in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (e) (hereafter, section 530.5(e)). After deciding Jimenez, the court transferred this case back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the case in light of that decision. Defendant and the Attorney General have each filed supplemental briefs in which they do not dispute the proper disposition of this appeal as to six of the seven convictions at issue. The parties agree that nothing in Jimenez undermines our original holding that defendant\u2019s burglary conviction must be"], "id": "248032e5-fa3a-4a38-b608-8238371a1f21", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["On October 23, 2003, the defendant was charged with <mask> in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7 190.78 [1]), unlawful possession of personal identification information in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7 190.81), and criminal impersonation in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 190.25 [1]). These charges are all class A misdemeanors, and the crimes were alleged to have occurred on October 3, 2003. The defendant was arraigned on a criminal court complaint on October 24, 2003. The People filed support*174ing depositions corroborating hearsay information contained in the complaint at the time of the arraignment, thereby converting it into an information."], "id": "a83e3ebf-2562-4523-88e1-83ebfcdbb09b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Lastly, DeskSite posits that money laundering is a \"known concern\" within the automobile industry, especially with high-end exotic cars. Even if we accept this to be true, the use of a third party's check to pay for a car by itself is still not a red flag of money laundering, particularly where, as here, the check contains a memo line with the customer's initials on it. Further, courts have refused to fashion new duties to deal with similar endemic problems such as <mask> and have justified that refusal with reasoning that is equally applicable here: \"Given the scope of the problem and the consequences to the community of imposing a noncontractual duty with resulting liability for breach, a decision to shift the burden of loss from the actual victim to a third party duped by the thief is one to be made, if at all, by the Legislature, not the judiciary.\" ( Rodriguez , supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 466, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 543.)"], "id": "d8f0fef5-421d-43c6-a160-abeb655f5bac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Here, the sole allegations are that defendants opened at least one cellular account in the name of Avi Natanov and that Avi Natanov is not the real name of either defendant. Of course, conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence cannot supply reasonable cause (see People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]). If Avi Natanov were not a real person, but merely an alias, then no identity of \u201canother person\u201d would be stolen. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidentiary facts that Avi Natanov is a real person whose identity was improperly assumed by defendants \u2014 perhaps in the form of a supporting deposition from an Avi Natanov asserting that defendants had no permission or authority to open a cellular account in his name \u2014 the information fails to establish every element of the crime of <mask>."], "id": "6d7e7f38-501a-4613-9c65-d37ec9dd5962", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant in Bush committed offenses between October 2000 and January 2002. (Bush, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 998, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 190.) During that period, section 368, subdivision (d) only referred to theft or embezzlement from an elder victim and did not reference forgery, fraud, or <mask> under section 530.5. (\u00a7 368, former subd. (d), added by Stats. 1998, ch. 936, \u00a7 7.5.)"], "id": "3bda16af-f287-458f-9c62-679c7a09dfda", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant in Bush committed offenses between October 2000 and January 2002. (Bush, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 998, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 190.) During that period, section 368, subdivision (d) only referred to theft or embezzlement from an elder victim and did not reference forgery, fraud, or <mask> under section 530.5. (\u00a7 368, former subd. (d), added by Stats. 1998, ch. 936, \u00a7 7.5.)"], "id": "bb618877-ab40-4548-9418-99f40e6c8bf4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The panel affirmed convictions for possession of device making equipment (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1029(a)(4)), possession of at least fifteen unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1029(a)(3)), aggravated <mask> (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1028A(a)(1)), and possession of stolen mail (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1708), in a case in which the defendant argued that the district court reversibly erred by instructing the jury that \u201cintent to defraud\u201d under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1029(a)(3) and (4) means an intent to deceive or cheat."], "id": "0e063b87-81e9-4685-b299-d33f1fffbd48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["*395By notice of motion dated June 13, 2013, defendant moved for an order to set aside the jury verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30 (1) on the ground that the court\u2019s response to the jury note was improper. Specifically, defendant contends that the court erred in providing to the jury a definition of \u201cfinancial loss\u201d which is not contained in the <mask> statute. Defendant argues that appellate courts have cautioned trial courts against reliance upon definitions contained in other sections of the Penal Law or found in other state or federal statutes absent legislative authority to do so."], "id": "026cdc6e-89b0-40b4-a325-f569eddda725", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Simply put, Sanders contends that since the burglary charges have been reclassified as misdemeanor shoplifting and the amount of goods taken from the merchants was under $950, the section 530.5 violations must be considered as petty thefts and therefore must be reduced to misdemeanors and dismissed. As we will point out, even though section 530.5 violations are often referred to as \"<mask>,\" they are not theft offenses. Theft is not an element of the offense. The offense is not in the theft chapter (chapter 5) of the Penal Code, but is instead listed in chapter 8 dealing with false personation. The gravamen of the section 530.5, subdivision (a) offense is the unlawful use of a victim's identity. Moreover, as we will discuss, there were multiple victims in the offenses charged. The entry into commercial establishments to obtain property by false pretenses victimized the merchant, and not the cardholder. The cardholder is a victim because her identity was unlawfully used."], "id": "b655ea84-e68d-467c-a5db-05e77d358b16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["awards, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $6,600 in victim restitution to D.S. and T.S., a married couple, who were the victims of the conduct charged in count 23. We affirm the award. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The third amended felony information charged defendant with grand theft (Pen. Code, \u00a7 487, subd. (a);1 counts 1, 4, 6, 10-17, 23-24); filing a false or forged instrument with the county recorder\u2019s office (\u00a7 115, subd. (a); count 2); taking or driving a motor vehicle with intent to deprive the owner of title to or possession of the vehicle (Veh. Code, \u00a7 10851, subd. (a); count 3); <mask> (\u00a7 530.5, subd. (a); count 5); forgery (\u00a7 470, subds. (c), (d); counts 7-9); fraudulently inducing a person to sign a contract (Civ. Code, \u00a7 2945.4, subds. (a), (e), (f); counts 18-20); and unlawful practice of law (Bus. & Prof. Code, \u00a7 6126, subd. (a); count 21). The information also alleged as to counts 8 and 9 that defendant had been released on bail when those offenses were committed (\u00a7 12022.1) and as to all counts that defendant had engaged in a series of felonies the material element of which was fraud and embezzlement in an amount exceeding $500,000 (\u00a7 186.11, subd. (a)) (a great-taking enhancement). Defendant resolved the matter by pleading no contest to counts 1, 2, 4, and 9, as well as admitting the on-bail enhancement and the great-taking enhancement in exchange for a stipulated prison sentence of 12 years. The remaining charges and allegations were dismissed with a Harvey2 waiver for purposes of restitution. On February 16, 2018, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. He was also ordered to pay certain fees and victim restitution. The court retained jurisdiction to award further restitution to other victims of defendant\u2019s crimes."], "id": "3ae78f67-61bd-4856-9370-52fe2674cca5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["*492*684The jury here was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 2040 that to find defendant guilty of <mask> in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a), \"the People must prove that: [\u00b6] 1. The defendant willfully obtained someone else's personal identifying information; [\u00b6] 2. The defendant willfully used that information for an unlawful purpose; [\u00b6] AND [\u00b6] 3. The defendant used the information without the consent of the person whose identifying information he was using.\" The jury was further instructed that \"An unlawful purpose includes ... Falsely representing or identifying one's self as another person to a peace officer, upon a lawful detention, to evade the proper identification of himself. [\u00b6] or [\u00b6] Giving information to a peace officer, who is performing his duties under the vehicle code, when he knows the information is false.\" Defendant concedes that not every violation of section 148.9 or Vehicle Code section 31 results in a violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a) but argues that the rule applies in this instance because the manner in which he violated section 148.9 and Vehicle Code section 31 would commonly result in a violation of section 530.5. We disagree."], "id": "e0b5fbda-663a-46e3-a5b1-f1d6f336ee4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["<mask>, without question, is becoming one of the fastest growing criminal offenses in the 21st century. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that in a five-year period prior to early 2003, in the United States alone, there were 27.3 million reported cases of identity theft (Thomas Fedorek, Computers + Connectivity = New Opportunities for Criminals and Dilemmas for Investigators, 76 NY St BJ 10, 15 [Feb. 2004]). The ensuing fraud caused damages in the billions for businesses, *893financial institutions and consumers, and subjected the victims to hours upon hours of work related to straightening out problems caused by the theft of their identity.6"], "id": "232b75af-8c9e-4354-a22c-8a616880e8a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Because the statute is susceptible to these two reasonable interpretations and the legislative history is inconclusive, we decide this issue in accordance with the rule of lenity and sanction the interpretation more favorable to defendant (see Green, 68 NY2d at 153). Clearly, the more favorable interpretation *227would require the People to prove both elements, that defendant used Catalfamo\u2019s personal identifying information and that he consequently assumed Catalfamo\u2019s identity. In addition, we think this is the more sensible reading according to the plain meaning of the statute because the word \u201cby,\u201d as used in the phrase \u201cassumes the identity of another person by [one of the enumerated methods],\u201d indicates the vehicle by which the assumption of identity takes place. It does not, however, indicate that assumption of identity is an inevitable consequence of using a person\u2019s identifying information. Put another way, although the statute provides three alternative means by which a defendant may commit the offense, assumption of identity must be the end result. Accordingly, whether defendant \u201cassumed the identity\u201d of another is a separate and essential element of the offense of <mask> which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."], "id": "b6d13fa9-8bef-4c2c-9e19-fcfdb0dbf3a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Here, Jimenez's conduct is identical to Gonzales's conduct. They both entered a commercial establishment during business hours for the purpose of cashing stolen checks valued at less than $950 each. Both defendants committed \"theft by false pretenses,\" which \"now constitutes shoplifting under [section 459.5, subdivision (a) ].\" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 862, 868-869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 [shoplifting as defined in section 459.5, subdivision (a) encompasses all thefts, including theft by false pretenses].) Section 459.5, subdivision (b) makes it clear that \" '[a]ny act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting,' \" and that \" '[n]o person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.' \" ( Gonzales , at p. 863, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, italics added.) The trial court properly *1290concluded that Jimenez's acts of shoplifting could not be charged as felony <mask> under section 530.5, subdivision (a). ( Gonzales , at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Under section 495, subdivision (b), they could be charged only as misdemeanor shoplifting. ( Gonzales , at pp. 862, 876-877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 ; see 2 Couzens, Bigelow & Prickett, Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2017) \u00a7 25:4, p. 25-29 [\"If section 459.5 applies, the defendant may not be alternatively charged with burglar[y] or identity theft\"].)"], "id": "26b1cd66-9245-4a7b-ba7e-e4ca1c0f3375", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Acosta, J. This appeal raises questions about the elements of <mask> and whether intangible property can be criminally pos*220sessed, where a defendant used his associate\u2019s credit card number to pay for hotel expenses without authorization. Specifically, we are called upon to determine, first, whether assumption of identity is a discrete element of identity theft or whether it occurs automatically when a person uses another\u2019s personal identifying information, and second, whether criminal possession of stolen property includes intangible property, namely a credit card number. Regarding the first issue, we find that to secure a conviction for identity theft the People must prove not only that a defendant used another\u2019s personal identifying information, but that he or she consequently assumed the identity of that person. Because the hotel was aware of defendant\u2019s identity, he did not assume the identity of his associate by charging the credit card and, accordingly, the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of identity theft. As to the second issue, we have determined that the legislature intended intangibles, including credit card numbers, to fall within the ambit of criminal possession of stolen property. Defendant constructively possessed his associate\u2019s stolen credit card number, and thus he was properly convicted of the latter offense."], "id": "b18cc994-732b-496f-9fc8-85fff755e607", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant was convicted on six counts relating to the two forged checks; two counts of <mask> (\u00a7 530.5, subd. (a)), two counts of second degree commercial burglary (\u00a7 459, subd. (b)), and two counts of check forgery (\u00a7 475, subd. (c)). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant was found to have several prior convictions and to have served several prior prison terms. Defendant received a sentence of six years in prison."], "id": "c317b4c7-74f7-46f8-aa6e-61b66636b09c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["*390The trial court denied the petition. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal reversed, rejecting the Attorney General's argument that because Garrett intended to commit felony <mask> ( \u00a7 530.5 ), section 459.5 did not apply. ( Garrett , at pp. 86-90, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.) The court reasoned: \"[E]ven assuming [Garrett] intended to commit felony identity theft, he could not have been charged with burglary under ... section 459 if the same act -- entering a store with the intent to purchase merchandise with a stolen credit card -- also constituted shoplifting under [s]ection 459.5.\" ( Id. at p. 88, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.) Based on this reasoning, the court held that the use of a stolen credit card to purchase merchandise valued at less than $950 constitutes shoplifting under section 459.5. ( Garrett, at p. 90, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.)"], "id": "9ea80d32-9022-4872-8a7a-effa649bd1d2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["At the hearing, the court stated it would first hear from the People because they had filed an objection. The prosecutor began: \"In case 0664 the charge is a 459 second; however, we believe that it is not entitled to resentencing because the entry was into Wells Fargo Bank and the defendant attempted to cash a check belonging to another person which would be an <mask> and, therefore, it would be entering the bank with the intent to commit a felony, identity theft.\" After clarifying that the check was written off someone else's account, the prosecutor continued: \"In case 0901, it would be the same argument as to the 459 second and the defendant entered SR Food and Liquor and attempted to cash two checks belonging to another person which again *829would be the identity theft issue; however, he would be entitled to resentencing on the 476 [fictitious check count] because the amounts were less than $950.\""], "id": "f81e03c8-c035-4943-bfbe-410f47a54447", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Mr. Ellis cites a number of cases where prejudice was shown. In many of those cases, however, a required definition was omitted entirely from the instructions. See State v. Cooper , 215 S.W.3d 123, 127 (Mo. banc 2007) (holding that omission of \"knowingly enter[ing] Victim's house 'unlawfully' \" from the instructions was prejudicial); State v. Arnold , 397 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013) (omitting definition from the jury instructions for <mask> was plain error); State v. Stover , 388 S.W.3d 138, 153-55 (Mo. Banc 2012) (omitting \"knowing of the substance's content and character\" element from the jury instructions on first-degree trafficking of a controlled substance was plain error); State v. Neal , 328 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (omitting \"threaten[ed] the immediate use of a dangerous instrument against any person\" element from jury instruction was plain error)."], "id": "51f23c03-9029-4b4b-9858-8f4fbb033fca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The second count charges the defendant with <mask> in the second degree. In relevant part, Penal Law \u00a7 190.79 (3) provides that this crime is committed by a person who \u201cknowingly and with intent to defraud assumes the identity of another person by presenting himself or herself as that other person, . . . and thereby . . . commits or attempts to commit a felony or acts as an accessory to the commission of a felony.\u201d This indictment specifically alleges that the defendant \u201cassumed the identity of an aunt of Noah Pozner\u201d and thereby committed the class E felony of scheme to defraud in the first degree."], "id": "fa548700-ea00-4289-a190-3a6b9f3853f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Identity Theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["On May 28, 2013, during its deliberations, the jury sent the court a note requesting \u201cclarification of the definition of financial loss in the context of <mask>.\u201d (Court exhibit No. 2.) The attorneys first read the note, and then the court read it into the record. Because the term \u201cfinancial loss\u201d is not specifically defined in the Penal Law or the pattern jury charges in the context of identity theft under Penal Law \u00a7 190.80 (2), the court afforded counsel an opportunity to propose a clarifying response. Defense counsel proposed that the court instruct the jury that \u201cfinancial loss would be that the victims suffered a financial loss as a result of . . . element one of the four elements.\u201d (Tr at 15, lines 8-11.)"], "id": "0370d380-8356-4df3-9641-33d633f7d0d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["However, in light of the prevalence of <mask> today, our fact pattern is likely to be repeated. Thus, it is appropriate to offer some comment on these issues. State Farm\u2019s obligation to appear and defend in this suit must be weighed in terms of the strong public policy heretofore expressed and depends upon the efficacy of the service upon Jacques A. Baker at the address provided in the police report in conferring jurisdiction over the owner-driver actually involved in this accident. This, in turn, devolves to the operation of the provision for service upon unknown parties (Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 1024, at 249 [1997 ed],5 and to the judicial refusal to entertain challenges to jurisdiction when a party has provided an incorrect address. (Gardner v Tully, 227 AD2d 587 [2d Dept 1996]; Harrington v Dickinson, 159 AD2d 876 [3d Dept 1990].)"], "id": "aca61fed-4197-444c-a686-764d5a0a31fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The public interest here clearly outweighs the private interests of the parties as Ms. Caminite has failed to demonstrate that public access to the court documents filed in this proceeding would likely result in harm to a compelling interest of the movant (see Mancheski v Gabelli Group Capital Partners at 502). Moreover, in considering whether to seal the record in a guardianship proceeding, the privacy rights of, and the best interests of, the alleged incapacitated are paramount, and not the interests or privacy rights of other litigants (see Matter of Linda E. [Justin B.] at 702-703). Although the legislature should reevaluate Mental Hygiene Law \u00a7 81.14 in view of the broad impact of HIPAA on guardianship proceedings, the unfortunate ease of international <mask>, and the number of sister states which presumptively seal court records in guardianship proceedings, good cause has not been established to seal the record here."], "id": "499a5502-e61f-4ffa-944c-cae7e221cb1f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs allege that on January 26, 2012, Clincy M. Robinson was arrested and charged with <mask> in the first degree (one count) and criminal possession of computer related materials (two counts), scheme to defraud in the first degree (two counts) and unlawful possession of personal information in the third degree (one count). Mr. Robinson was charged with being in possession of 25 face sheets from NSUH, data that is maintained on the computer network of NSUH, and being in possession of computer data consisting of personal identifying information for over 900 individuals, without authorization, and it is alleged that he pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced on December 13, 2012 in the District Court of Nassau County."], "id": "0dab7101-7744-447a-aeed-d5884239626c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Our analysis tracks that of the Supreme Court in Gonzales. In Gonzales , a defendant had been charged with two felonies-forgery and second-degree burglary-where each involved the same property: forged $125 checks that he attempted to cash at a bank. ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The defendant had pled guilty to the burglary charge and the court had dismissed the forgery charge. ( Ibid. ) The Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's claim that the defendant was \"not eligible for resentencing because he also entered the bank intending to commit <mask>.\" ( Id. at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) It instead agreed with the defendant's position that \"even assuming he entered the bank with an intent to commit identity theft, section 459.5, subdivision (b) would have precluded a felony burglary charge because his conduct also constituted shoplifting.\" ( Ibid. ) Thus, \"the shoplifting statute would have precluded a burglary charge based on an entry with intent to commit identity theft here because the conduct underlying such a charge would have been the same as that involved in the shoplifting, namely, the cashing of the same stolen check to obtain less than $950.\" ( Id. at pp. 876-877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "3f9c0742-9b13-43e8-94b1-ed1762cf58ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Unlike Powell and Hernandez, this court relied upon the definition of \u201cfinancial loss\u201d contained in federal case law and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines specifically used in the context of financial crimes, including \u201cLarceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft . . . Fraud and Deceit.\u201d (US Sentencing Guidelines Manual \u00a7 2B1.1.) These offenses closely mirror the offense of <mask>, which contains as an element \u201cfinancial loss,\u201d which was the subject of the jury note. The offenses enumerated in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (US Sentencing Guidelines Manual \u00a7 2B1.1) protect the same interests that the New York Legislature sought to protect when it enacted Penal Law \u00a7 190.80."], "id": "c8a82c37-77a5-405a-824f-7b633f857bee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": [". There are rare cases in which the government determines that disclosure is appropriate and such situations must be justified by a clear government interest which prevails in a balancing test. For example, in In re Crawford (194d 954 [9th Cir 1999], cert denied sub nom. Ferm v United States Trustee, 528 US 1189 [2000]), a lay preparer of bankruptcy petitions objected to a statutory requirement of 11 USC \u00a7 110 (c) that he place his identifying Social Security number on court papers. The Ninth Circuit recognized a right of informational privacy in relation to a Social Security number, which was a conditional right to be weighed against the governmental interest (194d at 959). It opined that the threat of <mask> was not an immediate harm, but one remote in time and place and to be undertaken by a nongovernmental actor and that \u2014 unlike disclosure of HIV status, sexual orientation, or genetic makeup \u2014 a Social Security number \u201cis not inherently sensitive or intimate information, and its disclosure does not lead directly to injury, embarrassment or stigma\u201d (194d at 959-960). It held a sufficient justification for the requirement could be found in the legislative purpose and bankruptcy\u2019s special interest in public access to judicial proceedings (194d at 960)."], "id": "cfd0f757-ac14-4947-8e55-119590c542de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["*945In view of the privacy interests at stake, disclosure of the records of respondents containing dates of birth and home addresses, and other personal information of inmates could easily be used to facilitate <mask>, thereby resulting in both economic and personal hardship to inmates (Matter of Scott, Sardana & Pomeranz v Records Access Officer of City of Syracuse, 65 NY2d 294 [1985]). The dates of birth of inmates, who enjoy a lesser degree of privacy, have been protected from disclosure under FOIL (Matter of Investigation Tech., LLC v Horn, 4 Misc 3d 1023[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51010[U] [2004]). The decision of respondents to deny petitioner access to dates of birth and addresses of inmates was not arbitrary and capricious nor was it an abuse of discretion."], "id": "205ecf58-f92f-4eae-b26e-b47d678f8be1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["belonging to [Ahmar Siddiqi], during and in relation to the offense\u201d charged in Count 2; and Count 4, possession of stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1708. The superseding indictment also charged Saini with aiding and abetting Paulina Schaiy to commit all four offenses. Schaiy had pleaded guilty to aggravated <mask> and agreed to cooperate with the government."], "id": "64b86f12-44bb-4e7e-9bb6-8f7aa7b06080", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Second, the court in People v. Grayson, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pages 458-459, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, found that possession of access card account information with fraudulent intent under section 484e, subdivision (d) was distinguishable from other theft crimes because of the significant risk of <mask> and loss to the victim. The court explained that there was no authority to suggest the electorate intended to \"undercut\" the broad consumer-protection purpose behind section 484e, subdivision (d) by valuing such a risk at $950 or less. (People v. Grayson , at p. 460, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 658.)"], "id": "5ca642e7-058e-481a-9926-0a853da5d72a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": [" The defendant's contentions that the two counts of <mask> in the first degree were multiplicitous and that her conviction of both counts violated constitutional principles of double jeopardy are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Gonzalez, 99 NY2d 76, 82; People v Rosario, 184 AD3d 676, 677). In any event, the contentions are without merit. The defendant was convicted under distinct subdivisions of the statute, each requiring proof of an additional fact (see Penal Law \u00a7 190.80[1], [2]; CPL 200.30[2]; People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267, 269-271; People v Ayala, 172 AD3d 1084, 1084; Matter of Lavon S., 136 AD3d 1044, 1046)."], "id": "7144a23a-4571-4976-a1c2-b836836fbe61", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["In March 2017, People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 held that entering a bank to cash a stolen check for less than $950 is \"shoplifting\" within the meaning of section 459.5. ( *953Id. at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The Court further held that even if the defendant entered the bank with an intent to commit <mask>, he could only be charged with shoplifting under section 459.5. ( Id. at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "4ffb9d9e-6fa9-47a1-b21b-6c12222acf47", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["*655Plaintiff has attached as an exhibit her credit score with TransUnion as 702 as of December 23, 2004, which would seem to indicate that any adverse ratings resulting from the actions of the defendants have been erased from her credit report. By this documentation, plaintiff is representing that it took her almost two years to repair her credit. In fact, the TransUnion report shows only two accounts as reported with a negative history. One is a Home Depot account that plaintiff indicates is one of the fraudulently opened credit cards. The second negative account is the Staten Island Savings Bank mortgage. All of the other wrongfully opened accounts have apparently been removed from plaintiff\u2019s credit history. The fact that one or more of these accounts may still improperly be appearing may give rise to a cause of action pursuant to General Business Law article 25 against the entities reporting these accounts and carrying them on the plaintiffs credit history. There is also a question as to whether or not the Home Depot account being reported is the same fraudulent account since it is listed as opened in August 2002 while the one which plaintiff asserts was part of the <mask> was opened in July 2002. In addition, it appears to have a different account number than the one opened by the defendants. Also, the late payment being reported is as of April 2003, a date four months after which plaintiff states she learned of the identity theft and notified the credit reporting agencies and cardholders."], "id": "55d39824-e330-4412-977e-3ba3b7e45d76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Huerta is consistent with Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th 858, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437. In Gonzales , the Supreme Court interpreted section 459.5 to include entry into a bank with intent to commit <mask> because that entry also constitutes shoplifting. And although Proposition 47 omits any reference to identity theft, \"the focus of the ballot pamphlet was on the value of the property, setting the threshold for felony treatment at $950.\" ( Id . at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Because Gonzales engaged in conduct that constituted shoplifting under section 459.5, he could only be charged with misdemeanor shoplifting. ( Id . at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "e5b7e11d-ae20-43d5-960d-45934f7e9899", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["If the intention were to exclude offenses under section 484e, subdivision (d), section 490.2, subdivision (a) could have been written so its introductory language was more narrow or included specified exceptions. (See Romanowski, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 156-157, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 861.) Moreover, there is evidence that Proposition 47 contemplated the risk of <mask> crimes. For example, Proposition 47 also amended section 473, check forgery, making it a misdemeanor where the value of the check does not exceed $950. Checks contain the same type of account information that is found on an access card, as well as the owner's address. Thus, a person in possession of another person's check is likely to have access to the same identifying information as a person who acquires and retains access card account information. Yet, section 473 explicitly states that the changes effectuated by Proposition 47 apply unless the defendant is convicted both of forgery and of identity theft, as defined in section 530.5. The check forgery provision indicates that the risk of identity theft is not sufficient to block Proposition 47 relief; rather, it is only when a defendant has actually been convicted of identity theft that check forgery would not be reclassified as a misdemeanor. Furthermore, the identity theft provisions under section 530.5 can be charged as either a misdemeanor or a felony, so the intent to protect consumers against identity theft crimes is not synonymous with a felony charge."], "id": "1b21f5f8-9a06-463b-b8ca-7d7e16a4236b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["By indictment No. 3633/13, the defendant is charged with grand larceny in the third degree, a class D felony offense pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 155.35 (1), and <mask> in the first degree, a class D felony offense pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 190.80 (1). On September 30, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (a). On October 15, 2013, the People filed an affirmation in response, opposing the defendant\u2019s motion. On November 8, 2013, the defendant filed a reply and on November 18, 2013, the People filed a letter in response to that reply. On November 19, 2013, the People provided the court with transcripts related to several court appearances. As a specific factual issue regarding the defendant\u2019s representation by counsel remained unresolved after a review of the transcripts and the papers submitted by the parties, the court ordered a hearing in connection with the defendant\u2019s motion. That hearing was held before this court on March 7, 2014. Based upon a review of the court file, the relevant transcripts, the papers filed by the parties, and the evidence presented at the hearing, the defendant\u2019s motion is denied."], "id": "66cc3e13-01c9-4db0-a607-754f1285b00c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Here the facts of Brayton's <mask> crime are similar to Gonzales , Garrett and Jimenez . Brayton used a stolen driver's license belonging to another person to obtain a $107.07 store credit. She obtained the credit by the false representation that she was the person named in that driver's license. In Gonzales , entering a bank to cash a stolen check fell within the purview of the resentencing provision. In Garrett , using another person's credit card to purchase property constituted misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. Similarly, here it was Brayton's use of another person's driver's license that allowed her to obtain the credit."], "id": "8e81fb33-9a30-40f8-a8f0-0cf2f99c2609", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Identity Theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": [". In relation to the Restatement standard quoted, tort claims relating to Social Security numbers \u2014 notwithstanding that Social Security numbers are found to be private information and confidential \u2014 generally are found insuf*917ficient because either there is a failure of proof of distribution to the public at large or the information is not regarded as derogatory (Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 649 NW2d 859, 862-863 [Minn Ct App 2002] [Social Security numbers are confidential and private, but \u201care not on their face revealing, compromising() or embarrassing\u201d], revd on other grounds 663 NW2d 550 [Minn 2003]; Phillips v Grendahl, 312d 357 [8th Cir 2002]; Basse v Motorola, Inc., 351 Ill App 3d 67, 813 NE2d 1013 [1st Dist 2004]; see also Lora M. Jennings, Paying the Price for Privacy: Using the Private Facts Tort to Control Social Security Number Dissemination and the Risk of <mask> [Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 NW2d 550 (Minn 2003)], 43 Wash-burn LJ 725 [Spring 2004])."], "id": "34b22622-c31f-4a03-bd3b-c3a3322fef4b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Second, the court in People v. Grayson, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pages 458-459, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, found that possession of access card account information with fraudulent intent under section 484e, subdivision (d) was distinguishable from other theft crimes because of the significant risk of <mask> and loss to the victim. The court explained that there was no authority to suggest the electorate intended to \"undercut\" the broad consumer-protection purpose behind section 484e, subdivision (d) by valuing such a risk at $950 or less. (People v. Grayson , at p. 460, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 658.)"], "id": "6d2638ef-83fc-471a-a59a-10c72aa80e73", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The People charged defendant by felony complaint with three counts of receiving stolen property (\u00a7 496, subd. (a), counts 1-3), and three counts of <mask> (\u00a7 530.5, subd. (a), counts 4-6). At her arraignment, defendant agreed to plead guilty to count 1 in exchange for the dismissal of counts 2 through 6 and a sentencing recommendation from the People of two years in county jail. Defendant pleaded guilty to count 1 and admitted to receiving stolen mail. The trial court found a factual basis for defendant's guilty plea and subsequently sentenced defendant to two years in county jail with 80 days of pretrial and good conduct credit."], "id": "f5a136c2-122b-49b8-a4d3-365c92f52d90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Presenting oneself as another-\u2014e.g. affirmatively stating \u201cI am John Doe\u201d or signing another person\u2019s name\u2014is the quintessential way in which one assumes another\u2019s identity. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which presenting oneself as another would not result in an assumption of that person\u2019s identity. By contrast, assumption of identity is not necessarily accomplished when a person uses another\u2019s personal identifying information. The use of that information can be accompanied by an implicit assumption of identity, but that will not always be the case. In a typical credit card transaction, for example\u2014when a person offers a credit card to pay for a hotel stay or to purchase an item at a store, or enters the person\u2019s credit card information to make an Internet purchase\u2014it is implied that the person presenting or using the card is the card*228holder, even if the person does not affirmatively present himself or herself as such (see People v Wilson, 52 AD3d 239, 240 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 743 [2008] [suppression motion properly denied where arresting officer viewed the defendant rapidly purchasing multiple MetroCards with multiple credit cards at vending machine]; People v Vandermuelen, 42 AD3d 667, 670 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 965 [2007] [evidence was legally sufficient to establish commission of <mask> where the defendant opened credit card account in victim\u2019s name, using victim\u2019s identifying information, and made three charges with credit card]). Using another\u2019s credit card will, in most cases, also necessarily constitute an implied assumption of that person\u2019s identity."], "id": "ae5bcafe-ddf0-4fbf-b17a-b39376772d71", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Jeffrey Ndungi Sila was charged with two counts of theft of public funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 641 (Counts I and III) and with aggravated <mask> in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 1028A (Count II). A jury convicted Sila on all counts, and he was sentenced to a total term of"], "id": "049cd8fb-99b3-457f-92fd-1fb16668e514", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court misunderstood the elements of the crime of <mask>. Section 530.5, subdivision (a), provides that the crime is committed when a person obtains personal identifying information of another and \"uses that information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or medical information without the consent of that person....\" (Italics added.) Thus, the crime of identity theft was not committed \"in the parking lot\" before defendant entered the bank."], "id": "fead252a-b092-4ee4-be21-1b03fa3b3d5d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Discovercard asserts that the first and core \u201cinjury\u201d in the case at bar was the creation of a debt in plaintiffs name with Discovercard, and that plaintiff knew of that debt in late 2000 or 2001 and \u201cdid nothing and waited for the inevitable consequence of unpaid debt to be visited upon him in his application for a mortgage loan more that three years later.\u201d In contrast, it is plaintiff\u2019s position that all the elements of the tort to be truthfully pleaded in the complaint were not available until September 2004 when he learned of the <mask> in the credit report and that the \u201cinjury\u201d did not accrue until the bank set a higher rate of interest on account of the negative credit report."], "id": "941baa80-1230-4a22-a260-2ca308964972", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[t]he core of the basic third-degree <mask> offense, a class A misdemeanor, parallels the crime of \u2018criminal impersonation in the second degree.\u2019 That crime, also a class A misdemeanor, is committed when a person \u2018impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another.\u2019 \u201d (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law \u00a7 190.77 at 145, quoting Penal Law \u00a7 190.25 [1].) And criminal impersonation requires that a \u201creal person\u201d have been impersonated (People v Sadiq, 236 AD2d 638, 639 [2d Dept 1997]; see also People v Powell, 59 AD2d 950 [2d Dept 1977])."], "id": "61dd49a4-1b4f-48c5-89c5-98b555c59949", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\"(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), any person who is guilty of forgery relating to a check, bond, bank bill, *402note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order, where the value of the check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, except that such person may instead be punished pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if that person has one or more prior convictions for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290. This subdivision shall not be applicable to any person who is convicted both of forgery and of <mask>, as defined in Section 530.5. \" (Italics added.) Under the amended section where a defendant is convicted of both forgery and violation of section 530.5 the minimum dollar amount for felony classification does not apply."], "id": "420972b3-76ac-4482-8c99-1c9159acf33d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["In Gonzales the People argued \"that, even if defendant engaged in shoplifting, he is still not eligible for resentencing because he also entered the bank intending to commit <mask>. Thus, his felony burglary conviction could have been based on his separate intent to commit that offense.\" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Defendant \"counter[ed] that, even assuming he entered the bank with an intent to commit identity theft, section 459.5, subdivision (b) would have precluded a felony burglary charge because his conduct also constituted shoplifting.\" ( Ibid . ) The Supreme Court agreed with defendant: \" Section 459.5, subdivision (b) requires that any act of shoplifting 'shall be charged as shoplifting' and no one charged with shoplifting 'may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property .' (Italics added.) A defendant must be charged only with shoplifting when the statute applies. It expressly prohibits alternate charging and ensures only misdemeanor treatment for the underlying described conduct .\" ( Ibid ., last italics added.) A conspiracy to commit shoplifting is not included in \"the underlying *515... conduct\" described in section 459.5. ( Ibid. ) \" ' \"The punishable act, or the very crux, of a criminal conspiracy is the evil or corrupt agreement [to commit a crime].\" ' [Citation.]\" ( People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 870, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 289 P.3d 791.)"], "id": "8d078fec-ab7a-4882-ad84-0ba022d4a905", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["In Olguin , the probationer had agreed to the warrantless search of his residence. The California Supreme Court there held that a condition requiring the probationer to notify his probation officer of the presence of pets at the probationer's residence was reasonably related to future criminality because the pet disclosure condition helped protect probation officers during compliance visits and facilitated unannounced searches of the probationer's residence, aimed at discovering whether the probationer was complying with the terms of his probation. ( Olguin, supra , 45 Cal.4th at pp. 381-382, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1.) Similarly, the appellate court in Balestra upheld a condition requiring the probationer to submit her person and property to search with or without probable cause, concluding that such condition served the rehabilitative purpose of helping a probation officer ensure that his or her charge was obeying all laws. ( Balestra, supra , 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 61, 64-68, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 77.) For that reason, the condition was reasonably related to future criminality. ( Ibid. ; see Olguin, supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 381, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1.) An electronic device search condition is likewise reasonably related to preventing a defendant's future criminality. ( *131People v. Valdivia (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1130, 1137-1139, review granted Feb. 14, 2018, S245893 ( Valdivia ) [electronic device search condition was reasonably related to future criminality because it helped the probation officer ensure that the defendant was complying with the conditions of his probation by obeying all laws]; In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 293-296, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841 [electronic device search condition was reasonably related to future criminality because it enabled peace officers to review the probationer's electronic activity for indications that the probationer had drugs or was otherwise violating his probation].)2 *423Here, defendant admitted that he willfully, and with intent to defraud, acquired the personal identifying information of 10 or more persons. The trial court found that electronic devices would be extremely useful in manufacturing, obtaining and using the kinds of items found in defendant's possession. The trial court imposed other probation conditions aimed at deterring defendant's commission of <mask> crimes in the future. Defendant does not challenge those other terms of his probation. Searching defendant's cell phone, computers and other electronic storage devices would enable defendant's probation officer to ascertain whether defendant is complying with the other unchallenged conditions of defendant's probation."], "id": "2c9dbde3-a027-4799-b1c7-3a573b791e6a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Case law in New York has held that to prevail the plaintiff must establish that malevolence was the defendant\u2019s sole motive in acting (Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314 [1983]). In an <mask> situation, although the defendants intended to act as they did, and harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable, the main purpose of the defendants\u2019 actions is economic gain for themselves and not to solely cause financial harm to the plaintiff. To prevail on a claim for prima facie tort, the plaintiff would have to prove that the defendants were motivated by the intention to cause her economic harm rather than benefit themselves. It appears that the plaintiff did not suffer any direct financial harm from the defendants\u2019 actions since she has not made any allegation that she had to pay for any of the credit charges the defendants incurred. The facts of this case make prima facie tort unavailable as a cause of action to the plaintiff."], "id": "1a1b8b21-4330-495e-aace-5eac6f597aa9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": [" The defendant's contention that there was legally insufficient evidence to support the conviction of grand larceny in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Kolupa, 13 NY3d 786, 787; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492). However, contrary to the People's contention, the defendant did preserve for appellate review her legal sufficiency challenge to the convictions of <mask> in the first degree. Since the defendant's case did not supply any additional evidence of guilt relative to the counts of identity theft in the first degree, the defendant was not required to renew her motion at the close of the evidence in order to preserve her current contentions (see People v Murray, 163 AD3d 1000, 1001; People v Squires, 68 AD3d 900, 900). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of grand larceny in the second degree and both counts of identity theft in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15(5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to those crimes was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633)."], "id": "5bd5bf7b-c6fb-4b0d-b5cf-2eca22be1c9a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person is guilty of <mask> in the first degree when he or she knowingly and with intent to defraud assumes the identity of another person by presenting himself or herself as that other person, or by acting as that other person or by using personal identifying information of that other person, and thereby: . . . \u201c2. causes financial loss to such person or to another person or persons in an aggregate amount that exceeds two thousand dollars . . . .\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 190.80 [2].) Under New York Penal Law, the term \u201cfinancial loss\u201d is not defined in the context of identity theft."], "id": "54604e69-8b9f-4ead-aaf4-631ec5dfc3e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The public interest here clearly outweighs the private interests of the parties as Ms. Caminite has failed to demonstrate that public access to the court documents filed in this proceeding would likely result in harm to a compelling interest of the movant (see Mancheski v Gabelli Group Capital Partners at 502). Moreover, in considering whether to seal the record in a guardianship proceeding, the privacy rights of, and the best interests of, the alleged incapacitated are paramount, and not the interests or privacy rights of other litigants (see Matter of Linda E. [Justin B.] at 702-703). Although the legislature should reevaluate Mental Hygiene Law \u00a7 81.14 in view of the broad impact of HIPAA on guardianship proceedings, the unfortunate ease of international <mask>, and the number of sister states which presumptively seal court records in guardianship proceedings, good cause has not been established to seal the record here."], "id": "7ad65cab-9a61-4d92-9856-b6c2d2c12195", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Here, it is undisputed that neither the Penal Law nor the pattern jury charges contain a definition of the term \u201cfinancial loss\u201d in the context of <mask>. Thus, this court was compelled to craft a meaningful response to the jury by reference to other sources. In doing so, it adopted the definition of \u201cfinancial loss\u201d contained in United States v Arjoon (964d 167 [2d Cir 1992]). Such definition embraces the intent of the legislature when it enacted the statutes criminalizing identity theft."], "id": "98843f17-92e7-44f9-8c40-5217a2ad8c94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The court notes that the drug crimes specified in section 216.00 (1) include class B, C and D, as well as E, felonies. The crimes specified in section 410.91 (5) include several class D, as well as E, felonies. The crimes defendant is charged with committing are all class E felonies (with the exception of one misdemeanor). Furthermore, and very important in the court\u2019s view, is the fact that the \u201celigible\u201d crimes specified in section 410.91 (5) are \u2014 on their face \u2014 at least as serious, if not more so, than the crimes defendant is charged with committing. Additionally, the crimes specified in section 410.91 (5) are not \u2014 on their face \u2014 any more likely to have been committed because of drug addiction than the crimes charged here. In short, the court can discern no rational basis for permitting someone charged with burglary or criminal mischief the opportunity to be considered for the program when someone charged with falsifying business records or <mask> is precluded, regardless of his or her therapeutic needs. If anything, the court is of the opinion that *458defendant\u2019s crimes here are more likely the product of drug addiction than, for example, burglaries typically are."], "id": "1e371fca-c729-4abb-b30d-9fea316da0b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant points out that forgery was the only crime charged other than the second degree burglary to which he pled, and under Proposition 47, the forgery of a check less than $950 is a misdemeanor. However, the People were not required to separately charge the felony of <mask> that defendant entered with intent to commit because burglary is complete upon entry with the requisite criminal intent. (People v. Brownlee (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 921, 930, 141 Cal.Rptr. 685.) The record of defendant's conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript, shows that defendant entered the bank with the intent to commit identity theft."], "id": "4388a896-54c9-432f-b1a2-fded22e6a278", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[a]t any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the verdict or any part thereof upon the following grounds: \u201c1. [a]ny ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court.\u201d Defendant argues that the court should set aside the verdict with respect to counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, <mask> *396in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 190.80 [2]), on the ground that the court improperly instructed the jury as to the definition of \u201cfinancial loss.\u201d This court is not persuaded."], "id": "28d1e9e5-3265-48de-bca5-e52236f166e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["*230Our decision should not foment any worry that someone in defendant\u2019s position could avoid criminal liability altogether. There are offenses under which his conduct more squarely falls, such as unlawful possession of personal identification information and theft of services (he was not charged with the former offense, but he was convicted of the latter). <mask> is a serious issue, to be sure, but we cannot give the statute so broad a reading as to bring defendant\u2019s conduct within its orbit (People v Harper, 75 NY2d 313, 318 [1990]; People v Gottlieb, 36 NY2d 629, 632 [1975])."], "id": "97333ab1-41c8-49a1-a0e8-a5181c5ba7a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The court concludes that respondents properly invoked the personal privacy exemption in denying petitioners access to the *628birth dates of the approximately 250,000 individuals who comprise New York State\u2019s workforce. Looking first to the privacy interests at stake, it is by now well established that the disclosure of an individual\u2019s full birth date, taken together with his or her full name and the details of employment, can be used to facilitate <mask>, thereby resulting in both economic and personal hardship to individuals (see e.g. Matter of Goyer v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 12 Misc 3d 261 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2005, McCarthy, J.]). Even recognizing the somewhat lesser expectation of privacy enjoyed by public employees with respect to the details of their state employment, the court believes that a reasonable person would find the disclosure of his or her precise birth date, taken together with his or her full name and other details of his or her state employment, to be offensive and objectionable."], "id": "9d052ef2-8277-450a-9e3e-a05035e077e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Despite \"the broad consumer protection\" objective underlying section 484e, the Supreme Court in Romanowski held this to be no reason to disregard the limitation to misdemeanor treatment prescribed by Proposition 47 if the $950 threshold is not crossed. ( People v. Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 913-914, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) We can discern no reason why enforcing the strong public interest in preventing <mask> is not subject to the same limitation prescribed by Proposition 47 and recognized in Romanowski . We repeat what the Supreme Court stated in Gonzales: \" 'One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.' [Citations.] The Act also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" ( People v. Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Both Page and Romanowski demonstrate the Supreme Court's view that the language of Proposition 47 should be \"construed 'broadly' and 'liberally' to effectuate its purposes.\" ( People v. Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1187, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 406 P.3d 319.) As the court pointed out in Page, \"In the voter guide to Proposition 47, the Legislative Analyst explained that under existing law, theft of property worth $950 or less could be charged as a felony 'if the crime involves the theft of certain property (such as cars).' [Citation.] Under the initiative, according to the analysis, such crimes would no longer be charged as grand theft 'solely because of the type of property involved.' [Citation.] To the extent section 490.2 is ambiguous as to its inclusion of a theft charged under Vehicle Code section 10851, these indicia of the voters' intent support an inclusive interpretation.\" ( Ibid. ) These indicia similarly support an inclusive interpretation with respect to the theft of personal identifying information charged under section 530.5, subdivision (c)(2)."], "id": "d31dd75e-3287-4bb6-a959-6bb3ed836421", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The panel affirmed convictions for possession of device making equipment (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1029(a)(4)), possession of at least fifteen unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1029(a)(3)), aggravated <mask> (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1028A(a)(1)), and possession of stolen mail (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1708), in a case in which the defendant argued that the district court reversibly erred by instructing the jury that \u201cintent to defraud\u201d under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1029(a)(3) and (4) means an intent to deceive or cheat."], "id": "103db8b7-1c6a-4995-89f5-1fc0d4156c17", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Prior to Proposition 47, all forgery offenses were \"wobblers,\" meaning they could be charged and punished either as a felony or a misdemeanor. (\u00a7\u00a7 17, subd. (b)(1), 473, subd. (a) [\"Forgery is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.\"].) Proposition 47 amended section 473 to *652add a new subdivision (b) (section 473(b)), which states, in relevant part: \"Notwithstanding subdivision (a), any person who is guilty of forgery relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order, where the value of the check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year.... This subdivision shall not be applicable to any person who is convicted both of forgery and of <mask>, as defined in Section 530.5.\""], "id": "b1da86aa-0580-49c9-aa02-912a7fcc948f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J., at speedy trial motion; Juan M. Merchan, J., at jury trial and sentencing), rendered December 7, 2011, as amended December 12, 2011, convicting defendant of <mask> in the first degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and two counts of theft of services, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 2V3 to 7 years, should be modified, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to the extent of vacating the identity theft conviction and dismissing that count, and otherwise affirmed."], "id": "707f37ce-3cdb-424e-bd1f-5746072c86db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Prior to Proposition 47, all forgery offenses were \"wobblers,\" meaning they could be charged and punished either as a felony or a misdemeanor. (\u00a7\u00a7 17, subd. (b)(1), 473, subd. (a) [\"Forgery is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.\"].) Proposition 47 amended section 473 to *652add a new subdivision (b) (section 473(b)), which states, in relevant part: \"Notwithstanding subdivision (a), any person who is guilty of forgery relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order, where the value of the check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year.... This subdivision shall not be applicable to any person who is convicted both of forgery and of <mask>, as defined in Section 530.5.\""], "id": "2576d568-e27a-4926-b4d5-c1aeed02519d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": [" The defendant's contentions that the two counts of <mask> in the first degree were multiplicitous and that her conviction of both counts violated constitutional principles of double jeopardy are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Gonzalez, 99 NY2d 76, 82; People v Rosario, 184 AD3d 676, 677). In any event, the contentions are without merit. The defendant was convicted under distinct subdivisions of the statute, each requiring proof of an additional fact (see Penal Law \u00a7 190.80[1], [2]; CPL 200.30[2]; People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267, 269-271; People v Ayala, 172 AD3d 1084, 1084; Matter of Lavon S., 136 AD3d 1044, 1046)."], "id": "0551efa1-5ce8-4fd7-a4ef-552bee796cb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Last, we are not persuaded the People should be permitted on remand to withdraw from the plea bargain and reinstate the dismissed felony <mask> counts because defendant breached her side of the bargain. The decision in People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026 (Collins ) does not support the People's request. The defendant there pleaded guilty to one count of oral copulation in violation of former section 288a, in exchange for dismissal of multiple charges and dismissal of the allegation the defendant committed the oral copulation by means of force. (Id. at p. 211, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026.) Before sentencing, the Legislature repealed former section 288a and enacted a new version of the statute that did not proscribe oral copulation between consenting adults. (Ibid. ) The defendant objected to the trial court's jurisdiction to impose sentence because the crime to which he pleaded guilty had been repealed. The trial court overruled the objection and sentenced the defendant to one to 15 years in state prison. (Id. at pp. 211-212, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026.)"], "id": "e3e73e97-e326-4bd1-8ceb-0ad237111c9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant in Bush committed offenses between October 2000 and January 2002. (Bush, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 998, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 190.) During that period, section 368, subdivision (d) only referred to theft or embezzlement from an elder victim and did not reference forgery, fraud, or <mask> under section 530.5. (\u00a7 368, former subd. (d), added by Stats. 1998, ch. 936, \u00a7 7.5.)"], "id": "7b3f6303-777b-4c03-9d8a-3bc30b353069", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Here, Jimenez's conduct is identical to Gonzales's conduct. They both entered a commercial establishment during business hours for the purpose of cashing stolen checks valued at less than $950 each. Both defendants committed \"theft by false pretenses,\" which \"now constitutes shoplifting under [section 459.5, subdivision (a) ].\" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 862, 868-869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 [shoplifting as defined in section 459.5, subdivision (a) encompasses all thefts, including theft by false pretenses].) Section 459.5, subdivision (b) makes it clear that \" '[a]ny act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting,' \" and that \" '[n]o person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.' \" ( Gonzales , at p. 863, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, italics added.) The trial court properly *1290concluded that Jimenez's acts of shoplifting could not be charged as felony <mask> under section 530.5, subdivision (a). ( Gonzales , at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Under section 495, subdivision (b), they could be charged only as misdemeanor shoplifting. ( Gonzales , at pp. 862, 876-877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 ; see 2 Couzens, Bigelow & Prickett, Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2017) \u00a7 25:4, p. 25-29 [\"If section 459.5 applies, the defendant may not be alternatively charged with burglar[y] or identity theft\"].)"], "id": "d876dd29-b75b-42f0-8d68-4fd04fedd240", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Because the statute is susceptible to these two reasonable interpretations and the legislative history is inconclusive, we decide this issue in accordance with the rule of lenity and sanction the interpretation more favorable to defendant (see Green, 68 NY2d at 153). Clearly, the more favorable interpretation *227would require the People to prove both elements, that defendant used Catalfamo\u2019s personal identifying information and that he consequently assumed Catalfamo\u2019s identity. In addition, we think this is the more sensible reading according to the plain meaning of the statute because the word \u201cby,\u201d as used in the phrase \u201cassumes the identity of another person by [one of the enumerated methods],\u201d indicates the vehicle by which the assumption of identity takes place. It does not, however, indicate that assumption of identity is an inevitable consequence of using a person\u2019s identifying information. Put another way, although the statute provides three alternative means by which a defendant may commit the offense, assumption of identity must be the end result. Accordingly, whether defendant \u201cassumed the identity\u201d of another is a separate and essential element of the offense of <mask> which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."], "id": "07bb5ca8-88b2-4958-be28-c506f68010a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs allege that at the time they received medical treatment they provided personal information to the defendants, and that on or before fall 2010 and continuing at least through 2012, medical record face sheets and unencrypted computer network data were stolen from defendants North-Shore LIJ. It is also alleged that patients\u2019 physical (hard copy) hospital face sheets were unsecured and were stolen from inside the premises of the defendants\u2019 facilities, including NSUH. These face sheets consist of cover sheets containing information about each patient, including their full name, their spouse\u2019s full name if married, date of birth, address, telephone number, medical record number, Social Security number, insurance information, and current medical information and history. Plaintiffs allege that the stolen data contains private, personal information, including but not limited to protected health information as defined by HIPAA, Social Security numbers, medical information and other information of hundreds of patients. Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the defendants\u2019 failure to implement and follow basic security procedures, their personal information is now in the hands of thieves, and that they face a substantial increased risk of <mask>. Each of the 13 plaintiffs allege that they have experienced repeated instances of identity theft since said data breach and that as a consequence of said breach, plaintiffs, as well as current and former patients, have had to spend and will continue to spend significant time and money in the future to protect themselves. In addition, plaintiff Peterman alleges that as a result of the data breach her credit rating was substantially damaged; plaintiff Vetere alleges that as a result of the data breach her *1032income tax refund for 2010 was fraudulently claimed and sent to a third party; and plaintiff Akins alleges that identity thieves fraudulently filed state and federal income tax returns for 2011, causing him substantial financial losses."], "id": "fbab2c7c-c6ca-4e6d-be80-6b6b5e7a886e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": [" The defendant's contentions that the two counts of <mask> in the first degree were multiplicitous and that her conviction of both counts violated constitutional principles of double jeopardy are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Gonzalez, 99 NY2d 76, 82; People v Rosario, 184 AD3d 676, 677). In any event, the contentions are without merit. The defendant was convicted under distinct subdivisions of the statute, each requiring proof of an additional fact (see Penal Law \u00a7 190.80[1], [2]; CPL 200.30[2]; People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267, 269-271; People v Ayala, 172 AD3d 1084, 1084; Matter of Lavon S., 136 AD3d 1044, 1046)."], "id": "2587f141-946c-4275-b397-2e20dedab53c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant contends the trial court erred in considering facts outside the record of conviction to support its conclusion that defendant undertook both burglaries with the intent to commit <mask>. The record, specifically the factual bases set forth in the plea agreements, states defendant entered Wells Fargo Bank and SR Food and Liquor only with the intent to commit theft. The prosecutor had proffered that the intent was to commit identity theft, but defendant had objected to the court's considering this disputed fact. Defendant adds that the trial court's finding-limiting shoplifting-reflected a misunderstanding and consequent misapplication of the law."], "id": "1607c9e3-eaf1-42c9-8cd5-bb79ee5ade8e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["At the hearing, the court stated it would first hear from the People because they had filed an objection. The prosecutor began: \"In case 0664 the charge is a 459 second; however, we believe that it is not entitled to resentencing because the entry was into Wells Fargo Bank and the defendant attempted to cash a check belonging to another person which would be an <mask> and, therefore, it would be entering the bank with the intent to commit a felony, identity theft.\" After clarifying that the check was written off someone else's account, the prosecutor continued: \"In case 0901, it would be the same argument as to the 459 second and the defendant entered SR Food and Liquor and attempted to cash two checks belonging to another person which again *829would be the identity theft issue; however, he would be entitled to resentencing on the 476 [fictitious check count] because the amounts were less than $950.\""], "id": "c3723a13-f720-40af-911d-847bd9da2458", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["In both Gonzales and this case, the defendant had pled guilty to burglary in exchange for the prosecution's dismissal of another charge. In both cases, the defendant's burglary indisputably satisfied the elements of misdemeanor shoplifting, because the defendant entered the building with the intent to commit a larceny of property worth less than $950. In both cases, the People argued that the defendant's intent at the time of his entry into the commercial establishment was not merely to commit a theft, but also to commit a different felony also directed at taking the same property. In Gonzales , the Supreme Court held that the shoplifting statute precluded a burglary charge based on intent to commit <mask>, even though identity theft involves additional elements. ( Gonzales, supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 876-877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Here, we must decide whether the shoplifting statute precluded a burglary charge based *268on intent to commit robbery, even though robbery involves the additional element of the use of force or fear."], "id": "7cf64cf6-031f-41f6-8bb6-fc06a34b45b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["In March 2019, while Jimenez was still pending, we issued an opinion resolving defendant\u2019s appeal by holding that, as the Attorney General had acknowledged, her conviction for burglary had to be reduced to shoplifting under new section 459.5, subdivision (a), and further holding that, as the Attorney General had disputed, her five convictions for <mask> and mail theft in violation of section 530.5, subdivisions (a), (c), and (e) also had to be reduced to misdemeanors in violation of section 459.5, subdivision (a), or of section 490.2. The California Supreme Court granted review of this case and deferred briefing pending its decision in Jimenez. In March 2020, the court decided Jimenez, holding that Proposition 47 does not apply to convictions for unlawfully obtaining and using personal identifying information in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a), and that such convictions may not be reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting (\u00a7 459.5). (Jimenez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 58\u201359.) 2 Jimenez did not address mail theft in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (e) (hereafter, section 530.5(e)). After deciding Jimenez, the court transferred this case back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the case in light of that decision. Defendant and the Attorney General have each filed supplemental briefs in which they do not dispute the proper disposition of this appeal as to six of the seven convictions at issue. The parties agree that nothing in Jimenez undermines our original holding that defendant\u2019s burglary conviction must be"], "id": "714678e5-50df-4fa3-8315-e8eff098be8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Thereafter, in August 2004, plaintiff claims that, when he and his wife applied for a mortgage to purchase a new home, a credit report was run by the bank to which he applied and he learned that there were four credit cards in his name, including the Discovercard, which had outstanding balances on accounts which he never possessed. He states that when he contacted the credit card issuers he learned that an unknown person had stolen his identity and run up significant balances, using a fictitious address to which bills were sent. Plaintiff asserts that he never lived at the address given by the imposter and that he never received any credit card billing statements from any of the card issuers, including Discovercard. On September 30, 2004, he filed a police report with his local police department reporting the <mask>."], "id": "3a044f91-c45a-4923-b5a0-02b2ae6258b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["On the day of the hearing when defendant changed his plea, the People filed a 23-page boilerplate memorandum of points and authorities, accompanied by a 12-page declaration from a Sacramento County *184Sheriff's deputy assigned to the Sacramento Valley Hi-Tech Crimes Task Force, in support of the imposition of a probation condition requiring defendant to submit his electronic storage devices, including but not limited to cell phones and computers, to warrantless search and seizure. The boilerplate memorandum explained that the superior court had \"developed new language describing search and seizure terms and conditions accompanying grants of probation for certain cases.\" Essentially, the new language added \"electronic storage devices\" to the standard condition permitting warrantless probation searches, which already permitted searches of a probationer's \"person, place, property, automobile, ... and any object under [the probationer's] control.\"2 According to the memorandum, the probation department was \"recommending the imposition of this new language in cases, such as this, where there is a nexus between the grant of probation and the defendant's use of an electronic device.\" Being a boilerplate document, however, the memorandum did not provide any details relating to this specific case. Instead, the memorandum asserted in a footnote that the new search condition \"should be imposed in cases where there has been a demonstrated connection between the type of criminal conduct involved and the use of electronic devices and/or [where the condition] bears a reasonable relation to future criminality, such as the following: drug sales/transportation; fraud, <mask>, financial crimes; sex offenses; human trafficking, pimping and pandering; domestic violence ; weapons-related offenses; gang enhancements and gang membership; and any other case where a defendant used an electronic device during the current offense or in a previous crime.\" (Italics added.)"], "id": "46345302-2d2b-4024-b8e1-d45402d0a870", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b63 Espriu testified at the jury trial, and during direct examination her counsel asked if any of her prior convictions \u201crelated to fleeing from law enforcement.\u201d Espriu responded in the negative. The State then argued that defense counsel had \u201copened the door\u201d for the State to further inquire as to the nature of Espriu\u2019s prior felony convictions. The superior court agreed and allowed the State to elicit testimony during cross- examination that Espriu had been convicted of theft of means of transportation, <mask>, trafficking in stolen property, and possession of dangerous drugs. The court instructed the jury that it could use the prior convictions only to evaluate Espriu\u2019s credibility and not as evidence of guilt. The jury later found Espriu guilty as charged."], "id": "fa49808c-6f58-467f-9d7b-459c6f1035ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff asserts that her \u201ccredit rating\u201d with the three major credit rating firms declined as a result of the adverse credit history created under her identity by the defendants. Plaintiff has provided documentation that her scores after July 2003 were below 600 with two of the three companies. However, plaintiff has not provided any documentation as to what her score was prior to May 2002 when the defendants allegedly commenced their scheme. Although there appear to be six accounts showing delinquencies opened within the time period plaintiff asserts the defendants were engaged in their <mask> scheme, the credit reports also show delinquencies and late payments on a Staten Island Savings Bank mortgage taken out in May 2002 for an undisclosed premises. Plaintiff does not appear to be alleging that the delinquencies on the mortgage payment resulted from the defendants\u2019 afctions. There is no showing from plaintiff that the late payments on the mortgage account are not relevant to her declining credit score."], "id": "38eee24c-9ce5-426a-8781-92182a68c48d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cIn matters of statutory construction, legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and [the] proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the Legislature\u201d (People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 383 [1998] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). Penal Law \u00a7 190.78 was enacted in 2002 as part of a comprehensive package of laws whose purpose was to protect and vindicate the rights of consumers actually victimized by the crime of <mask> (see L 2002, ch 619):1"], "id": "8dac2b81-7fb1-4ac0-8f2b-7deed6696beb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["*655Plaintiff has attached as an exhibit her credit score with TransUnion as 702 as of December 23, 2004, which would seem to indicate that any adverse ratings resulting from the actions of the defendants have been erased from her credit report. By this documentation, plaintiff is representing that it took her almost two years to repair her credit. In fact, the TransUnion report shows only two accounts as reported with a negative history. One is a Home Depot account that plaintiff indicates is one of the fraudulently opened credit cards. The second negative account is the Staten Island Savings Bank mortgage. All of the other wrongfully opened accounts have apparently been removed from plaintiff\u2019s credit history. The fact that one or more of these accounts may still improperly be appearing may give rise to a cause of action pursuant to General Business Law article 25 against the entities reporting these accounts and carrying them on the plaintiffs credit history. There is also a question as to whether or not the Home Depot account being reported is the same fraudulent account since it is listed as opened in August 2002 while the one which plaintiff asserts was part of the <mask> was opened in July 2002. In addition, it appears to have a different account number than the one opened by the defendants. Also, the late payment being reported is as of April 2003, a date four months after which plaintiff states she learned of the identity theft and notified the credit reporting agencies and cardholders."], "id": "cf5625d5-1fa0-46bd-96f3-dc6c03414e1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The third element of <mask> in the first degree under Penal Law \u00a7 190.80 (2) requires that the defendant cause \u201cfinancial loss to [the person from which she used personal identifying information] or to another person\u201d (emphasis added). In this case, even though the money was ultimately reimbursed to the civilian victims, the defendant did indeed cause financial loss to those civilian victims for a period of time, however temporary. The testimony adduced at trial demonstrates that the victims were deprived of their money from the time the defendant used the money to make unauthorized purchases until such time as the financial institutions reimbursed the money to the civilian victims. During that period the money was not available to the civilian victims for their use."], "id": "1fb14455-e84e-4843-b262-da816e0c04d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Discovercard asserts that the first and core \u201cinjury\u201d in the case at bar was the creation of a debt in plaintiffs name with Discovercard, and that plaintiff knew of that debt in late 2000 or 2001 and \u201cdid nothing and waited for the inevitable consequence of unpaid debt to be visited upon him in his application for a mortgage loan more that three years later.\u201d In contrast, it is plaintiff\u2019s position that all the elements of the tort to be truthfully pleaded in the complaint were not available until September 2004 when he learned of the <mask> in the credit report and that the \u201cinjury\u201d did not accrue until the bank set a higher rate of interest on account of the negative credit report."], "id": "be11ec92-31e7-4fb2-ac2f-84ea2dc8b51c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant contends the trial court erred in considering facts outside the record of conviction to support its conclusion that defendant undertook both burglaries with the intent to commit <mask>. The record, specifically the factual bases set forth in the plea agreements, states defendant entered Wells Fargo Bank and SR Food and Liquor only with the intent to commit theft. The prosecutor had proffered that the intent was to commit identity theft, but defendant had objected to the court's considering this disputed fact. Defendant adds that the trial court's finding-limiting shoplifting-reflected a misunderstanding and consequent misapplication of the law."], "id": "7ee18804-1946-4561-a4b5-59f445424364", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant contends the trial court erred in considering facts outside the record of conviction to support its conclusion that defendant undertook both burglaries with the intent to commit <mask>. The record, specifically the factual bases set forth in the plea agreements, states defendant entered Wells Fargo Bank and SR Food and Liquor only with the intent to commit theft. The prosecutor had proffered that the intent was to commit identity theft, but defendant had objected to the court's considering this disputed fact. Defendant adds that the trial court's finding-limiting shoplifting-reflected a misunderstanding and consequent misapplication of the law."], "id": "29d4f86c-3503-4d1b-9f9b-adfb8f1f37c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["As Justice Donnino has observed, \u201c[t]he core of the basic third-degree <mask> offense, a class A misdemeanor, parallels the crime of \u2018criminal impersonation in the second degree.\u2019 \u201d (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law \u00a7 190.77.) Criminal impersonation in the second degree, Penal Law \u00a7 190.25 (1), is committed by a person who \u201c[i]impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another.\u201d The Second Department has held that \u201cin order to be found guilty of this [form of criminal impersonation], the People must have established that [the defendant] impersonated a real person.\u201d (People v Sadiq, 236 AD2d 638, 639 [2d Dept 1997].) As one court has held, relying on Sadiq, \u201cin requiring that a defendant prosecuted for identity theft have assumed the identity of \u2018another person,\u2019 the legislature plainly contemplated criminal conduct committed against an actual victim\u2014that is, an innocent person whose identity or information is actually stolen.\u201d (People v Debranche, 38 Misc 3d 872, 875 [Crim Ct, NY County 2012].)"], "id": "452c0eb5-2a70-4d43-bf77-1b9e8f3b2dee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Martin Marcus, J. On May 10, 2013, the defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Bronx County and charged with scheme to defraud in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 190.65 [1] [a]), and <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 190.79 [3]). In an omnibus motion, the defendant seeks, inter alia, dismissal of both counts of the indictment, the scheme to defraud count on statutory double jeopardy grounds, and the identity theft count for legal insufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the indictment is granted."], "id": "8ce4d006-75a0-4e05-a26d-b940757171c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Our analysis tracks that of the Supreme Court in Gonzales. In Gonzales , a defendant had been charged with two felonies-forgery and second-degree burglary-where each involved the same property: forged $125 checks that he attempted to cash at a bank. ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The defendant had pled guilty to the burglary charge and the court had dismissed the forgery charge. ( Ibid. ) The Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's claim that the defendant was \"not eligible for resentencing because he also entered the bank intending to commit <mask>.\" ( Id. at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) It instead agreed with the defendant's position that \"even assuming he entered the bank with an intent to commit identity theft, section 459.5, subdivision (b) would have precluded a felony burglary charge because his conduct also constituted shoplifting.\" ( Ibid. ) Thus, \"the shoplifting statute would have precluded a burglary charge based on an entry with intent to commit identity theft here because the conduct underlying such a charge would have been the same as that involved in the shoplifting, namely, the cashing of the same stolen check to obtain less than $950.\" ( Id. at pp. 876-877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "6181b0b3-9b35-41a8-973f-8d76abba2ab4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The detectives searched Schaiy\u2019s purse and found a debit card with someone else\u2019s name, a counterfeit postal arrow key, and a cell phone. The cell phone contained photos of credit cards with other people\u2019s names, photos of driver\u2019s licenses belonging to different people, more \u201cprofiles,\u201d and text messages between Schaiy and Saini about mail and <mask>. For example, one text message referred to stealing mail: \u201c[A]re you going mailboxing?\u201d 2 Another text"], "id": "cb5c2db9-8866-4691-9535-40dc3996f6b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The parties agree that a person must assume the identity of another in order to be guilty of <mask>. Where the parties differ is on the question of whether engaging in one of the statute\u2019s enumerated methods\u2014here, using another\u2019s personal identifying information in the form of a credit card account number\u2014necessarily constitutes an assumption of identity. In other words, is assumption of identity a discrete element of the statute that must be proven independently of one of the methods by which identity can be assumed, or do the People automatically prove assumption of identity by proving that a defendant used another\u2019s personal identifying information? This question requires us to refer to the canons of statutory interpretation."], "id": "73768d43-f12f-4352-8b70-e54dbd9ef6b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person is guilty of <mask> in the first degree when he or she knowingly and with intent to defraud assumes the identity of another person by presenting himself or herself as that other person, or by acting as that other person or by using personal identifying information of that other person, and thereby: . . . \u201c2. causes financial loss to such person or to another person or persons in an aggregate amount that exceeds two thousand dollars . . . .\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 190.80 [2].) Under New York Penal Law, the term \u201cfinancial loss\u201d is not defined in the context of identity theft."], "id": "76d210bd-f0e7-439b-b30d-209ee225e23c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "identity theft", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["*492*684The jury here was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 2040 that to find defendant guilty of <mask> in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a), \"the People must prove that: [\u00b6] 1. The defendant willfully obtained someone else's personal identifying information; [\u00b6] 2. The defendant willfully used that information for an unlawful purpose; [\u00b6] AND [\u00b6] 3. The defendant used the information without the consent of the person whose identifying information he was using.\" The jury was further instructed that \"An unlawful purpose includes ... Falsely representing or identifying one's self as another person to a peace officer, upon a lawful detention, to evade the proper identification of himself. [\u00b6] or [\u00b6] Giving information to a peace officer, who is performing his duties under the vehicle code, when he knows the information is false.\" Defendant concedes that not every violation of section 148.9 or Vehicle Code section 31 results in a violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a) but argues that the rule applies in this instance because the manner in which he violated section 148.9 and Vehicle Code section 31 would commonly result in a violation of section 530.5. We disagree."], "id": "e5488126-7fbc-4f07-86c6-590aebecb359", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Computer Crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["While this court is cognizant of the many difficulties confronting the attorney representing a client who may be the target or subject of a Grand Jury investigation (Arkin, Target or Subject of Inquiry \u2014 Defense Counsel\u2019s Dilemma, NYLJ, Oct. 18,1984, p 1, col 3) and the uncertainties of dealing with complex computer technology, here defendants were aware the Grand Jury was investigating \u201cthe taking of computer code from Stony Brook University Hospital and delivering it to Albert Einstein Hospital in Philadelphia\u201d (Motion to dismiss, exhibit B, at 2 and exhibit D, at 4 of affidavit of defendant\u2019s attorney) and that the Grand Jury was investigating the activities of the employees or agents of Stony Brook Systems, Inc., in this regard (Motion to dismiss, exhibit B, at 2). Furthermore, in accordance with the aforementioned oral decision of Judge Namm dated December 13, 1984, the Special Prosecutor informed defendants that the offense occurred during the period of approximately June 1981 through August 1981 and that \u201cFrank Russo and Stony Brook Systems, Inc. were involved in the taking of computer code from *882the University Hospital at Stony Brook\u201d. Defendants also knew that this code consisted of computer \u201csoftware.\u201d (Motion to dismiss, exhibit D, at 6 of affidavit of defendant\u2019s attorney and exhibit H.) At a minimum, this information differentiated the crimes being investigated from other types of computer-related criminal activity (Raysman and Brown, Evolving Statutes on <mask>, NYLJ, Jan. 11, 1983, p 1, col 1)."], "id": "ac515d30-fc32-4fc0-91fd-4e89f21fd906", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "computer crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["While research of the case law shows that the prosecution\u2019s theories may be novel, they comport with the Legislature\u2019s direction to construe the Penal Law \"according to the fair import of [its] terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 5.00; see, People v Ditta, 52 NY2d 657, 660). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has recently approved an expansive interpretation of the Penal Law in the specific area of computer crimes. In People v Versaggi (83 NY2d 123), the defendant\u2019s conviction for the crime of computer tampering in the second degree under Penal Law \u00a7 156.20 was affirmed, with the Court holding that the element of alteration of a computer program was satisfied by evidence that the defendant had accessed a computer program designed to control telephone service and caused that program to shut off a number of telephones *551for a period of time. Recognizing a legislative response to the burgeoning problem of <mask>, the Court of Appeals chose not to \"legislate or nullify statutes by overstrict construction\u201d (People v Versaggi, supra, at 131, citing People v Abeel, 182 NY 415, 421-422), and so avoided a restrictive interpretation of the term \"alter\u201d which would leave acts such as those committed by the defendant in Versaggi without penal sanction."], "id": "9ec36ae9-3c61-4f8c-a5f4-b397cb95d494", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "computer crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["This case involves perhaps the first prosecution under New York\u2019s new <mask> statute, Penal Law article 156, which went into effect on November 1, 1986, just days before the incidents charged herein. As of yet, the statute has not been construed by any court, and the reported decisions involving prosecutions under similar statutes in other States offer little substantive guidance. (See, e.g., People v Brown, 726 P2d 638 [Colo 1986]; State ex rel. Hall v Wolf, 710 SW2d 302 [Mo 1986].)"], "id": "3878f1e2-7a69-4b6c-b6fb-f6c3a398e9ed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "computer crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant has suggested that the criminal activity which took place constituted interrupting the operation of the computer system, as opposed to altering a computer program. In some States, interrupting the operation of a computer system is classified as a crime. (See, e.g., Cal Penal Code \u00a7 502 [c]; Conn Gen Stat Annot \u00a7 53a-251 [d].) This classification is absent, however, from New York\u2019s <mask> statute. The New York State Legislature has instead chosen to focus on the activity itself rather than the result of that activity. (See, Comment, The Challenge of Computer-Crime Legislation: How Should New York Respond?, 33 Buffalo L Rev 777, 785 [1984].) Therefore, the court must look to the statute and the alleged activity to determine whether that activity is within the purview of the statute."], "id": "88d4ad2e-bb46-4863-9d7c-c9d60fab4f6f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Computer Crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cany and all numbers, text messages (SMS), picture messages (MMS) and direct connect contained within said cellar telephone which are believed to have been used in furtherance of the attempted kidnaping of T.C., and any and all evidence tending to establish ownership of the cellular telephone and connect persons to said cellular telephone.\u201d The affidavit attached thereto, sworn by Police Officer Johnny Chalen, states that defendant first met T.C. in September 2013 in an online chat room, that they exchanged text messages on their respective cell phones, that on November 16, 2013, they met in person at defendant\u2019s apartment at 1995 Davidson Avenue, and that while inside defendant\u2019s apartment, defendant asked T.C. to work as a prostitute and showed her photos of male clients that were stored on his computer. When T.C. refused defendant\u2019s entreaties, defendant placed a gun to her head and did not allow her to leave the apartment. (See aff of Police Officer Chalen \u00b6\u00b6 5-7.) Pursuant to this search warrant, Police Officer Jonathan Reifer of the New York City Police Department, <mask> Squad searched the contents of the seized cell phone utilizing forensic software that extracts data from cell phones and converts it into a format readable to a layperson. It is uncontested that all of the text messages, chat logs, emails, locations, images and video that were contained on the cell phone were recovered from it. (See exhibits C, D attached to defendant\u2019s motion.) It is also uncontested that, although the forensic software permitted a trained user to limit the search of the cell phone by key word, date, time, and type of file, no such limitations were utilized by Officer Reifer. Included in what was recovered from this cell phone are conversations between defendant and his male clients about T.C. and conversations between defendant and T.C. (See People\u2019s mem of law at 5.) In addition, almost all of the text and picture messages recovered from this cell phone relate to defendant\u2019s escort business. These include voluminous communications between defendant and male clients and defendant and other sex workers, regarding prices, locations, and sex acts, as well as numerous photographs of sex workers that were sent to male clients. (See People\u2019s mem of law at 9-10.)"], "id": "9f56b748-a83f-4754-a5e9-4792aa3b5c0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Computer Crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["On February 16, 2015, the New York City Police Department was notified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Cyber Tipline (NCMEC) that a suspected image of child pornography had been uploaded onto an email account, A_@juno.com, provided by Internet service provider (ISP) Juno Online Services. The parent company of Juno, United Online, had reported the upload the day it occurred, December 26, 2014, and that the image came from a particular Internet protocol address (IP address), xx.xxx.xx.49. Police Officer Anthony Santilli, who was assigned to the <mask> Squad and who applied for the search warrants at issue here, viewed the image and determined that it fell within the definition of child pornography. He used the American Registry for Internet Numbers to learn that Verizon was the ISP that as*966signed the IP address used to upload the image. He subpoenaed Verizon and discovered the name of the subscriber to the email account and the address of the subscriber, a business, Pink Label, with a Brooklyn, New York address. The particular customer who signed onto the computer at the time was identified as \u201cJoseph H.\u201d Through another subpoena served on United Online, Santilli found subscriber information about the account, that it had been opened the day before the uploading, the member name, and that it was connected to the IP address originally reported. He also gained access to the connection logs which showed the time during which five additional IP addresses were connected to the Internet, the amount of data that was transferred, and the identification numbers of additional IP addresses used. With this information Santilli subpoenaed Verizon again and learned that one of the five additional IP addresses was assigned to Pink Label and the other four were associated with defendant, Joseph Hayon, at his home address in Brooklyn, New York."], "id": "c3e3149c-3dce-4f8e-833a-f686cf450f93", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "computer crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["According to the National Institute of Justice, the number of security guards has increased by 50% over the last 10 years, and there are indications projecting an even further expansion, for example, there exists grave concern about the ability of many police departments to competently investigate the technical complexities of corporate crime, <mask>, as well as commercial bribery and/or industrial espionage, etc."], "id": "f720bea7-e623-4d2e-a9f7-930ec0689213", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "computer crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["To further this policy, section 170.00 (1) of the Penal Law was amended in 1986 by the insertion of the phrase \"including computer data or a computer program\u201d. (L 1986, ch 514, \u00a7 5, eff Nov. 1, 1986.) This was done in acknowledgment of the \"proliferation of computers and the technological advances of recent years [which] have left the State without adequate protection against the many insidious forms of <mask>.\u201d (Governor\u2019s Mem approving L 1986, ch 514, 1986 NY Legis Ann, at 233.) The amendment to include computer data and computer programs was designed to \"[fill] the legal void by providing [a] comprehensive statutory framework for responding to the illegal and unethical use of computers.\u201d (Id., at 234.)"], "id": "f35207b9-eaed-4c05-bfd2-6aed38b71451", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "computer crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["This case brings into question the applicability and reach of various sections of Penal Law article 156, which was enacted in 1986 to \"adapt New York\u2019s statutes to the realities of the computer age. By prohibiting the unethical and illegal use of computers, the bill provides the first line of defense against the burgeoning threat of computer crime\u201d (Governor\u2019s Mem approving L 1986, ch 514, 1986 McKinney\u2019s Session Laws of NY, at 3172). Curiously, despite the bill\u2019s laudable goals and the ubiquitous use of computers in business and personal affairs, the number of <mask> prosecutions is exceedingly modest. To this date, there are but a handful of reported decisions involving Penal Law article 156."], "id": "0886742f-97e7-42a7-9f49-1b3520e8f812", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "computer crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["MCL 752.796(1) provides: \u201cA person shall not use a computer program, computer, computer system, or computer network to commit, attempt to commit, conspire to commit, or solicit another person to commit a crime.\u201d Thus, the <mask> has two elements: (1) the commission, attempted commission, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of a crime; and, (2) through the use of a computer. In this case, the record reflects that the prosecution presented evidence that defendant violated MCL 168.932(c) and MCL 750.248(1) through the use of a computer. The circuit court erroneously quashed the two counts of use of a computer because it erroneously concluded that the district court abused its discretion by binding over defendant to face trial for the predicate offenses, the violations of MCL 168.932(c) and MCL 750.248(1). Because the circuit court erred by quashing the bindover on those two underlying offenses, it necessarily erred by quashing the two related use of a computer counts. The evidence supported the district court\u2019s ruling that crimes had been committed and that probable cause existed to believe that defendant committed violations of MCL 168.932(c) and MCL 750.248(1) by using a computer to alter and falsify the QVF."], "id": "c87b58d1-7a24-4745-8dec-74ee6c498934", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Computer Crime", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Regarding the asserted need for more time to try to recover the text message, defense counsel's declaration stated \"the defense investigators [ ]who have done extensive work on this case [ ]since the Public Defender's Office was appointed approximately four months ago\" had sent Connie and her boyfriend's damaged cell phones to the <mask> Institute at Dixie State University (the Dixie State Institute). The declaration explained the phones had been previously sent to another laboratory that had no success in recovering \"crucial text messages\" and the Dixie State Institute was one of the only labs that could attempt \"chip extractions\" that might recover the message. Defense counsel declared he left a message with the Dixie State Institute the day before filing the continuance motion to determine when their work would be completed but had not \"heard back yet.\""], "id": "68fcf0a1-ffe0-4270-8ce7-7de661171d85", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Cyberbullying", "legal_topic": "Computer", "masked_sentences": ["Recent advances in technology appear only to reinforce Justice Scalia\u2019s concerns that Navarette further opened the 911 system to abuse by weakening the requirement that a tipster\u2019s assertion of illegality be reliable. Those advances have made it even easier for bad actors to exploit the 911 system by \u201cspoofing\u201d a phone number so that the 911 dispatcher thinks the call is coming from a different phone number, providing even more cover for malevolent tipsters. See Brumfield, Chapter 284: Deterring and Paying for Prank 911 Calls That Generate a SWAT Team Response, 45 McGeorge L Rev 585, 586 (2014) (explaining the process of spoofing a phone number); Kenyon, FTC Issues Warning of Social Security Scams, CQ Roll Call Washington Data Privacy Briefing (April 16, 2019) [2019 CQDPRPT 0288], available at <https:/perma.cc/WG42-A242> (\u201c[T]he FTC recommends consumers to not trust caller ID systems because it is easy for official-seeming phone numbers to be spoofed . . . .\u201d). In recent years, individuals have used spoofing technology to make fake 911 calls in order to prank or harass individuals. See Chapter 284, 45 McGeorge L Rev at 585; Jaffe, Swatting: The New <mask> Frontier After Elonis v. United States, 64 Drake L Rev 455, 456 (2016). After Navarette, some commentators have cited spoofing as one reason why 911 calls may not be sufficiently reliable\u2014specifically in the context of the Navarette decision. See, e.g., Gelb, How"], "id": "15c904ba-4a4d-4aaa-82fb-1e3175c4d26b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["There are only two major differences between parole and <mask> proceedings in New York. The first is the *421agency who was supervising the release of the petitioner at the time of the alleged violation \u2014 New York State Division of Parole oversees parolees while city and State Departments of Probation oversee probationers. The second is that a criminal or Supreme Court Judge presides over and adjudicates at probation violation proceedings while members of the New York State Parole Board preside over and adjudicate at parole violation proceedings. These are procedural, not substantive differences."], "id": "a23bbdf0-1694-4aae-8fd2-c051db9d1f11", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["We affirm. We reject defendant\u2019s contention that the People failed to establish that he violated the terms of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Filipowicz, 111 AD3d 1022, 1022 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1156 [2014]; People v D\u2019Entremont, 95 AD3d 1507, 1507 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1025 [2012]). Defendant\u2019s probation officer testified that she contacted him by phone on June 1, 2012, shortly after she had taken over his case, to inform him that he was still on probation and needed to report. Despite that admonition, defendant failed to appear for three scheduled meetings in June and July 2012, as well as a court date on June 20, 2012 for a hearing on the original <mask>. Additionally, the officer spoke with defendant on July 13, 2012 and informed him that a warrant had been issued for his arrest and, despite defendant\u2019s assurance that he would turn himself in, he failed to do so. The officer testified that defendant failed to report for supervision appointments and had no further contact with the Probation Department until his arrest in October 2012. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s violation of probation was established by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Welch, 55 AD3d 952, 953 [2008]; People v Walts, 34 AD3d 1043, 1043 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 850 [2007])."], "id": "5577772a-2d62-4c48-b6d3-b5a88cc4c0eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"The probation officer filed a notice of <mask> against appellant under ... section 777, subdivision (a) on December 19, 2013. The petition alleged minor failed to attend the Community Care Program, was truant in school attendance, failed to observe curfew, and tested positive for marijuana. The minor admitted the truancy violation and the court dismissed the remaining allegations. As a result of the violation, the court ordered 30 consecutive days of detention."], "id": "9168f1e2-7489-432a-9978-090497de0060", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["We think that the meaning of the phrase \"in all cases\" is unambiguous and a <mask> hearing is simply a part of the underlying misdemeanor \"case.\" Therefore, we hold that a misdemeanor defendant is entitled to have an attorney appear on his or her behalf at a probation violation hearing under section 977 ; the defendant's personal appearance is not \"lawfully required,\" until such time that the court orders a defendant to personally appear. (\u00a7 1305, subd. (a)(1)(D).)"], "id": "c5aa7dfe-f167-4ccd-901a-e41ef1fbb0e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In contrast, the similarities between the two are considerable. Both proceedings occur only after conviction and sentence of the petitioner has been imposed and prisoner treatment and rehabilitation have been considered. Both proceedings are administrative in nature, not criminal, even though the charges of a violation of either parole or probation, if determined to be valid, may result in incarceration. Neither proceeding requires the filing of an indictment or information to be initiated, nor do they require a trial to be resolved. In light of these minor differences and substantial similarities, and because <mask> proceedings are not considered to be covered by the IAD (see Carchman, supra; Capalongo, supra), the logical conclusion is that parole violation proceedings should be similarly excluded from its umbrella."], "id": "7ebaada8-18d0-4fb7-8f1f-f1a43c5abb16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The only regulation cited in plaintiff\u2019s complaint which imposes a clear duty is found at 9 NYCRR 352.1 (b): \u201cIn the absence of court direction, a court shall be notified upon a conviction of crime, absconder status, or a significant violation of technical conditions of probation, within seven business days of the probation department\u2019s knowledge of the conviction or determination of absconder status or significant violation.\u201d Similarly, the St. Lawrence County <mask> policies require notification within five business days. While there is a real question that the County\u2019s own written probation policies constitute part of a \u201cwell-developed body of law and regulation\u201d upon which to predicate General Municipal Law \u00a7 205-e liability, *440for the reasons that follow (discussing 9 NYCRR 352.1 [b]), plaintiffs cause of action premised upon either would fail for lack of causation."], "id": "56422d82-b044-4e43-8b91-1d61dfb63b86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On March 22, 2017, Deputies F. and B. were driving a marked patrol car and recognized Jimenez, who had an active felony no bail warrant for his arrest for a <mask>. The deputies activated the patrol car's lights and sirens and attempted to conduct a traffic stop. Although Jimenez initially pulled into a parking lot, he did not stop; instead, he pulled into traffic on a busy street without yielding, causing another car to brake suddenly to avoid collision. He led the deputies on a high-speed pursuit, accelerating to 50 and 55 miles per hour on streets with speed limits of 25 and 35 miles per hour, *414speeding through numerous intersections and stop signs without slowing or stopping, again requiring another vehicle to slam its brakes to avoid a collision. At one point, he was speeding so fast that he was able to \"catch air\" after coming to a dip in the road."], "id": "e814d18c-9e9b-4cc8-9ae3-114325c6365f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The St. Lawrence County Probation Department, failing to abide by its own <mask> policies that a memorandum of investigation be provided to the sentencing court within five days of the Probation Department being notified of an arrest, sent a belated violation package to the jurisdictional court on December 18, 2006. Canton Village Justice Michael Crowe signed a declaration of delinquency and issued an arrest warrant on December 29, 2006, which was faxed to the Probation Department on January 2, 2007. Thereafter, plaintiff alleges the defendants failed to properly process Trim\u2019s arrest warrant since it was neither forwarded to the local police nor input into the warrant entry/registrant system by the Probation Department. It is alleged the fax was shredded or destroyed. It is further alleged these acts caused Brinkerhoff s death since these delays permitted Trim to remain at large for months. During oral argument, plaintiffs counsel stated he only recently learned Trim had previously been stopped on the Thruway without incident, and had defendants timely applied for the arrest warrant and properly processed it, Trim could have been successfully taken into custody without event during that traffic stop. This information, he urges, can and should be developed during discovery."], "id": "0686edda-bf08-4c18-bf1a-cb810055cf49", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["If this <mask> hearing is a criminal proceeding, then the case of People v Parker (82 AD2d 661, affd 57 NY2d 815) must be considered. There, the court held inadmissible in a prosecution for a new crime statements made in the absence of counsel to a parole officer who knew that the parolee was *816represented by counsel. Not only was the 6th Amendment right to counsel violated, but the court held that 5th Amendment rights were also applicable, and Miranda warnings were required. The court distinguished between a parole violation hearing and a criminal proceeding."], "id": "465cdf7c-fef9-4256-afcd-eee0b1091e66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Aleman's attorney asked the court for permission to use the Letter because \"it is relevant and material with respect to [Cabral's] credibility.\"5 The prosecution asked the court \"to exclude\" the Letter under Evidence Code section 352, because it was pure speculation that Cabral received any kind of benefit. Aleman's counsel countered that the Letter is \"something the jury can consider in determining [Cabral's] credibility and whether he's benefiting from being a witness in this case,\" i.e., the jury could infer that Cabral falsely testified against defendants to avoid being sent to prison for a <mask>. Medrano's counsel chimed in, \"the jury is entitled to know how many benefits he's receiving.\" The court allowed the defense to use the Letter, because it is relevant to whether Cabral sought to benefit from his cooperation with the prosecution, and specifically noted that Cabral could be questioned about his conviction for transporting drugs in Arizona."], "id": "66005f9a-ee93-4bf6-a6f4-ee4022374d65", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Unlike the defendant in Allen, defendant in this case was incarcerated for the <mask> under a detainer. Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree home invasion and possession of burglar tools on July 10, 2013. He was then sentenced to three-years\u2019 probation with a year in the county jail, with credit for 160 days. On March 17, 2017, five days after Black\u2019s death, a warrant was issued for defendant\u2019s arrest regarding the probation violation. Under Allen, defendant\u2019s detention, beginning March 17, 2017, had \u201cnothing to do with a denial of or inability to furnish bond in the new criminal proceeding.\u201d Id. Instead, his inability to post bond was a result of the probation violation. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to credit under MCL 769.11b, and the trial court did not plainly err when it sentenced defendant. D. DUE PROCESS"], "id": "082ae76a-b8e0-40b8-8bc4-109e67dfa890", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["confinement to order execution of sentence (or make other final order) if sentence has previously been imposed (3d par., 3d sentence). Failure to comply with any one of these three time limits divests the court of any remaining jurisdiction. (5th par.)\u201d (Hoddinott, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 999.) The purpose of section 1203.2a is to \u201cto prevent the inadvertent denial of the benefit of concurrent sentencing under [ ] section 669 and is structured to preclude the mechanical imposition of consecutive sentences by depriving the court of further jurisdiction over the defendant if the court fails to act within 60 days following notification of defendant\u2019s confinement.\u201d (Pompi v. Superior Court (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 503, 507, fn. omitted (Pompi).) \u201cBecause loss of jurisdiction is such a severe sanction, however, courts have been unwilling to impose it \u2018unless the sentencing court\u2019s jurisdiction has been ousted by strict compliance with the statute. [Citations.]\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (People v. Murray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 149, 156.) II Additional Facts On June 4, 2020, defendant sent a letter to the Tehama County District Attorney (not the probation office) to request \u201cunder section 1203.2(a)\u201d that the prosecutor accept his admission to a <mask> in the Tehama County case and have that term be one year consecutive to his Butte County sentence, or alternatively, to run them concurrently. The letter came with a form notice of demand for trial or disposition under section 1381. Both the letter and form reference his Butte County conviction. On May 27, 2020, the Tehama County Superior Court issued an order for production of prisoner to the Butte County Jail to produce defendant for a July 6 hearing. On July 1, 2020, the Tehama County Sheriff\u2019s Office filed a letter with the Tehama County Superior Court stating defendant was \u201cunavailable for pickup for his court date on July 6, 2020. He has been sentenced to state prison, and BUTTE COUNTY JAIL will not release him on the order of production due to his pending delivery to state prison.\u201d"], "id": "63d65b94-17f2-4c60-8132-9b16964580e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Several months later, in March 2016, Charley, still 16, was arrested a third time, again for violating probation. This time, in his second <mask> petition, he was alleged to have twice tested positive for marijuana, repeatedly been late to school and been discharged from his court-ordered counseling program for missing three consecutive weekly sessions. Charley once again admitted the violations and the juvenile court sustained the petition. He was continued as a ward of the court and again reinstated on probation."], "id": "dba938f6-8017-4ef0-8925-493d1df381ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["a suspended or revoked license and driving without proof of insurance in case number OBL04059 were dismissed in connection with Simpson\u2019s July 29, 2020 no contest plea to simple battery in case number OBL04328. Simpson admitted to a <mask> based on the battery conviction. 3As set forth above, Simpson\u2019s first payment on his fines and fees in this case was not due until November 22, 2020, more than a month after this probation violation hearing."], "id": "00ac3b4b-4c7f-48f8-9435-de135f80b148", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On April 5, 2011, Boswell was arrested in Jackson County on unrelated charges. While incarcerated in the Jackson County Detention Center awaiting trial on the 2011 charges, Boswell signed a waiver of the <mask> preliminary hearing on his 2009 case. On April 28, 2011, his probation officer filed a probation violation report with the Clay County Circuit Court recommending revocation of Boswell's probation for the 2009 case."], "id": "57a53094-db17-4bd0-ace0-fc6b7f5d706b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Amay Lott, who had been housed in the county jail in 2005 at the same time that Smith and Williams were there, testified that while in jail, Smith had spoken about a burglary and murder in which she and Mitchell had been involved.25 According *35to Lott, the original \"story that [Smith] had in there [i.e., in the county jail]\" was that \"[s]he was in there for a <mask>.\" However, Lott testified that she overheard Smith tell Williams about a burglary at a house where an \"old lady\" was home. According to Lott, Smith said that her boyfriend Michael was there, as well as another woman and another man. Although Lott initially said that she overheard Smith talking to Williams about the crime,26 Lott later indicated that Smith had told Lott details about what \"happened inside the house.\" According to Lott, Smith said that \"[t]hey went in there to rob the house, and apparently she-the lady was there. It scared them. That they ended up putting-she was telling them just leave her alone, let's go, let's go. They put a pillowcase over her head, and the boys proceeded to beat her. And she was trying to get them to stop, but they-.\" Lott testified that Smith told her that \"[t]he boyfriend\" put the pillowcase over the woman's head, and that \"[t]he cousin\" was the one who \"tied up the elderly lady.\" Lott indicated that the group had taken items from the house, including rare coins, bottles of change, and jewelry."], "id": "a6c4bacd-4c77-4257-bbab-c68885ea5d19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A sentencing court has broad power to revoke or modify a term of probation at any time during the probationary period, which includes the power to extend the probationary term. ( People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095 & 1100, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 820 P.2d 278 ( Cookson ).) This power is not limited to cases where a *508<mask> has been committed. ( Id . at p. 1098, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 820 P.2d 278.) However, \"[a] change in circumstances is required before a court has jurisdiction to extend or otherwise modify probation.... 'An order modifying the terms of probation based upon the same facts as the original order granting probation is in excess of the jurisdiction of the court, for the reason that there is no factual basis to support it.' [Citation.]\" ( Id. at p. 1095, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 820 P.2d 278, italics omitted, quoting In re Clark (1959) 51 Cal.2d 838, 840, 337 P.2d 67.)"], "id": "8c55e571-9fb0-41a0-b340-00ecc72f1af6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, when granting probation, trial courts ordinarily suspend the imposition of sentence, as happened in this case. (\u00a7 1203.2, subd. (c).) In other words, Santillan's sentence had not been imposed, and therefore the same criminal \"case\" continued during his probationary period. There is simply no basis to conclude that a <mask> hearing is not part of a defendant's continuing criminal \"case.\""], "id": "ff82fc5a-a494-40dd-a563-d669334488cf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The surety argues that once a defendant is convicted he is no longer charged with, nor is he accused of a misdemeanor, therefore any subsequent <mask> hearings are not included within the \"case\" under section 977. The surety's interpretation of the statute is somewhat contrived and wholly unsupported by case law. Taken to its logical extreme, this argument would also apply to a sentencing hearing (a defendant has also been convicted at that point). But it is settled law that a misdemeanor defendant may waive the right to be personally present at sentencing. (See Olney v. Municipal Court , supra , 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 461, 184 Cal.Rptr. 78 ; \u00a7 1193, subd. (b) [\"If the conviction be of a misdemeanor, judgment may be pronounced against the defendant in his absence\"].)"], "id": "7abb4535-4297-405c-8d27-7d743e3146f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant, while on probation for the felony of driving while intoxicated, was incarcerated for the definite sentence of one year from December, 1976, until April, 1977, in connection with the unrelated charges of obstruction of governmental administration and resisting arrest. He was released on bail for the latter matters in April of 1977 pending an appeal of the convictions. On March 10, 1977, the defendant was sentenced for a <mask> of the earlier matter to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed three years in a State correctional facility."], "id": "817622c9-a0ba-4d2e-ad15-720520542088", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["With these immutable jurisdictional rules in mind, it is clear that \u201cthe appropriate court\u201d having jurisdiction over matters relating to a transferred probation sentence can and must only be determined based upon the geographic location of the defendant\u2019s offending conduct as circumscribed by CPL 20.40 and 20.50. As applied here, the defendant\u2019s failure to make the restitution payments to the Essex County Probation Department, located in the Town of Elizabethtown, provides the necessary geographic nexus for the Town of Elizabethtown Justice Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant\u2019s <mask> proceeding premised upon such nonpay*1020ment. Similarly, the violation proceeding could properly have been brought in the defendant\u2019s town of residence (CPL 20.40 [3]) or in Essex County Court (see People v Roberts-Alexandrov, 102 AD3d 219 [3d Dept 2012])."], "id": "92ebf6c9-ee0f-41a2-8911-8a6d628d2477", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The result here is not inconsistent with the cases cited by either the defendant (Matter of Rogers, 194 Misc 2d 103, 104 [Elmira City Ct 2002]; People v Murtovic, 42 Misc 3d 1203[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52180[U] [Newburgh City Ct 2013]), or by the People (People v Roberts-Alexandrov). In Rogers, the court clearly applied the jurisdictional constraints imposed by CPL 20.50: \u201cWhere a county contains multiple different local criminal courts, section 20.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets the geographical jurisdiction of offenses, and the jurisdiction of the cities, towns and villages located therein.\u201d (Matter of Rogers, 194 Misc 2d at 104.) Nothing in Rogers indicates that the offending conduct of the defendant there occurred in the city of Elmira. Because CPL 410.80 (2) (a) (ii) requires that, upon transfer of a probation case, \u201c[t]he sending probation department shall consult with the probation department to which supervision will be transferred to determine the appropriate criminal court to receive the case,\u201d the Rogers court held that \u201cthe [receiving] Probation Department, in making its recommendation as to the appropriate local criminal court to receive the case, must take into consideration the geographical residence of the defendant and the geographical jurisdiction of the local criminal court.\u201d (Id. at 105.) Notably, the failure to designate the proper court to which the powers of the sentencing court will be transferred, or, presumably, the incorrect designation, on the intrastate order of transfer is a ministerial act which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court which ultimately considers a <mask> (see People v Perry, 188 AD2d 909 [3d Dept 1992], llv denied 81 NY2d 975 [1993]; People v Roberts-Alexandrov). In Rogers, the appropriate court was the Town or Village Court of Horseheads, where the defendant resided."], "id": "ba211d8e-a800-4854-9ee5-36252c41b292", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["While CPL 390.20 (2) does not explicitly address the requirements of a presentence investigative report upon resentencing for a violation of probation, the courts have uniformly interpreted CPL 390.20 (1) to require such a report in felony cases. (People v Jackson, 106 AD2d 93.) There appears to be no good reason why the same rule should not apply in misdemeanor cases. The purpose of obtaining a presentence investigative report is to provide the court with a summary of the defendant\u2019s conduct and any relevant changes in his status since the previous PSI. Courts have permitted an updated presentence report or its functional equivalent, such as a <mask> packet with updated summary to be used. (People v Goon, 124 AD2d 347; People v Jackson, supra.) But the information must be current. (People v Laster, 140 AD2d 233; People v Roberts, 143 AD2d 560.) Courts have also approved sentencing without an updated PSI if the probation officer at the time of the probation violation hearing gives information on the defendant\u2019s conduct and any changed conditions since the time of the original report. (People v Allen W., 129 AD2d 867.)"], "id": "379b51ef-943b-466f-adbf-5971e95c18c7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The only regulation cited in plaintiff\u2019s complaint which imposes a clear duty is found at 9 NYCRR 352.1 (b): \u201cIn the absence of court direction, a court shall be notified upon a conviction of crime, absconder status, or a significant violation of technical conditions of probation, within seven business days of the probation department\u2019s knowledge of the conviction or determination of absconder status or significant violation.\u201d Similarly, the St. Lawrence County <mask> policies require notification within five business days. While there is a real question that the County\u2019s own written probation policies constitute part of a \u201cwell-developed body of law and regulation\u201d upon which to predicate General Municipal Law \u00a7 205-e liability, *440for the reasons that follow (discussing 9 NYCRR 352.1 [b]), plaintiffs cause of action premised upon either would fail for lack of causation."], "id": "84a37517-4a39-4406-9319-0db9999e79fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Violation of probation involves an infraction by a defendant of a condition of a sentence. Examination of CPL 410.60 and CPL 410.70 points up the difference between <mask> and parole revocation procedures. The defendant probationer must be brought before the court that imposed the sentence. Based on a formal declaration of delinquency, the probation violation procedure calls for a formal hearing at which the court may receive any relevant evidence that is not legally privileged. The probationer, entitled to appear with counsel, may cross-examine witnesses and may present evidence on his own behalf. The court\u2019s finding, if it involves violation of a condition of the sentence, must be based upon a preponderance of the evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court may revoke, continue or modify the sentence of probation and in the event of revocation, must impose a sentence as specified in the Penal Law. Although the hearing is termed a \"summary one\u201d, and the court may receive any *1034\"relevant evidence\u201d, it still is necessary to have competent evidence to support a finding."], "id": "c5310c7f-86a3-44f6-b10b-f9efb9e788e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["take domestic violence classes. On February 20, 2003, after a hearing on a <mask>, the court imposed a three-year state prison sentence of for his 2001 spousal abuse conviction, stayed the sentence, and ordered Huerta to serve 270 days in county jail. On September 29, 2003, after another violation, the court ordered Huerta to serve the remainder of the three-year term in state prison. 2. Corporal Injury to a Child\u2019s Parent in 2013 On September 25, 2012, police arrested Huerta following another incident with Torres, which had occurred on July 10, 2012. In case No. BA400409, the People charged Huerta with corporal injury to a child\u2019s parent (\u00a7 273.5, subd. (a)), with a prior conviction within seven years (\u00a7 273.5, subd. (e)(1)). According to the preliminary hearing transcript, Huerta and Torres had an on-again-off-again relationship for 14 years and had two children together. Torres testified that Huerta attacked her when she discovered him pulling the sensor cables from her car. When she demanded to know why he was vandalizing her car, Huerta yelled back at her and shoved her against a concrete wall, injuring her. Two days later, she reported the incident to police because Huerta had showed up at her house, calling her names. Based on this evidence, the court held Huerta to answer for the corporal injury to a child\u2019s parent. On March 4, 2013, Huerta pled no contest and the court sentenced him to two years in prison. 3. Motions to Vacate In June 2019, Huerta filed motions to vacate his 2001 spousal abuse and 2013 corporal injury to a child\u2019s parent convictions based on newly discovered evidence of actual"], "id": "5b06caee-8b09-4227-b38e-f1a208cdcc30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Indeed, father's criminal history spanned almost 30 years, with multiple arrests for possession of narcotics for sale, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of crack cocaine. Recent arrests include petty theft (2010); possession of a controlled substance and violation of probation (2010); second degree robbery, possession of a controlled substance, and trespass (2012); possession of a controlled substance for sale, possession of paraphernalia, and carrying dirk/dagger (2012); burglary, assault with great bodily injury, receiving known stolen property, and committing an offense while on bail (2012); unlawful driving/taking of a vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, and <mask> (2013); second degree burglary, vandalism, and battery (2014); possession of a controlled substance (2015); domestic violence (2015); assault with great bodily injury, possession of a switch blade, and resisting/obstructing police officer/EMT (2016); reckless driving, forgery of registration, driving without a valid license, and receiving stolen property (2016); and petty theft (2016)."], "id": "3405f5e6-a7bc-4d5d-959b-b21e6176c79f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["P.O . and Appleton suggest the probation condition at issue here is reasonably limited. Unlike the conditions found overbroad in those cases, the probation condition here is tailored and limits the types of data that may be searched. The condition explicitly requires Juan to \"[s]ubmit [his electronic devices] to search ... for electronic communication content information likely to reveal evidence that the minor is continuing his criminal activities *272and is continuing his association via text or social media with co-companions . This search should be confined to areas of the electronic devices including social media accounts, applications, websites where such evidence of criminality [or ] <mask> may be found .\" (Italics added & underscoring omitted.) Thus, under this condition, a probation officer may infringe Juan's privacy interests, but only to the extent the electronic communication content searched is reasonably likely to yield evidence of continued contact with coparticipants or gang members, drug use, or other criminal activity and noncompliance with probation conditions. Other data that may be present on his electronic devices, such as banking information and medical records, is not subject to search under the condition."], "id": "bc32004e-a7f5-4c01-a0bc-fc4024a5b2a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": [" Turning to the merits, we find no reason to disturb County Court's determination that the People proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation (see CPL 410.70 [3]). \"<mask> hearings are summary in nature and evidence presented thereat may include hearsay, although that may not be the sole basis for the finding of a violation\" (People v Bevilacqua, 91 AD3d 1120, 1120 [2012]; see People v Finch, 160 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2018])."], "id": "8f011906-68b1-49c8-b8b8-694d8ba225fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Any other interpretation of the regulations would squarely place the defendant in the position of monitoring, unilaterally, the progress of his treatment at the expense of the Probation Department and the court, which have primary responsibility for such supervision. It would also effectively prevent a <mask> finding, because such a determination cannot be made in this state wholly on the basis of hearsay testimony. (People v Henderson, 256 AD2d 1131 [4th Dept 1998]; People v Raleigh, 184 AD2d 869, 870 [3d Dept 1992] [testimony of clinic director and discharge summary held competent nonhearsay evidence].) HIPAA\u2019s Privacy Rule cannot be read sensibly to allow offenders to cut off access to treatment information whenever the offender begins to fail the treatment program, nor can it be read to require the Probation Department and the judiciary to resort to a court order to access protected health information previously disclosed (or subject to disclosure) in reliance on an authorization whenever an offender unilaterally chooses to revoke his authorization. \u201cOne recalls the venerable maxim of Pascal: \u2018No one should be Judge in his own cause.\u2019 Phrased less elegantly, in the vernacular, it is akin to having the fox guard the henhouse.\u201d (Matter of Windsor Park Tenants\u2019 Assn, v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 59 AD2d 121, 147 [2d Dept 1977] [Hawkins, J., concurring].)"], "id": "36cd6dda-af05-444f-aa32-5c872e4f222f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In October 2016, appellant's probation officer filed a notice of <mask> under section 777 alleging that appellant had violated probation by (1) assaulting another juvenile at camp; (2) refusing to follow school regulations, resulting in his suspension; (3) assaulting a probation officer; and (4) attempting to start a fight by spitting at another juvenile. Following a hearing on December 22, 2016, the court found the alleged violations true and ordered appellant committed to DJF for a maximum period of five years and eight months."], "id": "fb6dd402-5eb7-46be-ab97-351bc8e7119e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*748Minor argues a finding that the commitment order is unlawful would not eliminate YOTP or similar programs because juvenile courts could set a fixed term of confinement and, if the minor failed to successfully complete the custodial program in that time, the probation officer could file a notice of <mask> to extend the confinement period. The availability of an alternative commitment order does not render the current order unconstitutional."], "id": "4e54457e-39ce-4897-8d6b-ef5a9af61ee8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Upon completing this sentence in December 2020, Hibshman was released to his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s house to begin his term of supervised release. But soon after, the Indiana state court revoked his probation on his state forgery conviction due to his federal escape conviction. Hibshman was ordered to report to the county jail to serve a two-year term of imprisonment for the state <mask>. He failed to do so. Hibshman instead moved out of his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s house and stopped communicating with his federal probation officer. Authorities found him more than three months later at the scene of a car accident where he gave a fake name and stated he was a minor."], "id": "7dbb741c-914b-487a-9ab0-c56398a87f74", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Point III, Townsel contends the circuit court erred in allowing the State to use confidential documents, specifically, <mask> reports, to impeach defense witness Kambria Williams. On direct examination, Williams testified that Townsel was in her (Townsel's) apartment when Collins was killed. Williams further testified on direct that she had been living in the apartment complex where the crimes occurred for about a year prior to the incident."], "id": "8e3c573a-bf05-479c-bee5-19c7ff0d6388", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Revocation of probation is a matter of discretion of the court. There are no limiting requirements as to the manner of the hearing or determination. A probationer brought before the court for such determination, without being furnished counsel, has not been deprived of his constitutional rights. (Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F. 2d 410.) A hearing on a charge of <mask> is in the nature of a summary proceeding and is not a \u2018 \u2018 criminal prosecution\u201d. (United States v. Hollien, 105 F. Supp. 987.)"], "id": "a6c1d52c-29a4-49ab-be47-2cfd8dc6f2f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Both defendant and Valencia testified at the <mask> hearing. Both testified that the methamphetamine was Valencia's, and that defendant did not know that Valencia had methamphetamine until Officer Chin pulled up behind defendant's car and Valencia started to panic. They also testified that they had never met before that morning. They said they met when they both came to help a mutual friend who had been kicked out of her apartment move her belongings; after defendant drove the friend and her belongings to her ex-boyfriend's apartment, he agreed to give Valencia a ride."], "id": "6979d7a6-f2e7-40ca-8aaa-1d6b126694c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This theory is flawed. First, Andrews is distinguishable as it dealt with the 1985 version of K.S.A. 22-3716, which did not require district courts to impose graduated sanctions for probation violations. 11 Kan. App. 2d at 324; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22- 3716(2). Rather, the statute gave district courts the option to impose a defendant's full underlying prison sentence following a single <mask>. Similarly, the Lumley court analyzed a version of K.S.A. 22-3716 that did not mandate intermediate sanctions."], "id": "1705313d-74b3-4efd-bc5c-38d33db17588", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This court has not found any reported appellate decision in this state addressing whether a <mask> specification adequately sets forth the condition violated if the specification does not precisely name the probation condition allegedly violated. In the absence of any specific precedent on this issue, the court rules that a purely technical defect in the notice does not prevent a court from finding a violation of probation and determining whether probation should be revoked (see Hammons v Sheriff of Jefferson County, Tex., 901d 59, 60 [5th Cir 1990] [technical and nonprejudicial variances in parole revocation proceedings does not violate due process]; Perry v U.S. Parole Commn., 831d 811, 813 [8th Cir 1987] [same]; Atkins v Marshall, 533 F Supp 1324, 1328 [SD Ohio 1982] [same]).2 After all, the notice required by CPL 410.70 (2) is a component of the defendant\u2019s general right to be heard before probation is revoked, and a defendant\u2019s right to be heard is not violated by a defect in notice that does not prejudice the ability to present a defense at the probation hearing (see Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778 [1973]; People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113 [1953])."], "id": "406e06b2-ec34-4016-b859-a4987a65ffdb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["For the reasons discussed above under the first prong of Lynch , the threshold test does not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality. (Cf. Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 92-93, 130 S.Ct. 2011 *451(conc. opn. of Roberts, C.J.).) [strong inference found as to juvenile sentenced to life without parole where the crime and <mask> were less serious than offenses like murder or rape, and defendant's youth and immaturity made him \"markedly less culpable than a typical adult who commits the same offenses\"].) Although Baker's insignificant criminal record and low recidivism score point in his favor, his three separate sexual offenses against A.D. and abuse of trust against a vulnerable victim do not. Certainly, a comparison of all the relevant factors does not lead to an \" 'inference of gross disproportionality.' \" ( Id. at p. 60, 130 S.Ct. 2011, italics added.) Baker cannot show that the sentence imposed on him, severe as it may be, violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to him.9 *734DISPOSITION"], "id": "48ef6db0-d6cd-4ad9-9817-7faa327fc647", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Last year, in People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794 ( Hall ), the high court addressed the need for an express knowledge element in two probation conditions that prohibited the defendant from possessing firearms or illegal drugs. ( Id. at p. 498, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.) Hall rejected the argument that these conditions were unconstitutionally vague because they did not expressly define the mental *1128state necessary to sustain the <mask>. ( Ibid. ) It held that the conditions \"include[d] an implicit requirement of knowing possession\" and therefore afforded the defendant fair notice of the required conduct. ( Id. at p. 497, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794 ) The court stated, \"California case law already articulates not only a general presumption that a violation of a probation condition must be willful, but also specifically provides that probation conditions barring possession of contraband should be construed to require knowledge of its presence and its restricted nature.\" ( Id. at p. 501, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.) Because case law requires the conditions to be construed as prohibiting knowing possession of contraband, Hall concluded the substance of the conditions would not be changed if they were modified to include the word \"knowingly.\" ( Id. at pp. 503-504, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.) Accordingly, the Court \"decline [d] [the] defendant's invitation to modify those conditions simply to make explicit what the law already makes implicit.\" ( Id. at p. 503, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.) The Court added that while trial courts are free to explicitly \"specify the requisite mens rea\" when imposing such a probation condition, inclusion of the express knowledge requirement is not constitutionally compelled. ( Id. at pp. 503-504, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.)"], "id": "c5a1eb09-53ca-42c5-bde3-ef7343392598", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["2. Charges, plea, and sentence Van Eck was charged in case number KA122021 with resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, \u00a7 69, count 1)2 and exhibiting a deadly weapon (\u00a7 417, subd. (a)(1), count 2). The information also alleged that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, on January 21, 2020, Van Eck pled nolo contendere to count 1. The parties stipulated that a factual basis for the plea existed in the police reports and preliminary hearing transcript. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Van Eck on probation for a period of three years, on condition that he serve 365 days in jail. It awarded 261 days of custody credit. It ordered count 2 dismissed and struck the section 667.5 enhancement. 3. <mask> hearing On August 27, 2020, the probation department filed a notice of probation violation, based on Van Eck\u2019s three recent arrests: a June 28, 2020, arrest for possession of a blackjack in case number KA125558; a July 30, 2020 arrest for driving under the influence in case number 0WC04752; and an August 6, 2020 arrest for misdemeanor drug offenses. On December 16, 2020, defense counsel declared a doubt, the proceedings were stayed, and Van Eck was referred to mental health court pursuant to section 1368 for an assessment of his competency. On January 15, 2021, criminal proceedings were reinstated after Van Eck was found competent. The matter was set for a combined preliminary hearing in case number KA125558 and"], "id": "f1ea610e-b539-471f-9896-276ab9ecb752", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The district court treated the hearing on June 11, 2020 as a <mask> hearing. Generally, once there has been evidence of a violation of the conditions of probation, the decision to revoke probation rests in the district court's sound discretion. State v. Coleman, 311 Kan. 332, 334, 460 P.3d 828 (2020). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Ingham, 308 Kan. 1466, 1469, 430 P.3d 931 (2018). The party asserting the district court abused its discretion bears the burden of proof. State v. Stafford, 296 Kan. 25, 45, 290 P.3d 562 (2012)."], "id": "63d21218-ced2-4105-8ea9-281c2e81d129", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["at his <mask> hearing on July 29, 2020. This assertion is belied by his statements at the October 20, 2020 probation violation hearing indicating he knew he had a reporting requirement and was prepared to admit he violated his probation by failing to report. In any event, at the July 29, 2020 hearing, when the trial court reinstated his probation, the court indicated the terms and conditions of probation remained the same\u2014meaning the reporting requirement to which he was \u201corientated\u201d on October 5, 2017 remained in place."], "id": "fd6cc679-64e8-459a-ba56-714b06b27cdc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Harris (supra) stated the general proposition that a Probation Department\u2019s delay in filing a violation of probation does not deny a defendant due process of law; Cherry (supra) rejected a defendant\u2019s claim that laches and his right to a speedy trial invalidated the revocation of his probation, where he was charged with a violation almost three years after his conviction for a second crime which served as the basis for the violation; and Douglas (supra) held that a defendant, against whom a declaration of delinquency was filed in 1991, and whose resentence for a <mask> was on June 3, 1996, had failed to object that the proceeding was untimely, but that in any event the objection was without merit."], "id": "e83555a9-91bb-4e05-a613-59e1a7e0d4e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "PROBATION VIOLATION", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*545Even assuming extradition were an available alternative, Arizona did not request Ramirez's extradition. It requested his return under the ICAOS. The Arizona court order and arrest warrant were prominently marked with the notation \"INTERSTATE COMPACT <mask>.\" In a \"NOTE TO COURT\" that was part of the court's order, the Arizona probation officer noted that Ramirez was subject to an \"INTERSTATE COMPACT WARRANT\" and identified an ICAOS rule (Rule 5.111) prohibiting bail during the ICAOS retaking process. Although the warrant form also referenced extradition in standard notations, the documents read as a whole make clear that Arizona sought Ramirez's return under the ICAOS; it did not seek his extradition. The ICAOS rules impose certain requirements on California in this situation, including the probable cause hearing described above, and those requirements have the force of statutory law. California authorities could not treat Arizona's request under the ICAOS as a request for Ramirez's extradition and thereby avoid these requirements."], "id": "fc21132b-5e49-4045-9d16-dea7a3232b99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Several months after Oliver's conviction in 18CR2402, the State moved to revoke Oliver's probation based on new crimes he was alleged to have committed in violation of the terms of his probation. Oliver admitted the <mask> at the hearing on the State's motion. With respect to Oliver's new crimes, he entered into a plea agreement with the State that resulted in him pleading guilty to one reduced charge and the rest were dismissed. The sentence imposed for that new conviction is the subject of Oliver's current appeal."], "id": "e42ad509-11af-4675-880f-a7eb6e7bd41c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The parties appear to be in agreement up to this point. Both sides recognize that defendant may not be deemed in violation of the firearms or narcotics conditions of probation if his possession or control of the prohibited items was unwitting. In other words, a <mask> can occur only if defendant knowingly owned or possessed these items or had them in his custody or control. Consequently, the issue presented here is not what state of mind is required to sustain a violation of probation, but the extent to which that state of mind must be expressly articulated in the probation condition itself to provide defendant with fair warning of what the condition requires. In defendant's view, the conditions at issue in this case are unconstitutionally vague and must be modified to state explicitly that knowing possession is required. The People respond that these conditions implicitly include a knowledge requirement already, rendering them sufficiently precise to afford defendant fair notice of what is prohibited."], "id": "8ebff718-e283-4f35-98ee-78829b4df009", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our colleagues in Division One have examined the distinction between knowing what you are supposed to avoid, which is pertinent to vagueness, and the mens rea of willfulness, which is required for a <mask>. (People v. Gaines (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1039, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 (Gaines ).) \"[P]robation may not be revoked unless the evidence shows that a probationer's conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms of his or her probation. [Citation.] Thus, sentencing courts need not include a requirement that a probationer knowingly violated a condition in order to protect against enforcement of unwitting violations.\" (Ibid. )"], "id": "2cd22678-95c0-4aab-acd5-75854fd07e0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, we are unpersuaded that our holding in this factually unique case will encourage defendants in work release programs to abscond and hide out until their probation expires. There is good reason for them not to engage in such behavior. The sheriff can notify the court or the probation department, and the court can revoke probation. Or, if the sheriff chooses not to notify the court, defendants still risk discovery within the probationary time. At any <mask> hearing, the court can impose additional time in custody or impose any suspended sentence. The prosecutor can also charge defendant with a misdemeanor ( \u00a7 4024.2 ). Moreover, in this case, that probation expired before law enforcement caught up with Barber cannot be wholly attributed to his evasion of law enforcement. Barber was not in hiding. He was in the sheriff's own custody at the Los Angeles County jail from at least December *37519, 2011 through January 4, 2012, after the IRC Want had issued in 2010 for his failure to complete the work assignment. He appeared in court at probation violation hearings on January 4, 2012 and June 5, 2012, again after the IRC Want had issued. Law enforcement therefore had ample opportunity to apprehend Barber within the period of probation, but did not.12"], "id": "456470d7-8221-4152-86c7-cc06c4277c27", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"(1) Except as provided in (4), to appeal from a superior court judgment after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after an admission of <mask>, the defendant must file in that superior court-with the notice of appeal required by (a)-the statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 for issuance of a certificate of probable cause. [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6]"], "id": "431c1ad9-4e53-4058-a13f-757d219af464", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The salient facts of this case are relatively simple. Howard Blake is charged under a governor\u2019s warrant with being the South Carolina fugitive, Larry Barnett, who allegedly escaped from the Anderson South Carolina Stockade in 1976. Barnett was serving a sentence of seven years for passing several bad checks and a <mask> from a prior grand larceny. Howard Blake has lived continuously at the same address in Suffolk County, New York, since 1983. He was married in 1987, helping to raise his wife\u2019s three children from a prior marriage. He and his wife also had two children of their own in 1988 and 1992."], "id": "bf81ec44-cdb6-40ea-8ba6-f0340796b700", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["11 While the Commonwealth now insists Appellant did not complete the batterer\u2019s course, there was no mention of this probation condition during the revocation hearing. See Commonwealth\u2019s Brief at 7. To the extent the trial court implies Appellant failed to establish he completed the course, we note that the Commonwealth bears the burden of proof in a probation revocation hearing. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4 n.9 (\u201cThere was no evidence introduced to suggest that [Appellant] had completed the course.\u201d); Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2007) (\u201cThe Commonwealth establishes a <mask> meriting revocation when it shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer\u2019s conduct violated the terms and conditions of his probation[.]\u201d)."], "id": "fa800e83-d646-495f-a93b-7b1bf4ebf5cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The St. Lawrence County Probation Department, failing to abide by its own <mask> policies that a memorandum of investigation be provided to the sentencing court within five days of the Probation Department being notified of an arrest, sent a belated violation package to the jurisdictional court on December 18, 2006. Canton Village Justice Michael Crowe signed a declaration of delinquency and issued an arrest warrant on December 29, 2006, which was faxed to the Probation Department on January 2, 2007. Thereafter, plaintiff alleges the defendants failed to properly process Trim\u2019s arrest warrant since it was neither forwarded to the local police nor input into the warrant entry/registrant system by the Probation Department. It is alleged the fax was shredded or destroyed. It is further alleged these acts caused Brinkerhoff s death since these delays permitted Trim to remain at large for months. During oral argument, plaintiffs counsel stated he only recently learned Trim had previously been stopped on the Thruway without incident, and had defendants timely applied for the arrest warrant and properly processed it, Trim could have been successfully taken into custody without event during that traffic stop. This information, he urges, can and should be developed during discovery."], "id": "40400573-ecd6-40b8-ab41-3fd1a9485e54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A citizen not on probation cannot have her cell phone or computer searched absent probable cause and a warrant. It is reasonable to treat probationers differently due to their diminished rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when an officer has \"reasonable suspicion that a probationer ... is engaged in criminal activity, ... an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.\" ( Knights , supra , 534 U.S. at p. 121, 122 S.Ct. 587.) Under what I think is the most appropriate application of the Fourth Amendment authorities we have, I would require that reasonable suspicion standard of blanket electronic search conditions, at least where the probationer's crime did not involve the internet or computers. A warrantless and suspicionless digital search could be based on some ground that is tailored to the probationer in advance, as part of the conditions of probation, or it could be based on reasonable suspicion that the probationer has committed a crime or other <mask>. But it should have some such articulable basis. Where digital evidence is concerned, we should ensure that \"the Fourth Amendment [does not] fall[ ] out of the picture entirely.\" ( Riley , supra , 573 U.S. at 392, 134 S.Ct. 2473.)"], "id": "7f38c993-faf2-47ad-b3e4-b9ffac6f5c0a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This court has not found any reported appellate decision in this state addressing whether a <mask> specification adequately sets forth the condition violated if the specification does not precisely name the probation condition allegedly violated. In the absence of any specific precedent on this issue, the court rules that a purely technical defect in the notice does not prevent a court from finding a violation of probation and determining whether probation should be revoked (see Hammons v Sheriff of Jefferson County, Tex., 901d 59, 60 [5th Cir 1990] [technical and nonprejudicial variances in parole revocation proceedings does not violate due process]; Perry v U.S. Parole Commn., 831d 811, 813 [8th Cir 1987] [same]; Atkins v Marshall, 533 F Supp 1324, 1328 [SD Ohio 1982] [same]).2 After all, the notice required by CPL 410.70 (2) is a component of the defendant\u2019s general right to be heard before probation is revoked, and a defendant\u2019s right to be heard is not violated by a defect in notice that does not prejudice the ability to present a defense at the probation hearing (see Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778 [1973]; People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113 [1953])."], "id": "1947e7e8-a6fe-4110-adc7-dca116ab33e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["confinement to order execution of sentence (or make other final order) if sentence has previously been imposed (3d par., 3d sentence). Failure to comply with any one of these three time limits divests the court of any remaining jurisdiction. (5th par.)\u201d (Hoddinott, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 999.) The purpose of section 1203.2a is to \u201cto prevent the inadvertent denial of the benefit of concurrent sentencing under [ ] section 669 and is structured to preclude the mechanical imposition of consecutive sentences by depriving the court of further jurisdiction over the defendant if the court fails to act within 60 days following notification of defendant\u2019s confinement.\u201d (Pompi v. Superior Court (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 503, 507, fn. omitted (Pompi).) \u201cBecause loss of jurisdiction is such a severe sanction, however, courts have been unwilling to impose it \u2018unless the sentencing court\u2019s jurisdiction has been ousted by strict compliance with the statute. [Citations.]\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (People v. Murray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 149, 156.) II Additional Facts On June 4, 2020, defendant sent a letter to the Tehama County District Attorney (not the probation office) to request \u201cunder section 1203.2(a)\u201d that the prosecutor accept his admission to a <mask> in the Tehama County case and have that term be one year consecutive to his Butte County sentence, or alternatively, to run them concurrently. The letter came with a form notice of demand for trial or disposition under section 1381. Both the letter and form reference his Butte County conviction. On May 27, 2020, the Tehama County Superior Court issued an order for production of prisoner to the Butte County Jail to produce defendant for a July 6 hearing. On July 1, 2020, the Tehama County Sheriff\u2019s Office filed a letter with the Tehama County Superior Court stating defendant was \u201cunavailable for pickup for his court date on July 6, 2020. He has been sentenced to state prison, and BUTTE COUNTY JAIL will not release him on the order of production due to his pending delivery to state prison.\u201d"], "id": "47cf7137-1481-4dfa-a946-a2b089f592c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A collateral question not reached in this litigation is the burden of proof required for a parole violation. Is it beyond *92a reasonable doubt, a preponderance of the evidence, substantial evidence or entirely satisfactory evidence? Interestingly enough there has been virtually no litigation in this State on the burden of proof either for parole or <mask>. This court adopts the standard set forth in a probation violation case, People v. Valle (7 Misc 2d 125) that the evidence and facts must reasonably satisfy the board that a parole violation has occurred."], "id": "0cf1da62-8e55-467c-9a7a-20b4c3ff1c4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On April 5, 2011, Boswell was arrested in Jackson County on unrelated charges. While incarcerated in the Jackson County Detention Center awaiting trial on the 2011 charges, Boswell signed a waiver of the <mask> preliminary hearing on his 2009 case. On April 28, 2011, his probation officer filed a probation violation report with the Clay County Circuit Court recommending revocation of Boswell's probation for the 2009 case."], "id": "68d68a77-bb18-4fd1-b451-6b2c4616b49f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court declined to strike the prior robbery conviction and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 55 years to life in prison based on a term of 15 years to life for the murder, doubled to 30 years under the three-strikes law, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. The court sentenced defendant *649to a concurrent two-year term for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court terminated probation for the prior robbery and applied custody credits to the <mask>. The court told defendant, \"it is entirely possible-some might say likely-at some point the law will provide you with a means of shortening your sentence and whether that happens and whether your sentence is ever shortened, whether you are paroled, would depend largely on your conduct in prison. I hope you see that as an incentive to turn your life around.\""], "id": "6a8847ba-72d4-4a2c-b36c-ef5785bfd3b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although defendant's ability to \"maintain\" \"training, schooling or employment\" may not be entirely within her control, any non-compliance with these requirements due to \"circumstances beyond ... her control\" cannot give rise to a <mask>. ( People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 858.) That is because courts routinely imply a \"willfulness\" requirement into conditions of probation. ( Id. ;"], "id": "826eca6b-98a9-41dd-9ca1-cc0cd9ae653b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On March 30, 2017, Hall again appeared in court for another <mask> hearing. Hall's attorney advised the court that Hall refused to attend the long-term treatment program. Counsel further advised that, given the options attending treatment or revocation, Hall preferred revocation. Based on Hall's admitted violations and his refusal to comply with the conditions of his supervision, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve out his remaining three-year sentence. The trial court also ordered Hall to pay the remaining balance of his restitution within ninety days of his release. Hall now appeals from this order."], "id": "39388ac9-5441-44d6-b6e7-6fac39a9fde8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A summary of the evidence and testimony before the court is necessary to understand and address the issues Sills raises on appeal. Sills was the first witness called by DHS. He testified that he had been incarcerated on the day B.S. was born and was not responsible for the child's removal. He *253continued to be incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction on a <mask> (failure to pay fines), he had been incarcerated for 17 months, but he was set to be released soon. He testified that his expected release date was August 1 but that he fully anticipated to be released mid-June. He stated that he is on parole until January 2021. He testified that once he is released from custody, he intends to live with his mother and work at Anchor Packaging."], "id": "28729c5f-8405-4b11-be67-a55e1e8ab05e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The final requirement for collateral estoppel is that there be a final and valid judgment. The People contend that a probation hearing is not a final judgment because a defendant still remains on probation after a hearing and because new charges may be brought at any future time while the defendant remains on probation. The court is not persuaded by this argument. *545While the court may make a finding of \u201cnon-violation\u201d and restore the defendant to probation, any future violations lodged would result from new acts or omissions, and not those already resolved by the court. The People would not be permitted to try again to establish a <mask> based upon the same accusation of sexual abuse (see generally, CPL 410.70)."], "id": "baeb2695-66d5-49da-aef3-5e8701ece2e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Deen filed a timely pro se motion for post-conviction relief. Post-conviction counsel filed a timely amended motion in July 2016. The amended motion asserted three claims for post-conviction relief, all based on an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The amended motion claimed (i) that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Deen's mental capacity at the time of his offenses, which could have established that Deen was not responsible for his criminal conduct because of mental disease or defect under section 552.030;1 (ii) that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Deen's mental capacity at the time of his guilty plea to possibly establish that Deen lacked the capacity to understand the plea hearing or assist in *138his own defense pursuant to section 552.020; and (iii) that counsel at Deen's <mask> hearing was ineffective for failing to investigate Deen's mental capacity to possibly establish that Deen lacked the capacity to understand his probation hearing or assist in his own defense pursuant to section 552.020."], "id": "be00114f-c842-448c-ba30-e99c754c835b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This theory is flawed. First, Andrews is distinguishable as it dealt with the 1985 version of K.S.A. 22-3716, which did not require district courts to impose graduated sanctions for probation violations. 11 Kan. App. 2d at 324; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22- 3716(2). Rather, the statute gave district courts the option to impose a defendant's full underlying prison sentence following a single <mask>. Similarly, the Lumley court analyzed a version of K.S.A. 22-3716 that did not mandate intermediate sanctions."], "id": "890811f4-51d4-40fe-bacc-a6153c0bff2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Revocation of probation is a matter of discretion of the court. There are no limiting requirements as to the manner of the hearing or determination. A probationer brought before the court for such determination, without being furnished counsel, has not been deprived of his constitutional rights. (Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F. 2d 410.) A hearing on a charge of <mask> is in the nature of a summary proceeding and is not a \u2018 \u2018 criminal prosecution\u201d. (United States v. Hollien, 105 F. Supp. 987.)"], "id": "3104d37a-fa72-4645-85c2-95ffc58dcbca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "PROBATION VIOLATION", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*545Even assuming extradition were an available alternative, Arizona did not request Ramirez's extradition. It requested his return under the ICAOS. The Arizona court order and arrest warrant were prominently marked with the notation \"INTERSTATE COMPACT <mask>.\" In a \"NOTE TO COURT\" that was part of the court's order, the Arizona probation officer noted that Ramirez was subject to an \"INTERSTATE COMPACT WARRANT\" and identified an ICAOS rule (Rule 5.111) prohibiting bail during the ICAOS retaking process. Although the warrant form also referenced extradition in standard notations, the documents read as a whole make clear that Arizona sought Ramirez's return under the ICAOS; it did not seek his extradition. The ICAOS rules impose certain requirements on California in this situation, including the probable cause hearing described above, and those requirements have the force of statutory law. California authorities could not treat Arizona's request under the ICAOS as a request for Ramirez's extradition and thereby avoid these requirements."], "id": "e779163e-ced7-431e-9e26-e97578607cd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On May 7, 2015, Caretto appeared for a <mask> hearing. The trial court appointed a public defender and suggested that a motion to reduce the charges under Proposition 47 might be appropriate. The next day Caretto filed a one-page motion asking that the two charges for which he was convicted be reduced to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. While he alleged the value of the stolen property was less than $950, he did not identify the stolen property or attach a declaration or other evidence showing the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950."], "id": "edbfc910-0ae5-47cb-a43d-225c62448c1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In June 2016, the trial court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Arevalo on probation for 12 years subject to various terms and conditions, including that he serve 365 days in jail. The court explained that before it could grant probation Arevalo was required \"to waive the excess\" custody credits over 365 days to comply with Johnson . In accepting the waiver, the court then stated, \"Mr. Arevalo, as I indicated as part of my sentencing here, in order for me to grant you probation you would have to *826waive what would be 968 days of custody credits. So in other words, that if you were to come back to court on a <mask> your credits towards any prison sentence you might receive would be limited to 365 days. That's actual time plus conduct credits. Do you understand that?\" Arevalo responded, \"Yeah.\" He was awarded 365 days of custody credits, composed of 183 days of actual credits and 182 days of conduct credits, resulting in the jail term being deemed served."], "id": "42300db6-9fae-4295-bc19-5880b6dc2598", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Indeed, father's criminal history spanned almost 30 years, with multiple arrests for possession of narcotics for sale, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of crack cocaine. Recent arrests include petty theft (2010); possession of a controlled substance and violation of probation (2010); second degree robbery, possession of a controlled substance, and trespass (2012); possession of a controlled substance for sale, possession of paraphernalia, and carrying dirk/dagger (2012); burglary, assault with great bodily injury, receiving known stolen property, and committing an offense while on bail (2012); unlawful driving/taking of a vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, and <mask> (2013); second degree burglary, vandalism, and battery (2014); possession of a controlled substance (2015); domestic violence (2015); assault with great bodily injury, possession of a switch blade, and resisting/obstructing police officer/EMT (2016); reckless driving, forgery of registration, driving without a valid license, and receiving stolen property (2016); and petty theft (2016)."], "id": "aa171f8e-cbd3-4525-a7d6-04fbec7da5dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On December 2, 2002, defendant appeared in court without counsel to answer a violation of probation specification alleging that he had violated his probation by failing to notify the Department of Probation that he had changed his address. No <mask> hearing was conducted on that day. During the court proceeding, the court agreed with the Department of Probation\u2019s liaison, who was in court, that this purely technical violation would not result in a revocation of probation, provided that defendant had paid the fine imposed as part of the sentence. Defendant informed the court that he had paid the $5,000 fine."], "id": "363995ba-bf7e-4512-8263-916d6c4859db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On May 7, 2015, Caretto appeared for a <mask> hearing. The trial court appointed a public defender and suggested that a motion to reduce the charges under Proposition 47 might be appropriate. The next day Caretto filed a one-page motion asking that the two charges for which he was convicted be reduced to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. While he alleged the value of the stolen property was less than $950, he did not identify the stolen property or attach a declaration or other evidence showing the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950."], "id": "d380268a-5e62-4b74-977c-e07fe022b340", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the July 6 hearing, for which defendant was absent, the trial court said, \u201cI think what you need to do or what I assume the People are going to do is submit another order of production probably a couple weeks down the road, once he is transferred; but I don\u2019t know if CDCR is actually taking people,\u201d implying it had been impacted by the COVID- 19 pandemic. The trial court discussed possible next steps with the parties, telling defense counsel, \u201c[T]o the extent that they are not going to deliver [defendant] because he has the state prison commitment, . . . if you want to talk to [defendant] and when you talk about, you know, the benefit that he could have if he had concurrent sentencing or something like that, if you have something from him that says he is going to waive his appearance pursuant to\u2014I can\u2019t remember the section\u2014it gets done within 30 days. [\u00b6] . . . He makes that demand and if he does that then the Court will sentence him accordingly and then he\u2019ll get the benefit.\u201d The trial court ultimately left it up to the parties to decide whether the People wanted to submit another order of production or whether defendant would ask to be sentenced immediately on the <mask>. On July 10, 2020, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Tehama County. Defendant stated the petition\u2019s grounds for relief were: \u201c1381/1382, Time Credits (1/3 time CDCR) MCRP Eligibility without Hold. (Timed Out in Butte Case) (Teh[a]ma \u2018Hold\u2019) pc 1203.2(a).\u201d Defendant explained that he was \u201cin limbo\u201d because there had been a custodial hold in Tehama County since October 9, 2019, and he could not be transferred to prison from the Butte County Jail because of the COVID-19 pandemic. He asked to be moved to Tehama County Jail so the hold could be resolved or he could be moved to a residential program, \u201cor 1203.2(a).\u201d On July 14, 2020, the trial court ordered the petition transferred to Butte County because \u201c[i]t appears that [defendant] is being held in the Butte County Jail on a Butte County Superior Court case that he has been sentenced on.\u201d The trial court\u2019s order included a footnote that, to its \u201cknowledge, no request pursuant to Penal Code Section 1203.2a has been made by [defendant].\u201d"], "id": "853a9b10-ab39-4777-bb0a-64e628a8cf46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> prior to ordering her to serve her prison term or make particularized findings explaining why the safety of the community or Hays' welfare justified a deviation from the sanction structure. Thus, Hays' case is reversed and remanded with directions to conduct a new probation violation hearing where either a sanction is imposed, or the proper findings can be made if warranted."], "id": "9643265b-811c-449d-8011-285e87d6da76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["We think that the meaning of the phrase \"in all cases\" is unambiguous and a <mask> hearing is simply a part of the underlying misdemeanor \"case.\" Therefore, we hold that a misdemeanor defendant is entitled to have an attorney appear on his or her behalf at a probation violation hearing under section 977 ; the defendant's personal appearance is not \"lawfully required,\" until such time that the court orders a defendant to personally appear. (\u00a7 1305, subd. (a)(1)(D).)"], "id": "37b0c52d-9f0b-4687-a5aa-8118ff3ac60f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, the surety points out there is a different standard of proof at a <mask> hearing than at a criminal trial. ( People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 445, 272 Cal.Rptr. 613, 795 P.2d 783 ; Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 348-349, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223.) While that observation may be accurate, it is unremarkable and irrelevant. Different standards of proof apply at preliminary hearings and various pretrial evidentiary hearings, but the surety could not credibly argue that those hearings are not a part of a particular defendant's same underlying criminal \"case.\""], "id": "2f58234c-58f8-4d63-8bb8-55615e0d4c9a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Several months after Oliver's conviction in 18CR2402, the State moved to revoke Oliver's probation based on new crimes he was alleged to have committed in violation of the terms of his probation. Oliver admitted the <mask> at the hearing on the State's motion. With respect to Oliver's new crimes, he entered into a plea agreement with the State that resulted in him pleading guilty to one reduced charge and the rest were dismissed. The sentence imposed for that new conviction is the subject of Oliver's current appeal."], "id": "e18eb093-639a-4d34-a74e-564afc816a8b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["But as the State asserts, the record reflects that Galloway was placed on probation under the supervision of court services on the day of sentencing. In fact, the district court stated: \"Sentence will be 12 months or a year in jail, Court Services for 12 months starting today.\" The order for probation filed by the district court stated that Galloway was placed on probation for a period of 12 months effective January 17, 2020. The order included a special condition that Galloway \"[m]ust serve 90 days in the Reno County Jail or serve 3 days in the Reno County Jail followed by 2160 hours of house arrest to be started within 3 weeks.\" Because Galloway's assignment to house arrest was a condition of her probation, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3716(b)(3)(B), governing the procedure for a <mask>, was all the legal authority the district court needed to revoke the house arrest order when Galloway violated the rules of the house arrest program."], "id": "eefbbf0d-8d04-4f22-9ae4-2496f6ee8072", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["For the same reason, the other case relied upon by defendant, People v George (59 AD3d 858 [3d Dept 2009]), which in turn cites People v Tausinger (55 AD3d 956 [3d Dept 2008]), another case involving failure to pronounce a period of PRS, is no more helpful to him than Morbillo. George, in any case, is to be distinguished from both Morbillo and this case, as it involved a failure to inform the defendant of the consecutive running of a new sentence with a resentence upon a <mask>, the terms of which lay entirely within the discretion of the sentencing judge, rather than an omission to mention an undischarged incarceratory term arising out of a parole violation, which, pursuant to statute, must be served consecutively. The former related to a revocable sentence (under Penal Law \u00a7 60.01 [2] [a], *1151[b] [regarding terms of probation or conditional discharge under Penal Law article 65, or intermittent imprisonment under Penal Law article 85]), the latter to an undischarged term being served by \u00e1 predicate felony offender (pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 70.25 [2-a] [relating to terms of imprisonment imposed under recidivist sentencing provisions of Penal Law article 70]). It is clear that Penal Law \u00a7 70.25 (2-a) does not relate to a revocable sentence such as was at issue in George. And as has already been noted, the First Department\u2019s decision in Wilson is precisely on point and is controlling. The consecutive running of defendant\u2019s sentences was statutorily mandated, and the court\u2019s failure to inform defendant of that fact neither caused his sentence to be incomplete, as was true in the PRS cases, nor rendered his plea unknowing, involuntary or unintelligent under Fifth Amendment due process standards."], "id": "44e08ca3-53ad-477f-9ca3-b2e38c4eb4c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*395Prior to the disposition hearing , the prosecutor filed a section 777 notice of <mask> based on the juvenile hall assault. Admitting he had erred in filing a new section 602 petition instead of proceeding by way of a probation violation, the prosecutor moved to both set aside the minor's admission to the allegations of the petition and to dismiss the petition. The prosecutor explained that he was \" 'trying to get to a [DJF-eligible] offense' \" due to the probation department's concerns and noted that none of the available placements were willing to accept the minor. ( Greg F. , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 402, 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 283 P.3d 1160.) The court granted the motion and dismissed the petition pursuant to section 782. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that section 733(c) prohibited the juvenile court from invoking section 782. ( Ibid. )"], "id": "452c3500-15d2-483d-9170-fa2b8aa475f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant also argues the stay away condition is vague because it does not more specifically define the \"Apple campus.\" But the word \"campus\" is understandable enough and is not unconstitutionally vague. ( In re Edward B. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1237, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 [probation condition prohibiting being on a school campus not vague].) Because any violation of a probation condition must be willful, if defendant were to be in a place that he did not know is within the Apple campus, he would not be in violation of his probation. ( Ibid. , citing People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th 494, 501-502, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794 ; see also People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 858 [no <mask> unless the probationer willfully violates a condition].)"], "id": "9c86208d-de77-42dc-a439-097955b8ad0b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["With these immutable jurisdictional rules in mind, it is clear that \u201cthe appropriate court\u201d having jurisdiction over matters relating to a transferred probation sentence can and must only be determined based upon the geographic location of the defendant\u2019s offending conduct as circumscribed by CPL 20.40 and 20.50. As applied here, the defendant\u2019s failure to make the restitution payments to the Essex County Probation Department, located in the Town of Elizabethtown, provides the necessary geographic nexus for the Town of Elizabethtown Justice Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant\u2019s <mask> proceeding premised upon such nonpay*1020ment. Similarly, the violation proceeding could properly have been brought in the defendant\u2019s town of residence (CPL 20.40 [3]) or in Essex County Court (see People v Roberts-Alexandrov, 102 AD3d 219 [3d Dept 2012])."], "id": "6ab6ffb1-6f8c-48e7-bb2d-dd9198d3d587", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A citizen not on probation cannot have her cell phone or computer searched absent probable cause and a warrant. It is reasonable to treat probationers differently due to their diminished rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when an officer has \"reasonable suspicion that a probationer ... is engaged in criminal activity, ... an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.\" ( Knights , supra , 534 U.S. at p. 121, 122 S.Ct. 587.) Under what I think is the most appropriate application of the Fourth Amendment authorities we have, I would require that reasonable suspicion standard of blanket electronic search conditions, at least where the probationer's crime did not involve the internet or computers. A warrantless and suspicionless digital search could be based on some ground that is tailored to the probationer in advance, as part of the conditions of probation, or it could be based on reasonable suspicion that the probationer has committed a crime or other <mask>. But it should have some such articulable basis. Where digital evidence is concerned, we should ensure that \"the Fourth Amendment [does not] fall[ ] out of the picture entirely.\" ( Riley , supra , 573 U.S. at 392, 134 S.Ct. 2473.)"], "id": "cdb5c1be-3e4e-40f8-8b6f-a4fb629c0643", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Appellate Division, Second Department, has never explicitly stated its reason or rationale for prohibiting the sentencing court from considering offenses of which a defendant has been found not guilty. Thus, under Appellate Division, Second Department, precedent a court may find a violation of the condition of probation that a probationer live a law-abiding life (Penal Law \u00a7 65.10 [1]) based upon criminal activity of which a defendant has been acquitted (see, cases cited above), yet when sentencing such a defendant the sentencing court may not consider the acts constituting the <mask>."], "id": "97e6f851-4eac-4ef3-8029-46aee6f25b6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The sentencing court also noted: \"It's not reasonable or supported by objective facts that the defendant would have rejected the deal, risked going to trial on the new [section] 11378 [drug charge] with a strike prior, with six years of state prison exposure, mandatory state prison exposure at 80 percent time, while the Court was hearing the <mask> in the older case, the [section] 245 [strike prior probation] case, concurrently with four years['] exposure itself. [\u00b6] His Johnson waiver [of custody credit] I think shows the defendant's willingness to negotiate a deal. The facts suggest he took the best deal he could to physically avoid going to state prison, as I said. [\u00b6] There's no evidence, I don't think on this record, that his counsel inaccurately conveyed the DA's offer to him or affirmatively misadvised him on immigration consequences. [\u00b6] ... I'm finding that the defendant has not established ... he has not proved prejudicial error under [ section 1473.7 ] subdivision (a)(1). \" (Italics added.)"], "id": "0dbf407d-63c7-4b25-9f67-7d258655e4c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["We need not determine whether the State's cross-examination of Williams violated Section 559.125.2 because Townsel cannot prove that a miscarriage of justice or a manifest injustice *741resulted.6 See State v. Kunonga , 490 S.W.3d 746, 756 (Mo. App. 2016) (noting that, under plain error review, we need not determine if the circuit court's action was erroneous where the appellant cannot demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or manifest injustice occurred). She \"must prove that the jury's verdict would have been different but for the inadmissible evidence, not merely that the inadmissible evidence contributed to the jury's verdict.\" Id. Townsel cannot meet this burden because the evidence of her guilt was overwhelming. In addition to the multiple identifications of Townsel as Collins's attacker, the knife found in her sink had Collins's blood on the blade and her DNA on the handle. Additionally, evidence of Mandy's spontaneous remark during the 911 call that the attacker had cut herself while stabbing Collins, combined with evidence that Townsel had a cut on her hand and testimony explaining the various ways that a person can cut themselves while stabbing someone else, points to Townsel's guilt. In light of this evidence, Townsel cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different but for the State's cross-examination of Williams about information contained in her <mask> reports. The circuit court did not plainly err in allowing the cross-examination. Point III is denied."], "id": "71b9065b-0b1a-48b1-b500-d77208519331", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["2. Charges, plea, and sentence Van Eck was charged in case number KA122021 with resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, \u00a7 69, count 1)2 and exhibiting a deadly weapon (\u00a7 417, subd. (a)(1), count 2). The information also alleged that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, on January 21, 2020, Van Eck pled nolo contendere to count 1. The parties stipulated that a factual basis for the plea existed in the police reports and preliminary hearing transcript. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Van Eck on probation for a period of three years, on condition that he serve 365 days in jail. It awarded 261 days of custody credit. It ordered count 2 dismissed and struck the section 667.5 enhancement. 3. <mask> hearing On August 27, 2020, the probation department filed a notice of probation violation, based on Van Eck\u2019s three recent arrests: a June 28, 2020, arrest for possession of a blackjack in case number KA125558; a July 30, 2020 arrest for driving under the influence in case number 0WC04752; and an August 6, 2020 arrest for misdemeanor drug offenses. On December 16, 2020, defense counsel declared a doubt, the proceedings were stayed, and Van Eck was referred to mental health court pursuant to section 1368 for an assessment of his competency. On January 15, 2021, criminal proceedings were reinstated after Van Eck was found competent. The matter was set for a combined preliminary hearing in case number KA125558 and"], "id": "7b32724c-28ca-494e-9c45-3995a5cf747d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On September 29, 2016, a <mask> hearing was held. Movant's probation officer testified that since Movant was placed on probation, Movant had three law violations - shoplifted at Wal-Mart, convicted of forgery, and committed assault - and one citation for using marijuana. Finding *239that Movant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, the court revoked Movant's probation and ordered that his previously imposed sentences be executed."], "id": "7bafe8bb-821d-495f-806a-f920df84eb85", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"(1) Except as provided in (4), to appeal from a superior court judgment after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after an admission of <mask>, the defendant must file in that superior court-with the notice of appeal required by (a)-the statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 for issuance of a certificate of probable cause. [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6]"], "id": "d1dcba70-7138-4a4b-96e9-b43167093e91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The California Fostering Connections to Success Act, often referred to as AB12, allows nonminor dependents to remain under the juvenile court\u2019s dependency jurisdiction and receive financial assistance until age 21 if they comply with certain statutory requirements. (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009\u20132010 Reg. Sess); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011\u20132012 Reg. Sess); In re Shannon M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 285 (Shannon M.).) In this appeal, Leon E. challenges the juvenile court\u2019s decision to terminate his status as a nonminor dependent, contending: (1) the court abused its discretion in finding he was not meeting AB12 eligibility requirements; (2) termination of the dependency was not in his best interest; and (3) termination was premature, as the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) failed to comply with its obligations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 391, subdivisions (a)\u2013(c), (h), 1 to verify that Leon had received statutorily required information, documents, and services. During the pendency of this appeal, Leon turned 21 years old, and the Bureau now contends, among other things, that the appeal is moot because Leon has aged out of the nonminor dependency system. We conclude the appeal is not moot because a reversal could still afford Leon effective relief. As to the merits of the appeal, we conclude that while the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Leon failed to meet AB12 eligibility requirements, the order terminating dependency jurisdiction must be reversed and the matter remanded to ensure compliance by the Bureau and the juvenile court with the procedural requirements of section 391, subdivisions (a)\u2013(c), (h), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.555(c) and (d). 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2015, Leon, at age 15, was declared a ward of the juvenile court in Solano County after admitting to three misdemeanors and six felonies, including two sex crimes. He was removed from his home and placed at Turning Point Family Care, a residential treatment facility that focuses on the rehabilitation of sex offenders. In February 2018, Leon turned 18 years old, and he was transferred the following month back to Solano County juvenile hall after a <mask>. His case was then transferred to"], "id": "3aec3ae6-b03f-485d-918c-9ba32dcc1c96", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant's conviction for felony false personation in violation of section 529, subdivision (a)(3) must be reversed.5 Since we reverse his conviction on that count in case No. SS160618, we remand the matter for resentencing. The trial court's revocation and termination of probation in case Nos. SS120317A and MS338702A is attributable in part to defendant's guilty conviction for violating section 529, subdivision (a)(3). Since the conduct leading to defendant's <mask> should not have been charged as a felony, the trial court should again exercise its discretion and determine if it should revoke probation for both cases. If the court chooses to revoke probation again, it should select the appropriate sentence."], "id": "e2701bba-b3cd-4fba-9ada-90058fb3b93d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The basis of the contention that the <mask> hearing should not be held first is that such a hearing is governed by no formal procedure and need only conform with the common understanding of due process (see People v. Oskroba, 305 N. Y. *17113, 117) and that petitioner therefore runs the risk that unless he testifies at the section 935 (Code Grim. Pro.) hearing, his probation will be revoked. This, it is claimed, violates petitioner\u2019s constitutional right against self incrimination with respect to the criminal charges which may be later separately tried. In United States ex rel. MacLaren v. Denno (173 F. Sup. 237, affd. 272 F. 2d 191, cert, denied 363 U. S. 814) the court held at page 241: \u2018 \u2018 The facts that the probationer must make his defense to the probation violation prior to a possible criminal trial encompassing the same transactions as the violation does not violate the probationer\u2019s constitution [sic] rights.\u201d The court agrees with that conclusion. Petitioner may stand on his constitutional right against self incrimination in the probation proceeding as he could in the criminal proceeding or in any civil proceeding involving the same facts. What he really complains of then is not that he is being denied his privilege against self incrimination, but that he is being denied due process because the probation granted to him on his first conviction may be withdrawn if he exercises the privilege. There is no denial of due process in such circumstances (see Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117)."], "id": "382d1447-2c30-49a2-96b2-d0449088843a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In misdemeanor cases, a trial court may generally grant unsupervised or \"summary\" probation. (\u00a7 1203b; People v. Caron (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 236, 246, 171 Cal.Rptr. 203.) However, a court may revoke, modify, or terminate probation at any time before the term expires, after conducting a <mask> hearing. (\u00a7\u00a7 1203.1-1203.3.) Indeed, if the imposition of sentence has been suspended, and a trial court revokes probation, the court may take the defendant into custody and impose a sentence up *1190to the maximum punishment allowed for the underlying charge. (\u00a7 1203.1.) Thus, at probation violation hearings, courts routinely take into account the defendant's actions, including what has occurred during the entirety of the underlying \"case,\" in order to decide whether to revoke, modify, or terminate probation."], "id": "a0b35e1a-2462-4ad9-b3b0-42b9ffe785e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A summary of the evidence and testimony before the court is necessary to understand and address the issues Sills raises on appeal. Sills was the first witness called by DHS. He testified that he had been incarcerated on the day B.S. was born and was not responsible for the child's removal. He *253continued to be incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction on a <mask> (failure to pay fines), he had been incarcerated for 17 months, but he was set to be released soon. He testified that his expected release date was August 1 but that he fully anticipated to be released mid-June. He stated that he is on parole until January 2021. He testified that once he is released from custody, he intends to live with his mother and work at Anchor Packaging."], "id": "78b80ce3-54ed-469c-bef2-f08e8819e49c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Several months after Oliver's conviction in 18CR2402, the State moved to revoke Oliver's probation based on new crimes he was alleged to have committed in violation of the terms of his probation. Oliver admitted the <mask> at the hearing on the State's motion. With respect to Oliver's new crimes, he entered into a plea agreement with the State that resulted in him pleading guilty to one reduced charge and the rest were dismissed. The sentence imposed for that new conviction is the subject of Oliver's current appeal."], "id": "8d2177d8-9e7e-424f-adfc-badc1662611a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On May 7, 2015, Caretto appeared for a <mask> hearing. The trial court appointed a public defender and suggested that a motion to reduce the charges under Proposition 47 might be appropriate. The next day Caretto filed a one-page motion asking that the two charges for which he was convicted be reduced to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. While he alleged the value of the stolen property was less than $950, he did not identify the stolen property or attach a declaration or other evidence showing the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950."], "id": "25e5e043-8c68-4aff-8dc7-7015e631227d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On December 3, 1977, he was arrested and subsequently indicted for the crimes of attempted sodomy, sexual abuse, burglary and attempted robbery. He was tried and acquitted. He was then charged with the instant probation violations which concededly arose out of incidents leading to the December 3, 1977 arrest and indictment for which he was acquitted. However, while the acquittal may be persuasive, it is not determinative of the issues in this case. For the defendant is not charged with the same crime or any crime, but with a <mask>. Moreover, the standard of proof required for a finding of such violation is preponderance of the credible evidence not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (CPL 410.70)."], "id": "6e7bee40-1c2f-49d7-ba6c-331112e2ec34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A <mask> information, sworn to by a probation officer with the Essex County Probation Department and dated June 4, 2014, was filed with the Town of Elizabethtown Justice Court. The sole violation alleged was that the defendant then owed $490 in restitution, the defendant having only paid $635 when he should have paid $1,125 (15 months at $75 per month). On June 12, 2014, the defendant admitted to the violation of probation, and the case was adjourned until December 11, 2014. When the defendant failed to appear at the December date, a warrant for his arrest was issued, and the town justice signed a judgment in the amount of $519.59 against the defendant, that being the amount then owed toward his restitution obligation. The defendant was arrested on December 31, 2014 and upon being brought before the local court he was remanded without bail to the county jail."], "id": "3187de75-88d4-4bc7-9f7b-09cc8661cf2f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Pursuant to People v Tyrrell (101 AD2d 946): \"A hearing on a <mask> is a summary, informal procedure which *346does not require strict adherence to the rules of evidence; statutory and due process requirements are met so long as defendant is given formal notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard and to confront the witnesses against him through cross-examination\u201d (CPL 410.70 [3]; People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113, 117; People v Compton, 42 AD2d 201; cf. People v Crandall, 51 AD2d 841)."], "id": "2346c385-38be-44bc-aa5e-6a175928a6a3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "probation violation", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The salient facts of this case are relatively simple. Howard Blake is charged under a governor\u2019s warrant with being the South Carolina fugitive, Larry Barnett, who allegedly escaped from the Anderson South Carolina Stockade in 1976. Barnett was serving a sentence of seven years for passing several bad checks and a <mask> from a prior grand larceny. Howard Blake has lived continuously at the same address in Suffolk County, New York, since 1983. He was married in 1987, helping to raise his wife\u2019s three children from a prior marriage. He and his wife also had two children of their own in 1988 and 1992."], "id": "d31b8b89-e371-476e-8882-bc2719be5201", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe government may not use or solicit false evidence or allow it to go uncorrected.\u201d United States v. Funchess, 422 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir. 2005). To prove a due process violation on the grounds that the government presented false testimony at his trial, Gross must show that: \u201c(1) the prosecution used perjured testimony; (2) the prosecution should have known or actually knew of the <mask>; and (3) there was a reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony could have affected the jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d United States v. Bass, 478 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Funchess, 422 F.3d at 701)."], "id": "257c18af-7a6c-4a3c-beef-ffb32b6404e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This rule, however, requires that the materiality must appear on the face of the indictment, even though it is alleged that the testimony stated to constitute -<mask> is material. In People v. Peck, 146 App. Div. 266, the court said (p. 268): \u201c Willfully and knowingly testifying to an immaterial fact is not perjury. (People v. Teal, 196 N. Y. 372.) The indictment does not in words charge that any or all of the statements therein alleged to have been made by defendant were material or were of and concerning a matter material in the proceeding then being conducted by the examiner. It is not necessary that the indictment so charge, provided the facts, which are set forth therein, are sufficient in themselves to show that the sworn statements alleged to be false were material. But the materiality must be shown in the indictment itself either by direct statement or by the facts stated therein. (Wood v. People, 59 N. Y. 117, 121; People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 672; Commonwealth v. Pollard, 53 Mass. 225, 229.)\u201d"], "id": "69af72f3-11b1-4353-be55-1af1c249c437", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Drouet made clear that evidence controverting the landlord's stated intent was highly relevant. In rejecting the tenants' concern that \"the retaliatory eviction defense is 'the only method available to protect one's home from an alleged phony Ellis [Act] eviction,' \" the Drouet majority disagreed. ( Drouet, supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 597, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 73 P.3d 1185.) It explained, \"[A] tenant who believes the landlord's invocation of the Ellis Act ... is phony and that the landlord actually intends to offer the vacated units to new tenants may controvert the landlord's statement of intent . The landlord will then have the burden to establish his or her bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the market by a preponderance of the evidence. It is that requirement, and not the retaliatory eviction defense itself, that will prevent or deter phony evictions.\" ( Drouet , at p. 597, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 73 P.3d 1185, italics added & omitted.) The tenants' fear, \"that a landlord may invoke the Act but secretly intend to re-rent the units once the existing tenants have been displaced ... presupposes that although the tenant controverted the landlord's intent, the landlord committed <mask> at the hearing, the tenant was unable to uncover the perjury by cross-examination or by other evidence , and the fact finder was unable to detect the perjury. The likelihood of an erroneous outcome is further diminished by the landlord's awareness that an Ellis Act eviction followed closely in time by a re-renting of the premises to new tenants would be persuasive evidence of the landlord's bad faith in any future Ellis Act proceeding . ( Civ. Code, [former] \u00a7 1942.5, subd. (e) ; Evid. Code, \u00a7 1101, subd. (b).)\" ( Drouet , at p. 598, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 73 P.3d 1185, italics added.) Finally, the Drouet majority noted that \"perjury concerns do not arise in this case\" because \"San Francisco has eliminated the incentive for sham Ellis Act evictions by adopting ordinances strictly limiting the landlord's right to re-rent the withdrawn property to others, to raise the rent, or to sell the property unencumbered by these limitations. (S.F. Admin. Code, \u00a7 37.9A, subds. (a), (c), (d), (g); see Gov. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 7060.2, 7060.3.)\" ( Drouet , at p. 598, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 73 P.3d 1185.) Martin reads Drouet selectively to support his argument, asserting Drouet suggests there is no incentive for a San Francisco landlord to use the Ellis Act as pretext, all the while harboring a secret intent to re-rent withdrawn units. Yet, we cannot agree the existence of these penalties means circumstantial evidence of a landlord's intent should be wholly excluded in an Ellis Act unlawful detainer action."], "id": "0af106b8-46d7-49af-bea1-6945327a5422", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["We now come to the testimony of claimant herself. This was probably objectionable, at least in part, and objection was interposed thereto at the hearing, the testimony being taken subject to a motion *585to strike out. The objection was; however, subsequently withdrawn in the memorandum of the attorney for the administratrix. In the course of her voluminous examination and cross-examination, the claimant proved to be a most evasive and unsatisfactory witness, entitled to absolutely no credibility whatsoever. In the early part of her examination she seemed to strive to reconcile her testimony with that which had been elicited from the witnesses for the estate, but she later reverted at times to the facts sworn to hi her proof of claim, with the result that so far, at least, as she was concerned, the record became a patchwork of contradiction and palpable <mask>. Thus she testified that, beginning in the fall of 1902, decedent and his wife came \u201c almost every year during the winter months, the spring, fall arid winter months,\u201d before and after the time they spent the summer at Rockaway Beach, but \u201c long after \u201d that, about 1916 or 1917, although she was \u201c not positive \u201d of the time, down to her death, but not including 1920, or 1923. Mrs. Brush spent \u201c I should imagine between two to three \u2014 about three months each year, I should think \u201d (Stenographer\u2019s Minutes, p. 106), \u201c about every year \u201d (Id. p. 106), \u201c I am pretty sure \u201d (Id. p. 124). \u201c Mrs. Brush generally spent three or four weeks, sometimes four, and sometimes less, and sometimes more.\u201d \u201c They generally came up every year.\u201d Mrs. Brush would spend \u201c several weeks, I would say. I could not very well remember.\u201d"], "id": "e082cb7d-d403-4314-a4ad-c7a8048d59d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b621 The Court in Milkovich considered an opinion piece titled \u201cMaple beat the law with the \u2018big lie.\u2019\u201d Id. at 4. The article in its entirety was about the coach, identified by name, and the superintendent, who testified at a court hearing. Id. at 3\u20135. The Court concluded that the article\u2019s caption and nine sentences were actionable because they clearly implied that the coach had committed <mask>, an assertion that was provable as false. Id. at 21."], "id": "95f04924-9746-4606-aefc-d681057ae22b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In affirming the trial court\u2019s factual determination regarding the equitable distribution of this marital asset in Mahoney-Buntzman v Buntzman (12 NY3d 415 [2009]), the Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of policy, it could not permit parties to assert positions in legal proceedings that are contrary to declarations made under the penalty of <mask> on income tax returns."], "id": "6c3130a9-9bdd-4b66-aa08-c52220e63c65", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["And so came Victaulic's closing arguments, with their focus on \"Finberg,\" \"RFAs,\" \"lies,\" and \"penalty of <mask>,\" words used so often, and so interrelatedly, that it is truly difficult to count. The jury deliberated for some five hours, and returned with a verdict answering a total of six separate questions, one of which had seven subparts, a total of 13 separate questions. That verdict awarded damages for breach of contract totaling $1,073,868.80, finding for Victaulic on each of seven claims in the exact amount sought. The verdict awarded attorney fee damages for bad faith of $8,259,712.31, the exact amount Victaulic's expert testified to. And the jury also found, by a nine-to-three vote, the insurers acted with fraud, oppression, or malice committed by a managing agent. All this, after a three and one-half week trial, in some five hours of deliberation."], "id": "0751a1dc-be17-4020-b737-1f5ae3c696bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"We have that here. Both of these. AIG's lying on the RFAs, lying on the interrogatories is despicable under any measure. Under oath, penalties of <mask>. They know what they are doing. They lied. And they did it with complete disregard for the law and for Victaulic's rights. Not only, though, do those constitute, those RFAs, the interrogatories, do they constitute malice and oppression. It's fraud. It is fraud. They knew what they were doing and they intentionally misrepresented the facts."], "id": "a224e465-b81e-4b3a-97ee-6b76f9ac353c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although EPTL 3-4.1 (a) (2) (A) does not explicitly state that the physical act of revocation must take place upon the will itself, it would be a tortured and imaginative reading of the statute to infer that an act of burning, tearing, cutting, cancellation, obliteration, or other mutilation or destruction would refer to anything other than the executed original. The purpose underlying the enactment of the Statute of Wills (EPTL 3-2.1), which is a variant of the Statute of Frauds in even stricter form, is to protect a decedent\u2019s estate, preserve the integrity of a testator\u2019s plan for the distribution of his assets, and to close the door as far as possible to the obvious temptations of fraud, <mask>, and collusion (Matter of Coffed, supra; Matter of Tremain, supra). Objectants have not cited, nor has the court found, a single decision in which the court permitted revocation by physical act to take place other than *957upon the testamentary instrument itself. It might be surmised that the absence of any authority directly holding that a will may not be revoked by a physical act upon a copy of the will was only due to the fact that the objectants were the first who were ingenious enough to advance such a proposition."], "id": "e550f707-c143-41ee-96af-410c1e9838ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["All the evidence tends to show that the contract was for the sale of a monument. It was spoken of as a thing then existing to be sold, not as a thing to be manufactured. They called it a monument with reference to the use for which it was designed. It -was a sale, if there were any bargain made, of the marble then comprising what the parties called a monument; as much so, in my opinion, as if the article had been a carriage, requiring for its completion an additional coat of paint or of varnish,, a tongue, or thills, or whiffletree or other like appendage. \u00bfThe work to be done to finish the monument was not essential to its existence, character or design, but to its completeness and comeliness merelyf The legislation in England has put an end to all such questions in that country, by an act of the 9th of George 4, ch. 14, which enacts \u201cthat the provisions of the statute of frauds shall extend to all contracts for the sale of goods, and notwithstanding the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of such contract be actually made, procured or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for making or completing thereof or rendering the same fit for, delivery.\u201d . The supreme court of Wisconsin, in Hardell v. Medium, (1 Chand. Rep. 278,) say of this act that they regard it as \u201c laying down no new principle, covering no new ground,\u201d but as containing in remarkably clear, simple and explicit language \u201c the true construction of the original act.\u201d To this I fully agree; and it seems that the late decisions had brought back the law before the passage of this act to about the same point, and conforming to the plain intent and fair interpretation of the original statute; particularly the case' of Garbut v. Watson, and Donn v. Ross, with which coincide Atkin*212son v. Bell, (8 Barn. & Cress. 277,) and Smith v. Surman, (9 561.) In this latter case, which was an action for the sale of lumber, Bayley, J. says: \u201c The vendor, so long as he was felling the trees and preparing the timber for delivery, \u201c was doing work for himself, and not for the defendant.\u201d So in this case, so long as the plaintiff was polishing and finishing up this monument he was doing work for himself. This, Judge Harris, in Comstock v. Stewart, (supra,) says presents the true rule in such cases. See also, Allen v. Jarvis, (20 Conn. Rep. 50,) where the same rule is asserted. The case of Donovan v. Willson, (26 Barb. 138,) is not in conflict with these views. In that case the contract was to \u201c manufacture, furnish and deliver beer.\u201d It comes perhaps within the class of cases referred to by Chief Justice Shaw, \u201c where the workman is to put together materials and construct an article for the employer.\u201d That case, however, was decided upon the authority of Bennett v. Hull, (10 John. 364,) in which the contract was to deliver 100 barrels of apples. The price exceeding $25, the court held that the contraqt was within the statute, and that the statute applied to executory contracts; and upon that of Crookshank v. Branch, and Small v. Freely, the first of which was rightly decided, and the latter, in effect, overruled in Donn v. Ross, and mistakenly followed and under protest, in Robertson v. Vaughn, (5 Sand. S. C. R. 1.) I have always doubted the correctness of the decision in the case of Donovan v. Wilson, but think it may possibly stand, upon the cases of Crookshank v. Bennett, and Mixer v. Howarth, (supra.) But I cannot but think that the case, as Judge Duer says, in Robertson v. Vaughn, was \u201c within the mischief the statute of' frauds was designed to prevent, and the contract between the parties was substantially a sale of goods and merchandise, and not for work and labor.\u201d The statute of frauds was designed to prevent frauds and perjuries. Instead of fulfilling its office it has doubtless been the most prolific cause of-fraud and <mask> of any statute ever enacted, and *213since parties are permitted to be witnesses in their own favor, the temptations and facilities for committing perjury are obviously not so diminished as to make it wise to repeal the statute, or defeat its operation by further judicial refinements. | The tendency in all our courts, at the present day, is to construe the statute of frauds in all its particulars according to the obvious meaning and fair import of its language. (Mallory v. Gillett, 23 Barb. 612, recently affirmed in the Court of Appeals; Brewster v. Silence, 4 Seld. 211; 11 Barb. 144.) In the language of my brother Johnson, in the last case, I regard the statute as plain and imperative, and feel much more inclined to yield to its authority than to any array of opinions or dicta which have sought to evade or nullify it to save hard cases and prevent or remedy some particular act of injustice.\u201d I think the motion for nonsuit should have been granted, and that the case should go back for a new trial. |"], "id": "568d832f-049d-46bd-94b7-4ea8afd2700f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*988The Grand Jury\u2019s primary function is to \"determine whether sufficient evidence exists to accuse a citizen of a crime and subject him or her to criminal prosecution\u201d (People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d 389, 394). In a <mask> case, the Grand Jury cannot fulfill its function unless it is given the opportunity to decide whether identified, specific and particularized statements are false. \"A grand jury, in order to make that ultimate determination, must necessarily determine what the question under inquiry was. To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him\u201d (Russell v United States, 369 US 749, 770, supra)."], "id": "4f514fa5-2f9a-4848-92fd-b6c7798bb26f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cEvidence of prior specific criminal, vicious or immoral conduct should be admitted if the nature of such conduct or the circumstances in which it occurred bear logically and reasonably on the issue of credibility.\u201d (34 NY2d at 376.) \u201cA demonstrated determination deliberately to further self-interest at the expense of society or in derogation of the interests of others goes to the heart of honesty and integrity.\u201d (Id. at 377.) \u201cLapse of time . . . will affect the materiality if not the relevance of previous conduct.\u201d (Id. at 376.) But \u201cCommission of <mask> or other crimes or acts of individual dishonesty, or untrustworthiness (e.g., offenses involving theft or fraud, bribery, or acts of deceit, cheating, breach of trust) will usually have a very material relevance, whenever committed.\u201d (Id. at 377.)"], "id": "c8a82e04-d134-46f2-b23b-b10048ff87a1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the case of People ex rel. Valenti v McCloskey (6 NY2d 390) the Court of Appeals dealt with the distinction between clear, direct and unequivocal testimony which might be perjurious and testimony so patently false on its face so as to be considered as no testimony at all. The Valenti case involved two writs of habeas corpus brought by individuals who had been committed to civil jail as a result of prior testimony before the State Commission of Investigation. The relators testified a second time before the commission but the commission refused to assent to their release stating that the relators \"gave 'some sort of answer to each question\u2019 but * * * that the answers given were 'in varying degrees, false, evasive and obstructive of its investigation; indeed, in many instances the answers are inherently incredible\u2019.\u201d The Court of Appeals ruled that both relators should be released. The opinion stated (pp 403-404): \"the only meaningful standard by which it may be determined whether each of the relators 'submitted] to do the act which he was required to do\u2019 * * * is whether he 'directly responded\u2019 to the enumerated 26 questions 'with unequivocal answers * * * clear enough so that if they are shown to be false [he] would clearly be guilty of <mask>.\u2019 * * * When the answers given by Frank and Costenze are carefully measured against this standard, it becomes apparent that, though they may have been false, they were definite and unequivocal\u201d. Thus, the court found that the answers in question were not, as the commission contended, so incredible as to be unbelievable and perjurious, without extrinsic proof. It is significant that in arriving at this decision the Court of *174Appeals acknowledged (p 398): \"With respect to both civil and criminal contempt, however, the courts of this State have recognized that under certain circumstances a response to a question may be so false and evasive as to be equivalent to no answer at all.\u201d"], "id": "8b2c906c-bfef-4bb2-974e-412697877120", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["I. That the count of <mask>, first degree, is based on facts alleged which do not constitute (and the evidence before the Grand Jury could not have sustained as) the crime charged as a matter of law. He argues that he did not himself make the false statement under oath alleged in the indictment, since he only performed the ministerial act of notarizing the verification of his co-owner, Paul Gould. But Bergen is charged with more than having notarized Gould\u2019s verification. He is charged with having acted in concert with and aided, abetted and induced Gould in the making and filing of the application containing the *878false statement of cost of the new kitchen cabinets. The evidence before the Grand Jury sustains the commission of both alleged acts. Under section 2 of the Penal Law, a person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission, or who directly or indirectly counsels or induces another to commit a crime, is a principal."], "id": "b6dd9c72-fbf9-41f5-86f4-fe33de823ad2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The conversation turned to the issue of immunity. Defense counsel argued that if the prosecutor really had no intention of charging appellant with <mask>, then the court should grant appellant immunity for it. The judge thought that was a good idea in theory. However, he felt he lacked the authority to grant immunity on his own. When the prosecutor was unwilling to offer immunity to appellant, the prospect was forgotten."], "id": "00607b17-3721-4036-8329-8e3a3d42c8b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["As the Supreme Court long ago held, \u201cthe constitutional guaranty of the 5th Amendment does not deprive the lawmaking authority of the power to compel the giving of testimony, even [though] the testimony, when given, might serve to incriminate the one testifying, provided immunity be accorded * * * in all respects commensurate with the protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation.\u201d (Glickstein v United States, 222 US 139, 141 [1911]; see also Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441 [1972].) The New York Legislature exercised this power by enacting CPL 50.20, which provides that \u201ca [person who] * * * refuse [s] to give evidence requested of him on the ground that [the testimony] may tend to incriminate him\u201d (CPL 50.20 [1]) may nonetheless be compelled to give that evidence if he receives immunity from a \u201ccompetent authority.\u201d6 (CPL 50.20 [2] [a], [b].) A person who testifies in a legal proceeding with the transactional immunity granted pursuant to CPL 50.10 (2) \u201ccannot * * * be convicted of any offense or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he gave evidence therein,\u201d but \u201cmay nevertheless be convicted of <mask> as a result of having given false testimony in [the] legal proceeding [in which he is an immunized witness].\u201d (CPL 50.10 [1]; see People v Gottfried, 61 NY2d 617 [1983]; Matter of Rush v Mordue, 68 NY2d 348, 357 [1986].)"], "id": "82172a7b-a934-4f6f-9745-51482043a741", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the present case, the defendant swears also <! that be has cause to suspect and does suspect,\u201d that the wool was stolen by Bishop. The indictment alleges that he had not cause to suspect, and did not suspect that the wool was stolen by Bishop. The jury have pronounced the charge in the indictment to be true. Whatever doubts may have once existed, it is now clearly settled that a man may be \u201c convicted of <mask> in swearing that he believes a fact to be true which he knows to be false.\u201d (2 Russ. 1753, 1754.) On this ground also the conviction of the defendant is regular, and supported by adjudged cases."], "id": "3bef4c56-674c-4609-9200-d6802ee9ac9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cI explained the concepts of immunity, self-incrimination, <mask> and contempt, and that they were obliged to answer all questions truthfully and responsively. \u201cI further explained to the witnesses that though the company had hired me to be available to them during their ordeal, no one was obliged to accept my services, and that I had no intention of foisting myself upon anyone. I also explained that regardless of whether they wanted to avail themselves of my services, since they had all been involved with the store\u2019s coupons in one way or another, it would be imprudent of them not to speak with some lawyer. Each witness was further told that there was at least a hypothetical risk, in any situation where one attorney represents more than one client, that conflicts of interest could arise; but I offered my professional judgment that no such risk was lurking in this case, as none of them was a target and all would obtain complete transactional immunity from any state prosecution. I further informed the witnesses that if, for whatever reason, any witness preferred to obtain separate counsel, I would be able to secure an adjournment of their appearance until such counsel were ready to act in their behalf.\u201d The District Attorney alleges, and the attorney admits, that he further counseled his clients to tell the truth but not to provide additional information."], "id": "253c1683-2652-4dde-9306-f997bf331044", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Meredith Lintott's retraction stated: \"In 2010, during my campaign to be re-elected District Attorney, I published a political campaign advertisement on the radio which stated or implied that Mr. Robert Forest had felony charges pending against him, that he had assaulted an unarmed man with a firearm, and that he had bribed my opponent to obtain a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Robert Forest did not bribe anyone. Mr. Forest did not have any criminal charges pending against him and he did not commit an *1112assault on an unarmed man with a gun. I personally dismissed all of the criminal charges that were pending against him more than 2 years before my campaign advertisement was broadcast on the radio. I want to confirm that I made the right decision when I dismissed the charges that were pending against Mr. Forest. I apologize for the harm my statements have caused Mr. Forest, his family, and his businesses. [Signed] Meredith Lintott\" (Italics added.) The statement was not sworn under penalty of <mask> and, as noted, was part of the settlement of a lawsuit filed by defendant against her for defamation."], "id": "92f79dc4-5b17-415b-830f-f95a389cd4c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his Grand Jury testimony is based on the argument that the absence of the warnings violated his constitutional rights, tainted the Grand Jury testimony and made it inadmissible for the purpose of proving on a trial for <mask>, that his testimony was false. In Robinson v. United States, (supra, p. 251) the court answered that contention: \u201c The theory of the defendant\u2019s contention is so elusive that it is difficult to write about it. It is a really a tour de force, rather than a reasoned conclusion. It requires, sub silentio, an assumption that there is a duty upon the government to have an observer present at all trials to give a specific warning to any witness who, it is thought, may perjure himself, that if he does perjure himself, he may be prosecuted.\u201d"], "id": "d7c4a64f-072a-4e0a-aa71-7d8cf58d7511", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The second problem is the state never placed the accused at the vehicle or proved he fired any weapon of any type, no person identified the accused as having taken the vehicle or being associated with it. I am sure the state will argue this point, but no person ever identified who the \"he\" was that was referred to as taking the vehicle. In addition there was no evidence whoever took it remained at all, we must be mindful two officers committed <mask> on the stand. In any event even the judge claims \"I don't think you even put him at the scene\" where the judge doubts you have placed the defendant at the scene this is reasonable doubt. No person saw anyone fire a shot, no less the defendant, nor did anyone see him anywhere around the residence or the vehicle with or without a firearm, again, no person testified who was present on the evening in question or how many persons were in the area of the vehicle, or carrying weapons."], "id": "ca314fca-d790-4741-b19e-f4a27bbca3f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The arbitrator found that the alleged reimaging contract was to be performed over three years.7 Under California's statute of frauds, when, as here, a contract is not to be performed within one year it \"or some note or memorandum thereof, [must be] in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent.\" ( Civ. Code, \u00a7 1624, subd. (a).) The writing need not contain all of the contract's terms; it is sufficient \"if it identifies the subject of the parties' agreement, shows that they made a contract, and states the essential contract terms with reasonable certainty.\" ( Sterling v. Taylor (2007) 40 Cal.4th 757, 766, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 116, 152 P.3d 420.) The purpose of this requirement is \" 'to require reliable evidence of the existence and terms of the contract and to prevent enforcement through fraud or <mask> of contracts never in fact made.' \" ( Ibid. , quoting Rest.2d Contracts, \u00a7 131, com. c., p. 335.)"], "id": "f8403723-8b92-4c81-ac59-8183c45a68ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c The effect of the judgment of the court of appeals was the same as if the whole of the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action had been admitted.' It was equivalent to an admission, by a failure to put in an answer, that the defendants had, maliciously and without probable cause, caused the plaintiff to be arrested, imprisoned and prosecuted upon a charge of <mask>. But the amount paid for counsel fees and costs the plaintiff had to prove upon the assessment, for that was in no way settled by the judgment of the court of appeals, the effect of which was simply to establish the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action as averred in his complaint, but nothing more, and the ruling of the judge upon this point was, in my opinion, erroneous (jP. 76). * * * As respects the assessment of damages in this case, it is to be regarded as analogous to a *395default upon a failure to answer, and to be governed by the practice which existed upon assessing damages upon an inquest at the circuit or upon a writ of inquiry before a sheriff's jury\u201d (P. 78)."], "id": "22497294-1043-4696-a1af-956d22be210a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*641In considering this case, I have entirely disregarded the testimony of Miss Lee, as unworthy of credit. It abundantly appeared from the evidence on both sides that she and the deceased cohabited for many years, i Yet she, not choosing to decline answering, boldly testifies to the contrary. Her denial is clearly untrue. That portion of the history of the life of the decedent is regarded as material, and therefore the rulefalsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, is applicable. I cannot agree with those who justify swearing to a falsehood in such cases. It is simply adding <mask> to vice. But there are other reasons why she is considered unworthy of credit. It is unnecessary to enumerate them here."], "id": "5be40858-06c7-4356-9cc2-39977cbeac6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cDuring and after August 2010, numerous and widespread insufficiencies in foreclosure filings in various courts around the nation were reported by major mortgage lenders and other authorities. These insufficiencies include: failure of plaintiffs and their counsel to review documents and files to establish standing and other foreclosure requisites; filing of notarized affidavits which falsely attest to such review and to other critical facts in the foreclosure process; and \u2018robosignature\u2019 of documents by parties and counsel. The wrongful filing and prosecution of foreclosure proceedings which are discovered to suffer from these defects may be cause for disciplinary and other sanctions upon participating counsel\u201d (emphasis added). The mandatory affirmation requires the plaintiffs attorney to state, under the penalties of <mask> pursuant to CPLR 2106, that he or she communicated with plaintiffs representative (the name and title of whom must be specified) on a specified date, and that such representative informed the attorney that the representative"], "id": "4d2604da-58f2-4701-bd8f-7b2698c4d51e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This court\u2019s treatment of the witness Isaac, ruling that as a matter of law he was not an accomplice to intentional murder or manslaughter, even though he could be an accomplice as a matter of fact for felony murder, is consistent with rulings in pertinent, although not identical, situations. There are appellate holdings that a witness who took part in a serious crime *713that was closely connected to the crime charged was not an accomplice to the crime charged, despite the connection between the two crimes and the witness\u2019s implication of himself in a felony; this was so even though the two crimes had a common element, as they do in this case (causing the death). These cases confirm that Isaac\u2019s status as a potential accomplice to the related attempted burglary or attempted larceny at the victim\u2019s store, and thereby to the felony murder, does not entail his status as a potential accomplice to the intentional shooting of the victim. (See, People v McAuliffe, 36 NY2d 820 [accomplice to bribery is not an accomplice to the defendant\u2019s <mask> about that bribery]; People v Brooks, 34 NY2d 475 [receiver of stolen property is not an accomplice to the theft]; People v Greenberger, 96 AD2d 910 [vendors who paid kickbacks to the defendant, a hospital administrator, were not accomplices to the defendant\u2019s attempt to evade payment of income taxes by failing to report those kickbacks as income]; People v Maldonado, 123 AD2d 788 [witness was not accomplice to manslaughter in the first degree alleged to have been committed when the defendant shot the deceased after a brawl, merely because during the brawl the witness tried to pass the defendant a large knife].)"], "id": "636f22b2-ea7d-46f6-8617-13890b301458", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On June 4,1980, Leo reappeared before the Grand Jury. The statutory definition of immunity from prosecution was read to him, and he was informed that notwithstanding its grant by operation of law he could be prosecuted for <mask> and for contempt for refusal to answer legal and proper questions. Asked whether he understood the meaning of contempt, he refused to answer any questions and read a prepared statement."], "id": "b7b4d5f3-5297-44cf-a0d6-f52712408e19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["However, the first time the Court of Appeals had the question before it, it affirmed, without opinion, the lower court\u2019s exercise of discretion in granting the disclosure of grand jury minutes to residents of the Town of Mt. Pleasant to aid them in proceedings to remove the Receiver of Taxes. (Matter of Quinn, 293 NY 787.) In People v Di Napoli (27 NY2d 229, 234), the Court of Appeals clarified its position: \"We start with the proposition that secrecy of grand jury minutes is not absolute.\u201d Disclosure rests in the discretion of the Trial Judge who must balance public interest in disclosure against that in secrecy. Ascribing as reasons for the mainte*105nance of secrecy, the court listed (p 235): \"(1) prevention of flight by a defendant who is about to be indicted; (2) protection of the grand jurors from interference from those under investigation; (3) prevention of subornation of <mask> and tampering with prospective witnesses at the trial to be held as a result of any indictment the grand jury returns; (4) protection of an innocent accused from unfounded accusations if in fact no indictment is returned; and (5) assurance to prospective witnesses that their testimony will be kept secret so that they will be willing to testify freely.\u201d"], "id": "e2facdc6-ff31-4d08-b911-4bab2562b59f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["2. The complaint alleges the giving of a mortgage, its subsequent foreclosure and perfecting of title, and possession of the premises by due course of law in the defendant. The plaintiffs were parties to that action. This pstops them from questioning the validity of that judgment or the proceedings under it in this action. Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511-522; Lyon v. Lyon, 67 N. Y. 250; Rawiszer v. Hamilton, 51 How. Pr. 297. Even though the judgment was recovered by fraud and <mask>, yet it cannot be questioned collaterally. Railroad Co. v. Harrold, 65 How. Pr. 89. The complaint is to be taken as a whole in its construction, and as a whole it shows that the plaintiffs were ousted of possession by j udgment and writ authorized by law, and so long as as that stands, it must be regarded as conclusive upon their rights. Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211. If the mortgage upon which the judgment is obtained was procured by fraud and is void, it and the judgment under it may be impeached in an equitable action, (Krekeler v. Ritter, 62 N. Y. 372;) but it is conclusive upon the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action. The demurrer is sustained, and judgment ordered in favor of the defendant, with costs."], "id": "da45cb8a-9b81-4407-8099-907afeab268a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The People's brief does not cite Caldwell, supra , 212 Cal.App.4th 1262, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 99, but that case contains a holding that is very similar to the People's argument here. Defense counsel argued that detectives testified falsely about whether they used correct procedures in conducting a photo lineup. On rebuttal, the prosecutor contended that the detectives would not risk their careers by committing <mask>. While conceding that the prosecutor's remarks were similar to those in other cases where vouching was found to have occurred, the Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that the prosecutor \"was not vouching for [the police witnesses'] credibility; he was rebutting the defense attorney's charge that the officers had lied about the photo lineup.\" ( Id. at p. 1271, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 99.)"], "id": "ed76ccc8-a65c-4ee2-a729-6755c29eb5a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Bernard J. Fried, J. Defendants Adam Cohen, Stanley Cohen, Jamie K. C. Scher (nee Jamie Cohen), Todd Spehler and Eileen Torrillo are charged in a 27-count indictment, which includes 21 counts of <mask> in the first degree. At issue is whether the State of New York has jurisdiction over these perjury charges, and whether New York\u2019s perjury statute encompasses perjury, before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)."], "id": "e1aca1a3-5862-497d-bbdf-5961d1a62a01", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although we do not have precedent interpreting Code \u00a7 8.01-4.3, the Supreme Court of Virginia did consider the statute\u2019s application in Spruill v. Garcia, 298 Va. 120, 125 (2019). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an unsworn statement that was \u201cmerely \u2018acknowledged\u2019 as \u2018true and correct\u2019 before a notary public\u201d was not \u201can unsworn declaration made under penalty of <mask>.\u201d Spruill, 298 Va. at 125 (citing Code \u00a7 8.01-4.3). In contrast, the phrase \u201csubstantially similar\u201d has been interpreted by this Court. See, e.g., Mason v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 599, 608 (2015). \u201c[T]wo things are \u2018substantially similar\u2019 if they have common core characteristics or are largely alike in substance or essentials.\u201d Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 608, 613 (2009). \u201cSimilar,\u201d on the other hand, means \u201chaving characteristics in common\u201d or being \u201calike in substance or essentials.\u201d Id. (quoting Similar, Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1993)). example attestation clause.5 See Johnson, 53 Va. App. at 613 (quoting Substantial, Webster\u2019s,"], "id": "78f9aa67-3c37-43e7-ae56-32a04bf49062", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment averred the contrary of each of these statements to be true, and charged the appellant with having \u201c falsely, wickedly, willfully, knowingly, unlawfully and corruptly committed willful and corrupt <mask> \u201d in giving this testimony. To this indictment the appellant, by his counsel, filed a demurrer in writing on the ground that the facts stated in said indictment did not constitute a crime. Upon the hearing of the demurrer the court overruled the same and ordered that the defendant plead to the indictment."], "id": "d480b7a7-15c9-43ad-8d25-cada6725ad42", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["And in People v. Morrison, 98 Misc. Rep. 555, following the reasoning in the Peck case, the court held that where the facts alleged negatived the materiality of testimony and showed that it must have been immaterial the indictment is bad on demurrer. Nott, J. (on p. 557), stating the rule, said: \u201c There is no doubt of the general rule that an allegation in an indictment for <mask> that the testimony is material is sufficient. * * * But where the facts further alleged in the indictment negative the materiality of the testimony and show that it must have been immaterial, the indictment is bad on demurrer in spite of the allegation contained therein that the testimony was material.\u201d"], "id": "50e8f7c2-7979-476f-8b51-6e3ce4e9b842", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["With regard to the third count, the indictment charges all three defendants with the crime of attempted grand larceny in the first degree by common scheme or plan. Section 1290-a of the Penal Law requires that \u201cif * * * the defendant made use of any false or fraudulent representations * * * in the course of accomplishing * * * the theft, evidence thereof may not be received at the trial unless the indictment * * * alleges such representation or pretense \u201d. The indictment alleges common-law larceny by unlawful scheme and plan without alleging any false pretense as an overt act. The only attempted larceny established at the trial is one by the false representation that a bill for services rendered was a valid one. Such overt act must be alleged in the count charging larceny and the prosecution may not rely upon a <mask> count in the indictment in order to cure its error in pleading, since larceny is not a derivative of perjury."], "id": "de1b05d8-0c5c-4ec4-b127-ca0ffa0fc57f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The affirmation as recommended by the Senate Finance Committee in its Sixth Report is the most precise manner of complying with the rule. The affirmation should read as follows: \u201c The undersigned, attorneys of record [of counsel with the attorney of record] for A. B. affirms that the foregoing statement is true, under penalty of <mask>. O. D. [address] \u201d (p. 206)."], "id": "ec3e2c52-2630-45d0-9f47-67da15596366", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This court heard the defendant\u2019s testimony, which concerned adjudicative facts: defendant\u2019s forcible, unlawful taking of the complainant\u2019s jacket which defendant admitted under oath in the Grand Jury but denied under oath at trial. The prosecutor persuasively asserts these are facts about which defendant is not likely to be mistaken. The defendant was convicted by a jury of the crime of robbery in the first degree, which defendant under oath at trial denied committing. The defendant\u2019s guilt of the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt by the testimony of the victim and two police officers as well as the defendant\u2019s own testimony in the Grand Jury. The question arises as to whether the proof of defendant\u2019s apparent <mask> is sufficiently strong and the perjury so material that enhancement is warranted. In Dunnigan (supra) defendant categorically denied any involvement with illegal drugs. On the Government\u2019s case-in-chief, five witnesses testified to personal observations of defendant\u2019s illegal drug trafficking, four of whom admitted complicity in these enterprises."], "id": "81379954-dc12-4af0-97cb-5f1f295e5ea0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In view of this and other evidence in the record, it cannot be said that Traver and Slocum committed <mask>, nor that, without their testimony, there is in the record \u2018 \u2018 no proof that Tony Nadile was in Syracuse on the day of the crime \u201d. The allegations in the petition fit the description stated in People v. White (309 N. Y. 636, 641, supra): \u201cMany sworn allegations are palpably untrue, not improbable or unbelievable, but untrue.\u201d The court is satisfied that the \u201cnew evidence\u201d offered by defendant fails to create a question of fact to rebut the presumption of validity attached to the factual basis for the original judgment which is essential to the granting of a hearing. (People v. Richetti, supra; People v. Wurzler, 280 App. Div. 1020.)"], "id": "ae05670f-2ae9-44b3-af0d-eaac666a58a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Clearly, therefore, the power to cause the arrest and prosecution of William Lomnicky for the crime of <mask> or any other related crime, as sought by petitioner, is vested solely in the respondent Frank D. O\u2019Connor, District Attorney of Queens County. Under the circumstances, the respondents, the Magistrates\u2019 Court of the City of New York and John M. Murtagh, its Chief City Magistrate, may not be directed to usurp the function of the District Attorney to arrest and prosecute William Lomnicky of the crime of perjury or any other related crime (Matter of McGraw v. Finegan, 243 App. Div. 778; Matter of Bailey v. Kern, 177 Misc. 904) and the application in that regard must be and is denied."], "id": "6c2a6d0f-461e-462f-81bd-74cc0b2ff28a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant has attacked the aborted immunity on three fronts: (1) The prosecutor\u2019s offer of immunity was such as to prevent the defendant\u2019s access to the informant; (2) the prosecutor\u2019s offer of immunity was tantamount to threatening the informant with <mask> prosecution if he testified favorably to the defendant; and (3) the court indicated that the immunized *751statement could possibly be used as evidence in a future perjury prosecution.2 The defendant concluded that the combination of these alleged errors resulted in an ineffective offer of immunity which deprived the defendant of vital testimony and that as a consequence the motion to suppress should have been granted."], "id": "6f510fe2-e08e-4d79-912c-4248d1d80367", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["By the fourth count of Indictment 910C-72, defendant Percy is charged with official misconduct for failure to pay just com*532pensation as to Parcels 12 and 13 based on submitted appraisal figures. Count 11 of Indictment 910G--72 charges him with <mask>, premised again on the theory that at the time of settlement the county\u2019s appraised value figure was $132,000 and not $56,000. Assuming, that by being the ultimate signatory to the settlement agreement, Percy bears responsibility, it is amply clear that the minutes nowhere reveal the awareness by the jury of the existence of the $56,000 figure and offer."], "id": "4c66d21b-f349-446b-9fc1-c8365d2a72d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["If the defendant herein seeks a suppression hearing to challenge the scope of police conduct, defendant must affirmatively assert that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item seized or in the area searched (Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, supra; Rawlings v Kentucky, 448 US 98; United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83, supra). The defense bar cannot have it both ways. They cannot challenge the seizure of items found in public places by claiming their clients\u2019 constitutional rights were violated and then maintain at trial that the property recovered doesn\u2019t belong to their clients at all. Defendants must affirmatively state that the property belongs to them and, in circumstances where the property is not recovered on the person of the defendant, that their discarding of the property was a \"spontaneous reaction\u201d to unlawful police conduct (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 593; compare, People v Wilson, 201 AD2d 399 [spontaneous response], with People v Myrick, 199 AD2d 823, Iv denied 83 NY2d 808; People v Thomas, 203 AD2d 96, Iv denied 83 NY2d 972 [calculated act]). The defense bar should be reminded that suppression hearing testimony or pleadings made in support of a suppression hearing cannot be used at trial against a defendant on the prosecution\u2019s direct case, thus removing much of the self-incriminating dilemma that had motivated the automatic standing rule (People v Wes*263lev, 73 NY2d 351, 356, supra; Simmons v United States, 390 US 377, supra). It follows that unless someone seeks to suborn <mask>, the doctrine of legal standing is not an obstacle to justice."], "id": "316ab455-66b8-475c-b504-66376deb7818", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Davis (247 Mich. 602) the defendant had testified that he had not previously been arrested and convicted of any offense. The court, after asking defendant a question, said, among other things, in the presence of the jury, \u201c Mr. Prosecutor, as soon as the court is dismissed, you make a complaint, and Mr. Sheriff you can sign it charging the respondent here with <mask>, and take him into custody. Go ahead with your questions.\u201d"], "id": "34247100-71c5-4654-aae0-5890065eb371", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On the contrary, it is fair to assume that, in view of the fact that many of the States had repudiated the doctrine of Wain n. Warlters from the start\"; that in others, where it had been followed to some extent, it was either considerably modified by the courts, and in the course of time restricted to a small class of. cases, or entirely abrogated by statute ; that even the courts of England found themselves compelled to modify and refine it by degrees; that after an attempt and. trial for more than *317thirty years to enforce it in this State by express statutory enactment, it was found to do more harm than good, inasmuch as it operated as a fraud on the merchant, the farmer, the mechanic and the laborer, who acted upon \u2022the faith of the written promise of a third person, but who in most cases found it very difficult to state the real consideration of the collateral promise in legal and technical form, so as to make a valid agreement; that, therefore, in this age of great and rapid commercial progress, the further requirement of a compliance with a technical rule of law not prescribed by nor observed in other States, the enforcement of which has proved an endless source of trouble, annoyance and injustice, without yielding in a corresponding degree the benefits expected to flow from it,\u2014namely, the prevention of the crime of <mask>, was inconsistent with the true commercial interests of the great State of New York, with its rapidly increasing population, composed in part of valuable foreign elements,\u2014it is fair to assume, I repeat, that in view of all these considerations, the legislature changed the statute in 1863 with the express intention that the requirement that the consideration be expressed in every agreement, should thereafter no longer be insisted on in any manner. I can arrive at no other conclusion, and whoever will undertake the task of reading and studying among other cases the decision in Brewster v. Silence (8 N. Y. [4 Seld.], 207), followed in Glen Cove Ins. Co. v. Harrold (20 Barb., 298), and in Draper v. Snow (20 N. Y, 331), and on the other hand the case of the Union Bank v. Coster (3 Id. [3 Comst.], 203), the controlling principle of which decision was necessarily involved and reaffirmed and approved in Gates v. McKee (13 Id. [3 Kern.], 232), and again in Church v. Brown (21 Id., 315), and then notice the frank admission of Chief Justice Comstock, in the last named case, that the decision of the case of Brewster v. Silence, which he had followed, with his associates, in Draper n. Snow (20 Id., 331), was erroneous, and therefore he should be prepared to uphold the contracts and dealings of men, belonging to the *318class which, are condemned in the decision referred to ; whoever, I say, will undertake that task, will,'in all probability, arrive at the same conclusion to which I have arrived as regards the reasons which induced the legislature, among other things, to change the statute in 1863. It is true the legislature might have been more explicit, and enacted, in the words of the Massachusetts statute, \u201cThat the consideration of any such promise, contract or agreement, need not be set forth or expressed in the writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith, but may be proved by any other legal evidence,\u201d or the words of the Indiana statute, which is nearly similar to that of Massachusetts; but, although this has not been done, I think the legislature of this State has been sufficiently explicit, under all the circumstances, in making known its determination to enact the same rule. In the face of this legislative intent sufficiently expressed, the judicial interpretation of the law, as applied in some cases to the law of 1813, in conformity with the English doctrine, must cease, as inconsistent therewith and totally repugnant thereto. I have no doubt that since 1863 securities to an immense amount have been taken in business throughout this State, in reliance upon the idea that a compliance with the old rule is no longer necessary; the interpretation contended for by the defendant would place all the contracts entered into in respect to these securities in jeopardy, and would thus greatly increase the .uncertainty of the law, which is now proverbial."], "id": "114f2864-dd39-4ae2-a4e4-6e3b8d479868", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["As we have stated, Wilder was not cross-examined as to the matter involved in the question put to George Morse. Suppose he had been, and admitted the declaration, could witnesses be called to sustain his general character ? Rex v. Rudge (2 Peake N. P. Cases, 232) is an authority for a negative answer. It was said, in Jackson v. Lewis (13 Johns., 505) that \u201c inquiry as to any particular immoral conduct is not admissible against a witness.\u201d It was held in Rex v. Hemp (5 Carr. & P., 468) that a witness cannot be asked whether he has heard the witness sought to be impeached commit <mask> in the trial of a cause. In Harrington v. Lincoln (3 Gray, 133), the court refused to receive evidence that a witness said if he had been on the stand he would have said something-even if it had been untrue, after the witness had denied so stating."], "id": "b5297de3-6611-465d-b8ce-89c9ae82a488", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is true that in the case of the People v. Petmecky (99 N. Y., 421), the language of the court might seem to justify the adherence to the rule existing previous to the change in respect to the disqualifying effect of a conviction for <mask>. But as the question was not considered by the court, it cannot be held to have been adjudicated upon. The learned court, therefore, having left the whole question entirely to the jury, as to what weight they would give to this testimony of Fullgraff and Duffy, did all that it was required *46to do by reason of any exception wbicb was taken upon tbe part of tbe defendant\u2019s counsel."], "id": "a441122b-0e9c-4640-9366-9d8a4cccd358", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*1015\u201c Q. Are you retired? A. Yes sir. u Q. What are you retired from? A. I refuse to answer on the grounds that 1 cannot he compelled to testify against myself. \u201c Q. Now Mr. Healy, I am going to tell you that you cannot refuse to answer questions unless you invoke your Constitutional privileges and state the reasons for refusing to answer questions. A. I have the same answer. \u201c Q. Mr. Healy, if I tell you that I am going to insist that you answer questions, or else have the Foreman direct you to answer, I would advise that if you fail to answer we will seek to hold you in contempt, will you answers [sic] the questions then? A. Give me the questions. \u201c Q. What are you retired from? A. I refuse to answer on the Constitutional grounds that I cannot he compelled to testify against myself. \u201c Q. What is the basis for that refusal? A. What you told me this morning. \u201c Q. What did I tell you? A. That I was going to be indicted. \u201c Q. Didn\u2019t I say that you would be indicted if you didn\u2019t tell the truth? A. That I was going to be indicted and that was it. \u201c Q. If you didn\u2019t tell the truth, didn\u2019t I tell you that? A. You did not. \u201c Q. If I tell you now that if you don\u2019t tell the truth we will seek an indictment against you, will that change your position? A. No. \u201c Q. Under what circumstances would you testify? A. None. \u201c Q. If I tell you Mr. Healy, that I will then request the Foreman of the Grand Jury to advise you that if necessary we will give you Immunity and then compel your answers, will you then answer the questions? A. I will answer: I have to answer then. \u201c Q. You do realize that? A. Yeah. \u201c Q. You realize that as a result of your former employment as a police officer, is that correct? A. No, it\u2019s in the Constitution. \u201c Q. And you want to follow the Constitution and don\u2019t want to impede the investigation of this Grand Jury? A. No I do not. \u20181 Q. You would not tell a lie would you? A. No sir. \u201c Q. You realize what telling a lie would constitute at this point, do you not? A. I know its <mask>. \u201c Q. You realize you have taken an oath and sworn to tell the truth? A. Yes. \u201c Q. Do you feel that any answers you might give would incriminate you? A. I do. *1016\u201c Q. If I tell you now that I am going to ash the Foreman to excuse you and then to consider whether or not they will give you Immunity, in return for your cooperation, will you take that under advisement and then come bach and answer questions? A. I don\u2019t understand you. 11 Q. If 1 tell you that I am going to ash the Foreman of the jury to give you Immunity from prosecution and then after they have decided to give you Immunity, I will then put certain questions to you and compel you to answer, do you, understand that? A. 1 understand that. \u201c Q. Will you be willing to do that? A. As far as I am able. \u201c Q. Do you realize even if you are given Immunity, it does not grant you Immunity from prosecution for perjury? A. I understand that. \u201c Q. Do you realise that before I ash the Grand Jury to give you Immunity that I will have to talh to you outside, myself, for a minute? A. Alright. 11 Q. Do you realise Mr. Mealy that if, after Immunity is grcmted, you refuse to answer any questions, you will be held in contempt and face a possible jail sentence? A. 1 understand that. \u201c Q. Did you discuss with anybody your appearance before this Grand Jury? A. No. \u201c Q. Mr. Foreman, at this time I ask that the witness be excused for a minute. By Foreman: You may be excused. \u201c Witness excused.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) Subsequently, on the same day, i-iealey was recalled before the Grand Jury and was questioned, in part, as follows: \u201c Q. Mr. Healey, did you ever receive any money from any other sergeant in the precinct to which you were attached? A. No. \u201c Q. Did you ever give any other sergeant any money? A. No sir. \u201c Q. Did you ever hear of the Sergeants Club? A. No. * \u2018 Q. What precinct were you assigned to ? A. The last was the 109. \u201c Q. When were you there? A. December 1, 1955 to 1960, when I retired. \u201c Q. All that time you never received any money from any other sergeant? A. No sir. \u201c Q. Did you ever receive any money from Bichard Davis? A. Bichard Davis ? I don\u2019t know him. \u201c Q. Did you ever receive any money from him? A. I don\u2019t know him even. *1017\u201c Q. Did you ever receive any money from William Lade? A. I did. \u201c Q. You did? A. Yeah. \u201c Q. What for? A. He gave it to me, that\u2019s all. \u201c Q. Well, how did it come about? A. 1 went to see him and he gave me money, five or six times. \u201c Q. What did you do with the money? A. I kept it; spent it. \u201c Q. How much did he give you? A. Sometimes fifty, sometimes seventy-five. \u201c Q. Dollars? A. Yes. \u201c Q. Tell us what he gave it to you for? A. I don\u2019t know. I never done anything for him. \u201c Q. I am glad you have decided to co-operate Mr. Healey. I am glad you have decided to tell the truth. At this point, I am going to give you a minute to catch your breath and sit out in the other room. Would you? A. You want me to sit out in the other room? \u201c A. Just for a minute. Take your glass of water with you. (Witness leaves jury room.) \u201c Witness excused.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) In view of the conclusion to which I have come as to how this motion must be decided, it is not necessary to determine whether at that point in the proceedings healey had in fact already been given immunity from prosecution by the District Attorney so as to preclude his subsequent indictment. It should be pointed out, however, that the Assistant District Attorney had recalled the defendant healey for questioning after representing to him \u2018 \u2018 that I am going to ask the Foreman of the jury to give you Immunity from prosecution and then after they have decided to give you Immunity, I will then put certain questions to you and compel you to answer"], "id": "3ccfea3c-130b-47d1-9e64-827c08a53e63", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This whole contention, of course, rests on the assumption that the original stories told by the witnesses Ames and Mary Ballant were false. It is my opinion, after a careful review of all the documents and records in this case, that the original *471stories told by the witnesses Mary Ballant and Harold Ames were true, that Mary Ballant was guilty of <mask> on the trial, was properly indicted therefor, and should have been convicted therefor and that the witness Ames was not coerced into giving false testimony against the defendant."], "id": "9ad0a0a5-fa9b-4949-977f-c91e915f5edf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["By the facts as alleged in his amended complaint, plaintiff acknowledges that (1) ConEd hired him despite the fact that he reported his <mask> conviction, and (2) ConEd\u2019s subsequent termination of him was based on the assertion that \u201ceveryone knew\u201d \u201cwho [plaintiff] was\u201d (amended complaint f 33) and because of \u201cpotential disruption of business operations\u201d and \u201cdamage to the Company\u2019s reputation.\u201d (Amended complaint *][ 36.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was involved in the Louima incident. However, there is no allegation that ConEd considered the perjury conviction as a factor in terminating the plaintiff; nor is there any mention of the perjury conviction with respect to plaintiff\u2019s interaction with McGrath or Frankel. And, although not binding, case law submitted and found by the *842court indicates that Frankel\u2019s \u201csilence\u201d when plaintiff voiced his belief that he was being terminated for his convictions is insufficient to support an inference that plaintiff was terminated based on his perjury conviction (see Van Houdnos v Evans, 807d 648, 655 [7th Cir 1986] [\u201cSilence alone, however, is not evidence of discriminatory intent\u201d]; Alms v AdvancePCS, 2006 WL 2032746, *3, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 50100, *11 [D Ariz, July 18, 2006, No. 2:04-CV-00332 (JWS)] [finding that silence by hiring agent did \u201cnot suggest he agreed with the age-discrimination allegation implicit in (plaintiff\u2019s) question\u201d]; Ali v Stetson Univ., Inc., 340 F Supp 2d 1320, 1325 [MD Fla 2004] [\u201cWhatever might have been behind the board\u2019s silence, it is not in the nature of a remark \u2018whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate\u2019 \u201d]). Thus, when read as a whole, the amended complaint fails to support a claim that ConEd terminated him because of his perjury conviction of lying under oath."], "id": "94e7bb70-ebea-4060-b862-e9cda9aa7365", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*628\u201c Since the only means available to contradict and impugn that <mask> was to peruse the transcript of the first trial for comparison of the testimony, counsel moved the trial court for time to obtain a copy of the transcript for his use in cross-examination of the witnesses. The Court denied this motion, thus leaving petitioner and his counsel with no means to refute the perjurrers prejudicial testimony."], "id": "a1ce57be-e48f-4355-b2be-1ed8f03c3a3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["defendant through the introduction of his own coerced tes- timony. It did so despite the strong and obvious interest in preventing <mask> because the very introduction of the coerced testimony would violate the Fifth Amendment\u2019s provision that \u201c[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\u201d In view of that guarantee, balancing of interests was \u201cnot simply un- necessary,\u201d but \u201cimpermissible.\u201d Portash, 440 U. S., at 459. The Sixth Amendment speaks with equal clarity: \u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\u201d It admits no exception for cases in which the trial judge believes un- confronted testimonial hearsay might be reasonably neces- sary to correct a misleading impression. Courts may not overlook its command, no matter how noble the motive. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 145 (2006) (\u201cIt is true enough that the purpose of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair\u201d). D The State warns that a reversal will leave prosecutors without recourse to protect against abuses of the confronta- tion right. These concerns are overstated. State and fed- eral hearsay rules generally preclude all parties from intro- ducing unreliable, out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter asserted. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 802. Even for otherwise admissible evidence, \u201cwell-established rules,\u201d such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403, \u201cpermit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.\u201d Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U. S. 319, 326 (2006). If a court admits evidence before its misleading or unfairly prejudicial na- ture becomes apparent, it generally retains the authority to 14 HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK"], "id": "dd6a4593-6fdf-4d7e-bbc5-6e22781380df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["We also note that Code of Civil Procedure section 98, applicable in limited civil cases, allows for the presentation of \u201cprepared testimony of [relevant] witnesses in the form of affidavits or declarations under penalty of perjury\u201d in lieu of presenting \u201cdirect testimony.\u201d (Italics added.) Thus, our Legislature has described such declarations as \u201ctestimony,\u201d at least in the context of limited civil cases. (Code Civ. Proc., \u00a7 98.) We need not, however, determine whether a declaration under penalty of <mask> submitted in another action amounts to \u201cformer testimony\u201d within the meaning of section 1290 because we conclude the defendant Dunmores had no opportunity to cross-examine Ruth Dunmore in the underlying bank actions with an interest and motive similar to that which they have in this case. \u201cThe essence of the hearsay rule is a requirement that testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of cross-examination. [Citation.] The basic theory is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examination.\u201d (Buchanan v. Nye (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 582, 585.) In accordance with this requirement, section 1291 requires, as a condition of admissibility, that \u201c[t]he party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.\u201d (\u00a7 1291, subd. (a)(2).) Here, the defendant Dunmores were parties in the underlying bank actions, and the question of whether or not Ruth and George Dunmore signed the loan documents or authorized anyone to do so on their behalf was certainly at issue. However, Ruth was obviously not subject to cross-examination in her own declaration. Such a declaration provides prepared testimony akin to a direct examination. (See Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1347.) In the context of limited civil cases, where declarations may be presented in lieu of live testimony, the right of cross-examination is preserved by"], "id": "bcdd3de7-c6a3-403c-ac7d-6931e001c961", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Subsequent to said interview, the defendant was called before the Grand Jury and, in response to a question by the Assistant District Attorney who conducted the interview, as to whether or not the bid that was finally submitted was very high, he responded \"No\u201d, but that \"maybe it was a little high\u201d. The District Attorney then asked whether or not defendant had told him during the April, 1975 interview that the bid was \"very high\u201d, to which he responded \"No\u201d, resulting in one count of <mask>."], "id": "366d057f-2db1-47d0-9870-726cef42d1ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Rule 7 of the Rules of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Village of Matinecock provides in pertinent part: \u201cAll appellants, applicants, opponents and witnesses shall ei*982ther be sworn or, in the absence of being sworn, shall be required to state the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth as if under oath and under legal liability for full penalties for <mask>.\u201d Petitioners contend that the Board\u2019s failure to enforce this rule and its taking of unsworn evidence constituted a procedural error requiring the setting aside of its determination. It would appear that the Chairman misconstrued the Board\u2019s own rules although he accurately stated the law; \u201cThe statements of the witnesses do not have to comply with the technical requirements applicable to testimony in court. They are not even under oath. It is enough that reasonable men could view them as entitled to probative effect.\u201d (People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v Walsh, 244 NY 280, 287; see, also, Matter of Von Kohorn v Morrell, 9 NY2d 27, 33; Matter of Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianity v Rosenfeld, 91 AD2d 190, 201.) Accordingly, any procedural defect in not swearing witnesses or requiring that they make their statements under the penalties for perjury was de minimis and harmless especially where no objection was raised at the hearing."], "id": "eb304b6b-e402-428f-b517-dba074ee64e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Richard T. Andrias, J. In September 1989 defendant Judith Goldfinger was charged in a five-count indictment with conspiracy in the fifth degree, *766grand larceny in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree, commercial bribing in the first degree and <mask> in the third degree. In essence, it is alleged that Ms. Goldfinger, who sells commercial business forms for her employer, codefendant Cosmos Forms, Ltd. (Cosmos), conspired and schemed to defraud one of her corporate customers, Guardian Life Insurance Co. (Guardian), by inflating invoices for goods sold and delivered in 1987 and 1988."], "id": "06671f23-a865-4998-9590-67d829741bf7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the case of O'Reilly v. People (86 N. Y. 154), the affiant had the intention to verify a document, but no words were exchanged between him and the notary, who merely affixed his seal. The court there ruled that there could be no <mask> conviction since there had been no \u201c obligation of an oath \u201d (p. 162). No doubt, it was to avoid such requirements that the new supplemental perjury statute was enacted applicable to \u201c statements \u201d. This new subdivision 4, unlike subdivisions 1 and 2, does not use the word 1 \u2018 swear \u2019 \u2019 but instead merely states: one who \u201c subscribes \u201d a statement."], "id": "071e3d7b-f855-4c0b-9c2a-78b93cdf6611", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["That proper examination of a talesman on his voir dire to test his qualifications as a juror is material, generally speaking, is beyond question, and but for the importance of this case and the strenuous energy with which it was urged in the argument, that the questions propounded as indicated in the indictment did not constitute <mask>, the. foregoing would be perhaps sufficient on this subject."], "id": "6eef8132-149b-484a-98be-cee6f9bba8fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["I. That the count of <mask>, first degree, is based on facts alleged which do not constitute (and the evidence before the Grand Jury could not have sustained as) the crime charged as a matter of law. He argues that he did not himself make the false statement under oath alleged in the indictment, since he only performed the ministerial act of notarizing the verification of his co-owner, Paul Gould. But Bergen is charged with more than having notarized Gould\u2019s verification. He is charged with having acted in concert with and aided, abetted and induced Gould in the making and filing of the application containing the *878false statement of cost of the new kitchen cabinets. The evidence before the Grand Jury sustains the commission of both alleged acts. Under section 2 of the Penal Law, a person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission, or who directly or indirectly counsels or induces another to commit a crime, is a principal."], "id": "cd99e87a-d6cd-4522-8dd6-b671f2bd84f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The testimonial oath is designed to serve two discrete functions: to alert the witness to the moral duty to testify truthfully and to deter false testimony by establishing a legal basis for a <mask> prosecution. (.Matter of Brown v Ristich, 36 NY2d 183,189.) To achieve these purposes, it is evident that the giving of an oath to testify truthfully must be a meaningful exercise. The test is whether the prospective witness \u201chas sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of an oath and to give a reasonably accurate account of what he has seen and heard vis-a-vis the subject about which he is interrogated.\u201d (People v Rensing, 14 NY2d 210, 213; accord District of Columbia v Armes, 107 US 519, 521-522.) \u201cThe witness must, at a minimum, have \u2018some conception\u2019 of the obligations of an oath and the consequences of giving false testimony.\u201d (People v Parks, 41 NY2d 36, 46, quoting from People v Washor, 196 NY 104, 109.)"], "id": "8d4247c0-9989-4bc0-87c9-ec8af808dd1f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"[The prosecutor's] argument strayed ... into impermissible territory when *563she implicitly suggested that all 12 unidentified, mostly nontestifying officers ... had been involved in a case or cases involving higher stakes such as kilos of cocaine, heroin, and stolen Maserati parts, but had not risked their careers for the higher stakes case or cases; and the same 12 officers had mortgages, car loans, and children in private schools. Although the officers' financial obligations and experience were irrelevant to appellant's guilt, [the prosecutor] argued these factual matters outside of the record to attempt to establish the veracity of the few members of the group of 12 officers who testified. This constituted vouching.\" ( Woods, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 [53 Cal.Rptr.3d 7].) The published California case law on this particular form of vouching (asserting without evidence that law enforcement witnesses would not lie because of the professional, financial or legal harm they would suffer) is scant; besides Woods , we have found only one other case ( People v. Caldwell (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1262, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 99, about which we will have more to say below), although we suspect this prosecutorial tactic is not uncommon. As indicated in Rodriguez's brief, there are also some federal appellate cases in which the same fact pattern was found to constitute improper vouching. ( United States v. Weatherspoon (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 [among statements constituting improper vouching was assertion that police officer witnesses would not lie because they would risk prosecution and loss of jobs and pensions; existence of such risks was outside record]; United States v. Combs (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 564, 574-576 [prosecutor's argument that agent would not lie because it was \"darn sure\" he would be fired for <mask> was improper vouching]; United States v. Gallardo-Trapero (5th Cir. 1999) 185 F.3d 307, 319-321 [prosecutor committed improper (but harmless) vouching with argument that federal agents and federal prosecutor would not commit perjury, as this would endanger their careers].)"], "id": "9ab246c6-2d84-45f2-b80e-55f9d1244b07", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["An award of punitive damages is further supported by the fact that Pimsler pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation. (See Mulder v Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 208 AD2d 301, 308 [1st Dept 1995] [punitive damages warranted where misconduct demonstrates \u201csuch wanton dishonesty as to imply a criminal indifference to civil obligations\u201d].) Furthermore, Pimsler has shown no remorse for his actions and, in light of the jury\u2019s finding, has committed <mask> in this action. Finally, the jury\u2019s decision to award punitive damages was proper in order to deter any such future conduct, and to send a message to the public that they can have confidence in the legal profession. (See 164 Mulberry St. Corp. v Columbia Univ., 4 AD3d 49, 60 [1st Dept 2004] [\u201cdeterent value of punitive damages is most effective against frauds, and is especially appropriate when the fraud is aimed at the public generally\u201d].) In light of these aggravating factors, the court concludes that the jury\u2019s award of punitive damages against Pimsler was not contrary to the weight of the evidence or contrary to law."], "id": "93358fbf-4c29-48ad-942c-0eb8789dae5e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeals has \u201cdeclined to prescribe fixed rules prohibiting or allowing the use for credibility purposes of prior offenses based solely upon the potentially inflammatory impact of the crime or the victim involved, even in the sensitive area of sex offenses.\u201d (See People v Bennette, 56 NY2d 142, 147 [1982].) In People v Bennette, the defendant had been convicted of a sex offense involving a child who was eight years old. \u201cThe defendant\u2019s conviction for sodomy was not irrelevant to the question of his veracity.\u201d (Id. at 148.) \u201cA person ruthless enough to sexually exploit a child may well disregard an oath and resort to <mask> if he perceives that to be in his self-interest.\u201d (Id.) The probative value of the conviction \u201cwas not diminished by the passage of time\u201d; the incident was not \u201cburied deep in the defendant\u2019s past,\u201d but rather was a \u201crecent conviction\u201d for which the defendant was still on parole at the time of trial. (See id.)"], "id": "3b505ca1-167e-4a2d-8822-a5fe3de4d7d5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In determining the thrust of Miranda and in evaluating its scope, it is necessary to bear in mind that it was concerned with the effect of custodial interrogation on Fifth Amendment rights. That amendment guarantees that no person may be compelled to be his own. accuser. To insure against police intrusion upon this constitutionally guaranteed privilege, statements made by a defendant during such custodial interrogation are excluded unless it is demonstrated that the requisite procedural safeguards have been employed. However, to bear witness against himself, the defendant must have already committed the act. To commit the act by the statement is not to bear witness to it. Thus, a witness, who is compelled to testify to criminal acts committed by him under a grant of immunity (CPL 50.20, subd 2) or under circumstances where immunity attaches as a matter of law, may not be prosecuted for the criminal acts to which he is compelled to testify. Nevertheless, a prosecution for <mask> will lie if he willfully testifies falsely (People v Tomasello, 21 NY2d 143, 149; CPL 50.10, subd 1). \"The immunity does not extend in futuro\u201d (United States v Tramunti, 500d 1334, 1344), nor does it confer a license to commit perjury (Glickstein v United States, 222 US 139, 142; United States v Tramunti, supra). .'"], "id": "21b9d827-86b3-4164-b64f-e1caaf1ff85f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The People's brief does not cite Caldwell, supra , 212 Cal.App.4th 1262, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 99, but that case contains a holding that is very similar to the People's argument here. Defense counsel argued that detectives testified falsely about whether they used correct procedures in conducting a photo lineup. On rebuttal, the prosecutor contended that the detectives would not risk their careers by committing <mask>. While conceding that the prosecutor's remarks were similar to those in other cases where vouching was found to have occurred, the Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that the prosecutor \"was not vouching for [the police witnesses'] credibility; he was rebutting the defense attorney's charge that the officers had lied about the photo lineup.\" ( Id. at p. 1271, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 99.)"], "id": "c6412c4f-22b9-4406-835e-6cf2a774a31f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Certain of the claims asserted in Waggoner's pro se motion (such as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; claims of instructional error; and claims of a variance between the charging instrument and the evidence at trial) are plainly claims that could-and should-have been raised in Waggoner's direct appeal. Those claims are not properly asserted in a motion for post-conviction relief, yet counsel retained them verbatim , and without any attempt to justify consideration of those claims in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Many of the other claims Waggoner asserted (such as claims of witness tampering; suborning <mask>; forgery of documents; interference in jury deliberations; alteration of the trial transcript; \"rampant judicial misconduct\" and juror misconduct; and \"[r]ampant perjury, forgery, [and] manufacture of false evidence\") are factually extravagant. Counsel retained all of those claims in Waggoner's \"amended\" motion, without reciting a single additional fact or legal authority, and without any indication that counsel had herself determined that a good-faith factual and legal basis actually existed for the claims. It is significant in this regard that the circuit court initially dismissed all of the claims in Waggoner's pro se motion as frivolous-yet appointed counsel later repeated all of those same claims, with no substantive revision or supplementation.8"], "id": "0caec700-5ea7-4cc8-b86a-8794ba214ebd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Hyde (supra), the learned judge further said: \u201c The subject was discussed at some length by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Smith (11 Allen, 243), the question being whether a suborner of <mask> was an accessory before the fact of the perjurer. The court said: \u2018 The crime of subornation of perjury is clearly in its nature that of an accessory before the fact to the perjury. Both perjury and subornation are felonies under our statute, being punishable by imprisonment in the State prison. * * * Whoever procures a felony to be committed, though it be by the intervention of a third person, is an accessory before the fact, for it is not necessary that there should be any direct communication between the accessory and the principal. * * * And the accessory is a felon, though his felony is different in kind from that of the principal. * * * So it is said to be a principle in law which can never be controverted, that he who procures a felony to be done is a felon. * * * We cannot see that the application of these principles is changed when the crime of the accessory before the fact is made by statute a substantive felony. The object of making it a substantive felony may be either to provide a distinct or milder punishment upon conviction, or to authorize the indictment and conviction of the accessory where the principal has not been convicted.\u2019"], "id": "fe9a5d24-fb45-402a-8d1d-82aafa493789", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["At trial, had Applicant been armed with and able to use Godfrey's <mask> to impeach him in front of the jury, our confidence that the jury would have convicted Applicant is likewise not undermined. Even if the jury was convinced that Godfrey was not credible and it did not believe any of his testimony, the other officers testified that Applicant consented to the search."], "id": "9fda9b50-e2d2-4793-a117-08f0b30ebb68", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"But the prosecutor says nothing like this could ever happen, because the officers would fear for their jobs and pensions and would risk prosecution for <mask>. Nonsense. Maybe in fantasyland-not in the real world. How many times have you read in the newspaper that an officer was fired and jailed for perjury? Yet studies have shown that working in law enforcement involves quite a bit of lying, more than in civilian life. Officers know they can get away with it, because they have that code of silence, the omerta you have heard about; because prosecutors will not go against them; because the system is their system."], "id": "167430c2-9f32-4fdc-9675-5416a51a0ef4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The elements necessary under the statutory charge of <mask> as set forth in section 210.10 of the Penal Law are as follows: \"A person is guilty of perjury in the second degree when he swears falsely and when his false statement is (a) made in a subscribed written instrument for which an oath is required by law, and (b) made with intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official functions, and (c) material to the action, proceeding or matter involved.\u201d"], "id": "098a13cc-43dc-4e6e-b923-a04b9071a9f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["While this court finds that the policies favoring immunity do not extend to the remaining claims, which concern allegedly criminal conduct and/or conduct constituting an intentional tort, it also concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable cause of action for damages. Specifically, reviewing those claims in a manner most favorable to plaintiff (see, Szczerbiak v Pilat, 229 AD2d 977), the court notes that there is no common-law cause of action for harassment (see, CBS Inc. v Arcane Visuals, 156 Misc 2d 665, 667), annoyance, intimidation or <mask> and that the only statutes that exist are criminal statutes. Plaintiff has also failed to plead the necessary elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (see, Howell v New York Post Co., 81 NY2d 115, 121; Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135, 143), negligence (see, Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781) or defamation (see, 2 NY PJI 157 [2001 Supp]). Furthermore, the remedy for any alleged violation of an order of the Greene County Family Court is to petition that court for appropriate relief. Thus, plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed as to those claims, as well."], "id": "8ae72ebb-ccec-48eb-9c95-c503e73724de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In reply, ConEd argues that article 23-A does not apply to plaintiff\u2019s vacated conviction because a conviction vacated on appeal is not a conviction within the meaning of the law. Thus, the vacated conviction cannot serve as a basis for plaintiff\u2019s claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, incorporating article 23-A. Plaintiffs application did not disclose the vacated conviction, and if \u201cconvictions\u201d included convictions vacated on appeal, then plaintiff could have been terminated for failing to disclose such convictions in his employment application. Plaintiff\u2019s termination had nothing to do with the fact that he was convicted of <mask> in 2002. His notoriety stemmed from his record as a police officer, not his record as a \u201ccriminal\u201d as plaintiff claims. Article 23-A does not apply where the ex-offender is terminated for reasons other than a previous conviction. And, case law strictly construes the scope of article 23-A."], "id": "269b3a96-fc59-49cf-bcdd-e87c764d0e46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The purpose of an oath is to secure truth. \"In its broadest sense, an oath is any form of attestation by which a person signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully\u201d (58 Am Jur 2d, Oath and Affirmation, \u00a7 1). Traditionally, its function was to purge the conscience and impress upon the witness a due sense of religious obligation, so as to secure the truth of his testimony under the influence of its sanctity (see, O\u2019Reilly v People, 86 NY 154 [1881]). Then, as *317now, false testimony or statements under an oath authorized by law subjected one to punishment for <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 210.45)."], "id": "62c990a6-c8e2-4f5e-9fb2-75921abe473e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is the defendant\u2019s claim that the indictment does not allege facts constituting the crime of <mask> in that it does not set forth that an oath was administered, that the defendant was sworn to give testimony in the case of Stiner v. Stiner, that the occasion upon which defendant signed the alleged false affidavit was- not one wherein an oath was required by law or one on which an oath could lawfully be administered, that the indictment does not allege that the statement was made in connection with the prosecution and trial of the case of Stiner v. Stiner, or that the notary public had authority to administer oaths in the county of Broome and finally that it appears on the face of the indictment that the alleged false affidavit was not material to any issue involved in the prosecution and trial of the Stiner case."], "id": "7a8e4289-2355-41f4-9161-8a5ad24808a0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although it has been held that \u201c The law requires the testimony of witnesses to be given under the sanctity of an oath \u201d (People v. Frindel, 58 Hun, 482), I cannot find any statute commanding it, but the practice is universal and supported by statutes prescribing the \u201c mode of swearing \u201d and punishment for <mask>. It is a part of our judicial system by inheritance, and a method of procedure having the sanction of settled usage is commonly regarded as due process. (Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302; Bookman v. City of New York, 200 id. 53.)"], "id": "5d176a2e-7f3b-4675-b6f4-a5c3a03b9739", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["2. The complaint alleges the giving of a mortgage, its subsequent foreclosure and perfecting of title, and possession of the premises by due course of law in the defendant. The plaintiffs were parties to that action. This pstops them from questioning the validity of that judgment or the proceedings under it in this action. Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511-522; Lyon v. Lyon, 67 N. Y. 250; Rawiszer v. Hamilton, 51 How. Pr. 297. Even though the judgment was recovered by fraud and <mask>, yet it cannot be questioned collaterally. Railroad Co. v. Harrold, 65 How. Pr. 89. The complaint is to be taken as a whole in its construction, and as a whole it shows that the plaintiffs were ousted of possession by j udgment and writ authorized by law, and so long as as that stands, it must be regarded as conclusive upon their rights. Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211. If the mortgage upon which the judgment is obtained was procured by fraud and is void, it and the judgment under it may be impeached in an equitable action, (Krekeler v. Ritter, 62 N. Y. 372;) but it is conclusive upon the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action. The demurrer is sustained, and judgment ordered in favor of the defendant, with costs."], "id": "25cfee60-49e7-4275-8c2b-03f648ad0054", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The next witness is William Leehe also proves the will. He says he was requested by Doctor Arden to go with him to see a sick patient; he went; he never saw Mrs. Mo until he met her at the house where Jones was lying sick. His testimony, in substance, concurs with that of Arden and Waters; but it is assailed on several grounds. I will briefly consider them. Lee says, that on the third of May, Mrs. H. called on him, and gave Mm the first information of Jones\u2019s decease. Walter Furlong testifies, that he informed Lee of the decease of Jones, the morning he diedo Whether Lee received the information on the 15th of April, or the 3d of May? is a circumstance irrelevant and unimportant, in respect to the subject of this will 5 it could have no effect whatever, allowing that the witness intended to aid the cause of Mrs. JET. If Lee was corrupt enough to sacrifice his integrity, he would have testified falsely to some fact that might be material. It would be in character, for a knave, on prudential grounds, to adhere to truth in circumstances of no moment | he would not expose himself to contradiction where nothing could be gained. I perceive no motive for stating the time of receiving information falsely. The law will not impute <mask> on such a state of facts, but will ascribe the variance to misapprehension or mistake ; besides, Lee? who swears to one day, is equally credible as Furlong, who swears to another."], "id": "eed81040-5be4-425b-91c0-b38894b3aeb8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*652The factual circumstances of the act involved in the offense of being a subscribing witness to a nominating petition that contains a false statement were unknown to the common law. However, the underlying criminal conduct that is the essence of this offense is perjurious in nature. <mask> is one of the notorious crimes recognized by the common law (People v Teal, 196 NY 372; Hoormann v Climax Cycle Co., 9 App Div 579). As the inherent nature of this offense has its antecedent roots in the common-law crime of perjury, it should be construed as requiring the same mens rea element of knowledge that the statement subscribed and sworn to by the witness was known by him to be false. This result is in comportment with the court\u2019s view that under all of the circumstances, justice and basic fairness requires that the defendant be permitted an opportunity to defend himself against these perjury-related charges by asserting a factual lack of knowledge defense that would constitute a complete defense to the perjury charges in chief."], "id": "9269dc13-93d4-474f-be23-9bbb5025ccfc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["When a prosecutor makes uninvited and unsubstantiated accusations of improper conduct directed toward a defense attorney in an attempt to prejudice the jury against the defendant, courts refer to this as striking a defendant over the shoulders of his counsel. Id. at 355. This can be seen, for example, when the prosecutor argues that defense counsel has manufactured evidence, suborned <mask>, accepted stolen money, or represented criminals. Id. This type of argument is improper. Dinkins , 894 S.W.2d at 357."], "id": "1c33313c-021f-4031-a545-a5b0b0aaa95f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Morales cites no authority for the proposition that a defendant's dubious incentive to commit <mask> constitutes an absurd consequence, and it's easy to see why. For a defendant who is willing to lie, the incentive to do so is not even unusual, much less absurd. An innocent defendant who has not committed each element of a less serious crime may choose to enter a plea agreement in order to reduce his or her sentencing exposure in the event of a conviction after trial on a more serious one. Or a guilty defendant may testify *808falsely to try to avoid conviction altogether. While we recognize these unfortunate realities, we decline to treat the decision to commit perjury as a mere economic calculation. Those who testify under oath are required to tell the truth, regardless of any purported incentives. Accordingly, we find that no absurd consequences follow from construing Page , Garza , and the plain meaning of Penal Code section 490.2 to allow defendant's felony Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction to stand."], "id": "8ffe836d-8531-43fe-b599-60f70fac6b48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*988The Grand Jury\u2019s primary function is to \"determine whether sufficient evidence exists to accuse a citizen of a crime and subject him or her to criminal prosecution\u201d (People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d 389, 394). In a <mask> case, the Grand Jury cannot fulfill its function unless it is given the opportunity to decide whether identified, specific and particularized statements are false. \"A grand jury, in order to make that ultimate determination, must necessarily determine what the question under inquiry was. To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him\u201d (Russell v United States, 369 US 749, 770, supra)."], "id": "56cd3206-e81c-4379-8f3c-fa8c551963e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Outside of New York, particularly in the Federal jurisdictions, there is more authority dealing with specificity of corroboration as it applies to the \"two-witness\u201d rule. In United States v Seavey (180d 837) the fact pattern is similar to that in the instant case. Based upon the defendant\u2019s Grand Jury testimony denying illegal payments to one Sales or other employees of the War Shipping Administration, two witnesses testified at defendant\u2019s trial for <mask>. One stated that she had seen $50 pass from defendant to Sales on one occasion. Sales himself testified to having received $125 from the defendant on another occasion. In rejecting the defendant\u2019s contention on appeal that the two-witness rule must apply to each alleged passing of money, the court stated (supra, p 839): \"It should be borne in mind that what the defendant is being prosecuted for here was not the giving or taking of bribes, but an alleged perjured statement that he had never made any payments on behalf of his employer to a given group of persons. Two witnesses testified, each to a different payment. The defendant has, therefore, been proved a perjurer by the testimony of two witnesses\u201d."], "id": "58aa96e5-add3-41fb-8263-af0e839ec2b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The allegations in the third amended complaint are inconsistent with facts appearing in the mechanics lien and other exhibits attached to Panterra GP, Inc.\u2019s earlier complaints. (See Vallejo Development, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 946-947 [where allegations in a complaint conflict with allegations appearing in a mechanic\u2019s lien that constitutes an exhibit, the allegations in the mechanics lien must be accepted as true as they are made under oath].) The mechanics lien unambiguously specified that Panterra Development Ltd., L.L.P. was the \u201cgeneral contractor\u201d for the Studio Movie Grill Bakersfield project and had furnished \u201clabor, materials, equipment, services, and/or work\u201d for the project. Crucially, the facts asserted in the mechanics lien were verified as true and correct under penalty of <mask> by none other than Panterra GP, Inc.\u2019s own president (who also signed the construction contract on behalf of Panterra Development Ltd., L.L.P.). The subsequent, partial release of mechanics lien contained similar facts that were again verified, under oath, by Panterra GP, Inc.\u2019s president himself. Is Panterra GP, Inc. contending, as the majority would have it, that its president perjured himself in recording the mechanic\u2019s lien for $2,997,545.75 on behalf of Panterra Development Ltd., L.L.P.? The facts reflected in the mechanics lien take precedence over conflicting allegations in the complaint, and the latter are disregarded. The facts that are properly taken as true establish that Panterra Development Ltd., L.L.P. was the contracting party and general contractor for the project. Accordingly, the first cause of action, reformation of contract based on unilateral or mutual mistake as to the identity of the contracting parties, fails. Panterra GP, Inc. did not provide the trial court with any explanation as to the stark inconsistency between its prior allegations and exhibits on the one hand, and its new allegations to the effect the contract did not reflect the correct parties, on the other. (See Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 456, fn. 12; see American Advertising & Sales Co. v. Mid-Western Transport (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 875, 879 [\u201c[c]ourts are understandably suspicious of a party\u2019s belated claim of mistaken admission"], "id": "437ee0e7-caf1-4c12-b392-88144a2cfdce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his or her own defense, but does not have a right to testify falsely. ( Nix v. Whiteside (1986) 475 U.S. 157, 173, 106 S.Ct. 988, 997, 89 L.Ed.2d 123, 138.) A defense attorney has an obligation to act as a conscientious and diligent advocate, but \"[i]t is utterly reprehensible for an attorney at law to actively procure or knowingly countenance the commission of <mask>. [Citation.]\" ( In re Jones (1971) 5 Cal.3d 390, 400, 96 Cal.Rptr. 448, 487 P.2d 1016.) A defendant's right to testify does not trump an attorney's ethical responsibilities. ( Whiteside , at p. 173, 106 S.Ct. at p. 997, 89 L.Ed.2d at p. 138 ].)"], "id": "f64326be-eee6-4a63-a659-0ba288d2158c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Federal courts explicitly permit such immunized evidence to be presented at a trial to prove <mask>, provided that such testimony or statement is untruthful (United States v Berardelli, 565d 24; United States v Pisani, 590 F Supp 1326). They reason that immunity granted to a witness to compel testimony is part of a bargain under which the witness agrees to testify truthfully and the government agrees not to use his testimony against him, but the bargain struck is conditional upon the witness who is under oath telling the truth (United States v Tramunti, 500d 1334)."], "id": "0c51f6c2-b0da-4257-a81d-9452125e4bf8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Prior to the enactment of former Civil Code section 5110.730 in 1984, it was relatively \" 'easy' \" for spouses to transmute community property into separate property and vice versa, simply by oral statement. (See Estate of MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262, 268-269, 272 Cal.Rptr. 153, 794 P.2d 911 ( MacDonald ), quoting Recommendation Relating to Marital Property Presumptions and Transmutations, 17 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep. (1984) p. 213 (1984 Law Revision Commission Report).) The allure of easy transmutations had encouraged extensive litigation by allowing spouses to \" 'transform a passing comment into an \"agreement\" or even to commit <mask> by manufacturing an oral or implied transmutation.' \" ( MacDonald, supra , 51 Cal.3d at p. 269, 272 Cal.Rptr. 153, 794 P.2d 911, quoting 1984 Law Revision Commission Report, supra , at p. 214.) With the passage of former Civil Code section 5110.730, the era of easy transmutation came to an end."], "id": "fc7b5614-6e72-4985-8fa8-a5910fb37666", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*465The charges which the defendant has made of fraud, subornation of <mask>, and abuse of official power are both numerous and serious in character. More or less illustrative of some of the extravagant charges advanced are these two: (1) The Court of Appeals decided the case of Matter of Lyons v. Goldstein (290 N. Y. 19, supra) \u2014which held that a court of criminal jurisdiction has inherent power to set aside, upon motion, its* own judgment based upon fraud or misrepresentation of an officer of the State depriving a defendant of due process \u2014 solely for the purpose of preventing the Supreme Court of the United States from passing upon the defendant Whitman\u2019s own case and for the purpose of persuading that tribunal to remand it to the courts of this State; (2) that Mr. Justice Brewster was elevated from the trial bench to the Appellate Division solely for the purpose of preventing him from handing down any favorable decision on a habeas corpus application on Whitman\u2019s behalf \u2014 it appeared, I note, that Judge Brewster had previously held that the defendant\u2019s'resort to habeas corpus was prop\u00e9r."], "id": "813ee3bc-ba52-47e7-9200-dc3553ec8f26", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["On May 27,1980 Garcia was called to the stand to testify at the hearing on the motion to vacate the judgment of conviction. Since the trial of this indictment he has been arrested and convicted on still another charge and is presentedly serving a sentence of 2 to 4 years which, with the consent of the District Attorney\u2019s office covered his violation of probation on the two weapons cases discussed above. *104He asserted his Fifth Amendment privileges and, on the advice of counsel, refused to testify at the hearing unless he was granted immunity. The People, while conceding that they had no current investigation of Garcia which could reasonably be thwarted, nor any intention of prosecuting Garcia for <mask> or related crimes, refused to request immunity for Garcia. (CPL 50.30 prohibits a court from granting immunity to a witness, thereby compelling his testimony, absent a request to do so by the People. Thus immunity, which is a creature of statute, can only be conferred at the People\u2019s discretion.)"], "id": "01fd398b-5ab5-4d80-a763-18ed5ca35591", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In reaching this decision, the court has also considered cases addressing the sufficiency of evidence against defendants charged with <mask> in the first degree, which also includes the element of materiality to an action, proceeding or matter (Penal Law \u00a7 210.15). In People v Uhrey (169 Misc 2d 1015 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1996]), the court similarly held that a mere witness statement to law enforcement does not automatically convert a criminal investigation into a proceeding. The court determined that an oral statement at a meeting with a prosecutor investigating a murder was insufficient to support the charge of perjury in the first degree as the oral statement was not testimony as required by statute:"], "id": "b350fa2b-3840-4309-9b70-b22e879d4371", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The counsel for the people argues that the last clause of the portion of the statute above quoted only applies where the witness has declined to answer upon the examination, upon the ground that his answer might tend to criminate him; otherwise, the counsel says, witnesses in supplementary proceedings may testify falsely with impunity, as their testimony could not be used to support a prosecution against them for <mask>. The argument proceeds upon a misconception of the statute. Immunity from the consequences of perjury is not secured to the witness, whether he does or does not ask to be excused before testifying. He shall not be excused from answering on the ground that his examination will tend to convict him of a fraud: i. e., of a fraud upon his creditors in respect to his property ; otherwise, the object of the statute, which is to obtain a discovery of his property, would be frustrated. In all other respects, he is entitled to the benefit of the rule, that a witness is not obliged to criminate himself. In the present case, a refusal, on the part of the witness, to answer would have been unavailing, for the obvious reason that his testimony could not have tended to show him guilty of a crime, except, possibly, of a fraudulent disposition of his property, which, according to the statute, would not excuse him from answering. We apprehend that the true meaning of the provision, that the examination of a witness in supplementary proceedings shall not be used against him in any criminal proceeding is, that it shall not be used as evidence of any fact testified to by him on *369such examination. If that is the extent of the provision he is liable, like other witnesses, to indictment for perjury, and his testimony, given on the examination, may be shown on the trial of such indictment, not as proof of the facts stated by him, but as evidence of his sworn statements. But whether the opinion last expressed be correct or not, certain it is that the testimony of the witness cannot be used as evidence of a fact stated by him on such examination, and as on the trial of this case, the testimony of the defendant as a witness in the supplementary proceedings was received solely as evidence of certain facts stated by him on such examination, it was directly within the prohibition of the statute and its reception was error."], "id": "b018dc74-6e78-4e74-8857-6b8f165036a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The purpose of an oath is to secure truth. \"In its broadest sense, an oath is any form of attestation by which a person signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully\u201d (58 Am Jur 2d, Oath and Affirmation, \u00a7 1). Traditionally, its function was to purge the conscience and impress upon the witness a due sense of religious obligation, so as to secure the truth of his testimony under the influence of its sanctity (see, O\u2019Reilly v People, 86 NY 154 [1881]). Then, as *317now, false testimony or statements under an oath authorized by law subjected one to punishment for <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 210.45)."], "id": "841f5176-9057-4137-b925-a1620f097a34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 21 Ruling Case Law, page 259, the rule is stated as follows: \u201c It may be laid down as a general rule that any testimony which is relevant in the trial of a case, whether to the main issue or some collateral issue, is so far material as to render a witness who knowingly and wilfully falsifies in giving it guilty of <mask>. It is but common knowledge that it frequently occurs in the trial of causes that inquiries are made of witnesses touching matters which do *598not directly concern the commission of the acts which constitute the offense, yet such inquiries and answers may be material and highly important to the end that the triers of the fact may properly and intelligently weigh the testimony in the cause. If it is so connected with the matter at issue as to have a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove some fact that is material by giving weight or probability to, or detaching from the testimony of a witness thereto, it is sufficient and makes the testimony material. The degree of materiality is of no importance; for, if it tends to prove the matter in hand, it is enough, though it be but circumstantial.\u201d (See, also, State v. Rash, 78 Atl. 405.)"], "id": "92083c5b-563a-4f29-8ee5-da8defb0c021", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In his opening brief, Joseph contended that he was incorrectly charged with <mask> under section 118, subdivision (a), a felony, when he should have been charged with falsely reporting a crime to police under section 148.5, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor, relying in part on the rule of statutory construction articulated in In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 276 P.2d 593. Following our initial review of the record, we asked the parties to brief the issues of: (1) whether Vehicle Code section 10501, subdivision (a), preempts section 148.5, subdivision (a), or section 118, subdivision (a), and (2) the impact, if any, of a recent Court of Appeal decision that has since been depublished. Joseph now contends that Vehicle Code section 10501, subdivision (a) preempts section 118, subdivision (a). The Attorney General argues section 118, subdivision (a) applies."], "id": "44b00626-373d-4ddf-89d1-45a9dcb452ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Consequently, if the act of Caponi before a notary was a mere certification or affirmation, unbuttressed by any testimony which indicated that an oath was taken by him at that time, said act cannot be an act of <mask>. It was a mere witnessing. And, since an act of perjury must be established by another to bottom a charge of subornation of perjury against one who procures the same, the proof of perjury herein is lacking. Accordingly, the count charging subornation of perjury has not been sustained, as a matter of law, and it is dismissed."], "id": "1a77fddd-5f59-43a9-9504-50a0f77c96e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["He further testified that there were no instructions concerning the degrees of grand larceny, the definitions of specific words used in the statute defining particular degrees of larceny or corroboration in the case of <mask>. There were no instructions covering the defendant\u2019s status, rights, powers and duties in his capacity as executor of the estate of Paul N. Westerbeke, Sr., although the decedent\u2019s will was an exhibit before the Grand Jury."], "id": "cd5a8ed3-4954-4f9b-a2c2-67c0ab753531", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is not to be contested, that the case thus presented, is a case of fraud; a fraud practised upon the referee\u2014upon the defendant Bacon\u2014and upon the law, embodied in the Code. The plaintiff is responsible for the acts and statements of his agent throughout the transaction. The agent was to be the witness. He was the witness. By his consent, a fictitious plaintiff was placed before the court; and that imposition was supported by his oath, through the whole struggle in the cause. He now comes, stained with this illegal design, successfully *426accomplished by these statements, to sustain- an action, the success of which must rest upon his immoral and illegal connivance in a fraud, if it does not involve him in <mask>."], "id": "6433ec11-de6b-488a-8179-62d070517520", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The situation here is analogous. In 2008, in opposition to defendant's petition for a finding of factual innocence, Ms. Lintott submitted a declaration under penalty of <mask> stating her reasons for dismissing the assault charge *1113against defendant in 2006. She averred that she \"moved to dismiss the case based on insufficient evidence to obtain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.\" She also averred that she \"believed that an objective fact finder would find the assault with a firearm by Robert Forest took place if the standard was by a preponderance of evidence, but that there was not a 'probability' of a conviction if the standard was beyond a reasonable doubt.\" (Original italics.) Her decision to dismiss was based on information the defense presented to her in December 2007 bearing on his asserted defense of self-defense. This information included \"interviews conducted by the defendant's investigators\" and a \"handwritten report\" by David E. Paoli, who was the father of David A. Paoli, who was married to the victim's mother. David E. Paoli \"reported encounters with [the victim] when he was off his 'meds,' and believed that [the victim] had threatened David A. with a mawl and 'some gang members.' \" Lintott also averred that her decision to dismiss was \"strongly disapproved of\" by the deputy district attorney who had filed the case and who believed he could win a conviction notwithstanding the anticipated defense evidence. Finally, Lintott averred defendant's prosecution was justified by six objective reasons: \"(1) the defendant pulled a firearm on an unarmed victim and held it to his face, (2) the defendant 'had a hold of' the victim's clothing as he held the gun to his head, (3) the victim had no reported record of violence, (4) the defendant at the time was parked in front of a bar where he had been drinking Tequila, (5) the defendant fled on his motorcycle instead of waiting for the police, and (6) the defendant has a criminal record (conviction under Penal Code \u00a7\u00a7 12025(b) and 12301 [sic ] ) involving a firearm.\""], "id": "96e99835-2596-4ccd-9f3e-a1d733f42581", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Association also suggests that confidential records fall outside the Brady duty to disclose because that duty extends only \"to information obtained during an investigation about a criminal matter against a defendant.\" (Italics added.) This, too, is mistaken. What matters for Brady purposes is what the prosecution team knows, not how the prosecution team knows it. Suppose, for example, that a prosecutor is personally aware (based on an earlier case) that a key witness in a pending prosecution is a habitual liar who has been repeatedly convicted of <mask>. To say that the prosecutor need not disclose that information *339merely because it was not \"obtained during\" investigation of the defendant's case would be irreconcilable with the right to a fair trial underlying Brady ; it would \"cast[ ] the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice.\" ( Brady , supra , 373 U.S. at p. 88, 83 S.Ct. 1194 ; cf. City of San Jose , supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 57, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73, 850 P.2d 621 [noting People's concession that Brady required disclosure, to defendants charged with battery on police officers, of the fact that an officer had been disciplined pursuant to a complaint of excessive force].)"], "id": "27341ac2-e6d3-493b-a648-be43571f4b2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["We think the learned trial judge fell into an error when he said, in response to the request, \u201cit is not pertinent to the case,\u201d and that remark may have led the jury to conclude that it was not important for them to consider whether or not the appellant, when he gave his evidence as to seeing Parish in Utica on the twenty-ninth of December, \u201c honestly believed that was the day.\u201d Archbald says, in 3 Waterman\u2019s Notes (at page 595), viz.: \u201cThe false statement must have been willfully made, for if a man swear *179falsely from inadvertence or mistake it is no offense.\u201d Hawkins says: \u201c It is said no oatk shall amount to <mask> unless it be sworn absolutely and directly, and that therefore he who swears a thing according as he thinks, remembers or believes, cannot, in respect of such an oath, be found guilty of perjury.\u201d (3 Archbald, 595.) Lord O. J. He Grey said that a person may be convicted of swearing that he \u201c thinks or believes a fact to be true,\u201d but that it renders the proof more difficult. (See note, 3 Archbald, 596.) The Revised Statutes (2 R. S., 681) provides that \u201c every person who shall willfully and corruptly swear, testify or affirm falsely to any material matter * * * shall upon conviction be adjudged guilty of perjury.\u201d The language of section 96 of the Penal Code differs some in phraseology, and uses the words \u201cwillfully and knowingly\u201d instead of the words \u201cwillfully and corruptly.\u201d Under either statute it is essential that the testimony given should be false, known to be such, or not known to be true though so alleged, and that in the former case the falsity be known and the falsity intentionally asserted. An honest mistake, an honest misapprehension, may lead a 'party to mistakenly testify untruly as to a fact when there is the utmost good faith and integrity of purpose. In this class of cases, as in others arising under the criminal law, it is important that the jury be left to inquire what was the intention of the party accused of crime."], "id": "6038acc7-e7c4-4a59-8f0c-4488a1ceac86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In considering its decision, the court is faced with the question of whether, under the peculiar circumstances extant here, the acting in concert conviction may properly rest upon the uncorroborated dying declaration. Although the weight to be given to a dying declaration is for the jury to decide, there is wide judicial recognition that \" ' \"[d]ying declarations are dangerous, because [they are] made with no fear of prosecution for <mask> and without the test of cross-examination, which is the best method known to bring out the full and exact truth\u201d \u2019 \u201d (People v Nieves, 67 NY2d 125, 133 [1986], quoting People v Falletto, 202 NY 494, 499 [1911]; see also, Fisch, New York Evidence \u00a7 923 [2d ed 1977]; Richardson, Evidence \u00a7 316 [Prince 10th ed]). As stated in Nieves (at 133), our Court of Appeals \"has always regarded dying declarations with a degree of skepticism\u201d (see, People v Bartelini, 285 NY 433 [1941]; People v Ludkowitz, 266 NY 233 [1935]; People v Corey, 157 NY 332 [1898]). In the course of trial testimony, evidence to corroborate the victim\u2019s dying declaration was not *261offered. The degree of evidentiary value ascribed to such declarations being less than in-court testimony, it must often be determined by the context in which it was uttered, as well as by any supporting evidence available in the evaluation of the declarant and his declaration (see, People v Nieves, supra)."], "id": "c92a8929-9f59-4fef-8e25-7ab2253afe10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "perjury", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["By the fourth count of Indictment 910C-72, defendant Percy is charged with official misconduct for failure to pay just com*532pensation as to Parcels 12 and 13 based on submitted appraisal figures. Count 11 of Indictment 910G--72 charges him with <mask>, premised again on the theory that at the time of settlement the county\u2019s appraised value figure was $132,000 and not $56,000. Assuming, that by being the ultimate signatory to the settlement agreement, Percy bears responsibility, it is amply clear that the minutes nowhere reveal the awareness by the jury of the existence of the $56,000 figure and offer."], "id": "7a148911-f495-4b8b-91a8-db7ccffa96dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*39Defendant was charged with three counts of criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 215.50 [3]), three counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 240.30 [1] [b]), and one count of harassment in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 240.26 [1]). Following a jury trial, defendant, who chose to proceed pro se with standby counsel present, was found guilty as charged. Defendant was also summarily adjudged twice in <mask> (see Judiciary Law \u00a7\u00a7 750, 751); however, he raises no issue on appeal pertaining to these adjudications."], "id": "8534fc82-1bed-4eb9-9f4b-b4c3ff0bc3eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is well settled that a proceeding to punish for a <mask> arising out of or during the trial of a civil action commences a special proceeding which is separate and distinct from the original action (Board of Educ. v Pisa, 54 AD2d 821; Matter of Murray, 98 AD2d 93). Hence, jurisdiction must be acquired anew. But, contrary to respondent\u2019s argument, the separate proceeding to punish for a criminal contempt has been traditionally viewed in New York as a civil special proceeding (Matter of Douglas v Adel, 269 NY 144, 146), notwithstanding the necessity that the accused be shown to have violated the underlying order with a higher degree of willfulness than is required in a civil contempt proceeding.* **\u00a7In consequence, the rules of civil rather than criminal procedure should govern the origination of the criminal contempt application (Siegel, NY Prac \u00a7 484, at 650)."], "id": "d3241ed7-0f72-4d18-bf78-6d4ee533a937", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Department of Housing Preservation and Development (DHPD) moves by order to show cause pursuant to section D26-53.07 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (Housing Maintenance Code), CPLR 5104 and article 19 of the Judiciary Law, to punish the respondent landlord for <mask> (Judiciary Law, \u00a7 751) by imprisonment for a definite period not to exceed 30 days and a fine of $250 for each separate contempt and for civil contempt of court by remand to and imprisonment in civil jail (Judiciary Law, \u00a7 774) for each separate contempt in regard to the alleged failure of the said respondent landlord to comply with the order of this court entered on June 30, 1982 and for such other and further relief as this court *1014may deem just, proper and equitable under the circumstances. The premises are located at 163-20 108th Avenue in Jamaica, in the Borough of Queens consisting of a multiple dwelling, with four apartment units with an assessed valuation of $11,800 and with tax arrears in the sum of $944.02 pending for the last four tax quarters. The respondent had entered into a consent order in which he agreed to correct certain violations at the subject premises by September 30, 1982. The DHPD alleges that an inspection of these outstanding violations was made on November 26, 1982 and that 11 violations remain uncorrected. DHPD further alleges that the refusal of the said respondent to obey said order, was calculated to and actually did defeat, impair, impede and prejudice the petitioner in its efforts to have the subject premises restored to minimum housing standards and that this refusal to obey said order was willful. The respondent landlord appeared in court on the return day and stated that he was without an attorney, that he wanted an attorney to represent him and that he could not afford an attorney."], "id": "a0ce225f-8724-4675-87b3-0d1bdd588ea8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["People v. Florentine (276 App. Div. 730) is persuasive authority for the position of the movants. There the appellant was adjudged guilty of <mask> for refusing to testify before a grand jury. He asserted his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for his refusal to testify. It appeared that the appellant had made a sworn statement before the City Court and refused to testify before the Grand Jury, on the ground that his testimony might tend to disclose that he had committed perjury in making such statement. The Grand Jury at that time was investigating the crime of gambling. The Appellate Division held that the grant of immunity in the gambling statute accorded immunity to the appellant, even against the possible crime of perjury committed in the past, and that he was properly adjudged in contempt."], "id": "70e5a244-6d60-48c1-9c59-cc14e97525ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["All other matters asserted in the moving affidavits giving the various grounds for the defendant\u2019s position before the Grand Jury such as, \u201c he was a layman of limited education,\u201d and that he was \u201c truly confused,\u201d are matters of defense at the trial. In People v. Berson (308 N. Y. 918, 920) it was held that: \u2018 \u2018 defendant was properly convicted of a <mask>, although it is possible, and even probable, that his refusal to answer was because of a mistaken belief that he had a right so to do and, although it is possible, and even probable, that a truthful answer to the question would have shown his innocence of the alleged misconduct which the Grand Jury was investigating.\u201d"], "id": "88182c86-352c-4fc4-b624-b735d56a1470", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of Court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*982The Colombo case involved a claim of double jeopardy by a defendant challenging an indictment brought under the former Penal Law for the same conduct for which he had previously been punished under the Judiciary Law. As in the. instant case, Colombo refused to answer Grand Jury interrogatories after he had been afforded immunity from prosecution. Thereafter, he too was brought before a Judge (Dec. 8, 1965) who directed him to answer, and he likewise refused to obey the order of the court. On December 15, 1965 the Supreme Court, Kings County, stated that \u20181 by his contumacious and unlawful refusal after being sworn as a witness to answer any legal and proper interrogatories and for his wilful disobedience to the lawful mandate of this Court, defendant had committed a <mask> in the immediate view and presence of the Court.\u201d These are virtually the identical words used by Judge Kelly in holding the defendant Failla in contempt. In each case, the contempt citation recited two grounds \u2014 refusal to answer Grand Jury questions and refusal to obey the court\u2019s lawful order. In Colombo, after appellate proceedings proved fruitless, the defendant offered to testify, but his offer was refused, and he served his 30-day1 sentence and paid his $250. fine,"], "id": "cb59e70d-0480-419a-aa03-97b0cf7ee948", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["To sustain a finding of either civil or criminal contempt based on an alleged violation of a court order it is necessary to establish that a lawful order of the court clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate was in effect, and it must appear with \"reasonable certainty\u201d that the order has been disobeyed (Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection v Department of Envtl. Conservation, supra, at 240). The violation issued against the defendant in this case, seeking to hold him in criminal contempt, properly alleged that a lawful mandate of *142this court was in effect at the time of the violation, a temporary order of protection, and also identified the underlying crime pursuant to which it had been issued. The violation also properly set forth the claim that the defendant had failed to comply with the terms of the lawful mandate then in effect, and alleged sufficient facts to support the wilfulness of his conduct. The defendant\u2019s assertion that the violation must be dismissed as facially insufficient because it failed to state the city in which the violation occurred is meritless since a violation of an order of protection is not an accusatory instrument, does not result in a criminal conviction, and is, therefore, not subject to the sufficiency requirements for accusatory instruments outlined in CPL article 100. In cases involving nonfamily offenses, as exists here, a violation of an order of protection is governed by CPL 530.13, and, in addition to the power of the court to impose punishment under CPL 530.13 (8), such a violation is punishable as a civil and/or <mask> pursuant to sections 751 and 753 of the Judiciary Law.2 Thus, absent a statutory requirement that the city in which the violation allegedly occurred be specifically noted in the violation, the violation of the order of protection need not be dismissed on that basis."], "id": "5f783bfb-01e5-406b-a5c3-5b3a5e6f9356", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["A conviction for a <mask> may be reviewed in one of two ways, depending upon the circumstances which existed at the time that the adjudication of contempt was made. If the alleged contempt was within the view and presence of the court, then even without the taking of any record, the order of *641adjudication constitutes the entire record and the review, if any, must be by certiorari. On the other hand, if the adjudication of contempt was based upon acts which occurred outside of the view and presence of the court, then the proper remedy for review is by appeal, and under such circumstances the appellate court will determine the appeal based upon not only the order of adjudication, but also upon the minutes and other papers submitted to it."], "id": "081708ec-2170-4184-ab88-fda3876dc51a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Section 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an appeal from a judgment of conviction \u201c or other determination from which an appeal can be taken \u201d stays the execution of the judgment or determination upon filing a certificate of reasonable doubt. It would seem that the mandate of the Court of General Sessions committing the witness to the workhouse for <mask> in refusing to answer questions before the Grand Jury is such a determination within the meaning of section 527. Whether it is an appealable determination is beclouded by the provision in section 752 of the Judiciary Law providing that a mandate punishing a person summarily for a contempt committed in the *70immediate view and presence of the court is reviewable by a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act. As stated in the Thirteenth Annual Report of the N. Y. Judicial Council, 1947, at pages 236-237: The decisive factor in determining the method of reviewing the contempt proceedings is whether the contempt, having been committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, has been punished summarily or whether formal proof has been taken with respect to the acts or conduct alleged to constitute contempt. It has been held by the Court of Appeals that the proper method of reviewing a mandate issued after a summary adjudication of a criminal contempt committed during a civil action is by a certiorari proceeding. A prior case had held that the proper method of reviewing a criminal contempt committed during a criminal action and punished summarily was by a certiorari proceeding. The reason for reviewing summary contempts by a certiorari proceeding is that the court or judge has acted upon his own knowledge as to the facts constituting the contempt, and there can be no substitute for his statement of these facts in the mandate of commitment."], "id": "12b79030-03bd-4c2b-a9ff-0d10d0b91fd7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["This relatively simple factual recitation raises three issues which must be resolved: (1) whether this court can proceed in light of the automatic stay; (2) whether the violation of the order directing the turnover of the automobiles constitutes a <mask>, or a civil contempt of court, or both; and (3) if the court can proceed, and a civil or criminal contempt is found, what is the proper remedy?"], "id": "dd4151ee-3f3c-42e2-983e-95630ba8481a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["In view of the fact that each witness has appeared before me this day with his counsel, has been informed of the court\u2019s determination herein, and each witness \u2014 except Carmine Lombardozzi, who has informed the court that he will and did return to the Grand Jury to testify and whose examination is presently incomplete \u2014 has advised the court that he will not answer any of the legal and proper interrogatories put to him, I find that each is guilty of a <mask> in violation of subdivision 3, of section 750, of the Judiciary Law, in that each witness in the immediate presence of the court has willfully disobeyed the lawful mandate of this court to answer legal and proper interrogatories; and for such criminal contempt each of the witnesses, except Carmine Lombardozzi, is hereby sentenced to the Civil Prison of the City of New York for a term of 30 days, and in addition thereto to pay a fine of $250, and in the event said fine is not paid, he shall be imprisoned for an additional term of 30 days. Submit order."], "id": "fb9fef80-f246-4780-9443-4e5341b19654", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The directive issued by the City Court Judge to the newspaper reporter under the circumstances of this case was not a lawful mandate with regard to suppressing reporting of the facts of the arrests. The published article reporting the public court proceedings determining that two youths, unnamed, might be treated as youthful offenders for undisclosed offenses did not violate the court directive or the law. In attempting to hold the newspaper reporter, the newspaper corporation, and its managing editor in <mask>, the City Court is exceeding its authorized powers. Because the nature of this case involves an aspect of freedom of the press a writ of prohibition will furnish a more effective remedy than an appeal after completion of the criminal contempt proceedings."], "id": "4fb5e3e1-b7fd-4aec-993b-0d7e596071fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The restraining order of June 3, 1969, in brief, enjoined and stayed the aforesaid defendants from striking or committing any other act or acts in violation of section 210 of the Civil Service Law of the State of New York (Taylor Law). That order and supporting papers were served personally on each of the defendants, excepting Nancy [sic] Helen Schwartz and Claudine Gaynor on June 3 and 4, 1969. Ernest Fleischman, Esq., of the firm of Delson and Gordon, appeared for said defendants on the return date of the order, June 10,1969. Thereafter the motion for a preliminary injunction was granted (decision of Doeohoe, J., dated June 13, 1969), and a certified copy of that order (entered on June 17, 1969) was personally served on each of the defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed and refused to obey and comply with said order of June 3, 1969, but on the contrary they engaged in an illegal strike on the 12th, 13th, 16th and 17th days of June, 1969, in violation of section 210 of the Civil Service Law, for which plaintiff seeks on this motion to punish them for <mask>."], "id": "1a600483-006d-4fa8-916b-1d8948b20b41", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Harold Tompkins, J. The plaintiff Attorney-General of the State of New York (Attorney-General) moves by order to show cause pursuant to article 19 of the Judiciary Law and CPLR 5104 for an order adjudging defendants East Coast Auto Consultants Corp. (East Coast) and its president, defendant Brian Lombardo, guilty of civil and <mask>. The Attorney-General seeks a fine of $865,000 and imprisonment of Lombardo for the criminal contempt and for the civil contempt, a fine sufficient to compensate aggrieved consumers."], "id": "f57e4375-280a-4e59-83f5-6fdc96ba0a3a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The facts in this matter are that on January 3, 1985, petitioner, Patricia Sanford Trice, w\u00e1s found in civil contempt of court, pursuant to Judiciary Law \u00a7 750 (A) (5) and was directed to be imprisoned in the Onondaga County Correctional Facility for a term of 30 days and fined $250. The parties hereto have stipulated to this court that though there has been a finding of civil contempt, in actuality petitioner Trice was found in <mask> pursuant to Judiciary Law \u00a7 750 (A) (5); \u00a7\u00a7 751, 755."], "id": "ddba4986-f835-44ea-ae88-7d5eced7e791", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Correction Law \u00a7 804 (1) provides in part that: \u201cEvery person confined in an institution serving a definite sentence of imprisonment may receive time allowances as discretionary reductions of the term of his sentence not to exceed in the aggregate one-third of the term imposed by the court.\u201d The sole question which has been presented to this court is whether the aforesaid section is applicable to petitioner\u2019s imprisonment based on her being adjudicated in <mask>. Analyzing first Correction Law \u00a7 804, the keystone phrase for the parties\u2019 contentions is \u201cdefinite sentence\u201d. A \u201c[sjentence\u201d is defined by CPL 1.20 to mean \u201cthe imposition and entry of sentence upon a conviction.\u201d Further, a \u201c[c]onviction\u201d is defined pursuant to CPL 1.20 (13) to mean \u201cthe entry of a plea of guilty to, or a verdict of guilty upon, an accusatory instrument other than a felony complaint, or to one or more counts of sdch instrument.\u201d In reviewing the applicable sections of the Judiciary Law, the language contained therein provides that one is \u201cpunished\u201d for a criminal contempt and thereafter \u201ccommitted\u201d or \u201cimprisoned\u201d rather than being convicted and sentenced for a crime with its attendant rights and formalities. Indeed, the court\u2019s power to punish for criminal contempt is clearly not based upon accusatory instruments, but rather exists to uphold and vindicate the authority mandates and decorum of an individual court (People v Paperno, 98 Misc 2d 99 [1979]). Further, as in the case at bar, it may be determined summarily when the contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court (Judiciary Law \u00a7\u00a7 751, 755). Thus, from the applicable statutes, it appears that petitioner\u2019s punishment for criminal contempt would not be a sentence for purposes of Correction Law \u00a7 804."], "id": "566b35b1-78df-4af3-9d97-afd592997074", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["It has been stated that it \"is well settled that a proceeding to punish for a <mask> arising out of or during the trial of a civil action commences a special proceeding which is separate and distinct from the original underlying action\u201d (Board of Educ. v Pisa, 54 AD2d 821), and that \"the separate proceeding to punish for a criminal contempt has been traditionally viewed in New York as a civil special proceeding\u201d, and as a \"consequence, the rules of civil rather than criminal procedure should govern the origination of the criminal contempt application\u201d (Department of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v 24 W. 132 Equities, NYLJ, Dec. 11, 1987, at 12, col 1 [App Term, 1st Dept]; see also, Matter of Douglas v Adel, 269 NY 144)."], "id": "97943075-32bc-4c6b-b26f-d5b2604850df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Recognizing the sanctity of a Grand Jury subpoena and the drastic consequences of disobedience, Patel\u2019s counsel contacted the Special Assistant Attorney-General (hereinafter referred to as the special assistant or the prosecutor) responsible for investigation and prosecution of the matter. Counsel expressed his client\u2019s willingness to comply, but since the subpoena commanded the production of voluminous records in a mere six days, he requested additional time for compliance. The special assistant rejected the request and commenced a proceeding to find Patel in <mask>."], "id": "1f786802-a268-4a92-ab9f-122abf9d25ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Loren N. Brown, J. The plaintiffs have moved for an order punishing the defendants for civil and <mask>, permitting the State and its agents to enter dump sites at issue, without notice, and at any reasonable time for the purpose of allowing the State to fulfill its responsibilities under State law and granting it related relief. Defendant John Rock opposes the motion for a contempt order. Defendant Ross Rock opposes the *233motion for contempt, and cross-moves for an order permitting \"reconsideration\u201d of the court\u2019s order, signed on June 27, 1989, and entered on July 5, 1989, finding Ross Rock liable."], "id": "f49484f9-5913-43c2-8677-2f2de749ae59", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cOne significant reason for the alarming frequency with which orders of protection are violated is that felony charges of <mask> can be brought only in unduly narrow circumstances * * * prosecutors must be able to bring felony charges for violations of orders of protection as soon as defendants commit criminal actions that jeopardize the safety of domestic violence victims * * *"], "id": "27db2a1f-fb1f-4f7b-a385-85fea1bc8bac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["What chance would there be for a conviction under such indictment, upon the facts in this case ? The appeal from the order allowing the mandamus presented important, and to some extent, difficult questions for determination, and the common council were justified in seeking to have them settled by the Court of Appeals, particularly, as very little delay could result thereby,, and no injury ensue. The learned justice, at the Special Term,, erred in assuming that it was their duty to acquiesce in the previous decisions in- the matter. The statute furnishes a means of review, and it is the privilege of public bodies, as well as private litigants, to avail themselves thereof, and it is often their duty to do so. But if, in the discharge of this duty, they are to be coerced. *331into compliance -with the judgment sought to be reversed and subjected to punishment, notwithstanding that they have been zealous in their efforts to perfect the appeal, so as to avail themselves of the stay, which the law provides, then the remedy by appeal becomes-a farce, and the provisions for a stay, during its pendency, a mockery. In what respect was the appellant guilty of misconduct ? The law provided a method for the final' decision of the question at issue, and that upon taking the steps necessary to secure such decision, the judgment below would be suspended. The body, with which he was acting, directed these steps to be taken. Was it incumbent upon them to escape the commission of a misdemeanor, and a <mask>, to remain in session until their official counsel had taken all these steps ? The question implies its own answer. Having, in good faith, instructed the counsel to the corporation to take the appeal, the members of the common council were not .liable to punishment for failing to-execute the commands of the writ. They were entitled to a reasonable time, after-having determined to appeal, to prepare and serve the papers necessary to render it effectual. To hold otherwise, would be practically to deprive public bodies of the right to-appeal, in cases of this kind, and in effect to nullify the provisions of the statute permitting it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant did not willfully disobey the writ in question, within the meaning of the statute, and was not guilty of a criminal contempt."], "id": "84948cf5-2eb8-4b59-8cc0-d51533f27b5e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["The circuit court's order that Burrow serve a twenty-day jail sentence is *506clearly punitive because it is for a set amount of time that is not related to any requirement of the court that, if complied with, would end the sentence. The $500 fine payable to the court is also purely punitive and in the nature of criminal contempt. The circuit court's award of attorney's fees, however, is in the nature of civil contempt. We addressed the issue of whether the award of attorney's fees is a form of civil or <mask> in Applegate v. Applegate , 101 Ark. App. 289, at 293-94, 275 S.W.3d 682, 685 (2008). We held:"], "id": "53fa876e-a80b-44bc-99aa-22b1a361b341", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*508For the first time on appeal, Burrow argues that \"there is no caselaw, precedent, or legal authority under the criminal contempt statute for the trial court (as the trier of fact) to hold a person in <mask> for not being truthful in a deposition\" and that the circuit court violated his \"constitutional rights that all criminal defendants are entitled to\" by finding him in contempt for giving false testimony in his deposition. Burrow asserts that the proper way to pursue the allegation that he lied in his deposition is to file perjury charges against him and prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Burrow failed to make these arguments to the circuit court; thus, we are unable to address his argument. This court will not consider arguments that are not preserved for appellate review. Stacks v. Stacks , 2009 Ark. App. 862, at 4, 377 S.W.3d 265, 269. It is incumbent on the parties to raise arguments initially to the circuit court in order to give that court an opportunity to consider them. Balcom , 2016 Ark. App. 313, at 3, 496 S.W.3d at 407."], "id": "391e2d3e-fd69-49e3-9deb-7a27aded7ab4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Charge One alleged that the respondent was convicted of a serious crime within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 691.7 (b). By order dated November 8, 1985, the Honorable Daniel P. FitzGerald, Justice of the Supreme Court, New York County, adjudged the respondent to be in <mask>, an unclassified misdemeanor, based upon his willful disobedience of a lawful order of the court and a course of willful, unlawful, and contumacious behavior in the presence of the court during the case of People v Everett Curry."], "id": "258c1cf3-554a-46e0-ae55-b5ff70ae7c00", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Charge Three alleged that the respondent was convicted of a serious crime within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 691.7 (b). In or about May 1982, the Honorable George D. Covington, Justice of the Supreme Court, Bronx County, adjudged the respondent to be in <mask>, an unclassified misdemeanor, based upon his willful, unlawful, and contumacious behavior in the presence of the court during the case of People v Luis Soto."], "id": "199cdf95-38c7-40a7-8da4-e331959cda10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["*214Charge Five alleged that the respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (5) and conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (7) (now [8]). During the course of the criminal trial People v Francisco Torres, Also Known as Alfredo Maldonado, the Honorable Gerald Sheindlin, Justice of the Supreme Court, Bronx County, adjudged the respondent to be in <mask>."], "id": "84da0f2e-e631-41c0-8e51-a7420fa3baca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "criminal contempt of court", "legal_topic": "Court-related", "masked_sentences": ["Charge Eight alleged that the respondent was convicted of a serious crime within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 691.7 (b). By order dated December 15, 1992, the Honorable Leslie Crocker Snyder, Justice of the Supreme Court, New York County, *215adjudged the respondent to be in <mask>, an unclassified misdemeanor, for intentionally, knowingly, and willfully engaging in disorderly, contemptuous, and insolent behavior, in the immediate view and presence of the court during the case of People v Raphael Martinez."], "id": "9a5c335c-6b5c-4812-9670-96f2e105ef81", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to the first issue defendant contends that various correspondence by governmental officials and agencies concerning the new statute (no commitee hearings were conducted),1 as *27well as Governor Mario Cuomo\u2019s memorandum issued upon signing CPLR article 13-A into law (1984 McKinney\u2019s Session Laws of NY, at 3627-3628), indicate that the statute is limited to crimes involving <mask>, white-collar crime and criminal activity involving organized crime. The court finds no such limitation within those memoranda and correspondence."], "id": "c42194f5-8c92-4fd2-851a-c626c820ceda", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u2022 an investigating agency's report that a vehicle matching the truck's exact description had been flagged at a border patrol checkpoint for possible involvement in narcotics trafficking; \u2022 Villarreal's unusual nervousness; \u2022 Villarreal's seemingly rehearsed story; \u2022 the fact that Villarreal had not had any cargo in nearly a week, but had nonetheless recently departed in the dead of night from a location near the border, heading northward without any cargo; \u2022 the smell of fresh paint emanating from the vehicle, which Cipriani knew to be an indication of hidden compartments and <mask>. Thus, within the first minutes of the stop, Cipriani had several facts within his objective grasp that justified further investigation into the nature of Villarreal's trip. See Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d at 914."], "id": "09d294f4-b9df-4c0f-bdab-6441d2d21782", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Resendiz , the defendant, a legal permanent resident of the United States, asked his counsel whether his plea to a <mask> charge, an aggravated felony, would affect his legal residency. According to the defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, his counsel had assured him at the time he entered his plea he would have \" 'no problems with immigration' \" except that he would not be able to become a United States citizen. In a declaration submitted by the Attorney General in response to the defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, the defendant's trial counsel stated he did not remember what he had actually told the defendant but that it was his custom and practice to explain to noncitizen clients \" 'that a guilty plea is likely to [a]ffect ... the client's ability to become a citizen. I also tell these clients that I make the assumption that the federal government is always wanting to deport non-citizen felons. I explain to them they should assume the government has a policy to deport people in their position.' \" ( Resendiz , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 238, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 19 P.3d 1171.)"], "id": "917adfae-5ec8-47a8-81aa-cdfd507accdc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Section 195.223.9 criminalizes <mask> in the second degree if a person possesses or has under his or her control more than 30 grams of methamphetamine. Where the person possesses 90 grams or more but less than 450 grams, the second-degree drug trafficking is a class A felony. Section 195.223.9(2). To establish second-degree trafficking, the State had to prove that Shigemura (1) had conscious and intentional possession of the substances, either actual or constructive, (2) was aware of the presence and nature of the substances, and (3) possessed more than 90 grams of methamphetamine. See *741State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 806-07 (Mo. banc 2016) (citing Section 195.223.9)."], "id": "26ecad07-fdf9-42c6-8e76-eeb7127d0a99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The primary programmatic purpose must be determined by examining \u201cthe underlying reason for undertaking it\u201d as opposed to \u201cthe particular manner in which the checkpoint was conducted\u201d (Trotter, 28 AD3d at 169-170). Thus, where the Rochester Police Department checked vehicles at a checkpoint for windshield stickers, driver\u2019s licenses and registrations as part of a larger initiative aimed at detecting and deterring violent crime and <mask> in a specific target area, the stop violated the defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights and all items seized from the defendant were properly suppressed (People v Trotter, 28 AD3d 165 [2006], supra)."], "id": "60da45ce-f46f-4a22-b476-5be07aa56279", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 2016, Lyons filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3582(c) to have his sentence reduced pursuant to Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court granted the motion and reduced Lyons\u2019s sentence on the <mask> conviction to 120 months. In 2017, Lyons again moved for a sentence reduction under \u00a7 3582(c), citing Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced base offense levels for certain drug offenses. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Lyons\u2019s sentence had already been reduced to the statutory mandatory minimum imprisonment term that continued to apply to his drug trafficking offense, such that he was ineligible for a further reduction. After Congress passed the First Step Act (FSA), which made the Fair Sentencing Act\u2019s reduced mandatory minimum sentences for offenses involving cocaine base retroactively applicable to certain defendants, Lyons filed a pro se motion seeking a further sentence reduction under FSA \u00a7 404. Thereafter, the Federal Public Defender enrolled as Lyons\u2019s counsel and filed a new motion for a sentence reduction on his behalf. In his counseled motion, Lyons argued that he was eligible for a reduction because the statutory imprisonment range for his drug trafficking offense had been lowered from a range of 10 years to life down to five years to 40 years and that his guidelines range had been reduced to 84 to 105 months of imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release. This revised range was lower than the mandatory minimum sentence that had applied to him prior to enactment of the FSA. Lyons urged the district court to reduce his sentence to 84 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release on the grounds that the reduction would further the goals of Congress in enacting the FSA and would avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. He also asserted that such a reduction was otherwise warranted under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a), given the amount of time that he had already served, his significant postconviction rehabilitation, the skills that he had"], "id": "abfd6d47-7542-404f-9193-d5e346ed84d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["words, are considered a continuation of the original law. This rule of interpretation is applicable even though the original Act or section is expressly declared to be repealed.\u201d (citations omitted)). We think such an interpretation of the significance of the strike-and- insert language is especially appropriate with respect to the 1998 enact- ment amending section 924(c)(1). The changes\u2014in particular, the new graduated sentencing scheme distinguishing between the use and the brandishing or discharge of a firearm in the commission of a crime\u2014 made it significantly more complicated to parse the various penalties prescribed in the statute. Congress may be understood to have decided, as the canon anticipates, to \u201cserve the causes of convenience and certainty\u201d by setting forth the entire amended statute within the public law itself, rather than by specifying the various amendatory provisions that the code publishers would have to fashion into a coherent whole. For these reasons, we do not believe that Congress\u2019s choice to \u201cstrike\u201d section 924(c)(1), and insert a newly organized replacement, evinces an intent to abrogate- and-reenact the entirety of the earlier version of the statute sufficient to overcome the presumption established by the \u201ccontinuation\u201d canon. We turn next to the three substantive changes that the 1998 amendment did make to the statute, which we described above, in order to determine whether they demonstrate that Congress intended to insulate the \u201csemiau- tomatic assault weapon\u201d language from operation of PSRFUPA\u2019s sunset provision. In our view, they do not. In so concluding, we find it signifi- cant that, although those changes were clearly important, they did not affect the types of firearms to which a ten-year sentence attached. Nor did they alter the basic judgment, embodied in the text that PSRFUPA origi- nally added to section 924(c)(1), that the use of semiautomatic assault weapons should receive the same sentencing treatment as the use of short- barreled rifles and short-barreled shotguns. First, the 1998 enactment specified, in the new subsection (c)(1)(A), that\u2014contrary to the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Bailey\u2014the federal offense would henceforth cover cases involving not just the more active \u201cuse\u201d of firearms, but also possession in furtherance of any crime of violence or <mask> crime. But that change did not alter or affect the 1994 amendment\u2019s specific reference to semiautomatic assault weap- ons. To be sure, after 1998, possession of such weapons in furtherance of"], "id": "c8f27acc-005e-4386-9f30-69a2f2a5f6d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["with another who possesses [it] is insufficient\u201d to show possession. Id. In Ochoa, we held that the government presented the jury with sufficient circumstantial evidence from which it reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had constructive posses- sion of ammunition because he exercised dominion and control over the bedroom in which it was located. United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1105 (11th Cir. 2019) cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2553 (2020). Specifically, the government connected the defendant to the bedroom through \u201chis phones (one of which had on it a photo of Ochoa laying on the bed in the bedroom), personal identification cards, and travel papers bearing his name\u2014all of which were found in the same bedroom as the ammunition.\u201d Id. \u201cThe fact that other people had access to or may have also occupied the residence [did] not make [this] evidence insufficient.\u201d Id.; see also United States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824, 830 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding sufficient ev- idence supported a defendant\u2019s conviction for possession of a fire- arm in furtherance of a <mask> crime because the firearm was found in the defendant's bedroom and the dresser drawer con- tained her passport). Here, the government presented sufficient evidence at trial that Richards was in constructive possession of the firearms. Rich- ards\u2019s statements to law enforcement indicated that he had knowledge of the firearms in the residence and intended to use them when needed, firearms were discovered in almost every room of the house, and Richards was discovered within reaching USCA11 Case: 21-10695 Date Filed: 01/26/2022 Page: 5 of 8"], "id": "26ddc5c6-e329-4a35-8c4f-fac840905987", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Yolanda L., supra , Division Eight of this district found future risk based on evidence that father's <mask> activity would likely reoccur, reasoning that firearms are \"tools of the trade\" in the \"narcotics business.\" ( In re Yolanda, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 996, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 839.) No evidence of drug activity is present in this case, though father was affiliated with a gang. In In re C.V. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 924, this court suggested that gang activity alone was insufficient for taking jurisdiction of a child. ( Id. at p. 573, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 924.) Nothing in the record suggests that father's gang activity endangered the child."], "id": "5d54974a-260f-47d7-91f7-abdefa1594bd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant\u2019s assertion that the People failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his conviction is without merit. While executing a search warrant at an apartment which had been observed to be the focal point of <mask> activity, and at which an informant had made a controlled buy, police officers found defendant holding a small amount of crack cocaine, wrapped in a piece of paper with his name and a phone number, later revealed to be that of one of his two pagers, written on it. A paper bag containing many small glassine envelopes, of a type used for packaging crack cocaine for resale, was discovered in the immediate vicinity, as was the larger amount of cocaine\u2014similar in kind to that defendant was holding\u2014which defendant was found by the jury to have constructively possessed. Taken together, these facts support an inference that defendant was involved in the drug-selling activity that had been observed at the apartment, and that he was not merely an innocent bystander, but had knowledge of, and dominion and control over, the cocaine discovered concealed in a false soup can located in a kitchen cupboard just a few feet from where he was sitting (see, People v Tejeda, 73 NY2d 958, 960; compare, People v Headley, 74 NY2d 858, 859)."], "id": "3812a968-dd19-478b-b43e-cf0054b4f8db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["a predicate crime\u2014in addition to more active uses\u2014became a separate federal offense. But in this respect, the 1998 amendment merely treated semiautomatic assault weapons the same as it treated all other firearms, a general state of equivalence that the statute established even before the 1994 amendment. Nothing in the 1994 PSRFUPA affected this basic statutory equivalence, or altered the fact that semiautomatic assault weap- ons were already \u201cfirearms\u201d covered by the description of the conduct prohibited by section 924(c)(1) prior to PSRFUPA\u2019s amendment of the section in 1994. And the same is true for the 1998 amendment. The new subsection (c)(1)(A) sets forth the basic prohibition on the use, carry, or possession of a \u201cfirearm,\u201d but, as in the predecessor section (c)(1), it does not refer separately to semiautomatic assault weapons. Second, the 1998 amendment, also in subsection (c)(1)(A), imposed a new graduated sentencing scheme based upon the manner in which the \u201cfirearm\u201d is used during and in relation to any crime of violence or <mask> crime. Whereas all such uses were subject to a fixed five-year sentence before 1998, the 1998 amendment established a new baseline sentence of a minimum of five years. The amendment also provided that the \u201cbrandishment\u201d and \u201cdischarge\u201d of a firearm in relation to such crimes are to be punished by minimum sentences of seven and ten years, respec- tively. But this change, too, did not in any way affect the PSRFUPA\u2019s 1994 amendment of section 924(c)(1). That earlier amendment did not address the appropriate terms of imprisonment for different uses of a \u201cfirearm\u201d in the commission of an underlying offense. And the new use- specific sentencing structure that the 1998 amendment added to subsec- tion (c)(1)(A) applies to all \u201cfirearms\u201d and does not treat semiautomatic assault weapons separately, or even mention them. In sum, these first two changes Congress made to section 924(c)(1) in 1998 did not affect, let alone abrogate, the only substantive change made by the 1994 amendment. The sole effect of that 1994 amendment was\u2014 subject to the ten-year sunset provision\u2014to treat semiautomatic assault weapons as equivalent to short-barreled rifles and short-barreled shotguns for purposes of setting the sentence for their use during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Nothing in the establish- ment of the new section 924(c)(1)(A), however, reflects a congressional intention to revisit that earlier change, let alone to repeal the temporal limitation that the sunset provision imposed upon it. Applicability of Ten-Year Minimum Sentence to Semiautomatic Assault Weapons"], "id": "05e75d4d-986b-4228-8353-e6ed9cfd360d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In terms of the instant case, the Broadie court found that the mandated life imprisonment sentence in all class A-III drug felonies not only unusual when compared to sentences imposed for similar crimes in other jurisdictions; it also found the sentence severe when compared to sentences for crime within the State, since only murder in the first degree is punished more severely. The court found the legislative scheme did not contravene the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions because it found the legislative classification was enacted to enforce the penological goals of deterrence and isolation. Empirical data contained in the Final Report of the Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation and other authorities cited show that the new drug laws have had no effect on <mask> or drug abuse in this State. The amendment of subdivision 4 of section 70.00 of the Penal Law is a legislative declaration that individualized punishment of a year or less, in appropriate cases, protects the public interest where small scale sellers of narcotics are brought before the bar of justice. To paraphrase the words of Mr. Justice Marshall in Furman v Georgia (supra) to the extent that New York State uses the life imprisonment provisions of the new drug laws to encourage confessions and guilty pleas, such penalties are not being used for punishment purposes. If not used for legitimate punishment purposes, they contravene the cruel and unusual constitutional interdictions."], "id": "ac13d5f7-9f51-4b89-91a4-c89592c8eca6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Beaucoup evidence shows that Crittenden knew he possessed a controlled substance. I\u2019ll start with what should end the matter: Crittenden said as much. When agents confronted him about handing the bag to his wife, Carla Dominguez, he told them that he \u201cthought\u201d or \u201cbelieved\u201d it contained marijuana. The district court reasoned that, \u201cif anything,\u201d Crittenden\u2019s confession showed merely that he \u201cbelieved the bags contained marijuana.\u201d So apparently the validity of the verdict rendered by twelve citizens turns on whether the defendant said \u201cI believed\u201d instead of \u201cI knew.\u201d This belief/knowledge distinction defies real life. People don\u2019t use the mens rea terms found in the United States Code when confessing. And they often try to hedge their culpability. The jury recognized Crittenden\u2019s confession for what it was. It\u2019s because of their broader understanding of everyday situations and language that jurors are better positioned to decide the facts than judges trained in the law. As this case shows, we have a proclivity for how-many-angels-can-dance parsing. Crittenden\u2019s wife also admitted Crittenden\u2019s knowing participation in <mask>. The jury heard recordings of her telling the buyer that she was \u201cworking with her husband\u201d and mentioning \u201ctrafficking marijuana with her husband.\u201d The statements of Crittenden and his wife are direct evidence of his knowledge. Standing alone they are strong evidence of guilt. But wait\u2014there\u2019s more. Most drug cases rely on circumstantial evidence to prove state of mind. See United States v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1999). There was plenty of that here. Yet the district court ignored most of it, focusing only on the confession that the court rationalized away. That failure to grapple with other incriminating evidence alone is an abuse of discretion. See Hernandez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 266, 271\u201372 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that"], "id": "71e8d174-530a-4fa3-989d-75146171b0b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The affidavits submitted in support of the original warrant depicted a fairly sophisticated <mask> operation about which the investigators had learned significant but limited information using other investigative procedures. The informants and undercover officer the investigators had used could not infiltrate the organization and physical surveillance would not secure the evidence necessary to identify and convict all of the conspirators and seize the drugs and proceeds. As in People v Giraldo (270 AD2d 97 [1st Dept 2000]), the application for an eavesdrop warrant in this case was appropriate. To satisfy the requirements for issuance of an eavesdropping warrant, the applicant need not make a showing that every conceivable method of investigation has been tried and failed (although most such methods were, in fact, utilized here). Rather, the requirements are satisfied by establishing the nature and progress of the investigation and the difficulties inherent in the use of normal law enforcement methods in order to attain the ultimate investigative objectives. (People v Brown, 233 AD2d 764 [3d Dept 1996]; also cf., People v Spano, 170 AD2d 996 [4th Dept 1991].) These were not generalized and conclusory statements that other investigative procedures would prove unsuccessful, but rather lengthy and detailed renditions of precisely what procedures were tried without ultimate success. (Cf., United States v Rivera, 198 FRD 48, 50 [WD NY 1999].) Tested in the required practical and commonsense fashion, in the context of the objectives of the investigation, this application was legally *186sufficient. (People v Hafner, 152 AD2d 961 [4th Dept 1989]; People v Campagni, 151 AD2d 1010 [4th Dept 1989]; People v Baris, 116 AD2d 174, 186-187 [4th Dept 1986].)"], "id": "802f0dda-9d4c-41c2-9bcf-8a15773c6684", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["forbidden by the Supreme Court. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. Chamu gives us no reason to disturb the Board\u2019s conclusion that his theory is \u201chighly improbable.\u201d B. Chamu also posits that Florida\u2019s cocaine possession statute is problematic in another way: he says it does not require the state to prove that a defendant knew the possessed substance was illegal. Chamu suggests that the federal immigration statutes at issue \u201cinvoke generic offenses\u201d that must be compared to Florida\u2019s statute, and he concludes that knowledge of a substance\u2019s illicit nature is an \u201cessential element\u201d of the generic federal crime of cocaine possession. He argues that Florida\u2019s statute lacks that element and is \u201ccompletely dissonant with the federal offense\u201d\u2014 so it cannot trigger immigration consequences. The argument falls short on a fundamental level. To begin, Chamu misconceives how the categorical approach applies here. As the Supreme Court explained in Shular, that approach has two forms. 140 S. Ct. at 783. When a statute invokes the generic version of a crime\u2014say \u201cburglary\u201d or a \u201c<mask> crime\u201d\u2014then a court must discern \u201cthe elements of the offense as commonly understood\u201d and compare them to the ones in the state statute of conviction. Id. (quotation omitted). The mens rea, of course, can be one of those elements. See, e.g., Donawa v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275, 1281\u201382 (11th Cir. 2013). USCA11 Case: 19-13908 Date Filed: 01/26/2022 Page: 15 of 16"], "id": "52baf28a-4c8e-4f62-9ecb-b119aa241fe5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["unauthorized person. Based on this state charge, Emmitt\u2019s federal probation officer petitioned for revocation of his supervised release because Emmitt had violated the supervised release conditions not to commit another crime and not to possess a firearm. About two months later, on November 20, 2019, Emmitt was again arrested and was charged under Alabama law with <mask>, possession of drug paraphernalia, and carrying a concealed pistol without a permit. In December 2019, the probation officer amended the petition to add violations based on circumstances on the date of his arrest and these new state charges. Specifically, the addendum charged Emmitt with violating conditions prohibiting him from committing another crime, illegally possessing a controlled substance, possessing a firearm, and associating with persons engaged in criminal activity. C. Revocation of Supervised Release At the revocation hearing, Emmitt admitted the violations charged in the petition, and the district court revoked Emmitt\u2019s supervised release. The district court discussed with Emmitt the fact that he faced new firearm and drug-trafficking charges, that those charges were \u201ca separate matter,\u201d and that any agreement he may have with the government about those charges did not bind the district court in the revocation proceedings. Emmitt indicated that he understood. He later stated that he was trying to come to an agreement with the government as to USCA11 Case: 20-13384 Date Filed: 01/31/2022 Page: 4 of 10"], "id": "808bb560-5c6d-442d-bdb8-07dabab25d6f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["forbidden by the Supreme Court. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. Chamu gives us no reason to disturb the Board\u2019s conclusion that his theory is \u201chighly improbable.\u201d B. Chamu also posits that Florida\u2019s cocaine possession statute is problematic in another way: he says it does not require the state to prove that a defendant knew the possessed substance was illegal. Chamu suggests that the federal immigration statutes at issue \u201cinvoke generic offenses\u201d that must be compared to Florida\u2019s statute, and he concludes that knowledge of a substance\u2019s illicit nature is an \u201cessential element\u201d of the generic federal crime of cocaine possession. He argues that Florida\u2019s statute lacks that element and is \u201ccompletely dissonant with the federal offense\u201d\u2014 so it cannot trigger immigration consequences. The argument falls short on a fundamental level. To begin, Chamu misconceives how the categorical approach applies here. As the Supreme Court explained in Shular, that approach has two forms. 140 S. Ct. at 783. When a statute invokes the generic version of a crime\u2014say \u201cburglary\u201d or a \u201c<mask> crime\u201d\u2014then a court must discern \u201cthe elements of the offense as commonly understood\u201d and compare them to the ones in the state statute of conviction. Id. (quotation omitted). The mens rea, of course, can be one of those elements. See, e.g., Donawa v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275, 1281\u201382 (11th Cir. 2013). USCA11 Case: 19-13908 Date Filed: 01/26/2022 Page: 15 of 16"], "id": "57f9b373-4ff4-40f2-8802-472762d4c0fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or <mask> crime . . . , uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug traffick- ing crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiau- tomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). Significantly, however, Congress included in the PSRFUPA a sunset provision that limited the temporal effect of the Act. The sunset provision, section 110105(2), stated that \u201c[t]his subtitle and the amendments made by this subtitle . . . are repealed effective as of the date that is 10 years after [PSRFUPA\u2019s effective] date.\u201d Thus, because section 110102(c)(2) clearly was an \u201camendment made by this subtitle\u201d\u2014namely, an amend- ment to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)\u2014it would have been \u201crepealed\u201d and ceased to have legal force and effect as of 2004 unless Congress enacted inter- vening legislation that insulated section 110102(c)(2) from the operation of the sunset provision. In 1998, Congress did enact intervening legislation that amended sec- tion 924(c)(1). Congress enacted the legislation in response to Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), a Supreme Court decision that inter- preted section 924(c)(1) and was issued one year after PSRFUPA\u2019s en- actment. In Bailey, the Supreme Court considered what it meant to \u201cuse\u201d a firearm for purposes of section 924(c)(1). It held that the government had to prove that a defendant \u201cactively employed the firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime\u201d in order to \u201csustain a conviction under the \u2018use\u2019 prong\u201d of the statute. Id. at 150. In response to Bailey, multiple bills were introduced in both houses of Congress to make clear that the \u201cuse\u201d of a firearm for purposes of section 924(c)(1) would not require the active employment of the firearm in the commission of a predicate crime. Significantly, many of these bills pro- posed further amendments to section 924(c)(1) that went beyond merely responding to the Court\u2019s interpretation of the term \u201cuse.\u201d This legislative activity ultimately resulted in the passage of a 1998 amendment to section"], "id": "64ffa10c-52d0-4793-99a9-f73d447b3694", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is a matter of record in New York that the Penal Law enacted in 1965 (eff. Sept. 1, 1967) provided for substantially lessened penalties for drug law violations than were previously in effect (see former Penal Law, \u00a7 1751). It cannot be argued that these less -severe methods of1 'dealing with -<mask> provided -a sufficient deterrent as the problem in this State continued to increase. As former Governor Rockefeller pointed out in his annual message to the Legislature in 1973, educational and treatment pr ograms supported by large funding -also failed to ameliorate the problem (see Annual Message of the Governor, McKinney\u2019s -Session Laws of 1973, pp. 2317-2322). In view of the failure of nonpenal measures and less -severe penalties, this court *78cannot find that the punishment now provided is \u201c excessive \u201d or \u201c unnecessary \u201d."], "id": "45726893-c361-4475-8986-a68f4cb4de91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["[S]o long as the computer search is limited to a search for evidence explicitly authorized in the warrant, it is reasonable for the executing officers to open the various types of files located in the computer's hard drive in order to determine whether they contain such evidence. United States v. Richards , 659 F.3d 527, 540 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). As previously stated, the record contains no evidence officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. Likewise, it is clear officers were searching only for evidence tying Applegate to <mask>. In so doing, they uncovered clear, unequivocal and immediately apparent evidence of Applegate's possession of child pornography. This evidence was found in the same types of files which could reasonably have contained evidence related to drug trafficking. The officers properly limited their search in conformity with the warrant and, as the trial court correctly found, did not conduct an impermissible general search."], "id": "7a682f1a-878e-4d25-b5aa-345d6b269850", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Sadler\u2019s arguments do not undermine these key facts. Sadler points out that Alexander never saw Sadler involved with any \u201cPolo\u201d deals, and Tempo never used Sadler as a runner. But this evidence does not mean that Sadler could not have knowingly and intentionally joined the \u201cPolo\u201d conspiracy, nor does it preclude his involvement in other ways. See Martinez, 430 F.3d at 332\u201333. The combination of Sadler\u2019s desire for leadership within \u201cPolo,\u201d his possession of <mask> paraphernalia, and his possession of the \u201cPolo\u201d phones provided sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Sadler was a co-conspirator."], "id": "81e71b48-6708-4053-8fcc-18af4612fbfe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The final issue before the court is whether there exists \u201cgood cause\u201d to grant the City a judgment of possession for Mrs. Omolukum\u2019s apartment based on illicit <mask>. At the outset it should be noted that at trial, the City did not claim that Mrs. Omolukum was personally involved in such activity. However, as the City points out in its brief, it is not necessary that a named tenant be personally involved in illicit narcotics sales in order for her to lose her apartment. (Riverview Apts. v Guzman, NYLJ, Feb. 13, 1991, at 21, col 2 [App Term, 1st Dept].) Neither is it necessary that such sales take place inside the subject apartment. (City of New York v Rodriguez, 140 Misc 2d 467 [Civ Ct, NY County 1988] [holding that sales which take place in front of an apartment building provide grounds for eviction].) Finally, the fact that the person who actually sold the illicit drugs no longer resides in the subject apartment does not abate the proceeding. (New York County Dist. Attorney v McDaniels, NYLJ, May 24, 1991, at 22, col 4 [Civ Ct, NY County].) However, where a named tenant is not claimed *801to be personally involved in any illegal trade, the City must, as it concedes, demonstrate the existence of a \u201cnexus\u201d between such trade and the subject premises. (Marwyte Realty Assoc. v Valcarcel, 150 Misc 2d 1044 [App Term, 1st Dept].) In determining this, the court must inquire whether the evidence shows that \u201cthe acts and conduct complained of warrant the inference of acquiescence in an occupancy contemplating the prohibited purposes\u201d. (City of New York v Goldman, 78 Misc 2d 693, 696-697 [Civ Ct, NY County 1974].)"], "id": "05d5e3af-574e-4cc2-9152-225d8eff753e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00a7 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), and possession of a firearm during that offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A)(i). As part of the plea agreement, the Government agreed not to proceed on a previously filed information under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 851(a) seeking an enhanced sentence under \u00a7 841(b)(1)(A)(i) based on Lyons\u2019s previous conviction of a drug felony. 1 The Government also agreed not to file any additional charges against Lyons. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A). In return for the Government\u2019s concessions, Lyons agreed to cooperate with the Government and to waive his right to appeal or collaterally attack his convictions or sentences. At rearraignment, the district court accepted Lyons\u2019s guilty plea but deferred acceptance of the plea agreement to sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A), (c)(3)(A) (prescribing procedures for entry and acceptance of plea agreements where the Government agrees to dismiss extant charges or not bring others); see also U.S.S.G. \u00a7 6B1.2(a), p.s. At sentencing, the district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Lyons to 140 months of imprisonment on the <mask> conviction, the middle of the advisory guidelines range, and a consecutive term of 60 months for the firearms conviction. It also imposed concurrent five-year terms of supervised release. Though it did not pursue the \u00a7 851 enhancement, the Government did not move to dismiss the \u00a7 851 enhancement information that it had previously filed, and the district court did not enter an oral or written order expressly dismissing it. Lyons did not object to the Government\u2019s failure to request dismissal of the \u00a7 851 information, and he did not file a direct appeal."], "id": "5b305c74-14ef-44fb-b93a-0c1de6ca4236", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["offenses. Most Defendants pleaded guilty. Only Tempo and Sadler proceeded to trial. The trial lasted nineteen days, and the witnesses included \u201cPolo\u201d customers, law enforcement officers, paramedics, acquaintances, medical and forensic experts, and one of the alleged co-conspirators (and co-Defendants). The government also introduced physical evidence from surveillance operations and property searches. This evidence tells the story of a sophisticated and well- organized <mask> scheme called \u201cPolo.\u201d The government alleges that Tempo led this operation and that Sadler\u2014Tempo\u2019s half-brother\u2014participated."], "id": "0ece795f-42f0-49a1-ad53-a0b9fb38d947", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Battlefield experience gained from the war on drugs has prompted the courts to change their view on what constitutes probable cause. The jurisprudence in the area of observations of street drug transactions, for example, \u201chas moved beyond such niceties as distinctions based on the color or degree of opacity of the envelope to the point where the visual identification of the object exchanged for money is merely one element in the totality of the circumstances to be considered in any probable cause assessment.\u201d (People v Graham, supra at 59, quoting People v Shaw, 193 AD2d 390 [1st Dept 1993] [internal quotation marks omitted].) The courts have applied evolving tests to determine the \u201challmark\u201d of a drug transaction. A glassine envelope went from a mere \u201ctelltale sign of heroin\u201d to the \u201challmark of an illicit drug exchange.\u201d (People v McRay, supra at 604 [internal quotation marks omitted].) Similarly, the tinfoil packet was soon recognized as the cocaine analogy of the glassine. (People v Balas, 104 AD2d 1039 [2d Dept].) In the mid-1980\u2019s, with the advent of crack/cocaine, the plastic vial joined the glassine envelope and tinfoil packet as a hallmark of drug activity. (People v Thomas, 227 AD2d 351 [1st Dept 1996]; People v Cummings, 194 AD2d 418 [1st Dept 1993].) Over these two decades of increased <mask>, the courts realized that they cannot operate \u201cin a vacuum\u201d and cannot ignore developing modes and techniques of drug trafficking and use."], "id": "b318f8b2-232e-4695-aabc-9286c75ff4d6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["trafficking crime or a crime of violence and possessed a firearm in furtherance of [a] <mask> offense or a crime of violence.\u201d The trial court instructed that the government could prove Wright committed the crime either way, but that the jury needed to \u201cunanimously agree upon the way in which [Wright] committed the violation.\u201d As to Count 4, the jury returned a general verdict and did not indicate which of the charged predicate offenses it relied on. The district court sentenced Wright to 240 months\u2019 imprisonment on Count 1 and 360 months imprisonment on Counts 2, 3, and 5, all to be served concurrently. As to Count 4, the district court imposed a consecutive 60-month sentence, for a total sentence of 420 months\u2019 imprisonment. C. Direct Appeal and First \u00a7 2255 Motion Wright filed a direct appeal but did not challenge the validity of the predicate offenses supporting his \u00a7 924(c) conviction on Count 4 or argue that any part of \u00a7 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague. On December 19, 2007, this Court affirmed Wright\u2019s convictions and sentences. See United States v. Reed, 259 F. App\u2019x 289 (11th Cir. 2007). In 2009, Wright filed his first \u00a7 2255 motion raising numerous claims, none of which are relevant to this appeal. Wright\u2019s \u00a7 2255 motion was denied on the merits, and both the district court and this Court denied Wright\u2019s requests for a certificate of appealability. USCA11 Case: 20-14869 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 5 of 22"], "id": "ec37c459-893f-4eee-82d4-610d152419a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Information in the affidavit, which was obtained both from Hovis and the investigation, established probable cause to believe that Reed had engaged in <mask> and that his residence was likely to contain evidence of his ongoing criminal activity. Detective Morgan\u2019s independent observations of Hovis leaving Reed\u2019s residence and approaching the vehicle immediately before finding heroin and hydrocodone on Hovis corroborated Hovis\u2019 claim that evidence of a crime would likely be found at the residence. Hovis admitted to purchasing the heroin from Reed and possessing it. Hovis provided first-hand information about Reed selling heroin that Reed kept in a small container inside his pocket. The affidavit was sufficient to sustain the warrant."], "id": "ea60428f-e864-4db4-848f-b41825e7572b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Arebalos asserts he was unaware at the first hearing of \"extensive evidence regarding the regional narcotics task force surveillance\" of him. But, beyond speculation, Arebalos does not explain-and nothing in the record shows-what this evidence was, what was allegedly new about it, and how it was material to the suppression motion. Without such details, Arebalos's claim fails. Arebalos focuses on Adelmann's motivation for stopping Arebalos's tractor-trailer, but the trial court could reasonably find that Arebalos's counsel knew prior to the first suppression hearing that Adelmann's motivation was to investigate Arebalos for <mask>. Arebalos's counsel therefore knew *194enough to articulate the potential relevance of his leading question, which Arebalos asserts was to explain the reasons for the stop, and pursue it and similar topics at the first suppression hearing.3 He therefore had the opportunity to present these arguments at the time of that hearing; he simply did not do so."], "id": "8fee9db4-e3f3-451e-b31f-68d0c9a22984", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The instant case is similar to State ex rel. Taylor v. Moore, 136 S.W.3d 799 (Mo. banc 2004). In State ex rel. Taylor, the defendant pleaded guilty to <mask> and the plea agreement provided that defendant be placed in long-term treatment pursuant to Section 217.362. Taylor, 136 S.W.3d at 801. However, like here, after sentencing, the DOC determined that defendant was ineligible for the program. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that the statute requires the sentencing judge notify the DOC before sentencing someone to long-term treatment and determined that defendant was entitled to habeas relief because the trial court erred in sentencing him without first verifying his eligibility for the treatment program. Id. The Court then added that \"if [the defendant] had known he was ineligible for [the treatment program], he would have rejected the plea agreement and gone to trial. He expected to serve less than two years ... but now serves lengthy sentences.\" Id. at 802."], "id": "a3473d02-8b64-4235-891e-d348ce1abae6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["There are, at present, three nightclubs operating on the block on which the premises is located. Venture proposes to open a *269nightclub with a capacity to accommodate 300 to 400 people, which will serve food, and feature both live and recorded music. The club will be open Wednesday through Sunday from 9:00 p.m. until 3:30 a.m. The nightclub will be located on the premises recently vacated by another nightclub, known as Cheetah, which petitioners label \u201cnotorious\u201d for its excessive noise, milling crowds, honking taxis, <mask>, and violent episodes, including, allegedly, a shooting. (Affirmation of urgency at 2.) Petitioners, who include local residents, community organizations, as well as a New York State Senator and a member of the New York City Council, claim that the neighborhood is already oversaturated with bars and nightclubs, and express their concern that the new club will be just as disruptive to the lives of the residents of the area as was Cheetah. Consequently, they oppose the Authority\u2019s decision to bestow a liquor license on Venture."], "id": "8dc41f7e-7fb1-434a-ade0-e174c7ab0f92", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["This leaves Mendoza\u2019s charges for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and RICO conspiracy. We concluded above that the government presented insufficient evidence to justify those two convictions. So, by the same token, we conclude that the government offered insufficient evidence to prove that Mendoza committed either of those two crimes as an \u201cunderlying crime\u201d of <mask> or violence for the purposes of \u00a7 924(c). Hunter, 887 F.2d at 1003. Of course, the government need not \u201cseparately"], "id": "0a57347a-f678-42d5-aa97-c462a7eb39f3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The evidence showed that Appellant engaged in <mask> with G.B. while she was pregnant with R.A.G., and they were both arrested. As a result, Appellant was incarcerated for the first four years of R.A.G.'s life and R.A.G. lived with Appellant's mother for about a year and a half until G.B. was released from custody. Following his release from prison, Appellant was deported to Mexico. It is understandable that Appellant, as a result of his deportation, has been unable to visit with R.A.G. in person in the United States, but the evidence showed that Appellant has not had any other type of contact with R.A.G. during the years following his deportation. According to Appellant's sister, G.A., Appellant is a college professor in Mexico, and he has maintained the same telephone number and Facebook account since his release from prison in 2012, yet he made no effort to contact R.A.G. even after he learned that the child had been removed from G.B.'s care. Appellant has been absent from R.A.G.'s life to the extent that R.A.G. did not even know that Appellant is his father. While incarceration and deportation are not sufficient, standing alone, to support a finding under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), these facts are part of Appellant's overall course of conduct. We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish a firm conviction or belief in the mind of the trier of fact that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered R.A.G.'s physical or emotional well-being under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). See Walker v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services , 312 S.W.3d 608, 617-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) ; In re U.P. , 105 S.W.3d at 236. Issue Two is overruled. Because the evidence is sufficient to support one of the four predicate termination grounds found by the trial court, it is unnecessary to address Issues One, Three, and Four."], "id": "85227df4-ba90-41b8-a2ed-dd57d4065dfc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs on the other hand argue that their appearance in the illustration is virtually identical to the photograph taken; that they were identified by friends as appearing in the illustration and that the illustration held them up to contempt, ridicule, and scorn in their community since they were depicted as involved in <mask>. They also assert that the photo and illustration were used without their consent."], "id": "ae7e39d7-b36b-4b90-9224-201f22b6b4b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["words, are considered a continuation of the original law. This rule of interpretation is applicable even though the original Act or section is expressly declared to be repealed.\u201d (citations omitted)). We think such an interpretation of the significance of the strike-and- insert language is especially appropriate with respect to the 1998 enact- ment amending section 924(c)(1). The changes\u2014in particular, the new graduated sentencing scheme distinguishing between the use and the brandishing or discharge of a firearm in the commission of a crime\u2014 made it significantly more complicated to parse the various penalties prescribed in the statute. Congress may be understood to have decided, as the canon anticipates, to \u201cserve the causes of convenience and certainty\u201d by setting forth the entire amended statute within the public law itself, rather than by specifying the various amendatory provisions that the code publishers would have to fashion into a coherent whole. For these reasons, we do not believe that Congress\u2019s choice to \u201cstrike\u201d section 924(c)(1), and insert a newly organized replacement, evinces an intent to abrogate- and-reenact the entirety of the earlier version of the statute sufficient to overcome the presumption established by the \u201ccontinuation\u201d canon. We turn next to the three substantive changes that the 1998 amendment did make to the statute, which we described above, in order to determine whether they demonstrate that Congress intended to insulate the \u201csemiau- tomatic assault weapon\u201d language from operation of PSRFUPA\u2019s sunset provision. In our view, they do not. In so concluding, we find it signifi- cant that, although those changes were clearly important, they did not affect the types of firearms to which a ten-year sentence attached. Nor did they alter the basic judgment, embodied in the text that PSRFUPA origi- nally added to section 924(c)(1), that the use of semiautomatic assault weapons should receive the same sentencing treatment as the use of short- barreled rifles and short-barreled shotguns. First, the 1998 enactment specified, in the new subsection (c)(1)(A), that\u2014contrary to the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Bailey\u2014the federal offense would henceforth cover cases involving not just the more active \u201cuse\u201d of firearms, but also possession in furtherance of any crime of violence or <mask> crime. But that change did not alter or affect the 1994 amendment\u2019s specific reference to semiautomatic assault weap- ons. To be sure, after 1998, possession of such weapons in furtherance of"], "id": "70464c9a-b1e9-474f-b928-b1461de214e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["undisputedly valid <mask> predicates. 6 Thus, Wright\u2019s indictment charged him with violating a valid federal statute and the indictment defect Wright points to here was nonjurisdictional. See Brown, 752 F.3d at 1354. Moreover, this Court has repeatedly held that a Davis claim like Wright\u2019s\u2014in which the \u00a7 924(c) count charges both valid and invalid predicates\u2014can be procedurally defaulted. See Granda, 990 F.3d at 1286-92; Parker, 993 F.3d at 1262. D. Wright Cannot Overcome His Procedural Default On direct appeal in 2007, Wright did not argue that his \u00a7 924(c) conviction was invalid because the \u00a7 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. Thus, like the petitioners in"], "id": "3241b424-f4a7-46fd-8691-eb2c22b13fda", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["First, defendant has failed to make financial disclosure, and failed to offer a legitimate derivation for the money. Secondly, he has been convicted of a crime, and thirdly, the government *871has made a prima facie showing that defendant\u2019s conviction for possession is probably and reasonably related to <mask>, of which the money is the proceeds. Furthermore, \"drug trafficking\u201d, the alleged criminal activity, poses serious threats to the safety of all society and the quality of our lives."], "id": "725203b0-ba23-476d-a688-02c340c77dcd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["We also disagree with the appellant\u2019s argument that, even if the officer\u2019s testimony is accepted, it fails to establish the existence of probable cause. When a police officer stationed in a location known for <mask> observes a suspect participate in a rapid series of hand-to-hand transactions, involving the exchange of money for a small object, there is probable cause to believe that the suspect is selling narcotics (see, e.g., People v Little, 204 AD2d 351; People v Jones, 186 AD2d 681; People v Owens, 155 AD2d 696; see also, People v Bittner, 97 AD2d 33)."], "id": "c8d3e15b-bbf4-46eb-a30b-13524276832c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Canady was murdered by a gunman in his barbershop in broad daylight at approximately 11:30 a.m. on May 9, 2014. The prosecution contended Grant, who led a <mask> operation, plotted revenge against Canady for stealing marijuana and sleeping with Grant's girlfriend, Talya Martin, over a year before the murder. According to prosecutors, Grant commissioned defendants Johnson and Guthrie, and other uncharged and unknown individuals, to murder Canady."], "id": "56cab54c-db94-47f2-a6f9-7b6e066476dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Continuing the Apprendi analysis, in Harris v United States (536 US 545 [2002]), the Supreme Court distinguished between factors extending the minimum, as distinguished from the maximum, sentence. (Id. at 566.) It reviewed the federal <mask> statute, which extended the minimum sentence if the court found that a gun had been \u201cbrandished\u201d during the crime. Sustaining the conviction, the Court held that although factors extending the outer, or maximum, parameters of a sentence are elements which must be pleaded in (federal) indictments and proved to a jury, those factors extending the minimum penalty are sentencing considerations, properly left to the court alone. (Id. at 568.)"], "id": "736c5259-f3ea-4749-b9e8-d9c110a84765", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["trafficking crime or a crime of violence and possessed a firearm in furtherance of [a] <mask> offense or a crime of violence.\u201d The trial court instructed that the government could prove Wright committed the crime either way, but that the jury needed to \u201cunanimously agree upon the way in which [Wright] committed the violation.\u201d As to Count 4, the jury returned a general verdict and did not indicate which of the charged predicate offenses it relied on. The district court sentenced Wright to 240 months\u2019 imprisonment on Count 1 and 360 months imprisonment on Counts 2, 3, and 5, all to be served concurrently. As to Count 4, the district court imposed a consecutive 60-month sentence, for a total sentence of 420 months\u2019 imprisonment. C. Direct Appeal and First \u00a7 2255 Motion Wright filed a direct appeal but did not challenge the validity of the predicate offenses supporting his \u00a7 924(c) conviction on Count 4 or argue that any part of \u00a7 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague. On December 19, 2007, this Court affirmed Wright\u2019s convictions and sentences. See United States v. Reed, 259 F. App\u2019x 289 (11th Cir. 2007). In 2009, Wright filed his first \u00a7 2255 motion raising numerous claims, none of which are relevant to this appeal. Wright\u2019s \u00a7 2255 motion was denied on the merits, and both the district court and this Court denied Wright\u2019s requests for a certificate of appealability. USCA11 Case: 20-14869 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 5 of 22"], "id": "83ed81df-1395-469f-86be-fd5cc3d6d903", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["To that end, Cipriani diligently pursued the permissible lines of inquiry. He probed Villarreal about his trip, asking about his origin, destination, purpose, and other relevant details. While waiting for dispatch to retrieve a report on Villarreal's border crossings, he asked about Villarreal's lack of cargo. To verify his answers, Cipriani spent time consulting Villarreal's logbooks, which the officer had a right to do. See Kersey v. Wilson , 69 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (citing 49 C.F.R. \u00a7 395.8(k)(2) ). Cipriani quickly frisked Villarreal and inspected the vehicle for safety violations, stating that he anticipated giving Villarreal a warning. Cipriani then directly asked Villarreal about his arrest record and any criminal activity he may have been involved in, such as <mask>. Within twenty minutes, he had obtained Villarreal's consent to search his vehicle to check for possible narcotics. We therefore find no merit in Villarreal's complaint about Cipriani's investigation, which was diligent and proportionate to the suspicious circumstances before him. See Kothe , 152 S.W.3d at 64."], "id": "3e4d289c-6948-4e34-b4db-e2e868001486", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The following situations are known to exist in The Bronx: landlords on their own initiative or upon request of the Bronx District Attorney bring eviction proceedings against illegal drug dealers at considerable cost to them for legal services. After an illegal drug dealer is evicted he/she remains in the same building by (a) buying another apartment from another tenant, or (b) paying a tenant in another apartment daily for the use of said apartment, or (c) intimidating and coercing a tenant to permit the criminals to use his/her apartment for illegal <mask>. Some of them take over a store or a one-family house and operate their illegal trade from there."], "id": "33e91544-1557-4383-afd7-49afe4ca8387", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Battlefield experience gained from the war on drugs has prompted the courts to change their view on what constitutes probable cause. The jurisprudence in the area of observations of street drug transactions, for example, \u201chas moved beyond such niceties as distinctions based on the color or degree of opacity of the envelope to the point where the visual identification of the object exchanged for money is merely one element in the totality of the circumstances to be considered in any probable cause assessment.\u201d (People v Graham, supra at 59, quoting People v Shaw, 193 AD2d 390 [1st Dept 1993] [internal quotation marks omitted].) The courts have applied evolving tests to determine the \u201challmark\u201d of a drug transaction. A glassine envelope went from a mere \u201ctelltale sign of heroin\u201d to the \u201challmark of an illicit drug exchange.\u201d (People v McRay, supra at 604 [internal quotation marks omitted].) Similarly, the tinfoil packet was soon recognized as the cocaine analogy of the glassine. (People v Balas, 104 AD2d 1039 [2d Dept].) In the mid-1980\u2019s, with the advent of crack/cocaine, the plastic vial joined the glassine envelope and tinfoil packet as a hallmark of drug activity. (People v Thomas, 227 AD2d 351 [1st Dept 1996]; People v Cummings, 194 AD2d 418 [1st Dept 1993].) Over these two decades of increased <mask>, the courts realized that they cannot operate \u201cin a vacuum\u201d and cannot ignore developing modes and techniques of drug trafficking and use."], "id": "936d867c-4cae-4b24-8d03-c54bf8101821", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Drug Trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court explained that this privilege protects \u201cthe public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking\u201d by ensuring that the President and his advis- ers are \u201cfree to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.\u201d 418 U.S. at 708. The privilege for presidential communications is \u201cfundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.\u201d Id. The report at issue is a confidential communication to the President containing a Cabinet Secretary\u2019s advice on decisions delegated by statute to the President\u2014whether automobile and automobile-part imports \u201cthreaten to impair the national security\u201d and whether they should be adjusted to remove that threat. 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1862(b)(3)(A). The report is therefore a core presidential communication. See, e.g., Loving v. Dep\u2019t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (\u201ceasily\u201d holding that \u201cmemo- randa from the Army and Defense Secretaries directly to the President advising him\u201d on his statutory review of a court-martial death sentence \u201cfall squarely within the presidential communications privilege\u201d). The presidential communications privilege applies to the report in its entirety. See Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745\u201346. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the report reflects the exercise of statutory authority delegated to the President pursuant to Congress\u2019s constitutional powers to impose \u201cTaxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises\u201d and to \u201cregulate Commerce with foreign Nations.\u201d U.S. Const. art. I, \u00a7 8, cls. 1, 3. The presidential communications component of execu- tive privilege protects the President\u2019s power to faithfully execute all of the laws. Communications related to the President\u2019s independent constitu- tional functions may raise \u201cparticularly strong\u201d confidentiality concerns, Assertion of Executive Privilege Concerning the Dismissal and Replace- ment of U.S. Attorneys, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (2007) (Clement, Act\u2019g A.G.), but the privilege applies equally to communications concerning the execu- tion of statutes, see, e.g., Assertion of Executive Privilege Over Communi- cations Regarding EPA\u2019s Ozone Air Quality Standards and California\u2019s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 Op. O.L.C. 1, 3 (2008) (Mukasey, A.G.); Assertion of Executive Privilege for Memorandum to the President Concerning Efforts to Combat <mask>, 20 Op. O.L.C. 8, 8 (1996) (Reno, A.G.)."], "id": "fc567e9d-f958-4352-91ca-6357b42bbb0a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At trial, Mr. Dincsalman testified that he just signed the subject papers without reading them. However, on further questioning, he indicated that in over 30 years of business he had probably never signed papers without reading them until, of course, the papers involved in this case. While a doubtful assertion on its face, the court having had the benefit of assessing his demeanor as Dincsalman rendered it, found the claim even more incredible and rejects it as nothing more than a convenient fabrication. Similarly incredible was the testimony of Mr. Erhan Kaatsiz. Mr. Kaatsiz took the stand as a prior felon, having been convicted on federal <mask> charges involving cocaine and heroin, and having served eight years in prison. It was shown that in their application for a New York State lottery license for their gas stations, where an applicant\u2019s prior felony conviction would be fatal thereto, the ownership interests of Mr. Kaatsiz in the gas stations was omitted. On repeated questioning throughout his testimony Mr. Kaatsiz displayed evasive responses and would not definitively admit or deny whether he had knowledge of the critical facts at issue in this case including whether he knew of the debt to Americana, knew of the confession of judgment or knew of the assignment of the lease. Specifically, when asked whether he knew of the lease assignment to Americana he testified \u201cI don\u2019t remember,\u201d and when asked whether he discussed it with Mr. Dincsalman he testified \u201cI don\u2019t think so,\u201d and when asked whether he gave his permission for a confession of judgment for the debt of one million dollars to be entered against MP Associates he testified \u2018T don\u2019t remember.\u201d In sum, he could not or would not definitively assert that he had no knowledge of the debt outstanding which his companies had run up for fuel deliveries from Americana or that he had no knowledge of the confession of judgment or lease assignment granted as security to insure further fuel deliveries for his gas stations."], "id": "7c60a217-1b20-455a-b252-18e8819a0841", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the petition filed below, Hill argued that he was actually innocent and was entitled to habeas and audita querela relief based on a United States Supreme Court ruling in Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), which held that mere possession of a weapon is insufficient proof to sustain a conviction for use of a deadly weapon pursuant to a federal criminal statute applicable to <mask>. Hill alleged that the holding in Bailey represented a new constitutional rule that is retroactively applicable to his case and entitles him to scientific testing of items found at the crime scene, including a marble rolling pin, to establish that Hill did not actively \"use\" the rolling pin to murder the victim. Hill's reliance on Bailey is misplaced. Bailey construes the meaning of \"use\" in a federal criminal statute; it does not purport to be anything other than a statutory decision and does not represent a new rule of constitutional law. See Gray-Bey v. United States , 209 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2000). In any event, the circuit court denied Hill's petition based on the lack of jurisdiction to hear either claim."], "id": "95e544c9-13f8-4dcf-8f7a-62cda1ce9d53", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to the first issue defendant contends that various correspondence by governmental officials and agencies concerning the new statute (no commitee hearings were conducted),1 as *27well as Governor Mario Cuomo\u2019s memorandum issued upon signing CPLR article 13-A into law (1984 McKinney\u2019s Session Laws of NY, at 3627-3628), indicate that the statute is limited to crimes involving <mask>, white-collar crime and criminal activity involving organized crime. The court finds no such limitation within those memoranda and correspondence."], "id": "7adbd271-a05e-4da1-8c17-eb44eb307d93", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["924(c)(1) titled \u201cAn Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns.\u201d The 1998 amendment provided that \u201c[s]ection 924(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended . . . by striking \u2018(c)\u2019 and all that follows through the end of paragraph (1) and inserting the following: \u201c\u2018(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of vio- lence or <mask> crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addi- tion to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime\u2014 \u201c\u2018(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; \u201c\u2018(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and \u201c\u2018(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. \u201c\u2018(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a vio- lation of this subsection\u2014 \u201c\u2018(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or \u201c\u2018(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.\u2019\u201d Pub. L. No. 105-386, \u00a7 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469, 3469 (1998). The 1998 amendment therefore split section 924(c)(1) into two new subsections\u201418 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(1)(B)\u2014and made three major changes to the section\u2019s operation. First, new section 924(c)(1)(A) made clear that the offense created by section 924(c)(1) applies not only to any individual who \u201cuses or carries a firearm,\u201d but also to one who, \u201cin furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.\u201d Second, the remain- ing portion of subsection (c)(1)(A) imposed new minimum terms of imprisonment for specified types of firearms use. In lieu of the pre-1998"], "id": "e6a4da48-9164-4d08-8e3c-7ba35f5530b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["We need not discuss whether a trial attorney in 1989 had an affirmative obligation to advise his client of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea under California law. ( Padilla v. Kentucky , supra , 559 U.S. at p. 374, 130 S.Ct. 1473 [announcing that the Sixth Amendment requires trial counsel to advise a criminal defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea]; Chaidez v. U.S. (2013) 568 U.S. 342, 344, 350, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 [holding that the rule announced in Padilla was not retroactive, but noting that prior to Padilla , state courts were required to resolve the issue for themselves].) This is not a case where trial counsel remained silent and failed to discuss immigration consequences with his client at all. Here, Ogunmowo raised his immigration concerns with Kaplan, and in return, Kaplan gave him incorrect advice without researching or investigating the issue. Affirmatively misadvising a client that he will not face immigration consequences as a result of a guilty plea in a *537<mask> case-when the law states otherwise-is objectively deficient performance under prevailing professional norms."], "id": "c89070ad-370d-496c-ad14-b4fb6ec272c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["A claim may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Generally, in order to state a cause of ac- tion a petition must (1) give notice of the events out of which the petitioner\u2019s grievance arises and (2) allege the substantive material elements of the particular cause of action relied on (New York County Dist. Attorney\u2019s Off. v Rivera, NYLJ, Apr. 7, 1992, at 32, col 3; Siegel, NY Prac \u00a7 208 [2d ed, 1991]). RPAPL 741 (4) requires a petition to \u201c[s]tate the facts upon which the special proceeding is based.\u201d The petition must be based on a theory of recovery sufficiently particular and clear so as to inform the court and enable the respondent to-prepare for litigation (New York County Dist. Attorney\u2019s Off. v Rivera, supra). RPAPL 711 (5) and 715 (1) create a cause of action which permits a landlord to recover possession of the premises and to remove the tenants therefrom where the premises is used \u201cfor any illegal trade or manufacture, or other illegal business.\u201d (RPAPL 711 [5].) In a motion to dismiss for failure to state cause of action, every fact alleged in the petition is assumed to be true and the petition is construed liberally in the petitioner\u2019s favor (New York County Dist. Attorney\u2019s Off. v Hardin, Nov. 18, 1992, at 23, col 1). The term \u201cuse\u201d has been construed to identify conduct which is continu- ous and recurrent (see, 1165 Broadway Corp. v Dayana, of N. Y. Sportwear, 166 Misc 2d 939; 1021-27 Ave. St. John Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v Hernandez, 154 Misc 2d 141; Cohen v Car- roll, 63 Misc 2d 222; 190 Stanton v Santiago, 60 Misc 2d 224; Lituchy v Lathers, 35 Misc 2d 556). In the context of cases involving the use of the premises for the illegal business of <mask> and sales, the concept of \u201cuse\u201d has been expanded to include the inference of the respondent\u2019s participa-tion and/or acquiescence in the legal business (see, New York County Dist. Attorney\u2019s Off. v Rivera, supra; see also, New York County Dist. Attorney\u2019s Off. v Harvin, supra; Wingate Hall Co. v Bet- anees, NYLJ, Sept. 29, 1993, at 22, col 6). In the instant case, *1014petitioner has attached to the petition and to the notice of termination copies of the search warrant, arrest reports of the respondents, the police laboratory controlled substance analysis report indicating that 17/8 ounces and 41 grains of marihuana were seized at the premises. The police report also indicates that a scale and packaging materials were seized during the search and subsequent arrests. The annexation of the above materials to the petition and to the notice of termination gives clear notice of the events out of which the petitioner\u2019s grievance arises and serves to allege adequately the elements of its cause of action. Respondent\u2019s participation or acquiescence in the use of the apartment for illegal drug sales may be inferred from the indicia of drug measurement, packaging and sales recovered in the search of the premises."], "id": "f94fad52-bd2d-4e06-8e87-5074abe31854", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Drug Trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["To the extent that \u201ccounting heads\u201d is an appropriate method of determining admissibility under Frye, even the Wesley concurrence does not call for blind acceptance of all experts\u2019 opinions. The concurring opinion viewed several witnesses\u2019 testimony as irrevelant because \u201c[n]one . . . was expert in Forensic DNA analysis.\u201d (Id. at 438.) Even Frye (293 F at 1013-1014) discussed the need for testimony from specific \u201cphysiological and psychological authorities\u201d in order to find expert testimony concerning the results of a \u201cdeception\u201d test to be admissible. Thus, at a Frye hearing, a court should not just count the scientist\u2019s head, but should consider what expert hat can be worn on that head. This is the assessment that is supposed to be made at every trial when an expert testifies. The jury is instructed to consider, inter alia, \u201cthe qualifications and the believability of the witness\u201d in determining \u201cwhether or not to accept [their] testimony.\u201d (CJI2d[NY] Expert in General\u2014 Expert Witness.) Notably, there are even different approved jury instructions related to different areas of proffered expertise, such as Crime Victim Syndrome and <mask>. (See CJI2d[NY] Expert.)"], "id": "003950b4-28f1-4a3a-8aa0-705db138ca32", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs on the other hand argue that their appearance in the illustration is virtually identical to the photograph taken; that they were identified by friends as appearing in the illustration and that the illustration held them up to contempt, ridicule, and scorn in their community since they were depicted as involved in <mask>. They also assert that the photo and illustration were used without their consent."], "id": "4d9d70bd-2e0f-47fc-a657-cdef08a0a949", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Section 195.223.9 criminalizes <mask> in the second degree if a person possesses or has under his or her control more than 30 grams of methamphetamine. Where the person possesses 90 grams or more but less than 450 grams, the second-degree drug trafficking is a class A felony. Section 195.223.9(2). To establish second-degree trafficking, the State had to prove that Shigemura (1) had conscious and intentional possession of the substances, either actual or constructive, (2) was aware of the presence and nature of the substances, and (3) possessed more than 90 grams of methamphetamine. See *741State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 806-07 (Mo. banc 2016) (citing Section 195.223.9)."], "id": "b5188e94-23d6-4517-93a7-f92ba8dbc2ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["For example, in the Court of Appeals case of Muniz v Flohern, Inc. (77 NY2d 869, 870 [1991]), an infant plaintiff standing outside of a store located on defendant landlord\u2019s premises was blinded by shotgun pellets discharged by a robber from inside the store; she sought to hold the landlord responsible for her injuries. The Court refused, holding that the landlord was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint despite the fact that the landlord had been made aware that its tenant was engaging in illicit <mask> actively on the premises, yet made no attempt to stop it. As the Court reasoned, no special relationship existed between the landlord and either plaintiff or the gunman that would impose upon the landlord a duty to regulate the assailant\u2019s conduct. As the Court held:"], "id": "11479ae6-6051-4005-9a82-0ca8b59cfbb4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On September 15, 1986, a County Court Judge authorized an eavesdropping warrant for the seizure of telephone communications of a certain individual at his residence to obtain evidence of <mask>. The police on the same day intercepted three telephone conversations between that individual and the defendants which indicated that the defendants were engaged in gambling operations. These telephone calls and other calls of a similar nature were minimized because they did not pertain to the offense designated in the said warrant. The same County Court Judge on September 20, 1986 refused to amend the wiretap order at the request of the police to include the crime of gambling, finding that there was insufficient probable cause to justify the same. On January 11, 1987 after the completion of the narcotics investigation, the police obtained a search warrant for the defendants\u2019 residence which was based in part upon the unanticipated conversation involving gambling. The defendants now seek to suppress the evidence of gambling confiscated by virtue of such warrant."], "id": "a62ca95d-0599-4eb9-954f-8165f839d294", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense\u201d the resulting offense level \u201cincrease[s] by 4 levels.\u201d Generally, this enhancement applies when the gun facilitated or had the potential to facilitate another felony offense and applies automatically \u201cin the case of a <mask> offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs.\u201d Id. cmt. (n.14(A\u2013B)); Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1250. The Guidelines define a drug trafficking offense, in part, as \u201cany offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of, or offer to sell a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2L1.2 cmt. (n.2); United States v. Martinez, 964 F.3d 1329, 1334 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Perez, 366 F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 2004)) (\u201cAlthough section 2K2.1 does not define \u2018drug trafficking offense,\u2019 we\u2019ve said that \u2018[w]here the same language appears in two guidelines, it is generally presumed that the language bears the same meaning in both . . . [W]here two sentencing guidelines are worded identically, absent any distinctions or clarifying words noted in the Commentary, they should be interpreted and applied in the same manner.\u2019\u201d). USCA11 Case: 20-14776 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 12 of 17"], "id": "14384cd1-e47c-44f4-8d6b-1e7111780742", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Drug Trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In this prosecution for a single street-level sale of crack observed by two Housing Police officers through binoculars, it was reversible error to permit, over defense objection, background testimony from Officer Laccone regarding the \"High Intensity <mask> Act\u201d program of which they were a part and then to permit Officer Abad to explain the hierarchy of street-level drug organizations and how they operate in housing projects. Such testimony, particularly Officer Abad\u2019s, was neither brief and limited to its expressed purpose of explaining the small amount of money ($4) and drugs (two vials of crack) recovered from defendant at the time of his arrest (cf., People v Garcia, 83 NY2d 817; People v Woney, 205 AD2d 480, Iv denied 84 NY2d 835), nor \" 'carefully monitored\u2019 \u201d (People v Stanard, 32 NY2d 143, 146). Although the Trial Justice attempted to set limitations on this testimony in her pretrial ruling, she later permitted the prosecutor to exceed such limitations. In short, in order to explain the paucity of money and drugs found on defendant, there was no need to go into a full fledged explanation of illegal drug organizations, thus clearly prejudicing defendant by escalating evidence regarding a single sale of illegal drugs into testimony suggesting that defendant was part of a large-scale drug trafficking operation (cf., People v Garcia, supra; People v Williams, 204 AD2d 183, Iv granted 84 NY2d 834). Concur\u2014 Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Rubin, Kupferman and Ross, JJ."], "id": "c4a42d34-5699-45bd-b3d8-aa9ff5880bef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["A careful review of the record reveals substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision, and we discern no error in its application of the law to the facts. We agree with the trial court that, although inartfully drawn, the search warrant authorized officers to conduct a search for images-both still and moving-for evidence of Applegate's involvement in <mask>. The memory card from the tablet-internal flash media used to expand storage capacity-was likewise included within the parameters of the search warrant. Applegate's contentions to the contrary are without merit."], "id": "27dcc25e-bf67-4f99-8428-4c4a11406c31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence and falls within the \u00a7 924(c) statute. B. Merits of Espinosa\u2019s Claim Under \u00a7 924(c), it is a crime to brandish a firearm in further- ance of \u201cany crime of violence or <mask> crime.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). For \u00a7 924(c) purposes, a predicate offense quali- fies as a crime of violence if it is a felony and \u201chas as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.\u201d Id. \u00a7 924(c)(3)(A). Subsection (A) is referred to as the \u201celements clause.\u201d See St. Hubert, 909 F.3d at 337, 344\u201345. Twice this Court has held that a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery \u201cclearly qualifies as a crime of violence\u201d under the ele- ments clause. In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016); St. Hubert, 909 F.3d at 345\u201346. Eight other circuits have also held that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under \u00a7 924(c)(3)(A)\u2019s elements clause. See United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 344 (2020); United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126, 128\u201329 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 919 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Bowens, 907 F.3d 347, 353\u201354 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1299 (2019); United States v. Garc\u00eda-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 106\u201309 (1st Cir."], "id": "3731e7ca-b226-4b39-ab64-f981a6d188e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The government laid a sufficient foundation to establish Smith\u2019s expertise. Smith testified that he had worked at the Cleveland Police Department for 21 years total, including 10 years as a detective in the vice unit. He explained that he has participated in a vast number of drug investigations, controlled buys, and interviews with drug users or traffickers. Smith also said that he is familiar with slang or code words used in the drug trade and with drug dealers\u2019 tendency to use multiple phones to conduct a drug trade. He further testified that he has listened to jail calls during drug-trade investigations. Based on this testimony, the government clearly established that Smith had the \u201cknowledge, skill, experience, training, or education\u201d necessary to give his expert opinion on matters concerning <mask>. See Fed. R. Evid. 702."], "id": "566430fb-6731-4337-aba7-26d319cd23d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Even though the indictment cited 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A), the indictment adequately informed Reed that he was being charged with conduct prohibited in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(B)(i)\u2014that is, knowingly possessing, in furtherance of <mask>, a .410 gauge shotgun, bearing serial number A753311B, which was specifically described as \u201ca short-barreled shotgun\u201d with a \u201cbarrel length [of] less than 18 inches,\u201d as defined by 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 5845(a)(1). The record makes plain that, consistent with \u00a7 924(c)(1)(B)(i), Reed was properly informed that he faced a ten- year mandatory minimum sentence in the operative plea agreement and again during the district court\u2019s colloquy at the change of plea hearing. Reed expressly acknowledged he understood the penalties he was facing. Armed with this knowledge, Reed entered a plea of guilty. Given this irrefutable evidence, the statutory citation mistake in the indictment does not give rise to a claim entitling Reed to relief. See United States v. Buchanan, 574 F.3d 554, 565-66 (8th Cir. 2009)"], "id": "258af97c-c3da-4dcf-9c71-e03a881f8c2b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["This leaves Mendoza\u2019s charges for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and RICO conspiracy. We concluded above that the government presented insufficient evidence to justify those two convictions. So, by the same token, we conclude that the government offered insufficient evidence to prove that Mendoza committed either of those two crimes as an \u201cunderlying crime\u201d of <mask> or violence for the purposes of \u00a7 924(c). Hunter, 887 F.2d at 1003. Of course, the government need not \u201cseparately"], "id": "aa6a81c3-665f-447e-8ae6-9f66cb20582b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Evidence also showed that Sadler actually participated in the conspiracy. After police arrested Tempo on June 14, 2016, geolocation data showed that the x3399 \u201cPolo\u201d number moved to 15652 Eastburn, an address that Sadler often visited (and possibly where he resided), and where his children lived with their mother. When Officer Villerot called the x3399 number trying to set up another undercover purchase on June 15, 2016, a man answered the phone and directed Officer Villerot to a location. Ultimately, Officer Villerot abandoned this undercover purchase. Around the same time, officers saw Sadler leave the Eastburn house in a black Escalade that officers had previously seen near \u201cPolo\u201d drug sales. Officers pulled Sadler over and found both \u201cPolo\u201d phones in the car. When police searched the 15652 Eastburn residence, they found a digital scale, a large bag with drug residue, sandwich bags, Noscapine\u2014which is a popular heroin cutting agent\u2014documents with Sadler\u2019s name on them, and a firearm and ammunition. The jury heard evidence that these objects are commonly associated with <mask>.5 While these facts may not be enough, standing alone, to support the jury\u2019s conviction, together, this evidence shows that Sadler sought out more involvement and leadership within \u201cPolo\u201d and that he attempted to take over \u201cPolo\u201d operations after many \u201cPolo\u201d"], "id": "049f1781-ea70-4d44-a450-164f4e02448e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Association of the Bar of the City of New York published its Final Report of the Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation in 1977.9 The report is the result of a project begun shortly after enactment of the new drug laws and its purpose was to collect data concerning the functioning of the new laws and to evaluate their effectiveness. After three years of exhaustive study, the Final Report states that available data indicates that despite the expenditure of substantial resources, neither did the new law deter <mask> nor contain its spread. The Final Report\u2019s conclusion may be summarized as follows:"], "id": "1f1185ef-8f0e-414f-9509-e396668fa4b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Later, when asked to explain his reasons for the challenge, the prosecutor highlighted the fact that Domanique J. questioned \"whether the criminal *878justice system works for the most part.\" The prosecutor also noted that \"at a time when he was living with his mother, she was arrested and charged and convicted of <mask>.\" The prosecutor felt that \"he was living with her at the time, and then the fact that he has visited her in prison, certainly suggests someone who might be prone to sympathy at the prospect of somebody going to prison for a crime.\""], "id": "b3f57f53-5169-4828-ac0f-19597077b765", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant Hyne was arrested on February 1, 1989 for possession of \"crack\u201d cocaine. According to Police Officer Laura Romer\u2019s affidavit, defendant was observed driving his 1979 Chevrolet Camaro to a known <mask> location in Queens. It appears that a passenger in defendant\u2019s vehicle exited the car and was observed purchasing a controlled substance. When the passenger returned to the subject vehicle, defendant drove off. Shortly after leaving the aforementioned location, the vehicle was stopped and one glassine of \"crack\u201d cocaine was found on the front passenger seat. Seven more glassines were found on the floor of the rear passenger seat. Defendant Hyne and his passenger were both placed under arrest for criminal possession of a controlled substance and the vehicle was seized pursuant to Administrative Code \u00a7 14-140. The complaint alleges that the vehicle was used by defendant as the instrumentality of or to aid and further the commission of a crime."], "id": "74e8fe04-bce9-4622-bda2-47894b37a69c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The primary programmatic purpose must be determined by examining \u201cthe underlying reason for undertaking it\u201d as opposed to \u201cthe particular manner in which the checkpoint was conducted\u201d (Trotter, 28 AD3d at 169-170). Thus, where the Rochester Police Department checked vehicles at a checkpoint for windshield stickers, driver\u2019s licenses and registrations as part of a larger initiative aimed at detecting and deterring violent crime and <mask> in a specific target area, the stop violated the defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights and all items seized from the defendant were properly suppressed (People v Trotter, 28 AD3d 165 [2006], supra)."], "id": "b08c5f61-2614-4a59-85ce-c109a7174d8b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Drug Trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court explained that this privilege protects \u201cthe public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking\u201d by ensuring that the President and his advis- ers are \u201cfree to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.\u201d 418 U.S. at 708. The privilege for presidential communications is \u201cfundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.\u201d Id. The report at issue is a confidential communication to the President containing a Cabinet Secretary\u2019s advice on decisions delegated by statute to the President\u2014whether automobile and automobile-part imports \u201cthreaten to impair the national security\u201d and whether they should be adjusted to remove that threat. 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1862(b)(3)(A). The report is therefore a core presidential communication. See, e.g., Loving v. Dep\u2019t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (\u201ceasily\u201d holding that \u201cmemo- randa from the Army and Defense Secretaries directly to the President advising him\u201d on his statutory review of a court-martial death sentence \u201cfall squarely within the presidential communications privilege\u201d). The presidential communications privilege applies to the report in its entirety. See Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745\u201346. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the report reflects the exercise of statutory authority delegated to the President pursuant to Congress\u2019s constitutional powers to impose \u201cTaxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises\u201d and to \u201cregulate Commerce with foreign Nations.\u201d U.S. Const. art. I, \u00a7 8, cls. 1, 3. The presidential communications component of execu- tive privilege protects the President\u2019s power to faithfully execute all of the laws. Communications related to the President\u2019s independent constitu- tional functions may raise \u201cparticularly strong\u201d confidentiality concerns, Assertion of Executive Privilege Concerning the Dismissal and Replace- ment of U.S. Attorneys, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (2007) (Clement, Act\u2019g A.G.), but the privilege applies equally to communications concerning the execu- tion of statutes, see, e.g., Assertion of Executive Privilege Over Communi- cations Regarding EPA\u2019s Ozone Air Quality Standards and California\u2019s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 Op. O.L.C. 1, 3 (2008) (Mukasey, A.G.); Assertion of Executive Privilege for Memorandum to the President Concerning Efforts to Combat <mask>, 20 Op. O.L.C. 8, 8 (1996) (Reno, A.G.)."], "id": "e6c0ad2b-da55-40ef-973a-324c0aaf5122", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In sentencing the defendant, this court was mindful of the \u201cprimary\u201d objective of probation. The defendant is a troubled individual who admits to gun possession and has been previously involved in multi-state <mask> and needs supervision. According to the probation report, the defendant incurred no infractions while incarcerated, but was known to be affiliated with the \u201cbloods\u201d gang. Although while incarcerated the defendant earned a GED, his mother indicated to the Probation Department that the defendant has a history of mental health problems and needs the guiding hand of a male figure. The Probation Department recommended \u201ccounseling\u201d for the defendant. This court deems the guiding hand of the New York State Department of Probation to be necessary to insure that the defendant does not further his narcotics habit, to prevent him from associating with persons who will improperly influence him and to insure that he gets proper counseling for his emotional and physical needs. A probationary sentence can only benefit the defendant in his future well-being."], "id": "49cc5994-0160-4dd1-a232-b0c9e38e547c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Vera thus is misguided in arguing \"Officer Maltese had already finished the mission of the traffic stop-to write a citation for illegally tinted windows-when he transmuted the stop into a <mask> investigation .... Officer Maltese had finished all aspects of the traffic stop when he began the dog sniff ....\" The mission of the traffic stop was in fact not finished when the dog sniff began, because the citation had not yet been written. (See Rodriguez , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 1612 [referring to the mission \"of issuing\" a ticket for the violation, quoting Caballes , supra , 543 U.S. at p. 407, 125 S.Ct. 834 ].)"], "id": "68991c2b-ba15-49d4-a305-e3d9a9683ed6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Since it was the plaintiff who set the chain of events in motion and the injuries were proximately caused by a criminal intruder, \" 'it requires too much stretching of the imagination to hold the defendants] responsible\u2019 \u201d (Waters v New York City Hous. Auth., 69 NY2d 225, supra, relying on Palsgraf v Long Is. R. R. Co., 248 NY 339, to determine that plaintiff was not within the zone of foreseeable harm). In the absence of a duty, there is no breach and without a breach there is no liability (Kimbar v Estis, 1 NY2d 399, 405). \"[A]s a matter of policy the courts have consistently sought 'to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree\u2019 * * * and to protect against crushing exposure to liability\u201d (Russo v Grace Inst., 145 Misc 2d 242, 245, affd 153 AD2d 820). It would be unreasonable to impose liability upon defendants in the case herein where the facts conclusively show that defendants did not exercise control over the actions of the unidentified assailant. Thus, the court cannot reasonably subject defendants to liability for an unforeseeable criminal incident which was outside their control and stemmed from plaintiff\u2019s own <mask>."], "id": "693a333e-a20e-4419-8258-096fca84bc04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Continuing the Apprendi analysis, in Harris v United States (536 US 545 [2002]), the Supreme Court distinguished between factors extending the minimum, as distinguished from the maximum, sentence. (Id. at 566.) It reviewed the federal <mask> statute, which extended the minimum sentence if the court found that a gun had been \u201cbrandished\u201d during the crime. Sustaining the conviction, the Court held that although factors extending the outer, or maximum, parameters of a sentence are elements which must be pleaded in (federal) indictments and proved to a jury, those factors extending the minimum penalty are sentencing considerations, properly left to the court alone. (Id. at 568.)"], "id": "e41009d4-a9aa-42a7-bbdf-26ffeb1b756f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["This factual summary is based on police reports in the augmented record as defendant waived preparation of a full probation report. Two officers were on patrol in a marked car in the early morning. As they drove through an area \"known to have a lot of <mask>,\" they noticed a car in a parking lot with the driver's door open. Defendant was in the driver's seat, and another man was also in the car. A woman was standing next to the driver's door. When an officer approached, the woman walked away and ignored the officer's questions about what she was doing there. Defendant disclosed his name and informed the officers that he owned the car. After a records check revealed that defendant was on probation with search terms, the officers conducted a probation search of the car. In the fuse panel on the driver's side, an officer found a working scale and a black container with 14 hand-rolled cigarettes inside. The cigarettes contained a green leafy substance and crystal shards that later tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine."], "id": "b53e5ce3-d403-44d5-9f32-dea58534bcbb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["A careful review of the record reveals substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision, and we discern no error in its application of the law to the facts. We agree with the trial court that, although inartfully drawn, the search warrant authorized officers to conduct a search for images-both still and moving-for evidence of Applegate's involvement in <mask>. The memory card from the tablet-internal flash media used to expand storage capacity-was likewise included within the parameters of the search warrant. Applegate's contentions to the contrary are without merit."], "id": "d3d6cf54-cab5-458a-9893-8ef7beb50f5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*568We are also not persuaded by the appellate division's reliance on Vega , supra , 130 Cal.App.4th 183, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 700. (Moore , supra , 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. Supp. 15-16, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 132.) The Vega court held the criminal laboratory analysis fee does not apply to defendants convicted of conspiracy to transport cocaine because it is not a punishment. (Vega , at p. 185, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 700.) The Vega court reached this conclusion by reasoning: \"It is clear to us the main purpose of ... section 11372.5 is not to exact retribution against drug dealers or to deter drug dealing (given the amount of money involved in <mask> a $50 fine would hardly be noticed) but rather to offset the administrative cost of testing the purported drugs the defendant transported or possessed for sale in order to secure his [or her] conviction. The legislative description of the charge as a 'laboratory analysis fee' strongly supports our conclusion, as does the fact the charge is a flat amount, it does not slide up or down depending on the seriousness of the crime, and the proceeds from the fee must be deposited into a special ' criminalistics laboratories fund' maintained in each county by the county treasurer.\" (Vega , at p. 195, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 700.)"], "id": "64920233-fcf9-45d8-837f-c98e22c2b998", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense\u201d the resulting offense level \u201cincrease[s] by 4 levels.\u201d Generally, this enhancement applies when the gun facilitated or had the potential to facilitate another felony offense and applies automatically \u201cin the case of a <mask> offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs.\u201d Id. cmt. (n.14(A\u2013B)); Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1250. The Guidelines define a drug trafficking offense, in part, as \u201cany offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of, or offer to sell a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2L1.2 cmt. (n.2); United States v. Martinez, 964 F.3d 1329, 1334 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Perez, 366 F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 2004)) (\u201cAlthough section 2K2.1 does not define \u2018drug trafficking offense,\u2019 we\u2019ve said that \u2018[w]here the same language appears in two guidelines, it is generally presumed that the language bears the same meaning in both . . . [W]here two sentencing guidelines are worded identically, absent any distinctions or clarifying words noted in the Commentary, they should be interpreted and applied in the same manner.\u2019\u201d). USCA11 Case: 20-14776 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 12 of 17"], "id": "a1c1f8c3-2ae5-4410-baf8-d57c260beab2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On this record, we have no such \u201cgrave doubt\u201d about whether Wright\u2019s \u00a7 924(c) conviction rested on an invalid ground. The jury unanimously found Wright guilty of all three predicate crimes. And, as already discussed, all three predicate crimes were inextricably intertwined as they stemmed from the same plan and attempt to rob cocaine from a drug dealer\u2019s stash house using firearms. See id. at 1293; see also Parker, 993 F.3d at 1265 (holding that the record made clear that if the jury relied on the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate, it also relied on the valid <mask> predicates because they were inextricably intertwined and therefore any error was harmless); Foster v. United States, 996 F.3d 1100, 1107 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying Parker and concluding, on virtually identical facts to those found in Wright\u2019s case, that the jury \u201ccould not have found that Foster\u2019s gun use or possession . . . was connected to his conspiracy to rob the stash house without also finding at the same time that they were connected to his conspiracy and attempt to possess with intent to distribute the cocaine he planned to rob from the same stash house\u201d and thus \u201cthe inclusion of an invalid predicate offense in the indictment and jury instructions was harmless\u201d). The record establishes that Wright was actively involved in the planning of, and attempt to commit, the armed stash-house robbery. Specifically, Wright met with the undercover agent several times to plan the stash-house robbery; knew the stash house had armed guards; knew that they needed an experienced robbery crew and firearms in order to steal the cocaine from the USCA11 Case: 20-14869 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 21 of 22"], "id": "ed91318c-a304-498b-8af7-7991f918b02f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b623 On the other hand, drug-courier evidence may be admitted where it \u201chas significance beyond the mere suggestion that because an accused\u2019s conduct is similar to that of other proven violators, he too must be guilty.\u201d Lee, 191 Ariz. at 546, \u00b6 19. Thus, such evidence may be used \u201cto assist a jury in understanding the modus operandi of a drug-trafficking organization\u201d or if it is otherwise \u201chelpful to a jury\u2019s understanding of the evidence.\u201d Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142\u201343, \u00b6\u00b6 22, 25. That said, an \u201cexpert may not provide an opinion comparing the modus operandi of [a drug- trafficking] organization with the conduct of a defendant in a particular case\u201d because \u201cit is the province of the jury to determine whether a defendant\u2019s conduct fits within the modus operandi of a <mask> organization.\u201d State v. Garcia-Quintana, 234 Ariz. 267, 271, \u00b6 14 (App. 2014); see also Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 143, \u00b6 25 (observing that an expert may explain how certain items \u201ccan be used to mask the smell of illegal drugs from police dogs\u201d but may not take the further step of opining that the defendant\u2019s possession of such masking agents, \u201ctogether with other behaviors, was \u2018consistent with drug trafficking\u2019\u201c)."], "id": "7dcaa639-a452-4a9e-b8fe-ccda80bb6018", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At defendant\u2019s trial, he moved for a Sandoval ruling. (People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974].) The People sought to question the defendant for impeachment purposes, should he choose to take the stand in his own defense, regarding his prior convictions, which included a prior felony conviction in Federal court. The defendant had pleaded guilty in Federal court on February 19, 1992 to possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and possession of a firearm during a <mask> crime, after having lost his motion to suppress the physical evidence underlying both those charges. In pleading guilty on the Federal case, the defendant entered a conditional plea which provided he could appeal the District Court\u2019s denial of his suppression motion."], "id": "6bd8d30b-35f3-42d2-979e-3092691dfdd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["to one predicate but not the other.\u201d Id. at 1289-90 (quotation marks omitted). The Court determined that, as in Cannon, Granda\u2019s \u201calternative predicate offenses [were] inextricably intertwined\u2014 each arose from the same plan and attempt to commit armed robbery of a tractor-trailer full of cocaine.\u201d And this \u201ctightly bound factual relationship of the predicate offenses preclude[d] Granda from showing [on collateral attack] a substantial likelihood that the jury relied solely on\u201d the one invalid predicate. Id. at 1291. Finally, for the same reason\u2014that no reasonable juror would have concluded Granda conspired to possess the firearm in furtherance of only the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy and not the <mask> crimes\u2014this Court also concluded that Granda could not establish actual innocence. Id. at 1292; see also Parker v. United States, 993 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2021) (following Granda as \u201cmaterially indistinguishable\u201d to conclude the \u00a7 2255 movant had not shown actual innocence to overcome the procedural default of his Davis claim where it was \u201cundeniable on this record\u201d that the movant\u2019s \u201cvalid drug trafficking predicates [were] inextricably intertwined with the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate\u201d). C. Wright\u2019s Davis Claim is Subject to the Procedural Default Bar Wright argues his Davis claim cannot be procedurally defaulted because the error is jurisdictional. On collateral review, a defendant can avoid the procedural default bar altogether \u201cif the alleged error is jurisdictional.\u201d United States v. Bane, 948 F.3d USCA11 Case: 20-14869 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 13 of 22"], "id": "fd332e9e-14d9-4369-9264-7442807c588e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Nadeem Makada, an immigration attorney, testified as an expert on the effect a drug-related conviction would have on a noncitizen's immigration status and what \"reasonably competent specific affirmative advice would have been at the time of [the] plea.\" Makada said a <mask> offense was an aggravated felony known in the legal community as a \"kiss of death.\" It permanently barred a noncitizen from reentering the United States and from obtaining any form of legal residency here."], "id": "f9ff13e8-29af-4606-a000-06f924539dcd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Nadeem Makada, an immigration attorney, testified as an expert on the effect a drug-related conviction would have on a noncitizen's immigration status and what \"reasonably competent specific affirmative advice would have been at the time of [the] plea.\" Makada said a <mask> offense was an aggravated felony known in the legal community as a \"kiss of death.\" It permanently barred a noncitizen from reentering the United States and from obtaining any form of legal residency here."], "id": "59d0e65b-2959-462e-85a4-87b37cc2cc9e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs on the other hand argue that their appearance in the illustration is virtually identical to the photograph taken; that they were identified by friends as appearing in the illustration and that the illustration held them up to contempt, ridicule, and scorn in their community since they were depicted as involved in <mask>. They also assert that the photo and illustration were used without their consent."], "id": "ed950cbc-d769-45ec-84b9-3e2e9c298c2a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At trial, Mr. Dincsalman testified that he just signed the subject papers without reading them. However, on further questioning, he indicated that in over 30 years of business he had probably never signed papers without reading them until, of course, the papers involved in this case. While a doubtful assertion on its face, the court having had the benefit of assessing his demeanor as Dincsalman rendered it, found the claim even more incredible and rejects it as nothing more than a convenient fabrication. Similarly incredible was the testimony of Mr. Erhan Kaatsiz. Mr. Kaatsiz took the stand as a prior felon, having been convicted on federal <mask> charges involving cocaine and heroin, and having served eight years in prison. It was shown that in their application for a New York State lottery license for their gas stations, where an applicant\u2019s prior felony conviction would be fatal thereto, the ownership interests of Mr. Kaatsiz in the gas stations was omitted. On repeated questioning throughout his testimony Mr. Kaatsiz displayed evasive responses and would not definitively admit or deny whether he had knowledge of the critical facts at issue in this case including whether he knew of the debt to Americana, knew of the confession of judgment or knew of the assignment of the lease. Specifically, when asked whether he knew of the lease assignment to Americana he testified \u201cI don\u2019t remember,\u201d and when asked whether he discussed it with Mr. Dincsalman he testified \u201cI don\u2019t think so,\u201d and when asked whether he gave his permission for a confession of judgment for the debt of one million dollars to be entered against MP Associates he testified \u2018T don\u2019t remember.\u201d In sum, he could not or would not definitively assert that he had no knowledge of the debt outstanding which his companies had run up for fuel deliveries from Americana or that he had no knowledge of the confession of judgment or lease assignment granted as security to insure further fuel deliveries for his gas stations."], "id": "2a102061-2a5b-4b0c-bc52-e34800ff71e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["with another who possesses [it] is insufficient\u201d to show possession. Id. In Ochoa, we held that the government presented the jury with sufficient circumstantial evidence from which it reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had constructive posses- sion of ammunition because he exercised dominion and control over the bedroom in which it was located. United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1105 (11th Cir. 2019) cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2553 (2020). Specifically, the government connected the defendant to the bedroom through \u201chis phones (one of which had on it a photo of Ochoa laying on the bed in the bedroom), personal identification cards, and travel papers bearing his name\u2014all of which were found in the same bedroom as the ammunition.\u201d Id. \u201cThe fact that other people had access to or may have also occupied the residence [did] not make [this] evidence insufficient.\u201d Id.; see also United States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824, 830 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding sufficient ev- idence supported a defendant\u2019s conviction for possession of a fire- arm in furtherance of a <mask> crime because the firearm was found in the defendant's bedroom and the dresser drawer con- tained her passport). Here, the government presented sufficient evidence at trial that Richards was in constructive possession of the firearms. Rich- ards\u2019s statements to law enforcement indicated that he had knowledge of the firearms in the residence and intended to use them when needed, firearms were discovered in almost every room of the house, and Richards was discovered within reaching USCA11 Case: 21-10695 Date Filed: 01/26/2022 Page: 5 of 8"], "id": "07682ca1-563a-4b50-ae3e-a993a1910dfc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The primary programmatic purpose must be determined by examining \u201cthe underlying reason for undertaking it\u201d as opposed to \u201cthe particular manner in which the checkpoint was conducted\u201d (Trotter, 28 AD3d at 169-170). Thus, where the Rochester Police Department checked vehicles at a checkpoint for windshield stickers, driver\u2019s licenses and registrations as part of a larger initiative aimed at detecting and deterring violent crime and <mask> in a specific target area, the stop violated the defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights and all items seized from the defendant were properly suppressed (People v Trotter, 28 AD3d 165 [2006], supra)."], "id": "a1b94345-ac8f-4b36-84a5-0fce04192997", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In early 1985 a police investigation led to the conclusion that the second floor apartment at 149 Highland Place in Brooklyn was being used for the packaging and distribution of heroin. The apartment was occupied by Manny Vargas, who *753the police suspected was the kingpin of this particular <mask> operation. The police set forth the facts supporting their conclusion in an affidavit and obtained a search warrant for the location. On February 9, 1985, at 8:45 p.m., the police unit consisting of approximately a dozen officers executed the search warrant and raided the apartment."], "id": "1ed165ef-ca9a-4c21-b396-bbcaa839bd5b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["There are, at present, three nightclubs operating on the block on which the premises is located. Venture proposes to open a *269nightclub with a capacity to accommodate 300 to 400 people, which will serve food, and feature both live and recorded music. The club will be open Wednesday through Sunday from 9:00 p.m. until 3:30 a.m. The nightclub will be located on the premises recently vacated by another nightclub, known as Cheetah, which petitioners label \u201cnotorious\u201d for its excessive noise, milling crowds, honking taxis, <mask>, and violent episodes, including, allegedly, a shooting. (Affirmation of urgency at 2.) Petitioners, who include local residents, community organizations, as well as a New York State Senator and a member of the New York City Council, claim that the neighborhood is already oversaturated with bars and nightclubs, and express their concern that the new club will be just as disruptive to the lives of the residents of the area as was Cheetah. Consequently, they oppose the Authority\u2019s decision to bestow a liquor license on Venture."], "id": "e506e0d6-42e9-4cc1-ad69-7ab48638abe5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Both officers testified at the instant hearing. Officer Guy testified that his informant never told him that the purchases were made within the second-floor apartment, in spite of his affidavit to the contrary. Bewildering was his further statement, that he made no personal investigations or observations to support his belief that <mask> was being conducted on the second floor, although his affidavit indicated that he did. Credulity was stretched even further, by his testimony that he read and signed his affidavit after he heard the contradicting testimony of his informant before the issuing Judge. In spite of all, he nevertheless, maintained that he believed that the affidavit was correct when he signed it."], "id": "c5d08464-ce22-49e4-9e56-9f9e2ffed4ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Crippen's second point on appeal is that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call the crime-lab chemist as a witness at trial, which he claims is a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront that witness. Again, he relies on the discrepancies in the description and weight of the drugs in the crime-lab report and in the testimony of Reese and contends that someone tampered with the evidence to overcharge him with <mask>. He argues the testimony of the chemist would have confirmed his theory."], "id": "643e2287-ee60-446c-8baa-6f0d9f135e18", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Poplar Bluff, Missouri, detectives began investigating Reed in the spring of 2014, after receiving tips from informants that Reed was trafficking heroin out of his residence and complaints from Reed\u2019s neighbors about unusually high traffic to and from the residence, consistent with <mask>. On May 21, 2014, while surveilling Reed\u2019s residence, Detectives Jason Morgan and Josh Stewart observed a known heroin addict, James Hovis, leave the residence and approach a parked vehicle with three occupants. Aware that Hovis had an outstanding arrest warrant, the detectives arrested him. During a search incident to the arrest, Hovis was found to be in possession of heroin and hydrocodone. During an interview, Hovis informed law enforcement that Reed sold him heroin from a metal tin that Reed kept in his pants pocket. Based on the information received from Hovis and his personal observations, Detective Morgan prepared an application for a search warrant covering Reed\u2019s residence and an affidavit in support of the application. A state judge issued the warrant."], "id": "de5b4e26-0eff-46ee-a9b0-f1a4392e9ea0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["However, in Watts , supra , 2 Cal.App.5th at page 231, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 202, the court concluded, contrary to the above authority, that the criminal laboratory analysis fee is a fee rather than a fine and, thus, is not subject to penalty assessments. In reaching this conclusion, the Watts court rejected the Martinez courts' interpretation of the first paragraph of section 11372.5, subdivision (a). The court explained, \"As to the statute's reference to 'total fine,' we fail to perceive how the fact that the crime-lab fee increases the 'total fine' necessarily means the fee is itself a 'fine' subject to penalty assessments. Nothing about the statute's use of the phrase 'total fine' is *495inconsistent with the conclusion that the crime-lab fee simply gets added to the overall charge imposed on the defendant after penalty assessments are calculated.\" ( Watts , supra , at p. 234, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 202.) The court also cited legislative history that \"bolsters the conclusion that the Legislature's characterization of the crime-lab fee as a 'criminal laboratory analysis fee' reflects an intent to treat the charge as an administrative fee not subject to penalty assessments\" and explained that the fee was intended to defray administrative costs, not for retribution and deterrence. ( Id . at pp. 234-235, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 202, citing People v. Vega (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 183, 195, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 700 ( Vega ) [\"It is clear to us the main purpose of Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 is not to exact retribution against drug dealers or to deter drug dealing (given the amount of money involved in <mask> a $50 fine would hardly be noticed) but rather to offset the administrative cost of testing the purported drugs the defendant transported or possessed for sale in order to secure his conviction.\"].)"], "id": "e607b212-8dfc-4e29-b578-8a5a99bee922", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["11 Elsewhere, the Aybar-Ulloa concurrence notes that \"the application of the MDLEA to Aybar[-Ulloa]'s conduct in this case\" -- i.e., conduct aboard a stateless vessel -- would likely be consistent with international law, [e]ven if we were to assume that the law of nations places limits on Congress's power under the Define and Punish Clause to subject foreign nationals on foreign vessels in international waters to our domestic criminal laws, and even if we were to assume that the United States may not assert protective jurisdiction over <mask> merely because it occurs on stateless vessels in international waters, see Robinson, 843 F.2d at 3-4."], "id": "4fa61b2d-ef02-43de-847c-5f33cd8a324b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On this record, we have no such \u201cgrave doubt\u201d about whether Wright\u2019s \u00a7 924(c) conviction rested on an invalid ground. The jury unanimously found Wright guilty of all three predicate crimes. And, as already discussed, all three predicate crimes were inextricably intertwined as they stemmed from the same plan and attempt to rob cocaine from a drug dealer\u2019s stash house using firearms. See id. at 1293; see also Parker, 993 F.3d at 1265 (holding that the record made clear that if the jury relied on the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate, it also relied on the valid <mask> predicates because they were inextricably intertwined and therefore any error was harmless); Foster v. United States, 996 F.3d 1100, 1107 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying Parker and concluding, on virtually identical facts to those found in Wright\u2019s case, that the jury \u201ccould not have found that Foster\u2019s gun use or possession . . . was connected to his conspiracy to rob the stash house without also finding at the same time that they were connected to his conspiracy and attempt to possess with intent to distribute the cocaine he planned to rob from the same stash house\u201d and thus \u201cthe inclusion of an invalid predicate offense in the indictment and jury instructions was harmless\u201d). The record establishes that Wright was actively involved in the planning of, and attempt to commit, the armed stash-house robbery. Specifically, Wright met with the undercover agent several times to plan the stash-house robbery; knew the stash house had armed guards; knew that they needed an experienced robbery crew and firearms in order to steal the cocaine from the USCA11 Case: 20-14869 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 21 of 22"], "id": "17797968-ba92-42c7-bf1f-350e3ad08bce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Evidence also showed that Sadler actually participated in the conspiracy. After police arrested Tempo on June 14, 2016, geolocation data showed that the x3399 \u201cPolo\u201d number moved to 15652 Eastburn, an address that Sadler often visited (and possibly where he resided), and where his children lived with their mother. When Officer Villerot called the x3399 number trying to set up another undercover purchase on June 15, 2016, a man answered the phone and directed Officer Villerot to a location. Ultimately, Officer Villerot abandoned this undercover purchase. Around the same time, officers saw Sadler leave the Eastburn house in a black Escalade that officers had previously seen near \u201cPolo\u201d drug sales. Officers pulled Sadler over and found both \u201cPolo\u201d phones in the car. When police searched the 15652 Eastburn residence, they found a digital scale, a large bag with drug residue, sandwich bags, Noscapine\u2014which is a popular heroin cutting agent\u2014documents with Sadler\u2019s name on them, and a firearm and ammunition. The jury heard evidence that these objects are commonly associated with <mask>.5 While these facts may not be enough, standing alone, to support the jury\u2019s conviction, together, this evidence shows that Sadler sought out more involvement and leadership within \u201cPolo\u201d and that he attempted to take over \u201cPolo\u201d operations after many \u201cPolo\u201d"], "id": "0bdca47a-84ec-4b78-b3c1-194cf0f11250", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, it is certain that, with respect to this particular language, the alternative to a generous construction is a practical destruction of the avowed purpose of the legislation. If narcotics malefactors can avoid ultimate conviction for their participation in the packaging process by the simple expedient of fleeing to another room in the \u201cfactory\u201d complex, then seldom will there be sufficient proof even to activate the \u201croom presumption\u201d. If the prosecution evidence cannot encompass a \u201cclose proximity\u201d not measured by feet or locale alone, it can serve no practical or useful purpose in the continuing fight against illegal <mask> and packaging."], "id": "f7d1c648-1aad-451f-a188-547b77d0ff45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Arebalos asserts he was unaware at the first hearing of \"extensive evidence regarding the regional narcotics task force surveillance\" of him. But, beyond speculation, Arebalos does not explain-and nothing in the record shows-what this evidence was, what was allegedly new about it, and how it was material to the suppression motion. Without such details, Arebalos's claim fails. Arebalos focuses on Adelmann's motivation for stopping Arebalos's tractor-trailer, but the trial court could reasonably find that Arebalos's counsel knew prior to the first suppression hearing that Adelmann's motivation was to investigate Arebalos for <mask>. Arebalos's counsel therefore knew *194enough to articulate the potential relevance of his leading question, which Arebalos asserts was to explain the reasons for the stop, and pursue it and similar topics at the first suppression hearing.3 He therefore had the opportunity to present these arguments at the time of that hearing; he simply did not do so."], "id": "d0fbf41a-fc22-4ba1-bfd3-1e0007f12298", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Abbie Crites-Leoni, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. substance containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), as well as a charge of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a <mask> crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B). 2 The written plea agreement preserved Reed\u2019s right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. Reed now appeals, contending the search warrant affidavit was not supported by probable cause. We disagree and we affirm."], "id": "38c7a8c4-e049-448e-aeeb-caf555f0074d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["924(c)(1) titled \u201cAn Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns.\u201d The 1998 amendment provided that \u201c[s]ection 924(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended . . . by striking \u2018(c)\u2019 and all that follows through the end of paragraph (1) and inserting the following: \u201c\u2018(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of vio- lence or <mask> crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addi- tion to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime\u2014 \u201c\u2018(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; \u201c\u2018(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and \u201c\u2018(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. \u201c\u2018(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a vio- lation of this subsection\u2014 \u201c\u2018(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or \u201c\u2018(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.\u2019\u201d Pub. L. No. 105-386, \u00a7 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469, 3469 (1998). The 1998 amendment therefore split section 924(c)(1) into two new subsections\u201418 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(1)(B)\u2014and made three major changes to the section\u2019s operation. First, new section 924(c)(1)(A) made clear that the offense created by section 924(c)(1) applies not only to any individual who \u201cuses or carries a firearm,\u201d but also to one who, \u201cin furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.\u201d Second, the remain- ing portion of subsection (c)(1)(A) imposed new minimum terms of imprisonment for specified types of firearms use. In lieu of the pre-1998"], "id": "59e0893b-2354-4345-b8a6-20f7feb41ac9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug trafficking", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["This incident seemingly occurred in an area described as a \"war zone\u201d, plagued by <mask>, vandalism, robberies and rapes where the police are unsuccessfully fighting an uphill battle to curb criminal conduct. While a landlord has a nondelegable duty* to take minimal precautions to protect *439tenants and legitimate visitors from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts (Tartar v Schildkraut, 151 AD2d 414, 415, supra; Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 513, supra; Iannelli v Powers, 114 AD2d 157, 161, lv denied 68 NY2d 604), it would be unreasonable to impose a duty to safeguard one such as the plaintiff because to do so would \"cast the defendants in the role of insurers of the safety, of the premises\u201d (Tarter v Schildkraut, supra, at 415, citing Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507, 519, supra) for those engaged in criminal activities."], "id": "30f43109-d6e4-4922-89c7-2a23a8d47c00", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Every parent knows that teenagers make mistakes. A fifteen-year-old Henry Mendoza was no exception, though his error was far more serious than most. At that young age, Mendoza joined the Canta Ranas Organization (\u201cCRO\u201d), a Californian gang known for violent extortion and <mask>. Mendoza was a member of the CRO for at least eight years and served under the leadership of two of his childhood friends, the gang\u2019s heads. All agree so far. But after this point, Mendoza\u2019s path becomes less clear."], "id": "1cf3893f-ac6b-4f54-9229-a7929d6f5321", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["There is no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the classification of cocaine within the definition of the term \"narcotic drug\u201d is arbitrary and irrational. Conceding that the statutory definition is broader than the dictionary definition, the Legislature is not required to follow the latter in applying the term to a number of different classes of drugs for purposes of legal control (United States v DiLaura, 394 F Supp 770). In assessing the gravity of a criminal offense, the primary consideration is the harm it causes to society. The Legislature, in making this assessment, could properly view criminal narcotics sales not as a series of isolated transactions, but as symptoms of the widespread and pernicious phenomenon of <mask>. Social harm in drug distribution is great indeed. The drug seller, at every level of distribution, is at the root of the pervasive cycle of destructive drug abuse (see, generally, President\u2019s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Narcotics and Drug Abuse [1967], p 7). Defendants would minimize drug trafficking by arguing that it is not a crime of violence. Because of their illegal occupation, however, drug traffickers do often commit crimes of violence against law enforcement officers and, because of the high stakes, engage in crimes of violence among themselves."], "id": "005ff888-e4eb-45c6-9d14-b477816b7c14", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Treating first the dismissal of the libel actions, there can be little dispute regarding the proper standard to be applied in determining defendant\u2019s liability for the allegedly defamatory picture. Although the infant plaintiffs are \"private\u201d persons, the subject matter of the article in issue \u2014 the involvement of juveniles in the city\u2019s wide-reaching <mask> network \u2014is unquestionably a matter \"within the sphere of legitimate public concern\u201d (Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196, 199). Accordingly, defendant may not properly be cast in damages for defamation unless it is proven that it acted in a \"grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties\u201d (supra, at p 199)."], "id": "749f3800-92e6-44cc-9413-e54579aff734", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In contrast, the chain conspiracy usually involves several layers of personnel dealing with a single subject matter, as opposed to a specific person. Drug trafficking is often cited as a classic example of a chain conspiracy inasmuch as it is characterized by manufacturing links, wholesaling links and retailing links. (United States v Bruno, 105d 921 [2d Cir 1939], revd on other grounds 308 US 287.) A single conspiracy can be proven if each link knew or must have known of the other links in the chain, and if each defendant intended to join and aid the larger enterprise. (Marcus, op. cit.; Kotteakos v United States, 328 US 750 [1946]; Blumenthal v United States, 332 US 539 [1947].) The chain theory of conspiracy has been recognized by New York State courts in a <mask> case (People v Parker, 124 Misc 2d 772), and in a stolen property fencing scheme. (People v Kiszenik, 113 Misc 2d 462.)"], "id": "70934fc0-5138-4d92-baa1-5455a2900893", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant relies on the cases of United States v Falcone (109d 579 [2d Cir 1940], affd 311 US 205 [1940]) and Direct *682Sales Co. v United States (319 US 703 [1943]). These cases are applications of the familiar principle, restated in the subsequent case of Ingram v United States (360 US 672 [1959]), that liability under the general federal conspiracy statute for a \u201c[conspiracy to commit a particular offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself.\u201d (Id. at 678, quoting Note, Developments in the Law \u2014 Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv L Rev 922, 939 [1959]; see People v Ozarowski, 38 NY2d 481, 489-490 [1976].) In Falcone, a supplier of goods otherwise in free commerce, i.e., sugar, yeast and cans, was held not guilty of conspiring with a group of distillers to operate an illegal bootlegging operation because the suppliers had only a diffuse knowledge that the goods would be used in the illegal fashion actually contemplated by the buyer, and the supplier did not have knowledge that the buyer was conspiring with other distillers in a broader illicit distillery operation. In Direct Sales, by contrast, a supplier of morphine sulphate was held to have joined an illegal <mask> conspiracy engaged in by the doctor/buyer because the supplier sold a highly regulated product not in \u201cfree commerce\u201d (id., 319 US at 710-711) \u201cin such quantities, so frequently and over so long a period [the supplier] must have known [the doctor/buyer] could not dispense the amounts received in lawful practice and was therefore distributing the drug illegally.\u201d (Id. at 705.) The defendant supplier in Direct Sales was held \u201cnot only [to] kno[w] and aquiesc[e], but [to] joi[n] both mind and hand with [the doctor/ buyer] to make its accomplishment possible.\u201d (Id. at 713 [adding that \u201c(t)he step from knowledge to intent and agreement may be taken\u201d (emphasis supplied)].)"], "id": "36f08c76-6513-4ff4-bd8c-32f1bdab7337", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["PER CURIAM: Nicole Lenae Hays pleaded guilty to drug possession, <mask>, and firearm possession charges in February 2017. The district court awarded Hays a downward dispositional departure to probation for 36 months with an underlying prison term of 160 months. After Hays tested positive for drugs on several occasions, the State moved to revoke her probation, and Hays stipulated to the violations. The district court revoked Hays' probation and ordered her to prison. On appeal, Hays argues the district court erred in imposing her underlying prison term without first ordering intermediate sanctions as mandated by K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716(c). Under the facts here, the district court was required to either impose a sanction in response to Hays'"], "id": "31bd331a-a8f1-4160-92c6-e8ac38fa23f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["704. In United States v. Ham, 628 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2011), the defendant argued that the district court erred by allowing an agent to testify whether certain quantities of crack were consistent with personal use. Id. at 805. The court emphasized that \u201cthis Court routinely allows qualified law enforcement officials to testify that circumstances are consistent with <mask> rather than personal use.\u201d Id. (quoting United States v. Alford, 332 F. App\u2019x 275, 282 (6th Cir. 2009))."], "id": "9275ee76-9ecf-49f1-bf44-8f4aae958542", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Neither the government\u2019s question nor Smith\u2019s response explicitly referenced Franklin\u2019s intent. Rather, after establishing that 500 grams of cocaine and 300 grams of heroin constitutes a drug-trafficker\u2019s amount, Smith defined the term \u201cdistribution amount\u201d as \u201csomeone that\u2019s trying to get rid of a lot of dope, it\u2019s not just a guy selling just an ounce and two ounces in the house and breaking it down to 10s, 20s.\u201d Given that this court has reiterated that an officer is permitted to testify that certain quantities of narcotics are consistent with <mask> rather than personal use, the district court did not plainly err in permitting Smith to testify that 500 grams of cocaine and 300 grams of heroin constitute a drug-trafficker\u2019s amount."], "id": "68933b41-7bc0-420c-9cdc-8902c5365d98", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Hernandez Lopez argues the district court\u2019s application of \u00a72D1.1(b)(12) was improper because the house was primarily a family home. This assertion is inconsistent with our precedent, which demonstrates that the enhancement applies when the defendant \u201cuses the premises for the purpose of substantial drug-trafficking activities, even if the premises was also [his] family home at the times in question.\u201d Id. at 707. Here the officers found distribution-level quantities of methamphetamine and a scale in the basement of the house where Hernandez Lopez lived with Escamilla and her children. The evidence established Hernandez Lopez stored methamphetamine in the basement and he dried and prepared the methamphetamine for distribution in the basement. Escamilla told the officers that Hernandez Lopez did not allow her or the children into the basement, and only his belongings were stored there. And, while there is no evidence of actual distribution occurring in the basement, the commentary to \u00a72D1.1(b)(12) explicitly states that maintaining a premises for the purpose of <mask> includes storage of the drugs. USSG \u00a72D1.1(b)(12), comment. (n.17); see also United States v. Garcia, 774 F.3d 472, 474-75 (8th Cir. 2014) (2-level enhancement appropriate where defendant stored drugs in a detached garage). The enhancement was appropriately applied here."], "id": "fcb59fc8-7c80-47f6-8fdd-00b16eff3700", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 2005, Thompson was charged in a 49-count superseding indictment for his involvement in the Black Disciples <mask> network. He pled to a drug conspiracy count. At sentencing, the district court applied enhancements for Thompson\u2019s role as organizer and leader of the gang\u2019s drug activity, possessing and using a gun in connection with the drug dealing, and obstructing justice by lying to the court about his role in the Black Disciples during his plea colloquy. Though the government previously agreed to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility as part of the plea deal, the district court denied the offense level reduction based on Thompson\u2019s false statements. The resulting Guidelines advisory range was life imprisonment. In the end, the district court sentenced Thompson to 540 months (45 years)."], "id": "da50b281-e552-440b-8f52-837b34a3a4ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Using a confidential informant, the police made three methamphetamine purchases from Bone at his Des Moines, Iowa residence in September and October 2019. Thereafter, they obtained a search warrant for his home. The subsequent search revealed 42 grams of methamphetamine, a loaded .380 semiautomatic handgun, and other items relating to <mask>. After having his rights read to him, Bone admitted to possessing and selling methamphetamine and to owning the handgun."], "id": "316ebdb2-e273-486b-ba14-ea542cd6e2c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At trial, the State included Roberts' prior conviction for distribution of methamphetamine in its opening statement, presented it as a stipulation at the end of its case, discussed it in its closing statement, and included it as a factor in its jury instructions. The State clearly relied on Roberts' prior conviction\u2014but for what? Because Roberts never put his intent to possess drugs or paraphernalia in dispute\u2014it is reasonable to assume the jury might have used Roberts' prior bad acts evidence to prove something other than intent, such as propensity. Other than his prior conviction, the State relied on evidence from Officer Cooper, a forensic scientist who testified that the substance in the suitcase was in fact methamphetamine, and Sergeant O'Hare who was at the scene but also testified regarding his experience with common <mask> practices. There was no testimony from Kennedy or anyone else identifying the owner of the suitcase. Officer Cooper provided circumstantial evidence, such as a lack of items labeled with Kennedy's name, that could demonstrate the suitcase did not belong to Kennedy. There was also circumstantial evidence that the suitcase did not belong to Roberts, such as its location, Roberts' contemporaneous statements at the scene, Kennedy's admission to recent drug use, and Kennedy's description of the needles used for his own drug use matching those found in the suitcase."], "id": "40d0c614-b261-4815-8162-79f42b048e55", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At trial, the State presented the following evidence. Detective Napier of the Fort Smith Police Department arranged a controlled buy of methamphetamine. In a controlled buy, an officer gives a confidential informant (C.I.) money to purchase drugs from a suspect. Detective Napier was investigating Curtis Jones for <mask> and arranged for a C.I. to perform a controlled buy with Jones. Detective Napier met with the C.I. on the morning of December 22, 2015, and had her purchase methamphetamine from Jones. The C.I. went to Jones's residence and purchased $200 worth of methamphetamine from Jones."], "id": "a8dcbc68-a55e-4261-8568-f98179e6aa5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Brewer, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975), in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a drug possession conviction where the district court had excluded evidence of how a testifying informant, who was the sole witness to the crime, had previously framed an individual in another criminal case. Id. at 562. Unlike in Brewer, R.E. did not testify at trial and was not the only witness to the drug deal that furthered the alleged <mask> conspiracy charged. Instead, video and audio evidence captured both the defendants' conversations \u2013 conspiratorial actions in and - 40 - (intentional or not) would have done little to help the defendants,"], "id": "a6f0da1c-7b25-4222-932b-f611c9c231e7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On both Defendants\u2019 conspiracy charges, the jury found that the crimes \u201cresulted in the death . . . [and] serious bodily injury of another person.\u201d (Def. Tempo Jury Verdict, R. 665, Page ID #3629; Def. Sadler Jury Verdict, R. 667, Page ID #3643). On Tempo\u2019s <mask> charges, the jury found that one count \u201cresulted in . . . death\u201d and four counts \u201cresulted in . . . serious bodily injury.\u201d (Def. Tempo Jury Verdict, R. 665, Page ID ##3629\u201331). Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 18"], "id": "4a8aedb7-8303-4845-b7c2-f44669e2c847", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Tempo next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his five charges under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). He raises two issues in this regard: (1) whether he can be held liable for every \u201cPolo\u201d <mask> under \u00a7 841(a), and (2) whether \u201cPolo\u201d drugs caused the death and injuries of the four overdose victims as required under \u00a7 841(b)(1)(C)."], "id": "d5e97f2c-803d-4142-be03-8c9a0408d7b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court admitted a February 2011 letter written by a deputy district attorney to a judge in a different case, regarding a probation hearing for prosecution witness Sabino Cabral (the Letter). The Letter states that Cabral is a material witness in the case against Aleman and Medrano, and was recently convicted in Arizona, in violation of his California probation. It continues, \"Mr. Cabral testified at the preliminary hearing as a witness for the prosecution.... His testimony detailed the inner workings of a <mask> ring and the murder of a motorist on the 101 freeway. He has put *685himself at great personal risk by cooperating in this murder prosecution. [\u00b6] To our knowledge he has not received leniency for his cooperation to date.\""], "id": "c5ba95ce-b7cc-477a-a714-9a430a7e042c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On questioning by Medrano's counsel, Cabral denied receiving leniency and denied that he testified about a <mask> ring, causing defense counsel to ask if the Letter is \"a lie\" adding, \"You've never in your life detailed or testified about the inner workings of a drug distribution ring ... yet when the prosecutor asked you about it, you seemed to agree with it, correct?\" When Cabral answered \"yes,\" defense counsel said, \"That's a dang lie. That statement is a lie because you've never done that, have you?\" Cabral replied, \"No.\""], "id": "ed5d8b0a-8569-4672-9b56-96be07d71714", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["There was no direct evidence admitted of a drug ring rivalry between defendants and the victims, only that they \"had a beef\" or engaged in altercations. No one proved that the victims were drug dealers, so the \"beef\" could have been anything-a family dispute, or disrespectful behavior. Even if the jury inferred that the beef was a <mask> rivalry, it went toward proving a motive for the seemingly unprovoked shootings, while the unarmed victims were driving down the road."], "id": "ff00e151-1fde-47b7-b10e-ceffe8fbdd2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Despite defendants' best efforts to crush Cabral, the jury elected to believe his testimony against friends that he saw almost daily in 2008. The jury was *696informed that Cabral had immunity, but was not protected from a perjury charge. Owing to the Letter defendants used for impeachment, the jury knew that Cabral may have received leniency for his testimony, and was involved in a <mask> ring. The defense missed no opportunity to paint Cabral as a criminal unworthy of credence; they were not prevented from mounting a defense. As Aleman concedes, credibility is decided by the jury. (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 41, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520 [\" 'it is not a proper appellate function to reassess the credibility of the witnesses' \"].)"], "id": "ac1fa1eb-2acd-4bf6-994d-c86d2d98eb0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The DDLA's genesis is the \"Model Drug Dealers Liability Act\" (the Model Act) presented to state legislators in the early 1990's by the \"American Legislative Exchange Council\" to provide \" 'a means for parents and others to obtain monetary damages from drug dealers for the injuries caused by drugs to their family and communities.' \" (145 Am.Jur. (rev. 2017) Trials \u00a7 2.) More than 20 states have adopted the Model Act or a version of it. (Ibid .; see, e.g. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-124-101, et seq. ; Col.Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-21-801, et seq. ; Ga. Code Ann., \u00a7 51-1-46 ; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann., \u00a7 663E-1, et seq. ; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. \u00a7 691.1601, et seq. )8 The Council's Web site currently describes the goals of the Model Act: \"(1) to allow all persons and companies harmed by illegal drugs to bring suit for damages against all persons who are part of the <mask> network within their 'target community'; (2) to deter people from becoming part of the drug distribution network; and (3) to encourage users to seek treatment and encourage companies to provide treatment, knowing that reimbursement may be possible from drug dealers themselves.\" (http://www.modelddla.com/Imposing_Products_Liability_ for_Illegal_Drugs.htm.)"], "id": "2775cc0f-4300-4135-b21a-034820aef34b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The facts of Phillips are somewhat convoluted but offer an instructive parallel. Ms. Phillips and her husband attempted to sue a company (Cooper Laboratories, Inc.) that succeeded to the liabilities of a company (SMP-NY) that had purchased, for adequate consideration, a fertility <mask> business from E.S. Miller Laboratories, Inc. (Miller). ( Phillips , supra , 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1652, 1655, 264 Cal.Rptr. 311.) Miller and SMP-NY were both subsidiaries of Nestle, and after Miller sold the drug distribution business to SMP-NY, Miller continued as a profitable subsidiary, running warehouse operations for a decade until Nestle dissolved it. ( Id. at p. 1658, 264 Cal.Rptr. 311.) When plaintiffs sought to hold Cooper strictly liable for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of Ms. Phillips having ingested Miller's fertility drug, they failed. Cooper was not liable under Alad because the transfer of the drug distribution business from Miller to SMP-NY did not cause \" 'the virtual destruction of the [Phillipses'] remedies against' \" Miller. ( Id. at p. 1657, 264 Cal.Rptr. 311.) Miller had \"continued as a separate viable corporate entity\" and in the ensuing decade \"was more profitable as a warehouse operation than it had been as a pharmaceutical operation.\" ( Id. at p. 1658, 264 Cal.Rptr. 311.) So, here, NCRS continued as a viable corporate entity after the sale of its car rental business, until its assets and liabilities were assumed by merger with General Motors. Nothing about the sale of its assets to New NCRS inhibited, let alone destroyed, Hernandez's remedies against NCRS, as she could have proceeded against NCRS or, after the merger, against General Motors for years after the sale to New NCRS."], "id": "9cd0aaa1-ba8b-4917-b800-fd35529e062d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Again, Appellant argues that State offered no evidence that he agreed to the conspiracy while in Brown County and also that he committed an overt act there to further the illegal <mask> ring in that county. We disagree that the State is required to do so to establish Appellant's guilt of engaging in organized criminal activity. Rather, the State must prove that Appellant conspired to commit an enumerated crime with the specific intent of participating in the criminal activity with a combination of persons and that he also possessed the intent to participate in the profits of the combination. PENAL \u00a7 71.02(a). And Article 13.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted with the statute creating the organized criminal activity *343offense, provides a special venue rule. \"This is similar to the portion of the venue provision dealing with conspiracy that permits prosecution for conspiracy in \" 'any county in which one or more of the conspirators does any act to effect an object of the conspiracy.' \" Id. \"It is intended to permit placing venue in any of a large number of counties when the combination is an extensive one. There is no requirement that the defendant have committed an act in that county because the offense can be merely agreeing to commit an enumerated offense.\" George E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, 40 Texas Practice Series: Criminal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 5:26 (2016). Thus, venue is proper where the engaging in organized criminal activity occurs. See 1 D. Mark Elliston & Terrence W. Kirk, Texas Practice Guide: Criminal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 2.23 (2016); see also Ford v. State , 282 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, no pet.)."], "id": "6aacdd1d-9266-4f50-ba19-7897ce2f29a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug distribution", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Therefore, the possession of cash in close proximity in both time and location to . . . where drugs were seized \u2013 and here it would be the shed which is up the stairs from the kitchen area \u2013 would be probative of <mask>. That the possession of that money and the secretion of that money . . . whether it be a space heater or in some sort of electrical socket in a wall shows . . . not only the proceeds of drug distribution which the State seeks to prove, but also a recognition or consciousness of guilt that the defendant chooses to hide that in the wall or a space heater."], "id": "7d824a00-77c0-4ba0-a1dc-a1029d8fe978", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["This is a special proceeding to declare a forfeiture of respondent\u2019s 1987 Volkswagen which was seized during the course of his arrest on a <mask> charge. The affidavit of the arresting officer states that he observed respondent arriving in *130his vehicle at a \"known drug location\u201d, then saw him exit the vehicle and enter an abandoned building where he purchased a white glassine envelope alleged to contain heroin. After returning to the vehicle and driving away, respondent was apprehended and placed under arrest and his vehicle seized."], "id": "a714121a-d6b8-42e1-9b19-2e51e3690e8b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Gutierrez likened the choice he faced between breath and blood testing to a defendant arrested in his car for <mask> who is then given a choice between two searches: a warrantless search of his car, which the constitution allows ( Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 350, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 ), and a warrantless search of his cellphone, which it does not ( Riley v. California , supra, 134 S.Ct. 2473 ). Counsel argued that if the suspect in this hypothetical chose the cellphone search, we would not consider it a valid search incident to arrest even though the suspect had chosen the cellphone search over a search that would have been a valid search incident to arrest. Counsel's argument is creative, but unpersuasive."], "id": "cc5ade11-a43d-4ab4-aae2-82156943cde1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant did not believe the police had the right to stop him and was very upset about the procedure. The defendant did not want the police officers to search him and tried to stop any search. The defendant struggled with the police officers and refused to be handcuffed. Eventually the defendant was handcuffed, arrested, and brought back to the police station. He was charged with harassment, resisting arrest, and felony <mask> (a search of the defendant incident to his arrest revealed drugs on his person)."], "id": "4a155f03-fd98-41c5-9a81-36f49395edc9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["As an initial matter, Penal Law \u00a7 220.78 contains six subdivisions. Subdivision (1) is concerned with a person who helps another person \u201cwho is experiencing a drug or alcohol overdose or other life threatening medical emergency.\u201d (Id.) Subdivision (1) is the relevant subdivision here. The People ask the court to interpret subdivision (1) as being applicable (in regard to crimes under Penal Law art 220) only to crimes of possession of controlled substances, or involving paraphernalia, where the prosecution thereof relies on evidence obtained by the authorities as a result of the defendant seeking health care for another person who is experiencing an overdose or other life threatening medical emergency. The People assert the defendant here has not been charged with either a <mask> or a drug paraphernalia crime, and, therefore, the People argue Penal Law \u00a7 220.78 does not apply to this case."], "id": "6278a159-121f-4729-acbc-9e92717efa3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Retribution is a recognized objective of criminal punishment (Notey at 282). But if a sentence of 25 years to life is appropriate for a getaway driver convicted of felony murder and reckless endangerment, why is a greater punishment warranted for defendant in the present case, convicted of only <mask> and reckless endangerment? Finally, to visit greater retribution on a defendant who was permanently disabled as a result of his crime serves no compelling penological objective (Notey, 72 AD2d at 282). The consecutive sentences imposed in this matter do not promote fairness in our criminal justice system and can only be regarded as unduly harsh and excessive."], "id": "d085d704-4706-4f4d-9d9b-af69b7224d6a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cproject manager interview \u201c2. The project manager or his representative will interview the tenant in order to discuss the problem which may lead to termination of tenancy, seek to ascertain the facts involved, and, when appropriate, seek to assist the tenant by securing outside help. \u201cthe tenancy administrator \u201c3. If remedial action by the Manager fails, or if the Manager believes that termination of tenancy is the appropriate course of action, he shall submit the entire file, together with his written recom*65mendations and the reason therefor, to the Tenancy Administrator for review and appropriate action. If the case is based on non-desirability, the Manager shall consider in reviewing the file, among other things, the extent of the impact of the behavior of the tenant\u2019s family upon the project. If the Tenancy Administrator finds, after review of the file that a basis for termination of tenancy proceedings exists, the file shall be referred to the Legal Department for the preparation of a Notice of Charges.\u201d There is no dispute that no such discussion was had with petitioner. Rather, respondent asserts that such a discussion is not required before a manager forwards the matter for a hearing because the charge involved allegations of criminal drug activity. Respondent cites no authority for this distinction between \u201ccommon breach of rules and regulations, such as untimely payment of rent or improper disposal of garbage\u201d and alleged <mask>. (Respondent\u2019s mem of law at 11.) On the contrary, the Housing Authority Termination of Tenancy Procedures state at the outset that they \u201cdeal with termination of tenancy brought on any of the following grounds: Non-Desirability, Breach of Rules and Regulations, Chronic Breach of Rules and Regulations, Chronic Delinquency in the Payment of Rent, Non-Verifiable Income, Assignment or Transfer of Possession, Residual Single Person Occupancy and Misrepresentation\u201d (H 1). Moreover, the language of the Termination Procedures (H 2) is that the manager \u201cwill,\u201d not \u201cmay,\u201d interview the tenant. Indeed, respondent\u2019s interpretation is contradicted by the analysis in Escalera v New York Hous. Auth. (924 F Supp 1323, 1328 [SD NY 1996]), where the court identified the project manager interview as the first of the four decision-making levels provided for in the consent decree underlying the Termination of Tenancy Procedures.6"], "id": "57be8a1f-a587-4d92-b919-c116b2dd2ed5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["6. get her to strip for her dad\u2019s friend because they needed money, but she would not do it. M.B. was so upset that the mandated reporting party called 911 so an officer could go check on her. The referral was substantiated for general neglect and deemed inconclusive for exploitation. Mother had a criminal history dating back to 2000, including various misdemeanor offenses such as <mask>, driving under the influence, petty theft, and elder cruelty. On September 3, 2020, the agency filed a petition on behalf of Joshua, Matthew, M.B., and M.S., contending they came within the juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect). It was alleged the children had suffered or were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness resulting from mother\u2019s inability to protect them due to substance abuse issues, mental health issues, domestic violence issues with Joshua\u2019s father, and failure to provide an appropriate home. As to Joshua, Matthew, and M.B., it was further alleged they came within the juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling) based on mother\u2019s previous dependency case involving M.S. At the detention hearing on September 4, 2020, the juvenile court ordered the children detained from mother. That day, the social worker provided mother with referrals for parenting, individual counseling, and clinical assessments for mental health and medication and substance use disorders. The agency\u2019s combined jurisdictional/dispositional report contained a social history of mother that was conducted in January 2019. Mother reported first using methamphetamine when she was 17 years old. She had previously undergone a mental health assessment, and the clinician informed her she had PTSD and bipolar disorder that may be substance induced. Mother further reported she was prescribed medication for depression through another clinician."], "id": "caaad9dc-bb52-4f09-aae1-b0288d85b376", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["6. get her to strip for her dad\u2019s friend because they needed money, but she would not do it. M.B. was so upset that the mandated reporting party called 911 so an officer could go check on her. The referral was substantiated for general neglect and deemed inconclusive for exploitation. Mother had a criminal history dating back to 2000, including various misdemeanor offenses such as <mask>, driving under the influence, petty theft, and elder cruelty. On September 3, 2020, the agency filed a petition on behalf of Joshua, Matthew, M.B., and M.S., contending they came within the juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect). It was alleged the children had suffered or were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness resulting from mother\u2019s inability to protect them due to substance abuse issues, mental health issues, domestic violence issues with Joshua\u2019s father, and failure to provide an appropriate home. As to Joshua, Matthew, and M.B., it was further alleged they came within the juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling) based on mother\u2019s previous dependency case involving M.S. At the detention hearing on September 4, 2020, the juvenile court ordered the children detained from mother. That day, the social worker provided mother with referrals for parenting, individual counseling, and clinical assessments for mental health and medication and substance use disorders. The agency\u2019s combined jurisdictional/dispositional report contained a social history of mother that was conducted in January 2019. Mother reported first using methamphetamine when she was 17 years old. She had previously undergone a mental health assessment, and the clinician informed her she had PTSD and bipolar disorder that may be substance induced. Mother further reported she was prescribed medication for depression through another clinician."], "id": "dcf1653d-ff78-4c5f-ba3c-f7b6f4967e85", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Wallach, J. The suppression court\u2019s erroneous ruling, in this <mask> case, was based in part on an incomplete finding of facts. The unrefuted testimony in the record reveals that shortly after 9:00 p.m. on a late winter evening in 1992, uniformed Police Sergeant Gildea and Officer Fraiser chased and stopped a livery cab they had just observed running a red light on Fordham Road in the Bronx. Approaching with their weapons bolstered, Fraiser went to the driver\u2019s side while Gildea took a position outside the passenger side, where he could observe the two occupants in the rear seat."], "id": "cc5a4d6c-e1e4-4d51-bdbb-f31d18501d2a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["obstruction of justice charges. Defendant Demarco Tempo appeals his convictions and sentence on a drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(b)(1)(A)\u2013(C), 846; <mask> and distribution charges under \u00a7 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and a drug possession and distribution near a school charge under \u00a7\u00a7 841, 860. Defendant Kenneth Sadler challenges his convictions and sentence on a drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(b)(1)(A)\u2013(C), 846; a drug possession and distribution near a school charge under \u00a7\u00a7 841, 860; a felon in possession of a firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(1); a conspiracy to obstruct justice charge under \u00a7 1512(k); and witness tampering charges under \u00a7 1512(a)(2)(A). For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM Tempo\u2019s convictions and sentence, AFFIRM Sadler\u2019s convictions, but VACATE Sadler\u2019s sentence, and REMAND for a new trial on the sole question of whether Sadler was within the chain of distribution as required before imposing an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(b)(1)(C)."], "id": "53c48903-3154-48ce-975d-0270d102e208", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On November 4, 2014, the voters of California enacted \"The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act\" (hereinafter Proposition 47), which became effective the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, \u00a7 10, subd. (a).) Proposition 47 changed portions of the Penal Code and Health and Safety Code to reduce various <mask> and theft-related offenses from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by certain ineligible offenders. (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362.) Section 3 of the initiative specified it was the \"purpose and intent of the people of the State of California to:\" \"[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession,\" \"[a]uthorize consideration of resentencing for anyone who is currently serving a sentence for any of the offenses listed herein that are now misdemeanors,\" \"save significant state corrections dollars on an annual basis ... [and] increase investments in programs that reduce crime and improve public safety, such as prevention programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment.\" (Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, p. 70, \u00a7 3, subds. (3), (4), (6).) The electorate also directed that Proposition 47 \"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.\" (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1222, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 907.)"], "id": "1e63b294-3f63-4ce6-b190-9516ab4c5cc0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": [" The <mask> count was properly joined with the other counts in the indictment, because there was overlapping evidence that tended to prove both the drug charge and the charges relating to the original incident (see CPL 200.20[2][b]). Evidence of the original incident was relevant to explain how defendant came to be arrested for the drug charge, and evidence of defendant's flight from the police was relevant to all the charges (see People v Johnson, 48 NY2d 925, 926 [1979]; People v Khan, 174 AD2d 510, 510 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 968 [1991]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER"], "id": "5f436193-291d-4756-8427-89c3db2640c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*315Simply put, New York has jurisdiction to prosecute, as an accomplice to <mask>, one who sent the drugs from another state to his fellow conspirators in New York. That conclusion is only underscored by the provisions of CPL 20.60 (2) which, as noted, state that one who causes property to be shipped to New York is \u201cdeemed to have personally transported\u201d it to New York and \u201cto have personally made . . . delivery\u201d in New York. Under that rale, defendant is deemed to have been present in New York when Federal Express delivered to the coconspirators the pills he had tendered to that company for shipment."], "id": "b82e9272-e2b3-41ab-a043-7c82d5eafc4c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our Supreme Court has stated that an \"essential element[ ]\" of every <mask> case is that the defendant possessed a controlled substance \" 'in a quantity usable for consumption or sale.' \" ( People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1184, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081 ; People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1242, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717 ). Accordingly, under the official instruction that states the elements in most simple-possession drug cases, the jury is told that the prosecution must demonstrate that \"[t]he controlled substance was in a usable amount.\" ( CALCRIM No. 2304.) Likewise, our opinion today states that an element of the *358defendant's Penal Code section 4573.6 crime was that the drug was in an \"amount sufficient to be used as a controlled substance.\" (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 343.)"], "id": "36a1e783-e140-4152-89da-107c9c5e8788", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Harlee argued that severance was required because of possible prejudice that might result to him from the jury hearing about his codefendant\u2019s alleged <mask>. The evidence would show that defendants were best friends and that Harlee had stayed at Summers\u2019 apartment the night before. Additionally, defendant Harlee argued that the drug counts were not properly joined in the indictment with the assault and robbery counts."], "id": "9a3fd940-405a-40c2-985f-ddc48bd6a14c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In denying the suppression motion regarding the Federal firearms prosecution, the court saw no impropriety with the BATF agent\u2019s search of the premises under the State warrant, even though his goal was completely separate and distinct from the State goal, and there existed probable cause to obtain a Federal warrant. The court found that the State warrant was acquired in good faith and that there was collaboration on the part of the State and Federal agencies, notwithstanding the fact that the BATF agent was there to investigate a crime unrelated to <mask>."], "id": "a3725c71-8ef4-4e1d-bd82-c4883bf5a59c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although the court\u2019s research had discovered no case in New York which has answered this question, it has been addressed in other jurisdictions. Thus, in United States v Bazy (1994 WL 539300, *3, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 14165, *7 [D Kan, Aug. 29, 1994], affd without op 82d 427 [10th Cir 1996]) after the defendant was legally arrested on the street for <mask> and patted down, the police detected \u201csomething in his underwear.\u201d They then placed him near a car, unbuckled his pants, and, stretching his clothes away from the defendant\u2019s waist, and reaching into his underwear with a rubber-gloved hand, removed a block of cocaine from beneath his scrotum. In upholding this search, the Bazy court first noted that while a search incident to a legal arrest extends to a full search of the person (see, United States v Robinson, 414 US 218 [1973]), such authority does not permit a strip search. (Accord, People v More, 97 NY2d 209, 213 [2002].) The court also noted that a strip search, being an invasion of personal rights of the first *485magnitude (Chapman v Nichols, 989d 393, 395 [10th Cir 1993]), may only be justified on the street upon exigent circumstances. The court then found such circumstances existed based on the probable cause that the defendant had secreted drugs in his underwear; that if they were not immediately removed, they were subject to imminent destruction or disposal, and in fact posed a health risk to the defendant who was attempting surreptitiously to push them into his rectum. Moreover, the court noted that while the search was more than a pat down, it was still limited in scope: the defendant was not required to disrobe nor were his private parts visible to the public.5 The search was therefore reasonable."], "id": "0f053b09-b10a-4be2-944b-5b796b265265", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Sections 1203.1ab and 1210.1 and Health and Safety Code section 11551 do not authorize the trial court's order. Section 1203.1ab authorizes an order requiring, as a condition of probation, a defendant convicted of an offense involving the unlawful possession, use, sale or other furnishing of any controlled substance to pay the cost of drug and substance abuse testing, under certain circumstances. Section 1210.1 requires drug testing as a condition of probation in a case where the defendant was convicted of a nonviolent <mask> offense. (\u00a7 1210.1, subd. (a).) Defendant was not convicted of a drug-related offense. Moreover, even when it applies, Health and Safety Code section 11551, which authorizes periodic drug tests in certain circumstances, does not authorize an order requiring the probationer to pay the cost of administering the tests. ( Health & Saf. Code, \u00a7 11551, subds. (a), (d).)"], "id": "b9669991-ea67-433b-bcd0-bb773afca6a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Initially, we note that petitioner has abandoned his challenge to the finding of guilt with respect to unauthorized exchange inasmuch as his brief is limited to challenging the smuggling and <mask> charges (see Matter of Staine v Fischer, 111 AD3d 999, 999 [2013]). With respect to those charges, a portion of the confidential testimony that was relied heavily upon by the Hearing Officer in rendering the determination was unavailable because the recording was indecipherable, thereby precluding us from undertaking a meaningful review (see Matter of Gallagher v Fischer, 108 AD3d 802, 802 [2013]). Accordingly, the determination must be annulled to that extent and the matter remitted for a new hearing upon those charges (see Matter of Medina v New York State Dept. of Corr. Servs., 104 AD3d 976, 977 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 859 [2013])."], "id": "1e34d273-0c6e-4ef2-b4bf-ad6db10ad5bd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cproject manager interview \u201c2. The project manager or his representative will interview the tenant in order to discuss the problem which may lead to termination of tenancy, seek to ascertain the facts involved, and, when appropriate, seek to assist the tenant by securing outside help. \u201cthe tenancy administrator \u201c3. If remedial action by the Manager fails, or if the Manager believes that termination of tenancy is the appropriate course of action, he shall submit the entire file, together with his written recom*65mendations and the reason therefor, to the Tenancy Administrator for review and appropriate action. If the case is based on non-desirability, the Manager shall consider in reviewing the file, among other things, the extent of the impact of the behavior of the tenant\u2019s family upon the project. If the Tenancy Administrator finds, after review of the file that a basis for termination of tenancy proceedings exists, the file shall be referred to the Legal Department for the preparation of a Notice of Charges.\u201d There is no dispute that no such discussion was had with petitioner. Rather, respondent asserts that such a discussion is not required before a manager forwards the matter for a hearing because the charge involved allegations of criminal drug activity. Respondent cites no authority for this distinction between \u201ccommon breach of rules and regulations, such as untimely payment of rent or improper disposal of garbage\u201d and alleged <mask>. (Respondent\u2019s mem of law at 11.) On the contrary, the Housing Authority Termination of Tenancy Procedures state at the outset that they \u201cdeal with termination of tenancy brought on any of the following grounds: Non-Desirability, Breach of Rules and Regulations, Chronic Breach of Rules and Regulations, Chronic Delinquency in the Payment of Rent, Non-Verifiable Income, Assignment or Transfer of Possession, Residual Single Person Occupancy and Misrepresentation\u201d (H 1). Moreover, the language of the Termination Procedures (H 2) is that the manager \u201cwill,\u201d not \u201cmay,\u201d interview the tenant. Indeed, respondent\u2019s interpretation is contradicted by the analysis in Escalera v New York Hous. Auth. (924 F Supp 1323, 1328 [SD NY 1996]), where the court identified the project manager interview as the first of the four decision-making levels provided for in the consent decree underlying the Termination of Tenancy Procedures.6"], "id": "6adfc821-9271-4b9e-bcac-f513c2e6da73", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In denying the suppression motion regarding the Federal firearms prosecution, the court saw no impropriety with the BATF agent\u2019s search of the premises under the State warrant, even though his goal was completely separate and distinct from the State goal, and there existed probable cause to obtain a Federal warrant. The court found that the State warrant was acquired in good faith and that there was collaboration on the part of the State and Federal agencies, notwithstanding the fact that the BATF agent was there to investigate a crime unrelated to <mask>."], "id": "43eafe0a-624a-4a29-a0e9-2687d102d05d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Retribution is a recognized objective of criminal punishment (Notey at 282). But if a sentence of 25 years to life is appropriate for a getaway driver convicted of felony murder and reckless endangerment, why is a greater punishment warranted for defendant in the present case, convicted of only <mask> and reckless endangerment? Finally, to visit greater retribution on a defendant who was permanently disabled as a result of his crime serves no compelling penological objective (Notey, 72 AD2d at 282). The consecutive sentences imposed in this matter do not promote fairness in our criminal justice system and can only be regarded as unduly harsh and excessive."], "id": "fd034d49-8bb2-489b-be39-cde13862b41f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["We find unpersuasive the defendant\u2019s contention that a New York State Police Trooper acted illegally in requiring him to exit the vehicle in which he was a passenger. The hearing evidence demonstrates that the trooper, working alone, had lawfully stopped the subject automobile for violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see, People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413; People v Pincus, 184 AD2d 666; People v Foster, 173 AD2d 841) and was engaged in placing the operator of the vehicle under arrest and conducting a search of his person at the rear of the automobile. Hence, the trooper\u2019s direction that the defendant exit the vehicle was a lawful and appropriate safety precaution (see, People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, cert denied 493 US 966; People v Sprinkler, 198 AD2d 313; People v Rodriguez, 167 AD2d 122; People v Babarcich, 166 AD2d 655). Moreover, the defendant\u2019s act of discarding a cut plastic straw containing what appeared to be narcotics residue provided ample probable cause for his arrest on a <mask> charge."], "id": "47c7da89-be58-422b-b9d8-30904e8444c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Brewer, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975), in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a <mask> conviction where the district court had excluded evidence of how a testifying informant, who was the sole witness to the crime, had previously framed an individual in another criminal case. Id. at 562. Unlike in Brewer, R.E. did not testify at trial and was not the only witness to the drug deal that furthered the alleged drug distribution conspiracy charged. Instead, video and audio evidence captured both the defendants' conversations \u2013 conspiratorial actions in and - 40 - (intentional or not) would have done little to help the defendants,"], "id": "cfb29d29-493f-4709-9da7-a950c370cf6f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant\u2019s reliance on People v Retamozzo (25 AD3d 73 [1st Dept 2005]), which involved the same trial judge, is misplaced. In Retamozzo, we held that the defendant was denied a fair trial on <mask> charges by the trial court\u2019s repeated questioning of the defendant during his direct testimony and of prosecution witnesses during cross-examination. However, in Retamozzo, the court posed questions that assumed facts that had not yet been testified to in order to bolster the People\u2019s witnesses, repeatedly interrupted the defense cross-examination of the People\u2019s eyewitnesses in order to \u201cdevalu[e]\u201d and \u201cdenigrare]\u201d the defense, and engaged in extensive questioning of the defendant to attack his credibility (25 AD3d at 76-78). This significant interference, which advocated the prosecution\u2019s case and completely undermined the defense, does not exist here."], "id": "d1dba5c4-a580-42e9-86ea-80515437e8d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The petition also alleged that mother had an unresolved substance abuse problem; a history of methamphetamine use. She reportedly had last used methamphetamine approximately two weeks prior to the incident in which minor cut his finger. Mother's probation officer reported that mother was not enrolled in a drug treatment program, had multiple positive drug tests, and was not attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Mother's criminal history included spousal battery (Pen. Code, \u00a7 243, subd. (e)(1) ), vandalism (Pen. Code, \u00a7 594, subd. (a) -(b)(1) ), and <mask> offenses (Health & Saf. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 11351, 11377, subd. (a) ). Minor's father had an even more extensive criminal history, and his whereabouts were unknown."], "id": "635261c4-83b5-48ae-bef2-82d45aced95a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The voters accomplished precisely the same result by passing Proposition 47. The initiative proposed to \"[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, *539nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>.\" (Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec., supra, text of Prop. 47, p. 70, \u00a7 3, subd. (3).) It also sought to \"[a]uthorize consideration of resentencing for anyone who is currently serving a sentence for any of the offenses listed herein that are now misdemeanors.\" (Id. at \u00a7 3, subd. (4).) The reclassification and resentencing procedure is expressly available retroactively because it applies to anyone \"currently serving a sentence for a conviction ... of a felony ... who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section.\" (\u00a7 1170.18, subd. (a), italics added.) We conclude, therefore, that the voters of California expressly changed the law for reasons of public policy in a way that is intended to affect the sentences of offenders like Gonzalez, notwithstanding the plea agreement, and that Gonzalez was therefore eligible for resentencing. Moreover, because the People conceded Gonzalez did not pose *1068an unreasonable risk of danger to the public safety, the trial court was required to grant her petition and recall her sentence."], "id": "a838bf64-39c2-4401-8070-f2dc64f3b52d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": [". People\u2019s exhibit 9 reveals that defendant was taken into custody on May 29, 2001 on charges of contempt and domestic violence. The minutes of his guilty plea in New Jersey also refer to an April 29, 2000 <mask> charge and a May 4, 2001 robbery of one Donnell Shields. There is no claim of any relationship between these charges and the May 17, 2001 Newark bar robbery or this indictment\u2019s May 15, 2001 carjacking-kidnapping-homicide charges."], "id": "e8cb6aa1-e00b-4de9-be20-833d81d0ef8e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The testimony also showed that Riggs's homelessness, instability, <mask>, and subsequent plea to a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia prevented her from engaging in visitation with her children, and the circuit court found that these factors demonstrated that the children faced potential harm if returned to Riggs's custody. We have affirmed a circuit court's best-interest finding, in part, because a parent's overall lack of stability was evidence of potential harm. Robinson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2017 Ark. App. 262, 520 S.W.3d 322. Moreover, both DHS and the tribal representative from the Cherokee Tribe were in agreement that returning the children to Riggs would be detrimental to them."], "id": "300a6395-7c71-425d-8e0f-ffb252c36716", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Turning to the case at bar, the juror in question stated that he had once used cocaine in the past and that he felt marihuana possession should be legalized. The juror admitted that he presently does not take any drugs and agrees with laws dealing with <mask> and drug sale. The juror only expressed reservations with marihuana possession, a crime which is not relevant to the charges in this case."], "id": "a403606c-4f9e-484f-9a07-fa60b71a3b75", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner claims that it presented no witnesses because the federal officials would not respond to its attorney\u2019s subpoena. Even if this is true, petitioner presented no other proof of the alleged nuisance conduct. Certainly if respondent had been engaged in ongoing <mask> and sales over the course of three years as petitioner claims, a neighbor or building employee would have made some observation of such. Petitioner makes a point of the many playgrounds and children in the complex. If respondent was dealing drugs in the subject premises or grounds, some concerned parents undoubtedly would have complained and there would be at the very least a complaint or police report."], "id": "fd6ef56a-259f-4b5c-9369-ccf71b0023a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The dispositional report filed by the San Mateo County Human Services Agency (Agency) indicated that mother was homeless after an August 2014 *394domestic violence incident with M.C., which led to arrests for both on domestic violence and <mask> charges. Mother reported M.C. \" 'punched and stomped her in the chest' \" and so she \" 'cracked him over the head' \" with a bong. Mother admitted consistent past methamphetamine use with M.C. She told the social worker she no longer used methamphetamine, but did drink alcohol. She reported a diagnosis of schizophrenia and stated she often heard voices. Mother was pregnant with M.C.'s second child and, according to the social worker, her focus appeared to be on rekindling her relationship with M.C."], "id": "32662dc6-2229-450a-ad9b-abf20e889e34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"While the petition is extremely difficult to decipher, it is apparent he does not feel he is being treated fairly when it comes to interaction with other inmates and claims that jailers have threatened to frame him for <mask>. He does not indicate that any of these actions have occurred, and the most he can assert in regards to any actual fact is that he feels uncomfortable and threatened. Not only is he seeking release from pretrial detention, he is seeking relief of dismissal of the charges against him. This is relief that cannot be obtained through habeas corpus, and further, the facts do not justify his pretrial detention release. If he has grounds for release, he should seek them through the criminal actions against him.\" (Emphasis added.) Bowers timely appealed. His appointed counsel filed an appellate brief on his behalf but Respondent, Barton County Sheriff Brian Bellendir, never submitted a brief."], "id": "98afbc1d-9472-4b42-90d1-f42a5df6b61d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Immunity from the narcotics laws was again denied to members of the Neo-American Church in North Carolina v. Bullard (267 N. C. 599 [1966]). The defendant\u2019s brief correctly points out that the North Carolina court questioned the sincerity of the defendant\u2019s claim. However, the court then went on to say: \u201c Even if the defendant were sincere and possessed and used such drugs only as required by his religious belief, his First Amendment rights did not protect him from criminal liability for such forbidden <mask>. The court said that it was true that the First Amendment permits a citizen complete freedom of religion, so that he may belong to any church or to no church and may believe whatever he will, but nowhere does it authorize him in the exercise of his religion to commit acts which constitute threats to the public safety, morals, peace, and order. The court concluded: \u2018 The defendant may believe what he will as to peyote and marijuana and he may conceive that one is necessary and the other is advisable in connection with his religion. But it is not a violation of his constitutional rights to forbid him, in the guise of his religion, to possess a drug which will produce hallucinatory symptoms similar to those produced in cases of schizophrenia, dementia praecox, or paranoia, and his position cannot be sustained here \u2014 in law nor in morals. \u2019 \u201d (Ann. 35 ALR 3d 946-947)."], "id": "b27d6d6e-72bd-4ade-89d3-426aa2c2e682", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*434Defendant, then age 29, had five prior felony convictions, four of which occurred in New Jersey and three of which involved <mask>. All occurred between 1991 and 1997. None of his prior convictions constituted violent predicates, and he was not sentenced here as a prior violent predicate felon. Nevertheless, on August 19, 2003, the court imposed the maximum sentence of 25 to life for the first-degree possession count, 1272 to 25 years for the third-degree possession count, with the sentences to run concurrently, and 27s to 7 years for the first-degree reckless endangerment count, with that sentence to run consecutively to the drug crime sentences."], "id": "2a12ee83-48e8-4492-89e5-d25aff4b80e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cEligibility. \u201cAn inmate must satisfy all criteria set forth in subdivisions (a) through (d) of this section to be eligible for merit time consideration . . . \u201c(b) Disciplinary record criteria. An inmate must not commit any serious disciplinary infraction. A serious disciplinary infraction shall be identified as behavior which results in criminal or disciplinary sanctions as follows: \u201c(1) any conviction for a State or Federal crime that was committed after the inmate was committed to the Department of Correctional Services; \u201c(2) a finding under Part 253 or 254 of this Title of violation of any of the following rules as described in section 270.2 of this Title: \u201c(i) 1.00 \u2014 Penal Law offenses; \u201c(ii) 100.10 \u2014 assault on inmate; \u201c(iii) 100.11 \u2014 assault on staff; \u201c(iv) 100.12 \u2014 assault on other; \u201c(v) 101.10 \u2014 sex offense; \u201c(vi) 101.20 \u2014 lewd exposure; \u201c(vii) 104.10 \u2014 rioting; \u201c(viii) 105.12 \u2014 unauthorized organization; \u201c(ix) 108.10 \u2014 escape; \u201c(x) 108.15 \u2014 abscondance; *995\u201c(xi) 113.10 \u2014 weapon; \u201c(xii) 113.13 \u2014 alcohol; \u201c(xiii) 113.24 \u2014 drug use; \u201c(xiv) 113.25 \u2014 <mask>; \u201c(xv) 117.10 \u2014 explosives; \u201c(xvi) 118.10 \u2014 arson; \u201c(xvii) 118.22 \u2014 unhygienic act; \u201c(xviii) 180.14 \u2014 urinalysis violation; \u201c(3) receipt of disciplinary sanctions under Part 253 and 254 of this Title which total 60 or more days of SHU and]or keeplock time-, or \u201c(4) receipt of any recommended loss of good time as a disciplinary sanction under Part 254 of this Title.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) Statutory construction is clearly a function of the courts (see, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 75; see also, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318 [1989]). The rules of statutory construction require that when the language of a statute is clear, the court must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used therein (see, Statutes \u00a7 94; see also, People v Munoz, 207 AD2d 418 [2d Dept 1994]). Moreover, Statutes \u00a7 94, Comment explicitly provides in part as follows: \u201cThe Legislature is presumed to mean what it says.\u201d"], "id": "de230052-5954-422d-b1af-48bed6cf8c35", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant did not believe the police had the right to stop him and was very upset about the procedure. The defendant did not want the police officers to search him and tried to stop any search. The defendant struggled with the police officers and refused to be handcuffed. Eventually the defendant was handcuffed, arrested, and brought back to the police station. He was charged with harassment, resisting arrest, and felony <mask> (a search of the defendant incident to his arrest revealed drugs on his person)."], "id": "f05a89a5-a31a-464a-ba5b-f8535f0c9f34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On November 4, 2014, the voters of California enacted \"The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act\" (hereinafter Proposition 47), which became effective the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, \u00a7 10, subd. (a).) Proposition 47 changed portions of the Penal Code and Health and Safety Code to reduce various <mask> and theft-related offenses from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by certain ineligible offenders. (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362.) Section 3 of the initiative specified it was the \"purpose and intent of the people of the State of California to:\" \"[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession,\" \"[a]uthorize consideration of resentencing for anyone who is currently serving a sentence for any of the offenses listed herein that are now misdemeanors,\" \"save significant state corrections dollars on an annual basis ... [and] increase investments in programs that reduce crime and improve public safety, such as prevention programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment.\" (Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, p. 70, \u00a7 3, subds. (3), (4), (6).) The electorate also directed that Proposition 47 \"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.\" (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1222, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 907.)"], "id": "df59842f-757b-438a-bae6-407d55555d37", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant Outley was denied an \u201cevidentiary\u201d hearing, and his sentence was enhanced after the trial court heard the *549defendant\u2019s attorney explain that the defendant had no intention to violate court orders which were the basis for his arrest for criminal contempt between plea and sentence. The defendant Ogtong likewise was denied an \u201cevidentiary\u201d hearing, and he received a more severe sentence after the defendant\u2019s attorney explained to the court that the defendant\u2019s arrest for a misdemeanor <mask> charge was only a technical violation and that the defendant lacked any intention to violate the court\u2019s \u201cno arrest\u201d condition.2"], "id": "eb208d73-a3cd-4054-bffe-212047abb992", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On December 14, 2004, Governor Pataki signed into law chapter 738 of the Laws of 2004, known as the \u201c2004 Rockefeller Drug Law Reform Act\u201d (DLRA), which, among other things, includes provisions that increased the weight thresholds from four to eight ounces for A-I felony <mask> and from two to four ounces for A-II felony drug possession, changed the sentencing structure for drug felonies from indeterminate to determinate sentences, eliminated life sentences, permitted certain sentenced A-I drug offenders to apply for immediate resentencing and provides for sentenced A-II drug offenders to have additional merit reductions of the minimum term of their sentences. The new law also provides for the termination of lifetime parole for sentenced class A-I and A-II felony drug offenders after three years of unrevoked parole."], "id": "ccb225d4-206f-4176-a29a-a2aec6f49953", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The testimony also showed that Riggs's homelessness, instability, <mask>, and subsequent plea to a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia prevented her from engaging in visitation with her children, and the circuit court found that these factors demonstrated that the children faced potential harm if returned to Riggs's custody. We have affirmed a circuit court's best-interest finding, in part, because a parent's overall lack of stability was evidence of potential harm. Robinson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2017 Ark. App. 262, 520 S.W.3d 322. Moreover, both DHS and the tribal representative from the Cherokee Tribe were in agreement that returning the children to Riggs would be detrimental to them."], "id": "f36fde4d-8635-44df-8900-6cc1fc6ee928", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, we note our decision comports with the stated goals of Proposition 47, which declares the \"act shall be broadly construed to accomplish its purposes.\" (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, p. 74, \u00a7 15 (Voter Information Guide).) \"One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.\" ( Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 992, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.) The Act \"also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" ( Gonzales, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 ; see Voter Information Guide, text of Prop. 47, \u00a7 3, par. (3), p. 70.)"], "id": "3df63a88-a60e-476a-a158-d9b1e7f09161", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The primary issue in Williams was whether Williams's motion to suppress was specific enough to afford the prosecution notice of the grounds for the motion. But the court also elaborated on the prosecution's failure to meet its burden of proof and the importance of requiring it to do so. ( Williams , supra , 20 Cal.4th at pp. 138-139, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52.) The facts of the case, the court wrote, \"underscore forcefully the reason behind [the] rule [that a valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice]. Deputy Hunt was surveilling defendant on suspicion of drug-related offenses and had called Deputy Oliver for assistance before defendant made the right turn without signaling. Deputy Hunt was likely looking for an opportunity to search defendant's truck. If he and Oliver truly intended to take an inventory pursuant to a preexisting policy or practice rather than to search for drugs, why did they fail to complete the inventory? Why, when they found what they assumed to be drugs, did their need to inventory defendant's truck mysteriously evaporate? Having found the drugs, the police still needed to tow the truck, but apparently they were no longer very concerned about following policy. The inference *803is strong that they were never very concerned about following policy; Hunt opened the leather bags, not because he wanted to take an inventory pursuant to a preexisting policy, but because he suspected defendant of <mask> and wanted an excuse to 'rummage[e]' for evidence.\" ( Id . at p. 138, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52.)"], "id": "988d6242-01d3-41d8-947c-f41af9c9244e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Following a six-month investigation, petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with violating the prison disciplinary rules that prohibit unauthorized exchange, <mask>, smuggling, stealing and extortion. Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty of unauthorized exchange, drug possession and smuggling and not guilty of the remaining charges. Petitioner\u2019s administrative appeal was unsuccessful, prompting this CLR article 78 proceeding."], "id": "b246d357-7a11-4299-8404-17860cacb16b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The dispositional report filed by the San Mateo County Human Services Agency (Agency) indicated that mother was homeless after an August 2014 *394domestic violence incident with M.C., which led to arrests for both on domestic violence and <mask> charges. Mother reported M.C. \" 'punched and stomped her in the chest' \" and so she \" 'cracked him over the head' \" with a bong. Mother admitted consistent past methamphetamine use with M.C. She told the social worker she no longer used methamphetamine, but did drink alcohol. She reported a diagnosis of schizophrenia and stated she often heard voices. Mother was pregnant with M.C.'s second child and, according to the social worker, her focus appeared to be on rekindling her relationship with M.C."], "id": "b041d132-9551-402d-9d7c-2f8c3668bdc7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our interpretation is consistent with the voters' overall intent in passing Proposition 47. Proposition 47 was intended to \"[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.\" (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, \u00a7 3, subd. (3), p. 70.) Petty theft by false pretenses is precisely the type of nonserious, nonviolent crime Proposition 47 was aimed towards affecting. For example, Proposition 47 also made the crimes of forgery and drafting checks without sufficient funds of less than $950 misdemeanors. (\u00a7 473, subd. (b); \u00a7 476a.) Moreover, theft by false pretenses is less likely to involve violence than a situation where a person has the intention to steal openly displayed merchandise from a store. To provide misdemeanors for that type of theft, but not for theft by false pretenses, would contradict the voters' general intent of requiring misdemeanors for nonserious, nonviolent theft crimes."], "id": "d4070530-5527-4e89-b8e6-5bd602db62b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["However, on cross-examination, petitioner testified he had abstained from illicit drugs since April 2004 \u2014 two months before his first arrest in June 2004 for <mask>. Petitioner admitted on cross-examination he has used heroin, cocaine, and marijuana in the past. Petitioner testified he receives mental health treatment, takes medications, and is supervised by parole. Although petitioner testified he now sees his daughter, he conceded that he is the sole occupant of his apartment."], "id": "db11dfa5-ae4e-464a-ae88-6ab03724e8c7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cEligibility. \u201cAn inmate must satisfy all criteria set forth in subdivisions (a) through (d) of this section to be eligible for merit time consideration . . . \u201c(b) Disciplinary record criteria. An inmate must not commit any serious disciplinary infraction. A serious disciplinary infraction shall be identified as behavior which results in criminal or disciplinary sanctions as follows: \u201c(1) any conviction for a State or Federal crime that was committed after the inmate was committed to the Department of Correctional Services; \u201c(2) a finding under Part 253 or 254 of this Title of violation of any of the following rules as described in section 270.2 of this Title: \u201c(i) 1.00 \u2014 Penal Law offenses; \u201c(ii) 100.10 \u2014 assault on inmate; \u201c(iii) 100.11 \u2014 assault on staff; \u201c(iv) 100.12 \u2014 assault on other; \u201c(v) 101.10 \u2014 sex offense; \u201c(vi) 101.20 \u2014 lewd exposure; \u201c(vii) 104.10 \u2014 rioting; \u201c(viii) 105.12 \u2014 unauthorized organization; \u201c(ix) 108.10 \u2014 escape; \u201c(x) 108.15 \u2014 abscondance; *995\u201c(xi) 113.10 \u2014 weapon; \u201c(xii) 113.13 \u2014 alcohol; \u201c(xiii) 113.24 \u2014 drug use; \u201c(xiv) 113.25 \u2014 <mask>; \u201c(xv) 117.10 \u2014 explosives; \u201c(xvi) 118.10 \u2014 arson; \u201c(xvii) 118.22 \u2014 unhygienic act; \u201c(xviii) 180.14 \u2014 urinalysis violation; \u201c(3) receipt of disciplinary sanctions under Part 253 and 254 of this Title which total 60 or more days of SHU and]or keeplock time-, or \u201c(4) receipt of any recommended loss of good time as a disciplinary sanction under Part 254 of this Title.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) Statutory construction is clearly a function of the courts (see, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 75; see also, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318 [1989]). The rules of statutory construction require that when the language of a statute is clear, the court must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used therein (see, Statutes \u00a7 94; see also, People v Munoz, 207 AD2d 418 [2d Dept 1994]). Moreover, Statutes \u00a7 94, Comment explicitly provides in part as follows: \u201cThe Legislature is presumed to mean what it says.\u201d"], "id": "f265c524-9cab-47c2-a502-2233d1af833f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Since his release in 1992 (and since his last conviction in Aug. 1987 almost 30 years ago), petitioner has not been arrested, was released from probation and pardoned for one of his <mask> charges,4 and has been a very successful and productive member of society. For example, petitioner graduated from Fordham University magna cum laude and earned a Master\u2019s degree in social work, attaining licensure to work as a licensed clinical social worker. During that period, petitioner became a member of the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), and received the Black Men of Distinction Award from New York State Senator Marty Markowitz for his contributions to community service, entrepreneurial activities, and personal achievement. Petitioner also passed New York State\u2019s Credentialed Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Counselor exam, and helped prepare students for the exam. Petitioner worked as a supervisor for the Addiction Research and Treatment Corporation in Brooklyn, became a provider of *898clinical screening and assessment services for impaired driver offenders, and was a director for a women\u2019s shelter in Brooklyn, responsible for 48 employees and compliance with state and federal regulations. Petitioner also worked as a part-time social worker for the Lower Eastside Service Center in Manhattan, providing psychotherapy to inmates pursuant to New York State parole mandate, and organizing therapy groups to combat domestic violence. And, petitioner was a part-time adjunct professor at St. Joseph\u2019s College in'Brooklyn, teaching courses in areas of health and substance abuse."], "id": "c9293329-4c0f-4252-afaa-f7e9d459f26f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["We find unpersuasive the defendant\u2019s contention that a New York State Police Trooper acted illegally in requiring him to exit the vehicle in which he was a passenger. The hearing evidence demonstrates that the trooper, working alone, had lawfully stopped the subject automobile for violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see, People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413; People v Pincus, 184 AD2d 666; People v Foster, 173 AD2d 841) and was engaged in placing the operator of the vehicle under arrest and conducting a search of his person at the rear of the automobile. Hence, the trooper\u2019s direction that the defendant exit the vehicle was a lawful and appropriate safety precaution (see, People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, cert denied 493 US 966; People v Sprinkler, 198 AD2d 313; People v Rodriguez, 167 AD2d 122; People v Babarcich, 166 AD2d 655). Moreover, the defendant\u2019s act of discarding a cut plastic straw containing what appeared to be narcotics residue provided ample probable cause for his arrest on a <mask> charge."], "id": "e2eda523-5230-4ee9-85a8-e0fad755bcc7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The primary issue in Williams was whether Williams's motion to suppress was specific enough to afford the prosecution notice of the grounds for the motion. But the court also elaborated on the prosecution's failure to meet its burden of proof and the importance of requiring it to do so. ( Williams , supra , 20 Cal.4th at pp. 138-139, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52.) The facts of the case, the court wrote, \"underscore forcefully the reason behind [the] rule [that a valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice]. Deputy Hunt was surveilling defendant on suspicion of drug-related offenses and had called Deputy Oliver for assistance before defendant made the right turn without signaling. Deputy Hunt was likely looking for an opportunity to search defendant's truck. If he and Oliver truly intended to take an inventory pursuant to a preexisting policy or practice rather than to search for drugs, why did they fail to complete the inventory? Why, when they found what they assumed to be drugs, did their need to inventory defendant's truck mysteriously evaporate? Having found the drugs, the police still needed to tow the truck, but apparently they were no longer very concerned about following policy. The inference *803is strong that they were never very concerned about following policy; Hunt opened the leather bags, not because he wanted to take an inventory pursuant to a preexisting policy, but because he suspected defendant of <mask> and wanted an excuse to 'rummage[e]' for evidence.\" ( Id . at p. 138, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52.)"], "id": "8708ed98-2f58-43b7-8b4b-ee043630ca01", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, the analysis of whether Bowers' K.S.A. 60-1501 petition may be dismissed must begin by accepting as true the allegations set forth in Bowers' initial K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. The district court failed to do this. Rather, in its order of dismissal, when discussing the petition's factual allegations, the district court found that \"it is apparent [Bowers] does not feel he is being treated fairly when it comes to interaction with other inmates and claims that jailers have threatened to frame him for <mask>.\" Thus far, this is an accurate reading of the petition."], "id": "98b601b6-8e08-49c8-a504-27c0711a65cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Despite \"the broad consumer protection\" objective underlying section 484e, the Supreme Court in Romanowski held this to be no reason to disregard the limitation to misdemeanor treatment prescribed by Proposition 47 if the $950 threshold is not crossed. ( People v. Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 913-914, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) We can discern no reason why enforcing the strong public interest in preventing identity theft is not subject to the same limitation prescribed by Proposition 47 and recognized in Romanowski . We repeat what the Supreme Court stated in Gonzales: \" 'One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.' [Citations.] The Act also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" ( People v. Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Both Page and Romanowski demonstrate the Supreme Court's view that the language of Proposition 47 should be \"construed 'broadly' and 'liberally' to effectuate its purposes.\" ( People v. Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1187, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 406 P.3d 319.) As the court pointed out in Page, \"In the voter guide to Proposition 47, the Legislative Analyst explained that under existing law, theft of property worth $950 or less could be charged as a felony 'if the crime involves the theft of certain property (such as cars).' [Citation.] Under the initiative, according to the analysis, such crimes would no longer be charged as grand theft 'solely because of the type of property involved.' [Citation.] To the extent section 490.2 is ambiguous as to its inclusion of a theft charged under Vehicle Code section 10851, these indicia of the voters' intent support an inclusive interpretation.\" ( Ibid. ) These indicia similarly support an inclusive interpretation with respect to the theft of personal identifying information charged under section 530.5, subdivision (c)(2)."], "id": "76992073-ddef-4a3a-98a7-4b0139a48e6f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The framework for the principal issues before us was summarized in Jimenez , supra , 22 Cal.App.5th at pages 1286-1288 as follows: \"On November 4, 2014, California voters enacted Proposition 47, 'The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,' which became effective the next day. [Citation.] Proposition 47 reduced certain theft-related offenses from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by certain ineligible offenders. [Citation.] ... [\u00b6] Proposition 47 directs that the 'act shall be broadly construed to accomplish its purposes.' [Fn. omitted.] One such purpose of Proposition 47 is ' \"to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.\" [Citations.] [Proposition 47] also expressly states an intent to \"[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.\" ' [Citations.] [\u00b6] Proposition 47 added several new provisions, including section 459.5, which created the crime of shoplifting. Section 459.5, subdivision (a) provides: 'Notwithstanding [s]ection 459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.' 'Shoplifting is punishable as a misdemeanor unless the defendant has previously been convicted of a specified offense.' [Citations.] Section 459.5, subdivision (b) explicitly limits charging with respect to shoplifting: ' \"Any act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.\" ' \" (Citing People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "26aaf755-4933-49bf-b5ed-c1e00c6d8d7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*434Defendant, then age 29, had five prior felony convictions, four of which occurred in New Jersey and three of which involved <mask>. All occurred between 1991 and 1997. None of his prior convictions constituted violent predicates, and he was not sentenced here as a prior violent predicate felon. Nevertheless, on August 19, 2003, the court imposed the maximum sentence of 25 to life for the first-degree possession count, 1272 to 25 years for the third-degree possession count, with the sentences to run concurrently, and 27s to 7 years for the first-degree reckless endangerment count, with that sentence to run consecutively to the drug crime sentences."], "id": "618b9226-088a-49bb-b2d1-2a00743b692a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b614 As with <mask>, circumstantial evidence may support a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. See State v. Gill, 248 Ariz. 274, 278, \u00b6\u00b6 9\u201310 (App. 2020) (evidence sufficient to uphold conviction absent any DNA evidence or fingerprints on paraphernalia). Here, however, insufficient evidence supported Morrison\u2019s using the syringe to hold heroin, let alone for the purpose of injecting heroin. See supra \u00b6\u00b6 9\u201313. Insufficient evidence, therefore, also supported Morrison\u2019s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia."], "id": "098ecee0-b91a-474d-8b18-6bb2fecc3452", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Second, the record contains evidence showing that the State connected the package, and its contents, to Shigemura. The package was addressed to Shigemura, at his residence. Within the package, the officers discovered a large quantity of methamphetamine-$12,000 worth-which supports an inference of Shigemura's possession under the totality of the circumstances. See *742State v. Smith, 850 S.W.2d 934, 944 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993) (finding sufficient evidence of <mask> where police uncovered 500 grams of marijuana hidden in a variety of locations throughout the apartment, even though there was joint possession of the apartment and the defendant had many guests the day the police discovered the drugs)."], "id": "0e8ac7ba-32c4-4dfd-829c-9a2e678bfa47", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["To convict a defendant of possession with the intent to distribute, the government must show \u201c(a) the defendant knowingly (b) possessed a controlled substance (c) with the intent to distribute.\u201d United States v. King, 339 F. App\u2019x 604, 608 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)). The defendant does not need to be in actual possession of the substances; \u201cconstructive\u201d or \u201cjoint\u201d possession suffices. United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2006). The evidence demonstrates constructive possession when it shows \u201cownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband is concealed.\u201d United States v. White, 932 F.2d 588, 589 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Gordon, 700 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1983)). <mask> may be proven either by direct or circumstantial evidence, and such evidence need not \u201cremove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.\u201d United States v. Morgan, 469 F.2d 83, 83 (6th Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v. Prieur, 429 F.2d 1237, 1238 (6th Cir. 1970)). Intent to distribute may be inferred from a large quantity of drugs. United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1065\u201366 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that the possession of one kilogram of cocaine was enough to support an inference of intent to distribute)."], "id": "5ba33d63-8dda-490b-8011-1b50d8771816", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The dispositional report filed by the San Mateo County Human Services Agency (Agency) indicated that mother was homeless after an August 2014 *394domestic violence incident with M.C., which led to arrests for both on domestic violence and <mask> charges. Mother reported M.C. \" 'punched and stomped her in the chest' \" and so she \" 'cracked him over the head' \" with a bong. Mother admitted consistent past methamphetamine use with M.C. She told the social worker she no longer used methamphetamine, but did drink alcohol. She reported a diagnosis of schizophrenia and stated she often heard voices. Mother was pregnant with M.C.'s second child and, according to the social worker, her focus appeared to be on rekindling her relationship with M.C."], "id": "642f8d9e-2459-49e3-b3b2-3c2e535a3651", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Leija's case is closer to Berney than it is to Herrera or Pearson. In both Herrera and Pearson, the <mask> crimes had the physical evidence of the drugs themselves. But in Berney, the jury could only rely on the testimony of the victim who said that Berney took her tip jar without permission. The video of the incident was"], "id": "c181d37b-1f8a-4dd4-a661-1167e499874c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*892Appellant attempts to avoid this conclusion by challenging respondent's assertion that \"[o]ne has to possess marijuana in order to smoke or ingest it.\" Appellant points out that possession is not necessarily an inherent aspect of smoking or ingesting marijuana. A person can smoke marijuana without possessing it, for example, by smoking a joint in the possession of another person. Caselaw has recognized that \"[i]ngestion ... at best raises only an inference of prior possession.\" ( People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1241, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717.) \"[D]epending on the circumstances, mere ingestion of a drug owned or possessed by another might not involve sufficient control over the drug, or knowledge of its character, to sustain a <mask> charge.\" ( Ibid . ; People v. Spann (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 400, 408, 232 Cal.Rptr. 31 [\" 'possession,' as used in [ Penal Code section 4573.6 ], *286does not mean 'use' and mere evidence of use (or being under the influence) of a proscribed substance cannot circumstantially prove its 'possession' \"].)"], "id": "a2e17dce-6bf8-4039-9063-f7c6ba7de388", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Brittney was convicted on August 21, 2014 on charges of child cruelty and felony <mask>. She was sentenced to three years of probation with a *515condition she serve 181 days in county jail. Due to a conviction for identity theft in Arizona, she was subsequently confined in state prison in Perryville, Arizona, with a reported January 6, 2017 release date.4"], "id": "ec531075-392d-49eb-a715-e35e3cc49ce1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["obstruction of justice charges. Defendant Demarco Tempo appeals his convictions and sentence on a drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(b)(1)(A)\u2013(C), 846; <mask> and distribution charges under \u00a7 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and a drug possession and distribution near a school charge under \u00a7\u00a7 841, 860. Defendant Kenneth Sadler challenges his convictions and sentence on a drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(b)(1)(A)\u2013(C), 846; a drug possession and distribution near a school charge under \u00a7\u00a7 841, 860; a felon in possession of a firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(1); a conspiracy to obstruct justice charge under \u00a7 1512(k); and witness tampering charges under \u00a7 1512(a)(2)(A). For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM Tempo\u2019s convictions and sentence, AFFIRM Sadler\u2019s convictions, but VACATE Sadler\u2019s sentence, and REMAND for a new trial on the sole question of whether Sadler was within the chain of distribution as required before imposing an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(b)(1)(C)."], "id": "afffb4eb-7375-4145-a445-7e3296ce8d3e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In denying the suppression motion regarding the Federal firearms prosecution, the court saw no impropriety with the BATF agent\u2019s search of the premises under the State warrant, even though his goal was completely separate and distinct from the State goal, and there existed probable cause to obtain a Federal warrant. The court found that the State warrant was acquired in good faith and that there was collaboration on the part of the State and Federal agencies, notwithstanding the fact that the BATF agent was there to investigate a crime unrelated to <mask>."], "id": "137b764c-8d12-4c6a-a4d6-677496d7156b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, we note our decision comports with the stated goals of Proposition 47, which declares the \"act shall be broadly construed to accomplish its purposes.\" (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, p. 74, \u00a7 15 (Voter Information Guide).) \"One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.\" ( Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 992, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.) The Act \"also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" ( Gonzales, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 ; see Voter Information Guide, text of Prop. 47, \u00a7 3, par. (3), p. 70.) Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court's order declaring E.P.'s offense a second degree burglary."], "id": "ca831225-4bfe-4cc1-8ee8-e590543eaec3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Initially, we note that petitioner has abandoned his challenge to the finding of guilt with respect to unauthorized exchange inasmuch as his brief is limited to challenging the smuggling and <mask> charges (see Matter of Staine v Fischer, 111 AD3d 999, 999 [2013]). With respect to those charges, a portion of the confidential testimony that was relied heavily upon by the Hearing Officer in rendering the determination was unavailable because the recording was indecipherable, thereby precluding us from undertaking a meaningful review (see Matter of Gallagher v Fischer, 108 AD3d 802, 802 [2013]). Accordingly, the determination must be annulled to that extent and the matter remitted for a new hearing upon those charges (see Matter of Medina v New York State Dept. of Corr. Servs., 104 AD3d 976, 977 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 859 [2013])."], "id": "77ddeea4-4f7a-410a-a7eb-effd85f6d51e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The pertinent statutes and regulations do not permit the parole board to calculate a single parole eligibility date for multiple offenses, nor do they permit the board to delay a parole vote on an eligible offense until an inmate is also parole eligible on a much longer concurrent sentence. By refusing to consider applicant for parole based on his eligibility date for his ten-year forgery sentence, and by instead delaying a parole vote for that offense until he is eligible for parole on his forty-year sentence, the parole board has deprived applicant of the possibility of beginning to serve his cumulated ten-year sentence for <mask>. This is an arbitrary deprivation of applicant's statutory right to be considered for parole on each offense after a specified period, and it may result in him being imprisoned for longer than other similarly situated inmates serving single sentences under materially identical circumstances. Given these circumstances, I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that applicant is entitled to neither habeas nor mandamus relief. I, therefore, respectfully dissent."], "id": "4fa7949e-438e-4a2c-8271-026a36e945c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Initially, we note that petitioner has abandoned his challenge to the finding of guilt with respect to unauthorized exchange inasmuch as his brief is limited to challenging the smuggling and <mask> charges (see Matter of Staine v Fischer, 111 AD3d 999, 999 [2013]). With respect to those charges, a portion of the confidential testimony that was relied heavily upon by the Hearing Officer in rendering the determination was unavailable because the recording was indecipherable, thereby precluding us from undertaking a meaningful review (see Matter of Gallagher v Fischer, 108 AD3d 802, 802 [2013]). Accordingly, the determination must be annulled to that extent and the matter remitted for a new hearing upon those charges (see Matter of Medina v New York State Dept. of Corr. Servs., 104 AD3d 976, 977 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 859 [2013])."], "id": "42712e5e-1dcd-4c8a-8f75-57c114152cbe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Far more compelling is defendant's argument that \"categorically excluding petty thefts charged under Health and Safety Code section 11368 contradicts *565Proposition 47's explicit purpose of reducing prison spending and maximizing alternatives for nonserious and nonviolent crime.\"3 The electorate intended Proposition 47 to \"reduce punishment for any theft of property worth less than $950 that could previously be charged as grand theft based on the type of property.\" ( People v. Romanowski, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 910, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) As the court pointed out in People v. Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, \" 'One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.' [Citations.] The Act also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" As the court there stated with respect to the contention that larceny should be treated differently from other forms of theft, \"[t]here is no indication that the electorate somehow viewed ... differently\" obtaining a small amount of drugs by the use of an altered prescription from doing so by other means of petty theft or shoplifting. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "a1d7fb97-4495-402b-a979-e248b71b6381", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cNor can claimant\u2019s arrest on the <mask> charge support a finding of misconduct, because that charge was ultimately dismissed and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that claimant was in fact involved in any drug-related activity. To hold otherwise would give rise to an implication that willfulness has come to mean being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Indeed, such a holding would establish a dangerous precedent, i.e., that disqualifying conduct may be predicated on a mere arrest unsupported by a conviction.\u201d (See also Matter of Weigand [Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn.\u2014 Commissioner of Labor], 259 AD2d 824 [3d Dept 1999] [a finding of misconduct cannot be predicated upon an arrest for driving under the influence without a conviction].) Indeed, such a decision was made by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board in Silberzweig\u2019s own case. (See exhibit 1 to reply mem.) Initially, the Department of Labor had disqualified Silberzweig from receiving benefits on the ground that his employment had been lost through misconduct because he had been absent without leave during his incarceration. The Appeals Board reversed, stating that"], "id": "214abdb8-320d-4682-9560-01604fbc6cf8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*892Appellant attempts to avoid this conclusion by challenging respondent's assertion that \"[o]ne has to possess marijuana in order to smoke or ingest it.\" Appellant points out that possession is not necessarily an inherent aspect of smoking or ingesting marijuana. A person can smoke marijuana without possessing it, for example, by smoking a joint in the possession of another person. Caselaw has recognized that \"[i]ngestion ... at best raises only an inference of prior possession.\" ( People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1241, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717.) \"[D]epending on the circumstances, mere ingestion of a drug owned or possessed by another might not involve sufficient control over the drug, or knowledge of its character, to sustain a <mask> charge.\" ( Ibid . ; People v. Spann (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 400, 408, 232 Cal.Rptr. 31 [\" 'possession,' as used in [ Penal Code section 4573.6 ], *286does not mean 'use' and mere evidence of use (or being under the influence) of a proscribed substance cannot circumstantially prove its 'possession' \"].)"], "id": "26410264-b496-41e7-a420-b0ac4fb50d46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor, except that such person may instead be punished pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if that person has one or more prior convictions for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290.\" Proposition 47's addition of section 490.2 specifically reduced punishment for the \"category of theft crimes ... that could previously be 'charged as grand theft' simply because 'the crime involves the theft of certain property' \" by creating a $950 threshold regardless of the type of property involved. ( People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 910, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 ( Romanowski ), citing Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35 (Voter Information Guide).) This section was added to target certain \"nonserious and nonviolent property and drug offenses\": grand theft, shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, check forgery, and <mask>. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "07ce922d-19dd-45dd-8993-a6ad069910bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["We also acknowledge that the Court of Appeals, in Matter of Joseph M. (82 NY2d 128), declined to recognize an \"inherent power\u201d to unseal records, outside the literal provisions of CPL 160.50. In that case, the records were sought by a school board for the purpose of initiating disciplinary proceedings against a teacher for <mask>. Previously, the teacher had been acquitted of the identical charge. Clearly, a determination to open the records under those circumstances would have collided directly with the public policy which motivated the enactment of section 160.50."], "id": "b76fddf9-fe64-40b4-bdfd-0f7bcab65f81", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Far more compelling is defendant's argument that \"categorically excluding petty thefts charged under Health and Safety Code section 11368 contradicts *565Proposition 47's explicit purpose of reducing prison spending and maximizing alternatives for nonserious and nonviolent crime.\"3 The electorate intended Proposition 47 to \"reduce punishment for any theft of property worth less than $950 that could previously be charged as grand theft based on the type of property.\" ( People v. Romanowski, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 910, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) As the court pointed out in People v. Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, \" 'One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.' [Citations.] The Act also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" As the court there stated with respect to the contention that larceny should be treated differently from other forms of theft, \"[t]here is no indication that the electorate somehow viewed ... differently\" obtaining a small amount of drugs by the use of an altered prescription from doing so by other means of petty theft or shoplifting. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "5afa43da-dd30-4988-bc09-3812b79341d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On November 4, 2014, the voters of California enacted \"The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act\" (hereinafter Proposition 47), which became effective the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, \u00a7 10, subd. (a).) Proposition 47 changed portions of the Penal Code and Health and Safety Code to reduce various <mask> and theft-related offenses from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by certain ineligible offenders. (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362.) Section 3 of the initiative specified it was the \"purpose and intent of the people of the State of California to:\" \"[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession,\" \"[a]uthorize consideration of resentencing for anyone who is currently serving a sentence for any of the offenses listed herein that are now misdemeanors,\" \"save significant state corrections dollars on an annual basis ... [and] increase investments in programs that reduce crime and improve public safety, such as prevention programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment.\" (Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, p. 70, \u00a7 3, subds. (3), (4), (6).) The electorate also directed that Proposition 47 \"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.\" (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1222, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 907.)"], "id": "44a0842b-1425-4faa-b340-0be74564a7b0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the first of those cases, Matter of Abraham v Justices of N. Y. Supreme Ct. of Bronx County (37 NY2d 560), the petitioners, who had been convicted in the Federal court of conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute narcotic drugs, were charged in New York State, inter alia, with criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the first degree. The conduct constituting the State possession charge was alleged as an overt act in the Federal indictment. After rejecting the petitioners\u2019 Fifth Amendment double jeopardy argument on the basis of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Court of Appeals turned to an analysis of the pertinent New York statutes. It found that the acts involved in the successive prosecutions constituted a single criminal transaction. The exception contained in CPL 40.20 (subd 2, par [b]) was found to be inapplicable because \"[c]learly, the Federal drug conspiracy laws and the State\u2019s <mask> laws are aimed at the same evil \u2014 narcotics trafficking\u201d (Matter of Abraham v Justices of N. Y. Supreme Ct. of Bronx County, supra, p 567)."], "id": "3cd3922f-eeea-48ed-b236-2bb45e4731c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The presentence report prepared in September 1993 states that defendant is 48 years old and that her first contact with the criminal justice system occurred when she was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (cocaine) under indictment No. 1771/91. She was sentenced to an unconditional discharge on that case on May 21, 1991. She was again arrested for <mask> before the end of 1991. Approximately a year later, she was arrested for this case and charged with selling a total of three vials of crack to two separate individuals. Defendant has never been involved in any type of drug treatment program. The criminal justice system has never previously offered her any referrals or assistance in entering such a program."], "id": "369487ba-3916-4cb8-a186-b95a7d11f18b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"[Proposition 47] also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' [Citation.]\" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Martin lacks the prior convictions that would disqualify her from misdemeanor treatment under Proposition 47."], "id": "b16a3481-d118-4c52-9d24-1b0a13a70112", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["PER CURIAM: Nicole Lenae Hays pleaded guilty to <mask>, drug distribution, and firearm possession charges in February 2017. The district court awarded Hays a downward dispositional departure to probation for 36 months with an underlying prison term of 160 months. After Hays tested positive for drugs on several occasions, the State moved to revoke her probation, and Hays stipulated to the violations. The district court revoked Hays' probation and ordered her to prison. On appeal, Hays argues the district court erred in imposing her underlying prison term without first ordering intermediate sanctions as mandated by K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716(c). Under the facts here, the district court was required to either impose a sanction in response to Hays'"], "id": "a4152930-5457-4758-acc4-520cc804a98d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The issue is particularly troubling since if the presumption is to be routinely applied to anyone who enters a car, innocent people who step into a car, not knowing drugs are in the trunk, can be charged with the serious crime of <mask>. That frightening possibility must be balanced, however, against the equally important concern that if the presumption is not applied to drugs in the trunk, drug dealers, if wise enough, could transport their drugs in the trunk and only the driver would be subject to successful prosecution. Indeed, it was the difficulty in prosecuting drug traffickers which caused the Legislature to originally create the drug presumption (People v Leyva, 38 NY2d 160) and its constitutionality is well settled. (Ulster County Ct. v Allen, 442 US 140.)"], "id": "db0f70e2-e462-4ed1-9eff-c1aeb112e241", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*892Appellant attempts to avoid this conclusion by challenging respondent's assertion that \"[o]ne has to possess marijuana in order to smoke or ingest it.\" Appellant points out that possession is not necessarily an inherent aspect of smoking or ingesting marijuana. A person can smoke marijuana without possessing it, for example, by smoking a joint in the possession of another person. Caselaw has recognized that \"[i]ngestion ... at best raises only an inference of prior possession.\" ( People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1241, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717.) \"[D]epending on the circumstances, mere ingestion of a drug owned or possessed by another might not involve sufficient control over the drug, or knowledge of its character, to sustain a <mask> charge.\" ( Ibid . ; People v. Spann (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 400, 408, 232 Cal.Rptr. 31 [\" 'possession,' as used in [ Penal Code section 4573.6 ], *286does not mean 'use' and mere evidence of use (or being under the influence) of a proscribed substance cannot circumstantially prove its 'possession' \"].)"], "id": "faaf496e-0b99-4ec5-91c7-d8728ff39717", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*324At the opening of the trial of the two brothers on the <mask> charge, counsel for the defendants moved to sever the trials on the ground that the defendant Galen Smalls by reason of his age was eligible to apply for youthful offender treatment. The motion to sever was granted and the separate trial of Rodney Smalls commenced. It was later revealed that Galen Smalls was 21 years of age and therefore ineligible for youthful offender treatment."], "id": "71cd70c7-b5c0-41e2-b733-81ac246f652a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Brittney was convicted on August 21, 2014 on charges of child cruelty and felony <mask>. She was sentenced to three years of probation with a *515condition she serve 181 days in county jail. Due to a conviction for identity theft in Arizona, she was subsequently confined in state prison in Perryville, Arizona, with a reported January 6, 2017 release date.4"], "id": "f2d165d3-0c31-4c4c-abaf-e9bf68734368", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our interpretation is consistent with the voters' overall intent in passing Proposition 47. Proposition 47 was intended to \"[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.\" (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, \u00a7 3, subd. (3), p. 70.) Petty theft by false pretenses is precisely the type of nonserious, nonviolent crime Proposition 47 was aimed towards affecting. For example, Proposition 47 also made the crimes of forgery and drafting checks without sufficient funds of less than $950 misdemeanors. (\u00a7 473, subd. (b); \u00a7 476a.) Moreover, theft by false pretenses is less likely to involve violence than a situation where a person has the intention to steal openly displayed merchandise from a store. To provide misdemeanors for that type of theft, but not for theft by false pretenses, would contradict the voters' general intent of requiring misdemeanors for nonserious, nonviolent theft crimes."], "id": "00ee6e31-77f0-4692-9e1f-81970b854fd1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant\u2019s criminal history includes a youthful offender adjudication (YO) for burglary in the third degree in 1974, a resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration conviction in 1980, a Georgia conviction for auto theft, aggravated assault and <mask> in 1982 (with a 3-year sentence imposed after revocation of a 10-year probation term), a felony cruelty to animals conviction in 1990, and this 1984 rape and associated offenses. Defendant\u2019s effort to show that his Georgia convictions were for acts which are not felonies under New York law is improbable, given the sentences imposed and the title of the crimes involved. He does not allege that his convictions were not for felonies under Georgia law, and he fails to establish that the guidelines promulgated pursuant to Correction Law \u00a7 168-Z (5) (b) (iii) intended to import the definition of a second felony offender in Penal Law \u00a7 70.06 (1) (b) (i). (See New York State Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, Sex Of*476fender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 14 [Factor 9] [Nov. 1997] [referencing the Penal Law only in connection with the term \u201cviolent felony\u201d].) I find that the People have, prima facie, established the existence of the prior felony, and the defendant\u2019s proffer of the stack of Georgia statutes (exhibit A), is insufficient to put the court to the obligation to demand more particularized proof."], "id": "6941aa77-1d44-49e0-8afa-d04780f3dd87", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Here, had defendant knowingly faced the options of pleading guilty and subjecting herself to \u201ca near-certainty of multiple decades of banishment from the United States\u201d (United States v Orocio, 645d at 645) or proceeding to trial and risking a likely one-year period of incarceration and separation from her family upon conviction, she may well have chosen to proceed to trial in the hope of avoiding deportation and permanent exile from her loved ones upon partial or full acquittal. Moreover, had defendant proceeded to trial, it is not certain that she would have been convicted on the felony drug sale charge (Penal Law \u00a7 220.39). It is possible on the facts presented that defendant could have been convicted only of <mask> with intent to *767sell (Penal Law \u00a7 220.16 [1]), or of simple drug possession (Penal Law \u00a7 220.03), as a lesser included offense, and thus might have avoided a conviction for an aggravated felony and the certainty of elimination of the possibility of discretionary cancellation of removal."], "id": "21652c99-5554-4b45-afb8-f8cf31934857", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant Outley was denied an \u201cevidentiary\u201d hearing, and his sentence was enhanced after the trial court heard the *549defendant\u2019s attorney explain that the defendant had no intention to violate court orders which were the basis for his arrest for criminal contempt between plea and sentence. The defendant Ogtong likewise was denied an \u201cevidentiary\u201d hearing, and he received a more severe sentence after the defendant\u2019s attorney explained to the court that the defendant\u2019s arrest for a misdemeanor <mask> charge was only a technical violation and that the defendant lacked any intention to violate the court\u2019s \u201cno arrest\u201d condition.2"], "id": "f373d850-9e1d-4b68-9509-4029fd0267bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Proposition 47 directs that the \"act shall be broadly construed to accomplish its purposes.\"3 One such purpose of Proposition 47 is \" 'to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.' [Citations.] [Proposition 47] also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, citing Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 992, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648, and the Voter Information Guide, supra , text of Prop. 47, \u00a7\u00a7 2-3, par. (3), p. 70.)"], "id": "a9b6268c-6353-4b13-a7c4-8165586ae46c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["CPL 30.30 (1) (a) provides that an indictment must be dismissed \"where the people are not ready for trial within * * * six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony.\u201d It is well settled that a criminal action commences upon the filing of the first accusatory instrument notwithstanding the fact that this instrument may be replaced or superseded by a subsequent indictment during the course of the action (People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351 [1980]; People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37 [1980]). Therefore, both the robbery and <mask> charges are deemed to have *338commenced on January 21, 1993, when the felony complaint was filed."], "id": "e686bce0-5332-4569-bc41-5911deaaa712", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant Outley was denied an \u201cevidentiary\u201d hearing, and his sentence was enhanced after the trial court heard the *549defendant\u2019s attorney explain that the defendant had no intention to violate court orders which were the basis for his arrest for criminal contempt between plea and sentence. The defendant Ogtong likewise was denied an \u201cevidentiary\u201d hearing, and he received a more severe sentence after the defendant\u2019s attorney explained to the court that the defendant\u2019s arrest for a misdemeanor <mask> charge was only a technical violation and that the defendant lacked any intention to violate the court\u2019s \u201cno arrest\u201d condition.2"], "id": "a6e12548-e364-44e4-a742-cd6895621605", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Rena K. Uviller, J. Defendant has been indicted for first degree rape. At his arraignment bail was set in the amount of $15,000, bond or cash. *782Based upon defendant\u2019s prior conviction for <mask>, the arraigning Judge directed that any proposed surety be examined prior to defendant\u2019s release. (CPL 520.30.) Notwithstanding the Judge\u2019s order, defendant was released from custody upon the posting of a bond two weeks later, without the surety having been examined. The bond was issued by the Frontier Insurance Company in the amount of $15,000. The justifying affidavit attached to the bond attested that Mois\u00e9s Medina posted, in support of the bond, $5,000 cash, which included $3,910 as collateral plus a service charge and premium."], "id": "1aef1b75-6f2a-46b0-acb7-4fc7a154149e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant failed to provide a record supporting his contention that a Sandoval hearing was conducted in his absence. Thus, there is no basis to review his claim that his right to be present at all material stages of the proceedings was violated People v Bharat, 204 AD2d 169), or that the court\u2019s Sandoval ruling was an abuse of discretion. In any event, in regard to the latter claim, the court\u2019s ruling permitting inquiry into prior convictions for criminal mischief and criminal sale of a controlled substance, while precluding inquiry into two <mask> convictions, was a proper exercise of discretion."], "id": "852d7776-cd88-4990-b8d7-2fc10ff7d0f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Far more compelling is defendant's argument that \"categorically excluding petty thefts charged under Health and Safety Code section 11368 contradicts *565Proposition 47's explicit purpose of reducing prison spending and maximizing alternatives for nonserious and nonviolent crime.\"3 The electorate intended Proposition 47 to \"reduce punishment for any theft of property worth less than $950 that could previously be charged as grand theft based on the type of property.\" ( People v. Romanowski, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 910, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) As the court pointed out in People v. Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, \" 'One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.' [Citations.] The Act also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" As the court there stated with respect to the contention that larceny should be treated differently from other forms of theft, \"[t]here is no indication that the electorate somehow viewed ... differently\" obtaining a small amount of drugs by the use of an altered prescription from doing so by other means of petty theft or shoplifting. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "f2f26969-32a0-4b40-af8f-38867ef19e49", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["But the lab could not determine the quantity of methamphetamine on each scrap. Thus, Polk's primary argument in this appeal is that the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of his <mask> crime: that he possessed a \"usable quantity\" of the methamphetamine. His argument has appeal based on the language of the element. After all, if an unknown quantity of methamphetamine on three tiny scraps of paper is sufficient to show a \"usable quantity\" beyond a reasonable doubt, it is hard to see how any quantity could ever be too small. We nevertheless hold that his argument fails under existing law."], "id": "74a804c2-c2cc-4309-be30-78435e8850dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": [". People\u2019s exhibit 9 reveals that defendant was taken into custody on May 29, 2001 on charges of contempt and domestic violence. The minutes of his guilty plea in New Jersey also refer to an April 29, 2000 <mask> charge and a May 4, 2001 robbery of one Donnell Shields. There is no claim of any relationship between these charges and the May 17, 2001 Newark bar robbery or this indictment\u2019s May 15, 2001 carjacking-kidnapping-homicide charges."], "id": "da2c07d4-d39b-47d6-8ae7-e223bb94cd3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In June 2014, mother was convicted on felony <mask> charges (which were later reduced to misdemeanors) for which she was sentenced to three years' probation and 180 days in jail. While in jail, mother took several classes, including Narcotics Anonymous, parenting classes, and substance abuse classes. When mother was asked why these classes \"didn't work\" (i.e. she began using methamphetamine again after release), she stated, \"I honestly did take a lot of what I learned to use out there, and it ... did help me. But then ... I got released August 5th, and my dad passed away [as a result of alcoholism] August 8th, so that was really hard for me to deal with.\""], "id": "d1805175-6f3d-4658-8f6c-261ddf459621", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our interpretation is consistent with the voters' overall intent in passing Proposition 47. Proposition 47 was intended to \"[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and <mask>, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.\" (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, \u00a7 3, subd. (3), p. 70.) Petty theft by false pretenses is precisely the type of nonserious, nonviolent crime Proposition 47 was aimed towards affecting. For example, Proposition 47 also made the crimes of forgery and drafting checks without sufficient funds of less than $950 misdemeanors. (\u00a7 473, subd. (b); \u00a7 476a.) Moreover, theft by false pretenses is less likely to involve violence than a situation where a person has the intention to steal openly displayed merchandise from a store. To provide misdemeanors for that type of theft, but not for theft by false pretenses, would contradict the voters' general intent of requiring misdemeanors for nonserious, nonviolent theft crimes."], "id": "cc583ab0-87fd-4f45-8375-bc21d84ced89", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Here, had defendant knowingly faced the options of pleading guilty and subjecting herself to \u201ca near-certainty of multiple decades of banishment from the United States\u201d (United States v Orocio, 645d at 645) or proceeding to trial and risking a likely one-year period of incarceration and separation from her family upon conviction, she may well have chosen to proceed to trial in the hope of avoiding deportation and permanent exile from her loved ones upon partial or full acquittal. Moreover, had defendant proceeded to trial, it is not certain that she would have been convicted on the felony drug sale charge (Penal Law \u00a7 220.39). It is possible on the facts presented that defendant could have been convicted only of <mask> with intent to *767sell (Penal Law \u00a7 220.16 [1]), or of simple drug possession (Penal Law \u00a7 220.03), as a lesser included offense, and thus might have avoided a conviction for an aggravated felony and the certainty of elimination of the possibility of discretionary cancellation of removal."], "id": "a97a6535-0ea4-4a6f-b237-ece46f1e9f13", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Immunity from the narcotics laws was again denied to members of the Neo-American Church in North Carolina v. Bullard (267 N. C. 599 [1966]). The defendant\u2019s brief correctly points out that the North Carolina court questioned the sincerity of the defendant\u2019s claim. However, the court then went on to say: \u201c Even if the defendant were sincere and possessed and used such drugs only as required by his religious belief, his First Amendment rights did not protect him from criminal liability for such forbidden <mask>. The court said that it was true that the First Amendment permits a citizen complete freedom of religion, so that he may belong to any church or to no church and may believe whatever he will, but nowhere does it authorize him in the exercise of his religion to commit acts which constitute threats to the public safety, morals, peace, and order. The court concluded: \u2018 The defendant may believe what he will as to peyote and marijuana and he may conceive that one is necessary and the other is advisable in connection with his religion. But it is not a violation of his constitutional rights to forbid him, in the guise of his religion, to possess a drug which will produce hallucinatory symptoms similar to those produced in cases of schizophrenia, dementia praecox, or paranoia, and his position cannot be sustained here \u2014 in law nor in morals. \u2019 \u201d (Ann. 35 ALR 3d 946-947)."], "id": "cb7b6c73-265c-4331-bf61-4bf70357cb91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The jury convicted Tempo on seven counts: one count of drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(b)(1)(A)\u2013(C), 846; five counts of <mask> and distribution under \u00a7 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and one count of drug possession and distribution near a school under \u00a7\u00a7 841, 860. The court sentenced him to 30 years of imprisonment. The jury convicted Sadler on six counts: one count of drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(b)(1)(A)\u2013(C), 846; one count of drug possession and distribution near a school under \u00a7\u00a7 841, 860; one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(1); one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1512(k); and two counts of tampering with witnesses under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1512(a)(2)(A). The court sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment for the drug conspiracy and distribution offenses, 10 years of imprisonment for the firearm offense, and 5 years of imprisonment for the obstruction of justice charges."], "id": "7689cd6c-8b02-477f-a3e1-8c6095b6822f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "minor in possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Rodriguez was convicted of second degree assault, a Class IIA felony. See Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-309(1)(b) (Reissue 2016). Rodriguez\u2019 sentence of 5 to 8 years\u2019 imprisonment is within the statutory sentencing range for Class IIA felonies which are punishable by a minimum of no imprisonment and a maximum of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment. See Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-105 (Cum. Supp. 2020). Because Rodriguez\u2019 sentence is within the statutory limits, we consider only whether the court abused its discretion in weighing the appropriate factors. When imposing a sentence, a sentencing court is to consider the defendant\u2019s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime. State v. Blaha, 303 Neb. 415, 929 N.W.2d 494 (2019); State v. Rogers, 297 Neb. 265, 899 N.W.2d 626 (2017). At the time of the preparation of the PSR, Rodriguez was 28 years old, single, with no dependents. She graduated from high school and had a minimal criminal history which included convictions for speeding, <mask>, first offense driving under the influence, and refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test. The PSR reflected that Rodriguez had issues with alcohol and marijuana and that continuing mental health treatment would be beneficial. The probation officer set forth in the PSR: Based upon [Rodriguez\u2019] minimal criminal history, her expressed preference [for] probation, interest in continuing mental health treatment, and the number of programs which would benefit [Rodriguez] and reduce her risk to recidivate, I believe she would benefit from a supervisory structure with cognitive and behavioral programming. Therefore I recommend she be sentenced to a term of probation in this matter. Based upon the severity of the offense, I recommend said sentence of probation be for an extended duration and include a period of incarceration. These conditions will emphasize the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law."], "id": "cdf0766c-08be-49c5-b91b-5cccf9750df9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "minor in possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The second factor, whether the alleged offense included violence, the evidence is undisputed that it did. Lohman is alleged to have struck the victim from behind with some type of metal rod. This factor weighs in favor of retention. Lohman claims that the third factor, motivation for the offense, weighs in favor of transfer because he was acting in defense of his brother when he struck the victim. He describes the motive as \u201ca typically juvenile motivation. A dispute over a girl.\u201d The district court acknowledged Lohman\u2019s reason for striking the victim, but also recognized that other witnesses indicated that the victim was not engaged in the fight prior to being struck by Lohman. The court described the motivation as \u201cmuddled\u201d but concluded it weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction. We find no abuse of discretion in this finding. Given Lohman\u2019s close proximity to his 18th birthday, the district court reasoned that the time during which the juvenile court would have jurisdiction over him was \u201crapidly coming to an end.\u201d Therefore, because of Lohman\u2019s age and the circumstances of others involved in the offense, this factor weighed in favor of retention. Lohman argues that since the participants were between the ages of 16 and 18 years of age and had apparently gone to the park to fight, \u201cthe ages of the participants supports the transfer of this case to the juvenile court.\u201d Brief for appellant at 21. We disagree, and find that Lohman\u2019s age weighs in favor of retention. One of the most influential factors for retaining jurisdiction is Lohman\u2019s previous history with the juvenile court system. Although Lohman refers to his prior juvenile adjudications as involving \u201crelatively minor offenses,\u201d the evidence supports the district court\u2019s characterization of them as \u201cregular and consistent involvement\u201d with the court. His prior brushes with the law include charges for criminal mischief (damaging the hood of an automobile causing damage of $0-$500), <mask>, including marijuana and drug paraphernalia, theft (which was ultimately dismissed), possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, another charge of theft, criminal mischief with damage between $501 and $1,499, and terroristic threats, amended to disturbing the peace. As a result of these adjudications, Lohman has had a myriad of services provided to him, yet his actions continue to escalate. This factor weighs in favor of retention. The district court found that consideration of public safety and Lohman\u2019s ability to appreciate the nature and seriousness of the crime both weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction. Considering the fact that Lohman went to the park with a weapon and given his prior experience with the juvenile court, we agree with the district court that public safety is a concern and that Lohman had an appreciation of the consequences of his action and the danger that it posed. Lohman argues that because the altercation involved a female acquaintance, there \u201cis no evidence that [Lohman] is out, wandering the streets of Sidney looking for his next victim.\u201d Brief for appellant at 26. However, given the escalating nature of Lohman\u2019s aggressive behavior, it is uncertain as to who, or what, may next set him off. These factors weigh in favor of retention. The only factor that the court found weighed in favor of transfer was a consideration of Lohman\u2019s best interest, but recognized that it \u201cis difficult to readily evaluate\u201d his best interests. The remaining factors it found either neutral or irrelevant to the facts of this case. After considering all of the evidence, given the services which have already been provided to Lohman, the violent nature of the offense, Lohman\u2019s age and previous history with the juvenile court system, and the need for public safety, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court\u2019s order denying transfer of Lohman\u2019s case to the juvenile court."], "id": "1cd01da9-b245-4e8a-85f6-6d9fe7e2510f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "minor in possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On February 22, 2017, appellant was adjudicated delinquent in case no. JV-2017-51 for <mask> of a handgun, obstructing governmental operations, and theft by receiving. His disposition was 24 months' probation and 90 days in the juvenile detention center. During his time in juvenile detention, appellant allegedly attacked a fellow juvenile and was charged with battery in the third degree on April 3, 2017. In addition, the State filed a petition to revoke appellant's probation in case no. JV-2017-51 based on the battery charge. An adjudication hearing took place on May 10, 2017, in which the trial court heard both cases together."], "id": "f86988f5-13f9-40fe-98e0-ad791a405a11", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "minor in possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Jennifer Baptist testified that she was Zion's juvenile-probation officer. Prior to the current charges, Zion had been adjudicated delinquent for <mask> of a handgun and was on an indeterminate period of probation. According to Ms. Baptist, Zion had complied with some of his probation requirements but had failed to complete anger management and had twice tested positive for marijuana."], "id": "166892f0-2407-4815-b0d6-253bcedc2848", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "minor in possession", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The juvenile court found that C.S. \"does not have much by the way of juvenile offenses,\" and listed C.S.'s police contacts and the citations he received as a 14-year-old for misdemeanor possession of marijuana ( Health & Saf. Code, \u00a7 11357 ) and being a <mask> of alcohol ( Bus. & Prof. Code, \u00a7 25662 ), which resulted in letters of reprimand from the probation department. The court observed that C.S. was also cited for residential burglary and stealing a car when he was 14, \"both felonies for which [a petition] was filed in [the juvenile] court.\"9 In addition, the court noted that C.S.'s fingerprints had been found on a stolen car but charges were not filed because the statute of limitations had run."], "id": "90710285-f655-4e02-8f1b-d305b5367094", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The holdings of the various cases are difficult to reconcile. It seems to me that the question is very well discussed in the opinion of Judge Hazard, in People v. Bevins (74 Misc. 377) in the Oneida County Court. After referring to some of the decisions mentioned above, Judge Hazard discusses the questions applying to the particular case before him. In that case the defendant had been convicted of <mask>. Afterwards he was being tried upon the charge of disorderly conduct arising out of the same transaction. The court said: \u201c It seems to be obvious that the crimes are separate and distinct as a matter of law, although they may be closely related on the facts. A man may be intoxicated without using profane and obscene language, and, vice versa, he may use profane and obscene language in excess without being intoxicated. Defendant could not have been convicted of the crime of public intoxication by proof of any quantity of obscene and profane language. There must have been other proof. As a matter of fact, there was proof in the intoxication case that he talked loudly, walked unsteadily and staggered.\u201d"], "id": "b7be7639-318c-4f5e-8a94-92d1a3f79251", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The first of the claimant\u2019s witnesses was a Donald Roselle. He had been in the Chatterbox when Dixson came in and had talked to him for a few moments. He did not think Dixson appeared to be drunk. Roselle left the restaurant and was starting to drive away when he saw Dixson come out the door ahead of two troopers. He said Dixson\u2019s hands were behind him and that he saw Trooper Sacco pounding Dixson around the face and neck with his fists. Roselle said he called to Sacco \u201c that\u2019s a hell, of a way to pound a guy \u201d and that Sacco hollered back \u201c get out of here Roselle or I\u2019ll get you later.\u201d Roselle drove away. He was arrested the next night by Trooper Sacco for <mask>. Mr. Roselle had been drinking that evening and had a record of several convictions for speeding, impaired driving, etc."], "id": "9b01b1f2-f6db-4909-b731-35ce935b9f46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Trooper Sacco was the first witness for the State. He stated that he and Trooper Field arrived at the Chatterbox Restaurant about 2:15 a.m. They visited for a few moments with Anna Doran and then were invited into the restaurant by off-duty Trooper Huckle and a Mr. Cashman to have a cup of coffee. He and Trooper Field went into the restaurant and as they walked back to the Huckle table he heard Dixson say \u2018 \u2018 here come those bastards.\u201d He walked by Dixson and sat down at the table and ordered a cup of tea. He heard Dixson call \u201c Hey Buster \u201d a couple of times and then said Dixson walked over to the table and put a hand on the table and leaned on Sacco\u2019s shoulder. Trooper Sacco said he could smell alcohol on Dixson and he was mumbling. The trooper said he told Dixson to sit down and that he replied that Sacco was not man enough to make him sit down. With that, Trooper Sacco said he stood up, told Dixson he was under arrest for <mask>, took him by the shirt and belt and took him out the door of the restaurant. He stated that as they went out the door Dixson twisted away from him and struck at him and fell to the ground. Sacco said he picked Dixson up and that Dixson struck him in the chest with his cast. Sacco said he struck once and only once. He said Dixson kept on punching so he and Trooper Field handcuffed him. They then took Dixson to the jail where Sacco cleaned his face with a wet towel and then called the troop substation and advised the duty officer of what had happened. He and Field then took Dixson to Dr. Stevenson who bandaged his head and they then returned Dixson to jail. Trooper Field essentially corroborated Sacco\u2019s testimony. Both Sacco and Field are about six feet and three inches in heighth and we would estimate weigh between 195 and 215 pounds."], "id": "8f918694-7ecf-42c4-bc85-efef592f29fa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["After the interview at the Canton substation, Dixson was taken by two other troopers to a Justice of the Peace in Nor-wood, where he was charged with <mask> and arraigned by the Justice. He was released on $10 bail after a plea of not guilty. He was eventually tried before Police Justice Halliday at Potsdam, without a jury, and was found not guilty."], "id": "e625d8f3-2780-4fa3-97c1-c9efc5405cca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["If we did find such probable cause, we would also find that the State, through the agency of the State troopers, particularly Trooper Sacco, exercised bad judgment and extremely excessive force in effecting this arrest. In such a situation the State must respond in damages. (Piatkowski v. State of New York, 43 Misc 2d 424, mod. 24 A D 2d 544; Lippert v. State of New York, 207 Misc. 632.) We observed all the witnesses very closely and have weighed and considered their testimony carefully and thoroughly. We find that Mr. Dixson had been drinking but that his conduct did not approach that of <mask>. *108Wc find that Trooper \u00a1Sacco acted in a fit of pique and that, when his temper got the better of his training and judgment, he acted with brutal and unrestrained physical force on the body and person of the claimant herein; \u201che exceeded all proper and rational bounds.\u201d (People v. Denker, 225 App. Div. 517, 520.)"], "id": "1dfee0ed-5603-4a4d-8ba3-2b69c5d550af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The claim that the trial court committed errors in admitting certain other evidence upon the trial is not sustained. The evidence of Mrs. Keeling as to the transaction and her injuries is material, relevant and admissible. The question of the admission of the certificate of conviction for <mask> of the defendant is provided for by statute. It was for the jury to decide whether the defendant in this case was the person mentioned in the certificate."], "id": "88b0c6c8-4e6c-4abf-8011-eb8ddba33348", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is specifically charged here that the defendant was advised to see the complainant in this case and pay him some money to withdraw the charge. I can see no honest reason why the complainant in the case would be interested in withdrawing a charge of intoxication and disorderly conduct upon the payment of any sum of money. <mask> is also a matter in which the community where the alleged offense took place is interested, and it is not a personal matter."], "id": "25e6ea20-3e04-4df1-b7af-0a72244d0b67", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["A prosecution is commenced when an information is laid before a magistrate charging the commission of a crime. The information is an allegation made to a magistrate that a person has been guilty of some designated crime. (Code Crim. Proc. \u00a7 145.) An information performs the same function as an indictment in a court of record and must set forth the facts to establish a crime, but the exactness required in an indictment need not be present. All that is necessary is that the information should state the crime charged with such accuracy that the defendant may know the exact offense which it is claimed he has committed. (People v. Olmsted, 74 Hun, 323.) However awkwardly an information in a police court may be drawn, if it charges a crime known to the law and states acts done by the accused that constitute such a crime, it will be sufficient. {People v. Pillion, 78 Hun, 74.) The information in this case clearly informed the defendant as to the precise crime with which he was charged and no error was committed by the magistrate in refusing to dismiss the charge. The defendant also contends that *582the magistrate erred in receiving certain other evidence in the case but I am unable to find any erroneous ruling made by the magistrate in the reception of evidence that in any way prejudiced the right-s of the defendant. In fact, the defendant made very few objections to the conduct of the trial and apparently relied entirely upon an alibi which he hoped to establish. The defendant contends that after having heard the alibi testimony the court should have dismissed the charge against the defendant at the close of the case due to the fact that the principal witness for the People had been convicted of several offenses. The witness McCarthy testified that he had been convicted a number of times for <mask>, once for petit larceny, and probably once for disorderly conduct, but the trial court could not find as a matter of law that because of these convictions for minor offenses the witness was unworthy of belief. \u201c Criminals may tell the truth. If after weighing their story, in view of all of the circumstances and all corroboration, it seems credible, we need not reject it merely because their reputation is bad or their habits vicious. Such facts are but a warning that caution should be used. For it is also to be remembered that in fixing the blame for such a crime as we are here considering the state is not likely to discover witnesses of high character.\u201d {People v. Cohen, 223 N. Y. 406.) A jury may believe a witness of bad character in preference to one of good character if they feel the former has told the truth and the latter has not."], "id": "32c1ae2d-b4f1-4809-bad8-bb55f58aabe3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["If the conclusion that <mask> is not a crime, and not covered by said section 1694, then we may logically say that one convicted of vagrancy or being a disorderly person, likewise does not come within its provisions. So, one confined in a county jail or other institution upon a conviction and commitment for any of such offenses, might with impunity, if occasion permitted, walk out on those in whose legal custody he was in, without fear of the penalty prescribed in said section. This creates a dangerous situation, and one of great importance to all the sheriffs of the State and the custodians of the institutions to which such commitments are made."], "id": "87e7f803-6da8-4696-b172-07795e603cbc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*1043The indictment charges a violation of section 1694 of the Penal Law, which makes an escape from custody or confinement by a prisoner a misdemeanor, if such custody or confinement is \u201c upon a charge, arrest, commitment, or conviction \u201d for a misdemeanor. The district attorney contends that <mask> is a misdemeanor. The defendant contends that it is not a misdemeanor."], "id": "125cef56-bd7f-45a2-be0f-62fe9283e8ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In support of his contention the district attorney cites People v. Reson (249 App. Div. 54), decided by the Appellate Division, Third Department, on November 11, 1936, the facts in which case are the same as in the instant case and which raised the precise question as is raised here. That court held that <mask> is a crime, a misdemeaaor, and overruled a demurrer which had been interposed as here."], "id": "ff99137b-19e5-42d0-872e-63d261152525", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In support of his position, the defendant has submitted his own affidavit, the affidavit of his wife and the affidavit of his attorney. The affidavit of defendant\u2019s attorney, John F. Cenesky, contains the statement, that on a prior occasion in March, 1953, when the defendant was arrested on a charge of <mask>, the Justice of the Peace told the defendant\u2019s attorney in a telephone conversation, \u201c if the Defendant ever appeared before him for anything at all, he would throw the book at him and that he had no use for the individual. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "ef2a0197-ba85-49c2-81c5-9fc82f93c0d5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["He cites People v. Reson (249 App. Div. 54). In that case the Third Department held that a man who broke out of jail while confined on a sentence for <mask> could be indicted for escape as a misdemeanor, holding the public intoxication was a misdemeanor and not an offense. That court stated that a person charged with public intoxication was entitled to a jury trial."], "id": "f3a3e814-7afa-47f5-b8c5-099e040ed87d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeals has thus settled the law. There is no right to a jury trial for <mask> under section 1221 of the Penal Law. Public intoxication is an offense, triable summarily by the court. (See, also, McQuage v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 249; People v. Waters, 153 Misc. 686; People v. Cleary, 182 Misc. 302.)"], "id": "ec31f034-6167-4509-936a-bc3908e4cbf9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The People contended that the defendant committed perjury in verifying the answer in regard to the allegations contained in paragraph fourth of the complaint and contended that the defendant denied that she had meretricious relations with one Theron 0. Freeman and lived in adulterous intercourse with him and denied that she was convicted of <mask> and that she was not a woman of chaste, virtuous and temperate habits and did not have a good character, record and reputation."], "id": "79705ec9-e54e-4da5-a306-f04e14db0c73", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Both of the crimes of which the defendant was found guilty are crimes against the general public and one of the necessary ingredients of both the charge of <mask> and disorderly conduct is that the public must be disturbed. Without proof of such there is no violation. Since the crimes of which the defendant has been convicted, if they occurred, occurred in an isolated area with no persons or houses around it, the defendant could not be guilty of either such charge. (People v. Hook, 3 N Y 2d 485; People v. Huyck, 171 Misc. 467; People v. Perry, 265 N. Y. 362.)"], "id": "a38d9ada-cb12-4b3b-9590-a235b1248480", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA. Shortly after midnight Jack Buchal of the Monticello Police Department came out to the Monticello Raceway and at that time he advised me that Charles Wingate, one of our drivers, had been arrested on a charge of <mask>, was presently confined in the Monticello village lock-up and at that time he told me that when the personal effects were removed from the prisoner there were various slips and papers which might be betting slips and papers, and he asked me if I was interested and I told him that I would proceed to the village lock-up with him as soon as the Raceway money had been deposited. This I did."], "id": "5a13835e-77b5-4856-9f8c-296e4e00f727", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["If the language of section 155 is to be literally construed, and if offenses and infractions are to be classified as misdemeanors, the Justice of the Peace would be required to inform every defendant charged with an offense or an infraction of his right of removal and grant him an adjournment for such purpose, if demanded. However, neither the County Court nor the Supreme *433Court is likely to grant such a certificate for the reason that a G-rand Jury has jurisdiction to investigate crimes only and has no authority to investigate nor indict for violations constituting offenses or infractions. Hence, even if such certificate was granted, in instances of offenses and infractions, it would have the bizarre effect of removing a case from a court which has original jurisdiction to a Grand Jury which has none. Regardless of the unqualified language of section 155 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, such result could never have been intended. See, also, People v. Mulkins (25 Misc. 599, 601-603) where it was held to be no error to fail to inform defendant of the right to remove a charge of <mask>, an offense, from the court of original and exclusive jurisdiction. The same reasoning applies here."], "id": "d19d17a5-96eb-4395-8bc4-8bb0a0be992f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On the evening of June 3,1971, two off-duty Village of Johnson City policemen, Patrolmen Robert Uhler and Stephen Holgash, decided to have a few drinks before going home from work and, after stopping briefly at two other taverns, proceeded to the Peppermint Lounge at 60 Broad Street in Johnson City where they arrived shortly after midnight on the morning of June 4, 1971. Present were the defendant and several other individuals, some of whom later testified on behalf of the defendant. Within a few minutes of the time that the two policemen entered the Peppermint Lounge, a personal argument took place between the defendant and Patrolman Uhler which involved, at most, some shoving and grabbing, and lasted approximately a minute. *1047It ended abruptly when the female proprietor intervened and separated the participants. At this time, the defendant moved to the other end of the bar, Patrolman Uhler went back to his bowling game, and 10 to 15 minutes passed without further incident. However, Patrolman Uhler evidently was not satisfied with the outcome of this minor fracas, for shortly thereafter he approached the defendant and either demanded an apology and accompanied this demand with the threat of arrest, or requested an apology and when the defendant declined to do so, attempted to place the defendant under arrest. In any event, a second scuffle ensued and after several people, including the defendant\u2019s mother, either slipped and fell or were knocked down, the defendant was physically escorted by the two off-duty policemen out the door of the bar, across the street, and to the Johnson City police station. Here he was booked on charges of <mask>, harassment and resisting arrest. Bail was set at $100 and, following the posting of bail by several patrons of the Peppermint Lounge, the defendant was immediately released."], "id": "6c10f22e-c6b8-43f2-964f-815a7c135c47", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the trial the prosecution rested its direct case after calling the two policemen involved in the incident in question and defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him. The Village Justice complied to the extent of dismissing the <mask> charge and the trial proceeded on the two remaining offenses. The defendant then called several witnesses, all of whom were either patrons or employees of the Peppermint Lounge on the night of the incident and all of whom substantially contradicted the policemen\u2019s version of the events leading up to defendant\u2019s brief incarceration. After the defendant himself took the stand, there was a rebuttal and surrebuttal and the defense unsuccessfully renewed its motion to dismiss."], "id": "72ef8a26-bc55-46f8-b7fd-7a2847175e0b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Applying that standard to the facts, this court concludes that a reasonable man awakened from sleep and ordered out of his car by a uniformed officer would conclude that he was in custody and being subjected to \u201ccustodial interrogation.\u201d Even if we premised our consideration on the proposition that the defendant was dead drunk, a fact which is not in any way sustained by the evidence as no proof whatsoever of the extent of the defendant\u2019s intoxication was produced, it must be concluded that the defendant had not, was not and was not about to commit any crime, or offense or infraction of law. Intoxication, even <mask>, has been removed from the penal statutes of this State."], "id": "536e590f-aef7-40a2-ab2e-2093749f0581", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In that case it was held that a prior prosecution for <mask> did not bar a later prosecution for disorderly conduct, based upon some of the same actions, for one can be drunk without being disorderly and, therefore, different facts would have to be proved at the second trial, and that although the crimes may be closely related on the facts, they are separate and distinct as a matter of law."], "id": "c5229331-c2e6-4f86-9603-df8a093e3cd4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Daniels (285 App. Div. 619) the defendant allegedly said \u201cHello, Honey: that\u2019s my baby \u201d or words to that effect to a passenger in the car of a passing motorist who had asked police officers directions. One of the officers reprimanded defendant and then proceeded to place him under arrest. He was not told why or given any reason for the arrest. No charge of <mask> or disorderly conduct was ever lodged against him."], "id": "97bb42e6-6372-4876-829e-44c34a7df969", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["A city magistrate has summary jurisdiction to impose a sentence of imprisonment only in a limited number of offenses, such as disorderly conduct, vagrancy, <mask>, and with regard to violations of certain sections of the Sanitary Code (N. Y. City Crim. Cts. Act, \u00a7| 102, 102-c, 120). It is the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York which has exclusive jurisdiction of all misdemeanors committed within the city, except charges of libel (N. Y. City Crim. Cts. Act, \u00a7 31). It is true that a city magistrate may hold a Court of Special Sessions where the misdemeanor is of a certain type, including any violation of any provision of the Multiple Dwelling Law (N. Y. City Crim. Cts. Act, \u00a7 130, subd. g); but that may only be where, upon arraignment before him, and after taking the information, deposition and statement of the defendant or his waiver, and after informing defendant of his right to be tried by three justices of the Court of Special Sessions, defendant consents to have the action heard and determined by the magistrate sitting as a court (N. Y. City Crim. Cts. Act, \u00a7 131). In that event, the conviction is the determination of the Court of Special Sessions and the commitment states, as it should, that it is issued out of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York; the entire proceeding, and, of course, the matter of jurisdiction with it, has been transferred into one properly before the Court of Special Sessions."], "id": "c1593e10-8101-4cc9-af2e-7cc45c7bbbd2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*813At the opening of this trial, although the defendant had joined the issue, it was shown that before another part of this court, he had announced the withdrawal of his answer to permit the case to go by default. At the same time he made the unsworn statement that lie was an alcoholic. He did not attend the trial. The case was tried on three separate days, the plaintiff testifying on the first, her nephew and brother on the second and she again on the third day. The plaintiff is a mature woman formerly married happily and in business with her former husband for 27 years. On a visit to her summer home in Woodbourne, N. Y., while helping in her sister\u2019s restaurant she met the defendant in November, 1954. On 15 or 20 social occasions together when she imbibed, she testified that the defendant refused saying \u201c I don\u2019t drink.\u201d There was no direct inquiry by her for Iris disclaimer that he was not addicted to intoxicating stimulants. They were married in March, 1955, took up residence in her New York City apartment on Bennett Ave., and lived happily until just a year later when in March or April, 1956, upon returning to the apartment, she found him drunk and disorderly. Testimony by the plaintiff that there was a telephone call to an unidentified person affiliated with an organization whose objective is the rehabilitation of victims of alcoholic addiction and also that the defendant was taken to a hospital for related treatment must be rejected as hearsay and thereby incompetent. The defendant returned to Bennett Ave. five days later. The plaintiff says she told him that their marriage was at an end for his concealment but they continued to live at the apartment although not as husband! and wife. Four months later he repeated his drunkenness and then she packed up and moved out. Documentary proof was received of three convictions of this defendant for <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 1221) in 1951 and 1952, in courts near the place where the parties met and where the defendant had lived for 17 or 18 years. On the second day of trial the plaintiff\u2019s nephew testified in corroboration of the plaintiff to the defendant\u2019s premarital disavowal of the use of spirituous liquors. The plaintiff\u2019s brother testified regarding his discovery of the defendant\u2019s bad habits in December, 1956. On the third day the plaintiff was recalled. She changed her testimony as to post discovery relations between the parties. She had first said that their separate and independent occupancy of the same apartment had continued for four months, from his first drunken display in March, 1956 until the second in July or August, 1956. Evidently, to reconcile her story with her brother\u2019s testimony, she now changed the time of the rupture to December, 1956. *814Thus for 9 months, she testified, they were in the same 2% room apartment, the defendant\u2019s occupancy limited to sleeping there alone and nothing else. He did not eat there nor was his laundry supplied."], "id": "b4e703cc-2669-419b-a0af-22bb3f290912", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On March 4, 1956 defendant O\u2019Connor\u2019s automobile covered by the policy was involved in an accident as a result of which defendants Millie and Perley Hamilton sustained personal injuries and the defendant Millie Hamilton sustained property damage. Defendant O\u2019Connor reported the accident to the \u00bfEtna Co. and on April 16, 1956, after an investigation, the \u00bfEtna Co. rescinded the policy, returned the premium with interest to O\u2019Connor, and notified him in writing of the recission for the reason that plaintiff learned, after the accident, that *834O\u2019Connor\u2019s answer to question \u201c 15 (m) \u201d was false. There is no dispute that O\u2019Connor was convicted on four occasions for disorderly conduct and <mask> during the 36-month period prior to the application."], "id": "bfb81295-6bcf-4116-bcdd-f0725bd98676", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Thereafter and on or about May 29,1961 the attorney for petitioner requested the then Mayor of North Tonawanda to approve *678five individual agents of petitioner to solicit funds for the American Eescue Workers. On May 31,1961 by l\u00e9tter to petitioner\u2019s attorney, the then Mayor denied application of four of the five applicants. He denied the application of Loretta E. Ackerson on the ground that she submitted untrue statements in her affidavit, to wit: that she had not been convicted of any crime, misdemeanor or other violation of municipal ordinance when, in fact, she had been convicted on April 25,1959 for soliciting funds for the petitioner without the Mayor\u2019s permit. The Mayor denied the application of Dewitt Ackerson on generally the same grounds and for the additional reason that his affidavit failed to disclose three violations of <mask> in the City of Buffalo in the years 1929 and 1934."], "id": "8678facb-5b50-4165-b344-9927c1327cda", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner was involved in a minor traffic accident in the City of Rome, Oneida County, New York, on November 7, 1963. There was some property damage, but no personal injuries were involved. The Rome City police came to the scene of the accident. Patrolman Fuller arrested the petitioner at the scene on a charge of driving while intoxicated. His sworn report, of November 7, 1963, stated: \u201c Upon arriving to investigate an accident, the driver of one car, Paul Williams Barnes (petitioner) was unable to stand or walk a straight line, his speech was slurred and his breath smelled strongly of alcohol. Barnes admitted he had been drinking \u201d, The petitioner was then taken to the Rome City Police Station. He was asked to take the chemical test, but he refused to answer. He finally said: \u201c I don\u2019t think that I will take the test \u201d. He was then advised that his refusal would mean the loss of his license. Later that same night, the charge against the petitioner was changed from driving while intoxicated, to <mask>, which is a violation of Ordinance 2 of the 'City of Rome. An affidavit regarding this changed charge was sworn to on December 6,1963, by Patrolman Fuller. Both of the affidavits by Fuller were forwarded to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in Albany. The information filed in the City Court of Rome, sworn to by Sgt. O\u2019Brien of the Rome Police Department on November 8,1963, charged the petitioner with public intoxication. On November 20, 1963 the charge of public intoxication was dismissed upon the motion of the petitioner\u2019s attorney. The petitioner pleaded guilty to violation of subdivision (a) of section 1120 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law for failure to keep right."], "id": "b320d15a-6a9a-4f13-8b94-f82a14a20c94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner claims that respondent Commissioner acted in error and without jurisdiction since the information filed charged petitioner with <mask> (Ordinance 2 of City of Rome) and not driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law, \u00a7 1192), and that petitioner under that charge did not have to submit to a chemical test. Petitioner also contends that the subsequent affidavit by the same police officer, charging petitioner with public intoxication, indicates that the police officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe petitioner guilty of driving while intoxicated."], "id": "aabbe286-8002-49c0-bae7-2ddbeef417b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law states that whoever operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition shall be guilty of a traffic infraction. Subdivision^. of the section further provides, however, that no conviction shall be had unless it is shown by means of a chemical test administered within two hours of defendant\u2019s arrest that there was at least 10/100 of one per centum of alcohol in the defendant\u2019s blood. Since the peti*848tioner refused to submit to a chemical test, there could be no conviction under section 1192. (People v. Wagonseller, 25 Misc 2d 217 [I960].) The record is clear that it was after the defendant\u2019s refusal, that the arresting officer charged defendant with <mask>. Under these circumstances the information filed is not controlling but is treated merely as a pleading. (People v. Belcher, supra.)"], "id": "4e361f72-18ed-4da0-a54e-0b070ce20ef7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner has attached to his moving papers an affidavit from Judge Close in which he states that he \u2018 \u2018 never refused to take jurisdiction over the defendant or to sit as a Court of Special Sessions * * * but the arresting officers failed, neglected and refused to explain why the defendant was being brought before your deponent rather than * * * a nearer available Magistrate in the Town of Camillus and * * * refused to lay the information.\u201d The answering affidavits by the Deputy Sheriff and the two State Troopers who participated in these arrests uniformly state that Justice of the Peace Close was abusive, used profane language and complained that he did not know why the troopers were bringing cases to him when they had never done so before and that he was overheard saying that \u201c since the matter did not occur in his township he did not feel he should handle the case.\u201d There appears to be no dispute as to the fact that Judge Close refused to take jurisdiction and no information was laid before him, nor were any of 'the individuals arraigned in Judge Close\u2019s court. Subsequent to that, another call was made to the dispatcher asking if another Judge might be available to handle these arrests and the dispatcher contacted Judge James Jerome in the Town of Geddes, who indicated he would be willing to accept 'an arraignment at that time. It was then about 4:40 a.m. The defendants, including the petitioner, were .thereupon brought before Judge Jerome, an information was laid charging the *287petitioner with <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 1221) and disorderly conduct (Penal Law, \u00a7 722, subd. 1) and he was arraigned on both of these counts."], "id": "5d0c9ca7-696d-46a2-b0d2-dae32affa8a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants were charged by two officers of the Troy Police Force with various offenses, arising out of an apparent \"evening on the town\u201d in view of leave granted to Theodore Darling from his naval duties. Theodore was accused by the arresting officers of violations of section 1192 of the Vehicle *488and Traffic Law pertaining to driving while under the influence of alcohol. William Darling was accused of <mask>, lewdness and violation of an ordinance of the City of Troy concerning open containers."], "id": "16c4ec6d-1425-4557-a340-5880245dedec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"Municipalities have been held liable to a bystander negligently shot by a policeman engaged in an altercation with another (Wilkes v. City of New York, 308 N.Y. 726); to a taxicab driver shot by a passenger negligently placed in his cab by policemen (Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N Y 2d 455); to the estate of an arrested man who died from pneumonia caused by exposure in the jail and failure to treat a fractured hip and elbow (Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498); to the estate of a man negligently shot by a policeman for making a disturbance while intoxicated (Flamer v. City of Yonkers, 309 N.Y. 114); to the estate of a man arrested for <mask> who died from cerebral hemorrhage in consequence of failure of the police to procure medical aid (O\u2019Grady v. City of Fulton, 4 N Y 2d 717); to a wife shot by her husband to whom the police had negligently returned a pistol (Benway v. City of Watertown, 1 A D 2d 465); and to a bystander injured while directing traffic at the instance of a police officer (Adamo v. P. G. Motor Freight, 4 A D 2d 758). In McCrink v. City of New York (296 N.Y. 99) a city was held liable for negligently having omitted to dis*457charge a police officer by whom plaintiffs intestate was shot. In Meistinsky v. City of New York (309 N.Y. 998) the estate of a holdup victim recovered who had been killed by an untrained officer\u2019s bullets. Negligence of the city was found in its omission to use reasonable care in training the police officer so that he could shoot straight and hit the criminal instead of his victim. None of these actions could have been brought until after the waiver of governmental immunity by section 12-a (now \u00a7 8) of the Court of Claims Act (Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361), but in each of them liability arose from negligence of a city in the exercise of the police power, and in at least two of them the negligence consisted in nonfeasance rather than in misfeasance (McCrink v. City of New York, supra; Meistinsky v. City of New York, supra).\u201d (Schuster v City of New York, supra, pp 81-82.) In Schuster the plaintiffs intestate was murdered after he had supplied the police with information leading to the arrest of a well-known, dangerous fugitive from justice. After the decedent\u2019s part in the capture was widely publicized he immediately received communications threatening his life, of which he notified the police. Three weeks later Schuster was shot and killed while approaching his home in the evening. The subsequent action by Schuster\u2019s father raised the issue of municipal liability for failure to provide adequate police protection once it reasonably appeared that the decedent was in danger. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division (286 App Div 389) which had affirmed the dismissal of the complaint by Special Term, and denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the complaint, stating at page 86: \"The instant action is based on negligence. It is grounded on negligence of the police in the failure to exercise reasonable care for the protection of Schuster after he had received threatening letters\u201d."], "id": "09c65107-04e8-4bca-a01e-0185d3a6bec4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On January 18, 1978 the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to both of the above charges. Thereafter, on April *1146, 1978 he returned to court and as a result of a plea bargain he withdrew his earlier not guilty plea and interposed a plea of guilty to a violation, namely, <mask> under section 240.40 of the Penal Law entitled \u201cAppearance in public under the influence of narcotics or a drug other than alcohol\u201d in satisfaction of the Penal Law charge. At the same time the Public Health Law charge was dismissed in satisfaction of the guilty plea to the amended charge of public intoxication."], "id": "39dcf01b-a2b7-4a71-9ade-f5084fae18d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["This is in no way a case of strict liability: Plaintiff, due to the fact that he was operating a bicycle, was not charged with nor convicted of driving while intoxicated, <mask> is no longer a criminal offense, and he in turn is not within the class of people to whom the restaurant may be strictly liable. By the same token, plaintiff asks no more of defendants than their own alleged negligence entitles him to. The defendants are not counterclaiming against plaintiff for any physical injury to person or property sustained directly due to either his conduct or intoxication. There is thus no reason in law, policy or the facts for this court to accept defendants\u2019 argument that they are entitled to claim over against the third-party defendant for damages they may ultimately be called upon to pay due to their negligence. Even conceding the third-party defendant\u2019s potential strict liability under the statute (General Obligations Law \u00a7 11-101) as noted supra, it cannot be fairly said that the restaurant should be held strictly accountable to defendants in a case which is otherwise solely a matter of comparative negligence, particularly where that third-party defendant could theoretically claim over against the plaintiff (Wood v City of New York, supra; Herrick v Second Cuthouse, 100 AD2d 952, affd 64 NY2d 692; cf. Weinheimer v Hoffman, 97 AD2d 314)."], "id": "02546b0b-a331-42d2-89fa-56d1f5427c4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Following the holding in Powell (supra) New York\u2019s Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld the conviction of a defendant for <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 240.40), finding that there is a direct relation between the conduct condemned by the statute and the legitimate interest which the community has in preserving the public order. The court emphasized that the statute does not exact punishment for merely a condition, but for a condition from which it might reasonably be expected that an annoyance or danger might arise (People v Myers, 39 AD2d 122 [2d Dept 1972]). Accordingly, the court upheld the constitutionality of the statute."], "id": "d1d0cbc5-b0b8-4b76-aead-62c60a225060", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner is a graduate of Harvard Law School, and is admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York. However, the matter for which he appeared in the Monroe County Family Court was based upon petitions filed against him, personally, involving two children and for the most part, he appeared in that court pro se. The initial proceeding was commenced in October 1996, based upon a petition, filed by the mother, requesting a determination of paternity for one of the children and an order of custody. Later, the litigation included issues involving family offense allegations, as well as child support. On February 28, 1997, Mr. O\u2019Connell appeared before the respondent Family Court Judge, and after some colloquy, admitted that he had consumed alcoholic beverages on that day. The respondent stated that, in her opinion, Mr. O\u2019Connell could not participate in any hearing on this appearance and she would decline to take any admission from him. Accordingly, there was an adjournment of the scheduled hearing, and Mr. O\u2019Connell was given the following admonition: \"If you come to Court on the next occasion and you\u2019ve taken a drug or an alcoholic drink, you will be in contempt of Court. We\u2019ll have a hearing, and probably, you\u2019ll go to jail. I will also have you arrested for <mask> under Section 240 of the Penal Law. Do you understand that, Mr. O\u2019Connell?\u201d"], "id": "c0a55899-4e1d-48ec-a990-2b2a588f22fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": [". At the time, there was no open container law in New York City. The City Council passed Introductory Number 647-A, banning possession of open containers of alcohol with the intent to consume. However, Mayor Beame vetoed the provision citing the Legislature\u2019s belief that it would be \u201cdisturbingly inconsistent\u201d to outlaw public drinking when the Legislature had recently repealed <mask> because it \u201cwas no longer considered a crime.\u201d In addition he cited \u201can inherent danger that this measure could be enforced selectively, and in a discriminatory manner.\u201d (Veto message, Mar. 26, 1976, contained in Bill Jacket, Local Laws, 1979, No. 16 of City of NY.) The current provision in the Administrative Code has its origins in Introductory Number 5 of 1978 which was presented to Mayor Koch. Once again, some urged a veto in the belief that public intoxication was a medical, not a criminal, problem. (See, e.g., mem of NY City Dept of Mental Health & Mental Retardation Servs, Dec. 5, 1978.) In approving the measure, the Mayor expressed his confidence that the police \u201cwill endeavor to enforce the law as fully and fairly as possible.\u201d (Approval message, May 9, 1979.)"], "id": "ee2c8310-c1e2-4036-939b-e82dee11edcb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Section 40 was repealed by section 2501 of chapter 88 of the Laws of 1909 (the Penal L\u00e1w) and, in its place, section 1221 *304of the Penal Law made <mask> a misdemeanor. Section 1221 was thereafter amended by chapter 700 of the Laws of 1911. The amendment eliminated the words \u201c is guilty of a misdemeanor \u201d, but fail\u00e9d to classify the charge."], "id": "856c5533-e324-4f79-a9db-2d2d694b71a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Since the Constitution of the State of New York will not be violated by the denial of the right to a jury trial, and since the Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, have indicated that <mask> is a petty offense \u201c triable summarily by a magistrate without a jury \u201d (Matter of Cooley v. Wilder, 234 App. Div. 256, 259, supra), the demand for a jury trial is denied. Ordered accordingly."], "id": "599c1377-01fa-4cf2-a320-c5e3bd90bac9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["I\u2019m asking for a mistrial based on the fact I was not able to get into my <mask>. It went to the motive into why [H.L.] made an allegation that he abused her. Therefore, I\u2019m asking for a mistrial based on the fact I was not able to get into that line of questioning. Therefore, it has hamstrung my ability to make argument to the jury."], "id": "698a66ce-9b15-4aeb-8347-317d2733df5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In January 2017, a permanency-planning hearing was conducted. The trial court found Otis not to be credible. Otis was partially compliant with the case plan, but she blamed DHS for her failures in getting to appointments. The trial court recited that Otis had been arrested for <mask> in mid-October 2016 and had failed to comply with drug screening. The trial court listed several drug tests wherein the sample lacked the appropriate temperature or Otis claimed the inability to produce a specimen. The trial court found that Otis was \"not minimally fit to parent any child,\" and it authorized the filing of a petition to terminate her parental rights."], "id": "18f23903-de4d-4ad2-8fb3-3f74039d7729", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*729Although Sharks tried to rehabilitate himself in the eleventh hour, these improvements need not be necessarily credited by the circuit court and do not necessarily outweigh evidence of prior noncompliance. By the time Sharks had been released from jail and had begun serious rehabilitation efforts, D.S. had been in DHS custody for nearly a year. Over the course of the case, Sharks tested positive for alcohol, was arrested at least twice for <mask>, and was inconsistent in visiting D.S. While Sharks's purposeful efforts to complete most of the significant aspects of the case plan in the six weeks before the termination hearing are admirable, they do not warrant reversal. Had Sharks put forth those efforts earlier in the case, a termination may have been prevented, but Sharks's efforts to get his life together were still a work in progress at the time of the termination hearing. Given Sharks's history of mixing prescription medications and alcohol, his arrests for public intoxication, and his odd behavior during previous hearings, the court was not clearly wrong to find a likelihood of potential harm if D.S. was to return to his custody. Past actions of a parent over a meaningful period of time are good indicators of what the future may hold. Sharks's behaviors over the course of the entire case do not show enough stability and sobriety to render the court's finding that Sharks posed a risk of potential harm to D.S. clearly erroneous. Sharks , 2016 Ark. App. 435, at 11, 502 S.W.3d at 577 (internal citations omitted)."], "id": "a0d09e4d-6ff9-4fef-a7a6-d8e0971cf980", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["This case was initiated by appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) when it filed a petition for emergency custody of the children in Washington County Circuit Court on May 2, 2016. An attached affidavit of a family-service worker stated that the children were removed from the parents' home in Washington County two days earlier pursuant to an emergency hold. The affidavit alleged that both parents, Alecia and Joshua, had been arrested, thereby leaving no caretaker for the children. Alecia was arrested for endangering the welfare of a minor and <mask>. Joshua was arrested for endangering the welfare of a minor and domestic battery committed against Alecia. The affidavit further stated that there had been prior DHS involvement with the family for issues related to environmental neglect, educational neglect, and inadequate shelter."], "id": "29ef1648-1bf7-42d9-af54-4c2d2fb4c5be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["King was originally placed on probation in 2011 for being in possession of PCP, which is the drug phencyclidine.1 One of the conditions of her probation was that *408she not violate any federal or state law. On September 30, 2016, King was arrested in North Little Rock and charged with <mask>. On October 3, 2016, the State filed a petition to revoke her probation based on that violation. In hearings conducted in November 2016 and January 2017, King told the circuit court that she had \"pled guilty\" to the public-intoxication charge and that she was represented by a \"public defender.\" King could not remember the name of the attorney, but her defense counsel stated that it \"should have been Terry Ballard.\""], "id": "32f97820-3c4f-4cf7-9b6c-054a1d8e9bb8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the revocation hearing conducted in March 2017, the State entered into evidence the North Little Rock District Court docket sheet as proof of her guilty plea to <mask>. The docket sheet documented that King was charged with public intoxication on September 30, 2016; that on the same date King was released from jail on her own recognizance; that on October 4, 2016, King pleaded guilty and the trial court found her guilty; and that District Judge Jim Hamilton sentenced her to \"Fine Plus Court Cost And Fines Given Credit Time Served.\" The docket noted the presence of Lauren Eldridge on behalf of the prosecutor, but it was silent as to whether King was represented by counsel."], "id": "15a3c408-6352-4528-8296-e359f81ede25", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the revocation hearing, the State did not make reference to any of the comments that King had made in earlier hearings about the public-intoxication matter, nor did the State ask the trial court to take judicial notice of those prior comments. The State did not present testimonial or other evidence to prove that King was, in fact, guilty of <mask>. King did not testify. Defense counsel argued to the trial court that it should dismiss this revocation petition because there was no proof that King had been represented by counsel when she entered the guilty plea in district court. The trial court rejected defense counsel's argument, remarking that it was left with the State's exhibit showing a district court finding of guilty, from which King had not appealed. The trial court acknowledged, however, that the docket sheet was \"silent\" so that it had no idea whether King had been represented at the district court proceedings. The trial court granted the State's petition to revoke, and King was sentenced to three years of supervised probation with random drug screens. This timely appeal followed."], "id": "79b5cf17-0bc9-4dd4-9122-582427095672", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["King argues on appeal that her probation could not be revoked on the basis of her guilty plea to <mask> absent proof that she was either represented by counsel or waived her right to counsel at the district-court level. King relies on Alexander v. State , 258 Ark. 633, 527 S.W.2d 927 (1975), as controlling authority on that point. In Alexander , the Arkansas Supreme Court held that:"], "id": "b362e5ec-0581-4be3-a825-01145eef76bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the present appeal, the State did not present any evidence at the revocation hearing to support that King was guilty of the misdemeanor crime of <mask> other than the docket sheet showing the guilty plea. The district court docket sheet is silent on whether King was represented by counsel when she pleaded guilty in district court. The State failed to \"show that the facts\" supported that King was guilty of public intoxication, even by a preponderance standard. We must follow the precedent set by our supreme court, and we are powerless to overrule its decisions. Williams v. State , 2013 Ark. App. 179, 2013 WL 1010411."], "id": "12df0c9a-d52a-40a6-be71-4037346afee7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Parrish refused to leave and was advised that if he did not leave he would be placed under arrest. Parrish refused to leave and allegedly became argumentative with officers, which eventually led to him being (1) taken to the ground by a leg sweep issued by Harris, (2) subsequently handcuffed, (3) detained at the Pope County Detention Center, and (4) charged with resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, <mask>, and interference with governmental operations. In the resulting Pope County District Court criminal trial, Parrish was found guilty on all charges."], "id": "ce6a00b7-306e-4b6c-8fc5-0f90b0003266", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*546filed a petition for emergency custody of L.S. Attached to the petition was an affidavit of a DHS caseworker stating that DHS had exercised a 72-hour hold on the child after Leslie was found highly intoxicated in a ditch digging for arrowheads. Leslie did not know where L.S. was, and L.S. was passed around from person to person before the police located her several hours later. Leslie was arrested for <mask> and endangering the welfare of a minor. The affidavit further stated that Leslie's parental rights had been involuntarily terminated as to L.S.'s older sibling, M.S.2 On the same day that DHS's petition was filed, the trial court entered an ex parte order of emergency custody of L.S. The trial court subsequently entered a probable-cause order."], "id": "6b5c6e6a-f5e8-43ee-9d5e-9c6259cb0e52", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Adam Nutt testified that he loves J.N. with all his heart and that they enjoy many activities together such as fishing, swimming, and riding the four-wheeler. He also said that he is willing and able to financially support J.N. for the rest of his life. He acknowledged that he had received a ticket for <mask> two years ago but said he did not have a drinking problem and had no DWIs."], "id": "79a0f54e-6d8e-4d57-9f4d-dce74b90f8b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["KJ, AJ, and EJ went into DHS custody after Joslin's arrest in May 2017 for domestic battery, domestic assault, <mask>, and interfering with emergency communications. He was arrested because he hit all the girls, and he dragged KJ on the floor by the hoodie she was wearing, which choked KJ.3 Joslin had custody of AJ and EJ, so DHS took emergency custody of those two children. Joslin's ex-wife had custody of KJ, but DHS took emergency custody of KJ in June 2017 because the mother was using drugs, she left KJ with improper supervision, and the home was in squalor. In July 2017, the paternal grandmother petitioned to intervene, asserting she had been CJ's primary caretaker for most of CJ's life, that her parents had a very limited relationship with CJ, and that CJ should stay in the only home she had ever known.4"], "id": "92125795-4c85-4072-9467-e381f252f471", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Similarly, in P.O., supra , 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841, another *206case upon which the prosecution here relied in the trial court in discussing the required nexus, the court held that the electronic search condition was reasonably related to future criminality. ( Id . at p. 295, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.) The minor, who was found under the influence of drugs at school, admitted to using hashish oil earlier that morning and had 11 Xanax tablets in his pocket. ( Id . at p. 292, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.) After admitting to one count of misdemeanor <mask>, the minor was placed on probation. ( Ibid . ) The minor objected to an electronic search condition which required him to submit any electronics including passwords to search, pointing out there was no evidence he was buying or selling drugs. ( Id . at p. 293, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.) The juvenile court made an express finding, emphasizing the need to help the minor avoid substance abuse. The juvenile court stated why it found the condition to be necessary: \" '[T]o properly supervise these drug conditions, we need to go on your web sites, check what you may be presenting as far as your ability to purchase, to sell drugs, your ability to-we have people who present themselves on the Internet using drugs or ... in possession of paraphernalia, and that's the only way we can properly supervise these conditions ....' \" ( Ibid . ) On appeal, the P.O. court concluded the search condition was reasonably related to future criminality because it enabled probation officers to supervise the minor effectively. ( Id . at p. 295, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.) The court reasoned: \"the condition enables peace officers to review [the minor]'s electronic activity for indications that [he] has drugs or is otherwise engaged in activity in violation of his probation. We cannot say that the juvenile court's given reason for imposing the condition-that minors are apt to use electronic devices to show off their drug use or ability to procure drugs-was speculative or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion.\" ( Ibid . ) However, the P.O. court went on to conclude the search condition was overbroad. ( Id . at pp. 297-298, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.)"], "id": "a6fe7092-65e2-4d18-af87-9d2684a9b5f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Acosta contends the electronic search condition should be modified, if it is to be imposed at all. However, we are unable to discern how that could be done in the instant case, as in our view access to Acosta's electronic devices is the best way to determine if he \"is ridding himself of his gang associations and activities, as required by the terms of his probation, or is continuing those associations and activities, in violation of his probation.\" (See Ebertowski , supra , 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 413 ; compare In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 297-298, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841 [noting the requirement a minor submit his \"electronics including passwords\" to search with or without a warrant was overbroad and was thus modified to limit such searches of electronic devices and/or accounts to \"media of communication reasonably likely to reveal whether he is boasting about drug use or otherwise involved with drugs,\" when there was no evidence minor was buying or selling drugs in connection with his misdemeanor <mask> offense, when the goal of minor's probation was to facilitate his \"rehabilitation,\" and when the minor's needs were not \"severe\"].)"], "id": "759e8c7e-2310-4b1c-96d3-1ad77b8dc21c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant's reliance on In re Erica R . (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 909-913, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919, and In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 291-293, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841, is misplaced. Those cases involved drug possession and <mask>, respectively. Here, defendant was convicted of possessing methamphetamine for sale , and the record supports a finding that an electronic device was used in those sales. Allowing a probation officer to access information on defendant's electronic devices will facilitate supervision and deter future criminality by ensuring that defendant does not attempt to sell drugs using any electronic device. Further, while the court in In re P.O. ultimately found an electronic device search condition unconstitutionally overbroad, it determined that even in the context of a *144public intoxication juvenile adjudication \"the electronics search condition [was] reasonably related to future criminality.\" ( In re P.O. , at p. 295, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.)"], "id": "5e1b5d99-93f2-4319-9133-4414ced1fff7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The purpose of the challenged conditions is to prevent defendant from using electronic devices in the future to facilitate the sale of controlled substances. Defendant's possession of an Android phone when he was arrested for possessing methamphetamine for sale distinguishes this case from *145those where similar probation conditions have been rejected as unconstitutionally overbroad. (See In re P.O. , supra , 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 291-293, 298, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841 [modifying juvenile electronic device search condition because condition bore no relationship to <mask> adjudication]; People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719-720, 728-729, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.) Defendant's possession of an electronic device while committing his crime makes this case more similar to Q.R. , where the minor had used an electronic device in committing his jurisdictional offenses and the reviewing court found no overbreadth in juvenile probation conditions allowing electronic devices to be searched. ( Q.R. , supra , 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238, rev. granted.) Here, as in Q.R. , access to defendant's electronic devices is appropriate to ensure that he does not reoffend while on probation."], "id": "734e0d0b-af76-42f4-94f7-205b23d6bae3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the felony case, the prosecution moved in limine to exclude testimony about defendant's intoxication at the time of his arrest for the underlying misdemeanor, citing Evidence Code sections 350 and 352. According to the arresting officer's report which was summarized in the motion, the officer observed defendant cross a street with no regard for traffic and then drink from a pint-sized bottle of whiskey. Defendant smelled strongly of alcohol and had slurred speech. He was arrested for <mask> (\u00a7 647, subd. (f) )."], "id": "9bc87993-f7af-45f3-b65c-04f991760484", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On his jury questionnaire, Domanique J.-a 22-year-old Black man who had recently moved to California-indicated that he held a bachelor of fine arts degree in dance and had attended a high school for the performing arts in New York City. Domanique J.'s questionnaire also disclosed that he had an aunt who had been arrested for \"drug trafficking\"; that he had visited her in jail; and that he, himself, had been arrested for <mask>. Domanique J. was uninterested in reading material or video entertainment involving: \"Criminal, court, Law & Order, News.\" And he stated that: \"The Criminal Justice System works for the most part but there are cases where I feel the system has not worked.\""], "id": "d32b0705-b7f0-4b2f-9512-8eac64f807e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["During voir dire, the prosecutor asked Domanique J. more about his lack of interest in criminal justice-related entertainment, which elicited the following response: \"I just, I don't find crime or anything dealing with the court interesting. I mean, if it was up to me, I would rather just not be here.\" With respect to his arrest for <mask>, Domanique J. elaborated: \"At the time, like the arrest, I guess you would say I didn't feel like I was treated fairly, but I definitely got off very easy. So-.\" When asked about his aunt's arrest, Domanique J. stated that she was convicted of trafficking drugs (marijuana) and spent four or five years in jail; he was close to her; he \"was living there at the time,\" although he did not go to court with her; he visited her in jail three times; and, when she was released earlier that year, he spoke with her about her case. The prosecutor challenged Domanique J. immediately after he was questioned."], "id": "fc3de9b9-ce87-42a5-a923-2c6b214cc14c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["As discussed above with respect to Pierre M., the trial court found that the prosecutor's challenge based on Domanique J.'s stated belief that the criminal justice system was flawed was legitimate and race-neutral. As for the prosecutor's other articulated reason for challenging Domanique J., the trial court opined, correctly, that \"caselaw has repeatedly held that negative experience by the juror or a close relative of the juror [with the criminal justice system], that is a bona fide and genuine and race neutral reason to excuse the juror.\" (See, e.g., People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 655, fn.3, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970 [citing cases]; Wheeler , 22 Cal.3d at p. 277, fn. 18, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 [stating that a \"personal *306experience\" with conviction and incarceration \"suffered either by the juror or a close relative, has often been deemed to give rise to a significant potential for bias against the prosecution\"].) The court noted that Domanique J. \"indicated that his mother was arrested for drug trafficking, that he visited her in prison. He was living with her when she was convicted of this crime.\" Thereafter, the court went even further than the prosecutor on this point, stressing Domanique J.'s own experience with the criminal justice system: \"[H]e, himself, had a contact with the criminal justice system, that he had a negative experience with that. He felt that he was not treated fairly, although he seems to admit and acknowledge that what he was arrested for was <mask>, and he served a very lenient sentence, even by his own standards, which he admitted. But, nevertheless, he harbors the feeling which he expressed here in court, that his experience was a negative one. He doesn't feel that he was fairly treated by the criminal justice system.\""], "id": "9a0b98f8-4496-4e9b-8c3a-3fca45a594dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Father admitted having been arrested three or four times for DUI. He did not recall the dates. He was also arrested for <mask>. The children were not present on any of these occasions. He was not arrested while caring for the children. Father acknowledged his problems with alcohol in the past, but testified that he has not touched alcohol in more than a year. Father has never been arrested for using or possessing a controlled substance or for any violent criminal acts."], "id": "0a7be605-490a-4122-80f9-f7aacb2069e3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Obviously the instruction allows jurors to choose any element, find it occurred at any place and time, then combine another element with it at some other place and time, to choose any victim *654whether inside outside day or night, then choose any of several alleged exhibitions, then choose where and when the defendant may have been angry or threatening, then further when and where it believed a shotgun could have been readily capable of lethal use, as well as when and where he did any one of these things knowingly or not. Obviously such a patchwork verdict is impermissible. There simply is no possible way to know where when or if the jury found he had done all of these required elements in one place at one time, knowingly, or that it was even possible at all without using evidence from multiple separate acts including uncharged criminal actions. Such an instruction for DWI would run afoul as a jury could determine that the defendant was intoxicated, that he had operated a vehicle, and that he did so knowingly. The problem is he could have operated the vehicle at 9am, become intoxicated at noon, he has still operated a vehicle and he was intoxicated, just not at the same time; and not at the same place, and not as one criminal action. The state itself relies on just the same patchwork of elements in its reply to the primary point on appeal, using elements from inside the home, elements from outside the home, relying on the fact they heard a gunshot come from the location of the vehicle to prove a lethally capable firearm, then using shotgun shells found 200 yards away from that location not even remotely considered evidence, to infer a shotgun must have been present at the shooting range, then back to the events inside of the home to infer an angry manner, and threatening manner, then back outside to say there were people present because the deputies were there shining their lights at him, and he would have known a light has a source, the problem is the state has combined two separate criminal allegations at two separate places and times, to try to prove all of the elements of one offense, this is of course impossible because there were not two separate criminal offenses charged, and even if there had been the instructions must clearly separate each separate criminal accusation. The state explains that it does not matter where or when each of the elements occurred just that each element was inferred by the state somewhere at any time. The state's argument falls flat on its face because as noted above one can operate a vehicle, one can be legally intoxicated, one can do both of these things knowingly on the same day in the same County. But if the state charges DWI in one count which occurred at 9am, then charges <mask> at noon; the state cannot say oh well be was drunk at noon and he got a blood test that proved a BAC in excess of .08 at noon, but he was operating a vehicle at 9am, so well the jury will have to find he was drunk and he knowingly operated a motor vehicle. There is no evidence he did both of these things at the same time; but yes, if the jury is simply instructed that they only have to \"find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about January 1, 2014 in the county of Linn; the defendant; First was intoxicated at a BAC of .08; and second that he operated a motor vehicle, and third that he did so knowingly; then you will find the defendant guilty of DWI. Obviously he did all three of these things, just not at the same time or place. Obviously he did not commit an offense, but the fatally flawed instruction causes a patchwork verdict. The same applies here, and is impermissible. It is apparent from the Judges determination the state was choosing to submit an accusation it had not charged, that the instructions as given could cover any one of several accusations, separately or combined as one single lengthy act. The jury was simply not asked to distinguish between these separate acts, or instructed they could not use multiple separate acts to form one patchwork verdict of guilt by combining several actions at different times and places to satisfy various elements of the verdict's director of guilt which must occur as one act, at the same time and place, to the same victim(s) using the same evidence. For this reason the verdict cannot stand and must be reversed. The court may well find this point moot *655as explained herein due to lack of jurisdiction, or other dispositive points. As it is a point of general interest to this court for future protection of the Constitutional Rights of the accused it should be addressed."], "id": "32c4f8cf-0841-4f13-a47a-2020ccec1b1d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Zepeda asked the firefighters to check appellant, and they determined that he was not suffering from low blood pressure or low blood sugar and was \"okay.\" Zepeda said the next step was to get appellant to the sobering center, which is a place where people found to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs can be given a chance to \"sleep off whatever they've taken\" rather than being arrested. Zepeda opined that the sobering center was the best place for appellant at that point to get him the help he needed, but Zepeda further explained that if a person believed to be intoxicated in public doesn't want to go to the sobering center, the alternative is to arrest the person for <mask>."], "id": "c0aa3d90-59b5-4107-b6ce-b85919f55c7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["According to Zepeda, appellant kept his free hand out of Zepeda's reach while rolling his body back and forth and pushing with his body against Zepeda. Appellant appeared angry during the encounter, and Zepeda told appellant that he was under arrest for <mask>. Zepeda eventually managed to get appellant fully handcuffed with the help of two or three of the firefighters. Zepeda stated that at the time of the arrest, appellant was \"obviously a danger to himself or others in the state that he[ was] in.\""], "id": "34585011-e195-4a92-bd09-e34c168fcb54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Regarding Zepeda's intent, appellant emphasizes the portion of Zepeda's testimony in which he stated that once the firefighters finished examining appellant, the \"next step\" was to take him to the sobering center. While this testimony supports the conclusion that Zepeda initially may not have intended to arrest appellant, it is clear from Zepeda's further testimony that circumstances rapidly changed. As Zepeda explained, the options at that point were to either take appellant to the sobering center or arrest him for <mask>. Zepeda described that when he placed a handcuff on appellant's left wrist, appellant appeared angry and forcefully prevented Zepeda from handcuffing the other wrist, pushed back against Zepeda, reached his arm away from Zepeda, and rolled around. At some point during the encounter, Zepeda told appellant that he was under arrest for public intoxication."], "id": "349bf786-9b3b-44cb-b281-fbedec22c680", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "public intoxication", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Q. [W]hen you handcuffed [appellant], you said you placed a handcuff on one hand. Do you recall which hand that was-or which arm that was? A. I believe it was his left. Q. His left arm. So were you facing the front of him at the time, or were you able to grab his arm and bring it behind him? A. I was-already had it behind him. Q. Okay. Do you recall [appellant] asking you why you were doing that? A. I told him he was under arrest for <mask>.... Q. And so I'm assuming you're trying to grab his other arm from-you're reaching around from behind Mr. Crofton to grab his other arm? A. Correct. But he's pushing against me with his body not allowing me to do it. The jury could have concluded from this exchange that Zepeda told appellant he was under arrest at the same time or immediately before appellant pushed him. Zepeda's statement is some evidence of his intent to arrest as opposed to merely detain or transport before appellant used force against him."], "id": "a2576870-daae-4b14-b635-fe15752200e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecution moved before trial to preclude Ahmed from raising a <mask> defense. They asserted, inter alia, the defense was inapplicable \"because Livermore Municipal Code 05.80.20 completely prohibits dispensaries within it's [sic ] jurisdiction. ... [\u00b6] Based on the City of Livermore's restriction on the establishment of dispensaries the defendant was *474not operating a lawful collective and therefore should not be allowed to rely on\" a medical marijuana defense under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act."], "id": "96d00abc-ef5e-4322-a827-8b1fb8e71ad8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Spot , for example, the People brought a civil enforcement action against <mask> distributors, alleging violations of the local municipal code, the Health and Safety Code, and the UCL. ( People ex rel. Feuer v. Superior Court (Cahuenga's The Spot ) (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1364, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 ( Spot ).) Citing *483People v. Witzerman (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 169, 105 Cal.Rptr. 284 ( Witzerman ), the Spot court summarily concluded there was no right to jury trial because \"the gist of an action under the UCL is equitable.\" ( Spot , at p. 1384, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 809.)"], "id": "f07e2b6c-7f63-4eda-86bd-49b1d85f49ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants argue that the trial court erred by granting Pasadena's motions and issuing the injunctions because \"there is no substantial evidence of a city ordinance which explicitly declares that a <mask> dispensary is a nuisance.\" Defendants assert that such an *898explicit declaration is required in order to deem any land use a nuisance per se, citing Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co . (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 ( Beck ). In that case, the court stated, \"The concept of a nuisance per se arises when a legislative body with appropriate jurisdiction, in the exercise of the police power, expressly declares a particular object or substance, activity, or circumstance, to be a nuisance.\" ( Id. at p. 1206, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518.)"], "id": "33ae9e9e-ceac-407f-83f6-407ef68b8bf7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On March 7, 2017, the City's voters approved Proposition M (ord. No. 184,841). The preamble noted that, under AUMA, \"Retail sales of nonmedical cannabis may only take place pursuant to a state license, scheduled to become available in 2018,\" and that the City Council intended to \"enact by ordinance a comprehensive regulatory and enforcement system related to medical and nonmedical cannabis activity.\" The preamble further provided, \"[S]o that <mask> is available to patients in need of it, [MMB's] that have been operating in compliance with the limited immunity and tax provisions of [LAMC s]ections 45.19.6.3 and 21.50 at the one location identified in the Business's business tax registration certificate on file with the City should continue to operate until City licenses or permits are available, and, thereafter, priority in the processing of applications for a City license or permit should be given to those Businesses.\""], "id": "5960ee84-dddf-43dc-9556-dfba6c3e2883", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Construing Penal Code sections 4573, 4573.5, 4573.6, and 4573.9 together ( Gutierrez, supra , 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 386, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 ), the court looked to division 10 for a definition of the controlled substances referred to in Penal Code section 4573.5 and concluded that <mask> is a controlled substance. ( Harris, supra , 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 577.) The court explained: \"We are required by rules of statutory interpretation to '[examine] the statute's words' and give them 'a plain and commonsense meaning.' [Citation.] In doing so, we can only conclude that the Legislature intended to exclude 'controlled substances' from [Penal Code] section 4573.5's ambit, as section .5 does exactly that by its reference to 'any drugs, other than controlled substances. ' \" ( Harris , at p. 1465, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 577.)"], "id": "eacc0472-961b-4c04-bb57-382ba8982e47", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["appellant\u2019s premises in September 2015, County \u201cseized and summarily destroyed . . . approximately 880 high-grade, high- yield <mask> plants.\u201d The marijuana seized on other occasions \u201cwas all badly decompensated and full of bugs\u201d when it was returned to appellant. \u201c[Appellant] determined that all inventories of packaged and stored cannabis products seized from [appellant\u2019s] offices in the subject Raids, although returned, was in such damaged and degraded condition that all value was lost.\u201d County\u2019s Demurrer to 2020 Petition County demurred to the 2020 petition. It maintained that the petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the statute of limitations, and the doctrine of laches. County also claimed that it had lawfully destroyed the 880 marijuana plants and \u201chad no duty to preserve and return the [other] seized marijuana.\u201d The court\u2019s ruling on the demurrer states: \u201cThe Court Sustains, without leave to amend, [County\u2019s] demurrer [to the 2020 petition] on grounds the matter is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. [Citation.] [Appellant] raised the same facts and claims alleged here in a prior action [the 2016 petition], which the court dismissed without leave to amend after [appellant] failed to state a claim, despite having the opportunity to amend"], "id": "e906c97f-1192-4163-a763-32a5cff4b7f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Against plaintiffs' minimal showing of hardship we must weigh the effect estoppel would have on public policy and the public interest. Public policy favors eliminating nonconforming uses. ( Feduniak , supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 591.) And the City has a fundamental interest in locally determining where <mask> collectives are authorized. The public interest embodied in these policies outweighs the potential impacts to plaintiffs."], "id": "f5b295bf-5695-4792-b72c-fb5448735cf1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The PMC therefore states that <mask> dispensaries are not permitted, and non-permitted uses are nuisances. This was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the dispensaries constituted nuisances per se. \"[W]here the law expressly declares something to be a nuisance, then no inquiry beyond its existence need be made and in this sense its mere existence is said to be a nuisance per se.\" ( Beck, supra , 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 ; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1086, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [\"An act or condition legislatively declared to be a public nuisance is ' \"a nuisance per se against which an injunction may issue without allegation or proof of irreparable injury.\" ' \"].) Defendants have cited no authority in support of their position that a nuisance must be enumerated in a single *899ordinance section in order to be deemed a nuisance per se, and we have found none. *1095Defendants argue that Pasadena's permissive zoning structure is insufficient to establish a nuisance per se, because \"[p]ermissive zoning by definition creates only a presumed prohibition, but not an explicit legislative determination that the use in question, medical marijuana dispensary, is a nuisance.\" Pasadena asserts that courts have recognized permissive zoning as a valid method of prohibiting dispensaries. Pasadena is correct. For example, in City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, the Court of Appeal held that the municipality's permissive zoning code, combined with a code section stating that all unauthorized uses were nuisances, established that the dispensary at issue was a nuisance per se. ( Ibid . ) Other cases also have found that permissive zoning sufficiently bars the establishment of medical marijuana dispensaries. (See, e.g., The Kind and Compassionate v. City of Long Beach (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 116, 128, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 [a permissive zoning scheme meant that the dispensaries \"never had a vested property right to operate a medical marijuana dispensary in the city\"]; City of Corona v. Naulls (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 418, 433, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [\"where a particular use of land is not expressly enumerated in a city's municipal code as constituting a permissible use, it follows that such use is impermissible\"]; City of Claremont v. Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1165, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [where the \"Claremont Municipal Code expressly states that a condition caused or permitted to exist in violation of the municipal code provisions may be abated as a public nuisance,\" the \"operation of a nonenumerated and therefore expressly prohibited use ... created a nuisance per se.\"].)"], "id": "7f2f3f73-abbb-4fea-8739-0409d2b96528", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b610 On June 27, 2019, Swarer sent Respondent an email indicating that she and Tierney had decided to not pursue the <mask> business venture any further and requesting a refund of the unused retainer. Respondent did not reply to the email until July 22, 2019, at which point he indicated that he would review their file and remit the unused portion of the retainer that week. On August 19, 2019, Swarer sent Respondent another email indicating they had not received their refund. Respondent replied the next day, apologizing for the delay and promising to resolve the matter by the following Monday. Swarer sent another follow-up email the following Wednesday, August 28, 2019, because they still had not received any remittance. Respondent never replied to this message. Swarer sent two more follow-up emails on November 8, 2019, and November 24, 2019, requesting an account of how their funds were used and that any remaining portion be returned. On March 6, 2020, Swarer sent one final message to Respondent demanding an account and the return of any unused funds. Swarer also indicated that she had contacted the county bar association for advice on how to recover their money."], "id": "cd9e9e49-bf1e-4889-b666-d92b97def0a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Medical Marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["5 Appendix A to the EIR contained the full text of the initial study, including the discussion of biological resources. B. CEQA Requirements CEQA was adopted so that \u201call agencies of the state government which regulate activities . . . which are found to affect the quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental damage. . . .\u201d (\u00a7 21000, subd. (g).) The agency evaluates whether the proposed activity is subject to CEQA because it could affect the quality of the environment. If it is subject to CEQA, the agency decides whether the project qualifies for an exemption from CEQA review. (Union of <mask> Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1185 (Union).) If a project does not fall within a CEQA exemption, the lead agency conducts an initial study to determine whether the project may have a significant impact on the environment. (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 380; CEQA Guidelines, \u00a7\u00a7 15063, subd. (a), 15002, subd. (k)(2) [hereinafter \u201cGuidelines\u201d].) The purposes of the initial study are to provide information to the lead agency so it can determine whether to prepare an EIR or a negative declaration, to enable the lead agency to modify the project by mitigating adverse impacts to a less-than-significant level so it can prepare a mitigated negative declaration, and to assist in preparing and EIR if one is required, by focusing the EIR on significant effects, identifying the effects determined not to be significant, and explaining why potentially significant effects would not be significant. (Guidelines, \u00a7 15063, subd. (c)(1)-(3)(C).) If the initial study reveals \u201csubstantial evidence that any aspect of the project, either individually or cumulatively, may cause a significant effect on the"], "id": "a86b057c-0811-497c-961d-caf8f6c5ad44", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Before the Supreme Court was the appeal of Lovie Troy Matthews (Matthews), who served as the getaway driver for an armed robbery in which a security guard was killed. ( Banks , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 794, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330.) Leon Banks (Banks), David Gardiner (Gardiner), and Brandon Daniels (Daniels) attempted to rob a <mask> dispensary. ( Id . at p. 795, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330.) Banks and at least one of the other men were armed. ( Ibid . ) When Banks, Gardiner, and Daniels were fleeing the dispensary, Banks and a security guard began shooting at each other, and Banks killed the guard. ( Ibid . ) Matthews was not present at the scene of the robbery, but he picked up Daniels and Gardiner a block away shortly thereafter. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "5d193ad4-1cea-44cc-8eb4-7e54f054063b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 ( Strasburg ), a different panel of this division held that a police officer had probable cause to search a vehicle based on the odor of marijuana, despite the defendant's presentation of a <mask> prescription. ( Strasburg , at pp. 1058-1059, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306.) The court rejected the defendant's argument that the decriminalization of medicinal marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) bars a law enforcement officer from conducting a reasonable search based on the odor of marijuana. \"[T]he officer is entitled to continue to search and investigate, and determine whether the subject of the investigation is in fact possessing the marijuana for personal medical needs, and is adhering to the eight-ounce limit on possession.\" ( Strasburg , at p. 1060, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306.)"], "id": "07c312e1-ddfb-4cab-97f0-c5fd2e06fc89", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In finding the City has consistently interpreted its Municipal Code to exclude <mask> collectives from the medical office use, we do not rely on exhibits four and five to the City's request for judicial notice. Those exhibits are complaints filed against the City in superior court by other medical marijuana collectives, along with attachments that appear to be compliance orders issued by the City. They were not provided to the Appeals Hearing Board or to the trial court. We granted judicial notice because they are court records. (Evid. Code, \u00a7 452, subd. (d).) But in taking judicial notice of court records, we do not take notice of the truth of any matters stated therein. (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 987-988, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 26.)"], "id": "d1555320-e2e9-49fc-9a5f-1e7a474a1874", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court relied primarily on City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494 ( Riverside ) in its tentative ruling granting the motion. It explained: \"[W]hen they considered what are we going to do with the cooperatives, the collectives, the dispensaries operators establishments, or providers, under [ Health and Safety Code section] 11362.7681 the Legislature said, okay, we're going to let the cities decide as to whether or not they are going to let any of those collectives or cooperatives into their city and set up business, set up shop. They can decide whether to allow them to set up shop. They can decide if they let them set up shop, where, and under-you know, they can set it by zoning laws, say where and what hours you can operate, and that kind of stuff. That-[section] 11362.768 says, in paragraph (f), nothing in this section shall prohibit a city, county, or city and county from adopting ordinances or policies that further restrict the location of establishment of a <mask> cooperative, collective, dispensary, operator, establishment or provider. So, cities, or counties, or city and county, which applies only to San Francisco, can restrict those things. They can keep them out entirely. They can let them be there under certain conditions. That's the power of the City."], "id": "50a0df05-e8c7-46f9-829d-f7bd775aac31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["appellant\u2019s premises in September 2015, County \u201cseized and summarily destroyed . . . approximately 880 high-grade, high- yield <mask> plants.\u201d The marijuana seized on other occasions \u201cwas all badly decompensated and full of bugs\u201d when it was returned to appellant. \u201c[Appellant] determined that all inventories of packaged and stored cannabis products seized from [appellant\u2019s] offices in the subject Raids, although returned, was in such damaged and degraded condition that all value was lost.\u201d County\u2019s Demurrer to 2020 Petition County demurred to the 2020 petition. It maintained that the petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the statute of limitations, and the doctrine of laches. County also claimed that it had lawfully destroyed the 880 marijuana plants and \u201chad no duty to preserve and return the [other] seized marijuana.\u201d The court\u2019s ruling on the demurrer states: \u201cThe Court Sustains, without leave to amend, [County\u2019s] demurrer [to the 2020 petition] on grounds the matter is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. [Citation.] [Appellant] raised the same facts and claims alleged here in a prior action [the 2016 petition], which the court dismissed without leave to amend after [appellant] failed to state a claim, despite having the opportunity to amend"], "id": "a1f95bff-001e-476d-b54c-e3df726c8696", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants also argue that the trial court erred because \"Pasadena shows neither nuisance conduct nor an explicit declaration by the City Council that a <mask> dispensary is a nuisance.\" However, \" '[n]uisances per se are so regarded because no proof is required, beyond the actual fact of their existence, to establish the nuisance.' \" ( City of Costa Mesa v. Soffer (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 378, 382, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 735.) Here, defendants did not dispute that they operate medical marijuana dispensaries, and the PMC stated that medical marijuana dispensaries are not allowed and therefore a nuisance. Thus, there was no need for additional evidence or any determination of facts regarding whether the dispensaries created a nuisance."], "id": "46a9f650-ad2d-4dc5-9819-5dede93ad642", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants also argue that the trial court erred because \"Pasadena shows neither nuisance conduct nor an explicit declaration by the City Council that a <mask> dispensary is a nuisance.\" However, \" '[n]uisances per se are so regarded because no proof is required, beyond the actual fact of their existence, to establish the nuisance.' \" ( City of Costa Mesa v. Soffer (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 378, 382, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 735.) Here, defendants did not dispute that they operate medical marijuana dispensaries, and the PMC stated that medical marijuana dispensaries are not allowed and therefore a nuisance. Thus, there was no need for additional evidence or any determination of facts regarding whether the dispensaries created a nuisance."], "id": "71338404-a3fe-444b-9f4b-58e7f3841ac1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The City argues that all of the specifically enumerated professions in the Municipal Code definition of medical office \"have in common the fact that they are physicians or similar professions and that they *370have patients.\" The City contrasts those characteristics with <mask> collectives, which it argues have neither physicians nor their own patients because members of collectives \"are patients of the physicians who prescribed marijuana.\""], "id": "10ae3055-f54f-4ff8-9a47-89544e7d5d03", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The essence of RCCC's TAC was the private actions the group took to restrain trade and monopolize the <mask> market in Richmond. That was the gravamen, the thrust, of the cause of action. Whatever the protected activity, it *826was at the most incidental. ( Martinez v. Metabolife International, Inc ., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 187-188, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494 ; Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 672-673, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 31.)"], "id": "367eb9ef-5663-4b1a-8a30-509519a621b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b610 On June 27, 2019, Swarer sent Respondent an email indicating that she and Tierney had decided to not pursue the <mask> business venture any further and requesting a refund of the unused retainer. Respondent did not reply to the email until July 22, 2019, at which point he indicated that he would review their file and remit the unused portion of the retainer that week. On August 19, 2019, Swarer sent Respondent another email indicating they had not received their refund. Respondent replied the next day, apologizing for the delay and promising to resolve the matter by the following Monday. Swarer sent another follow-up email the following Wednesday, August 28, 2019, because they still had not received any remittance. Respondent never replied to this message. Swarer sent two more follow-up emails on November 8, 2019, and November 24, 2019, requesting an account of how their funds were used and that any remaining portion be returned. On March 6, 2020, Swarer sent one final message to Respondent demanding an account and the return of any unused funds. Swarer also indicated that she had contacted the county bar association for advice on how to recover their money."], "id": "23c8119c-1a67-4268-ad13-832b4581ad8b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs received notice from a City inspector that the collective might not be a permissible land use, and they point to no affirmative representations by the City to the contrary. (See Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1318, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 195, 223 P.3d 57 [To support estoppel, the \" 'representation, whether by word or act, to justify a prudent man in acting upon it, must be plain, not doubtful or matter of questionable inference. Certainty is essential to all estoppels.' \"].) Plaintiffs list a number of actions the City could have taken to make its position clearer, such as enacting a moratorium on <mask> collectives, expressly listing medical marijuana collectives as an impermissible use, and expressly redefining the term medical office specifically to exclude medical marijuana collectives. Those actions would have clarified the City's position, but their absence does not make reliance on delayed enforcement reasonable."], "id": "e5b9c930-c89b-480f-8b45-6738382933da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*141The next day the jury asked the court for \"the criteria, guidelines, requirements considered by the state of CA in order to sell and/or distribute <mask> by collectives, dispensaries, operator, or other products?\" and \"the criteria, guidelines, requirements considered by the State of CA in order to open a collective/dispensary?\" The court instructed the jury that \"Collectives and dispensaries must follow local laws, codes, and city ordinances under the laws of the State of California.\""], "id": "fe2af61f-499c-4ca4-9da6-425d844f7989", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b69 On or about August 28, 2018, Matthew Peter Tierney and his wife, Shani Swarer, retained Respondent to assist them with setting up a <mask> business. During their initial meeting, Respondent had Tierney sign an Attorney Retainer Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, Tierney paid Respondent a $5,000.00 retainer in the form of a check to cover fees and costs incurred during the representation.2 The agreement also provided that upon conclusion of the representation, the balance of the retainer, if any, would be returned to the client."], "id": "1fdb64e5-1f08-461e-b0a1-8fbceca9ff46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs argue the \"prolix phrase in a 13-page tax ordinance\" was \"wholly inadequate\" to inform them that they were operating illegally. But plaintiffs had constructive knowledge (if not actual knowledge) of the disclaimers. They received business tax certificates directly from the City, and the marijuana business tax disclaimers were in the publicly available Municipal Code, easily found using reasonable care or diligence. ( John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1190, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 137 P.3d 153 *491[Constructive knowledge is \"knowledge 'that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore is attributed by law to a given person.' \"].) In light of the express disclaimers, reliance on paying *373required business taxes as authorization to operate a <mask> collective is unreasonable as a matter of law."], "id": "d075416a-9665-4096-bca0-85bb648645ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On March 19, 2015, CCC filed a petition for writ of mandate and motion for peremptory writ of mandate (writ motion). The facts alleged in the writ petition are undisputed. CCC alleges in the writ petition the following facts. CCC is a California nonprofit corporation. CCC sponsored and drafted a proposed <mask> initiative petition. The key provisions of the Initiative are that the Initiative would repeal existing City code provisions prohibiting medical marijuana dispensaries and would adopt regulations permitting and establishing standards for the operation of medical marijuana dispensaries within the City. The proposed Initiative allows the City to permit a maximum of three medical marijuana dispensaries. An applicant must obtain a business license and applicable City permits. According to the Initiative, a medical marijuana dispensary must pay the City an \"annual Licensing and Inspection fee\" of $75,000 (Initiative \u00a7 17.158.100). Initiative proponents, Nicole De La Rosa and James Velez, presented the Initiative petition to the City."], "id": "93dfc6a7-e7c0-4174-838f-c7eeec6cd074", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs argue that by collecting a marijuana business tax and requiring a business tax certificate, the City induced reasonable reliance by plaintiffs. The inescapable flaw in plaintiffs' argument is that express disclaimers in the Municipal Code and on the business tax certificate unambiguously state that collection of taxes is not authorization to operate a <mask> collective. Two passages in the Municipal Code state that the marijuana business tax was enacted to raise revenue and was not intended to be a regulatory permit fee. Another Municipal Code section, which we have previously quoted, is entitled \"Payment of tax does not authorize unlawful business.\" And the business tax certificate issued to plaintiffs states that it is \"not an endorsement, nor a certificate of compliance with other ordinances or laws, nor an assurance that the proposed use is in conformance with the City's Building/Fire/Zoning regulations.\""], "id": "a28b5c01-263f-49b6-a2ab-84d45f795ef5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["1 We use \u201ccannabis\u201d and \u201cmarijuana\u201d interchangeably. inapplicable because a judgment was not entered in the prior action that is the basis for County\u2019s res judicata claim. On the other hand, we agree with County that appellant filed its present action after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations and that the running of the statute was not tolled. We reject appellant\u2019s argument that County is judicially estopped from arguing that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm. Procedural Background 2016 Petition On October 7, 2016, appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus (2016 petition). The 2016 petition was amended three times. The third amended petition, dated September 5, 2017, sought a writ of mandamus directing County to return appellant\u2019s cannabis plants and products that had not been \u201cwasted, damaged or destroyed.\u201d County seized the cannabis pursuant to search warrants executed during four raids of appellant\u2019s premises in 2015 and 2016. \u201cFor property taken that has been wasted, damaged or destroyed,\u201d appellant sought to recover \u201cthe reasonable value of such property.\u201d Appellant estimated that the value of all of its property taken by County was \u201cin excess of at least fifteen million dollars.\u201d In the third amended petition, appellant alleged that it \u201cis a Collective . . . consisting of medical cannabis patients and patient caregivers.\u201d It has \u201coperated in conformance with state <mask> laws.\u201d Therefore, the seized cannabis \u201cwas legally in [its] possession . . . [and] was not contraband.\u201d \u201cTo date, [appellant] has not been charged with any crime.\u201d (Underlining omitted.) \u201c[A]ll 44 felony charges\u201d filed against Jeffrey Kroll, appellant\u2019s \u201chead of operations,\u201d were dismissed,"], "id": "2c6512a7-dc63-4412-83e2-43b77ccd30c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Meanwhile, on April 28, 2016, Pasadena cross-complained in defendants' action, seeking injunctive relief and nuisance abatement. On July 15, 2016, Pasadena filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in defendants' action. Defendants noted that there already was a preliminary injunction in place affecting many of the defendants. However, Pasadena was seeking an additional injunction because \"<mask> dispensaries are trying to circumvent the preliminary injunctions already issued by either renaming the dispensary or allowing other dispensaries to occupy and use their location.\""], "id": "fc71cbb7-4ef9-4cbd-91c1-b6d9f2cce6b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On March 1, 2016, Pasadena filed its reply to defendants' opposition in the injunction action. Pasadena noted that defendants did not refute that defendants are operating <mask> dispensaries in the City of Pasadena. Pasadena further argued that it employs \"permissive zoning,\" which means that if a land use is not specifically listed in the Zoning Code, it is prohibited. Because a medical marijuana dispensary was not listed as an allowed use in the Zoning Code, such a use was not allowed. In 2005, Pasadena added the definition of a medical marijuana dispensary to the PMC by enacting section 17.80.020M. Pasadena pointed out that because the ordinance was adopted in 2005, defendants' challenge to it was time-barred because \"facial challenges to zoning provisions are subject to the 90-day limitation period\" under *1091*896Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B). Pasadena also stated that the City Council authorized the actions to abate illegal medical marijuana dispensaries."], "id": "20670661-e891-4ad8-9990-07b1a5252f90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In July 2015, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 1715, which is the ordinance at issue on this appeal.4 The council determined there were more than 40 <mask> businesses operating in the city despite being a prohibited use under the zoning ordinance. The council declared: \"the city wishes to resume collection of marijuana tax and also address the continued proliferation of unauthorized medical marijuana dispensaries in the city by accepting tax from, and granting limited immunity from enforcement of its prohibition on medical marijuana dispensaries under the Vallejo Municipal Code to, those medical marijuana dispensaries that meet certain criteria, until the number of medical marijuana dispensaries is reduced to no more than four ....\""], "id": "3d34a5c1-4013-40d0-a49c-1c4cfec5e473", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["appellant\u2019s premises in September 2015, County \u201cseized and summarily destroyed . . . approximately 880 high-grade, high- yield <mask> plants.\u201d The marijuana seized on other occasions \u201cwas all badly decompensated and full of bugs\u201d when it was returned to appellant. \u201c[Appellant] determined that all inventories of packaged and stored cannabis products seized from [appellant\u2019s] offices in the subject Raids, although returned, was in such damaged and degraded condition that all value was lost.\u201d County\u2019s Demurrer to 2020 Petition County demurred to the 2020 petition. It maintained that the petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the statute of limitations, and the doctrine of laches. County also claimed that it had lawfully destroyed the 880 marijuana plants and \u201chad no duty to preserve and return the [other] seized marijuana.\u201d The court\u2019s ruling on the demurrer states: \u201cThe Court Sustains, without leave to amend, [County\u2019s] demurrer [to the 2020 petition] on grounds the matter is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. [Citation.] [Appellant] raised the same facts and claims alleged here in a prior action [the 2016 petition], which the court dismissed without leave to amend after [appellant] failed to state a claim, despite having the opportunity to amend"], "id": "cf4c9b3a-7d13-4a84-8bd9-5d078d106429", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Medical Marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"A SLAPP suit is 'a meritless lawsuit \"filed primarily to chill the defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights.\" ' [Citations.] California's anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss 'certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.' \" ( <mask>, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602, 613, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45.) Per the anti-SLAPP statute: \"A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.\" ( \u00a7 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)"], "id": "f715f69f-0622-423b-b199-31813de2324b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The PMC therefore states that <mask> dispensaries are not permitted, and non-permitted uses are nuisances. This was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the dispensaries constituted nuisances per se. \"[W]here the law expressly declares something to be a nuisance, then no inquiry beyond its existence need be made and in this sense its mere existence is said to be a nuisance per se.\" ( Beck, supra , 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 ; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1086, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [\"An act or condition legislatively declared to be a public nuisance is ' \"a nuisance per se against which an injunction may issue without allegation or proof of irreparable injury.\" ' \"].) Defendants have cited no authority in support of their position that a nuisance must be enumerated in a single *899ordinance section in order to be deemed a nuisance per se, and we have found none. *1095Defendants argue that Pasadena's permissive zoning structure is insufficient to establish a nuisance per se, because \"[p]ermissive zoning by definition creates only a presumed prohibition, but not an explicit legislative determination that the use in question, medical marijuana dispensary, is a nuisance.\" Pasadena asserts that courts have recognized permissive zoning as a valid method of prohibiting dispensaries. Pasadena is correct. For example, in City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, the Court of Appeal held that the municipality's permissive zoning code, combined with a code section stating that all unauthorized uses were nuisances, established that the dispensary at issue was a nuisance per se. ( Ibid . ) Other cases also have found that permissive zoning sufficiently bars the establishment of medical marijuana dispensaries. (See, e.g., The Kind and Compassionate v. City of Long Beach (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 116, 128, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 [a permissive zoning scheme meant that the dispensaries \"never had a vested property right to operate a medical marijuana dispensary in the city\"]; City of Corona v. Naulls (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 418, 433, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [\"where a particular use of land is not expressly enumerated in a city's municipal code as constituting a permissible use, it follows that such use is impermissible\"]; City of Claremont v. Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1165, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [where the \"Claremont Municipal Code expressly states that a condition caused or permitted to exist in violation of the municipal code provisions may be abated as a public nuisance,\" the \"operation of a nonenumerated and therefore expressly prohibited use ... created a nuisance per se.\"].)"], "id": "ee068020-5e5d-4399-b377-7f42128b4631", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In July 2015, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 1715, which is the ordinance at issue on this appeal.4 The council determined there were more than 40 <mask> businesses operating in the city despite being a prohibited use under the zoning ordinance. The council declared: \"the city wishes to resume collection of marijuana tax and also address the continued proliferation of unauthorized medical marijuana dispensaries in the city by accepting tax from, and granting limited immunity from enforcement of its prohibition on medical marijuana dispensaries under the Vallejo Municipal Code to, those medical marijuana dispensaries that meet certain criteria, until the number of medical marijuana dispensaries is reduced to no more than four ....\""], "id": "8f59fb71-bf63-4d44-983b-38eb7b192aba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Ordinance No. 185,343 defined an \"EMMD\" as \"an existing <mask> dispensary that is in compliance with all restrictions of Proposition D.\" (LAMC, \u00a7 104.01(12), italics added.) Also, it provided an \"EMMD\" would be given priority in obtaining a city license, only as long as it had been in full compliance with the Proposition D requirements for limited immunity. (LAMC, \u00a7 104.07(a).) The ordinance thus depended, as an integral part of its scheme, on an MMB complying with the law and not having been prosecuted until it obtained a license. Further, the ordinance stated, \"An EMMD that as of January 1, 2018, meets all of Proposition D requirements shall continue to have limited immunity up until the time the EMMD receives Temporary Approval\" for a license to sell *21marijuana (LAMC, \u00a7 104.07(b), italics added). Providing for continued immunity implies pre-2018 violations were not rendered noncriminal."], "id": "c5749919-b709-4abb-b536-76f2c972c6c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Appellants argue that our cited cases about taxes generally including assessments are inconsequential, because we cannot apply this common usage without a \"clear, unambiguous indication\" that this was the People's specific intent in adopting the 1911 constitutional provision, and the cited cases did not so hold. Appellants cite California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, where an initiative petition sought a special election to impose taxes on <mask> dispensaries, but the city invoked the constitutional provision that a tax proposed by \"local government\" was to be submitted at the next general election. ( Id. at pp. 931, 937.) The Supreme Court held \"local government\" did not include \"the electorate.\" In doing so, the Court noted that the \"common understanding\" of the term \"local government\" did not readily lend itself to include the electorate. ( Id. at p. 937.) Thus, common usage of words is a factor in construing the constitutional provision. Here, the common usage of the term \"taxes\" in 1911 generally included user fees and assessments."], "id": "bee0a703-ec51-479f-b656-00befe62d8e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Municipal Code was amended in 2011 specifically to regulate <mask> collectives, but that regulatory scheme was suspended almost immediately due to a referendum petition challenging the amendments. The Municipal Code was amended again in 2014 specifically to regulate medical marijuana. Under the 2014 amendments, \"medical marijuana collective\" is not listed as a permissible use in the Commercial Office district. It is, however, *368listed as a restricted use in certain industrial zoning areas."], "id": "bf5fc9eb-db9a-4e63-abd2-f509d9f02422", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*143Nothing in Riverside 's application of preemption principles supports the trial court's conclusion that a local ban on dispensaries abrogates the <mask> defense in a prosecution under state criminal law. While a local government remains free to enact local ordinances to regulate (or prohibit) medical marijuana operations within its jurisdiction ( Riverside, supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 762, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494 ; see also \u00a7 11362.83; Kirby v. County of Fresno (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 940, 961, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 815 ), nothing in law or logic supports an extension of local government power over land use within its borders to, in effect, nullify a statutory defense to violations of state law. How could it? A city or county has no power to preempt state law. Nor does any language in the MMP or CUA even arguably suggest the defense provided by section 11362.775, subdivision (a) is available only to medical marijuana providers who are *477compliant with local ordinances. The court's ruling that Ahmed's violation of the Livermore ordinance barred him raising a medical marijuana defense under the MMP was thus erroneous as a matter of law."], "id": "8947faf8-8e96-401f-bb5e-f0d269dc360e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b69 On or about August 28, 2018, Matthew Peter Tierney and his wife, Shani Swarer, retained Respondent to assist them with setting up a <mask> business. During their initial meeting, Respondent had Tierney sign an Attorney Retainer Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, Tierney paid Respondent a $5,000.00 retainer in the form of a check to cover fees and costs incurred during the representation.2 The agreement also provided that upon conclusion of the representation, the balance of the retainer, if any, would be returned to the client."], "id": "ff3b0e48-47fa-4423-9d01-7c72d229a068", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Ordinance No. 185,343 defined an \"EMMD\" as \"an existing <mask> dispensary that is in compliance with all restrictions of Proposition D.\" (LAMC, \u00a7 104.01(12), italics added.) Also, it provided an \"EMMD\" would be given priority in obtaining a city license, only as long as it had been in full compliance with the Proposition D requirements for limited immunity. (LAMC, \u00a7 104.07(a).) The ordinance thus depended, as an integral part of its scheme, on an MMB complying with the law and not having been prosecuted until it obtained a license. Further, the ordinance stated, \"An EMMD that as of January 1, 2018, meets all of Proposition D requirements shall continue to have limited immunity up until the time the EMMD receives Temporary Approval\" for a license to sell *21marijuana (LAMC, \u00a7 104.07(b), italics added). Providing for continued immunity implies pre-2018 violations were not rendered noncriminal."], "id": "6eb25362-6de3-4fd0-8030-385fe1876dd3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Applying the foregoing test, we conclude the City erred in determining that the adoption of the Ordinance was not a project. Prior to the Ordinance, no <mask> dispensaries were legally *838permitted to operate in the City. The Ordinance therefore amended the City's zoning regulations to permit the establishment of a sizable number of retail businesses of an entirely new type. Although inconsistency with prior permissible land uses is not necessary for an activity to constitute a project (see Muzzy Ranch , supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 388, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247, 160 P.3d 116 ), establishment of these new businesses is capable of causing indirect physical changes in the environment. At a minimum, such a policy change could foreseeably result in new retail construction to accommodate the businesses. In addition, as UMMP suggests, the establishment of new stores could cause a citywide change in patterns of vehicle traffic from the businesses' customers, employees, and suppliers. The necessary causal connection between the Ordinance and these effects is present because adoption of the Ordinance was \"an essential step culminating in action [the establishment of new businesses] which may affect the environment.\" ( Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Board of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 797, 187 Cal.Rptr. 398, 654 P.2d 168 ( Fullerton ).) The theoretical effects mentioned above are sufficiently plausible to raise the possibility that the Ordinance \"may cause ... a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment\" ( \u00a7 21065 ), warranting its consideration as a project."], "id": "83b7c1d1-b3af-41d3-82b7-8c5373bdac89", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["California Law requires law enforcement officers to return \"lawfully possessed\" marijuana to its owner. The CSA, however, prohibits the distribution of marijuana without regard to whether state law permits its recreational use. The Garden Grove court confronted the scenario that involved whether a law enforcement officer who returns <mask> under California *260law *6would also be \"distributing\" marijuana under the CSA. The Garden Grove court found that \" 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1)... does not apply to persons who regularly handle controlled substances in the course of their professional duties.\" ( Garden Grove, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 390, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 656 ; see United States v. Feingold (9th Cir.2006) 454 F.3d 1001, 1008 [ \u00a7 841(a)(1) could apply to doctor only if, in distributing a controlled substance, he intended \"to act as a pusher rather than a medical professional\"].) The San Francisco Police Department would be returning the instant marijuana pursuant to a court order, and not acting as drug \"pushers\" the CSA was designed to combat. Accordingly, there is no \"positive conflict\" between California Law and the CSA such that the two could not consistently stand together."], "id": "ef26d040-2308-4311-bea6-a8e0aa946de5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants' opposition was supported by the declaration of defendants' attorney, Stanley H. Kimmel. Kimmel stated that the Planning Commission *1090proposed a revision to the Zoning Code to define <mask> dispensaries on January 26, 2005. The Planning Commission then forwarded that recommendation to the City Council, which noticed a hearing on the issue, but continued the hearing several times. Kimmel stated that the hearing regarding the proposed rule was eventually held on July 18, 2005, and that the hearing was included in the agenda for the meeting on that date. Kimmel argued that the schedule for adoption of the ordinance violated hearing and notice requirements in the PMC. Kimmel also asserted that the initial language defined \"medical marijuana dispensary,\" but did not ban such a land use. Kimmel said that ordinance 7018, which included language prohibiting medical marijuana dispensaries, was adopted without a required public hearing in September 2005. Although Kimmel quoted several documents throughout his declaration, such as City Council agenda statements, none of the documents is included as an exhibit."], "id": "85f47633-3c51-4e1a-b478-ec846066ce74", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Local governments may rationally limit <mask> dispensaries to those already in operation and compliant with prior law as past compliance shows a willingness to follow the law, which suggests future lawful behavior. ( 420 Caregivers, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 219 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1335-1338, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 17.) In 420 Caregivers , the appellate court upheld a Los Angeles ordinance restricting dispensaries to those that had been in operation for several years and had registered under a prior ordinance. ( Id. at pp. 1326-1328, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 17.) The court characterized the ordinance as \"essentially a 'grandfather provision' with the added gloss of a prior registration requirement.\" ( Id. at p. 1335, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 17.) The court rejected an equal protection challenge, noting that \"[i]n areas of social or economic policy not involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights, a statute must be upheld so long as there is any reasonably conceivable set of facts that provides a 'rational basis' for the classification.\" ( Id. at pp. 1333-1334, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 17.) The court observed that \"[s]o-called 'grandfather provisions' have routinely withstood equal protection challenges, both at the federal and state levels\" ( *1087id. at p. 1335, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 17 ) and found no constitutional infirmity in the added requirement of prior registration. Those dispensaries' willingness to register under the prior law \"provided the City with a rational basis to conclude that they would continue to act in a law-abiding manner going forward.\" ( Id. at p. 1338, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 17.)"], "id": "cf0db7ce-f009-4979-81fb-9284fa2ba036", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"Notwithstanding the activities prohibited by this Article, and notwithstanding that [MMB] is not and shall not become a permitted use in the City for so long as this Article remains in effect, [an MMB] shall not be subject to the remedies set forth in Los Angeles Municipal Code Sections 11.00 or 12.27.1 solely on the basis of: (1) an activity prohibited by Section 45.19.6.2; and (2) the fact that [MMB] is not a permitted use in the City, provided however that, as authorized by California Health and Safety Code Section 11362.83, this limited immunity is available and may be asserted as an affirmative defense only so long as subsections A. through D. and G. through O. of this Section 45.19.6.3 remain in effect in their entirety, only by [an MMB] at the one location identified in its original or any amended business tax registration certificate issued by the City, and only if that [MMB] does not violate any of the following <mask> business restrictions: [enumerating 15 restrictions].\""], "id": "a8395d6f-4a96-4e03-a300-774015ea8603", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs argue that a <mask> collective is a medical office because it is a health-related occupation. They note that the term medical generally means something curative or related to healing, and they cite Health and Safety Code section 11362.5, subdivision (b)(1)(A), which states that one purpose of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 is to \"ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes *487where that medical use ... has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment\" of various ailments. Plaintiffs contend that because medical marijuana collectives provide a medical and health-related service, they should be considered medical offices under the Municipal Code."], "id": "402e36e9-bb18-47c7-a6a6-ff40fcb732af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The arguments made by Save Lafayette Trees to the contrary are not persuasive. Save Lafayette Trees argues, \" section 65009 is a statute adopted to address California's 'housing crisis' by 'reduc[ing] delays *642and restraints upon expeditiously completing housing projects.' (... \u00a7 65009(a)(1).) It does not by its terms, or even by implication, apply to the city's contract with PG&E to remove mature trees along public hiking trails.\" Although one of the three findings made by the Legislature with respect to section 65009 relates to housing,3 nothing in section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), restricts its application to decisions involving housing. As set forth above, courts have interpreted the statute as applying to challenges to a broad range of local *157zoning and planning decisions. (See, e.g., Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1096, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 892 [ordinance prohibiting <mask> dispensaries]; Okasaki v. City of Elk Grove (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 873, [variance to landowners, in order to authorize pool and spa in setback zone].)"], "id": "05f5b406-4d4b-4089-83c3-1778123afb6c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Before the Supreme Court was the appeal of Lovie Troy Matthews (Matthews), who served as the getaway driver for an armed robbery in which a security guard was killed. ( Banks , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 794, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330.) Leon Banks (Banks), David Gardiner (Gardiner), and Brandon Daniels (Daniels) attempted to rob a <mask> dispensary. ( Id . at p. 795, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330.) Banks and at least one of the other men were armed. ( Ibid . ) When Banks, Gardiner, and Daniels were fleeing the dispensary, Banks and a security guard began shooting at each other, and Banks killed the guard. ( Ibid . ) Matthews was not present at the scene of the robbery, but he picked up Daniels and Gardiner a block away shortly thereafter. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "bcfd65e5-b6a3-49b1-83e9-a71d9a993fa2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs1 own the subject property and the <mask> collective at issue. At all relevant times, the subject property was zoned Commercial Office under the City of San Jose Municipal Code (Municipal Code). The Municipal Code defines the Commercial Office zone as a \"district in or near residential areas or between residential and commercial areas.\" The property abuts a residential use."], "id": "b8e20109-537d-4bc8-858f-1af4224db6ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 ( Strasburg ), a different panel of this division held that a police officer had probable cause to search a vehicle based on the odor of marijuana, despite the defendant's presentation of a <mask> prescription. ( Strasburg , at pp. 1058-1059, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306.) The court rejected the defendant's argument that the decriminalization of medicinal marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) bars a law enforcement officer from conducting a reasonable search based on the odor of marijuana. \"[T]he officer is entitled to continue to search and investigate, and determine whether the subject of the investigation is in fact possessing the marijuana for personal medical needs, and is adhering to the eight-ounce limit on possession.\" ( Strasburg , at p. 1060, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306.)"], "id": "80cc5d50-bb14-4267-8790-f0c9d5a2ed9e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b610 On June 27, 2019, Swarer sent Respondent an email indicating that she and Tierney had decided to not pursue the <mask> business venture any further and requesting a refund of the unused retainer. Respondent did not reply to the email until July 22, 2019, at which point he indicated that he would review their file and remit the unused portion of the retainer that week. On August 19, 2019, Swarer sent Respondent another email indicating they had not received their refund. Respondent replied the next day, apologizing for the delay and promising to resolve the matter by the following Monday. Swarer sent another follow-up email the following Wednesday, August 28, 2019, because they still had not received any remittance. Respondent never replied to this message. Swarer sent two more follow-up emails on November 8, 2019, and November 24, 2019, requesting an account of how their funds were used and that any remaining portion be returned. On March 6, 2020, Swarer sent one final message to Respondent demanding an account and the return of any unused funds. Swarer also indicated that she had contacted the county bar association for advice on how to recover their money."], "id": "6db72ad1-1487-47d5-a141-7cccdb073612", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The accountant report was prepared by New Era Certified Public Accountants, LLP (New Era), which specializes in accounting and tax preparation services for <mask> dispensaries. The accountant report provided a list of compliance areas, including licensing and permits, and estimated related costs incurred by cities and counties. New Era estimated the total annual cost of the enforcement procedures itemized in the accountant report totaled $56,540 per dispensary, plus an additional annual $10,000 per dispensary to cover possible fees resulting from a noncompliant dispensary failing to comply with applicable regulations and guidelines, which could lead to revocation or suspension of a license."], "id": "4cf591c1-0b3a-4bc5-8bbd-9efbfe0e73f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The appellate court held that there was no conflict preemption: \"Conflict preemption exists when 'simultaneous compliance with both state and federal directives is impossible.' [Citation.] ... A claim of positive conflict might gain more traction if the state required , instead of merely exempting from state criminal prosecution, individuals to possess, cultivate, transport, possess for sale, or sell <mask> in a manner that violated federal law. But because [state law does not] require such conduct, there is no 'positive conflict' with federal law .... [Citation.] In short, nothing in either state enactment purports to make it impossible to comply simultaneously with both federal and state law.\" ( Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim , supra , 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 758-759, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 89.)"], "id": "ecf61d50-580c-4c28-9501-12b7722f5bc2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In any event, the record does not bear out the People's claim that Ahmed could not substantiate an MMP defense. At the outset of trial defense counsel advised the court, \"this is a <mask> collective slash dispensary case. ... [\u00b6] You had to have [a] medical marijuana card. You had to have a prescription from our doctor. You had to have a driver's license to go into his open store to purchase.\" When the court asked defense counsel whether he had evidence supporting a medical marijuana defense, counsel responded, \"I have testimony, I have documents. You want me to show you some of the documents? ... [\u00b6] I have no problem with doing that in this case. I am absolutely open.\" Ahmed testified at trial that the collective was being run properly and without criminal activity; that he did nothing illegal; that only patients with medical cards were permitted in the sales room; that he paid sales and employee payroll taxes; and that the collective was a non-profit, with any profits received put back into the business \"for the patients.\" One of the investigating officers testified that out of 1,400 or 1,500 collective members *144whose records were seized only 5 or 6 had not provided California I.D.'s, and the officer was unable to identify any individuals who had not provided a physician's recommendation for marijuana. The People's current position that Ahmed failed to show he could assert a medical marijuana defense simply ignores all of this."], "id": "0e3ad58d-3752-405b-b80a-559fd8044653", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Vallejo has several ordinances affecting the operation of <mask> dispensaries. The starting point is its zoning ordinance, which predates state medical marijuana laws. Vallejo's zoning ordinance provides an extensive list of permitted land uses and prohibits all other uses. (Vallejo Mun. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 16.06.010-16.06.630.) An unpermitted use is declared to be \"a public *744nuisance.\" (Id. , \u00a7 16.100.040.) Vallejo has never recognized medical marijuana dispensaries as a permitted land use. A marijuana dispensary is not a designated land use and, therefore, is an unpermitted nuisance. (Id., \u00a7\u00a7 16.06.010-16.06.630, 16.100.040; see City of Corona v. Naulls (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 418, 433, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [enjoining operation of a medical marijuana dispensary upon finding that \"where a particular use of land is not expressly enumerated in a city's municipal code as constituting a permissible use, it follows that such use is impermissible \"].)1"], "id": "fba3bb80-df45-417a-b058-0004b399e551", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The jury continued to wrestle with questions about <mask>. The following day the jury requested the text of the code section \"pertaining to medical marijuana and collectives\" and asked: \"Is it illegal, specifically under California state law, to do any of the following? [\u00b6] ... For a collective/dispensary of medical marijuana to operate while knowingly being not in compliance with a local law or ordinance?\" The court responded by providing the jury with the text of sections 11359 (possession for sale), 11360, subdivision (a) (sale) and Penal Code section 186.10 (money laundering). It did not give the jury the text of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA; \u00a7 11362.5) or Medical Marijuana Program (MMP; \u00a7 11362.7 et seq.), but referred the jury to \"the instructions already given concerning medical marijuana collectives or dispensaries.\""], "id": "c51e288b-dd37-417a-bd6f-531e1331a70c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The appellate court held that there was no conflict preemption: \"Conflict preemption exists when 'simultaneous compliance with both state and federal directives is impossible.' [Citation.] ... A claim of positive conflict might gain more traction if the state required , instead of merely exempting from state criminal prosecution, individuals to possess, cultivate, transport, possess for sale, or sell <mask> in a manner that violated federal law. But because [state law does not] require such conduct, there is no 'positive conflict' with federal law .... [Citation.] In short, nothing in either state enactment purports to make it impossible to comply simultaneously with both federal and state law.\" ( Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim , supra , 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 758-759, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 89.)"], "id": "24b190e9-3b0c-4b25-b481-0a1b7be3dddf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The City of Pasadena filed a nuisance abatement action against several businesses and individuals related to <mask> dispensaries, which are prohibited by the Pasadena Municipal Code (PMC). The defendants in that action later filed a lawsuit against the City of Pasadena, and the two cases were deemed related. In each of the two actions, the trial *894court granted Pasadena's request for injunctions, prohibiting defendants from operating their medical marijuana dispensaries in Pasadena. The defendants appealed from each order, and we consolidated the appeals."], "id": "ea62ebe3-1a8a-499d-a9cc-7f69ab1e91db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court relied primarily on City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494 ( Riverside ) in its tentative ruling granting the motion. It explained: \"[W]hen they considered what are we going to do with the cooperatives, the collectives, the dispensaries operators establishments, or providers, under [ Health and Safety Code section] 11362.7681 the Legislature said, okay, we're going to let the cities decide as to whether or not they are going to let any of those collectives or cooperatives into their city and set up business, set up shop. They can decide whether to allow them to set up shop. They can decide if they let them set up shop, where, and under-you know, they can set it by zoning laws, say where and what hours you can operate, and that kind of stuff. That-[section] 11362.768 says, in paragraph (f), nothing in this section shall prohibit a city, county, or city and county from adopting ordinances or policies that further restrict the location of establishment of a <mask> cooperative, collective, dispensary, operator, establishment or provider. So, cities, or counties, or city and county, which applies only to San Francisco, can restrict those things. They can keep them out entirely. They can let them be there under certain conditions. That's the power of the City."], "id": "7ae80405-87b8-4788-af2a-6fa47003f3a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"Notwithstanding the activities prohibited by this Article, and notwithstanding that [MMB] is not and shall not become a permitted use in the City for so long as this Article remains in effect, [an MMB] shall not be subject to the remedies set forth in Los Angeles Municipal Code Sections 11.00 or 12.27.1 solely on the basis of: (1) an activity prohibited by Section 45.19.6.2; and (2) the fact that [MMB] is not a permitted use in the City, provided however that, as authorized by California Health and Safety Code Section 11362.83, this limited immunity is available and may be asserted as an affirmative defense only so long as subsections A. through D. and G. through O. of this Section 45.19.6.3 remain in effect in their entirety, only by [an MMB] at the one location identified in its original or any amended business tax registration certificate issued by the City, and only if that [MMB] does not violate any of the following <mask> business restrictions: [enumerating 15 restrictions].\""], "id": "f03d8543-97da-489a-ad26-a620e703f6bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In finding the City has consistently interpreted its Municipal Code to exclude <mask> collectives from the medical office use, we do not rely on exhibits four and five to the City's request for judicial notice. Those exhibits are complaints filed against the City in superior court by other medical marijuana collectives, along with attachments that appear to be compliance orders issued by the City. They were not provided to the Appeals Hearing Board or to the trial court. We granted judicial notice because they are court records. (Evid. Code, \u00a7 452, subd. (d).) But in taking judicial notice of court records, we do not take notice of the truth of any matters stated therein. (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 987-988, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 26.)"], "id": "3b97cc86-375c-4367-b447-013d2b786971", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Medical Marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Zaragoza identified exhibit A as \"a print screen\" of a computer system that had been used to enter business tax applications. He confirmed that the printout contained his signature and a date file stamp. He stated he did not know what prompted the printout and that the stamp did not indicate receipt of any documents. When the prosecutor showed Zaragoza an exemplar of a \"<mask> Dispensary Business Information Form\" (Business Information Form), he stated that he had never seen such a form before."], "id": "993b2a6b-0d37-4fb9-83cf-e0cb67f1392b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b610 On June 27, 2019, Swarer sent Respondent an email indicating that she and Tierney had decided to not pursue the <mask> business venture any further and requesting a refund of the unused retainer. Respondent did not reply to the email until July 22, 2019, at which point he indicated that he would review their file and remit the unused portion of the retainer that week. On August 19, 2019, Swarer sent Respondent another email indicating they had not received their refund. Respondent replied the next day, apologizing for the delay and promising to resolve the matter by the following Monday. Swarer sent another follow-up email the following Wednesday, August 28, 2019, because they still had not received any remittance. Respondent never replied to this message. Swarer sent two more follow-up emails on November 8, 2019, and November 24, 2019, requesting an account of how their funds were used and that any remaining portion be returned. On March 6, 2020, Swarer sent one final message to Respondent demanding an account and the return of any unused funds. Swarer also indicated that she had contacted the county bar association for advice on how to recover their money."], "id": "f7698d84-b883-4494-be23-7bc93fc215d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["For the first time at oral argument, counsel for defendants asserted that in City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, Inc . (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494, the Supreme Court held that state marijuana laws did not permit a municipality to implement a \"total ban\" on <mask> dispensaries. This is incorrect. In City of Riverside , the Court stated that state marijuana law \"neither ... expressly or impliedly preempts the authority of California cities and counties, under their traditional land use and police powers, to allow, restrict, limit, or entirely exclude facilities that distribute medical marijuana, and to enforce such policies by nuisance actions.\" (Id . at p. 762, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494 [emphasis added].)"], "id": "fc79e551-c7d1-4770-b932-32d94711c9ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["This case arises from the city of Walled Lake\u2019s implementation, under the authority of the Medical Marihuana Facilities Licensing Act (MMFLA), MCL 333.27101 et seq., of its <mask> facilities licensing ordinance and plaintiff\u2019s subsequent application for a license to operate a provisioning center. The ordinance specifies that there are to be three licenses for provisioning centers, with two located in the C-2 zoning district and one located in the C-3 zoning district. Walled Lake Ordinance C-334-17, \u00a7 6b, enacting \u00a7 21.49(b) of the Zoning Ordinance. Subsequently, the city passed Resolution 2018-10, which established administrative rules for processing MMFLA permit applications."], "id": "69f0cef1-981d-4c36-bb79-cfb39d117fac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 ( Strasburg ), a different panel of this division held that a police officer had probable cause to search a vehicle based on the odor of marijuana, despite the defendant's presentation of a <mask> prescription. ( Strasburg , at pp. 1058-1059, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306.) The court rejected the defendant's argument that the decriminalization of medicinal marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) bars a law enforcement officer from conducting a reasonable search based on the odor of marijuana. \"[T]he officer is entitled to continue to search and investigate, and determine whether the subject of the investigation is in fact possessing the marijuana for personal medical needs, and is adhering to the eight-ounce limit on possession.\" ( Strasburg , at p. 1060, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306.)"], "id": "60325871-3864-4ed5-bb32-32f520dcf9aa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b69 On or about August 28, 2018, Matthew Peter Tierney and his wife, Shani Swarer, retained Respondent to assist them with setting up a <mask> business. During their initial meeting, Respondent had Tierney sign an Attorney Retainer Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, Tierney paid Respondent a $5,000.00 retainer in the form of a check to cover fees and costs incurred during the representation.2 The agreement also provided that upon conclusion of the representation, the balance of the retainer, if any, would be returned to the client."], "id": "046fe55a-46e2-4544-873a-d827d4804526", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["We agree. As noted earlier, land use regulation is a function of local government. ( City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 742, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494.) State law permitting medicinal marijuana use and distribution does not preempt \"the authority of California cities and counties, under their traditional land use and police powers, to allow, restrict, limit, or entirely exclude facilities that distribute <mask>, and to enforce such polices by nuisance actions.\" ( Id. at p. 762, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494.)"], "id": "f9e90672-5932-4afc-bfa2-8cdd917b1bf2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["7 The applicable Maine statute, at the time, limited the authorization of <mask> use to persons with debilitating medical conditions. We do not in this case confront a situation where a so-called \"medical marijuana\" authorization scheme in practice allows for recreational use, so we have no occasion to speculate about how the rider might or might not apply in those circumstances."], "id": "b9192f30-18d0-4c6d-bf9b-f66906a94c78", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["On December 10, 2015, represented by attorney Thomas Byrne, McClain and Harrell filed a complaint naming three defendants: \"Karen Kissler, individually and dba Karen Kissler, Esq. and Alternatives, a Health Collective.\" Action No. 258139 alleged one cause of action, for breach of contract, which claim alleged that on June 22 a \"written agreement\" was made \"between Katie McClain, Jonothan Harrell and Karen Kissler,\" alleging that the agreement was \"as follows: Karen Kissler would employ Plaintiffs to raise 99 <mask> plants\" at Geyserville. Action No. 258139 sought $144,500 in damages.3 No claim was asserted against Alternatives.4"], "id": "ad359442-242b-4c86-810e-752462824cea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Applying the foregoing test, we conclude the City erred in determining that the adoption of the Ordinance was not a project. Prior to the Ordinance, no <mask> dispensaries were legally *838permitted to operate in the City. The Ordinance therefore amended the City's zoning regulations to permit the establishment of a sizable number of retail businesses of an entirely new type. Although inconsistency with prior permissible land uses is not necessary for an activity to constitute a project (see Muzzy Ranch , supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 388, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247, 160 P.3d 116 ), establishment of these new businesses is capable of causing indirect physical changes in the environment. At a minimum, such a policy change could foreseeably result in new retail construction to accommodate the businesses. In addition, as UMMP suggests, the establishment of new stores could cause a citywide change in patterns of vehicle traffic from the businesses' customers, employees, and suppliers. The necessary causal connection between the Ordinance and these effects is present because adoption of the Ordinance was \"an essential step culminating in action [the establishment of new businesses] which may affect the environment.\" ( Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Board of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 797, 187 Cal.Rptr. 398, 654 P.2d 168 ( Fullerton ).) The theoretical effects mentioned above are sufficiently plausible to raise the possibility that the Ordinance \"may cause ... a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment\" ( \u00a7 21065 ), warranting its consideration as a project."], "id": "0e261d42-222d-4a5c-b775-2963f70c8ad6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the Ellis Street property, officers found 143 live marijuana plants. There were three <mask> cards, including one for Tapia, that purported to allow 90 live plants and six pounds of processed marijuana for each card holder. Inside a wooden shed on the property were portions of marijuana plants hanging by strings and a large bucket containing freshly cut marijuana plants. In a trailer on the property, officers found a handgun and a shotgun; the shotgun had been reported stolen in Watsonville. The trailer also was being used as a location to dry marijuana."], "id": "630a0845-c13b-4649-a6ee-f9aa446c1eb1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In their reply brief, appellants place great weight on the Supreme Court's recent decision in California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49 ( Cannabis ). We requested supplemental briefing from the City to address Cannabis , which was published after it submitted its brief in this case. The City contends the holding in Cannabis is not applicable here. The facts in Cannabis involved a voter initiative to permit <mask> dispensaries and to require each dispensary to pay an annual $75,000 licensing and inspection fee. ( Id. at pp. 931-932, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.) The California Cannabis Coalition collected signatures from 15 percent of the city's voters and requested a special election to consider the initiative pursuant to Elections Code section 9214 ( section 9214 ). ( Ibid . ) The city concluded the $75,000 fee constituted a general tax and could not be voted on in a special election. ( Id. at p. 932, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.) The California Cannabis Coalition filed a writ of mandate alleging the city violated section 9214 by failing to hold a special election on the initiative. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "8c25c6ce-3dfb-4250-82ad-a154b5090ebc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Medical Marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"A SLAPP suit is 'a meritless lawsuit \"filed primarily to chill the defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights.\" ' [Citations.] California's anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss 'certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.' \" ( <mask>, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602, 613, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45.) Per the anti-SLAPP statute: \"A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.\" ( \u00a7 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)"], "id": "792c4055-86aa-4ef2-9b53-734f4fd5c3cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The arguments made by Save Lafayette Trees to the contrary are not persuasive. Save Lafayette Trees argues, \" section 65009 is a statute adopted to address California's 'housing crisis' by 'reduc[ing] delays and restraints upon expeditiously completing housing projects.' (... \u00a7 65009(a)(1).) It does not by its terms, or even by implication, apply to the city's contract with PG&E to remove mature trees along public hiking trails.\" Although one of the three findings made by the Legislature with respect to section 65009 relates to housing,3 nothing in section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), restricts its application to decisions involving housing. As set forth above, courts have interpreted the statute as applying to challenges to a broad range of local zoning and planning decisions. (See, e.g., Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1096, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 892 [ordinance prohibiting <mask> dispensaries]; Okasaki v. City of Elk Grove (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 873, [variance to landowners, in order to authorize pool and spa in setback zone].)"], "id": "ce9ba4a5-0391-4a5a-aab3-474051d10814", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In arguing there was an \"unlawful amendment of Measure C,\" NCORP4 contends that the tax measure permits a delinquent taxpayer to cure its default *1088with payment of back taxes, penalties and interest. NCORP4 argues that Ordinance No. 1715 \"revokes\" this curative provision by denying \"immunity to an applicant who is otherwise ready, willing and able to meet his past-due tax obligations.\" The argument misconstrues Measure C. The failure to pay taxes under Measure C has never been capable of cure by the simple expediency of tendering late payment. A person violating Measure C is \"guilty of a misdemeanor\" (Vallejo Mun. Code, \u00a7 5.05.600) and may be prosecuted even if late payment is made (id ., \u00a7 5.05.590). In any event, Ordinance No. 1715 does not preclude late payment of taxes but limits immunity to those <mask> dispensaries that \"paid quarterly taxes from the date of opening until the city ceased accepting tax in February 2015.\" (Id. , \u00a7 7.100.080(A)(3).) NCORP4 did not pay taxes \"from the date of opening\" but only proffered payment years later when applying for immunity. (Ibid. )"], "id": "35a49c8b-08b9-4210-a65c-3426a1ede274", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Medical Marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"A SLAPP suit is 'a meritless lawsuit \"filed primarily to chill the defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights.\" ' [Citations.] California's anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss 'certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.' \" ( <mask>, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602, 613, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45.) Per the anti-SLAPP statute: \"A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.\" ( \u00a7 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)"], "id": "7346c279-da59-4c42-ae81-d88c8063c7f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*810CCC further alleges the City refuses to allow CCC to participate in any discussion or hearing determining whether the Initiative imposes a general tax. In addition, Initiative section 17.158.100 allegedly is only a minor part of the overall Initiative and would only affect the three proposed <mask> dispensaries. CCC asserts in its writ petition the City took the position the Initiative imposes a general tax because the City is against the Initiative. CCC further alleges the City's position allegedly is a pretext and serves no legitimate purpose. CCC concludes the City's refusal to place the Initiative on a special election ballot violates CCC's rights under the Elections Code and California Constitution. CCC's writ petition therefore requests the trial court to issue a writ of mandate compelling the City and City clerk to place the Initiative on a special election ballot in compliance with Elections Code section 9214."], "id": "7c59e193-73ce-482f-be35-6504d06963c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["*485An inspection report prepared before the appeals board hearing noted that one of the City's code enforcement inspectors had met with the collective's business owner in 2010 and told him \"this location may not qualify due to the residential use located next door.\" The City filed a brief with the Appeals Hearing Board that contained additional information about City Council directives regarding <mask>. According to the brief, in 2012 the City Council \"directed Code Enforcement to focus its enforcement priorities on ... collectives\" operating near schools. In 2013, the City Council added to the priority list collectives \"located on a parcel that shares a 'zero lot line' with residential uses.\" The City's code enforcement department had sent compliance orders to several collectives meeting those criteria, including plaintiffs' collective. After a hearing, the Appeals Hearing Board upheld the compliance order."], "id": "aa7cb16a-8aa2-4cae-92e6-0f760cec41d6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Appellants argue that our cited cases about taxes generally including assessments are inconsequential, because we cannot apply this common usage without a \"clear, unambiguous indication\" that this was the People's specific intent in adopting the 1911 constitutional provision, and the cited cases did not so hold. Appellants cite California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, where an initiative petition sought a special election to impose taxes on <mask> dispensaries, but the city invoked the constitutional provision that a tax proposed by \"local government\" was to be submitted at the next general election. ( Id. at pp. 931, 937.) The Supreme Court held \"local government\" did not include \"the electorate.\" In doing so, the Court noted that the \"common understanding\" of the term \"local government\" did not readily lend itself to include the electorate. ( Id. at p. 937.) Thus, common usage of words is a factor in construing the constitutional provision. Here, the common usage of the term \"taxes\" in 1911 generally included user fees and assessments."], "id": "443a002e-f168-45dc-96c2-fb0dfe394b77", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Medical Marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["<mask>, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45, is persuasive-if not on point. There, the court affirmed the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion with this language: \"It would be inappropriate for us to insert into a pleading claims for relief based on allegations of activities that plaintiffs simply have not identified, even if the parties suggest on appeal how plaintiffs might have intended to frame those claims or attempt to identify the specific conduct or assertions of statements alleged to be false on which plaintiffs intended to base such claims for relief. It is not our role to engage in what would amount to a redrafting of the first amended complaint in order to read that document as alleging conduct that supports a claim that has not in fact been specifically alleged, and then assess whether the pleading that we have essentially drafted could survive the anti-SLAPP motion directed at it.\" ( Id. at p. 621, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 fn. omitted.)"], "id": "c7dacd59-963e-4287-b64c-c6f6c75676bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 ( Strasburg ), a different panel of this division held that a police officer had probable cause to search a vehicle based on the odor of marijuana, despite the defendant's presentation of a <mask> prescription. ( Strasburg , at pp. 1058-1059, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306.) The court rejected the defendant's argument that the decriminalization of medicinal marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) bars a law enforcement officer from conducting a reasonable search based on the odor of marijuana. \"[T]he officer is entitled to continue to search and investigate, and determine whether the subject of the investigation is in fact possessing the marijuana for personal medical needs, and is adhering to the eight-ounce limit on possession.\" ( Strasburg , at p. 1060, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 306.)"], "id": "309718b3-fe7b-4216-9a68-632397e7b50c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The appellate court held that there was no conflict preemption: \"Conflict preemption exists when 'simultaneous compliance with both state and federal directives is impossible.' [Citation.] ... A claim of positive conflict might gain more traction if the state required , instead of merely exempting from state criminal prosecution, individuals to possess, cultivate, transport, possess for sale, or sell <mask> in a manner that violated federal law. But because [state law does not] require such conduct, there is no 'positive conflict' with federal law .... [Citation.] In short, nothing in either state enactment purports to make it impossible to comply simultaneously with both federal and state law.\" ( Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim , supra , 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 758-759, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 89.)"], "id": "fb9105e2-9ee4-4181-8c6a-4adc23d21797", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["We agree. As noted earlier, land use regulation is a function of local government. ( City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 742, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494.) State law permitting medicinal marijuana use and distribution does not preempt \"the authority of California cities and counties, under their traditional land use and police powers, to allow, restrict, limit, or entirely exclude facilities that distribute <mask>, and to enforce such polices by nuisance actions.\" ( Id. at p. 762, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494.)"], "id": "b2b98e51-ce43-4a81-abec-dd9a7ce5ce9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b69 On or about August 28, 2018, Matthew Peter Tierney and his wife, Shani Swarer, retained Respondent to assist them with setting up a <mask> business. During their initial meeting, Respondent had Tierney sign an Attorney Retainer Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, Tierney paid Respondent a $5,000.00 retainer in the form of a check to cover fees and costs incurred during the representation.2 The agreement also provided that upon conclusion of the representation, the balance of the retainer, if any, would be returned to the client."], "id": "2b7b691c-87cd-4290-ab61-b852d165a4af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The business tax was suspended in February 2015. The city council found there had been a \"proliferation of <mask> dispensaries\" and that \"accepting taxes from those engaged in an activity that is not lawful under the city's land use regulations tends to confuse the public as to the city's *1084policy and undermines enforcement of the city's land use controls.\" The city undertook to draft an ordinance limiting the number of dispensaries before reinstating the tax."], "id": "133df772-f3ca-45c2-ac5b-698e079ca078", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs argue that we should not defer to the City's interpretation because the \"terms 'medical office' and 'other similar health related occupations' are not technical, obscure or complex.\" But given that <mask> collectives are unique entities because marijuana remains illegal for most purposes under federal law, whether such a land use is authorized by a catchall provision in a local zoning classification is intertwined with issues of fact, policy, and discretion. (See Yamaha , supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 12, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.)"], "id": "5b44891f-0e6a-44f0-b950-e8dfdb9ca5dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["7 The applicable Maine statute, at the time, limited the authorization of <mask> use to persons with debilitating medical conditions. We do not in this case confront a situation where a so-called \"medical marijuana\" authorization scheme in practice allows for recreational use, so we have no occasion to speculate about how the rider might or might not apply in those circumstances."], "id": "48cf7c2b-4890-4aba-8fab-aa8a9f56772e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Vallejo has several ordinances affecting the operation of <mask> dispensaries. The starting point is its zoning ordinance, which predates state medical marijuana laws. Vallejo's zoning ordinance provides an extensive list of permitted land uses and prohibits all other uses. (Vallejo Mun. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 16.06.010-16.06.630.) An unpermitted use is declared to be \"a public *744nuisance.\" (Id. , \u00a7 16.100.040.) Vallejo has never recognized medical marijuana dispensaries as a permitted land use. A marijuana dispensary is not a designated land use and, therefore, is an unpermitted nuisance. (Id., \u00a7\u00a7 16.06.010-16.06.630, 16.100.040; see City of Corona v. Naulls (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 418, 433, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [enjoining operation of a medical marijuana dispensary upon finding that \"where a particular use of land is not expressly enumerated in a city's municipal code as constituting a permissible use, it follows that such use is impermissible \"].)1"], "id": "2233cee8-2786-4e41-91bc-5ca723d4a4f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Meanwhile, on April 28, 2016, Pasadena cross-complained in defendants' action, seeking injunctive relief and nuisance abatement. On July 15, 2016, Pasadena filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in defendants' action. Defendants noted that there already was a preliminary injunction in place affecting many of the defendants. However, Pasadena was seeking an additional injunction because \"<mask> dispensaries are trying to circumvent the preliminary injunctions already issued by either renaming the dispensary or allowing other dispensaries to occupy and use their location.\""], "id": "2b834222-d0e8-44f8-be69-e58e62791af7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi2 ... or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, [citations], the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. [Citations.] We break no new ground in observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard.' \" ( Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 ; California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 ; see also People v.Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 141, 127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317 [erroneous failure to instruct on affirmative defense \"constitutes a denial of this right which 'is in itself a miscarriage of justice' \"].) This case exemplifies a deprivation of the right to assert a defense. It cannot be said on this record that the refusal to permit Ahmed's possible <mask> defense was harmless beyond a reasonable *478doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.) We must reverse.3"], "id": "b3a3c3db-28af-4883-928b-022bbee8d465", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Ahmed requested leave to move for a new trial on the grounds that the court erroneously (1) precluded him from raising the state <mask> defense on the basis that Livermore's local ban against dispensaries preempted the state law defense to a criminal prosecution; and (2) instructed the jury that it is illegal under California law for a legal medical marijuana dispensary to deposit money into a federal bank. The court denied the request. Ahmed was sentenced to five years' felony probation with conditions including one year in county jail, a $5,000 restitution fund fine, and approximately $82,000 in other fines and fees. This appeal was timely filed."], "id": "a7f1fd01-aba3-4b41-9f62-7328d39d317d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Medical Marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["<mask>, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45, is persuasive-if not on point. There, the court affirmed the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion with this language: \"It would be inappropriate for us to insert into a pleading claims for relief based on allegations of activities that plaintiffs simply have not identified, even if the parties suggest on appeal how plaintiffs might have intended to frame those claims or attempt to identify the specific conduct or assertions of statements alleged to be false on which plaintiffs intended to base such claims for relief. It is not our role to engage in what would amount to a redrafting of the first amended complaint in order to read that document as alleging conduct that supports a claim that has not in fact been specifically alleged, and then assess whether the pleading that we have essentially drafted could survive the anti-SLAPP motion directed at it.\" ( Id. at p. 621, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 fn. omitted.)"], "id": "424ff5ab-344e-4b67-9bbe-3b64240965fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Agency Report dated March 4, 2015 (Agency Report), was prepared jointly by City departments under Elections Code section 9212, to address *976the anticipated impacts of the Initiative on the City. The Agency Report concluded the Initiative's $75,000 licensing and inspection fee exceeded the estimated actual costs incurred from issuing a license for a <mask> dispensary and conducting annual inspections of the dispensary. The City estimated the actual annual costs would total $15,014.28. Because the $75,000 licensing and inspection fee imposed by the Initiative exceeded the anticipated costs of licensing and inspection of a medical marijuana dispensary, the City concluded in the Agency Report that the $75,000 fee is a general tax, which must be presented to voters at a regularly scheduled election under Article 13C. In reaching this conclusion, the City relied on the reports provided by the City's departments, which are included in the Agency Report."], "id": "dae2b263-85ec-4fb5-ac78-fc595c3321e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Medical Marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["interpreted the \u201csafe harbor,\u201d there are numerous other reasons that preclude the entry of summary judgment. 1. Interpreting section 1185\u2019s \u201csafe harbor\u201d North American urges that the trial court erred in construing what is required to fit into section 1185\u2019s \u201csafe harbor.\u201d Specifically, North American argues that the \u201csafe harbor\u201d is (1) satisfied only if the driver\u2019s license presented to the notary was a genuine license actually issued by the California DMV (rather than a genuine-looking but fake license), (2) satisfied only if the notary complies with all other industry customs, which may be defined by expert testimony in a specific case, and (3) is automatically negated if the person appearing before the notary turns out to be an imposter. These arguments require us to engage in our own independent analysis of section 1185 (Union <mask> Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1183 [\u201cStatutory interpretation is \u2018an issue of law, which we review de novo\u2019\u201d]), and we reject each of these arguments. a. Does section 1185 require that the driver\u2019s license presented be issued by the DMV? A notary\u2019s acknowledgement of a document falls within section 1185\u2019s safe harbor if the person appearing before him provides a driver\u2019s license that reasonably appears to have been issued by the DMV, even if it was not actually issued by the DMV. We so conclude for two reasons. First, this is how similar language has been interpreted in other contexts. Akin to section 1185, Business and Professions Code section 25660 erects a statutory safe harbor for persons selling alcohol to minors if they verify the buyer\u2019s age by looking at a \u201cvalid motor vehicle operator\u2019s license\u201d \u201cissued by a . . . state"], "id": "05754013-26b2-4450-811f-3c338f1c2e9b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The arguments made by Save Lafayette Trees to the contrary are not persuasive. Save Lafayette Trees argues, \" section 65009 is a statute adopted to address California's 'housing crisis' by 'reduc[ing] delays and restraints upon expeditiously completing housing projects.' (... \u00a7 65009(a)(1).) It does not by its terms, or even by implication, apply to the city's contract with PG&E to remove mature trees along public hiking trails.\" Although one of the three findings made by the Legislature with respect to section 65009 relates to housing,3 nothing in section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), restricts its application to decisions involving housing. As set forth above, courts have interpreted the statute as applying to challenges to a broad range of local zoning and planning decisions. (See, e.g., Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1096, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 892 [ordinance prohibiting <mask> dispensaries]; Okasaki v. City of Elk Grove (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 873, [variance to landowners, in order to authorize pool and spa in setback zone].)"], "id": "edb39cc5-7dc3-408d-a4db-3d82b9ec0a33", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants argue that the trial court erred by granting Pasadena's motions and issuing the injunctions because \"there is no substantial evidence of a city ordinance which explicitly declares that a <mask> dispensary is a nuisance.\" Defendants assert that such an *898explicit declaration is required in order to deem any land use a nuisance per se, citing Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co . (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 ( Beck ). In that case, the court stated, \"The concept of a nuisance per se arises when a legislative body with appropriate jurisdiction, in the exercise of the police power, expressly declares a particular object or substance, activity, or circumstance, to be a nuisance.\" ( Id. at p. 1206, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518.)"], "id": "31b38b5c-b7ad-4885-beb1-fd32a7426772", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["The City argues that all of the specifically enumerated professions in the Municipal Code definition of medical office \"have in common the fact that they are physicians or similar professions and that they *370have patients.\" The City contrasts those characteristics with <mask> collectives, which it argues have neither physicians nor their own patients because members of collectives \"are patients of the physicians who prescribed marijuana.\""], "id": "d7bc44b2-feeb-489a-8cf8-7376d87cbf31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["Proposition 64 (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) ) legalizes and regulates non<mask>. The proposition added various sections to the Health and Safety Code. As relevant to this case, section 11362.1 permits the cultivation of not more than six living marijuana plants (\u00a7 11362.1, subd. (a)(1) & (3) ) and reduces the punishment for an adult cultivating more than six plants to a misdemeanor, unless other circumstances, not relevant here, are present. ( \u00a7 11358, subds. (c) & (d).)"], "id": "6f6e571e-f989-4587-b308-42f72a4552bb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "medical marijuana", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["For the first time at oral argument, counsel for defendants asserted that in City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, Inc . (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494, the Supreme Court held that state marijuana laws did not permit a municipality to implement a \"total ban\" on <mask> dispensaries. This is incorrect. In City of Riverside , the Court stated that state marijuana law \"neither ... expressly or impliedly preempts the authority of California cities and counties, under their traditional land use and police powers, to allow, restrict, limit, or entirely exclude facilities that distribute medical marijuana, and to enforce such policies by nuisance actions.\" (Id . at p. 762, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494 [emphasis added].)"], "id": "14743d2a-f27b-47d9-9905-b73ad03fbb7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "drug manufacturing", "legal_topic": "Drug-related", "masked_sentences": ["In September 2014, Mr. Ryan violated the conditions of his release on both convictions. The court revoked his probation and executed his previously suspended consecutive 15-year sentences for both *154convictions. Mr. Ryan filed a Rule 24.035 motion challenging only his conviction in 2012 for <mask>.3 The motion court appointed counsel for Mr. Ryan, who filed an amended motion asserting Mr. Ryan's plea counsel was ineffective for inducing an involuntary guilty plea by: (1) informing Mr. Ryan of a change in the State's offer only minutes before he entered his plea, (2) failing to discuss the facts of the case with Mr. Ryan before the plea, and (3) intimidating Mr. Ryan into accepting the revised plea offer by saying he would receive a harsher sentence if he did not accept the State's revised offer."], "id": "01e34cab-2f8d-43d4-bbf6-6eb36ec8d016", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cIf the jury believe from the evidence that previous, up to, and at the time of the <mask> in question, the prisoner thought or believed that his wife actually loved him, and would not have left him but for the persuasion of the deceased and females acting in his inter- \u25a0 es1-, and that she was willing to return and would have returned to him but for this cause, tliat this was an unwairanted and unsound delusion on the part of the prisoner, that thereafter, and in consequence thereof, \u25a0 his mind became and continued diseased, that such delusion and disease increased in intensity until the prisoner became, was, and remained subject to great causeless and violent frenzies and paroxysms of rage, in which his power of distinguishing whether he was committing a crime or not was, for the time, destroyed or superseded, and that the act charged upon him was committed while in such a paroxysm, and while such power of distinguishing was destroyed or superseded, he is not responsible, legally, for that act."], "id": "8cd0fb95-b3f2-4e5b-aee6-576c6d693ddc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["This indictment contains a single count of manslaughter in the second degree. Indeed, this charge was submitted but dismissed by the Grand Jury. It does not contain the charge of criminally negligent <mask>, the sole count voted by the Grand Jury. A Grand Jury proceeding is defective when \"[f]ewer than twelve grand jurors concur in the finding of the indictment.\u201d (CPL 210.35 [3].) The proper remedy for such a defect is dismissal, when the defendant seeks such relief. (CPL 210.20 [1] [c].)"], "id": "4f17d54e-4288-4435-a082-8144ccfb777b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": [". The <mask> offenses excluded from the six-month rule of CPL 30.30 are nevertheless subject to the right to speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, section 12 of the Civil Rights Law and CPL 30.20. However, the court previously ruled that there has been no constitutional or statutory violation of defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial. Thus, the only issue on the instant motion is whether the statutory exclusion of CPL 30.30 (subd 3, par [a]) applies when the charge is attempted murder."], "id": "124930e0-50ec-46dc-8f93-a8e3d672f411", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["It appears to be accepted on both sides that the <mask> was a retaliatory act of persons connected with the Hip Sing Tong Society, a rival and antagonistic organization to the On Leon Tong Society, for the killing by members of the latter society on a prior date of the president and vice-president of the Hip Sing Tong Society, and that the person who was intended to be shot and killed on February 27, 1912, was not the one who was wounded and who died from such wound, namely, Lee Kay, but Lee Po Ming, who stood behind Lee Kay, and who, as stated, was the vice-president of the On Leon Tong Society. If this theory is correct it is not surprising that the persons who saw the occurrence were in part members of the On Leon Tong Society. It is, moreover, not surprising that other members of the On Leon Tong Society should take steps legitimate in character to discover and produce before the court witnesses to the shooting in aid of the prosecution of those who are said to have done it."], "id": "eefcf2f5-46b2-4cb3-a100-eb55738c51ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Florencia Meyers: A resident of the same apartment complex who had seen Carty sitting in her car at the apartment complex a day before the kidnapping. Carty told Meyers that she was going to be having a baby the next day. *156Sherry Bancroft: A Public Storage employee where Carty had a storage unit. She testified that on May 12, 2001, Carty told Bancroft that she was in labor and expecting a baby boy. Bancroft said that she saw Carty again on May 15, 2001 between 6:30 and 7:30 in the evening. Carty told her that the baby was at home with the father, and she left with a baby blanket and two sets of clothes. Denise Tillman: She worked at a Houston medical uniform store. She testified that Carty visited the store on May 12, 2001, and bought a number of items, including a blue pen, a nurse's ID tag, a stethoscope, surgical scissors, and two scrub tops and scrub pants. Jose Corona: The record refers to him as both Carty's boyfriend and husband. They had lived together for two-and-a-half years, but Corona moved out of the apartment before the kidnapping and murder. Carty had engaged in a pattern of telling Corona she was pregnant, then would never give birth. She would not take him to the doctor with her, she never appeared pregnant, and so Corona \"was tired of lies\" and decided to leave. On the day before the kidnapping, Carty called Corona \"many times\" to tell him that she was going to have a baby boy the next day. She also called him on May 16th to tell him that the baby would arrive that day. Charlie Mathis: A DEA agent who had occasionally used Carty as a confidential informant some time before the offense occurred. He testified for the State. He said that he had known Carty for eight to ten years. Mathis said that in 1994 or 1995 she was \"closed out,\" which meant that she was no longer on the books of the DEA as a confidential informant. Nevertheless, Carty would still contact Mathis from time to time with tips. Some time in 2001 Carty told Mathis that she gave birth to a boy. He said he was confused because the timing was off, and her husband did not seem to know about the baby. On the day of the kidnapping, Carty called Mathis and asked him to come to the police station. The police had also contacted Mathis to help interview Carty. Mathis said that when he arrived at the police station, he told Carty that she needed to tell the police anything she knew about the location of Rodriguez and baby Ray. Carty told Mathis that she had given two cars to people that she feared were involved in the kidnapping. She took the police to an address on Van Zandt Street where there was a car parked with baby Ray inside. There was another car parked there that had Rodriguez's body in the trunk. The police arrested Carty and other individuals who were at the Van Zandt address. On cross examination, Mathis testified that he did not believe Carty was involved in the kidnapping. He also testified that he did not believe Carty would do something like this. When defense counsel asked if Carty was a \"good informant,\" Mathis said he had \"no way of measuring who is good and who is not.\" Mathis said that Carty was generally truthful but that there were times when he felt that Carty \"wasn't as truthful as she should have been.\" Dr. Paul Shrode, an assistant medical examiner, testified as to the cause of Rodriguez's death. Dr. Shrode testified that Rodriguez died as the result of a \"<mask> suffocation.\" He said that her airway was compromised, and it could have resulted from the tape over her mouth, or the *157plastic bag taped around her neck, or her body position in the trunk."], "id": "ead97795-b3a6-46ff-a977-a82c9084627b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": [". Defendants contended that the indictment, drawn in common-law form, was fatally defective for its failure to charge the murder in the language of the statute (Rev. Stat., part 4, tit. 1, eh. 1, \u00a7 5,1st ed., vol. 2, pp. 656, 657) which, so far as here pertinent, defined a criminal <mask> as murder \u201c When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death\u201d etc. (subd. 1) and \u201cWhen perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of any felony\u201d (subd. 3). The absence of \u201cpremeditated design\u201d was also *501embodied in the definition of murder by an act imminently dangerous, etc. (subd. 2)."], "id": "8ecd5ee9-99cc-4c1b-9aeb-b9129cfb998c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["However, even at this early stage counsel fell short professionally in important respects. He seemed to have no sensitivity to the potential conflict of interest6 he faced from the outset by representing the codefendant Fitzroy McNeil7 at the same time during this early arrest process. While this was to be remedied shortly by the appointment of counsel from the 18-B <mask> panel for McNeil in Criminal Court, the problem concerns counsel\u2019s interview of both suspects at that time. A careful lawyer should have interviewed his client separately and limited his representation of McNeil to certain prophylactic instructions to the police, and certainly not engage in a joint interview of both, as counsel testified he did, or conduct any interview of McNeil without a clear, intelligent and voluntary waiver by McNeil and Smith of the potential conflict of interest. Not only was this apparently ignored by counsel, but he put himself in the position more than three years later of not being able to differentiate at the CPL article 440 hearing who told him what about the facts of the homicide, at least at this early stage.8"], "id": "22a2503b-a5a7-473e-89f4-a523dff8228a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Some two months later, Colorado officers interviewed Spring in a Kansas City jail. Given the Miranda warnings, he again signed a waiver. When they brought up the Colorado <mask>, Spring indicated he was ready to talk, and confessed. ( Spring , supra , 479 U.S. at pp. 567-568, 107 S.Ct. 851.) The trial court denied a suppression motion, but the Colorado Court of Appeals and Supreme Court held the waiver invalid because the ATF agents had not told Spring he would be questioned about the Colorado homicide during his interview. ( Id . at pp. 568-570, 107 S.Ct. 851.) The high court reversed, finding the waiver voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. ( Id . at pp. 573-577, 107 S.Ct. 851.)"], "id": "d55dffc3-24ba-4ea6-8414-e6ea3dceda44", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him-and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the <mask> offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth-for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it. Id. at 477-78, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that defendants who committed homicide crimes as juveniles and faced a sentence of life without parole were entitled to a sentencing hearing that would permit the judge or jury to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and the individual circumstances of the crime as mitigating factors for a lesser sentence. Id. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Because the mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes in Alabama and Arkansas violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, the Court reversed the judgments of this court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded *67the cases for further proceedings. Id."], "id": "90f8851c-97e1-4d2c-811d-ef4001f26f5d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In People v Kane (213 NY 260, 277), the Court of Appeals upheld the <mask> conviction of a defendant who shot a pregnant woman even though claimed negligent treatment at a hospital \u201cmay also have had some causative influence\u201d. The court did say, however, that if the death was solely attributable to the secondary agency, and not at all induced by the primary one, then there would be a defense to the charge."], "id": "cb5a2fb5-737f-4812-8b6a-6f0040c8d1ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Summarizing the record of October 12, 1977: As the record in the instant case shows, defendant was not picked up until 2:30 a.m. the night before the polygraph exam, and obtained a maximum of three hours sleep before being tested the next morning. Defendant, not being formally charged, was taken to another police headquarters and intensively questioned from approxmately 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. with short breaks for lunch and to rest. There is also evidence that defendant was familiar with police procedures and tactics which militate in favor of his confession being knowingly and intelligently made. However, there is ample evidence to show that the police in the instant case did not take the time to thoroughly advise defendant of his rights and that defendant, with three hours sleep, was put under severe strain during interrogation throughout the course of the afternoon. After being placed in the patrol car, defendant was not again advised of his rights before admitting to the burglary. The course of events throughout the afternoon was sufficiently severe to render any admissions to an unrelated crime inadmissible. Defendant\u2019s physical and emotional energy, already having been spent during interrogation with respect to the <mask>, the police officers were not free to \"tag on\u201d a burglary confession with*250out renewing defendant\u2019s Miranda rights in the police car preliminarily to the continued interrogation. For the foregoing reasons, People v Manley (40 AD2d 907, supra) clearly differs on the facts although not on the law, for to hold otherwise would be mainfestly unjust. The tactics utilized by the police in the instant case were not per se psychologically coercive; however, the length of the interrogation combined with the restricted purpose for which the waiver was signed, has not been sufficiently overcome by the State with enough evidence of voluntariness to sustain its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."], "id": "df125649-5934-447a-baf9-4d738c857b4c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["People v Abbott (84 AD2d 11), cited with approval in People v Flayhart (72 NY2d 737, 741), illustrates these rules and supports the People\u2019s theory of criminal responsibility. Two defendants engaged in a \"drag race\u201d and sped down a street in a residential area. Abbott tried to pass the car driven by the codefendant, Moon, lost control and smashed into another automobile, killing the driver and two passengers. Both defendants were charged with manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent <mask>. They were convicted of criminally negligent homicide."], "id": "58a8cc03-4854-4e07-bf63-61dd3f7fc18f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Addressing a similar claim of instructional error, the California Supreme Court explained: \"An unlawful killing involving either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life constitutes voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder, when the defendant acts upon an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. [Citations.] In addition, a <mask> is justifiable and noncriminal where the actor possessed both an actual and reasonable belief in the need to defend. [Citations.] In either case, 'the fear must be of imminent harm. \"Fear of future harm-no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm-will not suffice. The defendant's fear must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily injury.\" ' [Citations.] The trial court need not give [perfect or imperfect self-defense] instructions on request absent substantial evidence to support *748them.\" (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 550, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182 ; see People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614 ; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) Where there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude a defendant had an actual or honest belief in the need to defend against imminent danger to himself or others, such instructions are properly refused. (People v. Rodriguez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1269, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 345 ; accord, People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [instructions on imperfect self-defense required where the evidence that the defendant was guilty only of that lesser offense is \" 'substantial enough to merit [a jury's] consideration' \"; the existence of any evidence, no matter how weak, will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense]; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531 [sua sponte instruction that defendant killed in unreasonable self-defense is not required when the evidence is \" 'minimal and insubstantial' \"].) On appeal, we apply a de novo standard of review. (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614.)"], "id": "3f4faceb-05d6-4e8b-8589-8e1b9b3dec15", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["An investigation was immediately commenced. At the outset, the police noted that a metal milkbox had been placed under the window next to the victim\u2019s bed and surmised that the criminal had stood on this box to look inside the bedroom. On June 20, 1972 Detective Donald Palmer of the 105th Precinct noted a man walking about the area at 5:00 a.m. in the morning. The detective questioned this man, who identified himself as the defendant and gave his residence. The defendant further stated that he had no knowledge of the recent <mask> on the next block. The detective then asked him what he was doing on the streets at such an early hour, and the defendant stated that he was just taking a walk. He told the detective that he was currently receiving public assistance while attending a trade school and volunteered the name and telephone number of this school. The following morning the detective contacted the trade school and, based on conversations with officials at the school, decided to question the defendant again."], "id": "b15ee3f6-45b5-4199-8305-0431c36e31f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In recognition that further persistence by the juror in talking out loud as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant could have disastrous and prejudicial consequences in terms of the right to a fair trial, it was agreed that, in addition to the *923usual admonitions not to converse with anyone on any subject relating to the case, the court would instruct the jurors not to talk to themselves, out loud, about the case. Although the instruction sounded at the time as ridiculous as it appears on paper now, in my view, it was necessary as an initial curative step to correct a problem which could possibly lead to a mistrial in a <mask> case expected to continue for over five weeks \u2014 one with graphic evidence by both sides as to whether the dismembered body parts were cut by a sharp instrument or by the dog, and one which both sides concededly do not wish to try twice."], "id": "b687dd4c-6e81-4de7-847c-4a93a1823f25", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding for judgment directing respondents to comply with certain requests made by petitioner pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 6 [FOIL]). Petitioner sought the production of documents relating to two criminal proceedings *243directly related to the death of Kathleen Martyn on January 6, 1997; a separate criminal charge of obstructing governmental administration lodged against the defendant in one of those proceedings, Malcolm James; and a fourth criminal event, one involving the husband of Kathleen Martin as the victim of a robbery. Petitioner requested the production of: all documents relating to the arrest of Carlos Cajigas and Michael Fernandez for the <mask> of Kathleen Martyn; all documents regarding the arrest of Malcolm James and charges of criminal possession of a weapon, the pistol used to shoot Mrs. Martyn in the left eye, and attempted robbery relating to an attempt to rob the Martyns at the end of December 1996 or the first part of January 1997; all documents relating to an appearance ticket issued to Malcolm James for obstructing governmental administration, which was returnable in Mount Vernon on January 16, 1997; and all documents relating to the investigation of an attempted robbery or robbery of James Martyn on or about August 11, 1996 (sic)."], "id": "4a6a9093-d7a6-434a-b0e5-719a44c3980f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Dr. Levine testified that he examined photographs of the deceased for purposes of possible bite mark identification. At the time of the examination, Dr. Levine was acquainted with the defendant\u2019s dental characteristics, since he had, in September of 1977, acquired and examined a cast of the defendant\u2019s teeth in an investigation of a Schenectady County <mask>, and, on the basis of his examination, had concluded that the defendant, Lemuel Smith, had imposed the bite marks found on the victim, Marilee Wilson.3"], "id": "fbfd97d0-3205-4c73-85c5-302f857877de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Even if the crimes charged have different elements of proof they are triable separately. (CPL 40.20 [2].) However, when they arise out of the same transaction, they are joinable. (CPL 200.20 [2] [a]; also see People v Ruzas, 54 AD2d 1083 [1976].) For example, it is proper under the CPL to join the charge of criminally negligent <mask>, two charges of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and the charge of failing to drive on the right side of roadway, where all charges arose from the same automobile accident. (People v Butor, 75 Misc 2d 558 [1973]; also see People v Lopez, 59 AD2d 767 [1977].)"], "id": "cfa22dd7-6564-4dad-88d9-29f9cc29071a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["6. As of the date that the name of the defendant as the alleged perpetrator was given to the investigating detectives by a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who had been given such information by a then somewhat questionable confidential informant, Michael Orlando, the <mask> squad ceased to consider any other person as a suspect in the murder of Archimedes Cervera, other than the defendant and his alleged unindicted coconspirators."], "id": "05d016dd-7483-47c6-9d71-912bd6141cdb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Sometime during January 21, a call was received by Patrolman B of the Fourth Squad Detectives from defendant\u2019s mother seeking help for him. Defendant had, at this point, been taken to Brookhaven Memorial Hospital along with Patricia V after an automobile accident which occurred while they were en route to a motel. It should be noted that defendant had become B\u2019s informant after B had arrested defendant on December 8,1980, as the result of a burglary complaint made by the girlfriend\u2019s husband. After this earlier arrest, defendant had been advised by B to get a lawyer, but defendant insisted it was \u201call bullshit. * * * going to Family Court.\u201d B, learning that <mask> was interested in Lucarano, called Me C and informed him that defendant wanted to talk to B about pressing charges against his girlfriend, because she had forced Valium on the defendant. It was ultimately agreed by Me C and B that they would go to the hospital to talk to defendant. Prior to leaving, Me C encountered Assistant District Attorney S, Chief of the Major Offense Bureau, who was at homicide on an unrelated matter. S, after learning from Me C or B that defendant had several prior pending charges, instructed Me C to inquire if defendant had an attorney, and that if defendant did not, it would be permissible to talk to him."], "id": "efad63e0-a0b3-48d5-a02f-8f171dc33099", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Had there only been one indictment and had count two, a non<mask> count, been part of it from the very beginning, that count would not be subject to dismissal pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1). Subdivision (3) (a) of that statute states that subdivisions (1) and (2) (which provide for dismissal of the indictment and release of the defendant from custody, respectively, where the People are not ready for trial within specified time periods) \u201cdo not apply to a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of\u2019 various homicides, including murder in the second degree. The question remains whether the rule is any different where a homicide indictment is superseded by a second homicide indictment which contains, in addition to the homicide count, a new nonhomicide count."], "id": "1a0b9c75-e905-4300-8d91-ed496634e849", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Convicted of manslaughter in the first degree in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding him from introducing evidence, in support of his self-defense claim, that the victim had searched a retail website for weapons in the days preceding the stabbing. The defendant and the victim had been involved in two fights the week before the stabbing, and, after each altercation, the victim threatened to kill the defendant. The stabbing at issue occurred a few days later, after the victim approached the defendant. The defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to introduce into evidence a forensic analysis of data extracted from the victim\u2019s cell phone showing that the phone had been used to conduct certain online searches for weapons between the first fight and the stabbing. The court denied the motion in limine, concluding that, because there was no evidence that the victim had purchased any of the items he searched for or that the defendant was aware of the victim\u2019s search activity at the time of the stabbing, the search history was not relevant to prove the defendant\u2019s state of mind with respect to whether his fear of the victim was subjectively and objectively reasonable under the provisions (\u00a7 4-4 (a) (2) and (b)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence permitting an accused in a <mask> case to introduce evidence of the victim\u2019s violent character under certain circumstances. The court further concluded that the search history was not admissible to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor because the victim\u2019s act of searching for weapons did not result in a criminal conviction. On the defendant\u2019s appeal from the judgment of conviction, held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant\u2019s motion seeking to introduce evidence of the victim\u2019s online searches for weapons: a defen- dant in a homicide case, after laying a proper foundation that he acted in self-defense, may introduce evidence of the victim\u2019s violent character to prove that the victim was the aggressor, regardless of whether such character evidence had been communicated to the accused prior to the homicide, and such violent character can be proven by opinion or reputation testimony, or evidence of the victim\u2019s conviction of violent crimes, but not by specific violent acts not resulting in a criminal convic- tion; in the present case, the defendant\u2019s lack of awareness of the victim\u2019s online searches rendered them irrelevant for purposes of establishing the defendant\u2019s state of mind because they could not have impacted the defendant\u2019s subjective belief that he needed to resort to deadly physical force, and the defendant did not claim that the searches them- selves constituted violent crimes; moreover, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the search history was admissible as a prior act of misconduct under the relevant provision (\u00a7 4-5 (c)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, because, even if the searches were evidence of prior misconduct admissible to prove the victim\u2019s state of mind, \u00a7 4-5 (c) does not apply to evidence of the victim\u2019s violent character in homicide cases, which is specifically covered by \u00a7 4-4 (b), and \u00a7 4-4 trumps the more general rules set forth in \u00a7 4-5 regarding the admissibility of specific act evidence. Argued April 29\u2014officially released October 22, 2021*"], "id": "ed62734c-6889-4199-97d1-8c0c450107b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["I find that no promises or representations were made by either Assistant District Attorneys to Gramando regarding the ultimate disposition of the two <mask> cases pending against him in exchange for his trial testimony. When Monaghan stated at the trial that no promises of any kind were made (Record on Appeals, pp. 296-297, supra) such remarks were made by him in relation to prosecutions of pending indictments against Gramando for the killings of Spagna and Rubin."], "id": "320b3c10-144d-4360-a3be-52aadf18e1f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["See, e.g. , Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that a sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment when imposed on juveniles in non<mask> cases); Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (barring capital punishment for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes). Roper and Graham established that \"children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing [b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.\" Miller , 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455."], "id": "02ee4d05-1522-4b0c-b9dc-e8650963a4d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features -- among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him -- and from which he cannot usually extricate himself -- no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the <mask> offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth -- for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the"], "id": "469b1370-53ee-4d70-aa54-5ee9662cd375", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the request to preserve materials held by various law enforcement agencies, the court granted the motion only as to records related to the Wynne, Watts and Livingston murders6 and denied the request as it pertained to the Brooks <mask>,7 the Parker homicide and the evidence listed in the notice of aggravation. The court limited the records sought from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the Los Angeles County Probation Department to reports generated in connection with \"this case,\" and denied the request as to the Los Angeles County Coroner-Medical Examiner and the San Bernardino County Coroner-Medical Examiner. The court also declined to order the Los Angeles Superior Court or the San Bernardino Superior Court to preserve judicial records."], "id": "80a7c464-3d35-43f6-a2d0-56b665b967d5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On August 9, 1971, plaintiff was charged with five specifications of violations of the rules and procedures of the police department, charging that he did \"knowingly and wrongfully\u201d: (1) engage in outside employment during the time he was not on duty without written authorization of the police commissioner; (2) register a vehicle in New Jersey from an address at which he did not reside; (3) make false statements during an official <mask> investigation being conducted by the New York State police; (4) \"cohabit with one, Nina Shapiro, a married female, not his wife\u201d at a designated motel in Elmsford, New York, on September 21, 1970, while lawfully *682married to another woman; and (5) give evasive answers during an official department interview as to whether plaintiff had registered on September 21, 1970, at the specified motel in Elmsford, New York, under the name of Mr. and Mrs. L. Lewis, and at that motel and other motels using the name L. Lewis, on other occasions."], "id": "9f285511-476c-4caf-a78f-34d005a508cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In any event, the court finds there was no evidence that the police deliberately delayed the commencement of formal judicial proceedings here to effectuate uncounselled interrogation. The passage of time owed to the ongoing investigation of this double <mask>, during which the police were, among other things, awaiting forensic confirmation that the gun they had recovered was the murder weapon, trying to establish the identity of the gun\u2019s owner and interviewing several persons who had been arrested in the apartment in which the gun had been recovered, at least one of whom, in addition to defendant, they suspected may have been involved in the shootings. Under these circumstances, the delay of 32 hours from defendant\u2019s arrest until his conversation with Detective Cuiffi was neither so extraordinary nor excessive as to render involuntary any of the statements taken from defendant in the interim.5 (See e.g., People v Curry, 287 AD2d at 253 [32-hour delay not excessive \u201cgiven the extensive, rapidly expanding police investigation involving multiple shootings, defendants and witnesses\u201d] [citations omitted]; People v Haywood, 280 AD2d 282, 282 [1st Dept 2001] [20-hour delay \u201cnot extraordinary\u201d]; People v Barker, 168 AD2d at 212 [delay of 16 hours \u201cwas justified in light of the ongoing investigation\u201d].) Of course, the length of time from the conclusion of defendant\u2019s statement to Detective Cuiffi on June 16, *8352004 until his arraignment the next day had absolutely no bearing on the voluntariness of any of his statements. (See People v Vargas, 7 NY2d 555, 566 [1960]; People v Haywood, 280 AD2d at 282.)"], "id": "fe1fd08b-793c-4a83-9a40-6ac0f51ef98b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Correction Law article 26, entitled \"Temporary Release Programs for State Correctional Institutions\u201d, defines the term \"eligible inmate\u201d as \"a person confined in an institution who is eligible for release on parole or who will become eligible for release on parole or conditional release within two years\u201d (Correction Law \u00a7 851 [2]). However, the statute goes on to provide that if an inmate was convicted of one of the violent felony offenses enumerated in Penal Law \u00a7 70.02, \"where such offense involved the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument\u201d, the inmate is not eligible to participate in a work release program until that inmate is eligible for parole or will be eligible for parole within 18 months. The statute provides that inmates convicted of escape or absconding, or <mask> or certain sex offenses are ineligible for participation and also provides that inmates convicted of violent felonies cannot participate in temporary release programs without the written approval of the commissioner. Thus, when the Governor promulgated his Executive Order in January of this year, the Correction Law provided that inmates convicted of violent felonies, with the exception of those convicted of homicide or sex-related offenses, were eligible for participation in temporary release programs if they were within 18 months of their parole or conditional release eligibility date."], "id": "1ade276f-244a-44b4-a98c-1c4c1d16e17c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Mitchell testified that although he was aware that the items Beck had given him were stolen, he was unaware that the items had been taken from the *777scene of a <mask>. If he had known this, he would not have taken the items, or he would have tried to sell them to someone else. Mitchell admitted that he attempted to pawn some of the items that Beck had given him in exchange for drugs."], "id": "f1f22b4d-3ad4-4ea7-bb3b-0028082eb485", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Charles H. Solomon, J. Defendant is charged with murder in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 [1]). He allegedly shot his father, Jose Cortijo, to death at his place of employment in Manhattan. The shooting occurred on December 12, 1977. Defendant was not a primary suspect in the <mask> until almost 18 years later, when he stated to a New York City probation officer during a presentence interview that he killed his father. This interview was being conducted after defendant was convicted of a narcotics-related felony in New York County Supreme Court. These statements, as well as two subsequent statements made *180to police detectives, are the subject of the instant motion to suppress. A hearing was held before me on defendant\u2019s motion. At that hearing, the People called Probation Officer Urania Vullo and Detectives Frank Colaianni and Dan Danaher. Defendant did not present any witnesses at the hearing. In an oral ruling delivered from the Bench, defendant\u2019s motion was denied in its entirety."], "id": "2d425662-34c7-41f9-99ae-aba3430fccc2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[T]he carelessness must be such that its seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community\u2019s general sense of right and wrong (see, People v Haney, 30 NY2d 328, 333, 335; see also, People v Ricardo B., 73 NY2d 228, 235-236; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53). What, we believe, is abundantly clear from our decisions and from the governing statutory language is that criminally negligent <mask> requires not only a failure to perceive a risk of death, but also some serious blameworthiness in the conduct that caused it. The risk involved must have been \u2018substantial and unjustifiable\u2019, and the failure to perceive that risk must have been a \u2018gross deviation\u2019 from reasonable care\u201d (People v Boutin, 75 NY2d 692, 696 [1990]). The mere \u201c \u2018nonperception\u2019 of a risk, even if death results, is not enough\u201d (id. at 696; see also People v Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370 [2008]; People v Conway, 6 NY3d 869 [2006])."], "id": "85c2e01c-9eb7-49d7-8f09-665f44b8b4b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The autopsy report in this case was not manufactured for the benefit of the prosecution. Indeed, an autopsy is often conducted before a suspect is identified or even before a <mask> is suspected. That it may be presented as evidence in a homicide trial does not mean that it was composed for that accusatory purpose or that its use by a prosecutor is the inevitable consequence of its composition. \u201cThe mandate to OCME is clear, to provide an impartial determination of the cause of death.\u201d (People v Washington at 193.)"], "id": "411288b1-23df-423e-a1fd-e4b1fa3c575b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On October 4, 1984, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant, Donna Bell, guilty of felony murder and burglary in the first degree in connection with the death of her mother, Palmina Bell. The following day, her attorney received a letter from Stephen Gagne, the boyfriend with whom Donna Bell was living at the time of her mother\u2019s murder. Stephen Gagne had *44been tried and convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree (intentional and felony murder) as well as burglary in the first degree in connection with Palmina Bell\u2019s <mask> and was serving a sentence of 25 years to life for those crimes. In his letter, which was dated September 28,1984, he indicated, for the first time, that he would testify on Donna Bell\u2019s behalf and try to refute the testimony which his brother, Louis Gagne, was going to give as a prosecution witness.1"], "id": "a12e1443-cbbd-44d0-8510-95820ccd0079", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In the concluded case, after hearing the evidence presented, the jury, as the trier of fact, acquitted defendant of all three <mask> charges. The common element shared by these crimes is that the defendant\u2019s act caused the death of Johnny Turner (see, Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 [1], [2]; \u00a7 125.15 [1]). Having scrutinized these crimes in this respect, the court notes that the charge of murder in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 [2]), that is, reckless murder, is almost identical to the charge now being sought to be retried, reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 120.25). This except for a sole distinguishing factor: the former crime contains the element of defendant\u2019s act bearing on the outcome, that is, as \"the cause of death\u201d. In the latter crime, the fact of death is not an intrinsic element for consideration; rather, the issue is whether Mr. Redd engaged in \"reckless endangerment * * * under circumstances evincing] a depraved indifference to human life.\u201d The statutory provisions defining these offenses have been designed by our Legislature to prohibit very different kinds of criminal conduct (see generally, CPL 40.10 et seq.). The question to be presented centers not at all on the outcome of any conduct by Mr. Redd, but on the element of risk produced by such conduct. It cannot be said that this has been adjudicated with finality."], "id": "3ef552f9-1998-4ca0-8538-1f1700b65b50", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The DOC\u2019s procedures for placing inmates in close custody were initially implemented by a directive issued in 2005, as amended by DOC Directive 6006R-D (available at http://prtlprd-web.nyc.gov/html/doc/downloads/pdf/6006R-D.pdf, cached at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/webdocs/6006R-D.pdf), effective May 28, 2009 (answer, exhibit A). According to respondent, close custody housing is \u201cdesigned to protect vulnerable inmates (and in a smaller number of cases, to separate certain predatory inmates) who can not safely be held in General Population, or in another less restrictive housing unit than Close Custody.\u201d (Id. 1f 37.) Close custody is the DOC\u2019s \u201cmost restrictive security status,\u201d and is comprised of two categories of inmates. (Aff of Frank Squillante [DOC Assistant Chief for Special Operations] If 2.) The first is close custody/protective custody (CC/PC), in which most inmates are placed at their own request, or occasionally involuntarily, because their safety would be at risk if they were to be placed in the general population. (Id. 1\u00cd 4.) These inmates include prisoners who were charged with a violent sex or hate crime, child abuse, or child <mask>; inmates, including gay and transgendered inmates, who are themselves victims of attacks from other inmates; cooperating witnesses; and inmates placed in protective custody because of their identity, e.g., their status as celebrities or in law enforcement. (See id. 1f 5.) The second category of inmates, termed non-protective custody/close custody housing (non-PC/CCH), includes inmates who pose a serious threat to security \u2014 for example, inmates who committed violent acts while previously incarcerated, are known gang members, or are known to have a propensity for violence. (Id. If 6.)"], "id": "f33f77f6-fccd-44dd-9d3a-54bcc9bfd620", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["People v. McGrath (202 N. Y. 445) is in point. In that case the defendant was tried under an indictment charging him with murder in the first degree and was convicted of murder in the *707second degree. It was held that the granting of defendant\u2019s motion to set the verdict aside did not preclude a new trial for the charge of murder in the first degree. In so holding, the court, per Willard Bartlett, J., said (pp. 45(U451): \u201c Another suggestion is made, however, which it is necessary to notice. This is that upon an indictment for murder in the first degree, a conviction of murder in the second degree operates as an acquittal of murder in the first degree and the accused cannot again he put upon trial for the higher grade of <mask>, when the original judgment is reversed or the verdict otherwise set aside at his instance. * * * That such is not now the rule in this state was declared by this court to be the effect of sections 464 and 544 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in People v. Palmer (109 N. Y. 413) * * * *. In the Palmer case it was distinctly decided that, under the sections cited, where a defendant has been convicted of a lower degree of the crime charged in the indictment and upon his own application a new trial is ordered, the case stands as if there had been no trial at all and the defendant must be tried under the indictment as it is and not simply for the grade of crime of which he was previously convicted.\u201d"], "id": "af446f30-97eb-4ce2-b6e7-347dc6987275", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["All the courts which have addressed this issue have ruled that the lack of the element of intent does not violate due process of law (People v Root, 524d 195, 196-197, cert den 423 US 1076; Commonwealth v Redline, 391 Pa 486,491-493, supra; Brown v State,_Ind_,_, 448 NE2d 10,15; People v Dillon, 34 Cal 3d 441, supra). The rationale was aptly stated in People v Root (supra), where the court said: \u201cNothing in the United States Constitution deprives legislatures of the power to impose upon those who kill their victims in the course of inherently dangerous felonies the same sanctions they choose for those who kill their victims after meditation sufficient to satisfy the jurisdiction\u2019s definition of first-degree murder\u201d (p 197). It is for the Legislature and not for the courts to determine the proper elements of felony murder. Similar thoughts were ex*847pressed by the California Supreme Court in People v Burton (6 Cal 3d 375, 388) where the court said: \u201cThis court has reiterated numerous times that \u2018The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit.\u2019 (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781 [44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P. 2d 130].) The Legislature has said in effect that this deterrent purpose outweighs the normal legislative policy of examining the individual state of mind of each person causing an unlawful killing to determine whether the killing was with or without malice, deliberate or accidental, and calibrating our treatment of the person accordingly. Once a person perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies, then in the judgment of the Legislature, he is no longer entitled to such fine judicial calibration, but will be deemed guilty of first degree murder for any <mask> committed in the course thereof.\u201d The court therefore finds that the lack of the element of intent in felony murder does not violate due process of law or equal protection."], "id": "4fd65947-363c-4902-ab29-1cf2baeaa5c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["As previously stated, the mother had unrestricted access to her son after the questioning at the Housing Precinct. Her testimony that she did not discuss the interrogation with her son afterward is extraordinary in the circumstances. This would probably be so in any circumstance. Here, however, there was the additional factor that she already knew, from this very officer, that her son was a suspect in the Gales <mask>. Either it means that she is absolutely incredible, or it means that she had absolute confidence in her son\u2019s ability to take care of himself vis-a-vis the police. Certainly, it cannot mean that she is neglectful or uncaring. She did, after all, go to the Housing Precinct, and testified here in his behalf."], "id": "0b8a9701-efd1-4b86-a5e1-8eb9eda517d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In overturning a death sentence for Enmund, the United States Supreme Court \"found a broad consensus against imposing death in cases 'where the defendant did not commit the <mask>, was not present when the killing took place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme to murder.' [Citation.] Accordingly, it held the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for any felony-murder aider and abettor 'who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.' [Citation.] The intent to commit an armed robbery is insufficient; absent the further 'intention of participating in or facilitating a murder' [citation], a defendant who acts as 'the person in the car by the side of the road at the time of the killings, waiting to help the robbers escape' [citation], cannot constitutionally be sentenced to death.\" ( Banks, supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 799, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330.)"], "id": "13fb166e-ac0c-43aa-aad9-4b08777f82e7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["It is certain that the mother chose not to go to the 84th Precinct. This takes on additional significance when considered in the light of her prior knowledge of the police wanting to talk to her son about the <mask>, and the fair and reasonable inference that she talked with her son when she was with him at the Housing Precinct after the interrogation."], "id": "9e4bd44d-a4bf-4310-b227-d656c5e04ef0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant is charged by a one-count indictment with having committed the crime of criminally negligent <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 125.10). The charges arise out of an incident alleged to have occurred on November 15, 2008 in the Town of Keene, Essex County, in which it is claimed the defendant shot and killed a member of his deer hunting party."], "id": "390afb76-623a-4217-a79b-bb9a7bcde258", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["It is noted that the will contains an in terrorem clause which became significant early in the probate proceeding after KB filed a barrage of pro se motions contending that her mother not only had been incompetent at the time the will was executed, but also, had been murdered by Elinor and Anne (during her extended visit with Anne and her family in Seattle) in complicity with the New York attorney who had drafted the *151will. After KB pressed the Seattle authorities to investigate her charges concerning Mrs. B.\u2019s death, the coroner there examined decedent\u2019s remains and concluded that she had died of natural causes. But the coroner\u2019s findings failed to deter KB from continuing to allege, in court papers and other declarations, that decedent had been the victim of foul play and that a <mask> investigation was ongoing in Seattle. KB also continued to level charges that the will was a sham and that her sisters and an ever-widening group of other alleged wrongdoers (ultimately including all levels of court personnel) had conspired either to harm Mrs. B. in various ways during her lifetime or to steal from her estate thereafter."], "id": "4712585c-c340-437b-8b46-0d448e7ec792", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["After Graham came Miller, supra, 567 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 2455, in which the high court prohibited sentencing a juvenile <mask> offender to mandatory LWOP and required the sentencing court to consider the mitigating qualities of youth, including: (1) age and its hallmark features such as immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risk and consequences; (2) family and home environment; and (3) circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of participation and familial or peer pressure. (Id. at pp. 2467-2468, 2475.)"], "id": "e350b298-ab9a-40b3-83bc-20fbfe8f0e16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The United States Supreme Court required individual sentencing consideration in Miller precisely because the Miller defendants had been mandatorily sentenced to LWOP and for no other reason. The vice of the LWOP sentencing schemes in Miller was that the sentencer was prevented from taking into account individual sentencing considerations, including the attributes of youth, to impose a proportionate sentence because the only alternative was to sentence defendants to LWOP, the harshest sentence available for juveniles. \"By removing youth from the balance-by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult-these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. That contravenes Graham 's ... foundational principle: that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.\" (Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2466.) While the high court in Graham categorically banned LWOP sentences for juveniles who committed non<mask> offenses, the court in Miller recognized that in homicide cases an LWOP sentence could constitutionally be imposed when sentencing \"the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.\" (Miller, at p. 2469, italics added.) But the Miller court required sentencers \"to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.\" (Id. at p. 2469, italics added.) As *1505a result of S.B. 260, juvenile offenders are no longer treated as if they are not children, and they are no *729longer \"irrevocably\" sentenced to a lifetime in prison. Indeed, defendants here will have a realistic opportunity for parole after 25 years whereas an adult would likely not live long enough to see the adult minimum parole eligibility date."], "id": "ebd9c7ce-f76a-4ea8-a464-bd4751ca8ab0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Similarly, criminal negligence could alternatively be found by a jury under these facts in finding that, although unaware of the risk, he failed to perceive the substantial or unjustifiable risk, which was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed (Penal Law, \u00a7 15.05, subd 4; criminally negligent <mask>, Penal Law, \u00a7 125.10)."], "id": "983c7ce4-cdb0-4c5f-85fb-a4ae8388f350", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In pursuing the particular line of questioning before the grand jury, the Assistant District Attorney presenting this case was seeking information as to the whereabouts of a certain laptop computer, which she believes can provide critical evidence for the grand jury. This laptop computer had direct access to a video security and surveillance system, an Ademco Rapid Eye digital video system, that had been installed in the residence of the <mask> victim. In support of her application, the Assistant District Attorney has set forth evidence which establishes that during the time period in which it is believed that the homicide took place, the laptop computer in question did, in fact, access the video security system. Thus the evidence suggests that this laptop computer could have assisted the perpetrator in the commission of the homicide by turning off the security system at that critical period of time and allowing the perpetrator unfettered access to the residence. The District Attorney contends that this laptop computer is to be considered an instrumentality of the crime. At the very least, the District Attorney asserts that the laptop computer provides evidence, including possible video images of the inside of the victim\u2019s residence, which is critical to the grand jury in their investigation of the murder.1"], "id": "92216f08-5ad7-41db-942f-05a3d2e057d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant, Dominic Carbonaro, had been arrested seven or eight times. He was convicted at least twice. Although he dropped out of school after completing the ninth grade Carbonaro was not inexperienced in the methods of police investigation and interrogation. Carbonaro testified that he knew he would be apprehended. He also knew that the jacket which was left at the scene of the <mask> would be traced to him. In addition the defendant knew that he was supposed to appear in Criminal Court in New York City on April 9, 1962 to answer a charge of grand larceny."], "id": "da5a71d8-b922-4274-a76a-ee3973416e54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Thereafter, defendant was indicted under No. 5469-92 and charged with two counts of second degree murder (intentional and depraved indifference), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. After a jury trial, defendant was acquitted of the two counts of second degree murder and found guilty of the lesser included count of criminally negligent <mask>, as well as criminal possession of a weapon."], "id": "acb66b10-4ead-4c81-bc8f-5b12c54158cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThis is to inform you that you are being placed in the following restrictive housing status: . . . Protective Custody 23 hour lock-in as per Board of Correction variance . . . \u201cReasons for placement and the evidence relied upon to make this decision: Because you were *326indicted for Manslaughter in the Second Degree in the <mask> of Tyree Abney at the George Motchan Detention Center on October 3, 2004, and because of the known gang affiliation of alleged participants in that homicide, the Department of Correction has determined that, in order to protect your safety and the safety and security of other inmates, staff and others in the facility you must be housed in 23-hour lockdown status, with individual recreation.\u201d The notice advised petitioner that, if he disagreed with the placement, he was entitled to a hearing before an impartial hearing officer from the adjudication unit within 24 to 48 hours after he received the notice. The notice said that at the hearing petitioner had the opportunity to personally appear, the right to be informed of the evidence resulting in the placement, the right to review documentary evidence relied upon by the Department, the opportunity to make a statement, and the right to call both inmate and staff witnesses and present documentary evidence subject to the hearing officer\u2019s discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits. At the hearing the petitioner was represented by Mr. Lugo and also present were the hearing officer who was a captain in the Legal Division of DOC, and DOC counsel."], "id": "173c428f-24c2-44fb-b77e-2079d4f354f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant also moves to dismiss the criminally negligent <mask> indictment (No. 2132/95) on the grounds that the filing of a \"corrected\u201d indictment was an improper attempt to circumvent the People\u2019s lack of statutory authority to amend the indictment. The defendant further argues that this indictment represents an improper extension of the Grand Jury. The People contend that the procedure adopted by the prosecution to obtain a \"corrected\u201d indictment was proper and based on established legal authority."], "id": "0e72f204-ee0e-426b-997d-9f951ea9f65f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": [". Defendants contended that the indictment, drawn in common-law form, was fatally defective for its failure to charge the murder in the language of the statute (Rev. Stat., part 4, tit. 1, eh. 1, \u00a7 5,1st ed., vol. 2, pp. 656, 657) which, so far as here pertinent, defined a criminal <mask> as murder \u201c When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death\u201d etc. (subd. 1) and \u201cWhen perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of any felony\u201d (subd. 3). The absence of \u201cpremeditated design\u201d was also *501embodied in the definition of murder by an act imminently dangerous, etc. (subd. 2)."], "id": "09a7d7e7-5724-4084-9486-9982df7e4374", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Hartung is completely inapposite. There, the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the <mask> by the defendant provided for the punishment of death on conviction. That statute was repealed and in place thereof the new statute provided that \u2018 When any person shall be convicted of any crime punishable with death, and sentenced to suffer such punishment, he shall, at the same time, be sentenced to confinement at hard labor in the state prison until such punishment of death shall be inflicted \u201d. (22 N. Y. 95, 97.) It further provided that \u201c No person so sentenced or imprisoned shall be executed in pursuance of such sentence, within one year from the day on which such sentence of death shall be passed \u201d. (22 N. Y. 95, 97.) The only point actually decided in the Hartung cases was that the revised statutes so far as they attempted to subject the defendant to both the punishment of death and previous imprisonment at hard labor was ex post facto and void (see Mongeon v. People, 55 N. Y. 613, 616 and the like evaluation of Hartung in Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180, 185, and in State ex rel. Pierre v. Jones, 200 La. 808, 817). There an additional punishment was added to the punishment in existence at the time Hartung committed the crime. That additional punishment was imprisonment at hard labor for a year before the possible imposition of the death penalty. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the attempt by statute to impose additional punishment over and above that prescribed by the law in existence at the time of the commission of the crime m'ade it an ex post facto enactment. That is not the situation here."], "id": "03c5aa3b-a058-480e-985a-1769a3e161c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On January 29, 1981, at about 11:45 p.m., the 16-year-old defendant, Robert Jandelli, killed his 26-year-old sister, Carol Jandelli, by striking her about the head with a hammer and then slitting her throat with a knife. The defendant had no prior history of mental or emotional illness and there was no evidence of any particular animosity between him and the victim. He was discovered by the police on the morning following the <mask>, wandering around a subway station with his wrists slit. When he told the police he had killed his sister, they investigated the house in which he resided with his parents and the victim and found her body. The defendant was arrested and after receiving medical treatment for his wounds, he was interviewed by an Assistant District Attorney. In this interview, which was tape recorded, the defendant gave a lucid and detailed account of the killing."], "id": "8c0dcc51-561b-4287-ab37-b5b45889871b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The analysis in Rose , supra , 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, a case cited with approval in Aranda , is instructive. The issue in Rose was \"whether the harmless-error standard of Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, applies to jury instructions that violate the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana [ (1979) ] 442 U.S. 510 [99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39] [ ( Sandstrom ) ], and Francis v. Franklin [ (1985) ] 471 U.S. 307 [105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344].\" ( Id . at p. 572, 106 S.Ct. 3101, fn.omitted.) The Sandstrom court held that an instruction in a <mask> prosecution that \" 'the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,' violates the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.\" ( Sandstrom , supra , at p. 512, 99 S.Ct. 2450.) The Rose court held Sandstrom error is trial error amenable to harmless error analysis under Chapman . ( Rose , supra , at p. 582, 106 S.Ct. 3101.)"], "id": "c484c322-80ef-43cd-97b2-ece803621d0a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["This court finds, however, that Shuman\u2019s confession is not admissible and was the fruit of the incriminating confession of Pounds, since it led to Shuman\u2019s confession, confessing his participation in the <mask>. For the fruit of the poison tree doctrine to be operative, a causal chain must be shown to exist from the primary illegality to the procurement of and the effect upon the substance of the evidence sought to be implied. Any causal chain that could have existed between Pounds and Shuman might have been broken by Shuman\u2019s own acts, but we cannot find any real point of departure in the evidence to demonstrate that this was so."], "id": "f5d099f0-eeb9-4b55-9881-507fb2370323", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defense in this case is directed to show you that the defendant did not have that capacity, and that he did not know, when he struck the blow, that he was committing wrong. If the proof of that fact is satisfactory to your minds, you must acquit him. The law does not require any sacrifice of a man who does not *218act intelligently in the commission of the act for which he is tried. In applying this rule you will look at the facts of the case ; first in regard to the evidence to show unsoundness of mind. You will first consider what facts there are affecting the issue which are clear and undisputable. You find here the prisoner, a young man of about twenty years years of age. You find he was married about two years ago, and had one child. You find him married to a woman of dissolute life and vile character. You find that in infancy he was afflicted with fits and convulsions, that he had numerous fits of that character in his younger years. I think that you should assume that there was a taint of insanity in his family, though not in the direct line. The father had no symptoms of insanity, but his uncle and collateral relations of his father had the taint of insanity. This fact you are entitled to consider upon the question you are to decide. You find that this man, during the week previous to the <mask>, had controversy with his wife. You find that they were reconciled on the Saturday before the homicide, so far that they went together to the house about eleven o\u2019clock at night\u2014 so far you have facts which you may assume as undoubted."], "id": "9db66bf1-08a9-40d2-b5a4-7d4fcd402ec7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The killing of the third Mississippi victim was slightly different but nevertheless also admissible under Ingram (71 NY2d 474, supra), although solely on the issue of the defendant\u2019s shared intent to kill. The proof that the People proffer regarding this third subsequent <mask> lacks any real probative indication of the defendant\u2019s intent to rob. The available evidence suggests that this killing was planned solely out of motivation to eliminate a potential witness, the larceny being an afterthought. The recurrence of a homicide, however, in the victim\u2019s residence, by firearm, with the defendant and Goodman present after a consensual entry, within 20 days of the events which are the subject of the present indictment, is potent evidence which tends to negate inadvertence, defensive purpose, or innocent intent."], "id": "c26896af-2b42-41d4-8038-559511fa6e9b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In our case, the thrust of the Grand Jury presentation was the <mask> charges, not the drug possession. The misdemeanor charge was presented to the Grand Jury because the cocaine was found on defendant\u2019s person when he was arrested. Were the issue not raised in conjunction with the homicide presentation, the drug charge could have been pursued by the District Attorney, if he deemed it advisable, in the Criminal Court, a far more appropriate forum."], "id": "09b49af5-e496-4a59-a182-ba7ef7287507", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["4. For example, under this statutory language, an adult court could accept a plea to reckless <mask>, R.C. 2903.041, on a transferred felony-murder charge, R.C. 2903.02(B). Reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of felony murder, State v. Owens, 162 Ohio St.3d 596, 2020-Ohio-4616, 166 N.E.3d 1142, \u00b6 1, and thus, it is an offense different from felony murder."], "id": "6869d727-f239-4a01-97f2-a75da915dd8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In 1999, a Crawford County Circuit Court jury found Ray guilty of theft of property and capital murder after he and an accomplice broke into Lisa Lewis's home, shot her multiple times, and then fled the scene in her car. See Ray v. State , 344 Ark. 136, 40 S.W.3d 243 (2001). Ray *64was sixteen years old when the crimes were committed, and he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without parole for capital murder2 and twenty years for theft of property.3 In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States held that \"the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.\" Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The Court further held that defendants who committed <mask> crimes as juveniles and faced a sentence of life without parole were entitled to a sentencing hearing that would permit a judge or jury to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and the individual circumstances of the crime as mitigating factors for a lesser sentence. Id. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455."], "id": "5f77ecda-3f08-4df2-8d27-c978af1b4d7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[T]he carelessness must be such that its seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community\u2019s general sense of right and wrong (see, People v Haney, 30 NY2d 328, 333, 335; see also, People v Ricardo B., 73 NY2d 228, 235-236; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53). What, we believe, is abundantly clear from our decisions and from the governing statutory language is that criminally negligent <mask> requires not only a failure to perceive a risk of death, but also some serious blameworthiness in the conduct that caused it. The risk involved must have been \u2018substantial and unjustifiable\u2019, and the failure to perceive that risk must have been a \u2018gross deviation\u2019 from reasonable care\u201d (People v Boutin, 75 NY2d 692, 696 [1990]). The mere \u201c \u2018nonperception\u2019 of a risk, even if death results, is not enough\u201d (id. at 696; see also People v Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370 [2008]; People v Conway, 6 NY3d 869 [2006])."], "id": "8625e829-922b-4975-8188-342296edf68c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cI respectfully submit that the People have failed to prove a prima facie case of Depraved Indifference Murder. Not only have they failed to prove a prima facie case that my client Bryan Hawkins was the perpetrator of the <mask> . . . but they failed to prove that Mr. Hawkins acted with Depraved Indifference Murder in that matter.\u201d (Id. at 489.) The Court of Appeals held that the motion"], "id": "161235ca-55e1-4e4d-81ef-472858913379", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him-and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the <mask> offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth-for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it. Id. at 477-78, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that defendants who committed homicide crimes as juveniles and faced a sentence of life without parole were entitled to a sentencing hearing that would permit the judge or jury to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and the individual circumstances of the crime as mitigating factors for a lesser sentence. Id. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Because the mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes in Alabama and Arkansas violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, the Court reversed the judgments of this court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded *67the cases for further proceedings. Id."], "id": "404d2798-b2b7-4062-9dbb-b0fd8282a592", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["After Patricia failed to return missed phone calls and text messages for the rest of the day, Barbara and Phyllis went to check on Patricia at her house. Around 5:30 p.m., Barbara found Patricia-she had been shot to death on the porch of her home. Deputy Chief Medical Examiner Stephen Erickson testified that Patricia had died of multiple gunshot wounds and that the manner of death was <mask>. Specifically, Dr. Erickson testified that an examination of Patricia's body revealed five gunshot wounds. One wound was located on the right chest, just below the clavicle. Erickson stated that this wound struck both lung lobes and would have been fatal in and of itself. A second wound was discovered on the right breast. This wound also went through both lung lobes and would have been fatal in and of itself. A third wound was discovered in the fold of Patricia's armpit. Erickson stated that this wound struck the lungs, \"devastated the heart,\" and would have been \"rapidly fatal.\" He stated that the three wounds\"produce[d] an almost immediate loss of blood pressure throughout the body.\" Patricia would have collapsed in about fifteen to twenty seconds. Two other wounds were found-one on the upper back and one on the right forearm. Erickson testified that neither wound would have been independently fatal. He further testified that stippling4 on Patricia's lips, chin, and nose indicated that at least one of the shots was fired from as close as three feet."], "id": "a6fa3c35-7fa5-4b13-a473-c4316801903f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The majority of States confronted with this issue have done no more than to recognize the common-law rules as codified or modified by their own State\u2019s statutes. At common law it was clear that an unborn fetus, viable or otherwise, could not be the subject of <mask>. (3 Coke, Institutes, at 58 [1648]; 40 CJS, Homicide, \u00a7 2 [b], at 824; Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 40 ALR3d 444.) It appears that the New York State Legislature in the 1965 revisions of the Penal Law adopted the common-law rule by defining \"person\u201d as \"a human being who has been born and is alive\u201d. (Penal Law \u00a7 125.05 [1].) Despite the following 22 years of development in science and medical technology there has been no revision of the definition."], "id": "f01d0286-96fd-45e0-b962-13a0b0786618", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court notes that in a <mask> case it is customary to obtain a video statement through a \u201criding\u201d Assistant District Attorney promptly following an admission by an accused at any time of the day or night, but in this case no attempt was made to videotape the defendant\u2019s statement until the following day. Detective McGurran testified that it was not until after 1:00 p.m. on November 3 that he even suggested to the defendant that a videotape statement be made, after the defendant had already been in custody for 27 hours. Two videotaped statements were taken from the defendant between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. and were concluded at approximately 5:00 p.m.; however, defendant was retained at the precinct for an additional 15V2 hours until Sergeant Mullins resumed questioning at approximately 8:30 a.m. on November 4. Between 8:30 a.m. and 2:25 p.m. on November 4, with the results of the ballistics testing in hand, Sergeant Mullins was successful in obtaining additional statements from the defendant. The defendant was not removed to central booking in preparation for his arraignment in criminal court until approximately 2:25 p.m. It has not been established exactly what time he was actually arraigned, but it is agreed that he was not arraigned until some time after 5:30 p.m. on November 4 and possibly as late as 1:00 a.m. on November 5. The People contend that this *384extraordinary period of delay was necessitated by the need for additional \u201cinvestigation.\u201d"], "id": "6bc96627-8ba1-4db5-a653-e9dc690dc770", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The second count essentially accuses the defendant of attempted felony murder. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime. (Penal Law, \u00a7 110.00.) One cannot attempt felony murder. (People v Miller, 32 NY2d 157; People v Hassin, 48 AD2d 705.) Felony murder is an unintentional <mask> in which the element of evil intent is transferred from the underlying felony to the killing thus justifying punishment for murder. (People v Nichols, 230 NY 221, 226-227; People v Enoch, 13 Wend 159, 174.) Since one who intended to commit \"felony murder\u201d would actually commit an intentional homicide, one cannot attempt felony murder."], "id": "e6798fd1-84c2-4426-9c8b-4956f1867762", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant correctly urges that the statute must be strictly construed and suggests that claimant is unable to meet the statutory standard of proving at trial by clear and convincing evidence that he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument. But, the claimant examines the entirety of that statutory provision, correctly parsing the grammar of Court of Claims Act \u00a7 8-b (5) (c): \u201che did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument or his acts or omissions charged in the accusatory instrument did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the state\u201d (emphasis supplied). Strict statutory construction in this instance inures to claimant\u2019s benefit. The conjunctive \u201cor\u201d leads to an examination of those acts charged in the indictment. First, the reversal by the Appellate Division of criminally negligent <mask> inherently finds that claimant\u2019s acts on the afternoon of June 19, 2001 did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor. Second, all of the other offenses in the accusatory instrument, including those for which he was found guilty: operation of a motor vehicle at imprudent speed (Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 1180 [a]), failure to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 1172 [a]), and failure to keep right (Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 1120 [a]) are infractions (Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 1101) and do not constitute a felony or misdemeanor. Paris v State of New York (Ct Cl, filed Jan. 9, 1992, Blinder, J., Claim No. 77395, Motion Nos. M-41260, CM-42580, affd 202 AD2d 482 [1994] [exhibit G to defendant\u2019s motion papers]) is not to the contrary. In Paris, while the conviction for criminally negligent homicide was reversed, the remaining conviction as charged in that indictment was for operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended, the equivalent today of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 511), which currently is either a misdemeanor or a felony.2 While Paris may have a similar procedural posture to the claim at bar, there is a substantive *400distinction between a traffic infraction as contrasted with a misdemeanor or felony, an issue that was not visited by the Paris trial court or the Appellate Division."], "id": "37c41bc1-3682-4901-8cf4-fde3c0670212", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court\u2019s conclusion regarding the futility of the proposed crime scene replication is strengthened by Dr. Fraser\u2019s affidavit where he admits that he could not \u201cconduct a reconstruction,\u201d \u201c[d]ue to several factors, e.g. cloud cover and ground snow.\u201d And although Dr. Fraser states that he would \u201cconduct his reconstruction on a Friday night in order to account for the lighting given off from people\u2019s houses,\u201d on the theory that \u201cmore houselights tend to be lit, and tend to stay lit later into the night and on the weekend,\u201d these efforts would amount to speculative guesswork and would never provide an accurate recreation inasmuch as no questions were ever asked of any of the witnesses about the lights emanating from nearby homes, apartments or cars. Indeed, defendant concedes this point when he writes that \u201cDr. Fraser cannot feasibly reconstruct conditions identical to those existing on the night of Mr. Stone\u2019s <mask>.\u201d Thus, because it is impossible to replicate a crime scene that, at this point, can most aptly be described as a blank slate, the court exercises its discretion to preclude Dr. Fraser\u2019s testimony, as his opinion holds no probative value and is therefore wholly unsuitable as corroborating evidence (but cf. People v Bronson, 32 Misc 3d 201, 216 [Crim Ct, Queens County 2011] [finding the recanting witness\u2019s testimony to be \u201cinherently) believab(le)\u201d inasmuch as it acquired an additional \u201caura of believability\u201d given the corroborating testimony from the recanting witness's brother (emphasis added)])."], "id": "ef457f59-c480-45fb-9b40-6905487b2bc6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The first period consists of the two calls made to the telephone switchboard operator at the Central Park Precinct in October, 1979.1 find, and defense counsel concedes, that defendant\u2019s right to counsel had not as yet attached. The calls were made by an anonymous caller who merely claimed to have some information regarding the Murphy <mask>. Accordingly defendant\u2019s statements made during these calls are admissible."], "id": "21491f2f-0f0c-42c8-a032-3822c90d753c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["appeal. (See People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 108.) Nor is there any suggestion such an offer would have been futile. Indeed, the court solicited additional information to assist its evaluation. Newborn offered none below and does not do so here. The court reasonably exercised its discretion (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623) to limit cross- examination on a witness\u2019s unrelated prior offense, particularly when presented with no additional offer of proof or further argument. Newborn next claims he was unable to explore whether DeSean tried to gain favor with law enforcement by falsely attributing a double <mask> to Danny Cooks and Ernest Holly.32 Newborn tried to show that DeSean identified Cooks and Holly because he was dating Holly\u2019s ex-girlfriend. Yet the record demonstrates Newborn was able to elicit precisely the testimony he sought. After a relevance objection, Newborn rephrased his question and DeSean testified that he had been dating Holly\u2019s ex-girlfriend around the time he implicated Cooks and Holly in the homicides. Newborn complains he was prevented from seeking further details but identifies no ruling that so limited him. More importantly, he fails to explain how additional information about the relationship would have been probative. The essential facts establishing DeSean\u2019s asserted motive to falsely accuse someone else of murder were before the jury. Newborn\u2019s third allegation of deficient cross-examination concerns DeSean\u2019s testimony about another shooting. In"], "id": "50825c42-e47b-4e81-902c-f539937716aa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In support of his claim, defendant relies on Miller v Alabama (567 US \u2014, 132 S Ct 2455 [2012] [unconstitutional to impose life imprisonment without parole on a defendant under the age of 18]), Graham v Florida (560 US 48 [2010] [unconstitutional to impose life imprisonment on a juvenile offender convicted of a non-<mask> offense]), and Roper v Simmons (543 US 551 [2005] [unconstitutional to impose death on a defendant under the age of 18]). Such reliance is entirely misplaced. Although both Miller and Graham held it was unconstitutional to impose life without parole on a person under the age of 18, the defendant received no such sentence. In fact, he is parole eligible. No doubt he is unhappy over the prospect that the aggregate mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment may preclude him from ever being paroled, he nevertheless remains eligible for it. As for his reliance on Roper, defendant was obviously never exposed to the imposition of a death sentence."], "id": "282d1866-8506-47c5-b28a-c92fd49d805e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The reasoning of Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for a majority of the court, in Matter of Gault (387 U. S. 1 [1967]) applies to the factual situation with which we are now confronted. First, Mr. Justice Fortas described the commitment of a boy to a State institution (p. 27): \u201c A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence\u2014 and of limited practical meaning \u2014 that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a \u2018 receiving home \u2019 or an 1 industrial school \u2019 for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes \u2018 a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours \u2019. Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees and 1 delinquents \u2019 confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and <mask>.\u201d"], "id": "7c3bf370-caab-4872-968a-a3b779b829c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["As a result of the adoption of the status quo by the enactment of the new CPL, the Administrative Board, recognizing the problem, pre-empted the field and promulgated its own rules (22 NYCRR 29.1-29.7). Generally, these rules provided that 90 days after arrest for any offense other than one of <mask>, a defendant held in custody who had not been brought to trial would be entitled, upon application, to release on bail or on his own recognizance; and that upon the expiration of six months without trial, a defendant would be entitled to dismissal of the accusatory instrument (Supplementary Practice Commentary, *15McKinney\u2019s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 11A, CPL 30.30, 1972-1973 Annual Pocket Part, p. 14). The rules did not recognize any excuse for delay regardless of circumstance."], "id": "84f08f35-0bd3-4de7-b5fa-db518e7fb42a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["If the defendant had proceeded without calling any psychiatric witnesses, the People, having rested their case, could have been precluded from calling expert witnesses in rebuttal. (See Richardson, Evidence [10th ed], \u00a7 459; CPL 260.30.) The defendant, however, elected to call a psychiatrist as a witness in support of his insanity defense. This psychiatrist testified that, in his opinion, at the time he killed his sister, the defendant did not appreciate either the nature and consequences of his conduct or that it was wrong. According to this expert, due to organic brain damage, the defendant suffered an episode of Penfield\u2019s Automatism during which he had no control over his actions and involuntarily killed his sister. The prosecution then called three psychiatrists, in rebuttal, who testified that they found no evidence that the defendant had the type of localized brain damage which could have triggered Penfield\u2019s Automatism. These experts stated that this is a type of epileptic seizure during which the individual behaves in a robot-like manner and performs aimless, undirected acts of which he has little, if any, recollection, and that the defendant\u2019s conduct and detailed recollection were inconsistent with such an episode. They were of the opinion that at the time of the <mask>, the defendant knew and *392appreciated the nature and consequences of his conduct and that it was wrong."], "id": "470bee73-5184-439a-9df6-7a4b4d222a46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The powers and duties of the coroner as set forth in article 17-A of the County Law (especially \u00a7\u00a7 671, 673, 674, 675 and 678) would not be consistent with the respondent\u2019s interpretation that \u201cportable object[s]\u201d refer only to portable objects found \u201cin the vicinity of the body\u201d or are restricted to physical items, such as knives, guns, etc., involved in a <mask>. By no stretch of the reading of the sections herein can such a conclusion be interpolated. The coroner in the course of his investigation is not restricted by statute with the sole and specific responsibility for viewing and examining the body only. As a matter of fact, a reasonable reading of the article leads to quite the opposite conclusion. The only test being that everything be done to investigate which will reasonably assist in establishing the cause of death or to determine the means or manner of death. It is utterly ridiculous to believe that the intention of the Legislature of this State was to allow coroners and/or their medical examiners to examine bodies and prevent them from using whatever reasonable written materials and records which could assist them to more accurately and definitively accomplish their stated task and duty."], "id": "7911ef2e-5ec9-4d3e-8b0d-8c77ea36f7b2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeals in Ingram (supra) drew upon the reasoning of Dean Wigmore with respect to the probative value of subsequent similar acts upon the issue of intent. Wigmore indicated that there is no fixed rule regarding the similarity of the subsequent events: \"a correct application of the principle would receive any evidence of the sort which conveys any real probative indication of the defendant\u2019s intent.\u201d (2 Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7 363 [2] [Chadbourn rev 1979].) Here, the People\u2019s proof of the third Mississippi <mask> contains the defendant\u2019s express admission that he and Goodman went to the victim\u2019s house to kill him. This evidence is exactly the type of substantive probative indication of the defendant\u2019s intent contemplated by Wigmore and the Ingram court. Accordingly, evidence of this third Mississippi homicide will be admissible on the issue of the defendant\u2019s shared intent to kill."], "id": "b314e7ff-1b6c-4382-bd28-4d6e13d9b9a1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants argue here that audiotapes and worksheets prepared by the OCME, and kept within that agency\u2019s custody, are constructively within the People\u2019s possession, because the OCME performs a \"prosecutorial function\u201d in that it generates material \"during the course of the primary criminal investigation\u201d, and it is therefore a \"vital part of the prosecutorial team\u201d in <mask> cases. Defendants also argue that the local prosecutor has been given statutory access to, and thus control over, prior statements of prosecution witnesses contained in material generated by the OCME as part of a homicide investigation. We find neither argument persuasive."], "id": "31b7b978-1340-4955-bc64-454d2e7262ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On the trial the defendant took the stand and stated that he lived for four years in Springfield, Massachusetts, prior to taking up his residence in Troy, lie also stated that he was in Springfield, Massachusetts, on the Gth day of April, 1908, and Avas not in Troy on the excelling or night of the <mask>, lie gave his evidence through an interpreter, asserting that he could not speak English. lie also denied that he had made any confessions as testified to by the xvitnesses for the People. His testimony xvas incredible and against the overwhelming Aveight of evidence. The only other witnesses sworn for the defense Averc Joseph and Mary Misisco, avIio testified that in the early part of April the defendant called at their 1 louse in Troy and asked if he could get a room for the night; they Avere unable to fix the precise date and their testimony is of no value."], "id": "5c09efc0-b6d1-4ee5-bd9e-0a910afd971b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["First, the court reported that apart from automobile homicides he found not one conviction in New York for a \u201c lawful act\u201d <mask>. Second, he found that automobile homicides, almost without exception, involved \u201c unlawful acts\u201d, such as drunk driving, reckless driving, speeding, etc. Third, even in unlawful act homicides most courts require proof of such a degree of negligence \u25a0 \u2014 \u201c culpable \u201d, or \u201c criminal \u201d, or \u201c gross \u201d as to be the equivalent of criminal intent. Fourth, he found that \u201c In addition to knowledge of risk creation there must be conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, which in terms of the culpable negligence manslaughter statute, means a risk that death or serious bodily injury will probably (as distinguished from possibly) ensue \u201d (11 Misc 2d 219, 236). Fifth, \u201c a person engaged in performing a lawful act is ordinarily not conscious of creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Ordinarily therefore, a greater degree of proof of conscious risk creation will be necessary \u201d (p. 237). The court summarizes the results of his obviously vast research when, *50referring to what the triers of the fact must find, he states: \u201c The jury will then be required to determine whether or not the defendant was actually and consciously aware of the fact that by his acts or his omissions he was creating a risk; that the risk created was both unreasonable and unjustifiable under all the circumstances established by the evidence; that for a risk to be both unreasonable and unjustifiable it must involve conduct so highly culpable and blameworthy as to be tantamount or equivalent to an intent to injure another; and that the defendant in disregarding such a risk knew or should have known that the probable (as distinguished from possible) consequences of his conduct would result in death or serious injury to another. And, of course, that all this must be established beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (pp. 241-242)."], "id": "2058612a-ea14-453e-88ff-45233547a846", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Although at some point in the investigation some member of the <mask> squad instructed the police property bureau to hold the recorder and recording as evidence, it is clear that the initial instructions, for whatever reasons, by the detective responsible for the murder scene was to the effect that the recording device and its recorded contents were to be returned to the estate of the deceased. For no apparent reason, however, on May 19, 1984, after the arraignment of the defendant, and after defense counsel had called for the preservation of all recorded conversations, the tape recorder and the cassette recording contained therein were publicly auctioned by the property bureau."], "id": "c75becb7-65cd-4a1f-a0d4-1c05cb44feef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b616 The court of appeals in Slover addressed whether a victim\u2019s attorney fees could be ordered as restitution in a criminal case. 220 Ariz. at 242 \u00b6 1. Slover was convicted of negligent <mask> and DUI after his passenger died in a rollover accident. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 1\u20132. On appeal, Slover challenged the restitution order requiring him to pay attorney fees incurred by the victim\u2019s wife during the criminal proceedings. Id. \u00b6 4. The victim\u2019s attorney essentially \u201cacted in the role of an adjunct prosecutor, \u2018prodding\u2019 the state to pursue the case and apparently assisting it with the prosecution.\u201d Id. at 243 \u00b6 8. The court of appeals disallowed the fees because they did not flow directly from the criminal conduct but instead \u201carose from either the state\u2019s inability to prosecute the case independently and competently or the wife\u2019s mistrust that it would do so.\u201d Id. The court concluded that the victim\u2019s attorney fees were \u201cconsequential rather than direct damages arising from Slover\u2019s crime.\u201d Id. The court left for a future case whether attorney fees incurred by a victim to \u201cassert a concrete right under the Victims\u2019 Bill of Rights\u201d could be recovered as restitution. Id. \u00b6 9."], "id": "65c40278-541d-4100-97e8-f42233ccd2f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Before conducting the lineup, the police decided to conceal the identities of Carter and Cook from Mr. Greenberg. This is an apparently routine practice (or, at least, not an unusual one) in <mask> lineups conducted at the sixth homicide zone. Moreover, in this case the police investigation had revealed that the defendants had a reputation for violence in the *453community where this crime occurred, and this reputation was known by both Carter and Cook. Indeed, Cook asked that his identity not be made known to the defense attorney. Additionally, Detective Lundun knew that a man named Robert Campbell, who, in October, 1977, had been a complainant in an armed robbery case, had identified Ivan Johnson and another man as the perpetrators of that crime. Johnson, who had allegedly told Campbell not to go to the police, was arrested. On October 30, 1977 (30 days after the alleged murder of Joseph Thomas), Robert Campbell was shot three times as he was about to enter his apartment. Derek Ellis was arrested for this killing before November 15,1977. The alleged motive for the killing was to eliminate Campbell as a witness against Ivan Johnson. (Since that time Ellis has been tried and convicted of murder in the second degree for killing Campbell and is presently serving a 25-year-to-life sentence.) The general facts of the Campbell killing were known by Cook and Carter and they were both fearful. The police also believed that there were other colleagues of Johnson, Ellis and West at liberty at the time of the lineup."], "id": "fc15f5b0-1ad9-450a-8bcb-2a502dd652e7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The alleged <mask> occurred 10 years ago in July, 1950. Defendant was taken into custody 9 years thereafter, in July, 1959, when he made two separate statements, one prepared by the authorities and signed by him, the other being oral and transcribed by a stenographer. Although the statements are claimed to be exculpatory, rather than incriminatory, it seems clear from the papers and oral argument that they may be admissible as partial admissions and that the People intend to offer them at the trial."], "id": "338af5cc-f25f-4b3d-a3e5-4a7edccc4ea6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On October 31, 1997, at about 11:20 a.m., Detective Petrak, recently apprised of defendant\u2019s role in the 1992 robbery, met defendant in the recreation room of the Washington Correctional Institute in upstate New York. After introducing himself, Detective Petrak, in the presence of Detective Hayes, informed defendant, an inmate serving a sentence for an unrelated robbery, that he was investigating \u201cold shootings\u201d, including the drive-by shooting of codefendant Gibson, which defendant had claimed witnessing. After engaging in small talk with defendant, Detective Petrak obtained a written statement and diagram of defendant\u2019s purported observations of the drive-by shooting on the day of the Radio Shack <mask>. Upon concluding the interview at 12:05 p.m., Detective Petrak informed defendant that he might revisit him."], "id": "a511d760-47e3-4d53-b00f-aacd9e70a8e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["was the day after her daughter\u2019s birthday. Mariscal remem- bered arriving at the restaurant with her daughter and Newman at around 10 or 10:30 a.m. She recalled that Newman went on a supply run around 11 or 11:30 a.m. and that he returned with bread and possibly lighter fluid. She stated that she was not always with Newman while at the restaurant and that he would use the grill located outside of the restaurant. Riley, who worked at the restaurant, testified he and Newman arrived there at 7 a.m. to begin smoking turkeys. Riley stated Newman was at the restaurant all day, except for about 15 minutes around 10 or 10:30 a.m., when Newman went to the grocery store to get feather bones and charcoal. In their depositions, Rosa and Mullen confirmed that they worked at the grocery store, but could not confirm whether Newman shopped there on December 2, 2012. Newman\u2019s trial counsel testified in his deposition that on January 22, 2013, he was appointed to represent Newman. Counsel acknowledged that Newman made him aware of his alibi defense early on and that Riley and Mariscal could con- firm he was either at the restaurant or at the grocery store. In preparing a defense, on April 18, 2013, counsel hired a private investigator to investigate Newman\u2019s alibi defense, as well as Herrera-Gutierrez\u2019 version of events. The investigator was a retired Omaha police officer with 20 years\u2019 experience, including working as an investigator in the <mask> unit. In forming Newman\u2019s defense strategy, counsel planned to rely on the experience of his investigator. Counsel stated that his investigator\u2019s experience working in the homicide unit would aid him in determining whether Herrera-Gutierrez\u2019 description of the shootings was credible. Counsel attempted to obtain receipts from either the grocery store or Newman\u2019s restaurant, but Newman did not provide any. The investigator contacted the grocery store manager and learned that sales records were kept for only 10 days and that surveillance video was kept for only 40 days. - 470 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. NEWMAN Cite as 310 Neb. 463"], "id": "72f1508e-2535-43f3-b836-743fadf31824", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Harold J. Rothwax, J. The question presented is to what extent must the ultimate cause of death be foreseeable before a person may be charged with criminally negligent <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 125.10), and what quality of evidence of foreseeability is legally sufficient to sustain a charge of criminal negligence. (CPL 210.20, subd 1, par [b]; 70.10, subd 1.) The facts presented before the Grand Jury are that the defendant (approximately 30 years of age, 5 feet, 10 inches tall and heavyset) struck the deceased (54 years old, 5 feet, 6 inches tall and weighing a slight 80 pounds) once with the back of his hand, thereby fracturing the deceased\u2019s jaw and causing him to fall. The deceased, who had been drinking, possibly to excess, apparently struck his head on an angular object when he fell; suffered contusions and hemorrhage of the brain; was hospitalized; developed pneumonia and died six days later. In the medical examiner\u2019s opinion, the immediate cause of death was not the slap, but was the *186brain hemorrhage, probably caused by a fall onto an angular object."], "id": "5acdcf1a-415b-48ea-ba8c-4c40c6e13578", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["There is obviously a difficulty in the practical application of the distinction between those acts and omissions for which the municipality may be liable, on the ground that the act or omission is that of its servants or agents, as attempted to be expressed by Mr. Dillon, and those for which it is not liable ; and yet that there is a distinction between those acts or omissions of certain classes of officers who are appointed and controlled by a municipal corporation, and for which the municipality is liable in damages, and those for which no such liability can be alleged, is obvious to the common understanding. The attempt to hold a municipal corporation responsible for the shortcomings or negligent performance of their duties by the policemen of a city, is denied by the common judgment of men, without, perhaps, the ability to put into clear language the grounds upon which the case is to be distinguished from those, in which it is generally conceded that the municipality is responsible for the due and proper performance of the duty devolved upon the agent. This difficulty has been presented in various judicial examination's of the subject, where the decision has been adverse to the liability of the city, and yet the attempt to express in precise language the difference between the cases in which the maxim respondeat superior applies and cases to which it has no application, is not altogether satisfactory. In Stewart v. The City of New Orleans (9 Lou. Annual Rep. 461), a detachment of the police officers of the municipality was ordered by its chief to suppress unlawful assemblages of slaves in cabarets. In the performance of this duty they entered a dram-shop in which the slave of the plaintiff was found. The slave attempted to escape, was pursued and overtaken by the watch, and in capturing him they inflicted wounds of which he subsequently died. It was shown *405that be might have been arrested without the <mask>. The action being brought in one of the District Courts of New Orleans, the plaintiff there recovered, but the judgment was reversed by the Superior Court by a divided bench. In that case Judge CaMpbell, delivering the opinion of the majority said: \u201c The judgment, we think, is erroneous, and the error results from a failure in the application of the principle to make the proper distinction between the liability of a municipal corporation for acts of its officers, in the exercise of powers which it possesses for public purposes, and which it holds as part of the government of the country.\u201d"], "id": "b4d3e6aa-7984-4e07-82a3-b557c02244f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*684It is clear that the statement in the memorandum, that there was suspicion that plaintiff was involved in the death of Dr. Shapiro, was pertinent to the issues to be determined at the departmental hearing. The statement, inaccurately designated by plaintiff as a finding, has some relationship to the third specification, charging the making of \"false statements during an official <mask> investigation\u201d. The investigation referred to was the State police investigation into the death of Dr. Shapiro. The fact that plaintiff was found not guilty on that specification is not dispositive. Moreover, as noted by Judge Weinfeld (404 F Supp 719, 720, supra) , \"The statement * * * if anything, tends to exonerate plaintiff of any implication in the homicide.\u201d"], "id": "421381c8-95c3-4302-aa15-aeb1382d78cf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The People point out that CPL 30.30 (3) exempts from statutory speedy trial requirements any \"criminal action\u201d in which a defendant is accused of <mask>.3 CPL 1.20 (16) provides that a criminal action: \"(a) commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court * * * (b) includes the filing of all further accusatory instruments directly derived from the initial one, and all proceedings, orders and motions conducted or made by a criminal court in the course of disposing of any such accusatory instrument * * * and (c) terminates with the imposition of sentence or some other final disposition in a criminal court of the last accusatory instrument filed in the case.\u201d In People v Osgood (52 NY2d 37, 44 [1980]), the Court of Appeals applying to the term \"directly derived\u201d its ordinary meaning of being traceable to originating from, held that an indictment charging the defendant with the same crimes contained in a previously dismissed felony complaint was \"directly derived\u201d from the complaint. (See also, People v Colon, 76 AD2d 805 [1st Dept 1980] [commencement date for speedy trial purposes of count of superseding indictment charging conspiracy, which was not included in original charges, was same as for counts previously charged]; People v Ramkisson, 114 Misc 2d 535 [Sup *286Ct, NY County 1982] [indictment including crimes charged in felony complaint was \"directly derived\u201d from complaint even though it included other crimes].)"], "id": "e5f22d4d-f267-4631-b786-fdc1268e0aad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cIn construing statutory language, courts must \u2018take the statutes as they find them and * * * [may not extend] their operation beyond the bounds of the legislative intent\u2019. (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, \u00a7 73.) The plain, natural meaning of the language and import of penal statutes must be followed\u201d (People v Walker, 120 Misc 2d 235, 238; Penal Law \u00a7 5.00; People v Ditta, 52 NY2d 657, 660). In defining when a motion to dismiss must be granted, pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (a), the language of the statute unequivocally makes direct reference to \u201ca defendant\u201d. Indeed, subdivision (3) (a) specifically removes an entire class of defendants (those charged with certain <mask> offenses) from CPL 30.30 protection. Neither subdivision (1) nor (3) of CPL 30.30 makes any reference to a defendant charged with a felony but joined on an indictment with a codefendant charged with an excluded homicide offense. It is reasonable to believe that this omission by the Legislature was intentional (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 74)."], "id": "eac518f6-e510-4675-8b9f-96672c4ed96c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["This court cannot agree. No evidentiary hearing is required. On June 12, 1978 a lineup was attempted, but was aborted when defendant appeared with a full beard and refused to shave. If in fact the perpetrator of the <mask> did at the time of the act, have a beard, an order that he shave would inure to his benefit. On the other hand, if the perpetrator was clean shaven at the time, this court is of the opinion that it may direct that the defendant shave and appear at a lineup for the reasons stated below."], "id": "b8b40aa8-4f72-4dea-92f7-3c9b70b58aca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant then asked the detectives if he could continue writing the statement that he had started prior to leaving the interview room. The detectives conferred with an assistant district attorney from the <mask> bureau who told them to allow the defendant to continue writing if he wanted to, but not to ask him any questions. The detectives therefore returned the paper and pen to the defendant and permitted him to complete his statement. The detectives knew that the defendant had written one full page and started a second before he asked for an attorney. Yet, it was not established how much defendant had *933written on the second page. Upon finishing his statement, the defendant signed it. This statement was translated by a Russian-speaking detective and sought to be admitted into evidence by the People."], "id": "5cb0cb6c-7767-43b8-b8e7-20d8b6873e30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant\u2019s prior <mask> conviction. D. The \u201cShotgun Video\u201d Defendant objected to the admission of the \u201cshotgun video\u201d extracted from a cell phone which depicted defendant firing a shotgun. Defendant\u2019s objection was based on Evidence Code section 352. Defendant asserted that, \u201cgiven the nature of the charges in this case and given that the video clip showed him firing a gun, it would be unduly prejudicial to\u201d him. The court allowed the video to be played for the jury. The court later explained that it did so because it saw the issue in this case less whether defendant a fired a gun and more what his intent was. The court also found that, while the video had \u201csome prejudicial impact,\u201d it was less prejudicial than the court had anticipated and determined that its prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh its probative value. On appeal, while defendant asserts the admission of the video was error, he does not offer substantive analysis in support of his contention. Instead, he merely recites the background, including his objection before the trial court and the trial court\u2019s ruling. He offers no analysis of the issue, nor any citation to authority supporting his position. \u201c \u2018 \u201cA judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (People v. Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465, 478, quoting Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) \u201cIt is the appellant\u2019s burden to demonstrate the existence of reversible error.\u201d (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 766.) \u201cTo demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error."], "id": "52b8c6c9-c5e5-461e-a7a0-3fa6b4e5b78e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The facts of this case are not complex. On April 24, 1977, a knife was thrust several times into the body of one Charles Gerald, occasioning a sudden loss of his blood, resulting, in turn, in his untimely demise. On the same date, the defendant was arrested by the police for this <mask>. The police had obtained her spontaneous confession and statements by eyewitnesses that she fatally assaulted the deceased while he was combing his hair in the bathroom."], "id": "7c77e09a-955c-4a30-8f17-67bf4b3f6ea7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["However, as the People also acknowledge, dissimilarities are important in analyzing the serial murder allegation: Victims: *218One victim was a 16-year-old African-American male. Three were 19- to 20-year-old male Hispanics. Instrumentalities: A .45 caliber handgun, a .357 caliber handgun, a .25 caliber handgun and a 12-gauge shotgun. Motives: One contract shooting that began as a kneecapping and resulted in a <mask>; one unplanned victim who was a companion of the contract shooting victim; one drive-by shooting as revenge for an earlier robbery committed by the victim and one shooting driven by the defendant\u2019s desire to locate a former girlfriend. Defendant as Shooter: The defendant is alleged to be the shooter of the companion to the contract shooting victim and in the drive-by shooting. An unindicted accomplice is alleged to have shot the contract victim. The People are unsure if the defendant shot or commanded the shooting of the fourth victim. Wounds: One with shotgun wounds to the neck in the drive-by; one with multiple gunshot wounds to the head, abdomen, chest and neck; one with multiple gunshot wounds to the head, chest and hip; and one with a single shot to the head whose head thereafter was covered with a plastic bag. Location: Two on a public sidewalk during the same incident; one as he sat in a car on a public street and one in the defendant\u2019s basement while handcuffed and blindfolded."], "id": "8d41f734-8bf1-49fc-a8ff-7935612949d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant and several of his brothers are ranking members of the Vigilantes. Fifteen <mask> investigations in which Vigilante members are suspects are presently in progress. Eight known Vigilantes are under indictment for murder, including the defendant. The organization has a policy, known to its members as well as others, *392called \u201cprocess elimination\u201d. That policy is to kill potential witnesses who co-operate with the police against them. As an active and high-ranking Vigilante, the defendant was aware of this policy."], "id": "04322ca6-75ab-4ffe-95ec-7befd32339cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Doctor Pasquale determined the cause of death to be \u201casphyxia and hypothermia due to environmental exposure to cold temperature\u201d and the manner of death to be <mask> (grand jury minutes, Apr. 11, 2007, at 14). \u201cHomicide\u201d was later defined by the ADA as, \u201cany conduct which causes the death of a person under circumstances constituting Murder, Manslaughter in the First or Second Degree, or Criminally Negligent Homicide\u201d (grand jury minutes, Apr. 12, 2007, at 8; see Penal Law \u00a7 125.00)."], "id": "68a8fc44-0512-4b12-a11c-a9e86d087208", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "homicide", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In Dr. Baden\u2019s opinion, the opinions and conclusions of Dr. Rubio were inconsistent with some of her findings. By way of example, Dr. Baden noted that the cause of death listed in Brittney\u2019s autopsy report was multiple brain injuries due to rotational forces (shaken impact baby syndrome) <mask>. Rather than multiple brain injuries, however, Dr. Baden noted that there were no brain injuries other than the two that he had previously referenced in the back of the brain and the front side of the brain, which \u201care classic for a fall and don\u2019t support the concept of shaken baby. And there is no subdural hemorrhage, which is part of the importance of the shaken baby that she describes.\u201d"], "id": "064f46a7-ad7b-469e-8c6b-1d2187889b4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["We need not determine if Lozano's calculations are correct, because her argument rests on the faulty premise that the only remedy for the asserted Eighth Amendment violation is resentencing her to no more than 26-years-to-life for her conviction of first degree <mask> with special circumstances. Montgomery , as we have explained, permits the states to remedy a Miller violation by providing meaningful parole consideration-as afforded by SB 394-rather than resentencing. Moreover, the sentence cap of 26-years-to-life urged by Lozano is not required by the Eighth Amendment. (See People v. Garcia (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 941, 949-50, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 217 [juvenile sentence of 32 years to life does not violate the Eighth Amendment]; People v. Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, 57, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 114 [no case has been cited in which a court struck down a juvenile's sentence as cruel and unusual where \"the perpetrator still has substantial life expectancy left at the time of eligibility for parole\"].)"], "id": "4db897a0-01cd-4cbc-9ffc-1bab6168f86e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Edward C. Alfano, J. Defendant has been indicted for felony murder1 (two counts) (the underlying felonies are robbery and burglary) and one count of intentional <mask>. Defendant\u2019s confession indicates that at the time of the homicide he was \u201chigh\u201d on drugs. In its jury charge this court did not charge intoxication as to felony murder, but did charge intoxication as to intentional murder. The court wishes to expand on its rationale.2"], "id": "5c85d7e5-0a02-4eca-bfe5-4731c4b4aaa6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was admitted to the Utah State Hospital on January 30, 1979 and was seen by Mr. Jensen on January 31, 1979. The purpose for Mr. Jensen seeing the defendant on that day was to obtain a social history for inclusion in the report to the court. The defendant related his general social history covering his family and other involvements with the legal system since his childhood. The defendant related that there was another crime that he was concerned about that he wanted to get cleared up, and left the impression with Mr. Jensen that he had committed a rape-<mask>. He asked Mr. Jensen as to what degree of confidentiality there would be if he were to relate any specific facts. Mr. Jensen told him that there was no complete confidentiality. The defendant wanted Mr. Jensen to check further. Jensen talked with his supervisor who consulted with the Assistant Attorney-General of the State. On February 1, 1979, Jensen passed the information back to the defendant that on a capital offense there would definitely be no confidentiality. The defendant told Jensen that he wanted to get his life straightened out and that he would want to talk to his wife."], "id": "865506ea-d597-418b-a5ef-13a732d69ba1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Their restriction of the idea of \u201c necessarily included \u201d crimes to those of generic likeness foils the so-called \u201c lesser included offense exception \u2019 \u2019 to the \u2018 \u2018 same evidence test \u2019 \u20198 and arrays New York with the jurisdictions denying that jeopardy of conviction of the foundational felony is involved in a prosecution for that type of <mask> (see, e.g., Southworth v. State, 98 Fla. 1184, 1188-1189; Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 108, 118 and authori*503ties cited; People v. Andrae, 305 Ill. 530, 535; Centers v. Commonwealth, 318 S. W. 2d 57, 58 [Ky.]; State v. Rodgers, 100 S. C. 77, 82; State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 238, 240; contra, People v. Miccichi, 264 Mich. 581, 583; State v. Cooper, 32 N. J. L. 361, 372, 373, 375; State v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 595, 608-609). By reason of the unintended, fatal consequence, the offenses are thought to he elementally different and, as it is said, the test of jeopardy by successive prosecutions \u201cis not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense.\u201d A \u201c single act \u201d may violate two statutes but if one \u2018 \u2018 requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either * * * does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other \u201d (Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434). In summary, the \u201cact-offense dichotomy \u201d9 defeats the plea of former jeopardy. But, apparently, it goes still further."], "id": "31c073e0-cbdb-45a3-9bfd-bf9ae13c68d2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Although the delay in arresting defendant was indeed substantial, defendant\u2019s claim that the prosecution has not established good cause for the delay is unavailing. Defendant, a thrice-convicted violent felon,2 now stands indicted for the horrific <mask> of Noellis Bayanilla. At 5:00 a.m. on August 6, 1989, the unconscious body of then 17-year-old Noellis Baya-nilla was discovered in the rear courtyard of 2645 Morris Avenue. It was determined that Ms. Bayanilla was thrown off of the five-story building\u2019s rooftop. Ms. Bayanilla sustained massive injuries, including multiple broken bones and internal injuries and, after two days of unimaginable suffering, succumbed to her injuries and died. The New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) found that Ms. Bayanilla sustained major and severe blunt force trauma and ruled her death to be a homicide. From the outset of the investigation, defendant was a suspect, as he was observed the morning of the incident with Ms. Bayanilla both outside 2645 Morris Avenue and then entering 2645 Morris Avenue with her. However, no witnesses observed defendant and Ms. Bayanilla on the roof and no witnesses observed defendant push Ms. Bayanilla off the rooftop. Moreover, no physical evidence recovered connected defendant to the murder, and when defendant was questioned *768by the police he denied murdering Ms. Bayanilla and claimed he was at home at the time of her murder. Due to the insufficiency of the evidence, until 2016, neither defendant nor anyone else was arrested for murdering Ms. Bayanilla. (See affirmation of Assistant District Attorney [ADA] Newton Mendys at 2-3.)"], "id": "f71d5c93-8044-4c50-82de-cf16152bf2b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In the case of The People v. Rawson (7 Wend., 417), it was held that the provisions of the statute are merely directory, and a neglect of its provisions is not, per se, sufficient for setting *243aside the verdict. In Ferris v. The People (35 N. Y., 125), the eame doctrine was reiterated in the case of a conviction for <mask> in the first degree, and also by the General Term of the third \u00a1lepartment in Gardiner v. The People (6 Parker\u2019s Crim. Rep., 157)."], "id": "d79dc138-2445-4acd-b2c8-3b064dd61f1f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["So, as I say, going back to the origin of things, gentlemen, it was the intention of the framers of this Code to provide a definition and a punishment for every kind of homicide noit excusable or justifiable; and every kind of homicide not excusable or justifiable which is not <mask> in the first or second degree, or a death ensuing while engaged in a duel, is manslaughter."], "id": "a7f68684-8440-4b4d-9071-32ffa99fd950", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["A complaint was filed on March 27, 2003, charging defendant with <mask>. An arrest warrant issued, and on March 31, Dudek and Chicoine drove to San Quentin to take defendant into custody. They told him he was under arrest for the murder. Chicoine testified that when the officers first encountered defendant in a receiving area at the prison, he told them \"that he had been meaning to call us, that he had already talked to a counselor and that he intended to call us.\" There had been no contact with defendant since the last interview, but he said \"[h]e knew we'd be coming back.\" Chicoine understood defendant's statements as a reinitiation of the discussion at the end of the March 21 interview, when he had said \"he did want to talk to us, he wanted to explain what was going on.\""], "id": "4d2c12f4-2bb2-49f1-b68a-c88d712d19b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In sum, the evidence before the Grand Jury was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the defendants intended to and did participate in the robbery that led to the <mask>. The inference of guilt does not flow logically from the facts adduced before the Grand Jury. On the contrary, the evidence utterly fails to establish that the defendants were acting in concert with the other two individuals to commit the crimes charged. The indictment must, therefore, be dismissed. (GPL 190.65 [1] [b]; 210.20 [1] [b]; People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976 [1987].)"], "id": "74041faf-b6a3-47ac-ab0a-98ebede70ced", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cIf the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause [(OSC)].\u201d (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (c).) The court then holds a hearing within 60 days to determine whether to vacate the <mask> conviction. (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) At this stage of the proceeding, the prosecution has the burden of proving \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt[ ] that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.\u201d (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (d)(3); Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 723-724.) B. Standard of Review We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for substantial evidence. (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658 [\u201cA judgment will not be reversed so long as there is substantial evidence to support a rational trier of fact\u2019s conclusion . . . .\u201d]; see People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 320; see, e.g., People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1096 [orders denying resentencing under section 1170.18].) In so doing, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below. (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1028.) We look for substantial evidence, which is evidence that is \u201creasonable, credible and of solid value\u2014 from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078; Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 804), and we do not substitute our own factual determinations for the factfinder\u2019s. (Koontz, at p. 1078.) C. Major Participant Jackson contends the record lacks substantial evidence to support the court\u2019s finding that he was a major participant. We consider the following factors when determining whether a defendant was a major participant: (1) the defendant\u2019s role in planning the crime that lead to the victim\u2019s death;"], "id": "f2b8cd0a-f02b-4985-984b-fb6c5a6dbea3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Johnson also relies on Trevino, supra , 26 Cal.4th 237, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283 to support his argument that Andrews is not applicable here, but his reliance is misplaced. Trevino held that it is the prior offense that establishes whether the defendant is eligible for the death penalty or a life sentence without the possibility of parole under section 190.2, subdivision (a), and not the particular characteristics of the defendant at the time he committed the offense. (Trevino, at p. 244, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283.) In Trevino , the defendant committed a prior <mask> at age 15 in Texas where he was tried as an adult. (Ibid . ) Had the crime occurred in California he would have been tried as a juvenile and, on appeal, the defendant argued this distinction precluded the use of the conviction as the basis for enhanced punishment under section 190.2. (Trevino, at p. 239-240, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283.) In rejecting this argument, the Trevino court distinguished the statutory language of section 668 from that of section 190.2, noting that \"section 668 would permit consideration of a defendant's age in determining whether that defendant could have been imprisoned for the same conduct in California.\" (Trevino, at p. 241-242, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283.) In drawing this distinction the court pointed to the statutory language of section 668, which provides, \" 'Every person who has been convicted in any other state, government, country, or jurisdiction of an offense for which, if committed within this state, that person could have been punished under the laws of this state by imprisonment in the state prison, is punishable for any subsequent crime committed within this state in the manner prescribed by law and to the same extent as if that prior conviction had taken place in a court of this state.' \" (Trevino, at p. 241, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283, quoting \u00a7 668.) In contrast, section 190.2 stated, \" 'For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second degree.' \" (Trevino, at p. 241, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283.) We do not agree with Johnson that this distinction is relevant to the determination in this case. Unlike the defendant in Trevino , Johnson points to no personal characteristic that would have precluded a conviction in California had the murder he committed in Jamaica occurred in this state."], "id": "e56c0023-eb94-470e-96f6-650d51eb6fe6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Following the State\u2019s case-in-chief, Defendant Bassett presented Erik Nielson, with no objection from the State, as an expert witness in the field of rap music. Dr. Nielson described the history of the \u201c<mask> ballad,\u201d lyrics that are often violent and include the theme of murder, identifying this type of ballad in varied styles of music, including country music, opera, hard core punk, and folk music. He explained that rap music is a part of the hip-hop culture, but one of many different types of hip-hop expression. He then recounted the history of the hip-hop culture, which began in the South Bronx during the early to mid-seventies when gang activity in this area was prevalent. Dr. Nielson stated that \u201cthe explicit purpose of hip-hop was to take a lot of that aggression and territoriality and competitiveness inherent to gang life and to channel it into something artistic and productive.\u201d He explained that this gang history was influential in rap music \u201cbecause that\u2019s really the sort of - - that\u2019s where it all started, in some senses.\u201d"], "id": "4b14cec9-e9e3-40af-bd0a-1e50091bf6b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["United States Supreme Court case law has long distinguished between such murders and other crimes against persons, reserving the most draconian sentences for murderers alone. Consistent with the Eighth Amendment, first degree murderers can be executed; defendants convicted of even the most egregious sexual crimes cannot. ( Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641 [aggravated rape of a child]; Coker v. Georgia (1977) 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 [armed robbery, rape of an adult woman, and other felonies].) Juveniles who <mask> can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, if in fixing that sentence the sentencer has considered mitigating circumstances including \"how children are different, and how those differences counsel against\" an LWOP sentence. ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 479-480, 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455.) Juveniles who commit non-homicide crimes, by contrast, are categorically exempt from LWOP sentences. ( Graham , supra , 560 U.S. at p. 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011.) Section 3051 flouts this pattern. It makes youthful-offender parole hearings available to intentional first degree murderers after 25 years of incarceration, while categorically denying them to One Strike sex offenders."], "id": "3d940aa3-efbc-4964-91fb-82bf301236c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The prisoner was thirteen years of age on May 25,1943, when he was indicted for <mask> first degree. He was fourteen when he was permitted to plead to murder, second degree and was sentenced on a judgment of October 19, 1943, to fifty years to life by a judge of this court. The plea was accepted after several days of trial."], "id": "b815e81a-ce5f-49e3-a448-f4c13b3f0a05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Flood, reasonably, then sought further clarification, stating, \"We want to continue to talk to you. Do you want to continue to talk to us or do you want to talk to a lawyer?\" Guthrie again did not unambiguously invoke his rights, stating only, \"If you're gonna charge me, charge me. If not, let me go. Or, or call ... immigration and say I'm here illegally.\" Flood explained that Guthrie *57was under arrest and that he was being charged with <mask>. The interrogation then continued without any further statement from Guthrie about his rights."], "id": "56eb872a-aec5-465b-ae38-e7bedf7f6bc4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant was not present when the deputy relayed the juror\u2019s request for permission to separate from the rest of the jurors and walk around the corner. Defendant had the right to be present, to hear the juror\u2019s request, and to witness the experiment that was conducted. Implicit in the right to be present is the right to hear what the jury hears and to see what the jury sees (see, People v Morton, 189 AD2d 488, 494, supra; see also, People v Smith, 195 AD2d 265, supra). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Mark, J.\u2014 <mask>, 2nd Degree.) Present\u2014Denman, P. J., Balio, Lawton, Callahan and Doerr, JJ. *987the street. In reviewing a determination of the suppression court, great weight must be accorded its decision because of its ability to observe and assess the credibility of the witnesses, and its findings should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (see, People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759, 761; People v Hill, 175 AD2d 603)."], "id": "59b2de78-eaf2-4ec2-a418-a4e065d3cca5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Even assuming that the Federal or New York State Constitution imposes a duty upon counsel or the trial court to warn defendant with respect to this particular consequence of his plea, or even assuming that plea counsel misadvised defendant regarding the subsequent use of his factual admissions, defendant\u2019s motion still would fail as he has not established a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if warned by counsel that his plea allocution could be used at a subsequent trial for <mask>. Although defendant avers that had he known of the potential prosecution, he would not have pleaded guilty, the favorable sentence he received pursuant to his plea undermines the credibility of this statement. Had he gone to trial and been convicted of both attempted murder in the second degree and bribery in the second degree, defendant faced consecutive terms that could expose him to twice the sentence he was promised under the plea agreement. Thus, it is no surprise that defendant chose to plead guilty. The court therefore rejects as not credible defendant\u2019s claim that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known that his plea allocution could be used against him at a subsequent murder trial. To the contrary, defendant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the absence of this advice in plea counsel\u2019s representation."], "id": "181f4348-4a8d-4ba9-8d3c-4ec5e74c9145", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In that case, the defendant Moran pleaded not guilty to three counts of <mask>, first degree, and two psychiatrists found him competent to stand trial. At that point, he advised the Nevada trial court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and plead guilty. His reason for doing so was to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing. That is exactly what the defendant Lavalle wants to do."], "id": "6f415b75-1053-410e-9ddc-197d5ddb78df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In its brief the State makes the apparently serious suggestion, although admittedly speculative, that the only recorded visitors for the decedent, namely his father, mother or wife, may have brought him the seconal. If such were the fact, the court would dismiss the claim. There is not a scintilla of evidence, however, to substantiate such statement. Aware, moreover, that these relatives had done everything in their power to help the *365decedent and to see him cured during the many years of his troubles, and having observed the wife and father on the witness stand, the court dismisses such hypothesis, deeming it unconscionable to hold that the parents or wife may have been guilty at best of the practice of euthanasia or at the worst of <mask> for profit."], "id": "1aa5114c-5128-48c5-a114-7ee00a970bc1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court made considerable factual findings mitigating the gravity of the offense. The only finding in aggravation in the record appears to be court's comment a crime \"doesn't get much more serious than this when you have an unarmed person shot and killed.\" Yes, the charge against J.N. is <mask> and the loss of life *235is a grave and serious circumstance, but J.N. was not the killer. The statute does not exclude juveniles charged with murder from consideration for treatment in juvenile court. Yet, this appears to be what the court's thinking was. We cannot say substantial evidence supports the court's finding J.N. was not suitable for juvenile court treatment based on the gravity of the offense. Because we conclude substantial evidence does not support the court's findings in favor of unsuitability, possibility of rehabilitation and gravity of the offense, and there is no dispute the other three factors, criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and success of previous attempts to rehabilitate the minor, favored suitability, we must conclude the court abused its discretion by concluding J.N. was not suitable for treatment in the juvenile court."], "id": "a8a23390-a69b-44e2-86c8-7904796274e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*940The question is, does this section limit the Attorney-General to the prosecution of persons, corporations, etc., for practices and acts which constitute violations of the statutes against monopolies, that is, to the specifically prohibited acts embraced by sections 340 and 341 of the General Business Law, or does it include other violations of the laws of our State which violations were incidental to and part of the plan or process by which the statutes against monopolies were violated. With complete1 respect for the rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed, the conclusion is inescapable that section 347 of the General Business Law is a legislative grant of great power and authority to the Attorney-General to provide him with adequate means for enforcing the provisions of sections 340 and 341 of the General Business Law. It is urged that the Attorney-General is limited to the investigation and prosecution of violations of sections 340 and 341, all of which violations are misdemeanors. A reading of the first sentence of section 347 clearly indicates no such limitation. It states: \u201cThe Attorney-General may prosecute every person charged with the commission of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of this State, applicable to or in respect of the practices or transactions referred to in this article.\u201d (Italics mine.) Had the Legislature intended to limit the powers of the Attorney-General to the prosecution of misdemeanors it could have done so by some appropriate limitation such as \u201c The Attorney-General may prosecute every person charged with the commission of a violation of article 22 of the General Business Law.\u201d The statute as it stands must be construed to mean that the Attorney-General has the authority to prosecute for any criminal offense in violation of any law of this State, provided that such offense is applicable to or in respect of violations of article 22 of the General Business Law. That is, if the Attorney-General shall find evidence that violations of article 22 of the General Business Law were accomplished by means of the commission of other crimes, then he has authority to prosecute those whose crimes were committed as part of the means, plan or scheme by which violations of such article were effected. Any criminal act done in the furtherance of a violation of such article must be deemed subject to investigation and prosecution by the Attorney - General. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the act. To illustrate, assume that an investigation by the Attorney-General should disclose that an unlawful monoply in violation of article 22 was accomplished by means of arson, felonious assaults, extortion, forgery, bribery or even <mask>. Can it be said that the Attorney-General is precluded from investigating any or all of such felonies which were the means of creating the unlawful *941monopoly? Is he to cease investigating the moment evidence discloses a felony? Is he precluded from fully pursuing by investigation and prosecution every criminal offense which contributed to the establishment of the unlawful monopoly? \u201e When the evidence is at hand and immediately available for presentation to the grand jury, must he refuse to proceed because it involves a felony, even though such felony may have been the sole means by which the unlawful monopoly was created? Such questions indicate the absurdity of any such suggested limitation of power and authority. It must be held that the Attorney-General has absolute power and authority to investigate and prosecute any offense which is part of the means by which the illegal practices or transactions condemned by article 22 of the General Business Law were accomplished."], "id": "405902df-df46-4df6-8d28-2a43c6fe9bc4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant District Attorney of Westchester argues that the commitment of individuals pursuant to CPL 730.40 (1) is for the purpose of conducting a prompt examination and report as to the person\u2019s need for treatment and confinement and he cites Matter of Torsney (47 NY2d 667) as authority for that *950limited purpose. Matter of Torsney (supra) upholds automatic commitment to the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene of a defendant found not guilty by reason of a mental disease or defect. However, in Torsney, the defendant had been tried and although acquitted, he was found to have committed the crime of <mask>. The Supreme Court allows a difference in treatment between those acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity and those merely charged with crimes. In Jones u United States (463 US 354), the Supreme Court held that one acquitted by reason of insanity may be hospitalized for a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if convicted. Moreover, the standard of proof for determining that such a person is a danger can be a preponderance of the evidence, whereas in a civil commitment it must be by clear and convincing evidence (cf., Addington v Texas, 441 US 418; Jackson v Indiana, supra). The basis for the different treatment, however, is that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act, therefore demonstrating dangerousness. In a footnote the court stated: \"The proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee committed a criminal act distinguishes the case from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), in which the Court held that a person found incompetent to stand trial could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of the finding of incompetency. In Jackson there was never any affirmative proof that the accused had committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous.\u201d (Jones v United States, supra, at 364, n 12.)"], "id": "97fb8da2-f0f1-4ced-a240-9c566f40c664", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant challenges his attempted <mask> conviction on the basis the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the kill zone theory of liability. In appellant's view, the kill zone theory was not applicable to the facts of his case, and the trial court worded its instruction in a confusing manner that amounted to \"gibberish.\" While the instruction was inartfully worded, it was *565certainly not \"gibberish.\" We believe the kill zone theory was amply supported by the evidence, and appellant could not possibly have been prejudiced by the way the instruction was phrased. We therefore uphold his conviction for attempted murder.2"], "id": "3e4faca5-ecdf-4183-bcbf-be7ec224afe5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*952The defendant, a thirteen-year-old boy, was indicted on August 26, 1943, charged with the crime of <mask> in the first degree. Thereafter he pleaded not guilty and was assigned two defense counsel by the court. ITe proceeded to trial on November 15,1943; and on November 23,1943, after seven days of trial, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree. On December 6, 1943, he was sentenced to State Prison by Hon. J. Gordon Flannery, then a Judge of this court, for an indeterminate term of from thirty years to life."], "id": "e6a7054e-7264-45e7-8aad-fc4dfa0cb612", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["As one can only expect, Kerrick\u2019s <mask> has irrevocably upended his family\u2019s lives. One state court found, \u201c[s]ince his murder, his mother\u2019s health has deteriorated. She has been on medication and will not leave the house except for doctor appointments.\u201d State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999). Kerrick\u2019s mother suffered a nervous breakdown and repeatedly has panic attacks. Id. She has been unable to sleep at night since his murder. And Kerrick\u2019s brother suffered from mood swings after blaming himself for his brother\u2019s murder. Id. As this ordeal enters its fourth decade, we must not forget that every delay delivers a fresh denial of closure to Kerrick\u2019s family."], "id": "720f6695-d24d-48ba-82a3-a10b5a49c54e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The article in question starts on page 1 of the Sunday, November 13, 1994, edition of The Buffalo News. The title of the article is \u201cSuspect Described as City\u2019s Deadliest.\u201d The subtitle of the article is \u201cJohnson Accused of Killing Eight, Trying to Slay 25 in Reign of Terror.\u201d The article starts by describing Danyl \u201cReese\u201d Johnson as, according to \u201csome police officers,\u201d the deadliest criminal in the history of Buffalo. Johnson was accused of killing 8 people and attempting to <mask> 25 others. The article was prepared in anticipation of his upcoming trial. The article continued on page A-6 of the newspaper, where the title was \u201cPolice Classify Man as Remorseless \u2018stone killer.\u2019 \u201d The article quotes police officers as describing Johnson as a \u201cdangerous individual,\u201d while quoting Johnson\u2019s court-appointed lawyer as believing the police and prosecutors to be on a vendetta against Johnson, charging him with every unsolved crime in the City of Buffalo. The article then goes on to describe Johnson\u2019s criminal history and the various allegations contained in court documents. A sidebar article on the same page is entitled \u201cA Trail of Death.\u201d The sidebar article *566contains 18 \u201cbullet\u201d points listing the charges and accusations against Johnson. The 15th point identifies the following accusation against Johnson: \u201cOffering $100,000 for the killing of Buffalo rival, Sid Cottrell and two other people, in May 1992. The slayings never occurred.\u201d In the context of that item, plaintiff bases his lawsuit on the use of the word \u201crival.\u201d"], "id": "592ba904-84c3-4ab0-8799-cc262f8000da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["conviction when an accomplice is killed by a third party rather than by the defendant or another accomplice. [Citations.] \u201cUnder such circumstances, the defendant may nonetheless be convicted of <mask> under the provocative act doctrine. \u2018[W]hen the perpetrator of a crime maliciously commits an act that is likely to result in death, and the victim kills in reasonable response to that act, the perpetrator is guilty of murder. [Citations.] \u201cIn such a case, the killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice committed with conscious disregard for life.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254, 263\u2013264 (Lee), review granted July 15, 2020, S262459; review dism. and remanded Nov. 23, 2021 in light of People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis).) \u201cLike any other murder, a provocative act murder committed without deliberation and premeditation is murder of the second degree.\u201d (People v. Swanson (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 604, 616 (Swanson), review granted Feb. 17, 2021, S266262, review dism. and remanded Nov. 23, 2021 in light of Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.) While the felony murder rule cannot be used to impute malice when neither the defendant nor an accomplice actually committed the killing, \u201csection 189 may be used to establish the degree of the murder if malice\u2014and therefore murder\u2014is otherwise proved. [Citation.] Thus, a provocative act murder which occurs when a defendant acts with implied malice may nevertheless be first degree murder if it occurs during the course of a section 189 felony.\u201d (People v. Mejia"], "id": "3e26543b-7d14-4bd8-8746-46575c9cc95d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["We conclude that the trial court's instruction defining a \"dangerous weapon\" to include an \"inherently dangerous\" object entails the presentation of a legally (rather than factually ) invalid theory. There was no failure of proof-that is, a failure to show through evidence that the box cutter is an \"inherently dangerous\" weapon. Instead, a box cutter cannot be an inherently deadly weapon \"as a matter of law.\" ( McCoy , supra , 25 Cal.2d at p. 188, 153 P.2d 315.) This is functionally indistinguishable from the situation in which a jury is instructed that a particular felony can be a predicate for felony <mask> when, as a matter of law, it cannot be. Because this latter situation involves the presentation of a legally invalid theory ( People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 808, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886 ), so does this case."], "id": "97de1da0-3164-41f7-812f-827cea3d7693", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Daniel D. Angiolillo, J. Petitioner represents Carlos Cajigas in the pending trial of <mask> in the first degree and related charges arising out of the death of Kathleen Martyn. Within the criminal proceeding, petitioner has moved for a variety of relief relating to discovery, both within an omnibus motion and in separate motions relating to the Grand Jury presentation and the People\u2019s use of subpoenas to obtain background material relating to defendant Cajigas. This court has issued decisions addressing the requests for relief made by petitioner on behalf of Mr. Cajigas."], "id": "585b684e-9100-43bc-8c50-c63f75dd245d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The jury retired at 6:31 o \u2019clock p. m. They returned into court at 2:23 o\u2019clock on the following morning, and the following took place: \u201c The Court: Mr. Foreman, you say you want a part of the charge read? The Foreman of the Jury: The part of the charge in which you state the law about John Mancini in this case. The Court: All right, the stenographer will read that to you. [The stenographer read as follows] : \u2018 They have corroborated what Daniello said and have shown the defendant\u2019s connection with this crime by the witness Mancini. Mancini, you may remember, was the man who testified that he was a partner of Daniello some years ago in the restaurant business, and claims that he was present at one or two of the conferences at Coney Island and elsewhere, and also in the restaurant on Myrtle avenue on the day of the alleged <mask>. Mancini claims that he was in those places, that he heard some of the talk as to the planning of this shooting in Navy street, and that he *654went over to New York with Daniello at the time of the killing of Ferrazano, who is said to have been the third member of the Morello gang to be killed pursuant to this conspiracy. Although there, is no claim that Mancini had a hand in the actual killing of Ferrazano, he appears to have been outside of or near the restaurant with Daniello at the time that two other men went into the restaurant and did the actual killing. The claim of the defense is that Mancini was also an accomplice; that he was a party to this same undertaking and was just as guilty as Daniello. An accomplice, very briefly, is anyone who has a hand in the commission of a crime, where the proof shows that he himself could be indicted for the crime. In other words, the proof has to show, before a jury can find that a witness is an accomplice, that the alleged accomplice could himself have been legally and properly charged with the commission of the offense in question. I have said, as to Daniello, that there is no question about his being an accomplice, if you believe what he says, because he says he is, and that settles that point. But as to Mancini, he does not say that he was a member of the gang or had any hand at all in this killing; that he knew the others; that he went with them more or less and met them here, and that is not denied; but whether or not he was an accomplice in the eyes of the law I am going to leave to you as a question of fact. It will be determined, as I have already indicated to you, by your decision as to whether or not you find on the proof in this case that he (Mancini) could himself have been properly and legally prosecuted for this particular crime. If he could have been, he is an accomplice; if he could not have been, he is not an accomplice. If he is not an accomplice, and you believe what he says, then you might \u2014 I do not say you would \u2014 find in his testimony corroboration of what *655Daniello said, at least as to some part, tending to connect the defendant with the commission of this crime. \u2019 The Court: Gentlemen, if that is not all you want, please let me know now. I shall be here all night, and if there is anything you want at any time, if you will let me know, you may come in and have it. [At 2:28 a. m. the jury again retired. At 3:08 o\u2019clock a. m. the jury again returned into court.] The Court: Gentlemen, after you retired, I had my attention called to the fact that the stenographer when he began to read to you began in the middle of a sentence; and in order that there may be no possibility of any misapprehension about it I have asked you to come back. I think it is clear to you what was meant, but he started off as though I had stated it as a fact that there was a corroboration. Of course, you know that I did not state that as a fact. I said that it is for you to say whether there is. I said that the prosecution claims that there was corroboration in the opening part of the sentence which the stenographer omitted to read to \"you, and which just preceded the point at which he began. I think it was plain, anyhow, but in the abundance of caution I asked you to come back that I might say that to you. In listening to the stenographer read what I sai'd about accomplices I am afraid that perhaps my definition of accomplice might be misunderstood by laymen. What I am going to say to you about it now is exactly the same in legal meaning as what I did say to you. I said that an accomplice is one who could properly and legally be indicted for the offense in question. That is correct, because no one could properly and legally be indicted unless the proof was sufficient to convict him. You might not know that, however, and I am just going to say that what that meant is that an accomplice is one who could be convicted of the offense charged, and that is equiva*656lent to saying that he could he lawfully indicted, because you cannot find a lawful indictment unless there is sufficient proof to convict. Not being lawyers, however, you might not know that. I am not making any change at all in the legal effect of the charge, but am just explaining to you what perhaps I should have explained in the first instance. I think you will get that clearly. An accomplice is one who himself, on the proof in the case, would be guilty of the offense charged. If he would not be guilty on the proof in the case of the offense charged he is not an accomplice. I hope that is plain.\u201d"], "id": "68bce0d6-447c-4b91-92b7-8685139c3c72", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*15The defendant was indicted for the <mask> of Willie Turks, a transit worker, who was beaten to death on June 22, 1982. The incident giving rise to the death of Turks allegedly arose when Turks, Dixon, and another person were confronted by a group of people who expressed a desire to have them leave the neighborhood where the events transpired. Dixon is listed as a complainant in the fourth count of the indictment, charging assault in the first degree, and the seventh count of the indictment, charging discrimination under the Civil Rights Law."], "id": "7bdae317-f30f-4f32-9439-44c39605b4c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["A homicide which occurred during the course of a robbery constitutes the crime of felony <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 1044, subd. 2), and all who participate in the underlying felony are equally guilty of murder. Evidence of the commission of the underlying felony supplied the malice and felonious intent necessary to sustain the charge of murder (People v. Ertel, 283 N. Y. 519)."], "id": "db40e855-800e-481e-9bea-a680df310d45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On July 27, 2017, one day after the bond hearing, Cardenas was indicted in Cause Number 17-07-30100-D for the offense of capital <mask>, alleged to have been committed against Mussett on or about June 12, 2017 in Victoria County, Texas. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7 19.03(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). That same day, Cardenas was indicted in Cause Number 17-07-30101-D for the offense of aggravated sexual assault and in Cause Number 17-07-30102-D for the offense of burglary with intent to commit a felony, both alleged to have been committed against Mussett on or about June 12, 2017 in Victoria County, Texas. See id . \u00a7\u00a7 22.021, 30.02(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.)."], "id": "ba59d928-2082-4417-af2e-e0a93200a959", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> rule or natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing . . . . However, in this matter, [appellant] was not convicted under either of these two theories, but instead was convicted under the provocative act doctrine. . . . The Court of Appeal specifically distinguished provocative act murder doctrine from the felony murder rule. . . . Moreover, provocative act murder requires proof of malice, which distinguishes it from natural and probable cause murder. [\u00b6] [Appellant], therefore, is not entitled to resentencing under Section 1170.95.\u201d Appellant timely appealed."], "id": "fa7094fd-ce9c-4e84-81bd-d4cc4c9d1a45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["I fail to perceive any reason why the same opportunity should not exist when they are being detained as material witnesses, particularly in a case where a defendant is charged with the crime of <mask> in the first degree and is represented by assigned counsel, *172who are desirous of ascertaining the truth and are making the application in good faith."], "id": "20a4e8e9-914f-4597-9103-9832ad86d64c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["We have recently had occasion to examine this provision of law, in the case of Pierson v. The People (18 Hun, 239). In that case, the language of this section of the Code was invoked to prevent the disclosure by a physician of the symptoms exhibited by a deceased person, on the trial of an indictment against Pierson for the <mask> of the deceased by poisoning. We held, in that case, that the object and intent of the provision of the Code, was the protection of the patient and his representatives against the disclosure of information obtained by a physician in the course of his employment as such, and that it did not prohibit the disclosure of such information when the rejection of the testimony was sought to shield a person charged with the murder of, the patient, in a criminal proceeding against the latter for the alleged crime, and that such a case was clearly not within the intent of the statute, and was, therefore, not embraced by it."], "id": "d59f763f-37d6-4502-89c1-909ed8150c51", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["This court's current classification of theft of property goes back nearly four decades to Gustafson v. State , 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979). There, the court acknowledged that elements of Arkansas Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 are concerned with the distinction between crimes that involve dishonesty per se (e.g., \"forgery, perjury, bribery, false pretense and embezzlement\") and crimes that do not involve dishonesty per se (e.g., \"<mask>, manslaughter or assault\"). Id. at 288-89, 590 S.W.2d at 859. So far, so good. Without analysis, however, the court then reached the abrupt conclusion that \"theft, as it is defined in the Arkansas Criminal Code, involves dishonesty.\" Id."], "id": "45b75a1f-d31f-41d8-a456-80a64dcebbf3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-101(c)(1) provides that capital <mask> is punishable by death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-102(c) provides that first-degree murder is a Class Y felony. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-401(a)(1) provides that a conviction for a Class Y felony is punishable by a sentence of \"not less than ten (10) years and not more than forty (40) years, or life[.]\""], "id": "1ab48ba5-6d54-4171-9169-392d59411d48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["probable consequences doctrine, (2) the petitioner was convicted of attempted <mask> after he or she accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder, and (3) the petitioner could not presently be convicted of attempted murder because of changes to sections 188 or 189 made by Senate Bill No. 1437. As amended, section 1170.95, subdivision (b)(3) states that \u201c[u]pon receiving a petition in which the information required by this subdivision is set forth or a petition where any missing information can readily be ascertained by the court, if the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner.\u201d Here, McDonald\u2019s case is not yet final, and the amendments made to section 1170.95 by Senate Bill No. 775 became effective starting on January 1, 2022. Thus, we agree with McDonald that Senate Bill No. 775 and the amended version of section 1170.95 apply to his case. (People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1006 (Montes).) Applying the amended version of section 1170.95 to McDonald\u2019s case, we conclude that because convictions for attempted murder are now eligible under section 1170.95 and McDonald checked all the necessary boxes on his standardized form petition, he is entitled to counsel. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; \u00a7 1170.95, subd. (b)(3).) B. McDonald Has Filed a Facially Sufficient Petition McDonald argues that we must reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying his section 1170.95 petition because he has filed a facially sufficient petition. He claims that it is reasonably probable that had he been afforded the assistance of counsel, his petition would not have been summarily denied. The Attorney General concedes that"], "id": "5b3b4e0e-c5f2-4a38-9eca-910cb7e7b0c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant is charged in an indictment with attempted *1094<mask> in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110, 125.27 [1]), attempted aggravated assault upon a police officer (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110, 120.11), and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 265.03, 265.02). He now moves pursuant to CPL 210.20 and 210.25 for a dismissal or reduction of the attempted first degree murder count to attempted murder in the second degree on the ground that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish that the defendant was at least 19 years old at the time of the crime. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss is denied."], "id": "81350f6c-cda8-4ee1-9e3a-2cdb6ca71777", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*193(See Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 922, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 202, 209 P.3d 105 [a rational trier of fact could have found that the shooting of the victim was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of gang assault].) A jury could also reasonably infer that Lanford and Pettie, by participating in the assault on Delgadillo, encouraged Garcia to fire gunshots with the intent to facilitate his commission of attempted <mask>."], "id": "c7982103-9893-4e88-bff0-7f58f66261ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Detectives gave Rivera his Miranda warnings. Rivera stated he was aware of his rights in light of prior contacts with law enforcement. He wanted to clear up the matter and admitted being in the area of the February 28 shooting. He told the detectives that \u201cFace\u201d had done it, and he was with \u201cDemon\u201d at the time. Rivera claimed that \u201cDemon\u201d looked like him, and Demon was the one who shot Morales. Rivera recognized Morales from his photograph at the memorial. The detectives told Rivera one of the three <mask> victims was \u201cScooby,\u201d who was murdered about a week after the Morales shooting in an alley off Second Avenue. Rivera denied any knowledge of the shooting. Rivera professed it would have been"], "id": "0f2c99e1-dd47-4fe1-9a14-af94ce7ffbba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["1. The motion to inspect the Grand Jury minutes is denied. (People v. Bergerson, 17 N Y 2d 398; People v. Howell, 3 N Y 2d 672. 2. The motion to direct the People to furnish defendants with a list of witnesses they intend to call is denied in the court\u2019s discretion, as beyond the scope of permissible pretrial discovery. (People v. Spina, 14 A D 2d 505.) 3. The motion to direct the People to furnish a bill of particulars is denied, as seeking matter evidentiary in nature which is not within the scope of permissible pretrial discovery. (People v. Spina, 14 A D 2d 505, supra.) *10484. The motion to furnish defendants with all the prints seized so that the defendants\u2019 experts may examine them for the purpose of testifying at the trial is granted in part and denied in part. The court directs that the District Attorney permit the defendants\u2019 experts to examine the films under the supervision of the District Attorney\u2019s office at a mutually agreeable time. This will permit the defendants to adequately prepare for trial while at the same time insuring that the films will remain in the custody of the District Attorney\u2019s office. 5. Finally, the defendants seek to dismiss the indictments on the grounds of adverse pretrial publicity or in the alternative granting a change of venue to New York County. In support of this motion the defendants attach copies of newspaper articles which appeared in the local papers. Defendants rely on the United States Supreme Court decision in Shepard v. Maxwell (384 U. S. 333). That case involved what has been described as the carnival atmosphere surrounding the celebrated trial of the noted osteopath Samuel Shepard for <mask>. It is concerned more with what went on during the trial, both in and out :of the courtroom, than with the pretrial publicity. The fact situation in Shepard is clearly distinguishable from our fact situation here. Freedom of the press to report the news and to editorialize on the news is protected by the same First Amendment to the United States Constitution that defendants seek to justify in showing of these films. The press in Westchester County has been conscious of and has discharged its obligations to both the citizenry and defendants at the bar in a responsible manner exercising their right to freedom of the press while at the same time recognizing defendants\u2019 right to a fair trial."], "id": "7532f50c-4ee8-4c18-afa5-f2c37dbc02f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": [". In People v Koerber (244 NY 147), the trial court refused to charge the jury as to the different degrees of homicide and as to the effect voluntary intoxication had on the issue of whether defendant had the intent to commit the underlying felony (robbery). The Court of Appeals reasoned that if the defendant was intoxicated and was unable to form the intent to rob (the underlying felony), a jury could convict of felony <mask> or acquit. Therefore, the ruling of the trial court was held to be error. It held that voluntary intoxication should have been charged so that if the jury found that defendant\u2019s intoxicated condition negatived the intent to rob, the jury having been charged as to the lesser degrees of homicide, would have had the alternative to find defendant guilty of any one of those lesser degrees. Under former law, there existed felony murder and misdemeanor murder. Under present law, this distinction no longer exists. Under present law, as felony murder has no lesser included offenses and a conviction of felony murder will be upheld even though there is an acquittal of the underlying felony, People v Koerber (supra) is no longer the law."], "id": "9095635d-b6f6-4006-ab7d-810e6e53fa69", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The courts have also frequently affirmed the power to take, preserve and make reasonable use of data for the identification of persons accused of crime. In People v. Van Wormer (175 N. Y. 188, 195), the court said: \u201cAfter the arrest of the defendants their shoes were taken from them and placed in the footmarks leading to the house of the deceased made in the newly fallen snow on the night of the <mask> by the parties who went to the kitchen door. The shoes corresponded in all respects with the footprints, and the evidence of this fact, against objection and exception of the appellants, was admitted. It is contended that the seizure of the shoes and their comparison with the footprints compelled the defendants to' be witnesses against themselves and violated their constitutional safeguard. This claim is entirely disposed of by the decision of this court in People v. Gardner (144 N. Y. 119).\u201d The same rule, permitting the introduction of evidence concerning footprints which the'defendant had been required to make or which had been made from the shoes taken from him for the purpose of comparison, was applied in Thornton v. State (93 N. W. Rep. [Wis.] 1107), State v. Nordstrom (7 Wash. 506, 35 Pac. Rep. 382), Morris v. State (124 Ala. 44), State v. Fuller (34 Mont. 12, 35 Pac. Rep. 369), Myers v. State (97 Ga. 76), Magee v. State (92 Miss. 865), State v. Graham (74 N. C. 646), Bouldin. v. State (8 Tex. 334), Hahn v. State (73 Tex. 409, and cases cited), Commonwealth v. Pope (103 Mass. 440), and Carlton v. People (150 Ill. 181). In State v. Graham (supra), on a trial for murder, where evidence as to the correspondence in size of footprints found at the scene of the murder and footprints which the examining magistrate had compelled the defendant to make was held admissible, the court said: \u201c Po fears or hopes of the prisoner could produce resemblance of his track to that found in the corn field.\u201d"], "id": "2be48054-7361-4711-99ee-6c58f9c4d2d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Both defendants were arraigned on the assault indictment on October 11, 1995. At that point, the court adjourned the case until October 13, 1995 for bail applications and to give the District Attorney an opportunity to consider whether he would be \"undertaking an investigation to determine\u201d if the defendants would be charged with <mask> in the first degree (Judiciary Law \u00a7 35-b). This court then contacted the Capital Defender\u2019s Office and advised Mr. Dunn of the above factors and requested that a representative of his office be present on the October 13 adjourned date."], "id": "1f4af2a3-8bfe-4c06-aa5a-0d8abba847e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Second, the decision of the Court of Appeals in People v Cahill (2 NY3d 14 [2003]) does not change my view of the relevant paradigm of CPL article 470. In Cahill, the Court of Appeals, inter alla, reviewed two capital <mask> counts and concluded that the weight of the evidence did not support the aggravating or \u201cplus\u201d factors required to elevate murder in the second degree to murder in the first degree (id.; compare Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 [1] with \u00a7 125.27 [1]), and it thus reduced the conviction of two counts of capital murder to one count of murder in the second degree (Cahill, 2 NY3d at 72). The circumstances of that case, however, were unusual inasmuch as there the Court, in relevant part, considered evidence relative to circumstances in which a \u201ctypical\u201d intentional murder under Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 (1) punishable by a significant indeterminate sentence leaving open the possibility of parole (see \u00a7 70.00 [3] [a] [i]) may be elevated to an \u201catypical\u201d intentional murder under section 125.27 (1) punishable by, inter alla, death or life imprisonment without parole (\u00a7 60.06). Indeed, in my view, Cahill\u2019s result is borne of its peculiarity, and the Court\u2019s determination that the defendant there committed intentional murder but that the jury was not justified in concluding that he was eligible for the enhanced sentencing (id. at 37-38) does not lead me to believe that we may here reduce a conviction that is against the weight of the evidence to one of a lesser included offense."], "id": "4b7f18dd-0bcb-448f-9aa1-4b3451c3b20b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["And finally, it is obvious on the rather unique facts of this record, that Linville's <mask> prosecution did not in any real sense \"harass\" her, as might have been the case, for example, had she reasonably expected that the initial charges pressed against her would be the last. To put it bluntly, Linville knowingly tried to \"get off on a technicality.\" She pled guilty to a far less serious charge, lied about her involvement to the probation department before sentencing on that charge, and then immediately turned around and began bragging openly that she had been involved in the killings but could not be recharged and had \"got[ten] away with murder.\""], "id": "4732e50e-c7e6-4e9f-8f56-92cbba24ce48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*5903d. That he was duly charged, examined arid tried for the <mask> of Richard Bowden before a court legally constituted, and upon this trial and examination was duly and legally acquitted of the said murder and felony with which he stood charged, and was adjudged by the court not guilty thereof: To each of which pleas, the attorney for the commonwealth demurred generally, and the prisoner filed a joinder thereto, and the matters of law arising thereupon having been duly considered, the court doth decide :"], "id": "d1e7c479-22fe-43d5-829f-6d7de4af2a70", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 541A, which defines the crime of second degree felony <mask> when the defendant committed the fatal act. Frandsen challenges the inclusion of the following sentence in that instruction: \"The crime of kidnapping for extortion continues until a defendant has reached a place of temporary safety.\" Frandsen contends this sentence misstates the law because kidnapping for extortion is complete when a person seizes a victim with the intent to extort. Not so."], "id": "2dac8929-83ac-416b-bda7-78e0fbdd5956", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["1990), superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1995). Under Georgia law, a person commits aggravated assault when he (1) commits a simple assault, and (2) there is an aggravat- ing factor present (such as the intent to <mask>, rape, or rob; or the use of a deadly weapon). O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-21(a); see Smith v. Hardrick, 464 S.E.2d 198, 200 (Ga. 1995). A person commits simple assault under Georgia law when he either \u201c[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another\u201d or \u201c[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiv- ing a violent injury.\u201d O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-20(a). A criminal offense with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a \u201cviolent felony\u201d under ACCA\u2019s elements clause. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021). After Borden, we reinstated our opinion in United States v. Moss, 920 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2019), which had been vacated after a grant of rehearing en banc. United States v. Moss, 4 F.4th 1292, 1292 (11th Cir. 2021). In Moss, we held that a conviction for Georgia aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-21(a)(2) was a crime of recklessness where it was based on the \u201cplaces another in reasonable apprehension\u201d variety of simple assault. Moss, 920 F.3d at 759. Because a felony \u201cmust be predicated on the intentional use of physical force\u201d to qualify as a violent felony under ACCA\u2019s elements clause, we con- cluded that Georgia aggravated assault is not categorically a violent felony. Id. (citing United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010)). USCA11 Case: 21-10514 Date Filed: 01/27/2022 Page: 8 of 10"], "id": "82e0d060-be35-4a5d-bc16-ffa57b8f8ee0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["However, the \"mere fact that an invalid conviction was obtained does not immunize the facts underlying this conviction from consideration by the sentencing judge\u201d (United States v Atkins, 480d 1223, 1224). In that case, since the court was aware that the defendant\u2019s <mask> conviction had been reversed, he was entitled to consider the facts underlying the conviction and accord them whatever weight they deserved."], "id": "a0218d7f-e3eb-46d2-b7d2-22ddfdacc564", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Additionally, there is no requirement that the multiple offenses or transactions that comprise a criminal episode occur on the same day. In Guidry v. State , the court indicated that \"[h]ad the Legislature wanted us to consider a time differential in the application of [ \u00a7 3.01 ], it could have easily done so.\" 909 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, pet. ref'd). See also Crunk v. State , No. 13-07-00712-CR, 2009 WL 2973474, at *7-9 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi, Sept. 17, 2009, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.)(not designated for publication)(holding that a defendant's <mask> offense and his tampering with the evidence offense that occurred the next day were committed pursuant to the same transaction); Hernandez v. State , 938 S.W.2d 503, 508-09 (Tex.App.--Waco 1997, pet. ref'd) (finding that an April 16 cocaine sale and a September 22 marihuana sale were merely repetitious commissions of the same offense)."], "id": "207ed809-e9bc-4ffb-9257-5f2cd6fab9ed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["4. For example, under this statutory language, an adult court could accept a plea to reckless homicide, R.C. 2903.041, on a transferred felony-<mask> charge, R.C. 2903.02(B). Reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of felony murder, State v. Owens, 162 Ohio St.3d 596, 2020-Ohio-4616, 166 N.E.3d 1142, \u00b6 1, and thus, it is an offense different from felony murder."], "id": "6bb4b84f-d410-4d4c-bf82-02b4e1a27b45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Such is the case here. Because Oates' underlying felony for felony <mask> did not involve the use of force, he was not prosecuted for his use of force. Rather, he was prosecuted for committing a felony (attempting to distribute a controlled substance) that resulted in the death of the victims. Consistent with the statutory definition of felony murder, Oates was not prosecuted for felony murder because it was his use of force that caused the victims' deaths; he was prosecuted for felony murder because he committed a drug felony that resulted in their deaths."], "id": "ff651178-c62a-41af-95ba-1c4e034006db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["reversible error by admitting two sets of incriminating statements she gave to police, the first at the hospital and the second at the police station after she was advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Without the admission of these statements, defendant contends she would not have been convicted of two counts of second degree <mask>. With the exception of remand to resentence defendant on one count under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), we will affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On November 2, 2017, defendant finished her shift at Red Robin in Redding at around 9:15 p.m. Defendant was upset that evening and told her manager it had something to do with her boyfriend. Defendant said she needed to get drunk. Her manager told her to be safe and defendant said she always was, she had a designated driver. Defendant texted a friend that she was on her way to get drunk at home. Defendant\u2019s coworker that night, Brandon Sergeeff, observed that defendant was sad and complaining about taking care of her sister, spending all of her savings, and having an argument with her father earlier. After his shift, Sergeeff went to a local bar in Redding, Shameless O\u2019Leery\u2019s. Sergeeff messaged defendant about meeting up with him at the bar. Defendant joined Sergeeff and a friend at the bar. She said she had had three beers in the car before coming in. Defendant had a beer at the bar. Sergeeff left Shameless O\u2019Leery\u2019s and went to the Rusty Nail. Defendant came into the Rusty Nail later but Sergeeff did not see her drink anything there. Defendant messaged another coworker, John Fadden, about meeting up at Shameless O\u2019Leery\u2019s. Defendant said she had had a bad day and needed to get hammered. Fadden recalled defendant had at least one beer at Shameless O\u2019Leery\u2019s and a shot of tequila. They left in separate cars and went to the Rusty Nail. They had a beer there and were leaving in separate cars with plans to go back to defendant\u2019s house. Fadden asked defendant if she was okay to drive and she said she was. Fadden asked if"], "id": "09897436-51af-421c-b054-5aefd5f3eba8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*298There seems to have been some confusion in this case (O\u2019Hara) concerning his arraignment. It might appear as though he had been arraigned twice, once by the coroner and once by Judge Fay. In view of my finding that Meyer is without retroactive effect, it is unnecessary to determine whether there were two arraignments. However, from the proof before me I would be inclined to hold that there was only one arraignment, i.e., the one before Judge Fay. Under the former sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u00a7\u25a0\u00a7 773 through 790), when appropriate, the coroner was required to conduct a formal hearing. The .testimony of the witnesses must be reduced to writing and filed in the County Clerk\u2019s office (\u00a7 778). If the defendant has been arrested before the inquisition is filed, the coroner must deliver it together with all testimony to the Magistrate before whom defendant is brought (\u00a7 779). The Magistrate, or the Coroner, must proceed to examine the charge (\u00a7 783). Apparently no formal inquest was held by the coroner, no sworn testimony was taken. All the coroner did was to say to the defendant \u2018 \u2018 I am charging you with <mask> and holding you for the Grand Jury.\u201d This did not comply with the sections of the code quoted and rise to the dignity of a hearing or inquest. Since the defendant was in custody when the coroner arrived, section 779 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, required that he turn over jurisdiction to a Magistrate. Although for very limited purposes a coroner was cloaked with some of the powers of a Magistrate, the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically lists those officers who are Magistrates, and a coroner is not included (Code Crim. Pro., \u00a7 147)."], "id": "c5528a98-b024-4d7e-a13a-64ac382c5e76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On appeal, both parties agree that Bailey is entitled to jail-time credit against his <mask> sentence for the 123 days from the date of his arrest on this charge to the date he was released on bond. They disagree, however, as to whether Bailey is entitled to credit for the 736 days he spent in detention after his bond was revoked."], "id": "be5bc68e-d79e-43fa-8095-6b9108116aba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In Carr, the juvenile defendant was found guilty of three counts of capital <mask>, but he was sentenced to three concurrent sentences of LWOP 50 after the State chose not to seek the death penalty. Id. at *39058. \"Like Miller, the mandatory statutory sentencing scheme in place at the time of Mr. Carr's conviction denied the sentencer the opportunity to consider the attendant characteristics of Mr. Carr's youth before imposing the severe punishment of a life sentence without the possibility of parole for 50 years.\" Id. at 61. The Court found that \"[b]ecause Mr. Carr's sentence was imposed without any consideration of his youth, his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment[,]\" and he \"must be resentenced.\" Id. at 63."], "id": "4487cff7-efdf-4501-bc72-74efbfc79859", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On December 6, 1983, the defendant was arrested by Illinois authorities in Chicago on drug charges and for possession of a weapon, whereupon a request was made by the Richmond County District Attorney\u2019s office for the defendant\u2019s extradition. Such request was forwarded to the Governor of Illinois on or about February 7, 1984, but apparently, before it could be acted upon, the defendant pleaded guilty to the Illinois charges and on April 10, 1984 was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 3 to 6 years. As a result of the foregoing, the District Attorney was informed shortly after the date of sentencing that their request for extradition would *380not be honored, and they were advised to proceed by way of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (CPL 580.20). In the meantime, the defendant was indicted in Richmond County, inter alia, for attempted <mask> in the second degree and bail jumping in the first degree on January 27, 1984, under indictment No. 28/1984, and April 17, 1984 under indictment No. 110/1984, respectively, so that the total number of outstanding indictments pending against the defendant in Richmond County had risen to three."], "id": "240150d5-1a8e-474c-bc4b-7505a1154ee8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The Attorney General maintains that defendant received notice comparable to the shooter in Houston . The Attorney General points out that during a discussion whether the court should give the jury an unanimity instruction, the prosecutor mentioned, \"We haven't discussed voluntary manslaughter, but let's say with the two attempted murder[s], they can find him guilty of attempted <mask> with premeditation or guilty of regular attempted murder, *839and they can disagree on for which victim it was premeditated attempted murder and which one was just normal attempted murder. So I can see in that situation where that instruction [on unanimity] would apply.\" In the Attorney General's view, in essence, the prosecution can ignore its responsibility to plead premeditated attempted first degree murder as required by section 664, and a defendant forfeits his or her right to challenge the deficiency as long as the prosecutor at some point during trial mentions or alludes to the two types of attempted murder. Such a rule would eviscerate section 664, do violence to the meaning and rationale of Houston , and undermine any fair-minded understanding of notice and due process."], "id": "ad85eb8a-e225-4a47-b41d-0749a322a8e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Dominic R. Massaro, J. Huwe Burton is accused of matricide. His mother died as a result of separate stab wounds to her neck. On two occasions in as many days, young Burton was interviewed by the police. As he was preparing to leave the police station on the second *682occasion of interview, defendant stated, \"I want to tell you the truth, really what happened.\u201d He thereupon confessed to the <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 125.25)."], "id": "b7e23b8e-79cf-4adb-9751-1c725a3f199a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Pettie persuasively argues that this evidence, viewed in isolation, was not strong evidence of his guilt. As set forth above in section II.B, however, the prosecution also presented sufficient evidence to show Pettie was an active participant in the Norte\u00f1o criminal street gang together with Garcia and Lanford. Furthermore, Deputy Mull opined that when a gang member is summoned by fellow gang members to administer a \"beat down\" on some victim, the summoned member is expected to assist in the assault, even to the point of committing <mask>. Deputy Mull also opined that if that gang member failed to support or assist in the assault, the member would probably have the same punishment visited upon himself. Based on this testimony, a jury could reasonably infer that Pettie was not merely present, but that he aided and abetted the assault, attempted murder, and witness dissuasion. We conclude substantial evidence supported his convictions on the offenses and allegations charged in Counts 1 through 5.11"], "id": "7abf97be-c3fe-4494-969b-293a6bf30a9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Under the guise of \u201cheightened due process,\u201d defendant argues that he has a constitutional right to waive a jury trial. Defendant also claims that the prohibition against a nonjury trial violates his rights of equal protection and due process by depriving him of a tactical option available to noncapital defendants. Defendant emphasizes that \u201ca judge * * * may be better suited to analyze the evidence without [being] sway[ed] by pretrial publicity.\u201d This case, like any <mask> trial, has received some media attention."], "id": "fb98c961-960e-478a-b981-0a5121f30fcb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["And the said Samuel Myers\u2019 farther saith that the said Richard Bowden named in the indictment, and the Richard Bowden named in the record, are one and the same, and not diEerent persons ; that he the said Samuel Myers named in the indictment, and the said Samuel Myers named in the said record, and acquitted as aforesaid by the said corporation court of the <mask> aforesaid, are one and the same person and not diEerent persons, and that the murder charged upon him the said Samuel Myers before the said corporation court, *548and the murder charged upon him' the said Samuel Myers in the indictment aforesaid, are on\u00e9 and the sanae, and not different acts, and this he is ready to verify; wherefore since he the said Samuel Myers hath already been heretofore acquitted of the murde'r of the said Richard Bowden aforesaid, he prays the judgment of the court here, if he the said Samuel Myers should be again charged with the same murder of which he hath once already at another time been acquitted.\u201d"], "id": "f30e2c55-80ba-49f2-aebb-540d6f4fabef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The affidavit of the chief counsel for the committee states that on November 14, 1957 \u201cabout sixty-five individuals from many parts of the State of New York as well as from points as far distant as Florida, California, Texas, and Cuba met at the home of Joseph Barbara in Apalaehin. Members of the New York State Police, accompanied by certain Federal officials, were noticed observing the Barbara residence. Thereupon the sixty-five individuals, referred to above, promptly attempted to leave the premises in their automobiles. Many attempted to hide in the surrounding woods but were flushed out by members of the New York State Police. The police accosted each group as it was departing and learned the identity of the assembled individuals. An unusual number are known in police circles as leaders of organized rackets including the distribution of narcotics. Many of the sixty-five have records of conflict with the law, including convictions for dealing in narcotics, for extortion, and for bootlegging (during prohibition days) and arrests for almost every serious crime including <mask>. The identity of these individuals, particularly those described as the leaders, and the great distances they had traveled to meet at Apalaehin, obviously not a casual meeting, has caused many law enforcement officials to conclude that this meeting was a * convention \u2019 of the infamous Mafia, a criminal syndicate operating throughout the United States, Cuba and the world. Among those present were Joseph Profaci of Brooklyn, New York, described in the Third Interim Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (Kefauver Committee) as \u2018 one of the top leaders of the Mafia \\ Another was Vito Genovese of Highlands, New Jersey, believed by police experts to be another of the top leaders of the Mafia, and was known to have been a close associate of the notorious Albert Anastasia, recently murdered in New York City in \u2018 gang-land \u2019 style. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "eeba12bf-60aa-4f9c-90ef-a7fd2fc47244", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*424There is no doubt defendant caused the victim's death. But his mental state at the relevant time was not clear-cut at all. The jury could easily have inferred that he killed her in the heat of passion, rather than in a calculating way, particularly given his heavy drug usage that week, the evidence he was with her in the van, apparently peaceably for some time, and the lack of an apparent plan-at least a thought out plan-to kill her, among other facts. By so heavily resting the case for murder-and first degree <mask> to boot-on defendant's 1991 actions, the prosecutor greatly increased the likelihood the jury would also improperly rest its determination thereon. (See Hendrix , supra , 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 249-250, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 [a prosecutor's emphasis or minimization of uncharged act evidence at argument is relevant when considering whether introduction of the evidence was prejudicial].)"], "id": "3abae1c9-2b82-4687-8097-34ac6d75aed5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["After relating the complete story to his mother, which was consistent with the tape-recorded version of the juvenile\u2019s confession, and after attempting to persuade his *393brother Michael to confess to his involvement in the <mask> \u2014 which he never did, although Michael admitted being implicated in the theft of the minibike \u2014 Paul Quartararo then recanted his statements. He subsequently denied being involved in the murder, and said that he had \u201cmade up the story because he thought you guys would let me go [sic]!\u201d"], "id": "ee2e84f5-3e31-4f26-8cf2-17b32a7133a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Third, to the extent defendant contends there is no rational basis for treating joyriding convictions more harshly than automobile theft convictions, this contention is not persuasive. There are sound reasons to treat the temporary deprivation of a vehicle differently than the theft of that same vehicle. (People v. Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 240, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 197, 47 P.3d 1064 [exclusion significant to show the voters' intent].) In general, the Vehicle Code is concerned with assuring public safety on California thoroughfares, whereas the Penal Code is concerned with wrongs to individual people. For example, *474Vehicle Code section 10850 provides that the provisions of chapter 4, which includes Section 10851, \"apply to vehicles upon the highways and elsewhere throughout the State.\" In turn, Vehicle Code section 360 defines a highway as a \"way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the *1114public for purposes of vehicular travel.\" By punishing taking or driving a vehicle without the intent to deprive the owner of permanent title or possession, Section 10851 addresses dangers to the public. Such dangers are not encompassed by standard theft statutes, which focus on particular victims-the owners of stolen personal property. Undoubtedly, the unexpected loss of a vehicle directly affects the safety and welfare of individual vehicle operators and owners, but it also places the public at risk if, for example, the car is driven recklessly or used to commit another crime. Just as a vehicle can be a dangerous weapon, joyriding can jeopardize public safety. (See People v. Linares (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1196, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 [attempted <mask> by auto]; Veh.Code, \u00a7 13351.5 [requiring lifetime revocation of driver's license upon conviction of assault with a deadly weapon by means of a vehicle].)"], "id": "eaea868c-3813-46e0-aeb8-ed9cc2dfd23e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Two felonies arose out of the prisoner\u2019s acts \u2022 \u2014 \u2022 neither being dependent on or an ingredient of the other ; and for either or both he might have been indicted. But an indictment embracing both felonies would have been bad. If a person unintentionally kills another, while committing a minor felony which is not an ingredient of the killing, the tivo felonies being so distinct that they cannot be included in the same indictment, they are not merged, *494and the accused may be convicted of <mask> under the third subdivision of section five."], "id": "a2a1756e-744f-455c-959a-ca8c9ec32a8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defense, at trial, focused on Appellant's mental capacity. She argued she could not form the intent required to be found guilty of first-degree <mask>. The defense called two psychiatrists and Victim's Wife. Victim's Wife testified Appellant had a good friendship with Victim, but this changed because Appellant believed Victim was treating her poorly. Victim's Wife explained this belief continued even though she told Appellant she was not being abused. Victim's Wife testified that she, Appellant, and Victim attended counseling sessions to help Appellant overcome these issues."], "id": "08fb65fc-68bb-4148-a203-6c1979330789", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Rob Bonta, Attorney General and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ______________________________ Pursuant to order by the California Supreme Court, we vacate our original opinion and issue this opinion instead. In 2003, defendant and appellant Carlos M. Amador pleaded guilty to four counts of second degree <mask> (Pen. Code, \u00a7 187)1 and was sentenced to four concurrent terms of 15 years to life in state prison. On April 22, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that defendant had not stated a prima facie case for relief. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. He argued that because he established a prima facie case that he is potentially eligible for resentencing relief, the trial court should have issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing. On January 29, 2021, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s order, finding that defendant was a major participant in the crimes and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Amador (Jan. 29, 2021, B305288) [nonpub. opn.].) Defendant filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, and on November 17, 2021, the Supreme Court granted his petition, and \u201ctransferred [the case back] to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, with directions to vacate its decision and to reconsider the cause in light of People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971\u2013972.\u201d On December 1, 2021, the People filed a supplemental letter brief, conceding that \u201c[a]lthough the evidence does not appear to support [defendant\u2019s contention] that he could not be"], "id": "ee87bb37-ec9a-4dc2-84ad-9f1954eb3dea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, although there is no dispute that the evidence was sufficient to support the <mask> conviction, it was not \"overwhelming,\" as the People would have it. A finding of implied malice \"depends upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.\" (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296-297, 300-301, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279.) In this case, although the evidence that defendant actually appreciated the risk involved was substantial, it was also largely circumstantial and in significant part rested on inference of defendant's pre-collision state of mind from post-collision behavior. The jury reasonably could have found defendant did not act with implied malice, even if he appreciated the gravity of his actions immediately after the collision, and even though he should have known better from his past experience."], "id": "1c190d86-be63-4a88-8e8e-a3da99297d2f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Mobile telephone records showed that Aleman's device was activated near Placita Olivera at 12:24 a.m. on December 12, 2008, around the same time as Cabral's device. The two communicated numerous times between 3:18 and 3:45 a.m., using cell phone towers near the Bentley crash site. Cabral cooperated with police because he wanted to avoid being charged with Macias's <mask> or spend the rest of his life in prison."], "id": "7431c139-a5ba-4dc7-a41a-3c5bbb5a27ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["As we noted, with respect to Arredondo, the jury found true alleged firearm enhancements under section 12202.53, subdivisions (d) and (e). In addition to sentencing Arredondo to life without possibility of parole on his <mask> with special circumstances conviction, the trial court imposed an additional sentence of 25 years to life under section 12202.53, subdivision (d) and stayed imposition of the section 12202.53, subdivision (e) enhancement. At the time of sentencing, the trial court had no power to strike either firearm enhancement under section 1385. (See former \u00a7 12022.53, subd. (h).) However, in 2017, while Arredondo's appeal has been pending, the Legislature approved and the governor signed SB 620, which, as of January 1, 2018, gave trial courts the discretion to strike section 12022.53 firearm enhancements. (\u00a7 12022.53, subd. (h).)"], "id": "fdfe7211-e0ab-4081-9980-0e550ac5fc03", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On remand in Jackson v. Norris ,5 we rejected the State's argument that the Eighth Amendment violation could be cured by severing the capital-<mask> statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-101(c) (Repl. 1997), to provide for a sentence of life with parole. 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906. We explained that the imposition of that sentence would not allow for consideration of Miller evidence. Id. , 426 S.W.3d 906. Instead, we severed language from the statute \"so that, for juveniles convicted of capital murder, all that remain[ed] [was] that capital murder is a Class Y felony.\" Id. , at 7-8, 426 S.W.3d at 910. We remanded the case for a sentencing hearing at which Jackson could present Miller evidence for consideration and instructed that Jackson's sentence must fall within the discretionary sentencing range for a Class Y felony, which is ten to forty years or life. Id. at 9, 426 S.W.3d at 911 (citing Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997) ); see also Whiteside v. State , 2013 Ark. 176, 426 S.W.3d 917 (reversing juvenile offender's capital-murder sentence and remanding to the circuit court for resentencing within the discretionary statutory-sentencing range for a Class Y felony and directing that a sentencing hearing be held for presentation and consideration of Miller evidence)."], "id": "ae6ae859-05ca-4c2b-b713-893f0d46e8d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["three counts of <mask> (Pen. Code,1 \u00a7 187, subd. (a)) and multiple other felonies. Hall entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (\u00a7 192, subd. (a)) as a lesser offense of murder and one count of robbery (\u00a7 211). Hall also admitted the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The court sentenced Hall to a determinate term of 12 years in prison. In 2019, Hall filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition on the grounds section 1170.95 did not apply to persons who pleaded guilty to manslaughter as lesser offenses of murder. Hall appealed, and this court affirmed the denial of Hall\u2019s resentencing petition in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Hall, D078174 (Aug. 18, 2021).) Hall petitioned for review. The Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case to this court to reconsider our opinion in light of newly enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) (Senate Bill 775), which became effective January 1, 2022. We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on the impact of Senate Bill 775 on this appeal. Both Hall and the Attorney General contend the order must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and to conduct an evidentiary hearing as required by section 1170.95. We agree. The statutory changes that occurred while this case was pending require reversal. As such, we will reverse the order and remand the matter back to the superior court with directions."], "id": "300ebb1f-91e5-4737-ab53-c7d93d457f45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["As explained below, defendant's contention that his confession followed an invocation of his Miranda right to remain silent is forfeited due to the absence of a timely and specific objection, as well as defense counsel's subsequent withdrawal of all objections to the prosecution evidence. Defendant's secondary position-that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to make an objection to preserve the Miranda invocation issue for appeal-is meritorious. Defendant has established prejudice and reversal is required of the conviction for first degree <mask>. Defendant has not, however, established prejudice as to his *909conviction of kidnapping in count 3, which we affirm."], "id": "6c5a7d42-51c3-428a-9d17-7d514b46d1c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Penal Code section 32 provides in full as follows: \"Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony.\" The elements of the offense therefore required proof that defendant both \"harbored, concealed, or aided\" the accused <mask> defendants and did so with the intent they avoid trial, conviction, or punishment. ( People v. Tran (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1219, fn. 7, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 803 [listing all elements of a Penal Code section 32 violation].) The majority's extended discussion of defendant's intent correctly concludes that element was satisfied. But intent is not the critical issue in this case. What was lacking is proof that defendant's silence amounted to harboring, concealing, or aiding her brother and his confederates."], "id": "ddd7429e-6fb4-458e-bfe5-ae037543ebc1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner, who is imprisoned on a conviction of <mask> in the second degree, applied to participate in the temporary work release program in November 1993. The temporary release committee denied petitioner\u2019s application in a decision that was affirmed upon petitioner\u2019s administrative appeal. Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the determination, claiming that made*914quate consideration was given to certain factors which were required to be considered pursuant to Correction Law \u00a7 855. We agree with Supreme Court that the petition fails to state a cause of action."], "id": "6ece5b8a-a0d5-46e4-82d5-2b058f39ecca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In September 1996, Star-Telegram delivered the 16 pictures of the murdered coed, Adrienne Jones (AJ photos), to Sipa. From that time through April 1998, Sipa duly syndicated the photos, selling to virtually all of the major print and television media, including defendant St. Martin\u2019s Press, Incorporated (St. Martin\u2019s), which published a book about the <mask> and trial of the cadets. ."], "id": "26c61a7d-57e0-4d7b-9517-f2d121cffb90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In his defense, however, appellant testified that he did not shoot James Murray and that he did not go to his house on the day of the shooting. Considering his own testimony, the evidence clearly showed that appellant was either guilty of the offense charged or innocent. When a defendant makes a claim of innocence, no rational basis exists to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense because the jury needs to determine only whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Atkinson v. State , 347 Ark. 336, 349, 64 S.W.3d 259, 268 (2002). Based on his claim of innocence, there was no rational basis to instruct the jury on manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of capital <mask> or first-degree murder. Therefore, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in declining to instruct the jury on manslaughter."], "id": "40fd8ff9-ba12-4b59-8375-cfc27ecae17b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["A close reading of Johnson illuminates the critical difference between how a court assesses crimes under the residual clause and the second degree felony-<mask> rule. As discussed above, Johnson held the core infirmity with the ACCA residual clause is that it anchors risk to hypothetical facts. That is, the residual clause impermissibly \"ties the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined 'ordinary case' of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements .\" ( Johnson, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2557, italics added.) Implicit in this holding is that a crime is not unconstitutionally vague if a court assesses risk by one of two alternative methods: consideration of the real-world facts underlying the conviction or consideration of the statutory elements of the crime."], "id": "db920dcd-9301-4b0f-be38-97c9f8c0a65e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Two recent Court of Appeal decisions have held that defendants cannot seek relief under Senate Bill No. 1437 in direct appeals but instead must file petitions under section 1170.95. ( People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 727-729, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 860 ; accord People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1148, 1153, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 499.) We need not decide whether the same reasoning applies to preclude the seeking of such relief in a habeas petition. (See \u00a7 1170.95, subd. (f) [\"This section does not diminish or abrogate any rights or remedies otherwise available to the petitioner\"].) Here, Taylor mentioned Senate Bill No. 1437 in passing in his habeas petition, which was filed in the Supreme Court before the new legislation took effect. But he did not brief the issue of his entitlement to have the <mask> conviction itself vacated until he filed his traverse, and the Attorney General did not address the issue. Indeed, the Court issued an order to show cause \"why petitioner is not entitled [to] relief under [ Banks ],\" a decision that does not directly implicate Senate Bill No. 1437. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the more efficient course is for Taylor to seek to overturn his murder conviction by filing a section 1170.95 petition in the superior court. Once any such petition is filed, the parties will have the opportunity to address the effect of our holding on Taylor's *358entitlement to relief under Senate Bill No. 1437, an issue on which we express no opinion. *563III."], "id": "723a703c-49dc-4dd2-9fb3-0d3c2cb5da5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Review of New York cases regarding disclosure of other types of confidential and privileged information, while not exactly on point, have been instructive to the court. One such case is People v Reidout (140 Misc 2d 632 [Sup Ct 1988]). In that case, the defendant was charged in the <mask> of his wife and 13-year-old stepdaughter and the attempted murder of his seven-year-old son and nine-year-old stepson. The two boys were to be called as witnesses for the People, and the defendant subpoenaed their psychiatric treatment records to be used for purposes of attacking their credibility during cross-examination. The treating hospital moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that the records were protected under the physician-patient privilege, and their disclosure would have a chilling effect on the boys\u2019 ability to confide in and trust their therapist, thus hindering their recovery."], "id": "cb3a11bd-2081-44cd-a92d-0939dad1917f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On October 31, 2011, the investigators referred the whole case to the Fort Bend County District Attorney's Office and filed an offense report recommending that A.M., Patterson, and Edwards be arrested and charged with <mask>. However, the record reflects that the lead investigator did not sign a probable cause affidavit or obtain a directive to apprehend A.M. at that time. Rather, he testified that, although his October 2011 report requested A.M.'s arrest, he did not intend to arrest A.M. at that time because he needed \"some physical evidence to help corroborate\" the testimony against him."], "id": "b69cb369-9f1f-42ec-af3c-0d5e01698cc5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["8. which Cooper was taken. The court also cited Evidence Code section 352. Cooper argues the evidence is relevant to show that GSR can be transferred between surfaces. Thus, the particle of GSR found on Cooper\u2019s hand may have come from a source other than shooting a gun. But Cooper\u2019s counsel made that point with other questions. He elicited from Cavaleri that GSR can be transferred from other surfaces; that sometimes police cars have GSR in them; that the best place to perform a GSR test is at the crime scene, not later at the police station; and that the presence of GSR does not necessarily prove that the person fired a firearm. Any reasonable juror would have seen the point Cooper was trying to make: that he could have picked up a particle of GSR from any number of sources. If the trial court erred, it was harmless by any standard. Moreover, the prosecution was not required to prove that Cooper personally discharged a firearm. The prosecution only had to prove that Cooper was an accomplice in a <mask> for the benefit of a criminal street gang in which its principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. (\u00a7 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e); People v. Hernandez (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 474, 480.) That is what the jury found. The jury was not required to find that Cooper was the actual shooter. Here the evidence showed that Cooper acted with members of his gang to avenge disrespect shown to them by a rival gang member. If Cooper was not the actual shooter, he was at least an accomplice. It was unfortunately a typical murder carried out for the benefit of a criminal street gang."], "id": "454c3d1a-36f7-4487-853b-637f00a89ea2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court\u2019s research reveals no New York case law involving a motion for discovery of a private residence which is also *952a crime scene. However, New York has an analogous body of decisional law applying the principle that the discovery rights of a defendant must be balanced against the rights of third parties. In People v Chambers (134 Misc 2d 688 [Sup Ct, NY County 1987]), the trial court inspected the <mask> victim\u2019s diary in camera, after obtaining it from the victim\u2019s father\u2019s attorney. At one point, the diary had been in possession of the District Attorney but had been returned by the time defense counsel sought access. The court found that the defense had made no showing that it was reasonably likely that the diary contained evidence or potential evidence. The court examined the diary and found no relevant, admissible evidence, and nothing required to be disclosed under any constitutional or statutory provision. And, in People v Nelson (151 Misc 2d 951 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1991]), the court refused to order the taking of blood and saliva from the victim in a case where the rape defendant was arrested sleeping in the complainant\u2019s bed and made admissions. The court found that since the People did not intend to present any scientific evidence at trial, defendant\u2019s proposed discovery was neither relevant nor material.2 The court noted that the defense would of course be available to cross-examine the People\u2019s witnesses concerning the lack of scientific testing."], "id": "3ecec2ad-1688-4fcc-b41b-1c9517aa2c09", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On January 17, 1956 the County Judge before whom the <mask> case was tried, made and entered an order, on the basis of a stipulation signed by the parties to the appeal, which order directed the printing of the objectionable matter. Thus, the matter excluded from evidence was, by said order, made part of such record on appeal. Despite entry of this order, respondents still refuse to print the newspaper and magazine articles already referred to, and it is because of such continued refusal that the present application is now before this court."], "id": "48603d85-521b-4016-89c7-44496da9b439", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["As a factual issue, the stabber could be properly indicted for the criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree count of the indictment as it appears that he possessed the screwdriver with the intent to commit a crime (i.e., strike Corey Lawson with it). However, there was no testimony that showed that the stabber\u2019s intent was to cause death or serious physical injury to Junius Crawford (as opposed to Corey Lawson), the victim in this case, which are the theories underlying the attempted <mask> in the second degree and assault in the first degree counts."], "id": "3992d953-7c5f-4026-983c-3a43566d81a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The language of the constitutional provision prohibiting jury waiver where \"the crime charged may be punishable by death\u201d (NY Const, art I, \u00a7 2) and the statutory provision allowing *797waiver \"[ejxcept where the indictment charges the crime of <mask> in the first degree\u201d (CPL 320.10 [1]) cannot be reconciled when viewed in the context of the recently enacted Capital Offenders Law. The court must therefore look to the legislative intent to resolve this conflict and \"ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.\u201d (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 92.) \"As a general rule, the legislative intent with which statutes are enacted is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and from the objective and remedy in view.\u201d (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 95, at 196.) The court must not \"merely read the bare end product of the legislative labors, but rather * * * read the statute in light of the state of facts which were found by the Legislature and which prompted the enactment.\u201d (Id., at 197.)"], "id": "da13d3f5-5a16-44c2-a43e-94acf306ba12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In 1996, following a 14-week jury trial, Defendant-Appellant Leo Contrera was sentenced principally to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for a narcotics conspiracy offense (Count 47) and <mask> in aid of racketeering (Count 8), a concurrent term of 20 years\u2019 incarceration for arson (Count 7), and a consecutive term of five years\u2019 incarceration for a firearms offense (Count 10). On September 21, 2020, Contrera \u2014 represented by appointed counsel \u2014 moved the District Court for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391 \u00a7 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. On November 30, 2020, the District Court granted Contrera relief under the First Step Act by reducing his conviction for Count 47 to time served, but denied his request for relief as to Count 8. Then, on January 14, 2021, Contrera \u2014 proceeding without counsel \u2014 moved the District Court pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to correct alleged errors in his Presentence Report (\u201cPSR\u201d). By order dated February 5, 2021, the District Court"], "id": "132be033-00ef-4ef9-919e-861c806b9813", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The fact that death did not follow immediately upon the attack is of no significance. In People v Brengard (265 NY 100), a <mask> conviction was affirmed even though death came four years after the inflicting of a bullet wound. It is the causal connection that controls, said the court. \"The proximate relationship\u201d they said, \"must, of course, be clearly proved beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d (p 108)."], "id": "865bac15-4db4-4dbf-82e5-5b20323aeafc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In addition to evidence of the three-hour time gap, there was substantial evidence regarding the complicated relationship between defendant and Kerr from which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant was conflicted regarding what to do with Kerr after he had strangled her. By all accounts, their year-long affair was tumultuous and consuming. Defendant conveyed to others that he was in love with Kerr and wanted to marry her, and described their relationship as \"perfect.\" The evidence showed that defendant was upset and frustrated by Kerr's decision to try to reconcile with her husband. But even shortly before the <mask>, defendant continued to profess his love for Kerr and his desire for her to leave her husband and start a family with him. Moreover, although he suspected that Kerr was \"screwing him around,\" defendant nonetheless rented an apartment for her after she left her husband, signing the rental agreement as \"Donald Brooks and Lisa Brooks.\""], "id": "ce6010b4-d6d5-4781-8196-9201cc59f871", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Burton B. Roberts, J. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of 87 counts of depraved indifference <mask>, 87 counts of felony murder, one count of arson in the first degree and one count of assault in the first degree. On September 19, 1991, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 25 years to life on each of the 174 counts of murder, and concurrent terms of 25 years to life for the arson conviction and 5 to 15 years for the assault conviction. These convictions all resulted from the fire at the Happy Land Social Club on March 25, 1990."], "id": "3d4669ff-1a68-458a-856c-fb30706b16db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["During the questioning, Dilland and Crabtree repeatedly challenged I.F.'s account of the morning of the <mask>, stating, \"we have a lot of evidence pointing to another story.\" Although Dilland and Crabtree were polite and friendly, their questions manifested a belief that I.F. was culpable and they had the evidence to prove it. ( Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 587.)"], "id": "e53f4de0-42f1-43aa-be6b-43432845c278", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court concluded: \u201cBased on all of the facts and circumstances presented at the trial and during the hearing it is evident [defendant] is not eligible for relief under section 1170.95, as a review of the evidence indicates he could still be found guilty of <mask> under a theory of liability that remains valid and upon which the jury was instructed.\u201d The court concluded that, under the holding of either line of cases that have since been depublished, discussed ante, \u201cthe conclusion is the same.\u201d IV The Standard Of Review Employed By The Trial Court Defendant asserts \u201cthe trial court applied the wrong standard or failed to meaningfully employ any standard at all.\u201d Defendant emphasizes the court did not identify the standard of review it was employing, instead it merely stated its conclusion would be the same under either standard. Additionally, while stating defendant could still be found guilty of murder under a valid theory, the court did not identify that theory and it did not expressly make any finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also asserts the court improperly shifted the burden of proof. Upon reviewing the hearing and the trial court\u2019s order, we cannot say with any assurance what standard of review the court applied or whether it found the evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant would be guilty of murder under amended sections 188 or 189 and was thus ineligible for resentencing. The trial court did not state the standard of review it was applying. Although the court recited what the evidence \u201cdemonstrated,\u201d \u201cshowed,\u201d and \u201cestablished,\u201d it never set forth its standard of review. The court did not once articulate the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of review, whether in the context of the prosecution\u2019s burden of proof or its standard of review in considering the evidence as independent fact finder. The court\u2019s conclusion was that \u201ca review of the evidence indicates [defendant] could still be found guilty of murder under a theory of liability that remains valid and upon which the jury was instructed.\u201d (Italics added.) This evokes the substantial evidence standard of review"], "id": "236c455d-b061-4720-a8d8-fe3261f92fdf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Natalie Antonetti was assaulted in her Austin apartment in the early morning hours of Sunday, October 13, 1985. There was no sign of forced entry, and nothing was stolen. Antonetti was not sexually assaulted and had no defensive wounds. The blunt force trauma to her head, which the medical examiner found consistent with having been attacked with a club or small bat, caused skull fractures, brain contusions, and a coma from which Antonetti never recovered. Antonetti died after the withdrawal of life support. The crime remained unsolved after the death of Austin Police Department Sergeant Edward Balagia, a homicide detective who served as lead investigator and conducted most of the interviews and evidence collection. The unsolved \"cold case\" was reopened in 2007 after a call to a homicide tip line from Rebecca Davis, the wife of appellant Dennis Davis. Rebecca told police that in 1991 after a few drinks, Davis cried and said he had \"sinned against God and man,\" which she suspected was a reference to the unsolved <mask> of Davis's former girlfriend, Antonetti. Davis was charged with Antonetti's murder. Davis's wife Rebecca recanted her story and argued unsuccessfully that Davis's statement to her was shielded by marital privilege. At trial, there was no physical or forensic proof connecting Davis to the crime; rather, his prosecution hinged on circumstantial evidence and testimony from witnesses, many of whom had not been contacted during the investigation back in the 1980s. The circumstantial evidence about Davis included Davis's relationship and last interaction with Antonetti, his arrival at the scene after the assault, his statements after the assault, his alibi, his ownership of a car similar to one seen in the parking lot of the apartments on the morning of the assault, and other acts of aggression in the years since Antonetti's assault. The jury also considered certain statements and a 911 call from Donn Chelli, Antonetti's neighbor at the time of the assault. Davis v. State , 413 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. App.-Austin 2013, pet. ref'd). The jury convicted Davis in 2011 for Antonetti's *695murder, and the court sentenced him to thirty-six years' imprisonment. Id. at 819. The jury was not presented with evidence of a potential third-party perpetrator, including evidence of Antonetti's neighbor's identification of a different man from a photographic lineup as the person that he had seen holding a club or small bat while looking into the neighbor's apartment on the morning of Antonetti's assault. See id. at 827. This Court determined that Davis received ineffective assistance of counsel, reversed his conviction, and remanded this cause for a new trial. Id. at 838. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused the State's petition for discretionary review. See In re Davis , No. PD-1520-13, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 183, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2014). This Court issued our mandate in Davis's appeal on March 6, 2014."], "id": "86929543-c81c-4bac-a01f-f33d6b447967", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["IV Retroactive Application of Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 124 In addition to an indeterminate term of 40 years to life for the <mask> and firearm enhancement, defendant was sentenced to a consecutive determinate sentence of three years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the upper term for that crime. The upper term was selected \u201cbecause the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm and the threat of great bodily harm.\u201d At the time of defendant\u2019s sentencing, section 1170, subdivision (b) provided the trial court with discretion to choose between the lower, middle, or upper term, after considering the record in the case, the probation report, other reports, statements in aggravation or mitigation, and any other evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing, based on which term, \u201cin the court\u2019s discretion, best serves the interests of justice.\u201d (Former \u00a7 1170, subd. (b).) This changed, however, on January 1, 2022, when Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 124 went into effect. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, \u00a7 1.3 [Senate Bill 567]; Stats. 2021, ch. 695, \u00a7 5 [Assembly Bill 124].) Senate Bill 567 \u201camends section 1170 and 1170.1 to establish a sentencing procedure consistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely), and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 (Cunningham), when a trial court seeks to impose the upper term of custody.\u201d (Couzens, Selected Changes to California Sentencing Laws Effective 2022 (Barrister Press 2021) p. 6.) Section 1170, subdivision (b) now provides in relevant part: \u201c(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2). [\u00b6] (2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by"], "id": "c6c0c974-ec8a-4ba0-b0bc-df0fc2593c8a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "murder", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Russell P. Buscaglia, J. The defendant, on June 10, 2010, was charged by this indictment with <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.25). A jury trial was conducted. On January 19, 2011, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.20). On March 1, 2011, the defendant was sentenced to a 25-year determinate sentence and five years\u2019 postrelease supervision. Thereafter, the defendant moved pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law \u00a7 440.10 (1) (h) to vacate the conviction."], "id": "9878bd98-b05e-42c8-918c-92cb33a1560a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On July 14, 2001, four-year-old Ojagee Heber died as a result of a single gunshot wound to the head. Ojagee accidentally shot himself with an illegal firearm that his uncle, the defendant Wayne Heber, left underneath the cushion of a chair in the living room of his house. As a result of this incident the defendant is charged with <mask> in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, reckless endangerment in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third and fourth degrees, and tampering with physical evidence."], "id": "1dbf0109-ea13-41e5-a4e3-47f443cec705", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Baumgartner also maintained that the shooting had been accidental, stating: \u201cI am responsible for a \u2018Gun mis-fortune\u2019 or \u2018Mishap.\u2019 In cocking the firearm, the hammer never locked back, and it fell forward, firing the weapon. I never had any intention of actually firing the weapon recklessly at Mr. Clark. I\u2019m \u2018Guilty\u2019 of a <mask>, but not of a 2nd[ ] Degree Murder. I\u2019m telling you this with straight honesty and integrity. Please tell the \u2018Clark Family\u2019 that I am very [s]orry for being responsible for the death of their loved one. I am sincerely sorry to them. I do feel \u2018Remorse\u2019 for what happened.\u201d"], "id": "89340d86-89e3-4d92-bc36-47b2b65ff791", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant raises additional alleged errors related to his original trial, including issues of prosecutorial misconduct, improper admission of evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on involuntary <mask>. Defendant\u2019s additional arguments are not properly before this Court because they raise challenges to events that occurred at trial before the remand, and thus exceed the scope of the remand order. See Jones, 394 Mich at 435-436. In addition, this Court addressed many of defendant\u2019s challenges in the prior appeal,2 and the law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from revisiting its earlier decision. See Zitka, 335 Mich App at 334."], "id": "4f87c92b-2fba-48b8-8e82-181c865d818b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, this matter shall be set down for a hearing before this court to obtain, pretrial, the testimony of Ronald Baker regarding the death of Carolyn Vargas as well as the underlying facts surrounding all of his prior convictions, including his <mask> conviction in Virginia. Again, while pretrial depositions are not normally available in criminal proceedings, given the conflicting accounts previously given by Mr. Baker under oath, and the egregious conduct of the prosecutor in suppressing this information, it is appropriate under these particular circumstances to ascertain exactly what this witness will testify to at trial."], "id": "8bd32e4f-15d2-4f9e-94e6-954fb42d852c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["But they doubtless mean the same thing\u2014an intention to kill; for if they do not, and if, as has been contended, \u201c premeditated design\u201d means an intention formed some time before the killing, and demanding an interval of time between the formation and execution of the design, then is a large class of homicides untouched and unpunished by our law, namely, those cases where the intention to kill is formed on the instant, and is executed in, and is the cause of, the fatal act. Such cases, under that construction of the law, would not be murder, for want of premeditation to the design, and would not be <mask>, because there is present a design to effect death."], "id": "600a24e3-a34c-4b87-ada9-ba16ce7489d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The motion court did not hold the facts averred in Appellant's amended motion were insufficient to constitute a possible voluntary <mask> claim. Rather, the motion court found Appellant's claims were refuted by the record, specifically by the statements he made at his guilty plea. The motion court held (1) Appellant's statements indicating he was satisfied with trial counsel, who had investigated and explained all possible defenses, refuted the claim in his amended motion he was not informed of a voluntary manslaughter defense; and (2) Appellant's admission to each element of second-degree murder, and his omission of any mention of Victim being the initial aggressor, refuted the factual basis of his voluntary manslaughter claim."], "id": "49718953-e106-42ae-8e4e-e0d8b66a3017", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["It is of no significance that the appellate courts did not explicitly dismiss the indictment in conjunction with the order of a new trial, or did not explicitly authorize a resubmission to the Grand Jury of the surviving charge. (Cf. CPL 210.20, subd 4, par [b].) In light of Mayo (supra) *980and Beslanovics (supra), the appellate order of a new trial upon the surviving charge of <mask> implicitly required dismissal of the original murder indictment and resubmission of the manslaughter charge to a new Grand Jury. (Cf. People v Gonzales, 96 AD2d 847, supra.)"], "id": "66f9a0ef-6f89-4c18-8bc9-9fe03789ac5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In other words, there is (and must be) a lot of room between a trial judge's determination that there is \"any rational basis\" for giving a particular instruction in a particular case, and the jury's determination that the legal proposition set forth in that instruction was actually established at trial. A jury is free to reject the legal propositions contained in a thousand different jury instructions if it finds that the applicable burdens of proof for those legal propositions are not satisfied by the evidence presented at the trial, but a jury cannot agree with a legal proposition if that legal proposition is never set forth in an instruction for the jury's consideration. This is why we require a jury instruction where there is \"any rational basis\" for giving it. One can speculate about what impact the withholding of the <mask> instruction had in the case presently before us, but surely this practice of superseding the jury's role as fact-finder must be discouraged. Accordingly,"], "id": "5a5078a2-c454-4b8e-b412-79915cf39266", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the count charging him with depraved indifference murder is granted. Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the remaining count in the indictment is denied. Upon review of the Grand Jury minutes for this presentation, I find that the evidence adduced before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the remaining charge of <mask> in the second degree. The defendant\u2019s argument that retrial of this count is prohibited by CPL 310.70 is unpersuasive. A reading of this section and of the cases decided thereunder compels the conclusion that it prohibits retrial only of indicted counts which were not submitted to the jury in the previous trial."], "id": "3c9f5b78-8e34-4deb-ac64-fd84037b12f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["probable consequences doctrine, or <mask> may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner\u2019s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .\u201d (Italics added.)2 In her reply brief Duarte argues, with the passage of Senate Bill 775, the order summarily denying her petition for resentencing should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the superior court to appoint counsel and to thereafter reconsider her petition consistent with the provisions of section 1170.95 as newly amended.3 In a supplemental letter"], "id": "98dad689-b025-48cc-a67f-f71483a4cacb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["For the reasons that follow, we decline to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 470.20 (5) on the ground that the verdict *29is against the weight of the evidence. Instead, we conclude that the conviction should be reduced pursuant to CPL 470.15 (2) (a) to the lesser included offense of <mask> in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.20 [1]), and the matter should be remitted to County Court for sentencing on the lesser included offense pursuant to CPL 470.20 (4)."], "id": "5ebf199f-c436-47c9-bf3f-9c9372cb99b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["But, of course, the model code provision goes much further than merely requiring an accomplice to share in behavior. The behavior though negligent, may be perfectly lawful. It requires in addition that the accomplice must share in his principal\u2019s purpose and knowledge. In culpable negligence <mask>, this means that the accomplice like the principal, must have a conscious awareness of the danger involved and must consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or serious injury to others. (Cf. People v. Eckert, 2 N Y 2d 126.)"], "id": "3cfa8d1b-c608-458a-8c0f-c08551951c82", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of intentional murder or the lesser included offenses of <mask>, first degree, or manslaughter, second degree, or in the alternative, of depraved indifference murder or the lesser included offense of manslaughter, second degree; this was at the request of the defendant. The jury was further charged that the defendant could be found guilty of only one of those five crimes, or not guilty of all five crimes."], "id": "b412fc46-0418-445a-b638-d6c8d04e1fcc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\"The defendant is not guilty of murder or <mask> if he was justified in killing someone in self-defense or defense of another. The defendant acted in lawful self-defense or defense of another if: \"1. The defendant reasonably believed that he or someone else was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury; \"2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; \"AND"], "id": "a90e58c7-5730-48d9-a2e6-8ef7a9f6cb23", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["To be eligible for diversion, a defendant must be charged with class B, C, D or E felony drug offenses under Penal Law article 220 or article 221, or a specified offense under CPL 410.91 (5). The consent of the District Attorney is not required. Defendants are ineligible to participate in the program if, within the preceding 10 years, the defendant had been convicted of: (a) a violent felony offense; (b) a class A felony offense; or (c) any nonmerit time offense (i.e., <mask> in the second degree, vehicular manslaughter in the first and second degrees, criminally negligent homicide, an offense under Penal Law article 130, any offense of incest, and any Penal Law article 263 offense). This 10-year period excludes any time the defendant spent incarcerated. A defendant also will be excluded when he has been previously adjudicated a prior violent felony offender or a persistent violent felony offender or if there are pending violent charges which include one of the disqualifying offenses above. Other factors that the court may consider in determining eligibility are whether the defendant is a threat to public safety or is unable to participate in the program due to other pending charges or violations of probation or parole."], "id": "e1558a8b-59e9-46f7-ad9a-16cc921d2feb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The \"note on use\" following AMI Crim. 2d 1004-A provides that this instruction is used with AMI Crim. 2d 1004 when the defendant is asserting the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The note further instructs to use AMI Crim. 2d 301 (Lesser Included Offenses: Introductory Instruction) and AMI Crim. 2d 302 (Lesser Included Offenses: Transitional Instruction) with the bracketed language for extreme emotional disturbance <mask> with the instructions for the murder offense(s) being submitted, then this instruction, followed by AMI Crim. 2d 1004."], "id": "5f5a645d-ceb1-4547-b538-6ca864ba19a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["(a) When a person believes that the use of physical force is necessary for any purpose justifying that use of physical force under this subchapter but the person is reckless or negligent either in forming that belief or in employing an excessive degree of physical force, the justification afforded by this subchapter is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence suffices to establish a culpable mental state. (b) When a person is justified under this subchapter in using physical force but he or she recklessly or negligently injures or creates a substantial risk of injury to a third party, the *538justification afforded by this subchapter is unavailable in a prosecution for the recklessness or negligence toward the third party. In Harshaw , our supreme court held that it is reversible error to refuse to instruct on the lesser-included offense of <mask> when there is the slightest evidence to support the instruction. Id. ; see Norris v. State , 2010 Ark. 174, 368 S.W.3d 52. It does not hold that a defendant is entitled to a nonmodel jury instruction concerning section 5-2-614. See Harshaw , 344 Ark. 129, 39 S.W.2d 753. Thus, we cannot say that Nelson has established that counsel's failure to request a nonmodel jury instruction was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in finding that Nelson's claim had no merit."], "id": "62eccc07-47a0-4e95-b496-6fd66d08572c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge asked if there were objections to the proposed jury charges, which each included (based on the deadly weapon *384plea) an instruction that appellant would not be eligible for parole until his time served equaled one-half of the sentence imposed. Both the State and appellant responded that they had no objections. The jury, having been instructed that appellant was guilty of both charges as alleged in the indictments, sentenced him to twelve years in prison for the offense of intoxication <mask>, and ten years in prison with a recommendation of probation for the offense of intoxication assault."], "id": "eb05e449-05bc-40cb-a46b-e09c0f21fe7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThis is not [appellant\u2019s] first attempt to extricate himself from the plea bargain by seeking a reduction in his sentence \u2026. Here, [appellant] claims that the Court improperly imposed both the gun and gang enhancements for his conviction for voluntary <mask>. [Appellant] claims that imposition of both enhancements is contrary to \u2026 section 1170.1, subdivision (f). [Appellant] further alleges he \u2018meets the 10 year requirement stipulated in SB. [sic] 2942 as it relates to the District Attorney.\u2019 [Appellant] offers no analysis on this point. It appears [appellant] is referencing Senate Bill 2942, enacted in 2018, and which amended provision of \u2026 section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to permit the District Attorney to request a recall of a \u2026 felony sentence at any time. Contrary to what is apparently [appellant\u2019s] argument, that amendment, which took effect on January 1, 2019, did not confer on any defendant the ability to seek a recall of their sentence beyond the 120[-day] time limit in which the Court may, on its own motion, recall a sentence it has imposed. To the extent [appellant] is relying on \u2026 section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) in seeking a \u2018modification\u2019 of his sentence, the motion is denied, as this Court has no jurisdiction to recall the sentence. (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1165, citing People v. Roe (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 112, 118.)"], "id": "a5b4531a-2142-4069-815a-eef406b2c5bb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The jury found defendant not guilty of second degree murder, but guilty of voluntary <mask> as a lesser included offense. In a subsequent proceeding, defendant admitted the allegation \"as alleged\" in the information that he suffered a section 245 conviction in August 2005. He also admitted \"as alleged\" that he suffered a section 12020, subdivision (a)(1) conviction in November 2002. Before taking defendant's admissions, the court explained that defendant was admitting a strike under section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), which would double his sentence, and that he was admitting a prior prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b), which would add additional time to his term. Defendant stated that he understood the consequences of admitting the prior convictions as alleged."], "id": "e0c75c6c-723e-45d8-b888-723a96de93e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Donald J. Mark, J. The defendant was charged with the crime of <mask>, first degree, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 125.20 (2). She allegedly while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance caused the death of her newborn male infant by asphyxiation by placing two wads of paper in his throat. During the trial of this action two issues surfaced which depended for their resolution upon People v Hayner (300 NY 171). The first was the application of the defendant for a trial order of dismissal, and the second was the instructions to the jury on the definition of live birth."], "id": "0950e570-b8f6-4936-bb97-74db0d43c269", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Where an offence is created by statute, which was not an offence by the common law, it is a general rule that the indictment must charge the offence to have been committed under the circumstances and with the intent mentioned in the statute, which of course contains the only appropriate definition of the crime. State v. Jones, 2 Yerg. Ten. R. 22. State v. O\u2019Bannon, 1 Bayley's Law R. 144. But even in that case it is not necessary to pursue the exact words of the statute creating the offence, provided other words are used in the indictment which are equivalent, or words of more extensive \u25a0 signification, and which necessarily include the words used in *173the statute\u2014as where advisedly is substituted for knowingly, or maliciously for wilfully, and the like. The King v. Fuller, 1 Bos. & Pull. 180. United States v.Bachelder, 2 Gall R. 15. It is otherwise in indictments for common law offences, where the law has adopted certain technical expressions to define the offence, or to indicate the intention with which it was committed ; in which cases the crime must be described, or the intention must be expessed by the technical terms prescribed, and no other. Thus, in an indictment for murder, the terms murder of his malice aforethought are considered absolutely necessary in describing the offence ; and if these words are left out of the indictment, it will be deemed a case of <mask> only. In determining the question whether an indictment should be drawn as at the common law, or should appear to be founded upon a statutory provision which is applicable to the offence, the following\" rules are to be observed: If the statute creates an offence, or declares a common lawoffence, when committed under particular circumstances not necessarily included in the original offence, punishable in a different manner from what it would have been without such circumstances ; or where the statute changes the nature of the common law offence to one of a higher degree, as where what was originally a'misdemeanor is made a felony, the indictment should be drawn in reference to the provisions of the statute creating or charging the nature of the offence, and should conclude -against the form of the statute ; but if the statute is only declaratory of what was previously an offence at common law, without adding to, or altering the punishment, as was the statute of 25 Edward 3, declaring what should be considered and adjudged treason, the indictment need not conclude against the form of the statute. 1 Deae. Grim. Law, 661."], "id": "b1ce5b30-b5da-4f9a-9248-7d1460b6a290", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In Snow (supra) the Appellate Division held that driving while intoxicated (DWI), a Vehicle and Traffic Law felony (Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 1192 [former (5)]), may not serve as the predicate for a conviction of felony assault. In so holding, the Court stated (at 220), \"On the facts of this case, defendant could have been found guilty only of second degree vehicular assault, a class E felony (Penal Law \u00a7 120.03), because the victim of the incident suffered serious physical injury. Had the victim died defendant could have been convicted of second degree vehicular <mask>, a class D felony (Penal Law \u00a7 125.12). Defendant, however, was convicted of first degree assault under Penal Law \u00a7 120.10 (4), a class C felony, a more serious crime than could have been charged if the victim had died. This is an unreasonable and unjust result and could not have been intended by the Legislature\u201d."], "id": "19ff6011-194b-4f82-a2af-6a637a417a06", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["B. Misstatements of Law As defendant notes in his appellate briefing, his defense counsel argued that he, at most, \u201ccommitted <mask>, having been in fear for his life and/or provoked because of the violent attack.\u201d Addressing this argument, the prosecutor stated during the rebuttal argument: \u201cAs far as manslaughter, I touched on it just briefly. Now, the defendant was actually provoked? You could say, yeah. I mean, you\u2019re knocked to the ground. That would be provocation. Intense emotion, you could argue that [defendant] would have it at that point. But does it -- is it an intense emotion that obscures his reasoning and judgment?\u201d The prosecutor argued defendant was not \u201cunder the direct and immediate influence of the provocation\u201d because of the separation of time between the initial fist fight in the parking lot and the shooting. After arguing that a reasonable person standard applied to the question of provocation, the prosecutor continued: \u201cSo a person of average disposition, are they going to run and grab the gun out, or are they going to go talk to that officer or security [guard] and point the people out? Or maybe run over and continue the fight once the brothers are with them? Is a person of average disposition going to take that gun out and then conceal it and walk out to the street?\u201d Defense counsel objected that the argument misstated the law. The trial court overruled the objection, stating: \u201cI don\u2019t think it misstates the law necessarily. Each side has their interpretations. The jury\u2019s heard the evidence. They\u2019ve got the instructions. [\u00b6] Go ahead.\u201d The prosecutor continued: \u201c[I]t talks about a person with an average disposition, are they going to act a certain way?\u201d As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935: \u201cHeat of passion is a mental state that precludes the formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter. Heat of passion arises if, \u2018 \u201cat the time of the killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an"], "id": "9e0329ec-433b-4e50-b874-73aef6a31dfe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The accusatory pleading in this case is of no aid to Munoz. The pleading stated, in relevant part, \"On or about June 28, 2014, in the County of Los Angeles, the crime of MURDER, in violation of PENAL CODE SECTION 187(a), a Felony, was committed by RYAN MUNOZ, who did unlawfully, and with malice aforethought murder GEVORK KRPIKYAN, a human being.\" Munoz does not dispute that this does little more than repeat the statutory definition of murder from the Penal Code, and does not supply the additional elements that would encompass gross vehicular <mask> while intoxicated, namely the use of a vehicle and intoxication. (Cf."], "id": "ef2dd5c3-e929-4a76-9e00-b78fbab59edb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["After the defense had rested, the circuit court considered the jury instructions requested by the parties. The circuit court denied defense counsel's request for the <mask> instruction and instructed the jury on capital murder, first-degree murder, and second-degree murder. The jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder. For his sole argument on appeal, appellant contends that the circuit court erred by declining to instruct the jury on manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of capital murder and first-degree murder."], "id": "bb198fb5-2e88-4dab-8b29-e32b8474ed6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["amended section 1170.95 to expressly include within its reach certain convictions for attempted murder and voluntary <mask>. In light of this new legislation, we remand Montgomery\u2019s case for the superior court to appoint counsel for Montgomery and to determine in accordance with the procedures described in section 1170.95, subdivision (c), and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) whether Montgomery has made a prima facie showing he is entitled to relief. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. Montgomery\u2019s Conviction for Attempted Murder As described in our opinion affirming Montgomery\u2019s convictions (People v. Montgomery, supra, B208165), the evidence at trial established that Montgomery was the driver of a van under surveillance by the Los Angeles Police Department. Saul Eady, Montgomery\u2019s codefendant, and a third man were also in the van. As detectives monitored the van, one of them observed a person in the passenger side of the van reach out and fire four or five shots toward an alley. Detectives went to the alley to investigate and found Curtis Muse, who admitted he had been a member of the Crips at one time. The area where the shooting occurred was controlled by the Black P Stones, a rival Bloods gang. Muse was uninjured, but his car had several bullet holes in it. Muse told the detectives he had been in the driver\u2019s seat of his car at the time of the shooting. Detectives took control of the van after it was parked and its occupants left. From its interior they recovered a nine- millimeter semiautomatic handgun and a pump-action shotgun. Shell casings found at the shooting scene were matched to the handgun. A substantial quantity of rock cocaine and marijuana was also found inside the van. The People\u2019s gang expert testified"], "id": "462ac315-b899-4d84-b893-34671e2973bb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["A defendant\u2019s conduct is a \"sufficiently direct cause\u201d of injury or death when the \"ultimate harm is something which should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the acts of the accused\u201d. (People v Kibbe, supra, at 412.) To establish a sufficiently direct link between the risk that should reasonably have been perceived and the injury subsequently sustained, more than mere cause and effect must be demonstrated. Because the standard for criminal liability is higher than that required for civil liability, it is not enough to show that as a result of a variety of dangerous conditions, injury was foreseeable. Rather, before an injury may be said to have been \"directly caused\u201d by reckless conduct preceding it, the People must prove it was foreseeable that the injury would oc*112cur in the particular manner that it did.1 (People v Roth, 80 NY2d 239, 243-244 [1992].) In other words, in order to sustain a charge involving reckless conduct that results in injury or death, the People are required to submit proof from which the Grand Jury could conclude that the actual, specific cause of injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant\u2019s conduct. (People v Roth, supra, [in prosecution for reckless <mask> and criminally negligent homicide, evidence before Grand Jury insufficient to support conclusion that the defendants should have foreseen that their employee would place unprotected trouble light in path of high pressure washer during cleaning of petroleum tank trailer and that explosion causing spark would result from this combination]; People v Kibbe, supra; see also, People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692 [1976] [death of victim not foreseeable since death occurred after surgeon closed stomach wound inflicted by defendant and operated on an unrelated hernia]; People v Lowe, 214 AD2d 1 [1st Dept 1995] [making weapon accessible to intoxicated person does not support conviction for criminally negligent homicide]; People v Brown, 193 AD2d 496 [1st Dept 1993] [police officers\u2019 collision with an ambulance while responding to a report that a police car had been stolen could not be reasonably foreseen as being related to the acts of the defendant].)2"], "id": "a5afd111-39a0-4a1d-abdc-ce4c041b4ba5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["2 In an uncodified statement of its intent in enacting Senate Bill 775, the Legislature declared the legislation \u201c(a) Clarifies that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or <mask> under a theory of felony murder and the natural probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same theories. [\u00b6] (b) Codifies the holdings of People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961-970, regarding petitioners\u2019 right to counsel and the standard for determining the existence of a prima facie case. [\u00b6] (c) Reaffirms that the proper burden of proof at a resentencing hearing under this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [\u00b6] (d) Addresses what evidence a court may consider at a resentencing hearing (clarifying the discussion in People v. Lewis, supra, at pp. 970-972).\u201d (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, \u00a7 1.) 3 In her opening brief Duarte argued the superior court\u2019s summary denial of her petition without appointment of counsel violated the plain language of section 1170.95, subdivision (c), as well as her right to due process. She also argued Senate Bill 1437 applied to accomplice liability for attempted murder, not just murder, and the contrary interpretation of the legislation would violate her right to equal protection. The Attorney General in his respondent\u2019s brief argued any error in not"], "id": "3e0270e0-5e0d-4cac-ac44-0985373eafb6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": [". The \u201cspecified offenses\u201d in the indictment upon which the hate crimes charges are based are: murder in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 [3]), <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.15 [1]), assault in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 120.10 [4]), attempted robbery in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 160.15 [1]), and attempted robbery in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 160.10 [1]). Each of these crimes are \u201cspecified offense[s]\u201d as defined by Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (3)."], "id": "89d4ca0d-73f7-4f34-9a6c-3b4e7b271f56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of <mask> in the first degree in connection with his wife\u2019s death. The People established that the victim died as a result of injuries that she sustained after a physical attack. Defendant, who was the last person to see her alive, admitted that he and the victim had engaged in a physical altercation after he found her talking on the phone with a former paramour. According to defendant, however, his physical attack consisted only of hitting the victim twice on the head with a hairbrush and throwing a phone at her. In his defense, he presented expert testimony that the elevated levels of alcohol and prescription medication found in the victim\u2019s system at the time of her death were lethal, and that the majority of the victim\u2019s physical injuries, consisting of 12 fractured ribs and a lacerated liver, were the result of the improper performance of CPR after she had died of a drug and alcohol overdose."], "id": "57f4bb50-c51a-44d2-b1ca-583e2370827a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The Commission Staff Notes of the Staff of the State Commission on the Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code (Gilbert, Criminal Law and Procedure of New York [1975], pp *1422A-1, 2A-61-62) offer only the following as an explanation of \"extreme emotional disturbance\u201d: \"[T]he phrase 'in the heat of passion,\u2019 is abandoned as the criterion of mitigation in favor of the phrase, 'under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.\u2019 This standard, adopted from the equivalent <mask> provision of the Model Penal Code [\u00a7 210.3(b)], is, in the Commission\u2019s opinion, superior to 'heat of passion\u2019 and other traditional criteria from the standpoints of both logic and general fairness (see Model Penal Code Commentary, Tentative Draft No. 9, pp. 28-29).\u201d"], "id": "5229b493-6506-49c3-bfbd-2ee11162e574", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant pleaded guilty to <mask> in the second degree for shooting his girlfriend in the head. After serving the minimum of his indeterminate term of 2 to 6 years imprisonment, the defendant was paroled. Upon being paroled, he was informed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he was subject to deportation to his native Jamaica because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The defendant then brought the instant motion to vacate his judgment of conviction for manslaughter in the second degree, and to substitute therefor a conviction for criminally negligent homicide, a crime not involving moral turpitude. The defendant alleged that his plea was involuntarily made because the court failed to inform him that he could be deported for being convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The defendant also alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, because his counsel failed to *799inform him of the possibility of his deportation. The Supreme Court (Douglass, J.), vacated the defendant\u2019s judgment of conviction and set the matter down for an immediate trial (see, People v Ford, 157 Misc 2d 668). The People appeal from this order, claiming that the court improperly vacated the defendant\u2019s judgment of conviction."], "id": "2a812b77-fb0b-4a31-a0f8-15a6f3b49f0a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The particular language of the Security policy\u2019s criminal activity exclusion has apparently not been previously litigated. However, a similar clause was found not to automatically preclude coverage upon a conviction of a reckless offense. In Allstate Ins. Co. v Zuk (78 NY2d 41, 44 [1991]), excluded from coverage was: \u201c \u2018bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which are in fact intended by an insured person\u2019 (emphasis supplied).\u201d Based upon this language the Court of Appeals held that a criminal conviction of second degree <mask> premised upon recklessly causing a death did not collaterally establish the death was \u201creasonably expected to result\u201d from the acts of the perpetrator. (Supra, at 47.) The Court recognized that a person may engage in behavior that involves a calculated risk without expecting that an accident will occur."], "id": "1cc52137-1d7e-4e46-b9cc-db0b83924991", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The judgment is modified to vacate the sentence imposed, to strike the 25-year-to-life enhancement from the sentences imposed under counts two and four and stay the sentences imposed under counts two and four, and to vacate the stay with respect to the sentence imposed by the trial court under count one for attempted voluntary <mask>, imprisonment for a term of 12 years. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed."], "id": "cfdd76a2-ac52-4116-840d-23fb9412fa8a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["If a hearing is held to establish whether the wrong was intentional And a felony, the Surrogate\u2019s Court may try the issue de novo (Matter of Eckhardt, 184 Misc. 748, supra). This court agrees that if one were acquitted of any crime or pleaded guilty or were convicted of a crime which did not constitute forfeiture after a hearing, this court could, nevertheless, because of the difference of the burden of proof in civil proceedings, find that the elements of forfeiture exist. In the criminal proceedings the decedent\u2019s surviving spouse took the stand and testified on her own behalf and was found guilty of <mask> in the *461second degree. Accordingly since the burden of proof is stricter in the criminal proceedings and since she testified, this court in no event could find her actions to constitute less than manslaughter in the second degree (Grand v. City of New York, 32 N Y 2d 300, supra). The court must now decide whether that is enough to constitute forfeiture or whether a hearing should be held to determine if an \u201c intentional \u201d crime was committed."], "id": "3b6a915b-443f-422b-8e83-d3751d3ebdc1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, contrary to defendant\u2019s contentions, the notations on the verdict sheet do not constitute a \u201cverdict\u201d by the jury. In Matter of Oliver v Justices of N. Y. Supreme Ct. (36 NY2d 53 [1974]), the trial court submitted a count of murder in the second degree, and the lesser included offense of <mask> in the first degree to the jury. During deliberations, the jury submitted a note indicating a partial verdict as to one count, and a deadlock as to the other count. Without any requests by either party for a partial verdict, a mistrial was declared. Defendant subsequently submitted affidavits from 9 of the 12 jurors, indicating that the partial verdict was a unanimous acquittal of the murder charge. Based on these affidavits, defendant moved to dismiss the murder count, claiming he was acquitted of that charge. The Court of Appeals held that \u201cwhatever the actual substance of the jury\u2019s partial verdict, the decision upon the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence was not announced in court by the foreman and consequently was not recorded on the minutes. Thus, on the present facts there was no \u2018verdict\u2019.\u201d (Matter of Oliver v Justices of N. Y. Supreme Ct., 36 NY2d, at 57.)"], "id": "94e7e293-8582-4b71-bb26-8b173632f445", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Initially, we agree with the trial court that, contrary to defendant's argument, the relevant question is not whether defendant was impaired at the time of the accident, but whether she was acting with gross negligence. Defendant was charged with vehicular <mask> with gross negligence under section 192, subdivision (c)(1), which is defined in relevant part as \"driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.\" In contrast, section 191.5 defines the separate offense of \"[g]ross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated,\" which is \"the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of the vehicle, where the driving was in violation of [Vehicle Code] section 23140, 23152, or 23153, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.\" (\u00a7 191.5, subd. (a).) As the Attorney General notes, \"although both offenses require the prosecution to prove gross negligence, only section 191.5, subdivision (a) requires proof of intoxication or impairment. This is why vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence in violation of section 192, subdivision (c)(1), is a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. (See People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 610].)\" Accordingly, the prosecution was not required to establish defendant's impairment at the time of the accident and the evidence was not admitted for this purpose.2"], "id": "6bece00d-eefa-4d11-8794-964187186598", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["How, gentlemen, before you can convict the defendant of the crime of <mask>, there is another element almost always presented, and an important element, to which I shall now call *403your attention; and that is, the element of intent. It ik not necessary, gentlemen, that the defendant intended to violate the law. The law presumes that every person knows its provisions. It is certainly not necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the consequences of his ac-ts, if he committed them; but you must find an intent to do the unlawful thing in question,\u2014the specific act,\u2014to fight, contrary to the statute, to commit a battery on Riordan; that is, that there was intent not to violate section 488, section 458, or whatever the number was; not an intent to commit as a-srult and battery with the idea that he knew that he was committing it; but an intent to do the act which constituted a violation of those provisions. Now, gentlemen, this fact of intent is proved like any other fact in the case. You may infer this fact from other facts in the case; and the defendant is presumed, as has been suggested during the trial, to intend the ordinary and probable consequences of his acts. Upon this subject I shall read to you, gentlemen, and incorporate as a part of my direction to you, from the opinion of the late Mr. Justice Ruger, in the case of People v. Conroy:"], "id": "a1387d89-5c6e-424c-8e28-fba6a3a058c7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The medical evidence before the Grand Jury was, in fact, that the victim was beyond medical help to retain life and that she would surely die within moments or days. Whether the cessation of the victim\u2019s heartbeat was occasioned by intervention of medical personnel is unclear. Nevertheless, the clear medical evidence was that at the moment of death the initial stabbing continued to operate as a significant direct contribution thereto. The evidence and exhibits submitted and instructions given to the Grand Jury were, therefore, legally sufficient to establish the crimes charged (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 125.20 [<mask> in first degree], 120.10 [assault in first degree], 265.01 [criminal possession of weapon in fourth degree]) which, if unexplained or uncontroverted would warrant a conviction after trial. Defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal of the indictment because of insufficiency in the Grand Jury presentation and/or for disclosure of the Grand Jury minutes, except as hereinafter noted, is denied."], "id": "dec764d4-71ee-4e2e-92ae-93d16d6861f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Charles S. Lee, Daniel C. Chang and David W. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________ Maria Duarte pleaded guilty in 2005 to two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 187, subd. (a), 664)1 and admitted criminal street gang (\u00a7 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and firearm enhancement allegations (\u00a7 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)). On March 1, 2021 the superior court summarily denied Duarte\u2019s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, ruling Duarte was ineligible for relief because she had been convicted of attempted murder, not murder. While Duarte\u2019s appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, \u00a7 2) (Senate Bill 775), effective January 1, 2022, which amended section 1170.95 to expressly include within its reach certain convictions for attempted murder and voluntary <mask>. In light of this new legislation, we remand Duarte\u2019s case for the superior court to permit Duarte to amend her petition and, following amendment, to appoint counsel for Duarte and to determine in accordance with the procedures described in section 1170.95, subdivision (c), and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) whether Duarte has made a prima facie showing she is entitled to relief. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. Duarte\u2019s Convictions for Attempted Murder According to testimony at Duarte\u2019s preliminary hearing and admissions by Duarte at her plea hearing, Duarte drove a"], "id": "26dc40b1-a1c1-438b-b36d-d2788329cfea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Court of Appeals\u2019 Decision The Court of Appeals found no merit in Morton\u2019s insuffi- cient evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel claims and affirmed the district court\u2019s sentence of 15 to 20 years\u2019 impris- onment for Morton\u2019s <mask> conviction. 5 However, the Court of Appeals found the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of 30 to 40 years\u2019 imprisonment for Morton\u2019s possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony conviction and accordingly reduced it. In finding an abuse of discretion regarding Morton\u2019s sen- tence on count II, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the State v. Morton, 29 Neb. App. 624, 957 N.W.2d 522 (2021). - 363 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MORTON Cite as 310 Neb. 355"], "id": "43de1dd5-c5f0-423b-a6d0-301ffa2781ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["9. consequences doctrine, or <mask>,\u201d may file a petition to have that conviction vacated under certain circumstances. (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (a), italics added.) The amendments also codified the holding in Lewis that a petitioner has the right to appointment of counsel, if requested, prior to the court making the prima facie finding: \u201cUpon receiving a petition in which the information required by this subdivision is set forth \u2026, if the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner.\u201d (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (b)(3).) After appointment of counsel, the parties shall have the opportunity to submit briefing, and \u201cthe court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.\u201d (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so. (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (c).) Senate Bill 775 also amended section 1170.95 to clarify that after the court issues the order to show cause and conducts a hearing, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under the amended versions of sections 188 and 189. (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).)"], "id": "7af4a224-6d55-47ec-94a5-fd19cff4c4d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["the trial court should have instructed the jury: 'The fault or lack of fault of Robyn Curtis is a circumstance to be considered along with all the other evidence to determine whether the defendant's conduct was or was not the direct cause of Robyn Curtis' death.' See Chastain, 265 Kan. at 25, 960 P.2d 756. Given the evidence of Curtis' fault and consistent with Chastain, such an instruction would have been warranted in this case. In a case without this evidence, however, the trial court should use PIK Crim.3d 56.06-A, without any modification, to instruct the jury on the crime of involuntary <mask> while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.\" 36 Kan. App. 2d at 372."], "id": "c48a65dd-a111-45c8-90f3-cd75eb2bd620", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was indicted on November 9,1961 by the Grand Jury of Nassau County for the crime of murder in the first degree (2 counts). On November 14, 1961, the defendant appeared in the Nassau County Court. There, the court directed that a \u2018 \u2018 not guilty \u2019 \u2019 plea to the charge be entered and assigned counsel to represent the defendant. Subsequently, on November 26, 1962, the trial was commenced. On December 18, 1962, during trial, a motion to amend his plea of \u00a3 \u00a3 not guilty \u201d to a plea of \u201cnot guilty by reason of insanity\u201d was granted. On the following day, December 19, 1962, the defendant withdrew his plea of \u201c not guilty by reason of insanity \u201d and substituted therefor a plea of \u201c guilty \u201d to <mask> in the first degree (the second count of the indictment) in satisfaction of the indictment. On February 1, 1963, he was sentenced as a prior felony offender to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which was 40 years, and the minimum of which was 30 years."], "id": "32c67879-8bd1-4d63-ad6d-63f0e313b1b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The facts relevant to this request are: Defendant was an invited social guest in the apartment of his girlfriend. He had visiting with him his niece and nephew, both minors. The girlfriend was at home with her minor son. Complainant, a former boyfriend, knocked vigorously on the apartment door (he lived in the same building, on a different floor). Complainant had previously threatened defendant and defendant knew that complainant was on probation for involuntary <mask> in the State of Pennsylvania. During the door knocking, complainant directed oral abuse at defendant. Defendant went to the *220door, and attempted to reason with complainant. When the knocking subsided, defendant opened the door. The girlfriend and complainant went down the common apartment hallway and talked. Defendant got a kitchen knife. When the girlfriend\u2019s minor son went in to the outside common hallway, defendant went after him. Complainant then came back to the hallway area in front of the opened apartment door where defendant was standing. Amid further oral abuse from complainant, complainant lunged at defendant. A scuffle ensued, during which defendant stabbed complainant.*"], "id": "1ff3e17b-4971-4e93-b252-983ef7bff59f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Three counts in each indictment charge <mask> in the first degree and three mapslaughter in the second. The first count charges common law manslaughter in the first degree. It alleges, in substance, that the defendants did willfully and feloniously choke, suffocate and strangle the deceased by means of fire and of the smoke thereof, by reason whereof the deceased died. The defendants demur to this count on the ground that the \u201c mere fact that death resulted is not alone sufficient to justify the inference that the weapon was deadly, or that the means of death was likely to produce death.\u201d They further contend \u201c that the court must be able to say beyond a reasonable doubt that death is likely to result when a person is burned.\u201d The defendants\u2019 argument might well be directed to this point if this were a charge of assault in the first degree. This being a charge of manslaughter and the fact and cause of death being alleged, the argument is inapplicable. Whether the allegations in this count are susceptible of proof is not a matter to be considered on demurrer, and the demurrer thereto is disallowed."], "id": "c57f6497-aa0c-4bec-98f1-6033ae52c7d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Involuntary <mask> is a lesser included offense of murder; thus, a trial court must instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter \"[i]f the evidence presents a material issue of whether a killing was committed without malice, and if there is substantial evidence defendant committed *154involuntary manslaughter.\" ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 596, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492.)"], "id": "a820ec24-b187-43f0-a7e4-17cb03072b12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["An examination of the New York statutes applicable herein compels a focus on Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 125.00, 125.05 (1); \u00a7\u00a7 125.10 and 125.12. Penal Law \u00a7 125.00 is a general section which gives a generic definition of homicide. The scheme of the statute provides definitions of various types of homicide in later sections including murder, <mask>, abortion and criminally negligent homicide. The applicable Penal Law provisions state the following:"], "id": "f2e723d7-6984-4dc9-9476-72766826e991", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Pursuant to Section 565.024, \"[a] person commits the crime of involuntary <mask> in the first degree if he or she ... [r]ecklessly causes the death of another person.\" Section 565.024.1(1). \"A person 'acts recklessly' or is reckless when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.\" Section 562.016.4."], "id": "8c7edecf-4cfa-4013-a5b9-4b47bb3cfc56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["To make the accidental killing of Mr. Hasely a crime there must be something more than ordinary negligence. The killing must have been the result of culpable negligence. In People v. Angelo (246 N. Y. 451, 453) the court says \u201c Any killing is homicide \u2014 either murder or <mask> unless the act is excusable or justified. With the latter exception we do not here deal. It is excusable, however, if the homicide is committed *111by an accident or misfortune in doing a lawful act by lawful means with ordinary caution without unlawful intent. * * * \u2018 Ordinary caution \u2019 must mean the absence of culpable negligence * *"], "id": "5b0a8488-a69c-46bf-b7dc-e08ade1c8b2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Doctor Pasquale determined the cause of death to be \u201casphyxia and hypothermia due to environmental exposure to cold temperature\u201d and the manner of death to be homicide (grand jury minutes, Apr. 11, 2007, at 14). \u201cHomicide\u201d was later defined by the ADA as, \u201cany conduct which causes the death of a person under circumstances constituting Murder, <mask> in the First or Second Degree, or Criminally Negligent Homicide\u201d (grand jury minutes, Apr. 12, 2007, at 8; see Penal Law \u00a7 125.00)."], "id": "0df3199c-d3f9-44c7-81cf-f2be2b124cad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["We find the motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. First, unlike voluntary <mask>, \"[s]elf defense is not a technical or sophisticated legal defense that is beyond the knowledge of a lay person.\" Muhammad, 367 S.W.3d at 663. Like in Muhammad, the record before us does not indicate Appellant was unaware of the simple and commonly known concept of self-defense before pleading guilty. Id."], "id": "f340cfea-f437-4d51-be64-2e8be0b6e1ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["These legal standards for proving involuntary <mask> reveal the flaw in defendant's argument that he could not be convicted without expert testimony. Defendant asserts expert testimony was required to establish the duty, or standard of care, with which he was required to act, and whether his conduct amounted to a breach of that duty. But expert testimony is only appropriate where the subject of the testimony is \"beyond the common experience.\" ( Evid. Code, \u00a7 801, subd. (a).) Whether a person of ordinary prudence would foresee a risk of death or bodily harm in certain conduct is not beyond common experience-it is necessarily within it. Expert testimony is not required where the question is what a reasonable person would do."], "id": "ee60c992-fcae-41d3-a222-842c2e775079", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["We, however, need not decide that question. As we have explained, there is another valid rationale for creating the separate vehicular <mask> statutes, namely to create a wider range of penalties for an all-too-common form of homicide. The fact that, as a consequence of this statutory scheme, courts no longer must instruct on either involuntary or vehicular manslaughter as a lesser included offense of a Watson murder does not render the scheme invalid. In the absence of infringement on a fundamental right, the Legislature may address a problem as it sees fit despite the \"availability of less drastic remedial alternatives.\" ( Johnson , supra , 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 958, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 921.)"], "id": "8c973cac-1aba-4a2b-aef4-a648809422c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants in this count are described as \u201c the owners and proprietors of a certain factory, to wit, a certain workshop and manufacturing and business establishment which then. and there occupied the whole of the ninth floor of a certain building situated at the comer of Washington place and Greene street and were then and there the lessees and tenants of the said floor.\u201d The defendants insist that because this count fails to describe them as owners and operators of a teroant factory it must be resolved in their favor. It seems unnecessary to state that owners and proprietors in control of a factory in which employees have suffered injury from the failure of such owners to perform their duty have been held responsible under common andi statutory law; but the important consideration here is .that the statute has made the non-performance of a particular duty a misdemeanor, which, in this instance, becomes the foundation of a charge of <mask> in the first degree and the defendants are entitled to a strict construction of the statute."], "id": "9f7016a4-deab-4d0f-ad28-0bf11b6d05f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Admittedly, Jackson was the first decision to use the phrase \"nested lesser\" in describing those included offenses that consist of a subset of the elements of the greater offense. But a rose by any other name is still a rose. This Court's pre- Jackson cases make clear that, at the time of Meiners' appeal, a reasonably competent attorney would have understood the idea captured by this phrase and, therefore, would have known Meiners could not commit second-degree murder without committing involuntary <mask>. See, e.g., State v. Harris , 620 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Mo. banc 1981) (\"[I]t is impossible to commit the greater [offense] without first committing the lesser\"). Accordingly, a reasonably competent attorney would have known there was a basis in the evidence for the jury to acquit Meiners of second-degree murder and convict him of involuntary manslaughter-namely, the jury's right to disbelieve Meiners acted knowingly and to conclude that he instead acted recklessly."], "id": "a35be3fd-19f2-45ed-87e1-6bb4e5c450c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Q-eorge W. Cole stands indicted for the murder of L. .Harris Hiscock, on June 4,1867, at Stanwix Hall, in the \u25a0 city of' Albany. Under this indictment he may, if the .evidence justifies it) be convicted of either of the two de*323grees of murder, or of the four degrees of <mask>, or acquitted upon the ground of justifiable or excusable homicide, or of an absolute or temporary deprivation of reason, the result of settled insanity, or of a momentary, but ungovernable, frenzy, induced by the circumstances of the particular occasion."], "id": "76658b30-e3e1-40bb-a79c-18ce514608f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In Mullaney, supra, p 698, the statute draws a distinction between murder and <mask>, \"while refusing to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which it turns\u201d. Here, too, the New York Legislature defined separate degrees of robbery without mandating that the People show \"the fact upon which it turns\u201d. As in Mullaney, the punishments for the two different crimes vary greatly. An accused would face the 25-year permissible sentence for robbery in the first degree \"when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly lesser sentence\u201d (p 703)."], "id": "d0f701ed-b1f3-40a2-8a91-f065ee2160bb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["This court has held that \u201c[a] criminal conviction either by plea or after trial is conclusive proof of its underlying facts in a subsequent civil proceeding and collaterally estops a party from relitigating the issues\u201d (Estate of Mirissis, NYLJ, Mar. 16, 1993, at 25, col 3, citing Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v Arzillo, 98 AD2d 495 [1984]; Grayes v DiStasio, 166 AD2d 261 [1990]). In Mirissis, this court held that a de novo hearing was not necessary in order to prove that the wrong was intentional where the killer had entered a plea to <mask> in the first degree (see also Matter of Loud, 70 Misc 2d 1026 [1972]). Nevertheless, this court held that before declaring a forfeiture on the part of the killer, \u201cthe court should review the transcript of the minutes of the plea.\u201d Likewise, the court found that since \u201cthe record of conviction indicates that a notice of appeal was filed . . . the guardian ad litem should report on the status of same\u201d (Estate of Mirissis, NYLJ, Mar. 16, 1993, at 25, col 3)."], "id": "522eb217-3a7a-411f-87f7-1d1b98529e91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In Mullaney, the statute drew a distinction between murder and <mask> (p 698), \"while refusing to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which it turns\u201d. The presence or absence of entrapment, however, in no way affects the prosecution\u2019s duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged, for \"conduct is not less criminal because the result of *19temptation\u201d (Sherman v United States, supra, p 380 [Justice Frankfurter, concurring]; see People v Bornholdt, 33 NY2d 75, p 85, supra; People v Laietta, 30 NY2d 68, 75, supra). In fact, the jury does not reach the entrapment question, unless it finds the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime before them."], "id": "3df17e0d-b37e-4996-8c81-cbe3106cb69b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["court abused its discretion in considering and applying the relevant factors as well as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed. 20 [3] It is well established that an appellate court will not disturb sentences within the statutory limits unless the district court abused its discretion in establishing the sentences. 21 When sentences imposed within statutory limits are alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in considering well- established factors and any applicable legal principles. 22 [4,5] The relevant factors for a sentencing judge to consider when imposing a sentence are the defendant\u2019s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime. 23 The sentencing court is not limited to any mathematically applied set of factors, but the appropriateness of the sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment that includes the sentencing judge\u2019s observations of the defendant\u2019s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and cir- cumstances surrounding the defendant\u2019s life. 24 [6,7] We find that it was inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to second-guess the district court\u2019s discretion in sen- tencing Morton under the crime of possession with the predi- cate offense of <mask>, by opining the State\u2019s factual basis \u201cbest\u201d supported a crime he was not convicted of, unlaw- ful discharge of a firearm. 25 So long as the facts provide a sufficient basis to find all elements beyond a reasonable State v. Stabler, 305 Neb. 415, 940 N.W.2d 572 (2020). State v. Decker, 261 Neb. 382, 622 N.W.2d 903 (2001). State v. Greer, supra note 18. See id. Id. \u00a7 28-1212.02. - 367 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MORTON Cite as 310 Neb. 355"], "id": "714a626a-f0bd-4830-95fb-46d1410356b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court finds that this is the case here. There is no direct proof of intoxication submitted, or that such intoxication caused the accident. However, the defendant presents the affidavit of the office manager of defendant\u2019s law firm, Christopher Roselli, who states that the police report revealed that plaintiffs assignor, Luis Vargas, was arrested at the accident scene on charges of driving while intoxicated. He further states that he spoke to Orange County Assistant District Attorney Steven Goldberg, who informed him that Vargas was indicted on 34 charges, including two counts of driving while intoxicated. A formal request for a copy of the indictment was made, and the results of that request, a copy of the indictment, is annexed to defendant\u2019s reply papers. Among other things, the indictment *500contains not only a charge of driving while intoxicated, but also of vehicular <mask> in the first degree, as a passenger in Vargas\u2019s vehicle was ejected and killed as a result of his operation of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Other felony counts are based on injuries to other passengers. Thus, in addition to allegedly driving while intoxicated, his operation of the vehicle may have resulted in his having been injured while committing a felony."], "id": "8d7797a4-d37f-410a-a77a-6fc40831aa0f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, based upon our determination that the evidence is not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to kill the victim, but it is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim, which resulted in the victim\u2019s death (see Penal Law \u00a7 125.20 [1]), we conclude that the conviction of murder in the second degree should be reduced to <mask> in the first degree pursuant to CPL 470.15 (2) (a). Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment should be so modified, and the matter should be remitted to County Court for sentencing on the manslaughter conviction (see CPL 470.20 [4])."], "id": "40938e23-dda4-4d33-9f89-8593793c6438", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "MANSLAUGHTER", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["\"A. ERROR FOR FAILURE TO SEVER APPELLANT'S CASE FROM THAT OF HIS BROTHER SALVADOR? *905\"(CT 1:209, 215-216, RT 1:114-116, RT 16:1260; Pen. Code, \u00a7 1098 ; Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 544 [113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317] ; People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1081 [210 Cal.Rptr.3d 667, 384 P.3d 693] ; People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 850 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 289 P.3d 791] ; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 41 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] ; People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 236-237 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348, 212 P.3d 639] ; Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 447-448 [204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699] ; People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917 [59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869] ; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1287 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1] ; United States v. Tootick (9th Cir. 1991) 952 F.2d 1078, 1082 ; United States v. Romanello (5th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 173, 174 People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 231 [250 Cal.Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25] ; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1208-1209 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254] ; People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 110-111 [141 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, 277 P.3d 118] ; People v . Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 343 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61] ; People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 280 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 393] ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 168 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781] ; United States v. Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 962 F.2d 1349, 1362 ; United States v. Buena-Lopez (9th Cir. 1993) 987 F.2d 657, 661.) \"B. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE RE AIDING AND ABETTING? \"( Juan H. v. Allen (9th Cir.2005) 408 F.3d 1262, 1277-1278 ; People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323] ; People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 903 [207 Cal.Rptr.3d 228, 378 P.3d 615] ; People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 272-273 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 393] ; People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 529 ); People v. Hickles (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 86] ; People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1463-1466 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 680] ; People v. Joiner (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 946, 967 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 270] ; People v. Hill (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 287, 293-294 [175 P.2d 45] ; People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1376 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596] ; People v. Godinez (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 492, 499 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 325] ; People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 879-880 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 659, 279 P.3d 1131].) \"C. DID APPELLANT SUFFER PREJUDICE AS A RESULT OF AN IMPEACHMENT GANG PRIOR AS TO CODEFENDANT SALVADOR? *319\"(RT 9:808-812, CALCRIM No. 316 [evidence limited], Evid. Code, \u00a7 352 ; People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 297, fn. 7 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938] ; People v. Heckathorne (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 458, 462-463 [248 Cal.Rptr. 399] ; People v. McClellan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 793, 809 [80 Cal.Rptr. 31, 457 P.2d 871] ; People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 316 [211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111] ; In re Wing Y. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 69, 76-79 [136 Cal.Rptr. 390] ; People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, 88 [201 Cal.Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1] ; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710] ; People v. Maestas (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1482, 1495 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 644] ; People v. Perez (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 470, 479 [170 Cal.Rptr. 619] ; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th at 879, 922 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93] ; McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1378, 1381 and fn. 2 ; Henry v. Estelle (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1423, 1427-1428.) *906\"D. ERROR NOT TO GIVE DEFENSE-REQUESTED CALCRIM NOS. 224 AND 225? \"(RT 11:1018-1019; CALCRIM No. 223 [direct/circumstantial evidence] and CALCRIM No. 224 [circumstantial evidence] (CT 1:112-113); People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 676 [130 Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 259 P.3d 1186] ; People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1170 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 874] ; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 885 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135] ; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1222 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] ; People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 562 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137] ; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] ; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 347 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].) \"E. WERE AIDING AND ABETTING/NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES INSTRUCTIONS PROPER? \"(CT 1:134-137; People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560-56 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] ; People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117-1118 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210] ; People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5 [221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392] ; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107-109 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] ; People v. Patterson (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 610, 614 [257 Cal.Rptr. 407] ; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738] ; In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].) \"F. WERE ALL RELEVANT LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES GIVEN? \"(CT 1:131 [general instruction]; 139 [heat of passion/sudden quarrel]; CT 1:141 [imperfect self-defense]; *320People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 704, 708 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 256] ); CT 1:145 [assault with a firearm]; CT 1:147 [simple assault]; CT 1:149 [brandishing] ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 417 ; People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749, 764 [59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820] ; People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 774 [228 P.2d 281] ; People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662, 677-678 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340] ; Pen. Code, \u00a7 663 ; People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013] ; People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1586-1588 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 231].) \"G. INCONSISTENT VERDICTS/SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE-(MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL) \"(CT 1:209, 212-215, RT 9:874-875, RT 16:1258-1269; United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57 [105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461] ; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392] ; People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 856, 860-861 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 13, 15 P.3d 234] ; People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422, 428-429 [193 Cal.Rptr. 711]; People v. Santamaria, supra , 8 Cal. 4th at p. 911 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 884 P.2d 81] ; People v. Polowicz (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 640] ; People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1651, 1656 [277 Cal.Rptr. 656] ; People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 405 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 231] ; Count 2: Assault with semiautomatic weapon: Pen. Code, \u00a7 245, subdivision (b) ; CALCRIM No. 875, CT 1: 143-146 [definition of firearm vs. semiautomatic]; Pen. Code, \u00a7 17140 ; People v. Dokins (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184 [194 Cal.Rptr.3d 626] ; In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 874, fn. 4 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297] ; *907People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 132 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461] ; People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 141 [70 Cal.Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777].) \"H. CAN VOLUNTARY <mask> EVER BE A NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF A MISDEMEANOR LIKE SIMPLE ASSAULT OR BRANDISHING A WEAPON? \"(RT 11:1023-1027; CT 1:132, CALCRIM No. 252 [aiding and abetting \"requires a specific intent or mental state]; CT 1:136, CALCRIM No. 402 [aider and abettor must be found guilty of offense triggering non-target charged offense]; People v. Canizalez (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 832, 854 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 565] ; People v. Edwards (2015) 241 Cal.App. 4th 213, 275 [193 Cal.Rptr.3d 696] [depub.]; People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 299-300 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 256 P.3d 543] *321[simple assault]; People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1054-1055 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 482] [simple assault and breach of the peace for fighting in public]; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 325 P.3d 972] ; People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 872 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 659, 279 P.3d 1131] ; People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662, 681 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340] ; People v. Flores (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 866 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 732] ; People v. King ( 1938) 30 Cal.App.2d 185, 200 [85 P.2d 928]; People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 732-733 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 282] ; People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 922-923 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 202, 209 P.3d 105] ; People v. Butts (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 817, 836 [46 Cal.Rptr. 362] ; People v. Hickles (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1197 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].) \"I. DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING APPELLANT, A MERE AIDER AND ABETTOR, TO AN UPPER TERM OF 9 YEARS? \"(RT 16:1286-1287, Williams v. New York (1949) 337 U.S. 241, 247 [69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337] ; United States v. Barker (9th Cir. 1985) 771 F.2d 1362, 1365 ; People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 161 P.3d 1146] ; People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 161 P.3d 1130].)\" Although counsel presented the foregoing list of \"claims,\" she states in a declaration attached to the brief that she has thus far not \"uncovered any arguable appellate issues.\"6"], "id": "039f2de9-55a4-4468-a5a3-e7d38237d985", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The City further asserted that as Officer Gonzales drove her patrol car north on Chartres Street and crossed the intersection at Texas Avenue, where she had a green light, the car driven by Moser, who had failed to stop at a red light, \"violently\" struck the patrol car on its left side. Law enforcement officers took Moser, who admitted at the scene that she had previously consumed \"6-7 shots of alcohol\" and \"shouldn't have been driving,\" to a hospital, where personnel measured her blood-alcohol concentration at 0.189 grams. Moser later pleaded guilty to the offense of intoxication <mask>, and a court found her guilty and assessed her punishment at confinement for eight years."], "id": "51ce8e22-3924-49de-962b-6e9cbae4f23b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Prior to this proceeding the children\u2019s natural father, respondent herein, was convicted of second degree <mask> and sentenced to an indeterminate term. He is presently incarcerated in a State correctional institution and has been cited there to show cause why his consent to the proposed adoption should not be dispensed with on the grounds of his abandonment of the infant children and loss of civil rights (Domestic Relations Law, \u00a7 111)."], "id": "13e3244c-070b-4d2d-952b-3b7324ba8593", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Section 61 of the Correction Law provides that any male person between the ages of 16 and 21 years adjudicated a juvenile delinquent or convicted of any offense or of a misdemeanor, or of a felony (except mentally defectives), shall, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, be committed to the department reception center for classification, etc. The next sentence then provides: \u20181 The reception center shall also receive any male person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, who is fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of any act which, if committed by an adult, would be \u201d assault in the first *709degree, burglary in the first degree, <mask> in the first degree, rape in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, or any crime which would be punishable by death or life imprisonment. Since the relators did not commit any of the above-listed crimes, they do not come within the above exception as to persons under 16 years of age."], "id": "bc0175cf-3f77-4a27-bbbf-3e8e86abddf3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The next morning, Friday May 19, 2017, the jury (as had been arranged) began deliberations without the court formally reconvening. In a 11:30 a.m. note, the jury asked, \"If you believe its 2nd degree murder does that mean its automatic man-slaughter?\" The court and parties discussed the question in chambers. The written response given was \"No\" and the jury was referred to pattern instructions on murder and voluntary <mask> and the instruction on how to deliberate, that is, in part that \"You may consider these different kinds of homicide in whatever order you wish.\""], "id": "07beeedf-d0df-49d3-9b24-bb07b29328c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment charges <mask> in the second degree and alleges that the defendant Carlson manipulated \u201c certain switches and machinery \u201d controlling the operation of the elevator in the apartment house of which he was superintendent \u201c in a culpably negligent manner \u201d and that \u201c by reason of the acts, procurement, omissions and culpable negligence of the defendant, said elevator suddenly and without any warning thereof, ascended, the elevator door thereto and the gate thereon being open and without any one pushing any button therein, thereby causing said Renee Alprin to be thrown against the top of the elevator door, and sustaining divers wounds and injuries as a result of which she died on the aforesaid date, said acts of the defendant not being justifiable or excusable.\u201d"], "id": "1155639c-96c0-4cad-91cf-554f6104b157", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Citing Batchelor, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pages 1116 through 1118, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 28, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to advise the jury that he had been convicted of gross vehicular <mask> in the first trial. In Batchelor, as here, at the first trial the defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter, but the jury could not reach a verdict as to the murder charge. Also, as here, at the second trial *641the defendant was convicted of murder. The court in Batchelor held that the trial court committed reversible error because it did not advise the jury in the second trial that he had been convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter in the first trial. (Id . at pp. 1116-1117, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 28.) The court reasoned that the failure to so advise the jury gave it the \"false impression\" that the defendant would be \"unpunished\" if he was not convicted of murder. (Ibid . )"], "id": "c717e95e-4c98-4a70-86fb-ffa4d2efd4f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant\u2019s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he acted recklessly in causing the death of the victim is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10 [1995]; People v Huddleston, 101 AD3d 901 [2012]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant\u2019s guilt of <mask> in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law \u00a7 15.05 [3]; People v Licitra, 47 NY2d 554 [1979]; People v Johnson, 205 AD2d 707, 708 [1994]). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5])."], "id": "568ce849-9df0-44f8-ae87-cc76227c4305", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["On September 21, 1978 defendant, then approximately 18 years of age, entered a plea of guilty to <mask> in the first degree before Honorable John R. Starkey, now retired. On November 17, 1978 he was sentenced to a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 15 years in State prison. The sentence was appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, on the grounds of excessiveness. The Appellate Division affirmed, without opinion, on June 11, 1979. Defendant was released on parole on June 20, 1984. Since that time he has been detained in the Immigration and Naturalization Processing Center detention facilities, pending deportation."], "id": "99901fbe-99cb-4559-8e03-f10ba7a0f279", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Charles S. Lee, Daniel C. Chang and David W. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________ Maria Duarte pleaded guilty in 2005 to two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 187, subd. (a), 664)1 and admitted criminal street gang (\u00a7 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and firearm enhancement allegations (\u00a7 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)). On March 1, 2021 the superior court summarily denied Duarte\u2019s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, ruling Duarte was ineligible for relief because she had been convicted of attempted murder, not murder. While Duarte\u2019s appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, \u00a7 2) (Senate Bill 775), effective January 1, 2022, which amended section 1170.95 to expressly include within its reach certain convictions for attempted murder and voluntary <mask>. In light of this new legislation, we remand Duarte\u2019s case for the superior court to permit Duarte to amend her petition and, following amendment, to appoint counsel for Duarte and to determine in accordance with the procedures described in section 1170.95, subdivision (c), and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) whether Duarte has made a prima facie showing she is entitled to relief. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. Duarte\u2019s Convictions for Attempted Murder According to testimony at Duarte\u2019s preliminary hearing and admissions by Duarte at her plea hearing, Duarte drove a"], "id": "c2899f55-8f12-49ad-a710-8ed300fe2073", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["everyone within a kill zone, can support an intent to kill an individual. Also, Smith was shot when he was behind Pascal and therefore in the line of fire. Evidence that a shooter purposefully fired at the victims, one of whom was positioned one behind the other, \u201cwith each directly in his line of fire, can support an inference that he acted with intent to kill both.\u201d People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 743.) Thus, there is evidence of an intent to kill someone in the group the shooter fired into, and that defendant, a fellow gang member with the shooter, drove the truck in a way to facilitate the attempt to kill. Since, as the Supreme Court held in Stone, \u201ca generalized intent to kill someone, but not necessarily a specific target, is sufficient\u201d to support an attempted murder conviction (Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 136), there is sufficient evidence to support the attempted murder verdict under Stone, as there was substantial evidence of an intent to kill someone in the group.7 The People shall have the option of retrying petitioner on the attempted murder charge. II Remaining Contentions Petitioner\u2019s remaining contentions, that he had inadequate notice he could be principal for the purposes of the section 12022.53 enhancement, that failure to instruct on attempted voluntary <mask> deprived him of due process, that cumulative error warrants reversal, and that failure to raise any of his habeas contentions at trial or on appeal constituted ineffective assistance, are mooted by our reversal of the attempted"], "id": "e843076d-c003-4ed9-853b-1ff9851a1bf7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["I am confronted with two versions of a homicide, but, as distinguished from \"Rashomon,\u201d both come from one and the same source. It is essential that there be a factual determination, ab initio, as to which version is credible since the original version spells out an intent to kill (which defendant seeks to have mitigated to <mask> first degree on the basis of the claimed influence of \"extreme emotional disturbance\u201d). The subsequent story spells out no intent to kill, but *140rather an accidental death, based on self-defense. In my judgment, the first set of confessions represents the truth, for the following reasons:"], "id": "8c1d0561-63cb-4f3a-9858-654ab076a9b5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Because the jury expressed the possibility of being unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the trial court referred the jury to CALCRIM No. 3550 and emphasized their duty to try to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial court also referred the jury to CALCRIM No. 640 regarding the \u201crange of determinations\u201d that could be made with respect to the murder count and its lesser included offenses. As delivered to the jury, this instruction provides in relevant part: \u201c1. If all of you agree that the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is GUILTY of first degree murder, complete and sign that verdict form. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms for Count One. \u201c2. If all of you cannot agree whether a defendant is guilty of first degree murder, inform me that you cannot reach an agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict forms for Count One. \u201c3. If all of you agree that a defendant is NOT GUILTY of first degree murder but also agree that a defendant is GUILTY of second degree murder, complete and sign the form for NOT GUILTY of first degree murder and the form for GUILTY of second degree murder. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms for Count One. \u201c4. If all of you agree that a defendant is NOT GUILTY of first degree murder but cannot agree whether a defendant is guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign the form for NOT GUILTY of first degree murder and inform me that you cannot reach further agreement. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms for Count One. \u201c5. If all of you agree that a defendant is NOT GUILTY of first degree murder and NOT GUILTY of second degree murder, but also agree that a defendant is GUILTY of voluntary <mask>, complete and sign the forms for NOT GUILTY of first degree murder and NOT GUILTY of second degree murder and the form for GUILTY of voluntary manslaughter. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms for Count One."], "id": "e6900c6d-dc67-43e3-93dc-becbd3eab2c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner is the brother of a homicide victim, Darren McNamara. John Bonizio (Bonizio) was hired by Peter Rosner to avenge an insult to his daughter Cheryl Rosner. On August 25, 1982 Bonizio and an unknown companion carried out their contract by bludgeoning Darren McNamara to death. Bonizio was convicted of first degree <mask> and sentenced in January 1984 to a term of imprisonment of 6 to 18 years, which he is serving. At his sentencing, the Assistant District Attorney stated that Bonizio was involved with organized crime and that he had been sentenced to a concurrent term of imprisonment for certain felonies related to organized crime. Petitioner alleges that Bonizio, and Bonizio\u2019s associates, threatened his life, that of a witness to the crime and that of an undercover police officer."], "id": "23ddd892-a52a-40b0-8a1c-6f4cb498bfe9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*458On the facts established on the. trial defendant might have been indicted for the crime of murder in the second degree. There was a possible view of the facts which would justify a verdict other than conviction of murder in the first degree or an acquittal. The jury might have ignored the element of the crime charged in the indictment that defendant was engaged in the commission of a felony, which raised it to murder in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 1044; People v. Miles, 143 N. Y. 383, 389), and found merely that defendant assaulted Biggs with a loaded revolver, without deliberation and premeditation, but with intent to kill him, and killed Severance instead. Then the offense would be murder in the second degree. (People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, 521.) Beyond that was room for the exercise of a power to find the defendant guilty of <mask> in the first or second degree, depending upon the absence of the intent to kill. (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 1049, 1050, 1052.)"], "id": "65fbcaa4-f240-47c7-95fe-153b5b02e067", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court finds that this is the case here. There is no direct proof of intoxication submitted, or that such intoxication caused the accident. However, the defendant presents the affidavit of the office manager of defendant\u2019s law firm, Christopher Roselli, who states that the police report revealed that plaintiffs assignor, Luis Vargas, was arrested at the accident scene on charges of driving while intoxicated. He further states that he spoke to Orange County Assistant District Attorney Steven Goldberg, who informed him that Vargas was indicted on 34 charges, including two counts of driving while intoxicated. A formal request for a copy of the indictment was made, and the results of that request, a copy of the indictment, is annexed to defendant\u2019s reply papers. Among other things, the indictment *500contains not only a charge of driving while intoxicated, but also of vehicular <mask> in the first degree, as a passenger in Vargas\u2019s vehicle was ejected and killed as a result of his operation of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Other felony counts are based on injuries to other passengers. Thus, in addition to allegedly driving while intoxicated, his operation of the vehicle may have resulted in his having been injured while committing a felony."], "id": "be956d7e-3642-43a7-b220-db89189f25b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["This case has a unique history. On or about May 20, 2005, the plaintiff was involved in a violent altercation with Anthony J. Sciortino. In the course of the altercation, the plaintiff struck Sciortino in the head and neck with a baseball bat, and he subsequently died. The plaintiff was indicted for this incident for <mask> in the second degree. At trial he asserted the defense of justification, and was acquitted of the charge. On or about April 28, 2006, the Sciortino estate brought a wrongful death personal injury action against the plaintiff. Plaintiffs insurer initially disclaimed coverage and defense, although ultimately it did provide a defense for the plaintiff. However, it has steadfastly denied any duty to indemnify the plaintiff."], "id": "f0f70918-21ef-4d27-83c7-0e73579c2f07", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["If the jury were not satisfied that it was justifiable, they were next to inquire whether it was excusable? It is so under our law, when committed by accident of misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon a sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, without any dangerous weapon being used. The nature of the weapon used, and the manner in which it was used, must .be mainly instrumental in determining this question. Thus if, in the heat of passion, upon sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, a man had used his walking stick, or a butcher, in his stall, had used the knife that lay near him, or a cooper had used the adz with *66which he was then at work, and had given a blow which was fatal, bnt without any intention to take life, the homicide might be excusable. But that could hardly be where the weapon used was of a dangerous character, constructed solely for the purpose of taking life, and which could scarcely be fired off without hazarding it. If, in the melee, the prisoner had used the pistol, as he might any other hard substance found at the instant in his pocket, by striking a blow with it, calculated rather to wound than to kill, but had killed, it might be attributed to accident or misfortune. But that could not with propriety be predicated of the act of intentionally firing the pistol, and, unless such firing was justifiable, it was either murder or <mask>."], "id": "93a81b55-0193-41ff-ba86-c66a5d88960c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The court\u2019s instructions, however, did not leave the jury free to convict of the lesser crime. In giving such instructions the court committed serious error, and I think the exceptions which I have pointed out are sufficient to *481raise the question here. The defendant was found guilty of <mask> in the first degree and was sentenced to imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than twenty years."], "id": "7eb5a500-2d61-4a71-9fab-81db71b31af8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Here, Fields seeks to take advantage of the legislature's decision to repeal an existing provision, rather than relying on a newly enacted provision; thus, the first prong of the inquiry counsels against retroactive application. Under the second prong, we must determine whether the 85% mandatory minimum prison term provision of \u00a7 565.024.2 affected the penalty or punishment of first-degree involuntary <mask> as it existed at the time of Fields's offense."], "id": "6795c6e5-c388-44b6-a78e-83a0de1266bd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner was convicted of <mask> in the first degree and sentenced on September 23, 1977 to an indeter*72m\u00ednate period of imprisonment of a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 10 years. Prior to being sentenced, he had never been convicted of a crime. The instant crime had been characterized by respondents in their parole summary as \u201creportedly a family dispute, revenge type offense .\u201d Petitioner became eligible for parole on November 16,1979, and before that date, he attended a parole hearing on October 23, 1979. In a remarkably brief hearing \u2014 [the record only consists of 4y2 double spaced typewritten pages] \u2014 petitioner\u2019s conduct and activities during his imprisonment were the subject of a cursory inquiry by the Parole Board. At the hearing\u2019s conclusion, the Parole Board denied petitioner\u2019s early release and stated in its written decision:"], "id": "dc96aa81-d1f3-4f24-9d1b-eb7097e2ebb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The Judge charged the jury that the prisoner was on trial for murder, but might be convicted of <mask>. There being no doubt that he had perpetrated the homicide, the only question was as to the nature of the offense. If they could find that he had intended to kill, then it was murder, but if they could not find such an intention then the homicide was manslaughter, and being perpetrated in a cruel and unusual manner, it was the second degree of that crime."], "id": "de472592-d3bd-4c36-ad1a-9065eddd71cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of <mask> in the first degree and assault in the first degree, appealed from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his motion to correct a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner. The defendant had claimed in his motion that he was incompetent at the time of sentencing and that the sentencing court failed to order, sua sponte, a competency evaluation and hearing before imposing sentence. The defendant submitted with his motion to correct a police report, psychiatric evaluation and records from the Department of Correction that had become available after he was sen- tenced, all of which concerned his mental illness and psychiatric treat- ment prior to sentencing. The trial court dismissed the defendant\u2019s motion to correct for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the motion challenged his competency at the time he pleaded guilty and, thus, constituted a collateral attack on his conviction. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the defendant\u2019s motion, con- cluding that he had failed to raise a colorable claim that he was incompe- tent at the time of sentencing. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion to correct his sentence on the ground that he had failed to allege a colorable claim within the scope of the rule of practice (\u00a7 43-22) authorizing a judicial authority to correct an illegal sentence or a sen- tence imposed in an illegal manner. Held that the Appellate Court improp- erly upheld the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the defendant\u2019s motion to cor- rect, as the factual allegations and evidence the defendant presented in connection with his motion made clear that he raised a colorable chal- lenge to the character of the procedure that led to the imposition of his sentence, rather than the underlying conviction, and, thus, his claim nominally fell within the scope of \u00a7 43-22: although the prosecutor and defense counsel during the sentencing proceeding had discussed the defendant\u2019s psychiatric background and diagnosis of schizophrenia, the factual allegations and evidence the defendant offered in support of his claim demonstrated a possibility that a factual basis necessary to establish jurisdiction existed, as the police report and psychiatric evalua- tion showed that he previously had suffered from hallucinations, had attempted to commit suicide, and had not received treatment for his mental health for many years, and the department records showed that he had refused to take his prescribed medication and had suffered from auditory hallucinations approximately nine months before sentencing; moreover, contrary to the state\u2019s assertion that the trial court decided the merits of the defendant\u2019s claim and determined that the sentencing procedure complied with all constitutional and statutory requirements, that court\u2019s decision was limited to the issue of jurisdiction, as the court never explicitly ruled on the merits of the defendant\u2019s claim or made findings as to whether the proffered evidence overcame the presumption of competency. Argued March 25\u2014officially released October 21, 2021*"], "id": "9369b8a2-5581-4289-b601-dde44134bfbe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Citing to this court's opinion in People v. Batchelor (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1102, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 28 (Batchelor ), defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request that the jury for his retrial be informed that he had been convicted in a prior trial arising out of the same underlying facts of gross vehicular <mask> while intoxicated, instead informing the jury only that he had been convicted \"of two of the three charges brought by the district attorney.\" We agree that the trial court's instructions to the jury were erroneous in several respects, including this one, and that these errors require reversal of the second degree murder conviction."], "id": "5caa8d7b-e24f-46ec-b4e3-aea25169eefe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["of murder because of Senate Bill No. 1437\u2019s changes to the definition of the crime. (Lewis, at p. 957; Gentile, at p. 843.) In determining whether a petitioner has carried the burden of making a prima facie showing he or she falls within the provisions of section 1170.95 and is entitled to relief, it is appropriate to examine the record of conviction, \u201callowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.\u201d (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) 2. Reyes\u2019s Appeal In accord with the procedures described in People v. Cole (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1023, review granted October 14, 2020, S264278, we appointed counsel to represent Reyes on appeal. After reviewing the record, Reyes\u2019s counsel filed a brief raising no issues. Appointed counsel advised Reyes on November 15, 2021 that he had 30 days after he filed his no-issue brief to submit a brief or letter raising any grounds of appeal, contentions or arguments he wanted the court to consider. We provided a similar notice to Reyes on the same date. On December 13, 2021 we received a two-page typewritten supplemental letter brief from Reyes pointing out that the Legislature had enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, \u00a7 2) (Senate Bill 775), effective January 1, 2022, which amended section 1170.95 to expressly include within its reach certain convictions for attempted murder and voluntary <mask>. As Reyes indicates in his letter, section 1170.95, subdivision (a), now provides, \u201cA person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person\u2019s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural"], "id": "a3a4bbdd-f20a-416a-bf60-66e0fc95ebb7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Assuming the results are the same after this respondent has exhausted his appeals, if any, the undersigned finds that the language in Riggs (supra) may ultimately be applicable to the within situation. While not suggesting that a temporal analysis is determinative in cases such as this, had Deanna Palladino not post-deceased her mother so soon after Dianne Edwards\u2019 death, Brandon Palladino\u2019s expectation from his wife\u2019s estate might not include the assets of his mother-in-law\u2019s estate. In this case it is clear, however, that but for Brandon Palladino\u2019s actions, there would be no inheritance to be obtained through his wife Deanna. Respondent made that possible; and, upon his conviction for <mask> in the first degree (a class B felony defined under Penal Law \u00a7 125.20 [1] as intentionally causing serious physical injury to an individual resulting in such individual\u2019s death), he should not be allowed to profit in any way thereby."], "id": "8b737a37-e4a8-4bd0-8781-980dba431b8b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["With this in mind an analysis of the Pennsylvania case, heretofore discussed, justifies the conclusion that malice is the fact which differentiates murder from voluntary <mask>. In that respect the Pennsylvania law differs from ours. Under our statutes an essential characterization of murder in either degree is the intent \u2014 \u201c a design to effect the death of the person killed, or of another.\u201d (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 1042, 1046.) If the killing be with deliberation and premeditation; that is with malice, under our statutes it is first degree murder; if without deliberation and premeditation, i. e., malice, it is murder in the second degree."], "id": "8bdbaaa4-faf4-4547-bf16-0b14ad52b60b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Roberts argues that because the jury could consider voluntary <mask> as a lesser included offense to the second-degree murder charge in count 3, the court should have given felony-murder instructions for counts 1 and 2 that allowed the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter as an alternative underlying felony to intentional second-degree murder. Roberts claims that if the court had included a voluntary manslaughter felony- murder instruction, the jury would have been more inclined to convict him of voluntary manslaughter on the underlying offense, rather than second-degree murder. Roberts acknowledges that he did not request the felony-murder voluntary manslaughter instruction."], "id": "a96d456f-383b-4179-b2a7-b440b8f9e207", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Harold J. Rothwax, J. The defendant, having been indicted for <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 125.15), moves to dismiss the indictment upon the ground that the prosecution herein is untimely under the applicable Statute of Limitations. (CPL 210.20, subd 1, par [f]; 30.10, subd 2, pars [a], [b]; see People v O\u2019Neil, 107 Misc 2d 340, 341.) The court has also reviewed the Grand Jury minutes and finds the evidence sufficient to support the charge filed herein and the proceedings to have conformed in all respects with the procedures outlined in the defendant\u2019s motion."], "id": "fa4f1d19-abcb-4e5e-8d70-7a7c2b16b8dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The \"note on use\" following AMI Crim. 2d 1004-A provides that this instruction is used with AMI Crim. 2d 1004 when the defendant is asserting the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The note further instructs to use AMI Crim. 2d 301 (Lesser Included Offenses: Introductory Instruction) and AMI Crim. 2d 302 (Lesser Included Offenses: Transitional Instruction) with the bracketed language for extreme emotional disturbance <mask> with the instructions for the murder offense(s) being submitted, then this instruction, followed by AMI Crim. 2d 1004."], "id": "fc460659-4e06-47a0-8b0d-c1ad47413fe7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction of <mask> in the second degree or any lesser included offense, which would include, of course, criminally negligent homicide. Noting the possibility that a disagreement might have led to a heated argument, prompting the defendant to seize the weapon in order to threaten the deceased, the Court found that it was equally possible that the production of the gun was unrelated to any disagreement, \"perhaps displayed in friendship and carelessly discharged as a result of ordinary negligence.\u201d (Supra, at 57.) Most significantly though, the Court found that \"even assuming that the weapon was in the defendant\u2019s hand at the time of the shooting, neither this circumstance nor any other factors in the case compels the inference that the manner in which the defendant handled the weapon, if negligent, rose to the level of a criminal act [citation omitted].\u201d (Supra, at 57-58.)"], "id": "d5badcb0-1f05-4b69-852a-02bbfaa06d41", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["This court analyzes jury instruction challenges in a four-step progression. First, it considers whether the issue is properly reviewable based on preservation and jurisdiction standpoints; second, this court determines whether the instruction was legally appropriate; third, it determines whether the instruction was factually appropriate; and finally, if an error occurred, this court will determine whether it requires reversal. State v. Green, 311 Kan. 960, 983, 469 P.3d 1228 (2020). As a preliminary matter, Aue objected to the inclusion of the PIK Crim. 4th 52.050 jury instruction language in the instructions for reckless second-degree murder, voluntary <mask>, and involuntary manslaughter\u2014arguing it was unnecessary and including it three times overemphasized its importance. Thus, Aue preserved this issue for review. See State v. Perez-Medina, 310 Kan. 525, 533-34, 448 P.3d 446 (2019)."], "id": "f845c8b0-4fff-4c3a-a6be-2fccc652fb4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["the house, and where the victim, who was not part of the alter- cation, had been standing on the porch. Similarly, in State v. Moore, 32 we affirmed the defendant\u2019s convictions for assault in the first degree and use of a weapon to commit a felony (and his sentence to two consecutive terms of 20 to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment), when, without taking any real \u201c\u2018aim,\u2019\u201d the defendant fired one shot toward a house with little indication anyone was home, the shot pierced the house, and it hit the victim who was sitting inside, paralyzing her. [9] Under the factual basis presented here, a trier of fact could infer that Morton, intentionally firing a lethal weapon toward the front of the house and porch where several people were congregating, had intended to cause the death of \u201ca per- son.\u201d While there was no evidence Morton intended to harm any specific individual, an indiscriminate killer is just as culpable as one who targets a specific person. 33 The Court of Appeals, by concluding the facts better fit the crime of unlaw- ful discharge of a firearm, failed to recognize that the facts could support that level of culpability, and that they indisput- ably supported <mask>, and thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to impose a commensurate level of punishment. [10] And while we note that the sentencing range for unlaw- ful discharge is greater than that of manslaughter, it appears the Court of Appeals also used its reasoning as to what crime it believed better fit the facts to minimize the substantial bene\u00ad fit Morton received from the plea bargain agreement. The sentencing court took into account that but for his plea bar- gain agreement, Morton would have been facing a charge of second degree murder\u2014in addition to unlawful discharge and two charges of use of a firearm\u2014instead of the manslaughter and one count of possession of a firearm he was convicted State v. Moore, 276 Neb. 1, 3, 751 N.W.2d 631, 633 (2008). See People v. Perez, 50 Cal. 4th 222, 234 P.3d 557, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 310 (2010). - 369 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MORTON Cite as 310 Neb. 355"], "id": "e046ad0e-dddf-4320-a46e-a1ceaec3f8df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["*605( People v. Barton, supra , 12 Cal.4th at p. 201, fn. 8, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) These facts were not \"evidence that a reasonable jury would find persuasive\" to show Johnson committed a lesser included offense to first degree murder. ( Ibid. ) The trial court's failure to instruct on second degree murder or <mask> was not error."], "id": "71c9f0a2-e93b-4c05-8191-61cf31fc1e94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["In this vein, defendant argues that, if he were to have been accused of the commission of any of such crimes of violence or threatened violence as second degree arson, first degree burglary, criminal mischief in the first degree, second degree kidnapping, <mask>, or first degree rape, robbery or sodomy, he could expect to receive a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 25 years, if convicted."], "id": "686d2740-bf66-4f17-90df-b91f89f1b261", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "manslaughter", "legal_topic": "Life Taking", "masked_sentences": ["Prior to the amendment of CPL 310.70, effective September 1, 1974, this defendant undoubtedly could not be retried on the <mask> in the first charge under subdivision 2 of that section which read as follows: \"2. Upon the rendition of a partial verdict pursuant to subdivision one, a defendant may be retried upon an unresolved count of an indictment when such unresolved count is consecutive, as that term is defined in subdivision two of section 300.30, as to every count upon which the jury did render a verdict, whether of guilty or not guilty.\u201d"], "id": "9e8ebcc8-547a-4727-b33d-e80e3e90177c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant has appeared in this action and moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and *523failure to state a valid cause of action. Defendant does not deny the 14-year relationship with plaintiff, the New Mexico \u201cmarriage\u201d ceremony or that the parties entered into a civil union in Vermont. Defendant instead characterizes plaintiffs action as a frivolous contrivance in order to <mask> to steal defendant\u2019s real and personal property and to avoid her eviction from defendant\u2019s home. She states that plaintiff has no legal rights to any of defendant\u2019s property and that plaintiff has not contributed anything to defendant\u2019s property. In addition, defendant maintains that as the parties are not legally \u201cmarried\u201d any relationship she has with any other person is not adultery but rather \u201cmy own business.\u201d"], "id": "4b98cdc6-5e33-403a-ba8d-fc2f7c277257", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The parties offered conflicting testimony regarding VW's visitation with Williams. Williams described a warm relationship with his daughter, centered on church, and he testified that they played basketball together. He testified that visitation was hampered by Lofton's refusal to respond to texts or to make him aware of VW's sports and school events. Lofton testified that Williams inconsistently exercised his visitation, that he did little to make VW feel comfortable at his home, and that VW had spent the night at Williams's house twice in twelve years. Lofton explained that Williams failed to take VW to extracurricular activities when she was with him and that he made no <mask> to see VW on her birthday. We defer to the circuit court on credibility determinations, Ford v. Ford , 347 Ark. 485, 65 S.W.3d 432 (2002), and in light of our deference to the circuit court's ability to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, we hold that the circuit court did not err in its visitation determination. The circuit court thoughtfully addressed the visitation issue to fulfill VW's best interest and that also grants Williams the standard visitation he requested as he exercises his right consistently. We find no error in the circuit court's visitation order, and we affirm."], "id": "0d48c3b4-c896-4604-8228-a2854bda7750", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Detective Petrak again left defendant in the library and returned at 4:07 p.m. with Detective Ferrari, who had previously obtained a written statement from defendant at 3:30 p.m. during one of Detective Petrak\u2019s absences. On this occasion, in an apparent <mask> to wrap up any possible loose ends, Detective Petrak also wore a concealed recording device during Detective Ferrari\u2019s questioning. A 26-minute recording of defendant\u2019s statement resulted."], "id": "8453cd5c-a2f9-4f80-89e7-3dba0c64b9f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["California's felony murder rule is not worded so restrictively. It applies broadly to all killings \"committed in the perpetration of, or <mask> to perpetrate\" one of the statutorily enumerated felonies. ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 189.) That being the case, we are reluctant to impose any additional limitations on the causal requirement for felony murder in this state. We see no reason in law or logic why the felony murder rule, when otherwise applicable, cannot be applied when the victim dies as a result of inaction by defendant."], "id": "e000d852-1b09-44be-bcd6-ede13af53b92", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to defendant\u2019s contention that the court did not have jurisdiction to reduce the charge to an <mask>, under the Penal Law, \u201c[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 110.00). An attempt exists as an identifiable, *56separate offense from the crime that is being attempted (see People v Campbell, 72 NY2d 602, 605 [1988]). The Court of Appeals has held that where a penal statute imposes strict liability for committing certain conduct, with no result component, an attempt is legally cognizable, since a person can attempt to engage in that conduct (see People v Aponte, 16 NY3d 106, 109 [2011] [attempted stalking]; People v Prescott, 95 NY2d 655, 659 [2001] [attempted driving while intoxicated]; People v Saunders, 85 NY2d 339 [1995] [attempted criminal possession of a weapon]). Similarly here, the crime of patronizing a prostitute contained no result component. Rather, the statute proscribed particular conduct, either the payment or the agreement to pay a fee to another person pursuant to an-understanding that, in return therefor, such person (or a third person) will engage in sexual conduct, or the solicitation or the requesting of another person to engage in sexual conduct in return for a fee. There is nothing impossible about attempting to engage in such a course of conduct, since there can be an attempt to make such a solicitation or agreement, for example, if the communication never reached its intended recipient (see generally Aponte, 16 NY3d at 109). Thus, a defendant \u201cmay legally and logically attempt to act in the manner proscribed by this penal statute\u201d (Saunders, 85 NY2d at 341), i.e., attempt to patronize a prostitute (see e.g. People v Ward, 123 AD3d 590 [2014]; People v Rodriguez, 56 AD3d 574 [2008]; People v Gallicchio, 189 Misc 2d 182 [Westchester County Ct 2001]; People v Sharif, 141 Misc 2d 80 [Crim Ct, NY County 1988])."], "id": "64f107cf-f07a-47ea-b81b-e4d314b404f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Dr. Allee had brief telephonic conversations with Roe on February 9 and 10, 2015, to ask Roe \"a few last questions.\" At Dr. Allee's request, Roe emailed photographs of her bathing suits. Dr. Allee contacted all individuals the parties had identified as potential witnesses, but did not <mask> to contact anyone who had been mentioned during the investigation but not fully identified."], "id": "779725c0-21f6-4e9f-a2bc-9692645137de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant appeared by attorney and answered. There has been a substitution of attorneys for the defendant. According to a statement, unsworn to by the attorney for the defendant, an <mask> has been made to substitute the defendants Huff for the defendant Redeye in said Peacemakers\u2019 Court action on the grounds of a conveyance on June 1, 1965, from Redeye to the Huffs."], "id": "01849a44-2f95-466d-9a00-b5c29afbd329", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Administrative agencies may not impose additional requirements which have not been mandated by the Legislature. In Acorn Employment Serv. v Moss (supra), the Court of Appeals disallowed the commissioner\u2019s <mask> to require employment agencies, inter alla, to obtain its approval before selling business records to other agencies or before providing night telephone service. The court stated (292 NY, at p 153): \u201cThere can be no doubt that the functions thereby adjudged to belong to the Commissioner are legislative in character. Nor can there be any doubt that such exercise of undefined general power must be *292denied to administrative officers.\u201d Regulation 10 resembles the regulation in Acorn because it forces employment agencies to comply with requirements not mandated by statute. It is legislative in nature and exceeds the department\u2019s limited authority."], "id": "1f6089ab-cb54-4eb1-a7b8-520f75b74495", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The word \u201cassault\u201d, which is generally recognized as a synonym, has been frequently defined as \u201can unlawful offer or <mask> with force or violence to do corporal hurt to another \u201d (Pope v. State of New York, 192 Misc. 587, 593, affd. 277 App. Div. 1015; Decker v. Werbenec, 36 Misc 2d 220). No actual contact is required (Brown v. Yaspan, 256 App. Div. 991)."], "id": "8c346630-c30c-4a83-a2c8-202c9079efce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Claimant also submitted to the court following trial various literature in which the purportedly potential harmful effects of pepper spray are discussed. Defendant\u2019s objection to such information as an <mask> to inteiject expert opinion outside the confines of the trial is well taken. Moreover, claimant in the case before the court did not suffer dire or deadly effects from the pepper spray. Indeed, he suffered no permanent injuries and the effects of the spray ostensibly subsided within approximately one week."], "id": "29be2d85-6d16-40ee-8f60-f2acbf8a84bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["We do not wish to be understood as holding that the state assumes any insurance liability to protect travelers on the highway when such travelers <mask> to proceed through a fog. But it seems plainly apparent that if a traveler does run into a fog in a valley, as this traveler did, and attempts to travel through the fog in that valley on his way to his home, he must of course assume certain risks if he chooses to proceed. But those risks should be only those which remain after the state has taken the precautions necessary to protect a traveler who is using the road under ordinary conditions in the night-time, exclusive of such fog conditions. It was not incumbent upon the state to protect this traveler from ordinary risks which-he assumed by traveling through the thick fog, nor is that the holding in this case. But the state having failed to provide a fence or barrier at this dangerous curve, where failure was negligence with respect to a traveler traveling in the night-time even in the absence of fog, it was the absence of such barrier that permitted this traveler to drive off the embankment which at the point he left the highway was close to the edge of and within a very few feet of the legal edge of the highway. Had a suitable bar*404rier been placed at \u201c dug hill \u201d curve it would have prevented this traveler going over the retaining .wall, even though he had been traveling in a dense fog in the night-time, as he was."], "id": "c5639261-f38a-4924-b394-daa70c4da7b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This determination is in no manner affected by the fact that plaintiff had made no <mask> to exhaust the administrative remedies available to it. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, although a device by which the courts deny premature or unnecessary resort to their jurisdiction, is not without limitation. If an administrative remedy would afford a plaintiff substantially less than adequate relief for a wrong or no relief at all, the failure to exhaust remedies should not be a bar to seeking relief in the court through any appropriate means (cf. Lesron Junior v. Feinberg, 13 A D 2d 90, 94). It is obvious that the instant situation is quite unique and an exhaustion of administrative remedies would serve no useful purpose and would, indeed, be a futile act. Involved here is not a mere question of the interpretation made by a local rent administrator, but the legitimacy of -certain policies and regulations promulgated by the City Bent Agency itself. We are dealing solely with a question -of law. This court sees no reason to delay the resolution of this -controversy any further. Contemporary notions of distributive justice and simple fair play require that plaintiff be permitted immediate relief and the right to have the existing controversy formally determined. Accordingly, plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction is granted. Defendants are to serve their answer upon plaintiff within 20 days after service of a copy of this order with notice of entry thereof."], "id": "df9caa31-fc4e-495a-9ffd-ac0b9b4bb6bb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["We conclude that the economic burden test does not allow a boundless search for abstract cost-carrying of a tax by a litigant. Instead, we have applied the test under a specific set of circumstances: when an entity is contesting the applicability of the statute to its services but, out of an abundance of caution, chooses to pay the IRS itself rather than <mask> to collect the tax from its customers. See, e.g., id.; see also McGowan, 296 F.2d at 253. Because the would-be \u201ccollector\u201d has not in fact \u201ccollected\u201d the tax from someone using its services but rather paid the taxes itself, it does not expressly satisfy Section 6415\u2019s language. Because it has borne the economic burden, though, we have held that these parties still may pursue a refund. The circumstances of these cases applying the economic burden test differ materially from the facts of this case. JetPay actually collected the taxes from the customers and certainly did not pay the IRS preemptively before litigating the applicability of some tax. Moreover, none of the cases deal with a contractually imposed obligation to refund customers like JetPay assumed here. Every case instead concerns an entity arguably obligated under the statute to collect and pay the tax; none feature a self-imposed obligation like JetPay has assumed here. The narrow exception recognized in these cases is inapplicable to JetPay. III. Equitable subrogation to the taxpayer\u2019s rights JetPay\u2019s final theory is that it is equitably subrogated to the rights of the taxpayers to whom JetPay refunded the ticket costs. Effectively, JetPay says that by refunding Direct Air\u2019s taxpaying customers their excise taxes, it has stepped into their shoes and is thus able to assert their rights to a tax refund under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346. Section 1346 sets out a basic sovereign immunity waiver in tax refund suits. See \u00a7 1346(a)(1). The statute grants the district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States \u201cfor the recovery of"], "id": "7a3e158d-e85b-4846-ba69-537c9a459ea1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["A party must establish a reasonable probability of prevailing before pursuing a \"cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any <mask> to contest or compromise a claim or dispute[.]\" ( \u00a7 1714.10, subd. (a).) The court makes this determination after considering a plaintiff's verified petition accompanied by the proposed pleading, \"supporting affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability is based,\" and any opposing affidavits. (Ibid. ) However, \"[t]his section shall not apply to a cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client, where (1) the attorney has an independent legal duty to the plaintiff, or (2) the attorney's acts go beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the attorney's financial gain.\" ( \u00a7 1714.10, subd. (c).)"], "id": "aef08335-fcde-4ff5-b85f-33cd5fc29aef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, we reject again appellants' <mask> to marshal comparable jurors, here arguably to show that they had experiences with incarceration similar to Domanique J., but were not challenged by the prosecutor. Juror No. 3's questionnaire disclosed that, 30 years ago, the juror had visited an inmate at Vacaville Prison. The individual apparently was not a relative or close friend. Juror No. 12 indicated that \"years ago\" she picked up her brother at the Santa Rita Jail after he had been arrested on a domestic violence charge for which he was never prosecuted. And Juror No. 12 stated that he worked as a counselor at a correctional facility for six months during graduate school. Obviously, none of these experiences compares with visiting a close relative convicted of a serious crime on multiple occasions while she was incarcerated. Appellants also suggest the same comparable jurors on the issue of the fairness of the criminal justice system that they advanced in their challenge to Pierre M. But this attempt fails here for the same reason: None of those jurors had any other serious disqualifying issue, such as Domanique J.'s experiences *880regarding his aunt's incarceration or Pierre M.'s problems with the one witness rule. Thus, they were not similarly situated.9"], "id": "5953ee3d-ffca-4ff9-b904-d70fe859a15d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["from the applicant as to whether the applicant is under felony charges is unnecessary information for the purpose of deter- mining whether an individual is disqualified from purchasing or possessing a handgun. Such charges would, under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922, disqualify the applicant from purchasing a handgun. The information thus relates to the sole purpose of determin- ing whether the individual is disqualified from purchasing or possessing a handgun and not to any impermissible purpose. Nothing in \u00a7 69-2409, or any other provision of the statutory scheme pertaining to handguns, limits a background check as the sole means of obtaining the information of whether an applicant is disqualified from purchasing or possessing a handgun. Section 69-2408 makes it a crime to provide false infor- mation \u201con an application form\u201d that was approved by the Superintendent of Law Enforcement and Public Safety and is in compliance with any rules and regulations adopted by the Nebraska State Patrol and the governing statutes. Hofmann does not contest that the application form was duly approved and was in compliance with all governing rules, regula- tions, and statutes. We decline Hofmann\u2019s invitation to read \u00a7 69-2408 as making it a felony to provide false information only with respect to the minimum information of the appli- cant\u2019s full name, address, date of birth, and country of citizen- ship (and place of birth and alien or admission number if not a U.S. citizen), while shielding the applicant who provides false information in response to other lawful inquiries under the application. Even in light of principles of strict construction and reading \u00a7 69-2408 together with \u00a7 69-2404, we find no merit to Hofmann\u2019s argument that an applicant cannot <mask> to provide false information in violation of \u00a7 69-2408 simply because the false information in question was something other than the applicant\u2019s full name, address, date of birth, and coun- try of citizenship (and place of birth and alien or admission number if not a U.S. citizen). - 621 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. HOFMANN Cite as 310 Neb. 609"], "id": "162e1e99-3a82-4bcd-b702-c9e37ef7b651", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants do not deny the prejudicial nature of these articles. They do claim that they will have no effect on the trial. It is pointed out that the newspapers in which the articles were published have a local circulation, not extending throughout the county. An <mask> is made to show that only a small number of talesmen on any panel would come from the area in which these newspapers circulate, but either from mistake or ingenuousness the proper figures from which the conclusion could be drawn are not given."], "id": "2e1bbb84-2a62-416c-b1e9-359fa30a0076", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, the majority's opinion is inconsistent with Andrews because actions by the State are at issue in this case. Although *259the majority explains that-\"the AOGC is a named defendant, but its role in the proceeding is that of a tribunal or a quasi-judicial decision-maker rather than a real party in interest\"-and that \"it has no vested interest in the outcome of the appeal other than whether its decision is upheld,\" this is not the standard under Andrews . Andrews held that the State may never be made a defendant in any of her own courts. Accordingly, despite the majority's <mask> to narrow Andrews , the broad language of Andrews includes the actions alleged in this case. Here, Hurd alleges that the AOGC's actions were beyond the AOGC's authority as a State board and acted in an ultra vires manner. Therefore, State conduct is at issue, and Andrews bars suit."], "id": "7fe59b7e-1450-45f1-9e15-9bd2d9134595", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The D.C. Circuit, however, strenuously rejected this <mask> to turn the authority to make statutory choices under Chevron into an engine for preemption. See Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 82\u201385. The court explained that the discretion to classify a communications service under federal law does not permit the FCC to impose upon the states the policy preferences underlying that definitional choice. See id. As the D.C. Circuit explained, ACA CONNECTS V. BONTA 23"], "id": "c20245e1-5e11-4cdd-a3b7-a96938c4c6ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Service by posting is not the best method for giving notice of the commencement of an action. In order to pass constitutional muster service must be \u201cnotice reasonably calculated, under all [of] the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action\u201d. (Mullane v Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314; cf. Velazquez v Thompson, 321 F Supp 34, 39, affd 451d 202.) The method of service must not be \u201c \u2018unlikely to succeed\u2019 \u201d or \u201c\u2018predestined to failure\u2019\u201d or the court may find it equivalent to \u201c\u2018no <mask> at all.\u2019\u201d (815 Park Owners v West LB Admin., 119 Misc 2d 671, 677; Palumbo v Estate of Clark, 94 Misc 2d 1.) As the Supreme Court has recently said in Greene v Lindsey (456 US 444, 452-453): \u201cShort of providing personal service, then, posting notice on the door of a person\u2019s home would, in many or perhaps most instances, constitute not only a constitutionally acceptable means of service, but indeed a singularly appropriate and effective way of ensuring that a person who cannot conveniently be served personally is actually apprised of proceedings against him.\u201d General principles concerning service lead to the conclusion that in a \u201cconspicuous place\u201d service the place of posting must be on the premises in a *40location, preferably the entrance door, which, in the reasonable opinion of the process server, is sufficiently obvious to the occupant so to be expected to be seen."], "id": "f0d8a92a-a8dd-4c75-b70b-7f797865a7c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["(courts \u201cmust determine the intent of the Ohio General Assembly not from the expressions of a single legislator, but from the expression of the legislative body as a whole\u201d). But more importantly, we will not use legislative debate \u201cto muddy clear statutory language.\u201d Milner v. Dept. of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011). And here, clear language in Section 6 establishes that the section\u2019s standards are not merely aspirational. \u201cAspirational\u201d denotes a desire to achieve something. See Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary at 130 (defining \u201caspirational\u201d as \u201cof relating to aspiration,\u201d which itself is defined as \u201ca strong desire for realization,\u201d id.). Section 6 speaks not of desire but of direction: the commission shall <mask> to achieve the standards of that section. While Section 6 contemplates that the standards set forth in it may not come to fruition, it nevertheless requires the commission to try to achieve them. 2. Article XI, Section 6 claims are actionable {\u00b6 91} Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, and the statewide officeholders also argue that the claims based on Section 6 must be dismissed because Article XI does not provide a specific remedy for the commission\u2019s failure to comply with Section 6. They focus on Section 9(D)(3), which prescribes the scope of this court\u2019s remedial power for certain violations of Article XI:"], "id": "81ce2341-94fb-448d-b101-dea5e60d1e65", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Convicted of the crimes of larceny in the first degree, <mask> to commit larceny in the first degree, larceny in the second degree and conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree in connection with certain financial transactions involving an elderly victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant was hired as an in-home aide for the victim, and increasingly involved herself in the victim\u2019s life. A few months after the defendant was hired, the pastor of the defendant\u2019s church was granted power of attorney over the victim, and from that point forward the victim\u2019s banking activity began to diverge from several long-standing patterns. Increasing sums of money were being withdrawn from the victim\u2019s bank accounts and used by the defendant to pay for her various personal expenses. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of all four counts against the defendant. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the wrongfulness element of the offense of larceny, the charge to the jury having adequately conveyed the appro- priate levels of intent for both taking and retaining property in accor- dance with State v. Saez (115 Conn. App. 295), which outlined the state\u2019s obligation to show that the defendant acted with the subjective desire or knowledge that her actions constituted stealing: the court\u2019s charge to the jury, when considered as a whole and in light of the penal code\u2019s definition of larceny, was sufficient to adequately guide the jury; more- over, the language in the court\u2019s charge linking the requirement that the state must prove the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property with the requirement that the state must prove that the defendant took the property with an unlawful purpose adequately conveyed the requirement that the defendant must have intended to take the property wrongfully, such that the jury properly was apprised of the elements of larceny and the bar that the state had to meet with respect to the specific intent requirement in order to convict the defendant. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the jury instructions provided by the trial court granted the jury impermissibly broad latitude in considering the possibility of the victim\u2019s mental incapacity, that contention not being supported by the plain language of the court\u2019s instructions: the jury was informed that, even if it concluded that the victim was mentally incapacitated in any way, the instructions did not mandate a conclusion that the victim could not and did not consent to the defendant\u2019s taking of the property, and, by instructing the jury that it \u2018\u2018may\u2019\u2019 determine that the victim\u2019s mental incapacity prevented him from consenting to the taking of his property, the charge permitted the jury to exercise its discretion and consider whether the evidence before it supported such a finding; moreover, the jury charge clarified that an owner\u2019s inability to consent must be paired with the defendant\u2019s awareness of that inability in order to satisfy the wrongfulness require- ment of larceny, and the charge contained sufficient safeguards against the jurors improperly drawing conclusions as to the wrongfulness of the defendant\u2019s conduct. Argued September 13, 2021\u2014officially released January 11, 2022"], "id": "cdebca94-3113-4294-a849-693a61f245f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It appears that Stephenson's contention that the habeas statute should be viewed more broadly was essentially an <mask> to broaden the scope of a habeas action to include claims of trial error and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment. If so, we have held that a habeas corpus proceeding does not afford a prisoner an opportunity to retry his case, and a writ of habeas corpus will not be issued to correct errors or irregularities that occurred at trial. The remedy in such a case is a direct appeal. Birchett v. State , 303 Ark. 220, 795 S.W.2d 53 (1990)."], "id": "c1939294-5ed0-4c14-85fc-d1b739931348", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Legislature of this State, in its wisdom, has given hospitals a lien upon the proceeds of a recovery in a tort action (Lien Law, \u00a7 189). While an <mask> has been made through the introduction of legislation in the Legislature, to include physicians within the benefits of such law, this proposed legislation has failed of passage, and the Legislature has turned down the suggestion that physicians have such a lien. (See 1949 N. Y. Legis. Index, Senate Intro. No. 2045, Senate Print *210No. 2253, defeated March 29, 1949.) It was in an attempt to by-pass the Legislature\u2019s determination in that regard, that the printed form of assignment which was originally in existence was altered, so as to include within its scope that which the Legislature refused to enact into law. Somehow or somewhere, someone conceived the ingenious thought that physicians could be preferred over other creditors, by including the provision for an assignment to them, within the body of the hospital assignment itself."], "id": "0d112a53-42b9-4116-ac91-8570d449f1f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The testimony also sufficiently established that Brandi resisted and obstructed Chief Pearsall during the execution of the arrest warrant. A review of the testimony and body-camera footage indicates that after she was informed there was a warrant for her arrest, Brandi denied a warrant existed and insisted that she had never been stopped for excessive noise or loud exhaust. After the exchange between Anthony and Chief Pearsall, Brandi went back into the house, despite Chief Pearsall\u2019s instruction to stop, his <mask> to physically stop her from entering the house, and his repeated statement that he had a warrant for her arrest, which could be resolved by coming with him and paying $500 to get out of jail. After coming out of the house, Brandi continued to be verbally defiant toward the responding police officers and requested to see a copy of the arrest warrant. Even after Trooper Reynolds showed her the warrant, Brandi continued to be argumentative, insisted the warrant information was incorrect, and \u201calmost had to [be] pick[ed] [up] and [carried] to the patrol car.\u201d"], "id": "1ed217cc-1428-435f-8ec5-621d3e18aacf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"For purposes of this section, the defendant shall be deemed to remain in prison custody for an offense until the official discharge from custody, including any period of mandatory supervision, or until release on parole or postrelease community supervision, whichever first occurs, including any time during which the defendant remains subject to *713reimprisonment or custody in county jail for escape from custody or is reimprisoned on revocation of parole or postrelease community supervision.\" (Italics added.) As we explain below, the second flaw in the People's argument is the <mask> to apply subdivision (d) of section 667.5 to the circumstances in this case to determine whether defendant suffered a prior prison term in case BF147747A under section 667.5, subdivision (b). Established case law reveals the flaw in the People's argument."], "id": "f6d6ad2c-d285-46c5-8654-848fc164a3ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*894In behalf of the defendants George and Victor Mishkin it is urged that since knowledge is an essential element of proof, the offense is not malum prohibitum. Here, again, we suggest that a careful reading of said section B36-23.0 indicates that guilt may be predicated upon a sale or delivery or <mask> to sell or deliver or an offer to sell or deliver or starting, out for delivery, or causing to be started out for delivery less than 2,000 pounds by weight to the ton of solid fuel."], "id": "9f40a8fa-09c2-4abc-aaf3-0080b99128af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The rules of the State Liquor Authority (promulgated by the respondent itself and amended by the respondent from time to time) at all times provided very specifically in subdivision 10 of rule 2, which relates to revocation hearings, under the heading of \u2018 \u2018 Notice of Hearing \u2019 \u2019, that \u20181 Such notices shall be deemed to have been duly served if sent by registered or certified mail to the licensee addressed to the licensed premises and a copy thereof by ordinary mail to the residence of the licensee or to the residence of any officer of a corporate licensee,\u201d and, further, that \u201c Notices of hearing shall be mailed at least five days prior to the date set forth in said notice for the holding of said hearing unless the Authority, in its discretion, shall shorten the time fixed herein \u201d. Yet the notice of the hearing in this case when petitioner\u2019s default was quickly taken which, as received by counsel for the petitioner, set forth a wrong time for the hearing, which was sent out on June 21,11 days before the hearing date, was sent only by Western Union telegram and there was not so much as even a confirmation by mail. According to the testimony adduced in this case by respondent, no notice is ever sent by mail in any case; all notices are by Western Union telegram, obviously at much greater expense to the State, and no <mask> is ever made to verify the accuracy of transmission."], "id": "a84937b4-cac8-45d3-a167-f12d7506dd59", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3241. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291 and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742(a). Kuntz attempted to incorporate other arguments from his codefendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 28. His brief did not identify which issues he intended to adopt. Nor did it <mask> to individualize any arguments. His attempt to adopt arguments is therefore insufficient under Rule 28(i). See United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 146 n.9 (3d Cir. 2019). of trial, Kuntz and Brown each had his own counsel, so there was no conflict of interest."], "id": "6ea045a6-7c42-44a8-b853-800147273253", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff fails on the second and third prongs as well. Even where the recognition of a private right of action might promote one aspect of a statute\u2019s legislative goals, the greater concern is the \u201c \u2018consistency of doing so with the purposes underlying the legislative scheme\u2019 \u201d (Sheehy v Big Flats Community Day at 634, quoting Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314, 325 [1983]). \u201c[A] private right of action should not be judicially sanctioned if it is incompatible with the enforcement mechanism chosen by the Legislature or with some other aspect of the over-all statutory scheme\u201d (Sheehy v Big Flats Community Day at 634-635). As previously noted, the Superintendent of Insurance possesses broad regulatory powers over the sale of insurance policies in this state. Section 109 (d) of the Insurance Law reveals that only the Superintendent of Insurance is empowered to maintain a civil action. This provision, together with the broad disciplinary powers given to the Superintendent of Insurance, make plain the legislature\u2019s desire to establish the Superintendent as the sole regulator. This conclusion is supported by the express language of section 2130 (g), which provides, \u201cNothing in this section shall be *771construed to . . . diminish the power of the superintendent to take any other disciplinary action otherwise authorized by this chapter.\u201d As noted throughout this decision, if the plaintiffs members fail to provide documents or pay fees, the plaintiff is to report it to the Superintendent of Insurance. Allowing the plaintiff to act independently, and perhaps in contravention of the Superintendent of Insurance, would, in essence, set ELANY up as a co-regulator and undermine the clear legislative intent that ELANY\u2019s actions be supervised by the Superintendent of Insurance. It is unlikely that the legislature would have intended for the plaintiff to be a co-regulator with the Superintendent, and the plaintiff has offered little evidence of this intention other than its assertion that the words \u201cfacilitate\u201d and \u201cencourage compliance\u201d in Insurance Law \u00a7 2130 (a) (10) should be read that way. It is more likely that the legislature would not want a group of competitors to have the right to bring an action against a fellow competitor, which is exactly what has happened here. Given that the plaintiffs members are competitors in the insurance industry, there is no way of knowing whether this litigation is a legitimate <mask> to enforce the Insurance Law or an attempt to punish, injure, or obtain an unfair advantage. Therefore, the proper balance seems to be that the plaintiff may notify, advise, or inform the Superintendent of Insurance and allow the Superintendent to make an independent evaluation of what steps to take. If the Superintendent of Insurance finds that punishment is warranted it could respond in a variety of ways, including suspending the violator\u2019s license for noncompliance with the statute (see Insurance Law \u00a7 2105 [a]). Thus, recognition of a private right of action under the present circumstances would not advance the legislative purpose and would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme (see Hudes v Vytra Health Plans Long Is., 295 AD2d 788 [2002]). Accordingly, the court finds that ELANY does not have a private right of action under the Insurance Law."], "id": "e70f9237-cac9-4e46-be36-ae9c9ef8ead1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeals in Matter of Ryan (291 N. Y. 376, 416) in quoting with approval from Matter of Long Island Loan & Trust Co. (92 App. Div. 1, affd. 179 N. Y. 520) which the court held to be \u201c in point both on the matter of opening the decrees and the claimed acquiescence \u2019 \u2019, repeated the following words: \u2018 \u2018 \u2018 The trustee accounted in 1898, but none of the questions here raised was put in issue in that proceeding, and the decree on that accounting discharged the trustee only as to the assets directed to be distributed thereunder and the amount of the trust estate. As the trustee claims this decree to have worked an estoppel, the burden of proof is upon the trustee to show clearly that the question in issue in this case was litigated and determined in the former action (Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N. Y. 114, 127, and authority there cited), and having failed to show this, the life tenant is not estopped to assert her rights at this time. Nor is the position of the trustee changed by the fact that the life tenant made a motion in May, 1903 to open the decree of August, 1898, in which the matters here involved were set up as a reason for opening the former decree. The opening of the former decree rested in the discretion of the learned Surrogate, and as the former decree did not <mask> to settle any of the questions which are urged on this motion, the denial of the motion did not affect any substantial right of the life *1061tenant, and, under well-established rules, it could not work an estoppel on this accounting.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.)"], "id": "4fdb9117-b82f-4cb1-871c-bdc8458f46cf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The first objection to this allowance is, it no where appears that Wattles ever assented that the mortgage should secure any thing beyond the specific objects for which it was given. The assignment of the partnership goods to the respondent was subsequently taken as a collateral security. There is no proof that advances were made on the credit of the original security. A mortgage made to secure against future as well as present responsibilities is undoubtedly good. In some cases, a subject pledged for a debt may be considered as a security for further loans. The cases referred to by his honor the Chancellor, in Hendricks v. Robinson, (2 John. Ch. Rep. 309,) do not support the right claimed by the respondent. In Shirras v. Craig, (7 Cranch, 34,) the mortgage was executed, in part, to secure the payment of money actually due at the time, and in part to secure sums to be advanced. So, in The United States v. Hooe, (3 Cranch, 73,) the mortgage was to secure against existing and future responsibilities. The <mask> here is, without any understanding or agreement, to hold the mortgaged premises charged for a general balance. It is highly probable, from the testimony, that on an account taken, (after first applying partnership property to the payment of partnership debts,) a sufficient sum will remain out of the merchandize and other articles assigned as a collateral security with the mortgage, to pay off and discharge the note of $5000, and the responsibility incurred by the bond to Granger."], "id": "733845df-1a7b-4a41-9bc4-634e71017abf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["I find that exigent circumstances existed here which justified Detective Eiden in entering defendant\u2019s room with a key without giving notice of his authority or purpose. Eiden had been informed that defendant was a fugitive and he knew of defendant\u2019s getaway when Inspector G-aughran tried to apprehend him on the street. Under the circumstances, it was perfectly natural for the Detective to believe that defendant would again <mask> to escape if he knew he were about to be taken into custody. Eloquent proof of the Detective\u2019s rational and normal apprehension both for his own safety and the possible disappearance of the defendant are found in the fact that the Detective was accompanied by two uniformed police officers and that he drew his gun before turning the key and opening the door. To have done any less would have been extremely dangerous and would properly have subjected the Detective to criticism if the defendant had eluded him. I have therefore concluded that the arrest and the search and seizure incident thereto were entirely lawful."], "id": "8ccace66-cba4-4b13-998b-4f09ba865577", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["With these considerations in mind, we may now turn to the evidence. At the trial, Bundy testified that he was forced off the pavement, at a point about seventy feet from the bridge, by another car overtaking and passing. Prior to the trial, however, he had made statements to the effect that he was not forced off the road. The only other eyewitness, who was approaching from the opposite direction and s.aw Bundy go off *862the road and strike the bridge, testified that he saw no car attempting to pass Bundy or even near him. Bundy stated that his car struck only the sidewalk, but the preponderance of evidence indicates that he first struck the last two guardposts ahead of the bridge and then struck both the parapet and the sidewalk. The guardposts and cables showed evidence of damage, and the parapet wall was chipped and scratched. Further, the right-hand door was torn off the car and hurled down the west embankment of the creek, and the entire right side of the car was heavily damaged. He testified that his speed was between forty-five and fifty miles per hour, although he knew of the thirty-mile speed limit, but the totally demolished car and its 150 foot upside down skid strongly suggest a much greater speed. Bundy was familiar with the road and knew of the existence of the bridge. The highway and the bridge were well lighted and the end of the sidewaEc was marked with alternating yellow and black stripes. When he went off the road, he made no <mask> either to apply his brakes or to slacken his speed. The conclusion is inescapable that Bundy was negligent in operating his car at excessive speed, in leaving the pavement without good reason, in failing to slow his car, and, generally, in failing to observe what he was about."], "id": "76ddc13f-c439-4bda-a368-8b3123b20878", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants oppose the motion, claiming that plaintiffs counsel was in fact aware on Feburary 5, 1987, immediately before the hearing, that Dannon had been substituted for Gertel and that plaintiffs allegations regarding Dannon\u2019s qualifications are an insufficient basis upon which to vacate the panel\u2019s findings, absent any specific assertion or evidence of impropriety, bias or incompetence on the part of Dannon. Defendants, therefore, urge that plaintiffs sole recourse is to <mask> to impeach the attorney panelist at trial."], "id": "55f483e8-ad54-49da-b097-d2803ed559df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Hayes also cites to a legislative committee report referring to certain \"technical amendments\" recommended by the executive branch that reflect \" 'the administration's desire \"to change current law as little as possible ....\" ' \" (Assem. Com. on Education, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 818, Reg. Sess. (1993-1994), as amended June 21, 1993, p. 2, italics added.) Those comments are taken out of context and do not pertain to or <mask> to explain the deletion of the last sentence of section 44951."], "id": "c9e9116c-1a70-4a77-9fe2-a1683fa36051", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Comity does not call upon us to recognize the decree \u2014 as we might feel called upon to do in the case of a judgment on a commercial transaction transitory in nature where for one reason or another, an action is brought in a foreign country unrelated to the parties or the transaction and a defendant chooses to appear. No doubt Chihuahua would recognize a *109decree of divorce granted by our courts; but we do not recognize its power to decide for us the marital status of our domiciliarles, its power to grant the divorce in question. There is no magic in the formula \u201c personal appearance of plaintiff followed by appearance of the defendant by attorney \u201d in a case of this kind. And we should not recognize the decree. Such a decree was not recognized in the Calchvell case; nor in the Heine case; nor in the Molnar case from which I have quoted (the Molnar case was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division, First Department, 284 App. Div. 948, but the court\u2019s decision below was on alternative grounds \u2014 the divorce was no different from a \u201c mail order \u201d divorce; and the power of attorney to the defendant\u2019s Mexican attorney was invalid). There was just as much collusion here as in the Caldwell and Heine cases; just as much evasion of our laws and jurisdiction. The evasion is not made any the less transparent by the device of one side presenting papers instead of mailing them. There was agreement to dissolve the marriage by the signing and presentation of papers to a court lacking jurisdiction. The vice in the Caldwell case was not in the mailing, but in what was attempted by the mailing. That vice is not cured by what was done here; and the <mask> was the same. \u201c [T]he Mexican divorce here involved is a nullity, and of no more validity than a so-called mail-order divorce \u201d (Heine v. Heine, 10 A D 2d 864)."], "id": "89ff7c76-d7e9-4e8a-9987-a5b0a493ee3b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["MVAIC charges that petitioner\u2019s delay of several months in making the instant application has increased the amount of interest payable on the judgment by enlarging the interest period. However, the court does not find, nor does MVAIC make any <mask> to show, that such delay has in any way prejudiced the petitioner\u2019s right to receive payment of interest from the date of entry of judgment."], "id": "3d3ebd0d-6ece-45b9-af12-012b1916ce12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [" We find that, based on the clear and unambiguous text of Correction Law \u00a7 168-a (2)(a), first-degree assault as a sexually motivated felony is not a registerable offense under SORA because first-degree assault is not one of the enumerated offenses in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of that provision. Subparagraph (iii) of Correction Law \u00a7 168-a (2)(a), as amended, includes in the definition of sex offense \"a conviction of or a conviction for an <mask> to commit any provisions of the foregoing sections committed or attempted as a sexually motivated felony defined in section 130.91 of such law\" (emphasis added). Thus, according to the clear language of the statute, a defendant who is convicted of a sexually motivated felony offense can only be required to register under SORA if the underlying offense is specifically included as one of the Penal Law provisions listed in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Correction Law \u00a7 168-a(2)(a), which are the only \"foregoing sections\" in the definition of sex offenses. As it is undisputed that assault in the first degree is not one of the Penal Law provisions listed in subparagraph (i) or (ii) of Correction Law \u00a7 168-a(2)(a), assault in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony is not a registerable offense under SORA. When the legislature amended the statute, it could easily have included all sexually motivated felonies in the definition of \"sex offense.\" However, based on the clear wording of the amendment, the legislature chose to include only certain sexually motivated felonies in the definition of \"sex offense,\" and we must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, as amended (see Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., 41 NY2d at 208)."], "id": "c05f337b-1869-447f-a690-833b291f1f24", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["inconsistently, not for [Lane]) to carry on working at their community business, or to be responsible . . . for its loss of value, in the absence of gross negligence or intentional misconduct not present here.\u201d This reasoning is completely at odds with the family court\u2019s findings. The court did not require either party to continue working for the business, but it implicitly did assume that if either did it would not be with the intent of actually harming the business. Crouch did not wind up the business or <mask> a bona fide sale. Crouch and Lane might, in the abstract, have had reciprocal \u201cfiduciary duties,\u201d but they could hardly be called \u201cparallel,\u201d if for no other reason than Crouch had greater knowledge of the business as well as actual possession and control of its physical assets. Because Crouch was in charge of DCCH, it was he who \u201csinglehandedly\u201d tried to \u201cdissipate or destroy\u201d Lane\u2019s interest in the business. That amounts to \u201cgross negligence or intentional misconduct\u201d in anybody\u2019s book. (2) Crouch next argues that he \u201cdid not breach his fiduciary duty by going to work for Zega,\u201d \u201cby taking steps to wind down DCCH\u2019s activities in 2012 based on his desire to change his work.\u201d He believes that the family court \u201cdid not find that [he] stopped working at DCCH and went to work for Zega for any bad-faith reason such as in order to deprive [Lane] of funds, or that his conduct was grossly negligent, reckless, intentional misconduct, or in violation of law.\u201d This is not only hair-splitting, it is simply wrong. The family court did expressly find that Crouch\u2019s conduct was \u201cin violation of law,\u201d namely, the Family Code statutes codifying the obligations of spousal fiduciary duty. A finding of breached fiduciary duty would certainly"], "id": "cb96b2eb-4d2c-4849-a607-469c324e9890", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This bargain has been enacted into law. In 1967 (L. 1967, ch. 171, \u00a7 1; ch. 584, \u00a7 1) the Legislature provided for the sanitation men, and in 1968 (L. 1968, ch. 290, \u00a7 1) for the transit employees, the right to have pensions computed to produce a retirement allowance equal to one half of the employee\u2019s annual salary for the year prior to retirement. This is the law. The Legislature may try to negotiate a lower salary; but any law which attempts to modify the formula .rather than the input data is an <mask> to modify a contractual right guaranteed by the Constitution."], "id": "d5695bb7-3ef0-4a5d-9afc-a57683f3728b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Altesse argues that it removed the case to federal court because it fairly believed the state lawsuit was a counterclaim to its previously filed federal suit. Even if we ignore the federal court's conclusions that the removal was an <mask> to avoid the effect of the TRO and that the state suit was improperly removed, the removal was not a legitimate basis for ignoring the TRO. Post-removal, state-court orders generally \"remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the [federal] district court.\" 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1450."], "id": "0e94ecc1-dc91-458d-aa92-acdd8fb2065e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Upon this showing the court has no discretion to deny the application. All the later California cases are in agreement upon this point. The heirs, legatees, and devisees occupy no better position than creditors. The right to a homestead is statutory and superior to any <mask> at testamentary disposition. The executors are in error in their contention that the amount of the homestead is limited; the cases cited by them do not apply here. The law as now laid down was declared by the supreme court in Estate of Levy, 141 Cal. 652, 99 Am. St. Rep. 92, 75 Pac. 301, which says, in effect that in the absence of a statutory limitation as to value, the right of the applicant is paramount to all others, even though its assertion should absorb the half or the whole of the estate, where the only premises suitable for a homestead are indivisible, and where to deny such application would be to deprive the widow of her claim under the statute. The proof in this case justifies the court in decreeing that the applicant widow is entitled to an absolute homestead in the Ellis street property, and that the petition of the executors for an order of sale should be denied, and it is so ordered."], "id": "d85e6235-ffd5-4406-ab22-d367cb1ef92f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"In order to <mask> to establish stability and permanency in the lives of the children affected, final orders of adoption should not be lightly set aside. (See McGaffin v Family & Children\u2019s Servs. of Albany, 6 Misc 2d 776, affd 7 AD2d 769.)\u201d (Matter of Kane, 104 Misc 2d 83, 85.) The Legislature repealed Domestic Relations Law \u00a7\u00a7 118, 118-a, 118-b and 118-c in 1974 which permitted abrogation of adoptions under certain circumstances which developed after an adoption became effective. Under current law, an order of adoption may be set aside only where there is fraud, newly discovered evidence, or other sufficient cause (Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 114). The New York State courts have been sensitive and responsive to the religious needs of children especially as they are affected by *745adoptions (Matter of Santos, 278 App Div 373; Ramon v Ramon, 34 NYS2d 100). In today\u2019s society a custodial parent should have a strong voice on the religious training of his children and it would not be improper to request his new spouse to raise the children under a particular faith as a condition to consenting to the adoption (People ex rel. Rich v Lackey, 139 Misc 42)."], "id": "ac616ad7-fe7f-4600-b0d0-d4224f61e891", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*143It must be borne in mind that perhaps the only practical purpose which a division fence serves is to keep stock upon them owner\u2019s land. The case here under consideration serves to illustrate the proposition that the dangerous character of a fence does not necessarily add to its effectiveness as a barrier. It should not, therefore, be constructed in such a way as to prove a trap instead of a barrier. It is not going too far then to assume that the legislature in prohibiting the use of barbed wire in the construction of division fences had in view the natural propensity of certain domestic animals to leap fences and intended not only to protect them from injury while on their owner\u2019s side of the fence but also from unnecessary injury, when, acting upon that instinct which moves the brute creation, they might <mask> to break over an obstruction, the purpose of which they could not understand."], "id": "11881812-c0fe-4027-be05-2bdf320c9cbc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Legislature\u2019s decision not to use the word \u201cindictment\u201d in the statute defining the Supreme Court\u2019s trial jurisdiction over misdemeanors cannot be viewed as an oversight. In fact, the legislators did require grand jury action and/or indictments when defining the parameters of the Supreme Court\u2019s jurisdiction in other parts of article 10. For example, the Legislature stated that \u201c[l]ocal criminal courts have preliminary jurisdiction of all offenses subject to divestiture thereof in any particular case by the superior courts and their grand juries.\u201d (CPL 10.30 [2] [emphasis added].) More germane to the issue before the court today, the Legislature did require that the Supreme Court could preside over cases in which \u201cpetty offenses\u201d were charged \u201conly when such an offense is charged in an indictment which also charges a crime.\u201d (CPL 10.20 [1] [c] [emphasis added].)7 Accordingly, in terms of jurisdiction, since the Legislature required an indictment be voted before the Supreme Court could *182preside over a case charging only a petty offense, but did not specify that an indictment was required for the Supreme Court to assert its trial jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases, it is clear that CPL 210.05 cannot be read as an <mask> by the Legislature to limit, the Supreme Court\u2019s ability to exercise its trial jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases.8"], "id": "077e06d0-067b-42ab-8d5f-266556ea6a21", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Similarly, the evidence is insufficient to support the crimes of conspiracy to commit a scheme to defraud, scheme to defraud or falsifying business records on the part of DiSario in regard to the circulation scheme. DiSario was chosen by the conspirators, his superiors in the circulation department, to deliver 2,000 papers nightly to Citiwide drivers, who in turn delivered these papers to vendors, substituting the 2,000 papers for earlier editions of the Post in an <mask> to make it appear to auditors that papers were in fact being distributed for sale by the vendors named to the auditors. The evidence before the Grand Jury showed that DiSario returned the substituted papers to the Post where they were destroyed. While these deliveries may have been unusual, there is no evidence that the defendant DiSario was aware of the reason for the deliveries or of the alleged conspiracy to inflate circulation figures."], "id": "6e95e094-7c24-49b5-8db9-93d1d57af4c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In construing this statute, we must bear in mind that we have before us a somewhat unusual law. If A is indebted to B and cannot meet the obligation when it is due, B\u2019s remedy is by civil action; he cannot invoke the aid of the criminal courts. If, to forestall the civil suit, A gives his promissory note payable at his bank and if, on the due date of the note, A\u2019s funds or credit in his bank are sufficient to meet it, the note is paid by the bank; if not, B is still confined to a civil suit, either on the note or on the original indebtedness. The litigation is still private, with B as the plaintiff and A as the defendant. But should A <mask> to discharge the debt by his check, which is dishonored by his bank for lack of funds \u00f3r credit, then the matter takes on a new aspect; the Penal Law is invoked; the machinery of the criminal courts comes into action; the State now becomes the aggrieved party and B is only the complaining witness, who may be compelled to testify against his will; the district attorney is now empowered to step in, representing the State \u2014 in short, a crime has been committed. Doubtless the startling features of this law may be defended on the ground that they are necessary for the protection of business dealings; no objection has been raised, and possibly none can be raised, on constitutional grounds. Nevertheless the fact remains that this section is something new in the criminal law, though it closely resembles what used to be known, and abhorred, as \u201c imprisonment for debt \u201d in the civil law."], "id": "8a4b821b-ae1e-4c3d-a988-02a0cde6892e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*53appeal of the denial of an open-space land designation entitled them to attorney's fees under section 42.29 and held that it did not. Id. The taxpayers pointed to section 42.29's award of attorney's fees to a property owner who \"prevail[ed] in an appeal to the court under Section 42.25 or Section 42.26 of [the Property Tax Code].\" Id. (citing Act of May 30, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 905, \u00a7 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5033 (amended 2013) (current version at TEX. TAX CODE \u00a7 42.29 ) ). Section 42.25 provides, as it did at the time of Seven Investment Co. , that a taxpayer is entitled to a reduction of the appraised value on the appraisal roll if \"the court determine[s] that the appraised value of the property according to the appraisal roll exceed[s] the appraised value required by law.\" TEX. TAX CODE \u00a7 42.25 (emphasis added). The court of appeals in Seven Investment Co. reasoned that by protesting the denial of the open-space land designation, the taxpayers also simultaneously protested the excessive appraised value of their property. Dall. Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Seven Inv. Co. , 813 S.W.2d 197, 205 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. granted), rev'd, 835 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1992). We reversed, holding that the statutory provisions allowing for a protest of an excessive appraisal ( section 41.41(a)(1) ) or for a protest of an unequal appraisal ( section 41.41(a)(2) ) were \"separate and distinct\" from the provision allowing for a protest of a determination that property does not qualify for an appraisal ( section 41.41(a)(5) ). Seven Inv. Co. , 835 S.W.2d at 78-80. In other words, section 42.29 limited the recovery of attorney's fees for the appeal of a protest under section 41.41(1) or (2) ; however, the taxpayers had protested under section 41.41(5). See id. The fact that the Legislature had identified the two protests separately was a clear indication that the two were not synonymous. Id. at 78. \"Such a broad interpretation of section 42.29 is contrary to the [L]egislature's <mask> to limit the award of attorney's fees to excessive appraisals and unequal appraisals under section[ ] 42.25.\" Id. at 79."], "id": "7e340669-c50a-409a-a110-4978050b622a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In this court\u2019s own research of cases in other jurisdictions, the one case that appears to be persuasive on the issue in the instant case is Commonwealth v. Mink (123 Mass. 422 [1877]). In that case, the court held that, although an <mask> to commit suicide is not punishable as a crime, yet a person who, in attempting to kill himself, accidentally kills another who is trying to prevent such suicide, is guilty of manslaughter. The language of Chief Justice Gray is particularly significant and apposite."], "id": "32fe63d5-7f23-441d-aea5-9548c10cf27f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In an <mask> to demonstrate that he had standing, Justin produced three affidavits-his, his parents', and his lawyer's-alleging that he was ZK's father and had developed a relationship with ZK. He also provided a report from a \"home paternity test\" that he claimed resulted from samples taken from him and ZK, but the report Justin provided did not name the individuals tested and specifically made the following disclaimer:"], "id": "9d095be7-ca6b-4cea-83bf-4c8b3b381f04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*1011At the trial conducted herein, plaintiff sought to bulwark its contention as to its right to recover for breach of contract by resorting to parol evidence. Parol evidence may not be introduced if the writing in question expresses the complete agreement between the parties and is unambiguous. The parties may not show, or <mask> to show, that they attached a meaning different from the ordinary meaning of the language used, (General Phoenix Corp. v. Cabot, 300 N. Y. 87; 1 Mottla, N. Y. Evidence, Proof of Cases [2d ed.], \u00a7 154.)"], "id": "fc5b0448-7ac8-44ae-a300-731611ed16ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Court will deny the motion. As defendant did not <mask> to correct his testimony pertaining to those sections of the transcript described as \u201cmissing words,\u201d \u201cillegible,\u201d or which individually \u201cmakes no sense,\u201d the Court will grant him an additional 30 days from the date of entry of this order to provide corrected testimony for those portions of the deposition. The Court notes that many of defendant\u2019s corrections contained in his errata sheets fail to provide the reasons for the correction, a violation of the statute and case law, which require that the deponent provide a reason for each correction (Marine Trust Co. v Collins, supra, 19 AD2d, at 857; Columbia v Lee, supra, 239 App Div, at 850; CPLR 3116 [a]). Accordingly, defendant may, within the 30-day extension granted above, submit the reasons for each correction noted in his errata sheets. In the event that defendant is unable to reconstruct those questionable portions of his testimony, the Court will accept a sworn affidavit from the defendant incorporating his answers to the questions posed."], "id": "344319c4-0f80-47b8-a34e-4dd00c97d7cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As we explained at part III.B., ante , Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on a lack of causation. As part of their motion, Defendants did not <mask> to meet their initial burden of showing that Plaintiffs could not produce evidence that the product failed to satisfy ordinary consumer expectations as to safety. Instead, they argued that, as a matter of law, the consumer expectation test is inapplicable to the Subject Lift, because the Subject Lift is a \"complex piece of industrial equipment\" \"beyond the typical understanding of the ordinary consumer.\" The trial court agreed and declined to apply the consumer expectation test on the basis that \"the minimum safety of the [Subject Lift]'s design is not within the common knowledge of ordinary consumers\"-at least in part because \"the analysis of the [Subject Lift]'s design necessarily involves determining technical issues of feasibility, cost, practicality, risk and benefit, ... [which] require[s] expert opinion about the merits or deficiencies of the design.\"8 On appeal, Defendants continue to assert that the consumer expectation test cannot apply to Plaintiffs' claims, because the ordinary consumer has no experience, and thus no expectation, as to the design and safety of the Subject Lift-a complex and technical product."], "id": "7d32c6fe-8797-438d-9c69-bad4612dbb61", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Similarly here, the act of cancellation alone was sufficient to nullify the will. The record is barren of any oral evidence to show the time of the performance of the cancellation. The instrument itself stands without explanation by oral proof of the exact time when any of the alterations were made. If he made the notation at a time before, or after the obliteration, its effect was futile. If he made it before the actual obliteration of his signature, it was an ineffective <mask> to revoke the will. (Matter of Akers, 173 N. Y. 620, affg. 74 App. Div. 461.) He may have actually revoked it with the intent to leave both the last will and the prior will ineffective under a true understanding of our law and with a consequent vesting of his property by intestacy in his three sons. If he revoked the will, first by obliteration and then attempted by a notation subsequently made to revive his prior will, the act in making the notation of revival, without publication and attestation, as required by section 41 of the Decedent Estate Law, was worthless. But regardless of the subsequent notation, bis act of complete revocation under the statutory procedure forever destroyed the will which had been previously obliterated and canceled."], "id": "ef4a3ae4-09a6-4d1b-9a40-61a381381375", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Mitchell C. Rigby, Judge. Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Henry J. Valle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- INTRODUCTION In 2017, appellant Shacarria Tavares entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of battery by an inmate on a nonconfined person (Pen. Code, \u00a7 4501.5).1 Following negotiations, the People agreed to dismiss this charge after two years if appellant abided by certain terms and conditions; if appellant did not comply, she would serve a prison term of four years. In 2019, appellant sought dismissal of this criminal matter. The People opposed that request, contending that she was in violation of her plea agreement. The trial court determined that a material term of the plea agreement was ambiguous, and it gave appellant the opportunity to file a motion to withdraw her plea. Appellant, however, asked the court for specific performance. The trial court concluded that appellant was in violation of the plea agreement, and it sentenced her to prison for four years. In the present appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred. According to appellant, the written plea agreement is not ambiguous, and the court should have granted her specific performance, resulting in a dismissal of this case. Respondent takes the opposite view, asserting that the court properly resolved this dispute. Respondent asks us to affirm appellant\u2019s judgment. We conclude that appellant has the better argument. The express terms of the written plea agreement control in this situation, and we find no ambiguity. Moreover, even if we presume ambiguity exists, appellant\u2019s interpretation of the disputed terms is reasonable. To protect appellant\u2019s due process rights, the plea agreement must be construed in her favor. We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. The People may elect to dismiss the charges or, consistent with how the plea agreement has been construed in this opinion, the People may <mask> to establish that appellant violated the 2017 plea agreement."], "id": "61c3087c-e56d-40fa-9a7d-d58eaebb1cf6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Persons entering the IDTU are directed to turn off radios and place cell phones on vibrate. Officer Re did not <mask> to implement any similar safeguards in the field. Indeed, it is not clear that such procedures could even be observed during a car stop. Officer Arav testified that the Intoxilyzer 5000 uses three \u201cair blanks\u201d at different intervals surrounding a test to ensure that there is nothing in a room which might skew a breath sample. No evidence was presented as to whether the SD2 has a similar feature. The Intoxilyzer 5000 can recognize a spike in radio frequencies and will abort a test if such a spike is detected. The court did not learn anything about whether the SD2 has a similar feature. Health Department regulations require that a \u201csystem purge\u201d precede both the testing of a subject and a calibration test. (10 NYCRR 59.5 [c].) The court did not learn whether the SD2 complies with this feature. The Intoxilyzer machine is calibrated every six months. The SD2 in this case was calibrated annually.9"], "id": "d1e7ec19-3911-497b-88da-19b7059083f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In Matter of Ronan v Levitt (73 Misc 2d 35), certain officers of the New York City Transit Authority made similar arguments in an <mask> to quash subpoenae duces tecum served by the Comptroller. The authority in the Ronan case for the Comptroller\u2019s audit was Public Authorities Law \u00a7 2503 which gave him the right to examine the books and accounts of the Transit Authority, including its books, receipts, disbursements, contracts, and other matters relating to its financial *854standing. The court held that this language did not \"attempt to tell the Comptroller how to conduct such audit\u201d, nor did it \"draw such semantic distinction between 'management operational audits\u2019 and 'financial audits\u2019, as the petitioner[s] [Transit Authority] urge[s].\u201d (73 Misc 2d, at p 38.)"], "id": "6eef0330-db8f-4be8-9ab1-8f30b18cb626", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In the opinion of the court the respondent stretched the facts beyond recognition in an <mask> to show some provision for the child by stating that he had purchased two insurance policies, one in the sum of $5,000 and the other in the sum of $10,000, and that his son was the beneficiary of those policies. It was stated that the policies would be submitted to the court. When the policies were not produced after several months, the hearing was reopened. At the resumption of the hearing it developed that two policies in the principal sum of $1,000 each had been issued in 1951 but were permitted to lapse. Parenthetically, it should be noted that one policy covered death of the insured by accidental means, the weekly premium being 10 cents. The other policy was a 20-payment-life policy with a weekly premium of 85 cents. There was some further discussion with respect to policies in which the respondent\u2019s mother was the beneficiary. These policies, however, were not produced and would seem to bear no relation to the issue other than on the question of credibility."], "id": "48f92fbc-8072-4b8d-a7f7-b14e41c43dfb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["No party argues that Section 51.0412 of the Family Code, which became effective on September 1, 2013-before the December 2017 transfer hearing on remand-applies. See Tex. Fam. Code \u00a7 51.0412, Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 1299 (H.B. 2862), \u00a7 7, eff. Sept. 1, 2013 (permitting juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over person if, among other things, person is respondent in adjudication proceeding and proceeding is not complete before respondent turns eighteen, so long as court enters finding that prosecuting attorney exercised due diligence in <mask> to complete proceeding before respondent became eighteen years of age)."], "id": "7b7a338b-8031-48fb-8223-d238f2613dcd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Section 81-a of the Penal Law (L. 1942, ch. 791) provides: \u201c A female who has violated section eighty-a of this article or who has committed an <mask> to violate such section shall not be *102excused from attending and testifying or producing any evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any investigation or trial relating to violations of sections eighty, eighty-one, eighty-two, ten hundred and fifty, or eleven hundred and forty-two of this chapter, or an attempt to commit any such violation, upon the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of her, may tend to convict her of a crime or to subject her to a penalty or forfeiture; but no such female shall be prosecuted or subjected to any such penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which she is compelled, after having claimed her privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against her upon any\" criminal investigation, proceeding or trial.\u201d"], "id": "60ae552c-adb9-47eb-a09f-fd486b644b66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*501In the present case, defendant is charged with driving at an extremely high rate of speed along with the codefendant, and that as a result of this conduct, they recklessly caused the death of the passenger in the codefendant\u2019s vehicle. On the direct case, the People called Mr. John Borras, a civilian witness who testified that upon hearing a crash he responded to the scene of the accident. Mr. Borras further testified that he spoke with the driver of the red vehicle, Mr. Nasser, who stated he had been racing another vehicle and had sped up in an <mask> to keep the other driver from passing him. In the newspaper article authored by Mr. Howard, it was reported that Mr. Borras had spoken with the driver of the Civic, who had stated \u201che had been racing another vehicle and had sped up and was in third gear at the time of the crash, trying to keep the other driver from passing him.\u201d According to the testimony elicited during the bench trial, the driver of the Civic was the codefendant, Eladio Gonzalez. Upon cross-examination by defense counsel, Mr. Borras denied he had ever spoken to the driver of the Civic, and when asked to explain the discrepancy between his trial testimony and the statement contained in the newspaper article, Mr. Borras testified that the reporter was mistaken."], "id": "41f02cb5-1211-4c81-b104-f00b9eecf660", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["After the 1975 burglary-homicide that is also discussed below, the applicant, no longer a confidential informant and, therefore, no longer a beneficiary of that status, pleaded guilty under two indictments to several counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree in connection with the 1974 and 1975 drug sales. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of SVs years to life, although he initially protested that he did not \u201cfeel guilty of selling drugs.\u201d The applicant\u2019s continuing <mask> to minimize his culpability in connection with his drug sales, as discussed below, factors into our rejection of the present application."], "id": "bf5a8003-e203-4096-acd2-4857d8b3ff90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Even beyond the contractual limitations on defendant\u2019s available remedies, defendant cannot establish two of the basic elements necessary for specific performance. First, defendant cannot demonstrate that it was ready and willing to fulfill its remaining obligations under the agreement. Its decision to <mask> to force an adjournment of the closing by \u201cthree or four weeks\u201d and require plaintiff to cure the title defect demonstrates that it was not willing either to accept title as is, or to terminate the agreement and recover its deposit."], "id": "abe261c5-4ff1-4f7b-b848-3d59a460eef7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Indeed, it may be said, as it was in Hanrahan v. Corrou (170 Misc. 922, 929 that \u201c It may be that the committee is mistaken in its estimate; it may be that the transaction will not turn out as advantageously for the city as those interested in the project expect; it is possible that the expenses connected with future improvements will run the enterprise up to such a sum that the revenues paid into the city will be insufficient to meet the bonds as they become due and to pay the interest. The contract may be ill-advised. Time alone will tell. But if the city and its officers were acting in good faith the court will not <mask> to pass upon the wisdom of the purchase. That responsibility rests upon the municipal authorities.\u201d"], "id": "2734a970-7f6b-49f3-b2a8-781c096f93d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The State, however, contends that legislative history is inadmissible here to interpret the meaning of Executive Law \u00a7 12, because the statute is clear on its face. Prior case law indicates: \u201cWhere the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, the legislation must be interpreted as it exists. Absent ambiguity the courts may not resort to rules of construction to broaden the scope and application of a statute\u201d (Bender v Jamaica Hosp., 40 NY2d 560, 561-562 [1976]). \u201cIt is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should <mask> to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used\u201d (Patrolmen\u2019s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 208 [1976] [citations omitted]; Doctors Council v New York City Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669, 674-675 [1988]; see Desiderio v Ochs, 100 NY2d 159, 172 [2003]; Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v County of Oneida, 78 AD2d 1004 [4th Dept 1980], lv denied 53 NY2d 603 [1981])."], "id": "833d7c5a-a503-4848-8096-a314f0a876a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Between the court's assumption of jurisdiction of the Children and the initiation of termination of parental rights proceedings, Mother has had eight written service agreements with the Children's Division. Among other things, the service agreements afforded Mother with the right to supervised visits with her Children. During the first year that the Children were in the care, custody, and control of the Children's Division, Mother's visits with the Children were inconsistent and sporadic. Mother failed on numerous occasions during this time frame to confirm future visits with the Children's Division. Mother would, on occasion, call to confirm a planned visit, then fail to show up for the visit. On several occasions, the Children's Division worker would <mask> to contact Mother to facilitate a visit, but Mother would not answer her phone."], "id": "d411be63-fb93-495a-8bbb-0f4439743132", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["At the conclusion of the testimony, the court denied Sykes' motion for a directed verdict, and the matter proceeded to the jury after closing arguments. The jury returned a verdict finding Sykes guilty of carrying a concealed deadly weapon under Count 2, not guilty of resisting arrest under Count 3, and guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia under Count 4. The jury was hung on the trafficking in marijuana charge under Count 1, and the parties reached an agreement related to that charge. Pursuant to that agreement, Sykes moved to enter an Alford plea1 on an amended charge of criminal <mask> to trafficking in marijuana, less than 8 ounces, second offense. Sykes waived sentencing by the jury, and the court fixed his sentences at twelve months on Counts 1 and 2, and seven days on Count 4. The court ordered the forfeiture of items seized. By agreement of the parties, the forfeited items included the firearms, ammunition, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. The cash was to be returned to Sykes."], "id": "6c841c73-c254-4c32-9d33-d0e14e17b7ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Specifically before the jury entered the courtroom and the taking of evidence commenced, defendants\u2019 attorneys brought to the attention of the court that approximately 35 persons, occupying one half of the spectator seats in the courtroom were wearing red and black ribbon corsages. The court immediately held an on the record side-bar conference. Defendants contended that the ribbons represented an unfair <mask> to impede justice and influence and/or pressure the jury/court, thereby denying them a fair and impartial courtroom environment and resulting trial. The prosecutor contended that the ribbons were only symbols of concern and solidarity for the victim\u2019s family by persons affiliated with the not-for-profit national organization called \"Parents of Murdered Children\u201d and/or its New York branch, \"Parents of Murdered Children of New York State, Inc.\u201d It is to be noticed that one of the announced goals of this organization is \"to make the criminal justice system more sensitive to the needs of victims and treat victims with greater compassion and concern\u201d. The prosecutor also contended that the wearing of such ribbons had been permitted in other nameless, but relevant recent criminal proceedings in the Second Judicial Department. No specifics were ever submitted."], "id": "ca5be6a0-4077-4a5b-be8b-58d9e683caa7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Although, as it has been set forth above, the affidavit of Mr. Hudson specifies the actual statements made to all poten*883tial SLU recruits who expressed an interest in the wrestling program, and therefore sufficiently supplements the complaint in this respect, there has been no <mask> to identify when the statements were made and whether if any of the actual plaintiffs heard, and relied upon, any of these particular statements."], "id": "725d49f3-f84f-434b-a483-048e19a1688d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"[The DAA] is exempt from the state overtime requirements of Labor Code section 510. *407Morales [, supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 537-538, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] (citing Johnson [, supra , 174 Cal.App.4th 729, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 53 ] ). In an <mask> to avoid this prohibition, paragraph 17 of the SAC alleges: '... [DAA] is a joint employer with the Outside Promoters, and must therefore comply with Labor Code section 510, subdivision (a).' However, there exists 'no authority for the proposition that a joint employer may be held liable for Labor Code violations committed by a *92cojoint employer based on principles of agency or joint and several liability. Rather, whether an employer is liable under the Labor Code depends on the duties imposed under the particular statute at issue.' Noe [, supra , 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 333-334, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 836 ]. In short, the alleged joint employment of plaintiffs by the DAA and the private employers does not serve to transfer the liability of the private employers to the DAA. Labor Code section 510 does not contain language from which such joint liability can be inferred. \"Plaintiffs argue that the appellate decision in Morales issued after Noe , such that the Morales decision controls and constitutes 'law of the case.' This argument lacks merit. Morales does not hold that joint employers are jointly and severally liable for the wrongdoing of co-joint employers. Instead, the narrow issue that Morales decided was whether Plaintiffs could potentially amend their Complaint. Morales [, supra , at pp. 514, 542-543, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ]. Although leave to amend was permitted, the appellate court 'express[ed] no view as to the ultimate merits of [plaintiffs'] section 510 claim.' Id. at 544 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 1].\" (Emphasis altered.) The trial court thereafter entered a judgment in favor of the DAA."], "id": "5ef044ed-8182-4c2f-9e6d-6cdab2ffe36f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["have emphasized frequently, \u2018[l]egislation is rarely aimed at advancing a single objective at the expense of all others.\u2019\u201d Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, \u00b6 34, 357 P.3d 992 (alteration in original) (quoting Myers v. Myers, 2011 UT 65, \u00b6 27, 266 P.3d 806). \u201cMore often, statutes are a result of legislative give-and-take that balances multiple concerns.\u201d Id. (citation omitted); see also Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, \u00b6 23 n.6, 248 P.3d 465 (recognizing \u201cthe peril of interpreting statutes in accordance with presumed legislative purpose, particularly given that most statutes represent a compromise of purposes advanced by competing interest groups, not an unmitigated <mask> to stamp out a particular evil\u201d). \u00b638 The Tolling Statute, like most statutes, is not buttressed by a single, \u201cclear\u201d purpose. It is, instead, \u201cmulti-dimensional.\u201d State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, \u00b6 23, 308 P.3d 517 (rejecting Canton\u2019s argument that the State\u2019s interpretation of our criminal tolling statute conflicts with the statute\u2019s purpose because the statute \u201cimplicates other considerations\u201d alongside the one Canton advances). So, while the Tolling Statute is undoubtedly aimed at protecting the vulnerable \u201cfrom [] strict time restrictions,\u201d O\u2019Neal v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 1991), it is also undoubtedly aimed at addressing other concerns, see, e.g., Canton, 2013 UT 44, \u00b6 24 (\u201c[O]ur statute of limitations jurisprudence is aimed not only at balancing repose on one hand and an opportunity to prepare a case for filing on the other, but also at fostering certainty and avoiding unfair surprise.\u201d). \u00b639 Furthermore, while we agree with Commodity Transporters\u2014the purpose of the Tolling Statute is, at least in part, protective\u2014we are not convinced that the Legislature enacted the Tolling Statute to protect only those without legal guardians. We have noted that the \u201cUtah [L]egislature has recognized that the mechanical application of statutorily fixed limitations periods may unjustly penalize people who are unable to bring or maintain an action because of disability.\u201d O\u2019Neal, 821 P.2d at 1141. \u201cTo address this problem, the [L]egislature has provided for the tolling of statutes of limitations during a plaintiff\u2019s disability.\u201d Id.; see also id. at 1142 (examining \u201cthe policy underlying . . . [t]olling statutes based on mental incompetency\u201d and observing that they \u201care enacted to relieve from the strict time restrictions people \u2018who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society\u2019\u201d (citation omitted)); Johnson v. State, 945 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1997)"], "id": "0e86c38b-892b-4b8d-b6ef-2e44c2a0dbf7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Supreme Court of California reached a similar conclusion in People v Wheeler (supra, 22 Cal 3d, at 282, n 29, 583 P2d, at 765), regarding the situation at issue here, exclusion of black jurors by a white defendant: \"[W]hen a white defendant is charged with a crime against a black victim, the black community as a whole has a legitimate interest in participating in the trial proceeding; that interest will be defeated if the prosecutor does not have the power to thwart any defense <mask> to strike all blacks from the jury on the ground of group bias alone.\u201d"], "id": "1036edb5-77b6-4882-9141-e5e5c5ccff0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Wetzel does not suggest the Fourth Amendment confers a right to refuse to obey reasonable police commands issued during lawful police conduct. Moreover, the instant case is distinguishable from Wetzel . Here, defendant was not asserting a constitutional right such as the right to refuse consent to a warrantless search. Defendant actively intervened between the officer and the person being cited, during the officer's lawful <mask> to issue a citation."], "id": "2338d686-6189-474f-9e1b-4984bc74c395", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["A public entity may not recover in a representative public nuisance action any funds that it has already expended to remediate a public nuisance. This court acknowledged as much in Santa Clara I . ( Santa Clara I , supra , 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 310, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 313.) The trial court's abatement order in this case did not <mask> to award any already-incurred costs to plaintiff or to any of the 10 jurisdictions. Instead, the court's abatement order directed defendants to deposit funds in an abatement fund, which would be utilized to prospectively fund remediation of the public nuisance. None of these funds were permitted to be utilized to reimburse plaintiff, any of the 10 jurisdictions, or any homeowners for already-incurred costs."], "id": "88ab8444-893f-478a-b667-1d708a8f8c32", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Here was an elevator in general use by defendant\u2019s workmen for the purposes of his business, as plaintiff well knew. Plaintiff brings it to a point where he desires to use it, then goes away, and out of sight of it, a,distance of 25 feet, and then walks backwards with his load to the shaft; and, without any <mask> to see whether it was still there, or had been put to use by some other of the workmen, he steps into the space where he supposes it to be, and meets with the injuries complained of. There is no evidence whatever that he exercised the least care or precaution. Under the circumstances, we think, he was bound to look, and not to trust blindly that, because he left the elevator in one place, it would remain there till he got ready to use it. There is no question but what, if he had looked, he would have discovered the absence of the elevator, and a failure on his part to do so rendered him, in our opinion, fairly chargeable witli negligence; but, even if this were not so, still there is no evidence that the elevator on this occasion moved or went down by reason of any defect in its construction or appliances. On the contrary, there is testimony the other way. It appears that when plaintiff fell through the shaft the elevator was on the cellar floor, and that four or five tubs of lard had been loaded on it; and the witness Breit, who was in the cellar, swears that William Ohlandt, another of defendant\u2019s workmen, pulled it down and loaded it immediately previous to plaintiff\u2019s fall. This testimony is entirely antagonistic to plaintiff\u2019s contention that the elevator fell by reason of the softness of the belts, and satisfactorily accounts for the absence of the elevator from the place where plaintiff left it. There were thus shown two causes by which plaintiff might have sustained his injuries. If it was occasioned by the failure of the elevator to remain at the place where it was stopped, defendant might be chargeable with negligence. If it was occasioned by the man, Ohlandt, pulling it down to the cellar for a load of lard, then negligence could not be imputed to defendant. Plaintiff must fail if his evidence does not show that the accident happened from the first-named cause. If it is just as probable that the accident happened from one cause as the other, then plaintiff has not made out his case by a preponderance of evidence. Searles v. Railway Co., 101 N. Y. 661, 5 N. E. Rep. 66. It follows, therefore, from the views above expressed, that the learned trial judge was correct on both grounds in dismissing the complaint. Judgment affirmed, with costs."], "id": "f1e271c2-782c-4404-a35c-d514fac21dbc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In an <mask> to overcome this natural construction, the executrix calls attention to the rule which has sometimes been applied, that the word \" or \u201d may be read \u201c and,\u201d citing as authority Jackson v. Blanshan (6 Johns. 54, decided in 1810). Why this particular case was selected as the sole authority on this point is obscure, since its facts are anything but apposite to those of the case at bar, and there are several more recent authorities to similar effect. However, all of these urecedents are to be read in the light of the *423equally fundamental principle which is stated with peculiar aptness in Armstrong v. Moran (1 Bradf. Sur. 314, at p. 315): \u201c It is said, however, that \u2018 and \u2019 may be read \u2018 or,\u2019 and the words 1 and their heirs,\u2019 be changed into \u2018 or their heirs.\u2019 But \u2018 and \u2019 is never read ' or,\u2019 unless the context of the will favors it, and the general intention is thereby elucidated or promoted. These words are certainly not ordinarily convertible, and to change one into the other at will, to suit the mood of the reader, would work wondrous mischief with legal instruments, to say nothing of its singular effects upon the meaning of any English author one may chance to take down from the shelf.\u201d"], "id": "e060d360-6dcc-43c3-96d8-27a9f227fa64", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This argument hardly conforms to common experience. If motor vehicles, trucks or others, standing idly in barns or garages are expected to explode, fire departments will be obliged to increase their manpower and insurance rates are likely to go up. Indeed, the proof tendered by claimants defeats their contention. It is to the effect that some vandal broke into the barn. What that individual\u2019s intent was and whether or not the explosion and the fire were a successful culmination of his purpose are subjects for pure speculation. Was there any duty upon the State of New York to post a watchman at the barn to prevent the forcible entry? We think not, although counsel argues that Wheeler\u2019s knowledge of the two or three previous occasions when the barn had been broken into required the State to take additional security precautions. Perhaps local peace officers should have been more vigilant if they were aware that thievery was going on at the premises. But how could the State Department of Public Works or its officers and employees have anticipated that the next <mask> to steal gasoline from the fuel tank in the truck would result in an explosion?"], "id": "6d3f0692-ab16-4608-932b-ad8806bd71d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In Codling v Paglia (32 NY2d 330), New York courts accepted the theory of strict tort liability. In the course of its rationale, the Court of Appeals recognized the expansion of manufacturing operations and distribution of products. The court rejected the notion that a manufacturer may solicit the purchase and use of a product in reliance upon an assurance of its quality and yet <mask> to avoid responsibility when the expected and intended use of the product produces injury. The basis for the rationale is simple and unadorned, being that a *959manufacturer should be prepared to underwrite a loss caused by a product which produces injury when that product is being operated in the manner intended, is being used for the purpose designed and is defective in either design or function under circumstances where the user could not reasonably detect the defect or avoid the injury. Responsibility is placed where the fault is found to lie."], "id": "01ccee8a-dfe9-4b9d-b977-714943c4014b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Another letter addressed to her executors, dated December 31, 1929, reads as follows: \u201cTo my executors \u2014 My mother, Mrs. John Jamison, must not have anything belonging to me. As I stated in another letter, she was cruel to me as a child and young girl. Her cruelty and lack of consideration and care has had a devastating effect on my health and nerves all my life. Although she is married to a man who can afford to pay $12000 a year for the apartment in which they live, my mother still takes $1000 a year from my father\u2019s estate and has been taking it for over 23 years, even though she has been married all that time. I asked her if I could now have the $1000 a year, to which she has no right anyway. After being absolutely insulting to me about it she let me have one quarterly payment of $245 \u2014 then said that was all I could have. It is evident that she and Mr. Jamison are planning to cheat me out of money which she has and which was left her by my grandmother and my aunt. Mr. Jamison, with all of his wealth plans to take that money away from me in case of Mrs. Jamison\u2019s death. In case Mrs. Jamison should <mask> to break my will I wish my executors to use in court, as testimony, a letter which my executors will find in this safety deposit box (204), addressed to my father, Mr. A. G. Norman and written by my mother, in which she blackmails him through me. I am certain that such a dastardly and vile letter was never written by a mother before and it would absolutely prevent her from being able to *399break my will. I write all this because I could not rest in my grave if she ever got any of my father\u2019s or my money or property. Christine Norman Booth Dec. 31, 3 929. The letter to which I have referred was written to my father by my mother at the time she was getting her divorce from him. Christine N. Booth.\u2019\u2019"], "id": "708a8f10-1c30-466b-a72a-27e673e03148", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Allcutt (117 App. Div. 546 ; affd, 189 N. Y. 517), this court said: \u201cIt may be difficult by a precise definition to draw the line between where nursing ends and the practice of medicine begins,, and the court should not <mask>, in construing .this - statute to lay down in any case a hard, and- fast rule upon the subject, as the courts have- never undertaken to mark the limits of the police power of the. State or to have precisely defined -what constitutes fraud. What the courts have- done is to .say that given legislation was or was not within the limits of the police power, or that certain *843actions were or were not fraudulent.\u201d We thereupon proceeded to review all of the facts in that case and drew the conclusion there- . from that Allcutt came within the purview of the statute prohibit\" ing the practice of medicine without being lawfully authorized and registered, and sustained the conviction."], "id": "8bfe1cee-cdaf-4d9c-b27f-726fbe79722d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The referee found that the patents were valuable and were necessary for the business of the corporation. There is no finding of any fact of which fraud can be predicted or of any <mask> to evade the operation of the statute \u2014 nothing, indeed, to show that it was not made in good faith. The position contended for on behalf of the respondent, namely, that it was a fraud upon the stockholders and creditors of the company for its trustees to purchase of one of their number property for the alleged benefit of the corporation) and pay therefor the company\u2019s entire capital stock, cannot be sustained."], "id": "b47f7d76-5648-4aab-91e6-6b0521787e10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Subdivision 2 of section 224 of the Education Law, so far as here pertinent, provides: \u201cNo person shall * * * <mask> to obtain by fraudulent means any diploma, certificate or other instrument purporting to confer any literary, scientific, professional or other degree \u201d. A violation of the section is a misdemeanor and \u201c any person who aids .or abets another # * * to violate the provisions of this section \u201d is \u201c liable to the same penalties \u201d (Education Law, \u00a7 224, subd. 3)."], "id": "04c7944f-a008-49d4-8fca-a799676e7f36", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff in her affidavit states that she was \u201cbadly hurt \u201d in the accident and had a bad sprain of the back and right hip with shooting pains down to her legs and that as of now she still gets the shooting pains down her legs, and pain in her back. She stated she thought the pain would go away. The plaintiff does not claim that at the time she signed the release she had injuries which were unknown to her. She was at the time of the said signing of the release under treatment for the conditions she now claims. In Mack v. Albee Press (263 App. Div. 275, 277) the court said: \u201c The rule of law which is applicable to these facts does not seem to be disputed. When the settlement is made on the assumption of the existence of a state of facts it may be rescinded if that state of facts does not presently exist. (Landau v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 237 App. Div. 141; Great Northern R. Co. v. Fowler, 136 Fed. 118, 121.) Where, however, there is no mistake concerning the injuries but only a miscalculation of consequences, the voluntary settlement of the parties is irrevocable as to both. (Farrington v. Harlem Savings Bank, 280 N. Y. 1, 4; Miles v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 195 App. Div. 748; appeal dismissed, 233 N. Y. 644; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Wilcox, 116 Fed. 913.) Neither party may then rescind merely because the consequences of a known injury are more serious or less serious than had been anticipated. Such uncertainties are presumed to have been considered when the parties agreed upon the adjustment of their claims. (Sears v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., 163 N. Y. 374, 378; Kowalke v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co., 103 Wis. 472, 479; 79 N. W. 762.) Otherwise, settlements fairly arrived at and releases voluntarily given become futile and *1037nugatory, to be disregarded whenever the course of events reveals that too much or too little has been paid. (Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55, 64; Kovalke v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co., supra.) \u201d (See, also, Yehle v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 267 App. Div. 301.) Althoug'h this plaintiff contends the consequences of her injuries are more serious than supposed, an <mask> was made by her to have this case transferred to the City Court of Queens County. The ad damnum clause in this action seeks the recovery of $6,000."], "id": "0e22237d-89d8-4303-8864-525e90ec5260", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["What emerges from the divergent testimony of both parties in this matter is that petitioner had a license to use the atrium and basement which included electric and water usage. The evidence shows that the respondent permitted the petitioner to use the atrium for the purpose of selling flowers and that use of the atrium was temporary and contingent upon the ability of the landlord to rent the adjacent stores. Essentially, the atrium is an appurtenance adjoining the landlord\u2019s two commercial buildings. A thing \u201cappurtenant\u201d is defined to be a thing used with *547and related to or dependent upon another thing more important, and agreeing, in its nature and quality, with the thing whereunto it is appendant or \u201cappurtenant.\u201d Plainly stated, the atrium together with the basement was not a leasehold characterized by exclusivity and absolute use, since the keys which were initially given to petitioner by the respondent accessed both the atrium and the basement. The court is unpersuaded by respondent\u2019s argument that petitioner\u2019s use of the basement constituted a trespass. Respondent made no <mask> to secure the basement entry from the time petitioner began occupying the subject premises through March 17, 2008, the day of the lock out, thus, permitting unfettered access to the basement. Additionally, the court finds that at all times prior to March 17, 2008, respondent visited the premises at least twice a week and knew or had reason to know that the basement was being used. The photographs proffered into evidence showed electrical lines and plumbing \u201chook-ups\u201d running from the atrium to the basement that were in plain view. In light of these facts, the court finds it difficult to fathom that respondent was oblivious to petitioner\u2019s use of the basement and utilities over a six-month period."], "id": "45a87e29-4275-4dbd-8710-b5808b00e202", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This court cannot disregard the realities of the situation whereby the carrier is in fact a real party in interest. If unsuccessful in the declaratory judgment action, it, rather than the defendant, will be obliged to bear the cost of this litigation, and to pay such judgment as may be rendered against its assured, within the limitation of the coverage of the contract. Under these circumstances, the court must, in fairness, disregard the technicality that the movant is not a formal party to the instant action. Otherwise, if the carrier should not prevail in its action for a declaratory judgment, it will have to pay the judgment which by that time may have been rendered against the defendant herein and who, in view of what he has said in his second statement, will probably make no <mask> to defend the action, thus leaving the carrier no basis for vacating the judgment, appealing therefrom, or taking any steps to protect itself."], "id": "b97037d8-f7c5-46c3-a1b6-9e55f8f2fb13", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Legislature has, last week, taken steps to strengthen the law regarding weapons possession and sale. It has, however, permitted the blanket exemptions from prosecution for peace officers to remain in effect. There has, from time to time, been pending before the Legislature proposed legislation (e.g., S3719, A3952, 1973) which would correct this situation. Such legislation would permit possession by peace officers of weapons \"authorized by regulation or order of his employer.\u201d It would have prohibited possession of such weapons under circumstances evincing an <mask> to use them unlawfully against another. Peace officers should be permitted to possess *956any weapon which may be necessary for their protection and the proper discharge of their duties. The citizens of the State should not be rendered susceptible to any persons possessing weapons with pernicious intent, regardless of the employment of the possessor. It is entirely within the province and power of the Legislature to protect the public from such known and demonstrated dangers."], "id": "e732bfe8-c58d-4b6f-a251-55986deab2c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The court notes that also at issue are the statutory rights of a public employee under section 1173-4.1 of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL; Administrative Code of City of New York, ch 54, \u00a7 1173-1.0 et seq.) that public employees shall have the right to \u201cself-organization, to form, join or assist public employee organizations, to bargain collectively through certified employee organizations of their own choosing and shall have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities,\u201d (Administrative Code, \u00a7 1173-4.1.) Expulsion from a union is a serious penalty which cannot be permitted to be imposed without proper procedures. Under subdivision b of section 1173-4.2 of the NYCCBL, interference with such rights by a public employee union is prohibited: \u201cIt shall be an improper practice for a public employee organization or its agents: (1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of rights granted in section 1173-4.1 of this chapter, or to cause, or <mask> to cause, a public *878employer to do so\u201d. Unfair or unreasonable disciplinary procedures by a public. employee union serve to interfere with the rights of public employees to self-organization and collective bargaining, and such unfair procedures will not be condoned by the courts."], "id": "28eb03f7-be74-4fff-bee3-97afa6bf103d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*357See Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 50-53, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (defining \" 'witnesses' against the accused\" within the context of the Sixth Amendment to include not only those who actually testify at trial, but also those whose out-of-court statements are used against the defendant). Once the complaint was submitted, the right of confrontation attached to each defendant. Id. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Whether Cash Biz was attempting to obtain repayment of the loans through restitution as its conduct suggests, or to obtain some other form of punishment against its defaulting borrowers, it deliberately and repeatedly invoked the criminal justice system in an <mask> to achieve some form of satisfactory result based on the civil debt. In doing so, Cash Biz ignored its own right and obligation under the arbitration agreement contained in the Loan Contracts to seek collection of the debts through arbitration rather than judicially."], "id": "ec5af208-d40d-4515-b5b4-40ddd60ef41e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This court does not agree with petitioner\u2019s interpretation of the two cases cited by her that the discretionary wording of section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code is to be considered mandatory. In Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises (390 US 400) the Supreme Court allowed attorney\u2019s fees in a case involving racial discrimination. The court declared (p 402) therein that its decision was an <mask> to \"encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief\u2019. It was based on a desire to insure the vindication of a policy \"that Congress considered of the highest priority.\u201d (See Tatum v Morton, 386 F Supp 1308.)"], "id": "6ea207df-df14-495d-b8b0-521e447a8127", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On September 19, 2016, the trial court issued a minute order stating: \"It is clear to the court that significant differences of opinion remain regarding the scope of the Agency's production, and the court is persuaded that these disputes should be resolved before the court issues its Order in this case.\" Thus, the trial court directed that \"[t]o the extent the Agency continues to withhold responsive documents, the Agency is directed to prepare and submit to Petitioners an index identifying the author, recipient (if any), general subject matter of the document, and the nature of the exemption claimed. The parties are directed to then meet and confer and <mask> to resolve any remaining disputes.\""], "id": "36f9467b-f576-4e2f-ad04-ce72dfda3917", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["A cloud upon the title it certainly is not. The bond and mortgage are not negotiable, and the agreement which I have just quoted will always be a conclusive answer to any <mask> to collect them before the defendant has delivered to the plaintiffs the quitclaim from the city. Nor do I see how the plaintiffs have a right to foreclose the defendant from his title to the mortgage. The phrase that the mortgage shall remain as a security for' the delivery of the quitclaim, and not to be collectible until the delivery of the quitclaim, was not, in my opinion, intended to work a forfeiture of the mortgage if the defendant failed to obtain the quitclaim by the specified time. Time is not of the essence of the contract, and the only effect of failure to produce the quitclaim is to suspend the payment of the mortgage meanwhile."], "id": "9ea082ea-8704-49b0-a068-e52b94a2d30d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The drainage facilities provided by the State for this section of Saratoga Avenue consisted of the above-mentioned culvert, two drop inlets on either side of the street about 125 feet south of Arch Street, and two drop inlets on either side of the street some 500 or 600 feet north of Arch Street. Hugh T. McKee, an engineer familiar with the area experienced in highway construction, testified that such facilities were inadequate in number, size, character and location to handle the amount and type of drainage which came from Arch Street and from the area west of Saratoga Avenue generally. In particular, he stated that catch basins should have been provided at the Arch Street intersection. Daniel P. Roohan, County Assistant Engineer, who was in charge of the reconstruction of Saratoga Avenue in 1932, and who had been in charge of maintenance since that time, admitted that he had never made any study of the drainage area, and that, although he had noticed the debris on the pavement, he had never recommended or made any changes in the drainage system and had never even gone up Arch Street to investigate the cause of the difficulty. Prom this testimony and from the whole record, the conclusion seems inescapable that the State was negligent in failing to study the. drainage situation, in failing to provide adequate drainage in the first instance, and in failing to remedy or even to <mask> to remedy the situation which resulted from the lack of adequate drainage facilities. (Taylor v. City of Albany, 239 App. Div. 217, affd. 264 N. Y. 539; Sutherland v. State of New York, 189 Misc. 953.)"], "id": "4bdd59bb-d1ec-4eeb-bc8c-d420a7afbc7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["These dispositive facts are unaffected by the plaintiffs affidavit submitted on this motion, and the testimony of James Zito, that the identifiers rely on grooms to control the animal during the identification process, and that the defendant\u2019s employee failed to do so in this case. Even assuming for purposes of this motion that the groom did not control the horse after being asked to do so, the court cannot find that this created a \u201c \u2018unique and * * * dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in the sport\u2019 \u201d. (Morgan v State of New York, supra, at 485.) As indicated above, there is no dispute that a horse is a powerful and sometimes unpredictable animal, and the failure of a groom to control a horse therefore cannot be seen as so unusual that it comes within the ambit of this exception. In addition, the plaintiff continued in her <mask> to complete the identification notwithstanding *1042the excited condition of the horse. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to movant Benshoff, and the complaint and any cross claims asserted against him are dismissed."], "id": "cdaee108-6754-481d-a540-9b4a52d6c975", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The question before me is not whether the Thruway Authority must be served, but rather how must such service be effectuated? Court of Claims Act \u00a7 11 (a) provides that a claim or notice of intention must be filed with the clerk of the court and \"served personally or by certified mail, return receipt requested, upon the attorney general\u201d. Defendant maintains that the alternate method of service, certified mail, return receipt requested, applies only to service upon the *909Attorney-General, and that the Thruway Authority must be served by personal delivery. The only support for this contention is in the characterization of the Thruway Authority as a \"board\u201d (Public Authorities Law \u00a7 352) and the statutory instruction as to how to effect \"personal service\u201d upon a board (CPLR 312). I find that defendant\u2019s <mask> to engraft an element of exclusivity onto the procedure described in CPLR 312 ascribes an intention to the Legislature that did not exist, and also runs afoul of a number of basic principles of statutory construction."], "id": "5fc834d4-e328-4f6b-ac48-a8602ddab4d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Family Court presumed to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to foreclose any <mask> by petitioner to obtain judicial consideration of his rights as a parent. However, the doctrine is more appropriately applied against the mother than against petitioner (Michel DeL. v Martha P., 173 AD2d 308, 309; Matter of Boyles v Boyles, 95 AD2d 95, 98). If respondent now finds petitioner\u2019s involvement in his daughter\u2019s life to be inconvenient, she cannot deny that her predicament is the result of her own action. Not content with the *306knowledge of the identity of the biological father that her chosen method of conception afforded, Robin Y. initiated and fostered a relationship between petitioner and Ry. However strenuously this relationship may be gainsaid by respondent, its nature, duration and constancy during the six years prior to the commencement of this proceeding amply demonstrate petitioner\u2019s interest and concern for his child (Social Services Law \u00a7 384-b) so as to preclude summary termination of his parental rights. Nor, given that Ry has known petitioner to be her father since the age of three, is there any credibility to the suggestion that mere acknowledgement of petitioner\u2019s legal status will result in a shock to the child\u2019s sensibilities (compare, Terrence M. v Gale C., 193 AD2d 437, lv denied 82 NY2d 661). According to the testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist, Ry\u2019s recently expressed desire to sever contact with petitioner, coinciding as it does with the onset of the instant dispute, is based on concerns communicated to her by Robin Y. and Sandra R. These fears are based on the misapprehension that visitation by petitioner necessarily poses an immediate threat to the stability of the household. In any event, Family Court\u2019s precipitous pronouncement notwithstanding, visitation is a matter yet to be determined, and the value of therapy in reestablishing the relationship between Ry and her father is an appropriate consideration in that context (Wolfson v Minerbo, 108 AD2d 682). Finally, entry of an order of filiation has the advantage of supplying a further source of support, should the necessity arise, together with the potential for substantial inheritance (Michel DeL. v Martha P., supra, at 309)."], "id": "1ba9062d-7f7b-41d7-bca0-b3f0472648f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [" Memorandum: Plaintiff Timothy Brown commenced a negligence action against defendant-plaintiff Jason E. Askew and defendant Well Timed Transport, Inc. (Well Timed), and Askew commenced a separate negligence action against Well Timed, each seeking to recover damages for injuries that he sustained in a multivehicle accident. The accident occurred in the afternoon on a section of Interstate 90 (I-90) westbound consisting of four driving lanes and an on-ramp/merging lane. After the on-ramp/merging lane expires, the rightmost lane of the four driving lanes becomes an off-ramp from I-90 headed toward another highway, thereby requiring any driver seeking to remain on I-90 to merge left before I-90 reduces to three through lanes. The speed limit on the subject portion of I-90 is 55 miles per hour. Askew drove down the on-ramp, merged into the rightmost lane, and then intended to merge left again into the right through lane in order to continue on I-90. Meanwhile, Brown, who was driving a tractor-trailer, was in the left-center lane, and a taxi for Well Timed was in the right-center through lane that would continue on I-90. It is undisputed that Askew began an <mask> to merge into the right-center through lane but, ultimately, Askew's vehicle and the Well Timed taxi collided. The Well Timed taxi then hit Brown's tractor-trailer, which in turn hit the center barrier of I-90. The Well Timed taxi also struck the barrier and came to rest against it. Brown and Askew allegedly sustained serious injuries, and the driver of the Well Timed taxi died."], "id": "e846fb14-cb8b-4a39-832e-2a8ea51a76c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"Warnings, to be effective under the combined holdings in Miranda and Westover [Westover v United States, 384 US 436], must precede the subjection of a defendant to questioning. Later is too late, unless there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning. \"Unlike theories which require examination of a defendant\u2019s testimony as to his state of mind and, thus, an assessment of his credibility, the Westover approach may be based on an assessment of external events.\u201d (Emphasis added.) It is clear from the holdings in Elstad and Chappie, along with the facts in the instant case, defendant\u2019s second statement may be admitted on the People\u2019s direct case. Before Miranda warnings were administered, defendant was not subjected to intensive, in depth, or coerced interrogation. In fact, Officer B.\u2019s sole question to defendant before the assertation of the Miranda warnings can reasonably be viewed and described as impulsive, and not as an <mask> to deprive defendant of his Miranda warnings. There is nothing to indicate involuntariness in the pre-Miranda sense."], "id": "4dcb3149-eb15-4537-9cb2-726864f5f57b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["6th. Because the verdict does not find prisoner guilty of any offence ; for the act of 1785 does not punish with death the passing one of the cobs, but is in the plural, and the verdict is in the singular. The act particularly describes the offenc\u00e9, \u201c utter, or <mask> to pass, knowing them to be counterfeit.\u201d And in case the foregoing grounds should be 'overruled ,' the prisoner moves for a new trial, because the instruments given in evidence might have been put into the indictment, being a distinct felony, and should not have been allowed as mere testimony."], "id": "2ba1e17c-9640-457f-907c-19d16c1312be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "attempt", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It is, perhaps, not material in this case to define the rule with precision, and to <mask> to state with accuracy the precise effect to be given to a judgment or decree of the court as proof of probable cause under all circumstances, because in the present case the *192decree of the circuit court of the United States was adjudged to be-entitled to no effect whatever as evidence in support of the defense of the plaintiff in error.\u2014Daily Reg., February 16, 1886."], "id": "52c9c642-94c4-4f48-b559-bf20bc4b9ae2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["There is no per se rule that the Constitution has been offended whenever an informant learns information about the anticipated defense of a pending indictment, without regard to the circumstances under which the information was obtained. (See Weatherford v Bursey, 429 US 545, 552.) The prosecutor who supervised Lacen and the investigation into the alleged homicide <mask> here has averred that the prosecutor who was assigned to the instant case was shielded from any information regarding the defense revealed by the defendant to the informant in their conversations. The court need not assume that the prosecutors have misrepresented the facts, or that any revelation of information concerning the defendant or his attorney\u2019s view of the case communicated to a prosecutor through an *139informant necessarily has the potential for detriment to the defense or benefit to the prosecution solely because the prosecutor who has debriefed the informant in connection with a suspected new offense is employed by the same office as the prosecutor assigned to try the pending indictment. (See Weatherford v Bursey, supra, p 557.) The court notes that the claims of the defendant in his affidavit, submitted in support of his motion, are entirely conclusory in that regard."], "id": "5ab0b28d-d26a-49be-9673-3764029b5683", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*485In determining whether or not good cause has been established, the Third Department has found that a technical violation of the Open Meetings Law did not warrant nullification of the resolution without proof that the violation was motivated by an intent to avoid compliance with the Open Meetings Law (Matter of Frigault v Town of Richfield Planning Bd., 107 AD3d 1347 [3d Dept 2013] [change in location of meeting done for convenience not to prevent public attendance]). Here, even accepting petitioners\u2019 allegations as true that there were technical violations of the Open Meetings Law, there are no allegations\u2014other than speculation\u2014that such violations were part of a larger <mask> to circumvent the law."], "id": "86e32584-562f-4bbe-a3b5-aca6b39b3627", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In a 24-count information, the Contra Costa County District Attorney charged defendant and five others with <mask> *804to commit human trafficking (\u00a7\u00a7 182, subd. (a)(1), 236.1, subd. (b); count 1). The district attorney alleged in great detail a total of 51 overt acts committed by the various six defendants against Victims 1, 2 and 3, and other women working as prostitutes. Defendant was also charged with two counts of the substantive crime of human trafficking of Victim 1 (\u00a7 236.1, subd. (b); counts 14 and 17)."], "id": "471e7ec9-03e8-4083-9b5d-b2ba8818e9fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Supreme Court in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. , supra , 19 Cal.4th 26, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 960 P.2d 513, held a complaint alleging a defendant title insurer had refused to sell title insurance on any real property acquired at tax sales, which led to the termination of subsequent transactions to resell such properties, stated a cause of action for intentional interference with existing contractual relations. (Id. at pp. 56-57, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 960 P.2d 513.) The complaint, however, alleged the refusals were pursuant to an unlawful <mask> among several title insurers not to insure tax sale properties. (Id. at pp. 35-36, 57, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 960 P.2d 513.) The Court also held whether plaintiffs could prove defendant \"intended to interfere with land sale contracts when it denied title insurance ... [is] a matter for trial.\" (Id. at p. 57, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 960 P.2d 513.)"], "id": "294a7ece-b2c7-4f97-91a3-13eefdac6667", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Armstrong concedes that Defendants are part of the same agency, as Nevada\u2019s OSHA office is within the Division of Industrial Relations, which is within the Department of Business and Industry. Nev. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 618.235. But Armstrong contends that she adequately pleaded a <mask> between Defendants and ENTA, so that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is inapplicable. We disagree. The FAC focused on a conspiracy among the Defendants. It does not allege sufficient facts to support a conspiracy involving ENTA."], "id": "32bf01dc-4da0-4c2d-b6e8-ff097e780ed6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Since drafting the earlier part of this decision, I am informed that in said City Court and on motion of the said complainant, the judge of said City Court has granted an order herein permitting the said complainant to withdraw his said charge of <mask> against said defendants. That being so, the only charge remaining for hearing, trial and determination by said Court of Special Sessions is, whether or not the defendants are guilty of said charge of alleged assault in the third degree. With the merits of said controversy I am not here concerned. I cannot see how the trial thereof will present any intricate or complicated questions of fact or any difficult questions of law. Such a case is not of the exceptional character. So far as I can anticipate, it in no way meets the tests set forth in People v. Rosenberg (supra). I discover no adequate reason why said defendants cannot have a fair and impartial trial of the said charge of alleged assault in the third degree in said City Court."], "id": "2fa932e6-6255-4103-94b9-fe435c629926", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Before Davis, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges. Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge: Sergio Fernando Lagos urged the district court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255 on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing. The district court denied Lagos\u2019s motion, and for the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM. I Lagos pleaded guilty in 2015 to one count of <mask> to commit wire fraud and five counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2, 1343, and 1349. Lagos was the owner and CEO of U.S.A. Dry Van Logistics, LLC Case: 20-20283 Document: 00516192963 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2022"], "id": "e1a817f8-ae36-409f-aa31-efb8c82cade8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On December 1, 2011, Plaintiff filed its initial complaint in the action below. Plaintiff alleged that DAS, Defendants, and various other individuals and entities, including the United States government, \"agreed on a common plan ... to fraudulently transfer 13 million dollars from the Credit Suisse Bank account to DAS and thereby hinder, delay or defraud OPTIONAL in recovering that property.\" Although Plaintiff did not provide any details about the formation and operation of the alleged <mask>, it alleged that the DAS Freeze was a result of the conspiracy and that Parker had made misleading representations to the federal district court and to the Ninth Circuit."], "id": "e79d3081-60dc-4358-9381-0d5bd80a5f54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Second, an anti-SLAPP motion is an evidentiary motion (Finton Construction, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 213, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ), but Contreras fails to provide evidentiary support for her allegations of <mask> or aiding and abetting. \"Because civil conspiracy is so easy to allege, plaintiffs have a weighty burden to prove it.\" (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 333, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 339 (Choate ).) \"To prove a claim for civil conspiracy, [Contreras] was required to provide substantial evidence of three elements: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.\" (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 (Kidron ).) For liability to attach, knowledge of the planned tort must be combined with intent to aid in its commission. (Id . at p. 1582, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752.) \"While knowledge and intent 'may be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances' [citation], ' \"[c]onspiracies cannot be established by suspicions. There must be some evidence. Mere association does not make a conspiracy. There must be evidence of some participation or interest in the commission of the offense.\" ' [Citation.] An inference must flow logically from other facts established in the action.\"12 (Ibid . )"], "id": "fc746c87-d946-415b-b2f6-8b2337bb68ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In August of 2018, petitioner was arrested in Berkeley County, West Virginia, on several offenses, including obtaining money by false pretenses and/or schemes, <mask>, forgery and/or uttering, and grand larceny. In May of 2019, he was indicted of one count of financial exploitation of an elderly person, one count of conspiracy to commit financial exploitation of an elderly person, one count of felony fraudulent scheme, four counts of forgery, and four counts of uttering in Berkeley County. Petitioner pled not guilty to these charges. The Maryland court revoked petitioner\u2019s probation and issued a bench warrant for his arrest due to his failure to appear for a probation revocation hearing."], "id": "194f8787-fe40-4c81-bbeb-a169dd2d0bb0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["A couple of weeks after this, apparently early in May of 1967, defendant wife had an attorney from her lawyer\u2019s office come to the house one evening with the power of attorney which she wanted her husband to sign. He had no attorney of his own, but he admits that he signed the power of attorney and that he regarded the attorney as performing no more than the function of a notary. She then told plaintiff that she was going up-State with her sister but apparently she went to Mexico and secured a divorce dated May 9,1967. She was accompanied on the trip by an old acquaintance of plaintiff, defendant Louis Buttke, who at the same time, with the assistance of the same hometown lawyer, obtained a. Mexican divorce from his wife. For reasons not very clear the wife did tell plaintiff about May 16th that she was going to Mexico for the divorce and she left for a few days. The wife continued, however, to live with the plaintiff until September 16th, when she finally moved out. She married Buttke in October of 1967. According to the wife, even after she had the divorce the plaintiff did not want her to move out. When she finally did leave \u201811 left everything \u2019 \u2019 including a joint checking and joint savings account and most of the furniture and furnishings. Even as to the things she took, she admits telling the plaintiff that he could have back anything he wished. She did not, however, do anything about transferring title to the real property and at this point plaintiff finally consulted an attorney. Negotiations to settle the property questions came to naught and plaintiff, who has never transferred to the wife the items he agreed to transfer now offers to complete his performance and asks that the wife be ordered to execute deeds to the home and the summer house. He also sought in this action to annul the Mexican divorce on the ground *170of fraud, but he has now withdrawn this prayer for relief. He also asks $3,500 in legal fees which he alleges he has been obliged to expend herein and requests that defendants pay him $50,000 for fraud and <mask>. The actions for conspiracy against all defendants were dismissed at the trial for lack of proof."], "id": "16af0702-17d4-42c8-be28-dece69a0768b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, we find no proof of any <mask> on the part of the Long Island State Park police, the police of the City of New York and the County of Nassau to perpetuate and continue the false arrest of the claimant. Nor is there any proof of an assault upon the claimant by the State Park police. In fact, the claimant stated that he was never beaten by the State Police."], "id": "dfccd4d5-5528-45b5-8e71-c0279e5da879", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*754Paragraph 14 of the petition alleges: \u201c14. On information and belief, after the issuance of letters testamentary to the Executors, they entered into a <mask> with Marlborough Gallery and Marlborough A. G. to defraud the Estate of Mark Rothko, Deceased, to waste the assets of that estate and to dispose of the paintings of the decedent belonging to his estate for the sole benefit and profit of the respondents and each of them, and in. pursuance of that conspiracy they engaged in the acts hereinafter set forth.\u201d"], "id": "74b88627-2040-4232-aa2d-074dfb89374d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Were two or more of those listed below part of a <mask> that damaged Vernco? To be part of a conspiracy, a defendant and another person or persons must have had knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common objective or course of action that resulted in the damages to Vernco. One or more persons involved in the conspiracy must have performed some act or acts to further the conspiracy. Answer 'Yes' or 'No' as to each of the following: Hood ANSWER: Yes Nelson ANSWER: Yes Koenning/Insurance Once ANSWER: Yes *739Punitive Damages"], "id": "adc88475-70a9-4693-9077-f2415c7e9a1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As the result of defendant\u2019s alleged possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia at his residence on September 2, 1992 and $100 sales of cocaine to State Police informants on August 17, 1992 and on August 31, 1992, three separate indictments were obtained, charging defendant with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and two counts each of criminal use of drug paraphernalia in the second degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and <mask> in the fourth degree. Defendant disposed of all three indictments with a plea of guilty to a single count of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 4 to 12 years and a $5,000 fine. Defendant now appeals, challenging only the sentence imposed by County Court."], "id": "8df3ec9c-a9e9-4295-8b95-d856ba1effb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The complaint alleges that the defendants conspired, acted in concert and aided and abetted each other in their marketing and design of cigarettes. The defendants have moved to dismiss these allegations as they relate to the various causes of action. Citing Rastelli v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (79 NY2d 289, 295 [1992]), they claim that the complaint only alleges facts which indicate mere parallel activity among competitors and that such allegations are insufficient to establish a cause of action for <mask> or concerted action. The defendants assert that the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations are merely conclusory and contain no facts which suggest that the defendants actually entered into an agreement to act in conspiracy or concert with one another."], "id": "9fd4ec18-81a8-4069-b265-d083a6dfcea7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["CPLR 302 provides that a court may exercise jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who in person or through an agent commits a tortious act within or without the State. Based upon the acts of a subsidiary within the State, jurisdiction over a parent company may exist under an alter-ego theory. However, a parent-subsidiary relationship alone cannot form the predicate for jurisdiction over the parent (Heller & Co. v Novacor Chems., 726 F Supp 49, 54 [SD NY 1988], affd 875d 856 [2d Cir 1989]; Porter v LSB Indus., 192 AD2d 205, 213 [4th Dept 1993]). There must be some proof that the parent company dominates or controls the daily activities of the subsidiary. (Delagi v Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 NY2d 426 [1972]; Taca Intl. Airlines v Rolls-Royce of England, 15 NY2d 97 [1965]; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152 [1980].) Although here the record fails to demonstrate that Brown & Williamson\u2019s daily operations are controlled by the B.A.T. defendants, *420the facts do support allegations of a <mask> connecting all of the defendants to the transactions occurring in New York."], "id": "f89e4294-57bb-4632-b3ea-33323870ceb6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*498Winkler v. State , 2012 Ark. App. 704, at 6, 425 S.W.3d 808, 811. It is settled doctrine that the crime of <mask> is complete on the agreement to violate the law as implemented by one or more overt acts, however innocent such act standing alone may be, and it is not dependent on the success or failure of the planned scheme. Id. at 6-7, 425 S.W.3d at 811 (citing United States v. Joiner , 418 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2005) ). A conspiracy may be proved by circumstances and the inferences to be drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators. Id. at 6, 425 S.W.3d at 811."], "id": "52d25f18-28d1-4ff9-9fad-3ee425a6b6f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Peter P. Rosato, J. Defendant Robert Tutoni stands charged under the instant indictment with crimes of <mask>, fifth degree, bribery, second degree, and bribe receiving, second degree. Merv Blank and Arnold DiGregorio are named in the conspiracy and bribe receiving counts as unindicted coconspirators. Mr. Blank, as petitioner herein, now moves to expunge his name from the *672Tutoni indictment.* In so moving, petitioner raises an issue which, to this court\u2019s knowledge, has not squarely been addressed in this State, namely, whether it is improper to name someone in an indictment as an unindicted coconspirator."], "id": "2ead4b49-9b60-437e-aad2-a5c48d8221ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Although the fact that dissolution was rejected at the same time severance was accepted suggests that the problems in the west were the cause for the interest in dissolution, it is plaintiff\u2019s position that the severance agreement was evolved at \"clandestine\u201d meetings and was a part of a <mask> first to saddle him with Dr. Fiore and then to dissolve. Prior to the vote on the severance issue, plaintiff wrote to the directors of RHS alleging the agreement was illegal but demanding, that he be permitted to resign on the same terms. At the August 15 meeting he cast the only negative vote and resigned as an employee. Attempts to dissuade him were fruitless and on August 19, 1974 the corporate attorney wrote him stating that his employment contract required 90 days\u2019 notice of termination and contained a covenant not to compete and that if any portion of the eastern practice was lost to the corporation legal redress would be sought. Despite the fact that he was still a shareholder and, for another 90 days, a salaried employee of RHS, plaintiff immediately renewed his efforts to secure a separate contract from the Southampton Hospital. *450Upon receipt of a letter from the RHS attorney advising it of the restrictions contained in plaintiff\u2019s contract of employment, the hospital rejected plaintiff\u2019s proposal."], "id": "ac1856de-3514-401e-97da-7ab0330ecc8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The first cause of action is against 16 of the 25 directors and charges them with gross mismanagement with respect to allegedly excessive employment agreements entered into with defendant Rosenstiel, president of the corporation and chairman of the board. The second cause of action is against another group of 16 directors, alleging a plan or <mask> with defendant Rosenstiel to enter into an unreasonable and excessive supplementary and amendatory agreement. The third cause of action is against a group of 23 directors, alleging unauthorized granting of an option to purchase a certain amount of shares of the corporation to defendant Rosenstiel and misconduct by Rosenstiel in exercising the same. The fourth cause of action is against the entire board, alleging excessive payments to defendants Kiefer and Nauheim for \u201c special services \u201d. The fifth cause of action is against a group of 16 directors and alleges unauthorized options to purchase shares granted to defendants Mackie and Nauheim and their misconduct in exercising the same. The sixth and final cause of action is against 17 of the directors and defendant Sundstrom, alleging an unreasonable and excessive employment and stock purchase option arrangement with him. Accordingly, plaintiff seeks generally to hold the defendants liable for damages to the corporation and to nullify the afore-mentioned agreements, arrangements and plans and to enjoin further payments thereunder."], "id": "979d441e-b6af-47cc-bb83-475a5a0d6608", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["D. Hardwick mounts his final evidentiary challenge against a question the government asked one of Maurya\u2019s employers from after her time at MHS: \u201cDid you know back at the time that Ms. Maurya was working for you, did you know whether she had agreed to plead guilty to <mask> in connection with her prior employment?\u201d Hardwick objects to the question as lacking a foundation, as including \u201cinadmissible hearsay,\u201d and as causing unfair prejudice because \u201cthe Government was allowed to introduce evidence that Maurya admitted to joining a conspiracy without ever calling her to testify and allowing the Defense to cross-examine her.\u201d (Emphasis omitted). Hardwick suggests a number of possible grounds for exclusion, but because the defense had already informed the jury of Maurya\u2019s plea deal, we find no error in the district court\u2019s ruling. The government\u2019s single question regarding Maurya\u2019s guilty plea was asked after the defense had already told the jury about Maurya\u2019s plea during its opening statement. There, defense counsel explained: [U]ltimately [Maurya] sold her story to the government and became a witness. Went down, decided to cut a deal. Now, here is the woman that had stolen almost nine hundred thousand dollars. She cuts a deal with the government: I will testify for you. She believes that they will go lenient on her, and they give her a five-year cap on crimes that could take\u2014you could get a life sentence on. She gets a cap, USCA11 Case: 19-10746 Date Filed: 02/01/2022 Page: 18 of 24"], "id": "5762b4ed-244a-49d5-98e9-678b882a02dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, this court denies the motion for a pretrial hearing on this matter, but does direct that the prosecutor refrain from any reference to the alleged details of any coconspiratorial statements during voir dire or opening statements to the trial jury. During voir dire, the prosecutor may simply inquire about the prospective jurors\u2019 ability to apply the rules of law enunciated by the court, including the rule that any statement made by one conspirator, if made in furtherance of the <mask>, is admissible evidence against every other coconspirator as if uttered by him directly. (Cf., People v L.B. Smith, Inc., 108 Misc 2d 261 [Sup Ct, Onondaga County 1981].)"], "id": "2873bbf8-d62b-467e-b3b1-28d4eb44def8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [". Interestingly, ACA may have involved the in pari delicto doctrine, which prohibits coconspirators in a fraudulent scheme from suing each other. (See Kirschner v KPMG LLP, 15 NY3d 446, 464 [2010].) ACA and Goldman conspired to lie to investors about ACA\u2019s independence, but Goldman conspired with Paulson to lie to ACA. ACA wanted to be compensated for the latter scheme, despite such scheme taking place in the context of ACA\u2019s own <mask> with Goldman. To wit, the real loser on the deal was ABN AMRO, whose losses far exceeded ACA\u2019s."], "id": "7c1622c8-90cb-42f5-91cc-fc5e3f9fa8c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["rately with two counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(1) and one count of possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(k). See id. The <mask> charges were based on evidence of a scheme perpetrated by Plaintiff and his co- defendants that involved acquiring various properties, transfer- ring the properties among each other, setting fire to the proper- ties, and then making fraudulent insurance claims to collect mon- ey for the fire losses. See id. The firearms charges were based on evidence that law enforcement agents found multiple guns, in- cluding a shotgun with an obliterated serial number, when they searched Plaintiff\u2019s home in connection with the alleged conspira- cy, and the fact that Plaintiff had a prior New Jersey conviction for welfare fraud that initially resulted in a two-year sentence. See id. at 871. Plaintiff and his co-defendants elected to have the charges against them tried before a jury, and Defendant Gerald Williams was appointed to represent Plaintiff at trial. See id. at 869. After a three-week trial, Plaintiff and his co-defendants were convicted of the conspiracy charge, and Plaintiff was also convicted of the fire- arms charges. See id. at 871. Plaintiff was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 121 months for the conspiracy, 120 months for each of the \u00a7 922(g) firearm offenses, and 60 months for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. See id. With the assistance of a different defense attorney, Plaintiff appealed his conviction and sentence to this Court, arguing that USCA11 Case: 21-10597 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 4 of 13"], "id": "2cbe5f36-670e-4a5e-be08-28147cafbeaf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In October 1996, the Blumenfelds \u2014 New York residents\u2014 filed the first of the 13 investors\u2019 demands for arbitration. Subsequently, the 12 other investors each filed a separate demand for NFA arbitration in connection with the alleged fraudulent scheme. The investors asserted claims against Goldinger, Capital Insight,2 and the Respondents for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and its regulations, breach of fiduciary duty, failure to supervise, breach of customer agreement, churning, common-law fraud, <mask> to defraud, aiding and abetting common-law fraud, deceptive business practices, negligence, gross negligence, negligent misrepresentation and respondeat superior."], "id": "6ea8a9a5-8606-4603-b9ea-4e242ef9f62e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Concurrent with the diversion of funds from BNU an investigation of Steve\u2019s operations by the United States Department of Justice was underway. Two weeks after the hearing before this court on BNU\u2019s motion for a TRO on the funds in the accounts in New York City, the United States Attorney filed an indictment against Steve\u2019s principals, Steve Wangboje and Azie Guice, in the United States District Court in New Jersey. The indictment charged that they had engaged in \"money laundering\u201d of funds from narcotic operations, wire fraud and <mask>. The affidavits of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency personnel in support of the orders for the interception of wire communications among the defendants indicated that the money laundering scheme was related to drug trafficking activities by car dealerships located in Nigeria. One such dealership was Skymit Motors, Ltd. in Lagos, Nigeria, to which Steve\u2019s shipped luxury vehicles and parts. Communications intercepted from Wangboje\u2019s home with the other defendants \"reflect that the Subject[s] themselves are actively involved in fraudulent schemes * * * and have customers who were/are engaged in drug trafficking.\u201d The wiretaps also revealed that Skymit attempted to impede the investigation in Nigeria by, inter alia, instructing Steve\u2019s to manufacture and alter documents, and \"stonewall\u201d the investigators."], "id": "1f4a90ad-a1c8-46d6-8aa7-5299988f9796", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["If, then, this offence consists in combining to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means, it will clearly only be necessary in the first case to charge the combination #and the object of it, that the court may see it was a <mask> to do an unlawful act; but where the combination is not rendered criminal by the unlawfulness of its object, it will be necessary to go farther until the point of criminality is reached, and set out such unlawful means as rendered it so."], "id": "1d0d8bc5-30b8-4f6d-93f4-0b8855594d19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["But if we place no harsh construction on the codicil of January 24, 1902, and treat it also as an attempt to testam\u00e9ntate in good faith under the existing Statute of Wills, the evidence of its due execution by a competent and free testator is not very high. The codicil propounded was drawn by Mr. Parshall, and, like the will, the ceremony of its execution was performed at Port Jervis. It was witnessed by Mr. Parshall and by Dr. -Lambert, a resident physician of Port Jervis. Necessarily Dr. Lambert\u2019s means of observing the testator were limited to their joint residence at Port Jervis, which was brief. *594This witness was the family physician of the Wood family. He could not remember whether or not Mrs. Van Ness was present when the codicil was executed. He came to the ceremony by Mr. Parshall\u2019s request. It was he, this witness, who sent Miss Wood away on the argonautic expedition which led to her marraige. The effect of testimony of attesting witnesses to a codicil like this has been discussed in Marsh v. Tyrrell, 4 Ecc. Rep. 46. It is not necessary in a case of this kind to connect all the attesting witnesses with a <mask> or the undue influence charged. Even persons of high character may be employed and fail to do their duty in a situation like that of Dr. Lambert and Mr. Van Ness. Mr. Van Ness Was at Port Jervis, very old, among total strangers and away from his only daughter and lifelong friends. He was then over eighty-three years of age. Yet there is no evidence that the physician took the slightest pains to examine Mr. Van Ness alone and apart from his wife or Mr. Parshall. He was not bound to unravel all the complicated conditions of his family relations or the tangled threats of Mr. Van Ness\u2019 past life. But he should have taken some pains to ascertain the facts he attested. This attesting witness was naturally most interested in the Wood family. He did not even know at the time of the codicil that Mr. Van Ness had an only daughter dependent upon him to some extent. It appears that this witness made himself only perfunctorily an attesting witness and a part of a testamentary ceremony conducted by Mr. Parshall in the presence of Mrs. Alice Wood Van Ness, the possessor of all of Mr. Van Ness\u2019 estate."], "id": "45af9c6f-0ed9-4a5a-897b-4edbaa22cfc6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As to the first contention, the sufficiency in law of the counts charging perjury, larceny by false pretense and forgery having been herein sustained, the legal sufficiency of the <mask> counts is likewise sustained as to those three categories of crime charged. As to the second count of Indictment No. 20416, charging violation of section 2051 of the Penal Law, we, having determined that count to be insufficient in law, must necessarily determine the conspiracy counts likewise insufficient in law and they must be dismissed with respect to that crime only."], "id": "68d2ba33-ab0f-4275-8c01-83160c35d0c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The court\u2019s examination of the Grand Jury proceeding has failed to show any other overt acts done in furtherance of the <mask> until its pleadings termination date of August 1,1979 and within the two-year Statute of Limitations for such crime. \u201cThe purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity. For these reasons and others, we have stated before \u2018the principal that criminal limitations statutes are \u201cto be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.\u201d \u2019\u2019\u2019(Toussie v United States, 397 US 112, 114-115.)"], "id": "746d427b-6155-4180-a966-2c494cb1f318", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["McGill testified that Andrew Renaud was charged, as his role in a marihuana selling <mask>, with the task of delivering this load of marihuana to yet a third brother participating in the criminal enterprise, Tim Renaud in Pittsburgh. Brother Brian Renaud issued that order. Brian yelled at Andrew (who whined that his truck was in the shop and he couldn\u2019t get to Pittsburgh) and ultimately told him to get McGill to provide the wheels. Andrew is the one who directly told McGill about the plan and asked McGill to provide the transportation to deliver the marihuana to Tim. The discussed plan with Andrew was that McGill would be paid $500 or $600 to make the run with Andrew, plus he would get 2 of the nearly 19 pounds of marihuana being transported. McGill was going to remain silent, until he heard Andrew telling the police that none of the stuff in the vehicle was his. As McGill testified:"], "id": "79f69dd3-4300-4c39-885e-3ca8551eaa16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["fraud counts. Throughout the plea process, Greenhill was repre- sented by her second court-appointed lawyer (P.C.). On 3 February 2020, the district court conducted a change- of-plea hearing. During the plea colloquy, Greenhill testified under oath that she understood the plea agreement, that no one had threatened or coerced her to plead guilty, that she had had suffi- cient time to think about and to discuss with her lawyer her deci- sion to plead guilty, and that she was satisfied with her lawyer\u2019s representation. Greenhill also said she agreed with the govern- ment\u2019s factual proffer and that she was in fact guilty of <mask> to commit wire fraud. The district court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement\u2019s appeal waiver, explaining that by pleading guilty, Greenhill was giving up her right to appeal her conviction and sen- tence except in three narrow circumstances. Greenhill confirmed that she understood the appeal waiver. At the end of the plea colloquy, the district court determined that Greenhill understood the charges against her and the conse- quences of her guilty plea, that Greenhill was pleading guilty know- ingly and voluntarily, and that her plea was supported by an inde- pendent factual basis. The district court accepted Greenhill\u2019s plea and adjudicated Greenhill guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (\u201cPSI\u201d). The PSI calculated a total offense level of 26: a level that included a three-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and enhancements based upon the estimated loss amount USCA11 Case: 21-11102 Date Filed: 02/04/2022 Page: 4 of 12"], "id": "36e79ad6-69b1-4666-90db-f02b71525432", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As was noted earlier, and made clear by defendant\u2019s motion, the problem occurs when the further observation is made that both overt acts Nos. 3 and 4 are alleged to have occurred \u201con or about and between January 1, 1979 and February 15, 1979.\u201d Both acts are alleged to have occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the indictment on February 24, 1981 and thus would appear to fall beyond *990the two-year Statute of Limitations for the prosecution of <mask> in the sixth degree. (CPL 30.10, subd 2, par [c].) Generally the Statute of Limitations runs from the date of the last overt act done pursuant to the conspiracy. (Cf. Matter of Doyle, 257 NY 244; Dennis v United States, 384 US 855; Brown v Elliott, 225 US 392.)"], "id": "4e5a76bf-556d-4340-bb63-097eed44ff90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["But even if it were requisite that the order denying the motion to vacate the order of arrest should be vacated, and liberty given to renew it upon new facts, before a motion could be heard to reduce the bail, there were additional facts in such affidavits beyond what was before the court on the previous occasion. In the first place, the defendant denies specifically the various representations wherewith he was charged in the plaintiff\u2019s affidavit on *344which, the order of arrest was obtained; also an explanation of the original cause of difficulty between the parties; a denial of any <mask> between the defendant Spalding, and his co-defendants; the resumption of the possession of some, at least, of the goods in \u00bfontroversy, by the plaintiff since the defendant\u2019s arrest; the fact that three-quarters of the goods belonging to the firm did not consist of goods bought of the plaintiff, and were acquired since ; a denial of the defendant\u2019s insolvency ; the conversion of the goods bought of the plaintiff into money, and the excess of the value of the firm\u2019s assets beyond the value of the property sold by the plaintiff; the sale of goods of the firm by the plaintiff and his son since this action was begun to persons of doubtful credit; the incompetency of the plaintiff\u2019s son to manage the business ; the action brought by his wife, the plaintiff\u2019s daughter-in-law, for a dissolution of the partnership; a denial that the defendant drew from the assets of the firm the sum charged in the plaintiff\u2019s affidavit. These were amply sufficient to make a new case, and some of them were facts which occurred after the first motion was made, and the discretion of the court would not have been improperly exercised in rehearing either motion on such facts. The novelty of the facts is apparent ^from the plaintiff\u2019s deeming it necessary to deny them in an affidavit of four pages of printed matter."], "id": "68eefd1d-6c14-449c-83d0-e628b1704440", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In February 2007, appellants filed a complaint against Hancock with the ASBL, seeking to have Hancock sanctioned for his actions with regard to the survey. The ASBL dismissed this complaint against Hancock. Appellants call the ASBL's refusal to sanction Hancock \"contrary to all evidence\" and claim that the ASBL's findings were \"lies\" and that the dismissal of their complaint was \"baseless, of bad faith, and false.\" Essentially, they claim that the dismissal of their complaint was the result of a <mask> against them."], "id": "2fa7fd11-192d-48bd-9990-e95c48045ca8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c (e) The court shall have the power to hear, try and determine charges for every misdemeanor committed within the corporate limits of said city. * * * \u201c (f) The judge or assistant judge shall have power, upon conviction for misdemeanor, to impose a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one year in a county jail or penitentiary or a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment, with further imprisonment if such fine is not paid, not exceeding one day for each dollar of fine unpaid, except where a different punishment is by law prescribed for such offense.\u201d From this I conclude and determine that this special act must be deemed to be embraced in said subdivision 37 of section 56 of the said Code of Criminal Procedure, and that from the inception said City Court has and does possess in the first instance exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine said charge of <mask>, which, by said section 580 of the Penal Law, is specifically declared to be a misdemeanor, punishment of which is conceded to be by imprisonment in a pententiary or county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than $500, or by both (Penal Law, \u00a7 1937)."], "id": "e405f9f8-1069-4f61-a717-2a2e957604cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Cantu raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether he was prevented by Appellees' alleged deception from presenting the specific plans, actions, and evidence of the <mask>, fraud, perjury, and coercion defense he raised in his petition for bill of review. Cantu also raised a fact issue on whether he was only able to discover Appellees' misconduct years after the Gonzalez wrongful death suit ended, and he could not have previously presented the specific plans, actions, and evidence he proffered in his petition. Thus, Cantu has raised genuine issues of material fact on whether he is seeking an additional review of the specific elements and evidence of conspiracy, fraud, perjury, and coercion that were, or could have reasonably been, already litigated and appealed.... Therefore, the trial court could not have properly granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment on this theory. Cantu II , 448 S.W.3d at 496."], "id": "bf54cbb3-0b93-4811-b7ec-2040a0b55a3a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["But this statement should be read with the rule as declared by the Court of Appeals in Green v. Davies (182 N. Y. 499): \u201c There may be cases where acts committed in pursuance of a combination of a number of persons to injure a third person are actionable, while the same acts, if done by a single individual acting without such concert, would not be actionable. Such cases may be termed actions for <mask>, but where the conspiracy results in the commission of that which would be an actionable tort, whether committed by one or by many, then the cause of action is the tort, not the conspiracy.\u201d"], "id": "d4397ff4-7162-4933-a326-6a85958d89ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["directly related to the plausibility of the plaintiff\u2019s theory.\u201d 69 \u201cIf the plaintiff advances a strong, plausible theory then the quantum of evidence tending to exclude independent action is not as great as if the plaintiff advances a weak or implausible theory. Likewise, when there is a risk that the threat of antitrust liability will chill legitimate, procompetitive conduct by market participants, the quantum of evidence is also high.\u201d 70 IV We turn to the allegations and evidence in this case. A iPic alleges that AMC and Regal conspired to \u201ccrush iPic with clearances\u201d in order to \u201celiminate\u201d it \u201cfrom the markets of Houston and Frisco.\u201d iPic alleges that the <mask> was formed in January 2013 when, after hearing AMC\u2019s presentation to Open Road, Regal president Greg Dunn directed Regal\u2019s film department to clear any luxury or dine- in theater concept within three miles of a Regal theater. iPic further alleges that the conspiracy culminated with AMC and Regal\u2019s near simultaneous clearance requests on July 8, 2014. iPic claims no damages"], "id": "d4b5df5d-f6cd-4ea4-b71a-eb20ebccecd4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Youngkin moved to dismiss the claims against him under the TCPA. In a supporting memorandum, he argued that his reciting the Rule 11 agreement into the court record constituted the exercise of the right to petition, as defined in the Act, and served as a factual basis for Hines's fraud and <mask> claims against him. Youngkin also raised the affirmative defense of attorney immunity, arguing it shielded him from liability to a nonclient for actions taken in the course of representing a client.2 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Youngkin filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 27.008(b) and 51.014(a)(12). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that (1) the TCPA applied to the claims against Youngkin, (2) Hines made a prima facie case for each element of his claims, and (3) Youngkin failed to prove his attorney-immunity defense. We granted Youngkin's petition for review."], "id": "39890ddf-5012-412d-afc6-74673425680b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo conten- dere, of the crimes of <mask> to possess a controlled substance with intent to sell, conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, and conspiracy to operate a drug factory. During surveillance of a motel for illegal activity, a police officer, observing an individual, T, quickly enter and exit the defendant\u2019s motel room at around 1 a.m., believed that he had witnessed a drug transaction. After T exited the motel room, he entered a vehicle driven by another individual, which departed from the motel. A short distance from the motel, the police stopped the vehicle. When the police approached the vehicle, they smelled a strong odor of marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle. After T was removed from the vehicle, he admitted to possessing marijuana. A search of T\u2019s person revealed, inter alia, mari- juana and heroin. The police ultimately detained T, who, at that time, denied being in or having any connection with the defendant\u2019s motel room. The police then went to the house of T\u2019s grandmother, where T was living. After T\u2019s grandmother consented to a search of T\u2019s bedroom, the officers searched that room and found numerous plastic bags with the corners cut off, as well as other bags containing an off-white powder residue. The officers went back to the motel and spoke with the manager, who advised them that the defendant paid cash to rent a room there for a week and provided them with a copy of the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. The manager also indicated that a guest registration card for that room included the name of an individual with T\u2019s surname, which the police believed was most likely T. The officers then went to knock on the defendant\u2019s motel room door. The officers observed a light on, but no one answered. One of the officers then retrieved a canine officer and conducted a canine sniff of the motel walkway in the vicinity of the defendant\u2019s room. The canine alerted that it had detected contraband at the bottom of the door to the defendant\u2019s room. On the basis of all that had transpired since observing T enter and exit the defendant\u2019s room, the police decided to apply for a warrant to search the defendant\u2019s room. Before the police submitted their application for a warrant, how- ever, one of the officers noticed the defendant walking away from the motel. The defendant was ultimately detained, and the officers found a large wad of cash on his person, as well as a motel room key. The police informed the defendant that T had admitted to them that he was storing his supply of marijuana in the defendant\u2019s motel room, and the defendant responded that nothing in the room was his. The defendant agreed to open the door to the room for the officers but then changed his mind and refused to grant them entry. The defendant also indicated at that time that no one was in the room. To ensure that there was no one in the room who might destroy evidence before the officers could obtain a warrant, one of the officers used the defendant\u2019s key to open the door. After opening the door, and without entering, an officer looked inside for approximately fifteen to thirty seconds and then closed the door. While the door was open, the officer observed evidence of drug activity. The defendant was then informed he could leave. Thereafter, the police prepared an application for and obtained a search warrant for the room. The application had been based on the results of the canine sniff of the door of the motel room, the observations made during the visual sweep of the room, and T\u2019s admission to the police that he had kept his supply of marijuana in the room. A search of the room revealed a large quantity of heroin, among other items related to drug activity. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized from the motel room, claiming, inter alia, that the search violated his rights under the Connecticut constitution (art. I, \u00a7 7) because the search warrant application contained information obtained from an allegedly unlawful, warrantless visual sweep of the motel room. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the visual sweep was necessary to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence and, there- fore, was justified by the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The court also determined that, even if the visual sweep was not justified under that exception, the evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant was admissible under the independent source doctrine. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of conviction, claiming, as he had in the trial court, that he was entitled to suppression of the evidence found in the motel room because the search warrant derived from the allegedly unlawful visual sweep of the room. The defendant also asserted, for the first time, that he was entitled to suppression of the evidence because the search warrant application included information obtained from the warrantless canine sniff conducted by the police outside of the door of his motel room. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment, conclud- ing that the visual sweep was constitutionally permissible under the exigent circumstances exception and that a warrant was unnecessary with respect to the canine sniff because the sniff was not a search under the state constitution. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The canine sniff of the exterior door to the defendant\u2019s motel room was a search for purposes of article first, \u00a7 7, of the Connecticut constitution: the protection against a canine sniff that is afforded to a resident of a multiunit condominium complex under the state constitution in accor- dance with State v. Kono (324 Conn. 80) also extends to the occupant of a motel room, as motel guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their rooms, the fact that motel guests typically do not keep all of their personal effects in their rooms did not mean that the personal effects that guests do keep there should be subject to less protection under the law, a room occupied by a motel guest is not more vulnerable to a warrantless canine sniff than an apartment, condominium or house simply because other guests occupy nearby rooms or because rooms may be entered by motel staff to perform certain functions, and motel guests reasonably do not expect that the foot traffic generally associated with an open-air walkway abutting the motel\u2019s guestrooms includes law enforcement officers trolling the walkway with a trained canine in search of contraband. 2. The state could not prevail on its claim that, even if the canine sniff of the door to the defendant\u2019s motel room was a search, such a search could be conducted without a warrant, as long as the search was based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that there were illicit drugs in the room: although cases from other jurisdictions hold that a canine sniff of the door to an apartment or a condominium unit in a multiunit building is lawful if it is based on reasonable and articulable suspicion rather than on probable cause, this court determined that those cases were incompatible with its reasoning and holding in Kono; moreover, under article first, \u00a7 7, searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumed to be unreasonable, the state\u2019s heavy burden of overcoming that presumption is met only in certain excep- tional or compelling circumstances, and the few recognized exemptions from the warrant requirement under the state constitution invariably have involved searches conducted under circumstances requiring imme- diate action by the police, generally, in the interest of police or public safety, a consideration that was not implicated by a canine sniff per- formed to ascertain whether a motel room contains unlawful drugs; accordingly, a canine sniff of the exterior door to a motel room satisfies state constitutional requirements only if it follows the issuance of a warrant founded on probable cause. 3. The information available to the police unrelated to the canine sniff was sufficient to establish probable cause for the search of the defendant\u2019s motel room, but a remand to the trial court was necessary to afford the state an opportunity to demonstrate that the evidence seized from that room was admissible under the independent source doctrine by estab- lishing that the police would have sought the warrant regardless of the results of the canine sniff: the facts, untainted by the results of the canine sniff, were sufficient, standing alone, to support the issuance of the warrant, as T previously had been staying in the motel room, T was involved with and likely selling drugs, T was likely engaged in a drug transaction when he entered and immediately exited the room in the middle of the night, and there were likely drugs or drug related items in the room in light of what the police found on the defendant\u2019s person and the defendant\u2019s denial that anything in the motel room belonged to him; nevertheless, because the defendant did not raise the issue of the constitutionality of the canine sniff in the trial court and, thus, the state had no reason to adduce evidence demonstrating that the police were prepared to seek a warrant prior to the canine sniff or that they otherwise would have done so if the canine sniff had not occurred, the record was not clear with respect to that issue, and it would have been unfair to the state if this court had resolved the state\u2019s independent source claim on the basis of an undeveloped record; moreover, the inadequacy of the record with respect to the state\u2019s independent source claim did not require this court to reject the defendant\u2019s constitutional challenge to the canine sniff under the first prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), which ordinarily would bar appellate review of the defendant\u2019s unpreserved constitutional challenge on the basis that remands to sup- plement the record are generally not permitted, as a remand to allow the state to present additional evidence was appropriate, under the unusual circumstances of this case, insofar as allowing the Appellate Court\u2019s decision to stand would be contrary to the unanimous determina- tion of this court that the canine sniff was unlawful, and vacating the Appellate Court\u2019s judgment would result in confusion with respect to the legality of a warrantless canine sniff of a motel room. 4. This court could not resolve, as a matter of law, the state\u2019s claim that the evidence seized from the motel room was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine on the ground that such evidence would have been discovered by lawful means in the absence of the canine search: although it was apparent that the investigating officers were seeking to develop enough evidence to obtain a warrant for the motel room even before the canine sniff was conducted and that their investiga- tion could have resulted in their obtaining a warrant even if the canine sniff never occurred, the evidence adduced at the defendant\u2019s suppres- sion hearing did not establish, as a matter of law, that the police would have sought a warrant irrespective of the canine sniff; moreover, because this court lacked the authority to find facts, it could not resolve the factual issue presented by the state\u2019s inevitable discovery claim, as the undisputed evidence did not lead to only one possible conclusion; nevertheless, as the state had no reason to adduce evidence in support of its inevitable discovery claim before the trial court insofar as the defendant did not challenge the propriety of the canine sniff in that court, this court concluded that, on remand, the state must be afforded the opportunity to present additional evidence in support of that claim. 5. The Appellate Court and the trial court incorrectly determined that the visual sweep of the defendant\u2019s motel room was justified by exigent circumstances, as the possibility that evidence would be destroyed was too speculative: the belief held by the police that an immediate visual sweep of the room was necessary to avert the destruction of evidence was not objectively reasonable, as the police knew that neither of the two individuals actually linked to the motel room was in a position to destroy evidence located inside the room because, at the time of the visual sweep, T was under arrest and the defendant was with the police, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the police had reason to believe that anyone else had a similarly direct connection to the room or its contents, the generalized possibility that an unknown person might be lurking inside was not sufficient to justify a visual sweep, and, except for the unremarkable fact that a light was on inside the room, the record was devoid of any evidence from which a police officer reasonably could have concluded that someone was inside the room; moreover, the determination of whether the state could prevail on its claim that any impropriety stemming from the visual sweep was obviated by the independent source doctrine required additional fact-finding, and, accordingly, this court directed that, on remand, the state must be afforded the opportunity to present additional evidence related to whether the police would have sought a warrant irrespective of the visual sweep, and the trial court\u2019s determination of that issue must be made in light of the fact that the canine sniff was also unlawful. Argued February 27, 2020\u2014officially released September 15, 2021**"], "id": "fce4619e-7f4f-41e4-a86f-16c170bf5df8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["A most apparent analogy is where a defendant seeks to escape payment for goods sold and delivered, on the ground that plaintiff is using the goods in connection with the conduct of business violating the antitrust laws. The courts have been astute to draw a fine line, and to insist upon honoring commercial obligations which are not an integral feature of the antitrust violations. (See Kelly v Kosuga, 358 US 516; Bruce\u2019s Juices u American Can Co., 330 US 743, 755.) As Mr. Justice Jasen said in Fleet-Wing Corp. v Pease 011 Co. (29 Misc 2d 437, 439, mod on other grounds 14 AD2d 728): \u201cAn affirmative defense charging violation of the antitrust laws must be struck down upon motion to dismiss unless the contract for the sale of goods is alleged to be an integral part of the illegal <mask>. The contract must in itself carry out the terms of the illegality and be part and parcel of the violations to allow the defense to stand.\u201d"], "id": "7da01547-e8ed-4052-8fa6-483e48a39667", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The former employer of the three individual defendants seeks damages in its first cause of action for alleged loss of profits in the sum of $50,000, claiming that while still in its employ the three individual defendants organized the defendant Nueborne Concrete Breaking Corporation, whose name was thereafter changed to that of Able Breaking Corporation; that they entered into a <mask> that said corporations would compete with the plaintiff and entice away and obtain its business and customers for their own benefit and contrary to the interests of the plaintiff and to its detriment and damage; that, pursuant to this conspiracy, the defendants, while still in the employ of the plaintiff and unknown to it, purchased certain machinery, *248and with the aid \"of other of plaintiff\u2019s employees solicited the business of its customers and others and actually procured from such customers business and orders which were formerly given to the plaintiff; that the aforesaid competition and all of the acts and conduct of the defendants were contrary to and in violation of- the obligation of the individual defendants to be loyal to their trust and to their employer."], "id": "7d0a1cdd-7365-4beb-a894-b2e49bb03fb2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The second indictment (No.- 43-55) was found on January 5, 1955. It charged defendant Winter as sole defendant with additional violations of sections 270-a and 270-d of the Penal Law. The third indictment (No. 45-55) was also found on January 5, 1955. It charged defendants Winter and Wolf jointly with the crimes of <mask>, attempt to suborn perjury in the first degree, inducing another to commit perjury, and attempting fraudulently to induce a witness to give false testimony and to withhold true testimony."], "id": "d8132645-e629-4565-9db3-09730fb0e4ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On September 28, RCCC filed its opposition to the 7 Stars anti-SLAPP motion, included within which was a declaration of Hirschhorn testifying as to the facts that underlay the TAC. The declaration was 10 pages long, and set forth in vivid detail what the defendants did to RCCC, detail that supported Hirschhorn's testimony of a <mask> among defendants to harm RCCC-their \"war on RCCC.\""], "id": "bb0f8339-92c2-42a5-a20d-daaed07c4ac6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Phylis Skloot Bamberger, J. The defendant was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, <mask> in the fourth degree and 20 counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree. The charges were based on a scheme to defraud the New York State Medicaid system by billing in violation of the Medicaid regulations. Before and during the trial, the defense repeatedly asked that all charges be dismissed on the ground that the defendant\u2019s interpretation of the Medicaid regulations was correct and consequently her conduct was proper. This court rejects the defendant\u2019s interpretation of the rules and finds no legal defense based on them."], "id": "57bdb2cd-3688-4af6-b251-65b58392abd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Convicted of the crimes of larceny in the first degree, attempt to commit larceny in the first degree, larceny in the second degree and <mask> to commit larceny in the first degree in connection with certain financial transactions involving an elderly victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant was hired as an in-home aide for the victim, and increasingly involved herself in the victim\u2019s life. A few months after the defendant was hired, the pastor of the defendant\u2019s church was granted power of attorney over the victim, and from that point forward the victim\u2019s banking activity began to diverge from several long-standing patterns. Increasing sums of money were being withdrawn from the victim\u2019s bank accounts and used by the defendant to pay for her various personal expenses. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of all four counts against the defendant. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the wrongfulness element of the offense of larceny, the charge to the jury having adequately conveyed the appro- priate levels of intent for both taking and retaining property in accor- dance with State v. Saez (115 Conn. App. 295), which outlined the state\u2019s obligation to show that the defendant acted with the subjective desire or knowledge that her actions constituted stealing: the court\u2019s charge to the jury, when considered as a whole and in light of the penal code\u2019s definition of larceny, was sufficient to adequately guide the jury; more- over, the language in the court\u2019s charge linking the requirement that the state must prove the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property with the requirement that the state must prove that the defendant took the property with an unlawful purpose adequately conveyed the requirement that the defendant must have intended to take the property wrongfully, such that the jury properly was apprised of the elements of larceny and the bar that the state had to meet with respect to the specific intent requirement in order to convict the defendant. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the jury instructions provided by the trial court granted the jury impermissibly broad latitude in considering the possibility of the victim\u2019s mental incapacity, that contention not being supported by the plain language of the court\u2019s instructions: the jury was informed that, even if it concluded that the victim was mentally incapacitated in any way, the instructions did not mandate a conclusion that the victim could not and did not consent to the defendant\u2019s taking of the property, and, by instructing the jury that it \u2018\u2018may\u2019\u2019 determine that the victim\u2019s mental incapacity prevented him from consenting to the taking of his property, the charge permitted the jury to exercise its discretion and consider whether the evidence before it supported such a finding; moreover, the jury charge clarified that an owner\u2019s inability to consent must be paired with the defendant\u2019s awareness of that inability in order to satisfy the wrongfulness require- ment of larceny, and the charge contained sufficient safeguards against the jurors improperly drawing conclusions as to the wrongfulness of the defendant\u2019s conduct. Argued September 13, 2021\u2014officially released January 11, 2022"], "id": "770b6d4e-ca75-4600-adba-0e3c1522874e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Similarly, the case of Associated Press v. United States (326 U. S. 1) may be distinguished, on the basis that there a <mask> was involved which included all papers subscribing to the Associated Press. The Associated Press by-laws prohibited service of news to nonmembers and empowered members to block membership applications of competitors and make them pay high fees for entering. It was held that this conspiracy *443violated the Sherman Act since a new paper could be prevented arbitrarily from obtaining Associated Press news in competition with member papers in its area. In the present case there is no membership association which is blocking entry of anyone from competition. There is no concerted action by the plaintiffs at all. There is no conspiracy. The plaintiffs have not even refused to sell to defendants. The only thing sought to be enjoined is the defendants\u2019 unfair appropriation of plaintiffs\u2019 unpublished property."], "id": "aae6e076-602a-4f90-9e6d-1d55823fa5b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On page 1 of the Grand Jury minutes the District Attorney advised the defendant that \u201c the Grand Jury is in the process *374of conducting an investigation to determine whether or not there has been committed in this county crimes of <mask>, larceny and other crimes in connection with office holders and public employees. At the moment you are being called as a witness * * * [p. 2] it is quite conceivable in the course of this investigation that you may turn out to be a defendant, although at this moment we are calling you as a witness.\u201d (Italics in the above quotation made by this court.)"], "id": "2bd7603a-f1ce-49db-9245-2b019dc2f91f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Skinners conveyed the property to plaintiff on November 5, 1960. Five days later, plaintiff, by his attorney, directed a letter to the Skinners and to Mrs. Butcher stating that he was the owner of the premises. The Butchers say that this is the first knowledge they had of the delinquent taxes on the property and that upon receipt of that letter, their attor*1084ney contacted plaintiff\u2019s attorney in an unsuccessful effort to repurchase their interest by repayment of the taxes with interest and penalties and any other expenses the plaintiff may have incurred. On November 29, 1961, this action was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants. The Butchers entered a general denial and a counterclaim alleging a <mask> by plaintiff and Skinners to defraud them. The defendant Mary 0. Skinner is the niece of plaintiff\u2019s wife and neither the defendant Charles A. Skinner nor Mary 0. Skinner has appeared in this action."], "id": "68d9e01e-e8d1-4e3f-a52d-4b3565c88c2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Regarding instruction No. 4, contrary to Betancourt\u2019s asser- tion, the typographical errors to which he draws our attention were insignificant and did not detract from the instruction\u2019s meaning or purpose. With respect to instruction No. 8, con- trary to Betancourt\u2019s assertion, the inclusion of the second paragraph, which is not in NJI2d Crim. 5.1, was an accurate statement of the law. See State v. Kennedy, 239 Neb. 460, 476 N.W.2d 810 (1991). Regarding instruction No. 15, contrary to Betancourt\u2019s assertion, whether Betancourt fled from justice was in fact relevant to whether the <mask> charge was time barred and whether Betancourt could be found guilty of the conspiracy charge. See \u00a7 29-110(7) (tolling statute of limita- tions when defendant has fled). See Taylor v. State, 138 Neb. 156, 292 N.W. 233 (1940). Further, contrary to Betancourt\u2019s assertion, it did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Betancourt. [21] Instruction No. 13 read: \u201cAn issue in this case is whether [Betancourt] was present in Madison County, Nebraska, on November 15, 2003. The State must prove that he was.\u201d We agree with Betancourt and the State that with respect to count III, conspiracy, instruction No. 13 was an inaccurate statement of the law because Betancourt\u2019s physical presence in Madison County need not have been proved for purposes of the conspir- acy. Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-202(1) (Reissue 2008), which defines criminal conspiracy, states: A person shall be guilty of criminal conspiracy if, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony: (a) He agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of them shall engage in or solicit the conduct or shall cause or solicit the result specified by the definition of the offense; and (b) He or another person with whom he conspired com- mits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. Thus, the crime of conspiracy does not require the physical presence of the accused. It has been noted that conspiracy may be charged in both the place of the agreement, as well as any locale where any overt act by any one of the conspirators - 460 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BETANCOURT-GARCIA Cite as 310 Neb. 440"], "id": "5bccfa70-b138-4fc1-a67a-baec8e2591da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u2022 Fraud by misrepresentation and nondisclosure . These causes of action rest upon the contention that GTECH is factually responsible, at least in part, for the wording of the Game 5 instructions. These actions by GTECH, in turn, are alleged to amount to fraud upon the Steele Plaintiffs, either affirmatively or through its silence. \u2022 Aiding and abetting TLC's fraud . This cause of action assumes that TLC is responsible for the Game 5 instructions and committed the asserted fraud through those instructions. The wrong alleged of GTECH is intentionally \"assisting\" TLC by printing and distributing the Fun 5's tickets, activating the *792tickets to make them available for sale, and operating the Texas Lottery computer system in a manner that declined to validate the Steele Plaintiffs' tickets as winners. \u2022 Tortious interference with existing contracts . The premise of this cause of action is that a contract was formed between TLC and each of the Steele Plaintiffs when the latter \"exchanged $5 of their hard-earned cash for each of their Fun 5's tickets in return for the promise that they would be entitled to receive five times the amount in the Prize Box if their ticket revealed a Money Bag.\" GTECH \"willfully and intentionally interfered\" with these contracts, the Steele Plaintiffs maintain, \"by using and continuing to use a non-conforming computer program\" that omitted their tickets from the list of winning tickets. \u2022 <mask> . This cause of action asserts that GTECH and TLC had a \"meeting of the minds\" to \"print misleading and deceptive instructions on Fun 5's tickets, to distribute the misleading and deceptive tickets for sale to lottery players in Texas, and to use GTECH's computer system to validate tickets as non-winners when the clear language of the tickets represented that they should be validated as winning tickets.\" The latter three causes of action are founded on alleged acts by GTECH that would merely comply with TLC requirements and directives, and regarding which the relevant contracts left GTECH no discretion to do otherwise."], "id": "5cee4477-e77f-4db4-b1ed-6f8d863eb697", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In the course of the colloquy which took place the following appears: \u201c The Court: Well, in view of the statutes that govern bribery and <mask> I am going to direct you to answer, Doctor. I think the inquiry as to this is material and pertinent to the charges that are laid against this defendant. The Witness [defendant herein]: Will that give me immunity? The Court: It will give you immunity because of anything you may testify here.\""], "id": "11d58592-2b27-41b7-9cf8-e2616c6c8319", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["4During oral argument, Overton\u2019s counsel argued for the first time that the district court\u2019s refusal to revoke Overton\u2019s bail following the plea proceeding demonstrated that it had not truly accepted Overton\u2019s plea. Counsel asserted that the crime of conviction required a mandatory remand following a guilty plea and that even the government expressed a belief at that time that the court would \u201ccontinue the defendant on his current bond\u201d because of \u201cthe provisional nature of the plea and Probation\u2019s recommendation.\u201d App\u2019x at 301\u201302. But that misconstrues the record. Although the district court did indeed continue Overton on his bond at the conclusion of the plea hearing, it never stated \u2013 or even suggested \u2013 that its decision was based on the provisional nature of Overton\u2019s plea. Rather, the court indicated that it did not consider remand to be mandatory based on the charged offense. See id. at 302 (\u201c[F]or your information, this is a <mask> charge, it\u2019s not a substantive charge. [And 18 U.S.C. \u00a7] 1594 is not enumerated as a crime of violence under the statute. . . . I\u2019m considering that as well in terms of what is reasonable and in terms of the danger to the public as well as the risk of flight.\u201d); 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3143; see also id. \u00a7\u00a7 1591(b)(2), 1594(c), 3142(f)(1), 3156(a)(4)."], "id": "0eb12ef2-e9f8-4778-aec1-a136ceb9ef21", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["undertook the action. . . . The premise of the co-conspirator rule is that the conspirators have formed together for an unlawful purpose, and thus, they share the intent to commit any acts undertaken in order to achieve that purpose, regardless of whether they actually intended any distinct act undertaken in furtherance of the object of the <mask>. It is the existence of shared criminal intent that is the sine qua non of a conspiracy."], "id": "0b424c75-61fc-4fde-a06e-fd5bc15cbff9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["RAJESH and INN [Lending] since the security of the loan and the value of the property depended on a signed \u2018absolute NNN lease\u2019 as well. RAJESH and INN were clearly aware of the fraud and . . . participat[ed] in the <mask>.\u201d In addition to alleging fraud in the execution of the September 13 lease, the Complaint also sufficiently alleges Munoz\u2019s excusable ignorance of its terms. These allegations include: 1. Munoz is more than 80 years old, Spanish is his primary language, and he is \u201cnot proficient in reading English . . . .\u201d9 2. Although he has purchased real property before this transaction, none involved a hotel or a leaseback. 3. The \u201cSelling Defendants\u201d drafted and circulated the July 17 lease, \u201cwhich was confirmed as the final lease at least four times,\u201d with the last confirmation \u201cjust days before the close of escrow.\u201d 4. Because the July 17 lease was the only one ever circulated, Munoz \u201creasonably believed\u201d the lease transmitted on September 13 was the same and the changes, although material, \u201cwere not so numerous to be obvious.\u201d 5. The e-mail from Davis to Cassidy on July 17, which transmitted the July 17 lease, only reserved the defendants\u2019 right to make changes \u201cin case there was an error or oversight,\u201d and prior to close of escrow, defendants did not make any corrections, nor did they ever contend there was an \u201cerror or oversight\u201d needing correction. To the contrary, the July 17 lease was \u201ccirculated multiple times\u201d without change. It was the only lease agreement circulated before the close of escrow and was approved by Munoz. 6. \u201cShivam made it appear that he was signing the July 17 lease and did not attempt to identify any difference\u201d between the two leases."], "id": "20b1da6a-1710-4973-8ed5-546e5c149ec3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York has jurisdiction to hear and determine a charge of <mask>; and such trial without a jury does not violate any constitutional guaranty. *398(See People ex rel. Frank v. McCann, 253 N. Y. 221, 225; Inf. Crim. Cts. Act [Laws 1910, chap. 659, as amd.], \u00a7 31.) \u201c A misdemeanor is misconduct or offense inferior to a felony. As a rule, misdemeanors do not present difficult questions- of law or intricate questions of fact. They are not necessarily punished by severe penalties. Though they may be prosecuted by indictment, yet a statutory assignment of criminal law work has committed the trials of misdemeanors in the first instance to the Court of Special Sessions, with the exclusion of libel, which exclusion is significant. This jurisdiction is subject to the power of certain judges to certify that it is reasonable that a charge of misdemeanor should be prosecuted by indictment.\u201d (People v. Butts, 121 App. Div. 226.)"], "id": "ac084d12-6ac8-45b6-85a0-435a0750c75b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["By their fourth affirmative defense defendants assert a counterclaim against plaintiff and the joined parties seeking damages for loss of use of their land and other unspecified damages. As a basis for those claims, defendants contend that James Wadsworth, representing the estate of Robb, and Anthony Dutton, acting as either a trustee of plaintiff or as its legal counsel, were both members of the same law firm and that this amounted to a conflict of interest which injured defendants by interfering with their contract rights. Paragraph 30 of defendants\u2019 answer alleges : \u201cThat specifically, Wadsworth, rather than properly representing his client by attempting to clear title to the Robb parcel, conspired with Dutton to to [sic] improve the plaintiff Seminary\u2019s position.\u201d Defendants\u2019 conclusory allegations of <mask> and interference with contract rights are not supported by the facts and thus fail to state a cause of action."], "id": "0de470eb-3aa0-4c79-90b2-5bc47385f758", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It is agreed by all that there are two kinds of <mask>, into one or the other of which, all offences of that description may be divided. The jirsi, where the conspiracy is to commit a criminal act, in which case it is immaterial by what *means the object is to be accomplished; second, where it is to commit an act, not criminal in itself, by criminal means. Here the object is immaterial, and the illegality of the means used or intended to he used, constitutes the offence. In the first ease, it is the nature of the object; in the second, the nature of the means by which the offence is ascertained."], "id": "b0ec2661-b1d0-45f7-bd1b-f78c07b7de13", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["But regardless of whether abortion is or is not a crime against the person, the indictment appears to be valid because at least one of the alleged overt acts is sufficient to sustain the indictment as a pleading. Thfi Court of Appeals has held that the crime of abortion may be the subject of a <mask> and irrespective of the fact that the victim may not be prosecuted under the section, nor is an accomplice therein nor consents thereto, she is nevertheless a co-conspirator and her acts and declarations in furtherance of the conspiracy are competent evidence against all the conspirators (People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 [1874])."], "id": "453a7854-5f43-4a26-94a5-2aaeaf7c0ff9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The government\u2019s only argument in support of the jury\u2019s guilty verdict against Sadler is that Sadler is liable as a co-conspirator under Pinkerton. \u201cThe doctrine holds that a member of a <mask> is liable for \u2018substantive offense[s]\u2019 committed by his co-conspirators, even if he did not participate in them, as long as: (1) the offenses are \u2018done in furtherance of the conspiracy,\u2019 (2) they \u2018fall within the scope of the unlawful project,\u2019 and (3) they are reasonably foreseeable \u2018consequence[s] of the unlawful agreement.\u2019\u201d Hamm, 952 F.3d at 744 (quoting Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647\u201348)."], "id": "7ecf81db-0663-4271-b4df-14e871daf4cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, defendant asserts four claims of sentencing error, which the People concede. The parties agree the trial court should strike the one-year section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), enhancement as to the assault with a firearm count (count 4). The trial court should also stay under section 654 the one-year section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), enhancement as to the <mask> count. In addition, under section 654, the trial court should also stay the separate punishment either for count 2 or count 5. Defendant further asserts in supplemental briefing that this court should remand this matter for resentencing on his firearm enhancement ( \u00a7 12022.53, subd. (c) ) under recently enacted Senate Bill No. 620 ( (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) \u00a7 2), which amended section 12022.53, subdivision (h). The parties agree in their supplemental briefs that the recent amendment applies in this case retroactively, because the amendment took effect before final judgment."], "id": "d3b66de5-204f-49ca-9a60-d9651e596893", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["clear iPic in Houston. And when AMC requested clearances against iPic Frisco in July 2014, it was implementing a policy that AMC had unilaterally adopted more than a year-and-a-half earlier, before the <mask> is alleged to have begun. iPic argues that by teaming up and making their formal requests on the same day, Regal and AMC would have a greater chance of success with distributors. But it is hard to see why Regal\u2019s requests for clearances in Houston would have any impact on a distributor\u2019s decision how to allocate films 270 miles away in Frisco, or vice versa. iPic also contends that Regal and AMC\u2019s teaming up sends a stronger message to iPic than either exhibitor\u2019s requesting clearances alone would have. But the clearance requests target only two iPics, one of which was never built. Except for iPic Houston, all iPic\u2019s theaters have had access to all first-run films since the day they opened their doors. One of these, iPic Los Angeles, opened within a three-mile radius of an AMC theater in April 2013\u2014after the conspiracy allegedly began\u2014and AMC declined to clear it. If AMC and Regal did conspire in January 2013 to \u201ccrush iPic with clearances\u201d, the conspiracy was a failure. 74 B iPic nonetheless contends that it has presented evidence of"], "id": "2fe9a6bb-f984-43fe-809d-9d2c240d50d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The United States Supreme Court has held on more than one occasion that the mere existence of a <mask> to achieve a specific object crime does not imply the existence of a continuing conspiracy to conceal the detection and apprehension of the coconspirators after the \"main aim\u201d or \"central criminal purpose\u201d of the underlying conspiracy has been accomplished. Thus, the duration of a conspiracy cannot be indefinitely extended in this manner so as to make the subsequent acts or statements of one of the coconspirators binding upon the others (see, Grunewald v United States, 353 US 391, *693400-406; Lutwak v United States, 344 US 604, 615-620; Krulewitch v United States, 336 US 440). Here, the prosecution does not contend that there was an express agreement among the defendant, Wisan, and her two alleged conspirators \"to continue to act in concert in order to cover up, for their own self-protection, traces of the crime after its commission\u201d (Grunewald v United States, supra, p 404), accordingly, the language of that case is particularly apposite. As the Supreme Court stated: \"We cannot accede to the proposition that the duration of a conspiracy can be indefinitely lengthened merely because the conspiracy is kept a secret, and merely because the conspirators take steps to bury their traces, in order to avoid detection and punishment after the central criminal purpose has been accomplished * * * [A] vital distinction must be made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime\u201d (Grunewald v United States, supra, p 405)."], "id": "f13b3994-04e2-4045-9537-732d67ecd3b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It is unnecessary to analyze minutely the allegations of the <mask> charge. Suffice to say the theory is far fetched, fantastic, incredible. Many of the allegations are wholly unsupported by evidence) many of the allegations are inconsistent with and contrary to the evidence. So far as the Gretsches are concerned no facts are established to sustain the charge against them."], "id": "75e4c77a-d1ea-403b-b26b-eb69b6409e97", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs have submitted some evidence which would support all class members\u2019 claims that each defendant, as a member of the alleged <mask>, adopted standard policies and procedures whereby the same fraudulent methods were used to sell cigarettes to plaintiffs and the class members. Differences in brands, design changes, and variety of tar and nicotine levels may not create individual issues at trial because defendants were allegedly aware of and manipulated the amount of nicotine that is needed in any cigarette to keep a normal smoker addicted. Any individual issues of reliance are subordinate to the common class-wide issues, because proof that defendants engaged in a coordinated scheme of fraudulent activities is sufficient at the class certification stage to raise a presumption that the common issues are predominate. (Brandon v Chefetz, 106 AD2d 162, supra; Stellema v Vantage Press, 109 AD2d 423 [1st Dept 1985].)"], "id": "e042e8b7-7b34-443b-9b71-51ad218076f6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In the main action the plaintiff has stated several causes of action alleging fraudulent conversion by the defendants in relation to the sale of 1,000 electric organs in that the defendants conspired to obtain money from the plaintiff through fraudulent *719documents of title and delivery, by reason of which -plaintiff did part with a substantial sum of money and received delivery of none of the electric organs. By the third-party complaint defendant and third-party plaintiff Berger alleges that in fulfillment of the contract with the plaintiff and acting as an officer of the defendant International Organ Corp., he negotiated with Paul R. Brown, acting for himself and the defendant Paul R. Brown Co., Inc., for the purchase and delivery of 285 electric chord organs. It is then alleged that the third-party defendants conspired to defraud the third-party plaintiff. It is further alleged in the third-party complaint that the defendant and third-party plaintiff had never participated in any scheme, plan or <mask> but relied upon the acts and representations of the third-party defendants in dealing with the plaintiff and 11 if the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, it is entitled to judgment solely against the third-party defendants because of their individual and combined fraud and deceit, since in fact said Abraham H. Berger did pay over the sum of $14,300.00 to receive the organs to complete the obligation of International Organ Corp. to the plaintiff and said funds were actually paid to Max Jakob, Ltd. for same.\u201d Finally it is alleged that the affirmative and active participation of the third-party defendants in the plan and scheme caused any loss sustained by the plaintiff and judgment is demanded dismissing the complaint but in the event the plaintiff is entitled to judgment that such judgment should be rendered against the third-party defendants. Apart from the question of whether any damage is alleged in the third-party complaint, there is no request for the recovery of judgment thereon or for the recovery of judgment over. Thus there is in fact no complaint set out in compliance with the provisions of section 193-a pursuant to which the third-party action has been initiated. What is here attempted is solely to bring in additional defendants who may be liable to plaintiff and whom plaintiff has not elected to sue. Accordingly, the motion is granted dismissing the third-party complaint for legal insufficiency, with leave to amend within 20 days from service of a copy of this order with notice of entry."], "id": "c94c6c35-a33c-4740-84b8-cdaab982b78e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["At issue here is the status of these five alleged \"overt acts\u201d, each of which was allegedly committed by one or more of the coconspirators after the central purpose of the alleged <mask>, i.e., the murder of defendant\u2019s husband, had been accomplished. They include Jones driving Berry from the scene of the alleged murder to New Jersey (17); Berry dropping the weapon alleged to have been used in the shooting into a sewer in New Jersey (18); the payment of money by the defendant, Wisan, to Jones (19); and a meeting between Jones and Berry at which time Jones gave Berry a sum of money (20 and 21). Each of these five acts was allegedly committed on the day of, or on the day following the commission of the alleged murder, either in the State of New York or in the State of New Jersey."], "id": "a20d8f2b-fc4a-4663-9691-5443393e7cfe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*710It appears that the relief sought by the beneficiary in the <mask> action and the special proceeding is similar. In both, he demands general damages, a dissolution of the partnership, an accounting, rescission of the trust indenture and a surcharge of the trustee. There are also certain common issues alleged in both suits. The objections in this special proceeding charge the trustee with fraud, breach of fiduciary obligation by favoring the interests of the other partners above his own, and by conspiring with the partners to wrongfully interfere with the beneficiary\u2019s financial interest in the company. The complaint charges the partners with conspiracy to wrongfully interfere with the beneficiary\u2019s financial interest and conspiracy to induce the trustee to breach his fiduciary obligations."], "id": "b9a71ea6-6703-42e2-9909-7eb59a5d2e7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["For its premise, the high court relied on the United States Supreme Court's application of the federal hearsay exception in Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476, which states: \" '[W]hether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context. Even statements that are on their face neutral may actually be against the declarant's interest. \"I hid the gun in Joe's apartment\" may not be a confession of a crime; but if it is likely to help the police find the murder weapon, then it is certainly self-inculpatory. \"Sam and I went to Joe's house\" might be against the declarant's interest if a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's <mask>. And other statements *365that give the police significant details about the crime may also, depending on the situation, be against the declarant's interest. The question ... is always whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest \"that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true,\" and this question can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances.' [Citation.]\" ( Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 127, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 369 P.3d 521, quoting Williamson v. U.S., supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 600-601, 114 S.Ct. 2431, original italics & italics added, fn. omitted.) *64Applying this test to the facts before it, the Cortez court found the codefendant's out-of-court identification of the defendant disserved the codefendant's interest in several respects. When he made the statement, he knew the defendant and her car were already in police custody. By identifying the defendant, he increased the likelihood police would find evidence connecting him to the shooting. In fact, police found on the floor of the passenger side of defendant's car a live round matching the caliber and brand of several found at the scene. ( Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 127, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 369 P.3d 521.) The codefendant also knew that linking himself to the defendant would implicate him in a drive-by shooting for which the defendant had been arrested. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "49abc120-9ffb-4838-8b1d-e9bea93dee19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants misread MRI (supra). To understand their error, the history of this litigation is relevant. Plaintiffs\u2019 initial com*837plaint from 19892 asserted claims based on negligence, product liability and fraud, and also asserted claims for restitution and indemnity. Plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants were jointly and severally liable upon four theories: civil <mask>, concert of action, enterprise liability and alternative and market share theory. In 1991, the court, upon defendants\u2019 motion, dismissed the negligence and product liability claims as time barred, but found that the fraud claim had been timely commenced under CPLR 213 (8). (See, City of New York v Lead Indus. Assn., 1991 WL 284454 [Sup Ct, NY County, Dec. 23, 1991, Dontzin, J.].) Defendants had also moved to dismiss the restitution claims on grounds other than untimeliness; the court denied that branch of the motion. Defendants did not challenge, and the court did not address, the indemnity or joint and several liability claims. The Appellate Division affirmed, explicitly finding that the fraud claim was timely commenced under CPLR 213 (8). (City of New York v Lead Indus. Assn., 190 AD2d, supra, at 177.) No further appeal was taken from LIA I."], "id": "a3988df6-d49b-4840-a82f-3df437f74aed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Napa County Sheriff's Deputy David Quigley was dispatched to investigate the call of suspicious activity involving the white van. Quigley spotted the van, and someone in its driver's seat, in a parking lot near the property where the 911 caller had originally seen it; Morales got out as Quigley approached. Quigley found drug paraphernalia on Morales, who said that a man named Shawn gave him the van to use because Morales was homeless. Morales was to return the van to Shawn in a few days. Morales was arrested and charged by information with felony unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle ( \u00a7 10851, subd. (a) ), and other counts not relevant to this appeal. The information also alleged three prior felony convictions in Nevada for robbery and <mask> to commit robbery."], "id": "ac20efc7-b3c6-4166-8a75-f8451a6f75ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The ultimate position of the former is, apparently, that the document was a forgery and the product of a <mask> between the chief beneficiary, his son, who was one of the purported subscribing witnesses, and the scrivener-physician, who purported to be the other. In support of their contention, affidavits are submitted by two handwriting experts who unequivocally maintain that position."], "id": "86bd0548-f3c9-4500-995e-47970594d0d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["We need not be detained by the first ground urged, for there are sufficient ultimate facts set forth, as distinguished from conclusions of law, to make out a cause of action in <mask>. However, citing Finkelstein v. Kesalp Realty Corp. (279 App. Div. 939) to the effect that \u201c agents who, acting within the scope of their authority, induce the principal to breach a contract are not liable in damages to the other party to the contract \u201d, the individual defendants say that upon that ground the fourth cause of action is insufficient as to them."], "id": "8366a182-ae29-4d5b-a362-bccac080f070", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Next there is an information charging the two defendants, Lazarus Harrison and John De Bidder, which states: \u201c The defendants did agree to commit the offense of promoting gambling in the second degree in violation of section 225.05 of the Penal Law of the State of New York; and, among other overt acts in furtherance of said <mask>, defendants did engage in policy.\u201d"], "id": "af3c918d-08b5-415c-a51f-5a18c288feeb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Additionally, I disagree with the majority's reliance on People v. Huerta (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 539, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 637. I find Huerta to be inapplicable to this case. In Huerta , the defendant pled guilty to second degree commercial burglary based on her theft of eight bottles of perfume worth $463; she petitioned to have her conviction redesignated as a misdemeanor. ( Id. at p. 541, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.) The People appealed from the trial court's order granting the defendant's petition. ( Ibid. ) The People argued that the burglary *139involved an uncharged <mask> to commit larceny and that \"burglary predicated on such a conspiracy may be charged as a felony even after the electorate enacted Proposition 47.\" ( Id. at p. 545, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.) We disagreed and stated: *273\"It follows under the plain text of the statute [ Pen. Code, \u00a7 459.5 ] that prosecutors would have been required to charge [the defendant] with shoplifting and could not have charged her with burglary predicated on conspiracy had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of her offense. [The defendant] therefore qualifies to have her burglary conviction redesignated as misdemeanor shoplifting.\" ( Ibid. , fn. omitted.) Moreover, we noted that \"we indulge in every presumption to uphold the judgment and look to the appellant to show error. ( People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 876.)\" ( Id. at p. 545, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 876.) We found that the People did not give us any reason \"to question the trial court's finding.\" ( Ibid. ) \"Conspiracy played no role in the prosecution of [the defendant]. The People charged her with burglary, petty theft, and grand theft. The People entered a plea bargain with [the defendant] whereby she pled guilty to burglary and the People agreed to dismiss the grand and petty theft counts. [The defendant] entered a plea agreement based on these facts. Based on this history, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding larceny was the predicate of the burglary charge, and therefore did not err in granting [the defendant]'s petition.\" ( Ibid. ) The facts in this case are different. Here, unlike Huerta , the People charged defendant with robbery. Hence, robbery played a role in the prosecution of defendant and he entered into a plea agreement based on the charged offenses. Moreover, as the Huerta court noted, on appeal, \"we indulge in every presumption to uphold the judgment and look to the appellant to show error. ( People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 876.)\" ( Id. at p. 545, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 876.) Based on the facts and history of this case, I \"conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion\" in denying defendant's petition."], "id": "39b1c9fd-a7a0-4131-bbac-7c955d3a2a82", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the second defense and counterclaim asserted in the proposed answer in behalf of the defendant Norma McNeil, the court has examined the facts as set forth in the papers and finds that the charges of false representations and acts allegedly done as part of a <mask> by the plaintiffs to defraud the defendant Norma McNeil completely lacking in merit."], "id": "ffa99d2f-73b0-4838-9b3b-aea1ffb0877c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["took place. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a7 12.1(b)(2) (3d ed. 2018). Instruction No. 13 was an accurate statement of the law as to count I, kidnapping, and count II, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and we conclude that although erroneous as applied to the <mask> charge, any such error was harmless. See State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55, 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012). The undis- puted evidence was that all three alleged crimes physically took place in Madison County, and as such, instruction No. 13 would not have confused the jury. A hearing on this claim was not warranted. (l) Right Not to Testify Betancourt claims that appellate counsel did not raise that trial counsel did not adequately advise him about his right not to testify and that if he decided not to testify, that fact could not be considered an admission of guilt and must not influence the verdict in any way. Regardless of whether trial counsel advised Betancourt he had a right not to testify, the record shows that he was so advised by the court. At his arraignment, Betancourt was advised of his right not to testify, as well as advised that if he chose not to testify, that fact could not be used against him. Thus, even if trial counsel failed to advise Betancourt in this regard, he was not prejudiced thereby and appellate counsel was not ineffective in not pursuing this argument. A hearing on this claim was not warranted. (m) Sentence for Count III, Conspiracy Betancourt claims that appellate counsel, while serving as trial counsel upon remand for resentencing on the conspiracy conviction, was ineffective for not objecting to the district court\u2019s imposition of a sentence of \u201clife imprisonment without parole.\u201d The State concedes that Betancourt\u2019s conspiracy sen- tence of \u201clife imprisonment without parole\u201d is not authorized. In Betancourt I, the direct appeal, we remanded the cause for resentencing on the conspiracy conviction with directions to impose a life sentence. We said: - 461 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BETANCOURT-GARCIA Cite as 310 Neb. 440"], "id": "d2759903-b6de-443d-9f38-5de1e614497d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Whatever rights plaintiff may have against any other defendant, he sets forth no cause of action against the defendants Geneva and Goldman. The only connection between the said defendants and the claimed <mask> is the conclusory state-*356meat that the price paid by them for the foreclosed chattel\u00ae \u2018\u2018 was a wholly inadequate consideration therefor \u2019 \u2019. In addition, plaintiff is a general creditor and had acquired no lien on the property of the debtor. That being so, he has no right to maintain an action at law for this tort, based upon the claim as alleged in the complaint (Bartol v. Bennett, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 314; Braem v. Merchants\u2019 Nat. Bank, 127 N. Y. 508)."], "id": "1412f2e1-0e06-449a-bc48-6a63267fac19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff alleges that Guzzone \u201cconspired with Defendant Edythe Dagostino in obtaining credit cards in Plaintiffs name.\u201d Although not labeled as such, this appears to be a cause of ac*657tion alleging that Guzzone conspired to commit fraud. A \u201cmere <mask> to commit a fraud is never of itself a cause of action\u201d (Brackett v Griswold, 112 NY 454, 466 [1889]; Crispino v Greenpoint Mtge. Corp., 2 AD3d 478 [2003]; Agostini v Sobol, 304 AD2d 395 [2003]). The Brackett case and others have held that there is no separate cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud since the principles which govern the action for fraud and permit a recovery by a plaintiff are the same; there must be some overt act undertaken to carry out the fraud in order to warrant the finding of liability and the subsequent awarding of damages, if any."], "id": "f4ea2c45-d508-495d-a344-a41608c9480b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The complaint alleges a continuing <mask> from May 17, 1955 to the present time to prevent the plaintiff from acquiring the property covered by the contract of that date and from building any homes thereon. Since, however, conspiracy as such is not civilly actionable (Green v. Davies, 182 N. Y. 499, 504; Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y. 454, 466-467; Miller v. Spitzer, 224 App. Div. 39), the plaintiff must show the commission of acts recognized in law as tortious. Scrutiny of the plaintiff\u2019s answering affidavit, read in the light of his complaint, shows that his grievance is still the refusal to allow him to connect the sewer mains or pipes on his property with those on the property of the Club and Harrison-Rye\u2014in other words, the refusal to accord bim a sewer easement. In the face of the plain and persistent rejection of his demand for such an easement both before and at the closing of September 20, 1956, on what does he predicate his assertion that the denial of the easement is tortious ? The answer is found in paragraphs 33 and 40 of his complaint, in which he alleges that the defendants \u201c fraudulently induced \u2019 \u2019 bim to discontinue his lawsuits against them \u2018 \u2018 on their false promise that he would have their \u2018 goodwill \u2019 and cooperation \u2019 \u2019 in the acquisition of the property and in building homes *762thereon. In his answering affidavit he states again that the settlement was \u201c fraudulently induced.\u201d This is the gist of his claim on which he must stand or fall."], "id": "cc9e6bfc-7033-4c73-b46e-4df07675addb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Carrabis, together with 30 other defendants, has been charged with scheme to defraud in the first degree, section 190.65 of the Penal Law, <mask> to commit scheme to defraud, section 105.05 of the Penal Law, and violations of sections 352-c and 352-e of the General Business Law. During the course of the investigation of these charges, conversations were tape recorded by a confidential informant, working in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. With the sole exception of Carrabis\u2019 voice, the other voices on the tape can evidently be identified by a testifying witness."], "id": "86ae17f4-429e-424d-8622-a564ab17457b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Tbe plaintiff not bemg entitled to tbe aid of tbe court, in compelling tbe delivery of mvy stock, by reason of bis own illegal acts, it is useless to inquire whether tbe stock delivered to him corresponded with tbe description contained in bis contract witb Brown and Seligman, or whether tbe defendants, or either of them, were guilty of tbe fraudulent <mask> alleged."], "id": "9a1079ff-e028-40a2-8fa6-40874a023e68", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The second case of the trilogy (in actuality four separate cases decided in the same opinion), People v Abbamonte (43 NY2d 74), involved defendants who had been convicted in the Federal courts of <mask> to violate Federal drug laws and were then prosecuted for substantive State drug offenses allegedly committed during the period covered by the Federal conspiracy charges but, unlike the posture in Abraham (supra), not alleged as overt acts in the Federal prosecutions. In People v Abbamonte (supra, p 79) the Court of Appeals extended its Abraham holding and taught us that when the substantive State drug offense was not, but could have been, alleged and proved in the Federal conspiracy prosecution, the \"subsequent State prosecution offends the statutory mandate.\u201d The court repeated the steps taken in its analysis in the Abraham case and then concluded (supra, p 86): \"The problems for prosecutors engendered by CPL 40.20 and the analysis applicable to criminal prosecutions are due, it bears repeating, to the embracive nature of the crime of conspiracy. With respect to more narrowly de\u00f1ned substantive crimes there are no serious problems (cf. People v Lo Cicero, 14 NY2d 374, 379, supra). The public policy choice is either to avoid using the conspiracy alternative if double prosecution of offenders in *118criminal partnership is regarded as desirable, or to redefine the distinctions in CPL 40.20 to permit, in some manner, an exception for conspiracy along with the other exceptions. Neither in policy nor logic should the accident of pleading allegations or proof upon the trial be determinative. The unsound paradoxes to which that would lead have been discussed and need no repetition.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.)"], "id": "1c4eabac-18dd-443b-aade-e5064df0cf57", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cDeclarations made by one conspirator in the prosecution of the enterprise are evidence against all, but they must be made in furtherance of the enterprise and while the enterprise is pending. Narration of the past facts after the enterprise has come to an end by success or failure is not admissible in evidence against the others. (People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263.) Here the statements were not made in furtherance of the common enterprise. That had come to an end by failure. They were merely part of explanation given for the failure. The conspirators in making the statements were certainly not acting as agents in behalf of their fellows when they made this explanation to them. It follows that the reception of this narration as evidence binding upon the defendants who had no personal knowledge of the facts is erroneous. It has no more logical probative force against them than any other hearsay testimony.\u201d (Ryan at 305; see also People v Vaccaro, 288 NY 170 [1942]; People v Davis, 56 NY 95, 103 [1874] [\u201c(a) mere relation of something already done for the accomplishment of the object of the conspirators is not competent evidence against the others\u201d].) Consistent with the Ryan holding are two more recent opinions of New York\u2019s trial courts. First, in People v Wisan (132 Misc 2d 691 [Sup Ct, Richmond County 1986]), the court considered whether certain conduct constituted overt acts done during the charged murder <mask>. Those alleged overt acts all occurred after the murder. The court concluded that when *590the victim was killed, \u201cthe sole objective of the conspiracy was accomplished, and the conspiracy was at an end.\u201d (Wisan at 693.)2"], "id": "e2ae543f-a85c-4bdf-9c48-4bb075f553a1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Danann\u2019s defense, stated in various forms, is that the March 31, 1960 maturity date was inserted in the note and mortgage by mutual mistake, or by mistake on its part and fraud on the part of Associates. There is a separate defense, wholly unproved, that the assignment by Associates to the plaintiff was made pursuant to a fraudulent <mask> and that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Danann prays for reformation of the note and mortgage to delete the March 31, 1960 maturity date and for declaratory judgment to like effect."], "id": "5efddcdc-1108-4566-9c97-4626c7b89775", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["One of the coconspirators confronted the victim\u2019s father by brandishing a box cutter and threatening to \u201cgo through\u201d the victim\u2019s entire family in an effort to find him. When the coconspirators learned that the victim had been located, they swiftly assembled and drove to his location, where Mattis was given a gun by a coconspirator. The other coconspirators then waited in the car while Mattis engaged the victim in conversation, shot him twice, including a fatal shot to the back of his head, and then returned to the car. They all then fled the scene. When defendant heard of the shooting later that same day during phone calls, he warned one of the coconspirators to \u201csee no evil, hear no evil\u201d and \u201cdon\u2019t even talk\u201d if questioned. In our view, the reasonable inferences to be drawn from this evidence provide ample support for the jury\u2019s conclusion that defendant conspired to murder the victim in order to prevent him from testifying and thus was guilty of <mask> in the second degree (see People v McCoy, 89 AD3d at 1221-1222; People v Booker, 53 AD3d 697, 703-704 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 853 [2008])."], "id": "7e06f7e3-fc47-426b-9b52-71c95e73a4c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The government also relies on the comment attached to the Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction on intent to defraud. The instruction reads: \u201cAn intent to defraud is an intent to deceive [or] [and] cheat.\u201d 9th Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 5.12 (2021), https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury- instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Criminal_Instructions_ 2021_9_0.pdf. The comment states, in relevant part: \u201c[F]or purposes of other statutes, such as <mask> to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 371), intent to defraud only requires intent to deceive, not to cheat.\u201d Id. The comment, however, does not discuss which formulation of the instruction is appropriate for violations under the statute at issue, \u00a7 1029(a), and more importantly, is only instructive at best. See United States v. Tuan Ngoc Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 2020) (\u201cPattern jury instructions are not authoritative legal pronouncements.\u201d); see also Caveat, 9th Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. iv (\u201cThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals does not adopt these instructions as definitive. Indeed, occasionally the correctness of a given instruction may be the subject of a Ninth Circuit opinion.\u201d)."], "id": "85af18d7-8f9d-4ebd-aaec-abd4740beece", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The mandate is predicated on a finding that the contemner when called as a witness to testify before the Dutchess County Grand Jury investigating an alleged <mask> to commit the crimes set forth in sections 1747, 1751, 1752, 1533, 483 and 101 of the Penal Law and the alleged commission of crimes set forth in .sections 1751 and 1752 of the Penal Law, willfully, unlawfully and contumaciously refused to answer legal and proper ques*431tions before the Grand Jury after having been duly subpoenaed, sworn and after having been granted immunity pursuant to section 2447 of the Penal Law."], "id": "9967955b-da3a-4831-9e91-09d170ccae28", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The jury returned a verdict in favor of Havey on his breach of contract claim against Shadow Creek; the jury also answered \"yes\" to a question asking whether Mandy was individually liable under an alter ego theory, and \"yes\" to questions asking whether Mandy was individually liable for common law fraud and <mask>. The jury awarded $30,500 in damages for Havey's unpaid commission and $55,750 in attorney's fees. The trial court signed a final judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict."], "id": "02d5e984-30d7-4ff4-ace5-54e64be92348", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the appellant\u2019s motion which was for summary judgment dismiss*896ing the sixth cause of action, which alleged <mask> to commit fraud. \u201cNew York does not recognize civil conspiracy to commit a tort. . . as an independent cause of action\u201d (Dickinson v Igoni, 76 AD3d 943, 945 [2010]; see Alexander & Alexander of N.Y. v Fritzen, 68 NY2d 968, 969 [1986]; Brackett v Griswold, 112 NY 454, 466-467 [1889]). However, \u201ca plaintiff may plead the existence of a conspiracy in order to connect the actions of the individual defendants with an actionable, underlying tort and establish that those actions were part of a common scheme\u201d (Litras v Litras, 254 AD2d 395, 396 [1998]; see Alexander & Alexander of N.Y. v Fritzen, 68 NY2d at 969; Brackett v Griswold, 112 NY at 466-467; Romano v Romano, 2 AD3d 430, 431-432 [2003]). \u201cThe allegation of conspiracy carries no greater burden, but also no less, than to assert adequately common action for a common purpose by common agreement or understanding among a group, from which common responsibility derives. Therefore, under New York law, [i]n order to properly plead a cause of action to recover damages for civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege a cognizable tort, coupled with an agreement between the conspirators regarding the tort, and an overt action in furtherance of the agreement. A bare conclusory allegation of conspiracy is usually held insufficient\u201d (Faulkner v City of Yonkers, 105 AD3d 899, 900-901 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted])."], "id": "e80ed765-5cb2-4839-b013-5bad671c0ee7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The People contend that the defendant is responsible for the delay because he chose not to return to court after March 1993. The People concede that a delay of one year can be attributed to them. In the cases relied upon by the People, the defendants were wholly responsible for the delay in sentencing. (People v Lopez, 228 AD2d 395 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 1022 [1996]; People v Purtell, 225 AD2d 496 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 940 [1996]; People v Davidson, 158 AD2d 317 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 75 NY2d 965 [1990].) The defendants in those cases absconded, used aliases, or presented false pedigrees. For example, in Lopez (supra), the defendant absconded twice after providing different names and birth dates in connection with his September 1987 plea of guilty. The Court held that the defendant was responsible for the delay until October 1992, when the State authorities were notified by Federal authorities that the defendant was in their custody for <mask> to import cocaine."], "id": "0a1c6a99-e4ac-4b3d-ba5a-5c96c38df4e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The case of the Com. v. Kingsbury, (5 Mass. Rep. 106) is relied upon to sustain this objection; but,1 on examination, it will be found that the object of the <mask> in that case was, the procurement of goods in a manner amounting to larceny ; and the court very properly held that the conspiracy being a misdemeanor, was merged in the felony. They, *however, go on to say that the same rule would apply in cases of misdemeanor; that \u201c an intent to commit a misdemeanor manifested by some overt act is a misdemeanor; but if the intent be carried into execution, the offender can be punished but for one offence.\u201d I do not perceive how the general remark is strengthened by this illustration. Granting that the offender can be punished but once for the misdemeanor, it does not thence follow that he may not be punished for the conspiracy. No case is cited by the court in support of this general remark : and it was not called for by the case. The cases cited by the counsel in the cause are far from sustaining *651the principle. The King v. Sharpless, (1 Leach, 108,) and King v. Charlewood, (1 Leach, 456,) were two of the cases cited, both of which were indictments for larceny. The King v. Doran, (2 Leach, 608,) was another; where there were two indictments for the same offence ; one for a misdemeanor at common law, and the other for the felony under the statute ; and the court held that both could riot be sustained; for the misdemeanor was merged in the felony. The case in Massachusetts, therefore, does not warrant the observation of the judge, that an executed conspiracy is merged in the misdemeanor which maybe the object of it. No other case has been cited in support of the principle."], "id": "06af29a0-52f8-4a4c-afb2-719953815b5d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["alleging, inter alia, that Garcia conspired with FPS to hide the fact it did not perform the work by claiming FPS \u201chand cut\u201d the weeds when confronted with information that the parcels were locked and gated, and \u201cinvented\u201d the \u201cfine cut\u201d theory when plaintiffs asked for the disposal invoice. Plaintiffs argued they fell within an exception to the rule requiring fraud be pleaded with specificity when City and Garcia possessed the full information about the relevant communications. FPS\u2019s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings FPS moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the operative complaint did not state any cause of action and statutes of limitations barred the causes of action for slander of title and defamation, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. It argued the complaint\u2019s allegations showed plaintiffs knew FPS\u2019s bills were false because they knew the weeds had been abated, and thus they could not allege they justifiably relied to their detriment on the bills or the liens stemming from those bills. FPS argued the same points defeated plaintiffs\u2019 <mask> allegations as the conspiracy was premised on fraud. FPS argued the three-year statute of limitations barred plaintiffs\u2019 slander of title claim, as plaintiffs had constructive notice of the recorded December 2014 liens\u2019 existence, or alternatively they knew or should have known of the liens no later than January 13, 2015, when they obtained the e- mail from FPS to the reporter. FPS further argued plaintiffs could not allege they suffered any actual pecuniary loss relating to its filing of the liens; that allegations that their bankers or other creditors were aware of the liens were insufficient. As for the defamation cause of action, FPS argued that claim, predicated on the January 13, 2015 e-mail directed to the reporter, was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Additionally, they argued plaintiffs\u2019 complaint did not state a cause of action because the statement"], "id": "d35bf60e-6c66-41cd-b1fa-d423ba2c0156", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants\u2019 reasoning would thus, necessarily, apply to other degrees of <mask> defined in part by the ages of the conspirators, i.e., conspiracy in the third, fourth and fifth degrees. The courts have not, however, construed those statutes in the manner defendants suggest. Moreover, it seems evident that the text of section 105.17 does not indicate any legislative intent to radically distinguish the type of agreement criminalized from those criminalized by the statutes defining the other degrees of conspiracy."], "id": "5628efca-056d-4bce-a83c-d4923451b3a3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The People point out that CPL 30.30 (3) exempts from statutory speedy trial requirements any \"criminal action\u201d in which a defendant is accused of homicide.3 CPL 1.20 (16) provides that a criminal action: \"(a) commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court * * * (b) includes the filing of all further accusatory instruments directly derived from the initial one, and all proceedings, orders and motions conducted or made by a criminal court in the course of disposing of any such accusatory instrument * * * and (c) terminates with the imposition of sentence or some other final disposition in a criminal court of the last accusatory instrument filed in the case.\u201d In People v Osgood (52 NY2d 37, 44 [1980]), the Court of Appeals applying to the term \"directly derived\u201d its ordinary meaning of being traceable to originating from, held that an indictment charging the defendant with the same crimes contained in a previously dismissed felony complaint was \"directly derived\u201d from the complaint. (See also, People v Colon, 76 AD2d 805 [1st Dept 1980] [commencement date for speedy trial purposes of count of superseding indictment charging <mask>, which was not included in original charges, was same as for counts previously charged]; People v Ramkisson, 114 Misc 2d 535 [Sup *286Ct, NY County 1982] [indictment including crimes charged in felony complaint was \"directly derived\u201d from complaint even though it included other crimes].)"], "id": "d0affc97-74f0-4570-8dae-cea38ba702c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Insofar as issues c, d, e, and f are concerned, the plaintiffs\u2019 abrupt withdrawal of the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of express warranty causes of action from class action consideration undermines, in whole or in part, their contention about commonality. After the Appellate Division\u2019s CPLR 3211 order and after the plaintiffs\u2019 withdrawals, the only causes of action remaining for class consideration are the first (failure to warn prior to 1969), the fifth (negligent and defective design), the sixth (strict products liability), the eighth, in part (breach of implied warranty of merchantability), the ninth, in part (breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose), and the derivative claims. The plaintiffs did not show that scienter and deception remain in this case as allegedly significant common issues after the withdrawal of their central fraud claim. Moreover, a <mask> must rest on an intentional tort (see, Cresser v American Tobacco Co., 174 Misc 2d 1; Portnoy v American Tobacco Co., 1997 WL 92040, 1997 NY Misc LEXIS 31 [Sup Ct, NY County, Feb. 19, 1997, Eerier, J.]; Lindsay v Lockwood, 163 Misc 2d 228), and the plaintiffs did not adequately show that a viable intentional tort remains in their case. At best for the plaintiffs, they have muddied the record concerning whether conspiracy remains in this case as a common issue, and, if it does not, then a further question arises concerning whether the nonmanufacturing defendants (the parent companies and trade organizations) may be held in."], "id": "67eb2e28-f597-432d-88ed-a11807e52e3b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant McBoberts contends that this cause of action is defective on its face because it fails to allege that defendant McBoberts made any specific representations to plaintiffs Yackel, Castle, Bubino, Coles or Frank. However, the complaint *983does allege that the defendants were acting in <mask>, and a reading of paragraph Fifth of the bill of particulars herein dated November 14,1961 discloses that the \u201c defendants [including McRoberts] falsely and fraudulently represented to the stockholders of plaintiff corporation that the corporation was the owner of the lease rights on the Charleroi Mountain Club property\u201d. Inasmuch as plaintiffs are stockholders of the plaintiff corporation, this objection to the pleading fails."], "id": "22616292-2ecc-4d76-93a4-c6bfb02682d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "conspiracy", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Given the dismissal of the underlying fraud claim, plaintiffs\u2019 <mask> and aiding and abetting claims are also dismissed. (See Oster v Kirschner, 77 AD3d 51, 55 [1st Dept 2010]; Hoeffner v Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 85 AD3d 457, 458 [1st Dept 2011] [\u201cWhile a plaintiff may allege, in a claim of fraud or other tort, that parties conspired, the conspiracy to commit a fraud or tort is not, of itself, a cause of action\u201d].)"], "id": "ea48c4aa-1e11-4259-b5d0-2e8e280cccb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Goldman\u2019s reliance on Ryan v Hunton & Williams is similarly misplaced (Ryan v Hunton & Williams, 2000 WL 1375265, *10-11, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 13750, *29-30 [ED NY 2000]). There, plaintiffs asserted a claim for <mask> fraud against a bank for failure to shut down accounts being used in an alleged fraudulent scheme and for not informing plaintiffs of the suspected fraud. In dismissing the claim against the defendant bank for aiding and abetting fraud, the court stated that \u201c[a]bsent a confidential or fidu*290ciary relationship between the plaintiff and the aider and abettor, the inaction of the latter does not constitute substantial assistance warranting aider and abettor liability.\u201d (Ryan, 2000 WL 1375265, *10, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 13750, *29.) In contrast, plaintiffs\u2019 claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against Goldman in no way resembles the claim for aiding and abetting fraud asserted against a bank for failure to disclose."], "id": "8425db5b-574e-4cbb-9802-fb7625b2e0b5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*1191. Section 1030 of the Penal Law is vague and indefinite and, therefore, is invalid; 2. The alleged acts did not occur \u201c in or while attending \u201d a public school or institution of learning; 3. The victims consented to the acts; and 4. The victims were accomplices as a matter of law and there was no corroboration of their testimony. The indictment accuses the defendants of the crime of 1 \u2018 hazing \u201d, in violation of section 1030 of the Penal Law of the State of New York, committed as follows: \u201c The defendants, Robert LENTI, ROBERT PELLEGRINO, GAETANO ALISEO and PRANK GANNON, each <mask> the other and acting in concert, and accompanied by juveniles, in the County of Nassau, State of New York, on or about the 4th day of April, 1964, did wilfully and unlawfully engage in what is commonly called hazing, while attending an institution of learning in Union Free School District #11, Oceanside, County of Nassau, State of New York, to wit, the defendants, Robert lenti, Robert Pellegrino, gaetano aliseo and prank gannon, each aiding and abetting the other and acting in concert, and accompanied by juveniles, during an installation of pledges in an initiation known as \u201c Hell Night \u201d, for the purpose of inducting certain pledges into a fraternal organization, known as Omega Gamma Delta Fraternity, did wilfully, wrongfully and knowingly assault michael kalogris, DANIEL WILLIAM ALEXANDER, JOHN THOMAS BRENNAN, DAVID DENNIS and richard stewart by [sic] striking them about the body and face with clenched fists, open hands, forearms and feet.\u201d"], "id": "e72fab72-0d6d-48cb-b04a-f92f7cb2b62e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Contreras cannot escape this conclusion simply by alleging conspiracy or <mask>. It is settled that \"a plaintiff cannot avoid operation of the anti-SLAPP statute by attempting, through artifices of pleading, to characterize an action as a \" 'garden variety' \" tort or contract claim when in fact the claim is predicated on protected speech or conduct.\" (Trilogy at Glen Ivy Maintenance Assn. v. Shea Homes, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 361, 368, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 ; see Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 392, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475, 376 P.3d 604 [\"the application of section 425.16 cannot reasonably turn on how the challenged pleading is organized\"].) Conspiracy and aiding and abetting, the labels Contreras attaches to her claim, are no more than legal conclusions. (State of California ex rel. Metz v. CCC Information Services, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 419, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 [allegations that named and unnamed defendants \"conspired to conceal their improper loss valuations\" amounted to \"bare legal conclusions\"].) Such terms have \"no talismanic significance[.]\" (Berg & Berg, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 824, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 325.) Here, Dowling himself is not alleged to have done anything \"outside the scope of normal, routine legal services.\" (Cabral v. Martins, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 481, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 394.) Contreras does not claim he personally took part in the alleged wrongful entries, and the Complaint alleges no facts showing how Dowling might have assisted his clients' wrongful conduct.9 Conclusory allegations of conspiracy *722or aiding and abetting do not deprive Dowling's actions of their protected status. (See Flores v. Emerich & Fike (E.D. Cal. 2006) 416 F.Supp.2d 885, 909 [\"conclusory allegations\" of conspiracy by attorneys \"have no legal significance. It is not alleged that the [attorneys] independently converted the Flores' property, only that they conspired to do so. This is not a legally cognizable claim.\"].)"], "id": "e6d06403-7a2e-4b39-91a3-c3291ebb23f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*687With proof that Aliuddin and Urtis knew \u201cof the essential nature of the conspiratorial plan\u201d (Rosenblatt, 554d at 39), there is enough to send the conspiracy case to a trial jury on the theory that the supply to defendant of such a dangerous and integral part of his murderous plan is, prima facie, circumstantial evidence of their agreement to the plan. (Gallishaw, 428d at 763.) As in Direct Sales, \u201c[t]he step from knowledge to intent and agreement may be taken\u201d (id., 319 US at 713). Supplying a gun in such circumstances is more than merely <mask> a conspiracy, which is a separate crime not charged in this indictment. (Direct Sales, 319 US at 709 [\u201cone does not become a party to a conspiracy by aiding and abetting it, through sales of supplies or otherwise, unless he knows of the conspiracy\u201d]; United States v Ortega, 44d 505, 506 [7th Cir 1995, Posner, Ch. J.] [\u201cwhile a conspirator is almost always also an aider and abettor, an aider and abettor is often not a conspirator\u201d (citations omitted)].)"], "id": "89d30b50-36f1-49d5-836e-bb141b22cb60", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*842Here, Carter's conviction for first degree murder was not based solely on the theory of felony murder. The jury was instructed on separate theories of first degree murder-premeditated and deliberated murder and felony murder-and it was further instructed on theories of both direct liability and vicarious liability (<mask> the commission of a murder and conspiracy). There was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the murder was premeditated because Carter shot Brandon three times to avenge his cousin's death-including Carter's own statement that night that he \"got the guy\" who killed Aaron. The court reasonably could have concluded Carter's objective in attempting to rob the victim was independent of his objective in killing the victim, thereby justifying multiple punishments under section 654."], "id": "732b3fff-e1a9-4da4-9caf-26074fe7a102", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The judgment is reversed. The trial court's order on respondents' motion for summary judgment is reversed to the extent it granted summary adjudication of Applied's claims for breach of contract, conversion, and <mask> conversion; summary adjudication of the remaining claims is affirmed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal."], "id": "acfbac38-33b5-462e-abd6-685ac0225a4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["however, that CALJIC No. 8.11, entitled \u201c \u2018Malice Aforethought\u2019 \u2014Defined,\u201d which the trial court gave to the jury, \u201cis clearing natural and probable consequences theory including in the murder instruction [sic].\u201d Counsel referred to the jurors\u2019 questions about <mask> and the trial court\u2019s supplemental instruction, arguing \u201cthe jury had questions and concerns about a non-killer and any liability especially in a case like this where at best [there] was only circumstantial evidence of any kind of intent as to Mr. Robbins.\u201d Counsel concluded Robbins had made a prima facie case and \u201c[a]ny issue of any exception is the subject of an OSC.\u201d Counsel attached as exhibits to his reply Robbins I, the jury\u2019s questions, portions of the reporter\u2019s transcript where the court discussed the questions with counsel, some of the jury instructions (CALJIC Nos. 3.00, 3.01, 8.10, 8.11 8.20, 8.30, 8.31, 8.70, and 8.71),3 and portions of the reporter\u2019s transcript of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument. The prosecutor talked about aiding and abetting, using the examples of a getaway driver in a bank robbery or someone who drives the shooter in a drive-by. The prosecutor never mentioned natural and probable consequences, nor did he suggest Robbins could be liable for any intended crime other than murder. On June 10, 2020, Robbins\u2019s counsel filed a supplemental brief citing People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965. Counsel reiterated his argument that the \u201cCourt must find a prima facie finding of eligibility and set for an OSC.\u201d"], "id": "da4ab050-f724-47be-9342-1c01c1959fed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["About a month later, Zenovic filed a motion to compel arbitration in the San Diego action. He contended VBV's entire complaint was arbitrable because the allegations for each cause of action qualified as a \"Construction Dispute\" under the terms of the arbitration agreement, including VBV's causes of action for accounting, <mask> fraud and breach of fiduciary duty based on allegations of mismanagement of construction and billing practices, and violation of Penal Code section 496 based on allegations of theft of construction funds."], "id": "c470cde6-d0e5-479e-9573-d45575420b0d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants assert the evidence was insufficient to sustain the robbery convictions. They claim: (1) the victims did not have possession of the funds because the funds were in the ATM and were owned by the bank; (2) the funds were not in the immediate presence of the victims; and (3) there was insufficient force or fear. Defendant Mullins also claims: (4) the evidence of <mask> was insufficient, and (5) the evidence of conspiracy was insufficient. We conclude there was sufficient evidence to convict on each of the counts."], "id": "46f78615-156e-45fd-b917-77b85fa62804", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Specifically, the informations allege that on the various Sundays therein mentioned, the defendants, each <mask> the others, sold the following allegedly prohibited items: three sets of men\u2019s underwear, a pair of boys\u2019 shorts, two pairs of socks and a hammer. Many other articles, not *256authorized to be sold on a Sunday, were then and there displayed for sale."], "id": "04c9cf4a-296a-403d-b386-a212e190fc0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["2 For purposes of resolving defendant\u2019s appeal, we need not address the People\u2019s contention defendant could be convicted as a direct perpetrator of implied malice murder. contended defendant committed the crime of <mask> implied malice murder; defendant shared in the shooter\u2019s culpable mental state that the shooter \u201cwas going to do an act that was inherently dangerous and act with conscious disregard for human life.\u201d Defense counsel argued that a primary issue was who threw the gun. Defense counsel emphasized that Celica, Veronica, and a third witness all told police after the shooting that defendant did not throw the gun, but rather Guerrero either knocked the gun from defendant\u2019s hand or grabbed it and threw it. Defense counsel emphasized Celica was the only witness to testify at trial that defendant threw the gun. However, her testimony contradicted what she had previously told a police detective in her native Spanish. Defense counsel argued that Celica\u2019s testimony could not be credited and, even if it could, the prosecution still failed to prove conscious disregard and the subjective awareness that the gun would be used to kill someone. Defense counsel further asserted there was no evidence defendant was subjectively aware of the high probability of death. The trial court denied the petition, concluding defendant \u201cdoes not satisfy\u201d the requirement that he \u201ccould not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.\u201d (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) We discuss the trial court\u2019s decision in greater detail, post. DISCUSSION I Senate Bill No. 1437 \u201cMurder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.\u201d (\u00a7 187, subd. (a).) \u201cFor purposes of Section 187, malice may be express or implied.\u201d (\u00a7 188, subd. (a).) Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, \u201cthe natural and probable consequences doctrine rendered a defendant liable for murder if he or she aided and abetted the commission of a criminal act (a target offense), and a principal in the target offense committed murder (a nontarget offense) that, even if unintended, was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense.\u201d (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 248.)"], "id": "7d340a11-6550-4a29-92d2-1790767f7736", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs argue that JPMorgan\u2019s knowing participation in a fiduciary breach should be inferred from the fact that \u201cmany of the transaction terms were illegal per se\u201d (plaintiffs\u2019 brief at 29). As discussed above, however, the deal protection devices were permissible under the circumstances and the Bear Stearns defendants did not breach their duties to the company\u2019s shareholders. Absent a primary breach of fiduciary duty, <mask> liability cannot attach to JPMorgan\u2019s conduct. The record reflects arm\u2019s length, nonstop negotiations in which both sides were aggressively represented by teams of professional legal and financial advisors. Plaintiffs have not alleged, much less proven, that JP-Morgan wrongfully created conflicts on Bear Stearns\u2019 board or conspired with any of its members."], "id": "35cc522b-6b2b-419b-b960-13950735af87", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["We agree with the parties that the \u201cindependent fact finder\u201d standard, as opposed to the \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d standard, is the appropriate standard of review. (See People v. Garrison (Dec. 17, 2021, B308319) ___Cal.App.5th___ [2021 Cal.App. Lexis 1111] [the split of authority has been resolved by actions of both the Supreme Court and the Legislature; the trial court, acting as an independent fact finder, must determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory]; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 984 [the trial court must act as independent fact finder and determine whether the evidence establishes the petitioner would be guilty of murder under \u00a7\u00a7 188 and 189 as amended and is thus ineligible for resentencing under \u00a7 1170.95, subd. (d)(3)].) We conclude that, in considering a section 1170.95 resentencing petition after issuing an order to show cause, the trial court is required to independently determine that it would convict the defendant on a theory that remains viable under sections 188 and 189 as amended, not merely that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty on such a theory. III Additional Background -- The Trial Court\u2019s Order In its order, the trial court stated defendant was not eligible for section 1170.95 relief because \u201che does not satisfy\u201d the third requirement of section 1170.95, that he \u201ccould not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 . . . .\u201d (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) The court stated: \u201cDefendant . . . cannot make this showing because his murder conviction still holds up under the current law.\u201d (Italics added.) The trial court noted defendant\u2019s jury had been instructed on two theories: direct <mask> and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court recounted the events leading up to and including the altercation, as well as the gang evidence. The court credited Celica\u2019s testimony that defendant threw the gun to his companions. The court stated: \u201cThere was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion the person who picked up the firearm was . . . Jose . . . .\u201d The shooter then shot the victim, killing him. The trial court also emphasized defendant\u2019s close relationship with Jose and their shared Norten\u0303o gang affiliation."], "id": "c7d63344-01e6-47dd-aa7e-66694957103c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The jury was instructed on three theories of murder as to counts 1, 2, and 3: direct liability as a perpetrator under CALCRIM No. 520,3 direct <mask> of murder under CALCRIM No. 401,4 and murder based on the natural and probable consequences of conspiracy to murder Alford under CALCRIM No. 417.5 The jury also was instructed under CALCRIM No. 402 that defendants could be found guilty of murder on counts 1 and 3 if those killings were the natural and probable consequences of aiding and abetting the murder of Alford.6 In addition, the jury *292was instructed under CALCRIM No. 521 that \"A defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have *982proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. A defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill. A defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. A defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the acts that caused death. [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and the murder is second degree murder.\""], "id": "aca77ef9-7371-47e3-91cc-00d60560d56a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"[A] person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts.\" ( People v . McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210.) \"[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.\" ( People v . Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318.) \"Thus, proof of aider and abettor liability *814requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator's actus reus-a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor's mens rea-knowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor's actus reus-conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.\" ( People v . Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 423, 113 P.3d 100.) \"[N]either presence at the scene of a crime nor knowledge of, but failure to prevent it, is sufficient to establish <mask> its commission. [Citations.] However, '[a]mong the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.' \" ( People v . Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 525.)"], "id": "f3fa3b65-844d-4f41-b54e-3cafac54ce54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Bach of the provisions of the Penal Law and the Nassau County Government Law referred to in each of the counts of the indictment relates to the misdeeds of public officers or employees. This defendant is not such a public officer or employee. Despite this, he may be indicted under these sections because in each count he is charged with <mask>, and if the charges are proven he is a principal under section 2 of the Penal Law. (People v. Mullens, 292 N. Y. 408, 412.)"], "id": "5891926b-9a0b-41da-af5d-d972dea5a90b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In the case of People v. Brophy (49 Cal. App. 2d 15), the defendants submitted racing results to known book-makers by means of telephones. The defendant sent out information which *68included probable odds, names of jockeys, etc., and it was conceded that such information was a help to book-makers in that it assisted them in fixing odds and making payoffs. The court in finding that no crime was committed by the transmission of such information said (pp. 33-34): \u201c Respondent\u2019s claim that the furnishing of racing news to bookmaking establishments by telephone constitutes an <mask> in a violation of section 337 a of the Penal Code is without merit. It is not the transmission by use of a telephone of information concerning the results or probable results of horse races that constitutes a violation of the quoted Penal Code section, but it is the use which persons may make of such information in the acceptance of bets or maintaining places for the reception of bets that constitutes a violation of the law. Neither the telephone company nor appellant in his capacity of a subscriber for telephone service was accused in the injunction suit of managing, operating or participating in any gambling place or enterprise maintained for the acceptance of wagers on horse races or other contests of skill between men or beasts; * * *."], "id": "c9e2ac8f-f98d-4a3e-958a-03b1e8cd0a9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The jury was presented with the legally correct theory that Anthony, Price and Campbell directly aided and abetted or conspired in Flowers's first degree murder of Charles. \"Aiders and abettors may still be convicted of first degree premeditated murder based on direct <mask> principles. [Citation.] Under those principles, the prosecution must show that the defendant aided or encouraged the commission of the murder with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating its commission.\" ( Chiu , supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 166-167, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 325 P.3d 972.) As for conspirators, one who conspires to commit a murder is guilty of first degree murder when a co-conspirator commits the murder. ( People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1237, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537 [\"all conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated and deliberated first degree murder\"].)"], "id": "3f921a4a-fb57-4591-b6ca-46e38ccabc9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As also set forth in Kaplan's affidavit, in 1993, the federal district court sentenced the deputy to 16 years in prison \"for stealing money seized in drug investigations, conspiracy to commit perjury, tax evasion, <mask> perjury, submitting false documents on a loan application, and attempting to possess and distribute 66 pounds of cocaine for $6 million profit.\" In connection with his section 1473.7 motion, Ogunmowo submitted newspaper articles detailing the corruption scandal as a whole and this particular deputy's criminal case and resulting prison sentence."], "id": "99baa742-1d70-4e9e-8218-93a4563ae2df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In September 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, codefendant Hill, and their alleged companies for breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and <mask> fraud. Defendant moved to quash service of summons in November 2015. In an abundance of caution, plaintiff re-served the summons and complaint, thereby rendering the motion to quash moot. In January 2016, defendant demurred to the complaint, but later requested to take the demurrer hearing off-calendar. Concurrently with his request to take the demurrer hearing off-calendar, defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 435."], "id": "f69819c5-1070-4c30-9b8c-b84b0481bad2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff claims discrimination against him based on his Indian national origin, his Muslim religion, and his age based on the New York City Human Rights Law and the New York State Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY \u00a7 8-107 et seq.; Executive Law \u00a7\u00a7 291, 296 et seq.). Plaintiff also sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which defendant Wodzenski also moves to dismiss. Plaintiff claims that after he informed Wodzenski, his supervisor, that plaintiff had cancer, plaintiff was terminated after 32 years of employment. Previously, plaintiff had been the subject of a number of dismissals and reinstatements. Wodzenski is charged by plaintiff with <mask> the corporate defendants in their discriminatory acts."], "id": "42a6e09d-7eec-4fa4-8b89-f62875ab2940", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["under which defendant could still be convicted were as a direct aider and abettor of express or implied malice murder, and as a direct perpetrator of implied malice murder. 2 With regard to <mask> express or implied malice murder, the People asserted the evidence supported the conclusion Jose shot Guerrero and defendant had the intent that such lethal violence be used against Guerrero as demonstrated by the gang evidence and defendant\u2019s actions before and after the shooting. The People asserted the evidence supported a finding that defendant and Jose acted with malice aforethought in assaulting Guerrero with a firearm \u201cand that each was aware of the other\u2019s malice.\u201d The People continued: \u201cAt a minimum, [defendant] intended to, and in fact did, aid and abet Jose in committing an act, the natural consequence of which was dangerous to human life with conscious disregard for human life and thus is guilty of aiding and abetting implied malice murder.\u201d Defendant countered that the People failed to prove malice. Specifically, he asserted the People failed to prove that he knew Jose would shoot Guerrero when he picked up the gun, that defendant \u201cactually aided the murder,\u201d that defendant intended to aid the murder, and that he acted with conscious disregard for human life. Defendant also addressed the issue of who threw the gun to Jose, emphasizing the conflicting evidence on the subject. Moreover, according to defendant, even if he threw the gun, nothing more than speculation supported the premise that he did so intending that Jose shoot and kill Guerrero. Defendant further asserted the People could not establish he would be guilty of implied malice murder because there was no evidence he \u201cactually appreciated that death was a consequence of his action\u201d or that he consciously disregarded that danger. At the hearing, the People asserted there were three grounds on which to deny defendant\u2019s petition: (1) \u201cdirect perpetration\u201d; (2) as a direct aider and abettor based on Celica\u2019s testimony defendant threw the gun to Jose; and (3) aiding and abetting \u201cwhile he was being held by the victim.\u201d Relying on People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, the People"], "id": "b95ccfbd-5d74-429c-9fcd-ef9d180d061b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["hearing under Penal Code section 1170.95, acts as an independent fact finder or reviews the record for substantial evidence. On April 14, 2021, the Supreme Court granted respondent\u2019s petition. In October 2021, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 775 (2021\u20132022 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the language of Penal Code section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, \u00a7 2.) On December 22, 2021, the Supreme Court transferred this case to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in light of the passage of Senate Bill 775. Having vacated our original decision and reconsidered the issues presented in light of the new legislation, we again reverse and remand with directions to the superior court to issue an order to show cause and conduct a new evidentiary hearing in accordance with Penal Code section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3), as amended. DISCUSSION The trial court suggested two bases for denying defendant\u2019s petition for resentencing: (1) the jury necessarily convicted defendant under a direct <mask> theory; and (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record supporting defendant\u2019s conviction as a direct aider and abettor. The parties agree, as do we, that the first ground is unsupportable. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court relied on language in CALJIC No. 8.20 providing that \u201c[i]f you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation . . . , it is murder of the first degree.\u201d The court reasoned, in light of this instruction, the jury must have concluded defendant acted with the intent to kill when it convicted him of first degree murder."], "id": "7351b531-b665-4da3-a462-c0aca96a2017", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court granted summary judgment to respondents on all of Applied's causes of action. We conclude the court erred as to the breach of contract, conversion, and <mask> conversion causes of action, but the court properly granted summary judgment as to Applied's fraud-based causes of action (fraudulent concealment, aiding and abetting fraudulent concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty) on statute of limitations grounds.5"], "id": "33d9b918-72fd-4f9f-b55f-895d2cbbe01f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In the discussion with counsel that followed, the trial court treated the jury's question as two separate queries: one seeking guidance as to whether the jury could consider evidence of defendant's conduct after the shooting in determining guilt based on <mask>, and the other about the point at which the crime ends. After conferring with the parties, the trial court provided a written response to the jury's question, which omitted any guidance about when the commission of the crime came to an end: \"Factors relevant to the determination of whether defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting include but are not limited to presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.\" Later that day the jury reached its verdict convicting appellant of second degree murder and finding the gang and firearm allegations true."], "id": "2135fd87-9317-4524-9e01-eabba5e6fd91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cBY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT YOU AND BEAR STEARNS AGREE, THAT CONTROVERSIES ARISING UNDER OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY ACTIVITY BETWEEN YOU AND BEAR STEARNS, . . . SHALL BE DETERMINED BY ARBITRATION. ANY ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE HELD ONLY AT THE FACILITIES OF, BEFORE AN ARBITRATION PANEL APPOINTED BY, AND PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., OR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR SECURITIES DEALERS, INC.\u201d (Petition 11 3, quoting \u00a7 25 [a] of Customer Agreement, annexed as exhibit A thereto.) *609The underlying arbitration arises out of ICMC\u2019s claims that petitioners committed common-law and securities fraud in connection with the hedge fund, and that Bear Stearns failed to process and revoked ICMC\u2019s alleged irrevocable redemption of its investment in the hedge fund in October 2006 (see petition 1i 6, exhibit B annexed thereto). In the statement of claim, filed on July 25, 2008, ICMC sought recovery for breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, <mask> breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation. It sought, in addition to other damages, reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees, and other costs and expenses (exhibit B to petition, statement of claim 1f 106). Petitioners filed a statement of answer in which they denied all claims and any liability, asserted affirmative defenses, and requested that ICMC be directed to pay costs, fees and expenses, including reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees (exhibit C to petition, statement of answer at 24)."], "id": "2157bf74-ffb2-4b07-b207-27f9e6d07a55", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["commission of the offense (\u00a7 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for the murder, one year for a firearm enhancement, and two years for a probation violation. (Maldonado, supra, C041013 at p. 1.) Defendant appealed and this court affirmed the judgment. (Maldonado, supra, C041013 at p. 17.) In the opinion on direct appeal, this court noted that the jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine for first degree murder.3 (Id. at pp. 9-10.) In June 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. In his declaration, defendant checked the boxes to indicate a complaint, information, or indictment was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and at trial he was convicted of first or second degree murder under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Defendant also checked the box to indicate that he \u201ccould not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder because of changes made to Penal Code \u00a7 \u00a7 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.\u201d The prosecutor filed a response and motion to dismiss the petition and defendant\u2019s appointed counsel filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. On October 5, 2020, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition. The trial court noted defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and the jury had been instructed on this charge under both direct <mask> as well as the natural and probable consequences doctrine, so defendant \u201ccould have been convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.\u201d However, after reviewing the summary of evidence in this court\u2019s prior opinion, the trial court found that there was evidence defendant intended for Deponte to kill Garcia. \u201cThus, the court now concludes that as a"], "id": "31c15aa8-d388-4494-bfa3-f298c6dfaf5e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Alternatively, under both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, an individual employee may be held liable for <mask> discriminatory conduct (Executive Law \u00a7 296 [6]; Administrative Code \u00a7 8-107 [6]; see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2d Dept 2006]; D\u2019Amico v Commodities Exch., 235 AD2d 313, 315 [1st Dept 1997]; Peck v Sony Music Corp., 221 AD2d 157, 158 [1st Dept 1995]). In general, an individual defendant who actually participates in the conduct of an employer giving rise to the discrimination claim may be an aider and abettor, even when the individual lacks the authority to hire or fire the plaintiff. (See Feingold v New York, 366d 138, 158 [2d Cir 2004].) An aiding and abetting claim against an individual employee depends on employer liability, however, and, \u201c[w]here no violation of the Human Rights Law by another party has been established, . . . individuals cannot be held liable ... for aiding and abetting their own violations of the Human Rights Law.\u201d (Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 73 [3d Dept 2005]; see Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v Kirkland, 79 AD3d 886, 888 [2d Dept 2010]; Nicholson, 2011 WL 344101 at *3, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 11616 at *12; JG & PG ex rel. JGIII v Card, 2009 WL 2986640, *12, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 85372, *34 [SD NY 2009].)"], "id": "cef1fc37-0068-407b-88fd-f5c70b16560d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["murder.\u201d (Torres, supra, C069510, italics added.) Defendant asserts: \u201cIf appellant could conceivably have been convicted of second degree murder as a direct accomplice of murder then the instructional error would have applied to both theories of liability.\u201d However, the language quoted from this court\u2019s opinion on defendant\u2019s first appeal addressed only the contention he advanced on that appeal: \u201cthat the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not allow the jury to consider whether he might have been guilty of only second degree murder under the natural and probable consequence doctrine, even if the shooter was guilty of first degree murder.\u201d (Torres, supra, C069510.) The jury was also instructed with CALCRIM No. 400 on the general principles of <mask> and CALCRIM No. 401 on direct aiding and abetting. This court was not asked to, and did not, make any determination as to the instructions in relation to direct aiding and abetting. The quoted language from this court\u2019s prior opinion on defendant\u2019s first appeal does not preclude a trial court finding defendant would be guilty of second degree murder on a direct aiding and abetting theory based on res judicata, the law of the case, or any other theory. In short, nothing about Jose\u2019s original conviction, or this court\u2019s prior opinion, establishes, as a matter of law, defendant \u201ccould not be convicted\u201d of second degree murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory. (\u00a7 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) The denial of defendant\u2019s petition is not precluded by double jeopardy or res judicata principles. DISPOSITION The order denying defendant\u2019s petition is reversed. The case is remanded for the trial court to conduct a new hearing under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3)."], "id": "f8a2cd81-903e-4a2b-a3c8-0a39fc5c7c9a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["While no witness confirmed that one of the two accomplices seen in the video surveillance footage was Guthrie, the video footage combined with the cell phone evidence showing Guthrie's involvement with Johnson (and to a lesser extent the testimony that Guthrie was a former boxer), amply supported the inference that Guthrie was one of Johnson's accomplices. (See People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 [\" '[A]mong the factors which may be considered in making the determination of <mask> are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.' \"].) In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Guthrie knowingly and willingly participated in the murder of Canady."], "id": "c24c2dbf-940b-456a-b768-5a94951470d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cknowingly participated in defendant Audi America\u2019s aforesaid breach of fiduciary duty by, inter alia, substantially assisting Audi America in the planning and development of a competing Audi store in the territory serviced by JJM Audi and by accepting or agreeing to accept an open point from Audi America in connection therewith\u201d (exhibit A to motion sequence No. 2 \u00b6 192). In order to sustain a claim for <mask> breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must demonstrate: a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff; that the defendant knowingly induced or participated in the breach; and the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the breach (Baron v Galasso, 83 AD3d 626 [2d Dept 2011]; Yuko Ito v Suzuki, 57 AD3d 205, 208 [2008]; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 125 [1st Dept 2003])."], "id": "0c4bbeff-ffab-42f6-8d2e-55a4f4f54c76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the remaining claims alleged against defendants Thomas and O\u2019Neill for breach of fiduciary duty, <mask> such breach, and waste, which arise from the investigation conducted by the Board in response to plaintiffs demand, these claims are dismissed. These claims were not part of plaintiffs original demand. The demand addressed plaintiffs concerns regarding Citigroup\u2019s \u201csystemic failure of risk manage*310ment at the Board level and within senior management, all of which has caused Citigroup to suffer billions of dollars in damages as described herein and untold billions going forward\u201d (exhibit A to amended complaint at 2). It addressed, among other things, the write-down of $6 billion in assets as of the end of the third quarter of 2007, increases in reserves, the material overstatement of earnings, assets and net worth, off-balance-sheet transactions, and trading losses with regard to CDOs {id. at 2-3). The claims against Thomas and O\u2019Neill target alleged waste in their conduct of the Demand Committee investigation of the allegations in the demand. They do not arise from the same set of circumstances as set forth in the demand. There was no assertion in the original demand that Citigroup file litigation against Thomas or O\u2019Neill. In fact, they were selected to be on the Demand Committee because they were outside directors who were independent of the allegations. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, this is a new claim, a whole new assertion. The demand did not alert the Board so that it could take corrective action with regard to the yet to be conducted investigation. The references to excessive spending and waste in the demand have absolutely nothing to do with the investigation, which had not begun until months after."], "id": "b9e5612f-b774-4b81-8bfc-d310afde8899", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Assembly, the State and Silver appeared by the Attorney General and moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), to dismiss the complaint as against them for failure to state a cause of action. By decision and order dated March 15, 2005, Justice Thomas J. McNamara dismissed the Assembly as a defendant, finding that body to be a component of the State only, and finding that the State, not the Assembly, was Jane Doe\u2019s employer. Justice McNamara further ruled that, because Jane Doe did not claim that Silver participated in the underlying conduct, and this court is bound by that finding, no cause of action was stated against him, individually, for <mask> under Executive Law \u00a7 296 (6), a subdivision which allows for personal liability based on active participation in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim under the Executive Law. However, he ruled that Silver may be treated as Jane Doe\u2019s employer under Executive Law \u00a7 296 (1), because the complaint alleged that he was the person at the Assembly with the authority to determine and investigate complaints of sexual harassment, and the complaint alleged facts which, if proven, could establish that Silver was aware of prior allegations of sexual harassment by Boxley and failed to respond appropriately to these serious charges."], "id": "da2ca514-932b-44cc-b378-9cbc85aeb3ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The evidence as to the nature and conduct of defendants\u2019 business is both direct and circumstantial. The test as to its sufficiency is \u20181 whether common human experience would lead a reasonable man, putting his mind to it, to reject or accept the inferences asserted for the established facts \u201d (People v. Borrero, 26 N Y 2d 430, 435 [1970]). Applying that test, the court is convinced that defendants are engaged in the business of selling term papers to students, thereby knowingly <mask> them to attempt to obtain by fraudulent means a diploma, degree or certificate, in violation of subdivisions 2 and 3 of section 224 of the Education Law."], "id": "8c52783f-06b8-409b-bba2-e63baea688df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It is equally well settled that, \"[i]f believed by the fact finder, a defendant's honest and reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief in the victim's consent is a complete defense to a charge of ... rape.\" ( People v. Brooks , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 74, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 396 P.3d 480.) Defendant, of course, cannot claim this defense personally, as he clearly knew Yolanda had not consented to acting as a prostitute. Nonetheless, defendant reasons that if the john could raise such a defense, then defendant cannot be found guilty of <mask> a crime, as no crime occurred. We alluded earlier to the flaw in this argument, which we now explain."], "id": "57b63894-e53f-4914-ac43-441ad2c851f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant Williams\u2019 argument is that the time period from when the omnibus motions were decided should be charged against the People as DNA analysis was neither necessary nor appropriate regarding him. His argument that his acknowledgment of having had sexual relations with the complainant on the dates in question removed all issues but force from the case is without merit. In 8 of the 10 rape counts and all 9 sodomy counts, defendant is charged with <mask> and acting with one or more of the codefendants. Proof of their involvement in sexual acts against the complainant is both relevant as to defendant\u2019s liability as an accomplice and as to his liability as a principal on the question of force."], "id": "9b05f9a5-aad3-46be-adf9-a01b43df5bd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Given the dismissal of the underlying fraud claim, plaintiffs\u2019 conspiracy and <mask> claims are also dismissed. (See Oster v Kirschner, 77 AD3d 51, 55 [1st Dept 2010]; Hoeffner v Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 85 AD3d 457, 458 [1st Dept 2011] [\u201cWhile a plaintiff may allege, in a claim of fraud or other tort, that parties conspired, the conspiracy to commit a fraud or tort is not, of itself, a cause of action\u201d].)"], "id": "a4475d12-72c0-46a6-a13b-12cb77164a71", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Specifically, the financial statement for the year ending June 30, 2010 failed to identify the January 8, 2010, January 25, 2010 and February 9, 2010 (unauthorized) transactions. Further, plaintiff alleges, the financial statement for the year ending June 30, 2011 failed to identify the December 31, 2010 and June 28, 2011 transactions, and the financial statement for the year ending June 30, 2012 failed to identify the May 14, 2012 transaction. As pertaining to the instant motion, plaintiff asserts the following five causes of action against Mauceri: professional malpractice (9th cause of action); <mask> the commission of a tort (10th cause of action); negligent misrepresentation (11th cause of action); breach of contract (12th cause of action); and fraud (13th cause of action). Mauceri moves to dismiss these claims pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (5) and (7). Plaintiff opposes the motion."], "id": "159610f0-ba52-4b3f-a191-ea74f88681e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b616 Bade argues in reply that Johnson provided substantial assistance to Dr. Powar\u2019s commission of the second battery by \u201cmaking Bade available for the second battery by failing to discharge him.\u201d The alleged omission in a medical note of meeting discharge criteria does not give rise to an inference of Johnson\u2019s knowledge of a battery or constitute substantial assistance in the commission of a battery. See id. at \u00b6 9. The superior court did not err in granting summary judgment to Johnson on the <mask> medical battery claim."], "id": "01172981-d8e8-4e17-a772-e18cccd0874a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["1 Bade does not directly address in his opening brief the superior court\u2019s dismissal of claims against Johnson and Skadeland for <mask> fraudulent concealment, which the court dismissed for Bade\u2019s failure to provide an expert affidavit. He only mentions the aiding and abetting fraudulent concealment claim in passing and fails to develop any specific argument on appeal directed to this claim. He thus waives this issue as to Johnson and Skadeland. See Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 274 (1977) (\u201cThe failure to raise an issue . . . in briefs on appeal constitutes a waiver of the issue.\u201d (citation omitted)), overruling on other grounds"], "id": "5998ac37-f2a5-4c22-b8e0-de382c2a9977", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Before King, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* In separate appeals, Bryan Majors and Max Majors challenge the district court\u2019s order holding them jointly and severally liable for $500,500 in restitution. They contend that the restitution award is not supported by record evidence of the victim\u2019s loss and thus exceeds the statutory maximum. Because they implicate common facts and issues, we sua sponte consolidate the appeals under Fed. R. App. P. 3(b)(2). We vacate the restitution order and remand for recalculation. I. Bryan Majors and his brother, Max Majors, both pleaded guilty to kidnapping and <mask>. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2, 1201(a)(1) and (c). The brothers were part of a residential robbery scheme in which two assailants entered the victim\u2019s home, subdued her, and threatened to harm her son if she did not reveal where her money was stored. After she pointed the assailants to her safe, one of them pried it open and seized what was inside. The assailants left the home with considerable cash and other valuables."], "id": "52ae9c98-ca7a-413f-afcd-4f838822255e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Special District Attorney responds by asserting first that the defendant is not a person entitled to mandatory youth offender status because he is before a superior court under indictment, albeit charged only with a misdemeanor. (CPL 720.20 [1] [b].) He further asserts that the People have three interlocking confessions and that contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, \"the facts surrounding defendants\u2019 assault upon Mr. Leahy [the complainant] and their conduct in <mask> each other in the commission of such assault, including their respective roles in fending off those seeking to assist Mr. Leahy, require that this matter be tried in one trial, before one jury * * * A 'joint trial\u2019 would not, as alleged by Mr. Z * * * result in prejudice to him. Indeed, a severance would rather, make the presentation of this action to a jury disjointed and make confusion more likely.\u201d"], "id": "1cc95779-5a75-4f45-b301-18383f310840", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On June 22, 2010, plaintiff filed the amended complaint in this action, alleging that the Board constructively and wrongfully refused the demand and conducted a sham investigation (amended complaint 1I1\u00cd 150-180). The amended complaint asserts claims against various management defendants and members of the Board\u2019s Audit and Risk Management Committee for breach of fiduciary duty, <mask> such breach, and waste of corporate assets, seeking an accounting and disgorgement of all monies, profits, commissions, bonuses, and gains obtained. It includes a new cause of action against Franklin Thomas and Michael O\u2019Neill (the Demand Committee defendants), alleging breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting such breach, and waste of corporate assets by causing Citigroup to expend millions of dollars in an allegedly sham investigation (id. 1\u00cdH 185, 195, 200-202)."], "id": "436e01b4-6b21-4e42-af6a-a357fc4dcb6e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["For the reasons set forth below, we find that both Lewis and Young were convicted of armed bank robbery, that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under the still- valid \u201celements clause\u201d of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(3)(A), and that <mask> a crime of violence is also a crime of violence. Relatedly, we find that Lewis and Young have not met the requirements for filing a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255 because, under Ninth Circuit precedent, their claim does not \u201crely on\u201d a new rule of constitutional law."], "id": "abd3b863-b2a4-4805-a29c-a290f1d1a16f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*868As a threshold matter, section 487 \u201cis only applicable to attorneys and cannot extend derivative liability to a client.\u201d (Yalkowsky v Century Apts. Assoc., 215 AD2d 214, 215 [1st Dept 1995].) Therefore, no section 487 claim has been stated against the Alliance brothers. Since no underlying section 487 claim has been alleged against either the attorney defendants or the Alliance brothers, the conspiracy to violate and <mask> a violation of section 487 claims lack merit and are dismissed. (See e.g. Kagan v HMC-New York, Inc., 94 AD3d 67, 73 [1st Dept 2012]; Abacus Fed. Sav. Bank v Lim, 75 AD3d 472, 474 [1st Dept 2010].)"], "id": "3fdabb92-31fd-468b-895b-76f693211538", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaints arguing that (1) the plaintiffs have failed to identify which manufacturer\u2019s product was consumed by the plaintiffs and thus have failed to causally link each defendant to the asserted injuries, that (2) the plaintiffs have failed to plead a factually sufficient legal nexus between the parent corporations, the industry-related research organizations and the manufacturers to render them liable for torts allegedly committed by the manufacturers and (3) that the fraud and misrepresentation counts were not pleaded with requisite specificity and (4) that plaintiffs have not pleaded the necessary elements of conspiratorial, concerted action or <mask> liability."], "id": "42d7b0c6-7d2b-4eb2-abcb-f2dec588670c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["C. The Trial Court\u2019s Denial of the Petition The trial court denied the petition on three grounds. First, the trial court found that section 1170.95 relief is available to petitioners convicted of murder, not attempted murder. After that ruling, the California legislature passed Senate Bill No. 775, which expressly extends section 1170.95 relief to individuals convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2020\u20132021 Reg. Sess.) \u00a7 2, amending \u00a7 1170.95, subd. (a), eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) We agree with both parties that appellant\u2019s conviction for attempted murder, in and of itself, does not make him ineligible for relief under newly amended section 1170.95. Nevertheless, appellant remains ineligible for relief. Appellant was not convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. That doctrine imputes vicarious liability for reasonable foreseeable consequences of offenses committed by the person the accused aids or abets. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261.) Here it is undisputed that appellant was prosecuted as the actual shooter, not under any theory of <mask>, and the jury found true the allegation that he personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to the victim. The trial court did not err in finding appellant ineligible for relief."], "id": "4484dbfe-6ca6-4858-9cbc-0f381b107784", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It seems clear that the 1960 amendment shifting the loss to the drawer-employer of a dishonest employee was intended to relieve from responsibility a bank which acted in error but not amounting to bad faith. The amendment could not have been intended to absolve completely from responsibility a bank *698chargeable in a commercial sense with bad faith and therefore not entitled to the protection it would otherwise receive under the law (cf. Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N. Y. 223, 234, supra). Any other interpretation would confer immunity upon banks, while <mask> by means of their gross negligence or willful ignorance dishonest employees to steal from their employers."], "id": "36b0a11a-c8dd-478b-87b2-26c5cf0430d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As such, the Steele Plaintiffs' causes of action for <mask> fraud, tortious interference, and conspiracy each complain substantively of underlying decisions or directives of TLC, not any actions by GTECH within its independent discretion, thereby implicating sovereign immunity. But the analysis is more complicated with respect to the Steele Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action for fraud by misrepresentation or silence."], "id": "d96957e0-4b9c-4656-9ab1-0f1b72a5e9bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Section 2 of the Penal Law, among other things, divides crimes into two divisions: Felonies and misdemeanors. This section defines a principal as \u201c a person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act consti-tuting the offense or aids and abets in-'its commission, and whether present- or absent, and a person who directly fir iiidire'ctly counsels, commands, induces or procures another to'commit a- crime!\u201d The provision in this section-as to\u2018<mask> another-in-the\u2018commission of dm- offense relates only do -acts-or-omissions punishable as'felonies-or misdemeanors,1 under the provisions- of the Penal Law, and to the-violation-of statutes *313which declare acts \"or \u2022omissions to be -either felonies or. misdemeanors. If the violation of the ordinance of which the .defendant was convicted is \u00e1 misdemeanor; then- the. conviction must stand; but, if it ismot-a misdemeanor, the conviction must be reversed. \u2022 '"], "id": "88a7f4d3-1d9c-4700-bb72-d145538dc1ed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["White points out that mere presence at the scene of a crime, or failure to intervene, is insufficient in and of itself to constitute <mask>. (See People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 57, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 160 ; In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911, 149 Cal.Rptr. 87.) But J.D.'s testimony shows that White's participation was much greater than simply presence at the scene or failure to intervene. A jury could reasonably infer that White acted as a lookout during the attack and encouraged Owens to continue after J.D. first fought him off."], "id": "baf6e5c1-0282-4cc2-b7bf-d2c0266331a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Specifically, the informations allege that on the various Sundays therein mentioned, the defendants, each <mask> the others, sold the following allegedly prohibited items: three sets of men\u2019s underwear, a pair of boys\u2019 shorts, two pairs of socks and a hammer. Many other articles, not *256authorized to be sold on a Sunday, were then and there displayed for sale."], "id": "9c6af4a6-e7e2-48a8-b9e2-dcd08e60116a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["the natural and probable consequences theory of <mask> or on any felony-murder theory. The jury found Salas guilty of all charged crimes, all alleged enhancements, and the special circumstance. The jury found Garnica guilty of the crimes relating to the Saticoy Street shootings, but acquitted him of the crimes relating to the forced tattooing of Covarrubias (as well as any lesser-included offenses). D. Sentencing and appeal The trial court sentenced Salas to prison for a determinate term of 15 years, plus two indeterminate terms of life without the possibility of parole, plus 187 years to life, and sentenced Garnica to prison for 125 years to life. Both defendants filed timely notices of appeal. DISCUSSION I. Evidentiary Issues Garnica argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the jury could consider the Vega shooting and the prostitution sting against him. We review these evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 590.) A. The Vega shooting The trial court admitted the Vega shooting under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). That provision authorizes the admission of uncharged acts to \u201cprove some fact,\u201d including \u201cmotive\u201d and \u201cintent.\u201d (Evid. Code, \u00a7 1101, subd. (b).) To be admissible as so-called \u201c1101(b) evidence,\u201d a court must find that (1) the purpose for which the uncharged act is offered is relevant to the pending case (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 857- 858), (2) the uncharged act has the requisite degree of similarity, which ensures that it has a tendency to prove the purpose for which it is offered (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 22"], "id": "a736fd94-666e-4e36-982c-05c20864983c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, regarding the second cause of action for misappropriation of a trade secret, and the seventh and ninth causes of action for conspiring and <mask> such misappropriation, respectively, defendants argued that the information allegedly at issue was not a trade secret because such information was not private; and that, in any event, there was no evidence to show any such information had been misappropriated or used by defendants."], "id": "4d093c60-b3f5-41bc-a75d-424a7bd6fe81", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, regarding the second cause of action for misappropriation of a trade secret, and the seventh and ninth causes of action for conspiring and <mask> such misappropriation, respectively, defendants argued that the information allegedly at issue was not a trade secret because such information was not private; and that, in any event, there was no evidence to show any such information had been misappropriated or used by defendants."], "id": "de844a20-c370-4c06-92a7-d96ef552af92", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, we must reverse the order denying the petition and remand the matter to the trial court for a new section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3) hearing under the correct standard. At the new hearing, the parties should be afforded the opportunity to present additional evidence, should they so request. We reject defendant\u2019s contention that remand is inappropriate and that we must vacate his murder conviction. Defendant misplaces reliance on the rule that, \u201cwhen a reversal rests upon the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove its case, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction.\u201d (Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 42 [72 L.Ed.2d 652, 661].) Even if this rule applied in this context, our determination is not that the prosecution failed to proffer legally sufficient evidence, but rather that it is not clear the trial court employed the correct standard of review. Nor do we accept defendant\u2019s invitation to \u201cfind that [he] prevails under any standard of review.\u201d In light of our determination and this open remand, we need not reach defendant\u2019s substantial evidence claim, his claim addressed to the theory of <mask> an implied malice murder, or his claim that his petition may have been denied based on an invalid legal theory. V Res Judicata And Double Jeopardy Defendant asserts, essentially, that a finding that the trial court would convict him under direct aiding and abetting principles is precluded as a matter of law, and that the only other theory on which the jury was instructed was the now-invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine. Therefore, he asserts, in effect, that the trial court was precluded as a matter of law from denying his petition. Defendant contends that a finding that the trial court would still convict him of first degree murder is precluded by double jeopardy and res judicata principles. He bases this claim on this court\u2019s reversal of his first degree murder conviction on his first appeal and the reduction to second degree murder. (Torres, supra, C069510.) He claims that, under Gomez v."], "id": "fe9cb698-777d-4c83-9aec-06761cc10ad5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The court gave CALCRIM 400 : \"A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. [\u00b6] A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator. [\u00b6] Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes <mask> of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime.\""], "id": "745650ec-70da-4664-b86b-43a40236bf32", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, as in People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209, \"it is proximate causation, not direct or actual causation, which, together with the requisite culpable mens rea (malice), determines [defendants'] liability for murder.\" (Id. at p. 845, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209.) Here, there was no dispute Ellison died of a single gunshot wound. This was the direct, but-for cause of death. Overwhelming evidence established both Adam and Isaac fired into Ellison's car. Who fired the fatal shot is irrelevant. As our Supreme Court explained: \"A person can proximately cause a gunshot injury without personally firing the weapon that discharged the harm-inflicting bullet. For example, in People v. Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th 834, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209, ... two persons engaged in a gun battle, killing an innocent bystander. Who fired the fatal bullet, and thus who personally inflicted the harm, was unknown, but we held that the jury could find that both gunmen proximately caused the death. (Id. at pp. 848-849, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209....)\" (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 337, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.) The same is true here. While the jury should have been instructed with the \"direct, natural, and probable consequences\" language, we have no doubt the jury reached the same conclusion without it, i.e., the act of firing the fatal shot caused Ellison's death. Then, under the instruction that was provided, the jury properly concluded both Adam and Isaac proximately caused the death regardless of who fired the fatal shot. Moreover, use of the term \"proximate cause\" in the instruction, while improper, could only have benefitted defendants by potentially misleading jurors that proximate cause has a \" 'physical or temporal nearness' \" requirement that does not exist in the law. (People v. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 338, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.) As for Jesse, liability for murder turned on principles of <mask>, on which the jury was appropriately instructed. Thus, any instructional error was manifestly harmless."], "id": "1cfb37c5-5457-41f0-8ccc-c26784522699", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["When Costa returned from a short ride with defendant, he had only one bag of methamphetamine, unlike on the first occasion where Costa retained the other bags he had obtained from defendant. He turned over that single bag to Bellamy. When Bellamy asked Costa whether he got any, Costa said he had not. He explained, \"I'm doing bad right now cause I owe him money. So he ain't giving me nothing right now . But if you could kick me a little, that'd be cool.\" (Italics added.) Costa had recently lost money gambling, and he owed defendant approximately $400. Costa's reference to his debt and the fact that defendant was not providing him with any drugs \"right now\" is additional evidence establishing that defendant knew he was not providing methamphetamine to Costa, but rather he was knowingly <mask> Costa in providing methamphetamine to a third party."], "id": "f6db7018-515a-40bc-8940-f36d2618cc96", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u2018were deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to and with a conscious disregard for human life.\u2019 \u201d The prosecutor seemed to contend the natural and probable consequences doctrine remained a valid basis for at least a second degree murder conviction. At the subsequent hearing, the prosecutor told the court, \u201cI think both the implied malice theory and an amended form of the natural and probable consequences doctrine which relies on implied malice are still viable under 1437.\u201d The parties appeared before the court on September 1, 2020 for an evidentiary hearing. (See \u00a7 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) Gaither did not offer any new or additional evidence. The prosecution called an investigator to testify about lyrics he\u2019d found on the internet of two songs by a musician named Jay Capone. The prosecutor told the court one of the songs had been marked as a defense exhibit at trial and Gaither had \u201cindicated that he was involved in the production of it.\u201d After hearing from the witness, the court sustained Gaither\u2019s objections to the lyrics. The only other evidence the prosecution offered was the Attorney General\u2019s file, presumably from Gaither\u2019s direct appeal. After hearing at length from counsel, the court denied Gaither\u2019s petition. On the same day, the court issued a detailed written opinion. The court stated it had \u201cinstructed the jury on the theories that [Gaither] was (1) a direct perpetrator, (2) a direct aider and abettor, and (3) an aider and abettor and/or a coconspirator under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.\u201d The court continued, \u201cThe fact that a jury instruction was given on the now defunct natural and probable consequences doctrine of <mask> or conspiracy . . . would not preclude a conviction on a separate but still viable theory of liability for the murder.\u201d The court concluded the \u201cPeople ha[d] proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [Gaither] could be convicted of murder of any degree . . . as a perpetrator and/or as a direct aider and abettor under the current law . . . .\u201d"], "id": "46d2508c-68e5-4e25-a560-4dc7687f231d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Second, an anti-SLAPP motion is an evidentiary motion (Finton Construction, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 213, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ), but Contreras fails to provide evidentiary support for her allegations of conspiracy or <mask>. \"Because civil conspiracy is so easy to allege, plaintiffs have a weighty burden to prove it.\" (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 333, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 339 (Choate ).) \"To prove a claim for civil conspiracy, [Contreras] was required to provide substantial evidence of three elements: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.\" (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 (Kidron ).) For liability to attach, knowledge of the planned tort must be combined with intent to aid in its commission. (Id . at p. 1582, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752.) \"While knowledge and intent 'may be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances' [citation], ' \"[c]onspiracies cannot be established by suspicions. There must be some evidence. Mere association does not make a conspiracy. There must be evidence of some participation or interest in the commission of the offense.\" ' [Citation.] An inference must flow logically from other facts established in the action.\"12 (Ibid . )"], "id": "6d65e67f-8872-4846-9ae2-d9427d73a1d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In both trials, the jury asked at what point the commission of the crime ended for purposes of <mask> liability. Despite the similarity of the juries' questions, however, the trial court responded differently in each case.11 Appellant contends that the court abused its discretion in responding to the jury question in the second trial, because it led the jury to convict appellant of murder based on a legally invalid theory. We agree."], "id": "7110e83f-2afd-408e-a050-6e17bcd49721", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["-In apt words and without equivocation that section (2152 of\" the Penal Law) declares that \u201c the performance of any tragedy, comedy * * * negro minstrelsy * * * on the first day of the week is forbiddenTherefore it follows that if any such tragedy or comedy is performed that such performance must he by actors who take part in a performance forbidden by law. It follows also that if actors perform, there are persons who hire them or procure them to act in such performance. Such persons are those usually interested pecuniarily or otherwise, a's owner or manager, in giving the performance forbidden by law. There must also he persons who-aid in the theatrical performance in various capacities. If on any 'Sunday in this State a public theatrical performance is produced upon a stage, all who are engaged in aiding or furthering such performance, forbidden by law, and all engaged therein, whether as owner of the business that produced the play, the manager of the concern, the actors who take part therein, the ticket seller, the* *195ticket taker, the ushers \u2014 all in fact who are present, <mask> the forbidden performance, are violators of the law. \u201cA person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the of\u00edense or aids and abets in its commission, and whether present or absent, or who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, or induces or procures another to commit a crime, is a principal.\u201d (Section 2, Penal Law.)"], "id": "7c6a5938-111e-4f1a-b332-19d8593b46d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["commission of the offense (\u00a7 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for the murder, one year for a firearm enhancement, and two years for a probation violation. (Maldonado, supra, C041013 at p. 1.) Defendant appealed and this court affirmed the judgment. (Maldonado, supra, C041013 at p. 17.) In the opinion on direct appeal, this court noted that the jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine for first degree murder.3 (Id. at pp. 9-10.) In June 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. In his declaration, defendant checked the boxes to indicate a complaint, information, or indictment was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and at trial he was convicted of first or second degree murder under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Defendant also checked the box to indicate that he \u201ccould not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder because of changes made to Penal Code \u00a7 \u00a7 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.\u201d The prosecutor filed a response and motion to dismiss the petition and defendant\u2019s appointed counsel filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. On October 5, 2020, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition. The trial court noted defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and the jury had been instructed on this charge under both direct <mask> as well as the natural and probable consequences doctrine, so defendant \u201ccould have been convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.\u201d However, after reviewing the summary of evidence in this court\u2019s prior opinion, the trial court found that there was evidence defendant intended for Deponte to kill Garcia. \u201cThus, the court now concludes that as a"], "id": "403a2c38-c82a-4e06-a878-14b20029abab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c FIRST COUNT. \u201c The Grand Jury of the County of Kings, by this count in this indictment, accuse the defendants, each <mask> the other, of the crime of Obscene Prints and Articles, Contrary to Penal Law Section 1141. \u201c SECOND COUNT. \u201c The Grand Jury of the County of Kings, by this count in this indictment, accuse the defendants of the crime of Conspiracy, Contrary to Penal Law Section 580.\u201d It is obvious that the indictment was drafted pursuant to sections 295-a to 295-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (L. 1929, ch. 176) governing simplified forms of indictment."], "id": "ea15346e-93de-4443-8469-aa496a5619f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["We begin by analyzing plaintiff's claim for entire fairness review and find that the standard was not met.8 Accordingly, we review defendants' conduct in the merger proceedings under the enhanced scrutiny standard of review. We find that there are no triable issues of material fact related to the breach of fiduciary duty action against the nine independent directors and affirm the grant of summary judgment in their favor. We find that triable issues remain related to defendant DeWalt's apparent nondisclosure of arguably material information to the board and the shareholders and reverse the grant of summary judgment in his favor. We also reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of McAfee and Intel on the <mask> claim."], "id": "05dc11ad-a1f8-4ec3-ae76-d7f9f1d83630", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecutor urged the court to respond to the jury's question with the following quote from People v. Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492, 241 Cal.Rptr. 842 : \" 'Factors relevant to a determination of whether defendant was guilty of <mask> include[:] presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, [and] conduct before and after the offense.' \" (See also People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422, 429, 193 Cal.Rptr. 711.)"], "id": "c8dfab30-15c7-4696-88cd-a143fbf14a3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["See \u00b6\u00b6 74 [seventh cause of action for conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets, alleging \"Wallace misappropriated [AMN's] trade secrets by sending Aya an email containing trade secrets regarding [AMN's] strategy for competing with Aya\"]; and 82 [ninth cause of action for <mask> misappropriation of trade secrets, alleging same allegation against Wallace as in the seventh cause of action].)"], "id": "0a2e09fd-d3d1-4158-b068-735479dbf5ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Lastly, Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding the Shelbina Church was not liable for <mask> under section 537.046, which authorizes a civil action for damages related to injury or illness caused by a defendant's conduct of \"childhood sexual abuse.\" Section 537.046 ; see also Ratigan, 481 S.W.3d at 53. As defined by the statute, \"childhood sexual abuse\" is \"any act committed by the *662defendant against the plaintiff which act occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of eighteen years and which act would have been a violation of [Missouri statutes criminalizing, inter alia , rape, sodomy, or sexual abuse].\" Section 537.046.1(1); see also, e.g. , section 566.030 RSMo 2000; section 566.060 RSMo 2000; section 566.100 RSMo 2000. Appellant claims the Shelbina Church is liable under this section because it aided and abetted Sprinkel's sexual abuse of Appellant, and \"any civil action related to sexual abuse damages may be maintained pursuant to the language of [ section] 537.046.\" We disagree."], "id": "f5973559-2266-4656-a598-6ebba987bb2f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly concealed and misrepresented information about the addictive nature of nicotine, and manipulated the levels of nicotine in their cigarettes with intent to defraud cigarette smokers and purchasers, causing them to buy defendants\u2019 cigarettes. They assert claims for fraud, fraudulent concealment, conspiracy, concerted action, <mask>, and violation of General Business Law \u00a7\u00a7 349 and 350. On behalf of all similarly situated persons, they seek to recover the return of the purchase price spent on the defendants\u2019 cigarettes and punitive damages."], "id": "fa92b502-d390-42f4-b3b9-b2b01d03d9ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Our high court built upon its discussion in Banks , with greater emphasis on the requirements of reckless indifference, when it decided Clark , supra , 63 Cal.4th 522, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811 the following year. The defendant, William Clinton Clark (Clark), was convicted of two murders on an <mask> theory, and the court sentenced him to death on the basis of five special circumstance findings, two of which related to the first murder and three to the second. ( Id. at pp. 534-535, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811.) The Clark court concluded the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special circumstance findings that related to the first murder were not supported by sufficient evidence. ( Id . at p. 611, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811.) The facts, in sum, were these."], "id": "484d2cce-a214-4aae-8881-61c10150b7e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"In the case of defenses, ... a sua sponte instructional duty arises 'only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial *360evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.' \" ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 142, 157, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094, italics omitted.) Here, the defense theory of the case was that defendant lacked the requisite intent under section 10851, described in the trial court's jury instructions as the intent \"to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time.\" Assuming arguendo that admitting to stealing the vehicle can be called a \"defense,\" because the jury instructions for \"Theft by Larceny\" require the intent \"to deprive the owner ... permanently/ [or] to remove it from the owner's ... possession for ... [an] extended ... period of time,\" that purported defense would be inconsistent with Morales's theory of the case. ( CALCRIM 1800.) Moreover, there was certainly not substantial evidence to support any instruction on theories of theft or <mask> theft, as there was no evidence (as opposed to defendant's speculative theory) connecting \"Shawn\" and/or defendant to the actual theft of the car. Thus, under the standard governing a trial court's duty to instruct sua sponte on defenses, no such duty existed here. In sum, Morales's due process argument is meritless. *810V. Under Gallardo , the Trial Court's Findings on the Prior Strike Allegations Should Be Reversed."], "id": "38cd8e54-7619-409f-a60a-57c2b21882c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The cause of action for <mask> breach of fiduciary duty is premised on SGRisk\u2019s knowledge of the fiduciary duties owed by CRM and UHY to the trusts, and allegations that SGRisk intentionally continued to underestimate the trusts\u2019 future claims liabilities with the knowledge that this would aid and abet breaches of fiduciary duty by CRM and UHY. Because the allegations of fraud perpetrated by SGRisk are essential to this claim, a six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (8) is applicable (see IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]; Paolucci v Mauro, 74 AD3d 1517, 1519-1520 [2010]), rendering the claim timely."], "id": "84ab3a65-96e8-485c-a6ea-84960bf6f112", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*631Plaintiff does not contend that the shortened statute of limitations is inapplicable to its claims for breach of fiduciary duty and <mask> breach of fiduciary duty. In any event, its aiding and abetting claim is inadequately pleaded (see Bullmore v Ernst & Young Cayman Is., 45 AD3d 461, 464 [1st Dept 2007]; Brasseur v Speranza, 21 AD3d 297, 299 [1st Dept 2005])."], "id": "2207d2d9-9f8b-423b-9fc6-0ba40d5b3ef6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The sixth cause of action for <mask> fraud alleged the defendants conspired to defraud VBV with excessive billing for which VBV paid, and \"subsequently improperly recorded an untimely Mechanics Lien against the Residence in the amount of $449,126.96. Defendants then demanded [VBV] pay the sum of $648,811.43 or they would file a lawsuit to foreclose on the Mechanics Lien.\""], "id": "d3037cfd-20ae-4fbd-bb27-833713760c31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["To the extent the allegations are related to a breach of fiduciary duties by Mr. Mellul and Mr. Pagani, they should be dismissed. As explained below (eighth cause of action), the claim against Mr. Mellul and Mr. Pagani for breach of fiduciary duties should be dismissed. Therefore, the court cannot sustain a claim for <mask> such a breach."], "id": "64e12888-e945-4419-b76b-dd5f6a21316e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["While no witness confirmed that one of the two accomplices seen in the video surveillance footage was Guthrie, the video footage combined with the cell phone evidence showing Guthrie's involvement with Johnson (and to a lesser extent the testimony that Guthrie was a former boxer), amply supported the inference that Guthrie was one of Johnson's accomplices. (See People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 [\" '[A]mong the factors which may be considered in making the determination of <mask> are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.' \"].) In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Guthrie knowingly and willingly participated in the murder of Canady."], "id": "84ffbc22-590f-4e12-b233-765f6388710d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On December 14, 2009, New Media sued Kagalovsky, Iota LP, Aspida and Seragill in New York state court, asserting, among other things, claims for breach of fiduciary duty, <mask> breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and tortious interference with contract (New Media Holding Co. L.L.C. v Kagalovsky, Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 603742/2009 [action No. 1]). A few days later, after voluntarily dismissing its federal action, NMDC refiled its federal claims in state court, this time including Kagalovsky and Iota LP as defendants with the partnership, and adding an unjust enrichment claim as against Kagalovsky (New Media Distribution Co. L.L.C. v Iota Ventures LLP, Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 650754/2009 [ac*76tion No. 2]). Kagalovsky and Iota LP filed counterclaims in action No. 1, adding NMDC and Gusinski as counterclaim defendants, and filed nearly identical counterclaims against NMDC in action No. 2."], "id": "eb214950-c4d9-4bd0-b7fa-9d2f2000e6c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["To plead a prima facie case for <mask>, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant \u201csubstantially assisted\u201d in a fraud (see, King v George Schonberg & Co., 233 AD2d 242 [1st Dept 1996]; DePinto v Ashley Scott, Inc., 222 AD2d 288 [1st Dept 1995]). Allegations of mere inaction or silence are insufficient to sustain a claim for aiding and abetting unless the defendant has an independent duty to the plaintiff (King, supra; Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v Spira, 289 AD2d 173 [1st Dept 2001]; National Westminster Bank USA v Weksel, 124 AD2d 144 [1st Dept 1987]). A bank\u2019s mere acceptance of a loan repayment despite knowledge of the debtor\u2019s wrongful conduct does not rise to the level of aiding and abetting (see, Atlanta Shipping Corp. v Chemical Bank, 818d 240 [2d Cir 1987]; Renner, supra)."], "id": "6ae070a6-8a93-41f3-808a-8019c4d9aed9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["While no witness confirmed that one of the two accomplices seen in the video surveillance footage was Guthrie, the video footage combined with the cell phone evidence showing Guthrie's involvement with Johnson (and to a lesser extent the testimony that Guthrie was a former boxer), amply supported the inference that Guthrie was one of Johnson's accomplices. (See People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 [\" '[A]mong the factors which may be considered in making the determination of <mask> are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.' \"].) In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Guthrie knowingly and willingly participated in the murder of Canady."], "id": "85886a00-444e-4599-8cbe-b3354fa2101d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As previously noted, the Steele Plaintiffs' causes of action for aiding and *796abetting fraud and conspiracy presume that TLC deliberately chose the allegedly misleading Game 5 instructions so as to mislead and harm them. If so, GTECH had no power under the Instant-Game Contract to countermand TLC's decision-rather, the contract expressly reserved to TLC \"the sole right to reject [GTECH's] guidance for any reason\" and obligated GTECH to \"accept and support\" TLC's decision. More critically, the gravamen of the alleged \"<mask> fraud\" and participation in \"conspiracy\" by GTECH is that GTECH performed its contractual obligations to print and distribute Fun 5's and program game parameters into the Texas Lottery computer system once TLC had determined or approved the game design. GTECH had no discretion to do otherwise-instead, it was obligated to conform \"its tickets, games, goods, and services\" in accordance with TLC's specifications and designs. The same is true of the GTECH conduct made the basis of the Steele Plaintiffs' tortious-interference cause of action-GTECH's programming of the computer system in accordance with the game parameters, as GTECH was required to do under its contracts with TLC."], "id": "379a5fd1-1e01-40ed-80eb-95fbac37000b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c State of New York j County of Broome [- ss. City of Binghamton.] \u201c Walter Martin being duly sworn, deposes and says on information and belief that at the City of Binghamton, County of Broome and State of New York, on or about the 25th day of October, 1930 and thence continuously to and including September 15th, 1932, William A. Menzel and Martina M. Menzel each <mask> the other, did commit the crime of maintaining a public nuisance in violation of section 1530 of the Penal Law, in that they are persons who did unlawfully keep and maintain a certain common ill-governed building and structure located at No. 7 Exchange Street in said city and in said building did sell to various purchasers denatured alcohol with intent and knowledge on the part of the said William A. Menzel and Martina M. Menzel; *917that the said alcohol was to be used by said purchasers for beverage purposes, the said William A. Menzel and Martina M. Menzel, knowing that the said alcohol was unfit for human consumption and was likely to produce serious bodily injury to the individual drinking said alcohol; that the said William A. Menzel and Martina M. Menzel did permit intoxicated persons to remain in said premises while they made purchases of said alcohol. That the said sales were made in violation of the Constitution of the United States of America. That all of said acts, offended the public decency and rendered insecure in their lives and in the use of their property a great number of persons, good citizens of our state, there being and residing and causing great annoyance injury and danger to the comfort, repose, health and safety of a great number of persons, good citizens of our state there being, residing, passing and repassing to the common nuisance of said citizens. \u201c That the sources of his information and the grounds for his belief are statements made by William Nugent, Harry Slocum and Ray O\u2019Keefe. \u201c Wherefore he prays that a warrant may issue against the said William A. Menzel and Martina M. Menzel. \u201c WALTER MARTIN. \u201c Sworn to before me October 20th, 1932. \u25a0 \u201c William S. Richardson, \u201c City Judge of Binghamton.\u201d The defendants were arraigned before Hon. William S. Richardson, city judge of the city of Binghamton, on October 21, 1932, and at that time the attorney for the defendants moved to dismiss the information on the ground that it failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged or any crime, and more particularly upon the ground that it was made upon information and belief and that said information was insufficient. The motion so made was denied by the court and a trial had before the court and a jury on the 19th day of December, 1932, the jury returning a verdict against the defendants, and each of them. It appears from the record that the court and jury had the following conversation:"], "id": "0a6dc274-23a2-433f-9d32-870b7a223f51", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs seek to recover for injuries allegedly sustained by Elizabeth Tigue and Myrna Margolies (now deceased) as a result of the ingestion of DES by their mothers. Sayre Margo-lies proceeds on behalf of her daughter Myrna who died in 1977 at age 23, from clear cell adenocarcinoma of the cervix and vagina, a rare form of cancer in young women, associated with prenatal exposure to DES. Plaintiff Elizabeth Tigue was diagnosed as having vaginal adenosis, a precancerous condition associated with DES exposure, in which glandular tissue normally found in the cervix is found in the vagina. Plaintiffs\u2019 *469complaints allege breach of warranty, negligence, strict liability, res ipsa loquitur, concerted action and <mask> strict liability."], "id": "2e7466cb-e519-4190-844a-b038457939a1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, regarding the second cause of action for misappropriation of a trade secret, and the seventh and ninth causes of action for conspiring and <mask> such misappropriation, respectively, defendants argued that the information allegedly at issue was not a trade secret because such information was not private; and that, in any event, there was no evidence to show any such information had been misappropriated or used by defendants."], "id": "4066b2f1-a7d8-495a-864d-eacce9515fd7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the bankruptcy discharge was the result of a reorganization of the corporate defendants, resulting in their discharge of any obligation to the plaintiff. However, although their discharge insulates them from liability, there was no finding by the bankruptcy court on the merits of the plaintiffs claims against these defendants. That being so, plaintiff is free to litigate his claim of Wodzenski\u2019s <mask> defendants. This is so, he argues even though the bankruptcy discharge relieves the corporate defendants of any liability without a decision on the merits."], "id": "a8277998-942d-41a7-86ea-1db1d827825f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecution charged R.G., Cathey, and Kushner with E.L.'s murder. It argued R.G. was liable based on three theories: direct <mask>, conspiracy, and natural and probable consequences. The juvenile court rejected the aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories, but found that R.G. was liable for E.L.'s murder because the shooting was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the gang assault in this case. (See People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 922, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 202, 209 P.3d 105.)"], "id": "e4ad4ef9-02fc-478a-b57b-1b2c6c05895d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In 1990, state voters passed Proposition 115, which \"revised the scope of capital liability for <mask> felony murders by looking to federal constitutional law.\" ( Banks , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 798, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330.) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) provides that \"every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a [specified felony, including robbery,] which results in the death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a[n enumerated] special circumstance ... has been found to be true under Section 190.4.\" \"The statute thus imposes both a special actus reus requirement, major participation in the crime, and a specific mens rea requirement, reckless indifference to human life.\" ( Banks , supra , at p. 798, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330, fn.omitted.) Participating in a robbery-murder is one of the special circumstances for which an aider and abettor may be punished by death or life imprisonment without parole. (\u00a7 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)"], "id": "07ba972c-d305-43c4-ad7e-3449eab21fa4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In 2014, the California Supreme Court held that premeditation and deliberation \"is uniquely subjective and personal. It requires more than a showing of intent to kill; the killer must act deliberately, carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice to kill before he or she completes the acts that caused the death.\" ( Chiu , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 166, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 325 P.3d 972.) The Court held that under the natural and probable consequences theory \"the connection between the [aider and abettor's] culpability and the perpetrator's premeditative state is too attenuated to impose aider and abettor liability for first degree murder.\" ( Ibid . ) Thus, an aider and abettor's liability for premeditated murder \"must be based on direct <mask> principles.\" ( Id . at p. 159, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 325 P.3d 972 )"], "id": "dd89e569-8f42-4f9b-b399-0e60b3f482b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*631Plaintiff does not contend that the shortened statute of limitations is inapplicable to its claims for breach of fiduciary duty and <mask> breach of fiduciary duty. In any event, its aiding and abetting claim is inadequately pleaded (see Bullmore v Ernst & Young Cayman Is., 45 AD3d 461, 464 [1st Dept 2007]; Brasseur v Speranza, 21 AD3d 297, 299 [1st Dept 2005])."], "id": "b2090d45-fd7f-421e-bd22-408802655db0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On December 14, 2009, New Media sued Kagalovsky, Iota LP, Aspida and Seragill in New York state court, asserting, among other things, claims for breach of fiduciary duty, <mask> breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and tortious interference with contract (New Media Holding Co. L.L.C. v Kagalovsky, Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 603742/2009 [action No. 1]). A few days later, after voluntarily dismissing its federal action, NMDC refiled its federal claims in state court, this time including Kagalovsky and Iota LP as defendants with the partnership, and adding an unjust enrichment claim as against Kagalovsky (New Media Distribution Co. L.L.C. v Iota Ventures LLP, Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 650754/2009 [ac*76tion No. 2]). Kagalovsky and Iota LP filed counterclaims in action No. 1, adding NMDC and Gusinski as counterclaim defendants, and filed nearly identical counterclaims against NMDC in action No. 2."], "id": "4fc92bd2-382e-40b5-9a0b-46c164074e1c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As Chief Judge Posner puts it, \u201c<mask> requires knowledge of the illegal activity that is being aided and abetted, a desire to help the activity succeed, and some act of helping.\u201d (United States v Zafiro, 945d 881, 887 [7th Cir 1991], affd on other grounds 506 US 534 [1993] [paraphrasing L. Hand, J., in the classic formulation of the definition in United States v Peoni, 100d 401, 402 (2d Cir 1938)]; see People v Morhouse, 21 NY2d 66, 73 [1967]; People v Letizia, 122 AD2d 555 [4th Dept 1986]; People v Lilli, 71 AD2d 393, 401 [4th Dept 1979].) A store clerk\u2019s sale of a \u201cdress to a prostitute knowing that she will be using it in plying her trade is not guilty of aiding and abetting,\u201d because the dress sale is \u201ctoo trivial to support an inference that the clerk actually wants to help the prostitute succeed in her illegal activity.\u201d (Id., 945d at 887 [observing, \u201c(t)hat is where the requirement of proving the defendant\u2019s desire to make the illegal activity succeed cuts off liability,\u201d i.e., as an accessory].) The case of People v Letizia (supra), relied on by defendant, is an example. But if the putative aiders and abettors, here Aliuddin and Urtis, \u201cknowingly providfe] essential assistance [here by procuring and supplying a gun to one with an announced murderous intent], we can infer that [t]he[y] d[o] want [h]im to succeed, for that is the natural consequence of * * * [their] deliberate act.\u201d (Id., 945d at 887-888 [adding that it is \u201cbetter in evaluating charges of aiding and abetting to jettison talk of desire and focus on the real concern, which is the relative dangerousness of different types of assistance\u201d].) That Aliuddin and Urtis did not actually intend a murder is of no consequence if defendant requested that they commit conduct which would, if they so intended, make them aiders and abettors of murder. (People v Lubow, 29 NY2d 58, 64 [1971] [\u201cfortuity that the person solicited does not agree to commit or attempt to commit the incited crime plainly should not relieve the solicitor of *690liability\u201d].) Knowledge of defendant\u2019s murderous plan on Aliuddin\u2019s and Urtis\u2019 part is what distinguishes solicitation from facilitation. (People v Kaplan, 76 NY2d 140, 146 [1990].) Accordingly, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss or reduce count two is denied.5"], "id": "ab183057-ba61-47a1-9487-56d70b19a61a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, contrary to Baer Marks\u2019 arguments, we find that the <mask> allegations of the second, fourth and sixth causes of action are sufficient to allege a nexus between the primary fraud, Baer Marks\u2019 knowledge of the fraud and what it did with the intention of advancing the fraud\u2019s commission (see, National Westminster Bank v Weksel, 124 AD2d 144, 148, lv denied 70 NY2d 604). Although, as plaintiffs concede, Baer Marks did not prepare the Prospectus, did not represent Bergen, English, Whitecliff or the limited partners and was not involved in the solicitation of the investors, the act of its partner, Levitas, in executing the performance bond as surety when he knew or should have known that it was inadequate to cover the costs of completing the project, allegedly satisfied the condition which permitted the individual investors\u2019 funds to be released from escrow, thus substantially assisting consummation of Bergen\u2019s purchase of the limited partnership interest in Delco."], "id": "7c6debe4-138a-4494-9c2c-dd38b5bb0dcc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Count 1 alleges that the defendants, <mask> and being aided and abetted by each other and by one Vincent Anzalone did, on a certain day in Suffolk County, forcibly steal \"certain property\u201d from Simon Molldene and Steven Molldene, doing business as Select Auto Radio, and in the course thereof, and in the immediate flight therefrom, one or more participants displayed what appeared to be a revolver. That count of the indictment alleges that while so acting in concert they \"forcibly stole automobile radios and various audio equipment.\u201d"], "id": "e7bb2732-df13-4417-94ea-0b5a0de052fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Implied in the terms \u201c aid \u201d and \u201c abet \u201d is the need that there be at least two persons concerned in the commission of the offense, for there cannot be an aider or abettor unless there be also another person who is aided or abetted. There must, notwithstanding the assimilation of terms in the definition of the term \u201c principal,\u201d contained in section 2, be \u201c a person [who] directly commits the act constituting the offense \u201d and another who \u201c aids and abets in its commission \u201d\u2014 in point of fact, a principal guilty of actual commission, a completed crime, before it can be said that another has aided and abetted in its commission. Were there evidence before me that the defendant\u2019s employers had authorized the defendant to make the agreement in their behalf, they would appear as principals acting through the defendant as their agent in making the agreement, in which case they would be guilty as principals in fact, and the defendant guilty as one <mask> them by making the agreement for them. The facts here do not show such a situation. There was testimony to the effect that one of the two partner-owners of the establishment, whose names or identities the evidence does not disclose, was there at the time, but none that he participated in the transaction or saw or heard what transpired between Mr. Sussman and the defendant, nor any to the effect that either of the owners authorized or empowered the defendant either to make an agreement in their behalf with reference to the machine or to promise or to give merchandise should the user obtain the token ball as a result of his play. No authorization or permission from the defendant\u2019s employers to the defendant to make, as their agent, any agreement in their behalf, appears. Nor could the defendant\u2019s employers, upon the state of the evidence before me, be held guilty in a prosecution against them on the theory that there was \u201c apparent authority.\u201d That doctrine, which is applied in civil cases, is essentially the doctrine of equitable estoppel, based on the maxim \u201c that when one of two innocent persons must suffer from the act of a third person, he shall sustain the loss who has enabled the third person to do the injury.\u201d (Matter of Dugan, 147 Misc. 776, 781.) It goes no further in its application, and, indeed, even in civil cases it must appear that the person whom it is sought to charge created the \u201c appearance \u201d of authority, the proof of the appearance alone being insufficient. This is pointed out clearly by the Court of Appeals in Edwards v. Dooley (120 N. Y. 540, 544, 551) where the court says: \u201c While a principal is bound by his agent\u2019s acts when he justifies a party dealing with his agent in *737believing that he has given to the agent authority to do those acts, he is responsible only for that appearance of authority which is caused by himself, and not for that appearance of conformity to the authority which is caused only by the agent.\u201d (See, to the same effect, Churchill Grain & Seed Co., Inc., v. Buchman, 204 App. Div. 30; Wen Kroy Realty Co., Inc., v. Public Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of New York, 260 N. Y. 84, 87; Armstrong Co. v. Majestic Motion Picture Co., 87 Misc. 141.) To hold otherwise would open the door to great injustice and fraud, for by that means liability could be imposed on the innocent by the designing. In criminal cases, ignorance or indifference on the part of one momentarily left in charge or to but momentarily watch an establishment might result in placing guilt where it does not belong. Nor would any inference that might be drawn from the fact that one was left in charge justify an assumption that he was clothed with authority to commit an unlawful act. The presumption would be to the contrary. (Clark v. Metropolitan Bank, 10 N. Y. Super. Ct. [3 Duer] 241.)"], "id": "abad2d95-db5c-4472-b89b-d7dd325f0c6b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The preliminary hearing thus placed Calhoun on notice that he must be prepared to defend against no less than four acts of committing a lewd and *305lascivious act on a child. Count 4 covered the period from April 20 through June 2, 2016, while count 6 covered the period June 1 and 2 of the same year. Although the prosecutor stated at the preliminary hearing that count 6 was based on an <mask> theory, the evidence presented, and thus the transcript of the hearing, established he also could be held liable as a direct perpetrator. \"[I]t is not the complaint but the totality of the evidence produced at the preliminary hearing which notifies the defendant of the potential charges he may have to face in the superior court.\" ( People v. Donnell (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 227, 233, 135 Cal.Rptr. 217.)"], "id": "ac926d85-8082-464c-bc17-a4cd95434877", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cNew York does not recognize civil conspiracy to commit a tort as an independent cause of action.\u201d10 (Pappas v Passias, 271 AD2d 420, 421 [2d Dept 2000] [\u201c(s)ince the fraud cause of action was dismissed, the ninth cause of action, which alleged a conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff, was also properly dismissed\u201d].) As the Court of Appeals, in a tobacco suit, recently held: \u201cAs a result [of the failure of plaintiffs common-law fraud claims], there is no independent tort to provide a basis for liability under their concert of action, conspiracy, and <mask> theories. These causes of action must fail as well.\u201d (Small v Lorillard, supra, 94 NY2d, at 57.)"], "id": "c0b540b9-0ac1-48f1-955a-24c636d9a351", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["To the extent the allegations are related to a breach of fiduciary duties by Mr. Mellul and Mr. Pagani, they should be dismissed. As explained below (eighth cause of action), the claim against Mr. Mellul and Mr. Pagani for breach of fiduciary duties should be dismissed. Therefore, the court cannot sustain a claim for <mask> such a breach."], "id": "c2c41d49-4051-4e64-a927-fd9fc0327bf5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In view of the fact that the present ordinance does not declare its violation a misdemeanor, and of the further significant fact that whenever a violation of the law is declared a misdemeanor in the charter, it is expressly mentioned as a misdemeanor, the conclusion follows that a\" violation of section 408 of the ordinances of the city is not, a misdemeanor, and, therefore, the conviction of the defendant as <mask> in the violation of the said section is without authority in law."], "id": "77dd8d79-8e8e-45b7-90ac-4676ab3357f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On March 27, 2008, prior to the shareholder vote on the merger, plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended class action complaint asserting causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the director defendants, for a declaratory judgment to set aside the share exchange agreement, for <mask> a breach of fiduciary duty against JPMorgan and for equitable assessment of attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses against all the defendants."], "id": "c2e0908d-831a-411d-b849-db27b180fe98", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aiding and abetting", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants then caused SIGO to formally cancel the compensation plan, and announced their intention of selling the shares. Since that time, defendants allegedly caused SIGO to sell portions of the shares, the proceeds of which have allegedly been used to invest in a venture capital and private equity firm. AIG commenced this action in March 2008, asserting three causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Greenberg and Smith in their capacity as AIG directors, breach of fiduciary duties against all defendants, and <mask> breach of fiduciary duty against defendants."], "id": "21c988c8-4824-4790-936a-87e7a112100b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["single-family detached dwelling. The applicable Zoning Ordinance provisions, which support the ZHB\u2019s determination, provide as follows. Permitted uses in the Rural Residential zoning district include, inter alia, \u201c[s]ingle-family detached dwellings\u201d and \u201c[a]ccessory uses customarily incidental to the above permitted uses.\u201d Zoning Ordinance \u00a7\u00a7 150-24(B) and (L). \u201c[O]nly one specific principal use shall be allowed on a lot of land.\u201d Id., \u00a7 150-12.1. A \u201csingle-family detached\u201d dwelling is defined as \u201c[a] freestanding building containing one dwelling unit for one family and having two side yards, one front and one rear yard . . . .\u201d Id., \u00a7 150- 5. A \u201cdwelling unit\u201d is defined as \u201ca building or portion thereof arranged or designed for occupancy by not more than one family and having separate cooking and sanitary facilities.\u201d Id. An \u201c<mask> use\u201d is defined as \u201ca use customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use or building and located on the same lot with this principal use or building.\u201d Id. The ZHB determined that the second-story addition at issue was a single-family detached dwelling unit and the undisputed facts support that legal determination. The approximately 900-square-foot addition is located in a detached structure, formerly used as a garage, approximately 186 feet away from the preexisting single-family detached dwelling. With its own cooking and sanitary facilities, the addition features two bedrooms, a bath, a kitchen, and a living room. (F.F. No. 8.) Where, as here, the language of the ordinance is clear and free from any ambiguity, the ZHB\u2019s interpretation of its own ordinance is entitled to great weight and deference. City of Hope v. Sadsbury Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 890 A.2d 1137, 1143 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Moreover, the proposed use of the second-story addition as a residence is not listed in the Zoning Ordinance as a permitted accessory use. As the Zoning Officer testified:"], "id": "56f452fb-fa4b-4f8b-9f0c-879cf70aa91b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["To hold that personal observation of the affiant is a sine qua non to the validity of such an affidavit would, I think, place an unreasonable \u2014 and, at times, insurmountable \u2014 burden on law enforcement officials and the security of the community. Our Federal system of State sovereignty does not, in my view, warrant such an invasion of a State\u2019s rights to protect its own citizens and the majesty of its law. \u201c While it has been said that a complaining affidavit requires a higher decree of certainty and calls for closer scrutiny than an indictment for the same offense (People ex rel. Lawrence v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; People ex rel. de Martini v. McLaughlin, 243 N. Y. 417), an affidavit which appears to be full, definite and specific, and is made on knowledge, and not on information and belief, should be held sufficient as a charge of crime.\u201d (People ex rel. Gellis v. Sheriff of County of Westchester, 251 N. Y. 33, 36, supra.) People ex rel. de Martini v. McLaughlin (243 N. Y. 417, supra), also cited by the relator, is not in point. There, the affidavits do appear to have been made upon information and belief, the several affiants did not state the source of their belief, the charges therein were vague and indefinite, and the relator, prosecuted as an <mask> after the fact, was not alleged to have knowledge of the guilt of the principal offenders, and the crime in chief seems not to have been specified. The court indicated that (p. 420) although any one of these grounds might of itself be inadequate to defeat rendition, the cumulative effect rendered the requisition ineffective."], "id": "1922032d-0d15-411f-9f77-50082669b929", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Less than three weeks after sentencing, Linville also wrote a fawning letter to convicted serial killer Richard Ramirez displaying a morbid fascination with cold-blooded murder and also discussing her case. She knew her mail was being searched. Among other things, she told Ramirez the prosecution lacked evidence to prosecute her for murder, \"[s]o they threw an <mask> after the fact charge at me, and I walked out of the courtroom full of irate detectives and a furious DA with a sentence of three years, eight months.\" She asked Ramirez whether he liked \"that look of terror in the eyes of prey,\" and told him she had always \"been enthralled by True Crimes, but maybe my breed of attraction stems from different roots than the casual fan.\" And she told him, \"I never should have been arrested based on the absence of underlying evidence linking me to my crimes, but was railroaded into accepting a guilty plea to a lesser charge to sidestep the obviously corrupt attempts of law enforcement to gather evidence that can lead to more serious charges.\""], "id": "1a13a89b-224f-4296-930e-4500bf3eca3d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The County has commenced suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendants and a declaration that the \u201cApparel and <mask> Show\u201d, scheduled for December 5th through 7th, and the \u201cHoliday Extravaganza Show\u201d, scheduled for December 12th through 14th, violate the Lease agreement between SMG and the County because they are flea markets. The defendants claim that neither of these proposed shows and sales are flea markets because their venue is inside the Coliseum, because the goods are new, and because no food will be sold."], "id": "1cf06ef4-c197-406c-910a-24ba6cf04486", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury on self-defense and by declining to give the jury instructions on the lesser-related offense of being an <mask> after the fact. Although we can understand why the trial court thought it should instruct on self-defense in light of defendant's police interview statements, it was error to give self-defense instructions that defendant did not request and that were contrary to his theory of the case at trial. The error, however, was harmless because the self-defense instructions the court gave did not contribute to the verdict obtained, particularly in light of (a) other instructions given by the trial court that warned the jury of the possibility that not all of the instructions were necessarily applicable, and (b) the absence of any reference to self-defense in the defense closing argument. As for defendant's contention that the court should have instructed on the lesser related offense of being an accessory after the fact, the trial court did not err when it declined to give such an instruction in the absence of the prosecution's consent, as binding authority holds ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ( Birks ) )."], "id": "7d6db5d1-c1db-49cd-9ec2-555a262aea84", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It is undisputed that saccharin is a synthetic coal-tar product having a proportionate quality of sweetness five hundred times greater than sugar. That of itself, it. has no caloric food value. It seems to me to have been established conclusively though, that it has a positive value as a food <mask> in that it imparts to food a quality of sweetness that makes it palatable and agreeable to the taste and thus, where sweetness is desirable, serves the purpose of supplying a flavor to food, which if not sweetened would not be agreeable to the consumer, and consequently tend to discourage its consumption."], "id": "3ba4b9c6-e997-493e-a119-a8e4b1320493", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The People filed an information charging defendant with possession of marijuana for sale ( Health & Saf. Code,1 \u00a7 11359) and cultivation of marijuana (\u00a7 11358). At the time, both crimes were classified as felonies. (Former \u00a7\u00a7 11358 & 11359, as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 160 & 161, eff. Apr. 4, 2011.) The information also charged two prior prison term enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Under a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded guilty to a single felony count of <mask> ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 32 ),2 and the trial court dismissed *803the balance of the charges. Because defendant was found to have played a minimal role in this offense, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on three years' formal probation. He served 228 days in county jail and received 114 days of credit for time served."], "id": "2e3e4e2d-4f4e-4cb1-89b2-64fff92a5831", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["What constitutes the most analogous criminal conduct presents a mixed question of law and fact. (Brady, supra, 168 F.3d at p. 577.) The federal <mask> after the fact statute provides: \"Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.\" (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3.)"], "id": "a7ff5c65-e14f-4bdf-ae26-6bcc6e2ed6d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Will a gasoline service station change the essential character of this neighborhood? The property is already zoned for business uses and could be devoted at any time and without the consent of the Board of Appeals, to any of the following uses permitted by the ordinance: theatre or moving picture house, bakery, tailor shop, garage <mask> to a business use, printing office, shoe repair, hat cleaning, laundry and dry cleaning with a receiving and delivery agency. This zoning has thus fixed the character of the neighborhood. When one buys a home adjacent to vacant land with notice that it is already zoned for business or commercial uses, he cannot be heard to complain that its future development for such use will change the essential nature of the community. There is nothing whatever on this record which would indicate that the proposed use would depreciate values to a greater extent than would a per se permitted dry cleaning establishment or a laundry. It is rather the fact that a property can at any time be put to commercial uses which should establish values in the neighborhood."], "id": "ad3b744d-bd0e-4fb3-9daa-ae806f99cf4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, the determination of the ZBA that the \"structure\u201d comprising the skateboard ramp was a permitted <mask> use which is \"customarily incidental\u201d to the primary residential use under its zoning ordinance was both arbitrary and capricious, inasmuch as it was made without a sound basis and reason and there was not \"substantial evidence\u201d before the ZBA upon which such a conclusion could rationally be made by the ZBA (see, CPLR 7803 [3], [4]; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, supra; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., supra). Accordingly the determination of ZBA dated June 26, 1991 which directed the issuance of a building permit as of right of respondent Yackulic is ordered annulled and vacated forthwith."], "id": "10072191-bdbf-4a5a-a43c-2d5385027a92", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["James D. Pagones, J. *771The petitioner in this proceeding instituted pursuant to CPLR article 78 moves for an injunction preventing respondent Village from conveying an easement to respondent Furey and enjoining Furey from performing any work on said property. The relevant facts are not in dispute on this application. On or about September 10, 1957, a subdivision map for the St. John Development was filed with the Office of the Dutchess County Clerk. That map delineated streets intended to provide access to the various subdivision lots. One of those streets was known as Hy-Vue Terrace. By deed dated October 16, 1962, the streets and roads in the subdivision were conveyed to the Village of Millerton. The Village concedes that Hy-Vue Terrace \u201chas not been officially constructed or maintained by the Village of Millerton.\u201d In January 2003, the petitioner purchased two lots in the St. John Development, both of which front on Hy-Vue Terrace. Approximately six months later, respondent Furey obtained sketch plan approval for a proposed subdivision from the Town of Northeast Planning Board. Respondent Furey then undertook to obtain access to one of the lots in his subdivision via Hy-Vue Terrace. Before respondent Village had granted Mr. Furey access to the lot in question, the Town of Northeast Planning Board presented a proposed subdivision map at a public hearing indicating that access to lot No. 5 would be granted via Hy-Vue Terrace in the Village of Millerton. At a monthly Village Board meeting held on August 18, .2003, the Village Board agreed, without enacting a resolution, to allow Mr. Furey access as indicated on the proposed subdivision map. Thereafter, on September 11, 2003, the Town of Northeast Planning Board gave final subdivision approval and the subdivision map was subsequently filed with the Clerk of Dutchess County. After receiving final subdivision approval, Mr. Furey undertook to obtain an easement from the Village of Millerton consistent with their agreement to grant him access as proposed in his subdivision map. Various discussions took place at public meetings during which various environmental and other issues were raised. At a Village Board meeting held on June 20, 2005, the trustees passed a resolution \u201cto allow [Furey] the right of way and help prepare the right of way agreement and accept the restrictions.\u201d The resolution referred to restrictions in a deed prepared and submitted by Furey\u2019s \u00e1ttorney at that meeting. The restrictions referred to in the resolution are that the premises may not be further subdivided and may only have one single-family dwelling with customary <mask> structures on it and that the premises may not be used for any commercial purposes, except home occupations as allowed by the zoning law *772of the Town of Northeast. Neither the resolution nor the deed provide any details as to how the subject access road will be constructed or maintained."], "id": "519b071b-7017-444d-a1d9-78e8468b4556", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The \"plaintiffs acquired title to premises known as 1229 Baker Avenue, Schenectady, New York, on October 29, 1948. The lot in question has 40 feet frontage on Baker Avenue and is 140 feet in depth. There is a house upon the premises, occupied by the plaintiffs, and a detached garage. At the present time, the premises are residentially zoned, that is in Zone \u201c A \u201d, which permits single-family dwellings. The same zoning ordinance which was adopted in 1955 provides under schedule A, column 19: \u201c Other provision and requirements, District A, No. 4 \u2014 No commercial vehicle exceeding one ton capacity shall be parked or stored overnight in any dwelling district.\u201d The prior zoning ordinance of the City of Schenectady was adopted in 1927. It set up a classification of \u201c A \u201d \u2014 single family residence district for the lot in question and permitted <mask> buildings."], "id": "c2741c49-64c0-4929-9579-0fb062e383c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plainly, the term \"walkway\" can be used in different ways, but we conclude the statute here uses it in the sense of an external walking path. We reach this conclusion primarily based on the principle of statutory construction noscitur a soclis , i.e., where a word is used in a list, its meaning can be demonstrated by the other items in the list. (See People v. Drennan (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 [\"The rule of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis , a word takes meaning from the company it keeps, is useful here. 'A word of uncertain meaning may be known from its associates and its meaning \"enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used\" ' \"].) Aside from walkways, *90the other items in the list-carport, garage, overhang, patio, enclosed patio, and detached <mask> structure-are typically located at or near the periphery of a residential structure. In other words, they could arguably be included within the perimeter. The Legislature, therefore, felt compelled to specify that it did not mean to include those areas within assessable space. Accordingly, we conclude a covered or uncovered walkway, as used in section 65995, subdivision (b)(1), refers to an external *1195walkway, not an interior hallway. Any \"similar area\" is likewise on the periphery of the residential structure and does not include an interior hallway."], "id": "f1fe63bc-3ea8-411d-a209-c5f990ccc87d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["One week later, on January 12, 2000, the Planning Commission held a public hearing and meeting to consider petitioner\u2019s application. At that time, petitioner\u2019s counsel submitted to the Commission a memorandum (verified petition, Feb. 11, 2000, 1] 7) summarizing the legal principles governing the application of zoning laws to religious uses, and setting forth petitioner\u2019s contention that the instant application for construction of \u201c<mask> parking\u201d should be evaluated in the same manner as would a proposal to construct an actual church or other religious building (id., exhibit C)."], "id": "9c6a141d-d235-4a6c-9f04-92c3b60f413f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, the general policy, as applied in this State, is that religious institutions are virtually immune from zoning restrictions. However, most of the cases have involved churches and synagogues as well as uses ancillary or <mask> to the principal use of a structure as a place of worship. Judicial interpretation as to what constitutes a religious use has been very broad (see, generally, 1 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice [2d ed], \u00a7 9.34; Ann., 11 ALR4th 1084). Thus, a day care center (Matter of Unitarian Universalist Church v Shorten, 63 Misc 2d 978), a center for drug problems (Slevin v Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 66 Misc 2d 312) and a religious school which teaches secular subjects (Westbury Hebrew Congregation v Downer, 59 Misc 2d 387), have been included in religiously immune uses. Such broad interpretation reflects the policy articulated by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Community Synagogue v Bates (1 NY2d 445, 453, supra) that a church should not be limited to being merely a house of prayer as this would deprive it and the congregation of the opportunity of enlarging, perpetuating and strengthening itself.2"], "id": "8500fdd8-d212-4730-89f2-d85568b2430d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It cannot be disputed that the use of helicopters in this area has increased in the past 20 years; that helicopters are being used for the convenient and expeditious movement of corporate executives ; that the efficient supervision and management of business establishments with divisions or branches at widely dispersed locations may be enhanced by the swift shuttling between places that is possible with helicopters; and that modern merchandising methods can be assisted and the movement of merchandise can be facilitated by this mode of transportation. However, after taking notice of the increased use of helicopters in this area, this court cannot hold as a matter of law that the use h\u00e1s become so clearly incidental to and customarily -found in connection with any principal use as to entitle it to be clothed with the permissive mantle of an <mask> use."], "id": "0998638f-892f-4e8b-a85a-41dd3e46e398", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["prohibits uses for which it does not provide permission.\u201d Treisman v. Kamen, 126 N.H. 372, 375 (1985); see 15 Peter Loughlin, New Hampshire Practice: Land Use Planning and Zoning \u00a7 9.02, at 174 (2010) (explaining that under a \u201cpermissive\u201d ordinance, uses of land are generally prohibited \u201cunless they are expressly permitted as primary uses or can be found to be <mask> to a permitted use\u201d). The zoning ordinance does not expressly permit storing of junk for personal use. Accordingly, the defendant\u2019s storage of junk for personal use, not being permitted by the ordinance, is prohibited."], "id": "afc7d9b3-38f5-4251-a23b-10d708973a14", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Another question presented in Ferris was whether outside telephone lines and poles were \"appurtenances\u201d and if so, were they taxable. The court found that (p 418): \"outside wires and central office equipment are essential component parts which must function together as a unified, co-ordinated system\u201d (emphasis added). The court concluded that (p 419): \"in the statutory definition of real property as a subject of taxation (Tax Law, \u00a7 2, subd. 6 [now Real Property Tax Law, \u00a7 102, subd. 12, par. (d)], and \u00a7 3) the Legislature intended the word 'appurtenances\u2019 * * * to include telephone lines, wires and poles and all <mask> apparatus\u201d installed in an office as an integral part of the essential equipment. Although the Ferris case differs on its facts and while it involves the interpretation of a different portion of the statute (Real Property Tax Law, \u00a7 102, subd. 12, par. [d]), the conclusions reached therein with respect to legislative intent, the significance of movability and the taxability of apparatus which consists of essential component parts integrated in and used in conjunction with a unified system are helpful to this court in arriving at its determination."], "id": "e1c9156a-4c6a-4e66-b742-e96ea565ca04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*70While we reject Pitts's assertion that Henry's reading of a parole-violation report was the functional equivalent of an interrogation, Henry's question whether Pitts was an <mask> to capital murder is more troubling. Although Henry confidently testified at trial that, as Pitts's parole officer, she was not required to give him Miranda warnings, we point out that there is a growing trend toward accepting that probation and parole officers must advise probationers and parolees in police custody of Miranda warnings before any questioning. In Minnesota v. Murphy , 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984), the United States Supreme Court suggested in a footnote that a parolee in police custody being interviewed by a parole officer may be entitled to Miranda warnings. Id. at 429 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 1136. See also Fowler v. State , 2010 Ark. App. 23, 2010 WL 135209, vacated and affirmed on other grounds , 2010 Ark. 431, 371 S.W.3d 677 ; Beavers v. State , 2015 Ark. App. 124, 456 S.W.3d 783 (Virden, J., concurring)."], "id": "16f0ee11-f7ba-4f68-b787-2968efb59a87", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It is not sufficient to merely inquire whether the item is personal property and stop right there. The above test should be applied. This court cannot adopt the harsh view that a leg brace or an artificial leg is strictly an item of personal property and that the body ends where the leg stump ends. With regard to the contention that a \u201c shoe \u201d meets the definition since a shoe performs a physiological function and is an <mask> to the foot, the answer is that by no stretch of the imagination can ordinary footwear be considered a \u201c medical \u201d expense."], "id": "c372362c-e2bb-47e0-bf24-796b6ec31a5e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c A single individual living upon the premises as a separate housekeeping unit; or a collective body of one or more persons living together on the premises as a single housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship based on birth, marriage, or other domestic bond.\u201d In our opinion, the private residence does not constitute a parish house for religious purposes. Even assuming a parish house may constitute a main rather than <mask> use within the meaning of the ordinance, the factual situation clearly establishes that the actual or principal use of the building, as found by the court below, is that of a dwelling for residential purposes by more than four families. The mere designation by the church of this private residence as a parish house is not controlling (Slevin v. Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 66 Misc 2d 312). A parish house is defined as \u201c an auxiliary building belonging to a church and used for its business, social, or extension activities \u201d (Webster\u2019s New International Dictionary, 3d ed.). The uncontradicted evidence here is that the building is neither owned nor used by the church, and the incidental religious instruction provided to the occupants does not change this fact."], "id": "ddf24e70-40d2-4387-8273-fe8d7d28263e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Under section 11361.8, subdivision (b), the trial court \"shall presume the petitioner satisfies the criteria in subdivision (a) unless the party opposing the petition proves by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner does not satisfy the criteria.\" (Italics added.) No such clear and convincing evidence was presented below that would disqualify the defendant from Proposition 64 relief. While a small amount of methamphetamine was found in the Ukiah home, there is no evidence that defendant had any involvement with it, and the stipulated facts recited at the plea hearing make no mention of it. The only evidence in the record supports the conclusion that defendant's <mask> conviction was predicated on crimes that were reduced to misdemeanor offenses under Proposition 64."], "id": "ea9c8ec1-e16c-4099-a752-56916888032d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This court suggests that the authorization of such uses as helipads under the guise of their being an <mask> use is an unwarranted application of the accessory use device. In Bassett, Zoning (Russell Sage Foundation, 1936, p. 100), the basis for the custom of permitting accessory uses is explained as follows: \u201c During the formative period of comprehensive zoning it became evident that districts could not be confined to principal uses only. It had always been customary for occupants of homes to carry on gainful employment as something accessory and incidental to the residence use * * * The earliest zoning ordinances took communities as they existed and did not try to prevent customary practices that met with no objection from the community.\u201d"], "id": "155fa40d-a250-4523-ba83-5f78c201a4a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Third: We now come to the defendant\u2019s counterclaim for $72,-000. The story she has unfolded concerning the cash in the cigar box upstairs, the cash in the candy box downstairs, the cash in a steel box in Summit Hill, Pennsylvania, no doubt has some element of truth. For both these parties were certainly playing fast and loose with the cash that came into the Sterling Tire & <mask> Company. But, in the final analysis, all we have here is the oral, fantastic charge by the defendant and an estranged daughter that $69,400 in cash was placed in a steel box, carted to Summit Hill, Pennsylvania, and there placed under the bed in plaintiff\u2019s sister\u2019s bedroom, then to his father\u2019s attic and then *588back to the sister\u2019s bedroom. There is also a book in evidence showing some record of loans made by the plaintiff, bnt this is no proof that plaintiff had such an amount of cash \u2014 or that it came from the partnership business. The admitted fact is that both parties filed joint tax returns for many years which showed a net aggregate profit over the years of less than 10% of the amount sued for by this defendant."], "id": "4e110307-b897-4c65-8321-800f14686e25", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant\u2019s answering papers ask that summary judgment be granted defendant because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, which include a possible 25-foot extension of the Apartment B zoning under section 3(e) of article X of the Ordinance. Defendant made no cross motion, however, and the granting of summary judgment to defendant is, therefore, discretionary (compare the last sentence of CPLR 3212 [subd. (b)] with the third sentence of that subdivision). Plaintiffs served no reply affidavits and their moving papers do not fully meet the thrust of defendant\u2019s argument. Nonetheless, the court will not grant summary judgment to defendant, for on the trial plaintiffs may well be able to bring themselves within the rule of Howsey v. Village of Kensington (257 N. Y. 221), that application for a variance is not a condition to a declaration of unconstitutionality as to an ordinance which' destroys the greater part of the value of the property by precluding use for which it is reasonably adapted (see Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N. Y. 493 and note, at p. 499, the use of the phrase \u201c precludes the use for which it is most readily adapted\u201d [emphasis supplied]); Chusud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington, 22 A D 2d 895, 897). At basic issue in this action is whether plaintiffs may be required to use the Residence A portion as a park <mask> to the Apartment B portion while at the same t\u00fane being prevented from counting the Residence A portion of the purpose of the 35% land coverage limitation which determines the number of units that the multiple dwelling can contain. If plaintiffs can prove that, assuming that they will be granted a 25-foot extension of the Apartment B zoning, the 52-foot Residence A portion would be so greatly reduced in value if it is limited to accessory park use as to amount to confiscation within the rule of the Howsey ease, *437they will be entitled to judgment. Whether they can prove such reduction is a matter of expert opinion, and would not be decided on affidavits even if plaintiffs\u2019 expert\u2019s affidavit had fully met the defendant\u2019s argument. The issue is a subtle one which should be decided only after trial."], "id": "50a95c62-b5da-48a0-9ff8-3803e1cd0dd0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c Thus church and school and <mask> uses are, in themselves, clearly in furtherance of the public morals and general welfare. The church is the teacher and guardian of morals (State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229) and 1 an educational institution, whose curriculum complies with the state law, is considered an aid to the general welfare \u2019 (Archbishop of Oregon v. Baker, 140 Ore. 600, 613).\u201d (Ibid., p. 526.)"], "id": "664cc19b-7ad4-4767-bd74-cea785b6ca50", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This decision clearly does not govern the facts in the present case. As previously stated, the indictment need not accuse the defendant as an <mask> in order to support proof of his criminal liability for conduct of others. This does not mean that the prosecution may not elect to have the defendant so indicted. Where it does so, however, it is bound to prove the theory so charged. (People v Seldner, supra.)"], "id": "ff1357ff-3802-4549-a2d9-30f948039f4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Pursuant to the Town\u2019s Zoning Law, \u201c[h]ame [occupations are defined as businesses where the owner resides on the property and where the activities of the business are conducted inside the residence, a legally constructed <mask> building, or at off-site locations\u201d (Zoning Law [2008] of the Town of Mayfield \u00a7 202 [A] [42]). Anyone considering a home occupation must present their concept to the Town Planning Board for approval (see Zoning Law [2008] of the Town of Mayfield \u00a7 202 [A] [42]). The pertinent questions here are whether petitioner was operating a home occupation and, if so, whether his actions were grandfathered in by predating the enactment of the Zoning Law."], "id": "0187a85d-f6fd-490d-a9ac-73bbf3f1ed9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Less than three weeks after sentencing, Linville also wrote a fawning letter to convicted serial killer Richard Ramirez displaying a morbid fascination with cold-blooded murder and also discussing her case. She knew her mail was being searched. Among other things, she told Ramirez the prosecution lacked evidence to prosecute her for murder, \"[s]o they threw an <mask> after the fact charge at me, and I walked out of the courtroom full of irate detectives and a furious DA with a sentence of three years, eight months.\" She asked Ramirez whether he liked \"that look of terror in the eyes of prey,\" and told him she had always \"been enthralled by True Crimes, but maybe my breed of attraction stems from different roots than the casual fan.\" And she told him, \"I never should have been arrested based on the absence of underlying evidence linking me to my crimes, but was railroaded into accepting a guilty plea to a lesser charge to sidestep the obviously corrupt attempts of law enforcement to gather evidence that can lead to more serious charges.\""], "id": "830b7c95-f073-4b82-98b2-21ed3fa3ae46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*735\"However, such spaces may be rented for periods of not less than one week and not more than one month to persons who are not occupants of the residences to which such spaces are <mask> for the accommodation of the private passenger motor vehicles used by such non-residents, provided that such spaces are operated in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Buildings, in a manner which will not adversely affect the residential character of the neighborhood. Such spaces shall be made available to the occupants of the residences to which they are accessory within 30 days after written request therefor is made to the landlord.\u201d"], "id": "d2d3e4fe-4d74-4537-9138-b08fa2a8a061", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"I don't remember what I would have told the [district attorney] in this case. I'm telling you what my normal practice would have been. [\u00b6] I would have been *262counteroffering for misdemeanors. I would have been counteroffering, if immigration is an issue, transportation on a[ ] [ Health and Safety Code section] 11379 for personal use. I would have been counteroffering for some <mask> after the fact. I would have been doing those kind of things as a general rule.\" Mehr testified as an expert witness on behalf of Novoa. At the time of his testimony, Mehr had been an attorney for about 37 years. He specializes in immigration consequences of criminal convictions and postconviction relief. Mehr opined that, in 2003, \"reasonably competent attorneys\" would advise their clients of the immigration consequences for specific convictions. In addition, the attorneys would advise their clients regarding what pleas or strategies would be available to avoid \"immigration disaster[s].\" Mehr also testified that O'Connor could have explored other possible plea agreements to allow Novoa to avoid immigration consequences."], "id": "f17b688a-3b88-4c72-bc32-d5faaf934aea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe evidence before the court leaves little doubt that recreational motorcycle riding is a customary <mask> use of residential property in the Town of Mendon. The Town\u2019s attempt to cast this action in terms of the track itself is of no avail. The track is not a structure, and more to the point it has no effect at all on the character of Shane Bartholfs activity or on its impact on nearby property owners. If motorcycle riding creates undue amounts of noise a Town noise ordinance would be an appropriate way of limiting it; but no such ordinance appears to have been enacted. The zoning code cannot be forced in to do its job. \u2018Operating a motocross track\u2019 sounds like a zoning violation, but in this case its true meaning is \u2018riding a cross-country motorcycle\u2019 \u2014 and so framed the Town\u2019s claim at best sounds in nuisance.\u201d There can be no question based upon the testimony of various town residents that it is a customary use of property in the R-R district of the Town of Paris to have and use off-road recreational vehicles. While the Town\u2019s determination that there is a motorcycle track on the Spinellas\u2019 property and therefore a zoning violation based on the existence of a worn path strikes the court as an absurdity. The proof in the case is, by a great and clear preponderance, that there are a significant number of worn paths created by vehicles in the R-R area of the Town of Paris pursuant to uses comparable to the Spinel-las\u2019 use. The Town has argued the fact that the Spinellas engage in certain work in order to maintain the paths for safety purposes. This is irrelevant. The Town Board\u2019s attempt to force these property owners to abandon this customary accessory use and to keep their properties unsafe for this use in order to comply with the zoning ordinance is an abuse of discretion and outside of the four corners of the zoning ordinance. It is also relevant that permitted uses of R-R zoned property include *812farm, nursery, or truck garden purposes, which would inevitably be accompanied by use of various sorts of off-road vehicles to service these uses. The Town\u2019s position is that the creation of a path by use of an off-road four wheeler is permitted by the zoning law if the vehicle is used to service a truck garden, but is a violation if created for fun. And what if it\u2019s for both? Can the Spinellas legalize their vehicle use by putting a \u201ctree nursery,\u201d or a patch of edible dandelions at the end of the paths?"], "id": "9d3cd971-f761-4242-a6ee-808fb8a3f5dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In Matter of Yeshiva & Mesivta Toras Chaim v Rose (136 AD2d 710, 711) the Appellate Division, Second Department, *319wrote, inter alia: \"While recognizing that the courts of this State have been very flexible in their interpretation of religious uses under local zoning ordinances * * * the flexibility has been directed to ancillary or <mask> functions of religious institutions whose principal use is a place of worship. Affiliation with or supervision by religious organizations does not, per se, transform institutions into religious ones. 'It is the proposed use of the land, not the religious nature of the organization, which must control\u2019 (Bright Horizon House v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 Misc 2d 703, 709).\u201d (Citations omitted.)"], "id": "ddca9a47-0669-4ddb-895d-465233cf7366", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cOrnament. (1) Embellishment; decoration; that which adorns or beautifies. \u201cIllustration: I hold every man a debtor to his profession, from the which, as men of course do seek to receive countenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavor themselves, by way of amends, to be a help and ornament thereunto. \u2014Bacon. \u201c(2) [Fine Arts.] Any <mask> part of a work which has the merit of adding to its beauty or effect. \u201cIllustration: Pedestals, pediments, draperies, fringes, garlands, vases, cameos, utensils of elegant and picturesque form, are the usual subject of ornament in painting."], "id": "73d1fcb9-8672-4279-b741-0850efe10ee4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In the light of the testimony of detectives Clark and Glunson, as well as the testimony of Dr. Sheller who identified the defendant as having come to his office on two occasions on the afternoon of November 7, 1946, the exculpating affidavit on the part of Condon, the principal in the crime for which this defendant was convicted as an <mask>, now a fellow-prisoner of this defendant, and serving a term of not less than twenty-five years with at least two armed robbery convictions to his credit, is at best highly suspect."], "id": "303f4356-c6bb-4d28-afdc-a8290654906b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It is also true that in a nonstatus crime situation one who, with guilty intent, solicits a person to commit an offense may be guilty of the offense even though the solicitee lacks that intent and is unaware of the criminal nature of the conduct (People v Sadacca, 128 Misc 2d 494). These two principles cannot, however, be combined. If a statute limits those who are capable of committing a crime to those of a certain status, a person who lacks that status, regardless of her intent, is not liable as an <mask> to one who possesses that status but acts innocently. The Legislature, in enacting a statute which is limited in application to those of a certain position or status, seeks to prevent abuse of that position by the status holder. In aid of that objective, one who aids the *255status holder in committing a crime should be held liable as principal. Where, on the other hand, the status holder has no intention of violating the statute, the purpose behind the law is not served by prosecuting the nonstatus holder. In the instant case, the public servant in question acted in good faith and with innocent intention in possessing and issuing defendant\u2019s documents, it is impossible, therefore, for accessorial liability to attach to defendant. Counts 9, 17, 19, 21, 23 and 26 are, accordingly, dismissed."], "id": "69f3f148-b428-44bb-a6d8-66a8c5f2f206", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This in the court\u2019s opinion would be sufficient to sustain its conclusion that the board\u2019s finding was an unreasonable one and an abuse of its discretion under the circumstances. However, both at the public hearing and in the decision of the board reference was repeatedly made to the over-all development of which the drive-in is a part. While the status of the proposed restaurant and office building is not disclosed, these are uses expressly permitted in the business district and do not require approval of the Board of Appeals. An application for the 100-room hotel and <mask> use was pending before the same respondent board, and a decision on an application for a gas station was pending before the Town Board."], "id": "d0fbe501-7328-4b98-bf9a-3496e55e0fc1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["(c) New evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff did not perpetrate the crime and was not an accomplice or <mask> to the acts that were the basis of the conviction, results in the reversal or vacation of the charges in the judgment of conviction or a gubernatorial pardon, and results in either dismissal of all of the charges or a finding of not guilty on all of the charges on retrial."], "id": "15425f89-95e6-4f49-9cb3-a6e35eff4e8c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Any person who drives a vehicle, not his or her own, without the consent of its owner or lessee, and with intent temporarily to deprive the owner or lessee of his or her possession of the vehicle, without intent to steal the vehicle, is guilty of a felony. The consent of the owner or lessee of a vehicle to its taking or driving shall not in any case be presumed or implied because of the owner's or lessee's consent on a prior occasion to the taking or driving of that vehicle by the same or a different person. Any person who assists in, or is a party or <mask> to or an accomplice in any unauthorized taking or"], "id": "4359b4f3-b73f-464d-aa0d-ed96a2fec96d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The determination of respondent New York City Environmental Control Board (ECB) that the signs at issue constituted *448\u201cadvertising\u201d signs, rather than \u201caccessory\u201d signs, under New York City Zoning Resolution \u00a7 12-10, was not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Atlantic Outdoor Adv., Inc. v Srinivasan, 110 AD3d 598 [1st Dept 2013]). The court should have deferred to ECB\u2019s fact-sensitive analysis of whether the <mask> use was clearly incidental to and customarily found in connection with the principal use of the property (see Matter of New York Botanical Garden v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 91 NY2d 413, 420 [1998]). Concur \u2014 Tom, J.E, Acosta, Saxe, DeGrasse and Freedman, JJ."], "id": "e911969b-59ee-44ee-9e04-23d762d241d5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It appears that prior to October 3, 1983, subject properties in the Village of Mexico were zoned for residential use only. This restriction on use was imposed by resolution of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Mexico on the 17th *532day of May, 1957, which stated, in part: \u201cOther customary <mask> uses and buildings provided that such uses are incidental to the principal use and do not include any activity commonly conducted as a business.\u201d (Art IV, \u00a7 2, par 9.)"], "id": "ddc8779f-586d-4d29-ba3c-0c6f7fd58cf3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["This court further finds that the auxiliary equipment, <mask> apparatus and the various shore connections mounted on the power plant barges as well as the spud and clamp fixtures, take-off towers, feeder cables, power and control wirings, etc. are essential to the function of the power plant barges and that the fuel supply barges and their requisite equipment for supplying oil to the power barges are indispensable to their operation and that, taken as a whole, are a collection of instruments, appliances and machinery designed for a particular use and designed for a specific action or operation \u2014 an integrated system for the generation of and distribution of electric power throughout the city and the northeast grid\u2014 and as such have been properly classified as property assessable as real property under subdivision 12 of section 102 of the Real Property Tax Law. From the legislative history of the statutes and the decided cases it is clear to this court that it is and always has been the policy of this State and the intention of the Legislature that power-generating apparatus and machinery and equipment, whether movable or permanently affixed to realty, used in connection with the generation and distribution of power and an integral component part of a unified system \u2014 are taxable as real property per se under subdivision 12 of section 102 of the Real Property Tax Law because they generate and distribute power. This court finds that historic tests and common-law rules defining fixtures *1080simply are not determinative of what is properly taxable as real property in this area."], "id": "563b2975-6ce0-4e15-9ca4-1005d5f12a69", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Now, as to the cause of action brought by Frank Galluzzo, the third-party plaintiff, against the Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, the third-party defendant, on the insurance policy issued by the third-party defendant, the court finds these additional facts which will complete the factual background in this case: The policy which was issued covered the occupation of the third-party plaintiff, more specifically \u201c top soil delivery,\u201d and the term of the policy commenced May 20, 1954 and terminated May 20, 1955. The accident upon which this suit was originally brought occurred on October 20, 1954, within the term of .the policy. On October 20, 1954 the third-party plaintiff was making a delivery of material to a construction job located at 94th Street in the borough of Queens. The truck was driven to the location of the construction job and the material removed from it for the purpose of completing delivery. Since the material could not be driven to the point where it was desired, .it was necessary to carry the material from the truck to the point where delivery was finally to be effected. To complete the delivery the third-party plaintiff used a payloader. This is an <mask> vehicle used to move the material from the truck to the site of the construction job itself. It is the payloader which injured the plaintiff Paul Kemnetz."], "id": "3ed555eb-7521-4d25-bb85-83b72b40ab7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant\u2019s answering papers ask that summary judgment be granted defendant because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, which include a possible 25-foot extension of the Apartment B zoning under section 3(e) of article X of the Ordinance. Defendant made no cross motion, however, and the granting of summary judgment to defendant is, therefore, discretionary (compare the last sentence of CPLR 3212 [subd. (b)] with the third sentence of that subdivision). Plaintiffs served no reply affidavits and their moving papers do not fully meet the thrust of defendant\u2019s argument. Nonetheless, the court will not grant summary judgment to defendant, for on the trial plaintiffs may well be able to bring themselves within the rule of Howsey v. Village of Kensington (257 N. Y. 221), that application for a variance is not a condition to a declaration of unconstitutionality as to an ordinance which' destroys the greater part of the value of the property by precluding use for which it is reasonably adapted (see Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N. Y. 493 and note, at p. 499, the use of the phrase \u201c precludes the use for which it is most readily adapted\u201d [emphasis supplied]); Chusud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington, 22 A D 2d 895, 897). At basic issue in this action is whether plaintiffs may be required to use the Residence A portion as a park <mask> to the Apartment B portion while at the same t\u00fane being prevented from counting the Residence A portion of the purpose of the 35% land coverage limitation which determines the number of units that the multiple dwelling can contain. If plaintiffs can prove that, assuming that they will be granted a 25-foot extension of the Apartment B zoning, the 52-foot Residence A portion would be so greatly reduced in value if it is limited to accessory park use as to amount to confiscation within the rule of the Howsey ease, *437they will be entitled to judgment. Whether they can prove such reduction is a matter of expert opinion, and would not be decided on affidavits even if plaintiffs\u2019 expert\u2019s affidavit had fully met the defendant\u2019s argument. The issue is a subtle one which should be decided only after trial."], "id": "30256454-738e-4748-afc2-b59fae09d00a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["(10) Defendant initially refused inspection of the main house after granting access to the detached garage. Defendant did reluctantly grant access to the main house after being told by Inspector Parker that Town policy requires an inspection of all structures on the lot as the <mask> apartment can never allow more than two residential units or eight people living on one lot. The inspector advised that he would leave if access was not granted."], "id": "98fc57b1-bc4a-4e87-a2f5-3c76b5d92390", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeal observed that, at the time of its decision (in 1969), the question of \"[w]hether a falsehood to the police or other public investigators may violate the <mask> statute is a new question in California.\" ( Duty , supra , 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 103, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606.) The court explained that \"[a]ccording to some American decisions, the offense is not committed by passive failure to reveal a known felony, by refusal to give information to the authorities, or by a denial of knowledge motivated by self-interest. On the other hand, an affirmative falsehood to the public investigator, when made with the intent to shield the perpetrator of the crime, may form the aid or concealment denounced by the statute.\" ( Id. at pp. 103-104, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606.)"], "id": "33eba6e4-20d3-435e-87bc-faebf3dfe067", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The original property had been owned by the plaintiff\u2019s father from 1906 until his death in 1957 and since then by the plaintiff. The affected parcel has an area of over 83,000 square feet. Since 1926 it has been occupied and used solely for residential and <mask> purposes. In 1929 part of the property was zoned Business F for that portion running back 201.01 feet from Merrick Boad. In 1953 the full plot was zoned Business F. The plottage fronting on Merrick Boad was valued at $70,000 in transfer tax proceedings following the father\u2019s death. An additional value was allocated to the area immediately behind that plottage (which area was larger then than it is now)."], "id": "ecb23665-cfaa-43cd-8cd4-c605486440c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Arguendo, we may assume that the operation of school buses is a proper <mask> use for a nursery school. The difficulty with the defendants\u2019 position is that no special exception has been granted Lots Nos. 174 and 175 for the conduct of a nursery school. No case has been cited which would permit an accessory use on a parcel not zoned for the main or primary use (here an operation of a nursery school). If the defendants\u2019 position were valid, the ordinance could be avoided by extending the nursery school to include any of the adjacent property, without regard to the zoning or permitted uses of such adjoining property provided only that the use were an accessory use. Specifically, it is here held that unless Lots Nos. 174 and 175 are granted a special exception by the Town Board after a public hearing, the accessory use violates the ordinance."], "id": "4bf61206-8732-44c2-bf27-b2bc22b2933c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Consolidated with the above action is an action by the Town of East Hampton to enjoin defendants from maintaining a concrete block foundation and dwelling (the cottage) moved thereon which was erected and so placed without a permit and which structures, it is alleged, are prohibited by the zoning and tidal flood hazard ordinances Of the Town of East Hampton. Said Lot No. 3 is located in a Residential A District and a single family dwelling is a permitted use thereon (East Hampton Code, \u00a7 153-18, subd [2]). It is also permitted to have \u201c<mask> buildings\u201d thereon and section 153-18 E provides: \u201cAccessory Buildings: The use of which is customarily incidental to that of the main building on the same lot. A main building is one in which is conducted the principal use of the lot on which it is located.\u201d"], "id": "b7a31ff3-e11b-4e4e-b099-10257ab7caae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The People filed an information charging defendant with possession of marijuana for sale ( Health & Saf. Code,1 \u00a7 11359) and cultivation of marijuana (\u00a7 11358). At the time, both crimes were classified as felonies. (Former \u00a7\u00a7 11358 & 11359, as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 160 & 161, eff. Apr. 4, 2011.) The information also charged two prior prison term enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Under a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded guilty to a single felony count of <mask> ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 32 ),2 and the trial court dismissed *803the balance of the charges. Because defendant was found to have played a minimal role in this offense, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on three years' formal probation. He served 228 days in county jail and received 114 days of credit for time served."], "id": "84e697e5-10ba-407e-a498-bffa89fb8cee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioners commenced this special proceeding by the service and filing of an order to show cause in lieu of a notice of petition dated September 16, 2008 and petition. Demanded therein is a stay of a criminal proceeding commenced by the People of the State of New York, Town of Brookhaven, against petitioner, Davin M. Fortuna, in the Sixth District Court of Suffolk County. The petitioners further demand judicial declarations regarding the conforming nature of certain alterations and improvements made to the residence and the <mask> building situated on the petitioners\u2019 residential lot."], "id": "890bf46c-8614-425b-8154-869a6d59396a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The evidence established that all units, ranging from about 2 tons\u2019 to 20 tons\u2019 capacity, are standard items made by a number of well-known companies; that the units under 10 tons generally are installed by a licensed electrician or contractor roughly estimating the tonnage required for those premises and furnishing electrical wiring, plumbing piping lines and, rarely, ductwork for better distribution of the cool air; that such units may be readily used elsewhere under conditions which may vary within a 25% range from the original installation; that, where units of 10 tons or over are needed, an engineer may be asked to make a more precise survey of the heat load and distribution *1011for that particular layout, type of structure, use of premises, number of people, etc., and the type of unit and nature of <mask> wiring, piping and ductwork in such case may possibly qualify as an integrated and specially adapted air-conditioning system."], "id": "60aec897-dd65-4667-9c0b-f50a9d269fd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, the contextual approach set forth in Samuels and reiterated in Grimes does not permit a mechanical analysis of statements offered under Evidence Code section 1230. This approach is not by any means novel. In People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251 (Gordon ), the Supreme Court considered statements made by an <mask>, Rauch, who told law enforcement officers that he had provided the defendant, his nephew, with shelter and medical care after the defendant had been wounded in a robbery. Although the statement minimized the declarant uncle's role and portrayed his nephew in a much harsher light, the court found the statement admissible: \"The court could have reasonably concluded that at the time it was made, Rauch's statement so far subjected him to the risk of criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have made it unless he believed it to be true. This is because Rauch all but confessed that he was an accessory to the crimes committed in the Riverside K mart incident.... To be sure, Rauch did not expressly admit either intent or knowledge. But he impliedly admitted both by his suspicious conduct throughout the incident in question. [\u00b6] Defendant argues to the contrary. He *791claims Rauch's statement should be considered untrustworthy in view of its substance. He says it must be characterized as neutral or exculpatory, and therefore unreliable, because it admits no more than it does. We cannot so characterize the statement. To be sure, the criminal liability that the statement risks is not the highest.But it is significant nonetheless .\" (Id. at p. 1252, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251, second italics added.)"], "id": "c0005afe-6d30-4674-af74-8d6368938dab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plainly, the term \"walkway\" can be used in different ways, but we conclude the statute here uses it in the sense of an external walking path. We reach this conclusion primarily based on the principle of statutory construction noscitur a soclis , i.e., where a word is used in a list, its meaning can be demonstrated by the other items in the list. (See People v. Drennan (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 [\"The rule of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis , a word takes meaning from the company it keeps, is useful here. 'A word of uncertain meaning may be known from its associates and its meaning \"enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used\" ' \"].) Aside from walkways, *90the other items in the list-carport, garage, overhang, patio, enclosed patio, and detached <mask> structure-are typically located at or near the periphery of a residential structure. In other words, they could arguably be included within the perimeter. The Legislature, therefore, felt compelled to specify that it did not mean to include those areas within assessable space. Accordingly, we conclude a covered or uncovered walkway, as used in section 65995, subdivision (b)(1), refers to an external *1195walkway, not an interior hallway. Any \"similar area\" is likewise on the periphery of the residential structure and does not include an interior hallway."], "id": "3cf20fcd-6821-4c1c-8fdf-ad79d0e72448", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*473There is no doubt in principle that a legacy of a specific productive thing carries with it, after its kind, its \u201c accessories \u201d (Matter of Strasenburgh, 136 Misc. 91), its \u201c appendants \u201d (Matter of Althaus, 94 id. 43) and \u201c all accretions and increment thereon \u201d (Matter of Michaelis, 110 id. 185, 189; Matter of Gans, 60 id. 282, 286); which are also called its \u201c produce \u201d (Platt v. Moore, 1 Dem. 191), or its \u201cincrease\u201d (Murphy v. Marcellus, Id. 288); but if inanimate and unproductive articles of property are specifically bequeathed, and not delivered, it does not follow that the legatee is entitled to interest upon their value out of the estate by way oi recompense for detention \u2014 if withheld, the remedy is against the executor personally, (Isenhart v. Brown, 2 Edw. Ch. 341, 347). In the class of primitive cases, e. g., the mare in foal, the unshorn sheep, or the growing crop (Stall v. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158; Matter of Chamberlain, 140 id. 390), the line of demarcation is suggested by a hkening of interest in default to \u201c a fruit fallen from the tree in the life of the testator \u201d (Matter of Althaus, 94 Misc. 43, 48), but in the more complicated cases arising out of social obligations and the symbols in which they are embodied, it is not so easy to trace the causality that brings forth the \u201c produce,\u201d the \u201c increase \u201d and \u201c increment,\u201d or that draws unto itself the \u201c <mask>,\u201d the \u201c accretion \u201d and the \u201c appendant.\u201d A corporation, for instance, does not produce dividends of any sort with any natural or normal constancy. Dividends come if and when they are earned or declared; but interest on money or securities is continuous or constant, rather than contingent."], "id": "02243bb7-6483-4d6e-a2d0-1aefa0596d29", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Evidence was then given tending to establish the guilt of the several persons named in the indictment contained in the record. It is not necessary to determine to what extent the judgment record is evidence against the prisoner, to establish the guilt of the <mask>. It of course conclusively establishes that the person tried under the indictment set forth in the record had been convicted,but the question whether his guilt is conclusively established as against the person charged as accessory, who was not a party to the record, and had no opportunity to be heard upon the trial, is quite a different proposition. On looking into the evidence in this case given for the purpose of showing that tho offence had been in fact committed, it is apparent that all of it was admissible with a view to show circumstances tending to establish the prisoner\u2019s guilt as accessory, and as it was clearly admissible for *385that purpose, there was no error in receiving it, even if it were not necessary to have gone beyond the record for the purpose? of proving the guilt of the persons convicted under the principal indictment. The exception was not therefore well taken."], "id": "b1588ba9-9532-4315-bd01-a9a31f3ad87e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant argues charging her with crimes purportedly carrying a potential 40-year sentence3 constituted prosecutorial overreaching and asks this court to *758\"emphatically reject this prosecutorial overreach, and reaffirm that recalcitrant witnesses can be subjected to coercion and punishment for contempt, but cannot be thrown in prison for decades.\" Defendant, however, has not shown she raised this argument in the trial court. Nor does she cite any authority on prosecutorial overreaching in support of her claim. She cites no authority precluding the <mask> and contempt charges based on her refusal to testify. The Attorney General did not specifically address the overreaching claim in his brief or at oral argument. Defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court."], "id": "538641fe-678c-4731-b859-d798133be2d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c The following uses and no other are permitted in A Residential Districts: \u2018 \u2018 A. Single family dwelling. \u201c B. <mask> use and accessory building, provided such use or building does not include any activity commonly recognized as a business. \u201c C. Church or similar place of worship, parish house, public school, parochial school * * *. \u201c D. Office in the residence of a physician, dentist, lawyer, architect, accountant, engineer, insurance or real estate salesman or one engaged in a similar profession or business * * *. \u2018 \u2018 E. Rectory, Convent. \u2018 \u2018 F. Private garage. \u201c G-. Private stable, * * *. \u201c H. Farm.\u201d It is respondents\u2019 position that the uses proposed by the Diocese fail to constitute permitted residential A zone uses as a \u2018 \u2018 church or similar place of worship, parish house * * * parochial school * * * rectory (or) convent.\u201d The following excerpts from the Board of Appeals decision demonstrate its position clearly: \u2018 \u2018 though the Diocese proposes to carry on a religious activity at Thornfield, it has elected to do so by and through an instrumentality other than a church within the meaning of the town zoning ordinance, * * * the Diocese proposes to maintain a chapel upon the premises, but a chapel * * * is not a church or similar place of worship within the meaning of the zoning ordinance * * * (but) would simply serve as an adjunct to the Diocese conference *518center. * * * (and) is not designed or intended to serve the religious needs of the residents of the Town. * * * (So that) the mere fact that the conference center possesses a chapel would not authorize the existence of the conference center in the residential zone. \u2019 \u2019 The use \u201cfor conference center purposes does not constitute a church or other similar place of worship use within the meaning of the Zoning Ordinance.\u201d"], "id": "c0533ab1-2807-4e31-9ffd-fa991c20e7f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In a later case, Kendrick v. Lomax, (2 Cromp. & Jer. 405) the last indorser of a bill, after it became due, went to the plaintiff with another bill, with the same parties\u2019 names, and requested him to renew the first by taking the second bill. The plaintiff hesitated for some time, and ultimately the indorser left the second bill with him. On the trial, Justice Bayley, an eminent authority on the law of bills of exchange, intimated that such a receipt of the second bill would prevent the plaintiff\u2019s right of suing on the first, until the second was dishonored, and he left it to the jury to say whether the second was left and received on account of and in renewal of the first. The jury found that it was, and the Judge having told the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the expenses of the first bill, the second havirig'been paid at maturity, they found a verdict for the plaintiff for that amount. But the verdict was set aside, upon the ground that as the plaintiff was precluded from suing on the first bill, until the second matured, he could maintain no action for the expenses, the second bill having been duly paid. \u201cWhen,\u201d says Bayley, J., in delivering an opinion for the entering of a nonsuit, \u201c the plaintiff took the new bill, he virtually agreed, not only to postpone his right to sue on the first, but also to sue for the charges that were <mask> to it,\u201d\u2014which is going quite as far as we have gone in this State in the application of the rule that the taking of *490the new note suspends, until it falls due, the right to sue upon the previous one."], "id": "f7b4d0f7-0a90-4648-9de5-5b253b0dc0a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*736\"Note: Parking garage spaces may be rented for periods of not less than one week and not more than one month to persons who are not occupants of the residences to which the spaces are <mask> for the accommodation of the private passenger motor vehicles used by such non-residents, provided that such spaces are operated in a manner which will not adversely affect the residential character of the neighborhood. Such spaces shall be made available to the occupants of the residences to which they are accessory within 30 days after written request therefor is made to the landlord.\u201d"], "id": "34398e74-1ba1-411b-bc92-72124584322a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Plainly, the term \"walkway\" can be used in different ways, but we conclude the statute here uses it in the sense of an external walking path. We reach this conclusion primarily based on the principle of statutory construction noscitur a soclis , i.e., where a word is used in a list, its meaning can be demonstrated by the other items in the list. (See People v. Drennan (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 [\"The rule of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis , a word takes meaning from the company it keeps, is useful here. 'A word of uncertain meaning may be known from its associates and its meaning \"enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used\" ' \"].) Aside from walkways, *90the other items in the list-carport, garage, overhang, patio, enclosed patio, and detached <mask> structure-are typically located at or near the periphery of a residential structure. In other words, they could arguably be included within the perimeter. The Legislature, therefore, felt compelled to specify that it did not mean to include those areas within assessable space. Accordingly, we conclude a covered or uncovered walkway, as used in section 65995, subdivision (b)(1), refers to an external *1195walkway, not an interior hallway. Any \"similar area\" is likewise on the periphery of the residential structure and does not include an interior hallway."], "id": "e69c450a-4482-49d8-921a-887a5aab57e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The 36th clause, which was typewritten, provided as follows: \u201cIt is expressly understood that the dining car and/or <mask> buildings placed on the premises shall be considered personal property and not as part of the realty. At the end of the term or upon expiration date of this lease, the Tenant agrees to remove the diner and any accessory buildings and fill in the cellar excavation to the level of the remaining land and shall leave the entire premises free of foundation blocks and clear of refuse. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "387ed159-347d-472c-b18f-d4b27d7e157b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Not all of them testified in Linville's later murder trial. According to law enforcement records attached to the prosecution's opposition to Linville's motion to dismiss the later complaint charging her with murder, however, one inmate, Jamie Anderson, told authorities Linville had said her co-defendant had \"told on\" both of them and that if she had been arrested within 24 hours of the homicide the authorities would have found gun residue all over her. Another inmate, Belle Peterson, overheard Linville say on a transport bus to court that Moreno had \"snitched\" on her. Peterson also said Linville was very angry with Moreno, and was telling everyone that Moreno had told the police on her. Inmate Isabela Verela reported that Linville had said she wanted to see what it felt like to kill someone, picked her victims randomly, had no feelings about the killings, and laughingly told Verela \"How do you want me to feel, I don't know them, I don't care about them.\" Verela reported that Linville would brag about committing the murders and that she \"got away\" with it, and said she had been in Dixon driving around with Moreno because they were on a mission to kill people. And Paula Moyer, who was Linville's cellmate while in county jail awaiting trial, reported extensive incriminating statements by Linville, including that Linville admitted killing one of the victims and said Moreno had killed the other one, the police would never find the gun, and that murder charges could not be refiled against her. According to Moyer, after Linville was sentenced on the <mask> charge, Linville freely admitted killing one of the women and would laugh about it. She bragged that she was sentenced to just three years and eight months and had got away with murder. Moyer also reported that Linville became infatuated with serial killer Richard Ramirez, and wrote him a letter boasting about the murders."], "id": "7a84513c-4f00-4ed1-82c4-cbc254622e7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In almost every charter or grant of franchise, there may be found many minor duties, sometimes expressed, often implied; none of which are strictly essential to the due execution of the trust. These ought to be performed; still if executed substantially though not to the very letter, or if by change of times they become useless, they may be neglected without perverting the objects of the grant. For the neglect of these when any person is aggriev*582ed, the law has provided various fit remedies, short of that of forfeiture, which the authorities just cited regard as reserved for a violation of the main objects of the trust. Such minor omissions of <mask> ^duties seem well left to the writ of mandamus, of prohibition, of injunction, or to indictment or civil suits for damages. Sometimes, as in the present case, the cumulative remedy of a pecuniary penalty is added by special statutory provision. It is true that our revised statutes authorize the filing of an information against corporate bodies \u201c whenever they shall offend against any [ *583 ] of the provisions \u2018of the act creating such corporation.\u201d But as the judgment can only he pronounced upon a finding of \u201c guilty\u201d of unlawful usurpation or holding, the question whether such offence amounts to cause of forfeiture or not, is still open to inquiry and must depend upon the terms of the grant and the nature of the offence."], "id": "bdec3b41-4da9-4fb0-89fc-d49ad1801913", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["At the suppression hearing, Henry testified that on May 12, 2014, she went to the jail to serve Pitts with a parole-violation report. When Henry informed Pitts that he had been charged with capital murder, he said, \"Why do they not have an <mask> law in Arkansas?\" Henry asked Pitts if he was an accessory, to which he responded, \"Well, I'm not a capital murderer.\" According to Henry, Pitts said that he should not have been charged with capital murder and that no motive could be proved. She said that Pitts had initially used the pronoun \"we,\" before stopping midsentence to instead say \"they,\" when referring to the police's lack of understanding why the perpetrators committed the crime. Henry said that Pitts had stated that the police did not know whether the suspects had gone to the home to rob the place, talk with someone, or \"deal with a prior situation between people.\" Henry said that Pitts-not in response to questioning-discussed the lack of evidence against him. For example, he stated that he knew that his face was not shown on camera. Henry testified that she saw Pitts again the following day, May 13, to notify him of his right to a hearing. She said that Pitts again spoke of the evidence against him and what he had told investigators without any questioning by her, aside from asking whether he wished to waive the hearing. Henry admitted that, although Pitts was in custody, she did not read him Miranda warnings before speaking with him on either day. She explained that she had been \"acting under the scope of a parole officer, not an investigator.\""], "id": "5bea47d5-e823-460f-8823-ed3eaf92b907", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In Boreth v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment (396 Pa. 82) appellant\u2019s application for a permit to operate a beauty shop in her residence had been denied. In affirming such denial, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that such a beauty shop conducted in a residence, was not a \u201c home occupation \u201d, within the meaning of the Philadelphia Zoning Ordinance which permitted <mask> uses in residential districts, as that phrase *303was defined therein, viz.: \u2018 \u2018 Any lawful occupation customarily conducted in a dwelling as an incidental use \u201d (emphasis added)."], "id": "e28f2134-b3c3-45dc-8aa8-129effac8229", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The reasons given by the courts in support of that rule as to those merely donative or testamentary transfers are deduced from the general nature of a corporate dividend. Cases too numerous to cite here, hold that the declaration of a dividend is a written admission of an indebtedness in a fixed sum, which does not give rise to a contractual relation between the corporation and the stockholder; but merely created a debt of definite amount in favor of the latter against the corporation; nor does the declaration necessarily add an <mask> to the stock itself; but the dividend is an independent obligation, separate from the stock itself, and forming no part thereof. Any modification of that essential feature is the result of contract or market sales customs."], "id": "063503fe-6910-4569-9f2e-690be071973e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Each <mask> count specifically identified defendant as aiding a single individual in violation of section 32 : count 1-Robinson, count 2-Green, count 3-Bryant Clark and count 4-Byron Clark. Each count also specifically alleged defendant harbored, concealed and aided the individual \"with the intent that [he] might avoid and escape from arrest, trial, conviction, and *641punishment for\" the charged felony-murder. Each count had its own verdict form and the jury found defendant guilty as an accessory as to each individual."], "id": "83f571f0-2c3f-4482-8d1b-eceb804283ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["When section 421 was enacted in 1971, there was no exemption for commercial space. In 1975, section 421 was amended and commercial, community and <mask> use space not exceeding 12% for the first time came under the exemption. The issue posed in Teleon (supra) was how the mini-tax was to *307be apportioned between commercial and residential space, and not whether condominiums were excluded."], "id": "52ff0688-33b8-4369-9f01-e1dc607fddeb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On April 15, 1999, defendant filed an omnibus motion and served a request for a bill of particulars on the People. In that motion, defendant claimed, inter alla, that all seven charges in the indictment were legally insufficient and should be dismissed. In defendant\u2019s request for a bill of particulars, defendant specifically asked that the People, with respect to each count of the indictment, \u201cstate whether the defendant is alleged to have acted as a principal or as an <mask>.\u201d"], "id": "fb622b32-461f-4657-9109-bc4fc101b7af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner\u2019s premises are situated in a Residence \u201c B \u201d zone in which are permitted single-family occupancy and (\u00a7 B-1.6) \u2018 \u2018 <mask> use on the same lot with and customarily incidental to any of the above permitted uses, including a private garage. This shall be understood to include the professional office or studio of a doctor, dentist * * * provided the office * * * is located in the dwelling in which the practitioner resides \u201d."], "id": "f3d4687c-e959-4975-9739-af29cc07dbb0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"(a) Signs of a duly constituted governmental body: including traffic or similar regulatory devices, legal notices, or warnings at railroad crossings \"(b) Flags or emblems of a political, civic, philanthropic, educational, or religious organization \"(c) Temporary signs announcing a campaign, drive, or event of the above organizations \"(d) Memorial signs or tablets \"(e) Signs denoting architect, engineer, or contractor when placed on construction sites and not exceeding 25 square feet in area \"(f) Signs required to be maintained by law or governmental order, rule, or regulation, with a total surface area not exceeding ten square feet on any zoning lot \"(g) Small signs displayed for the direction or convenience of the public, including signs which identify rest rooms, freight entrances, or the like, with a total surface area not exceeding five square feet on any zoning lot.\u201d (Zoning Resolution \u00a7 12-10, \"Sign\u201d.) Section 42-52 of the Zoning Resolution provides that \"<mask> business signs or advertising signs are permitted with no restrictions on size, illumination, or otherwise, except as provided in * * * Section 42-53.\u201d Section 42-53 provides that, in Ml, M2 and M3 districts, \"no advertising sign shall be located * * * within 200 feet of an arterial highway * * * if such advertising sign is within view of such arterial highway.\u201d Appendix C of the Zoning Resolution lists the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway as an arterial highway."], "id": "6afd796b-bedd-4d40-bb4d-7c30d0457b8b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant urges strongly in support of her position the decision in Matter of Wise v. Michaelis (203 N. Y. S. 2d 247, affd. no opn. 12 A D 2d 788 [2d Dept.]) wherein the Supreme Court, Nassau County, annulled a determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals, Town of Hempstead, denying petitioner a permit to use a portion of her residence to practice hairdressing and cosmetology, and directed the issuance of the permit. The Hempstead Ordinance expressly permitted certain <mask> uses in a Residence \u201c B \u201d District, in the following pertinent language: \u201c Accessory use * * * customarily incidental to any of the above permitted uses, * * *. This shall be understood to include the professional office or studio of a doctor, dentist, masseur, teacher, artist, architect, real estate broker, engineer, musician, or lawyer, or rooms used for home occupations such as dressmaking, millinery or similar handicrafts \u201d (emphasis added)."], "id": "b621edd7-fb86-4812-85cc-92005d663116", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["prohibits uses for which it does not provide permission.\u201d Treisman v. Kamen, 126 N.H. 372, 375 (1985); see 15 Peter Loughlin, New Hampshire Practice: Land Use Planning and Zoning \u00a7 9.02, at 174 (2010) (explaining that under a \u201cpermissive\u201d ordinance, uses of land are generally prohibited \u201cunless they are expressly permitted as primary uses or can be found to be <mask> to a permitted use\u201d). The zoning ordinance does not expressly permit storing of junk for personal use. Accordingly, the defendant\u2019s storage of junk for personal use, not being permitted by the ordinance, is prohibited."], "id": "a4e98846-879c-4d81-a4a3-bdf09bef9098", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It unnecessary to decide whether the different time/different location test retains continuing vitality under section 654, at least as a stand-alone test. (Compare, e.g., People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786, 798, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 ( Valli ) [ Britt reflects that \" Kellett is not necessarily a simple 'different time/different place' limitation\"] with People v. Marlow , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 143-144, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825, 96 P.3d 126 [ Kellett held inapplicable to murders argued to be related by common motive but carried out at different times in different locations].) Here, Linville's offenses were committed at different times in different places. The murders were committed on November 16, 2007, in Vallejo and Dixon, which are in Solano County, whereas Linville disposed of the vehicle days later in Richmond, which is in Contra Costa County.6 But there is more. Examining \"the totality of the facts\" in light of section 654 's legislative goals ( People v. Flint (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 333, 336, 124 Cal.Rptr. 269 ), and focusing on the conduct Linville herself committed, the offenses were not so \"interrelated\" ( Kellett , supra , 63 Cal.2d at p. 827, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206 ) as to prohibit the state from pursuing a separate prosecution against Linville, after she pled guilty to being an <mask>, for the much more serious murder charges."], "id": "6074efef-a88f-4d95-a03a-ef5cbd0bd04e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["a. The partnership. On April 10, 1941 there was a triparty agreement, between a man named Shamamian, who was the owner of the Sterling Tire & <mask> Co., on one side and James Zolli and Vilma Zolli on the other. The plaintiff\u2019s signature on that agreement is clear as crystal, and his denial thereof brands him as one entitled to little credence from this court. I find that in 1941 the plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral partnership at will, to which each contributed an equal share of the assets and under which they were to share the *586profits and losses equally. I find that profits were so shared until the parties separated in 1952, when the plaintiff wrongfully excluded the defendant from the business. I hold that there was a partnership at will, that the partnership should be dissolved and that the defendant is entitled to an accounting and the appointment of a receiver."], "id": "2a0b8a69-a547-4bfe-a488-6f912dca9323", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["By approving the permit, the Village Board has in effect (1) usurped the power of the building official by extending the definition nf \u201c <mask> use \u201d to the proposed helipad; and (2) bypassed the safeguards of review by a Board of Appeals, thus engaging in \u201c back-door rezoning \u201d without the benefit or safeguard of the required public notice and hearings."], "id": "b99ac46e-5f68-4657-8643-21f7c9554942", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The Zoning Law provides the Zoning Board with the power to interpret various provisions of the statute, including the meaning of the term \"accessory\u201d. While the Zoning Board now asserts that its earlier interpretation of \"<mask> use\u201d was erroneous, it had the power to reach that interpretation. The Board also had the power to change its position since it found its prior interpretation to be erroneous. Administrative agencies are \"free, like courts, to correct a prior erroneous interpretation of the law * * * by modifying or overruling a past decision\u201d (Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516, 519). Thus, the Zoning Board properly exercised its power to reverse its earlier erroneous decision."], "id": "916623ba-aabd-49a6-aaf4-eb586f93551f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It appears .that in June of 1956, Country Bidge Club, Inc., applied for !a special use permit (on property which it leased) for permission to conduct a country club with the usual <mask> uses and facilities incidental thereto. Pursuant to the provisions of the zoning ordinance, the Town Board referred this application to the planning board. On July 25, 1956, the planning board recommended the issuance of the' special use permit upon six conditions to be complied with. Generally, these conditions related to and called for certain buffer landscaping, the location and screening of the parking area, the road layout, connections to be made from habitable structures to the sanitary sewer system and from swimming and other pools to storm water drainage, and also for the preparation of plans relating to the foregoing as well as to the locations of existing and contemplated buildings, structures, play areas and general lighting; said plans were to be approved by the planning board. On September 8, 1956, after due notice and a public hearing thereon called pursuant to the provisions of said zoning ordinance, the Town Board issued the aforesaid permit subject to the aforesaid conditions recommended by the planning board and subject also to a further condition that the privilege of membership be extended to all persons who resided in the *107community. Thereafter and pursuant to said conditions, plans were submitted which were approved by the planning board \u25a0subject to six additional requirements including drawings showing the same. Additional plans were then submitted and on August 5, 1957, the planning board again requested further plans which would set forth and show the proposed compliance with new and additional requirements then further imposed by said board."], "id": "3153814a-8562-4956-afdd-318a60983765", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["ELGO, J. The plaintiffs, Robert L. Parker, Peter E. Rogness, and Randi M. Solomon, trustee for the Randi M. Solomon Revocable Trust, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court denying their appeal from the decision of the defendant Zoning Commission of the Town of Washington (commission) to grant the applica- tion of the defendant 101 Wykeham Road, LLC (appli- cant), to modify a special permit previously approved by the commission in 2013 pursuant to a settlement agreement.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the application did not con- stitute an impermissible expansion of both a noncon- forming structure and a nonconforming use. The plain- tiffs further claim that the court \u2018\u2018failed to require compliance with [the] special permit standards\u2019\u2019 con- tained in the Washington Zoning Regulations (regula- tions).2 We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.3 This appeal concerns the development of a 26.9 acre parcel of real property owned by the applicant and known as 101 Wykeham Road in Washington (prop- erty). The property is located in the \u2018\u2018R-1 Farming and Residential\u2019\u2019 zoning district.4 Among the uses authorized by special permit in that zone is an \u2018\u2018Inn or Tourist home.\u2019\u2019 Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 4.4.1. The regula- tions, however, provide no definition of the terms \u2018\u2018inn\u2019\u2019 or \u2018\u2018tourist home.\u2019\u2019 In May, 2008, an entity known as Wykeham Rise, LLC (Wykeham), the predecessor in title to the applicant, applied for a special permit to construct an \u2018\u2018inn and associated appurtenances\u2019\u2019 on the property. Following a lengthy hearing over the course of several months, the commission, by a vote of three to two, denied that application.5 Wykeham appealed from that decision to the Superior Court, claiming that (1) the commission lacked a valid reason for its denial, and (2) the commis- sion\u2019s decision must be reversed due to the improper participation of alternate members in its deliberations and the improper predetermination of the merits of the application by one regular member of the commission. While that appeal was pending before the Superior Court, Wykeham alternatively sought special permit approval to operate a school on the property,6 and it is undisputed that the commission granted such approval. Although the record before this court is voluminous and contains materials that reference \u2018\u2018Wykeham Uni- versity,\u2019\u2019 it does not contain copies of any such special permit applications or the commission\u2019s formal deci- sion to approve such a special permit. The record nonetheless indicates that Wykeham agreed, as a condi- tion to the settlement agreement at issue in this appeal, to surrender the special permit approval that it had obtained for a school once the settlement agree- ment was ratified. See footnote 7 of this opinion. In October, 2011, the Superior Court issued its memo- randum of decision on Wykeham\u2019s appeal from the com- mission\u2019s denial of its request for a special permit to construct an inn on the property. The court concluded that none of Wykeham\u2019s claims constituted reversible error. At the same time, the court noted its concern about the conduct of the commission, stating in relevant part: \u2018\u2018The court observes . . . that certain commission members engaged in a level of conduct that skirted the boundaries of what is appropriate for municipal public officials sitting on a commission. First, during the course of the five public hearings held on Wykeham\u2019s application . . . Commissioner [Valerie] Friedman made observations and comments that might lead one to believe that the application was being predetermined and prejudiced in such a way that the principles of fundamental fairness during the proceedings were being undercut. . . . The court finds that . . . Com- missioner Friedman, as a sitting member of the commis- sion, created the appearance, in form, if not in sub- stance, of predetermination and, therefore, contradicted the spirit of the statutory mandate of Gen- eral Statutes \u00a7 8-11. The court further observes that the participation by [two] alternate commission members . . . in the deliberative process by way of comment or submission on why the application should be denied, was inappropriate.\u2019\u2019 The court concluded with the fol- lowing admonition: \u2018\u2018The court . . . strongly advises that Chairman [David] Owen, along with all of the com- missioner members, should undertake some remedial training and orientation concerning their duties as municipal public officials sitting on boards and commis- sions, including their obligation to remain impartial and nonjudgmental during such proceedings, and to with- hold judgment until all of the evidence and arguments have been presented for their deliberation.\u2019\u2019 Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judi- cial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 11, 2011). Wykeham then filed a petition for certification, seek- ing appellate review of the propriety of that judgment, which this court granted. In addition to Wykeham and the commission, the parties to that appeal included three neighboring property owners\u2014Eric A. Federer, Wendy R. Federer, and Teresa Rosen Peacocke. While that appeal was pending, the parties settled their differences and entered into an agreement dated January 9, 2013 (settlement agreement). That settle- ment agreement noted that Wykeham \u2018\u2018desires to con- struct and operate an inn\u2019\u2019 on the property and then set forth sixteen \u2018\u2018terms and conditions by and under which neither [the Federers] nor Peacocke would oppose Wykeham in its efforts to obtain [c]ommission approval [of] an [i]nn on the [p]roperty.\u2019\u20197 At a special meeting held on January 7, 2013,8 the commission, by a vote of four to one, approved the settlement agree- ment \u2018\u2018per the site development plan by Arthur H. How- land and Associates, dated July 8, 2011, revised to December 17, 2012, 32 sheets\u2019\u2019 (2012 plan). The commis- sion also incorporated by reference into its approval \u2018\u2018[t]he architectural renderings [marked] \u2018A\u2019 and \u2018B\u2019 \u2019\u20199 and six conditions of approval that were contained in its previous special permit approval to operate a school on the property.10 Following the commission\u2019s approval of the settle- ment agreement, a motion for approval was filed with the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes \u00a7 8-8 (n), as the appeal of the commission\u2019s 2008 decision to deny Wykeham\u2019s special permit request remained pending.11 Through legal counsel, the plaintiffs in the present action\u2014who were not parties to the settlement agreement or the proceeding before the Superior Court\u2014opposed the settlement agreement.12 After hear- ing from all interested parties, the court concluded that the settlement agreement \u2018\u2018reflects honest, good faith compromise on the part of all parties to this appeal.\u2019\u2019 Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Zoning Commission, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2013 WL 951156, *1 (Conn. Super. February 5, 2013). The court further emphasized that \u2018\u2018[t]he settlement reflects a substantially reduced proj- ect, which should be much more acceptable to the neighbors. The settlement includes the following: (1) the removal of some buildings which were part of the original proposal; (2) reduced parking; (3) reduced res- taurant; (4) a prohibition on amplified music; (5) closure of one means of access and egress; (6) limitation on the number of events which can be held; [and] (7) plant- ings to screen the activities of the project.\u2019\u2019 Id. Accord- ingly, the court approved the settlement agreement, thereby memorializing Wykeham\u2019s ability to construct an inn on the property, as depicted on the 2012 plan.13 See footnote 7 of this opinion. The settlement agreement also contemplates modifi- cation of the 2012 plan. In this regard, the agreement requires that \u2018\u2018[a]ny amendments to this [s]ettlement [a]greement must be consented to by all the parties herein or their heirs, successors or assigns.\u2019\u2019 The settle- ment agreement further provides that \u2018\u2018[a]ll modifica- tions to the approved plans must be approved by the [commission] or its authorized agent prior to implemen- tation.\u2019\u2019 On March 22, 2018, the applicant, as successor in title to the property, filed an application for the \u2018\u2018modifica- tion of [the] existing special permit\u2019\u2019 that had been approved by the commission at its January 7, 2013 spe- cial meeting (modification application). That applica- tion was accompanied by several documents, including a new site development plan prepared by Arthur H. Howland & Associates, P.C., dated December 2, 2016, revised to February 5, 2018 (2018 plan),14 a copy of the applicant\u2019s February 8, 2018 application for a building permit and related documentation,15 and copies of both the settlement agreement and the commission\u2019s January 7, 2013 approval thereof.16 In accordance with the instructions provided by the commission on its special permit application form, the application also included a written description of the proposed modification. In that correspondence, the applicant\u2019s legal counsel stated in relevant part: \u2018\u2018The [a]pplicant\u2019s goal is to build the [i]nn that it is entitled to build as a result of the settlement agreement reached with the [commission] in January of 2013 and approved by the court on February 5, 2013. To do that, the [a]ppli- cant [is requesting] a modification to the [2012 plan] incorporated into the [s]ettlement [a]greement. This modification is in part necessary in order to comply with newer building code requirements for fire egress. It is also discretionary in part as the [a]pplicant wishes to add grading and stone walls in the rear of the main building. . . . It is noted that there is an inconsistency between the [2012 plan] footprint . . . which defines the footprint of the main building, and [r]enderings A & B, (incorporated into the [commission\u2019s] approval of the [s]ettlement [a]greement). To wit, the footprint of the [r]enderings (to the extent that it is discernable) does not comply with the [s]ettlement [a]greement/ [2012 plan]. Understanding the limited purpose of the [r]enderings was merely to demonstrate the architec- tural style of the main building, the [s]ettlement [a]gree- ment/[2012 plan] was used for the footprint and the [r]enderings for the architectural [style; therefore, the] plans submitted substantially comply with both.\u2019\u2019 The commission held a public hearing on the modifi- cation application on April 17, and July 19 and 23, 2018, at which it received documentary and testimonial evi- dence.17 One contentious issue concerned the appli- cant\u2019s proposal to permit individual ownership of guest room units at the inn, as multifamily housing was not permitted under the regulations. Another major issue with the 2018 plan was the proposed addition of a 2000 square foot ballroom and parking concerns related thereto. Some members of the public also opined that the 2018 plan constituted an expansion of the noncon- forming structure memorialized in the 2012 plan and approved as part of the settlement agreement. In response, Peacocke, who had opposed Wykeham\u2019s 2008 special permit application and who was a party to the settlement agreement, stated at the public hearing: \u2018\u2018I just [want] to remind members of the commission . . . that there were four attorneys who negotiated and drafted the [settlement agreement]. If we had intended to create an exclusionary agreement itemizing all and only those matters, we\u2019d have said so, and we didn\u2019t. . . . [W]e . . . never undertook to create a compre- hensive agreement . . . .\u2019\u2019 The commission also was presented with evidence as to how the applicant\u2019s proposal compared with the Mayflower Inn, which was located \u2018\u2018right down the road\u2019\u2019 from the property and was \u2018\u2018the only inn in [Wash- ington]\u2019\u2019 at that time. Commission members were reminded that, because the regulations do not define the term \u2018\u2018inn,\u2019\u2019 the commission had \u2018\u2018repeatedly said [that] it uses the Mayflower Inn . . . as a de facto model of what [constitutes] an inn . . . in Washing- ton.\u2019\u2019 Due to the similarity of the Mayflower Inn to the applicant\u2019s proposal, Paul S. Szymanski, a civil engineer, testified that the Mayflower Inn provided \u2018\u2018a wonderful basis for comparison,\u2019\u2019 and the commission was pre- sented with evidence as to how the applicant\u2019s proposal compared with that existing inn.18 The commission deliberated the merits of the appli- cant\u2019s modification request over the course of three nights on August 7, 27 and 28, 2018. At the conclusion of those deliberations, the commission, by a vote of three to two, approved the application to modify the existing special permit in accordance with the 2018 plan.19 The commission attached twenty-five detailed conditions to that approval.20 See General Statutes \u00a7 8- 2 (a) (special permits may be subject \u2018\u2018to conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, conve- nience and property values\u2019\u2019); Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 594, 409 A.2d 1029 (1979) (\u00a7 8-2 \u2018\u2018expressly\u2019\u2019 provides that municipal \u2018\u2018com- mission[s] [are] authorized to impose conditions as a prerequisite to certain uses of lands\u2019\u2019); St. Joseph\u2019s High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. App. 570, 576, 170 A.3d 73 (2017) (\u2018\u2018in granting a special permit, the commission has the authority to place reasonable restrictions on the proposed use\u2019\u2019). Notably, the commission prohibited both the proposed ballroom and individual ownership of guest room units. See footnote 20 of this opinion. Although the commis- sion did not provide a collective statement of the basis of its decision,21 the motion it granted to approve the modification application concluded by stating: \u2018\u2018The [c]ommission finds that all of the foregoing conditions must be met in order for the proposed use to be success- fully accommodated on the chosen site in accordance with the applicable [regulations]. Therefore, if a court should determine that any of the foregoing conditions are invalid or unlawful, this approval shall be null and void . . . .\u2019\u2019 The plaintiffs, all of whom are owners of property located within 100 feet of the applicant\u2019s property,22 filed a timely appeal with the Superior Court, challeng- ing the propriety of the commission\u2019s decision to grant the modification application. The plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the commission improperly authorized the expansion of both a nonconforming structure and a nonconforming use in contravention of the regulations. The court rejected that contention and further concluded that the commission \u2018\u2018had substantial evidence to approve and modify the application and did so only after imposing certain conditions to protect the public health and safety. The court finds that the commission did not act arbitrarily or illegally . . . .\u2019\u2019 Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a petition with this court for certification to appeal pursuant to \u00a7 8-8 (o).23 We granted the plaintiffs\u2019 petition, and this appeal followed. Before considering the claims advanced by the plain- tiffs in this appeal, we note certain well established principles. \u2018\u2018[T]he function of a special permit is to allow a property owner to use his property in a manner expressly permitted under the zoning regulations, sub- ject to certain conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience, and surrounding property values. . . . The basic rationale for the special permit [is] . . . that while certain [specially permitted] land uses may be generally compatible with the uses permit- ted as of right in particular zoning districts, their nature is such that their precise location and mode of operation must be regulated because of the topography, traffic problems, neighboring uses, etc., of the site.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Joseph\u2019s High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 176 Conn. App. 585\u201386. Judicial review of a commission\u2019s decision to grant or deny a special permit must be mindful of \u2018\u2018the significant discretion that a commission is afforded . . . . In reviewing a decision of a zoning [commission], a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence rule, according to which . . . [c]onclusions reached by [a zoning] commission must be upheld by the [Superior Court] if they are reasonably supported by the record. The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the [commission]. . . . The question is not whether the [Superior Court] would have reached the same con- clusion . . . but whether the record before the [com- mission] supports the decision reached. . . . If [the Superior Court] finds that there is substantial evidence to support a zoning [commission\u2019s] findings, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the [commission]. . . . If there is conflicting evidence in support of the zoning commission\u2019s stated rationale, the reviewing court . . . cannot substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the commission. . . . The [commission\u2019s] decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that sup- ports any one of the reasons given. . . . Moreover, [s]ubstantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . \u2018\u2018[T]he substantial evidence standard is highly defer- ential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review. . . . In light of the significant amount of deference that the substantial evidence standard affords a commis- sion, the court has described it as an important limita- tion on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency . . . [that] provide[s] a more restrictive standard of review than standards embody- ing review of weight of the evidence or clearly errone- ous action. . . . [O]n appeal, judicial review [of a com- mission\u2019s denial of a special permit application] is confined to the question of whether the commission abused its discretion in finding that an applicant failed to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of applicable zoning regulations. When there is evidence in the record to substantiate the commission\u2019s deter- mination, the determination must stand.\u2019\u2019 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) McLoughlin v. Planning & Zoning Commis- sion, 200 Conn. App. 307, 318\u201320, 240 A.3d 709, cert. granted, 335 Conn. 978, 241 A.3d 131 (2020). At the same time, when a question of law is presented, such as the proper interpretation of a zoning regulation, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Reardon v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 311 Conn. 356, 364, 87 A.3d 1070 (2014); Zimnoch v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 302 Conn. 535, 547, 29 A.3d 898 (2011). This appeal concerns the alleged expansion of a \u2018\u2018non- conforming use,\u2019\u2019 a term of art with both general and specific meaning. In Munroe v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 75 Conn. App. 796, 818 A.2d 72 (2003), this court, citing a noted treatise on land use in this state, observed that, \u2018\u2018[t]he term nonconforming uses is often used without consideration as to what aspect of the use of property is nonconforming, and in determining whether an activity is an expansion or change of a nonconforming use, the nature of the nonconformity is important.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 806. The court then detailed four distinct types of nonconfor- mity: \u2018\u2018(1) nonconforming use\u2014the use of the land or structure on it is nonconforming (e.g., commercial use in a residential zone); (2) a nonconforming lot\u2014the lot is undersized, irregularly shaped, has inadequate width or depth or inadequate frontage; (3) nonconforming building or structure\u2014the structure does not meet the minimum or maximum size requirements, floor area ratio, height or bulk requirements of the existing zoning regulations; (4) nonconformity as to location of struc- ture, i.e., it does not conform with one or more of the setback requirements.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Verrillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. App. 657, 690 n.20, 111 A.3d 473 (2015). In the present case, the first and fourth types of nonconformity are implicated, as the plaintiffs claim that the commission improperly approved the expan- sion of both a nonconforming structure and a noncon- forming use on the property. We address each claim in turn. I We begin with the plaintiffs\u2019 contention that the court improperly concluded that the applicant\u2019s proposal did not constitute an impermissible expansion of a noncon- forming structure. To resolve that claim, we must deter- mine, as a threshold matter, whether the principles that govern nonconforming uses are applicable under the unique facts and circumstances of this case.24 That inquiry entails consideration of not only the undisputed fact that the alleged nonconformity was the direct result of the settlement agreement ratified by the Superior Court in 2013 but, also, the undisputed fact that, at all relevant times, no structure proposed by the applicant existed on the property, nor had construction of any such structure commenced. A \u2018\u2018A nonconformity is a use or structure prohibited by the zoning regulations [that] is permitted because of its existence at the time that the regulations [were] adopted.\u2019\u2019 Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 710, 535 A.2d 799 (1988). \u2018\u2018Where a noncon- formity exists, it is a vested right which adheres to the land itself. . . . A vested right . . . to continue the nonconforming use is in the land . . . . [T]he right to a nonconforming use is a property right and . . . any provision of a statute or ordinance which takes away that right in an unreasonable manner, or in a manner not grounded on the public welfare, is invalid. A lawfully established nonconforming use is a vested right and is entitled to constitutional protection.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483\u201384, 408 A.2d 243 (1979). As this court has noted, \u2018\u2018[o]ur General Statutes recognize and protect this bedrock principle.\u2019\u2019 Verrillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 155 Conn. App. 684; see General Statutes \u00a7 8-2 (a) (prohibiting municipality from amortizing or eliminating nonconformities through enactment or amendment of zoning regula- tions); General Statutes \u00a7 8-13a (a) (providing statutory protection to certain nonconforming \u2018\u2018building[s] or other structure[s]\u2019\u2019); General Statutes \u00a7 8-26a (b) (3) (providing that change in subdivision or zoning regula- tions, or boundaries of districts, \u2018\u2018shall not alter or affect a nonconforming use or structure as provided in [\u00a7] 8-2\u2019\u2019). Although the right to continue a nonconforming use is statutorily protected, it is equally well established that, absent extraordinary circumstances warranting variance of the zoning regulations by a municipal zoning board of appeals,25 such nonconformity cannot be expanded or enlarged. As our Supreme Court has explained, \u2018\u2018nonconforming uses should be abolished or reduced to conformity as quickly as the fair interest of the parties will permit\u2014[i]n no case should they be allowed to increase.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 205 Conn. 710; see also Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 243, 662 A.2d 1179 (1995) (\u2018\u2018a nonconforming structure cannot be increased in size in violation of zoning ordinances\u2019\u2019); Blum v. Lisbon Leasing Corp., 173 Conn. 175, 181, 377 A.2d 280 (1977) (noting \u2018\u2018the indisputable goal of zoning to reduce nonconforming to conforming uses with all the speed justice will tolerate\u2019\u2019); Kleinsmith v. Plan- ning & Zoning Commission, 157 Conn. 303, 314, 254 A.2d 486 (1968) (\u2018\u2018[t]he advantages which the owners of nonconforming property acquire by the enactment of a zoning ordinance are not to be subsequently aug- mented except as permitted by the ordinance\u2019\u2019); Guil- ford v. Landon, 146 Conn. 178, 182, 148 A.2d 551 (1959) (\u2018\u2018the accepted policy of zoning . . . is to prevent the extension of nonconforming uses\u2019\u2019); Planning & Zon- ing Commission v. Craft, 12 Conn. App. 90, 96, 529 A.2d 1328 (\u2018\u2018[z]oning regulations in general seek the elimination of nonconforming uses, not their creation or enlargement\u2019\u2019), cert. denied, 205 Conn. 804, 531 A.2d 937 (1987). Those principles are memorialized in the regulations at issue here, which provide in relevant part that \u2018\u2018[i]t is . . . the intent of these regulations that the nonconforming aspects of [any nonconforming] lots and structures shall not be enlarged, expanded, or extended . . . . A nonconforming use of a structure or lot shall not be extended, expanded, or enlarged . . . .\u2019\u201926 Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 17.1. Under the traditional analysis applicable to noncon- forming uses, \u2018\u2018[f]or a use to be considered nonconform- ing . . . [it] must possess two characteristics. First, it must be lawful and second, it must be in existence at the time that the zoning regulation making the use nonconforming was enacted.\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis in original.) Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, 201 Conn. 700, 712, 519 A.2d 49 (1986); see also Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 17.4 (permitting \u2018\u2018a lawfully constructed, but currently nonconforming, structure\u2019\u2019 to be \u2018\u2018continued so long as it remains otherwise lawful\u2019\u2019); Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 17.1 (intent of nonconforming use regu- lations is to permit nonconforming structures that existed \u2018\u2018before the [r]egulations as currently amended were passed\u2019\u2019 to \u2018\u2018continue until they are removed\u2019\u2019). The proposed structure in question here, known as the \u2018\u2018main building,\u2019\u2019 possesses neither characteristic. A \u2018\u2018lawful\u2019\u2019 use is one that complied with both \u2018\u2018state law\u2019\u2019 and all zoning regulations that were in effect when the use commenced. Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 201 Conn. 712. At all relevant times, the applicable regulation governing a \u2018\u2018Tourist Home or Inn\u2019\u2019 provided in relevant part that \u2018\u2018the minimum setback of any structure . . . shall be . . . [fifty] feet from any lot line.\u2019\u201927 Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 13.9.C. The footprint28 of the main building, as depicted on the 2012 plan that was incorporated by reference into the settlement agreement, was, at its closest point, to be located thirty-one feet from the property line. That loca- tion thus resulted in a nineteen foot intrusion into the setback area. Accordingly, the main building depicted on the 2012 plan cannot be deemed a lawful structure, as it does not comply with the setback requirements of the regulations. See Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 712. In addition, to constitute a nonconforming structure under established case law, the main building had to \u2018\u2018be in existence at the time that the zoning regulation making the use nonconforming was enacted.\u2019\u2019 (Empha- sis in original.) Id. The precedent of our Supreme Court instructs that \u2018\u2018[t]o be a nonconforming use the use must be actual. It is not enough that it be a contemplated use [or] that the property was bought for the particular use. The property must be so utilized as to be irrevoca- bly committed to that use.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francini v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 228 Conn. 785, 789, 639 A.2d 519 (1994); see also Karls v. Alexandra Realty Corp., 179 Conn. 390, 399, 426 A.2d 784 (1980) (explaining that, \u2018\u2018to be irrevocably commit- ted to a particular use, there must have been a signifi- cant amount of preliminary or preparatory work done on the property prior to the enactment of the zoning regulations which unequivocally indicates that the prop- erty was going to be used for that particular purpose\u2019\u2019); Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 176 Conn. 482\u201383 (\u2018\u2018[t]he lot and building in question\u2019\u2019 qual- ified as legally protected nonconforming uses because they were in existence prior to enactment of zoning regulations and had not \u2018\u2018changed in size or shape\u2019\u2019); Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 197, 215 A.2d 112 (1965) (because tract of land \u2018\u2018was not \u2018irrevocably com- mitted\u2019 to development,\u2019\u2019 it \u2018\u2018was not a nonconforming use\u2019\u2019); MacKenzie v. Town Planning & Zoning Com- mission, 149 Conn. 678, 684, 183 A.2d 619 (1962) (\u2018\u2018a contemplated use cannot constitute an actual use\u2019\u2019); Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 308, 170 A.2d 267 (1961) (\u2018\u2018[a] proposed use cannot constitute an existing nonconforming use\u2019\u2019); Fairlawns Cemetery Assn., Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 138 Conn. 434, 444, 86 A.2d 74 (1952) (To establish a nonconforming use, \u2018\u2018[i]t is not enough that it be a contemplated use, even though plans for that have been put on paper. . . . It is not enough that the property was bought for the particular pur- pose.\u2019\u2019 (Citations omitted.)); DeFelice v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 130 Conn. 156, 161, 32 A.2d 635 (1943) (\u2018\u2018[a]ctual use as distinguished from merely contem- plated use\u2019\u2019 is required). Although the main building was a contemplated use of the property, and its footprint was memorialized in the 2012 plan, there is no basis in the record to conclude that the property was irrevocably committed to that use. There is no evidence that construction of that structure ever commenced, nor has any party so argued. The main building was merely contemplated but did not actually exist. As a result, it does not satisfy the com- mon-law standard for a nonconforming use. That determination does not end our inquiry, as that common-law standard evolved in cases concerning non- conforming uses that \u2018\u2018antedate the enactment of zon- ing\u2019\u2019 regulations. Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 176 Conn. 482; see also Pleasant View Farms Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 265, 271\u201373, 588 A.2d 1372 (1991); Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 201 Conn. 711; Poneleit v. Dudas, 141 Conn. 413, 419\u201320, 106 A.2d 479 (1954); Lane v. Cashman, 179 Conn. App. 394, 438\u201339, 180 A.3d 13 (2018); Verrillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 155 Conn. App. 683\u201387. Given that context, the present case is fundamentally distinct, in that it origi- nates not from a preexisting use on the property but, rather, a settlement agreement regarding a proposed use. That crucial distinction requires us to more care- fully consider the precise nature of the use at issue in this appeal. As one treatise notes, a variety of uses of land are entitled to protection under our law, including special permit uses, nonconforming uses, and \u2018\u2018[a]uthorized ille- gal uses . . . allowed by variance granted by the zon- ing board of appeals.\u2019\u2019 R. Fuller, 9B Connecticut Prac- tice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (4th Ed. 2015) \u00a7 52:1, p. 219. The use at issue here\u2014the operation of an inn on the property with a main building partially inside the setback area\u2014technically is not the proper subject of a special permit, as the application did not strictly comply with the setback requirements of \u00a7 13.9 of the regulations. It also is not an illegal use authorized by a variance issued by the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Washington. Rather, the use here is something altogether different and is perhaps best described as a lawful use resulting from the approval of a settlement agreement by both the municipal zoning commission and the Superior Court. \u2018\u2018[S]ettlement of disputes . . . is to be encouraged as sound public policy.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Yale University v. Out of the Box, LLC, 118 Conn. App. 800, 809 n.7, 990 A.2d 869 (2010). In the context of a municipal land use agency\u2019s settlement of a pending appeal, there exists a \u2018\u2018powerful interest in the promo- tion of settlement of litigation by agreement of the par- ties.\u2019\u2019 Sendak v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 7 Conn. App. 238, 242, 508 A.2d 781 (1986). Moreover, the statutory requirement that any settlement involving a municipal land use agency must be approved by the Superior Court following a hearing; see footnote 11 of this opinion; \u2018\u2018provides a forum for the presentation of any challenges to a settlement, including any allegations of bad faith, collusion or other improper conduct by the parties to the settlement,\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018serves to protect the public interest by guarding against any attempt on the part of the settling parties to evade judicial review and scrutiny by potentially aggrieved landowners.\u2019\u2019 Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Com- mission, 259 Conn. 607, 616, 793 A.2d 215 (2002); see also Willimantic Car Wash, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 247 Conn. 732, 742 n.16, 724 A.2d 1108 (1999) (legislative history of \u00a7 8-8 (n) \u2018\u2018indicates that the requirement of court approval was designed to guard against surreptitious dealing between zoning boards and applicants, to avoid frivolous appeals initiated for \u2018leverage,\u2019 and to ensure that settlements are fair\u2019\u2019). That statutory requirement \u2018\u2018recognizes . . . the legitimacy of settlement of zoning cases . . . .\u2019\u2019 Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 617. As was the case in Brookridge District Assn., the settlement agreement in the present case resolved a pending appeal involving the commission and an appli- cant that had been denied an application for a special permit. See Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Zoning Commis- sion, supra, 2013 WL 951156. The settlement agreement was formally approved by the commission at a special meeting held on January 7, 2013, and thereafter was approved by the Superior Court following a hearing conducted in accordance with \u00a7 8-8 (n). Because all statutory requirements were followed and the settle- ment agreement was ratified by both the commission and the Superior Court, we agree with the plaintiffs that the proposed main building, as depicted in the 2012 plan, constitutes a lawful use of the property.29 Although lawful, the main building does not comply with the setback requirements for structures con- structed on property that is used as an inn. At all rele- vant times, \u00a7 13.9.C of the regulations required a fifty foot setback \u2018\u2018from any lot line.\u2019\u201930 The regulations define a \u2018\u2018nonconforming building\u2019\u2019 as \u2018\u2018[a] building, which does not conform to all the applicable provisions of these [r]egulations.\u2019\u2019 Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 21.1.49. Because it does not comply with the lot line setback requirements of \u00a7 13.9.C of the regulations, the main building is nonconforming under the regulations. We therefore conclude that the main building depicted in the 2012 plan and incorporated into the settlement agreement constitutes a lawful, albeit nonconforming, structure as a result of the approval of the settlement agreement by the Superior Court. The principles that govern nonconforming uses in this state thus apply to such lawful nonconforming structures. Like any non- conforming structure, the main building depicted in the 2012 plan cannot be expanded or enlarged within the setback area in the absence of a variance from the Zoning Board of Appeals. B The question, then, is whether the commission improp- erly authorized the expansion of that nonconforming structure when it approved the modification application in 2018. In its memorandum of decision, the Superior Court concluded that the commission properly deter- mined that the modification application did not consti- tute an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming structure. Our review of that determination is guided by the substantial evidence standard. See, e.g., Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 324, 329\u201330, 589 A.2d 351 (1991); Woodbury Donuts, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 139 Conn. App. 748, 760 n.11, 57 A.3d 810 (2012). The regulations prohibit the expansion of noncon- forming structures.31 To determine whether the com- mission improperly approved the expansion of the non- conforming main building within the setback area, we must determine, as a preliminary matter, the extent of the nonconformity that was memorialized in the 2013 settlement agreement. \u2018\u2018A settlement agreement . . . is a contract among the parties.\u2019\u2019 Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 532, 4 A.3d 288 (2010). At its essence, a settlement agreement that resolves a pending zoning appeal in accordance with \u00a7 8-8 (n) is a stipulated judg- ment, as it is \u2018\u2018a contract of the parties acknowledged in open court and . . . recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . [and] is binding to the same degree as a judgment obtained through litigation . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Roe, 246 Conn. 652, 664\u201365 n.22, 717 A.2d 706 (1998). We thus interpret the settlement agreement before us \u2018\u2018according to general principles governing the con- struction of contracts. . . . [T]he language used [in a contract] must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unam- biguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. . . . [Additionally], in construing contracts, we give effect to all the language included therein, as the law of contract interpretation . . . militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Awdziewicz v. Meriden, 317 Conn. 122, 129\u201330, 115 A.3d 1084 (2015). Furthermore, \u2018\u2018[t]he interpretation of the intention of the parties to the settlement agreement is a question of fact . . . and we review such a determination by an administrative agency to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 51, 66\u201367, 591 A.2d 1231 (1991). The settlement agreement consists of five compo- nents: (1) the settlement agreement document itself, which contains sixteen conditions; see footnote 7 of this opinion; (2) the commission\u2019s January 7, 2013 approval of the settlement agreement;32 (3) the 2012 plan, which was incorporated by reference into both the settlement agreement document and the commission\u2019s motion to approve the settlement agreement; (4) six additional conditions that the commission attached to its approval; see footnote 10 of this opinion; and (5) the two architectural renderings. See footnote 9 of this opinion. Those materials contain little in the way of dimen- sional limitation on the proposed main building. The 2012 plan is pivotal in that regard, as it was incorporated by reference into both the settlement agreement and the commission\u2019s approval. The 2012 plan circum- scribes the parameters of the footprint of the main building. It is undisputed that the main building depicted in the 2018 plan sat on the same footprint as it did in the 2012 plan and did not intrude farther into the setback area, and the commission was presented with evidence to that effect.33 Accordingly, there was no horizontal expansion of that lawful nonconforming structure, nor has any party so claimed. Rather, the plaintiffs claim that the commission improp- erly approved a vertical expansion of the nonconform- ing main building. Whether the vertical extension of an existing footprint constitutes an impermissible expan- sion of a nonconformity depends on the particular lan- guage employed in the applicable zoning regulations. See E & F Associates, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 320 Conn. 9, 12 n.3, 127 A.3d 986 (2015) (noting that \u2018\u2018variances were required because the vertical expan- sion of the building within the applicable setbacks con- stituted a prohibited expansion of the nonconforming use under the [Fairfield] zoning regulations\u2019\u2019); Munroe v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 75 Conn. App. 811 (concluding that vertical expansion of nonconforming structure through addition of second story caused \u2018\u2018a substantial increase in the nonconformity\u2019\u2019 in contra- vention of Branford zoning regulations); Doyen v. Zon- ing Board of Appeals, 67 Conn. App. 597, 602, 612, 789 A.2d 478 (vertical expansion of nonconforming struc- ture permitted under Essex zoning regulations), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 901, 793 A.2d 1088 (2002). The regulations here proscribe the vertical expansion of nonconforming structures.34 The settlement agree- ment, however, contains no restriction on the height of the main building. Notably, the 2012 plan does not specify the height or volume of that building, and nei- ther the conditions included in the settlement agree- ment document nor the conditions imposed by the commission contain any such dimensions or height restrictions.35 Although no height limitation is specified anywhere in the settlement agreement materials, the plaintiffs submit that such a limitation may be found in two other materials, namely, Wykeham\u2019s proposed \u2018\u2018university\u2019\u2019 plans from a previous special permit application (school plans) and a set of plans that were submitted to the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection in December, 2012, as part of an application for a general permit to discharge from subsurface sewage disposal systems on the property (discharge permit plans).36 It nonetheless remains that the commission did not refer- ence the school plans or the discharge permit plans in either its motion to approve the settlement agreement or the conditions attached to its approval. Had the com- mission wanted to incorporate those plans into its approval of the settlement agreement, it certainly knew how to do so, as it had done with both the 2012 plan and the two architectural renderings. See Joseph General Contracting, Inc. v. Couto, 317 Conn. 565, 579, 119 A.3d 570 (2015). In this regard, we note that the settlement agreement document that was before the commission described the 2012 plan as the \u2018\u2018complete site plan\u2019\u2019 for the proposed inn. Yet, the commission chose to incorporate only \u2018\u2018the [2012 plan], the [two] architec- tural renderings . . . and the [six] conditions of approval\u2019\u2019 into its approval of the settlement agreement. Put simply, the school plans and the discharge permit plans are not part of the settlement agreement that was approved by the commission and the Superior Court. Although the settlement agreement did incorporate two architectural renderings, those \u2018\u2018representative\u2019\u2019 renderings do not contain any dimensions or numerical specifications. Moreover, the transcript of the January 7, 2013 special meeting indicates that those renderings were offered merely for illustrative purposes regarding the design of the main building. See footnote 9 of this opinion. There is no indication whatsoever in the record before us that the commission considered those render- ings as accurate depictions of the height of the proposed main building; indeed, the height of the main building never was discussed at the commission\u2019s January 7, 2013 special meeting. At the public hearing held on the modification appli- cation five years later, Reese Owens, an architect, opined that the height of the main building that was approved as part of the settlement agreement could be extrapolated from a comparison of the architectural renderings and the discharge permit plans.37 Although that may be true, there is no indication in the record before us that commission members in 2013 ever made that comparison or intended to impose a height restric- tion on the main building stemming therefrom. We reit- erate that the height of the main building was a topic never broached at the January 7, 2013 special meeting. Moreover, the commission heard testimony at the 2018 public hearing from Szymanski, a civil engineer who (1) was involved in the drafting of both the 2012 and 2018 plans, (2) had participated in the 2013 special meeting, and (3) offered the architectural renderings in response to a question from the commission\u2019s admin- istrative assistant as to the design of the main building. Szymanski unequivocally stated at the 2018 public hear- ing that the architectural renderings were provided sim- ply to illustrate \u2018\u2018the architectural style\u2019\u2019 of the main building. The commission, as the sole arbiter of credibil- ity, was entitled to credit that testimony.38 See, e.g., Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 443, 941 A.2d 868 (2008). The commissioners also were presented with uncon- troverted evidence that the settlement agreement was a compromise between the parties intended to resolve the pending appeal of the denial of Wykeham\u2019s special permit application, to which the commission was a party. In addition, the commission heard testimony from Peacocke, who also was a party to the settlement agreement. Peacocke stated: \u2018\u2018I just [want] to remind members of the commission . . . that there were four attorneys who negotiated and drafted the [settlement agreement]. If we had intended to create an exclusion- ary agreement itemizing all and only those matters, we\u2019d have said so, and we didn\u2019t. . . . [W]e . . . never undertook to create a comprehensive agreement . . . .\u2019\u2019 As our Supreme Court has observed, \u2018\u2018[w]e will not insert limitations into a contract when the parties did not do so themselves. . . . This is especially so when, as here, the agreement is between sophisticated . . . parties represented by counsel. . . . In these cir- cumstances, we presume the parties used definitive language to describe their agreement.\u2019\u2019 (Citations omit- ted.) Salce v. Wolczek, 314 Conn. 675, 690\u201391, 104 A.3d 694 (2014); see also Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 59, 34 A. 765 (1895) (\u2018\u2018[w]e assume no right to add a new term to a contract\u2019\u2019). Those maxims apply here, as the settlement agreement was crafted by multiple attorneys and subjected to scrutiny at hearings before both the municipal zoning commission and the Superior Court. That settlement agreement contains no height limita- tion on the main building, and the record does not reveal an intent on the part of the commission to impose such a restriction in 2013. There is substantial evidence from which the commission, in approving the modifica- tion application in 2018, reasonably could conclude that no height restriction was intended to be included in the settlement agreement. We therefore reject the plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the commission improperly approved the vertical expansion of a nonconforming structure. For those same reasons, the plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the commission improperly approved an expansion of the floor area or volume of the main building is unavailing. Significantly, no floor plans were included in the settle- ment agreement. Moreover, no floor plans were pre- sented to the commission in its review of the settlement agreement. The January 7, 2013 transcript indicates that the floor area and volume of the main building were never discussed at the special meeting. The settlement agreement likewise does not contain a restriction as to the floor area or volume of the main building. It is noteworthy that the settlement agreement does specifically address the maximum floor area of a different structure proposed on the property. Paragraph five of the settlement agreement states in relevant part: \u2018\u2018The Inn\u2019s spa and fitness center will be limited to the area within the building that is labeled \u2018Fitness Building\u2019 on the Site Plan and cannot exceed floor area totaling more than 11,400 square feet SAVE THAT a single exer- cise room no larger than 3,800 square feet and con- taining only exercise equipment may be located within the \u2018Main Building,\u2019 labeled as such as depicted on the Site Plan. If the single exercise room is located in the Main Building, the size of the Fitness Building would then be reduced by the same amount so that the com- bined floor area devoted to spa and fitness facilities in the Fitness Building and Main Building cannot exceed 11,400 square feet in total.\u2019\u2019 That restriction demon- strates that the parties to the settlement agreement were mindful of floor area considerations and knew how to incorporate such restrictions into that contract. They nevertheless did not include a floor area limitation for the main building in the settlement agreement, and we decline to insert such a limitation into that contract now. See, e.g., Salce v. Wolczek, supra, 314 Conn. 690\u201391 (\u2018\u2018[w]e will not insert limitations into a contract when the parties did not do so themselves\u2019\u2019); R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 171 Conn. App. 61, 279 n.104, 156 A.3d 539 (2017) (\u2018\u2018if the parties had intended that the [contract] would provide defense coverage . . . they easily could have said so expressly\u2019\u2019), aff\u2019d, 333 Conn. 343, 216 A.3d 629 (2019). We also note that all three commissioners who voted to approve the modification application in 2018 were members of the commission when it approved the 2013 settlement agreement. See footnote 19 of this opinion. Those commission members were entitled to rely on their personal knowledge of the settlement agreement and the January 7, 2013 special meeting. See, e.g., Frito- Lay, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 206 Conn. 554, 570, 538 A.2d 1039 (1988) (\u2018\u2018commission members may legitimately utilize their personal knowledge in reaching a decision\u2019\u2019); Burnham v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 189 Conn. 261, 267, 455 A.2d 339 (1983) (\u2018\u2018members of [a zoning commission] are entitled to take into consideration whatever knowledge they acquire by personal observation\u2019\u2019); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 150 Conn. 558, 562, 192 A.2d 40 (1963) (\u2018\u2018[o]bviously, the members of the board had personal knowledge of the situation, and they were entitled to take that knowledge into consideration\u2019\u2019). One of those members, Nicholas N. Solley, voted against the approval of the settlement agreement in 2013. During delibera- tions on the 2018 modification application, another member who was not on the commission in 2013 stated to Solley, \u2018\u2018You were there [in 2013] . . . and I would like to hear . . . what you were thinking\u2019\u2019 at that time. In response, Solley noted that, in considering the settle- ment agreement in 2013, the commission \u2018\u2018didn\u2019t even deliberate over . . . any elevations or any . . . floor plans\u2019\u2019 and stated that the commission \u2018\u2018never approved specific floor plans.\u2019\u201939 Solley also stated that, for pur- poses of comparing the 2018 plan to the settlement agreement, \u2018\u2018we simply have no baseline from which to, other than [the 2012] plan, from which to draw a comparison . . . .\u2019\u2019 Commissioner David Werkhoven, who also was a member of the commission in 2013, similarly stated that the commission \u2018\u2018never discussed volume requirements\u2019\u2019 during the special meeting to approve the settlement agreement. Werkhoven further noted that a \u2018\u2018floor plan shows you rooms and how they\u2019re divided . . . . We didn\u2019t . . . get any of that. . . . We didn\u2019t talk about that. . . . We talked about the general outline of the [main] building. . . . We didn\u2019t say how they could use it or how they couldn\u2019t use it.\u2019\u2019 In voting to approve the modification applica- tion, those commissioners were free to rely on their personal knowledge of the 2013 settlement agreement proceeding. On our review of the record, we conclude that sub- stantial evidence exists from which the commission could conclude that no floor area or volume restrictions were included in the settlement agreement. The Supe- rior Court thus properly determined that the commis- sion did not authorize an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming structure when it approved the modifi- cation application. II The plaintiffs also claim that the court improperly concluded that the applicant\u2019s proposal did not consti- tute an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. We disagree. The following additional facts are relevant to that claim. Subsequent to the commission\u2019s approval of the settlement agreement, the regulations were amended to require at least 500 feet of frontage \u2018\u2018on a state high- way\u2019\u2019 for any \u2018\u2018Tourist Home or Inn\u2019\u2019; see Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 13.9.B; which the property here conced- edly lacks. As a result, the operation of an inn on the property is a nonconforming use. Although that noncon- forming use is entitled to protection under state law; see General Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 8-2 (a) and 8-26a; it cannot be expanded under established precedent and \u00a7\u00a7 17.1 and 17.3.A of the regulations. See part I A of this opinion. A On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the commis- sion, in granting the modification application, improp- erly expanded the scope of that nonconforming use. They argue that only those <mask> uses specifically mentioned in the settlement agreement are permitted on the property. See footnote 7 of this opinion. The commission counters that the settlement agreement neither explicitly nor implicitly limited the scope of permissible accessory uses. We agree with the commis- sion. The regulations in the present case define an \u2018\u2018acces- sory use\u2019\u2019 as \u2018\u2018[a] use customarily incidental and subordi- nate to a main use and located on the same lot with such main use.\u2019\u2019 Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 21.1.7; see also O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419, 421 n.1, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995) (\u2018\u2018[a]ccessory uses are, by definition, uses located on the same lot, and must be subordinate and customarily incidental to, the principal use\u2019\u2019 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The regulations do not con- tain an explicit list of permitted accessory uses for inns in Washington. At the same time, the regulations define a \u2018\u2018lot\u2019\u2019 in relevant part as a \u2018\u2018parcel of land occupied or capable of being occupied by one principal building and the accessory buildings or uses customarily inci- dental to it . . . .\u2019\u2019 Washington Zoning Regs., \u00a7 21.1.38. The parties agree that accessory uses are permitted on a lot used principally as an inn. They disagree about the extent to which the settlement agreement here limits accessory uses on the property. As we have noted, the proper construction of a settle- ment agreement is governed by principles of contract interpretation. See part I B 1 of this opinion. \u2018\u2018A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . In contrast, a con- tract is ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the language of the contract itself. . . . If the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the con- tract is ambiguous.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santos v. Massad-Zion Motor Sales Co., 160 Conn. App. 12, 18, 123 A.3d 883, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 959, 125 A.3d 1013 (2015). The settlement agreement here lacks any language addressing accessory uses generally or indicating that unspecified accessory uses are prohibited on the prop- erty. At the same time, the settlement agreement does contain explicit limitations on three accessory uses, namely, the proposed restaurant,40 the proposed spa and fitness center,41 and tented events held on the prop- erty.42 No other accessory uses are specified in that agreement. Because the settlement agreement is sus- ceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation as to the scope of permitted accessory uses, we agree with the commission that the settlement agreement is ambiguous in that regard. \u2018\u2018When a contract is ambiguous the [finder of fact] must consider extrinsic evidence and make factual find- ings as to the parties\u2019 intent.\u2019\u2019 Chiulli v. Chiulli, Supe- rior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV- XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 8, 2014) (reprinted at 161 Conn. App. 639, 650, 127 A.3d 1147), aff\u2019d, 161 Conn. App. 638, 127 A.3d 1146 (2015). \u2018\u2018The interpretation of the intention of the parties to the settlement agreement is a question of fact . . . and we review such a determination by an administrative agency to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 219 Conn. 66\u201367. The record before us contains evidence to substanti- ate a finding that the parties did not intend to restrict accessory uses on the property to only those addressed in the settlement agreement. Although the record indi- cates that the parties deliberately incorporated specific plans into that agreement, such as the 2012 plan and the architectural renderings, they did not include any floor plans depicting the uses contemplated for the interior areas of the main building.43 The transcript of the January 7, 2013 special meeting contains no discus- sion of the scope of accessory uses on the property, and the main building in particular, nor were any floor plans presented at that hearing. In addition, the commis- sion heard testimony during the public hearing on the modification application from Peacocke, who was a party to the settlement agreement. Peacocke empha- sized that \u2018\u2018there were four attorneys who negotiated and drafted the [settlement agreement]. If we had intended to create an exclusionary agreement itemizing all and only those matters, we\u2019d have said so, and we didn\u2019t. . . . [W]e . . . never undertook to create a comprehensive agreement . . . .\u2019\u2019 The commission was entitled to credit that testimony by a party to the settlement agreement. See, e.g., Gerlt v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 290 Conn. 313, 322, 963 A.2d 31 (2009) (assessing credibility of witnesses is sole prov- ince of zoning commission); see also Landry v. Spitz, 102 Conn. App. 34, 49 n.9, 925 A.2d 334 (2007) (\u2018\u2018[t]his court will not revisit credibility determinations\u2019\u2019 in case regarding interpretation of settlement agreement). The substantial evidence standard \u2018\u2018is highly deferen- tial and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Palomba- Bourke v. Commissioner of Social Services, 312 Conn. 196, 202, 92 A.3d 932 (2014). On our review of the whole record, we conclude that substantial evidence exists to support a finding that the parties to the settlement agreement did not intend to restrict accessory uses on the property to only those specifically mentioned therein. B We turn next to the question of whether the uses at issue constitute permissible accessory uses. On appeal, the plaintiffs maintain that the inclusion of a bar, a \u2018\u2018prefunction\u2019\u2019 meeting area, and a \u2018\u2018meeting room/ library\u2019\u2019 in the 2018 plan approved by the commission are not permitted accessory uses for inns in Washing- ton.44 We do not agree. \u2018\u2018[I]n the land use context, the term \u2018accessory use\u2019 traditionally connotes a relationship with the primary use.\u2019\u2019 Morgenbesser v. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecti- cut, 276 Conn. 825, 831, 888 A.2d 1078 (2006). As our Supreme Court has explained, \u2018\u2018[a]n accessory use is determined specifically by reference to the primary use of the property to which it is incidental.\u2019\u2019 Loring v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 287 Conn. 746, 767, 950 A.2d 494 (2008). \u2018\u2018[An] accessory use [is] a use which is customary in the case of a permitted use and incidental to it. . . . An accessory use under a zoning law is a use which is dependent on or pertains to the principal or main use. . . . The word incidental as employed in a definition of accessory use incorporates two concepts. It means that the use must not be the primary use of the property but rather one which is subordinate and minor in significance. . . . But inci- dental, when used to define an accessory use, must also incorporate the concept of reasonable relationship with the primary use. It is not enough that the use be subordi- nate; it must also be attendant or concomitant. To ignore this latter aspect of incidental would be to permit any use which is not primary, no matter how unrelated it is to the primary use. . . . In examining the use in question, it is not enough to determine that it is inciden- tal in the two meanings of that word as discussed [pre- viously]. The use must be further scrutinized to deter- mine whether it has commonly, habitually and by long practice been established as reasonably associated with the primary use. . . . In situations where there is no . . . specific provision in the ordinance, the question is the extent to which the principal use as a matter of custom . . . carries with it an incidental use so that as a matter of law, in the absence of a complete prohibi- tion of the claimed incidental use in the ordinance, it will be deemed that the legislative intent was to include it.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 753\u201354. \u2018\u2018[W]hether a particular use qualifies as an accessory use is ordinarily a question of fact for the zoning author- ity, to be determined by it with a liberal discretion.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clifford v. Plan- ning & Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 434, 451, 908 A.2d 1049 (2006). On appeal, a zoning commission\u2019s determination \u2018\u2018is subject to a very narrow, deferential scope of review\u2019\u2019; id.; and must be sustained if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it. Id., 452; see also Loring v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 287 Conn. 756. The primary use of the property here is an inn. Although the regulations do not define the term \u2018\u2018inn,\u2019\u2019 the evidence in the record before us indicates that the commission had used the Mayflower Inn, which, at all relevant times, was the only existing inn in town, \u2018\u2018as a de facto model of what [the term] inn means in Wash- ington.\u2019\u2019 The record includes uncontroverted evidence that the Mayflower Inn featured a bar, two libraries, and \u2018\u2018six separate\u2019\u2019 meeting areas.45 The record also contains evidence that \u2018\u2018all\u2019\u2019 of the accessory uses proposed by the applicant \u2018\u2018are typical of what [i]nns do\u2019\u2019 and that the proposed uses in question were of \u2018\u2018a smaller scale than what is currently offered [and] what has been offered at [the Mayflower Inn] for decades.\u2019\u2019 On that evidence, the commission reasonably could find that the three uses in question had commonly, habitually, and by long practice been established as reasonably associated with the primary use of an inn in Washington. See Loring v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 287 Conn. 754. The plaintiffs further claim that the court misapplied the precedent of our Supreme Court in Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 218 Conn. 324. We disagree. In Zachs, the court explained that, \u2018\u2018[i]n deciding whether [a] current activity is within the scope of a nonconforming use consideration should be given to three factors: (1) the extent to which the current use reflects the nature and purpose of the original use; (2) any differences in the character, nature and kind of use involved; and (3) any substantial difference in effect upon the neighborhood resulting from differences in the activities conducted on the property.\u2019\u2019 Id., 332. Here, the original use memorialized in the settlement agree- ment and the use approved by the granting of the modifi- cation application are one and the same: an inn on the property with accessory uses typical of inns in Wash- ington. Indeed, the commission required, as the very first condition attached to its 2018 approval, that \u2018\u2018[t]his approval remains subject to all of the conditions and limitations set forth in the settlement agreement approved by the commission on January 7, 2013, together with the conditions of approval that were incorporated into the commission\u2019s motion for approval of the settle- ment agreement.\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis added.) Moreover, in approving the modification application, the commission imposed additional, more restrictive limitations on the use of the property.46 Last, from the evidence adduced at the public hearing, the commission reasonably could find that the use of the property proposed in the modifi- cation application would not result in a substantial dif- ference in effect on the surrounding neighborhood. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there is evidence in the record to substantiate a finding that the proposed uses in question were within the scope of the lawful nonconforming use memorialized in the settle- ment agreement. The commission\u2019s determination that those uses constituted permissible accessory uses, therefore, was proper. III As a final matter, the plaintiffs claim that the court \u2018\u2018failed to require compliance with [the] special permit standards\u2019\u2019 contained in the regulations. We do not agree."], "id": "b5cc9db0-716b-4c3d-a398-887a349986a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The tenant removed, and replaced with substitutes, a series of wall cabinets in the kitchen which were so physically annexed and affixed as to have long been <mask> to and part and parcel of the realty. Besides installing metallic wall-covering material in the living room and bedroom, the tenant annexed to the freehold for use in connection with it, so that they cannot be removed without injury to the freehold, extensive and substantially imbedded ceiling and wall reconstructions and lighting arrangements."], "id": "1ddc86bb-081c-4821-99c3-5673961eb7a0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As to the other appellants, the evidence of combination is overwhelming. The testimony of Hunter, as to the declaration of Griffeth, that he was afraid the respondent would return before the day of sale, and get the proceedings stayed, receives strong and ample confirmation from Griffeth\u2019s whole subsequent conduct, and from all the circumstances in the case. It is the first glimmering we discover of the spirit and object with which the proceedings were conducted ; and makes him an <mask> before the fact, to all the subsequent acts of violence and oppression. It is followed up by an abandonment of all official discretion; and an entire submission to the plaintiffs in the execution. Instead of acting as the minister of the law, and guarding its precess against misapplication and abuse, he became the passive instrument of a party in the accomplishment of his illegal purposes. It was contended upon the argument, that he was not bound to incur the hazard of a suspension or adjournment of the sale, and that the law will not inquire into the extent of the hazard. Is it indeed true, that the law will not exercise a supervision or control over the discretionary acts of its ministerial officers ? That they are omnipotent and irresponsible in the exercise of the power entrusted to them ? \u201c It is a proposition,\u201d as was once said by Ld. Hardwicke, \u201c too monstrous to be debated.\u201d"], "id": "da5fe519-44c2-4f3b-839f-cad6236d9764", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["ECKER, J. This appeal arises out of a dispute between the plaintiff, Meribear Productions, Inc., doing business as Meridith Baer and Associates, and the defendants, Joan E. Frank and George A. Frank, in connection with a contract for the design, decoration, and staging for sale of the defendants\u2019 residence at 3 Cooper Lane in Westport. After the plaintiff staged the defendants\u2019 home by installing rental furniture, antiques, art, and home de\u0301cor for the purpose of enhancing its appearance and, thereby, its prospects for sale, the defendants defaulted on their contractual payment obligations to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, a California company, obtained a default judgment against the defendants in its home state and thereafter filed an action in the Superior Court in Connecticut seeking to enforce the California judgment or, alternatively, to recover under the theories of breach of contract or quantum meruit. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plain- tiff against George Frank on the count seeking to enforce the California judgment and in favor of the plaintiff against Joan Frank on the breach of contract count.1 On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the California judgment is unenforceable for lack of per- sonal jurisdiction, (2) the contract is unenforceable under the Home Solicitation Sales Act (HSSA), General Statutes \u00a7 42-134a et seq., and (3) the amount of dam- ages awarded by the trial court was improper. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts either are undisputed or were found by the trial court following a bench trial. The plaintiff is a California corporation that provides resi- dential design and decoration services, including the delivery, staging and leasing of home furnishings and de\u0301cor. The defendants are a married couple who resided in a home owned by Joan Frank at 3 Cooper Lane in Westport. In an effort to sell their home and make it more attractive to potential purchasers, Joan Frank, as the homeowner, entered into a \u2018\u2018[s]taging [s]ervices and []l]ease [a]greement\u2019\u2019 (agreement) with the plaintiff on March 13, 2011. Under the terms of the agreement, Joan Frank agreed to pay the plaintiff a \u2018\u2018 \u2018[s]taging [f]ee\u2019 \u2019\u2019 in the amount of $19,000, which represented a nonre- fundable \u2018\u2018 \u2018[i]nitial [p]ayment\u2019 \u2019\u2019 due \u2018\u2018prior to [the] deliv- ery and installation\u2019\u2019 of the furnishings. After the deliv- ery and installation of the furnishings, the agreement provided that Joan Frank would make monthly rental payments in the amount of $1900 beginning on July 23, 2011. The initial term of the agreement was for four months \u2018\u2018or until the buyer\u2019s contingencies are either satisfied or waived with respect to the purchase of the [p]roperty, whichever comes first.\u2019\u2019 If the property did not sell after four months, then the agreement would continue on a monthly basis, subject to the right of either party to terminate the agreement by providing written notice. Joan Frank was the sole signatory to the agreement. Although George Frank did not sign the agreement and was not a party to it, he participated in its negotiation. Indeed, in negotiating the agreement, the plaintiff dealt exclusively with George Frank, his office assistant, and the defendants\u2019 realtor. The plaintiff had no meaningful dealings with Joan Frank other than her execution of the agreement. In addition to negotiating the agreement, George Frank signed an addendum to the agreement, adden- dum B, which is a credit card authorization expressly made \u2018\u2018a part of [the] [a]greement . . . .\u2019\u2019 Pursuant to the credit card authorization, George Frank \u2018\u2018authorized the plaintiff to charge his Visa credit card a \u2018total amount\u2019 of $19,000.\u2019\u2019 George Frank crossed out lan- guage in the addendum providing that he agreed to personally guarantee \u2018\u2018any obligations that may become due.\u2019\u20192 Although George Frank was not a party to the agree- ment, he made substantive modifications to its terms. Paragraph 19 of the agreement contains a choice of law provision, which provides that \u2018\u2018[t]his [a]greement and the rights of the parties hereunder shall be determined, governed by and construed in accordance with the inter- nal laws of the [s]tate of California without regard to conflicts of laws principles.\u2019\u2019 Paragraph 19 also contains a forum selection clause, which provides that \u2018\u2018[a]ny dispute under that [a]greement shall only be litigated in any court having its situs within the [c]ity of Los Angeles, California, and the parties consent and submit to the jurisdiction of any court located within such venue.\u2019\u2019 Despite the choice of law provision, George Frank unilaterally added the following language at the end of paragraph 19: \u2018\u2018Since this is a contract for an agreement taking place in the state of Connecticut, Con- necticut laws will [supersede] those of California.\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis omitted.) After George Frank made the initial payment of $19,000, the plaintiff delivered and installed the rental furnishings and de\u0301cor pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Thereafter, the defendants defaulted on their rental obligation. The plaintiff hired a crew of movers to remove the rental furnishings and de\u0301cor from the defendants\u2019 residence, but the defendants denied the movers access to the premises. The defendants demanded that the plaintiff provide a written release of all claims, but the plaintiff refused. The inventory remained in the home.3 The litigation began in California. On February 15, 2012, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants in the Superior Court of California, county of Los Angeles, claiming, inter alia, breach of contract and conversion. That action resulted in a default judgment against the defendants in the amount of $259,746.10. When the default judgment remained unsatisfied, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield, seeking to enforce the foreign judgment. Alternatively, the plaintiff sought recovery against the defendants for breach of contract and quantum meruit under counts two and three of the complaint, respectively. The defendants raised various special defenses. In particular, the defen- dants claimed that (1) the California judgment was unenforceable for lack of personal jurisdiction, (2) the agreement was unenforceable under the HSSA because the plaintiff failed to advise the defendants of their cancellation rights, and (3) the plaintiff failed to miti- gate its damages and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On count one of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint, seeking enforcement of the California judgment, the trial court found that the California court lacked personal jurisdic- tion over Joan Frank due to insufficient service of pro- cess but that \u2018\u2018the substituted service of process on George Frank [was] valid.\u2019\u20194 \u2018\u2018To the extent that George Frank claim[ed] that the California court lacked suffi- cient minimum contacts over him\u2019\u2019 to satisfy the due process clause of the federal constitution, the trial court \u2018\u2018disagree[d].\u2019\u2019 The trial court reasoned that \u2018\u2018George Frank admit[ted] that he signed a guarantee of the stag- ing agreement with a company that has a principal place of business in California and that [the agreement] provides that [the city of] Los Angeles is the appropriate forum. He disputes only the extent of the guarantee. The California court possessed personal jurisdiction over George Frank, and its judgment is entitled to full faith and credit as to him.\u2019\u2019 Therefore, the trial court rendered judgment \u2018\u2018in favor of the plaintiff and against George Frank on the first count of the complaint for common-law enforcement of a foreign judgment.\u2019\u2019 The trial court proceeded to address counts two and three of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint against Joan Frank for breach of contract and quantum meruit, respectively. In connection with count two, the trial court found that \u2018\u2018the plaintiff\u2019s evidence relevant to the claimed breach [was] credible,\u2019\u2019 that \u2018\u2018[t]he furnishings were delivered to, and installed in, the residence in March, 2011,\u2019\u2019 and that \u2018\u2018Joan Frank failed to make the July rent payment, and the rent payments and other charges due there- after.\u2019\u2019 Moreover, the trial court found that, following Joan Frank\u2019s default on the rental payments, the plain- tiff attempted to remove the inventory from the defen- dants\u2019 residence, but the defendants wrongfully \u2018\u2018denied the movers access to their home unless the plaintiff provided them with a full release of all claims,\u2019\u2019 which the plaintiff \u2018\u2018reasonably refused . . . .\u2019\u2019 The trial court therefore concluded that Joan Frank had breached the agreement. The trial court rejected Joan Frank\u2019s claim that the agreement was unenforceable under the HSSA because the plaintiff had not provided her with notice of her cancellation rights, concluding that the \u2018\u2018plain and unambiguous\u2019\u2019 language of the statute exempts from the definition of a \u2018\u2018 \u2018home solicitation sale\u2019 \u2019\u2019 transactions \u2018\u2018 \u2018pertaining to the sale or rental of real property.\u2019 \u2019\u2019 Accord General Statutes \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5) (\u2018\u2018[t]he term \u2018home solicitation sale\u2019 does not include a transaction . . . pertaining to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019). The trial court determined that \u2018\u2018[a]n agreement con- cerning the staging of a residential home for sale in the real estate marketplace\u2019\u2019 pertains to the sale of real property and, therefore, is excluded from the purview of the HSSA. The trial court also rejected Joan Frank\u2019s claim that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate its dam- ages, finding that it was Joan Frank who had \u2018\u2018wrong- fully prevented\u2019\u2019 the removal of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor. Furthermore, because \u2018\u2018Joan Frank . . . wrongfully withheld payments under the agreement, and wrongfully refused the plaintiff\u2019s attempts to reclaim the inventory,\u2019\u2019 the trial court found that she had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by \u2018\u2018injur[ing] the rights of the plaintiff to receive the benefits of the staging agreement.\u2019\u2019 The trial court there- fore rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against Joan Frank on the plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim. Having determined that \u2018\u2018[t]he plaintiff [proved] that Joan Frank breached the contract,\u2019\u2019 the trial court stated that it \u2018\u2018need not consider the alternative claim for quantum meruit.\u2019\u2019 Finally, the trial court addressed the issue of dam- ages. On the first count of the complaint, enforcement of the California judgment against George Frank, the trial court awarded the plaintiff the full amount of the California judgment: $259,746.10. On the second count of the complaint, breach of contract against Joan Frank, the trial court awarded the plaintiff damages for the loss of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor in the amount of $235,598 and an additional $47,508.45 for \u2018\u2018the rental loss and related late fees,\u2019\u2019 for a total of $283,106.45. The defendants jointly appealed from the trial court\u2019s judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that (1) the California judgment was unenforceable against George Frank for lack of personal jurisdiction, (2) the agree- ment was unenforceable because it did not provide the defendants with notice of their cancellation rights under the HSSA, and (3) the damages award was improper because (a) the trial court awarded double damages against George Frank and Joan Frank for the same loss, and (b) the trial court incorrectly included damages for conversion of the home furnishings in the breach of contract award against Joan Frank. See Meribear Pro- ductions, Inc. v. Frank, 165 Conn. App. 305, 311, 316, 321\u201322, 140 A.3d 993 (2016), rev\u2019d, 328 Conn. 709, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018). The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment, holding that (1) the California judg- ment was enforceable as to George Frank because he consented to personal jurisdiction in California by sign- ing addendum B, which was incorporated into the agreement; see id., 315; (2) the agreement was not sub- ject to the provisions of the HSSA because it fell within the statutory exemption for transactions pertaining to the sale or rental of real property under \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5); see id., 316, 321; and (3) the measure of damages was proper because (a) the plaintiff may recover the full amount of damages under either count one or count two of the complaint but may not recover twice for the same loss; see id., 322; and (b) the amount of damages on the breach of contract claim was not clearly errone- ous in light of the trial court\u2019s factual findings \u2018\u2018that Joan Frank had breached the staging services agreement by failing to pay the rent due, by wrongfully using the furniture in the defendants\u2019 personal residence for approximately three years, and by thwarting the plain- tiff\u2019s efforts to retrieve its inventory, thereby resulting in the total loss of that inventory to the plaintiff.\u2019\u2019 Id., 323. This court granted the defendants\u2019 joint petition for certification to appeal.5 See Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 322 Conn. 903, 138 A.3d 288 (2016). During the adjudication of that appeal, a question arose \u2018\u2018whether George Frank\u2019s appeal had been taken from a final judgment when the trial court\u2019s ruling had not disposed of all counts against him,\u2019\u2019 namely, the plaintiff\u2019s alterna- tive theories of recovery in counts two and three of the complaint, breach of contract and quantum meruit. Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 715, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018). Following oral argument and supplemental briefing from the parties, we determined that the trial court\u2019s judgment was not final given that counts two and three \u2018\u2018remain[ed] unadjudicated\u2019\u2019 as to George Frank and \u2018\u2018present[ed] the possibility that [he] could be found liable for additional damages.\u2019\u2019 Id., 726. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded to that court with direction to dismiss the defendants\u2019 joint appeal. See id. On remand to the trial court, the plaintiff withdrew counts two and three as to George Frank.6 The defen- dants thereafter filed a joint appeal with the Appellate Court, which we transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes \u00a7 51-199 (c) and Practice Book \u00a7 65-2. I The defendants first claim that the foreign judgment against George Frank is unenforceable for lack of per- sonal jurisdiction because George Frank\u2019s sole contact with California was \u2018\u2018sign[ing] a single credit authoriza- tion in Connecticut, and every relevant action the plain- tiff took with regard to George Frank was taken in Connecticut. \u2018\u2018The defendants contend that, under these circumstances, George Frank lacked sufficient mini- mum contacts with California and that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him in that state offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice in violation of the due process clause of the United States constitution. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rud- zewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985) (\u2018\u2018an individual\u2019s contract with an out-of-state party alone [cannot] automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party\u2019s home forum\u2019\u2019 (emphasis in original)). The defendants further argue that George Frank did not consent to jurisdiction in California because he was not a party to the agreement, and, therefore, the forum selection clause in the agree- ment \u2018\u2018cannot form a proper basis for jurisdiction.\u2019\u2019 The full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution governs an action to enforce a foreign judg- ment.7 \u2018\u2018[T]he full faith and credit clause requires a state court to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it. . . . This rule includes the proposition that lack of jurisdiction renders a foreign judgment void. . . . A party can therefore defend against the enforcement of a foreign judgment on the ground that the court that rendered the judgment lacked personal jurisdiction, unless the jurisdictional issue was fully litigated before the rendering court or the defending party waived the right to litigate the issue.\u2019\u2019 (Citations omitted.) Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 214 Conn. 52, 56, 570 A.2d 687 (1990). The party raising a jurisdictional claim as a defense against the enforce- ment of a foreign judgment bears the burden of proving, \u2018\u2018by a preponderance of the evidence, facts that demon- strate that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction.\u2019\u2019 Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 364 n.11, 2 A.3d 902 (2010). On appeal, we defer to the trial court\u2019s factual find- ings but exercise plenary review over the ultimate ques- tion of personal jurisdiction. See Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 118, 918 A.2d 867 (2007). \u2018\u2018The question of whether another state\u2019s court properly exercised per- sonal jurisdiction is determined with reference to the law of that state.\u2019\u2019 Maltas v. Maltas, supra, 298 Conn. 367; see, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 174 Conn. 434, 438\u201339, 389 A.2d 756 (1978); J. Corda Construction, Inc. v. Zaleski Corp., 98 Conn. App. 518, 524, 911 A.2d 309 (2006).8 In California, \u2018\u2018a civil court gains jurisdiction over a person through one of four methods. There is the old- fashioned method\u2014residence or presence within the state\u2019s territorial boundaries. . . . There is minimum contacts\u2014activities conducted or effects generated within the state\u2019s boundaries sufficient to establish a \u2018presence\u2019 in the state so that exercising jurisdiction is consistent with \u2018 \u2018\u2018traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 \u2019\u2019 . . . A court also acquires juris- diction when a person participates in a lawsuit in the courthouse where it sits, either as the plaintiff initiating the suit . . . or as the defendant making a general appearance . . . . Finally, a party can consent to per- sonal jurisdiction, when it would not otherwise be avail- able.\u2019\u2019 (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Global Packaging, Inc. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1623, 1629, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813 (2011). We need not address the defendants\u2019 minimum con- tacts argument because we conclude that George Frank consented to personal jurisdiction in California.9 \u2018\u2018[D]ue process permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant . . . when the defendant consents to jurisdiction. . . . A party, even one who has no minimum contacts with [a] state, may consent to jurisdiction in a particular case. . . . Agreeing to resolve a particular dispute in a specific jurisdiction, for example, is one means of expressing consent to [the] personal jurisdiction of courts in the forum state for purposes of that dispute. . . . [Although] subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, per- sonal jurisdiction can be so conferred, and consent may be given by a contract provision.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockefeller Technol- ogy Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Techonology Co., Ltd., 9 Cal. 5th 125, 140, 460 P.3d 764, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 374, 208 L. Ed. 2d 98 (2020); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. 472 n.14 (\u2018\u2018[B]ecause the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are a variety of legal arrangements by which a litigant may give express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court. . . . For example, particularly in the commercial context, parties fre- quently stipulate in advance to submit their controver- sies for resolution within a particular jurisdiction. . . . [When] such [forum selection] provisions have been obtained through freely negotiated agreements and are not unreasonable and unjust . . . their enforcement does not offend due process.\u2019\u2019 (Citations omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.)). In the present case, the agreement expressly provided in relevant part that \u2018\u2018[a]ny dispute under [the] agree- ment shall only be litigated in any court having its situs within the [c]ity of Los Angeles, California, and the parties consent and submit to the jurisdiction of any court located within such venue.\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis added.) The defendants do not dispute that the forum selection clause in the agreement is valid and enforceable10 and, therefore, that its \u2018\u2018enforcement does not offend due process.\u2019\u2019 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. 472 n.14. Instead, they contend that George Frank is not bound by the forum selection clause because he did not sign the agreement. We disagree. Generally, a nonsignatory to a contract is not bound by a forum selection clause contained therein. See, e.g., Berclain America Latina S.A., de C.V. v. Baan Co. N.V., 74 Cal. App. 4th 401, 404\u2013405, 409, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (1999) (holding that nonsignatory to contract lacked standing to enforce forum selection clause). An exception to this general rule exists, however, for non- signatories who are \u2018\u2018so closely involved in the agree- ment or associated with a party to the transaction as to be functionally equivalent to that party.\u2019\u2019 Id., 403; see Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 583, 589, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149 (holding that forum selection clause was enforceable against nonsignatory on ground that it was \u2018\u2018 \u2018closely related\u2019 to the contrac- tual relationship because it stands in the shoes of those whom it purports to represent\u2019\u2019), review denied, Docket No. S117411 (Cal. August 27, 2003); Bancomer, S. A. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1461, 52 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1996) (to demonstrate that nonsignatory is \u2018\u2018 \u2018so closely related to the contractual relationship\u2019 that it is entitled to enforce the forum selection clause, it must show by specific conduct or express agreement that (1) it agreed to be bound by the terms of the . . . agreement, (2) the contracting parties intended the [nonsignatory] to benefit from the . . . agreement, or (3) there was sufficient evidence of a defined and intertwining business relationship with a contracting party\u2019\u2019); Lu v. Dryclean-U.S.A. of California, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1494, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (1992) (holding that nonsignatories were bound by forum selection clause because they were \u2018\u2018closely related to the contractual relationship\u2019\u2019 in that they allegedly \u2018\u2018par- ticipated in the fraudulent representations [that] induced [the] plaintiffs to enter into the [a]greement\u2019\u2019). Under the \u2018\u2018closely related\u2019\u2019 doctrine, a nonsignatory to a contract may be bound by a forum selection clause if the nonsignatory was so intimately involved in the negotiation, formation, execution, or ratification of the contract that it was reasonably foreseeable that he or she would be bound by the forum selection clause. See, e.g., Carlyle Investment Management, LLC v. Moon- mouth Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2015) (\u2018\u2018even if [the] defendants are not parties to the agreement or third-party beneficiaries of it, they may be bound by the forum selection clause if they are closely related to the agreement in such a way that it would be foreseeable that they would be bound\u2019\u2019); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd\u2019s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 1998) (nonsignatories who signed letters of credit to provide collateral for signatories were bound by forum selection clause because their \u2018\u2018interests . . . in [the] dispute are completely derivative of those of [the signatories]\u2014and thus \u2018directly related to, if not predicated upon\u2019 the interests of the [signatories]\u2019\u2019), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S. Ct. 851, 142 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1999); Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd\u2019s, 999 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993) (\u2018\u2018[i]n order to bind a [nonparty] to a forum selection clause, the party must be \u2018closely related\u2019 to the dispute such that it becomes \u2018foreseeable\u2019 that it will be bound\u2019\u2019); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 514 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (nonsignatories were bound by forum selection clause because they were \u2018\u2018so closely related to the contractual relationship\u2019\u2019). In determining whether a nonsignatory may be bound by a forum selec- tion clause, \u2018\u2018courts consider the [nonsignatory\u2019s] . . . relationship [to the signatory] and whether the [nonsig- natory] received a direct benefit from the agreement.\u2019\u201911 Carlyle Investment Management, LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, supra, 219. Applying these factors, we conclude that George Frank was so closely related to the agreement that he is bound by the forum selection clause explicitly providing that the \u2018\u2018the parties consent and submit to the jurisdiction of any court located within\u2019\u2019 the city of Los Angeles, California. First, the record reflects that George Frank participated in the negotiation of the agreement prior to its execution. Indeed, even though Joan Frank was \u2018\u2018the sole signatory [to] the agreement,\u2019\u2019 she had no \u2018\u2018meaningful dealings concerning the matter\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018was not involved in the process other than signing the agreement.\u2019\u2019 Instead, George Frank negotiated the agreement, \u2018\u2018took charge of the project and dealt with the plaintiff.\u2019\u2019 George Frank was a party to the agree- ment in all but name. Second, George Frank made substantive changes to the agreement prior to its execution. Specifically, \u2018\u2018George Frank unilaterally added the following language to the end of paragraph 19,\u2019\u2019 which is the portion of the agree- ment that contains the forum selection clause and the choice of law provision: \u2018\u2018Since this is a contract for an agreement taking place in the state of Connecticut, Connecticut laws will [supersede] those of California.\u2019\u2019 Notably, George Frank made no amendments to the forum selection clause. Third, in addition to negotiating and amending the agreement, George Frank executed addendum B, which is a credit card authorization that expressly was made \u2018\u2018a part of [the] [a]greement . . . .\u2019\u2019 Pursuant to adden- dum B, George Frank authorized a onetime credit card payment in the amount of $19,000, which represented the \u2018\u2018[i]nitial [p]ayment\u2019\u2019 or \u2018\u2018[s]taging [f]ee\u2019\u2019 due under the agreement. By doing so, George Frank authorized the sole payment made to the plaintiff and prompted the plaintiff\u2019s full performance of its contractual obligations under the terms of the agreement. Lastly, we consider George Frank\u2019s relationship with the parties and whether he benefited from the agree- ment. As we previously explained, George Frank is mar- ried to Joan Frank and resided with her at 3 Cooper Lane\u2014where the home furnishings and de\u0301cor were installed and remained for years. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Given that George Frank plainly enjoyed the use and benefit of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor and shared his wife\u2019s desire to enter into the agreement for the purpose of selling their marital residence, we have no trouble concluding that he received a direct benefit under the agreement. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that George Frank consented to personal jurisdiction in California. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that the Cali- fornia judgment is enforceable against George Frank under the full faith and credit clause. The concurring and dissenting opinion objects to our reliance on the closely related doctrine to affirm the trial court\u2019s enforcement of the foreign judgment against George Frank, arguing that \u2018\u2018the plaintiff did not advance [this theory], either in the trial court or before this court,\u2019\u2019 and that the plaintiff did not raise it as an alterna- tive ground for affirmance under Practice Book \u00a7 63-4 (a). It is true that the plaintiff did not frame its jurisdic- tional argument using the line of cases discussed in this opinion. In all but name, however, the gravamen of the plaintiff\u2019s argument throughout this litigation has been that George Frank was so closely related to the transac- tion that he should be bound by the forum selection clause in the agreement signed by his wife, Joan Frank. The record reveals that the plaintiff consistently has maintained that George Frank consented to personal jurisdiction in California via the forum selection clause, even though he was not a signatory to the agreement.12 In support of this argument, the plaintiff always has emphasized George Frank\u2019s close involvement in the negotiation and execution of the agreement, pointing out that he signed addendum B and \u2018\u2018made specific, handwritten changes to the [agreement] in certain places, including to the forum selection clause, which . . . expressly included the selection of California for litigation arising under the [agreement], yet did not alter or delete his consent to California jurisdiction.\u2019\u201913 (Emphasis omitted.) The plaintiff\u2019s failure to cite the applicable, governing case law is not fatal to its claim because it is well established that \u2018\u2018[w]e may . . . review legal argu- ments that differ from those raised\u2019\u2019 by the parties \u2018\u2018if they are subsumed within or intertwined with argu- ments related to the legal claim before the court.\u2019\u201914 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 644 n.2, 224 A.3d 147 (2020); see State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 124, 122 A.3d 1 (2015) (\u2018\u2018[W]e generally do not consider claims or issues that the parties themselves have not raised . . . [but] in cases too numerous to mention, we have considered arguments or factors pertaining to those claims or issues that were not expressly identified by the parties.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)). This is because, \u2018\u2018when [a case] is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 148, 84 A.3d 840 (2014); see In re David B., 167 Conn. App. 428, 448 n.10, 142 A.3d 1277 (2016) (\u2018\u2018[i]n resolving a claim raised by the parties, we are not required to constrain our analysis to the law relied on by the parties\u2019\u2019). Our independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of the governing law is particularly important in a case such as the present one, given our constitutional obligation to afford full faith and credit to the California judgment. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, supra, 124 (emphasizing importance of our power to identify and apply proper construction of governing law \u2018\u2018when plenary consideration is neces- sary to thoroughly address and accurately decide con- stitutional claims and other matters of substantial pub- lic importance\u2019\u2019). In light of the clear applicability of the closely related doctrine to the facts marshaled by the parties and found by the trial court,15 we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment enforcing the California judgment against George Frank. II The defendants next claim that the agreement is unenforceable under the HSSA because it did not include a notice of their cancellation rights in accor- dance with General Statutes \u00a7 42-135a (2).16 The plaintiff responds that it was not required to provide a notice of cancellation rights because the agreement falls out- side the purview of the HSSA. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the transaction at issue was not a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale,\u2019\u2019 as defined by the HSSA, because it \u2018\u2018pertain[ed] to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019 under \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5).17 The scope and meaning of the phrase \u2018\u2018home solicita- tion sale\u2019\u2019 in the HSSA presents a question of statutory construction, over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 422, 941 A.2d 868 (2008). \u2018\u2018When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 379, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). General Statutes \u00a7 1-2z guides this analysis and \u2018\u2018directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Section 42-135a provides in relevant part that \u2018\u2018[n]o agreement in a home solicitation sale shall be effective against the buyer\u2019\u2019 if the seller \u2018\u2018[f]ail[s] to furnish each buyer, at the time such buyer signs the home solicitation sales contract or otherwise agrees to buy consumer goods or services from the seller, a completed form in duplicate, captioned \u2018NOTICE OF CANCELLATION\u2019, which shall be attached to the contract or receipt and easily detachable, and which shall contain in ten-point boldface type\u2019\u2019 certain specified information regarding the buyer\u2019s right to cancel the transaction. General Stat- utes \u00a7 42-135a (2). A \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 is defined in relevant part as \u2018\u2018a sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods or services, whether under single or multiple contracts, in which the seller or his representative per- sonally solicits the sale, including those in response to or following an invitation by the buyer, and the buyer\u2019s agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place other than the place of business of the seller. . . .\u2019\u2019 General Statutes \u00a7 42-134a (a). \u2018\u2018The term \u2018home solicitation sale\u2019 does not include\u2019\u2019 various types of transactions, only one of which is pertinent to the present appeal, namely, transactions \u2018\u2018pertaining to the sale or rental of real property, to the sale of insurance, to the sale of newspa- pers or to the sale of securities or commodities by a broker-dealer registered with the securities and exchange commission . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis added.) General Stat- utes \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5). The parties dispute whether their contractual agree- ment for the design, staging, and leasing of home goods and services \u2018\u2018pertain[ed] to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019 under \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5). The defendants con- tend that this exception to the definition of a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 should be construed narrowly to apply only to contracts for the sale or rental of real property, rather than to goods or services used to facilitate the sale or rental of real property. The plaintiff responds that the defendants\u2019 proposed construction of the stat- ute ignores the expansive prefatory phrase \u2018\u2018pertaining to,\u2019\u2019 which, the plaintiff points out, Black\u2019s Law Diction- ary defines as \u2018\u2018 \u2018[t]o relate to; to concern.\u2019 \u2019\u2019 See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) p. 1260 (defining \u2018\u2018per- tain\u2019\u2019). The plaintiff argues that the agreement plainly \u2018\u2018pertain[ed] to the sale . . . of real property\u2019\u2019 within the meaning of \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5) because the contractual language \u2018\u2018clearly and repeatedly states that the sole, whole and entire purpose of the contract was to facili- tate the sale of the property.\u2019\u2019 We begin our analysis with the dictionary definition of the phrase \u2018\u2018pertaining to.\u2019\u2019 See, e.g., Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 326 Conn. 160, 176, 162 A.3d 706 (2017) (\u2018\u2018[w]hen a term is not defined in a statute, we begin with the assumption that the legislature intended the word to carry its ordinary mean- ing, as evidenced in dictionaries in print at the time the statute was enacted\u2019\u2019). The word \u2018\u2018pertain\u2019\u2019 means \u2018\u2018[t]o have reference; relate\u2019\u2019 or \u2018\u2018[t]o belong as an adjunct or <mask> . . . .\u2019\u2019 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New College Ed. 1979) p. 979; see also Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1976) p. 1688 (defining \u2018\u2018pertain\u2019\u2019 as \u2018\u2018to belong to some- thing as a part or member or accessory or product\u2019\u2019). Thus, a transaction is one \u2018\u2018pertaining to\u2019\u2019 the sale or rental of real property if the transaction refers or relates to the sale or rental, or if the transaction is an adjunct or accessory to the sale or rental. Under the former definition, any transaction for goods or services that is associated with or connected to the sale or rental of real property is exempted from the HSSA, whereas, under the latter definition, any transaction for goods or services that facilitates or aids the convenience or effectiveness of the sale or rental would be exempt. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, supra, p. 1097 (defining \u2018\u2018relate\u2019\u2019 as \u2018\u2018[t]o bring into logi- cal or natural association\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018[t]o have connection, relation, or reference\u2019\u2019); Webster\u2019s Third New Interna- tional Dictionary, supra, p. 11 (defining \u2018\u2018accessory\u2019\u2019 as \u2018\u2018an object or device that is not essential in itself but that adds to the beauty, convenience, or effectiveness of something else\u2019\u2019). The defendants contend that it would yield absurd and unworkable results to construe the real property exception to apply to all transactions for goods and services that relate to, or are an adjunct or accessory to, the sale or rental of real property and urge us to adopt a limiting principle to ensure that the exception does not operate beyond its intended scope.18 By way of example, the defendants point out that homeowners who purchase new windows from a door-to-door seller with the subjective purpose of making their home more attractive to potential buyers or renters, and thereby aiding or facilitating the sale or rental of the home, would not be afforded the consumer protections of the HSSA, whereas homeowners who purchase the same windows from the same seller for their own benefit (i.e., with no immediate intention of selling or renting the home) would receive the protections of the statu- tory scheme. The defendants argue that a limiting con- struction is necessary because such a random result would defeat the remedial purpose of the HSSA, con- trary to the intent of the legislature. The HSSA is a remedial statue that \u2018\u2018must be afforded a liberal construction in favor of those whom the legisla- ture intended to benefit.\u2019\u2019 Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 232 Conn. 666, 678, 657 A.2d 1087 (1995). As a corollary, we have recognized that exceptions to such statues \u2018\u2018should be construed narrowly.\u2019\u2019 Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 305 Conn. 488, 502, 45 A.3d 627 (2012). In construing the scope of the real property exception to the HSSA, we are mindful that we must intrepret the \u2018\u2018statute in a manner that will not thwart its intended purpose or lead to absurd results. . . . We must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 686, 986 A.2d 290 (2010). We agree with the defendants that it would defeat the remedial purpose of the HSSA if the consumer protections it provided were dependent on the subjective purpose for which a homeowner purchases consumer goods and services. See Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., 314 Conn. 773, 785, 105 A.3d 103 (2014) (examining legisla- tive history, even though language of statute was \u2018\u2018plain and unambiguous,\u2019\u2019 because \u2018\u2018a literal application of the statutory language would lead to a bizarre result\u2019\u2019); Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Ser- vices, 288 Conn. 790, 803, 955 A.2d 15 (2008) (\u2018\u2018[i]n construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended\u2019\u2019 (internal quotation marks omit- ted)). We therefore turn to extratextual sources of legis- lative intent to aid our interpretation. See Tuxis Ohr\u2019s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compen- sation Act, 309 Conn. 412, 422, 72 A.3d 13 (2013) (\u2018\u2018[w]hen a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and [com- mon-law] principles governing the same general subject matter\u2019\u2019 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The real property exception to the definition of a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 was added to the HSSA in 1976 \u2018\u2018[i]n order to conform to\u2019\u2019 the regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 19 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 1976 Sess., p. 1241, remarks of Senator Louis Ciccarello; see Public Acts 1976, No. 76-165, \u00a7 1; see also Federal Trade Commission, Cooling Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,164 (September 29, 1970). The FTC rule, which was codified in 1974 at 16 C.F.R. \u00a7 429.0 et seq., was enacted to protect consumers from the deceptive sales practices and high-pressure tactics used by some door-to-door sellers of consumer goods and services. See Federal Trade Commission, Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,934, 22,937 (October 26, 1972). Under the FTC rule, like the HSSA, door-to-door sellers are required to fur- nish buyers, in a specified format, notice and explana- tion of their right to cancel the transaction within three business days. See 16 C.F.R. \u00a7 429.1 (b) (2020). The three day \u2018\u2018cooling-off period\u2019\u2019 provides \u2018\u2018the consumer with an opportunity to discuss his purchase with others, to reflect upon the provisions of the contract, and per- haps to do a little comparative shopping. This will give him some opportunity to discover misrepresentations made by the salesman, or to realize either that he is paying too high a price for the product or that he simply didn\u2019t know when he agreed to buy what he was being asked to pay.\u2019\u2019 Federal Trade Commission, supra, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,942. Similar to the HSSA, the FTC rule defines a \u2018\u2018door- to-door sale\u2019\u2019 in relevant part as \u2018\u2018[a] sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods or services in which the seller or his representative personally solicits the sale, including those in response to or following an invitation by the buyer, and the buyer\u2019s agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place other than the place of business of the seller (e.g., sales at the buyer\u2019s residence or at facilities rented on a temporary or short-term basis, such as hotel or motel rooms, convention centers, fair- grounds and restaurants, or sales at the buyer\u2019s work- place or in dormitory lounges), and which has a pur- chase price of $25 or more if the sale is made at the buyer\u2019s residence or a purchase price of $130 or more if the sale is made at locations other than the buyer\u2019s residence, whether under single or multiple contracts. . . .\u2019\u2019 16 C.F.R. \u00a7 429.0 (a) (2020). \u2018\u2018The term door-to- door sale does not include a transaction . . . [p]er- taining to the sale or rental of real property, to the sale of insurance, or to the sale of securities or commod- ities by a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis altered.) 16 C.F.R. \u00a7 429.0 (a) (6) (2020). The real property excep- tion added to the HSSA in 1976, in other words, uses the exact words contained in the real property exception contained in the FTC rule promulgated in 1974. The real property exception was adopted by the FTC to alleviate concerns expressed by the National Associa- tion of Real Estate Boards. See Federal Trade Commis- sion, supra, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,948 and n.132. The FTC explained that, \u2018\u2018[i]nsofar as the sale of real estate itself is concerned, neither the [FTC] nor members of the real estate sales industry believe that such sales would be subject to the rule as land would not fall within the scope of the definition of consumer goods or services. However, transactions in which a consumer engaged a real estate broker to sell his home or to rent and manage his residence during a temporary period of absence may fall within the class of transactions to which the rule would apply.\u2019\u2019 Id., 22,948. In light of this concern, the FTC explicitly excluded transactions \u2018\u2018pertaining to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019 from the definition of a \u2018\u2018door-to-door sale . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 22,948\u201349. In doing so, the FTC \u2018\u2018empha- sized that it is not intended to apply to the sale of goods or services such as siding, home improvements, and driveway and roof repairs.\u2019\u2019 Id., 22,949. It is clear that the real property exception to the FTC rule and analogous state statutes adopted in conformity therewith do not encompass routine transactions for home improvement goods and services, regardless of the purpose for which these goods and services are purchased.19 See, e.g., Crystal v. West & Callahan, Inc., 328 Md. 318, 333, 614 A.2d 560 (1992) (holding that \u2018\u2018home improvement transactions are not excluded from the Maryland Door-to-Door Sales Act\u2019\u2019 because \u2018\u2018the General Assembly necessarily intended the exemp- tion for real estate to be construed in the same manner as the comparable federal language is construed\u2019\u2019). It is less clear, however, whether the real property excep- tion excludes from the scope of the statute the purchase of goods and services that are inextricably related to, or an integral adjunct or accessory to, the sale or rental of real property, such as the engagement of a real estate broker. Stated another way, the FTC commentary fails to explain whether the real property exception was intended simply to codify the understanding that real property transactions are not goods and services under the rule, or whether it was intended to go farther and also exclude from the scope of the rule transactions for some goods and services that pertain to the sale or rental of real property. There is a dearth of case law and scholarly commen- tary to aid us in answering this question, but what little authority exists indicates that the real property excep- tion is not limited to transactions for the sale or rental of real estate per se but, instead, encompasses a narrow category of transactions involving goods and services that relate to the sale or rental of real property. See, e.g., Busch v. Model Corp., 708 N.W.2d 546, 551 (Minn. App. 2006) (holding \u2018\u2018that the [contract for the] con- struction . . . of a new permanent garage . . . [fell] within the \u2018sales of real property\u2019 exception to the home solicitation sale statute\u2019\u2019 and that \u2018\u2018[the] respondent [therefore] was not required to comply with the home solicitation statute\u2019s notification requirements\u2019\u2019); Doyle v. Chihoski, 443 A.2d 1243, 1244 (R.I. 1982) (real prop- erty exception to staturory definition of \u2018\u2018home-solicita- tion sale\u2019\u2019 exempts from Home Solicitation Sales Act \u2018\u2018any agreement calling for the payment of a commission to a real estate broker who produces the requisite ready, willing, and able buyer\u2019\u2019); McDaniel v. Pettigrew, 536 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976, writ ref\u2019d n.r.e.) (rejecting claim that contract for sale of unimproved lot and new home construction \u2018\u2018was not a realty con- tract but an agreement for services to be performed\u2019\u2019 under real property exception because \u2018\u2018the parties intended that the house to be built [on] the lot was to become a part of the realty\u2019\u2019). See generally D. Pridgen et al., Consumer Credit and the Law (April, 2021) \u00a7 14:14 (noting that real property exceptions to state cooling off statutes are \u2018\u2018quite specific\u2019\u2019 but encompass some goods and services). Consistent with these authorities, we are persuaded that the real property exception to the definition of a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 in \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5) is not strictly limited to the sale or rental of real property.20 First, a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 under the HSSA, which is the equivalent of a \u2018\u2018door-to-door sale\u2019\u2019 under the FTC rule, is limited to the \u2018\u2018sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods or services . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis added.) General Statutes \u00a7 42-134a (a); accord 16 C.F.R. \u00a7 429.0 (a) (2020). Thus, the real property exception, by defini- tion, must apply to \u2018\u2018consumer goods or services.\u2019\u2019 See General Statutes \u00a7 42-134a (b) (\u2018\u2018 \u2018[c]onsumer goods or services\u2019 means goods or services purchased, leased, or rented primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, including courses of instruction or training regardless of the purpose for which they are taken\u2019\u2019); see also 16 C.F.R. \u00a7 429.0 (b) (2020) (defining \u2018\u2018con- sumer goods or services\u2019\u2019 as \u2018\u2018[g]oods or services pur- chased, leased, or rented primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, including courses of instruction or training regardless of the purpose for which they are taken\u2019\u2019). If the real property exception was intended simply to codify the prevalent understanding that the sale or rental of real property does not \u2018\u2018fall within the scope of the definition of consumer goods or services\u2019\u2019; Federal Trade Commission, supra, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,948; then the exemption would have been included in the definition of \u2018\u2018consumer goods or services,\u2019\u2019 rather than the definition of a \u2018\u2018door-to-door sale\u2019\u2019 under the FTC rule or a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 under the HSSA. Second, as we previously explained, the plain lan- guage of the real property exception is not limited to transactions for the sale or rental of real property. Instead, the exception extends to transactions \u2018\u2018per- taining to the sale or rental of real property . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis added.) General Statutes \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5); see also 16 C.F.R. \u00a7 429.0 (a) (2020). It is axiomatic that \u2018\u2018[e]ach word used by the legislature should be given effect and, as far as possible, the entire enactment is to be harmonized. . . . Words and and phrases of a statute are to be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language.\u2019\u2019 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ganim v. Roberts, 204 Conn. 760, 763, 529 A.2d 194 (1987). Construing the language of the statute in conformance with the FTC rule, as the legislature intended, and consistent with the remedial purpose of the HSSA, we conclude that a transaction is one \u2018\u2018pertaining to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019 if it is inextricably related to, or an integral adjunct or accessory to, the sale or rental. Accordingly, the sale, lease, or rental of such consumers goods or services are excluded from the definition of a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 under \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5).21 Having determined that a limited category of con- sumer goods and services may be excluded from the HSSA under the real property exception, we next con- sider whether the agreement at issue in the present case was inexctricably related to, or an integral adjunct or accessory to, the sale of the defendants\u2019 residence at 3 Cooper Lane. We begin and end our analysis with the language of the agreement, which definitively settles the question. The agreement provides that \u2018\u2018[i]t is under- stood that 3 Cooper Lane . . . is for sale and that Joan E. Frank . . . has entered into this agreement with [the plaintiff] to stage the [p]roperty for the purpose of sell- ing the [p]roperty.\u2019\u2019 The initial term of the lease was for four months or \u2018\u2018until the buyer\u2019s contingencies are either satisfied or waived with respect to the purchase of the [p]roperty, whichever comes first. If, after the expiration of the four . . . months, [t]he [p]roperty is not in escrow, the lease shall continue on a month to month basis provided that either party may terminate upon [fifteen] business day prior written notice . . . .\u2019\u2019 Joan Frank was required to \u2018\u2018inform [the plaintiff] when the [p]roperty goes into escrow, the date the contingen- cies are expected to be satisfied, and the date escrow is expected to close. [The plaintiff] may remove the [i]nventory once all of the buyer\u2019s contingencies have been met, expired or have been waived,\u2019\u2019 or \u2018\u2018[i]f the [p]roperty is not listed on the [multiple listing services] within [sixty] days of the completion of staging . . . .\u2019\u2019 Joan Frank was further required to \u2018\u2018notify the prospec- tive buyer of the [p]roperty that the [i]nventory is the subject of th[e] [a]greement and that [the plaintiff] has the absolute right hereunder to remove the [i]nventory from the [p]roperty before the close of escrow. [Joan Frank] shall provide [the plaintiff] with at least [ten] business days prior written notice . . . of the antici- pated date of the close of escrow or other sale or trans- fer of the [p]roperty. . . . [The plaintiff] shall have not less than [three] business days (following the expiration of the time period pursuant to the [n]otice of [c]losing [d]ate or the [n]otice of [t]ermination) within which to complete its removal of all [i]nventory . . . .\u2019\u2019 The sale of the defendants\u2019 residence was the stated purpose of the agreement, defined the duration of the agreement, and delimited its various terms. Under the agreement, for example, the plaintiff could remove the home furnishings and de\u0301cor if the defendants\u2019 residence was not listed for sale within a prescribed period of time or if, after listing, a buyer had been found and the buyer\u2019s contingencies had been met, expired, or waived. Additionally, the initial lease term was delineated by the procurement of a buyer for the residence and auto- matically continued on a monthly basis, so long as the defendants\u2019 residence was not in escrow or the lease was not terminated. Given that the terms of the agree- ment were intertwined with the sale of the property, we conclude that the agreement was inextricably related to, or an integral adjunct or accessory to, the sale of the defendants\u2019 residence and, therefore, excluded from the definition of a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 pursuant to \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5). Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the agreement was not subject to the notice of cancellation provisions in the HSSA. III Lastly, we address the defendants\u2019 claim that the trial court\u2019s award of damages was improper. The defen- dants contend that the trial court awarded the plaintiff \u2018\u2018double damages\u2019\u2019 by rendering judgment against both George Frank and Joan Frank for the same loss and incorrectly calculated the amount of damages for which Joan Frank was liable on the breach of contract count by including the conversion value of the home furnish- ings and de\u0301cor. The plaintiff acknowledges that it \u2018\u2018may collect only once for the same injury\u2019\u2019 but argues that the trial court \u2018\u2018properly awarded the appropriate amount as to each count representing recovery for each wrong complained of.\u2019\u2019 The plaintiff further argues that the trial court properly included the value of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor in its award of damages on the breach of contract count because Joan Frank\u2019s wrong- ful conduct resulted \u2018\u2018in the total loss of that inventory to the plaintiff.\u2019\u2019 We begin our analysis with the defendants\u2019 double recovery claim. \u2018\u2018Plaintiffs are not foreclosed from suing multiple defendants, either jointly or separately, for injuries for which each is liable, nor are they foreclosed from obtaining multiple judgments against joint [or suc- cessive] tortfeasors.\u2019\u2019 (Footnote omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 111\u201312, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). \u2018\u2018This rule is based on the sound policy that seeks to ensure that parties will recover for their damages.\u2019\u2019 Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 211 Conn. 67, 71, 557 A.2d 540 (1989). \u2018\u2018The possible rendition of multiple judgments does not, however, defeat the proposition that a litigant may recover just damages only once. . . . Double recovery is foreclosed by the rule that only one satisfaction may be obtained for a loss that is the subject of two or more judgments.\u2019\u2019 (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 71\u201372; see Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 29 n.14, 699 A.2d 964 (1997) (\u2018\u2018the principle against double recovery for the same loss applies in both tort and contract law\u2019\u2019); 2 Restatement (Second), Judgments \u00a7 49, comment (b), p. 36 (1982) (\u2018\u2018[a] judgment against one obligor under a contract does not terminate the claim against another obligor under the contract\u2019\u2019). In general, a loss is satisfied when a judgment of economic damages rendered in favor of the plaintiff in compensa- tion for the loss has been paid in full. See Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, supra, 69, 75\u201376 (plaintiff was pre- cluded from suing joint tortfeasor for wrongful death of decedent under double recovery doctrine because \u2018\u2018the plaintiff received compensatory, exemplary and treble damages in the amount of $1,187,763\u2019\u2019 for his loss in prior action, which \u2018\u2018the defendants . . . satisfied . . . in full\u2019\u2019); see also Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 807, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997) (\u2018\u2018The satisfac- tion of a judgment refers to compliance with or fulfill- ment of the mandate thereof. . . . There is realistically no substantial difference between the words paid and satisfied in the judgment context.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). The trial court\u2019s judgment on count one of the com- plaint against George Frank and count two of the com- plaint against Joan Frank awarded money damages in different amounts for the same underlying loss. George Frank is personally liable for the damages awarded on count one; Joan Frank is personally liable for the damages awarded on count two.22 Any payments made by George Frank in satisfaction of the judgment against him reduces the amount owed by Joan Frank, and any payments made by Joan Frank in satisfaction of the judgment against her reduces the amount owed by George Frank. See Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, supra, 211 Conn. 72 n.5 (\u2018\u2018 \u2018When a judgment has been rendered against one of several persons each of whom is liable for a loss claimed in the action on which the judgment is based . . . [a]ny consideration received by the judgment creditor in payment of the judgment debtor\u2019s obligation discharges, to the extent of the amount of value received, the liability to the judgment creditor of all other persons liable for the loss.\u2019 Thus, \u2018[a] payment by one person liable for a loss reduces pro tanto the amount that the injured person is entitled to receive from other persons liable for the loss.\u2019 \u2019\u2019), quoting 2 Restatement (Second), supra, \u00a7 50 and com- ment (c), pp. 40\u201342. It is undisputed that the plaintiff\u2019s loss was wholly unsatisfied when the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on counts one (enforcement of the California judgment against George Frank) and two (breach of contract against Joan Frank). Although the plaintiff may recover only once for its loss, the trial court was \u2018\u2018not foreclosed\u2019\u2019 from rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff against both defendants \u2018\u2018jointly or separately, for injuries for which each is liable . . . to ensure that [the plaintiff] will recover for [its] dam- ages.\u2019\u2019 (Ciations omitted; emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, supra, 211 Conn. 71. We therefore reject the defendants\u2019 double recovery claim. Lastly, the defendants contend that the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff on its breach of con- tract claim against Joan Frank was incorrect because it included the value of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor installed at 3 Cooper Lane. The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. The agreement provided that, at the conclusion of the lease term for the rental of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor, the plaintiff \u2018\u2018shall have not less than [three] business days . . . within which to complete its removal of all [i]nventory, with [Joan Frank\u2019s] permission, which will not be unreason- ably withheld.\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis in original.) Furthermore, the agreement required Joan Frank to acquire, prior to installation of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor, a $200,000 \u2018\u2018insurance policy insuring the value of the [i]nventory and a [g]eneral [l]iability policy of insur- ance, each naming [the plaintiff] as an additional insured.\u2019\u2019 Following installation, the plaintiff was required to provide Joan Frank \u2018\u2018with a list of the [i]nventory and values. If [i]nventory is damaged, lost, stolen or destroyed, [Joan Frank] will immediately notify [the plaintiff] in writing, and file all necessary reports, including those required by [the] insurer or by law. . . . [Joan Frank] shall be primarily liable to [the plaintiff] for any loss or liability related to the [i]mprove- ments and shall pay to [the plaintiff] any \u2018[s]tipulated [l]oss [v]alue\u2019 or other damages not covered by insur- ance.\u2019\u2019 At trial, the plaintiff admitted into evidence a list of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor installed at 3 Cooper Lane pursuant to the parties\u2019 agreement, as well as documentation of their value and photographs depicting their quality and appearance after installation. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court found that the home furnishings and de\u0301cor were \u2018\u2018appropriate\u2019\u2019 for the defendants\u2019 \u2018\u2018luxury home in an affluent community . . . .\u2019\u2019 The trial court also found \u2018\u2018credible the plaintiff\u2019s uncontested evidence [namely] the schedule of values of the inventory based on standard industry pricing for used furniture of the quality provided to the defendants. The plaintiff has lost the use of the inventory, and, moreover, the defendants have been wrongfully using the furniture in their personal residence for approxi- mately three years. The inventory was . . . supposed to be there [only] for a period of months. Consequently, the plaintiff had to replace the inventory. The essence of the staging agreement was to give the defendants\u2019 residence a showroom quality appearance, and, as noted, the inventory is reflective of that quality. There- fore, the court awards damages related to the inventory loss for the plaintiff and against Joan Frank on the first count in the amount of $235,598. Additionally, the evidence establishes that Joan Frank is responsible to the plaintiff for the rental loss and related late fees in the amount of $47,508.45. In view of the foregoing, the court awards damages on the second count for the plaintiff and against . . . Joan Frank . . . in the amount of $283,106.45.\u2019\u2019 It is well established that \u2018\u2018[t]he trial court has broad discretion in determining damages. . . . The determi- nation of damages involves a question of fact that will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.\u2019\u2019 (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bev- erly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 68, 717 A.2d 724 (1998). \u2018\u2018In a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony. . . . On appeal, we will give the evidence the most favorable reasonable con- struction in support of the verdict to which it is entitled. . . . A factual finding may be rejected by this court only if it is clearly erroneous. . . . A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . We are, therefore, constrained to accord substantial deference to the fact finder on the issue of damages. In deciding whether damages properly have been awarded, however, we are guided by the well established principle that such damages must be proved with reasonable certainty.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 68\u201369. \u2018\u2018The general rule in breach of contract cases is that the award of damages is designed to place the injured party, so far as can be done by money, in the same position as that which he would have been in had the contract been performed. . . . It has traditionally been held that a party may recover general contract damages for any loss that may fairly and reasonably be consid- ered [as] arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torosyan v. Boeh- ringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 32, 662 A.2d 89 (1995). Thus, in a breach of contract action, the plaintiff\u2019s damages are limited to those that \u2018\u2018the defendant had reason to foresee as the probable result of the breach at the time when the contract was made.\u2019\u2019 Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Associates, Inc., 199 Conn. 683, 689 n.3, 508 A.2d 438 (1986); see also 3 Restatement (Second), Contracts \u00a7 351 (1) and (2), p. 135 (1981) (\u2018\u2018Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made. . . . Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from the breach . . . in the ordinary course of events . . . .\u2019\u2019). \u2018\u2018[T]he question whether a particular element of loss was rea- sonably foreseeable is a question of fact . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Ambrogio v. Beaver Road Associates, 267 Conn. 148, 162, 836 A.2d 1183 (2003). We conclude that the trial court\u2019s award of damages for the plaintiff\u2019s loss of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor was not clearly erroneous.23 The agreement required Joan Frank to permit the plaintiff to remove the home furnishings and de\u0301cor at the conclusion of the lease term, to insure them for $200,000, and to pay the plaintiff \u2018\u2018damages not covered by insurance\u2019\u2019 if they were \u2018\u2018dam- aged, lost, stolen or destroyed . . . .\u2019\u2019 The trial court found that Joan Frank breached the agreement and \u2018\u2018wrongfully us[ed] the furniture in [the defendants\u2019] personal residence for approximately three years,\u2019\u2019 thus causing the plaintiff\u2019s total loss of the inventory valued at $235,598. In light of these facts, which the defendants do not challenge on appeal, we perceive no error in the trial court\u2019s finding that the plaintiff\u2019s loss of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Joan Frank\u2019s breach of the agreement. We therefore uphold the trial court\u2019s award of damages in favor of the plaintiff. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion ROBINSON, C. J., and McDONALD and KAHN, Js., concurred. * September 22, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. The trial court determined that there was no need to adjudicate the quantum meruit claim against Joan Frank after finding her liable for breach of contract. The plaintiff subsequently withdrew the breach of contract and quantum meruit claims against George Frank. Addendum B is a preprinted form that, in its original format, provided in relevant part: \u2018\u2018I authorize [the plaintiff] to charge my credit card for any due amount resulting from this staging/design agreement. I agree by signing below to personally guarantee to [the plaintiff], any obligations that may become due. \u2018\u2018Upon acceptance of this application, the client agrees to the payment terms stated by the creditor, [the plaintiff]. A 10 [percent] finance charge will apply on any open balances beyond terms. I understand that I am fully responsible for all balances on my account, and I am liable for additional charges that may be incurred by [the plaintiff] as a result of collection and/ or legal proceedings. . . .\u2019\u2019 George Frank crossed out the term \u2018\u2018any\u2019\u2019 in the first sentence and inserted the sum of \u2018\u201819,000\u2019\u2019 in its place. George Frank also crossed out the phrase, \u2018\u2018any obligations that may become due,\u2019\u2019 in the second sentence. Finally, the last sentence of the second paragraph is crossed out entirely. Sometime during the pendency of the present appeal, the defendants sold their residence at 3 Cooper Lane. See Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 165 Conn. App. 305, 309, 140 A.3d 993 (2016), rev\u2019d, 328 Conn. 709, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018). The plaintiff\u2019s counsel stated at oral argument before the Appellate Court that the current whereabouts of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor are unknown. See id. The plaintiff \u2018\u2018attempted constructive service on the defendants\u2019\u2019 at the office of LCP Homes, Inc., \u2018\u2018located at 1175 Post Road East in Westport.\u2019\u2019 LCP Homes, Inc., \u2018\u2018is a corporation owned by George Frank, and in which he and Joan Frank are corporate officers.\u2019\u2019 The trial court determined that service of process on Joan Frank was insufficient under \u00a7 415.20 (b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure because \u2018\u2018Joan Frank is not an owner or operator of the company, and, moreover, there is no evidence that she was ever present at the office.\u2019\u2019 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code \u00a7 415.20 (b) (Deering Supp. 2020) (providing that, in lieu of personal service, \u2018\u2018a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person\u2019s . . . usual place of business\u2019\u2019). With respect to George Frank, the trial court found that substituted service of process was sufficient on the ground that \u2018\u2018he is an owner of LCP Homes [Inc.] and Andy Frank Builders, which shared the [office at] 1175 Post Road East,\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018he had a presence at the office at the time of service . . . .\u2019\u2019 We granted the defendants\u2019 petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: \u2018\u2018Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that the trial court properly determined that: (1) the foreign judgment against [George Frank] was enforceable after concluding that he had minimum contacts with California that warranted the exercise of its jurisdiction; (2) the contract signed by [Joan Frank] was enforceable notwithstanding the provisions of the [HSSA]; and (3) an award of double damages to the plaintiff was appropriate.\u2019\u2019 Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 322 Conn. 903, 138 A.3d 288 (2016). On remand, the plaintiff moved for an award of postjudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes \u00a7 37-3a (a) on the breach of contract claim against Joan Frank. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to postjudgment interest in the amount of \u2018\u20185 percent per annum from the date of the final judgment until the date the judgment is paid\u2019\u2019 because Joan Frank had \u2018\u2018deprived [the plaintiff] of the use of its money and furniture\u2019\u2019 since 2011. The full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution provides in relevant part that \u2018\u2018Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State. . . .\u2019\u2019 U.S. Const., art. IV, \u00a7 1. Of course, the due process clause sets the outer limits of a state court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera- tions, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011) (\u2018\u2018[t]he [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal\u2019s authority\u2019\u2019 to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980) (\u2018\u2018[a] judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering [s]tate and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere\u2019\u2019). Consistent with the requirements of the full faith and credit clause, however, we first must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the applicable law of the foreign state. Under some circumstances\u2014including the present case, as we shall see\u2014we need go no further than an examination of state law because, if jurisdiction is established under state law, then the due process clause is satisfied. The concurring and dissenting opinion presumes that, by resting our jurisdictional holding on the closely related doctrine, we implicitly have concluded that George Frank lacks minimum contacts with California. That presumption is incorrect. The plaintiff\u2019s primary argument throughout this litigation has been that George Frank consented to personal jurisdiction in California. The closely related doctrine on which we base our holding falls within \u2018\u2018one of four traditional bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant\u2019\u2019 in California, namely, consent, which is \u2018\u2018sepa- rate from the \u2018minimum contacts\u2019 analysis.\u2019\u2019 Nobel Farms, Inc. v. Pasero, 106 Cal. App. 4th 654, 658, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881 (2003). Because consent is an alternative basis for personal jurisdiction, we need not conduct a minimum contacts analysis, and we express no opinion on the merits of the parties\u2019 minimum contacts arguments. To the extent the defendants contend that the forum selection clause is unenforceable under the HSSA because the plaintiff failed to provide them with notice of their cancellation rights as required by \u00a7 42-135a (2), we reject this claim for the reasons explained in part II of this opinion. In the context of parent-subsidiary corporate relationships, courts also consider \u2018\u2018the [nonsignatory\u2019s] ownership of the signatory . . . .\u2019\u2019 Carlyle Investment Management, LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, supra, 779 F.3d 219. Indeed, the plaintiff\u2019s primary argument on appeal is that \u2018\u2018George Frank expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the California courts by knowingly signing a contract that contained a forum selection clause, thereby making the California judgment fully enforceable against him in [Connecticut].\u2019\u2019 Although the concurring and dissenting opinion correctly observes that \u2018\u2018George Frank has consistently argued that he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California,\u2019\u2019 the plaintiff also consistently has argued that George Frank consented to personal jurisdiction in California by virtue of his involvement in the negotiation and execution of the agreement and addendum B. Although the plaintiff did not file notice of its intention to raise George Frank\u2019s consent to jurisdiction in California as an alternative ground on which to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Practice Book \u00a7 63-4 (a) (1), this procedural irregularity does not preclude our review of the plaintiff\u2019s claim. See, e.g., Gerardi v. Bridgeport, 294 Conn. 461, 466, 985 A.2d 328 (2010) (reviewing alternative ground for affirmance, even though defendants did not file notice under \u00a7 63-4 (a) (1), because there was no prejudice to the plaintiffs given that \u2018\u2018the defendants . . . raised the claim in their briefs . . . and the plaintiffs had an adequate opportunity to respond, and did so, in their reply briefs\u2019\u2019). The concurring and dissenting opinion is concerned that \u2018\u2018we might be going beyond the confines of our adversarial system in our discovery of an additional doctrine that supports the plaintiff . . . .\u2019\u2019 As a general admoni- tion, the concern is valid. The issue arises because we will occasionally rest our decision on a legal doctrine or theory that is not identical to the one argued and briefed by the parties. We agree with the concurring and dis- senting opinion that, ordinarily, we must desist from deciding cases on grounds that the parties have not raised. In our view, however, the distinction in our case law between claims and arguments, as outlined in the text accompanying this footnote, accurately and adequately delineates the \u2018\u2018limits of th[e] latitude\u2019\u2019 that govern our appellate review. For the reasons set forth herein, we are confident that we have not exceeded those limits under the circumstances of this case. We do not share the concern of the concurring and dissenting opinion regarding the factual findings of the trial court. The trial court expressly found that both of the defendants resided at 3 Cooper Lane and \u2018\u2018have been wrongfully using the furniture in their personal residence for . . . years.\u2019\u2019 There is no question that George Frank received a direct benefit under the agreement. General Statutes \u00a7 42-135a provides: \u2018\u2018No agreement in a home solicita- tion sale shall be effective against the buyer if it is not signed and dated by the buyer or if the seller shall: \u2018\u2018(1) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully completed receipt or copy of all contracts and documents pertaining to such sale at the time of its execution, which contract shall be in the same language as that principally used in the oral sales presentation and which shall show the date of the transaction and shall contain the name and address of the seller, and in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for the signature of the buyer, or on the front page of the receipt if a contract is not used, and in boldface type of a minimum size of ten points, a statement in substantially the following form: \u2018\u2018YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THIS TRANSACTION. SEE THE ATTACHED NOTICE OF CANCELLA- TION FORM FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THIS RIGHT. \u2018\u2018(2) Fail to furnish each buyer, at the time such buyer signs the home solicitation sales contract or otherwise agrees to buy consumer goods or services from the seller, a completed form in duplicate, captioned \u2018NOTICE OF CANCELLATION\u2019, which shall be attached to the contract or receipt and easily detachable, and which shall contain in ten-point boldface type the following information and statements in the same language as that used in the contract: \u2018\u2018NOTICE OF CANCELLATION \u2018\u2018. . . . (Date of Transaction) \u2018\u2018YOU MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION, WITHOUT ANY PENALTY OR OBLIGATION, WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS FROM THE ABOVE DATE. \u2018\u2018IF YOU CANCEL, ANY PROPERTY TRADED IN, ANY PAYMENTS MADE BY YOU UNDER THE CONTRACT OR SALE, AND ANY NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT EXECUTED BY YOU WILL BE RETURNED WITHIN TEN BUSINESS DAYS FOLLOWING RECEIPT BY THE SELLER OF YOUR CAN- CELLATION NOTICE, AND ANY SECURITY INTEREST ARISING OUT OF THE TRANSACTION WILL BE CANCELLED. \u2018\u2018IF YOU CANCEL, YOU MUST MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER AT YOUR RESIDENCE, IN SUBSTANTIALLY AS GOOD CONDITION AS WHEN RECEIVED, ANY GOODS DELIVERED TO YOU UNDER THIS CONTRACT OR SALE; OR YOU MAY, IF YOU WISH, COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUC- TIONS OF THE SELLER REGARDING THE RETURN SHIPMENT OF THE GOODS AT THE SELLER\u2019S EXPENSE AND RISK. \u2018\u2018IF YOU DO MAKE THE GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER AND THE SELLER DOES NOT PICK THEM UP WITHIN TWENTY DAYS OF THE DATE OF CANCELLATION, YOU MAY RETAIN OR DISPOSE OF THE GOODS WITHOUT ANY FURTHER OBLIGATION. IF YOU FAIL TO MAKE THE GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER, OR IF YOU AGREE TO RETURN THE GOODS TO THE SELLER AND FAIL TO DO SO, THEN YOU REMAIN LIABLE FOR PERFORMANCE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT. \u2018\u2018TO CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION, MAIL OR DELIVER A SIGNED AND DATED COPY OF THIS CANCELLATION NOTICE OR ANY OTHER WRIT- TEN NOTICE, OR SEND A TELEGRAM TO . . . . (Name of Seller) AT . . . . (Address of Seller\u2019s Place of Business) NOT LATER THAN MIDNIGHT OF . . . . (Date) \u2018\u2018I HEREBY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION. \u2018\u2018. . . . (Date) \u2018\u2018. . . . (Buyer\u2019s Signature) \u2018\u2018(3) Fail, before furnishing copies of the \u2018Notice of Cancellation\u2019 to the buyer, to complete both copies by entering the name of the seller, the address of the seller\u2019s place of business, the date of the transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third business day following the date of the transaction, by which the buyer may give notice of cancellation. \u2018\u2018(4) Include in any home solicitation sale contract or receipt any confes- sion of judgment or any waiver of any of the rights to which the buyer is entitled under this chapter, including specifically such buyer\u2019s right to cancel the sale in accordance with the provisions of this section. \u2018\u2018(5) Fail to inform each buyer, orally, at the time such buyer signs the contract or purchases the goods or services, of such buyer\u2019s right to cancel. \u2018\u2018(6) Misrepresent in any manner the buyer\u2019s right to cancel. \u2018\u2018(7) Fail or refuse to honor any valid notice of cancellation by a buyer and within ten business days after the receipt of such notice, to (A) refund all payments made under the contract or sale; (B) return any goods or property traded in, in substantially as good condition as when received by the seller; (C) cancel and return any negotiable instrument executed by the buyer in connection with the contract or sale and take any action necessary or appropriate to terminate promptly any security interest created in the transaction; and (D) cancel and return any contract executed by the buyer in connection with the transaction. \u2018\u2018(8) Negotiate, transfer, sell, or assign any note or other evidence of indebtedness to a finance company or other third party prior to midnight of the fifth business day following the date the contract was signed or the goods or services purchased. \u2018\u2018(9) Fail, within ten business days of receipt of the buyer\u2019s notice of cancellation, to notify such buyer whether the seller intends to repossess or to abandon any shipped or delivered goods.\u2019\u2019 General Statutes \u00a7 42-134a (a) provides in relevant part that \u2018\u2018 \u2018[h]ome solicitation sale\u2019 means a sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods or services, whether under single or multiple contracts, in which the seller or his repre- sentative personally solicits the sale, including those in response to or following an invitation by the buyer, and the buyer\u2019s agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place other than the place of business of the seller. The term \u2018home solicitation sale\u2019 does not include a transaction . . . (5) pertaining to the sale or rental of real property, to the sale of insurance, to the sale of newspapers or to the sale of securities or commodities by a broker-dealer registered with the securities and exchange commission . . . .\u2019\u2019 In the words of Justice Antonin Scalia, applying the phrase \u2018\u2018 \u2018relate[s] to\u2019 . . . according to its terms [is] a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to every- thing else.\u2019\u2019 California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillin- gham Construction, N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335, 117 S. Ct. 832, 136 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). Accordingly, when the application requires as a practical matter that some limitation be used to cabin such an unbounded phrase, the underlying doctrinal purpose or legislative inten- tion will set those boundaries. See Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1033, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (\u2018\u2018[t]o rein in th[e] phrase [\u2018relate to\u2019], limits must be found\u2019\u2019). We note that, under the Home Improvement Act (HIA), General Statutes \u00a7 20-418 et seq., home improvement contracts \u2018\u2018shall be considered a home solicitation sale pursuant to chapter 740 and shall be subject to the require- ments of said chapter regardless of the location of the transaction or of the signing of the contract.\u2019\u2019 General Statutes \u00a7 20-429 (e). Thus, home improvement contractors must provide purchasers with notice of their can- cellation rights. See generally Wright Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Dowling, 247 Conn. 218, 231, 720 A.2d 235 (1998) (\u2018\u2018The HIA is a remedial statute that was enacted for the purpose of providing the public with a form of consumer protection against unscrupulous home improvement contractors. . . .The aim of the statute is to promote understanding on the part of consumers with respect to the terms of home improvement contracts and their right to cancel such contracts so as to allow them to make informed decisions when purchasing home improvement services.\u2019\u2019 (Citation omitted.)). The defendants argue that the real property exception to the HSSA should be construed narrowly consistent with the statute of frauds, which does not apply to listing agreements or broker contracts. See, e.g., Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706, 722, 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (broker \u2018\u2018listing agreements are governed exclusively by [General Statutes] \u00a7 20-325a [and] such contracts do not fall within our statute of frauds\u2019\u2019 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brazo v. Real Estate Commission, 177 Conn. 515, 522, 418 A.2d 883 (1979) (\u2018\u2018in this state, a contract employing a broker to sell land is not within the [s]tatute of [f]rauds\u2019\u2019). The language and purpose of the HSSA is fundamentally different from that of the statute of frauds, however, and the defendants\u2019 reliance on our case law construing the statute of frauds is therefore misplaced. Compare General Statutes \u00a7 52-550 (a) (\u2018\u2018[n]o civil action may be maintained in the following cases unless the agreement . . . is made in writing and signed by the party . . . to be charged . . . (4) upon any agreement for the sale of real property or any interest in or concerning real property\u2019\u2019), with General Statutes \u00a7 42-134a (a) (5) (\u2018\u2018[t]he term \u2018home solicitation sale\u2019 does not include a transaction . . . pertaining to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019); see also Heyman v. CBS, Inc., 178 Conn. 215, 221, 423 A.2d 887 (1979) (\u2018\u2018the primary purpose of the statute [of frauds] is to provide reliable evidence of the existence and the terms of the contract\u2019\u2019). In arriving at this conclusion, we recognize that, in 2013, the FTC clarified the scope of the real property exception as applied to mortgage assistance relief services. See Federal Trade Commission, Rule Concerning Cooling- Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Other Locations, 78 Fed. Reg. 3855, 3857 (January 17, 2013). The FTC determined that the real property exception did not apply \u2018\u2018to services related to real property, such as mort- gage modification, mortgage loan brokerage, and foreclosure rescue ser- vices\u2019\u2019 because, \u2018\u2018[a]s determined by the [FTC] when it promulgated the [cooling-off] [r]ule, this exclusion, which renders the [r]ule inapplicable to the sale of real estate, does not necessarily reach so far as to exempt service- related transactions in which a consumer engages a real estate broker to sell his or her home or to rent and manage his or her residence during a temporary period of absence. Similarly, the exclusion does not necessarily reach so far as to exempt the . . . mortgage assistance relief services . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Footnote omitted.) Id., 3857 and n.24, citing Federal Trade Commis- sion, supra, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,948. In the view of the FTC, \u2018\u2018the [c]ooling-[o]ff [r]ule\u2019s right to cancel should extend to door-to-door sales of [mortgage assistance relief services]\u2019\u2019 because sellers \u2018\u2018direct their claims to financially distressed consumers who often are desperate for any solution to their mortgage problems and thus are vulnerable to the providers\u2019 purported solutions.\u2019\u2019 Federal Trade Commission, supra, 78 Fed. Reg. 3857. These concerns are \u2018\u2018exacerbated in situations in which sellers exercise undue influence over susceptible classes of purchasers\u2019\u2019 in the context of door-to- door sales. Id. The FTC\u2019s 2013 statement does not undermine our conclusion that the real property exception in the HSSA encompasses a limited category of consumer goods or services. The 2013 statement was released more than thirty years after the promulgation of the FTC\u2019s cooling-off rule and, there- fore, is \u2018\u2018a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of [the] earlier\u2019\u2019 FTC. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nixon, 231 Conn. 545, 560, 651 A.2d 1264 (1995); see also 2A N. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th Ed. 2014) \u00a7 48:20, p. 641 (\u2018\u2018a subsequent legislature may change an act to achieve whatever prospective meaning or effect it desires, but courts generally give little or no weight to the views of members of subsequent legislatures about the meaning of acts passed by previous legisla- tures\u2019\u2019). Even if this postenactment statement could be deemed useful in illuminating the purpose and intent animating the 1974 FTC exception to the cooling-off rule, it was not available to the Connecticut legislature in 1976, when the real property exception to the HSSA was adopted, and, therefore, is not indicative of our own legislature\u2019s intent. In addition, we cannot ignore the fact that the 2013 statement relates to special concerns stemming from the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis, which specifically involved the mortgage lending industry. This context plainly informs the FTC\u2019s statement expressing the view that certain transactions pertaining to the sale or rental of real property may fall outside the scope of the real property exception if a seller targets vulnerable and desperate consumers who are not in a position to make \u2018\u2018informed purchasing decisions . . . .\u2019\u2019 Federal Trade Commission, supra, 78 Fed. Reg. 3857. The agreement at issue in this case is far removed from such concerns. The California default judgment compensated the plaintiff for George Frank\u2019s breach of the agreement, just as the trial court\u2019s judgment on count two compensated the plaintiff for Joan Frank\u2019s breach of the agreement. The trial court\u2019s award of damages against George Frank on count one, enforcement of the California default judgment, was the same as the amount awarded by the California court: $259,746.10. The trial court\u2019s award of damages against Joan Frank on count two, breach of contract, was for $283,106.45. The award of damages against Joan Frank was not calculated on the basis of the California judgment but, instead, was determined by the trial court on the basis of evidence presented at trial regarding the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of Joan Frank\u2019s breach of the agreement. On appeal, the defendants do not challenge the discrepancy between the damages awarded against George Frank and Joan Frank. Joan Frank does not challenge the trial court\u2019s award of $47,508.45 for the lost rental value of the home furnishings and de\u0301cor and related late fees; nor does she claim that the award of damages for both rental loss and inventory loss for the home furnishings was improper."], "id": "d13874dc-a633-4065-9601-2a3f83944c99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The question presented is one of interpretation of the ordinance, i.e., does the principal use of a retail establishment such as Alexander\u2019s, in a general commercial district, as a matter of custom carry with it a helipad as an incidental \u00fase, so that as a matter of law it can be deemed that the legislative intent was to include it as a permitted <mask> use. In considering this legislative intent, it becomes necessary to determine whether the use was customary as of the time the regulations wei^s adopted, or whether such use has become customary since their enactment. (See People v. Nicosia, 42 Misc 2d 300; 1 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, p. 23-24.)"], "id": "455fe985-731e-4e4c-913c-40a181e0c7bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants challenge the validity of the town ordinance in that certain of its definitions are vague, i.e., <mask> building, single family dwelling and living quarters. Zoning and building ordinances being in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. (Allen v Adami, 39 *795NY2d 275; Thomsom Inds. v Incorporated Vil. of Port Washington North, 27 NY2d 537; Matter of 440 East 102nd St. Corp. v Murdock, 285 NY 298; 1 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice, [2d ed], \u00a7 12.01.)"], "id": "c68b2cd5-d4b3-4fe1-bcf0-3f69307a0f49", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["*267Dr. Murray was present for the experiments that Dr. Wirthlin conducted using Cavitrons. Dr. Murray also consulted on the methodology Dr. Wirthlin used to conduct his experiments. The article begins by stating that \"[d]ental unit waterlines are a source of cross-contamination from ... biofilm ....\" (Wirthlin & Marshall, Evaluation of Ultrasonic Scaling Unit Waterline Contamination After Use of Chlorine Dioxide Mouth Rinse Lavage, J. Periodontol (Mar. 2001) p. 401.) The article described biofilms in dental unit waterlines as \"a particularly vexing problem.\" (Ibid. ) The article further stated: \"The same problems occurring in fixed dental units occur in portable <mask> equipment such as ultrasonic scalers.... Typical ultrasonic scaling units might have over 16 feet of fine tubing, from the water connection to the end of the handpiece, in which to form biofilm.\" (Id. at p. 403.)"], "id": "3afc2429-578b-4aa8-94a1-fa4cf1ea8d6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["So far as I am aware, today's decision places California on the extreme outer edge of jurisdictions-indeed, in a group *770unto itself-concerning the reach of <mask> after the fact punishment. As summarized by Professor LaFave, the specifics of what type of aid will suffice to support an accessory conviction vary somewhat from state to state, but \"[f]ive kinds of aid usually are proscribed: (1) harboring or concealing the criminal; (2) providing him with certain means (e.g., a weapon, transportation, a disguise) of avoiding apprehension; (3) concealing, destroying or tampering with evidence; (4) warning the criminal of his impending discovery or apprehension; and (5) *652using force, deception or intimidation to prevent or obstruct the criminal's discovery or apprehension. To this list, a few jurisdictions have [also] added the giving of false information in certain circumstances.\" (2 LaFave, supra , \u00a7 13.6(a), pp. 555-556, footnotes omitted [citing state statutes].) None of these categories extends to mere silence in the face of compulsion to testify."], "id": "d709bf15-9a6c-4d42-be2d-745cfad3c5f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, the Nuckles court cited the Court of Appeal's decision in People v. Duty , supra , 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606 ( Duty ) with approval, and Duty even more precisely addresses the meaning and scope of Penal Code section 32 as relevant to the key issue presented here. In Duty , there was evidence that the defendant provided a false alibi for another suspected of arson. ( Id. at pp. 102-103, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606.) The question was whether this \"inferably false statement\" to the fire investigators was sufficient to convict the defendant as an <mask> after the fact. ( Id. at p. 103, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606.)"], "id": "87edc4e1-8d5d-4630-9d1f-08f6c8686d94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["We agree with Civil Court that the scope of tenant\u2019s extensive professional use of the apartment constitutes a significant violation of the tenancy (Matter of Park W. Vil. v Lewis, 62 NY2d 431). The use covenant of the lease, reasonably construed in the context of a regulated tenancy in a multiple dwelling, would permit tenant to personally engage in music instruction or rehearsal during the hours allowed. However, the \u201cprivilege\u201d afforded to tenant should not be read as authorizing the creation of commercial studios for hire by licensing individual rooms to third parties for a fee. The rent stabilization laws protect premises which are utilized primarily for residential purposes, not professional enterprises (Gallin *704v Mendelson, 151 AD2d 228). It is clear that the nature and extent of tenant\u2019s use does not qualify as an <mask> \u201cHome occupation\u201d under New York City Zoning Resolution \u00a7 12-10."], "id": "bd7e1adf-e414-4f79-90f4-720885c4a298", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The zoning ordinance of the Town of Bolton contains 18 articles, but most relevant to this litigation are portions of articles 4 and 5. Section 4.020\u00cd of article 4 sets forth the type of uses which may be introduced into a GB-5000 zone, permitted <mask> uses, minimum size of lots, minimum yard setbacks, maximum percentage of lot to be occupied, maximum height of building, shoreline restrictions, and permitted density. In article 5, the ordinance attempts to establish guidelines for site plan review.*"], "id": "16f5189b-8d42-4d43-9fd9-b5f73df07328", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The important issue now presented for\u201d determination is whether the witness, Arthur Thompson, should be compelled to answer the questions propounded to him on this hearing. *99The first interrogatory which he refused to answer was, \u201c Did you have any conversation with the defendant, Carl A. Richter, before the 6th of June, 1941, concerning matters pending before the January term of the Grand Jury in Richmond County? \u201d The witness asserted that the answer would tend to incriminate him. His distinguished counsel, the former District Attorney of Richmond County, was permitted to address the court and submit a memorandum of law in defense of the attitude taken by the witness. It is argued that if Thompson is forced to reveal the conversation he had with Richter as asked for in the question, it would tend to incriminate him of two crimes: (one) as an <mask> to defendant Richter, which is a misdemeanor; and, (two) perjury."], "id": "16b8abab-0700-4a8d-9c41-42c3b2cb31b2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Less than three weeks after sentencing, Linville also wrote a fawning letter to convicted serial killer Richard Ramirez displaying a morbid fascination with cold-blooded murder and also discussing her case. She knew her mail was being searched. Among other things, she told Ramirez the prosecution lacked evidence to prosecute her for murder, \"[s]o they threw an <mask> after the fact charge at me, and I walked out of the courtroom full of irate detectives and a furious DA with a sentence of three years, eight months.\" She asked Ramirez whether he liked \"that look of terror in the eyes of prey,\" and told him she had always \"been enthralled by True Crimes, but maybe my breed of attraction stems from different roots than the casual fan.\" And she told him, \"I never should have been arrested based on the absence of underlying evidence linking me to my crimes, but was railroaded into accepting a guilty plea to a lesser charge to sidestep the obviously corrupt attempts of law enforcement to gather evidence that can lead to more serious charges.\""], "id": "b3da6e04-d26c-4dd5-ae1e-52c6a150e191", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Because certain other action taken by the Board of Trustees with respect to the Building Zone Ordinance is questioned by the plaintiffs in this action, it is necessary to refer briefly to additional facts set forth in the complaint. On November 17, 1952 the Board of Trustees unanimously adopted an ordinance entitled \u201c An Ordinance amending the Village of Sands Point Building Zone Ordinance of 1932 relating to the regulation of the business of the erection and construction of dwellings and providing for temporary and conditional permits for the conduct of such business \u201d. The principal changes brought about by this amendatory ordinance, so far as pertinent to this litigation, were the addition of the new subdivision numbered 2A to section 602 of article VI of the Building Zone Ordinance and the addition of a new paragraph to subdivision 7 of section *96602 of the same article. In substance, the new subdivision 2A empowered the Board of Appeals to permit in a residence district a temporary and conditional use of a plot or tract of land for the business or occupation of construction and sale of dwellings and the buildings and structures <mask> thereto and to provide, in connection with said permit, regulations for the conduct of such business and conditions under which construction and sale of dwellings should be permitted on the plot or tract for which said permit is issued."], "id": "502c6354-f764-42a8-93ff-5011c5d76289", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["It appears that the subject premises are located in a \u201c B-6 or General Business District\u201d, as established by the existing zoning ordinance of the City of Rye. In addition to the main uses permitted in said district, the aforesaid zoning ordinance provides that when a special permit therefor has been issued, property located in such a district may be used for certain enumerated special uses which include, among others, \u201cBoat Yards and Docks. Docks, wharves, and storage and repair facilities for the maintenance and servicing of recreational small craft.\u201d In March of 1958, the respondent owner made application for a special permit to use the subject premises as a \u20181 marina for pleasure boats \u2019 \u2019; after the publication of notice of a public hearing to be held on said application, such hearing was held by the planning commission; and on May 27, 1958, the said commission found that certain basic conditions (required by the zoning ordinance in the case of any use which was permitted only by special permit) did prevail and it was then resolved that the said commission \u201c authorizes the issuance of a special permit * * * for the construction of bulkheads, piers, piling, fueling facilities, a marine supply store and <mask> facilities * * * for the docking, maintaining and storing of recreational small craft \u201d subject to the fulfillment of 32 conditions and safeguards as enumerated in said resolution."], "id": "d892971f-8b90-4214-843c-59633787ae2d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The business referred to is that of the publication of the paper from April 1, 1870, to the present. In this business-the plaintiffs, with Mr. Cornish, were the agents; the plaintiffs and defendants were the principals and partners. There will be (after excluding the property in existence at the beginning which was owned in common) no difficulty in ascertaining what was partnership property. In consideration of the position that by agreement the good-will was owned in common at the beginning, as well as the business; a goodwill that under ordinary circumstances might be deemed attached to the operations of the partnership through the five years under the written agreement and since, must be considered as <mask> to, and an accretion of, the good-will *366and business that existed in the beginning, the plaintiffs will be entitled to reasonable compensation for their services since April 1, 1875. \u2022"], "id": "4a2d2c07-1121-4680-9aa5-c14a61d6bb92", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant raises several arguments on appeal: the prosecution overreached when it charged her as an <mask> for refusing to testify, she cannot be guilty of being an accessory because her silence-refusing to testify-is not an affirmative act, her single act of refusing to testify does not support four felony convictions, the trial court failed to instruct on the elements of contempt, her statements to a detective were admitted into evidence in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights, and her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Fifth Amendment claim. We find no grounds for reversal and affirm the judgment."], "id": "67264017-06c4-4aa0-a34b-e77df8e20a62", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["However, even in instances involving <mask> uses, a disproportionate accessory use would still be barred (see Gallagher v Zoning Bd. of Adj., 32 Pa D & C 2d 669). And certainly uses ordinarily prohibited in a residential neighborhood, such as a slaughter house, could not invoke the First Amendment simply because the use is associated with deeply held religious beliefs."], "id": "c64adaf5-02b0-49b8-bd17-408b063bdcdb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["A defendant may be convicted of being an <mask> even if the principal is not prosecuted. (\u00a7 972.) Section 972 provides: \"An accessory to the commission of a felony may be prosecuted, tried, and punished, though the principal may be neither prosecuted nor tried, and though the principal may have been acquitted.\" The prosecution against defendant as an accessory after the fact properly went forward even though Robinson, Green, and the Clarks were never brought to trial."], "id": "afec2d8d-8d29-41e2-851b-0b6124f8ff52", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["To bring any other than the owner or proprietor into this proceeding, one must look to section 27 of the Penal Law. This section provides: \u201c A person who commits or participates in any act which would make him an <mask> if the crime committed were a felony, is a principal and may be indicted and punished as such, if the crime be a misdemeanor.\u201d"], "id": "0ad41faa-e34a-436d-baaf-aae47e71a47e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "accessory", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\"(a) Signs of a duly constituted governmental body: including traffic or similar regulatory devices, legal notices, or warnings at railroad crossings \"(b) Flags or emblems of a political, civic, philanthropic, educational, or religious organization \"(c) Temporary signs announcing a campaign, drive, or event of the above organizations \"(d) Memorial signs or tablets \"(e) Signs denoting architect, engineer, or contractor when placed on construction sites and not exceeding 25 square feet in area \"(f) Signs required to be maintained by law or governmental order, rule, or regulation, with a total surface area not exceeding ten square feet on any zoning lot \"(g) Small signs displayed for the direction or convenience of the public, including signs which identify rest rooms, freight entrances, or the like, with a total surface area not exceeding five square feet on any zoning lot.\u201d (Zoning Resolution \u00a7 12-10, \"Sign\u201d.) Section 42-52 of the Zoning Resolution provides that \"<mask> business signs or advertising signs are permitted with no restrictions on size, illumination, or otherwise, except as provided in * * * Section 42-53.\u201d Section 42-53 provides that, in Ml, M2 and M3 districts, \"no advertising sign shall be located * * * within 200 feet of an arterial highway * * * if such advertising sign is within view of such arterial highway.\u201d Appendix C of the Zoning Resolution lists the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway as an arterial highway."], "id": "a5652ac9-a28c-42c5-aafa-5d770a30283b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Victor M. Ort, J. *381This is an application pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of conviction upon the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. On August 28, 2003, defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty to the crimes of aggravated harassment in the second degree and aggravated harassment in the second degree as a <mask>.1 On October 24, 2003, defendant was sentenced to eight weekends at the Nassau County Jail and five years\u2019 probation on the hate crime charge and three years of concurrent probation for the aggravated harassment.2 Prior to the entry of his guilty plea, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment upon the ground that the conduct alleged in the indictment did not constitute the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court in a decision dated June 12, 2003."], "id": "efcee979-f679-4fe5-a404-3547ebbe77ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In moving to dismiss the indictment, defendant argued that Penal Law \u00a7 240.30 (1) requires that the threat be directed toward a specific individual, namely, the same person to whom the communication was addressed. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court held that there was no such requirement in the statute. Rather, the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree could be committed by a threat directed toward a class of individuals. The court concluded that the threatening communication in this case was directed toward the class of *382potential purchasers of the home who were of African-American ancestry, a group clearly protected by the terms of the statute. In this application, defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance is to the effect that defense counsel failed to raise the claim that the <mask> statute, as applied, violated defendant\u2019s right to free speech under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That is, the fliers should be considered \u201cprotected speech\u201d under that amendment."], "id": "9976f03a-8ea4-4dc5-a1ff-f74f850b2e56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In People v Rokicki (307 111 App 3d 645, 718 NE2d 333 [2d Dist 1999]), the Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the Illinois <mask> statute against a challenge under the First Amendment. In that case, the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct for subjecting a server in a pizza parlor to extreme verbal abuse because of his perception as to the victim\u2019s sexual orientation. The Illinois hate crime statute provided that a person \u201ccommits a hate crime when, by reason of the actual or perceived race, color, creed . . . [or] sexual orientation ... of another individual or group of individuals, he commits [any one of a series of enumerated crimes including] disorderly conduct.\u201d *383(307 III App 3d at 649, 718 NE2d at 336 [internal quotation marks omitted].) Thus, the Illinois statute was substantively equivalent to Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (1) (b).3 The Illinois court held that the hate crime statute does not infringe on a defendant\u2019s right of free speech because the statute does not punish an offender for merely thinking hateful thoughts or expressing bigoted beliefs but only punishes an offender who allows those beliefs to motivate his criminal conduct. (307 III App 3d at 651, 718 NE2d at 338.)"], "id": "17e48c20-cc88-415b-8d78-1c6b3ca8d99c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [". Pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 485.10 (2), when a person is convicted of a <mask> based upon a specified offense which is a misdemeanor or a class C, D, or E felony, the hate crime is deemed to be one category higher than the specified offense which he committed. Since aggravated harassment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, the corresponding hate crime is a class E felony."], "id": "d0f73eb1-759b-4a29-942b-7d773c639935", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [". Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized \u201cthe legislature . . . intended that improper bias which motivates certain criminal acts be the component which elevates the conduct to the level of a <mask>, rather than merely the status of a particular victim. There is no indication that the legislature intended only to redress the narrower wrong caused by biased selection of victims.\u201d (In re B.C., 176 III 2d 536, 551, 680 NE2d 1355, 1363 [1997]; see also Penal Law \u00a7 485.00.)"], "id": "cb447a38-30a9-4eff-96d3-7a19371081fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In Apprendi v New Jersey (supra), the case upon which defendant principally relies, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to a sentence imposed under New Jersey\u2019s <mask> statute, which had increased the penalty for firearms possession based upon a judicial finding that the defendant had acted with the intent to intimidate the victims based on their racial characteristics. In Apprendi, the Court discussed its earlier decision in Almendarez-Torres and, as defendant here correctly notes, did in fact state that it was \u201carguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested.\u201d (Apprendi v New Jersey, supra, 530 US at 489-490.) The Court also stated that because the issue of fact-finding as to a prior conviction was not before it in Apprendi, it would not then revisit the recidivist exception set forth in its decision in Almendarez-Torres. Lest there be any doubt as to its holding, the Apprendi court then stated, in unequivocal terms:"], "id": "92946568-d507-4156-bcbe-500b5f31c6f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Jill Konviser, J. The defendants are charged in a single indictment with acting in concert to commit the following crimes: murder in the second degree as a <mask>, murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree as a hate crime, manslaughter in the second degree, assault in the first degree as a hate crime, assault in the first degree, attempted robbery in the first degree as a hate crime, attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree as a hate crime, and attempted robbery in the second degree."], "id": "96333f8d-b8a2-4cfd-8b9e-034da245a3ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person commits a <mask> when he or she commits a specified offense[2] and . . . intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is committed or intended to be committed in whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person, regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct.\u201d In addition, Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (2) provides:"], "id": "fc7063b5-7c27-4354-b7fe-ae8f1c274ceb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The People maintain that the defendants, under an acting in concert theory, intentionally selected the decedent, Michael Sandy, as the person against whom the specified offenses were committed \u201cin whole or in substantial part because of a belief *284or perception regarding\u201d his sexual orientation. (See Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 [1] [a].) Specifically, the People allege, and the evidence before the grand jury shows, that on the evening of October 8, 2006, in Kings County, defendant Fortunato told defendant Fox and one Gary Timmins, in sum and substance, \u201cthat in the past, he had contacted gay men by means of a computer\u201d and robbed them. (People\u2019s affirmation in opposition to motion to dismiss <mask> counts at 2 11 3.) Fortunato allegedly also told Fox and Timmins in sum and substance that \u201cthis was an easy way to rob someone.\u201d (Id.)"], "id": "d7bc84df-ff6d-446f-a133-64b70359315a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants\u2019 claim that their conduct does not fall within the scope of the hate crimes statute is rejected. A person commits a <mask> when he or she commits a specified offense and intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is committed or intended to be committed in whole, or in substantial part, based on a belief or perception regarding the person\u2019s \u201crace, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation.\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 [1] [a].) In this case, the grand jury evidence shows that the defendants devised a plan to lure a gay man to a particular location in order to rob him, as Fortunato told Fox and Timmins he had done in the past. The evidence further shows that the defendants followed through on this plan by: (1) using the Internet to enter a gay chat room; (2) engaging in conversations in that gay chat room with Sandy, whom they believed to be a gay man; (3) luring Sandy to a remote location with false promises of sexual favors; and (4) attempting to rob Sandy upon his arrival."], "id": "fe30415b-c6b5-4c6a-badb-a030a8f9fbbb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants implicitly recognize that their conduct falls within the plain language of the hate crimes statute and seek to avoid its implications by asking this court to redefine a <mask> in a manner that would remove them from the scope of the statute. They claim that the legislative findings set forth in Penal Law \u00a7 485.00 alter the definition of a hate crime and additionally require the People to prove that the crime was motivated by bias, prejudice or hatred. As the defendants assert that there is no evidence that they were motivated by bias, prejudice or hatred toward Sandy when they attempted to rob him, they claim the hate crimes charges must be dismissed."], "id": "53e0a72d-7e6d-49d9-8743-9808d30c61ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The legislative findings, however, do not require proof of anything other than the intentional selection of a victim because of their \u201crace, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation.\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 [1] [a].) The Legislature appears to have included its findings within Penal Law article 485 as a means of: (1) justifying its decision to enhance sentences in cases where victims of specified offenses are intentionally selected based on a protected characteristic; (2) underscoring its outrage regarding such conduct; and (3) advancing its goal of deterring crimes motivated by bias, prejudice or hatred. (See Penal Law \u00a7 485.00 [enhanced punishment is necessary in such cases \u201cto provide clear recognition of (their) gravity . . . and the compelling importance of preventing their recurrence\u201d].) The Legislature, through its findings, therefore, made an assessment that the intentional selection of a victim based on a protected characteristic is tantamount to a crime motivated by bias, prejudice or hatred, thereby justifying enhanced punishment. (See Penal Law \u00a7 485.00.)4 Neither the legislative findings nor any other *287portion of the legislative history alter the definition of a <mask> as set forth in Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (1) (a).5"], "id": "dcedb86c-90f1-4449-992e-1531b20cef86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, had the Legislature wanted to require that a <mask> be based on something more than just the intentional selection of the victim because of a particular attribute, it could have done so. That the Legislature limited such offenses solely to instances where a victim of a specified offense is intentionally selected in whole or in substantial part because of a protected trait is a clear indication of its intent that no other criterion was required in order to sustain such a charge. (See People v Tychanski, 78 NY2d 909, 911-912 [1991] [\u201c \u2018The failure of the Legislature to include a matter within a particular statute is an indication that its exclusion was intended\u2019 \u201d (quoting Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394, 397 [1982])]; McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 74; see also McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 240 [\u201cThe maxim expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius is applied in the construction of. . . statutes, so that where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded\u201d]; McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 94, at 194 [\u201cthe language of an enactment should be given its plain meaning, or its everyday commonplace interpretation; and the court should neither limit nor extend plain language. Words will not be expanded so as to enlarge their meaning to something which the Legislature could easily have expressed but did not\u201d].)"], "id": "28229a82-19eb-40b2-b961-72de202282fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, the defendants assert that they should not be charged with hate crimes as their decision to rob Sandy was motivated only by their desire to obtain money and drugs. This argument is without merit. The hate crimes statute is premised both on the intent to commit a specified offense and on the intent to select a victim of that offense because of that victim\u2019s \u201crace, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 [1] [a]). Thus, for a <mask> to be charged in this case the statute requires both an intent to attempt to forcibly steal property, which the defendants admit (see Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 160.00), and an intent to select the robbery victim because of that victim\u2019s sexual orientation, which the grand jury evidence supports. (See Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 [1] [a].) Simply stating that their motivation was limited to their desire to obtain money and drugs, therefore, does not take the defendants out of the ambit of the hate crimes statute."], "id": "a349b934-b29f-4507-9c38-0597c3210ba4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants claim that the hate crimes statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case.6 Two grounds are raised in support of this claim. First, the defendants *289assert that the words \u201cin whole or in substantial part\u201d as set forth in the hate crimes statute are \u201cimprecise.\u201d Such imprecision, the defendants say, caused them to be charged with hate crimes even though their decision to select Sandy as their victim was not based on his sexual orientation, but rather on their belief that he would be an \u201ceasy mark and they would be able to take his drugs or money without much trouble.\u201d (Defendants\u2019 motion at 3.) The defendants\u2019 second argument is apparently that the hate crimes statute does not provide officials with clear standards for enforcement unless it is read to require that a <mask> may be charged only when an offender is motivated by bias, prejudice or hate. For the reasons that follow, the constitutional challenge to the hate crimes statute is rejected."], "id": "58dc00f6-fe31-4b24-aa14-505f7c1781ed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, any person of ordinary intelligence would understand that the words \u201cin whole\u201d mean completely or entirely and the words that immediately follow it \u201csubstantial part\u201d mean a considerable portion or amount. (People v Nelson, 69 NY2d at 307.) Thus, when considered in the context of the statute and the facts of this case, these terms sufficiently inform a person of ordinary intellect that if you search the Internet for the express purpose of finding a gay man to rob, a man you believe would \u201cprobably not offer much resistance\u201d (see defendants\u2019 motion at 3), you will be charged with a <mask>. This is so because at least a considerable portion, if not the entirety of your decision to intentionally select the victim, was *293based on a belief or perception regarding his or her sexual orientation. (Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 [1] [a].)"], "id": "9e9ff4ca-9885-4fac-87f6-95562bcb89ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants\u2019 second argument appears to be that the definition of a <mask> as set forth in Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (1) (a) is unconstitutionally vague unless it is read to require that the crimes against Sandy were actually motivated by bias, prejudice or hate. The law is well settled, however, that a court examining a statute on vagueness grounds is required to determine whether the existing statutory language sufficiently informs persons of ordinary intelligence of the forbidden conduct and provides law enforcement officials with clear standards for enforcement. (See People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 420-421.) If the statute as drafted accomplishes these goals then the constitutional challenge must be dismissed notwithstanding an assertion that the inclusion of an additional element in the statute would have made it easier for members of the public and law enforcement officials to understand the conduct prohibited by the statute. (See People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 426-427 [rejecting claim that antistalking statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied because it did not require the People to prove that an offender \u201cintend(ed) a specific result, such as fear or harm\u201d because the statute, as written, provided citizens with clear notice of the prohibited conduct]; People v Nelson, 69 NY2d at *294307-308 [rejecting claim that jostling statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied because it did not require the People to prove larcenous intent since the statute as written provided innocent citizens with clear notice of the prohibited conduct].)"], "id": "8f87dce8-56cc-46c2-80fa-f76d8e1b4d9a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, the defendants have not met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the definition of a <mask> as set forth in Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (1) (a), which makes no specific reference to bias, prejudice or hate, is unconstitutionally vague as applied. Nor could they as the definition \u201cclearly delineates specific conduct easily avoided by the innocent-minded\u201d \u2014 namely, the intentional selection of a crime victim in whole or in substantial part because of that victim\u2019s sexual orientation. (People v Nelson, 69 NY2d at 307-308.) Indeed, such conduct could have been easily avoided in this case if the defendants had not intentionally selected a gay man to rob."], "id": "f0c07238-2cda-4b2a-81d2-8927360e8667", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, the statute provides clear standards for enforcement in that it does not permit a <mask> to be charged merely because a victim happens to possess a trait protected by the statute. Indeed, Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (2) would not countenance such a result. Rather, such a prosecution is permitted only when the victim is intentionally selected because of that protected trait. (See Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 [1] [a].) These clear standards of enforcement were easily applied by law enforcement officials in this case as the evidence shows that the defendants made a deliberate and purposeful decision to target Sandy because of his sexual orientation. (People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 422.)9"], "id": "ee1e3043-6952-4123-97a8-7fc4f71c387c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [". As hate crimes legislation is often a matter of great controversy (see e.g., MacNamara, New York\u2019s Hate Crimes Act of 2000: Problematic and Redundant Legislation Aimed at Subjective Motivation, 66 Alb L Rev 519 [2003]), the Legislature apparently felt the need to justify its decision to enact such legislation by including its findings in the text of the statute. But no matter the reason for its inclusion, surely it was not to add an element to the definition of a <mask> as set forth in Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (1) (a), which *287focuses solely on the intentional selection of a victim on account of a protected trait."], "id": "3ec9eeca-f5fa-41bd-a478-743f5ced8569", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["The DOC\u2019s procedures for placing inmates in close custody were initially implemented by a directive issued in 2005, as amended by DOC Directive 6006R-D (available at http://prtlprd-web.nyc.gov/html/doc/downloads/pdf/6006R-D.pdf, cached at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/webdocs/6006R-D.pdf), effective May 28, 2009 (answer, exhibit A). According to respondent, close custody housing is \u201cdesigned to protect vulnerable inmates (and in a smaller number of cases, to separate certain predatory inmates) who can not safely be held in General Population, or in another less restrictive housing unit than Close Custody.\u201d (Id. 1f 37.) Close custody is the DOC\u2019s \u201cmost restrictive security status,\u201d and is comprised of two categories of inmates. (Aff of Frank Squillante [DOC Assistant Chief for Special Operations] If 2.) The first is close custody/protective custody (CC/PC), in which most inmates are placed at their own request, or occasionally involuntarily, because their safety would be at risk if they were to be placed in the general population. (Id. 1\u00cd 4.) These inmates include prisoners who were charged with a violent sex or <mask>, child abuse, or child homicide; inmates, including gay and transgendered inmates, who are themselves victims of attacks from other inmates; cooperating witnesses; and inmates placed in protective custody because of their identity, e.g., their status as celebrities or in law enforcement. (See id. 1f 5.) The second category of inmates, termed non-protective custody/close custody housing (non-PC/CCH), includes inmates who pose a serious threat to security \u2014 for example, inmates who committed violent acts while previously incarcerated, are known gang members, or are known to have a propensity for violence. (Id. If 6.)"], "id": "dd3fd649-13a2-4700-ae2b-d59925f30510", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c(a) (i) a conviction of or a conviction for an attempt to commit any of the provisions of sections 120.70, 130.20, 130.25, 130.30, 130.40, 130.45, 130.60, 230.34, 250.50, 255.25, 255.26 and 255.27 or article two hundred sixty-three of the penal law, or section 135.05, 135.10, 135.20 or 135.25 of such law relating to kidnapping offenses, provided the victim of such kidnapping or related offense is less than seventeen years old and the offender is not the parent of the victim, or section 230.04, where the person patronized is in fact less than seventeen years of age, 230.05 or 230.06, or subdivision two of section 230.30, or section 230.32 or 230.33 of the penal law, or (ii) a conviction of or a conviction for an attempt to commit any of the provisions of section 235.22 of the penal law, or (iii) a conviction of or a conviction for an attempt to commit any provisions of the foregoing sections committed or attempted as a <mask> defined in section 485.05 of the penal law or as a crime of terrorism defined in section 490.25 of such law or as a sexually motivated felony defined in section 130.91 of such law.\u201d (Correction Law \u00a7 168-a [2] [emphasis added].) The absence of a critical grammatical signpost, a parenthetical number preceding \u201cas a sexually motivated felony,\u201d seemingly limits the qualifying sexually motivated felony offenses only to *755those enumerated in subparagraphs (i) and (ii). By omitting a \u201c(iv)\u201d before the term \u201csexually motivated felony\u201d in SORA, the term appears to be modified by the \u201cforegoing sections,\u201d thus excluding attempted robbery in the second degree (among other sexually motivated offenses) from the registration requirements under the statute\u2014not likely the result the legislature intended, as many of the offenses enumerated in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) are sex offenses and already registerable. It is difficult to fathom that the legislature amended SORA to require already registerable sex offenders to register under SORA\u2014 this tautologic redundancy seems pointless. It is equally difficult to fathom that the legislature purposefully omitted the type of conduct the defendant committed here\u2014attacking a woman with physical disabilities and demanding that she \u201csuck his dick\u201d as she lay on the ground immobilized\u2014from the mandates of SORA. While the legislature seemingly intended to require registration for all sexually motivated felonies, that is simply not what the language of the amended statute conveys. This court is constrained, therefore, to find that, on its face, SORA does not include attempted robbery in the second degree as a sexually motivated felony. Thus, unless and until the statute is amended, the defendant need not register as a sex offender in connection with this matter."], "id": "ed46993e-0151-44be-ba4a-29b267e39525", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Seymour Rotker, J. The defendant has been charged by an eight-count indictment filed on November 24, 2000 with attempted murder in the second degree as a <mask> and related offenses. On or *188about December 21, 2000, the defendant filed a timely omnibus motion seeking various relief. The People responded to the motion which was decided by the Court on or about January 17, 2001. Certain pretrial hearings were conducted on January 29, 2001 and, on or about January 30, 2001, the Court ruled on those pretrial issues. On March, 6, 2001, the case was forwarded from a TAP Part to K-TRP as a trial-ready case for April 4, 2001. On that date, the matter was adjourned until May 9, 2001 because the Legal Aid Society, which represented the defendant from the time of his arrest, had internally reassigned the case to a different attorney for trial. On May 9, 2001, the newly assigned attorney asked the Court to permit him to file a motion challenging the constitutionality of New York\u2019s recently enacted \u201cHate Crimes\u201d legislation (Penal Law \u00a7 485.00). The Court directed the defendant\u2019s counsel to file an order to show cause addressed to this issue. The defendant filed the order as directed by the Court and the People responded with an affirmation in opposition dated May 15, 2001."], "id": "fb5cb0ff-2f68-4e62-a362-261a327a18ed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Jeffrey M. Atlas, J. The defendant has been indicted for assault in the third *342degree as a <mask>. In a pretrial motion, the defendant seeks dismissal of the indictment by challenging the constitutionality of the recently enacted Hate Crimes Act of 2000 (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 485.00-485.10). Sections 485.05 and 485.10 of the Penal Law, as they apply in this case, enhance the penalties for assault in the third degree by elevating that crime from a misdemeanor to a felony when it has been proved that the offender committed the crime of assault in the third degree and intentionally selected the victim because of a belief or perception regarding the sexual orientation of the victim.1 The defendant claims that this new statute is unconstitutionally vague. In particular, the defendant claims that the statute provides insufficient notice of prohibited conduct and permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. For the following reasons, the motion is denied."], "id": "b2ed0109-faff-4f0c-a67e-083e7a3b3730", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["As for the second issue, I also find that the language of the statute does not lend itself to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. To begin with, enforcement of these sections by the police is not likely to be expected. In fact, the provisions of these sections apply only when the defendant has already committed one of the underlying crimes specified in the section. Nothing in the statute changes the well-established requirement that the police must have probable cause before arresting an offender for the commission of the underlying specified crime. It is really irrelevant to the making of an arrest that the specified crime will in the fixture be elevated as a <mask>, even though that notion may affect the way the police investigate the crime. Beyond that, enforcement by the prosecutor, the Grand Jury and the trial court really turns on the sufficiency and clarity of proof establishing that the accused purposefully chose the victim, in whole or part, because of the accused\u2019s perception that the selected victim was, as in this case, of a certain sexual orientation. The sufficiency of such evidence is, of course, subject first to objective review by the prosecutor and, in the case of felonies, to scrutiny by the Grand Jury and review by the court. The language of the statute, as I have pointed out, is such as to permit a fully objective assess*346ment of the evidence before initiating any prosecution. Thus, the law provides objective criteria which must be observed throughout the accusatory process and in no way provides for enforcement according to the subjective conclusions of the complainant, police or prosecutor (see, People v Shack, 86 NY2d 529 [1995])."], "id": "31f037e0-17d2-42ef-be47-30bb2f1633b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [". <mask> legislation which permitted judges to enhance punishment beyond the statutory maximum sentence without the benefit of the trier of fact having found beyond a reasonable doubt that the prohibited victim selection had taken place was declared unconstitutional in Apprendi v New Jersey (530 US 466 [2000]). The New York statute avoids that pitfall by providing that the critical enhancing issues be charged as an element of the offense and proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the trier of fact before serving to increase the penalties beyond the usual maximum."], "id": "5232881c-727c-40b1-bb28-a983551639c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Apprendi involved a New Jersey <mask> statute which permitted the sentencing court to impose an enhanced maximum sentence upon finding that the crime for which the defendant was convicted was motivated by bias. The United States Supreme Court struck the New Jersey bias statute because it authorized that the determination of racist motivation be made by the judge alone, rather than proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In so ruling, the Court held that any fact that extends the outer parameter of punishment is a de facto element of the crime, and that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is abridged if it is not submitted and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The teaching of Apprendi thus is that \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d (Apprendi, supra at 490.)"], "id": "e97bce02-4325-4bbe-8690-226165fe20a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Each of the two forcible sodomy counts included sustained allegations that it was a <mask> and committed in concert (\u00a7 422.75, subd. (b)); that defendant was armed with and personally used a deadly weapon, and personally inflicted great bodily injury (\u00a7\u00a7 667.61, subd. (d)(6), 12022.7, 12022.8); that the offense involved a kidnapping that substantially increased the risk to the victim (\u00a7 667.61, subds.(d)(2)); and that it was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang."], "id": "44fbfab4-a51d-4116-8a0b-4a742ca06509", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Three of the four forcible oral copulation counts included sustained allegations that it was a <mask> and committed in concert, for the benefit of a criminal street gang; that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon; and that the offense involved a kidnapping that substantially increased the risk to the victim. In addition, the fourth count also included the sustained allegation that during the commission of the offense defendant personally used a deadly weapon."], "id": "336d8d70-cbcb-4caa-abd8-c8e927fed135", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["We recognize, obviously, that Section 52.1 is civil, while Section 241 is criminal, but in adopting the Screws standard we find it particularly significant that so much of the text and structure of Section 52.1 appears to descend from Section 241. It seems to us that, when our Legislature enacted <mask> legislation in 1987, it chose not to adhere strictly to the federal scheme by adopting a civil enforcement statute on the model of Section 1983, covering \"deprivations\" of rights and limiting the statute to public officials or other conduct evincing state action. Instead, it used as a model Section 241-a criminal conspiracy statute-giving the statute enough breadth to reach a wide range of \"interference\" with \"secured rights\" by means of fear-inducing conduct, whether undertaken by private actors or public officials. In essence, the Legislature created a hybrid of the historic federal civil rights enforcement scheme, using Section 241 as a unitary model for criminal as well as civil enforcement. The burden of proof is fundamentally different in these two arenas, of course, but other than that we see no reason why the applicable mens rea element ought to differ.31"], "id": "06271f4b-f306-4cde-bc4c-ba823cfcf63e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["In a series of cases going back some 20 years, California courts have repeatedly decried the rising number of hate crimes and related conduct.4 Yet such conduct proliferates. The most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics Report *335on hate crimes, states that \"U.S. residents experienced an average of 250,000 <mask> victimizations each year from 2004 to 2015.\" (Hate Crime Victimization, 2004-2015 < https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcv0415.pdf> (as of March 13, 2018).) Hate conduct takes its toll not only on individual victims *279but also on whole communities.5"], "id": "6cd16b08-15b1-4014-8278-25cda082d3a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["Section 594.3, subdivision (b) provides: \"Any person who knowingly commits any act of vandalism to a church, synagogue, mosque, temple, building owned and occupied by a religious educational institution, or other place primarily used as a place of worship where religious services are regularly conducted or a cemetery, which is shown to have been a <mask> and to have been committed for the purpose of intimidating and deterring persons from freely exercising their religious beliefs, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.\""], "id": "d5761b3a-8bab-4bf3-bc34-8104d9e38328", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [" \"a conviction of or a conviction for an attempt to commit any provisions of the foregoing sections committedor attempted as a <mask> defined in section 485.05 of the penal law or as a crime of terrorism defined in section 490.25 of such law or as a sexually motivated felony defined in section 130.91 of such law; or [other offenses not at issue here]\" (Correction Law \u00a7 168-a[2][a] [emphasis added])."], "id": "8d2dc473-88b1-4ba3-854b-07707460a0d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": [" \"a conviction of or a conviction for an attempt to commit any provisions of the foregoing sections committedor attempted as a <mask> defined in section 485.05 of the penal law or as a crime of terrorism defined in section 490.25 of such law or as a sexually motivated felony defined in section 130.91 of such law; or [other offenses not at issue here]\" (Correction Law \u00a7 168-a[2][a] [emphasis added])."], "id": "4aec8783-29ad-4ac4-9756-619ce2ad9f55", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["You have asked for our views on the constitutionality of a pending bill, the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act, S. 909, 111th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, Apr. 28, 2009). In particular, you have asked us to review section 7(a) of S. 909, which would amend title 18 of the United States Code to create a new section 249, which would establish two criminal prohibitions called \u201c<mask> acts.\u201d First, proposed section 249(a)(1) would prohibit willfully causing bodi- ly injury to any person, or attempting to cause bodily injury to any person through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, \u201cbecause of the actual or perceived race, color, reli- gion, or national origin of any person.\u201d This provision is similar to an existing federal law, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 245 (2006), the principal difference being that the new section 249(a)(1), unlike section 245, would not re-"], "id": "8aca890e-7fd9-4c41-825f-c288b334a695", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On or about September 12, 2012, indictment No. 7805/2012 was filed in Kings County, charging the respondent with, inter alia, scheme to defraud in the first degree, a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 190.65, and grand larceny in the second degree as a <mask> (two counts), a class B felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 155.40 and 485.05."], "id": "432bc6c2-3e0c-4ef6-9366-30088a4c76d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On December 20, 2012, the respondent pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court, Kings County, to grand larceny in the first degree, a class B felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 155.42, grand larceny in the second degree as a <mask> (two counts), a class B felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 155.40 and 485.05, grand larceny in the second degree, a class C felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 155.40, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (two counts), a class D felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 170.25, offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree (10 counts), a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 175.35, falsifying business records in the first degree (11 counts), a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 175.10, and scheme to defraud in the first degree, a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 190.65."], "id": "d6f09f0f-902a-436f-8c88-51624f0cb502", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On or about September 12, 2012, indictment No. 7805/2012 was filed in Kings County, charging the respondent with, inter alia, scheme to defraud in the first degree, a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 190.65, and grand larceny in the second degree as a <mask> (two counts), a class B felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 155.40 and 485.05."], "id": "eb672361-743f-4b6e-b436-cb1bd6d98780", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "hate crime", "legal_topic": "Mens Rea", "masked_sentences": ["On December 20, 2012, the respondent pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court, Kings County, to grand larceny in the first degree, a class B felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 155.42, grand larceny in the second degree as a <mask> (two counts), a class B felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 155.40 and 485.05, grand larceny in the second degree, a class C felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 155.40, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (two counts), a class D felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 170.25, offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree (10 counts), a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 175.35, falsifying business records in the first degree (11 counts), a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 175.10, and scheme to defraud in the first degree, a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 190.65."], "id": "2054da79-492b-4fdd-9c48-cceb9786b521", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Plaintiff Elbert Walker filed this action against his former criminal defense attorney, Defendant Gerald Williams, asserting a \u00a7 1983 claim and various state law claims arising from Defend- ant\u2019s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s \u00a7 1983 claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Having dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s only federal claim, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff\u2019s remaining state claims and dismissed those claims without prejudice. Plain- tiff appeals both rulings. We find no error and thus AFFIRM. In conjunction with his appeal, Plaintiff submitted a Mo- tion for Untimely Reply to the Opposition Brief, which we con- strued as a Motion for Leave to File a Reply Brief Out of Time. We GRANT Plaintiff\u2019s motion, and we have considered his reply brief in ruling on this appeal. BACKGROUND Plaintiff and two co-defendants were charged in 2012 with one count of conspiracy to commit multiple objects, including ar- son, bank fraud, <mask>, mail fraud, bankruptcy fraud, posses- sion of a forged security, and making false declarations in court in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 371. See United States v. Walker, 758 F. App\u2019x 868, 869 (11th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff was also charged sepa- USCA11 Case: 21-10597 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 3 of 13"], "id": "01ea09ba-836a-47af-b206-7f4b2b91a307", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Before Davis, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges. Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge: Sergio Fernando Lagos urged the district court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255 on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing. The district court denied Lagos\u2019s motion, and for the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM. I Lagos pleaded guilty in 2015 to one count of conspiracy to commit <mask> and five counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2, 1343, and 1349. Lagos was the owner and CEO of U.S.A. Dry Van Logistics, LLC Case: 20-20283 Document: 00516192963 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2022"], "id": "19a054f1-8a85-44f2-8158-2aae0cbe5892", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["(USADV), a company that provided cross-border trucking services to the maquiladora industry. He entered into a loan financing agreement on behalf of USADV with General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC), a nonbank lender, under which GECC extended a revolving line of credit secured by USADV\u2019s accounts receivable. The maximum sum that could be borrowed under the agreement was based on the amount of USADV\u2019s eligible accounts receivable. From around March 2008 at least until January 2010, Lagos and his co-conspirators engaged in a <mask> scheme whereby they induced GECC to extend a $35 million line of credit by fraudulently inflating USADV\u2019s accounts receivable. As a result of USADV\u2019s admitted \u201csubstantial overstatement in . . . Eligible Accounts,\u201d GECC had extended a \u201csignificance [sic] overadvance\u201d under the loan agreement. 1 Consequently, USADV declared bankruptcy several days after GECC learned of the fraud, explaining to the bankruptcy court that the company\u2019s \u201cneed\u201d for financing and the \u201cunlikelihood of finding other sources of financing given the significant overadvance position of [GECC]\u201d made a bankruptcy proceeding USADV\u2019s \u201conly realistic option.\u201d 2 Following Lagos\u2019s 2015 guilty plea, the district court sentenced him to 97 months\u2019 imprisonment and three years of supervised release and ordered him to pay a $600 special assessment and $15,970,517.37 in restitution. On direct appeal, Lagos challenged only the amount of restitution ordered, arguing that the restitution statute did not authorize the court to order restitution for GECC\u2019s legal, expert, and consulting fees incurred in investigating the fraud or its legal fees from the bankruptcy proceedings caused by the fraud. We rejected Lagos\u2019s argument, but the Supreme Court"], "id": "5d2592aa-ba23-456a-b131-9a02e163ae2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["By contrast, in a case relied on by plaintiff, the petitioner was indicted for violating the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which contained a provision expressly permitting the commencement of an action to challenge its constitutionality. (Goland v United States, 903d 1247 [9th Cir 1990].) Although the Court distinguished Dennis as \u201crestricted [to] the availability of certain defenses against criminal charges\u201d (id. at 1253), it also observed that if the petitioner had been indicted *823solely for conspiring to defraud the government or giving false statements to the government, he would be barred from collaterally attacking FECA\u2019s constitutionality. Moreover, the petitioner was directly charged with violating FECA, whereas here, plaintiff\u2019s officers were indicted not for violating the New York DBE program but for conspiracy and mail and <mask> based on a scheme to defraud it. It is thus distinguishable."], "id": "82878867-ddac-4e8b-ab6f-c6272d265922", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Here, plaintiff\u2019s officers have been indicted for mail fraud, <mask>, and conspiracy to launder money, in furtherance of *824a scheme to defraud by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises in connection with the DBE program; they are not charged with violating the program which plaintiff claims is unconstitutional. Consequently, as in Dennis and Bryson, any finding that the DBE program is unconstitutional is irrelevant and does not preclude a finding that plaintiff attempted to defraud it."], "id": "0bb0eaf1-8788-4c90-bb43-9dae834a3611", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cFrom November 2003 through August 2008, Mr. Grobart and his company \u2014 now known as Teneyck, formerly known as Neill Supply Company \u2014 engaged in a scheme to unlawfully obtain a contract from Con Edison by furnishing bribes to a Con Edison employee named James Woodason. Mr Woodason was involved in the awarding of contracts by Con Edison to companies via what was supposed to be a competitive bidding process. In 2003, Robert Rosenberg . . . brokered a deal between Mr. Grobart and Neill Supply on one hand and Mr. Woodason on the other, whereby Mr. Grobart and Neill Supply would pay a bribe to Woodason in exchange for Woodason steering a Con Edison contract to Neill Supply.\u201d (Emphasis added.) *196Thereafter, in March of 2012, plaintiff commenced this action against Rosenberg, a cooperating witness, who has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery and <mask>, pursuant to 18 USC \u00a7 371, but who had not been sentenced prior to oral argument on this motion."], "id": "8603ee0f-4151-447a-b426-d630c57d8a56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court finds plaintiffs arguments to be without merit. According to the plea agreement, dated March 10, 2011, which was entered into by Grobart, both for himself and for Teneyck, Inc., formerly known as Neill Supply Co., Inc.,* plaintiff pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging it with a violation of 18 USC \u00a7 371 in connection with a conspiracy to pay bribes in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 666 (a) (2) and commit <mask> under 18 USC \u00a7\u00a7 1343 and 1346. Rosenberg also entered into a plea agreement with the United States of America, dated December 2, 2010, in which he pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with a violation of 18 USC \u00a7 371 in connection with a conspiracy to commit bribery and wire fraud in violation of 18 USC \u00a7\u00a7 666 (a) (2) and 1343. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that plaintiff and defendant each pleaded guilty to the same one-count information and defendant\u2019s fault is equal to plaintiffs. Therefore, there is no need to impute Grobart\u2019s acts to Neill Supply, since plaintiff itself has pleaded guilty to the one-count information."], "id": "9f36b699-3ce9-4897-bdd1-6f292b644b42", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In connection with a federal investigation into her conduct, the defendant had previously been charged in the United States District Court of Connecticut with making false statements (18 USC \u00a7 1001). On June 6, 2013, she pleaded guilty not only to that charge, but also to <mask> (18 USC \u00a7 1343), a charge which was filed the day of her plea. She was subsequently sentenced to eight months\u2019 incarceration. Wire fraud is committed by a person who:"], "id": "fc9dafbf-bfa3-4c35-bfaa-8a3b9ab00756", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction unless: \u201c(a) The offenses as defined have substantially different elements and the acts establishing one of*881fense are in the main clearly distinguishable from those establishing the other; or \u201c(b) Each of the offenses as defined contains an element which is not an element of the other, and the statutory provisions defining such offenses are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.\u201d The People concede that the scheme to defraud count and the federal <mask> conviction are based on the same \u201ccriminal transaction.\u201d2 3**They contend, however, that the defendant may still be prosecuted for the state offense because the prosecution falls within both of the exceptions contained in CPL 40.20 (2). Neither applies in this case."], "id": "0ed3efe2-e859-465a-b78e-a4ec40e4b48d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["First, the offenses as defined do not, within the meaning CPL 40.20 (2) (a), \u201chave substantially different elements,\u201d nor are \u201cthe acts establishing one offense ... in the main clearly distinguishable from those establishing the other.\u201d Considering the first of these two prongs, it is evident that each crime has elements the other does not. Scheme to defraud in the first degree requires that the defendant actually \u201cobtain[ ] property from one or more . . . persons\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 190.65 [1] [a]), while <mask> does not. Wire fraud requires the transmission of \u201cany writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds\u201d by use of \u201cwire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce\u201d (18 USC \u00a7 1343), while scheme to defraud in the first degree does not. The question is not, however, whether the offenses have any different elements, but whether they have \u201csubstantially different elements.\u201d I find that they do not."], "id": "e8e15680-0d91-4c6f-8b5f-bb442741fa66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As the Court of Appeals has recognized, \u201cthe Legislature in amending the Penal Law to add crimes based on a scheme to defraud (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 190.60, 190.65; L 1976, ch 384), modeled the offenses upon the Federal mail fraud statute.\u201d (People v First Meridian Planning Corp., 86 NY2d 608, 616 [1995], citing William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law \u00a7 190.60.)3 Indeed, in explicat*882ing the language the legislature used to define a scheme to defraud, the Court of Appeals has \u201clook[ed] to Federal [mail fraud] precedents applying similar statutory language.\u201d (First Meridian Planning Corp., 86 NY2d at 616.) <mask> is mail fraud\u2019s \u201ctwin,\u201d* **4 and like mail fraud, requires a \u201cscheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.\u201d (18 USC \u00a7\u00a7 1343, 1341.)5"], "id": "69090db1-c42e-4ace-a52f-039756a99347", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[s]ections 190.60 and 190.65 contain language not found in the federal mail fraud section referring to a scheme \u2018constituting a systematic ongoing course of conduct . . . [,]\u2019 [t]his does not introduce a new, different element of the offense, but codifies what is contained in the concept \u2018scheme to defraud\u2019 under the federal statute.\u201d (Richard A. Givens, Additional Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law \u00a7 190.60, 1988 Pocket Part at 277.) Similarly, the mens rea required for scheme to defraud, an \u201cintent to defraud ... or to obtain property ... by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises,\u201d Penal Law *883\u00a7 190.65 (1) (a), is also essentially the same as that required for <mask> and mail fraud, since the purpose of the \u201cscheme or artifice\u201d required for those two crimes must be to \u201cobtain[ ] money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.\u201d (18 USC \u00a7\u00a7 1343, 1341.)"], "id": "fe519910-9da7-4acb-bdb0-c323536627db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The fact that scheme to defraud in the first degree requires that property be obtained from at least one victim also does not mean that the two crimes have \u201csubstantially different\u201d elements. In Matter of Abraham v Justices of N.Y. Supreme Ct. of Bronx County (37 NY2d 560 [1975]), the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution of the defendant for criminal possession of dangerous drugs in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 220.23, as repealed by L 1973, ch 276, \u00a7 18), was barred because of a prior conviction in federal court for conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute narcotic drugs. (21 USC \u00a7\u00a7 812, 841 [a] [1]; [b] [1] [A].) Because \u201cthe same possession of the same drugs was among the acts charged and proved and for which a conviction was had,\u201d the Court found \u201cno substance in the claim, hypothetically posited, that the Federal convictions could have been obtained without proof of possession of the drugs.\u201d (Abraham, 37 NY2d at 567 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also People v Abbamonte, 43 NY2d 74 [1977].) Similarly, here the claim, \u201chypothetically posited,\u201d that the <mask> conviction could have been obtained without proof that the defendant obtained property from at least one victim does not render the elements of scheme to defraud in the first degree and wire fraud substantially different."], "id": "72a10eff-491a-45c7-a6f1-12c455abb3ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Neither does the fact that <mask> requires the use of \u201cwire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce\u201d (18 USC \u00a7 1343), and that a scheme to defraud conviction, \u201chypothetically posited,\u201d could be obtained without proof of this element. In People v Lo Cicero (14 NY2d 374 [1964]), the defendant was charged with a robbery for which he had been acquitted in federal court. The Court of Appeals held that \u201c[t]he additional element of obstruction of interstate commerce, necessarily present in the Federal indictment, does not diminish the substantial identity of the two charges,\u201d and dismissed the robbery charge. (Id. at 379 [citations omitted].) Here, too, despite the jurisdictional interstate commerce requirement for wire fraud,6 that crime and scheme to defraud have substantially similar elements."], "id": "01dfdeb4-67b1-4377-92a7-582f643ca975", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Alternatively, the People claim that the defendant\u2019s prosecution for scheme to defraud in the first degree is not barred because it falls within the exception contained in CPL 40.20 (2) (b), since \u201c[e]ach of the offenses as defined contains an element which is not an element of the other, and the statutory provisions defining such offenses are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.\u201d As already noted, each offense does contain an element which is not an element of the other, satisfying the first prong of this exception. However, contrary to the People\u2019s argument, the statutory provisions defining scheme to defraud and <mask> do not meet the requirement of the second prong."], "id": "e2ba3f6c-361b-412b-a50b-738aa45514e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In contrast, in Matter of Schmidt v Roberts (74 NY2d 513, 522 [1989]), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant convicted of the federal crimes of interstate transportation of stolen property (18 USC \u00a7 2314), and conspiracy to commit that crime (18 USC \u00a7 371), could not be prosecuted in New York for grand larceny in the second degree, former Penal Law \u00a7 155.35, now Penal Law \u00a7 155.40. The Court concluded that the federal and state crimes were not designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil, since \u201c[t]he Federal crime of interstate transportation of stolen property and the State crime of larceny are both designed to punish thieves and to protect property owners from thefts.\u201d (Id.) Similarly, the federal <mask> statute and New York\u2019s scheme to defraud are both designed to protect the unwary from schemes to deprive them of their property by fraud. Thus, scheme to defraud in the first degree and wire fraud are not, as CPL 40.20 (2) (b) requires, designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil. (See also Matter of Kaplan v Ritter, 71 NY2d 222, 230-231 [1987] [\u201ccounts in the New York County indictment, which charge petitioners with securities fraud and grand larceny, cannot be prosecuted (pursuant to exceptions in CPL 40.20 [2] [b] and [e]) in light of the prior Federal prosecution for RICO violations and fraud\u201d].)"], "id": "e8d5c41d-d459-45f5-83a2-dc625f07a3b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The conduct for which the defendant is charged with scheme to defraud in the first degree is, without question, reprehensible. Nevertheless, because the exceptions set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of CPL 40.20 (2) do not apply here, the defendant, having been convicted of <mask> based on the same criminal transaction, can no longer be prosecuted for scheme to defraud in the first degree. Accordingly, count one of the indictment must be dismissed."], "id": "561fe376-1306-43eb-addd-d56a5f55ac61", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". Justice Donnino noted that the crimes of <mask> and crimes of scheme to defraud have been defined using \u201cparallel language.\u201d (William C. *882Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law \u00a7 190.60; see also People v Taylor, 304 AD2d 434, 435 [1st Dept 2003] [\u201cThe scheme to defraud statute (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 190.60, 190.65) was derived from and patterned after the federal mail fraud statute\u201d (citation omitted)]; People v Kaminsky, 127 Misc 2d 497, 501 [Sup Ct, NY County 1985].)"], "id": "a344413c-1e7b-443a-a5cf-7a404c086bb2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". Christopher Q. Cutler, McNally Revisited: The Misrepresentation Branch\u201d of the Mail Fraud Statute a Decade Later, 13 BYU J Pub L 77 n 3 (1998); see also Carpenter v United States, 484 US 19, 25 n 6 (1987) (\u201cThe mail and <mask> statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to both sets of offenses here\u201d). The legislative history of the wire fraud statute states that 18 USC \u00a7 1343, defining wire fraud, was designed as \u201ca parallel [to the] provision now in the law for fraud by mail.\u201d (United States v Garlick, 240d 789, 792 [9th Cir 2001], quoting S Rep No. 44, 82nd Cong, 1st Sess at 19 [1951].)"], "id": "1a6ea322-d8b4-4c33-b855-8f4eb64821d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". See Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 20 (1999) (\u201cAlthough the mail fraud and <mask> statutes contain different jurisdictional elements [\u00a7 1341 *884requires use of the mails while \u00a7 1343 requires use of interstate wire facilities], they both prohibit, in pertinent part, \u2018any scheme or artifice to defraud\u2019 or to obtain money or property \u2018by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises\u2019 \u201d)."], "id": "224d5e94-30c6-4e24-a0bf-6303fe9738b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The elements of the <mask> statute (U. S. Code, tit. 18, \u00a7 1343) are: (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of interstate or foreign wire facilities. These are necessary for the purpose of carrying out the execution of the scheme (Roberts v. United States, 226 F. 2d 464 [C. A. 6th, 1955], cert. den. 350 U. S. 935; Huff v. United States, 301 F. 2d 760 [C. A. 5th, 1962], cert. den. 371 U. S. 922; United States v. Whiting, 308 F. 2d 537 [C. A. 2d, 1962]; Lindsey v. United States, 332 F. 2d 688 [C. A. *3239th, 1964]; cf. Pereira v. United States, 347 U. S. 1 [1954]; Lemon v. United States, 278 F. 2d 369 [C. A. 9th, 1960] cases concerned with the mail fraud statute [U. S. Code, tit. 18, \u00a7 1341]). In United States v. Whiting (supra, p. 540) the court made this observation: \u201c Although no money was ever paid out to the defendants by the Banco do Brasil, the fact that a scheme to defraud fails of its purpose is not a defense. Hoffman v. United States, 249 F. 2d 338, 341 \u201d. And in United States v. Bagdasian (291 F. 2d 163 [C. A. 4th, 1961]) the court noted that it was not an essential part of the wire fraud statute for an indictment to allege that the defendant converted the money to his own use."], "id": "fa18b1d5-7da6-4eab-913b-78d6c4309976", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On September 22, 2016, the USAO unsealed a criminal complaint (USAO complaint) that charged Dr. Kaloyeros with one count of conspiring to commit <mask>. The charge is based on allegations that Dr. Kaloyeros conspired with real estate developers in Buffalo and Syracuse to defraud FSMC into awarding lucrative contracts to the developers (USAO complaint f 67). Specifically, Dr. Kaloyeros is accused of causing FSMC to issue purportedly competitive requests-for-proposals (RFPs) that secretly were tailored to the qualifications of preferred developers and designed to prevent competing bids\u2014all while falsely representing to FSMC that the bidding process was fair, open and competitive (id. f 68). On November 22, 2016, the USAO filed a wire fraud indictment against Dr. Kaloyeros, and he entered a plea of not guilty to the charge at his December 1, 2016 arraignment."], "id": "9fbc98a5-d634-4a96-b532-61393bf6e7a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Having determined that this court has jurisdiction it is necessary to next decide if the complaint states a cause of action under the RICO statute. The RICO statute, because of its broad definitions, appears to encompass many \u201cfraud related civil claims which are state and common law in nature and which do not involve racketeering in the ordinary meaning of that word\u201d. (See Brodsky, op. cit., p 2, col 1.) Thus, \u201cbecause RICO requires only two acts of mail or <mask> to establish a violation, and because each mailing or wire used in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, whether or not pursuant to the same scheme, constitutes a separate offense, a private right of action for treble damages is available for violation of section 1962 in virtually *158every case of commercial mail and wire fraud * * * Given the prevalence of mail and wire use in commercial transactions, RICO\u2019s provision for a private cause of action predicated on violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes virtually federalizes common law fraud.\u201d (Note, Civil RICO, op. cit., at pp 1104-1105.)"], "id": "0c44a5a9-279c-4d44-8c34-09e43aed2cf3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even assuming jurisdiction, it does not appear that an adequate RICO claim is set forth. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co. (741d 482, 492, decided July 25, 1984), held that under the statute, a party is entitled to treble damages only if it is alleged and proved that an enterprise\u2019s affairs have been conducted through a \u201c \u2018pattern of racketeering activity\u2019 \u201d, which is defined under section 1961 (1) to include acts involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, narcotics, embezzlement, extortion, fraudulent securities and mail and <mask>. The court in Sedima believed there was no evidence that Congress intended to create a broad civil cause of action under RICO unrelated to organized crime and its attempt at infiltration of private businesses. The court noted that while there were few cases where RICO had been used against reputed mobsters, there was a veritable explosion of cases alleging RICO offenses against legitimate enterprises where \u201cgarden variety\u201d allegations of fraud were alleged. Such use of the RICO statute was characterized by the court as \u201cextraordinary, if not outrageous\u201d (p 487). The court went on to hold that for \u201c \u2018pattern of racketeering activity\u2019 \u201d (p 492) to exist, the predicate acts upon which a RICO claim could be based would require at least two prior criminal convictions. Additionally, the court declared that beyond ordinary damages, one asserting a civil action under RICO must allege a \u201cseparate, distinct racketeering enterprise injury\u201d. There was a vigorous dissent from Judge Cardamone."], "id": "b221b2a3-35d0-4a98-8ab7-f787177fe76b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Congress in enacting RICO focused primarily on eradicating organized crime but did not limit the application of the RICO statute only to organized crime. The application of RICO was intended to reach both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises regardless of organized crime involvement. (See, Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co., 473 US 479.) The Supreme Court held in H. J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. (492 US 229, 249 [1989] ): \"We thus decline the invitation to invent a rule that RICO\u2019s pattern of racketeering concept requires an allegation and proof of an organized crime nexus.\u201d Since RICO includes Federal mail and <mask> as predicate offenses, the use of the mails and wire communications in furtherance of a scheme to defraud can easily place a violator of common-law fraud into the RICO statute subjecting him to sanctions of treble damages and attorney\u2019s fees. Each use of the mails or wire communications under the statute is a separate violation, even if there is only one scheme to defraud. These aspects of the statute invited different \"garden variety\u201d fraud claims to be brought under RICO."], "id": "55f9c60e-ad4c-4137-8862-a2ee4e44c8b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff\u2019s third cause of action alleged that defendant in carrying out his fraudulent scheme, used the mail and wires in connection with the acquisition of the house and the obtaining of the bank loans. It is alleged that each employment of the wire and mails constituted criminal mail and <mask>, and that since defendant was associated with other attorneys in law firms, he was engaged in an ongoing \"enterprise\u201d as part of his scheme to defraud, and that this constituted a \"pattern of racketeering activity\u201d pursuant to 18 USC \u00a7 1961 et seq. entitling plaintiff to recover treble damages and attorneys\u2019 fees."], "id": "02106560-3dd3-4a10-81cb-92e08502b547", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff contends that the pattern of racketeering activity was made out by allegations that she was induced to obtain *575two separate loans, each of which involved mail or <mask>. The \"ongoing enterprise\u201d is alleged to be the existence of the law firm defendant was associated with, even though it is clear that the law firm received no fees for this essentially private and personal transaction. The initial Beauford decision (supra) was overruled en banc (Beauford v Helmsley, 865d 1386). But Simpson (supra) still stands as controlling New York law. While in Beauford, there was one scheme directed at buyers of 8,000 condominium units, here we have a single individual involved in virtually contemporaneous transactions focused on a single real estate purchase. A court should not permit a plaintiff to convert what was essentially a single transaction into micro-units of activity in an attempt to demonstrate a multiplicity of acts."], "id": "84160b26-6137-4352-81a5-bc829f95a356", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Concurrent with the diversion of funds from BNU an investigation of Steve\u2019s operations by the United States Department of Justice was underway. Two weeks after the hearing before this court on BNU\u2019s motion for a TRO on the funds in the accounts in New York City, the United States Attorney filed an indictment against Steve\u2019s principals, Steve Wangboje and Azie Guice, in the United States District Court in New Jersey. The indictment charged that they had engaged in \"money laundering\u201d of funds from narcotic operations, <mask> and conspiracy. The affidavits of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency personnel in support of the orders for the interception of wire communications among the defendants indicated that the money laundering scheme was related to drug trafficking activities by car dealerships located in Nigeria. One such dealership was Skymit Motors, Ltd. in Lagos, Nigeria, to which Steve\u2019s shipped luxury vehicles and parts. Communications intercepted from Wangboje\u2019s home with the other defendants \"reflect that the Subject[s] themselves are actively involved in fraudulent schemes * * * and have customers who were/are engaged in drug trafficking.\u201d The wiretaps also revealed that Skymit attempted to impede the investigation in Nigeria by, inter alia, instructing Steve\u2019s to manufacture and alter documents, and \"stonewall\u201d the investigators."], "id": "bf665307-0bdf-476b-90a3-29b37814a782", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In July 1994, defendant and others were indicted by a Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for crimes involving the killing of four horses in order to collect insurance proceeds for the horses. On March 19, 1996, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal conspiracy to commit <mask>. Defendant admitted that he conspired with three others to kill a horse in order to enable one of them to file a false insurance claim as to that horse. Defendant further admitted that he told the horse killer to keep quiet about the people who hired the killer to slaughter the horses, and, if he kept quiet about defendant\u2019s friends and business associates, defendant would pay him money. Defendant also admitted that he later spoke with the horse killer and that defendant said that he would kill the horse killer if he did anything to hurt defendant. Defendant was sentenced to serve 33 months in prison, to be followed by three years of probation, and to make restitution of $200,000 to one of the defrauded insurance companies."], "id": "cba50f52-7a9a-4f0f-9520-ea9b158fa354", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Attorney Friedler was subsequently indicted in the United States District Court, District of New Jersey, and pleaded guilty to charges of <mask> and obstruction of justice, based on his conduct in defrauding petitioner and other clients, Attorney Friedler is currently incarcerated in a Federal penal institution. According to a press release, Attorney Friedler admitted that he fraudulently solicited and obtained money from his clients by telling them that he would use the money to bribe judicial employees, government agents and civil investigators and cause them to stop or alter their criminal and civil cases. He further admitted that he obstructed justice by providing a false invoice to petitioner, when petitioner had withdrawn $54,000 from his company\u2019s bank account so that it could not be seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation."], "id": "cb6508fa-08f3-405c-95a0-90898af5b1bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Before LUCK, LAGOA, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Elisabeth Greenhill appeals her conviction after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit <mask>, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349. Greenhill was sentenced to 87 months\u2019 imprisonment. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm Greenhill\u2019s conviction and sentence and dismiss this appeal in part. I. In 2018, a federal grand jury charged Greenhill and Green- hill\u2019s brother (Jonathan) with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and with five counts of wire fraud. Briefly stated, Greenhill and Jona- than owned and operated a travel agency that specialized in mak- ing arrangements for faith-based and humanitarian organizations to travel overseas for mission or humanitarian work. The super- seding indictment alleged that Greenhill and Jonathan engaged in a fraudulent scheme in which they diverted client funds to use for their own personal benefit."], "id": "69f10877-0d37-4326-a15c-02a175a81ece", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["fraud counts. Throughout the plea process, Greenhill was repre- sented by her second court-appointed lawyer (P.C.). On 3 February 2020, the district court conducted a change- of-plea hearing. During the plea colloquy, Greenhill testified under oath that she understood the plea agreement, that no one had threatened or coerced her to plead guilty, that she had had suffi- cient time to think about and to discuss with her lawyer her deci- sion to plead guilty, and that she was satisfied with her lawyer\u2019s representation. Greenhill also said she agreed with the govern- ment\u2019s factual proffer and that she was in fact guilty of conspiracy to commit <mask>. The district court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement\u2019s appeal waiver, explaining that by pleading guilty, Greenhill was giving up her right to appeal her conviction and sen- tence except in three narrow circumstances. Greenhill confirmed that she understood the appeal waiver. At the end of the plea colloquy, the district court determined that Greenhill understood the charges against her and the conse- quences of her guilty plea, that Greenhill was pleading guilty know- ingly and voluntarily, and that her plea was supported by an inde- pendent factual basis. The district court accepted Greenhill\u2019s plea and adjudicated Greenhill guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (\u201cPSI\u201d). The PSI calculated a total offense level of 26: a level that included a three-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and enhancements based upon the estimated loss amount USCA11 Case: 21-11102 Date Filed: 02/04/2022 Page: 4 of 12"], "id": "5a9be046-9a67-4436-b358-7856f579132f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["conspiracy to defraud cell phone users. According to the superseding criminal indictment in the record, the respondent owned a company that provided specialized digital content for a fee to cell phone users via text message. The respondent was approached by owners of a mobile aggregator company, who devised a plan to unknowingly and automatically subscribe cell phone users to receive content from the respondent\u2019s company, which, in turn, charged these users a monthly premium fee through their mobile carrier. The cell phone users never consented or agreed to the auto-subscription or resulting fee. The individuals at the mobile aggregator, and the respondent, then obtained that fraudulent fee from the mobile carrier, which mistakenly believed that the cell phone users had authorized the purchase of this respondent\u2019s content. Based on this scheme, the respondent pled guilty in 2017 to conspiracy to commit <mask> in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1349 and \u00a7 1343 (2012). 1 The Department of Homeland Security (\u201cDHS\u201d) placed him in removal proceedings, charging him with removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2018), as a respondent convicted of an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2018). 2 The DHS lodged an additional charge of removability under the same provision, charging the respondent with having been convicted of an aggravated felony attempt or conspiracy under section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act. The DHS also submitted an additional factual allegation: that the respondent was ordered to pay forfeiture traceable to his criminal offense in the amount of $346,717.08."], "id": "aee6bba9-707c-46d1-9b8f-a46e9d3ffae8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although the respondent pled guilty under the conspiracy provision in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1349, the judgment of conviction issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York contained a clerical error, inadvertently stating that he was convicted under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343, which defines the offense of fraud by wire, radio, or television. The district court later corrected the clerical error regarding the statute of conviction. The respondent has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by this clerical error because it is apparent from the record that all parties understood that the respondent was convicted under \u201cconspiracy to commit <mask>,\u201d despite the clerical error regarding the statute number. Additionally, the respondent admitted the allegation in the notice to appear that he was convicted of this offense and the charges of removability remain the same. Likewise, the respondent was not prejudiced by his prior counsel\u2019s purported failure to inform the court of this clerical error. See Flores v. Barr, 930 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (acknowledging that a respondent must demonstrate that he or she suffered prejudice as a result of his or her counsel\u2019s deficient performance). The DHS also charged the respondent under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within 5 years after admission, but this charge was later withdrawn."], "id": "ba859758-64aa-499e-8eee-40eac26926f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["to forfeiture, rather than the amount that was received by the entire criminal enterprise. We therefore conclude that the DHS can meet its burden of demonstrating a loss in excess of $10,000 to the victims of an offense involving fraud or deceit under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) by showing that a respondent was subject to criminal forfeiture for such an amount and that the forfeiture ordered was traceable and sufficiently tethered to the conviction. See Chiao Fang Ku v. Att\u2019y Gen. U.S., 912 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2019) (considering a forfeiture allegation contained in the information and holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343 constituted an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i)); Eversley-MacClaren v. Holder, 578 F. App\u2019x 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining that the Board appropriately relied on a forfeiture order, along with other sentencing documentation, to find the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000 under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i)); cf. Barikyan v. Barr, 917 F.3d 142, 146\u201347 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that an order of forfeiture showing a respondent laundered more than $10,000, established that he was convicted of aggravated felony money laundering pursuant to section 101(a)(43)(D) of the Act). In the instant case, the respondent was convicted of conspiracy to commit <mask> under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1349 and 1343. He agreed in his plea agreement that he was subject to forfeiture for his offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C) (subjecting to forfeiture all property derived from proceeds traceable to the offense, or a conspiracy to commit the offense). See Thompson, 990 F.3d at 683 (involving a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1349 and 1343 who was subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C)); United States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1375\u201376 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing when a forfeiture order is appropriate under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C)). The sentencing judge applied the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Honeycutt in determining the forfeiture amount, specifically linking this amount to proceeds directly traceable to the respondent. See Thompson, 990 F.3d at 689 (determining Honeycutt applies to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C)); see also Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1632\u201335 (holding that forfeiture is limited to property or proceeds in the defendant\u2019s possession that are directly traceable to his or her conduct). According to the amended judgement, the respondent was ordered to pay \u201c[f]orfeiture traceable to the offense, in the amount of $346,717.08.\u201d The amended judgment and the letter from the Federal prosecutor both explicitly state that the $346,717.08 forfeiture amount was traceable to the respondent\u2019s criminal conduct of conspiring to defraud cell phone customers. 3 This amount is thirty-four times greater than $10,000. The respondent asserts that the prosecutor\u2019s letter is not sufficiently reliable to establish that he agreed to the $346,717.08 forfeiture amount. However, as we previously noted,"], "id": "8f7cb6dd-d7f9-4d4c-be94-0456b6e79563", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent\u2019s conviction for conspiracy to commit <mask> constitutes a particularly serious crime barring asylum and withholding of removal under the Act and under the Convention Against Torture. See sections 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.16(d)(2) (2021). The Act prohibits the respondent from obtaining asylum or withholding of removal if he has \u201cbeen convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime [and is] a danger to the community of the United States.\u201d Sections 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 241(b)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act. Where the record \u201cindicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the [applicant] shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.\u201d Matter of M-B-C-, 27 I&N Dec. 31, 33 (BIA 2017) (emphases omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1240.8(d) (2016)). As discussed above, the respondent\u2019s conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud is a conviction for an aggravated felony. This conviction renders the respondent statutorily ineligible for asylum because it is one for a particularly serious crime. See sections 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) of the Act. Because the respondent was not sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years, however, his conviction is not automatically"], "id": "117307a8-a4c0-4a78-9317-78617b1b3e7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At trial, the Government claimed that the plan had a property interest in Barringer\u2019s 401(k) account. J.A. 555 (\u201cThe plan itself controls the assets in the plan until they are withdrawn. Accordingly, the plan has property rights in the assets of the plan until it withdraws.\u201d). As the district court\u2019s grant of the posttrial motion for a judgment of acquittal on the <mask> counts necessarily reflects, this proposition was not proven. invalidated count that would otherwise be inadmissible on the remaining counts, and this"], "id": "bb3f37a3-4708-46d6-b63e-1e6ada055b16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 29, 2015, a grand jury indicted Simone Swenson on four counts of <mask> and mail fraud based on a scheme to defraud prospective adoptive parents through her adoption agency, Sans Pareil Center for Children and Family Services, LLC (\u201cSans Pareil\u201d). As alleged in the indictment, the heart of this scheme was Swenson\u2019s practice of \u201cdouble matching\u201d\u2014matching two prospective families with the same birth mother and receiving payments from both families. In September 2019, the case was tried before a jury. The jury returned a verdict of \u201cnot guilty\u201d on the two wire fraud counts (counts 1 and 2), and a verdict of \u201cguilty\u201d on the two mail fraud counts (counts 3 and 4). The district court then granted Swenson\u2019s motion for judgment of acquittal only as to count 3. The sole remaining count of conviction, count 4, stemmed from a check for $1,800 to pay for birth-mother expenses sent to Swenson on September 18, 2013. 1 That check, in turn, was related to the double matching of birth-mother Ashley Smolt with two different prospective birth families\u2014 Daniel and Christopher Cuschieri (the \u201cCuschieris\u201d) and Annise and Jason Neidrich (the \u201cNeidriches\u201d). The Cuschieris had previously sent Swenson $13,400 in agency fees on June 7 for an adoption match with a potential birth mother; that match eventually fell through. Similarly, the Neidriches had paid Swenson $11,700 on July 1 for a match that eventually failed. After that failed match, the Neidriches were matched with birth- mother Smolt in mid-September. As part of that match, they were informed on September 12 by e-mail that their agency fees from the previous failed match would be rolled over, but that they needed to pay $1,800 for Smolt\u2019s birth-mother expenses. Annise Neidrich also testified that, after this e-mail,"], "id": "b3a8b52c-144b-43fb-8eb5-cf03757dbc10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201comission or non-disclosure of material facts by a non-fiduciary\u201d cannot support a mail fraud conviction). While Loughrin was interpreting the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1344, we have noted that precedents based on that statute can be used when interpreting the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341, since the bank fraud statute was modeled on the mail and <mask> statutes. See United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1520 (5th Cir. 1992) (\u201cIt is well settled that Congress modelled \u00a7 1344 on the mail and wire fraud statutes, and that the usual practice is to look to precedents under those statutes to determine its scope and proper interpretation.\u201d)."], "id": "690db837-8b16-4e7c-8ce3-76885f1f1056", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Cir- cuit Judges. GRANT, Circuit Judge: This case concerns two defendants found guilty of orchestrating large-scale corporate fraud. Nathan Hardwick was convicted at trial on counts of conspiracy, making a false statement to a financial institution, and <mask>. The district court sentenced him to 15 years in prison and required him, along with his alleged co-conspirator Asha Maurya, to pay over $40 million in restitution. Hardwick argues on appeal that the district court failed to support its restitution order with the reasoning required by law. He also attacks his convictions on a number of grounds and contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We agree with Hardwick that the district court must vacate and reissue its restitution order, but we otherwise affirm Hardwick\u2019s convictions and sentence. Hardwick\u2019s case has been consolidated with Maurya\u2019s on appeal. Maurya pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. She joins Hardwick\u2019s challenge of the restitution order, and further USCA11 Case: 19-10746 Date Filed: 02/01/2022 Page: 5 of 24"], "id": "9263597a-c6a3-433e-9b99-7977ee804b39", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["his private accolades to her. He claimed that she had \u201cduped\u201d him by stealing money from MHS, altering the firm\u2019s records to cover her tracks, and sending him payouts to hide the firm\u2019s real financial situation. After further investigation revealed large payments from MHS to Hardwick and his casino creditors, however, it became clear that \u201cthe jig was up.\u201d A grand jury indicted Hardwick and Maurya. After Maurya pleaded guilty, the grand jury issued a superseding indictment against Hardwick. He went to trial, where he was convicted of <mask>, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and making false statements to a federally insured financial institution. The district court sentenced him to 180 months in prison\u2014an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months. Maurya received a sentence of 84 months. The court also issued a restitution order requiring Maurya and Hardwick to \u201cpay restitution, jointly and severally, in the amount of $40,307,431.00.\u201d Both defendants now appeal. Maurya asks the court to vacate both the restitution order and her sentence. Hardwick requests the same relief, but he also directly challenges his convictions. II. We begin with Maurya\u2019s appeal. Maurya first argues that her sentence must be vacated because the district court applied a sentencing enhancement that did not exist when her offense was committed. The sentence, she says, thus violated the USCA11 Case: 19-10746 Date Filed: 02/01/2022 Page: 8 of 24"], "id": "8927bd32-edbf-44ae-ad79-b2bdcc7bdad9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The district court allowed the question after specifically noting that the subject of Maurya\u2019s guilty plea had already been raised in opening. The defense\u2019s only response was that an opening statement \u201cis not evidence.\u201d That is true\u2014but even so, a party cannot repeatedly emphasize a fact at length in an opening statement and then hope to persuade us that prejudice has resulted when the opposing party references it in a single question. The defense repeatedly told the jury that Maurya had entered a plea deal; Hardwick cannot possibly complain that the government led the jury to believe his own assertion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the question. E. Hardwick also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because his convictions were unsupported by the record. We review a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d 1260, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012). The evidence is sufficient if, taking it in the light most favorable to the government, \u201ca reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Id. We consider each of Hardwick\u2019s convictions in turn, beginning with conspiracy to commit <mask> under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1349. To prove conspiracy, the government needed to show that USCA11 Case: 19-10746 Date Filed: 02/01/2022 Page: 19 of 24"], "id": "9d98d955-6da6-484f-9782-46eff797fa4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant knew of it; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined it.\u201d United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 960 (11th Cir. 2015). Hardwick argues that \u201c[t]heoretically, the only evidence that could link Hardwick to a conspiracy with Maurya was Maurya\u2019s testimony, which the Government chose not to rely upon.\u201d But the record belies that assertion. To begin, the government introduced several communications between Hardwick and Maurya suggesting an understanding between the two about the fraudulent nature of the transfers. And further evidence suggested that Hardwick knowingly received far more money than he could have expected from ordinary distributions. It is true that inferences were required to connect the dots; as in many white-collar trials, the government produced not a smoking gun but a pile of documents and figures. And here those documents and figures gave the jury ample evidence to find that Hardwick and Maurya were entangled in an embezzlement conspiracy. We next consider Hardwick\u2019s 21 convictions of <mask> under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343, which required the government to prove both \u201c(1) intentional participation in a scheme to defraud and (2) use of the interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme.\u201d United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003). Hardwick conceded the second element of this offense at trial. And as we have just explained, the government offered substantial evidence to support its allegations that Hardwick intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud MHS. On appeal, Hardwick argues that USCA11 Case: 19-10746 Date Filed: 02/01/2022 Page: 20 of 24"], "id": "75ce3d2a-52f2-4f2d-b102-855e3dadb344", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["on the military community at Fort Drum. Finally, unlike the investigators in Wilcox who presumably were not affected by the controversial statements they uncovered, SPC V.G. was (according to the stipulated facts) \u201clikely\u201d to suffer \u201cemotional distress\u201d because of the broadcasting of the videos. Under the plain language of Article 117a(a)(4), UCMJ, nothing more is needed to establish a \u201cdirect and palpable connection to a . . . military environment.\u201d C. Other Contentions We note three other arguments that Appellant has made. The first argument lacks merit. Appellant contends that a court-martial cannot use \u201ca single factual basis . . . to satisfy two elements\u201d of Article 117a(a), UCMJ. Accordingly, Appel- lant argues, the court-martial could not consider the effects of the video on SPC V.G. for elements in Article 117a(a)(3), UCMJ, and also Article 117a(a)(4), UCMJ. We reject this con- tention. Evidence sometimes may satisfy two elements of an offense. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 (2005) (holding that evidence of \u201c[p]etitioners\u2019 smuggling operation\u201d satisfied two elements of the federal <mask> statute). The second and third arguments are not properly before this Court. Appellant contends that Article 117a(a), UCMJ, has \u201c[c]onstitutional implications\u201d that this Court must con- sider. Citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008), and other decisions, he questions whether Article 117a(a), UCMJ, gives persons of ordinary intelligence fair no- tice of what is prohibited. Appellant also contended at oral argument that there were some unresolved inconsistencies between what Appellant stated in the stipulation of fact and what the videos actually showed when they were introduced later at sentencing. We decline to reach these arguments be- cause they are not within the scope of the granted issue and were not briefed by both parties. See United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90, 95 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (declining to ad- dress an issue outside the scope of the granted issue). IV. Conclusion The judgment of the United States Army Court of Crimi- nal Appeals is affirmed."], "id": "df47265f-5a78-40f4-bb84-a16bce248cd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["g. What is shocking, if our suspicion is correct, is the disproportionate legal and regulatory consequence to [Lenders] and [Agent Partner] of [Lenders], as well as Holland & Knight, willingly joining Lee\u2019s apparent scheme to defraud PBM. Holland & Knight could not possibly have performed due diligence or complied with Pennsylvania law to advance Lee\u2019s scheme and harassment campaign against PBM. If our analysis is correct, then [Lenders] and [their] attorneys impaired PBM\u2019s secured property rights and lien, tortuously interfered with PBM\u2019s contractual rights and engaged in the tort equivalent of (at a minimum) <mask>."], "id": "c628eccd-c566-4d2a-aa53-4fb0df62648e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The government next points to case law. It argues that our decision in Miller is distinguishable. Even were that so, it would be irrelevant. In Miller, we held that the intent to defraud under the <mask> statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343, \u201crequires the intent to deceive and cheat.\u201d 953 F.3d at 1103. But our holding today rests on the plain and ordinary meaning of a different statute, one that Miller neither considered nor discussed."], "id": "4049f939-db87-49c2-98f5-3ab3f640ebcf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Congress responded the next year by enacting a new statute to revive the honest-services doctrine. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346 (clarifying that in mail fraud (\u00a7 1341) and <mask> (\u00a7 1343) prosecutions, \u201cthe term \u2018scheme or artifice to defraud\u2019 includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services\u201d). The Supreme Court later determined \u00a7 1346 was vague in its scope, and so read the statute narrowly to cover only conduct falling within the core of pre-McNally honest-services fraud\u2014\u201cschemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes and kickbacks supplied by a third party.\u201d Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404. Skilling is less relevant than McNally here because the meaning of \u00a7 1346 has little direct bearing on the meaning of \u00a71343, while \u00a7 1341 and \u00a7 1343 are nearly identical."], "id": "6baba93b-6838-4338-98e6-40c53cb23e43", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This case arises out of a criminal corruption investigation of officers in the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD). The investigation began in 2011 and was led by the United States Attorney's Office *781(USAO), with the assistance of select members of the criminal unit of SFPD's Internal Affairs Division (IAD-Crim). During the course of the investigation, search warrants of the cellphone records of former SFPD Sergeant Ian Furminger-the central figure in the corruption scheme-led to the discovery in about December 2012 of racist, sexist, homophobic, and anti-Semitic text messages between Furminger and nine SFPD officers.2 *936The criminal case proceeded to trial and resulted in a verdict against Furminger and a codefendant for conspiracy to commit theft, conspiracy against civil rights and <mask>. Three days after the verdict, on December 8, 2014, the text messages were released by the USAO to the administrative unit of SFPD's Internal Affairs Division (IAD-Admin). After IAD-Admin completed its investigation of the text messages, the chief of police issued disciplinary charges against respondents in April 2015."], "id": "e7610fa1-4228-4b47-a98f-813579ade3c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On December 5, 2014, a federal jury convicted Furminger and Robles of conspiracy to commit theft, conspiracy against civil rights and <mask>. Three days later, a meeting was held between Lieutenant Yick and members of IAD-Admin, IAD-Crim, and AUSA's Villazor and John Hemann. At this meeting, the USAO lifted the confidentiality restriction and authorized IAD-Crim to release respondents' text messages to IAD-Admin. In the following days, IAD-Crim provided voluminous records to IAD-Admin, including a CD containing thousands of pages of text messages sent and received by Furminger. Lieutenant Yick assigned three investigators to review the records for evidence of administrative misconduct."], "id": "9b096a9e-649e-479f-9cb7-022babc6e053", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In 2010, the BLP collapsed and Plaintiffs lost their investments. An FBI investigation revealed that Sigillito operated the BLP as a Ponzi scheme. Unsealing the indictment in May 2011, the United States charged Sigillito with money laundering, <mask>, and mail fraud. The federal indictment asserted that, inter alia , Sigillito and Brown retained unauthorized placement fees after transferring their clients' assets. A jury found Sigillito guilty, and the federal district court sentenced him to forty years in prison. Sigillito's convictions and sentences were affirmed. United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 941 (8th Cir. 2014)."], "id": "e1f38bc1-bdf0-4564-95fd-f048e085725e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Applying the capable-of-ascertaimnent test objectively, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs demonstrate that their damages were capable of ascertainment by May 2011, The parties agree that the BLP collapsed after an FBI investigation in 2010 and that Plaintiffs received notice of their extensive investment losses shortly thereafter. The parties acknowledge that Sigillito's federal indictment was unsealed in May 2011. Sigillito's indictment revealed the charges of money laundering, <mask>, and mail fraud arising from BLP operations. The federal indictment exposed the wrongful nature of the BLP venture, linking Plaintiffs' investment losses to, and unveiling the damage caused by, the BLP's administration. The federal indictment also established that Sigillito, in managing the BLP, retained numerous unauthorized placement fees before directing the distribution of his clients' assets to overseas borrowers and committed improper self-dealing in these transfers."], "id": "4b617342-0a93-4d6d-8ac9-33f6ea8a4b92", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On June 3, 2010, the United States filed a seven count indictment against Plaintiffs. Count I charged Plaintiffs with conspiracy to commit mail and <mask>, counts II through VI charged Plaintiffs with mail fraud, and count VII charged Plaintiffs with knowingly making a false statement for the purpose of obtaining a loan to be accepted and guaranteed by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (\"HUD\"). The indictment alleged Plaintiffs worked on several real estate transactions between September 1, 2003, and September 1, 2005, where Plaintiffs prepared applications for financing on behalf of the buyers which contained false, material statements about the buyer's ability to repay. Specifically, the indictment referenced five transactions in St. Louis, only one of which was listed in the MREC disciplinary proceeding. The conspiracy charge (count I) referenced all five transactions, the mail fraud charges (counts II through VI) applied to each property individually, and the knowingly making a false statement to HUD charge (count VII) only applied to the one property in common with the criminal and MREC charges."], "id": "194216fc-6fd9-4f8a-bad5-7af2a6705d56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Reynolds was convicted of <mask> in 2017. The district court sentenced her to nineteen months\u2019 imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. One special condition of release provided that Reynolds must not use or possess alcohol, and must not enter bars and taverns. The court imposed this condition in light of information that Reynolds had a problematic history of alcohol use, including two convictions for driving while intoxicated, and convictions for assault and criminal trespass that arose from acts taken while Reynolds was intoxicated."], "id": "c2c79e27-58a6-4bd8-a9bf-f9dfead28a4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Eric Mboule was charged with conspiracy to commit <mask> and entered a plea agreement that contained a waiver of the right to appeal. Nonetheless, Mboule has appealed, raising arguments re- garding the district court\u2019s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and various purported problems with his sen- tence. Because Mboule has not shown that the plea agreement 2 No. 20-3225"], "id": "df78865e-9025-45b7-9d9f-c6d7099724f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["should be voided in its entirety, the appellate waiver is appli- cable, and this appeal will be dismissed. I. BACKGROUND Mboule was charged with one count of conspiracy to com- mit <mask> for working with his co-conspirator, Patrick Guentangue, to defraud the University of Illinois Urbana- Champaign of $265,193.75. In the summer of 2016, an individ- ual purporting to work for Williams Brothers Construction, a contractor of the university, convinced a university employee to transfer that amount to a bank account owned by Guen- tangue. After Guentangue was arrested, he explained to law enforcement that he had set up the account on Mboule\u2019s in- structions and that Mboule told him to expect a wire totaling $265,000. Guentangue received approximately twenty-\ufb01ve percent of the proceeds with the remaining funds being dis- tributed according to Mboule\u2019s instructions. Mboule and Guentangue had conducted similar frauds on several occa- sions prior to this one. After he was charged, Mboule signed a cooperation agree- ment with the government in which he promised to provide complete and truthful information regarding his criminal conduct in exchange for the government informing the court of Mboule\u2019s cooperation in any sentencing hearing. Mboule also agreed to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. In pertinent part, the plea agreement provided that Mboule was entitled to a 2-level reduction in his o\ufb00ense level because, \u201cbased upon the facts currently known by the United States,\u201d he had \u201cclearly demonstrated a recognition and a\ufb03rmative acceptance of personal responsibility.\u201d The plea agreement nonetheless did not \u201cpreclude the United No. 20-3225 3"], "id": "083edd2e-5e0e-4e87-b08d-942c599d9789", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["FBI agent that Mboule lied to him during the pro\ufb00er session, in breach of the cooperation agreement. It also heard testi- mony from a victim of a di\ufb00erent <mask> that Mboule committed during the summer of 2016. Sentencing proceed- ings resumed on September 21, 2020. The district court con- cluded that the evidence from the \ufb01rst sentencing hearing es- tablished that Mboule \u201cviolated that portion of his plea agree- ment concerning cooperation in that he engaged in that fraud- ulent activity.\u201d After that hearing, Mboule, represented by a new lawyer, \ufb01led a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B). The motion stated that Mboule\u2019s previous trial counsel failed to inform Mboule that he could \u201center[] an open plea of guilty,\u201d leaving Mboule to believe that his only options were to \u201cproceed with trial or plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.\u201d The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. In its order, the court observed that Mboule did not express dis- satisfaction with his attorney or a desire to cancel the plea agreement \u201cuntil immediately after the January 13, 2020, hearing, where [Mboule] \ufb01rst saw the consequences of his lies.\u201d At the third and \ufb01nal sentencing hearing, held on Novem- ber 6, 2020, the district court resolved the remaining sentenc- ing issues and sentenced Mboule to 42 months\u2019 imprison- ment, which was within the guidelines range of 37 to 46 months, as well as 3 years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $265,193.75. The judge rejected the idea that Mboule had been coerced into pleading guilty and stated that Mboule was simply experiencing \u201cbuyer\u2019s remorse.\u201d 6 No. 20-3225"], "id": "354caad9-62b2-47cc-8077-95d576fcd993", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["the term \u201cproceeds\u201d in the federal money-laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006), means \u201cprofits\u201d and not \u201creceipts,\u201d and that its meaning must be uniform across contexts); compare id. at 525 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that \u201cproceeds\u201d could mean \u201creceipts\u201d or \u201cprofits\u201d depending on the context, suggesting that, \u201c[i]f Congress could have expressly defined the term \u2018proceeds\u2019 differently when applied to different specified unlawful activities, it seems to me that judges filling the gap in a statute with such a variety of applications may also do so, as long as they are conscien- tiously endeavoring to carry out the intent of Congress\u201d), with id. at 522 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing Justice Stevens\u2019s approach as a form of \u201cinterpre- tive contortion,\u201d and contending that the Court had \u201cforcefully rejected\u201d that approach in Clark), and id. at 532 (Alito, J., dissenting) (\u201cI cannot agree with Justice Stevens\u2019s approach insofar as it holds that the meaning of the term \u2018proceeds\u2019 varies depending on the nature of the illegal activity that produces the laundered funds[.]\u201d); see also Pasquan- tino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 358\u201359 (2005) (citing Clark in concluding that because the federal <mask> statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343, \u201capplies without differentiation\u201d to \u201cfraudulent uses of domestic wires,\u201d it must necessarily apply to a scheme to use the domestic wires to deprive a foreign sovereign of taxes that are due)."], "id": "db30d3c7-fad9-4d6e-8c15-38c69e8ac836", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["on the military community at Fort Drum. Finally, unlike the investigators in Wilcox who presumably were not affected by the controversial statements they uncovered, SPC V.G. was (according to the stipulated facts) \u201clikely\u201d to suffer \u201cemotional distress\u201d because of the broadcasting of the videos. Under the plain language of Article 117a(a)(4), UCMJ, nothing more is needed to establish a \u201cdirect and palpable connection to a . . . military environment.\u201d C. Other Contentions We note three other arguments that Appellant has made. The first argument lacks merit. Appellant contends that a court-martial cannot use \u201ca single factual basis . . . to satisfy two elements\u201d of Article 117a(a), UCMJ. Accordingly, Appel- lant argues, the court-martial could not consider the effects of the video on SPC V.G. for elements in Article 117a(a)(3), UCMJ, and also Article 117a(a)(4), UCMJ. We reject this con- tention. Evidence sometimes may satisfy two elements of an offense. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 (2005) (holding that evidence of \u201c[p]etitioners\u2019 smuggling operation\u201d satisfied two elements of the federal <mask> statute). The second and third arguments are not properly before this Court. Appellant contends that Article 117a(a), UCMJ, has \u201c[c]onstitutional implications\u201d that this Court must con- sider. Citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008), and other decisions, he questions whether Article 117a(a), UCMJ, gives persons of ordinary intelligence fair no- tice of what is prohibited. Appellant also contended at oral argument that there were some unresolved inconsistencies between what Appellant stated in the stipulation of fact and what the videos actually showed when they were introduced later at sentencing. We decline to reach these arguments be- cause they are not within the scope of the granted issue and were not briefed by both parties. See United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90, 95 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (declining to ad- dress an issue outside the scope of the granted issue). IV. Conclusion The judgment of the United States Army Court of Crimi- nal Appeals is affirmed."], "id": "43643386-993d-42c5-a194-669afece8511", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The second and proposed third amended complaints contained all the allegations at issue in the instant proceeding. The plaintiff\u2019s RICO claim alleged mail and <mask>. In order to satisfy the fraudulent scheme requirement, which formed the predicate for the acts of mail and wire fraud, the plaintiff had to allege the manner in which the purported misrepresentations were fraudulent and further, had to establish fraudulent intent (see, Beck v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820d 46, 50-51, cert denied 484 US 1005; see also, Anitora Travel v Lapian, 677 F Supp 209, 214). To establish its common law cause of action for fraud, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the defendants knowingly uttered a falsehood intending to deprive the plaintiff of a benefit and that the plaintiff was thereby deceived and damaged (Channel Master Corp. v Aluminium Ltd. Sales, 4 NY2d 403, 406-407). The essential elements are the representation of a material existing fact, falsity, scienter, deception and injury (supra, at 407)."], "id": "9f76d889-2b3b-4dc9-bbbe-a3e52e108474", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Shortly after this latest meeting, which took place on December 5, 1990, Wilson ceased cooperating with the FBI; the United States Attorney\u2019s office believes that Wilson thereupon revealed to respondent that he had surreptitiously recorded their conversations for the brief period in question. Wilson was arrested in February 1991, and later pleaded guilty to Federal felony charges of conspiracy to launder funds, conspir*179acy to commit bank fraud, and <mask>. Released on bail pending sentence, he has been a fugitive at large ever since."], "id": "c45880f6-818b-4c58-b607-1642c8463b5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["By order dated November 18, 2013, the Supreme Court of Georgia granted respondent\u2019s unopposed voluntary petition to resign from the Georgia bar based upon his conviction of <mask> in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 1343, a federal felony. Respondent also admitted that, by his conviction, he violated the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. In accepting the voluntary surrender of respondent\u2019s license, the court specifically noted that this surrender was tantamount to disbarment and directed that respondent\u2019s name be removed from the rolls of persons entitled to practice law in Georgia (see generally Matter of Goodhart, 56 AD3d 889, 890 [2008])."], "id": "e8007b8d-f5c6-4e08-b460-31b32c70434d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["By order dated November 18, 2013, the Supreme Court of Georgia granted respondent\u2019s unopposed voluntary petition to resign from the Georgia bar based upon his conviction of <mask> in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 1343, a federal felony. Respondent also admitted that, by his conviction, he violated the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. In accepting the voluntary surrender of respondent\u2019s license, the court specifically noted that this surrender was tantamount to disbarment and directed that respondent\u2019s name be removed from the rolls of persons entitled to practice law in Georgia (see generally Matter of Goodhart, 56 AD3d 889, 890 [2008])."], "id": "3be78e3f-bd7d-4aa2-aea2-c08259c03b4b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Per Curiam. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in New York in 1972, at this Judicial Department. In 1987 he pleaded guilty, in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, to charges of making false statements in support of a loan application (18 USC \u00a7 1014) and <mask> (18 USC \u00a7 1343). On July 6, 1989 we determined that these Federal felonies were \"serious crimes\u201d within the meaning of Judiciary Law \u00a7 90 (4) (d), and ordered respondent suspended from practice pending final disciplinary action (148 AD2d 152). Respondent was ordered to show cause why a final order of \"suspension, censure or removal from office\u201d should not be made (Judiciary Law \u00a7 90 [4] [g])."], "id": "2fb09e0a-6bba-44be-bdb2-b4be840cc5f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["While Federal \"serious crime\u201d convictions for <mask> and making false statements have generally been met with *9the sanction of suspension from practice (see, e.g., Matter of Laboz, 200 AD2d 239; Matter of Cecil, 190 AD2d 986; Matter of Martin, 181 AD2d 156), this respondent\u2019s deliberate engagement in a spiraling series of fraudulent acts in conjunction with an unsavory business associate who he had good reason to believe was involved in criminal conduct warrants the more severe sanction of disbarment (see, Matter of Catalfo, 181 AD2d 213). Accordingly, we reject the recommended suspension and find that disbarment is the only appropriate punishment (see, Matter of Friedman, 196 AD2d 280, 296, appeal dismissed 83 NY2d 888, cert denied \u2014 US \u2014, 115 S Ct 81)."], "id": "ed0f93d9-14ed-43f8-b0c1-ce3d57d2b093", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Per Curiam. On November 29, 1994, the respondent was found guilty, after a trial before the Honorable Jacob Mishler, of two counts of conspiracy and three counts of <mask>, in violation of 18 USC \u00a7\u00a7 371 and 1343, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The charges involved conspiring and knowingly and willfully devising a scheme and artifice to defraud The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter Freddie Mac) to obtain money and property from Freddie Mac by means of false and fraudulent pretenses and, for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice caused to be transmitted, by wire in interstate commerce, writings, signs, and signals."], "id": "6d844956-3942-4c0e-bc6a-072c2eed8a31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "wire fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On November 19, 1994, respondent pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to one count of conspiring to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 371; one count of <mask>, in violation of 18 USC \u00a7\u00a7 1343 and 2; one count of submitting false statements, in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 1001; and one count of bank fraud, in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 1344. Respondent\u2019s conviction arose from events which took place beginning in October 1993 when he joined a conspiracy to launder millions of dollars in cash which were the proceeds of narcotics trafficking. Respondent has not yet been sentenced."], "id": "3590162c-6b8c-448b-a38e-87f07d6ddc24", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, the last six counts concern the defendants\u2019 alleged demand that Sikowitz\u2019s campaign committee participate in the proposed joint election campaign outlined in the second of the two written proposals submitted to her, by paying Boone $16,100 for the \u201cCentral Brooklyn Operations.\u201d The seventeenth and nineteenth counts charge the defendants with attempted grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 155.35) and *806attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00,155.30 [6]), allegedly committed \u201con or about and between June 1, 2002 and August 1, 2002,\u201d with the first count alleging that the amount the defendants attempted to extort exceeded $3,000, and with both alleging that the larceny was committed by means of <mask>. The eighteenth and twentieth counts each charge the defendants with conspiracy in the fifth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 105.05 [1]) and allege, respectively, that they conspired to commit the larcenies that the seventeenth and nineteenth counts allege they attempted to commit. The twenty-first and twenty-second counts charge the defendants with attempted coercion in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 135.60 [9]) and conspiracy in the sixth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 105.00), on the theory that the defendants attempted to force, and conspired to force, Sikowitz to pay for the primary day operations."], "id": "54c99bd7-6fa8-42a2-9213-247350e1eb9a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["5As relevant here, the predicate crime of <mask> requires that the accused \"with the intent to . . . gain any money or other property or.. . . to do or abet or procure any illegal or wrongful act, whether or not the purpose is accomplished, threaten [ ] directly or indirectly\" to (1) \"injure a person or property\"; (2) \"expose or impute to any person any deformity or disgrace; oe (3) \"expose any secret.\" NRS 205.320(2), (4), (5). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 19-17A"], "id": "22b23817-0686-4d7e-bc02-435c56182b62", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["2 Consistent with these provisions, the jury was properly instructed that <mask>, for the purposes of the People\u2019s attempted extortion charge, is made up of the following elements: \u201c1. The defendant threatened to unlawfully injure or used force against the property of another person or a third person; 2. When making the threat or using force, the defendant intended to use that fear or force to obtain the other person\u2019s consent to give the defendant money or property; 3. As a result of the threat or use of force, the"], "id": "fa958969-d3ca-42ab-be48-843807025927", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Judge Earl further says: \u201c So far as I can discover there is absolutely no authority upholding the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant, that because the defendant did not inspire fear in the mind of Mrs. Amos by his threats, and thus could not have been guilty of the completed crime of <mask>, therefore, he cannot be convicted of attempting to commit the crime. That contention is, as I believe, also without any foundation in principle or reason.\u201d"], "id": "2268ed8b-28ce-4f6f-a852-edec4fc40c4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Under the requirements of section 850 an indictment, charging the crime of <mask> and arising out of the fact situation quoted above, must plead the following elements: (1) That property was obtained; (2) That it was obtained with the victim\u2019s consent; and (3) That the obtaining of the property was induced by wrongful use of force or fear. Under each of the four counts in the indictment it is alleged that the defendants actually obtained from the victim certain property owned by it, to wit, a stated sum of lawful currency of the United States of America. There can be no question that lawful currency issued by the Federal Government qualifies as property under the intendment of this statute and that the allegation as to that property satisfies in each count the element of \u201c obtaining of property from another.\u201d (People v. Hagen, 212 App. Div. 879; People ex rel. Short v. Warden of City Prison, 145 App. Div. 861.)"], "id": "3ef90631-4650-4e77-88f7-dbd497366392", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The application of the District Attorney for Albany County and the affidavit of Thomas J. 0 \u2019Donnell indicate that the intention at that time was to receive an amendment of the warrant of May 4, 1971, and discontinuance of that warrant and a new replacing warrant. The warrant issued on May 26, 1971, included the new crimes of grand larceny first degree by <mask>, and criminal usury. It also included the numbers listed to defendant Sher and to one Louise Lozoff. It did not amend the warrant of May 4, 1971."], "id": "6356bc42-b847-43c5-ac6d-9e424c5ce083", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Section 155.05 of the Penal Law defines conduct which constitutes the crime of larceny. Subdivision 2 of section 155.45 of the Penal Law provides that \u201c[p]roof that the defendant engaged in any conduct constituting larceny as defined in section 155.05 is sufficient to support any indictment * * * for larceny other than one charging larceny by <mask>.\u201d (See, also, People v Farruggia, 41 AD2d 894.) Subdivision 1 of section 155.05 of the Penal Law broadly states that \u201cA person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.\u201d Subdivision 2 sets forth specific means by which larceny may be committed. Additionally, grand larceny in the second degree requires that the property stolen exceed $1,500 in value (see Penal Law \u00a7 155.35). It is the People\u2019s position that defendant\u2019s conduct constitutes larceny committed by the means set forth in subdivision 1 of section 155.05 of the Penal Law and, additionally, by embezzlement and by obtaining property by false pretenses (see Penal Law, \u00a7 155:05, subd 2, par [a])."], "id": "8a6a27b0-398f-4f9c-9763-f76ea629bb89", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of first-degree kidnapping, sex trafficking, <mask>, and three counts of sexual assault. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Carolyn Ellsworth, Judge. A jury found appellant Keair Jamal Boyd guilty of the above- referenced crimes, after which the district court sentenced Boyd to an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 256 months. On appeal, Boyd challenges several evidentiary decisions, jury instructions. and the sufficiency of evidence to support the first-degree kidnapping conviction. We address each of his arguments in turn. Evidentiary rulings Expert testimony Boyd argues that the district court erred by allowing Sergeant Richard Leung to testify as an expert about the pimp-prostitute relationship because the subject matter fell within the jury's knowledge and Leung's testimony \"unfairly bolstered\" the victim-B.W.'s credibility. Boyd also contends that the testimony's prejudicial effect \"far outweighecr its"], "id": "838cc297-eb31-4ee6-84fb-53f8f0effb84", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant claims that the evidence fails to establish that a larceny was committed in the manner specifically alleged in the first count. An indictment need not specify that a defendant committed a larceny in any particular manner, unless the theory of prosecution is that the larceny was from a person or was committed by <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 155.45 [1]). In particular, when the theory of the prosecution is that the larceny was committed by false pretenses, the indictment need not so specify. (See People v Duffy, 231 AD2d 586 [2d Dept 1996]; People v Cannon, 194 AD2d 496, 498 [1st Dept 1993]; People v Farruggia, 41 AD2d 894 [4th Dept 1973].) Here the grand larceny count nonetheless specifically alleges that the defendant committed the larceny \u201cby means of false pretenses.\u201d This form of larceny, Penal Law \u00a7 155.05 (2), is committed when a person obtains possession of personal property by means of \u201ca false material statement about a past or presently existing fact.\u201d CPeople v Norman, 85 NY2d 609, 619 [1995]; Penal Law \u00a7 155.05 [2] [a]; see, People v Churchill, 47 NY2d 151, 156 [1979].) In contrast, larceny by false promise is committed when, \u201cpursuant to a scheme to defraud,\u201d a person obtains property by means of an express or implied representation \u201cthat he . . . will in the future engage in particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct.\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 155.05 [2] [d]; see People v Ryan, 41 NY2d 634 [1977].)"], "id": "c3141af4-80e0-46f8-a563-ae6a25ec1348", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> is a form of larceny under the law of this State (Penal Law \u00a7 155.05 [2] [e]). The respondent\u2019s demands for payment ranged from $5,000 up to $400,000. As such, the crime of which the respondent was convicted is essentially similar to grand larceny in the second degree or grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 155.40, 155.35)."], "id": "4d29972c-71e7-4e6f-b916-b9dc187a4ff0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is obvious that the portion of the opinion just quoted refers to both economic matters and matters purely of public polity. There was nothing in the evidence to warrant any implication that in this state any rich escaped taxation, or that Mrs. Green was among those who so did escape. It may be so, but such an inference was dehors the proofs in this case. Consequently I feel at liberty, but for strictly juridical and ethical purposes, to consider the same economic matters and matters of public polity outside of the case, but at greater length. In democratic republics, with universal suffrage, the growing danger of injustice is not to the poor, but to people of property. We should remember that other great states have failed in the past when the country swarmed with a consuming hierarchy of <mask>, and the receivers of taxes outnumbered the taxed, who were destroyed under forms of law."], "id": "e0a87edd-d5b8-49b3-890a-864fcfa4f10c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At trial Kaufman sought to present a defense that his prosecution for grand theft resulted from his refusal to give in to Emmet's attempted <mask>. On appeal Kaufman argues the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his pretrial motion in limine to admit evidence that Emmet threatened criminal prosecution if Kaufman failed to pay him. He also argues the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that Emmet's alleged extortion was a defense to *391grand theft. Kaufman claims the court's rulings should be reviewed under *351Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( Chapman ) because they deprived him of his constitutional rights to present a defense theory and to a jury determination of all facts pertaining to his guilt or innocence."], "id": "f4d5b64d-93da-4202-8625-ca9d14d9ac88", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant, and declared, amongst other things, \u201c That he being vicar-general to the Bishop of \u201c Lincoln, the defendant had caused to be printed a petition to parlia- \u201c ment, charging him with divers crimes,' as <mask>, oppression, *362\u201c and corruption in his office.\u201d The defendant justified the publication, and insisted on the truth of the subject matter of the petition. The act*on was Golden not to lie, the petition being the necessary and usual mode of complaint to parliament for the redress of any grievance. Holt\u2019s Law of Libel, p. 184. Lake y. King, 1 Saund. 121. (K.) and is recognized in Hawk. P. C. 194. 2 Inst. S28. 2 Burr. 811. 3 Taun. 456. 2 N. Rep. 341. See also Croswell\u2019s case, 3. Johns. Gas. 337. Duane\u2019s case, 1 Binney, 601. 5 Johns. Rep. 1. 5 Johns. 508. Clapp\u2019s case, 4 Mass. Rep. 163."], "id": "deed46a3-3aac-4236-83d9-6aa43e6262c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, the indictment goes well beyond what is required. A larceny count need not specify that the defendant committed the larceny in any particular manner, unless the theory of prosecution is that the larceny was from a person or was committed by <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 155.45 [1]). In particular, as already noted, a larceny count need not specify that the larceny was committed by false pretenses when that is the theory of the prosecution (see People v Duffy, supra; People v Cannon, supra; People v Farruggia, supra), and here the first count of the indictment, charging the defendant with grand larceny in the third degree, specifically alleges that the defendant committed the larceny by false pretenses. Even more particularly, it alleges that the property stolen was United States currency the defendant sought and obtained from the State of New York as \u201creimbursement for travel expenses ... by means of false pretenses in written instruments that the defendant offered for filing.\u201d"], "id": "9226f0a9-cf07-4b3d-9163-2facf9910b0f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Considering the context of Flanigan\u2019s statements and their inclusion in a newspaper article concerning plaintiff\u2019s attempts to evict a local manufacturer, no reasonable reader could understand Flanigan\u2019s statements as saying that plaintiff committed the criminal act of <mask>. To the contrary, it is clear from the context of the article and Flanigan\u2019s statements that Flanigan was concerned not with the legality of plaintiff\u2019s actions, but with the impact those actions would *943have on the community in general and on a manufacturer to which the IDA had provided financial assistance to bolster the local economy. Nor is there anything in Flanigan\u2019s statements or the newspaper article to imply that Flanigan\u2019s use of the word \"extortion\u201d was based upon undisclosed evidence. Neither the article nor Flanigan\u2019s remarks suggest that Flanigan was privy to any \"inside information\u201d about the lengthy and complicated legal dispute to which neither he nor the IDA was a party. Also lacking is anything to suggest that Flanigan was in a position to supervise plaintiffs actions or that Flanigan\u2019s statements were the product of a deliberate, careful, in-depth investigation (cf., Brown v Albany Citizens Council on Alcoholism, 199 AD2d 904). A reasonable reader would understand Flanigan\u2019s statements for exactly what they were: an impromptu reaction elicited by a newspaper reporter which the reporter used to add zest to an article about an otherwise mundane legal matter. Considering the communication as a whole, and in its immediate and broader social contexts, we conclude, as a matter of law, that a reasonable reader would be unlikely to understand Flanigan\u2019s remarks as provable fact, but would understand his remarks as likely to be opinion."], "id": "fdeca9bb-29f2-426c-9e36-d7b7df2fcf9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"Respondent urges that Winfield\u2019s testimony as to the substance of appellant\u2019s statement (at the time it was alleged that the 'pay offs\u2019 were to be change from appellant to Caputo) 'That that was the way it was going to be,\u2019 constituted a threat that induced fear. Assuming but not deciding that the words constituted a threat, we find nothing in the record which indicated any fear was created in the mind of Winfield, who testified that his conversations with appellant 'were always cordial and on a friendly basis.\u2019 In order to constitute the crime of <mask> the statute clearly requires evidence of a threat which creates fear in the person threatened. We find the evidence here insufficient to support the jury verdict on this charge in the indictment.\u201d (People v Rollek, 280 App Div 437, 439, affd 304 NY 905; emphasis supplied.)"], "id": "f9ffeb0d-891a-4351-951b-0018d4b8ad5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The second count of the indictment alleges that the defendants, each acting in concert with one another: \"stole certain property which was obtained by <mask> committed by instilling in the victim, Daniel Leon, a fear that the actor or another person would use or abuse his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely, namely, the defendants acting in concert demanding a quantity of United States currency to have defendant Latanya Gray, a police officer, withdraw criminal charges she had commenced against Daniel Leon.\u201d"], "id": "c59f88a2-a0cb-46a1-b838-f60250b417f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Kaufman's argument raises a pure question of law subject to de novo review. ( People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 870, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 996 P.2d 1184.) He admits he has not found any authority suggesting attempted <mask> by a victim provides a defense to criminal prosecution for grand theft by larceny. The cases he cites indicate only that if the facts supported it, the People could charge Emmet with extortion for abusing the criminal process. ( Beggs , supra , 178 Cal. at p. 81, 172 P. 152 ; Umana , supra , 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 628, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 573 ; Morrill , supra , 93 Cal. at p. 456, 28 P. 1068 ; \u00a7\u00a7 518, 519.) These authorities do not suggest alleged extortion by the victim should be an affirmative defense to the crime of larceny by the defendant ."], "id": "5ec5c75d-5231-4323-b9bf-9caddaeea2d5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The purpose of the licensing statute is stated in section 167 of the same article to be the \u201c safeguarding [of] the public against fraud, <mask>, exorbitant rates and similar abuses \u201d. The law was obviously directed at abuses in connection with resales of tickets by theatre ticket brokers and speculators and not at the prices charged by theatres at their own box offices, wherever located. Far from being detrimental to the public *211interest, the extension of theatre box offices to locations in Macy stores and elsewhere is a boon to the public, serves the public interest and should be encouraged. The fact that the business of theatre brokers, who sell tickets at premiums over box-office prices, may be adversely affected, furnishes no justification for holding that the box-office extensions or branches must be or should be licensed."], "id": "9450f592-00d9-4f5c-a64e-96c68da244fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Michael Crumble and Ramell Markus (together, \u201cDefendants\u201d) appeal their respective judgments of conviction and their sentences. Defendants were indicted for kidnapping and committing physical violence against Daniel Nieves to obtain drugs and money. They were convicted after a jury trial of kidnapping conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(c), kidnapping, id. \u00a7 1201(a)(1), and committing physical violence in furtherance of an <mask>, id. \u00a7 1951(a). They were acquitted of using, carrying, and possessing a firearm. Id. \u00a7 924(c). Markus was given a below- guidelines sentence of 180 months\u2019 incarceration, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Crumble was given a below-guidelines sentence of 108 months\u2019 incarceration, followed by five years of supervised release. We assume the parties\u2019 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal."], "id": "ed90a3b4-bd78-4080-94ac-4e8dd0d62222", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c The Grand Jury is conducting an investigation into conspiracy to commit the crimes of bribery, corruption, <mask>, and as part of this investigation the Grand Jury has seen fit to call you as a witness. The Grand Jury is seeking to determine whether or not certain individuals have conspired to commit the aforementioned crimes as a means of entering legitimate business areas. The Grand Jury is seeking to determine that these individuals have agreed among themselves to use tactics which could be violations of the State Penal Law as a means of entering legitimate business enterprises, is that clear? \u201d He was further advised that if he testifies without asserting his privilege against self incrimination, he may be waiving his rights and that anything he says may be used against him. He was further advised as follows: \u201cIf you are going to assert your Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, you will have to state so with respect to the questions put to you to indicate that you wish to be granted immunity by this Grand Jury. Now Mr. Oddo, in what business are you engaged in presently? \u201d He declined to answer on the ground that he had no opportunity to consult with his counsel and therefore he is asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. The District Attorney thereupon requested the Grand Jury to grant the witness immunity from prosecution, The *585Grand Jury, in the absence of the witness, the stenographer and the District Attorney, voted to grant the witness immunity. He returned to the Grand Jury room; was advised that the Grand Jury voted to grant him immunity whereby anything he testifies to cannot be used against him, and if he discloses any crime he cannot be indicted for such crime. Upon being asked the same question, he advised the Grand Jury that he wished to consult with counsel because he did not understand the meaning of the word \u201c immunity \u201d and he was excused until the 20th of October."], "id": "b394ac2b-3670-4310-9cdf-7c86fca3b622", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Under the circumstances, and because it will enable the plaintiff to review this'ruling with a short record, and because the article makes it crystal clear that Mickey Sheen was a name adopted by this man Watson, who was in fact arrested for <mask>; that he had no right to use the name \u2014 he was not authorized to use the name; and that he was not in fact Mickey Sheen, or anyone by that name, is also made very, very clear by the article. As a matter of fact, alongside of the article is a picture of John Watson, who used falsely and wrongfully the name of Mickey Sheen. All this the article makes indubitably clear. Under the circumstances, this plaintiff whose theatrical name is Mickey Sheen cannot be held to have been libelled."], "id": "a9bbfef6-a865-4002-aa58-9fb44e9c5f48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The People have adduced some evidence to establish each and every element of grand larceny by <mask> including a threat to: \"Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.\u201d (Penal Law, \u00a7 155.05, subd. 2, par. [e], cl. [ix].)"], "id": "9cb01454-c8ca-46ea-939d-f67dbb6f0a3f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". Under the common law, compensatory damages for mental distress are only available under certain circumstances, as in cases involving extreme misconduct. (See, Prosser and Keeton, Torts \u00a7 12 [5th ed 1984].) Under this standard, liability has often been imposed for insult and indignity inflicted by persons in positions of power or responsibility with respect to the public (op. cit., at 57-59); or, \"[t]he extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct may arise not so much from what is done as from abuse by the defendant of some relation or position which gives the defendant actual or apparent power to damage the plaintiff\u2019s interests. The result is something like <mask>.\u201d (Op. cit., at 61.) The statute protects employees from acts of extortion motivated by prejudice, and the insult and indignity perpetrated by employers who discriminate. Compensatory damages are available for mental distress caused in every employment discrimination case, as long as the emotional harm is proved."], "id": "c808d348-ed71-441e-b77f-41008bb317cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It must be borne in mind that the Code does not in general terms define forgery, w'hile it does define other crimes, such as homicide, robbery, larceny, <mask>, etc.; and in order to ascertain what act or acts constitute forgery the several sections which treat of the subject, and their subdivisions, must be examined; and from such an examination it is clearly apparent that all of the sections and the subdivisions thereof are not interdependent or governed by a general definition."], "id": "f0163251-9d65-4545-9f54-7e1f208306ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The grand jury, acting properly within its broad inquisitorial powers (People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N. Y. 383, 391), is investigating whether the crime of conspiracy and <mask> had been committed in connection with the unionization of retail vegetable and fruit stores and in connection with the trucking of fruits and vegetables in the county of New York."], "id": "ed720ae1-a90c-4546-90fd-d217f86daa15", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Under the circumstances, and because it will enable the plaintiff to review this'ruling with a short record, and because the article makes it crystal clear that Mickey Sheen was a name adopted by this man Watson, who was in fact arrested for <mask>; that he had no right to use the name \u2014 he was not authorized to use the name; and that he was not in fact Mickey Sheen, or anyone by that name, is also made very, very clear by the article. As a matter of fact, alongside of the article is a picture of John Watson, who used falsely and wrongfully the name of Mickey Sheen. All this the article makes indubitably clear. Under the circumstances, this plaintiff whose theatrical name is Mickey Sheen cannot be held to have been libelled."], "id": "ea83ac99-6f4f-4471-902d-7319a0decbd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants apparently rely upon the trial court\u2019s action in submitting only representative counts to the jury as a new circumstance justifying a further evidentiary review. The trial court, to avoid placing an unduly heavy burden on the jury in its deliberation, decided to submit, as representative of the People\u2019s case, only those counts of coercion and <mask> predicated on a theory of a threatened injury to persons (CPL 300.40 [6] [b]). The defendants therefore urge this court to again review the Grand Jury minutes and trial testimony, asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support this limited theory of prosecution."], "id": "8c9152a4-72a2-498f-8660-6b9c0fc74925", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The crime of <mask> \"is the obtaining of property from another, with his [ ] consent, ... induced by a wrongful use of force or fear ....\" ( \u00a7 518.) The \"elements of the offense are: (1) A wrongful use of force or fear, (2) with the specific intent of inducing the victim to consent to the defendant's obtaining his or her property, (3) which does in fact induce such consent and results in the defendant's obtaining property from the victim.\" ( People v. Hesslink (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 789, 213 Cal.Rptr. 465 ( *725Hesslink ). ) A defendant may induce fear by threatening to expose, or impute to a person \"a deformity, disgrace or crime\" or \"expose a secret affecting him [or her].\" (\u00a7 519; see Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 326, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606, 139 P.3d 2 ( Flatley ).) A \"secret\" includes a factual matter unknown to the general public, or to some particular portion of it interested in obtaining knowledge of the secret, and \"must affect the threatened person in some way so far unfavorable to the reputation or to some other interest of the threatened person [such] that threatened exposure would be likely to induce him through fear to pay out money or property for the purpose of avoiding the exposure.\" ( Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1078, 267 Cal.Rptr. 457.) Whether a threatened exposure would affect the victim is a factual question and depends on the nature of the threat and the susceptibility of the victim. ( Ibid. ; see Stenehjem v. Sareen (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1424, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 173 [threat may be implied from circumstances].) Extortion is a specific intent crime; guilt depends on the intent of the person who makes the threat and not the effect the threat has on the victim. ( People v. Umana (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 641, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 573.)"], "id": "8f686e29-1fd2-4890-8a38-829565930041", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Under the requirements of section 850 an indictment, charging the crime of <mask> and arising out of the fact situation quoted above, must plead the following elements: (1) That property was obtained; (2) That it was obtained with the victim\u2019s consent; and (3) That the obtaining of the property was induced by wrongful use of force or fear. Under each of the four counts in the indictment it is alleged that the defendants actually obtained from the victim certain property owned by it, to wit, a stated sum of lawful currency of the United States of America. There can be no question that lawful currency issued by the Federal Government qualifies as property under the intendment of this statute and that the allegation as to that property satisfies in each count the element of \u201c obtaining of property from another.\u201d (People v. Hagen, 212 App. Div. 879; People ex rel. Short v. Warden of City Prison, 145 App. Div. 861.)"], "id": "a376f7b2-f468-4657-bbe7-81207b6c9642", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Percoco and eight codefendants were charged via criminal complaint on September 20, 2016, and indicted November 22, 2016, accused of various corruption, <mask>, bribery and fraud offenses which are the subject of the Buffalo Billion/ Nano investigation. On December 21, 2016, United States District Court Judge Valerie E. Caproni signed a protective order on consent, binding on all parties, prohibiting disclosure to the public, including members of the media, of specified \u201cdisclosure material\u201d produced by the USAO to defendants. The Executive Chamber itself is not a named party in the indictment."], "id": "e580f896-1ff4-4060-9ef9-d49a91633cad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A joint indictment against the defendants, Steve Wuckich, alias Steve Wilson, and George Lee, alias George Foster, charging them with the crimes of conspiracy in violation of section 580-a of the Penal Law and the crime of <mask>, was returned by the Grand Jury of Onondaga County, having been filed on the 7th day of December, 1959 and thereafter, on the same date, having been remitted to the Onondaga County Court for trial or other disposition. It appears that the indictment was sealed for the reason that the whereabouts of the defendants was then unknown."], "id": "7f20af0a-f7f5-4ff7-9861-998548a550f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The only basis for sustaining this factual scenario as representing a burglary-robbery vis-\u00e1-vis the father and a separate kidnapping, insofar as concerns the mother and son, is the imaginative manner by which the indictment was created to pose, in two neat, tidy packages, a burglary-robbery as to the *117father, and a kidnapping as to the mother and son. This approach, however, overlooks the actual facts as they unfolded. It also fails to perceive that, while the situation might have escalated into an actual kidnapping, the arrival of the police intervened. Clearly, under the facts of this case, there was no <mask> at the time the police arrived. Inasmuch as, at that time, the extortion and the robbery were one and the same, we do not have two separate, independent crimes. (See, People v Pellot, supra, 105 AD2d, at 232.) Moreover, as stated, the manner by which the indictment was crafted, in avoidance of the legal and equitable principle underlying the merger doctrine, is improper and transcends the prosecutorial role, which does carry with it a degree of fairness in terms of the public."], "id": "692c7170-a4f7-4084-ac2f-dd43bfc04f7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Silas B. Ferguson in making tbis loan acted as tbe agent for bis brother, and exacted a bonus or allowance of ten per cent as tbe condition of tbe loan. Tbe mortgage was given for $2,700 and only $2,430 of tbe defendant\u2019s money was ever paid to tbe plaintiff thereon. It is true that tbe defendant knew nothing of tbe transaction at tbe time it took place; that bis agent kept tbe $270 for himself, and sent tbe mortgage by mail to tbe defendant who then resided in Otsego county and charged him $2,700 therefor. Tbis was in 1873. A year later, however, the defendant learned that tbe mortgage, as be expresses it in bis testimony, \u201c was bought at a discount. \u201d He then learned or would have learned if be bad prosecuted tbe inquiry, that he was bolding a mortgage for $2,700 upon which only $2,430 of bis money bad been loaned, and that bis agent bad exacted $270 usury thereon. It was then open to him either to ratify the act of bis agent or to repudiate it. He chose to ratify it by receiving interest for several years upon tbe whole sum and finally b.y seeking to foreclose for tbe whole sum. To restrain such foreclosure tbis action is brought. We think the judgment should be affirmed. Tbe defendant cannot with full knowledge of all the facts appropriate to himself the fruits of bis agents action, without ratifying ,the instrumentalities by which it was accomplished. No case is presented showing that tbe agent made any separate bargain for a bonus for the benefit of himself Tbe transaction was an express exaction of ten per cent, ostensibly for tbe benefit of tbe lender, without pretense that it was for the benefit of the agent, a transaction which the principal in no way has repudiated. In this respect the case differs from Philips v. Mackellar (92 N. Y., 34); Estevez v. Purdy (66 id., 446); Van Wyck v. Waters (81 ib., 352), and other similar cases in which the lender advanced the entire sum for which the security was given, and the agent in some way appropriated part of it to himself. Here the lender did not advance the face of the mortgage. His agent had his funds and could advance for him as much or as little as his thrift in <mask> required, and the result in this case was *375the principal obtained a $2,700 bond and mortgage for $2,430, and he allowed his agent to charge him $250 for his services; thus the> principal took all of the usury, and allowed his agent liberal wages,, not out of it, but because of it. The case seems to be much stronger than Algur v. Gardner (54 N. Y., 360)."], "id": "80c45270-2ad4-4d9a-91c6-e37eea347347", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["him in the event of the failure to accomplish his <mask> and of a prosecution for his attempted crime.\u201d (People v. Sanders (1922) 188 Cal. 744, at pp. 749-750; cited with approval in Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 327.) Again, it is the fact that the threat is directly linked to the monetary demand that is the critical factor. \u201c\u2018It is the means employed [to obtain the money] which the law denounces, and though the purpose may be to collect a just indebtedness arising from and created by the criminal act for which the threat is to prosecute the wrongdoer, it is nevertheless within the statutory inhibition.\u2019\u201d (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 326, italics added.) Applying these rules to the current facts, we believe Mousavi\u2019s initial communication with Falcon on September 6, 2019, as described above, was innocent. Her next e-mail sent on October 8, 2019, is a closer call when considered by itself. That e-mail contained at least an implicit threat, as Mousavi specified the crimes Falcon had allegedly committed, though she never directly linked her settlement demands to them. Instead, she explained how she had calculated her client\u2019s damages without making any direct reference to the alleged criminal misconduct. A skeptical observer might reasonably wonder why Mousavi referenced the \u201cBBC Violations\u201d at all within that demand. Indeed, we share that curiosity. We nonetheless conclude the October 8 correspondence standing alone may not have crossed the line into misconduct. But the October 8 e-mail must be considered in context along with the October 11, 2019 e-mail. In that e-mail Mousavi informed Falcon\u2019s counsel she had already \u201cput the attorneys for Harvest Health & Recreation Inc. (\u2018Harvest\u2019) on notice about Mr. Honard\u2019s claim for wages, without disclosing other issues mentioned in my letter of October 8, 2019.\u201d There can be no doubt that bribing a deputy district attorney (as alleged in the October 8 e-email) involves criminal misconduct. Mousavi then added, \u201cHarvest has requested that I forward the demand letters I have sent you. I am planning to"], "id": "02c1285c-6fa9-4b96-a0fd-c65c87e27467", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". Since under the original statutory scheme, no greater degree of larceny could be committed than that committed by <mask>, the prosecution had no incentive to frame a charge of grand larceny by extortion based solely upon the value of the property. In 1986, the Penal Law was amended to include a degree of larceny based upon the value of the stolen property exceeding $1,000,000 (Penal Law \u00a7 155.42, L 1986, ch 515, \u00a7 3), which exceeded larceny by extortion in the severity of punishment available."], "id": "52e357b4-6834-4102-aa82-1514b5b997fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Home Owners\u2019 Loan Act makes no provision for the outright payment of money to any particular class. It simply provides a means for loaning money to home owners to an amount not exceeding eighty per cent of the appraised value and in no case more than $14,000 on any one parcel of property. The loan bears interest and has to be repaid within a definite period of time. The loans are not limited to those who are improvident or incapable of properly protecting their own interests. The benefits of this act are open to all those who, because of the financial emergency, are unable to amortize their debt elsewhere. Public policy, therefore, does not require that this class of citizens be protected against <mask> or improvident bargains. Indeed, the type of person who owns his own home is usually well able to make contracts and to fully protect his rights. This is not a case, therefore, where Congress may interfere with the guaranties under the Fifth Amendment."], "id": "23021d49-ab9f-4d05-9927-2a29843c799d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["First, the subject matter of the Nassau County case was highly technical. Del Col, an attorney, was charged along with another with attempted <mask> from Data Treasury Corporation. The codefendant, who was Del Col\u2019s client, was scheduled to testify in a civil suit between the corporation and Wells Fargo relating to the use of technology patented by the corporation. The People\u2019s theory was that the defendant told the corporation that the codefendant\u2019s testimony would be favorable or unfavorable, depending on whether the corporation paid them off. The Special ADA in Del Col was selected because of his particular technical expertise, developed during past service in the District Attorney\u2019s Technology Crimes Unit. His special knowledge would naturally make his decisions difficult to \u201csupervise.\u201d"], "id": "578753d6-e9ed-4539-8bfc-73e94ffdc0c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It appears to the court that the Legislature by adopting these special rules of pleading and proof in regard to <mask>, simply acknowledged the separate origin of the crime of extortion apart from the common-law crime of larceny. Under the former Penal Law, extortion was a crime separate and *1008apart from larceny (former Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 850, 851). Extortion involves special problems of proof, and is more akin to robbery than to other forms of larceny. (See, People v Woods, 50 AD2d 941, 942 [2d Dept 1975] [dissenting opn, Cohalan, J.]; former Penal Law \u00a7 2120.) Upon enactment of the revised Penal Law, the crimes of extortion and larceny were merged. (See, Denzer and McQuillan, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Con Laws of NY, Book 39 [1967], Penal Law former \u00a7 155.40, at 458.) The previously recognized common-law forms of larceny and the statutory crime of extortion were incorporated into the revised Penal Law as larceny. (See, Penal Law \u00a7 155.05 [2].) Extortion became the most severely punished form of grand larceny. (Penal Law former \u00a7 155.40.)2 The revisers of the Penal Law believed that including extortion within larceny was a \"somewhat novel arrangement\u201d. (Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 155, at 103.) Since extortion was not larceny at common law, former Penal Law \u00a7 1290-a did not encompass charges of extortion. Therefore, under this predecessor to revised Penal Law \u00a7 155.45, an indictment for extortion necessarily would have specifically pleaded the separate statutes. The revisers of the Penal Law simply maintained a vestige of the historical separation between these crimes, by requiring that \"[w]here it is an element of the crime charged that property was * * * obtained by extortion, an indictment for larceny must so specify\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 155.45 [1]). In the court\u2019s view, this legislative history indicates an intent to continue to require special pleading as to any indictment upon evidence which would have constituted the crime of extortion under the former Penal Law."], "id": "fc266a7b-466e-4b35-886c-76ae014c0ca6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Notably, each of these cases preceded the 2002 creation of unlawful possession of personal identification information, a crime that, as discussed above, indicates the diminished relevance of the term \u201ctangible\u201d in the Penal Law\u2019s definition of \u201cpossess.\u201d We are thus inclined to reject the reasoning of Molina and Tansey and, instead, adopt an analysis more consistent with Johnson. The proposition that intangible property cannot be criminally possessed leads to the bizarre result that a person may commit larceny of intangible property, but may not be guilty of criminally possessing the very property which he or she has stolen (see Richard A. Greenberg et al., Criminal Law \u00a7 15:24 [3d ed 6 West\u2019s NY Prac Series 2007]). The Tansey court pointed out that \u201c[i]n neither Spatarella nor Garland did the Court [of Appeals] suggest that this view of property would be applicable to larceny by means other than <mask>, or to a possession offense\u201d (Tansey, 156 Misc 2d at 239). However, the Court did not foreclose the possibility of expanding that view to criminal possession offenses."], "id": "3d76d413-bd09-48fd-b805-d0033eda1f60", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The claim is made, first, that the District Attorney should be required to make more specific, by bill of particulars, the site where it is claimed that the alleged crime of <mask> was committed since \u201c in the County of New York \u201d includes all of Manhattan Island. It has been repeatedly held that a given county is a sufficient allegation of fact and is all that the statute requires in such case. The District Attorney cannot be compelled to furnish the particular building with address or location thereof and, unless he consents, the defendants are not entitled to this information which is in the nature of evidence."], "id": "d20c215a-ee10-41b3-b50a-569a82cafe31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["However, the decision actually compels the opposite result. The Court of Appeals was willing to force juries to split hairs in deciding which crime had been committed. (People v Dioguardi, 8 NY2d 260, 273-274.) But it did so only because of the logical inconsistency between a crime involving compulsion by one guilty party and one involving a voluntary agreement by two guilty parties. In contrast to the Dioguardi prosecution, the indictment at bar charges attempted <mask>, not extortion, and the solicitation of a bribe, not its actual receipt. Under the People\u2019s theory of the case there is no incongruity: both allegations point to guilt only on the defendant\u2019s part."], "id": "163d119a-fc81-4907-be03-4801eddaac6a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There is also included in the \u201c unclear \u201d area referred to in People v. Barr (supra) a situation where the pleaded crime is so remote (not \u201c factually connected \u201d) to the crime charged in the indictment, that its acceptance constitutes a violation of the constitutional provision (N. Y. Const., art. I, \u00a7 6) that \u201cno person shall be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime * * * unless on [presentment or] indictment of a grand jury.\u201d (See People ex rel. Cooper v. Martin, 5 A D 2d 736, supra; People v. Englese, 7 N Y 2d 83, supra; People v. Barr, 12 A D 2d 722.) But as a practical problem such instances are not likely to arise. Courts do not accept pleas to crimes so remote from the crime charged in the indictment as not to be at least 1* factually connected \u2019 \u2019. Thus a plea to robbery in an indictment alleging a felony murder would be \u2018 \u2018 factually connected \u201d; as would crimes such as coercion or <mask> to robbery or larceny. But even such hypothetical cases have not arisen in any jurisdiction. Courts require much closer factual connection before accepting pleas."], "id": "d3e42806-aaa0-4531-9ae1-cab83ff7b4a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Of course, Yellen and Sikowitz had no legal right to be endorsed by the Party, or to continue to be endorsed or supported by the Party, and the Party had the legal right to endorse and to withdraw the Party\u2019s endorsement and support from any candidate it chose. (Eu v San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 US 214, 224 [1989] [\u201cBarring political parties from endorsing and opposing candidates not only burdens their freedom of speech but also infringes upon their freedom of association\u201d]; California Democratic Party v Jones, 530 US 567, 575 [2000] [\u201cIn no area is the political association\u2019s right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee\u201d].) However, <mask> and coercion may be committed by threats to engage in conduct that is otherwise legal (People v Dioguardi, 8 NY2d 260, 271 [1960] [\u201c(the) entire character (of picketing by a labor union) changed from legality to criminality . . . when it was used as a pressure device to exact the payment of money as a condition of its cessation\u201d]), and a person may commit extortion or coercion by making a lawful demand for an unlawful reason. (People v Forde, 153 AD2d 466, 473 [1st Dept 1990] [defendant committed extortion when he \u201cthreatened the use of the otherwise legal \u2018matching\u2019 clause (of a labor contract) to harm (the victim\u2019s) company business, unless (the victim) paid him $2,000, since the defendant\u2019s use of the \u2018matching\u2019 clause was intended to extort money, rather than to carry out a legitimate objective of the Union\u201d]; see also United States v Enmons, 410 US 396, 406 n 16 [1973] [for defendant charged with violation of the federal Hobbs Act, which incorporated New York\u2019s definition of extortion, \u201cwhen the objectives of the picketing changed from legitimate labor ends to personal payoffs, then the actions became extortionate\u201d].)"], "id": "34700943-7e0e-4346-9886-4c2a86bc87ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*584The regular April 1964 Grand Jury of the County of Kings, as extended, has been and is conducting an investigation to determine whether the crimes of conspiracy, bribery, corruption, coercion, <mask> and usury were committed in Kings County by certain individuals. The Grand Jury heard testimony of several witnesses and examined certain books and records pertinent to the investigation. A reading of the Grand Jury minutes by the court leads it to the conclusion that the inquiry being made by the Grand Jury was in compliance with the law conferring duties upon the Grand Jury, section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows: \u201c Power of grand jury to inquire into crimes, etc. The grand jury has power, and it is their duty, to inquire into all crimes committed or triable in the county, and to present them to the court.\u201d"], "id": "400f29df-c82d-4dec-bbb7-0d1a277a00b2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["(Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 326, fn. omitted.). \u201cAttorneys are not exempt from these principles in their professional conduct.\u201d (Id. at p. 327.)7 The Supreme Court addressed a pivotal argument tendered by Mousavi both in the trial court and before us\u2014that her conduct did not constitute <mask> since she threatened no direct disclosure of Falcon\u2019s alleged criminal misconduct to either law enforcement or the media. We recognize at this point that this argument will strike a familiar chord with many lawyers who might ask, isn\u2019t this type of posturing standard operating procedure for aggressive litigators? Don\u2019t lawyers regularly link settlement demands to threatened consequences? In response, we concur with the answers provided by the Supreme Court in Flatley: \u201cthreats to do the acts that constitute extortion under Penal Code section 519 are extortionate whether or not the victim committed the crime or indiscretion upon which the threat is based and whether or not the person making the threat could have reported the victim to the authorities or arrested the victim. [Citations.] Furthermore, the crime with which the extortionist threatens his or her victim need not be a specific crime.\u201d (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 327.) In other words, it is the threat to reveal damaging information, not any subsequent revelation, that makes the conduct illegal when the threat is linked to a monetary demand. Many, perhaps most, extortionate threats may never actually be conveyed to either law enforcement or the media. The reason for this is obvious enough: the threat had its desired effect. \u201c[T]he accusations need only be such as to put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime. The more vague and general the terms of the accusation the better it would subserve the purpose of the accuser in magnifying the fears of his victim, and the better also it would serve to protect California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.10 also prohibits attorneys from making threats \u201cto present criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.\u201d"], "id": "2db64b18-0bab-4f11-812e-1ab86bdfb005", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["might be read as creating such a bright-line distinction, we respectfully disagree. While <mask> may \u201ccommonly\u201d involve a threat of future harm, the statute does not so require. Section 518 does not prescribe a minimum opportunity for the victim to \u201cconsent\u201d to avoid the harm threatened. And, as the \u201cconsent\u201d is not actual consent but coerced capitulation, we see no reason to distinguish between threats of immediate harm, that leave little time to the victim to consider his options, and threats of far-off harm, that offer more time for reflection. Indeed, the more immediate the threat, the more likely it is to prompt compliance, strengthening the inference that the perpetrator sought to induce the victim\u2019s \u201cconsent\u201d within the meaning of section 518.3"], "id": "4bba7df9-299d-4cc9-bd12-22807eef2a44", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As to his contention that the facts stated do not constitute the crime of <mask>, the defendant insists that there was no threat to do an unlawful injury to the property of another and, further, that no property was obtained by the defendants from any of their alleged victims. In addition he claims that the alleged acts, if true, would constitute, at best, the crimes of conspiracy and coercion, which are misdemeanors, but would not constitute the crime of extortion, a felony."], "id": "4c9278fb-9bba-41a6-ae65-ba229d0cdb2f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent induced by a wrongful use of force or fear. Fear such as will constitute extortion, may be induced by a threat: to do an unlawful injury to the property of the individual threatened. The common-law offense of extortion, affecting public office, has been extended by statute so as to include acts of private individuals. (2 Cyc. Crim. Law, \u00a7 1198; 3 Whart. Crim. Law [11th ed.], \u00a7 1895.)"], "id": "1b08cecb-9965-44a1-a860-ecc85b9da0f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 850 et seq.) and bribery in connection with labor relations (Penal Law \u00a7 380) have long been the subject of regulation in this State. They are certainly within the ambit of the historic and traditional police power of the State. There is nothing in the language of the Federal statute here involved or in its legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to foreclose the States from continuing to protect their inhabitants from such evils. On the contrary, such sources of Congressional intent as are available indicate that Congress did not purpose to invalidate existing State legislation on such subjects or to preclude State action with regard thereto."], "id": "1f4c2689-0b91-497b-bb60-92b636e26d37", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the instant case defendants are charged with <mask> by aiding and abetting the threat to picket certain stores unless they changed from nonunion cartmen to General Sanitation Service Corporation or others said to be, but which in fact were not, union carting companies. It is not necessary to extend *565this decision by a detailed analysis of the testimony. Suffice it to note that the evidence would not be sufficient unless it can be said with moral certainty that the only purpose it spells out is to benefit the defendants rather than the union. The testimony of Nolan and of each of the three store managers was that no suggestion was ever made concerning which cartman on the list proffered by Nolan was to be taken, that Nunzio Squillante though present did not speak until after General Sanitation had been selected, and that the sole reason for selecting General Sanitation was that it was first on the list. Recognizing the problem thus presented, the People introduced testimony intended to show a relationship between Vincent Squillante and most of the other companies on the list or to show that the remaining companies were not qualified to handle the business. Whether the evidence is of sufficient strength to bridge this gap in the chain of circumstances is a substantial question for the Appellate Division\u2019s consideration."], "id": "fe9cad09-6cfb-4f5b-b724-29a986928059", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Harold J. Rothwax, J. The defendants are before this court following rendition of a partial verdict on the indictment by a trial jury, which reached an impasse resulting in a mistrial as to the remaining counts. Of the original 51 counts contained in the indictment, 12 (Nos. 40-51) were severed by this court as involving only the defendant Leisner in a conspiracy exclusive of Marx and hence improperly joined (People v Ruiz, 130 Misc 2d 191, n, 193 [Sup Ct, NY County 1985]); and two were dismissed by this court for insufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury to establish the defendants\u2019 complicity in burglary. In addition, prior to jury submission, the trial court dismissed two counts each of attempted grand larceny (Nos. 18, 32) and attempted coercion (Nos. 20, 34), apparently for legal insufficiency of the evidence at trial, and withdrew 18 counts, evenly divided between attempted grand larceny and coercion based upon the theory of damage to property (Penal Law former \u00a7 155.40 [2] [b]; \u00a7 135.65 [1]), apparently in order to simplify the jury\u2019s tasks of deliberation by limiting the charges to <mask> and/or coercion by means of instilling fear of physical injury (Penal Law former \u00a7 155.40 [2] [a]; \u00a7 135.65 [1]). Fifteen counts were submitted to the jury, resulting in a verdict of guilty as to the first (a charge of conspiracy in the fourth degree), and a verdict of not guilty as to the second and fourth (attempted grand larceny and attempted coercion) counts. The jury was unable to agree on a verdict as to the remaining 12 counts and a mistrial was declared, without the defendant\u2019s consent, after five days\u2019 deliberation. The defendants have appealed the conspiracy conviction and the appeal is pending. The remaining counts are here for retrial."], "id": "b8e88a7d-ec0d-46eb-93be-48d9c7d8df24", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The issue then is whether the exemptions contained in Local Law No. 9 remedy the due process constitutional difficulties of the SRO legislation. Upon examination of the exemptions contained in Local Law No. 9, I find that they fail to alleviate the constitutional infirmities which existed in prior SRO legislation and create additional ones. The exemptions are tantamount to <mask>. While purportedly allowing the SRO owners to one day recover the use of their buildings, the law extracts a very high price for exercise of property rights. The regulatory scheme contained in Local Law No. 9 places an unfair and uncompensated burden on one class of property owners. The legislation in effect forces private indi*109viduals to subsidize a low-income housing program administered by the City of New York. Such a regulatory scheme severely interferes with plaintiffs\u2019 property rights. Accordingly, I find Local Law No. 9 was enacted in violation of plaintiffs\u2019 due process rights.28"], "id": "4069240c-67a6-4432-9e2a-168a868fdd0a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There are two indictments against these defendants, one filed February 26, 1943, and the other filed March 10, 1943, the latter being a superseding indictment adding the crime of <mask> to the crime of attempt to commit the crime of extortion as originally charged. The attempted crime is alleged to have been committed, by these defendants in the county of New York between on or about December 1,1938, and on or about January 13, 1939, attempting to obtain extortively the sum of $100,000, property of the Dravo Corporation, from E. T. Gott, Richard W. Hemp and J. S. Miller, officers of said corporation, in order to unlawfully injure the property of said corporation by corruptly and unlawfully fomenting and declaring strikes among its employees and by unlawfully and corruptly using their power to prevent the Dravo Corporation from entering into a contract with the International Union of Operating Engineers and the International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers *605Union, by unlawfully and corruptly using their power to prevent said corporation from employing members of said union, by unlawfully and corruptly using their power to prevent said corporation from, employing members of said union at prevailing and reasonable rates of wages and by unlawfully and corruptly hindering and impeding the conduct of the business of said corporation and otherwise interfering with'it."], "id": "df3701a1-5a1e-4044-9d04-b1c015d4638d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Howard E. Goldfluss, J. The defendant is charged in the indictment with criminal usury in the first degree and grand larceny by <mask>. He moves herein to suppress all evidence acquired or derived from electronic surveillance pursuant to an order of a Justice of this court previously issued on June 26, 1979. He relies on the recent decision of the New York State Court of Appeals, People v Shapiro (50 NY2d 747), which declared the New York statutory scheme for authorizing wiretapping unconstitutional as applied to the defendant therein. He maintains that the rationale and the conclusion in the Shapiro case must apply to him as well."], "id": "1296f47a-bfe6-4002-8167-2146fb9b51e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c \u2018 But there are other laws which are calculated for the protection of the subject against oppression, <mask>, deceit, etc. If such laws are violated, and the defendant takes advantage of the plaintiff\u2019s condition or situation, then the plaintiff shall recover; and it is astonishing that the reports do not distinguish between violations of the one sort and the other.\u2019 Two things are to be noted in this extract. That a distinction is taken between contracts malum prohibitum merely, and such as are immoral or contrary to general principles of policy; and also that stress is laid upon the fact that the law contravened in this case was intended to protect one party from oppression by the other. The first is a valid distinction, which runs through all the subsequent cases \u25a0 \u2014 \u25a0 the last was merely incidental to the particular case, and not essential to the principle. The first cases in which the principle was applied, were naturally those where the statute violated was intended for the special protection of the party seeking relief from some undue advantage taken by the other, because those were the cases in which the injustice of applying the same rule to both parties would be the most glaring. But it soon came to be seen that the principle was equally applicable to cases where the law infringed was intended for the protection of the public in general. * * *"], "id": "a7bc7e51-6f5e-487a-b30c-4495a9381e04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or <mask> or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."], "id": "ba12244c-8cf0-4070-a07c-d765eda85605", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant testified before the Grand Jury that when he heard the two men arguing with other club employees about the missing money, he heard one of them say that they were going to kill someone in the club if the money was not returned. He testified that when the argument became heated, he was \"very scared\u201d and went to his room to get his gun. He returned to the room where the men were arguing. He testi*709fied that the men stood, side by side between him and the front entrance to the club, and that the rear entrance led to a blind alley. He told the men that if they would tell him \"where they came from\u201d he would tell his boss to pay the money. The men said they were \"Tong On\u201d, a gang the defendant recognized as having a \"bad\u201d reputation for murder, <mask> and kidnapping. The defendant testified that he was afraid that if he did not pay them, the men would kill him. The men said that they wanted the money \"right now\u201d. One of the men said that if the defendant did not have any money, the man was going to kill somebody from the club. The defendant testified that the man pulled his jacket to the side and the defendant saw what he believed to be a gun handle. Defendant pulled his gun and fired twice without looking at the man. As the man approached him, the defendant continued to fire until the man fell. The other man ran. He denied chasing after and firing at the other man. The defendant also denied trying to flee, and denied possessing the bag that contained the gun."], "id": "65b20bf5-e718-45a0-8046-fa64a6207757", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In respect of the fund of $45,000 included in the tax estate the record furnishes no intelligible explanation why the sum should have been included in the tax estate at all. Its inclusion appears to be another evidence of arbitrary and irrational conduct of taxing officers of the government in forcing citizens to pay taxes in excess of the amounts actually due because some bureaucrat in the revenue department insists on the inclusion of an arbitrary addition to the taxable property of deceased though unable to advance any defensible theory for its inclusion. Here it would seem that the taxing authorities attempted an utterly indefensible inclusion in the tax estate of deceased of a fund put *893in trust by her in 1921. That trust ended in 1935 and the beneficiaries of the principal thereupon created other trusts with what they received. In respect of these further trusts deceased had certain rights. There is no basis upon which $45,000 can be asserted to be the measure of those rights. The sum of $45,000 included in the tax estate of deceased appears to be merely the lowest figure at which the estate representatives could compromise the indefensible demands of the revenue authorities. It appears to have been included by the assent of the estate representatives in surrender of their legal rights because of fear of attempted larger exactions and of fear of the cost of the estate assets of insistence upon the estate\u2019s legal rights. Nowhere in the assessment notices or in the computations of the taxing authorities is any description given of the property taxed which explains the figure $45,000. Nor is there given any statement of the source of that fund. No combination of calculations on any theory can produce a sum of $45,000 as a figure representing any property value subject to tax by reason of deceased\u2019s death. It stands on this record as the basis merely to an <mask> of excessive taxes from the estate. In these circumstances the court cannot find that it is related to any deed of trust of deceased at all. That of 1921 contains no language charging the property affected thereby with the tax. That of 1935 was not deceased\u2019s indenture and so is not within the terms of the will. The ultimate consequence is that the true estate must pay the exaction."], "id": "161ce0b6-a3c3-467f-8a6f-a970388a4127", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or <mask> or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."], "id": "2af480c3-ea9e-4ea2-97be-5b668e1b5a9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*301The indictment charges the defendants with attempted <mask>. It alleges that the Croation Printing and Publishing Company was a New York corporation \u201c engaged in the City and County of New York and elsewhere in the business of editing, publishing and distributing a certain daily newspaper,\u201d and that one Zotti was an officer and stockholder in the corporation; and that the defendants did feloniously attempt to obtain from said Zotti 1,000 shares of the stock of said corporation by means of a threat, \u201c then and there made to do an unlawful injury to the property of the said corporation; \u201d that is to say, by preventing, persuading and obstructing advertisers from inserting advertisements in the said newspaper."], "id": "088b308b-d889-482c-9911-17eb732ea8c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The second count of the indictment alleges that the defendants, each acting in concert with one another: \"stole certain property which was obtained by <mask> committed by instilling in the victim, Daniel Leon, a fear that the actor or another person would use or abuse his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely, namely, the defendants acting in concert demanding a quantity of United States currency to have defendant Latanya Gray, a police officer, withdraw criminal charges she had commenced against Daniel Leon.\u201d"], "id": "b77b7747-3bb0-499d-b69c-bb013c5416dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On the other hand, when a union official threatens to picket a company unless the company agrees to hire a firm that uses the union\u2019s members, the action threatened \u2014 picketing unless such a firm is hired \u2014 would materially benefit the union official in his representative capacity by furthering the interests of the union and its membership. (People v Adelstein, 9 AD2d 907 [2d Dept 1959], affd without op 8 NY2d 998 [1960].) As the United States Supreme Court has itself observed, \u201cjudicial construction of the New York statute reinforces the conclusion that, however militant, union activities to obtain higher wages do not constitute <mask>. For extortion requires an intent \u2018to obtain that which in justice and equity the party is not entitled to receive.\u2019 \u201d (United States v Enmons, 410 US at 406 n 16, quoting People v Cuddihy, 151 Misc 318, 324 [Ct Gen Sess, NY County 1934], affd 243 App Div 694 [1935].)"], "id": "d1182209-7252-49aa-8d1a-a40dd5f05570", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court of appeal then turned to the term imposed for the <mask> count. The court noted that the conviction for extortion under section 518 required the jury to find \"the use of force or fear induced by threat.\" ( Anaya, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 272, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 216.) The court further noted that the subdivision (b)(4)(C) life term applies to extortion under section 519, which defines fear induced by threat. From these observations, the court inferred that the Legislature intended for the subdivision (b)(4)(C) life term to *56apply when the offense involves a threat, but not when it involves a use of force absent any threat. The court rejected the Attorney General's argument that this would result in absurd results by punishing threats more harshly than the actual use of force. The court held that \"reserving the seven year-to-life term for the crime of extortion that involves a threat comports with the Legislature's desire to punish that threat more harshly. The use of force only, on the other hand, could amount to nothing more than a battery. Therefore, we believe the Legislature intended extortion committed via a felonious threat to be treated more harshly than extortion by simple force.\" ( Id. at p. 273, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 216.) Because the jury could have convicted the defendants of extortion based the use of force without a finding of fear induced by threat, the court vacated the enhanced sentence."], "id": "2327e2cf-c117-4fdf-bbb4-f4b3058b78bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["e-mail those letters on Tuesday.\u201d The implication is clear: settle the case now or Harvest will become aware of Falcon\u2019s alleged criminal misconduct next week. \u201cIt is not necessary that a threat should be apparent from the face of the letter, nor even necessary that it should be implied therefrom. The statute says if the language used is adapted to imply a threat, then the writing is sufficient. Parties guilty of the offense here alleged seldom possess the hardihood to speak out boldly and plainly, but deal in mysterious and ambiguous phrases . . . .\u201d (People v. Choynski (1892) 95 Cal. 640, 641\u2013642; Umana, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 640.) If Mousavi had not crossed the line earlier, her October 11 e-mail clearly did. As discussed above, Penal Code section 518 outlaws \u201cobtaining of property . . . from another, with his or her consent . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear.\u201d (Pen. Code, \u00a7 518, subd (a).) The statute specifically provides that fear can be created by accusing \u201cthe individual threatened. . . of a crime.\u201d (Pen. Code, \u00a7 519.) Mousavi\u2019s $490,000 settlement demand, as explained in her October 8 e-mail correspondence, was for unpaid wages, commissions, and related expenses. The demand was unrelated to any alleged criminal conduct. Thus, to paraphrase Flatley, Mousavi\u2019s threat to disclose criminal activity entirely unrelated to her client\u2019s damage claim \u201c\u2018exceeded the limits of respondent\u2019s representation of his client\u2019 . . . . (State v. Harrington, supra, 260 A.2d at p. 699 [attorney\u2019s veiled threat to have his client in a divorce action inform on her husband to the Internal Revenue Service and Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization supports attorney\u2019s conviction of extortion].)\u201d (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 330-331.) B. Evidence of <mask> As the trial court noted, the evidence made clear that Mousavi expressly linked her next potential communication with Harvest\u2014which she knew would inevitably reveal her accusations of criminal misconduct against Falcon\u2014to Falcon\u2019s failure to meet her settlement demand. This was extortion: \u201cobtaining of property . . ."], "id": "22529381-8f0a-4525-b890-84c876861bce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Penal Law \u00a7 110.10 applies when, as here, a person mistakenly believes that another participant in a criminal transaction is acting as a criminal, not as an undercover officer, and the crime is impossible according to its statutory definition because the other participant is an undercover officer. In such cases a charge of a completed crime must be reduced to an attempt to commit the crime (see, People v Zodda, 153 Misc 2d 94, supra; People v Babits, 122 Misc 2d 6, affd 116 AD2d 1047, supra; People v Coleman, 74 NY2d 381 [attempted promoting prostitution in the second degree (attempting to enlist as a prostitute a person less than 16 years old) was committed when the defendant, proposing to become a pimp for a young woman, mistakenly believed her to be a 15-year-old runaway, when she was actually a 24-year-old undercover police officer]; People v Zaborski, 59 NY2d 863 [while it was impossible to commit the crime of criminal possession of stolen property when the defendant received the stolen property from a police agent in a sting operation, the crime of attempted criminal possession of stolen property was established]; People ex rel. Perry v Gillette, 200 NY 275 [although the intended victim of a shakedown paid money to the defendant in an apparent response to the defendant\u2019s threats, he did so while acting on behalf of the police, and therefore the <mask> was not consummated; the proper charge was attempt to commit extortion]; People v Bon*261signore, 21 AD2d 309 [same]; People v Leichtweis, 59 AD2d 383 [the crime of burglary, charged as entering a building \u201cunlawfully\u201d to commit a larceny, was impossible because the security guard whom the defendants had bribed to facilitate their entry was secretly working with his employers to permit defendants\u2019 entry, in order to catch them inside, so their entry was authorized and not unlawful; however, attempted burglary was established because the defendants were unaware of that law enforcement plan])."], "id": "0b3d9b8c-438c-4bb6-ad1c-23fc5c3cb763", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The <mask> and coercion statutes at issue here violate neither the right to free speech nor the right of association. While the conduct each statute targets unquestionably includes speech, and while in this case the speech was uttered in the context of a political party\u2019s endorsements of candidates for public office, each statute requires that the speech constitute a threat that the speaker will cause the victim \u201cmaterial harm\u201d and that the conduct threatened be such that it would not \u201cmaterially benefit\u201d the actor. (Penal Law \u00a7 135.60 [9]; \u00a7 155.05 [2] [e] [ix].) Because the statutes are thus focused on threats of damage made for no legitimate purpose, they fall outside \u201c \u2018the realm of social or political conflict where threats to engage in behavior that may be unlawful may nevertheless be part of the marketplace of ideas, broadly conceived to embrace the rough competition that is so much the staple of social or political discourse.\u2019 \u201d (United States v Jackson, 986 F Supp 829, 833 [SD NY 1997], vacated on other grounds 180d 55 [2d Cir 1999] [error in jury instructions], revd on rearg 196d 383 [2d Cir *8191999] [conviction restored because error was harmless], quoting United States v Velasquez, 772d 1348, 1357 [7th Cir 1985].)13 For the same reasons, application of these statutes to the conduct with which the defendants are charged does not impermissibly interfere with the \u201cinternal administration of [a] party organization.\u201d (Smith v Pigeon, 174 Misc 2d 97, 101-102 [Sup Ct, Erie County 1997].)"], "id": "041ed547-df33-4b3c-af1e-eed3c6b1447f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment sets forth a designated period of time during which the alleged crime was committed by the defendant, the designated county in which the crime took place, and that the defendant stole property of the nature or value required to constitute the commission of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree. The People are under no obligation to set forth the particular way or manner in which the sum of $245,284.91 was stolen or the particular theory of larceny involved (Penal Law, \u00a7 155.45, subd 1). See, also, People v Farruggia (41 AD2d 894), in unanimously affirming the defendant\u2019s conviction for grand larceny in the second degree, the court said: \"Appellant urges that the indictment does not comply with CPL 200.50 (subd. 7) requiring a plain and concise statement of facts supporting the offense charged because it does not allege that the larceny was committed by false pretenses. The offense *337charged is larceny. False pretense is an evidentiary allegation of the means used to commit the crime and need not be specifically alleged. (CPL 200.50, subd. [7]; Penal Law, \u00a7 155.45.) An indictment charging larceny generally is supported by proof of any conduct constituting larceny as defined by section 155.05 of the Penal Law, except where property is taken from the person or obtained by <mask>. (Penal Law, \u00a7 155.45, subd. 2.) CPL 200.50 (subd. 7) is a re-enactment of similar provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We find no reason to infer that these provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law enacted after section 155.45 of the Penal Law impliedly repealed it.\u201d"], "id": "29103a3e-5ec9-439b-9070-aef751669914", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Based upon an investigation of the foregoing facts, which included interviews with Mrs. Burnham at the hospital on *419four separate occasions, Detective Favuzzi arrested the defendants on June 5, 1985. The defendants were indicted under indictment No. 2887/85 for the following crimes: attempted murder in the second degree; assault in the first degree (two counts); grand larceny in the first degree by <mask>; grand larceny in the second degree (17 counts); criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree; coercion in the second degree; and conspiracy in the fourth degree."], "id": "132920be-9aad-4106-b360-7e296ce595ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Per curiam. Delivered by Radcliff, justice. This is a case on error, from the sessions in Montgomery. The plaintiff was indi filed in the sessions for <mask>, as an attorney of the court of common pleas for that county. General errors have been assigned, and a number of objefitions taken to the indifitment and to the record, some of which are objefitions of form, and others of substance."], "id": "8a547270-7827-4226-8ce4-651ac6a61a00", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions. Christine Dubois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________________ Defendant Richard Bert Mendoza, Jr. (Defendant) appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of (1) attempted <mask> (Pen. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 664, 518);1 (2) attempted robbery (\u00a7\u00a7 664, 211); (3) assault with a deadly weapon (\u00a7 245, subd. (a)(1)); (4) assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (\u00a7 245, subd. (a)(4)); (5) robbery (\u00a7 211); (6) assault with a deadly weapon (\u00a7 245, subd. (a)(1)); and (7) dissuading a witness (\u00a7 136.1(b)(1)). The jury further found true the allegations of personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon with respect to the first and second counts (\u00a7 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and for inflicting great bodily injury with respect to the third and fourth counts (\u00a7 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 24 years and 4 months. Defendant contends: (1) his conviction for attempted extortion was unsupported by evidence; (2) he should not have been separately sentenced for distinct criminal acts committed during a continuous attack; and (3) multiple issues pertaining to the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion in sentencing him require resentencing. We agree in limited part due to a change in the law, vacate a portion of Defendant\u2019s sentence, and remand for resentencing as set forth below. BACKGROUND Defendant\u2019s convictions stem from two separate criminal episodes in the city of Pomona occurring weeks apart in 2018. The Spadra Cemetery Incident On the evening of September 16, 2018, young cyclists on a group ride sought to take a shortcut through the Spadra"], "id": "1d88a50c-101f-4f64-9af8-118ce1a6c969", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The moving papers do not disclose, and the court is, therefore, left in doubt, as to whether the applicants view this alleged transaction as a species of duress, as <mask> or merely as a type of usury. Furthermore, it is not indicated which, if either, got the worst of the bargain. It is inferable that the lady in the case was the loser, as the petition for her appointment indicates that the decedent at the time he was killed possessed no assets, which would lead to a belief that she not only has lost her husband, but her money as well."], "id": "39cfc483-078f-44c1-8cf0-dfd41c9939ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Further support for the view that acts, to be jurisdietionally significant under section 134, must be substantively essential to the commission of a crime, is derived from People v. Fowler (152 N. Y. S. 672 [Sup. Ct., N. Y. County, 1914]). In this case, the defendant, in Onondaga County, extorted a payment of money in the form of a check on an Onondaga bank. The check was indorsed for deposit at a bank in New York County from which it was sent to a correspondent bank in Albany, which ultimately caused the Onondaga bank to pay the item. The tainted fund originally deposited in the New York County bank was thereafter drawn upon in New York County. In denying the existence of any jurisdiction to prosecute for the crime of <mask> in New York County, the court wrote concerning the events occurring there (pp. 678-679): \u201c It is obvious that none of these acts is a constituent element of extortion. None of them constitutes any part of the offense. Nor were any of these acts \u2018 requisite \u2019 to the consummation of the offense. The word \u2018 requisite \u2019 here means, necessary, essential, indispensable. While these acts were steps taken by defendant to realize the value of the check, and could be shown on the trial, they were *1040nevertheless mere incidents in the history of the check, and not necessary, essential, or indispensable to the consummation of the crime.\u201d"], "id": "d0bbabc6-3faa-4ce6-8457-b602ed6e9e5d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even assuming jurisdiction, it does not appear that an adequate RICO claim is set forth. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co. (741d 482, 492, decided July 25, 1984), held that under the statute, a party is entitled to treble damages only if it is alleged and proved that an enterprise\u2019s affairs have been conducted through a \u201c \u2018pattern of racketeering activity\u2019 \u201d, which is defined under section 1961 (1) to include acts involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, narcotics, embezzlement, <mask>, fraudulent securities and mail and wire fraud. The court in Sedima believed there was no evidence that Congress intended to create a broad civil cause of action under RICO unrelated to organized crime and its attempt at infiltration of private businesses. The court noted that while there were few cases where RICO had been used against reputed mobsters, there was a veritable explosion of cases alleging RICO offenses against legitimate enterprises where \u201cgarden variety\u201d allegations of fraud were alleged. Such use of the RICO statute was characterized by the court as \u201cextraordinary, if not outrageous\u201d (p 487). The court went on to hold that for \u201c \u2018pattern of racketeering activity\u2019 \u201d (p 492) to exist, the predicate acts upon which a RICO claim could be based would require at least two prior criminal convictions. Additionally, the court declared that beyond ordinary damages, one asserting a civil action under RICO must allege a \u201cseparate, distinct racketeering enterprise injury\u201d. There was a vigorous dissent from Judge Cardamone."], "id": "16590776-c791-4997-9626-0b850875a395", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["- B.W.'s assertions to police thus gave investigators reason to believe that Boyd's phone, not B.W.'s phone, contained the probative information. Thus, B.W.'s phone did not \"so obvious[ly]\" contain exculpatory evidence, particularly in the form of photos, such that the failure to collect the photo evidence amounted to gross negligence. Cf. Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 988, 36 P.3d 424, 435 (2001) (concluding \"that the potential evidentiary significance of blood evidence \"was [not] so obvioue as to constitute gross negligence by investigators' failure \"to impound and tese it). We have also said that the selective collection of evidence does not prove even negligence, much less gross negligence. See Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 167-68, 17 P.3d 1008, 1018 (2001). Boyd also failed to show that it was possible for police to collect the data given the limitations of extraction tools. Randolph, 117 Nev. at 988, 36 P.3d at 435. Because Boyd failed to show materiality and gross negligence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the evidence-collection instructions. Sufficiency of the evidence Boyd argues that B.W.'s testimony demonstrates that she moved freely during the four-month period the State alleged the kidnapping occurred such that the evidence does not support his first-degree kidnapping conviction.4 He contends that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove that any kidnapping was not incidental to any <mask> because \"[n]one of the facte relied on by the State to establish first-degree kidnapping \"go beyond what is required to prove [the predicate offense of]"], "id": "9e468571-c8f4-4830-acb5-b3f8c645d73b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court is aware of the contrary holding in People v Crean (115 Misc 2d 996, 1000-1002 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 1982]). In Crean, the defendant obtained in New York County a check payable to the victim in Westchester County, deposited the check and withdrew the proceeds from a bank in New York County. The Westchester court held that venue was proper there since Westchester was the situs of the loss to the *23victim as a result of the larceny. This holding was contrary to a previous holding in People v Brown (69 Misc 2d 412 [Suffolk County Ct 1972]), that Suffolk County did not have venue of the larceny of proceeds of a sale of land located in that county, where the sale was consummated and the proceeds thereof converted in New York County. The court in Crean distinguished Brown on the grounds that Brown was limited to considering whether an element of the offense occurred in Suffolk County. This analysis overlooks the requirement that the result upon which venue is based must be an element of the crime charged. CPL 20.10 (3) states that \"[a]n offense of which a result is an element is a 'result offense\u2019.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Crean relies on People v Schlatter (55 AD2d 922 [2d Dept 1977]), which does not support the proposition for which it is cited. In Schlatter, the Court held that in the absence of proof that forged checks were made or altered in Nassau County, the deposit of such checks in a Nassau County bank was not a sufficient basis for venue of the forgery offense in Nassau County. The Court noted that forgery is not a result offense, meaning that obtaining money in Nassau County as a result of the forgery would not support venue. The Court remanded the larceny counts for trial in Nassau County, not because larceny is a result offense, but because the checks were deposited in and paid to an account in Nassau County. In other words, property in the form of money was obtained in Nassau County. (See also, People v Zaccaro, 132 AD2d 589, 590 [2d Dept 1987] [\"the only conceivable specific consequence or result of the crime of attempted grand larceny in the second degree by <mask> is that an element of that crime would be obtaining property by extortion\u201d].) In fact, the result of the larceny in Schlatter was felt in New York County, since the offices of the corporation on whose account the checks were drawn were located in New York County."], "id": "b733a7d5-0210-4530-aa28-d6b3963000c7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Howard E. Goldfluss, J. The defendant is charged in the indictment with criminal usury in the first degree and grand larceny by <mask>. He moves herein to suppress all evidence acquired or derived from electronic surveillance pursuant to an order of a Justice of this court previously issued on June 26, 1979. He relies on the recent decision of the New York State Court of Appeals, People v Shapiro (50 NY2d 747), which declared the New York statutory scheme for authorizing wiretapping unconstitutional as applied to the defendant therein. He maintains that the rationale and the conclusion in the Shapiro case must apply to him as well."], "id": "c5327aad-ba98-4f62-a82a-8e8110688adf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The crime of <mask> \"is the obtaining of property from another, with his [ ] consent, ... induced by a wrongful use of force or fear ....\" ( \u00a7 518.) The \"elements of the offense are: (1) A wrongful use of force or fear, (2) with the specific intent of inducing the victim to consent to the defendant's obtaining his or her property, (3) which does in fact induce such consent and results in the defendant's obtaining property from the victim.\" ( People v. Hesslink (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 789, 213 Cal.Rptr. 465 ( *725Hesslink ). ) A defendant may induce fear by threatening to expose, or impute to a person \"a deformity, disgrace or crime\" or \"expose a secret affecting him [or her].\" (\u00a7 519; see Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 326, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606, 139 P.3d 2 ( Flatley ).) A \"secret\" includes a factual matter unknown to the general public, or to some particular portion of it interested in obtaining knowledge of the secret, and \"must affect the threatened person in some way so far unfavorable to the reputation or to some other interest of the threatened person [such] that threatened exposure would be likely to induce him through fear to pay out money or property for the purpose of avoiding the exposure.\" ( Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1078, 267 Cal.Rptr. 457.) Whether a threatened exposure would affect the victim is a factual question and depends on the nature of the threat and the susceptibility of the victim. ( Ibid. ; see Stenehjem v. Sareen (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1424, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 173 [threat may be implied from circumstances].) Extortion is a specific intent crime; guilt depends on the intent of the person who makes the threat and not the effect the threat has on the victim. ( People v. Umana (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 641, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 573.)"], "id": "460b8109-dc0d-454b-b03f-cf17e29b9d6c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["See 3 Duesenberg & King, Sales & Bulk Transfers under the UCC, \u00a7 4.04(2). It does not follow however that if the modification is not procured by <mask>, duress, or some such action, it necessarily is enforceable. Though Comment 2 of section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that \u201cThe extortion of a \u2018modification\u2019 without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith\u201d, there would seem to be no reason to read this comment as indicating approval of a modification without consideration, no matter what its objective, so long as it was not procured through \u201cextortion\u201d."], "id": "24321a24-ef46-488b-b538-fd385d855c7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Statutory duplication is hardly a new phenomenon \u2014 it is, rather, the general practice in penal legislation. Thus, the thief who, by means of <mask>, appropriates for his own use a $2,000 automobile commits, under the New York Penal Law, at least seven crimes: three separate and distinct degrees of grand larceny (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 155.40, 155.35, 155.30), petit larceny (Penal Law, \u00a7 155.25), three separate and distinct degrees of criminal possession of stolen property (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 165.40, 165.45, 165.50) and finally, unauthorized use of a vehicle (Penal Law, \u00a7 165.05, subd 1). Each of these seven crimes is delineated in separate provisions of the law, and the extortion of the $2,000 automobile could properly be covered by any one or all of those separate provisions. The logic of the defense position would have us argue that larceny and possession of stolen property are general concepts, whereas, the use of an automobile without the owner\u2019s permission is completely specific, wherefore only the misdemeanor of unauthorized use was \"intended\u201d to apply where the property which is taken is an automobile. Manifestly, the argument crumbles of its own weight."], "id": "85ae2e90-af04-41f0-b620-198487d37a5d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or <mask>, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(e)(2)(B). The statute is violated when a defendant, in the course of committing a theft, either \u201c(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another,\u201d or \u201c(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.\u201d Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 29.02(a). We refer to the first alternative as robbery- by-injury and the second as robbery-by-threat."], "id": "ba3f2f94-861a-4762-8d28-adb094aeccea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The moving papers do not disclose, and the court is, therefore, left in doubt, as to whether the applicants view this alleged transaction as a species of duress, as <mask> or merely as a type of usury. Furthermore, it is not indicated which, if either, got the worst of the bargain. It is inferable that the lady in the case was the loser, as the petition for her appointment indicates that the decedent at the time he was killed possessed no assets, which would lead to a belief that she not only has lost her husband, but her money as well."], "id": "ec1a1181-82f5-49b5-8bd5-78c8b35f3e48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["took their money. Defendant was charged with <mask> by force or fear (Pen. Code, \u00a7 518 -- count 1),1 attempted extortion (\u00a7 524 -- counts 2-4), and second degree robbery (\u00a7 211 -- counts 5-7). It was further alleged as to all counts that defendant had previously been convicted of a prior serious or violent felony, a strike (\u00a7 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and as to counts 5 through 7, that he had been convicted of a prior serious felony (\u00a7 667, subd. (a)(1). Defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of robbery, counts 5 and 6, and admitted the strike allegation. The remaining charges and enhancements were dismissed with a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to a stipulated aggregate term of eight years in state prison, as follows: the midterm of three years on count 5, doubled for the strike, plus one year (one-third the midterm) on count 6, doubled for the strike. The trial court ultimately awarded 606 days of presentence credit (527 actual and 79 conduct), and ordered defendant to pay various fines and fees. At a restitution hearing, the trial court set restitution in the amount of $5,690, less $1,320 that law enforcement officers previously seized from defendant. II Appointed counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asking this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant."], "id": "13ae8257-346a-43a3-a28a-12d8083b2cc1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs made a motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, impermissibly inconsistent or compromised or, in the alterative, tainted by juror misconduct. In support of the claimed jury misconduct plaintiffs annexed affidavits from two jurors, Daniel and Garrison. Daniel stated that during the trial he was asked by juror number 4 what he thought of plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, Mr. Alterman. He responded that he didn\u2019t believe defendant Tsui. Juror number 3 remarked that \u201cif you can hate Mr. Tsui, then I can hate the attorneys,\u201d apparently referring to Mr. Alterman. Daniel also stated that juror number 5 stated \u201cmaybe I\u2019ll go and eat and [sic] Jing Fong and talk to Mr. Tsui.\u201d Other jurors agreed, saying \u201cOh, yeah, maybe we should all go.\u201d Daniel could not state if the jurors did in fact go to the restaurant. Other jurors referred to *545Mr. Tsui as \u201cvery handsome\u201d with a \u201cnice smile.\u201d Daniel stated that the jury never deliberated, never discussed the claims or the testimony in the case, instead juror number 3 stated she was voting no and nothing could change her mind. Each time the jury foreperson sought to ask each person to discuss their viewpoints, \u201che was shouted down\u201d by the four female members of the jury. Daniel stated that when he sought to discuss the case and state his opinions he was \u201cshouted down and cursed at because of his beliefs.\u201d When a readback of the testimony allegedly supporting the <mask> charge was requested, \u201cthe four women jurors refused to consider it\u201d with one remarking \u201cforget it, even if that was the evidence I won\u2019t change my mind.\u201d Daniel stated that the jury never deliberated on the damage to plaintiffs\u2019 reputation, refused to consider records submitted into evidence, and refused to discuss the matter of tips."], "id": "3b41b550-e849-48cc-8d46-10661676a1a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["testified at the hearing, Defendant instructed an associate to \u201ctalk to Gilly [another associate] ASAP and let him know what that fool did, homie. And let him know, fuckin\u2019, you know what I mean. I said talk to Diablo [another associate].\u201d For his conduct relative to Reyes on October 2, 2018, the jury convicted Defendant of (i) attempted <mask> of Reyes (\u00a7\u00a7 664, 518); (ii) attempted robbery of Reyes (\u00a7\u00a7 664, 211); (iii) assault of Reyes with a deadly weapon (\u00a7 245, subd. (a)(1)); and (iv) assault of Reyes with force likely to cause great bodily injury (\u00a7 245, subd. (a)(4)). For the various convictions stemming from the two separate incidents, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 24 years and four months imprisonment. In accordance with section 1170.1, subdivision (a), the court based the principal term on Defendant\u2019s conviction for assaulting Reyes with a deadly weapon, as enhanced (i) for causing great bodily injury (\u00a7 12022.7, subd. (a)); (ii) under the Three Strikes laws (\u00a7\u00a7 1120.12, subds. (a)-(d) & \u00a7 667, subds. (b)-(i)); and (iii) for a prior conviction of a serious felony (\u00a7 667, subd. (a)(1)). It imposed subordinate terms, subject to applicable enhancements, for all other convictions other than the attempted robbery and attempted extortion of Reyes. The court stayed sentences for the latter two convictions pursuant to section 654. Defendant timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. Substantial Evidence Supported Defendant\u2019s Conviction For Extorting Reyes On October 2, 2018 Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted extortion, on the premise that Defendant\u2019s actions were inconsistent with an effort to obtain"], "id": "f12bca3b-10ec-4708-9c45-59f563d05bb6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Michael Crumble and Ramell Markus (together, \u201cDefendants\u201d) appeal their respective judgments of conviction and their sentences. Defendants were indicted for kidnapping and committing physical violence against Daniel Nieves to obtain drugs and money. They were convicted after a jury trial of kidnapping conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1201(c), kidnapping, id. \u00a7 1201(a)(1), and committing physical violence in furtherance of an <mask>, id. \u00a7 1951(a). They were acquitted of using, carrying, and possessing a firearm. Id. \u00a7 924(c). Markus was given a below- guidelines sentence of 180 months\u2019 incarceration, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Crumble was given a below-guidelines sentence of 108 months\u2019 incarceration, followed by five years of supervised release. We assume the parties\u2019 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal."], "id": "fe4c29ba-66df-488e-bd00-c9ad5ae2ec61", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["(Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 326, fn. omitted.). \u201cAttorneys are not exempt from these principles in their professional conduct.\u201d (Id. at p. 327.)7 The Supreme Court addressed a pivotal argument tendered by Mousavi both in the trial court and before us\u2014that her conduct did not constitute <mask> since she threatened no direct disclosure of Falcon\u2019s alleged criminal misconduct to either law enforcement or the media. We recognize at this point that this argument will strike a familiar chord with many lawyers who might ask, isn\u2019t this type of posturing standard operating procedure for aggressive litigators? Don\u2019t lawyers regularly link settlement demands to threatened consequences? In response, we concur with the answers provided by the Supreme Court in Flatley: \u201cthreats to do the acts that constitute extortion under Penal Code section 519 are extortionate whether or not the victim committed the crime or indiscretion upon which the threat is based and whether or not the person making the threat could have reported the victim to the authorities or arrested the victim. [Citations.] Furthermore, the crime with which the extortionist threatens his or her victim need not be a specific crime.\u201d (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 327.) In other words, it is the threat to reveal damaging information, not any subsequent revelation, that makes the conduct illegal when the threat is linked to a monetary demand. Many, perhaps most, extortionate threats may never actually be conveyed to either law enforcement or the media. The reason for this is obvious enough: the threat had its desired effect. \u201c[T]he accusations need only be such as to put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime. The more vague and general the terms of the accusation the better it would subserve the purpose of the accuser in magnifying the fears of his victim, and the better also it would serve to protect California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.10 also prohibits attorneys from making threats \u201cto present criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.\u201d"], "id": "b0f39976-2b59-484c-b1db-97336d0a7d5b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In State of New York v Unique Ideas (supra), a consumer fraud action was brought by the Attorney-General and a consent judgment was entered against the defendants. The terms of the judgment were violated when the defendants waited less than a month before offering the same \" 'get rich quick\u2019 \u201d scheme condemned in the consent judgment to some 2,500,000 potential new customers through the use of four bulk mailings (State of New York v Unique Ideas, supra, at 347). The Attorney-General sought to impose a civil contempt fine of $250 for each of the 2,500,000 postjudgment mailings. The trial court found this fine to be theoretically within its powers, but in its discretion imposed a fine of $500,000. The Appellate Division, First Department, concluded that the maximum fine that could be imposed was $250 for each of the four bulk mailings (56 AD2d 295). The Court of Appeals rejected the constructions of both the lower court and the Appellate Division, finding that a contempt award arrived at by multiplying $250 by either the 2,500,000 individual offerings, or by *44the four bulk mailings, was improper. The Court indicated that where there is an actual loss or injury, Judiciary Law \u00a7 773 did not provide for a general $250 fine, single or multiple. The Court stated that, in keeping with its compensatory policy, the statute called rather for an assessment that would indemnify the aggrieved parties\u2014the defrauded consumers themselves. The Court held that since the consumers had suffered actual losses, \"any civil fine based on separate acts of contempt multiplied by the statutory maximum for unprovable damages would be inappropriate\u201d (State of New York v Unique Ideas, supra, at 350). The Court went on to state that \"[e]ven if we were dealing with a case of mere prejudice rather than actual injury, that construction would be no less problematic, for it could be indiscriminately applied to achieve '<mask> beyond the requirements of just compensation or indemnity, and to reward the omission of exact proof by multiplying the maximum award by the number of the offenders\u2019 or divisible offenses (Socialistic Co-op. Pub. Assn. v Kuhn, 164 NY 473, 476 * * *)\u201d (State of New York v Unique Ideas, supra, at 350; see also, Page v Cheung On Mansion, 138 AD2d 324, 325)."], "id": "f51fc2d4-0360-47da-9ddc-5cb85ba36115", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> is a form of larceny under the law of this State (Penal Law \u00a7 155.05 [2] [e]). The respondent\u2019s demands for payment ranged from $5,000 up to $400,000. As such, the crime of which the respondent was convicted is essentially similar to grand larceny in the second degree or grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 155.40, 155.35)."], "id": "16beb66e-06c9-4932-a32e-1015cb85ead5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The second count of the indictment alleges that the defendants, each acting in concert with one another: \"stole certain property which was obtained by <mask> committed by instilling in the victim, Daniel Leon, a fear that the actor or another person would use or abuse his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely, namely, the defendants acting in concert demanding a quantity of United States currency to have defendant Latanya Gray, a police officer, withdraw criminal charges she had commenced against Daniel Leon.\u201d"], "id": "8b035094-1442-4e7f-a8d0-ca24f8586e46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court fuly recognizes, as was stated in Curran v. Galen (152 N. Y. 33, 37), that \u201c public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue bis lawful trade or calling. * * * Every citizen is deeply interested in the strict maintenance of the constitutional right freely to pursue a lawful avocation, under conditions equal as to all, and to enjoy the fruits of his labor, without the imposition of any conditions not required for the general welfare of the community.\u201d (See Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 36, 116, 122; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 399.) There has been in the instant case no interference with the liberty or the property rights of Flynn. He was free to pursue his lawful calling and to dispose of bis labor and enjoy the fruits thereof. Had there been here a malicious interference by a third party with Flynn\u2019s right to the free disposal of his labor, or a threat to have him discharged as an inducement to the payment of money and by means of which money was obtained, then unquestionably the statutory crime of <mask> would have been proven. The learned Attorney-General contends, however, that there is a question of fact presented as to whether Flynn and the defendant entered into the agreement claimed by the latter, and that the contradictory testimony of the complainant in that regard should be ignored and the whole question left to a trial jury. It is my judgment that the absence of such an agreement would not in any way strengthen the prosecution\u2019s case. I cannot agree with the claims in the Attorney-General\u2019s brief: (1) \u201c That a property right existed in Patrick Flynn\u2019s position with the defendant; (2) that, however legal the means adopted were that the end being illegal, the entire series of acts becomes criminal.\u201d"], "id": "5beddfdc-b80d-4d72-b048-9971b125baa4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or <mask> or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."], "id": "19d71e83-ed15-45b6-8d85-7ba328d04b34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In one instance, however, the subcontractor performed work on Capparelli\u2019s house at the direction of the general contractor and upon the general contractor\u2019s promise to pay for the work. This conduct was motivated by expectation of profit, and not by fear that Capparelli would interfere with his contract. (See, e.g., United States v Garcia, 907d 380 [2d Cir 1990].) Moreover, the general contractor hired this subcontractor without Capparelli\u2019s influence. To the extent that the general contractor was motivated by fear of Capparelli to instruct the subcontractor to work on the renovation of Capparelli\u2019s house, this conduct is covered in other counts of the indictment. To the extent that the subcontractor\u2019s conduct was motivated by Capparelli\u2019s general reputation, this evidence is insufficient to establish <mask>, in the absence of any evidence of implicit threats by Capparelli to harm the business or person of the subcontractor. Moreover, the evidence in regard to this subcontractor does not support any other theory of larceny. The evidence fails to support an inference that the work was induced by any promise on the defendant\u2019s part (cf., People v Churchill, 47 NY2d 151, 156 [1979]) or by any misrepresentation of fact. Therefore, these counts of the indictment are dismissed."], "id": "e3994e9e-9ae3-48b8-aa3e-e1e3cb794b75", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Based upon an investigation of the foregoing facts, which included interviews with Mrs. Burnham at the hospital on *419four separate occasions, Detective Favuzzi arrested the defendants on June 5, 1985. The defendants were indicted under indictment No. 2887/85 for the following crimes: attempted murder in the second degree; assault in the first degree (two counts); grand larceny in the first degree by <mask>; grand larceny in the second degree (17 counts); criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree; coercion in the second degree; and conspiracy in the fourth degree."], "id": "39f6e3f3-6abb-48c8-a924-2bc678ecfdf0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Section 496, subdivision (a), regarding receiving stolen property, was also amended by Proposition 47. It now provides, \"Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or <mask>, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. However, if the value of the property does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), the offense shall be a misdemeanor, punishable only by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, if such person has no prior convictions for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290.\" (\u00a7 496, subd. (a).)"], "id": "11f74101-0155-41d2-a49d-9ba500f62f1b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Then the complainant was asked: \u201c Q. Now, you were convicted, were you not, in 1935 of <mask> by violence 1 \u201d Objection was made to the form of this question, \u201c extortion with violence \u201d and the objection was sustained. Then the defendant\u2019s attorney asked the District Attorney to turn oyer to him the criminal record of the witness, with which he complied."], "id": "3b2d73e2-0955-42be-8e85-a3fb843f93fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["3While Boyd acknowledges this precedent, he invites us to revisit it. We decline to do so as he cites no authority or justification to reconsider our precedent. See Maresca v. Stctte, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (declining to address arguments where a party failed \"to present relevant authority and cogent argument\"). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A .110.. \u2022 t 770, 778, 839 P.2d 578, 583 (1992). Additionally, we have rejected challenges to jury instructions on analogous grounds where the district court otherwise properly instructed the jury on the principles of burden of proof and presumption of innocence. E.g., Johnson, 118 Nev. at 806, 59 P.3d at 462 (rejecting argument that the reasonable-doubt instruction minimized the burden of proof, and noting the other instructions \"on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof\"). The charges instruction accurately stated the jury's role, despite that it did not also state that guilt requires the State to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, the district court provided two separate instructions, one on Boyd's presumption of innocence, and the other on the States burden. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in including the objected-to language in the charges instruction. Specific-intent instruction Boyd objected to the specific-intent instruction on the first- degree kidnapping charge, arguing that it gave a \"vague definition of specific intent and failed to tell the jury that Boyd needed to \"knowingly detain[ ] [B.W.] with the \"specific intent to hold or detain B.W. for the purpose of committing <mask>.\" He also argues that the instruction permitted the jury to determine guilt based on any purpose for which Boyd held B.W. so long as the evidence supported it, despite that the State's amended information listed only extortion as the purpose for which Boyd held B.W. Boyd contends that his proposed language would have corrected the alleged errors: \"To establish specific intent, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Boyd knowingly detained [B.W.] with the intent to commit extortion and purposely intended to kidnap her.\" A conviction for kidnapping stands if either (1) the defendant \"willfully seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals,"], "id": "92caf502-e651-4b46-b630-d41341bab8ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Leonard H. Sandler, J. The defendant, an attorney, moves this court to inspect the Grand Jury minutes and upon inspection to dismiss for legal insufficiency an indictment filed by an Extraordinary and Special Grand Jury charging him with attempted grand larceny in the first degree by <mask> (two counts), attempted coercion in the second degree (one count), and misconduct by attorneys in violation of section 487 of the Judiciary Law (one count)."], "id": "8db19549-a7bf-4c03-9f22-6558ef91bab6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is clear that where the People have relied upon a theory of larceny by <mask> under those sections of the Penal Law which expressly include extortion as part of the definition of the offense (Penal Law \u00a7 155.30 [6]; \u00a7 155.40 [2]), failure specifically to plead extortion requires dismissal of that count of the indictment. (People v Thompson, 80 AD2d 867 [2d Dept 1981].) As to these sections, it is also clear that evidence of larceny by extortion will not support a charge of larceny pleaded generally. (People v Robert YY, 58 AD2d 920, 921 [3d Dept 1977].) The People apparently assume that where extortion is not part of the definition of the crime, the provisions of Penal Law \u00a7 155.45 regarding extortion do not apply. The People apparently rely upon the term \"element\u201d in Penal Law \u00a7 155.45 (1)."], "id": "1fd11490-fbfa-4e14-bc76-56936f663f61", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "extortion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The People appropriately state in their papers, \u201cthe purpose and effect of imposing a sentence upon a defendant convicted of any crime, and in particular, a serious felony offense, is to deter similar conduct by the defendant.\u201d (People\u2019s mem of law at 43.) However, they fail to state a single purpose of imposing a criminal sentence upon this defendant. Since July 2007, the People have represented that the matter would be resolved by either a violation, an ACD or outright dismissal; but now, through no fault on defendant\u2019s part, he is facing the full effect of the possible sentence authorized by the felony charges, merely because (1) his attorney will not *370turn over evidence of <mask> (the tape), or (2) the ADA involved in plea negotiations did not have the actual authority to make any offer, or (3) of some misdirected emotional reaction. To sentence this defendant as a sex offender and expose him, and his family, to the myriad of conditions, regulations and rules associated with being convicted and designated as a sex offender would be a travesty of justice, given the facts of this case."], "id": "487ba5fd-49c8-4255-b1dc-debe1fa22299", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Edward J. Greenfield, J. In this action to recover under an insurance policy for losses allegedly sustained (see prior decision of May 10, 1984, by Greenfield, J.), plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the third affirmative defense and counterclaim in the amended answer. The challenged counterclaim was predicated upon alleged \u201c<mask> activities\u201d under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO; 18 USC \u00a7 1961 etseq.). The racketeering activity which it is alleged gives rise to treble damages claimed under RICO is the filing of a fraudulent and exaggerated insurance claim, using the mails and wire communication in interstate commerce in connection therewith."], "id": "a41e356f-370b-40c3-bda0-59af926a343c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["1 See Letter for Portia Roberson, Director, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, from William J. Murray, Deputy Director and General Counsel, New York Lottery (Dec. 4, 2009) (\u201cN.Y. Letter\u201d); Letter for Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, from Pat Quinn, Governor, State of Illinois (Dec. 11, 2009) (\u201cIll. Letter\u201d); Letter for Bruce Ohr, Chief, Organized Crime and <mask> Section, Criminal Division, from John W. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Illinois Department of Revenue (Mar. 10, 2010); Department of Revenue and Illinois Lottery, State of Illinois Internet Lottery Pilot Program (Mar. 10, 2010) (\u201cIll. White Paper\u201d)."], "id": "257274a6-1fc5-4bd8-bcfc-df0f4fb1c129", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As a prosecutor for almost two decades, and as one of the Judges presiding in the Adolescent Division of this court, this court knows of his own experience that there is a definite relationship between the creation and growth of juvenile delinquency and indeed more serious offenses and crimes against the common weal, and the operation of slot machines, which apparently appeal to the gambling instincts in young and old alike. Indeed, in Seaboard N. Y. Corp. v. Wallander (supra, p. 234) where it was sought to restrain the police commissioner of the city of New York from interfering with the use and operation of slot machines, the testimony of responsible prosecuting officers showed that \u201c there was a close relationship between the operation of pin-ball machines in this city and the increase in juvenile delinquency, as well as in the commission of many serious crimes *835of violence, including those of a <mask> nature, and even of murder.\u201d"], "id": "07ac96ec-567d-4c96-b945-b44d45a6a388", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant alleges that Simpson and Silverman used the United States mail to execute their scheme and committed at least two acts of mail fraud. Additionally, that Simpson, Silver-man and Grand White were an \u201centerprise\u201d as defined in subdivision (4) of section 1961 of title 18 of the United States Code. That the activities of that enterprise affected interstate commerce and that Simpson participated in the conduct of the enterprise\u2019s affairs through a pattern of <mask> activity in violation of section 1962 of title 18 of the United States Code."], "id": "535826a0-c8c9-4509-be5f-fda2b731517e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["By this motion the defendant argues that since he has already been tried once for the murder of Michael Holly he should not be tried again for the very same crime. He claims, in other words, that our State laws with respect to double *863jeopardy prohibit his second prosecution. The People contend however that this second prosecution is permitted. The prosecution relies upon a recent amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law which, in its view, allows the prosecution in our State court of a crime previously prosecuted in the Federal court as an act of <mask> under the RICO statute (CPL 40.50). It also relies upon a recent decision of Justice Gerald Sheindlin in People v Cooper (143 Misc 2d 654 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1989]) which was, in effect, affirmed by the Appellate Division (Matter of Cooper v Sheindlin, 154 AD2d 288 [1st Dept]). However, for the reasons set forth herein, I agree with the defendant that his motion to dismiss should be granted."], "id": "9940a94a-e096-4f29-b26d-b9e7a4d8df9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Each of the relators was subpoenaed to appear and did appear before the Temporary State Commission of Investigation in August, 1958. The subpoenas served on each of them stated in part that the subject of the investigation was to inquire into: \u2018 \u2018 Matters concerning the public peace, public safety and public justice, and the faithful execution and effective enforcement of the laws of the State of New York, with particular reference but not limited to organized crime and <mask>, including the organization, purposes and participants of, and discussions had and decisions made at, a meeting held on the premises of Joseph Barbara on or about November 14, 1957, at Apalachin, Tioga County, State of New York.\u201d"], "id": "cdeda46b-1858-411c-9268-3556614153b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Lewis R. Friedman, J. Law enforcement officials have moved toward increased reliance on civil forfeiture statutes to aid \"the war on crime.\u201d The forfeiture concept is justified on many different bases but, in the minds of most of those involved with law enforcement, the main advantage of forfeitures is that they make criminal offenses financially expensive so as to deter those who would engage in similar activity (see, e.g., Cuomo, Asset Forfeitures Bill Framed for Drug War, NYLJ, Jan. 17, 1990, at 39, col 5). Numerous forfeiture laws have been passed recently that are related to specific underlying crimes (e.g., CPLR art 13-A [felonies]; Public Health Law \u00a7 3388 [drugs]; Tax Law \u00a7 1846 [untaxed cigarettes]; 18 USC \u00a7 1961 et seq. [<mask>, RICO]; 18 USC \u00a7 1467 [obscene materials]; 21 USC \u00a7 881 [a] [drugs]). In this case the New York City Police Department, through its Property Clerk, puts to an unusual use one of New York\u2019s oldest forfeiture provisions, the New York City Administrative Code (first enacted as part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, L 1881, ch 442)1 \u2014 enforcement of the antiprostitution laws."], "id": "302f59a6-e19b-4832-8793-783b66a29cbe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["When the Conopeo action was commenced, Wein retained defendants to represent her interests. M & B appeared, and engaged in discovery and motion practice in the Conopeo action on its clients\u2019 behalf. When, however, the first amended complaint, i.e., the Conopeo complaint, which named Moskowitz as a defendant, was interposed, M & B withdrew as counsel for Wein and her companies in the Conopeo action. The Conopeo complaint, at paragraph 7, alleges that Moskowitz is an attorney, and that he represented Wein and her companies from 1995 to date. Paragraph 55 alleges that \u201c[a]t all relevant times, defendant Moskowitz not only served as de facto in-house counsel to defendants but also was instrumental in actively effectuating the operations of [a <mask> enterprise].\u201d Four of the six counts set forth in the Conopeo complaint are asserted against all named defendants, and, hence, include Moskowitz. Count I alleges fraud, and seeks damages including punitive damages. Counts II and III allege violations of the federal RICO statute (18 USC \u00a7 1962 [c], [d]; \u00a7 1964 [c]), and seek treble damages. Count VI alleges unjust enrichment. Thus, the Conopeo complaint charges Moskowitz, attorney for Wein and her entities, with engaging in fraud and racketeering activity together with, or on behalf of, his clients."], "id": "e4fdcb28-cdc2-477c-919f-9f8ddc660214", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The RICO statutes make it unlawful to use income from a pattern of <mask> activity: (1) to acquire an interest in, establish or operate an enterprise involved in interstate commerce; (2) to acquire or maintain an interest in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; (3) to conduct or participate in the conducting of such enterprise through racketeering activity; and (4) to conspire to do any of the foregoing acts. (Simpson Elec. Corp. v Leucadia, Inc., 72 NY2d 450 [1988].) The RICO statutes provide a civil cause of action for those injured by such prohibited activity. Plaintiff claims a civil right to recovery under RICO."], "id": "313a5f3e-fe62-4603-b4e8-815985f0e27a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["1 See Letter for Portia Roberson, Director, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, from William J. Murray, Deputy Director and General Counsel, New York Lottery (Dec. 4, 2009) (\u201cN.Y. Letter\u201d); Letter for Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, from Pat Quinn, Governor, State of Illinois (Dec. 11, 2009) (\u201cIll. Letter\u201d); Letter for Bruce Ohr, Chief, Organized Crime and <mask> Section, Criminal Division, from John W. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Illinois Department of Revenue (Mar. 10, 2010); Department of Revenue and Illinois Lottery, State of Illinois Internet Lottery Pilot Program (Mar. 10, 2010) (\u201cIll. White Paper\u201d)."], "id": "028c8cfe-76c1-4b1d-b76d-c66f59856125", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The concept \"enterprise\u201d has proven equally elusive. (See, United States v Turkette, 452 US 576; United States v Bledsoe, 674d 647, cert denied sub nom. Phillips v United States, 459 US 1040; United States v Stolfi, 889d 378; United States v Indelicato, 865d 1370.) Criticism of RICO stems not only from its vague language but also from the application of the statute to situations not usually associated with organized crime. This is so because whatever the definition of \"enterprise\u201d, it is not required that the enterprise be a criminal one. Indeed the statute is designed to attack the corruption of a legitimate enterprise by a pattern of <mask> activity. The result is that RICO is now widely used in cases where there is more than one defendant and the necessary predicate acts."], "id": "32eb148e-bf9d-4aa7-a5b4-a41e2d132321", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Tenth Circuit, in rejecting the \"simple discovery\u201d rule, gave what would appear to be a more persuasive basis for the contrary position. \"[W]e think that the more complete rule is 'that with respect to each independent injury to the plaintiff, a civil RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both *337the existence and source of his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern. \u2019 Bivens Gardens, 906 F.2d at 1554-55. This rule recognizes that a civil RICO plaintiff must allege not only injury, but also that the injury is part of a pattern of <mask> activity, to state a claim. Id. \u201d (Bath v Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, supra, at 820-821 [emphasis added].)"], "id": "bfadf03a-2fda-4599-b779-85757cc1e0f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court declines to apply Persico (supra) for several reasons. First, unlike the case at bar, the subsequent proceeding in P\u00e9rsico involved an entirely distinct legal offense, involving a different res gestae from the first offense. (Persico, supra, at 30.) In the case at bar, the defendant has simply been \"indicted up\u201d from assault to murder. The conduct which formed the basis of the assault proceeding, namely, the shooting of Martinez, is precisely the conduct which forms the basis of the murder trial. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the legislative history of the RICO statute explicitly provides for the use of prior convictions, obtained pursuant to plea agreements, to aid in establishing a pattern of <mask> activity. (See, supra, at 32; see also, e.g., United States v Phillips, 664d 971, 1009, n 55 [5th Cir 1981], cert denied sub nom. Platshorn v United States, 459 US 906 [1982].) Third, the prosecution in P\u00e9rsico sought only to introduce evidence of the conviction to establish RICO predicate act liability. (United States v Persico, supra, at 30.) It seemingly did not seek to read the defendant\u2019s prior allocution to the jury, as the prosecution seeks to do here."], "id": "c9573303-3031-4299-a95a-4039f20283b5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["But more significantly, as is pointed out in present counsel\u2019s argument to this court, never before has there been an instance where the Commission has denied a trade waste license without a finding or even an allegation which included one or more of the following: (1) being a member of organized crime, (2) <mask>, (3) a principal convicted of a crime, (4) association with organized crime figures, (5) board member of a criminal cartel, (6) business with organized crime, (7) nondisclosure of a principal, (8) operating as an unlicensed hauler, (9) applicant gave false testimony, (10) applicant engaged in predatory pricing and efforts to prevent independent companies from entering the New York City market, (11) bribery of public officials and/or police officers, (12) business records falsified to conceal crime, (13) participation in property rights grievances, (14) failure to disclose crime to the Commission, (15) refusal to accept monitor and/or pay monitor fees, or (16) extensive illegal dumping. To support his argument, counsel obtained all of these decisions via a request under the Freedom of Information Law and included them as exhibits to his papers. He urges that the prior decisions prove that the instant denial by the Commission was at sharp variance with its 10 years of decision making."], "id": "e59a94f8-6352-4f99-9ea5-dc661ab1de52", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The background given (at 2) depicts a crime-ridden industry, commercial carting in New York City, which \u201cwas operated as an organized crime-controlled cartel engaging in a pervasive pattern of <mask> and anticompetitive practices.\u201d Evidence to this effect, presented at lengthy City Council hearings, gave rise to the enactment of Local Law 42. As further pointed out in the history section of the decision, numerous indictments were brought in both state and federal court and a large number of organized crime figures were convicted and sent to prison."], "id": "fd2fd3a0-80ff-4963-a407-cbc3a1e6c047", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The issue to be determined is whether or not the witness\u2019 assertion of his privilege against self incrimination is proper. Curcio v. United States (354 U. S. 118) is determinative of the question. In that case a Special Grand Jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York was investigating <mask> in the garment and trucking industries in Nbav York City. Joseph Curcio, the secretary-treasurer of Local 269 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, was subpoenaed to appear before the Grand Jury and to produce the union\u2019s books and records. He appeared and testified before the Grand Jury that he was the secretary-treasurer of Local 269; that the union had books and records; that they Avere not then in his possession. He then refused on the ground of self incrimination to answer any questions pertaining to the whereabouts or who had possession of the books and records he had been ordered to produce. His assertion of self incrimination was overruled and he was summarily adjudged guilty of criminal contempt. The conviction related solely to Curcio\u2019s failure to answer questions asked pursuant to the subpoena ad testificandum. He was not charged with failure to produce the books demanded in the subpoena duces tecum. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction (234 F. 2d 470). The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the petitioner\u2019s personal privilege against self' incrimination attached to the questions relating to the whereabouts of the union\u2019s books and records Avhich he did not produce pursuant to the subpoena, stating (pp. 123-124, 128):"], "id": "8794a7cd-01e3-4d1e-ab2d-1db3355965a3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The rule that a civil RICO claim does not accrue until a plaintiff both knows, or should have known, of the injury to business or property, and that the predicate act causing injury is part of a pattern of <mask> activity is based on a *339sounder footing than the \"simple discovery rule.\u201d The compelling argument is that \"[conceptually there is no requisite RICO 'injury\u2019 until the damage impacting the plaintiff becomes part of a pattern of racketeering activity. Prior to that point there is no RICO injury and the statute of limitations may not begin to accrue\u201d (Keystone Ins. Co. v Houghton, supra, at 1131). Further, \"common sense indicates that there is no accrual until all facts exist so that the plaintiff can allege a complete cause of action\u201d (Butler v Local Union 823, 514d 442, 450 [8th Cir], cert denied 423 US 924). In Agency Holding Corp. v Malley-Duff & Assocs. (483 US, supra, at 154), the Supreme Court emphasized that \"the heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of racketeering\u201d. Moreover, \"[t]he application of the discovery rule to both the injury and pattern elements of the civil RICO claim properly advances the broad remedial nature of civil RICO. Because a civil RICO plaintiff must prove that his injury is part of a pattern of racketeering activity, an injured party must know, or have reason to know, that his injury is part of a pattern before he can be expected to file a civil RICO cause of action. This rule also furthers the purposes of the four year statute of limitations for civil RICO claims established by the Supreme Court by requiring plaintiffs to pursue the civil RICO remedy within four years of the time when they discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, that they are entitled to civil RICO damages for their injury\u201d (Bivens Gardens Off. Bldg. v Barnett Bank, 906d, supra, at 1555; see, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co., 473 US, supra, at 498 [RICO is to \" 'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes\u2019 \u201d])."], "id": "b597c3ee-9f19-407e-b945-fd67f414858f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A pattern of <mask> activity \"consists of 'at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after [October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years * * * after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.\u2019 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961 (5)\u201d (Agristor Fin. Corp. v Van Sickle, 967d 233, 241 [6th Cir]). The definition of racketeering activity includes \"any one of a number of predicate offenses, including wire and mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961 (1)\u201d (McCool v Strata Oil Co., supra, at 1464). Racketeering also includes fraud in the sale of securities (18 USC \u00a7 1961 [1] [D])."], "id": "29c5ce22-8f14-49a6-a66c-3881bcc720f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Each of these RICO claims requires that a defendant do one of two things: either (1) have collected an unlawful debt; or (2) engaged in a pattern of <mask> activity. (See 18 USC \u00a7 1962 [a] [\u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an un*819lawful debt\u201d].) Since the court has already determined that Arch did not collect an unlawful debt, it can only be liable under RICO if it engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. According to plaintiffs, in order to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, there must be activity of a continuing nature. Indeed,"], "id": "ac16d98d-056f-4705-99dd-242b2600c742", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Congress with the intent of giving RICO expansive application did not define the key phrase \"pattern of <mask> *244activity\u201d in the statute in order to give the word \"pattern\u201d a more flexible concept. The absence of such definition has created a plethora of legal views in the Federal courts as to the requirement of a \"pattern of racketeering activity\u201d under RICO. (Beauford v Helmsley, 843d 103 [2d Cir]; Condict v Condict, 826d 923 [10th Cir]; Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co., 741d 482 [2d Cir], revd 473 US 479, supra; Schreiber Distrib. Co. v Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806d 1393 [9th Cir]; Holmberg v Morrisette, 800d 205 [8th Cir], cert denied 481 US 1028; Moss v Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719d 5 [2d Cir]; Superior Oil Co. v Fulmer, 785d 252 [8th Cir]; United States v Jennings, 842d 159; Furman v Cirrito, 828d 898.)"], "id": "d0d92677-5178-42bf-9753-ab2fb12c67c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Almost five years later, in H. J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. (492 US 229, 239 [1989]), the court conceded that \"'continuity plus relationship\u2019 \u201d meant different things to different circuits. Nevertheless, it held firm to the Sedima requirement that, in order to establish a RICO pattern, the Government had to show \"that the <mask> predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.\u201d (H. J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra, at 239.)"], "id": "fb7820b1-f3d6-43d8-93ad-36d13e3f160c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["I hold that subdivision 1 of section 406 includes the present petitioner \u2014 although it is officially designated as a \u201c Commission \u2019 \u2019, and not as \u201c a board or committee \u2019 \u2019 \u2014 and that the subpoena was duly issued and duly made returnable for the time and place therein specified. The State Commission of Investigation has the function, poAver and duty, among others, to 16 conduct investigations * * * in connection with [a]ny matter concerning the public peace, public safety and public justice \u201c [t]he conduct of public officers and public employees \u201d and \u201c [t]he faithful execution and effiective enforcement of the laws of the state, with particular reference but not limited to organized crime and <mask> \u2019 It is authorized to \u201c conduct private and public hearings \u201d and to \u201c subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance [and to] examine them under oath \u201d. It may \u201c designate one or more members of the commission or its staff to preside over any such hearings \u201d and \u201c to exercise any such poAvers \u201d (L. 1958, ch. 989, \u00a7 2, subds. 2, 11)."], "id": "720bacf7-30aa-4874-97c7-028aa43c1869", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The drafters of OCCA were also concerned about what they regarded as vague language in RICO. For example, the term \"enterprise\u201d is not defined in RICO. \"Pattern of <mask> activity\u201d is defined merely as \"requiring] at least two acts of racketeering activity\u201d. (18 USC \u00a7 1961 [5].) Because of RICO\u2019s vagueness, there have been suggestions that the law may be vulnerable to constitutional attack. (See, e.g., Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality of RICO, NYLJ, Jan. 11, 1990, at 3, col 1.)"], "id": "ed93e135-0bd5-4976-9e16-c7ecab6e9318", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, respondents\u2019 reliance on Ramos\u2019 proffer detailing his collaboration with Frank DeCostello, Sr. in <mask> and other criminal activity further supports the license denial. The Appellate Division, First Department, upheld a determination similarly denying waste carting licenses in Matter of Hollywood *428Carting Corp. v City of New York (288 AD2d 71 [2001]), where the evidence included a confidential informant\u2019s affidavit. That Court explained that \u201c [although the statement of an anonymous informant set forth in one of the affidavits submitted by the Commission was not the only evidence of petitioners\u2019 participation in the cartel, we note that such hearsay may be competent to support the type of administrative determination challenged here\u201d (id. at 72 [citation omitted])."], "id": "661f080a-10e8-467a-b25e-98b20ab32251", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The United States Supreme Court has on occasion had difficulty discerning what Congress intended a RICO \"pattern\u201d to involve. In Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co. (473 US 479 [1985]), the court expressed dismay that Congress had failed to *117properly define the term at all but had simply required that a \"pattern\u201d include at least two acts of <mask> activity. The court concluded that \"pattern\u201d involved something more than two acts, and after examining RICO\u2019s legislative history, settled on \"'continuity plus relationship\u2019 \u201d as the additional requirement. (Supra, at 496, n 14.)"], "id": "0bccc9dd-0260-47d5-89dc-dbdcdb63c8dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*869\"2. A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction unless * * * \"(h) One of such offenses is enterprise corruption in violation of section 460.20 of the penal law, <mask> in violation of federal law or any comparable offense pursuant to the law of another state and separate or subsequent prosecution is not barred by section 40.50 of this article.\u201d It is plainly true that nothing said in section 40.50 bars the prosecution of this State indictment. In fact, section 40.50 is silent on the subject and therefore it may be argued that subsequent prosecution is not barred under section 40.20 (2) (h). However, I am again compelled to note that these amendments apply only when confronted with separate prosecutions for two different offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction. The inclusion by reference of the terms of section 40.50 into section 40.20 (2) or for that matter the addition of paragraph (h) to CPL 40.20 (2) by ordinary rules of statutory construction cannot constitute an amendment to the first subdivision of section 40.20. Nor, in my view, can it be argued, without raising issues of enormous magnitude under the State Constitution, that these additions affect the application of a basic double jeopardy rule in operation throughout the entire history of our State."], "id": "ee52dcf8-5014-41dd-91c7-5f5c41c62dfe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The drafters of OCCA were also concerned about what they regarded as vague language in RICO. For example, the term \"enterprise\u201d is not defined in RICO. \"Pattern of <mask> activity\u201d is defined merely as \"requiring] at least two acts of racketeering activity\u201d. (18 USC \u00a7 1961 [5].) Because of RICO\u2019s vagueness, there have been suggestions that the law may be vulnerable to constitutional attack. (See, e.g., Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality of RICO, NYLJ, Jan. 11, 1990, at 3, col 1.)"], "id": "c14c42b6-03a9-44cb-9fa3-5e297ed36c3b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In November 1990, after the investigation into alleged labor <mask> and other illegal conduct involving the plumbing industry had been underway for some time, the District Attorney applied for, and obtained, an order authorizing the installation of pen registers on three public telephones located at the Pelham Bay Diner in the Bronx. As required under CPL 705.10, there was the requisite showing of \"reasonable suspicion\u201d to authorize the use of a pen register in order to identify the telephone numbers dialed. This authorization was further extended in January 1991, and ultimately the District Attorney requested, and obtained, an eavesdropping warrant on the same telephones in February 1991, which was extended seven times through October 1991."], "id": "68cee224-d457-4a0d-a4dd-5bd6418faf44", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In 1996, following a 14-week jury trial, Defendant-Appellant Leo Contrera was sentenced principally to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for a narcotics conspiracy offense (Count 47) and murder in aid of <mask> (Count 8), a concurrent term of 20 years\u2019 incarceration for arson (Count 7), and a consecutive term of five years\u2019 incarceration for a firearms offense (Count 10). On September 21, 2020, Contrera \u2014 represented by appointed counsel \u2014 moved the District Court for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391 \u00a7 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. On November 30, 2020, the District Court granted Contrera relief under the First Step Act by reducing his conviction for Count 47 to time served, but denied his request for relief as to Count 8. Then, on January 14, 2021, Contrera \u2014 proceeding without counsel \u2014 moved the District Court pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to correct alleged errors in his Presentence Report (\u201cPSR\u201d). By order dated February 5, 2021, the District Court"], "id": "031c65b1-0d70-41c8-89cb-e0c106a12c4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["18 USC \u00a7 1962 prohibits the use or investment of income from a \"pattern of <mask> activity,\u201d (1) to acquire an *243interest in or to establish or operate an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce (\u00a7 1962 [a]); or (2) to acquire or maintain an interest in such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (\u00a7 1962 [b]); or (3) to conduct or participate in the conducting of such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (\u00a7 1962 [c]); or (4) to conspire to violate any of the first three foregoing subdivisions of section 1962 (\u00a7 1962 [d])."], "id": "0b63c17b-48c3-4009-a35e-8f3cb49d0a34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The government\u2019s theory, at trial and on appeal, is that Mendoza was a part of the CRO\u2019s <mask> conspiracy because he sold drugs for the gang\u2014the same theory the government pursued as to Mendoza\u2019s drug conspiracy charge. For these parallel theories, the government offered parallel evidence: the same evidence supported both the drug conspiracy charge and the RICO conspiracy charge. And unsurprisingly, Mendoza countered with the same argument that he used to challenge the drug conspiracy charge\u2014that he was a mere drug user, not a conspirator in distributing drugs to others\u2014and with the same counterevidence."], "id": "ebd49d13-3f05-449a-9305-64a7f08d66e3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The RICO statutes make it unlawful to use income from a pattern of <mask> activity: (1) to acquire an interest in, establish or operate an enterprise involved in interstate commerce; (2) to acquire or maintain an interest in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; (3) to conduct or participate in the conducting of such enterprise through racketeering activity; and (4) to conspire to do any of the foregoing acts. (Simpson Elec. Corp. v Leucadia, Inc., 72 NY2d 450 [1988].) The RICO statutes provide a civil cause of action for those injured by such prohibited activity. Plaintiff claims a civil right to recovery under RICO."], "id": "15da58b8-7de2-459c-bc0e-8a770f832ed3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In Bankers Trust Co. v Rhoades (741d 511, decided July 26, 1984), a somewhat different panel again dismissed a civil RICO complaint on the ground that section 1962 required an allegation that the injury alleged must be \u201cby reason of\u201d the <mask> activity. Applying that doctrine, damages sustained in defending a lawsuit on an insurance policy could not be considered damages arising by reason of \u201cracketeering activity\u201d."], "id": "5e58ccb7-bc17-4719-a114-62496dd4b23d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["1 See Letter for Portia Roberson, Director, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, from William J. Murray, Deputy Director and General Counsel, New York Lottery (Dec. 4, 2009) (\u201cN.Y. Letter\u201d); Letter for Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, from Pat Quinn, Governor, State of Illinois (Dec. 11, 2009) (\u201cIll. Letter\u201d); Letter for Bruce Ohr, Chief, Organized Crime and <mask> Section, Criminal Division, from John W. McCaffrey, General Counsel, Illinois Department of Revenue (Mar. 10, 2010); Department of Revenue and Illinois Lottery, State of Illinois Internet Lottery Pilot Program (Mar. 10, 2010) (\u201cIll. White Paper\u201d)."], "id": "7f961c20-0b12-4da5-8904-568ccac41929", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The District Attorney, on the other hand, alleges that this action is one of great importance to the People of the State of New York; that the issues in this action are intricate; that the subject matter of the indictment herein and the issues to be tried have been widely commented upon by Widespread newspaper publicity throughout the entire nation; that he has been informed and believes that an appropriate committee of the Congress of the United States is presently engaged in the investigation of gambling and forms of <mask> in connection therewith. It is his contention therefore, that this widespread publicity and from the nation-wide interest concentrated on the subject matter of this indictment, that an ordinary jury cannot, without delay and difficulty, be obtained to try the issues arising herein and that the due, efficient and impartial administration of justice in this case would be advanced by the trial of the issues herein by a special jury."], "id": "7c268508-b6d3-45ed-9304-470b46227dcf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["RICO makes it \u201cunlawful for any person employed by or as- sociated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise\u2019s affairs through a pattern of <mask> activity or collection of unlawful debt.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1962(c). In addition to creating criminal liability, RICO creates a civil cause of action for \u201c[a]ny person injured in his business or property\u201d by a violation of \u00a7 1962. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c). A plaintiff suing under RICO must allege six elements: \u201cthat the defendants (1) operated or managed (2) an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity that included at least two predicate acts of racketeering, which (5) caused (6) injury to the business or property of the plaintiff.\u201d Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2020). A claim must be dismissed if it fails to plausibly allege any one of these six elements. Id. As to the second element\u2014an enterprise\u2014a plaintiff must allege \u201cthe existence of two distinct entities: (1) a \u2018person\u2019; and (2) an \u2018enterprise\u2019 that is not simply the same \u2018person\u2019 referred to by a different name.\u201d Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001). We have explained that \u201ca defendant corpo- ration cannot be distinct for RICO purposes from its own officers, agents, and employees when those individuals are operating in their official capacities for the corporation.\u201d Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1355 (11th Cir. 2016) (\u201cThe Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the racketeering enterprise and the de- fendant must be two separate entities.\u201d). RICO defines an USCA11 Case: 21-12894 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 6 of 9"], "id": "b1d24366-09ba-4256-b29a-01c33f353243", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is not an insignificant indication of the deep-seated nature of the national infection that the rise in the crime rate this year \u2014 an \u201c appalling \u201d 8% increase according to F. B. I. Director J. Edgar Hoover \u2014 was sharpest in the smaller and medium sized areas. Except for sporadic arrests, narcotics continue as big business for the mobsters; policy rackets and bookies know no recession; bribery, extortion, and <mask> are unabated."], "id": "c7562193-a37a-442b-ac14-7182fbf81f17", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Mejia added that Davila had \"a history of manipulation and lies,\" including an open case alleging welfare fraud. Mejia testified that Davila ran a business with her ex-husband, which was investigated by the FBI for <mask> and organized crime. Mejia initially stated that Davila was found guilty, but then stated \"the trial is ongoing.\" Mejia also claimed Davila made a \"report\" in *225her prior divorce proceedings in which she claimed \"the same thing,\" presumably referring to the allegations of abuse."], "id": "8706f2ed-53e2-4354-8cfa-f9044d071650", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, respondents\u2019 reliance on Ramos\u2019 proffer detailing his collaboration with Frank DeCostello, Sr. in <mask> and other criminal activity further supports the license denial. The Appellate Division, First Department, upheld a determination similarly denying waste carting licenses in Matter of Hollywood *428Carting Corp. v City of New York (288 AD2d 71 [2001]), where the evidence included a confidential informant\u2019s affidavit. That Court explained that \u201c [although the statement of an anonymous informant set forth in one of the affidavits submitted by the Commission was not the only evidence of petitioners\u2019 participation in the cartel, we note that such hearsay may be competent to support the type of administrative determination challenged here\u201d (id. at 72 [citation omitted])."], "id": "e2ad332a-1482-4847-bf8f-0815e8d1db84", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff contends that the pattern of <mask> activity was made out by allegations that she was induced to obtain *575two separate loans, each of which involved mail or wire fraud. The \"ongoing enterprise\u201d is alleged to be the existence of the law firm defendant was associated with, even though it is clear that the law firm received no fees for this essentially private and personal transaction. The initial Beauford decision (supra) was overruled en banc (Beauford v Helmsley, 865d 1386). But Simpson (supra) still stands as controlling New York law. While in Beauford, there was one scheme directed at buyers of 8,000 condominium units, here we have a single individual involved in virtually contemporaneous transactions focused on a single real estate purchase. A court should not permit a plaintiff to convert what was essentially a single transaction into micro-units of activity in an attempt to demonstrate a multiplicity of acts."], "id": "2f258123-1e8b-432c-9204-1d81d26874d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["When RICO was enacted, it was widely viewed as a potent weapon against organized crime. But it has been used not just against \"organized crime\u201d in the traditional sense but also against many other activities since RICO as enacted permitted a very broad view of its scope. The key section of RICO, 18 USC \u00a7 1962 (c), makes it unlawful \"for any person employed *754by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise\u2019s affairs through a pattern of <mask> activity\u201d. The courts have held that the pattern requirement requires the existence of at least two criminal predicate acts, and the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the \"pattern\u201d requirement requires not only two such acts, but also a certain continuity and relationship among such acts (see, H.J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell, 492 US 229). Yet other than this verbiage there has been little or no guidance as to the actual meaning of the term \"pattern\u201d."], "id": "2c08bf50-f7b1-474d-82a7-6afda11b0e11", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is not an insignificant indication of the deep-seated nature of the national infection that the rise in the crime rate this year \u2014 an \u201c appalling \u201d 8% increase according to F. B. I. Director J. Edgar Hoover \u2014 was sharpest in the smaller and medium sized areas. Except for sporadic arrests, narcotics continue as big business for the mobsters; policy rackets and bookies know no recession; bribery, extortion, and <mask> are unabated."], "id": "b772840e-2e06-4d6d-857d-f6612b874572", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Congress with the intent of giving RICO expansive application did not define the key phrase \"pattern of <mask> *244activity\u201d in the statute in order to give the word \"pattern\u201d a more flexible concept. The absence of such definition has created a plethora of legal views in the Federal courts as to the requirement of a \"pattern of racketeering activity\u201d under RICO. (Beauford v Helmsley, 843d 103 [2d Cir]; Condict v Condict, 826d 923 [10th Cir]; Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co., 741d 482 [2d Cir], revd 473 US 479, supra; Schreiber Distrib. Co. v Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806d 1393 [9th Cir]; Holmberg v Morrisette, 800d 205 [8th Cir], cert denied 481 US 1028; Moss v Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719d 5 [2d Cir]; Superior Oil Co. v Fulmer, 785d 252 [8th Cir]; United States v Jennings, 842d 159; Furman v Cirrito, 828d 898.)"], "id": "01dce856-f591-41a3-9702-216a08f50514", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The respondents allege that the petitioner was convicted \u201cfor violating Title 18, U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1962(c), 1962(d), 1951, 1341 and 2 in that he did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree with others to conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the Civil Court of the City of New York, through a pattern of <mask> activity, to devise a scheme to defraud and for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, did cause to be delivered by mail payments to attorneys for judgment creditors, representing less than full amounts which had been received at sham public auction sales and engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce.\u201d"], "id": "fc66957a-fa6b-41d4-b502-5bf5ca4d3141", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Tenth Circuit, in rejecting the \"simple discovery\u201d rule, gave what would appear to be a more persuasive basis for the contrary position. \"[W]e think that the more complete rule is 'that with respect to each independent injury to the plaintiff, a civil RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both *337the existence and source of his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern. \u2019 Bivens Gardens, 906 F.2d at 1554-55. This rule recognizes that a civil RICO plaintiff must allege not only injury, but also that the injury is part of a pattern of <mask> activity, to state a claim. Id. \u201d (Bath v Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, supra, at 820-821 [emphasis added].)"], "id": "84916bd9-efa5-4f0f-adca-fea41ebf9cee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, I must address the argument made by the prosecution that this second prosecution is specifically permitted by additions to the law which were part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1986 (L 1986, ch 516). Upon the passage of our State\u2019s enterprise corruption laws, portions of CPL article 40 were amended to deal with the complex double jeopardy problems engendered by that new law. Amongst the additions to article 40, section 40.50 (9) was added to provide that: \"9. A person who has been previously prosecuted for <mask> pursuant to federal law, or any comparable offense pursuant to the law of another state may not be subsequently prosecuted for enterprise corruption based upon a pattern of criminal activity that specifically includes a criminal act that was also specifically included in the pattern of racketeering activity upon which the prior charge of racketeering was based provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to prohibit the subsequent prosecution of any other offense specifically included in or otherwise part of a pattern of racketeering activity alleged in any such prior prosecution for racketeering or other comparable offense. \u201d (Emphasis added.)"], "id": "5949b6a8-362f-4ec7-9a8b-ec5da1735c57", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even if the United States Supreme Court were to disagree with the views set forth in Sedima and Bankers Trust (supra), as to distinct RICO injury \u2014 it would make no difference, for defendant herein has made no pretense of alleging that the plaintiffs were engaged in a pattern of <mask> activity marked by two prior convictions. The mere making of a claim under an insurance policy is not, without more (even assuming mail and wire services to have been used), a basis for the assertion of a treble damage RICO claim. To permit the interposition of such a counterclaim in a suit on an insurance policy would result in RICO claims being routinely interposed, with the threat of treble damages and a \u201cracketeering\u201d label to be pinned on a plaintiff if, for some reason, he were unable to substantiate his allegations of a covered loss under the policy. An insurance claim, even if \u201cwillfully exaggerated\u201d, is not tantamount to \u201cracketeering activity\u201d, and should not give rise to \u201ca runaway treble damage bonanza\u201d. (Schacht v Brown, 711d 1343, 1361.)"], "id": "c0e6f23f-d5cf-4b25-beb3-f2722f8ab5b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The elements of the Federal RICO Act include not only two acts to establish a \" 'pattern of <mask> activity\u2019 \u201d but the Government must also prove the existence of an \"enterprise\u201d, that the enterprise engages in, or its activities affect, interstate commerce and that the defendant was associated with the enterprise (see, United States v Smith, 574d 308, 310). These elements are not part of the New York offense."], "id": "f5c68388-ee8d-49b4-9020-ea391b0a51d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["2 The State argued the federal felony conviction for conspiracy to commit murder in aid of <mask> was comparable to Washington\u2019s conspiracy to commit murder or first degree murder under accomplice theory. These offenses are both class A felonies. RCW 9A.28.040(3); RCW 9A.32.030(2); RCW 9A.08.020(3). As a \u201cviolent offense\u201d either crime would contribute 2 points to Escobar\u2019s offender score. Former RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(i) (2018); RCW 9.94A.525(8). If the federal felony conviction is not comparable to a Washington offense, it is scored as a class C felony and scores as 1 point. RCW 9.94A.525(3), (8); former RCW 9.94A.030(34) (2018)."], "id": "4770192f-2a72-4c33-991c-9a5fd0d4581a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["RICO \u00a7 1962 (c) makes it unlawful, in pertinent part, \"for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise\u2019s affairs through a pattern of <mask> activity\u201d (18 USC \u00a7 1962 [c]). The terms \"enterprise\u201d, \"person\u201d, \"racketeering activity\u201d, and \"pattern of racketeering activity\u201d are defined in 18 USC \u00a7 1961, in pertinent part, as follows:"], "id": "a4d658c9-58f6-499d-93b7-4ad28a280dde", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["RICO was enacted in order to \u201chalt organized crime\u2019s infiltration of the American economy by creating \u2018enhanced sanctions and new remedies\u2019 against defendants who engage in <mask> activity to operate or gain control of business enterprises. In addition to the substantial criminal penalties and harsh civil remedies that the government can seek, section 1964(c) [offers] a private right of action for treble damages to anyone injured \u2018by reason of\u2019 a violation of the Act.\u201d (See, generally, Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 Harv L Rev 1101.)"], "id": "1d44c4a5-00fe-4885-bca7-959f3fc68e36", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["That scope is extremely broad. 18 USC \u00a7 1962 (c) makes it unlawful \"for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise\u2019s affairs through a pattern of <mask> activity\u201d. There is no requirement that the \"enterprise\u201d be criminal in nature. As a result RICO has spawned substantial civil and criminal litigation having nothing to do with organized crime."], "id": "5948de4d-16a2-4f46-85a7-f08b8b96cd53", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even assuming jurisdiction, it does not appear that an adequate RICO claim is set forth. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co. (741d 482, 492, decided July 25, 1984), held that under the statute, a party is entitled to treble damages only if it is alleged and proved that an enterprise\u2019s affairs have been conducted through a \u201c \u2018pattern of <mask> activity\u2019 \u201d, which is defined under section 1961 (1) to include acts involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, narcotics, embezzlement, extortion, fraudulent securities and mail and wire fraud. The court in Sedima believed there was no evidence that Congress intended to create a broad civil cause of action under RICO unrelated to organized crime and its attempt at infiltration of private businesses. The court noted that while there were few cases where RICO had been used against reputed mobsters, there was a veritable explosion of cases alleging RICO offenses against legitimate enterprises where \u201cgarden variety\u201d allegations of fraud were alleged. Such use of the RICO statute was characterized by the court as \u201cextraordinary, if not outrageous\u201d (p 487). The court went on to hold that for \u201c \u2018pattern of racketeering activity\u2019 \u201d (p 492) to exist, the predicate acts upon which a RICO claim could be based would require at least two prior criminal convictions. Additionally, the court declared that beyond ordinary damages, one asserting a civil action under RICO must allege a \u201cseparate, distinct racketeering enterprise injury\u201d. There was a vigorous dissent from Judge Cardamone."], "id": "52ba6b77-2535-462e-a95f-e5845fbd39d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Congress in enacting RICO focused primarily on eradicating organized crime but did not limit the application of the RICO statute only to organized crime. The application of RICO was intended to reach both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises regardless of organized crime involvement. (See, Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co., 473 US 479.) The Supreme Court held in H. J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. (492 US 229, 249 [1989] ): \"We thus decline the invitation to invent a rule that RICO\u2019s pattern of <mask> concept requires an allegation and proof of an organized crime nexus.\u201d Since RICO includes Federal mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses, the use of the mails and wire communications in furtherance of a scheme to defraud can easily place a violator of common-law fraud into the RICO statute subjecting him to sanctions of treble damages and attorney\u2019s fees. Each use of the mails or wire communications under the statute is a separate violation, even if there is only one scheme to defraud. These aspects of the statute invited different \"garden variety\u201d fraud claims to be brought under RICO."], "id": "ce744d52-0216-4775-9cb6-83b70ff8a408", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As previously stated, the plaintiff alleges an extensive scheme of bribery in which illicit payments in the form of cash kickbacks were made to defendant George Steiner from defendants Kaswol, JBJ Flooring Co., Ace Pump Corporation, Chalgo Supply Company, Inc., and Bestall Chemicals in the amount of 10% of the contract amounts in consideration for the illegal granting of contracts without competitive bidding. It is claimed these kickback amounts were billed to and paid by Riverbay continuously from 1979-1982 without Riverbay receiving any consideration and that fictitious invoices were prepared by George Steiner to cover up his illegal acts. It is claimed that the defendants, together with Riverbay, constituted an \"enterprise\u201d as defined in 18 USC \u00a7 1961 (4), such enterprise being known as the \"Co-Op City Construction Defect Repair Program\u201d. The affect on interstate commerce alleged in the complaint is the purchase and sale of building materials including floor tiles, copper wire and cable, and valves. The <mask> activity alleged includes commercial bribery (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 180.03, 180.08), mail fraud (18 USC \u00a7 1341) and extortion (Penal Law \u00a7 155.05)."], "id": "3b2a4b56-ccad-410a-8a63-99e38a4665f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cCarl Perryman and Charles Sullins were arrested by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\u2018FBI\u2019) this morning, pursuant to a four count indictment charging them with (1) Conspiracy to Commit Murder in-aid-of <mask>, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1959 (a) (5); (2) Attempted Murder in-aid-of Racketeering, *313violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1959 (a) (5) and 2; (3) Assault with a Dangerous Weapon in-aid-of Racketeering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1959 (a) (3) and 2; and (4) Discharging of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 924 (c) (1) (A) (ii), 924 (c) (1) (A) (iii) and 2. Both Perryman and Sullins have been identified by the FBI Long Island Gang Task Force as members of the Old Mill Court Bloods (\u2018Bloods\u2019).\u201d Carl Perryman is alleged to have shot a member of the rival Crips at the parking lot of the subject premises located at 8 Old Mill Court, Rockville Centre, on March 16, 2011, with a gun supplied by Charles Sullins:"], "id": "9fb19286-e34c-45fe-9690-b8dfa18a635e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, respondents\u2019 reliance on Ramos\u2019 proffer detailing his collaboration with Frank DeCostello, Sr. in <mask> and other criminal activity further supports the license denial. The Appellate Division, First Department, upheld a determination similarly denying waste carting licenses in Matter of Hollywood *428Carting Corp. v City of New York (288 AD2d 71 [2001]), where the evidence included a confidential informant\u2019s affidavit. That Court explained that \u201c [although the statement of an anonymous informant set forth in one of the affidavits submitted by the Commission was not the only evidence of petitioners\u2019 participation in the cartel, we note that such hearsay may be competent to support the type of administrative determination challenged here\u201d (id. at 72 [citation omitted])."], "id": "767f8143-f04b-46b6-b2a6-c3fd491f1969", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The government\u2019s theory, at trial and on appeal, is that Mendoza was a part of the CRO\u2019s <mask> conspiracy because he sold drugs for the gang\u2014the same theory the government pursued as to Mendoza\u2019s drug conspiracy charge. For these parallel theories, the government offered parallel evidence: the same evidence supported both the drug conspiracy charge and the RICO conspiracy charge. And unsurprisingly, Mendoza countered with the same argument that he used to challenge the drug conspiracy charge\u2014that he was a mere drug user, not a conspirator in distributing drugs to others\u2014and with the same counterevidence."], "id": "38d3fa67-3b90-47e3-9fcb-4608874872e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The respondents allege that the petitioner was convicted \u201cfor violating Title 18, U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1962(c), 1962(d), 1951, 1341 and 2 in that he did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree with others to conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the Civil Court of the City of New York, through a pattern of <mask> activity, to devise a scheme to defraud and for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, did cause to be delivered by mail payments to attorneys for judgment creditors, representing less than full amounts which had been received at sham public auction sales and engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce.\u201d"], "id": "19726ce2-0515-4651-b5f8-e3afd467e7fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, in order to prevail on her claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegedly defamatory statements were authorized or ratified by the entire membership of the UFT (see Building Indus. Fund v Local Union No. 3, Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 992 F Supp 192 [ED NY 1996]). Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. Moreover, her challenge to Martin\u2019s continued vitality based upon her reliance on People v Newspaper & Mail Deliverers\u2019 Union (250 AD2d 207 [1998]) is unavailing. In that case, the Appellate Division, First Department, rejected an attempt to apply the holding in Martin to a labor union which was charged under section 460.20 of the Penal Law with enterprise corruption, predicated on unlawful acts allegedly committed by its officers, members and agents, including organized crime associates, in connection with newspaper distribution and various <mask> activities. Under the facts before it, the Court expressly disavowed Mar*897tin\u2019s application, emphasized that Martin involved tort liability rather than criminal liability and, stating that its literal application would frustrate the Legislature\u2019s intent behind its enactment of section 460.20 of the Penal Law, reversed the dismissal of the indictment based upon an erroneous application thereof (id. at 214). Thus, Newspaper & Mail Deliverers\u2019 Union, which involved the imposition of criminal charges, does not cast doubt upon Martin\u2019s continued viability."], "id": "f665d816-8f20-4d7f-89e0-972835b188db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*862In the spring of 1987, as a result of an investigation conducted jointly by Federal prosecutors and the prosecutors in this case, the defendant was indicted in the Federal court for <mask> in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 1962. In that case the Government charged that the defendant was part of a criminal enterprise known as the \"Westies\u201d and that the defendant committed at least two acts of racketeering in furtherance of that enterprise. As an act of racketeering the defendant was alleged to have \"willfully, knowingly and unlawfully\u201d murdered Michael Holly. From May through December 1987, along with other indicted \"Westies\u201d, the defendant was tried for the crimes alleged in the indictment and ultimately found guilty of the charges. At the time of the submission of the charges to the jury the Presiding Judge directed the jury to return a separate verdict as to the act of racketeering in question. Before rendering its final verdict, the jury reported that it had found the defendant guilty of this charge of murder. The defendant was sentenced to serve a term in prison of 60 years and the sentencing Judge made clear that the sentence was intended as punishment for the crime of racketeering as well as the individual acts of racketeering of which the defendant was found guilty."], "id": "7c94e013-b7d8-4377-a47a-892b9f85ab4b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff Riverbay Corporation (Riverbay) is the owner and operator of the housing complex known as \"Co-Op City\u201d in which approximately 55,000 people reside. This action arises out of the alleged <mask> activities of the defendant in connection with the \"Co-Op City Construction Defect Program\u201d. Riverbay hired defendant George Steiner to manage this project in July 1978. Steiner was terminated as project manager in October 1981 amidst allegations of mismanagement after it came to light that he had awarded an unusual number of contracts on an \"emergency basis\u201d without competitive bidding to several contractors, including defendants Kaswol Construction Corp. (Kaswol) and Richard L. Kashinsky (Kashinsky)."], "id": "e8766dc4-1827-45f7-89aa-eff941c50a0d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["When RICO was enacted, it was widely viewed as a potent weapon against organized crime. But it has been used not just against \"organized crime\u201d in the traditional sense but also against many other activities since RICO as enacted permitted a very broad view of its scope. The key section of RICO, 18 USC \u00a7 1962 (c), makes it unlawful \"for any person employed *754by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise\u2019s affairs through a pattern of <mask> activity\u201d. The courts have held that the pattern requirement requires the existence of at least two criminal predicate acts, and the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the \"pattern\u201d requirement requires not only two such acts, but also a certain continuity and relationship among such acts (see, H.J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell, 492 US 229). Yet other than this verbiage there has been little or no guidance as to the actual meaning of the term \"pattern\u201d."], "id": "b97b1db2-755c-4ef4-944c-4f8f4a797350", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Congress with the intent of giving RICO expansive application did not define the key phrase \"pattern of <mask> *244activity\u201d in the statute in order to give the word \"pattern\u201d a more flexible concept. The absence of such definition has created a plethora of legal views in the Federal courts as to the requirement of a \"pattern of racketeering activity\u201d under RICO. (Beauford v Helmsley, 843d 103 [2d Cir]; Condict v Condict, 826d 923 [10th Cir]; Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co., 741d 482 [2d Cir], revd 473 US 479, supra; Schreiber Distrib. Co. v Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806d 1393 [9th Cir]; Holmberg v Morrisette, 800d 205 [8th Cir], cert denied 481 US 1028; Moss v Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719d 5 [2d Cir]; Superior Oil Co. v Fulmer, 785d 252 [8th Cir]; United States v Jennings, 842d 159; Furman v Cirrito, 828d 898.)"], "id": "4d6a0e40-c0e7-4f5c-ab20-7000b5b37f26", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The rule that a civil RICO claim does not accrue until a plaintiff both knows, or should have known, of the injury to business or property, and that the predicate act causing injury is part of a pattern of <mask> activity is based on a *339sounder footing than the \"simple discovery rule.\u201d The compelling argument is that \"[conceptually there is no requisite RICO 'injury\u2019 until the damage impacting the plaintiff becomes part of a pattern of racketeering activity. Prior to that point there is no RICO injury and the statute of limitations may not begin to accrue\u201d (Keystone Ins. Co. v Houghton, supra, at 1131). Further, \"common sense indicates that there is no accrual until all facts exist so that the plaintiff can allege a complete cause of action\u201d (Butler v Local Union 823, 514d 442, 450 [8th Cir], cert denied 423 US 924). In Agency Holding Corp. v Malley-Duff & Assocs. (483 US, supra, at 154), the Supreme Court emphasized that \"the heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of racketeering\u201d. Moreover, \"[t]he application of the discovery rule to both the injury and pattern elements of the civil RICO claim properly advances the broad remedial nature of civil RICO. Because a civil RICO plaintiff must prove that his injury is part of a pattern of racketeering activity, an injured party must know, or have reason to know, that his injury is part of a pattern before he can be expected to file a civil RICO cause of action. This rule also furthers the purposes of the four year statute of limitations for civil RICO claims established by the Supreme Court by requiring plaintiffs to pursue the civil RICO remedy within four years of the time when they discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, that they are entitled to civil RICO damages for their injury\u201d (Bivens Gardens Off. Bldg. v Barnett Bank, 906d, supra, at 1555; see, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co., 473 US, supra, at 498 [RICO is to \" 'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes\u2019 \u201d])."], "id": "c3814f71-310d-4e43-9582-9ecf88e3389c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Congress with the intent of giving RICO expansive application did not define the key phrase \"pattern of <mask> *244activity\u201d in the statute in order to give the word \"pattern\u201d a more flexible concept. The absence of such definition has created a plethora of legal views in the Federal courts as to the requirement of a \"pattern of racketeering activity\u201d under RICO. (Beauford v Helmsley, 843d 103 [2d Cir]; Condict v Condict, 826d 923 [10th Cir]; Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co., 741d 482 [2d Cir], revd 473 US 479, supra; Schreiber Distrib. Co. v Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806d 1393 [9th Cir]; Holmberg v Morrisette, 800d 205 [8th Cir], cert denied 481 US 1028; Moss v Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719d 5 [2d Cir]; Superior Oil Co. v Fulmer, 785d 252 [8th Cir]; United States v Jennings, 842d 159; Furman v Cirrito, 828d 898.)"], "id": "bc48ec6b-c261-4f2f-bbfc-b340f394e8ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, in order to prevail on her claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegedly defamatory statements were authorized or ratified by the entire membership of the UFT (see Building Indus. Fund v Local Union No. 3, Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 992 F Supp 192 [ED NY 1996]). Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. Moreover, her challenge to Martin\u2019s continued vitality based upon her reliance on People v Newspaper & Mail Deliverers\u2019 Union (250 AD2d 207 [1998]) is unavailing. In that case, the Appellate Division, First Department, rejected an attempt to apply the holding in Martin to a labor union which was charged under section 460.20 of the Penal Law with enterprise corruption, predicated on unlawful acts allegedly committed by its officers, members and agents, including organized crime associates, in connection with newspaper distribution and various <mask> activities. Under the facts before it, the Court expressly disavowed Mar*897tin\u2019s application, emphasized that Martin involved tort liability rather than criminal liability and, stating that its literal application would frustrate the Legislature\u2019s intent behind its enactment of section 460.20 of the Penal Law, reversed the dismissal of the indictment based upon an erroneous application thereof (id. at 214). Thus, Newspaper & Mail Deliverers\u2019 Union, which involved the imposition of criminal charges, does not cast doubt upon Martin\u2019s continued viability."], "id": "e682f1e3-23a6-43c1-8dc9-749a51657ca4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["To say that to permit corporate officers to use corporate funds to buy off racketeers is contrary to public policy because likely to produce or increase <mask> is appealing to one\u2019s feeling of moral principles, but as applied to this case it involves the fallacious assumptions that business corporations owe a duty to the public to prevent racketeering at their own expense and that corporate officers are bound to observe that duty to the public even though it cause the loss of all the corporate funds committed to their charge. I do not think it can be said that public policy requires that corporate officers be thus required to serve two masters."], "id": "676dbcc6-f614-4d86-8bbe-5f35748ed8b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even if the United States Supreme Court were to disagree with the views set forth in Sedima and Bankers Trust (supra), as to distinct RICO injury \u2014 it would make no difference, for defendant herein has made no pretense of alleging that the plaintiffs were engaged in a pattern of <mask> activity marked by two prior convictions. The mere making of a claim under an insurance policy is not, without more (even assuming mail and wire services to have been used), a basis for the assertion of a treble damage RICO claim. To permit the interposition of such a counterclaim in a suit on an insurance policy would result in RICO claims being routinely interposed, with the threat of treble damages and a \u201cracketeering\u201d label to be pinned on a plaintiff if, for some reason, he were unable to substantiate his allegations of a covered loss under the policy. An insurance claim, even if \u201cwillfully exaggerated\u201d, is not tantamount to \u201cracketeering activity\u201d, and should not give rise to \u201ca runaway treble damage bonanza\u201d. (Schacht v Brown, 711d 1343, 1361.)"], "id": "67d1cae7-67aa-4df8-bd52-4ee6bebf3d34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant alleges that Simpson and Silverman used the United States mail to execute their scheme and committed at least two acts of mail fraud. Additionally, that Simpson, Silver-man and Grand White were an \u201centerprise\u201d as defined in subdivision (4) of section 1961 of title 18 of the United States Code. That the activities of that enterprise affected interstate commerce and that Simpson participated in the conduct of the enterprise\u2019s affairs through a pattern of <mask> activity in violation of section 1962 of title 18 of the United States Code."], "id": "1fbe2456-c2ff-4eac-90ed-a2d114d86468", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cCarl Perryman and Charles Sullins were arrested by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\u2018FBI\u2019) this morning, pursuant to a four count indictment charging them with (1) Conspiracy to Commit Murder in-aid-of <mask>, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1959 (a) (5); (2) Attempted Murder in-aid-of Racketeering, *313violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1959 (a) (5) and 2; (3) Assault with a Dangerous Weapon in-aid-of Racketeering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1959 (a) (3) and 2; and (4) Discharging of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 924 (c) (1) (A) (ii), 924 (c) (1) (A) (iii) and 2. Both Perryman and Sullins have been identified by the FBI Long Island Gang Task Force as members of the Old Mill Court Bloods (\u2018Bloods\u2019).\u201d Carl Perryman is alleged to have shot a member of the rival Crips at the parking lot of the subject premises located at 8 Old Mill Court, Rockville Centre, on March 16, 2011, with a gun supplied by Charles Sullins:"], "id": "9f0ef2e2-438b-479b-a267-2ca74fd125ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On June 22, 1981, as noted above, John S. Martin, Jr., USA-SDNY issued a subpoena (duces tecum) for the seized property with regard to alleged violations of sections 371 (conspiracy), 844 (possession, receipt and transportation of explosives) and 1962 of title 18 of the United States Code (principal of prohibited activities, i.e., <mask> or collection of an unlawful debt) and pursuant thereto respondent turned over the items to the Task Force."], "id": "ea368951-0332-472a-b7db-8cd666ba1c4d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is alleged that the said Edgecombe and Carey along with certain other personnel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service have been actively engaged \u201cin conducting certain investigations concerning possible violations of Federal Law and citizenship and deportability by/and of certain persons who are alleged to be or have been associated with certain <mask> and corruption in and around the City of Utica, County of Oneida, State of New York.\u201d It is further alleged, but only upon information and belief, that the testimony of said 11 persons before the Grand Jury is material and relevant to the investigation being conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The said petition contains no information of any kind which would indicate the source of the information and belief of the petitioner; the names of any persons who are being investigated as possible violators of Federal law, citizenship or deportability; whether the persons so being investigated are some of those whose testimony it is sought to examine; and in particular no information is made available to the court in such petition which could permit the court to determine what material or relevant information the Department of Immigration and Naturalization of the United States Department of Justice expects to obtain from an examination of the Grand Jury minutes."], "id": "69097b12-6444-410c-b1c8-84c7e3400f3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["I hold that subdivision 1 of section 406 includes the present petitioner \u2014 although it is officially designated as a \u201c Commission \u2019 \u2019, and not as \u201c a board or committee \u2019 \u2019 \u2014 and that the subpoena was duly issued and duly made returnable for the time and place therein specified. The State Commission of Investigation has the function, poAver and duty, among others, to 16 conduct investigations * * * in connection with [a]ny matter concerning the public peace, public safety and public justice \u201c [t]he conduct of public officers and public employees \u201d and \u201c [t]he faithful execution and effiective enforcement of the laws of the state, with particular reference but not limited to organized crime and <mask> \u2019 It is authorized to \u201c conduct private and public hearings \u201d and to \u201c subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance [and to] examine them under oath \u201d. It may \u201c designate one or more members of the commission or its staff to preside over any such hearings \u201d and \u201c to exercise any such poAvers \u201d (L. 1958, ch. 989, \u00a7 2, subds. 2, 11)."], "id": "2eb17cca-1f92-4e96-a2d5-a55240c562ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The background given (at 2) depicts a crime-ridden industry, commercial carting in New York City, which \u201cwas operated as an organized crime-controlled cartel engaging in a pervasive pattern of <mask> and anticompetitive practices.\u201d Evidence to this effect, presented at lengthy City Council hearings, gave rise to the enactment of Local Law 42. As further pointed out in the history section of the decision, numerous indictments were brought in both state and federal court and a large number of organized crime figures were convicted and sent to prison."], "id": "8d0513fd-3543-469b-8f27-747c0dab9c86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Edward J. Greenfield, J. In this action to recover under an insurance policy for losses allegedly sustained (see prior decision of May 10, 1984, by Greenfield, J.), plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the third affirmative defense and counterclaim in the amended answer. The challenged counterclaim was predicated upon alleged \u201c<mask> activities\u201d under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO; 18 USC \u00a7 1961 etseq.). The racketeering activity which it is alleged gives rise to treble damages claimed under RICO is the filing of a fraudulent and exaggerated insurance claim, using the mails and wire communication in interstate commerce in connection therewith."], "id": "a1754698-99c7-481f-a9d7-8bb9f517f691", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*869\"2. A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction unless * * * \"(h) One of such offenses is enterprise corruption in violation of section 460.20 of the penal law, <mask> in violation of federal law or any comparable offense pursuant to the law of another state and separate or subsequent prosecution is not barred by section 40.50 of this article.\u201d It is plainly true that nothing said in section 40.50 bars the prosecution of this State indictment. In fact, section 40.50 is silent on the subject and therefore it may be argued that subsequent prosecution is not barred under section 40.20 (2) (h). However, I am again compelled to note that these amendments apply only when confronted with separate prosecutions for two different offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction. The inclusion by reference of the terms of section 40.50 into section 40.20 (2) or for that matter the addition of paragraph (h) to CPL 40.20 (2) by ordinary rules of statutory construction cannot constitute an amendment to the first subdivision of section 40.20. Nor, in my view, can it be argued, without raising issues of enormous magnitude under the State Constitution, that these additions affect the application of a basic double jeopardy rule in operation throughout the entire history of our State."], "id": "2e246756-b0af-442e-b68c-da4e95b011c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There was printed upon the face of the subpoena a general statement concerning the subject of the investigation before the commission, which related to organized crime and <mask>, including \u00a3\u00a3 the organization, purposes and participants thereof, and discussions had and decisions made at, a meeting held on the premises of Joseph Barbara, Sr., on or about November 14, 1957 at Apalachin, Tioga County, State of New York.\u201d"], "id": "de1ee537-b1c4-4ae5-bc94-f7af5c7b9c79", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Leland DeGrasse, J. Plaintiff New York State Crime Victims Board (the Board) brings this action pursuant to New York\u2019s so-called \u201cSon of Sam\u201d Law (Executive Law \u00a7 632-a) against several entities and individuals associated with the writing and publication of the book Underboss, which recounts the life of defendant Salvatore Gravano. Gravano, a former member of the Gambino crime family, came to public prominence after being named in a Federal <mask> indictment with his boss John Gotti. Gravano became the highest-ranking member of La Cosa Nostra ever to testify against his former associates, and his testimony was instrumental in securing convictions against Gotti, Genovese crime family head Vincent Gigante, and a number of other organized crime figures."], "id": "503973bb-48ec-423c-ae4e-1a9098b6bb79", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Each of the relators was subpoenaed to appear and did appear before the Temporary State Commission of Investigation in August, 1958. The subpoenas served on each of them stated in part that the subject of the investigation was to inquire into: \u2018 \u2018 Matters concerning the public peace, public safety and public justice, and the faithful execution and effective enforcement of the laws of the State of New York, with particular reference but not limited to organized crime and <mask>, including the organization, purposes and participants of, and discussions had and decisions made at, a meeting held on the premises of Joseph Barbara on or about November 14, 1957, at Apalachin, Tioga County, State of New York.\u201d"], "id": "5b1734f4-da37-43fe-8f6e-5e3a2cd3ff12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is alleged that the said Edgecombe and Carey along with certain other personnel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service have been actively engaged \u201cin conducting certain investigations concerning possible violations of Federal Law and citizenship and deportability by/and of certain persons who are alleged to be or have been associated with certain <mask> and corruption in and around the City of Utica, County of Oneida, State of New York.\u201d It is further alleged, but only upon information and belief, that the testimony of said 11 persons before the Grand Jury is material and relevant to the investigation being conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The said petition contains no information of any kind which would indicate the source of the information and belief of the petitioner; the names of any persons who are being investigated as possible violators of Federal law, citizenship or deportability; whether the persons so being investigated are some of those whose testimony it is sought to examine; and in particular no information is made available to the court in such petition which could permit the court to determine what material or relevant information the Department of Immigration and Naturalization of the United States Department of Justice expects to obtain from an examination of the Grand Jury minutes."], "id": "b8413bd9-3f0a-4ec1-acc6-4ca267da78cf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The elements that must be pleaded to state a civil RICO claim are \"(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of <mask> activity\u201d (Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co., 473 US 479, 496; see also, McCool v Strata Oil Co., 972d 1452, 1464 [7th Cir] [\"(t)he elements of a civil RICO claim * * * are 1) a violation of the RICO statute, including proof that the defendant has participated in a pattern of racketeering, and 2) an injury to business or property\u201d])."], "id": "6a036996-7bc1-4eab-b60a-3e3f44d15183", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Respondents further observe that the decision reflected that the Commission reviewed a proffer, i.e., an offer of information to qualify for a plea bargain, made by Ramos to the New York County District Attorney\u2019s office. That proffer, they claim, described several incidents where petitioner collaborated with Ramos in <mask> and criminal activity. Such incidents allegedly included an offer to Ramos of $1,500 to assault someone whom he seriously injured with a kitchen knife, utilizing Ramos to slap a flower shop owner and collect money from him, directing Ramos to \u201cbeat up\u201d some youths harassing a customer, using Ramos to warn a competitor to stay away from certain Brooklyn customers, receiving customers that Ramos \u201cpoached\u201d from another carter, giving Ramos a badge issued by the Department of Sanitation, and setting up a meeting where two men offered Ramos $20,000 to kill someone."], "id": "08c8100a-6cec-44c1-95eb-c4fa5c80492f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["When the Conopeo action was commenced, Wein retained defendants to represent her interests. M & B appeared, and engaged in discovery and motion practice in the Conopeo action on its clients\u2019 behalf. When, however, the first amended complaint, i.e., the Conopeo complaint, which named Moskowitz as a defendant, was interposed, M & B withdrew as counsel for Wein and her companies in the Conopeo action. The Conopeo complaint, at paragraph 7, alleges that Moskowitz is an attorney, and that he represented Wein and her companies from 1995 to date. Paragraph 55 alleges that \u201c[a]t all relevant times, defendant Moskowitz not only served as de facto in-house counsel to defendants but also was instrumental in actively effectuating the operations of [a <mask> enterprise].\u201d Four of the six counts set forth in the Conopeo complaint are asserted against all named defendants, and, hence, include Moskowitz. Count I alleges fraud, and seeks damages including punitive damages. Counts II and III allege violations of the federal RICO statute (18 USC \u00a7 1962 [c], [d]; \u00a7 1964 [c]), and seek treble damages. Count VI alleges unjust enrichment. Thus, the Conopeo complaint charges Moskowitz, attorney for Wein and her entities, with engaging in fraud and racketeering activity together with, or on behalf of, his clients."], "id": "e7cec47b-daa8-4440-937a-2ef89e29b5a1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The term \"pattern of <mask> activity\u201d has also found judicial approval. Racketeering activity means any offense from an extensive list of Federal and State crimes listed in the statute. (18 USC \u00a7 1961.) The limited definition of \"pattern\u201d contained in RICO has also survived challenges that it is too vague. See, United States v Angiulo (897d 1169, 1179 [1st Cir 1990]), in which the court declined to invalidate the statute as vague \"simply because potential uncertainty exists regarding the precise reach of the statute in marginal fact situations\u201d."], "id": "d8b0b733-3a8e-4327-b812-88e3c4a64a3e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On or about May 20, 1993, some 20 months after commencing the 1991 action and 12 months after the Superior Court issued its articulation, respondents filed a demand for arbitration against the petitioners with the NASD in New York.2 The arbitration claims were based on the same transactions that formed the basis of the Connecticut action. However, in addition to asserting State common-law claims that were the subject of the 1991 action, respondents, in their statement of claim and demand for arbitration, asserted additional causes of action never submitted to the Connecticut court, including violations of Federal securities laws, NASD rules and State and Federal <mask> laws."], "id": "a30fece0-d34b-447d-9160-137065b6ab7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The term \"pattern of <mask> activity\u201d has also found judicial approval. Racketeering activity means any offense from an extensive list of Federal and State crimes listed in the statute. (18 USC \u00a7 1961.) The limited definition of \"pattern\u201d contained in RICO has also survived challenges that it is too vague. See, United States v Angiulo (897d 1169, 1179 [1st Cir 1990]), in which the court declined to invalidate the statute as vague \"simply because potential uncertainty exists regarding the precise reach of the statute in marginal fact situations\u201d."], "id": "0acca19a-b6a0-4c41-a616-59b75f39dfde", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["2 The State argued the federal felony conviction for conspiracy to commit murder in aid of <mask> was comparable to Washington\u2019s conspiracy to commit murder or first degree murder under accomplice theory. These offenses are both class A felonies. RCW 9A.28.040(3); RCW 9A.32.030(2); RCW 9A.08.020(3). As a \u201cviolent offense\u201d either crime would contribute 2 points to Escobar\u2019s offender score. Former RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(i) (2018); RCW 9.94A.525(8). If the federal felony conviction is not comparable to a Washington offense, it is scored as a class C felony and scores as 1 point. RCW 9.94A.525(3), (8); former RCW 9.94A.030(34) (2018)."], "id": "593facc7-391d-4f91-ac40-84f823a8d3b2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"(1) '<mask> activity\u2019 means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement) * * * section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering) * * *"], "id": "f0da7e91-24b9-4591-a73f-047852e09b93", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"(1) '<mask> activity\u2019 means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement) * * * section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering) * * *"], "id": "7d923c2f-35dd-48fc-866c-c9b66f83bf9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["18 USC \u00a7 1962 prohibits the use or investment of income from a \"pattern of <mask> activity,\u201d (1) to acquire an *243interest in or to establish or operate an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce (\u00a7 1962 [a]); or (2) to acquire or maintain an interest in such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (\u00a7 1962 [b]); or (3) to conduct or participate in the conducting of such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (\u00a7 1962 [c]); or (4) to conspire to violate any of the first three foregoing subdivisions of section 1962 (\u00a7 1962 [d])."], "id": "ad19449f-51c9-43c6-ae63-c0948a4716f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"(1) '<mask> activity\u2019 means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement) * * * section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering) * * *"], "id": "964aa96a-116a-482a-9db1-ab724f60d9d2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Each of the relators was subpoenaed to appear and did appear before the Temporary State Commission of Investigation in August, 1958. The subpoenas served on each of them stated in part that the subject of the investigation was to inquire into: \u2018 \u2018 Matters concerning the public peace, public safety and public justice, and the faithful execution and effective enforcement of the laws of the State of New York, with particular reference but not limited to organized crime and <mask>, including the organization, purposes and participants of, and discussions had and decisions made at, a meeting held on the premises of Joseph Barbara on or about November 14, 1957, at Apalachin, Tioga County, State of New York.\u201d"], "id": "939c5b25-376c-4c32-b534-8be965d465d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Conversely, the Third, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits hold that accrual of a RICO claim does not occur until plaintiff discovers both an injury to business or property and a pattern of <mask> activity, i.e., when all of the elements required to bring a civil RICO action exist (see, Davis v Grusemeyer, 996d 617 [3d Cir]; Keystone Ins. Co. v Houghton, 863d 1125 [3d Cir]; Glessner v Kenny, 952d 702 [3d Cir]; Granite Falls Bank v Henrikson, 924d 150 [8th Cir]; Bath v Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913d 817, supra [10th Cir]; Bivens Gardens Off. Bldg. v Barnett Bank, 906d 1546, 1550-1551 [11th Cir], cert denied sub nom. Barnett Banks v Konstand, 500 US 910, distinguishing Bowling v Founders Tit. Co., 773d 1175 [11th Cir], cert denied sub nom. Zoldessy v Founders Tit. Co., 475 US 1109). The Sixth Circuit in Agristor Fin. Corp. v Van Sickle (967d 233, supra) applied both the date of discovery of injury (\"simple discovery rule\u201d) and the date of discovery of a pattern of racketeering activity in applying the Statute of Limitations."], "id": "555c9c05-d0c7-4075-acb3-ad907b4a0005", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even if the United States Supreme Court were to disagree with the views set forth in Sedima and Bankers Trust (supra), as to distinct RICO injury \u2014 it would make no difference, for defendant herein has made no pretense of alleging that the plaintiffs were engaged in a pattern of <mask> activity marked by two prior convictions. The mere making of a claim under an insurance policy is not, without more (even assuming mail and wire services to have been used), a basis for the assertion of a treble damage RICO claim. To permit the interposition of such a counterclaim in a suit on an insurance policy would result in RICO claims being routinely interposed, with the threat of treble damages and a \u201cracketeering\u201d label to be pinned on a plaintiff if, for some reason, he were unable to substantiate his allegations of a covered loss under the policy. An insurance claim, even if \u201cwillfully exaggerated\u201d, is not tantamount to \u201cracketeering activity\u201d, and should not give rise to \u201ca runaway treble damage bonanza\u201d. (Schacht v Brown, 711d 1343, 1361.)"], "id": "80ff765e-d1d6-4660-85fd-21a7e83be5b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Mejia added that Davila had \"a history of manipulation and lies,\" including an open case alleging welfare fraud. Mejia testified that Davila ran a business with her ex-husband, which was investigated by the FBI for <mask> and organized crime. Mejia initially stated that Davila was found guilty, but then stated \"the trial is ongoing.\" Mejia also claimed Davila made a \"report\" in *225her prior divorce proceedings in which she claimed \"the same thing,\" presumably referring to the allegations of abuse."], "id": "84f0622a-bfea-4689-a0e6-c941fd612371", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["RICO \u00a7 1962 (c) makes it unlawful, in pertinent part, \"for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise\u2019s affairs through a pattern of <mask> activity\u201d (18 USC \u00a7 1962 [c]). The terms \"enterprise\u201d, \"person\u201d, \"racketeering activity\u201d, and \"pattern of racketeering activity\u201d are defined in 18 USC \u00a7 1961, in pertinent part, as follows:"], "id": "3869ee3c-e7e5-425d-9291-887cf46ebdea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Edward J. Greenfield, J. In this action to recover under an insurance policy for losses allegedly sustained (see prior decision of May 10, 1984, by Greenfield, J.), plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the third affirmative defense and counterclaim in the amended answer. The challenged counterclaim was predicated upon alleged \u201c<mask> activities\u201d under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO; 18 USC \u00a7 1961 etseq.). The racketeering activity which it is alleged gives rise to treble damages claimed under RICO is the filing of a fraudulent and exaggerated insurance claim, using the mails and wire communication in interstate commerce in connection therewith."], "id": "a4ec8dfa-e866-48fa-a8b5-7db63fe3f1d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c(1) \u2018<mask> activity\u2019 means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal *316gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States * * *"], "id": "b01862f3-bd77-4bef-8930-19e8f442bbb6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "racketeering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is not an insignificant indication of the deep-seated nature of the national infection that the rise in the crime rate this year \u2014 an \u201c appalling \u201d 8% increase according to F. B. I. Director J. Edgar Hoover \u2014 was sharpest in the smaller and medium sized areas. Except for sporadic arrests, narcotics continue as big business for the mobsters; policy rackets and bookies know no recession; bribery, extortion, and <mask> are unabated."], "id": "7a91c88d-dd86-4a9f-80ba-84a9b9803fd0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["These subpoenas were issued by John Harlan Amen, Assistant Attorney-General of the State of New York. The petitioners assert that the Assistant Attorney-General is conducting the present proceeding before the grand jury \u201c for the sole purpose of finding an indictment against the petitioner John J. Halleran accusing him of the crime of <mask> in violation of the Penal Law of the State of New York * * * or in connection with a charge against said petitioner thereon of -misconduct as a public official of the Borough of Queens by way of a presentment or report to be handed up to-this Court and filed with the Department of the President of the Borough of Queens as the basis of a proceeding *945to remove said petitioner John J. Halleran from said office of Commissioner of Borough Works, and in attempt to deprive hito of his pension rights under said New York City Employees Retirement System.\""], "id": "ebb32b1b-b6d7-4536-acb2-db9a5428bbdc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Whether and to what extent to admit evidence that Gibson had been murdered just before he was to testify against Sykes was the subject of extensive discussion between the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel during the course of the trial. The issue was first raised by the court prior to jury selection, because the trial judge was concerned that prospective jurors might have seen press coverage of Gibson\u2019s murder, linking it to his role as a witness in the Sykes trial and implicating the defendant. Defense counsel argued that no reference at all should be made to the Gibson murder at trial because it was \u201cwholly immaterial, separate and entirely unrelated\u201d to the <mask> and witness tampering charges against the defendant. The prosecutor argued that testimony regarding Gibson\u2019s death was relevant to explain why the three teenage girls came forward to the District Attorney, and that absent evidence of Gibson\u2019s death, the jury would be left to wonder why these witnesses \u201cturned around\u201d on the day of the Sykes trial. The prosecutor also emphasized that defense counsel had \u201cexplored\u201d the files related to the relocation of the girls, \u201cwhich are ugly\u201d and which showed that the girls were \u201cdifficult\u201d witnesses who had misbehaved in the hotels where they had been placed. He urged that it would be \u201cobscene\u201d to allow defense counsel to impeach the credibility of the girls by cross-examining them about the money given to them by the District Attorney\u2019s office for housing and living expenses during their relocation \u201cwithout knowing the dangers involved and why all these things took place.\u201d After hearing arguments by counsel, the court indicated that it would formulate an instruction that would inform the jury that another person had been tried and found guilty of killing Gibson, and that there was no evidence that the defendant was responsible for Gibson\u2019s death. Thereafter, in its preliminary instructions to prospective jurors, the court informed them that there had been extensive press coverage of some of the issues in the case, including the recent trial of a man named Travis *851Ragsdale for the murder of Robert Gibson. The court advised the prospective jurors that the defendant was \u201cnot in any way accused of being involved in that murder.\u201d"], "id": "92981afe-0cb0-49b0-bb07-d2f9f6cbce29", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*238The Fourth Department rejected this argument and upheld the conspiracy charge, stating that where concert between two people is not an element of the object crime a conspiracy count is proper. The court observed that, with respect to obscenity in the first and second degrees, the defendant may be found guilty for his individual, singular conduct of knowingly possessing obscene materials totally separate from concert with coconspirators. Potwora distinguished those cases involving <mask> and unlawful sale of liquor, where a conspiracy charge would not ordinarily lie in addition to the substantive offense, because concert between the giver and receiver or buyer and seller is an essential element of the object crime. (People v Potwora, supra, at 211, n 1, citing United States v Sager, 49d 725, 727 [2d Cir 1931], and United States v Katz, 271 US 354.)"], "id": "70ed2092-1d0f-4dac-a0e2-c4b3939a9230", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Each of the sixteen counts of the indictment, dealing with <mask>, charges that defendant Cilento, being a duly appointed representative of a labor organization, to wit, a trustee of the Social Security Fund of the Distillery, Rectifying and \"Wine Workers\u2019 International Union of America (A. F. of L.) and secretary-treasurer of said union, solicited, agreed to accept and did accept moneys from one Louis Saperstein, upon an understanding that Cilento should be influenced in respect of his acts, decisions and other duties as such representative. The other defendants are charged with having aided and abetted Cilento in the commission of the crime of bribery."], "id": "e5f851de-81d9-40ce-a75b-40e9c2519db1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The courts have repeatedly and consistently refused to dismiss indictments where there were arguably excessive delays as long as the reason for the delay was legitimate. A 24-month preindictment delay did not warrant dismissal of a <mask> indictment where, during those months, the People were investigating similar acts by defendant\u2019s fellow Department of Consumer Affairs\u2019 inspectors. (People v Bonsauger, supra.) A 22-month preindictment delay was excused by the prosecution\u2019s investigation of the eyewitness\u2019 account of the crime. (People v Quince, 119 AD2d 981 [4th Dept 1986], lv denied 68 NY2d 671 [1986]; to the same effect, see, People v Frazier, 159 AD2d 1017 [4th Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 734 [1990], cert denied 498 US 873 [1990] [an 11-year delay due to the People\u2019s efforts to corroborate an accomplice\u2019s statement was excused]; People v Angrisani, 160 AD2d 713 [2d Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 730 [1990] [a 12-month delay was excused where it was shown that there was an ongoing investigation]; People v Rosado, 166 AD2d 544 [2d Dept 1990], lv denied 77 NY2d 843 [1991] [an 18-month preindictment delay was the result of the prosecution\u2019s good faith investigation].)"], "id": "8b7805b9-83ea-4fa6-bcb5-5506307341eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In United States v Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal. (526 US 398 [1999]), the Supreme Court, in construing the general federal <mask> and gratuity statutes,2 explained the distinction between bribery \u2014 influencing\u2014and illegal gratuity \u2014 rewarding \u2014 as follows: the distinguishing feature of each crime is its intent element. Bribery requires an intent \u201cto influence\u201d an official act or \u201cto be influenced\u201d in an official act, while illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted \u201cfor or because of\u2019 an official act (18 USC \u00a7 201 [b] [1] [A]; [c] [1] [A]). More specifically, bribery involves the giving of value to procure a specific official action from a public official (United States v Myers, 692d 823 [2d Cir 1982]) whereas the element of a quid pro quo or a direct exchange is absent from the offense of receiving an unlawful gratuity. In order to be a bribe, a benefit must be connected to an agreement or understanding. Thus, the bribe giver or bribe receiver must have knowledge both of the benefit and of the terms upon which it was offered or solicited."], "id": "80ce2bb9-b71c-4ddf-9cbc-61183ff7ef72", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*779How near conduct comes to the accomplishment of an intended offense depends, of course, on what is necessary to the \"accomplishment\u201d of that offense. The crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance is not committed until a person comes into physical possession of, or at least assumes dominion and control over, a controlled substance. An arson is not committed until a fire is actually set. \"Completion\u201d of the crime of <mask> in the third degree, however, requires neither that the bribe be paid nor that the purpose of the bribe be achieved. \"The crimes of bribery and bribe receiving are complete upon the requisite agreement or understanding; no further act, such as the actual transfer of money, is required.\u201d (Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 200, at 454; see, People v Charles, 61 NY2d 321 [1984] [taking of official action unnecessary]; People v Arcadi, 79 AD2d 845, 846 [4th Dept 1980], affd on decision below 54 NY2d 981 [1981] [\"The essence of the crime (of bribe receiving) is the agreement, and the results of the agreement are immaterial\u201d].)"], "id": "9142ebc8-5c7d-4182-a70e-b19db492ff5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner was licensed both as a boxing second and manager by the commission. His licenses were suspended as a result of <mask> charges brought against him for violation of the Rules of the State Athletic Commission. Prior to the hearing to determine the said charges, petitioner voluntarily attempted to surrender his licenses. This was refused by the commission. Subsequently, as a result of several adjournments requested by the District Attorney of this county, the licenses expired by lapse of time. Petitioner consequently avers that in view of the foregoing the commission has lost its jurisdiction to act in this matter."], "id": "79e96812-6e38-42fa-a32f-d8d286950f7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cFrom November 2003 through August 2008, Mr. Grobart and his company \u2014 now known as Teneyck, formerly known as Neill Supply Company \u2014 engaged in a scheme to unlawfully obtain a contract from Con Edison by furnishing bribes to a Con Edison employee named James Woodason. Mr Woodason was involved in the awarding of contracts by Con Edison to companies via what was supposed to be a competitive bidding process. In 2003, Robert Rosenberg . . . brokered a deal between Mr. Grobart and Neill Supply on one hand and Mr. Woodason on the other, whereby Mr. Grobart and Neill Supply would pay a bribe to Woodason in exchange for Woodason steering a Con Edison contract to Neill Supply.\u201d (Emphasis added.) *196Thereafter, in March of 2012, plaintiff commenced this action against Rosenberg, a cooperating witness, who has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit <mask> and wire fraud, pursuant to 18 USC \u00a7 371, but who had not been sentenced prior to oral argument on this motion."], "id": "0f6e2a11-c8be-4726-924a-be2b9eb742dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Section 381 of the Penal Law * reads as follows: \u201c A person offending against any provision of any section of this chapter relating to <mask> and corruption, is a competent witness against another person so offending, and may be compelled to attend and testify upon any trial, hearing, proceeding, or investigation, in the same manner as any other person. But the testimony so given shall not be used in any prosecution or proceeding, civil or criminal, against the person so testifying. A person so testifying to the giving of a bribe which has been accepted, shall not thereafter be liable to indictment, prosecution, or punishment for that bribery, and may plead or prove the giving of testimony accordingly, in bar of such an indictment or prosecution.\u201d This section has bearing on the compulsion of persons to testify, the use that may be made of their testimony, and the granting of immunity."], "id": "cccc03a2-c10c-4b6f-b22b-745940e3798a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The necessity for a strict application of the constitutional provision, concerning local bills (Const., art. 3, sec. 16), was never greater than in the case before-us, in view of the abuses that might result, and have resulted from it. It is not pretended that the contract in suit was awarded to the lowest bidder. The manner in which it was procured leaves no doubt that <mask> was resorted to to obtain it."], "id": "40689fe8-9a64-4665-9a7f-a8cc7b88af2b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant also relies on United States v. Collins to support his argument that a pretrial survey of prospective jurors was permissible per se because it did not compromise the integrity of the jury selection process. In Collins , a federal judge was charged with <mask>, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy relating to allegations that a criminal defendant had paid the judge and his associate $100,000 in exchange for a lenient sentence. Prior to trial, the prosecution commissioned a telephone survey of 457 persons in the Eastern District of Louisiana, asking them various questions relating to the upcoming trial. The defendants found out about the survey and reported it to the district court, which in turn ordered the prosecution to cease all polling and to turn over the results of the poll to the court. After reviewing the polling material and the results collected, the court concluded that the integrity of the jury selection process had not been compromised."], "id": "607143a6-14b9-4218-a78c-c13b12ac3672", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["[c]ommon sense dictates that when it is alleged and proved that the defendant offered or solicited a proscribed benefit, it is not necessary to further prove that the offer or solicitation resulted in a bilateral arrangement or unlawful contract with the other party. The offense of <mask> is complete when the offer or solicitation is made. ... ... [W]here it is alleged the accused offered or solicited a benefit as consideration for an official act, it is not necessary for the State to prove the party to whom the offer or solicitation was made accepted the proposition or even understood the unlawful nature of the proposition; proof that the offer or solicitation was made by the accused with the purpose to promote or facilitate the exchange of the benefit for the official action is all that is required. Martinez v. State , 696 S.W.2d 930, 932-33 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, pet. ref'd). We agree. Common sense dictates that a bilateral agreement is not a required element to establish commercial bribery.6 Many criminal defendants are prosecuted for offering a bribe to a person who refuses to accept the bribe and instead becomes the State's witness. Similarly, many criminal defendants are prosecuted for soliciting a bribe from a person who refuses to pay the bribe and instead becomes the State's witness."], "id": "b45f740c-973a-4b7e-9ac2-221640751c39", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, the first count of the indictment, charging the defendant with the crime of <mask> in the third degree, is reduced to an attempt to commit that crime, and the motion to dismiss that charge, as so reduced, is denied. Pursuant to CPL 210.20 (6), within 30 days of the entry of this order the People must file a reduced indictment charging the defendant with the crime of attempted bribery in the third degree. The second count of the indictment, charging the defendant with the crime of attempted unlawful Grand Jury disclosure, is dismissed."], "id": "eed12ece-d2e7-45ee-86ae-e564ee649453", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The third category deals with crimes involving individual dishonesty or untrustworthiness, and virtually every court has uniformly agreed that these particular acts possess such a direct *817bearing of credibility as to outweigh any harm that their admission might bring to the defendant. Among the acts that would follow in this category are: \u201c Commission of perjury * * * or acts of individual dishonesty, or untrustworthiness (e.g., offenses involving theft or fraud, <mask>, or acts of deceit, cheating, breach of trust). \u201d (People v. Sandoval, supra, p. 377.)"], "id": "25c746ab-56d0-4d41-b92d-183809af1bd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". In Moll v United States Life Tit. Ins. Co. (710 F Supp 476, 481, n 3 [SD NY 1989]), a civil RICO action, where the plaintiff real estate purchasers\u2019 \"sole allegation of economic harm is that they did not receive the title insurance at a lower fee\u201d, Judge Leisure held that New York\u2019s commercial <mask> statute, as a matter of law, cannot be violated by a kickback paid to purchase such insurance, because the premium was nonnegotiable. While it may be that for Federal pleading purposes the complaint is deficient absent further allegations (compare, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v Young, 1994 WL 88129 [SD NY, Mar. 15, 1994, Haight, J.]), I do not agree, that as a *820matter of law, there cannot be economic harm to an employer whose employee accepts kickbacks when a purchase price is fixed."], "id": "a3f12588-4ef2-43d3-b667-95fc7359a76d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In December of 1973, an indictment was found by a Grand Jury in the United States court charging petitioners, amongst others, with <mask> and conspiracy in connection with harness racing. Their licenses were immediately suspended by respondents Racing \u00a1Board, and petitioners applied for a hearing in accordance with applicable rules and statutes. On February 6, 1974, a hearing was held at which testimony was taken which resulted in a finding by the hearing officer favorable to petitioners, with a recommendation for full reinstatement of their licenses. On February 22, 1974, the Racing Board ordered the hearings to be reopened for the taking of further testimony bearing ion the propriety of continuing the suspensions pending the outcome of the indictment."], "id": "bcad3331-b0f5-4c37-9863-4fa9898e9106", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201ccourt may for good cause shown * * * issue a protective order for a stated period regulating disclosure of the business or residential address of any prospective or sworn juror to any person or persons, other than to counsel for either party. Such good cause shall exist where the court determines that there is a likelihood of <mask>, jury tampering or of physical injury or harassment of the juror.\u201d"], "id": "fdd9b86d-f8f1-4bb6-8e6b-60c1e7ddf466", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Zarate contends the State failed to produce any evidence of an agreement to accept or an acceptance of $500.00 cash from Daisy Rich and Harry Rich. Zarate contends the variance is material because he did not have notice that the State intended to prove that he committed <mask> by receiving money from Rachel Elizondo; more importantly, Zarate avers he could potentially be subject to prosecution again for the crime that was actually proved at trial. Alternatively, Zarate contends the State only introduced evidence that Zarate agreed to accept $500.00 in cash to reduce Daisy Rich's bond, and not the bond for Harry Rich."], "id": "9c76d7a1-d628-436f-9992-3d64c3f634c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, as with <mask>, the crime of bribe receiving is complete upon the solicitation and agreement; if there is an \u201cattempt\u201d crime, it is when there is a solicitation of a bribe without an agreement that the public servant\u2019s action will be influenced. Where there is an apparent agreement, the defendant\u2019s state of mind being controlling, it is immaterial whether the benefit is conferred. As the Second Department held in People v Souvenir (209 AD2d 455 [2d Dept 1994]), the solicitation of a bribe is itself an attempt; thus, if there is an agreement, the fact that the bribe was never paid does not entitle a defendant to a charge down to the attempted crime. It is only in the Sanoguet situation, where there is no agreement, that there can be an attempt to commit the crimes of bribery or bribe receiving."], "id": "626590ab-40b0-48b4-9b38-974f294cb58c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to trial by unbiased, impartial jurors. ( U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends; Cal. Const., art. I, \u00a7 16 ; Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, superseded on other grounds by statute; People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87 ( Nesler ).) An impartial jury is one in which no juror has been improperly influenced, and every juror is capable and willing to decide the case based solely on the evidence. ( In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600 ( Hamilton ).) \"Juror bias does not require that a juror bear animosity towards the defendant. Rather, juror bias exists if there is a substantial likelihood that a juror's verdict was based on an improper outside influence, rather than on the evidence and instructions presented at trial, and the nature of the influence was detrimental to the defendant.\" ( People v. Cissna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1116, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 54.) \"A sitting juror's involuntary exposure to events outside the *213trial evidence ... may require ... examination for probable prejudice. Such situations may include attempts by nonjurors to tamper with the jury, as by <mask> or intimidation.\" ( Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 294-295, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600, 20 Cal.4th 1083A at pp. 294-295.) \"Because a defendant charged with crime has a right to the unanimous verdict of 12 impartial jurors [citation], it is settled that a conviction cannot stand if even a single juror has been improperly influenced.\" ( People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 208, 155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91.)"], "id": "429a9794-97ff-460c-a018-59bb121a9b24", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although not controlling, the definitions of lexicographers may furnish guidance in determining the sense with which a word is used in a statute. (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 234.) \"Corrupt\u201d has been defined in one respected dictionary as: \"1. guilty of dishonest practices, as <mask>; *852lacking integrity; crooked * * *. -Syn. 1. false, untrustworthy. corrupt, dishonest, venal apply to one, esp. in public office, who acts on mercenary motives, without regard to honor, right, or justice.\u201d (Random House Dictionary of the English Language [unabridged 2d ed 1987].)"], "id": "58ccd345-2de4-444a-be8c-4c1635daa1b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*25In Kremer v. Kremer (51 N. Y. S. 2d 394, affd. without opinion 269 App. Div. 827) Mr. Justice Cohalax makes it abundantly clear that where a defense such as the defendants Gold contend for in this case is relied upon, it is necessary for the defendants to prove that the alleged <mask> or illegality practiced upon the General Motors Corporation has actually been consummated. There was no such proof in this case in any way. Consequently, under this doctrine an express charge to the jury might have been improper for there was no evidence of consummation of a bribe to influence the employee of General Motors."], "id": "e1b9af93-6a34-4848-99e6-2e8b6a550499", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court does not consider the term \"particular\u201d superfluous. It has been variously defined as meaning \"individual; specific; local * * * partial in extent * * * not universal\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary [4th ed]), \"apart from others; special; limited; specific\u201d (67 CJS, p 881). The drafters of the paragraph took care in using the term to circumscribe jurisdiction over offenses committed wholly out-of-State, which they recognized as \"somewhat more delicate and controversial than the other categories. The kinds of offenses contemplated [by the *234paragraph] are exemplified by <mask> and perjury, the 'effects\u2019 of which are confined to corruption of New York\u2019s governmental and judicial processes\u201d (Staff Comment to Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law, p 41 [1967])."], "id": "959d2a3e-40af-4ac3-a320-135c2109bfe1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"This court is empowered by section 36 of the Public Officers Law to remove a public official for what amounts to intentional wrongdoing, moral turpitude, or a violation of a public trust\u201d (Matter of Pisciotta, 41 AD2d 949, 950). The intent of the law is to bestow on the courts discretion to draw a line between an actual intentional breach and mere oversight. Thus, certain administrative oversights and municipal accounting deficiencies by the Mayor of a village, though clearly technical violations of village law, were found attributable to the Mayor\u2019s inexperience and did not constitute grounds for removal. (Matter of Pisciotta, supra.) Had the deficiencies continued unabated, such continuation could be found to constitute an intentional disregard of duty. Where a town supervisor willfully refused to furnish a monthly report pursuant to former section 119 of the Town Law (renum *594\u00a7 125), he could be removed from office. (13 Opns St Comp, 1957, p 250.) Larceny of public funds constitutes grounds for removal (Matter of Abare v Hatch, 21 AD2d 84) as does corrupt bargaining for appointment (48 NY Jur, Public Officers and Employees, \u00a7 232), and <mask> (48 NY Jur, Public Officers and Employees, \u00a7 233). Even continued incapacitation of a councilman due to sickness, with the consequent inability to perform the duties of his office might constitute maladministration (17 Opns St Comp, 1961, p 448). Gross nonfeasance and neglect of duties often constitute negligence. (23 Opns St Comp, 1967, p 902). Whether the acts of a supervisor are sufficient grounds for removal from office is a question for the court to determine. (48 NY Jur, Public Officers and Employees, \u00a7 230, 4 Opns St Comp, 1948, p 57.)"], "id": "eb81a2f6-205a-42f1-872c-2a7f1d046a07", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["These subpoenas were issued by John Harlan Amen, Assistant Attorney-General of the State of New York. The petitioners assert that the Assistant Attorney-General is conducting the present proceeding before the grand jury \u201c for the sole purpose of finding an indictment against the petitioner John J. Halleran accusing him of the crime of <mask> in violation of the Penal Law of the State of New York * * * or in connection with a charge against said petitioner thereon of -misconduct as a public official of the Borough of Queens by way of a presentment or report to be handed up to-this Court and filed with the Department of the President of the Borough of Queens as the basis of a proceeding *945to remove said petitioner John J. Halleran from said office of Commissioner of Borough Works, and in attempt to deprive hito of his pension rights under said New York City Employees Retirement System.\""], "id": "0b5a4539-df97-4ae0-b179-bf366c9e0f86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["True indeed it is that money was given by Paramount, or Keough, to a duly appointed representative of a labor organization with intent to induce him not to cause a strike by employees of Paramount and of its subsidiaries, and in that sense the money was so given with intent to influence that duly appointed representative in respect to his acts. But the essence of <mask> is the voluntary giving of something of value to influence the performance of official duty (2 Bishop, Criminal Law [9th ed., 1923] \u00a7 85; Clark & Marshall, Crimes [4th ed., 1940] \u00a7 434; 9 C. J., Bribery, p. 402; 11 C. J. S., Bribery, \u00a7 1, pp. 840-841) and here the giving of the money was not voluntary and it was not given to influence the performance of official duty. There is not the slightest evidence that this duly appointed representative of a labor organization was or even pretended to be under any legal duty to cause a strike. He did not ask for pay *1004to influence him in the performance of any duty, real or pretended. He simply threatened to do unlawful injury to Paramount, and other similar companies, by calling a strike or strikes he was under no duty to call, and the only part his position as a representative of a labor organization played in the matter was that it constituted such a source of power as to give meaning to his threat and thereby induce consent to the giving of the money he demanded. In short, he was not the acceptor of a bribe but an extortioner (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 850, 851; People v. Feld, 262 App. Div. 909)."], "id": "d8a415c6-a286-4f2c-8c21-b384b177a47e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The necessity for a strict application of the constitutional provision, concerning local bills (Const., art. 3, sec. 16), was never greater than in the case before-us, in view of the abuses that might result, and have resulted from it. It is not pretended that the contract in suit was awarded to the lowest bidder. The manner in which it was procured leaves no doubt that <mask> was resorted to to obtain it."], "id": "ba65e2b4-4682-4ebe-b030-e1f62052994c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["But more significantly, as is pointed out in present counsel\u2019s argument to this court, never before has there been an instance where the Commission has denied a trade waste license without a finding or even an allegation which included one or more of the following: (1) being a member of organized crime, (2) racketeering, (3) a principal convicted of a crime, (4) association with organized crime figures, (5) board member of a criminal cartel, (6) business with organized crime, (7) nondisclosure of a principal, (8) operating as an unlicensed hauler, (9) applicant gave false testimony, (10) applicant engaged in predatory pricing and efforts to prevent independent companies from entering the New York City market, (11) <mask> of public officials and/or police officers, (12) business records falsified to conceal crime, (13) participation in property rights grievances, (14) failure to disclose crime to the Commission, (15) refusal to accept monitor and/or pay monitor fees, or (16) extensive illegal dumping. To support his argument, counsel obtained all of these decisions via a request under the Freedom of Information Law and included them as exhibits to his papers. He urges that the prior decisions prove that the instant denial by the Commission was at sharp variance with its 10 years of decision making."], "id": "564f10cc-11cf-4ece-a752-dc8260037df7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, in the first count of the People v Mercorella indictment, the alleged agreement to resign is made the basis for a charge against Mr. Mercorella of bribe receiving in the second degree. The theory of this count is that the resignation involved an \"exercise of discretion as a public servant\u201d and that Mr. Mercorella was bribed to resign at a particular time by the offer of a nomination to the Civil Court. The single-count indictment against Mr. Cunningham charging him with <mask> in the second degree involves precisely the same theory in a different form."], "id": "b19a98dc-5d25-4fe3-a9f3-8d109116e440", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["However, the single act of using a telephone to promote <mask> and extortion was held to provide no basis for a conviction under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which requires two separate predicate acts, even though the act encompassed two different criminal offenses (United States v Walgren, 885d 1417; 18 USC \u00a7 1961 et seq.). The Walgren decision was consistent with the holdings in other Federal RICO cases which determined the number of predicate acts charged (see, United States v Kragness, 830d 842; Polycast Technology Corp. v UniRoyal, Inc., 728 F Supp 926)."], "id": "0908fa51-1a27-4029-af49-6b28c23730b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant also appeals from a judgment convicting him, after a jury trial, of two counts of <mask> in the first degree and one count each of conspiracy in the fourth degree and forgery in the second degree. There is no merit to his contention that statements made in the absence of counsel and while in custody on the drug charges should have been suppressed. A defendant\u2019s right to counsel is not violated where, as here, defendant initiates a bribe offer in counsel\u2019s absence and defendant responds to further inquiry and investigation concerning that bribe offer (see, People v Middletown, 54 NY2d 474; cf., People v Bell, 73 NY2d 153)."], "id": "f9239c8a-9410-4231-9f9d-956748820706", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is the position of respondent that the withholding of the payments is justified by reason of the fact that the District Attorney of New York County has officially advised the Mayor of the city of the refusal of Vincent B. Turecamo, vice-president of the petitioner corporation herein, to sign a waiver of immunity when called before the Grand Jury of New York County pursuant to its subpoena. Respondent contends that the Grand Jury is investigating possible collusion in submitting bids and obtaining awards of painting contracts with various governmental agencies, including the Transit Authority of the City of New York, and possible collusion in obtaining payments thereof by <mask> of inspectors and other employees of such agencies. Moreover, under section 103-b of the General Municipal Law it is provided: \u2018 \u2018 Any person who, when called before a grand jury to testify concerning any transaction or contract had with the state, any political subdivision thereof, a public authority, or with a public department, agency or official of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or of a public authority, refuses to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution or to answer any relevant question concerning such transaction or contract, and any firm, partnership or corporation of which he is a member, partner, director or officer shall be disqualified from thereafter selling to or submitting bids to or receiving awards from or entering into any contracts with any municipal corporation or fire district, or with any public department, agency or official thereof, for goods, work or services, for a period of five years after such refusal or until a disqualification shall be removed pursuant to the provisions of section one hundred three-c of this article.\u201d"], "id": "6cfa924e-6538-481b-8180-a61d1b4c2003", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Moore Freight terminated Mr. Mize\u2019s employment, purportedly for cause, on November 7, 2019, slightly less than two years into Mr. Mize\u2019s five-year term under the Employment Agreement. His termination followed an internal investigation into what Moore Freight terms a \u201c<mask> scheme,\u201d consisting of \u201ccash payments, meals, personal items, used cars, and vacation packages\u201d purportedly provided by Mr. Mize to \u201ca key employee\u201d of one of Moore Freight\u2019s customers (\u201cCustomer\u201d).2 Moore Freight had retained outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins, to conduct the internal investigation. Vinson & Elkins is not representing Moore Freight in the instant action."], "id": "67bbb8ef-3a5c-4656-817a-86f6dfc745c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The next lower felony classification [Class B] which carries a discretionary maximum of 25 years and no mandatory mini*741mum (Penal Law, \u00a7 70.00) embraces arson in the second degree [causing fire in occupied building] (Penal Law, \u00a7 150.15); <mask> in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 200.04); bribe receiving in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 200.12); burglary in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 140.30); conspiracy in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 105.15); criminal mischief in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 145.12); kidnapping in the second degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 135.20); manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 125.20); rape in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 130.35); robbery in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 160.15); sodomy in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 130.50); and possession of explosives with intent to use unlawfully against the person or property of another (Penal Law, \u00a7 265.05, subd. 7)."], "id": "3292bd92-d56a-41c9-8bd6-4ad1328fe916", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Not disputing the possibility of another candidate, the District Attorney nevertheless argues against dismissal by drawing the analogy to certain case law pertaining to the <mask> offenses which holds those crimes to be complete upon the bribe receiver\u2019s promise to act, even though the contemplated result is beyond his authority to accomplish (citing People v Chapman, 13 NY2d 97, People v Jackson, 191 NY 293 and People v Mitchell, 40 AD2d 117)."], "id": "19d8dbd9-9368-4cfc-902a-06568af2da86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Further, the July 2015 Designation provides an appropriate method for a preliminary assessment of whether superseder is *675excluded under EO 147 because no significant question exists as to whether the deceased was armed at the time of their death. EO 147 confers the responsibility for this determination upon the AG, which necessarily involves mixed questions of law and fact. Indeed, interpreting EO 147 to require that the district attorney make that initial determination would undermine the very concern that prompted supersession. (See People v Weiner, 63 AD2d 722 [2d Dept 1978] [<mask> of police officers was involved placing the case under state special prosecutor\u2019s jurisdiction and requiring the district attorney to obtain the former\u2019s authorization before presenting the case to a grand jury].) Accordingly, the court finds that the July 2015 Designation permitting the AG, as Special Prosecutor, to require a district attorney to conduct some investigative activities and refrain from others is consistent with EO 147\u2019s legal mandate. (Matter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct. v Doe, 50 NY2d 14, 18 [1980] [a governor\u2019s authority and that of the special prosecutor designated by him extend only to those matters set forth in the Governor\u2019s order] .)"], "id": "b07b6cbf-4a08-46a2-ac7a-c93bd0ab77d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["While the court agrees with the People, citing People v Lugo *99(93 Misc 2d 195, 199), that \"the personnel records of a police officer should not be examined by a Magistrate, prosecutor or defense counsel each time an arrest is made\u201d, in a situation such as the instant, where the statutes pertaining to <mask> of a public servant places the police in a pivotal position of being a necessary party to the alleged crimes, said records might very well bear some relevance and materiality in the prosecution of these crimes. (See, Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 200.00, 10.00 [15].)"], "id": "d7e4dabd-e854-4552-b023-4b1bf2799086", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Because the People failed to accord defendant discovery of *978certain surveillance photographs (see, CPL 240.20 [1] [d]), the trial court refused to admit those photographs into evidence. The court also should have granted defendant\u2019s request to strike testimony concerning those photographs. Proof of defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming, however, and there is no significant probability that, absent that error, defendant would have been acquitted. Thus, that error is harmless (see, People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 242). We have reviewed defendant\u2019s remaining contention and conclude that it is without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Erie County Court, D\u2019Amico, J.\u2014<mask>, 1st Degree.) Present\u2014Denman, P. J., Green, Balio, Wesley and Callahan, JJ."], "id": "d3a090e2-60af-42bd-bc4d-b8782790a780", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Brasch court turned for authority for this reasoning to Jaehne (103 N. Y. 182, supra), a <mask> case, for which crime *371there is no tangible corpus delicti and indeed on the Ja\u00e9hne facts no corpus delicti at all. As noted (supra), Jaehne used \u201c the corroboration of the truth of the confession test\u201d rather than the \u201ccorpus delicti\u201d test. The Brasch court quoted Jaehne (p. 61): \u201cThe words of the statute, \u2018 additional proof that the crime charged has been committed,\u2019 seem to imply that the confession is to be treated as evidence of the corpus delicti * * * in other words, as competent proof of the body of the crime, though insufficient without corroboration to warrant a conviction.\u201d"], "id": "0f174d24-a256-4dab-90da-8d811076a49a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["engaged in the exercise of their official duties in public places. [Citations.]\u201d (Askins v. United States Dep\u2019t of Homeland Security (9th Cir. 2018) 899 F.3d 1035, 1044.) 16 Moreover, a person may record a confidential communication without violating section 632 when the recording is done \u201cfor the purpose of obtaining evidence reasonably believed to relate to the commission by another party to the communication\u201d of certain enumerated crimes, such as extortion, kidnapping, <mask>, and any felony involving violence against the person, including human trafficking and domestic violence. (\u00a7 633.5.)"], "id": "26ef4210-5bd1-40b5-a10e-76d7bbf6b908", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201ccourt may for good cause shown * * * issue a protective order for a stated period regulating disclosure of the business or residential address of any prospective or sworn juror to any person or persons, other than to counsel for either party. Such good cause shall exist where the court determines that there is a likelihood of <mask>, jury tampering or of physical injury or harassment of the juror.\u201d"], "id": "4526524c-0e26-4fea-bbff-87da275b11e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["During the course of these simultaneous but independently conducted investigations each of these defendants was subpoenaed to appear before both the Federal and State Grand Juries. In each they indicated an intention to refuse to testify or otherwise co-operate with the authorities on the grounds of their constitutional privileges against self incrimination. They were thereupon excused by the State authorities and did not appear before the County Grand Jury. The Federal authorities elected to compel their testimony, however, and each defendant was granted immunity from prosecution pursuant to section 2514 of title 18 of the United States Code. Upon being thus immunized from prosecution and compelled to testify by order of the local United States District 'Court, each of these defendants freely informed the Federal Grand Jury as to their knowledge of and joint participation in the <mask> of certain members of the County Legislature."], "id": "ba53aed1-fde3-4102-ae90-6f4181df8cfa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court does not consider the term \"particular\u201d superfluous. It has been variously defined as meaning \"individual; specific; local * * * partial in extent * * * not universal\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary [4th ed]), \"apart from others; special; limited; specific\u201d (67 CJS, p 881). The drafters of the paragraph took care in using the term to circumscribe jurisdiction over offenses committed wholly out-of-State, which they recognized as \"somewhat more delicate and controversial than the other categories. The kinds of offenses contemplated [by the *234paragraph] are exemplified by <mask> and perjury, the 'effects\u2019 of which are confined to corruption of New York\u2019s governmental and judicial processes\u201d (Staff Comment to Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law, p 41 [1967])."], "id": "8bf570e2-4fa2-4b7d-bc29-8aeff9fa1c72", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In a decision with respect to indictment No. 3488/13 dated May 1, 2014, the court found: (1) the evidence presented to the *581grand jury with respect to causation was legally sufficient; (2) the prosecution was not barred on double jeopardy grounds; (3) defendant would be given credit for the almost 10 years that he served on his sentence on the attempted murder charge if he is convicted on the pending murder charge; and (4) that defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated (People v Carromero, 43 Misc 3d 1218[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50714[U] [2014]). Additionally, relying upon People v Latham (90 NY2d 795, 799 [1997]), the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to preclude the use of his prior guilty plea at a trial on the murder charge. (Id.) This latter ruling was premised in part on the fact that defendant had not yet moved to withdraw or set aside his plea to the attempted murder charge. In the intervening year between the court\u2019s decision and the present, based upon a conflict of interest raised by defendant\u2019s counsel, the court assigned new counsel for defendant. That counsel has now filed a motion, pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (h), seeking to vacate defendant\u2019s 1986 plea and conviction to attempted murder and <mask>, which, if granted, would preclude the use at defendant\u2019s murder trial of the factual admissions made by defendant during the course of his 1986 plea allocution. (See People v Moore, 66 NY2d 1028, 1030 [1985] [a guilty plea once withdrawn or vacated is out of the case forever for all purposes, including the use of the contents of the plea allocution on the People\u2019s direct case or for impeachment purposes should defendant testify at trial].)2 For the following reasons, defendant\u2019s motion is denied."], "id": "a657accc-d4ab-4b05-8c1a-432c5beffcf4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The second count is in the words following : \u201c While corruption was thus diffusing itself through the veins and arteries of the political body, the republican party, relying implicitly on the fidelity of their representatives, were unapprehensive, after the decisions of the legislature, and after these decisions had been confirmed by a warmly contested election ; foreign invasion was not more distant from their thoughts, than the incorporation of the hostile bank. Almost every republican, who was originally a stockholder, has sold out; none but the bribers and the bribed contemplated the incorporation (meaning that the said plaintiff, and others, had been guilty of <mask> and corruption, in obtaining the ihcorporation of the said bank.) The only remaining *438question is, whether this count be good; and this will depend on the relevancy of the innuendo."], "id": "9b114a44-53e0-4196-ba61-95eafb94e095", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Since this court cannot legislate in the guise of interpreting a statute, nor extend its scope to include acts not encompassed in its language, I must grant the motion to dismiss the indictment since I conclude that Cilento\u2019s acts were those of a trustee, and not as a labor representative. The conspiracy count must fall, too, since it is based upon the same acts alleged in the <mask> counts. Submit order."], "id": "8a052afc-f125-4cf7-a490-886dd0003f66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The statutory economic harm requirement was added in 1983 when first degree commercial <mask> was raised to a class E felony, although the term economic harm was not defined in either the statute and/or in the legislative history. Indeed, at the time of the amendments, Attorney-General Robert Abrams, who considered the bill to amend the commercial bribery statutes \"part of [his] legislative program,\u201d and Senator James J. Lack, the Senate sponsor of the amendment, both thought that by adding the concept of economic harm, they were creating an affirmative defense. The Attorney-General wrote that *817\"[l]ack of economic harm to the employer or principal is an affirmative defense to both commercial bribery and commercial bribe receiving in the first degrees.\u201d (Attorney-General\u2019s Legislative Program, at 1, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 577.) During the Senate debate on the bill, Senator Gold asked Senator Lack, \"[c]an you tell me the philosophy behind creating an affirmative defense in a bribery situation? Is it based upon economic harm? How does that all get determined * * * Am I to understand that if there is a situation of commercial bribery, but it\u2019s a bribery between two competitive interests who may be at the same price and one interest decides that, in order to get the contract, they will make a commercial bribe, that since the employer may not suffer economically since it\u2019s between competing interests at the same price, that we are creating an affirmative defense?\u201d To which Senator Lack replied, \"that is correct. If it did not cause economic harm, it is an affirmative defense in a commercial bribery situation.\u201d (Senate debate transcripts, at 9759-9760.)"], "id": "cb01bfdc-9a13-4d4f-ad7f-e61eb10386a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The amended complaint alleges that on September 29, 2010, when the company admitted that illegal tactics were utilized to obtain these lucrative contracts, FalconStor\u2019s chair, president and chief executive officer (Mr. Huai) resigned his positions and the board announced that it had created an internal investigative committee to review certain practices. Thereafter, according to plaintiffs, the company\u2019s stock price fell over 22%. FalconStor\u2019s director of regional sales, defendant Lin, as well as a JP Morgan employee, Ted Zahner, pleaded guilty to violations of the Travel Act and Lin also pleaded guilty to extortion, in which Lin testified that he extorted Mr. Huai due to Huai\u2019s involvement in the <mask> scheme (compl \u00b6 15)."], "id": "cb29b9aa-8be2-4717-a995-819091c62815", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant herein was indicted on June 25, 1975 and charged with burglary in the third degree, <mask> in the second degree, possession of burglar\u2019s tools, and criminally possessing a hypodermic instrument. A review of the Grand Jury minutes shows no difficulty with the burglary and possession crimes but presents a unique question regarding the bribery charge; namely, does an offer to assist the police constitute bribery?"], "id": "168ca072-0a60-4e49-89d4-ded56df885d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["To be sure, \u201c[i]n appropriate instances, evidence of uncharged crimes may be allowable as background or narrative because juries might \u2018wander helpless\u2019 trying to sort out ambiguous but material facts\u201d (id., quoting People v Green, 35 NY2d 437, 441 [1974]; see People v Gleason, 285 App Div 278, 281 [1954]). Here, however, Gibson\u2019s murder constituted an entirely separate event that occurred after the charged crimes were allegedly completed. Proof of Gibson\u2019s murder was not so interwoven with \u201cthe evidence on which the guilt or innocence of the defendant [would] be determined\u201d that the jury required knowledge of the murder to make sense of the material facts of the tampering and <mask> charges (People v Gleason, 285 App Div at 281; see People v Stanard, 32 NY2d 143, 146-147 [1973]). Indeed, when proof of the charged crime may be amply understood without resort to evidence of an uncharged crime, the Court of Appeals has rejected similar \u201ccompleting the narrative\u201d contentions as a matter of law, even in circumstances where the uncharged crimes were actually committed contemporaneously with the charged crimes (see People v Resek, 3 NY3d at 389; People v Cook, 42 NY2d at 208; see also People v Foster, 295 AD2d at 112-113)."], "id": "8ca1abb3-b72c-4851-b990-86e1fe41f1b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In United States v Brewster (408 US 501 [1972]) the Supreme Court rejected the claim of a former United States Senator that he was immune from prosecution for soliciting and accepting bribes in the performance of his official Senate duties. The court noted that \"[t]he sweeping claims of appellee would render [legislators] virtually immune from a wide range of crimes simply because the acts in question were peripherally related to their holding office\u201d (408 US, supra, at 520). The court looked to the history and purpose of the clause which is not intended to confer blanket immunity from criminal prosecution on the class of legislators, but to protect the integrity , of the legislative process. Unlike the English Parliaments whose struggle against executive dominance gave rise to the clause, our Legislatures are coordinate branches of government and our clause \"designed to preserve legislative independence, not supremacy\u201d (supra, at 508). Therefore the court concluded that while the executive branch could not maintain a conspiracy prosecution upon evidence of the text of a speech given in Congress, nor the courts inquire into the Congressman\u2019s motivation for the speech (United States v Johnson, 383 US 169 [1966]), it could maintain a <mask> prosecution which required nothing more than evidence of a promise to perform a legislative act. (United States v Brewster, 408 US, supra, at 526-527.) The court observed that \"[t]aking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the legislative process or function; it is not a legislative act\u201d (supra, at 526). \"[A] prosecution that, though founded on a criminal statute of general application, 'does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant member * * * or his motives for performing them.\u2019 [United States v Johnson, supra, at 185]\u201d (supra, at 510) is not at odds with the Speech or Debate Clause."], "id": "e1207310-2a5a-4d2a-9257-7b11ddd1ff4b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The duplication process occurs in almost all the multiple areas of penal legislation. Thus, the offender who commits the highest degree of any given crime thereby automatically commits the lowest degree as well, to say nothing of other *987additional related crimes in separate areas of the law, e.g., burglary, trespass, <mask>, unlawful gratuities, arson, criminal mischief, resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration, rape, assault, etc. So pervasive is this duplication that the Legislature itself, recognizing and thereby confirming its own repetitions, has expressly afforded constitutional protection to defendants by way of barring duplicate punishments for the same act, and delineating specific instructions for the withdrawal of duplicative counts from a jury\u2019s consideration. (Penal Law, \u00a7 70.25, subd 2; CPL 300.30, 300.40, 300.50.) It is in fact probable that in most meter-tampering situations the misdemeanor theft of services will constitute as to larceny a lesser included offense. This will depend on the factual situation in each case \u2014 for the application of the lesser included offense definition in CPL 1.20 (subd 37) must be handled on a case to case basis. (People v Johnson, 39 NY2d 364.) If this proves to be the situation, the Trial Judge is commanded, under the sections just cited, to protect the defendant by eliminating submission of legislatively defined \"concurrent counts\u201d in an indictment. But this is hardly a command to dismiss any such counts in advance of trial. The validity of an indictment is not affected by duplicative counts \u2014the only kind of duplication which is prohibited is that which occurs within one count itself, which is to say each single count of an indictment \"may charge one offense only.\u201d (CPL 200.30.) (Parenthetically, it must be added that the theft of services provision in our law embraces a good deal more than the supply of electricity. It covers such items as restaurant, hotel, railroad, subway, and bus services, etc., with the result that in many instances the larceny statute may not apply, as where only a service, as opposed to a commodity, is involved. But where, as here, there is both a service and an actual commodity, then both the larceny and theft of services are applicable.)"], "id": "476a1697-c211-436c-b148-48cd97d3b0c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment describes the criminal enterprise as the \"Post Circulation Crew\u201d (hereinafter identified as the Crew), which allegedly existed for the purpose of controlling the circulation department of the New York Post by means of extortion, coercion, the falsification of business records, larceny, <mask> and other crimes for financial gain. The evidence before the Grand Jury established that the Bonnano crime organization employed the structure of the Post\u2019s delivery department to conduct a variety of unlawful schemes. The Crew included the superintendent of delivery of the Post, Robert Perrino, who is also an associate of the Bonnano crime organization. An eavesdropping device, installed inside Perrino\u2019s office at the Post, intercepted conversations which revealed the hierarchy within the criminal enterprise. Tapes show that Perrino received instructions from Salvatore Vitale, an unindicted coconspirator and the acting boss of the Bonnano crime organization. Perrino remitted portions of the proceeds of the Crew\u2019s illicit activities to Vitale. Perrino conducted various criminal schemes on the premises of the Post, using his position as superintendent of delivery to fur*12ther these criminal schemes. Among the schemes was usury, which Perrino conducted in part by his control over checks issued to men who worked under him and who were the victims of his usury. The evidence also showed that the defendant John Vispisiano, the business agent at the Post for the News and Mail Deliverer\u2019s Union (NMDU), in concert with Perrino, accepted payment to influence his discretion in regard to the enforcement of union rules covering Post drivers. Additionally, Vispisiano and Perrino engaged in a larcenous scheme to cause the Post to repurchase as unsold newsstand newspapers (known in the industry as \"returns\u201d), papers distributed free as samples for home delivery. Perrino oversaw this and another larcenous returns scheme operated by Perrino with one Joe Torre through the corporate defendant, Citiwide News. Perrino used Post drivers to carry out these larcenous schemes by funneling nonredeemable papers back to the Post as legitimate \"returns\u201d. Salvatore Vitale shared in the proceeds of these larcenies. Perrino also created and operated a payroll scam which involved placement on the Post payroll of a nonexistent person using the Social Security number of a deceased member of the Bonnano organization. In addition, Bonnano member Richard Cantarella was paid on the Post payroll for work he did not perform."], "id": "f6f89c9f-6d35-48f2-bab5-0c82104799b5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The allegations as pleaded by the plaintiffs reveal defendants\u2019 concerted effort to assert by speech and publication their views against the potential purchase of the Complex by a white purchaser, although these verbal and written statements can be characterized as unpleasant sharp attacks concerning race (cf., Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444), defendants have not asserted violence, threats, physical intimidation, libel, slander, fighting words, perjury, fraud, <mask> or any misrepresentation of law or facts (Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323; California Transp. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508; Brandenburg v Ohio, supra; Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 559, reh denied 380 US 926; Roth v United States, 354 US 476, reh denied 355 US 852; Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568). Speech may not be restricted because of its content (People ex rel. Arcara v Cloud Books, 101 AD2d 163, lv *309granted 103 AD2d 1049, mod 65 NY2d 324, cert granted 474 US 978, revd 478 US 697, on remand 68 NY2d 553)."], "id": "75c58c5a-123f-4e73-b3e4-4902a5739987", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is argued that \"[u]nder the plain language of the felony <mask> statutes, only that portion of the alleged bribe payment which is actually 'conferred] * * * upon\u2019 the employee * * * may be counted toward the $1,000 threshold amount.\u201d Therefore, since it is alleged that the plaintiff\u2019s attorney paid the expected percentage of the settlement amount directly to the middleman, who kept one half, and gave the balance to the adjuster, the defense argues that the amount retained by the middleman cannot be used towards satisfaction of the $1,000 statutory minimum amount. I disagree."], "id": "bc1fd7d5-4949-4d73-a40d-ea9d8d43ce65", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As discussed, for purposes of Public Officers Law \u00a7 30 (1) (e) the court looks to the elements of the offense, not the specific facts of petitioner\u2019s particular offense. (Feola v Carroll, 10 NY3d at 573; Duffy v Ward, 81 NY2d at 130.) Misdemeanors similar to stalking impugn an officer\u2019s moral integrity, even in the absence of specific falsehoods or corruption through fraud, perjury, or <mask>, for example. (Matter of Pirozzi v Safir, 270 AD2d 2 [1st Dept 2000] [aggravated harassment]; Matter of Segars v City of Buffalo, 237 AD2d 910 [4th Dept 1997] [menacing].) Although this authority predates Feola v Carroll (10 NY3d at 573), which held that child endangerment implied a lack of moral integrity, the Court of Appeals nowhere suggests that offenses involving harm to minors are the only misdemeanors that impugn integrity. Instead, the Court of Appeals emphasizes the willfulness of the harm inflicted."], "id": "05a2635f-6aeb-42c7-9a22-9613b0e19301", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff charges defendants with commercial <mask> in that the transfer restrictions are intended to influence employees to arrange travel for individual gains to the employers\u2019 detriment. To state a cause of action for commercial bribery, plaintiff must allege that defendants conferred a benefit on plaintiff\u2019s employee, without plaintiff\u2019s consent, with the intent to influence the employee\u2019s conduct. (Shemin v Black & Co., 19 AD2d 596.)"], "id": "74db3166-d732-4f38-97c6-5574e9296767", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, there was plenty of evidence that defendant's conduct was motivated by a lewd intent. \"Conviction under [ section 288 ] has never depended upon contact with the bare skin or 'private parts' of the defendant or the victim. [Citations.] Stated differently, a lewd or lascivious *505act can occur through the victim's clothing and can involve 'any part' of the victim's body.\" ( People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037 ( Martinez ).) \"[T]he lewd character of an activity cannot logically be determined separate and apart from the perpetrator's intent. It is common knowledge that children are routinely cuddled, disrobed, stroked, examined, and groomed as part of a normal and healthy upbringing. On the other hand, any of these intimate acts may also be undertaken for the purpose of sexual arousal. Thus, depending upon the actor's motivation, innocent or sexual, such behavior may fall within or without the protective purposes of section 288.... [T]he only way to determine whether a particular touching is permitted or prohibited is by reference to the actor's intent as inferred from all the circumstances.\" ( Martinez , at p. 450, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037.) The relevant circumstances include \"the defendant's extrajudicial statements [citation], other acts of lewd conduct admitted or charged in the case [citations], the relationship of the parties [citation], and any coercion, <mask>, or deceit used to obtain the victim's cooperation or avoid detection [citation].\" ( Martinez , at p. 445, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037.)"], "id": "af534425-0bb7-4f69-b5a4-9fedd10b7993", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Unlike the cited cases, the case at bar involves a leasehold on real property. Is McKeon therefore obligated to pay real estate taxes, make mortgage payments and maintain the warehouse in accordance with the building code and applicable ordinances while Prudential continues to collect rent from its subtenants and not pay rent itself? While the Legislature provided for criminal sanctions against perpetrators of commercial <mask>, it did not contemplate nor should the court contemplate under the circumstances present here the granting to a lessee of real estate carte blanche to remain in possession gratis and in perpetuity."], "id": "088bde15-8f65-472a-979a-b5c3f5a7282c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although the answer in this action does not set forth any such affirmative defense, defendant\u2019s posttrial brief is replete with accusations against plaintiff of fraud, deceit and <mask> of a real estate broker. Such charges against plaintiff, a member of the Bar, are not supported by the credible evidence adduced upon the trial. They are, for the most part, based on defendant\u2019s suspicion, surmise and conjecture. In any event, it is highly improper and unfair to make accusations of this nature in a brief without previously having set them forth in the pleadings."], "id": "846bae7d-444d-43f0-a0ef-3c8b303c9b1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, and perhaps most importantly, New York does not follow Sager (supra). In New York, \"[t]he crime of conspiracy is an offense separate from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy\u201d (People v McGee, 49 NY2d 48, 57, cert denied sub nom. Waters v New York, 446 US 942). In New York, a defendant may be charged with both conspiracy and substantive <mask> counts. (See, People v Sanders, 56 NY2d 51, rearg denied 57 NY2d 674; People v Manfredi, 166 AD2d 460, lv denied 76 NY2d 1022; People v Koopalethes, 166 AD2d 458, lv denied 76 NY2d 1022; People v McGee, supra [wherein the convictions of McGee\u2019s codefendants of both bribery and conspiracy were upheld].) Although in none of these cases was the issue of the propriety of charging both conspiracy and bribery specifically litigated, the courts seem to have taken for granted that charging both crimes is proper."], "id": "a203bf79-9ca3-4768-904a-7fb092d190a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, as with <mask>, the crime of bribe receiving is complete upon the solicitation and agreement; if there is an \u201cattempt\u201d crime, it is when there is a solicitation of a bribe without an agreement that the public servant\u2019s action will be influenced. Where there is an apparent agreement, the defendant\u2019s state of mind being controlling, it is immaterial whether the benefit is conferred. As the Second Department held in People v Souvenir (209 AD2d 455 [2d Dept 1994]), the solicitation of a bribe is itself an attempt; thus, if there is an agreement, the fact that the bribe was never paid does not entitle a defendant to a charge down to the attempted crime. It is only in the Sanoguet situation, where there is no agreement, that there can be an attempt to commit the crimes of bribery or bribe receiving."], "id": "4b3aa6ff-85bf-45f1-b4f6-21cd0aed2f1b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Each of the sixteen counts of the indictment, dealing with <mask>, charges that defendant Cilento, being a duly appointed representative of a labor organization, to wit, a trustee of the Social Security Fund of the Distillery, Rectifying and \"Wine Workers\u2019 International Union of America (A. F. of L.) and secretary-treasurer of said union, solicited, agreed to accept and did accept moneys from one Louis Saperstein, upon an understanding that Cilento should be influenced in respect of his acts, decisions and other duties as such representative. The other defendants are charged with having aided and abetted Cilento in the commission of the crime of bribery."], "id": "56c6e6bd-e9fe-4338-ae38-ea61413bf35e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Nothing in the record indicates that Zarate was either subjectively or objectively induced by Elizondo or law enforcement to commit the offense by such persuasion that would cause an ordinarily law-abiding person of average resistance to commit the crime of <mask>. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7 8.06(a) ; England , 887 S.W.2d at 908. Additionally, the evidence supports that Zarate made the call to the sheriff's office and reduced the bonds prior to Elizondo providing the monies. In fact, all of the witnesses, and the video-recording offered before the jury, supported the State's position that Zarate reduced the *272bonds for both Daisy and Harry Rich in anticipation of receiving the $500.00. Elizondo simply supplied the $500.00. Assuming, arguendo, Elizondo introduced the topic of bribery during one of her telephone calls with Zarate, the evidence supports that Zarate told Elizondo during their meeting, \"What they gave you [the money], that's for me.\" He then confirmed, \"Yes, I already lowered [the bond for] both of them.\" The evidence supports that Zarate came to an agreement with a third party for the benefit of Daisy and Harry Rich, called the jail and lowered the bonds for both Daisy and Harry Rich, met with Elizondo for the sole purpose of collecting $500.00, and the money was in exchange for Zarate's actions in reducing the bonds from $30,000.00 to $5,000.00 for both Daisy and Harry Rich. See Resendez v. State , 160 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.)."], "id": "b309c470-93da-43e5-b774-08430d19f0fa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It was Penal Law of 1909 \u00a7 379, the predecessor of Penal Law \u00a7 215.05 (bribe receiving by a witness), that contained a reference to \u201ctrial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, or any officer authorized to hear evidence or take testimony\u201d. This offense was found in article 34 dealing with \u201c<mask> and Corruption\u201d. The revised Penal Law that we have today condensed *341the language of section 379 to the tailored phrase \u201cany action or proceeding\u201d which now appears in both Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 215.00 and 215.05."], "id": "204fd010-9bd0-47bc-8868-149042a3834b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["If he had said to each individual taxpaying elector of the county, in order to influence votes in his favor: \u201cVote for me and I will pay you a certain sum of money, or I will see that you are saved the payment of a certain sum of money in your taxes,\u201d naming the sum, and which might be just the proportion which each individual taxpayer would have to pay in order to raise the sum of $1,300.; this would clearly be an act of <mask> to be punished criminally, and no intelligent man could innoCtently assume that this did not prevent him from truthfully taking the oath prescribed."], "id": "3fe18ed3-aaa4-438e-8572-a998ffff57fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As an affirmative defense to NBS's breach of contract claim, Cotter & Sons argued the Contracts were unenforceable because they were procured through commercial <mask>. The second question in the jury charge asked whether the Contracts were procured by bribery. The terms \"Contracts\" and \"bribery\" were defined in the charge. NBS did not object to the question or the definitions. The jury found that the Contracts were not procured by bribery. In its motion for new trial, Cotter & Sons did not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding of no bribery; it only argued that the jury's finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence."], "id": "09e3a9b9-6541-4654-8a30-2aea79bc0ca6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["No controversy exists regarding the ban by suppression. Conceding the illegality of the search in an opposing affidavit, the District Attorney takes the bull by the horns and moves therein for a dismissal of the first count of the indictment, being the count in which the subject matter resulting from the illegal search, is alleged. He contends, however, that the illegal search does not render impotent the second count in which the facts of the attempt to commit the <mask>, are alleged."], "id": "225088eb-edfe-4c1d-b346-c0d22df5a3ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant is charged with three counts of <mask> in the second degree in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 200.00. Count one alleges that on June 5, 1986 defendant Euston Roy Thomas paid Police Officer Henry Winter a sum of money \"upon an agreement or understanding that [Winter] would utilize the Police Department computer at the stationhouse to check the license plate numbers of individuals who were taking pictures of defendant\u2019s store, in order to identify them\u201d. Counts two and three allege that on June 21 and August 19, 1986 the defendant paid a sum of money to Police Officer Winter \"upon an agreement or understanding that [Winter] would refrain from making arrests at defendant\u2019s drug business location.\u201d"], "id": "166a7072-5733-44c5-a792-136aa76603a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant has entered a plea of guilty to the crime of attempted <mask>, a class E felony, allegedly committed on September 26, 1973. The presentence report of the Probation Department reveals, and defendant concedes, that in April, 1959 he was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of a felonious conspiracy to violate the Federal narcotics laws (U. S. Code, tit. 21, former \u00a7\u00a7 173, 174). He was thereupon incarcerated for some seven years, placing that conviction within a 10-year period of the instant offense, as extended by the incarceration. According to the new second-felony offender law, therefore, defendant has a predicate felony conviction, requiring the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence for the present offense."], "id": "69b7a93a-5e08-43a6-a303-a2847c82fd8a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"(1) 'racketeering activity\u2019 means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, <mask>, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement) * * * section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering) * * *"], "id": "e1ea93d1-5ebd-45ed-9ba2-768c6a20f508", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["However, the single act of using a telephone to promote <mask> and extortion was held to provide no basis for a conviction under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which requires two separate predicate acts, even though the act encompassed two different criminal offenses (United States v Walgren, 885d 1417; 18 USC \u00a7 1961 et seq.). The Walgren decision was consistent with the holdings in other Federal RICO cases which determined the number of predicate acts charged (see, United States v Kragness, 830d 842; Polycast Technology Corp. v UniRoyal, Inc., 728 F Supp 926)."], "id": "f6272733-1b24-4a0f-bd06-acbc95e2211c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court\u2019s treatment of the witness Isaac, ruling that as a matter of law he was not an accomplice to intentional murder or manslaughter, even though he could be an accomplice as a matter of fact for felony murder, is consistent with rulings in pertinent, although not identical, situations. There are appellate holdings that a witness who took part in a serious crime *713that was closely connected to the crime charged was not an accomplice to the crime charged, despite the connection between the two crimes and the witness\u2019s implication of himself in a felony; this was so even though the two crimes had a common element, as they do in this case (causing the death). These cases confirm that Isaac\u2019s status as a potential accomplice to the related attempted burglary or attempted larceny at the victim\u2019s store, and thereby to the felony murder, does not entail his status as a potential accomplice to the intentional shooting of the victim. (See, People v McAuliffe, 36 NY2d 820 [accomplice to <mask> is not an accomplice to the defendant\u2019s perjury about that bribery]; People v Brooks, 34 NY2d 475 [receiver of stolen property is not an accomplice to the theft]; People v Greenberger, 96 AD2d 910 [vendors who paid kickbacks to the defendant, a hospital administrator, were not accomplices to the defendant\u2019s attempt to evade payment of income taxes by failing to report those kickbacks as income]; People v Maldonado, 123 AD2d 788 [witness was not accomplice to manslaughter in the first degree alleged to have been committed when the defendant shot the deceased after a brawl, merely because during the brawl the witness tried to pass the defendant a large knife].)"], "id": "44ba90ba-0abf-44f9-9338-4d8f494af9b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant nevertheless argues that it was improper to issue an eavesdropping warrant on the basis of recorded statements by Elmann because he was never shown to be a rehable informant. The fact is that Elmann was not an informant at all; he was an apparent conspirator, soliciting bribes and boasting of his ability to influence cases in court. He took $5,000 from the woman upon the representation that it would he used to affect the outcome of her custody case. If his representations were true, he was guilty of <mask>; if they were false, he was guilty of grand larceny. In either case, the judge who issued the first warrant for electronic surveillance in the case \u2014 surveillance of Elmann\u2019s cell and business phones \u2014 had probable cause to believe that Elmann had committed a designated offense and that communications concerning that offense would be obtained through the electronic surveillance.4"], "id": "37982605-9a6c-4418-bb97-88ce0531302c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Whether or not the conspiracy conviction is a felony or a *622misdemeanor under New York law is uncertain and depends on the underlying crime. Murphy\u2019s conviction for conspiracy under 18 USC \u00a7 371 does not specify the underlying crime, be it <mask> or receipt of an unlawful gratuity. However, assuming, arguendo, that the underlying crime was the more serious charge of receipt of a bribe, the concomitant New York statute would be former section 200.10 of the Penal Law which provided:"], "id": "293eaad6-959e-4dc2-ad22-9734508bf400", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There are sound policy reasons why an indictment for both charges should be permitted. Any line drawn between solicitation and the attempted compulsion with which defendant is charged is bound to be perilously thin. Indeed, every solicitation would seem to imply some amount of coercion. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v Hall (536d 313, 321): \u201c[i]t cannot be said that in a <mask> case there is never an aspect of coercion on the part of the bribee.\u201d At least one other court has specifically held that solicitation of a bribe can be an attempted extortion. (State v Begyn, 34 NJ 35; see, also, United States v Phillips, 577d 495, 503, cert den 439 US 831; United States v Furey, 491 F Supp 1048,1057, cert den 451 US 913; Finley v State, 84 Okla Crim 309.)"], "id": "4fc70097-4a31-4bfc-a55e-d500ec024226", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The first count of the indictment alleges that the defendants, each acting in concert with one another: \"compelled or induced a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct which he has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him, or use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some *17act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely, and thereby compelling or inducing the victim to commit or attempt to commit a felony, namely, inducing and compelling Daniel Leon to pay the defendants a quantity of United States currency in exchange for defendant, Latanya Gray, a police officer, to withdraw criminal charges she caused to be brought against Daniel Leon, and thereby inducing and compelling Daniel Leon to commit the crime of <mask> in the third degree, a class D felony.\u201d"], "id": "f3efc7d3-7a23-4c1e-98a3-c4e46b7cff58", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*584The regular April 1964 Grand Jury of the County of Kings, as extended, has been and is conducting an investigation to determine whether the crimes of conspiracy, <mask>, corruption, coercion, extortion and usury were committed in Kings County by certain individuals. The Grand Jury heard testimony of several witnesses and examined certain books and records pertinent to the investigation. A reading of the Grand Jury minutes by the court leads it to the conclusion that the inquiry being made by the Grand Jury was in compliance with the law conferring duties upon the Grand Jury, section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows: \u201c Power of grand jury to inquire into crimes, etc. The grand jury has power, and it is their duty, to inquire into all crimes committed or triable in the county, and to present them to the court.\u201d"], "id": "afba3afb-601d-4a8b-a93f-8ff4165fbf38", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["[c]ommon sense dictates that when it is alleged and proved that the defendant offered or solicited a proscribed benefit, it is not necessary to further prove that the offer or solicitation resulted in a bilateral arrangement or unlawful contract with the other party. The offense of <mask> is complete when the offer or solicitation is made. ... ... [W]here it is alleged the accused offered or solicited a benefit as consideration for an official act, it is not necessary for the State to prove the party to whom the offer or solicitation was made accepted the proposition or even understood the unlawful nature of the proposition; proof that the offer or solicitation was made by the accused with the purpose to promote or facilitate the exchange of the benefit for the official action is all that is required. Martinez v. State , 696 S.W.2d 930, 932-33 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, pet. ref'd). We agree. Common sense dictates that a bilateral agreement is not a required element to establish commercial bribery.6 Many criminal defendants are prosecuted for offering a bribe to a person who refuses to accept the bribe and instead becomes the State's witness. Similarly, many criminal defendants are prosecuted for soliciting a bribe from a person who refuses to pay the bribe and instead becomes the State's witness."], "id": "fad3f4d6-863a-4ffd-8181-4bf299a72bd7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There is nothing in the case law that contradicts this construction of Penal Law \u00a7 195.00. In 1969, an upstate trial court recited the history of the statute and its predecessor provisions and held that the crime of official misconduct requires \"[a] culpable motive * * * which must be directly connected with the duty which the public servant [violated] * * * and such motive must be of a venal nature.\u201d (People v Thompson, 58 Misc 2d 511, 513.) The culpable mental state for the crime of official misconduct is defined by Donnino, Practice Commentary (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law \u00a7 195.00, at 431) as \"a specific intent to obtain a benefit or to injure another person or deprive another person of a benefit.\u201d A few courts have fleshed out the statutory definition of \"benefit\u201d in the context of <mask> and bribe receiving under Penal Law article 200. (See, e.g., People v Hyde, 156 App Div 618; People v Cavan, 84 Misc 2d 510; People v Adams, 86 Misc 2d 634.) In all cases, the \"benefit\u201d was required to be more than merely tangential and had a nexus personal to the defendant."], "id": "d3016ba1-bbfb-442b-833d-263f42d87032", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The prior act of <mask> in this case was a separate and independent transaction. There was nothing in the prior crime that evinced any preconceived general plan or design that encompassed the present crime. There was no concurrence of time, place or circumstance that joined them as one (People v Grutz, 212 NY 72). This case is distinguishable from People v Duffy (212 NY 57) where there was a systematic scheme of collecting bribes evidenced by a written list of bribe givers and of collections made pursuant t\u00f3 a system that joined the prior act of bribery with the crime charged. There is no such intertwining here, no \"visible connection\u201d, tending to prove the commission of this crime (People v Molineux, 168 NY, supra, at 309)."], "id": "8a63723e-a398-4ae9-9a4b-537bf74e5778", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The prior act of <mask> in this case was a separate and independent transaction. There was nothing in the prior crime that evinced any preconceived general plan or design that encompassed the present crime. There was no concurrence of time, place or circumstance that joined them as one (People v Grutz, 212 NY 72). This case is distinguishable from People v Duffy (212 NY 57) where there was a systematic scheme of collecting bribes evidenced by a written list of bribe givers and of collections made pursuant t\u00f3 a system that joined the prior act of bribery with the crime charged. There is no such intertwining here, no \"visible connection\u201d, tending to prove the commission of this crime (People v Molineux, 168 NY, supra, at 309)."], "id": "d01a006d-d8dc-4fcb-85d7-c80d43d92a16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants first contend that the offenses designated in the eavesdropping warrant are not crimes for which such warrant may lawfully issue pursuant to Federal legislation (US Code, tit 18, \u00a7 2516, subd [2]). The cited section limits the States\u2019 authority to eavesdrop to instances \u201cwhen such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission * * * of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, <mask>, extortion, or dealing in * * * dangerous drugs, or other [felonies] dangerous to life, limb, or property\u201d designated by the State\u2019s eavesdropping statute. There is no doubt that the Criminal Procedure Law authorizes eavesdropping to obtain evidence of the designated offenses of criminal possession of stolen property in the first and second degree (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 165.45, 165.50) and of usury in the first and second degree (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 190.40,190.42). (CPL 700.05, subd 8, pars [b], [e].) However, \u201cexamination of New York\u2019s wiretapping provisions reveals that the range of crimes in which electronic interception is permitted is much more encompassing than the Federal standard would seem to admit\u201d (People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747, 764) and to that extent \u201cruns afoul of the supremacy clause (US Const, art VI, cl 2)\u201d (p 763)."], "id": "cefaff8b-c508-4a13-894f-a3b74cc6669a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As the result of the investigation, both present and former officials of the City of Buffalo were indicted and charged with the crimes of conspiracy and <mask>. In its report to the court, the Grand Jury recommended that City of Buffalo officials examine the possibility of rescinding certain paving contracts and of recovering from collusive bidders the amounts of money paid under said contracts."], "id": "5929394e-54e4-40c2-b354-1a7af34e30f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Appellants argue the jury's finding that the Contracts were not procured by <mask> was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. As previously noted, the jury charge contained two definitions of bribery: one focusing on the actions of the fiduciary, Simpson, and one focusing on the actions of the non-fiduciary, NBS. Appellants argue the jury should have answered that the Contracts were procured by bribery if either Simpson or NBS engaged in bribery as defined in the charge. Appellants rely on evidence that Simpson was a fiduciary of Cotter & Sons, and he agreed to accept-and accepted-a personal benefit in exchange for his agreement that Cotter & Sons would enter into new janitorial contracts with NBS. Appellants further rely on evidence that NBS paid a benefit to Simpson as an owner of Premier on the condition that Cotter & Sons would enter into the new janitorial services contracts."], "id": "c54f1dce-bd2a-4dda-9160-5a01f6b64cf2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was subpoenaed to testify before the Grand Jury which was investigating the alleged <mask> and, when appearing, refused to waive immunity. After asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege before the Grand Jury, he was excused as a witness. It is asserted by the defendant and not denied that the Special Prosecutor had been advised beforehand that the defendant refused to waive his privilege; nevertheless, the prosecutor insisted on calling the defendant to \"place his refusal on the record.\u201d It is contended that the calling of a \"target\u201d to force his assertion of privilege before the Grand Jury is a deliberate tactical device used to improperly suggest to the layman on the Grand Jury that the defendant had something to hide and in fact, was criminally culpable."], "id": "911a529b-9215-42b0-b858-d06d0a4e82d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In his testimony before these investigators annexed to the said plea, the defendant testified that he was admitted to the bar of the State of New York sometime in October, 1912, and that he became acquainted with Russell in June or July, 1912. The substance of the defendant\u2019s testimony before the investigators was,, that he denied ever having offered Russell any money or attempting to bribe Russell in any way, but alleged that Russell asked him for a bribe which the defendant refused. The court refused to allow this plea to be interposed upon the ground that there was no provision of law for the interposition of such a plea. The defendant then on the same formal plea and the facts therein alleged moved to quash the indictment, which motion was also denied. The defendant then refused to plead, the court ordered a plea of not guilty to be entered, and upon these facts the defendant claims that he was entitled to immunity from prosecution on a charge of <mask> or attempt to bribe Dr. Russell by reason of his testimony before these investigators. The question of the defendant\u2019s immunity is really the only serious question presented on this appeal, as we all agree that the evidence amply justified the jury in finding the defendant guilty and that no error was committed on the trial which would justify a reversal of the judgment."], "id": "72590a5f-67ec-4c3c-be16-eb4aaa6b58e7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The FalconStor defendants also assert that while the amended complaint alleges that the company \u201cissued a series of materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company\u2019s purported financial performance, in which [it] concealed that the company\u2019s so-called financial \u2018results\u2019 [that] were, in substantial part, only \u2018achieved through a secret and illicit <mask> scheme,\u201d there is no description of the role that a single board member played in connection with the statements or allegation that any of those six members knew or should have known that these statements were misleading when they were made. With regard to the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that the board failed to provide sufficiently specific disclosures concerning its internal investigations and to respond properly to SEC inquiries, the FalconStor defendants set forth: (1) that following the SEC\u2019s letter, the company filed its form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 2011 and supplemented its prior disclosures (compl \u00b6 18); (2) that the company also responded to the SEC\u2019s letter by providing additional information and explaining, as requested, the reasons the company believed its disclosures had been adequate; and (3) that the SEC did ultimately accept the company\u2019s disclosures (exhibits C-K, containing SEC and FalconStor correspondence)."], "id": "a82dd262-8e79-4011-bd48-b92a0f45f669", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, it would be contrary to public policy to hold that the owner\u2019s inadvertent or deliberate acceptance of rent after commission of an illegal act could operate to waive the illegality, even if the owner\u2019s agents knew of the arrest or the underlying illegality, as respondent asserts. To so hold would be an open invitation to <mask> or intimidation of a landlord or managing agent, or collusion between the parties, to the detriment of the community."], "id": "29fa169f-b1bf-4cab-bdf0-b4d247ec3f0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The crime of <mask> consists of offering a bribe to a public officer with intent to influence him in his official conduct. (Penal Law, \u00a7 378.) The crime of bribery is thus committed though the public officer rejects the offer to bribe him. The acceptance of the bribe entails the commission of a distinct crime by a public officer. This distinct crime is separately defined in section 372 of the Penal Law. We will confine ourselves solely to sections 372 and 378 of the Penal Law as regards their force and effect upon section 381 of the Penal Law."], "id": "c655f57e-762f-42b2-95e0-3818f79f7a99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["After hearing this evidence, the trial court denied a motion to dismiss the charges, two counts of <mask> in the third degree. The court found that while there was no agreement between the defendant and the inspector or the investigator, there may have been an understanding, which it defined as an \" 'expectancy * * * that hopefully [the inspector] would not file\u2019 the violation.\u201d (People v Tran, 80 NY2d, at 174, supra.) In its final instructions to the jury, the court explained that \"the words 'upon an * * * understanding\u2019 refer to the defendant\u2019s understanding. The court added that those words 'as applied to this case, are equivalent to the words, \"with intent to\u201d.\u2019 \u201d *776(People v Tran, 80 NY2d, at 174.) Thus charged, the jury convicted the defendant on both counts of bribery."], "id": "75d10939-29a5-434c-960b-fec0df44606c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On April 10, 1939, the grand jury for the Extraordinary Term of the Special and Trial Term of the Supreme Court in and for the county of Kings indicted the petitioner, charging him with the crime of <mask> and the crime of taking unlawful fees in violation of section 1826 of the Penal Law, in that the said petitioner did on and between July 29,1937, and October 21,1937, ask and receive the sum of SI,000 from the said Duke and others upon his promise *920that he, the said petitioner, as a judge of this court, would dismiss the indictment as above set forth. Petitioner makes this motion, as alleged in the moving affidavit upon the grounds that the proper and adequate preparation of his case necessitates an inspection of the grand jury minutes upon which the abortion indictment of Duke and others was found. This motion is opposed by the Attorney-General through his special assistant who states that \u201c the People cannot consent to this application for the reason that such consent might establish a precedent detrimental to their welfare.\u201d"], "id": "07452fd2-35f1-4a0f-ae19-6c7d606d0f10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["When dealing with residential picketing by social protestors we are not dealing with \"pure speech\u201d but invariably involved in confrontation. As Professor Kamin so aptly describes it, confrontation \"laden with emotion, full of suggestions of acute economic conflict and even unspoken possibilities of a violent physical encounter.\u201d (61 Nw U L Rev 177, 211.) Such confron*130tation, as here, at the family home is fraught with danger and threatens the peace and tranquility of the entire neighborhood. It subjects not only one\u2019s family but also his neighbors to the harassment of the picketers. Certainly the foregoing is descriptive of the situation which occurred at the Walinsky home on August 4-5, 1977. Unfortunately, as the picketing becomes more vociferous the pressure to change one\u2019s position to that held by the picketers increases more out of concern for one\u2019s family and neighborhood than because of the strength of the picketers\u2019 arguments. All too often, as in this case, it becomes clear that the defendants seek not so much a forum to express their ideas but rather to force (by mounting social pressure and intimidation) a private citizen to change his views on one of the important issues of the day. As Professor Kamin notes (61 Nw U L Rev 177, 231) in his article heretofore mentioned: \"[W]hen a group resorts to residential picketing, it [in many instances] introduces a note of physical intimidation and coercion which is as foreign to our notions of proper public decision-making as <mask>, blackmail, or overt physical coercion. If public decisions are to be made in this way, the group which can bring the greatest * * * [pressure] to bear upon officials will see its views prevail. A government somewhere might function this way \u2014 but it would not be a democracy.\u201d"], "id": "e5568ba0-498d-4b34-a7c4-d91756295e0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Nor is plaintiff barred by the policy of McConnell v Commonwealth Pictures Corp. (7 NY2d 465, supra), an action to recover compensation for obtaining a contract by <mask>. In denying recovery the Court of Appeals carefully limited the authority of its decision to actions on contracts performed illegally by commercial bribery or the like. No feat of imagination can extend that doctrine to the present Case."], "id": "8e130e02-e9c2-45fc-903b-204a704e468b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant also appeals from a judgment convicting him, after a jury trial, of two counts of <mask> in the first degree and one count each of conspiracy in the fourth degree and forgery in the second degree. There is no merit to his contention that statements made in the absence of counsel and while in custody on the drug charges should have been suppressed. A defendant\u2019s right to counsel is not violated where, as here, defendant initiates a bribe offer in counsel\u2019s absence and defendant responds to further inquiry and investigation concerning that bribe offer (see, People v Middletown, 54 NY2d 474; cf., People v Bell, 73 NY2d 153)."], "id": "b8e53c79-7d3e-4cc6-b0eb-b7864f1c549e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In affirming the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division\u2019s denial, inter alia, of the husband\u2019s request for discovery on the issue of egregious marital fault for purposes of equitable distribution, the court held that the circumstances of the case were insufficient for that purpose. It reiterated its statement in the landmark case of O\u2019Brien v O\u2019Brien (66 NY2d 576, 689-590 [1985]) that marital fault is not a \u201cjust and proper\u201d factor under Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 236 (B) (5) (d) (14) for equitable distribution \u201c \u2018except in egregious cases which shock the conscience of the court.\u2019 \u201d In Howard S., the Court stated that in order to be a factor in making determinations on the economic aspects of the marriage, the egregious conduct \u201cmust consist of behavior that falls well outside the bounds of the basis for an ordinary divorce action.\u201d (14 NY3d at 436.) It added, however, that there may be situations where grounds for divorce and egregious *384conduct will overlap, but \u201cit should be only a truly exceptional situation, due to outrageous or conscience-shocking conduct on the part of one spouse, that will require the court to consider whether to adjust the equitable distribution of the assets.\u201d (Id.) It contrasted the case before it with cases where such an adjustment would be appropriate, one involving the attempted <mask> of the trial judge, the other a vicious assault of the other spouse in the presence of the children. (See Levi v Levi, 46 AD3d 520 [2d Dept 2007] and Havell v Islam, 301 AD2d 339 [1st Dept 2002].)"], "id": "d171da26-760a-4d62-b5d8-4ab6188be78a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["But it may be said that the question in each case was raised by demurrer which admitted all the allegations in the pleadings, and among others, that a sufficient number of voters were influenced by the promise to change the result; that it was only necessary to decide in those cases that the votes so influenced were null and void. This the court did, in each case, judicially determine. But the whole reasoning of the court goes to the extent of holding the entire transaction a fraud and nullity; a species of <mask> clearly against public policy and not to be tolerated."], "id": "b2086f72-de5e-4f17-ac49-2269103210f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As before stated, the Constitution has made an offer or promise to bribe, if it be rejected by the officer to whom it was tendered, a felony. It provides no immunity for any person who should be guilty of that offense, but the fundamental law of the State makes <mask> or an offer or promise of a bribe a crime, and apparently it is the only crime that is created by the Constitution, except the misdemeanor provided for by section 5 of the same article. Section 3 of the article, which makes this offer or promise to bribe a felony, provides for a case where *528the offer is accepted by the officer. It is there prescribed that a person who offers or promises a bribe to an officer, if it shall be received, is guilty of a felony. But there is a limitation which follows, that such a person offering or promising a bribe shall not be privileged from testifying in relation thereto upon a prosecution of the officer for receiving such bribe, and if he so testifies he shall not be liable to 'civil or criminal prosecution therefor. The Constitution there steps in and itself provides the immunity that shall be given to a person who has offered or promised a bribe to a public officer, and I do not see how the Legislature has any power to extend that immunity beyond that which the Constitution itself has provided. There is no such provision of immunity for a person who should offer or promise a bribe to an officer if the bribe be rejected, but any person who makes such an offer or promise is guilty of an attempt to bribe, which is declared to be a felony. As before stated, we have not to do in that case with the question as to how far this provision limits the provision in section 6 of article 1 of the Constitution, that a person shall not be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. We have not the question as to whether any testimony that the defendant had given in an investigation could be received against him as evidence upon the trial of this offense. We have a claim here that, because he did testify in an investigation instituted by the Governor that he was not guilty of the crime, he is immune from punishment when proved guilty, a claim which, if allowed, would seem to be in direct violation of the constitutional provision that any person who should offer or promise a bribe, if it be rejected by the officer to whom it was tendered, is guilty of a felony."], "id": "92a99afc-b48a-4b2c-81ba-04b5af82857c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "bribery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The underpinning of the allegations of plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint is based upon the admitted allegations. It states that as a result of its <mask> scheme, the company entered into contracts with JP Morgan worth over $12 million. However, since the contracts resulted, at least in part, from illegal bribes paid to employees of JP Morgan and/or their family members, the named defendants, members of the company\u2019s board of directors, certain officers and employees, concealed the bases *918for the lucrative contracts (compl \u00b6 7).1 Thus, plaintiffs assert that the company made materially misleading public statements about the true nature of its business relationship with JP Morgan."], "id": "3e66d1f8-581e-489c-b206-117327ad76ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["[t]he Commission of any act while on duty or off duty, which would be a violation of Federal, State or local law, other than minor traffic violations. This does not mean that a conviction or even arrest need have occurred for such a violation. (Emphasis added.) Stealing property from the cars on the tow lot or assisting his friend in such <mask> would be a violation of state law. A conviction beyond a reasonable doubt or an arrest based on probable cause is not required for Appellant to be dismissed under this provision of AR 117. Rather, the Commission bears the burden of proving that Appellant's employment should be terminated by a preponderance of the evidence. Spencer v. Zobrist, 323 S.W.3d 391, 398 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). Appellant was in fact arrested for stealing over $500 because the police determined they had probable cause to believe he had aided Marshall and Davis in the theft."], "id": "70f3cd01-1f57-4d51-9523-115948ffa77e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Respondent nevertheless posits that affirmance is still appropriate because the trial court \"could simply have denied the petition\" on the grounds that petitioner did not meet his prima facie burden of showing (1) he did not intend to commit a <mask> of property exceeding $950, (2) he did not intend to commit a nontheft felony, and (3) the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950."], "id": "65218a0a-aab1-46dc-a401-529a9f2416f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Agarwal waived indictment and pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated identity <mask>, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1028A(a)(1), and two counts under the CFAA for intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization and obtaining information valued at more than $5,000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1030(a)(2) and 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii). The plea agreement stated that sentencing was \u201cwithin the sole discretion of the sentencing judge\u201d and that the statutory maximum prison sentence was twelve years (five years for each CFAA violation, plus a mandatory two-"], "id": "7422a83b-daf6-4868-b211-9373a0751e30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*241Since Doss was decided, this Court, relying on successor provisions in subsequent penal codes, has repeatedly upheld convictions for <mask> in cases in which the defendant caused another person, unaware of the criminal nature of the acts, to appropriate property belonging to someone other than the defendant. See Houston v. State , 98 Tex.Crim. 280, 265 S.W. 585, 585-86 (1924) (holding that a defendant was properly charged with theft when he purported to sell a bale of cotton that was not his even though it was the buyer who removed it from the cotton yard); Wade v. State , 115 Tex.Crim. 160, 29 S.W.2d 377, 379 (1930) (holding that a defendant is liable for theft if, with a fraudulent purpose, he directs an innocent agent to secure a car on the defendant's behalf). In 1942, this Court declared, with respect to the offense of theft, that \"[i]f [a] defendant fraudulently procured a person innocent of any fraudulent intent to take the property for him, it is a taking through an innocent agent, and a taking by an innocent agent is a taking by [the] defendant.\" Spivey v. State , 144 Tex.Crim. 432, 164 S.W.2d 668, 672 (1942) (citations omitted). Therefore, the terms \"innocent\" and \"nonresponsible person,\" as those terms are used in Section 7.02(a)(1), include persons who are unaware that their conduct is unlawful.17"], "id": "e47c9812-60e3-41e2-87d9-a2d181a1e445", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cOnce the transportation of the goods has started, the property remains protected under the policy during the ordinary delays in transshipments incident to such movements. In consonance with the foregoing statement, the term \u2018in transit\u2019 in a policy insuring a broker against <mask> while property is in transit means while the property is in the possession of a messenger making delivery to a customer, and is not confined to periods of actual movement, but includes periods of rest during the progress of the continuous undertaking. \u201cWhether an interruption in actual transit is suf*152ficient to remove the goods from coverage depends on the extent and purpose of the interruption and the context of the risk contemplated. The temporary interruption for purposes related to the carriage itself does not remove the property from transportation. The true test is whether the goods, even though temporarily at rest, were still on their way with the stoppage being merely incidental to the main purpose of the delivery\u201d (Anne M. Payne & Joseph Wilson, New York Insurance Law \u00a7 19:35 at 680 [31 West\u2019s NY Prac Series, 2013-2014 ed]). Applying these principles of New York law to the instant case, the \u201cIn Transit\u201d provision of the bond must be understood to cover the loss here. MVMC was responsible for picking up the cash from the Federal Reserve Bank and delivering it to Cash-Zone locations. As in Underwood, the transit process was never completed for the portion of the funds that, through the \u201ctrick and false device\u201d of failing to segregate the funds as required, MVMC instead commingled them in order to facilitate and conceal its larceny. The transit for those funds was never completed."], "id": "6e953510-d8a4-4c8f-9240-97b3eae258d5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The plain language of section 666.5 supports the conclusion that it applies only to current felonies. It states that \"[e]very person who, having been previously convicted of a felony violation of Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code, or felony grand <mask> involving an automobile ..., or felony grand theft involving a motor vehicle ..., or a felony violation of Section 496d..., is subsequently convicted of any of these offenses shall be punished by imprisonment for two, three, or four years ....\" (\u00a7 666.5, subd. (a), italics added.) The phrase \"any of these offenses \" can only be read to refer to the felonies previously enumerated in the same sentence. (Ibid. , italics added.) The plain language of section 666.5 thus requires that both the prior and the current offenses must be felonies in order for section 666.5 to apply."], "id": "2b6684f9-4369-42ca-bcc4-a9afddf0c85b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The check was stopped by defendant because it was amongst 1,000 blank teller\u2019s checks which defendant alleges were \u201clost or stolen prior to or during shipment to Bowery\u201d. No facts are set forth as to how, where or when the <mask> occurred; whether such incidents had occurred in the past; what precautions are taken by the bank to avoid such an occurrence; nor what publicity it gave to let others *1072know of the theft of such a large number of checks. The bank claims that the signature on the check on the line above the word \u201cteller\u201d of a \u201cJerry Smith\u201d is not that of any of the employees."], "id": "05ebdced-bffc-4762-855e-271202628ee6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*652\u201c<mask> of Identity. No person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association or employee thereof shall knowingly and with the intent to defraud, obtain, possess, transfer, use or attempt to obtain, possess transfer, or use credit, goods, services or anything else of value in the name of another person without his or her consent.\u201d At the same time General Business Law \u00a7 380-Z was amended to provide:"], "id": "b6255940-e275-49cf-9af0-825ebcdd81f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We do not find that Page is helpful to our analysis here. Page simply reiterated the well-settled rule that a crime need not be explicitly defined as \"grand theft\" for Proposition 47 to apply. (See, e.g., Romanowski , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 910, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 [Prop. 47 applies to statutes defining \" 'any ... provision of law defining grand theft' \" and statutes proscribing \" 'obtaining ... property by theft' \"].) As discussed above, section 530.5 is not defined as grand <mask>, and does not proscribe \"obtaining property by theft.\" Section 530.5 addresses harms much broader than theft; and section 530.5, subdivision (c) has no requirement that the information be acquired or retained without the consent of its owner, a hallmark requirement of a theft crime. ( Romanowski , at p. 912, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 ; see also \u00a7 484, subd. (a).)"], "id": "654130be-3fb3-477f-be8e-269af711f099", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"11. INDEMNITY: Tenant(s) does hereby Indemnify and hold harmless Landlord from any loss by reason of injury or damage to person or property, from whatever cause, all or in part connected *506with the condition or use of the premises.... *529\"12. INSURANCE: Tenant, at Tenant's expense, shall maintain a policy of fire, extended coverage endorsement, burglary, vandalism and malicious mischief insurance for the actual cash value of stored property. Insurance on Tenant's property is a material condition of this agreement and is for the benefit of both Tenant and Landlord. Failure to carry the required Insurance is a breach of this agreement and Tenant assumes all risk of loss to store property that would be covered by such Insurance. \"[\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] \"19. CUSTOMER GOODS PROTECTION PLAN: If Tenant(s) elects to participate in [the Protection Plan], those provisions in this rental agreement concerning landlord's liability which are modified by [the Protection Plan] are considered never to have been in effect.\" The Protection Plan reiterated terms of the Rental Agreement, including that the tenant assumed the sole risk of loss or damage to stored property, A-1 was not liable for loss or damage to stored property, and the tenant must insure his or her stored property. The Protection Plan stated, however, that for an additional payment of $10 per month, A-1 would retain liability for loss of or damage to the tenant's stored property up to $2,500 for losses caused by fire, explosion, smoke, <mask>, vandalism, malicious mischief, roof leaf, water damage, vandalism, or collapse of the building where the property was stored. The Protection Plan went on to state that, if elected, \"[t]his limited acceptance of liability is a modification to the waiver of liability in paragraph eleven (11) of the rental agreement that it forms a part of. It satisfies the insurance requirement stated in paragraph twelve (12).\""], "id": "d41fc331-070b-4c0d-a988-d679fb042a74", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is concluded that the purpose of the statute is twofold. It is indeed a deterrent to <mask>. It is also a safety device; for to lock the ignition, to remove the key and to set the brake, all result in preventing interference with the automobile\u2019s stationary condition and mechanical immobility. It is protection to life and property which might otherwise be affected by improper movement of the automobile. And the Legislature\u2019s own explanation of its purpose corroborates the clear intent derived from the very words of the statute itself."], "id": "0f2785fd-421e-477b-b613-00c376313055", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["[O]ne of the things on Count 1 that, sure, we don't have anybody-neither one of the victims testified that they saw him take the money. Neither one. And [defense counsel] asked you more than once, is that what you're proceeding on. And you said yes before he got started. Now I can jump with all this other stuff that, yeah, he went in the house. I *756believe he went into the house. And he just didn't go in there just to say I showed up with someone. ... And I don't know where I'm going with it at this time, so I'm not sure that I'm right, that I'm going to grant your motion because I'm making a jump here. The problem is, I think he went in with a gun. I just-because they both said they saw it. I think he went in. Now, I'm having problems with I, II, and III because I'm not sure if there's a <mask>, but there's a problem. He said he went-came out with $3,000. Now, there's an issue of whether or not he took it from them by force or they just gave it to him. So therefore, I believe, just based on that, his own testimony from them-from what we just heard as part of the State's case, gave the Court some cause and some concern to shift it back. So based on that, I won't grant your motion for Directed Verdict at this time or to dismiss it based on their case. After verifying that the court was denying the dismissal of counts I, II, and III, defense counsel stated, \"I do think that Count No. 1 asked the Court to consider the lesser included offense of Burglary and for Count No. 2, the lesser included offense of Robbery.\" The State responded that it did not object to including the lesser offenses, but it believed it had met its burden \"for the charges that were made.\" The court confirmed its denial of the motion for dismissal."], "id": "da52fa6c-5056-45e0-9cb0-c728b223b6fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*837On the question of liability defendant\u2019s position is (1) that, because the car was locked and the key taken by plaintiff, there was no bailment and no responsibility, (2) that the disclaimer of liability for loss or <mask> printed on the parking ticket bars recovery, because plaintiff admittedly read it before he parked his car, and (3) that there is no presumption of negligence and plaintiff has failed to prove any."], "id": "cb9ae261-f757-4149-93cb-f83df295ef1b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although the court agreed that <mask> of access card information differed in some respects from other forms of theft, \"Proposition 47 broadly reduced punishment for 'obtaining any property by theft' where the value of the stolen information is less than $950.\" ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 906, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633, citing \u00a7 490.2, subd. (a).) Thus, a defendant convicted of stealing access card information could seek resentencing under Proposition 47 if the market value of the stolen information (considering possible illicit sales) was below the $950 threshold in section 490.2. ( Ibid. )"], "id": "b7166e54-ed24-4906-9f7d-fc15527ad567", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Indeed, the Pennsylvania robbery statute, based on the Model Penal Code, contains no requirement that force be used for the purpose of accomplishing the <mask>. As one Pennsylvania appellate court has remarked, \"[u]nder 18 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 3701 (a) (2), 'in the course of committing a theft\u2019 is unusual * * * insofar as it makes classification of robbery depend in part on behavior after the theft might be said to be accomplished.\u201d (Commonwealth v Maldonado, 343 Pa Super, at 167, 494 A2d, at 408, supra.)"], "id": "f9c288e4-350f-418f-9803-27fd6ffb5294", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is the view of this court that of the two, the result and rationale of Mr. Justice Conway is more appropriate. In applying destitution as a test Hinton v Lavine invoked the test to be applied on an original application for emergency assistance (Social Services Law, \u00a7 350-j, 18 NYCRR Part 372). However, as noted in Brown v Lavine, where replacement is sought of a lost check or lost cash, section 352 of title 18 of the regulations, which deals with standards of assistance is to be applied and that regulation of the Commissioner of Social Services is concerned with the amount to be awarded once initial eligibility is determined. Further, it is within that part that one finds the rules concerning replacement of a stolen check or stolen cash. Finally, the court notes that section 372.2(c) of title 18 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York provides that emergency assistance shall not be provided when destitution is due to loss, <mask> or diversion of a grant already made. In Domine v Shreck (44 AD2d 98) the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that while this rule could not be applied as to children so as to deny temporary relief where the loss was due to theft or diversion of a grant, it could be applied to deny emergency assistance to adults. However, as noted above the present proceeding does not involve Part 372, but Part 352 of the regulations which does authorize replacement of cash which has been lost or stolen."], "id": "7a400a13-ec9b-421d-8eac-64c493efca03", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["However, the proceeds of insurance received by the conservators for the loss sustained to the furniture and fixtures as well as the damage to the residence as a result *652of the fire in decedent\u2019s home are assets of the estate. The furniture, furnishings and residence destroyed by the fire of March 8, 1977 were not in existence at the time of decedent\u2019s death and the legacy and devise with respect to them adeemed. The intent of the testator is no longer considered. The present common-law rule in New York is that the absence of an asset from the distributive estate in and of itself adeems that legacy (Matter of Brawn, 219 NY 263, 268; Matter of Clark, 90 Misc 2d 925, supra; Matter of Harris, 98 Misc 2d 742). The fact that the absence of the asset was not the voluntary act of the testatrix is of no significance. \u201c[T]he precise thing given by the will is not available for disposition at the time of the testator\u2019s death, and it matters not whether this came to pass because of an intentional and voluntary act on the part of the testator, such as abandonment, sale or gift, or because of an occurrence, involuntary and unintended, such as condemnation, fire or <mask>.\u201d (Matter of Wright, 7 NY2d 365, 368-369.) The only present relief to this harsh rule of involuntary ademption may be found in EPTL 3-4.5 which permits the insurance proceeds received after testator\u2019s death to be substituted in the place of the missing property. The section applies however only to insurance proceeds received after the death of the testatrix. In the present case, the conservators made claim and collected the proceeds of the insurance long before the death of the testatrix herein."], "id": "3f672d63-3c8b-4ecd-aead-4f8976270cd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The North Carolina indictment (Forsyth Co., No. 3180, Jan. Term, 1942) on which the petitioner was convicted, also charged larceny and receiving stolen goods. The distinction in amount *99between simple and aggravated larceny is set at $20. Thus the case falls squarely within the rule in the Olah case (supra), and the indictment charging the <mask> of cigarettes of the value of $1.50 also brings the case under the rule set forth in People ex rel. Newman v. Foster (297 N. Y. 27)."], "id": "dcf586ac-bb1d-47da-962f-3365d409f87b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, DOE mentioned on the checklist facts beyond the offense for which petitioner was actually convicted. While petitioner\u2019s arrest stemmed from what DOE alleged to be her direct involvement in obtaining the \u201cconfidential information of consumers for her personal benefit,\u201d petitioner ultimately entered a plea to guilty solely to the offense of petit larceny for what she termed to be her actions \u201c[making] copies of the receipts for some of the orders being placed for in-store pickup\u201d at Best Buy, and passing that information along so \u201cshe could make some extra cash.\u201d Nowhere is it alleged that petitioner obtained, or attempted to obtain, any sensitive personal information such as a social security number from those receipts. Nevertheless, DOE\u2019s suggestion that petitioner obtained customers\u2019 \u201cconfidential information\u201d presupposes that petitioner retrieved sensitive information from the receipts, and used it for a nefarious purpose. That is not the crime that she was convicted of, and nothing in the record before the court supports such a premise. Perhaps DOE is deeming \u201cconfidential information\u201d as encompassing potential names and addresses that may have been listed on the receipts *394petitioner copied. If that were the case, there is nothing to suggest that such information was in fact \u201cconfidential\u201d or within the ambit of information that one would deem to be outside the scope of public access. Additionally, if petitioner had committed the act of stealing \u201cconfidential information\u201d that DOE ascribes to her, she likely would have been charged with other offenses, including potential identity <mask>. As such, DOE mischaracter-izes petitioner\u2019s offense by irrationally imputing additional criminal activity to petitioner not reflected by her actual plea to the offense of petit larceny."], "id": "f99aad29-6cb0-4f84-b1c7-008839318988", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of attempted burglary in the third degree in full satisfaction of an amended indictment charging him with multiple counts arising out of the <mask> of certain snowmobiles. County Court agreed to impose a prison sentence of 2 to 4 years, direct restitution and recommend that defendant be enrolled in a shock incarceration program. Defendant was cautioned, however, that if he were to violate the conditions of his release by, among other things, testing positive for any illegal substances, the court would not be bound by its promise to recommend shock incarceration. When defendant later tested positive for cocaine use, County Court sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 2 to 4 years, without recommending the shock program, and directed him to pay restitution in the amount of $2,790. Defendant now appeals.*"], "id": "0edcf196-ac20-4f8c-b419-76d843cca76e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thus for instance in Love (supra) the foreign statute defined larceny disjunctively as (1) stealing from the person and (2) stealing $25 or more in any manner. The indictment alleged the stealing of the sum of $20.75 from the person. This conclusively established that the defendant was convicted under (1) stealing from the person. He could not have been convicted of stealing under (2) since the indictment would have to allege <mask> of $25 or more. And in Gold (supra) the foreign statute defined burglary disjunctively as (1) breaking and entering with intent to commit a crime and (2) \u201c breaking out \u201d of a building under circumstances not a felony in this State. The operative allegations of the indictment alleged breaking and entering with intent to commit a crime. This excluded any possibility that defendant was convicted of \u201c breaking out \u201d of a building. Also some States define burglary as breaking and entering, etc., in the daytime or entering, etc. without breaking in the nighttime. If the operative facts allege a breaking and entry, etc., in the daytime, such allegations exclude any possibility that the defendant entered without breaking in the nighttime. People *623v. Knapp (supra) is an illustration of both kinds of burglary-statutes."], "id": "602df8df-7343-4fbf-aa13-7e4e2850d42e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Approximately three months later, Walsh was arrested for having engaged in corruption. Following entry of the court\u2019s suppression order but three days prior to the defendant\u2019s interposition of her initial guilty plea, the Official Corruption Unit of the New York District Attorney (OCU) received information that Walsh had stolen money. One week after such interposition, OCU learned that he was involved in the <mask> and sale of narcotics. Between December 16, 1993 and January 2, 1994, OCU received word that he was steeped in more venal activities. Consequently, Federal and State prosecutors charged him with numerous crimes and he pleaded guilty in both Federal and State courts for his transgressions. Significantly, no party here asserts that these misdeeds related to the instant matter or that Cesarano was implicated in the corruption."], "id": "7433bc07-6d8a-47e2-a4e9-1a55f90f13c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Gonzales is also not controlling here. In Gonzales , the Supreme Court held entering a bank to cash a stolen check for less than $950 is \"shoplifting\" within the meaning of section 459.5, a new misdemeanor crime created by Proposition 47. ( Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Section 459.5 provides shoplifting is \"entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny\" during business hours when the property taken is worth $950 or less. Our high court rejected the Attorney General's argument the defendant did not commit shoplifting because entering a bank with intent to pass forged checks was \"<mask> by false pretenses\" rather than \"larceny.\" ( Gonzales , at pp. 864-868, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Because California consolidated all theft offenses in section 490a, the court reasoned \"larceny\" in section 459.5 must be construed to mean \"theft,\" just as it does in the general burglary statute. ( Gonzales , at pp. 865, 868-869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Defendant emphasizes Gonzales focused on the value of the transaction rather than the form of theft as the demarcation between felonies and misdemeanors and suggests we apply the same analysis to section 473(b). (See Gonzales , at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Unlike section 459.5, however, section 473(b) does not define a new crime applicable to all forms of theft, but mandates misdemeanor treatment for forgery only when seven specific instruments are involved. Section 459.5's focus is on the value of the property stolen, but section 473(b) concerns both the type of instrument used in the forgery and its monetary value."], "id": "9ff147a1-7a7c-47ec-99c9-4126d9810422", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Last but not least, the People also rely on People v. Tardy (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 783, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 24. In Tardy , the information charged the defendant with robbery and alleged eight prior prison term enhancements ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 667.5, subd. (b) ). ( Tardy , supra , at p. 785, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 24.) The jury, however, *270found him guilty of the lesser included offense of petty <mask>. ( Id . at pp. 785-786, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 24.) The prosecution took the position that, because of the defendant's prior convictions, he was guilty of petty theft with a prior. ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 666.) The defendant then admitted the prior prison *622term enhancements, and the trial court sentenced him under Penal Code section 666. ( Tardy , supra , at p. 786, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 24.)"], "id": "da6f84a7-8f23-4150-af1b-535482eef840", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Morever, the circuit court here did not \"automatically\" deny Drexler's motion to transfer. Instead, the court considered the fact that Drexler had not only been charged with two counts of capital murder, but also with two counts each of aggravated robbery, <mask> of property, and abuse of a corpse. In addition to the serious nature of the capital-murder charge, the court also noted that aggravated-robbery charges \"have been designated as an eight (8) on the Seriousness Level contained within the Arkansas Sentencing Standards Grid and offense Seriousness Rankings.\" Thus, because the circuit court's finding was not based solely and \"automatically\" on the capital-murder charge, we find no error on this issue."], "id": "21f40d0b-c9e1-4658-a321-e45d7baae6e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, there is a question of fact regarding the policy terms. The insurance company sets forth in its affidavits at various times that the policy provides limits of insurance for physical damage coverage quoting \u201cSection IV \u2014 physical damage coverage, subparagraph A. and C.\u201d There is no dispute that the plaintiff\u2019s policy was on a nonreporting premium basis. Commercial\u2019s affidavits indicate that the application of the language contained in the policy at section IV, Physical Damage Coverage, C.2.c. leads to the conclusion that they owe only $1,725.75. However, at no time do the affidavits give specific references to the policy terms or coverage as to how this conclusion is reached. The only limit of insurance is stated under item seven of the \u201cGarage Coverage Form \u2014 Auto Dealers\u2019 Supplementary Schedule\u201d. This limitation is stated as being for the limit for each location and for comprehensive coverage. There is no indication of the limit for collision coverage which is marked above as a coverage for used autos and autos owned. This entire check box is under item seven for physical damage coverage. In addition, the limit of insurance for each location states an amount of $26,250 \u201cminus $250 deductible for each covered auto for loss caused by <mask> or mischief or vandalism subject to $1000 maximum deductible for all such loss in any one event.\u201d This does not indicate limitations on losses for collision."], "id": "8148665a-92ca-4bef-83d9-f6fdfd9372e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Under Proposition 47 (the \"Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act\"), which went into effect before Jackson committed the crime here, \" 'an offender who obtains a [vehicle] valued at [$950 or less] by <mask> must be charged with petty theft and may not be charged as a felon under any other criminal provision.' \" ( Page, supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 1183, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 406 P.3d 319 ; \u00a7 496, subd. (a).) The unlawful taking of a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession is a theft offense, but the unlawful driving of a vehicle is not.6 ( Page , at p. 1183, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 406 P.3d 319 ; People v. Gutierrez (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 847, 854, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 ( Gutierrez ).) Thus, some violations of section 10851(a) are punishable only as misdemeanors, and some are punishable as either misdemeanors or felonies. ( Page , at p. 1183, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 406 P.3d 319.)"], "id": "078c0d4b-afd8-4ab9-a94e-84c6516247ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*736To the extent, if any, that respondents can be deemed to have established separate \u201cclassifications\u201d of appearance enhancement establishments, such classification is presumptively valid, and petitioners have offered no evidence that respondents\u2019 conduct was irrational or arbitrary. Respondents\u2019 reasons for imposing the wage bond requirement specifically on businesses that provide nail specialty services was laid out in depth in the legislative history. The legislature explained that it has found abuses in the nail salon industry in particular and determined that the legislation was needed to protect nail salon workers in particular. The State of New York has a legitimate interest in protecting workers in the nail salon industry from unsafe working conditions and unfair labor practices, including wage <mask> and payment of below-minimum wages. As such, the legislation is related to a legitimate purpose and there has been no violation of equal protection."], "id": "4acd83e9-f75c-4612-99a2-4a665cafd614", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Because the evidence concerning the fingerprints of other persons in the van was not in itself sufficient to establish that Makkali did not commit the <mask>, Makkali has not met his burden of showing that he was prejudiced in violation of Brady . Moreover, in determining whether the petitioner was prejudiced, the totality of the evidence to support the judgment must be considered. The strength of the evidence adduced at a petitioner's trial is an important consideration in a coram nobis proceeding because the court must weigh the significance of the information that was alleged to have been concealed from the defense against the totality of the evidence to determine if the hidden information or evidence at issue would have been such as to have prevented rendition of the judgment had the existence of that material been known at the time of trial.1 Goins v. State , 2018 Ark. 312, at 6, 558 S.W.3d 872, 876. The mere fact that the fingerprints of two other people were found in the van does not establish that there existed some fact that would have prevented rendition of the theft judgment if it had been known at the time of trial. As stated, coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid, and Makkali's claims are not sufficient to overcome that presumption."], "id": "9eb5a8fa-82ef-4ddc-bb03-049c377dd204", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Jones, in his treatise on Bailments, 54, says, \u201c It is almost needless to add, that a mandatary as well as a depositary, may bind himself by special agreement to be answerable even for casualties.\u201d Judge Story, in his excellent treatise on Bailments, page 22, says, if a depositary should specially contract to keep safely, he might be liable for ordinary negligence, although the law would otherwise hold him liable only for gross negligence. Upon this ground, South-cote\u2019s case, 4 Co. R. 83, b. 1. Inst. 89. a, b, may perhaps be maintained to be good law ; and is not liable to the objection made against it in Coggs v. Bernard. If, indeed, it proceeded upon the ground asserted by Lord Coke, that a bailment upon a contract to keep and to keep safely is the same thing, it is certainly not law, and was overruled in Coggs v. Bernard. But from the report it would seem, that the bailment was there to keep safe ; and if so, then upon the special contract the party might have been held responsible, although he could not otherwise be so held by the general law. This was the doctrine maintained by all the judges in the case of Coggs v. Bernard, which case proceeded mainly upon that ground; and in a later case, Kettle v. Brumsdale, Willes\u2019 R. 118, 121, the same distinction was adopted by the court; and it was held, that if a depositary should accept to keep safely, he would be responsible for losses by robbery or <mask>, although not otherwise responsible upon the general principles of law. And again, in page 48, he refers to the saying of Lord Coke, \u201cfor if goods are delivered to one to be kept and to be safely kept, it is all one in law.\u201d Hence he concludes that if goods are delivered to a man to be safely kept, and after-wards those goods are stolen, this shall not excuse him, be-*355c ause by the acceptance he undertook to keep them safely, and, therefore, he must keep them at his own peril. But if goods are delivered to him to keep as he would keep his own, then, if they are stolen from him without his default or negligence, he shall be discharged. Co. Litt. 89, b. And he recommends on this account to those who receive goods, that they should receive them in a special manner, viz. to be kept as their own, or at the peril of the owner. An agreement, such as is made in the case at bar, being a positive unqualified promise to deliver the horses by a certain day, includes the obligation to safely keep them, for if the receiptor does not, he cannot deliver, and makes him answerable even for casualties. In Booth v. Wilson, 1 Barn. & Ald. 59, it was held, that a gratuitous bailee might maintain case against his neighbor, who suffered his fence to be so much out of repair, that the bailor\u2019s horse in a dark night fell from the bailee\u2019s field into the other, and was killed: the full value of the horse was recovered. This recovery was based upon the consideration, that the gratuitous bailee was responsible to the bailor for a redelivery of the horse, is the fact of responsibility,f which decides the right to the action of replevin. See Harrison v. McIntosh, 1 Johns. R. 385. Mr. Justice Fineux, in the Year Books, 21 Hen. 7, 14, pl. 23, said, (and it was an action of replevin brought by a bailee, for aught that appears upon a general bailment,) \u201c In this case, the bailee has a property in the thing against a stranger, for he is chargeable to the bailor ; and for this reason he shall recover against a stranger who takes the goods out of his possession.\u201d The power and control which the sheriff had over the chattels, he has im-1 parted to the receiptor, who is substituted in his place, as far as the possession and control of them are concerned, until the day of sale. They are, while in the receiptor\u2019s possession, as much in the custody of the law, as they were when in the sheriff\u2019s possession ; and I can see no reason why the receiptor should not have the protection of the law, and be authorized to maintain replevin, so that be may be enabled to discharge his responsibilities to the sheriff, as well as that the sheriff should have such protection and action, to en*356able him to discharge his responsibilities to the judgment creditor."], "id": "9a6ebafb-f165-4329-9e5d-19cf8301e342", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*640Respondent disagrees, and urges us to limit section 459.5 to the \"common\" understanding of shoplifting, which in respondent's view is the \"unauthorized entry into a retail establishment, while the establishment is open during regular business hours, with the intent to steal openly-displayed merchandise valuing not more than $950.\" Alternatively, respondent urges us to follow People v. Gonzales (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 35, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 (Gonzales ), in which the Fourth District, Division One, recently held the \"intent to commit larceny\" element in section 459.5 cannot be satisfied by entering a commercial establishment with the intent to commit <mask> by false pretenses."], "id": "2603f21e-c074-4ebb-a751-e09094d95f9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand <mask>, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor ....\" Section 490.2 sought to eliminate provisions that \"carved out separate categories of grand theft based on the type of property stolen, with either a lower value threshold or no value threshold at all.\" ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 908, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) Section 487 defined as grand theft the theft of \"more than $950 worth of anything; more than $250 worth of the crops or critters listed in subdivision (b); anything at all from the victim's person; or any cars or guns.\" ( Romanowski, supra at p. 907, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) By inserting a $950 threshold, *821Proposition 47 ensured that \"such crimes would no longer be charged as grand theft solely because of the property involved .\" ( *521Id. at p. 908, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) Proposition 47 had its sights on both the grand theft offenses listed in section 487 and those offenses that were elsewhere defined as grand theft. That was apparent from section 490.2's clause, \"[n]otwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft.\" ( Romanowski, supra, at p. 907, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633, citing \u00a7 490.2, subd. (a).)"], "id": "c9efbd00-e9dd-4ac0-9b54-088d5443d7b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner Betty Grip son is a recipient of public assistance for herself and her five children, ages 1% to 9, from the Albany County Department of Social Services in the Federal category of Aid to Dependent Children. She and the children reside in the City of Albany, Albany County, New York. She alleges that on April 15, 1973 approximately $180 in cash was stolen from her which amount was the balance of the proceeds from her public assistance check which she received on April 14,1973. She reported the <mask> to the respondent agency on Monday, April 16,1973 and applied for and was denied emergency assistance. She was without food, rent money and money to prevent a threatened turn-off of her electric and gas services. She claimed to be destitute and faced with starvation for herself and her children. The denial of emergency assistance was based upon New York State Department of Social Services\u2019 agency policy resulting from Commissioner Lavine\u2019s regulations as *1076found in 18 NYCRR 372.2 (b) and (c) and Bulletin 185. There was no investigation or hearing as to the alleged facts of .destitution."], "id": "f54db20b-c558-40e8-8fb9-1c5e9bee7841", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We begin our analysis by comparing the first element of both statutes. Although <mask> by receiving stolen property does not expressly prohibit \u201cunlawful taking or unlawful control over movable property,\u201d . . . the statute's requirement that a person intentionally acquire possession, control or title, retain, dispose or lend on the security of moveable property of another knowing or believing that it is stolen necessitates either theft of the property or unlawful control over the movable property of another. Similarly, the second element of theft by unlawful taking, that the movable property belong to another, is necessary to establish the second element of theft by receiving stolen property because a person cannot have knowledge or belief that"], "id": "62e567a6-b233-4748-be4a-f6eee36011a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["the nature and scope of criminal investigations on the basis of evidence or affidavits submitted in an ex parte proceeding.\u201d Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 n.20 (internal citations omitted); see also Harmon Memo at 3 (mech- anism for review by Article III judges of ex parte government applica- tions for electronic surveillance warrants satisfies \u201ccase or controversy\u201d requirement). Federal courts also may adjudicate ex parte petitions for naturalization under the Immigration and Nationality Act, even though in most such cases the United States does not appear as an adverse party and, as a result, there are no conflicting positions for the court to resolve. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926); Harmon Memo at 6. As we have observed, all of the above proceedings satisfy the Article III requirement of adverseness because, \u201cwhile they may formally take place ex parte, they also implicate a potentially adverse party competent to challenge the result of the proceedings either in that forum or at a later date.\u201d Memorandum for Sheryl L. Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs, from Robert Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Draft Bill Entitled the \u201cIdentity <mask> Victim Assistance Act of 2001\u201d at 3 (Feb. 6, 2001). For example, as the Court noted in Tutun with respect to naturalization proceedings, \u201c[t]he United States is always a possible ad- verse party\u201d to a claim for citizenship. 270 U.S. at 577. Whether a financial company subject to a petition that chooses not to appear before the Panel might be said to be \u201ca possible adverse party\u201d in this sense is not clear. The Print deprives the Third Circuit of jurisdiction over company appeals if the company \u201cacquiesce[d] or consent[ed] to the appointment of a receiver by the Secretary.\u201d Print \u00a7 202(b)(2)(A)(ii). And it appears that such a company would be statutorily foreclosed from attacking a receivership order in any collateral proceeding. See Print \u00a7 202(a)(3) (granting Panel \u201coriginal and exclusive jurisdiction of pro- ceedings to consider petitions by the Secretary\u201d). 7 One could argue that"], "id": "541836d5-c3dd-4f31-9c9b-2375ed1a48bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On October 15, 2010, T.S.N. was charged by information for the misdemeanor offense of <mask> by check, and a warrant for her arrest issued on November 16, 2010. She was not arrested until June 11, 2013. On that date, she was arrested for the felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. During the arrest process, the officer also executed the 2010 warrant and arrested T.S.N. on the theft by check charge as well as the assault charge. The theft and assault charges were filed in different courts with different cause numbers. T.S.N. pleaded guilty to the theft charge but not guilty to the assault charge. The assault charge was tried to a jury and she was acquitted."], "id": "b6d86312-8b74-4b11-b2ea-02e3ce28120d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*133Proposition 47 created a new misdemeanor crime called shoplifting by adding section 459.5. The statute defines shoplifting as follows: \"Notwithstanding Section 459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).\" (\u00a7 459.5, subd. (a).) If the taking of the property meets the definition of shoplifting, it must be charged as such: \"Any act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or <mask> of the same property.\" (\u00a7 459.5, subd. (b).) Under the shoplifting statute, felony burglary *266still is available for an entry to commit a theft outside of business hours, or of a large value of property, as \"[a]ny other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.\" ( \u00a7 459, subd. (a).)"], "id": "9d189bee-3c3e-48fb-8425-2929e03aaadd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Tested by the law applicable hereto, I hold that the defendants acquired the bonds in bad faith. Though they had no actual knowledge of the <mask>, the appearance of this immature, diseased and degenerate boy, claiming to be the owner of the bonds and in business for himself, was sufficient to deny his right to the bonds to the mind of any person with ordinary discrimination, or at least to thrust the duty upon the defendants to make further inquiries. They had no right to deliberately shut their eyes to obvious facts."], "id": "9eae5588-d08d-4b63-8208-700802d83fea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*596We do not find these cases persuasive. For example, in State v. Alexander (1987) 12 Kan.App.2d 1 ( Alexander ), the appellate court reasoned that \"[u]pon the retail sale of merchandise, Kansas law obligates a merchant to collect and forward a sales tax to the state. [Citation.] In no sense may a <mask> be characterized as a sale. [Citation.] Because the sweaters had not been sold, [the store from which the defendant stole the items] did not owe, and the state was not entitled to collect, a sales tax on them.... [\u00b6] ... Because no sales tax had been imposed, none was stolen.\" ( Id. at pp. 4-5.)"], "id": "a93f956c-2499-46b6-909e-6d862986d7ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c We also conclude that the word \u2018 rags \u2019 as used in the statutory definition of a junk dealer (Admin. Code, ch. 32, art. 18, \u00a7 32-113.0) includes the commodity dealt in by the defendants.\u201d The reason for the statute is clearly set forth in the American Wool Stock Corporation case, the Court of Appeals saying (pp. 79-80): \u201c Experience has taught that the various types of property dealt in by a junk dealer are peculiarly susceptible to <mask> and that the business of junk dealers, which provides a market for stolen property, is of a character which warrants *894regulation in the exercise of police power. Regulatory statutes enacted to that end have successfully withstood attacks as to their constitutionality.\u201d"], "id": "627d93a4-5a99-4c2d-b8a1-354492fff243", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As to the second trial, the record of which was before the court (4 A D 2d 1016), plaintiffs sued on a jeweler\u2019s liability policy which insured them against loss of jewelry. The policy excluded from coverage a loss occurring while the property was in an automobile, unless at the time of loss there was actually in, or upon the vehicle, the insured, his permanent employee, or a person whose sole duty was to attend the vehicle. The sole issue of fact was whether the vehicle was attended at the time of the loss. The evidence was overwhelming that the vehicle was unattended. The car was parked in the driveway of a garage *697with its hack end protruding on a public sidewalk. Two disinterested witnesses testified for defendant that they observed the car unattended at the garage entrance when an unidentified man took a bag from the vehicle and walked away. Plaintiff\u2019s case was predicated on Ms claim that the automobile was attended by a garage attendant at the time of the <mask>. However, plaintiff was unable to testify that the automobile was attended at all times by a garage attendant, and the garage attendant testified that the car was left unattended for a period of time."], "id": "6ecb1820-c01d-4585-b1ea-73f048e0f51b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Hook testified that he was arrested by Trooper Bartkowiak. On the other hand, Trooper Bartkowiak testified that he did not arrest Hook, but that Hook had consented to accompany him and go along in the State car to talk to the B. C. I. Corporal Cerino testified that he asked Hook if he would go along with Trooper Bartkowiak to Justice Link\u2019s office and Hook consented. William D. Ribyat, Jr., the attorney Hook called from Judge Link\u2019s, tended to corroborate Hook with respect to the arrest. However, the source of Ribyat\u2019s knowledge was the telephone call. Furthermore, he testified from a rather questionable recollection bolstered by some scratchy notes he had made. As we indicated upon the trial, after three days of observing Peter Hook, we place little credence in what he says. On the other hand, the three troopers were witnesses worthy of belief. They were experienced policemen aware of the fact they did not have a warrant for the arrest of Peter Hook or sufficient grounds to arrest him without one. At the time of the alleged arrest, they were merely investigating an alleged <mask>. So that upon this basis we make the finding that Peter Hook was not arrested by any State agent on April 13, 1955, but had accompanied the State agents voluntarily. On the other hand, even if we were to believe Peter Hook and hold that he was in fact arrested by the State Police at the time in question, it is our opinion that he sustained nothing more than nominal damages. As indicated supra, there was not sufficient evidence produced upon the trial to prove Peter Hook was guilty of larceny. However, the record indicates that the claimant and his wife had considerable marital difficulties. These difficulties at times erupted into open warfare between the parties. This marital strife was characterized by charges and counter-charges, as well *677as by assaults perpetrated by the parties upon each other, usually followed by recourse to the police and the courts. The occurrences of April 13, 1955, are due in part to the internal strife between Hook and his wife. The telephone call made by Mrs. Hook to Mr. Wheeler upon the date in question and the subsequent investigations of Peter Hook\u2019s activities by the State agents was due to the vendetta being waged between Mrs. Hook and her husband rather than any lofty desire on her part to see justice done or a criminal apprehended. Mrs. Hook\u2019s sole object was to make the State\u2019s agents her instruments in harassment of her husband. On the other hand, the story unfolded upon the trial reflects little to Peter Hook\u2019s credit and the entire procedure was punctuated with overtones of the marital problems in the Hook menage."], "id": "af84641a-27fd-4a8a-8fd3-1bc78ed7e817", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["To permit one to relieve himself from any part of the responsibility attached to the imputing to another the crime of <mask>, on the ground that he, on so slight a basis as this, believed the charge to be true, would be in effect to allow one who became dissatisfied with the conduct or business transaction of another towards or with him, to apply to such other person such epithets as he saw fit, and then, when called to account, to shield himself from a portion of the responsibility by the bare averment that the conduct or transaction in question induced in his mind a belief that the epithets were correctly applied."], "id": "2a71b640-2ea0-41a7-ac7c-7991806c3a3d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*233Another reason is that \"unlike other forms of stolen property, stolen vehicles are often dismantled and sold for parts in 'chop shops' which can raise their worth above retail value. [Citation.]\" (Peacock, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 713, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 344.) Targeting that type of criminal enterprise was in part the Legislature's intent in enacting section 496d, as indicated in the legislative history. The bill's author proposed that section 496d be added \"to the Penal Code to encompass only motor vehicles related to the receiving of stolen property.\" (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2390 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1998.) Section 496d was described as \" 'provid [ing] additional tools to law enforcement for utilization in combating vehicle <mask> and prosecuting vehicle thieves. Incarcerating vehicle thieves provides safer streets and saves Californians millions of dollars. These proposals target persons involved in the business of vehicle theft and would identify persons having prior felony convictions for the receiving of stolen vehicles for enhanced sentences.' \" (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2390 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1998.)"], "id": "01609c3d-ed1e-4c4e-9e29-9e6e3307bdb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On July 15, 2011, Gonzalez was charged with two felonies, robbery (\u00a7 211) and burglary (\u00a7 459). Gonzalez and prosecutors subsequently negotiated a plea agreement. On August 16, 2011, in accord with the plea *1063agreement, prosecutors amended the complaint against Gonzalez to add a felony charge of grand <mask> from a person (\u00a7 487, subd. (c) ) and a misdemeanor charge of battery (\u00a7 242), and also moved to dismiss the robbery and burglary counts. Gonzalez pled guilty to the new felony grand theft from a person and misdemeanor battery counts. Consistent with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 36 months of formal probation on the condition she serve 314 days in a work release program, after accounting for presentence custody and behavior credits."], "id": "cc84954a-1ead-4758-89e2-253fce611b99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Resisting this conclusion, the Attorney General in Gonzales argued that \"use of the term 'larceny' in section 459.5, coupled with labeling the offense 'shoplifting,' exhibited an intent by the electorate to limit that offense to the 'common understanding of shoplifting,' which she characterizes as taking goods from a store.\" ( Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 868-869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The court rejected the Attorney General's argument because \"the language of section 459.5 refers to the general burglary statute and imports the term 'larceny' [which] strongly suggests an intent that the term maintain its same meaning in both provisions, including application of section 490a.\" ( Id . at p. 869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The court also rejected the Attorney General's argument that the electorate intended to limit shoplifting to the <mask> of \"tangible merchandise\" because the shoplifting statute uses the term \"property,\" rather than the more expansive phrase \"money, labor, real or personal property\" found in section 490.2.5 ( Id. at pp. 870-871, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The court explained \" section 459.5 provides a specific definition of the term 'shoplifting.' In doing so, it creates a term of art, which must be understood as it is defined, not in its colloquial sense. Indeed, by defining shoplifting as an entry into a business with an intent to steal, rather than as the taking itself, section 459.5 already deviates *1208from the colloquial understanding of that term.\" ( Id. at pp. 870-871, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, second italics added.) The court also found no intent to use a narrower definition of the term \"property\" in the shoplifting statute than the definition of the same term in section 7, which defines property to include \"both real and personal property.\" ( Ibid . )"], "id": "fbe2a40f-0fea-4a51-93b6-907b35e07c98", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Gutierrez insists he was convicted on an invalid theory of vehicle <mask>, pointing to the evidence that Gonzalez had filed a stolen car report with the California Highway Patrol. However, the deputy district attorney argued, to establish Gutierrez's guilt, it was only necessary for the People to prove Gutierrez intended to deprive the owner of the rental car of possession \"for the period of time that he was driving that car.\" On this record we simply cannot say whether Gutierrez was convicted under a legally valid nontheft theory or a legally invalid theory of vehicle theft that did not include as an element the value of the stolen car. Accordingly, as did the Supreme Court in a similar situation in People v. Chiu , supra , 59 Cal.4th 155, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 325 P.3d 972, we reverse the felony conviction for unlawful driving or taking a vehicle and remand the matter to allow the People either to accept a reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor or to retry the offense as a felony with appropriate instructions. (See id . at p. 168, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 325 P.3d 972 [allowing People to either accept reduction of conviction to second degree murder or retry charge of first degree murder when jury may have based first degree murder conviction on an improper legal theory]; see generally People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 678, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 766, 151 P.3d 1177 [pursuant to Penal Code section 1260, \"an appellate court may modify a verdict to reflect a conviction of a lesser included offense, where insufficient evidence supports the conviction on the greater offense\"].)"], "id": "14beb157-c63c-4f8c-84f3-5d9bb73716e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant contends that it is not liable to plaintiff under the named perils insurance policy since plaintiff failed to prove that the lost property was caused by <mask>. Defendant asserts that the mere showing by the assured that a suitcase was lost or disappeared while in the custody of an air carrier, without more, is insufficient proof to hold the insurer liable under the terms of the policy. Defendant cites Suberi v Travelers Indent. Co. (NYLJ, June 14, 1985, at 7, col 2 [App Term, 1st Dept]), in support of its contention."], "id": "a0731e29-6ea3-42f7-a877-b5c012ee96dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At common law dioses in action, including bonds, bills and notes were held not to be \u201c personal goods \u201d and therefore not the subject of larceny (2 Wharton\u2019s, Crim. Law [12th ed.], \u00a7 1113; People v. Griffin, 38 How. Pr. 475). However, New York, by statute, has made the <mask> of \u201cpersonal property\u201d larcenous (Bork v. People, 91 N. Y. 5). In Boric it was held that a negotiable instrument can be the subject of a larceny."], "id": "7a2caba9-ee76-48bf-a23b-81b8595aeec0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"14. Responsibility for Damages. I am responsible and will pay you for all loss and damage to the vehicle regardless of who is at fault. Only if I do not violate any of the terms of this Agreement, my liability for all loss or damage (except <mask> of the vehicle if left unattended without all windows and doors closed and locked, and the ignition key removed, or loss or theft of tires, tools accessories, equipment, keys or vehicle documents) will be limited to:"], "id": "a10ce54d-08c6-48c7-a991-b1a7aad957f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Second, under California law burglary is an entry with the intent to commit any felony, not just theft-related offenses. A burglary is complete \"upon entry with the requisite intent to commit a felony or a <mask> ..., regardless of whether the felony or theft committed is different from that contemplated at the time of entry, or whether any felony or theft actually is committed.\" ( People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041-1042, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903.) Thus, the only element common to all burglaries is entry. Under Kelly and H.W. 's interpretation of section 466, burglary tools include any item that a defendant intends to use to commit any felony inside the entered property. In our view, it is absurd to consider items to be burglary tools when they are intended for use solely to facilitate non-theft related crimes. A piece of rope, for example, is not a burglary tool just because a defendant broke into a house intending to strangle an occupant. And a book of matches is not a burglary tool just because a defendant went into a store intending to burn it down. Limiting the definition of burglary tools to items that are intended to gain access to property avoids such unreasonable applications."], "id": "d7aa13dd-d080-462a-a1ca-47bb2decfc6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212, on the ground that no issues of fact exist, and that under the terms and conditions of the policy, there having been a <mask>, defendant is obligated to pay it the agreed value of the vessel. Defendant cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that under the established construction for ocean marine policies there is no coverage for the theft of the vessel, or for its mysterious disappearance."], "id": "e08b17cb-2538-4c61-b117-d3502c8684b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*917(\u00a7 484, subd. (a) [\"In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test.\"]; see Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 914, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) \"Acceptance of this approach was part of the backdrop against which Proposition 47 was enacted, and Proposition 47 does not refer to any other approach to valuation. We thus see no basis for an alternative approach to valuation either in the original statutory scheme or in the provisions enacted by Proposition 47. Courts must use section 484's 'reasonable and fair market value' test when applying section 490.2's value threshold for <mask> crimes.\" ( Romanowski, supra, at p. 914, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.)"], "id": "096103e9-9fa0-4163-8564-87ab81ec2e95", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Marshall and Appellant were friends and Marshall frequented the tow lot whenever Appellant was on duty. Access to and from the lot was controlled by remote operation from the office where Appellant was in charge. Marshall and Appellant were in telephone contact on the night of the incident. Marshall was observed in the act of stealing items from cars on the lot. The tow truck in which Marshall and Davis were apprehended was stopped at the exit gate, which could only be opened from the office where Appellant was stationed, alone. The truck was running with its lights on, and had speaker boxes, stereos, car batteries and other items inside the truck and on its flatbed. Marshall and Davis implicated Appellant in the <mask> scheme. Appellant's car was found in the location referred to by Marshall and Davis during their interrogations."], "id": "7b26a1e3-b203-4f1e-87df-1c959acfac72", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Sassi v. Jersey Trucking Serv. (283 App. Div. 73), upon which they rely, does not sustain their contention. There the defendant was a trucking service. After it had received a quantity of merchandise for delivery to specific consignees and before delivery, trucks and merchandise were stolen from its garage. Defendant thereupon notified its insurer of the loss. During the next three years the insurer investigated claims and endeavored to settle them. The negotiations bore no fruit and, more than three years after the <mask>, suit was brought against the trucking service which immediately impleaded its insurer. The insurer, relying on a clause in the policy identical in substance to that contained in the policy in the case at bar, sought summary judgment. In denying the application the court pointed out the short Statute of Limitations contained in the policy \u2018 \u2018 runs only from the time when under the other policy provisions the insurance company may lawfully be called upon to pay the loss \u201d (p. 77). This did not happen with the theft. The loss contemplated by the policy came into being only if and when the liability of the trucking company to the owners of the goods was determined. Hence, the one-year period was held to commence with the determination of the liability of the trucking company."], "id": "3401fd89-7e91-4380-bd3a-700951e4a488", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"3. Operation: Lessee represents Vehicle will be principally operated and garaged in the State of Connecticut and will be used by Lessee for its business * * * purposes * * * \"5. Maintenance and Repairs: Lessee shall be responsible for all maintenance and repairs to Vehicle and shall maintain the Vehicle in the same condition as leased, subject only to reasonable wear and tear * * * \"6. Insurance: Lessee shall be responsible for providing insurance coverages set forth below protecting the interests of Lessor and Lessee against bodily injury, property damage, comprehensive fire and <mask> and collision (with maximum deductible limits) as follows: \"C. Collision Damage to Vehicle (deductible) $250.00 Ded. \"Lessee shall deliver such policy to Lessor * * * The insurance policy required above shall be provided by an insurance company licensed under the laws of the State of principal operation and garaging of Vehicle; and shall name Lessor and Lessee as insured parties and Lessor as loss payee. Failure of Lessee to comply with any provision of a policy * * * shall be deemed a default under this lease causing termination. Lessee shall: pay the specified deductible limit as additional rent; notify Lessor immediately upon discovery of any damage or loss to the Vehicle * * * and provide written notice thereof within 24 hours. If Lessee fails to comply with any insurance policy or to notify Lessor and the insurance company of any *669insured claim, damage or loss to or of Vehicle, Lessee shall nevertheless pay for same as additional rent. As to all insurance, Lessee appoints Lessor as Lessee's attorney-in-fact\u201d (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that under the foregoing terms of the motor vehicle lease, A-Leet charged Ewing, its lessee, with various obligations consistent with an appearance of ownership of the leased vehicle reserving to itself various contractual safeguards to protect A-Leet\u2019s interest should Ewing breach its obligations to A-Leet."], "id": "b4afc625-631b-416c-8c74-d320bfe96ca2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff seeks summary judgment in the sum of $5,616.48, plus 15% counsel fees, based upon the following rationale: If all payments were made as per the lease, defendant would have paid a total of $28,380 over the life of the lease, plus $2,130 on the option to purchase, making a grand total of $30,510. In so calculating, plaintiff is apparently assuming that since defendants cannot return the stolen car, they are presumed to have exercised the option to purchase. It appears that plaintiff realized $18,250 from the proceeds of <mask> insurance on the car. This sum, when added to the total of the down payment plus the 12 monthly rental payments, made up to the time of the theft, equals $24,877, which, when subtracted from the sum of $30,510 leaves a balance of $5,638, which plaintiff seeks by this motion."], "id": "6251a754-7fb6-4c15-9c6a-22682f013be6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*387As to Kaufman's claim that the People named the wrong victim because Emmet continued to own the note, we observe that Hall affirmed a larceny conviction where the named victim continued to have a legal right to payment. As is true in this case, Hall might have been charged with <mask> from the state treasury just as Pearlstein might have been charged with theft from the developer. Instead, both were properly convicted of theft from the intended recipient of the funds. Similarly, England upheld a larceny charge where the named victim presumably retained the right to payment for services he had rendered. The rule to be distilled from these otherwise diverse cases is that a thief who intercepts a payment intended by the payor for a payee cannot be heard to complain because the prosecutor named the wrong victim. ( Hall , supra , 257 S.W. at p. 64 ; England , supra , 174 F.2d at p. 468 ; Pearlstein , supra , 547 A.2d at p. 652.)"], "id": "b61b5148-08fb-45da-8ee7-f32537e1d9b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["the appellee\u2019s brief. That is the where Sea Wasp should have put its challenge to the district court\u2019s liability rulings. Even if we were inclined to look past the procedural misstep and treat Sea Wasp\u2019s cross-appeal on liability as an alternative ground for affirming its win, there is no need to consider an alternative ground when we have affirmed for the reasons the district court relied on. Because we have affirmed the take-nothing judgment on the ground that Domain Protection is not entitled to damages or fees, we do not consider the liability issues. B. A cross-appeal is necessary, however, for the other issue Sea Wasp raises. Sea Wasp argues it is entitled to attorney\u2019s fees for successfully defending the Texas <mask> Liability Act claim. Because the district court did not award those fees, on this issue Sea Wasp is seeking something the judgment did not include. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. at 435. The Texas theft statute provides that \u201c[e]ach person who prevails in a suit under this chapter shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and necessary attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code \u00a7 134.005(b). Unlike the Stored Communications Act fee provision we addressed earlier, this one contains a \u201cshall\u201d making fees \u201cmandatory\u201d when a party prevails. Merritt Hawkins & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Gresham, 861 F.3d 143, 155 (5th Cir. 2017). And a defendant generally prevails when it obtains dismissal of a Texas Theft Liability Act claim. See id. at 156. Sea Wasp thus contends it is entitled to fees because the judgment dismissed the theft claim after the jury refused to award damages. The district court thought otherwise, concluding that the preliminary injunction"], "id": "2807857f-14f7-4d51-8d56-0e60f88ba870", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["- 24 - As relevant to the instant case, first degree felony murder is the \u201ckilling of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any . . . robbery . . . [or] theft[.]\u201d Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-202(a)(2). Robbery is \u201cthe intentional or knowing <mask> of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.\u201d Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-401(a). \u201cA person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner\u2019s effective consent.\u201d Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-14-103(a). Especially aggravated robbery is robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon and where the victim suffers serious bodily injury. Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-403(a). Conspiracy is committed when two or more people, \u201ceach having the culpable mental state required for the offense that is the object of the conspiracy, and each acting for the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of an offense, agree that one (1) or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes the offense.\u201d Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-12-103(a)."], "id": "a4900e3e-5593-4ac7-943d-746e2df66193", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["If only out of an excess of caution, we note that, even if we were to apply the federal constitutional harmless error standard, we would find that the asserted error was harmless. Under that standard, an error must be deemed prejudicial unless it is shown \"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\" (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.) Thus, an instructional error is harmless when \"the evidence ... is 'of such compelling force as to show beyond a reasonable doubt' that the erroneous instruction 'must have made no difference in reaching the verdict obtained.' [Citation.]\" (People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 431, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 P.2d 1193, fn. omitted.) Here, for the reasons already discussed, the evidence was overwhelming that defendant did not act in a heat of passion induced by some combination of the altercation at the mobile home and the <mask> of his truck."], "id": "1d0076b8-4e49-4e48-b872-9585e02ff384", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Teresa pleaded guilty to the underlying offenses of three counts of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (Roxicodone ) on November 6, 2009. She received a suspended sentence on each count. The conditions of her suspended sentences included not committing any offenses punishable by imprisonment. On May 16, 2017, the State filed a petition to revoke, alleging Teresa had committed the new offenses of residential burglary and <mask> of property. At the conclusion of the November 7, 2017 revocation hearing, Teresa moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had not proved its residential-burglary basis for revocation. The trial court denied the motion and found Teresa had violated the terms and conditions of her suspended sentences. The trial court did not prepare an order setting forth its findings and conclusions; however, no objection was raised to the lack of a written order. The pertinent docket entry for November 7, 2017, provided:"], "id": "99c530fe-d313-4b4d-bac8-0ab43eade884", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Pace and Crouch were found together just a few hours after the Glasscock Jewelry robbery, after a report from a Helzberg Jewelry store of suspicious activity very similar to the <mask> at the Warrensburg store. When Pace and Crouch were approached by a marked police car and uniformed officer, they started moving away in different directions, and Crouch broke into a run. Pace initially lied and said he did not know Crouch, before begrudgingly admitting that he \"kind of halfway\" knew him. Pace initially denied that the ring box was his, only to later change his story and claim that the ring box was in fact his, and demand its return. Perhaps most significantly, the two-carat diamond stolen from Glasscock Jewelry was found in the ring box which Pace stated that he owned."], "id": "5c34ab73-1766-4c30-83b4-69f9e2b6c565", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The State of New York is lessee of the housing project from the Federal Public Housing Authority. In turn the State of New York is lessor to the Town of Hempstead. The Town of Hempstead, under a permissive clause in its contract, engaged one Moriarity as agent to manage, operate and maintain the property on its behalf. Moriarity, as agent, leased an apartment to the parents of the infant. Also, Moriarity, as agent, contracted with Nassau & Suffolk Coinmeter, Inc., to install, maintain, and operate seventeen Bendix fully automatic coinmetered washing machines at various locations at the housing project and, at its own expense, to provide insurance coverage against personal injuries resulting from any equipment installed, and also to provide a contingent liability policy in favor of the State, the Town of Hempstead and the agent. The machines were to remain the property of Coinmeter and to be under its exclusive control and supervision. That contract contained the following clause: \u201c 8. Liability and Indemnification (a) The Company agrees to hold the State of New York the Town of Hempstead and the Agent harmless against all claims, liabilities or losses arising from injuries or alleged injuries to person or property in connection with the installation, operation, maintenance, servicing and supervision of the Machines or any other equipment installed or operated pursuant to this contract, (b) The Company agrees that the Agent is under no duty to safeguard or protect the Machines or equipment installed pursuant to this contract, and that the Agent will not be liable for any loss of or damage to such Machines or equipment or any part thereof because of fire, <mask>, loss, vandalism or other cause.\u201d"], "id": "b9c98f2a-1bf6-4202-b9be-70e4d87431c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["it entered against Sea Wasp meant this claim was a wash with neither party prevailing.7 When both sides achieve some litigation victories on a claim, there may not be a prevailing party. See, e.g., PlainsCapital Bank v. Jani, 2015 WL 7303934, at *3 (Tex. App.\u2014Fort Worth Nov. 19, 2015, pet. denied) (neither party prevailed); Mendleski v. Silvertooth, 798 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.\u2014 Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (same); Schlobohm v. Pepperidge Farm, 806 F.2d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Tunison v. Cont\u2019l Airlines Corp., 162 F.3d 1187, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same, citing cases); see also Travel Music of San Antonio, Inc. v. Douglas, 2002 WL 1058527, at *3 (Tex. App.\u2014San Antonio May 29, 2002, pet. denied) (neither side prevailed under Texas <mask> Liability Act when plaintiff dismissed before trial). Finding no prevailing party was sound here. Not only did Domain Protection obtain an early win with the preliminary injunction, but by unlocking the domain names that injunction may have contributed to Domain Protection\u2019s later failure to prove damages. It would be odd\u2014and seemingly undermine the goal of mitigating damages\u2014if a plaintiff\u2019s obtaining preliminary relief in a case later means it has to pay defense fees if it no longer has damages to recover. The district court thus was entitled to conclude that neither side prevailed. The intermediate Texas case Sea Wasp relies on does not counsel otherwise. See Glattly v. Air Starter Components, Inc., 332 S.W.3d 620, 640\u2013 41 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).8 Glattly does not"], "id": "11af6972-3f4b-4d6c-9fbc-7209a5e0f7de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["To accept the Division of Parole\u2019s position on this would allow for obvious abuses and an enormous waste of resources. Theoretically, if a person had been arrested on criminal charges alleging the <mask> of a loaded handgun and was violated on a criminal possession of a weapon third degree charge, a violation hearing could be held on that charge. If he prevailed at that hearing, the Division of Parole could then refile on a grand larceny charge involving the theft of the same handgun. If the petitioner prevailed on that charge, the Division of Parole could then refile on criminal possession of stolen property charges. That certainly is not the intent behind the authority given Parole from the New York State Legislature to monitor and supervise parolees released to their care and supervision."], "id": "6bc41a5e-0b0c-404d-b9d7-c7cda1bc8392", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It should be noted that this was defendant\u2019s ultimately evolved position on the trial, one drastically different from that contained in its pleadings and on many earlier motions herein. First of all, defendant originally sought to hold on tc the entire last two years of plaintiff\u2019s commissions over an( above his drawings, simply because of his alleged disloyalty i?. the last six months of that period. It was only on the trial that defendant finally sought to amend its theory to a claim for all earnings, drawings and commissions, but limited to those accrued during the last six months. Secondly, defendant had originally sought injunctive relief, loss of profits, and various counterclaims, all based on unfair competition, alleged <mask> of customers and trade secrets, and conspiracy with Lipten, together with inducing him to damage defendant\u2019s business; on the trial defendant expressly and haec verba dropped each and every one of these, and limited its complaint to plaintiff\u2019s *996six months of secret plans, while still representing defendant. Belated as this rethinking was, nevertheless, in the interest of justice, to avoid more years of delay, and in the absence of a showing of harm or surprise to plaintiff, I have permitted a wholesale conforming of all pleadings to the proof, albeit with considerable reluctance."], "id": "11d39291-2166-4bd7-a2dc-f73e44301fce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Having determined that, the issue remains whether defendant\u2019s actions constituted force within the meaning of the robbery statute. New York courts have generally followed the majority rule in most jurisdictions which have dealt with these types of cases, that \"a snatching unaccompanied by any resistance is not sufficient to constitute a robbery\u201d (People v Santiago, 62 AD2d 572, 575 [2d Dept], affd 48 NY2d 1023), and have declined to follow the minority view, led by the Kentucky courts, that \"a snatching of property from the victim is sufficient to constitute a robbery regardless of the victim\u2019s resistance or lack thereof\u2019 (People v Santiago, supra, at 578, citing Jones v Commonwealth, 112 Ky 689, 66 SW 633). Nevertheless, various State courts have determined that the force applied in the taking of a purse while looped over the victim\u2019s arm, shoulder or hand was sufficient to constitute a robbery (see, e.g., Commonwealth v Brown, 2 Mass App 883, 318 NE2d 486; Commonwealth v Jones, 362 Mass 83, 283 NE2d 840; State v Scoby, 719 SW2d 916 [Mo App]; but see, State v Sein, 124 NJ 209, 590 A2d 665; People v Gary, 80 Ill App 3d 817, 400 NE2d 473). Similarly, and more precisely, State courts have determined that where a purse was snatched with a great degree of force or where the strap or handle broke, the taking was accomplished with sufficient physical force to constitute a robbery (see, People v Roberts, 57 *510Cal App 3d 782, 129 Cal Rptr 529, overruled on other grounds in People v Rollo, 20 Cal 3d 109, 569 P2d 771; Raiford v State, 52 Md App 163, 447 A2d 496, affd in part and revd in part on other grounds 296 Md 289, 462 A2d 1192 [handbag \"ripped\u201d from the complainant]; Annotation, Purse Snatching as Robbery or <mask>, 42 ALR3d 1381-1391)."], "id": "5fc31993-f551-4d85-a10a-6e22eb95a97d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["While to the uninitiated \"assailing thieves\u201d may be considered the equivalent of pirates, such thieves are in fact quite different and their domestic depredations are covered while those of international pirates are not. A forcible taking on the high seas is piracy. A forcible taking in port or in local waters is a taking by assailing thieves. It is certainly a <mask> under the law of New York."], "id": "2a8103de-1b2e-4cd6-9d0b-f5dfb0c2b958", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["One of the risks insured against is loss by \u201c fires.\u201d This word follows the word \u201c seas.\u201d Another risk is that of loss by \u201c pirates, rovers or assailing thieves.\u201d If the goods in question had been lost while in the course of transportation through a fire on land or stolen on land, I would decide the case against the insurance company, for I would apply the well-known rule that as the language employed in the policy being that of the insurance company, all ambiguities ought to be resolved in favor of the assured. Imperial Shale Brick Co. v. Jewett, 169 N. Y. 143. For the printed part quoted plainly says that the insurance company will bear and take upon itself \u201c all other like perils, losses and misfortunes.\u201d A loss by fire or <mask> on land is like a similar loss on the seas. If, however, the tissue paper had been destroyed, while in transit on land, by some liquid having been accidentally thrown on it by some stranger to the contract, would the insurance company be liable? I think not. There is no ambiguity about that. Such a loss or peril would have been as unlike a peril insured against as a house is unlike a ship. To say that the company undertook to indemnify the plaintiff against all losses on land would be making a new contract for the parties, which even a court of equity would have no right to make. Albany City Savings Inst. v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40, 46."], "id": "15331390-3ef1-4c6f-ad05-476b3dd67ba2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On this appeal, defendant renews his contention that there is no such crime as attempted jostling. We agree. Jostling itself is an inchoate <mask> offense, aimed at the pickpocket who surreptitiously attempts to secure the personal property of his victim. It is in the nature of an *77attempt (see People v Thomas, 36 NY2d 514, 517; People v Rivera, 105 Misc 2d 285; Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law, \u00a7 165.25, pp 236-237). As such, there can be no such crime as attempted jostling. \u201c[TJhere cannot be an attempt to commit a crime which is itself a mere attempt to do an act or accomplish a result\u201d (People v Schmidt, 76 Misc 2d 976, 978; see 22 CJS, Criminal Law, \u00a7 74). Since a defendant cannot be convicted after trial of a nonexistent crime (see, e.g., People v Foster, 19 NY2d 150; People v Brown, 21 AD2d 738; People v Hassin, 48 AD2d 705), the charge must be dismissed."], "id": "03c31ca8-41f7-4fb6-9859-60e0aef562dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The new shoplifting statute directs that \"[n]o person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or <mask> of the same property.\" (\u00a7 459.5, subd. (b).) As the Supreme Court held, \"the phrase 'the same property' confirms that multiple burglary charges may not be based on entry with intent to commit different forms of theft offenses if the property intended to be stolen is the same property at issue in the shoplifting charge.\" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Robbery is a \"theft offense[ ],\" as the Supreme Court used that term in Gonzales. (See People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 692, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887 [\" 'robbery was the only available theft offense' \"];"], "id": "e45db6b2-fd77-462f-92ee-b04629600161", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, Morales seeks to persuade this court that the plain meaning of Penal Code section 490.2 entails results so dire as to compel us to \"rewrite the statute[ ] under the absurd consequences doctrine.\" ( Bell , supra , 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 352, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 93.) We are not so persuaded. In *358the first place, to call vehicle <mask> \"a more culpable act\" than post-theft driving is to beg the question. As the People note, there are reasons to think that the opposite is true. Driving is an inherently dangerous activity, driving illegally even more so, and although the theft of a car is a single incident, driving a car without its owner's permission may be done many times, multiplying the threat to public safety.2 Far from being absurd, then imposing harsher punishment on driving violations of section 10851 is entirely reasonable in this respect."], "id": "9839d006-8b46-486b-8f4d-0415cfda0270", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Coblentzes then moved, pursuant to CR 60.02, to set aside the order granting partial summary judgment, arguing Day presented no proof of adverse possession. The trial court granted so much of the motion awarding Day ownership of a portion of the Coblentz farm. However, it declined to set aside its finding the deed was champertous. Day then voluntarily dismissed his claims for adverse possession and <mask> of timber. The Coblentzes prevailed on all remaining issues at a jury trial. The trial court's judgment following the jury verdict made the partial summary judgment entered in Day's favor final and appealable."], "id": "87161af6-4fcf-4d9d-92e3-5fb497557480", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["What distinguishes this case from Williams , supra , 57 Cal.4th 776, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 305 P.3d 1241, is precisely what distinguishes <mask> by larceny from theft by false pretenses. As discussed above, theft by false pretenses requires two elements which larceny does not: the consent of the lawful owner to the defendant taking the *245property; and the lawful owner's reliance on the defendant's false representation. (Compare Davis , supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 305, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165 with *910Williams , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 787, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 305 P.3d 1241.)"], "id": "7c6059df-8022-426c-a37d-7014ef157cf3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The dissent asks us to consider the impact on inherent dangerousness by manufacturing methamphetamine in a more professional setting. To that end, he suggests that manufacturing (1) in a well-ventilated and equipped laboratory or (2) by a Ph.D. in chemistry could demonstrate that it is possible to manufacture methamphetamine safely, citing Howard . He offers in support a 2005 article titled SDSU grad indicted on charges he used campus lab to make drugs , and a 2008 article titled, Ex-Ph.D student makes a deal in meth, <mask> case , involving a University of California at Merced doctoral student. (Dis. opn. post , at p. 696, fns. 3, 4.) The first article alleged a San Diego State University graduate \"used a campus laboratory to manufacture methamphetamine, Ecstasy and other drugs,\" and that additional Ecstasy and fentanyl were recovered at his residence. The article presents no information from which to infer that the campus environment was any \"safer\" a venue to manufacture methamphetamine. (See The San Diego Union-Tribune, SDSU grad indicted on charges he used campus lab to make drugs (June 30, 2005) http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-sdsu-grad-indicted-on-charges-he-used-campus-lab-2005jun30-story.html [as of April 25, 2019].) Similarly, the doctoral student in Merced was charged with \"felony conspiracy to make meth[amphetamine] and embezzlement\" for allegedly stealing \"$ 10,000 in chemicals and equipment from the school\" to manufacture methamphetamine. Again, the article reveals nothing from which to infer that the student was \"safely\" producing methamphetamine. In fact, the investigation led to his and other residences where \"several thousand dollars worth of glass flasks, vessels, pumps and other equipment, as well as chemicals used in the production of meth\" was found. (See The Modesto Bee, Ex-Ph.D student makes a deal in meth , theft case (Sept. 27, 2018) < https://www.modbee.com/news/local/crime/article3114437.html> [as of April 25, 2019].) Storing chemicals in residences does not seem particularly any safer, despite the student's doctoral candidacy. The dissent also asks whether the outcome would be different if manufacturing took place in an isolated location, and \"Does the law change if, in the next case, the defendant is not someone like Gregory White but instead like Walter White?\" (Dis. opn. post , at p. 697 and fn. 5 [citing a Wikipedia entry for the fictional Walter White of the \"Breaking Bad\" television show]. (See Walter White (Breaking Bad )-Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_White_(Breaking_Bad)> [as of April 25, 2019] ).) The comparison to a fictional character is compromised when one realizes that the producers of that series had an interest in ensuring the protagonist-meth-cooking Walter-returned after each episode instead of perhaps perishing in a fire or explosion or from toxic fumes. Further, while we are reluctant to rely on a Wikipedia article (see Crispin v. Christian Audigier , Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2010) 717 F.Supp.2d 965, 976, fn. 19 [collecting cases on the unreliability of a \"user-generated source\" as a legal reference]; Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2015) 112 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1028 ; People v. Stamps (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 988, 997, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 828 [Wikipedia considered as hearsay] ), we would point out that the article's abstract of five seasons of the Breaking Bad series indicates several deaths occurred during the fictional Walter's enterprise, if apparently intentional. For example, the article states that in the first season, Walter begins a \"cook,\" only to produce phosphine gas. Phosphine gas is a toxic byproduct of methamphetamine manufacturing that was used as a nerve agent in World War I. (See People v. Odom (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1034, 277 Cal.Rptr. 265.) Walter then used the gas to kill one antagonist and incapacitate another, only to garotte him later. Notwithstanding dramatic plot twists, manufacturing in an isolated location is not dispositive of safety, and if an accomplice or other person is killed during the process, exposure to murder charges exists regardless of location. Of course, if no one else is present, there can be no killing for purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule and the issue is moot."], "id": "4dae6299-5d7d-4a33-9e22-32d0e3a0a6c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Let me say at once that petitioner\u2019s personal character is not in issue. But the respondent contends that denial of renewal of license is warranted because petitioner\u2019s son who in March, 1958, Was 16 years of age, had been twice apprehended and *1022charged with violation of law. Denial is rested on \u2018 \u2018 the situation as it exists in his home. \u2019 \u2019 Two pistols were burglarized from his home in his absence. The premises had been completely ransacked and the pistols discovered and taken despite their storage in apparently inaccessible locations. Petitioner secured the return of the pistols on January 30,1959, four days after the <mask>."], "id": "5215be58-deab-4eab-94e4-1c653813aa05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The specific grounds for DCAS\u2019s denial of petitioner\u2019s application were his 2009 dismissal by DOE as a school custodian \u201cfor misconduct related to <mask> of school property and conflict of interest for receiving improper compensation by concealing payment for contracted work,\u201d construction of a wall in the basement of the school where petitioner was employed. (Verified petition, exhibit A.) After a hearing by a City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) administrative law judge (ALJ), DOE\u2019s Chancellor accepted the ALJ\u2019s recommendation and terminated petitioner\u2019s employment in a decision dated November 16, 2009. The Chancellor found that petitioner\u2019s \u201cactions involved deception and moral turpitude\u201d and that he \u201cdisplayed no remorse\u201d and took no \u201cresponsibility for his proven misconduct.\u201d {Id., exhibit B at 2.)"], "id": "c6db9e3c-e507-435e-89c5-99ebdac7f261", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The probation report submitted to the juvenile court indicated that Mark had a record of disciplinary issues at school, had been arrested for vehicle <mask> earlier in the year and was currently participating in a restorative justice program, and had been cited for stealing a sports jersey at the mall the day before he was arrested for bringing a weapon to school."], "id": "e88cb16d-af51-4abb-b828-7ce16b07245a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The police officer who was called to the scene by a witness who saw the attempted <mask>, testified that he was unable to apprehend the thief, but that the right wheel of the automobile was over the curb and there was evidence that the front of the defendant\u2019s automobile had struck the rear of the plaintiff\u2019s automobile. He further stated that he entered the defendant\u2019s car and tried to start the motor; that he was able to do so by turning the ignition switch even though there was no key visible. However, when he stopped the motor and turned the key to the locked position he was unable to start the motor again."], "id": "439cf256-8b5a-4fe3-96bf-2f33ed7730cf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In Vidana , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 649, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805, the court held that grand <mask> by larceny under section 487, subdivision (a), and embezzlement under section 503 are \"different statements of the same offense.\" It reached this result notwithstanding that separate code provisions were involved, based on a comprehensive review of California's theft statutes including section 490a, which states \" '[w]herever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, embezzlement or stealing, said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word 'theft' were substituted therefore.' \""], "id": "2301ef3c-6924-421f-8810-9a6b05d402e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["D.N.'s adjudication for felony <mask> of a vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code section 10851 is reduced to a misdemeanor. The case is remanded to the juvenile court for the court to amend its minute orders from the jurisdiction and disposition hearings to reflect D.N.'s adjudication in count 2 is a misdemeanor. The remaining orders of the juvenile court are affirmed."], "id": "c702b0d0-877f-46d8-97d8-1bd5569e2b25", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In Halper (supra) the formula utilized by the False Claims Act produced a penalty of somewhat over 224 times the actual <mask>.6 This disturbed the Supreme Court as being grossly inconsistent with a remedial interpretation of the effect of the statute. Indeed, the court took special pains to point out in footnote 9 the fact that under the false claim statute as amended in 1986 the civil penalty against the defendant would have been more than $326,755, almost 560 times the actual theft. (490 US, supra, at 450.)"], "id": "12c2c293-d81f-4a27-aa00-2ae40ded3b19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Limitation by petitioner\u2019s brief to the narrower question has important bearing on whether the proceeding may be maintained as a class action. So limited, the issue becomes not whether respondent has determined on substantial evidence that petitioner and her children are not destitute or that no loss or <mask> occurred, but whether respondent\u2019s refusal as a matter of policy to consider the facts is impermissible under governing statutes and regulations. While the first would be a situation in which the wrongs asserted are individual to the different persons involved and thus not properly the subject of a class action (Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N Y 2d 120; Summers v. Wyman, 64 Misc 2d 67, affd. 36 A D 2d 795), the second Avould be a breach of duty which adversely affects in the same way the interest of every grant recipient whose cash has been lost or *692stolen \u2018 \u2018 and, being a wrong done to all, it should be susceptible of correction by legal action taken for the benefit of all \u2019 \u2019, Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp (18 N Y 2d 528, 537). Furthermore, a judgment in favor of all members of the class (persons denied a special grant by reason of respondent\u2019s policy refusal to consider their requests on the facts) \u201c could not, of course, prejudice the interests of any members of the class \u201d (Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., supra, p. 528, n. 2). While it is true, as respondent\u2019s brief notes, that Hall v. Coburn Corp. of Amer. (26 N Y 2d 396, 402) emphasized \u201c the closely associated relationships growing out of trust, partnership or joint venture, and ownership of corporate stock \u2019 \u2019 that have existed in class actions sanctioned by the Court of Appeals, it is also true that CPLB 1005 (subd. [a]) is not limited to those situations alone and that the question whether respondent\u2019s flat policy determination is permissible \u2018 \u2018 is one of common or general interest of many persons \u201d (i.e. those who have been, or may hereafter be, denied a special grant without regard to the facts)."], "id": "2c9e9618-8901-4268-854d-09721dbf4443", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This explanation does several things to support the conclusion that the electorate intended not only a narrow definition of larceny in the proposed shoplifting statute, but also the use of the historical definition of larceny. First, the analysis specifically describes shoplifting as \"a type of petty <mask>.\" (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra , analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35.) This description not only associates shoplifting with a specific type of crime, petty theft, but further identifies shoplifting as only a subset of that crime. At a minimum, then, the voters would expect shoplifting to be narrower than petty theft if relying on this description. Second, the analysis differentiates shoplifting from burglary, explaining that shoplifting is sometimes charged as burglary, as opposed to the petty theft of which it is a subset, and explicitly preventing that future practice. (Ibid .) Thus, voters relying on these statements would expect that shoplifting would be treated differently from burglary if Proposition 47 is passed. Finally, the analysis treats shoplifting as an existing crime, listing it with other known crimes which already have statutory definitions such as grand theft, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, forgery, and drug possession, while consistently *680using language suggesting individuals are regularly incarcerated for committing such crimes. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra , analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, pp. 35-36 [\"the measure reduces the penalties for the following crimes\"; \"about 40,000 offenders annually are convicted of the above crimes\"; \"the above crimes are nonserious and nonviolent, most offenders are currently being handled at the county level\"].) As such, one reading the analysis would conclude that the crime of shoplifting already exists and, knowledgeable about the general description of the crime in California case law to that point (People v. Superior Court (Cervantes ), supra , 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 ), would likely understand the crime to be limited in line with the historical definition of larceny."], "id": "4bd8c08c-6a91-47df-999e-1247fb37507a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Caretto's offense was receiving stolen property in violation of section 496, not <mask> of access card information in violation of section 484e, subdivision (c). But the valuation issue is the same and the reasoning in Romanowski applies with equal force. Caretto contended in the trial court that a debit card has only the minimal, intrinsic value of its plastic. As noted above, Romanowski rejected that approach in favor of applying the fair market value test. ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 915, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 [finding this \"approach has no basis in the statutory language 'reasonable and fair market value' \" in \u00a7 484, subd. (a) ].) Caretto now contends the \"reasonable and fair market value\" cannot be based on the amount of money in the linked accounts because, in his view, \"that is not how much the stolen cards would sell for.\" Instead, he argues that because Romanowski did not preclude the use of black market value, he is entitled to remand for an opportunity to present evidence of \"black market worth.\""], "id": "ea6c6cbe-cb7d-4329-965b-c4a06b5fa0b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In April 2015, defendant filed a motion seeking to be resentenced in the felony grand <mask> case on the ground that the redesignation of the petty theft with a prior conviction as a misdemeanor meant it was no longer a prior prison term for a felony under section 667.5, subdivision (b); thus, she argued, she was entitled to have her felony grand theft sentence reduced by a year."], "id": "1a511bd0-b7d4-4e97-aa03-9a3c2c78baca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The laws of most civilized nations show that they have considered it^unsafe to leave the necessitous borrower in the power of the lender. By the law of Moses, the Jews were prohibited from lending money upon usury to their brethren; though they were allowed to exact any rate of interest which *593they could obtain from strangers, the inhabitants of the surrounding nations, against whom the divine vengeance was denounced, on account of their idolatries and abominations ; but under the gospel dispensation, which teaches us to consider and treat all mankind as our brethren, every kind of lending upon usury is most unequivocally condemned. Long before the introduction of Christianity among the Romans, their laws also had prohibited the lending of money upon usury, and they punished it even more severely than the crime of <mask>, although judicial interest was allowed for withholding the payment of the money loaned, after the expiration of the stipulated time. This law was subsequently altered so as to allow a limited compensation by way of interest on the loan \u00a9f money ; and with various modifications, it still exists as the law of those countries which have derived the fundamental principles of their several codes from the ample stores of the civil law. 1 Domat, 128. 1 Bro. Civ. & Adm. Law, 376. Inst. Law of Spain, 283. Van Der Linden\u2019s Inst. 318, \u00a7 3. 1 Bell\u2019s Com. 308, Neither have these regulations, as to the rates of interest to be taken on loans of money, been confined to the Jews, and to those nations usually denominated civilized. By the laws of China, interest on a loan is limited to a certain rate per month, and whatever may be the term of credit, the lender can in no case recover interest exceeding the amount of the original debt, on the principal of the sum loaned. Staunt. Law of China, 158. So by the institutes of the Emperor Akber, a descendant of Tamerlane, and who gave law to a vast empire in Asia two hundred and fifty years since, the amount of interest on a simple loan was fixed at a certain rate per month, according to the rank of the parties to the loan ; and for a loan upon security or deposit, the interest was but one fourth of the amount allowed on a simple loan, and, as in the laws of China and of Rome, interest was in no case recoverable beyond the amount of the sum lent. 1 Glad-win\u2019s Ayeen Akbery, 471. So also, by the present law of the Hindoos, their rate of interest is fixed according to the rank of the parties; the highest interest being payable between persons of the lowest caste, and the rate of interest allowed on simple loans being higher than that allowed on loans upon *594deposit, &c. 1 Strange\u2019s Hindu Law, 297. With such evidences before us of the common understanding of mankind on this subject, and in all ages of the world, can it be doubted that the needy borrower must to a certain extent be protected against himself, and against the disastrous effects of his own improvidence 1"], "id": "be7db886-78db-40f6-9961-92a7c768c21a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A review of case law in this jurisdiction reveals but one definition of the words \u2018 \u2018 attended \u2019 \u2019 and \u2018 \u2018 unattended \u2019 \u2019 when used in an exclusionary clause of an insurance contract. In Kinscherf Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. (234 App. Div. 385, 386), the court was called upon to interpret a policy provision denying coverage \u201c whilst in or upon any automobile \u2022' * * unless such conveyance is attended at the time the loss occurs by a permanent employee of the assured.\u201d The court held (p. 386) that, \u201c such language can only be interpreted to *694mean that if the permanent employee of the plaintiff is not actually within or on the automobile, or so near thereto as to be able to observe a <mask> of the contents, he shall not be deemed to be in attendance at the time the loss occurs"], "id": "bd713e48-d8c9-4a4f-a688-14ff560ed01e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There is another facet of the conspiracy with which the defendant is charged which is, in the court\u2019s view, unsupported by the evidence. The alleged middlemen, operating as Melo Fashions, allegedly paid a detective Thomas Holland to provide confidential law enforcement information to protect the operation from investigation and the operatives from arrest. There is no evidence that the defendant participated in or had actual knowledge of this aspect of the conspiracy. Since the inference of defendant\u2019s knowledge of the existence of others in the enterprise is justified by the essential nature of the conspiracy (United States v Agueci, supra, at p 827), and since bribery and bribe *466receiving were not foreseeably integral to the operation of the <mask> and distribution of stolen property scheme, the defendant cannot justifiably be held to have agreed to the commission of these crimes (see United States v Rosenblatt, supra, at p 38; People v Vario, 56 AD2d 641). In the court\u2019s view, the receipt at trial of evidence regarding these crimes might substantially prejudice the accused by injecting a sensational issue into the trial which is not probative of defendant\u2019s participation in the conspiracy (cf. United States v Agueci, supra, at p 827)."], "id": "0ea2c61b-8e5e-472a-a046-247129fa6181", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"If you conclude that the defendant committed another charged offense or committed the uncharged offense, that conclusion is only one factor to *325consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of Second Degree Burglary and/or Grand <mask> of Personal Property. The People must still prove every charge beyond a reasonable doubt.\""], "id": "e929654d-d8d5-495a-bcfa-1c00f3670e64", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["GRATTON, Judge Kegan Ray Kolander appeals from the district court\u2019s order of restitution. Kolander argues the district court abused its discretion when it granted the State\u2019s amended motion for restitution. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Kolander was charged with four counts of grand <mask> by unauthorized control, Idaho Code \u00a7 18-2403(3), and three counts of burglary, I.C. \u00a7 18-1401, after using an acquaintance\u2019s financial transaction card without consent. Pursuant to a plea agreement, filed in January 2020, Kolander pled guilty to one count of grand theft by unauthorized control and one count of burglary. The State dismissed all remaining charges. The plea agreement included a provision wherein Kolander"], "id": "708a565a-2dbe-49d9-957b-b227e031c09f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In 2012, an information in San Diego County Superior Court case No. SCD240790 charged Carrea with one count of inflicting corporal injury to a former cohabitant (\u00a7 273.5, subd. (a)) and alleged he had three prison priors within the meaning of sections 667.5, subdivision (b), and 668. The second prison prior allegation alleged he had section 484 <mask> and section 459 burglary convictions in 2004 for which he allegedly served a prison term and did not remain free of custody for five years after his release. In August 2012, a jury found Carrea guilty of the section 273.5, subdivision (a), offense and he admitted the truth of the prison prior allegations. In January 2013, the trial court sentenced him to a total term of seven years, including a four-year term for his section 273.5, subdivision (a), conviction, plus consecutive one-year terms for each of the three prison prior enhancements.2"], "id": "f3c5f149-7a7e-40c4-8abf-acd2652f9766", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We affirm. Viewing these unusual facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude substantial evidence supports Kaufman's conviction for grand <mask> by larceny, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on that offense. We find no basis to conclude that a victim's attempted extortion of the defendant presents a valid defense to a charge of theft by larceny. Even if it were a valid defense, the evidence Kaufman sought to introduce came in at trial and did not present substantial evidence of extortion to warrant a jury instruction. Finally, we reject the People's claim of sentencing error and conclude that by ordering summary probation, the trial court classified Kaufman's offense as a misdemeanor by operation of law."], "id": "2b38259f-9689-46d3-8965-a4cfae3d30ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["See OCGA \u00a7\u00a7 17-3-1 (c) (providing for limitation period of four years for felonies other than those specifically listed or otherwise excluded); 16-8-12 (a) (3) (classifying <mask> by taking as a felony if committed \u201cby a fiduciary in breach of a fiduciary obligation\u201d). This Court denied McClendon\u2019s application for interlocutory appeal of this ruling. McClendon v. State, Case No. A20I0124 (Dec. 13, 2019)."], "id": "888340f2-a978-4217-971d-238a0e02e5a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Proposition 47 also added section 490.2, which states in part: \"Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand <mask>, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or *647personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor ....\" ( \u00a7 490.2.)"], "id": "a0589ffb-47f5-480e-8651-e0abb418908e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*268For example, in J.B ., our colleagues in Division Three struck such a condition as unreasonable. ( J.B., supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 752, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 589.) The minor admitted an allegation of petty <mask>, was adjudged a ward of the court, and placed on probation. The juvenile court imposed an electronics search condition, relying on the minor's statement he had been using marijuana for at least two and a half years and the court's experience that minors using drugs tend to brag about their usage on the Internet. ( Id. at pp. 752-753, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 589.) J.B."], "id": "a80be127-703c-4f38-8ab7-67ca8b9fff44", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On April 16, 2016, plaintiff submitted a telephonic whistleblower complaint to the Auditor. He \"reported the ... flaws in the Lottery's Retailer *478Compliance Program as well as the Lottery's failure to implement notification systems to flag and apprise investigators in advance of suspicious transactions and activities. In reporting the Lottery's failure to employ sufficient oversight and safeguards to prevent <mask> and embezzlement of scratchers tickets,\" plaintiff identified two specific cases \"whereby scratchers tickets retailers or their employees were able to abscond with approximately $123,000 and $270,000 worth of tickets ... months before the Lottery even became suspicious and began to investigate.\" He reported that defendant uses notification systems for its other games, but not for scratchers tickets, and he \"apprised the Bureau of the statements I had received from other Lottery[ ] supervisors and staff indicating that the Lottery was more concerned about sales of Lottery tickets than with preventing fraud.\""], "id": "1a584868-2d38-46a5-9b1c-fbc051d528e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["When a speaker communicates information on a subject matter in which he has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty and such information is communicated to a person with a corresponding interest or duty, a qualified privilege exists (La Scala v D\u2019Angelo, 104 AD2d 930, 931). Ms. Pizarro and all others present when Mr. Baeza made the remarks were all employees at Debevoise, and all shared an interest in protecting documents from <mask>."], "id": "9f884990-e49a-4c56-b673-e6446c795db9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "theft", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*914The majority opinion relies on People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165 ( Davis ) and attempts to distinguish Williams to find that the basis of Mireles's crime was larceny rather than <mask> by false pretenses and that, therefore, his conviction for robbery is supported by People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 194 Cal.Rptr. 909."], "id": "2669c30e-fc22-4855-b168-e7f04d4ccce4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We are not persuaded by the People's reliance on either People v. Huerta (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 539, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 637 ( Huerta ), or People v. Segura (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1282, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 904 ( Segura ), both of which predate Gonzales and Romanowski. Moreover, Huerta does not aid the People's position. The District Attorney in that case argued that Huerta was not eligible to have her burglary conviction redesignated as misdemeanor <mask> because she committed felony conspiracy during the offense. ( Huerta, at pp. 544-545, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.) The Court of Appeal determined that under the plain text of section 459.5, \"the prosecutors would have been required to charge [Huerta] with shoplifting and could not have charged her with burglary predicated on conspiracy had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of her offense.\" ( Huerta, at p. 545, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.) As a result, Huerta was entitled to have her burglary conviction reclassified as misdemeanor shoplifting. ( Ibid. )"], "id": "69ba230a-e73f-4d37-8d34-1fd6527c5eac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Ms. Jones described the scope of her part-time employment with Dillard's. She stated that she worked \"off-duty\" for Dillard's, during which time she was in uniform but was paid by Dillard's. Although her primary responsibilities were to deter crime and prevent <mask>, Ms. Jones had the full authority, as a Little Rock police officer, to make arrests for any criminal acts she observed. Ms. Jones stated that, during the 2012 incident when she was injured, she was attempting to make an arrest. She further stated that she had gotten involved in other incidents while working at Dillard's that did not involve Dillard's. For example, on one occasion Ms. Jones took a report from a lady who had her purse stolen, and on another occasion she made contact with and assisted in arresting an intoxicated man who had passed out in his car with a child present. Ms. Jones indicated that Dillard's did not object to her participation in these other criminal episodes and that, had she not gotten involved, she would have been in trouble with the Department."], "id": "822c38fa-2033-4504-91e2-0676ba763263", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As a result of the passage of Proposition 47 in November 2014, the felony offenses in the three cases were reclassified as misdemeanors with one exception: resisting an executive officer in the present case. (\u00a7 69.) In April 2015 appellant filed a petition for the recall of his felony sentence for second degree commercial burglary ( \u00a7 459 ) in the present case. Appellant requested that he be resentenced to misdemeanor <mask> (\u00a7 459.5) pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (b).2"], "id": "afbeaaf9-583e-4d8b-885a-9589a3955f54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["To the extent that the People\u2019s argument can be read to suggest that the defendant\u2019s criminal history would also not support Ms. Cardona\u2019s conclusion that he has an addiction or dependence on cocaine or alcohol, that argument does have some validity. The defendant\u2019s criminal record not only shows that he is a dealer of narcotics, but there is a glaring absence of any arrests or convictions for crimes in which cocaine was possessed for individual use. In fact, there is not a single misdemeanor arrest or conviction noted on his criminal record. Of course, the court understands that a person can be an addict and/or substance dependent and never have a positive random toxicology test, or never attend a treatment program, or never be arrested for \u201caddict-type\u201d crimes such as possession of a crack pipe or hypodermic needle, <mask>, criminal mischief, car theft, trespassing, or DWI. But the absence of even one of these facts in this case hardly supports the defendant\u2019s claim that he has a cocaine and alcohol addiction or dependence, let alone one serious enough to justify placing him into a long-term residential treatment program."], "id": "86113029-1205-4561-9b94-9b81eff23b2d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The analysis by the Legislative Analyst provides a summary of the \"Proposal \" made by Proposition 47. (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014), analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, pp. 35-36.) This proposal identifies several specific crimes, their existing penalties, and *568describes how Proposition 47 would change the punishment for each specific crime. As the analysis explains, \"the measure reduces the penalties for the following crimes: [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] ... <mask>. Under current law, shoplifting property worth $950 or less (a type of petty theft) is often a misdemeanor. However, such crimes can also be charged as burglary, which is a wobbler. Under this measure, shoplifting property worth $950 or less would always be a misdemeanor and could not be charged as burglary.\" (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra , analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35.)"], "id": "159b3875-d4ce-42e4-add3-a8a3f35d233e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"(a) Notwithstanding Section 459, <mask> is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary. Shoplifting shall be punished as a misdemeanor, except that a person with one or more prior convictions for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290 may be punished pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. \"(b) Any act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.\"2 Lopez contends that because he was charged with shoplifting pursuant to section 459.5, he could not also be charged with petty theft with a prior pursuant to sections 484 and 666. The People argue that in order to avoid absurd results, this court should interpret section 459.5 to permit alternate charging of shoplifting and petty theft."], "id": "6587b7ab-a160-42e8-b496-00db867f2ee5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In March 2017, People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 held that entering a bank to cash a stolen check for less than $950 is \"shoplifting\" within the meaning of section 459.5. ( *953Id. at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The Court further held that even if the defendant entered the bank with an intent to commit identity theft, he could only be charged with <mask> under section 459.5. ( Id. at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "cb632e2a-421f-468a-bb7b-5b27114cdc89", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In reaching this conclusion, we are not swayed by the Attorney General's argument that while \"the outside of an operating ATM may be very similar to the inside of [a] bank that is open for business,\" the inside of an ATM is never open to the public and thus entry into it cannot be deemed entry into a commercial establishment. We are aware that the Supreme Court is currently considering a case involving the possible distinction between commercial and non-commercial spaces within an establishment for purposes of section 459.5. (See People v. Colbert (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 385, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 822, review granted Feb. 15, 2017, S238954 ( Colbert ) [identifying issue on review as whether a defendant's entry into a separate office area of a commercial establishment that was off-limits to the general public constitutes an \"exit\" from the \"commercial\" part of the establishment that precluded reducing his conviction for second degree burglary to misdemeanor <mask> under Penal Code section 459.5 ].) However, we do not find the Colbert situation particularly analogous to the case at hand. Rather, we consider the Fifth District's recent opinion in People v. Bunyard (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1237, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628 ( Bunyard ) instructive."], "id": "b4b61760-97ac-46ff-a076-1c6f12bf8f9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As will be discussed post , it is important to note that there is one substantial difference. Historical references treat the crime of <mask> as a theft offense, which is consistent with other state's statutory definitions and schemes. (See e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 30-16-20 (LexisNexis 2016) [defining shoplifting as taking or concealing merchandise with the intention of converting it without paying for it or altering the price tag or container in order to deprive the merchant of all or some part of the value of the merchandise]; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 597.850 (LexisNexis 2015) [\"A merchant is presumed to have reason to believe that merchandise has been wrongfully taken by a person and that the merchant can recover the merchandise by taking the person into custody and detaining the person if the merchant observed the person concealing merchandise while on the premises.\"]; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 30.875 (LexisNexis 2016) [\"An adult ... who takes possession of any merchandise displayed or offered for sale by any mercantile establishment ... without the consent of the owner and with the intention of converting such merchandise ... to the individual's own use without having paid the purchase price thereof....\"]; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 13-1805 (LexisNexis 2016) [in addition to provisions similar to New Mexico's statute, defining shoplifting as \"[c]harging the purchase price of the goods to a fictitious person or any person without that person's authority\"].) The definition of shoplifting under Proposition 47, however, invokes not only the structure and phrasing of California's burglary law but the statute itself. (See \u00a7\u00a7 459 [\"Every person who enters any [defined structure], with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.\"]; 459.5 [\"Notwithstanding Section 459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny....\"].)"], "id": "b2e09228-78a4-4f4b-a172-89b292d3a2fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court erred by allowing section 459.5's term for the offense, <mask>, to govern the definition of the crime. While section 459.5 sets forth the new crime of shoplifting, it does not use that term to define the criminal conduct that constitutes the offense. Rather than leaving the term \"shoplifting\" undefined or defining it by reference to the common meaning of that term, section 459.5 gives it a more technical, legal definition as a subset of commercial burglary, entry into a commercial establishment during regular business hours with the intent to commit or committing larceny. By relying on the common meaning of the descriptive term for the crime, the trial court ignores the key operative word, larceny, which has a technical, legal definition that the trial court missed."], "id": "152e8831-f2f1-439c-8115-586995c8be1f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It appears that Macy\u2019s is acting beyond the scope of its power given under the statutes. In that case, the balance of the equities tips more favorably for plaintiff. The harm a consumer will encounter in being detained, confessing and agreeing to pay a civil penalty while in detention far outweighs the harm, if any, Macy\u2019s would incur in being enjoined from demanding confessions and payments while the individual is under detention. A preliminary injunction preventing Macy\u2019s from demanding written confessions and payments from a suspected shoplifter while in detention in no way prevents Macy\u2019s from proceeding to demand payment through a collection effort by its attorneys, or through a civil action, after the suspected shoplifter has been released. It should be noted that the bill jacket contemplates those suspected of <mask> would be informed that the merchant will seek civil restitution, then be allowed to leave the store, then be served with a demand letter with an offer to settle. Demanding payment while the suspected shoplifter is under the merchant\u2019s detention is not contemplated."], "id": "360990ba-2870-44eb-b2b0-c32c1ca4cf9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Starting first with the statutory scheme of Proposition 47, a rote application of the broader term of theft to the text of the <mask> statute assumes that the electorate was either unable to or did not desire to *681distinguish between larceny and other forms of theft when enacting the new and amended laws. But this notion is undermined by the language choices made within Proposition 47. In the shoplifting statute, \"larceny\" is differentiated from \"theft.\" The statute uses larceny in the definition of shoplifting, but protects shoplifters from discretionary charging choices by adding that no person \"charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.\" (\u00a7 459.5, subd. (b).) This choice of wording within the statute at issue confirms the electorate thought larceny was something different than other forms of theft. There would be no rational purpose for choosing different words to convey the same meaning if larceny and other forms of theft were intended to be wholly overlapping terms. (See Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 334, 343, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 628, 232 P.3d 625 [rejecting argument which \"contravenes the principle that 'when different words are used in contemporaneously enacted, adjoining subdivisions of a statute, the inference is compelling that a difference in meaning was intended' \"].) In addition, at least one other modification to the Penal Code brought by Proposition 47 identified theft generally as opposed to larceny specifically. (\u00a7 490.2, subd. (a) [\"obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft\"].) Within the overall scheme of Proposition 47, then, it appears the electorate intended to differentiate larceny from theft."], "id": "efbb377d-c830-4e4f-bf94-49351d05129b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Brown argues that the text of section 459.5, created in 2014 by the passage of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47), required the People *924to charge <mask> instead of receiving stolen property. As a question of statutory construction, this issue is reviewed de novo. ( Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 246 P.3d 612.)"], "id": "0847128e-bc95-4ebe-8d63-c4520cd0df46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["E.P. argues \"[b]ecause [he] committed an act of <mask>, he cannot also be prosecuted for the crimes of receiving stolen property. One cannot be convicted of both stealing and receiving the same property.\" (See \u00a7 459.5, subd. (b) [\"[a]ny act of shoplifting ... shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property\"]; \u00a7 496, subd. (a) [every person who conceals or withholds stolen property from the owner knowing the property is stolen commits a crime; a principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted pursuant to this section but no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property];"], "id": "1318f5cd-b719-41be-b02c-461d83d0eb39", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Garcia aside, the Attorney General asserts the locker room was not part of the Anaheim ICE's commercial establishment. He argues Hallam was wrongly decided and notes the Supreme Court granted review in People v. Colbert (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 385, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 822, review granted February 15, 2017, S238954, H042499, to decide the following issue: \"Did defendant's entry into separate office areas of a commercial establishment that were off-limits to the general public constitute an 'exit' from the 'commercial' part of the establishment that precluded reducing his conviction for second degree burglary to misdemeanor <mask> under Penal Code section 459.5 ?\" In Colbert , the evidence showed the defendant entered the private offices of a convenience store and a gas station to steal about $300 on each occasion. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the defendant's petition to designate his crimes as shoplifting. Regardless how the court decides this issue, the evidence here shows the locker room was part of the commercial establishment."], "id": "e147654b-804f-4600-8985-7ec999cbdc04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Brandon Lamar Martin (defendant) appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18,1 a statute added by Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. Defendant asserts his burglary convictions are eligible for resentencing because they would have been convictions for <mask>, punishable as misdemeanors under section 459.5, another statute added by Proposition 47. We disagree and *671affirm the judgment of the trial court. Section 459.5's use of the term \"larceny\" does not include all forms of theft. Defendant's felony conviction for second degree burglary, for entering a commercial establishment and acquiring merchandise by use of a forged check, is not subject to recall of sentence and resentencing under section 1170.18, subdivision (a) or designation as a misdemeanor under section 1170.18, subdivision (f), because his conduct would not have constituted a violation of section 459.5 had that section been in effect at the time of his offense."], "id": "5b320b37-7569-4d5a-89d7-b25132e29c33", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At 8:30 p.m. on Dec. 19, 1974, Police Officer Van Sykle and his partner Police Officer Malkom, dressed in civilian clothes and in an unmarked car, drove into a parking lot adjacent to a supermarket. The area was known for its criminal activity, which consisted of purse-snatching and <mask>, and there had been narcotics sales and robberies in the vicinity. The police officers observed a van parked in front and to the right of their car, in the middle of the lot. They watched this vehicle for approximately 20 minutes. During that period of time they saw two or three individuals at a time exit the van, walk to the fence of the lot and to the store and return to the van, all without ever entering the store."], "id": "6dce5f7f-30ad-49d0-85ec-dc2e2f370a22", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court further explained that the use of the phrase \" 'the same property' \" in section 459.5, subdivision (b) \"confirms that multiple burglary charges may not be based on entry with intent to commit different forms of theft offenses if the property intended to be stolen is the same property at issue in the <mask> charge. Thus, the shoplifting statute would have precluded a burglary charge based on an entry with intent to commit identity theft here because the conduct underlying such a charge would have been the same as that involved in the shoplifting, namely, the cashing of the same stolen check to obtain less than $950. A felony burglary charge could legitimately lie if there was proof of *391entry with intent to commit a nontheft felony or an intent to commit a theft of other property exceeding the shoplifting limit.\" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 876-877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "09ced004-c724-4ab8-b008-6d40b1271c67", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Our Supreme Court has held that a Proposition 47 petition to reclassify a conviction as a misdemeanor does not provide an opportunity for the People to withdraw from a plea agreement and pursue dismissed charges. ( Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 987, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.) In the Supreme Court case, the defendant had been charged with robbery, but the charge was dismissed when he pled guilty to grand theft from the person of another (\u00a7 487, subd. (c)). ( Harris , supra , at pp. 987-988, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.) Relying on the intent behind Proposition 47, the Court held that that the People could not oppose a resentencing petition by withdrawing from a plea agreement. ( Harris , supra , at pp. 991-992, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.) In this case, then, the People cannot revive the robbery charge. Our focus must be on defendant's burglary conviction, and whether it must be recharacterized as misdemeanor <mask>."], "id": "048c64f3-28f8-4e53-beff-279bd0172f4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although Liu broadly suggests that any conviction under section 530.5 is not subject to Proposition 47 relief ( Liu , supra , 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 150-153, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 889 ), the only issue before it was the classification of a conviction under section 530.5, subdivision (c). The court had no occasion to consider whether a conviction under section 530.5, subdivision (a) may qualify as <mask> under section 459.5, subdivision (a). Once again, \"cases are not authority for propositions not considered.\" ( Peoplev. Alvarez , supra , 27 Cal.4th at p. 1176, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372 ; People v. Superior Court (Rodas) , supra , 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1323, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 308.)"], "id": "0e246637-8868-4bfc-b6da-29bf7a92c5c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*595People v. Ceja (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 3, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 229 P.3d 995 [theft conviction operates as a bar to a receiving conviction].) The Attorney General concedes that if E.P.'s offense was <mask>, he cannot be prosecuted for receiving stolen property. But E.P. was not charged with shoplifting, and the juvenile court did not find that he committed shoplifting. Our reversal of the court's finding on the burglary count is not a finding that E.P. actually committed shoplifting. We merely concluded the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was not shoplifting. Moreover, E.P. does not contend there was insufficient evidence to support the true findings on the receiving stolen property counts. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's findings on counts 4, 5, and 6."], "id": "5e4b79ae-907b-45e3-b430-32a08b33b690", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In Bunyard , the defendant seeking resentencing had been convicted of second degree burglary after he attempted to break into a coin-operated soap dispenser in a 24-hour commercial laundromat. ( Bunyard , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1240, 1244, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) The trial court determined that such conduct did not \"comport with the commonsense meaning *609of 'shoplifting' \" and thus denied the defendant's resentencing petition. ( Id. at pp. 1239-1240, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) The appellate court reversed, concluding that when the defendant entered the laundromat during its regular business hours with the intent to commit larceny by theft he met the statutory definition of <mask>. ( Id. at p. 1244, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) In making this determination, the court held that it did not matter whether the defendant \"used a tool to effectuate the intended theft or force to attempt to break into the coin box.\" ( Id. at p. 1244, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) Rather, it concluded that the electorate did not intend section 459.5 to cover \"only the theft of merchandise or goods displayed for sale,\" opining: \"It would make no sense to distinguish, for purposes of misdemeanor versus felony treatment, between the intended theft of merchandise worth $10 to $15 and the intended theft of coins worth $10 to $15, simply because the former is openly displayed and offered for sale and the latter is not.\" ( Id. at p. 1245, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) Similarly, in this case, the fact that the money sought was located inside of the ATM is of no moment where the commercial establishment was entered with the requisite intent. (See Ravenscroft , supra , 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 644, 243 Cal.Rptr. 827 [\"[t]he gravamen of burglary is an act of entry, no matter how partial or slight it may be, ... accompanied by the proper intent\"]; see also Davis , supra , 18 Cal.4th at p. 715, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083 ; Colbert , supra , 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 392, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 822 (dis. opn. of Rushing, P.J.) [under \"plain language\" of section 459.5, \"a defendant commits shoplifting as soon as he or she enters a commercial establishment with the requisite intent\"].)3"], "id": "8a219fab-a280-4aca-944b-6b67766d14a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Our Supreme Court has held that a Proposition 47 petition to reclassify a conviction as a misdemeanor does not provide an opportunity for the People to withdraw from a plea agreement and pursue dismissed charges. ( Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 987, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.) In the Supreme Court case, the defendant had been charged with robbery, but the charge was dismissed when he pled guilty to grand theft from the person of another (\u00a7 487, subd. (c)). ( Harris , supra , at pp. 987-988, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.) Relying on the intent behind Proposition 47, the Court held that that the People could not oppose a resentencing petition by withdrawing from a plea agreement. ( Harris , supra , at pp. 991-992, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.) In this case, then, the People cannot revive the robbery charge. Our focus must be on defendant's burglary conviction, and whether it must be recharacterized as misdemeanor <mask>."], "id": "42d07df9-08c4-411c-bafc-7614306ab629", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In August 2016, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition. In rejecting E.P.'s motion to dismiss the burglary charge, the court concluded the ice rink's locker rooms were not part of the commercial establishment and the crime of <mask> covered thefts from the business, not from private citizens. Consequently, the court found true the allegations in the petition against E.P., declared him a ward of the court, and placed him on probation."], "id": "3abf2a6a-bc95-4433-a08b-a8e6da4eff15", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Dziunaa v Korvettes (61 AD2d 677, supra) discussed the question in connection with the validity of a waiver extracted in a criminal proceeding as a defense to liability in a subsequent civil action. The plaintiff had been arrested for <mask>. Upon the People\u2019s consent to dismissal of the charge, the court, sua sponte, conditioned dismissal upon release by the defendant of his claim against the store. The First Department held (pp 679-680) the waiver invalid as a defense because the circumstances under which it had been obtained amounted to coercion and duress."], "id": "8353a631-085b-40a4-a4a9-6becf437fc0d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We are not unsympathetic to the Attorney General's argument that characterizing the instant offense as <mask> expands that term far beyond its commonly understood meaning. Were we drafting section 459.5 to more closely resemble the crime of shoplifting as it is conventionally understood, we might have limited its application to only nonviolent entries into commercial establishments and/or to thefts solely of retail merchandise. But these limitations might very well have excluded from resentencing many nonserious burglaries that the electorate would otherwise have chosen to reach, as the developing caselaw has illustrated. And, in any event, where such concepts are not included in the statutory language as it was enacted, we cannot add them by judicial fiat. (See Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 871, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 [when construing a term of art, courts must assume that the electorate was aware of the ramifications of its choice of language]; id. at p. 874, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 [noting that section 490.5 limits its scope to petty theft of retail merchandise, while section 459.5 contains no such limiting language].)"], "id": "26f81bb5-bff5-4911-bd33-f60647ac209a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The California Supreme Court is currently reviewing whether a defendant convicted of second degree burglary for entering a bank to cash forged checks is entitled to resentencing under section 1170.18 on the ground the offense meets the definition of <mask> under section 459.5. (People v. Gonzales (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 35, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S231171 [entry into a bank to cash a forged check was not larceny within the meaning of \u00a7 459.5]; People v. Vargas (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1416, review granted Mar. 30, 2016, S232673 [entry into check cashing establishment with intent to commit theft by false pretenses by cashing a forged check was an intent to commit \"larceny\"].)"], "id": "93c82651-d939-478c-acff-1d9e764d67c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Hallam rejected the Attorney General's argument a \"room within the business where the buying and selling of goods or services does not occur\" could not be part of the \"commercial establishment.\" ( Hallam, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 912, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 812.) \"Turning to the words of the statute here, we find no indication that <mask> can occur only in specific areas of a commercial establishment. Nor does there appear any requirement that the business's commercial activity must be taking place in the area from which the theft occurs in order to qualify the offense as shoplifting. The trial court thus added an element to the offense that is absent from the plain language of the statute itself when it determined that appellant's theft would qualify as shoplifting only if it occurred in an area of the commercial establishment open to the public where merchandise is sold. Based on its impermissible revision of the definition of shoplifting, the court concluded that the crime was burglary rather than shoplifting because appellant entered the store through the back and stole an item from the employee restroom rather than an area of the store that was 'open for business.' \" ( Id. at p. 912, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 812.)"], "id": "ba9275e9-72bc-43da-8383-b6a9b4082322", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As a final matter, we conclude-again based upon our consideration of the electorate's objectives, as well as the need to broadly construe section 459.5 in order to effectuate its underlying purposes-that an ATM's \"regular business hours\" for purposes of the <mask> statute are not necessarily the \"banker's hours\" associated with its affiliated financial institution. As stated above, an ATM is useful precisely because it \"constitutes a place where specific services are provided when the main facility is closed and not open for banking business.\" ( Donald , supra , 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1194, 260 Cal.Rptr. 49.) Thus, even when the bank, itself, is closed to the public, many ATMs are still engaged in active commerce. While some may be located inside banks or other commercial establishments with more restricted business hours, many are open and available for the business of financial transactions 24 hours a day. Where the offense at issue otherwise falls below the statutory ceiling of $950 ( \u00a7 459.5 ), we can discern no meaningful *610distinction between theft from an ATM that is open after formal banking hours and one that it only open during the bank's normal business day for purposes of applying Proposition 47. We therefore reach the rather unremarkable conclusion that an ATM's \"regular business hours\" for purposes of section 459.5 are those hours during which the ATM, itself, is open for business."], "id": "a32f5f10-64b2-4871-af9b-49c43e18a9c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In sum, the juvenile court erred in denying E.P.'s motion to dismiss the burglary count either on the ground that stealing from private citizens is outside the statutory definition of <mask> or on the ground that the locker room was not part of a commercial establishment. No other ground supports the court's denial. Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court's order declaring E.P.'s offense a second degree burglary."], "id": "a642c73d-87f7-4ad6-84eb-1adf8d4dd489", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court granted Jimenez's motion over the People's objection. It stated that it had reviewed Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th 858, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, and People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 ( Romanowski ), and concluded that under the reasoning and holding of those two cases, the \"[c]ourt's hands have been somewhat tied.\" The court explained: \"It appears indicated that when there's conduct that results in the theft, which was here theft of property when it was used to derive on two separate instances money less than $950, the Court is mandated to reduce those to misdemeanors. Those are the rulings put forth by the Supreme Court.\" The court further stated: \"And even though [this case] involves a different charge, it appears to be somewhat of a theft charge which was the focus of Gonzale [s ] and Romanowski .... And based on the Court's review of those two recent rulings, the Court feels it is obligated ... to grant the defense motion and reduce Count 1 and Count 2 to misdemeanors as it appears to be that conduct that has been described in Proposition 47 as a <mask> type of offense.\""], "id": "d93e61e1-c962-4777-91c1-a3f39794a8d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In addition to his sexual offense history, respondent has a long history of burglary, trespassing and theft-related arrests and convictions. According to criminal history information introduced into evidence as part of Dr. Frances\u2019 report, EH. was arrested for burglary in 1984 with no reported disposition, convicted in 1985 of receiving stolen property, convicted in a separate 1985 incident of petit larceny, convicted of petit larceny in 1986 after being arrested for burglary, convicted in a second 1986 incident of criminal possession of stolen property after being arrested for burglary, convicted of criminal trespass in 1987, convicted of burglary in 1988, convicted in a second 1988 incident of criminal trespass after being arrested for attempted burglary, convicted in 1989 of <mask> and convicted in a second 1989 incident of criminal trespass (in addition to public lewdness)."], "id": "6b916f0e-ceca-4ab3-b4ec-3a812689ce44", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Store detectives and other retail store employees are permitted to arrest or detain persons suspected of <mask> (General Business Law \u00a7218), and such employees are generally deemed to be acting as private individuals and not as public servants. However, government cannot avoid constitutional restrictions by using private persons as its agents or by participation in the private actions to such an extent that the private character of the activity is obscured. (People v Jones, 47 NY2d 528 [1979].) Thus, where police identified themselves to the defendant at the store premises and waited outside while store detectives questioned a suspect, the participation created the type of custodial atmosphere which Miranda (supra) was intended to alleviate. (People v Jones, supra, at 534.)"], "id": "1dcf7e0c-ba6d-4562-b388-3fdde2e006c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The weekend preceding the dispute was Father's custody weekend. Over the weekend, Daughter took a school trip to an amusement park. On Sunday, she and several other students were caught <mask>. Father was informed of the incident and was told Daughter likely would be suspended from school. Father and Mother exchanged numerous text messages regarding the situation well into the night. In one, Father told Mother to be prepared to pick Daughter up at school the next day if she was suspended. Daughter returned from the trip around midnight and Father and Daughter talked about what had occurred until 1:00 or 1:30 a.m."], "id": "ffcb51b7-3fc6-413b-a8e5-1d0dd609f770", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Our high court has interpreted the scope of Proposition 47's <mask> and petty theft provisions; it held that a felony burglary conviction for cashing stolen checks worth less than $950 required resentencing as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47's enactment of section 459.5 defining shoplifting.10 ( *395People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 ( Gonzales ).)"], "id": "5f8782d3-6cfb-4474-a0a1-db0aac0b73a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of that petition. It held that \"entering a commercial establishment with the intent to use a stolen credit card to purchase property valued at no more than $950 constitutes <mask>,\" a misdemeanor (\u00a7 459.5), eligible for Proposition 47 resentencing. ( People v. Garrett , supra , 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 84, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.) It said, \"[T]he dispositive issue is whether [the defendant's] act fell within the definition of 'shoplifting' under Section 459.5.\" ( Id . at p. 88, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369, italics added.) \"[W]e must interpret Section 459.5 as if it defined shoplifting to mean 'entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit theft .' ( Ibid. ) It noted that under section 484 the definition of theft includes taking property of another \" 'by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense.' \" ( Id. at p. 89, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.) The court said, \"Using another person's credit card to purchase property without the card owner's consent is 'theft' under this definition.\" ( Ibid . )"], "id": "12d24eb4-18e2-4df4-bc70-dfd332b66c0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [" The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations. The record supports the conclusion that defendant knew he was prohibited from entering a store as the result of a trespass notice communicated to him after a prior <mask> incident. Although the notice was not admitted into evidence, defendant nevertheless admitted receiving it and a store manager testified that, along with the store's loss prevention agent, he personally provided it to defendant (see e.g. People v Guerman, 156 AD3d 544, 544 [1st Dept 2017], lv denied 31 NY3d 1014 [2018]). Additionally, there was corroborating circumstantial evidence. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER"], "id": "ceda1670-293f-4071-984a-2fc6332f4b3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thereafter, in October 2015, Osotonu filed the instant petition, asking the trial court to recall his three convictions for second degree burglary and resentence him to misdemeanor <mask>. Only one of those three convictions-that involving count 10-is at issue in this appeal. The Solano County District Attorney's opposition to the petition describes the incident underlying the relevant offense as follows: \"With respect to the burglary in Count 10, on January 26, 1997, a bomb exploded at the Wells Fargo Bank/ATM machine on Tennessee Street in Vallejo at approximately *6042:50 a.m. The eastside of the bank was damaged and a portion of the ATM machine was blown apart. The steel frame of the ATM machine was located in a nearby parking lot and there was a crater in the cement wall near the machine.\" Reportedly, the ATM was targeted as part of a larger scheme to help a co-defendant \"destroy the evidence in [that co-defendant's] criminal case by means of an explosion.\" According to Osotonu, he agreed to participate in the ATM crime with the intent \"to create a diversion and to get money.\""], "id": "dccafbc5-5e79-4018-b77e-bc051e2ee7f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We reverse. After Proposition 47, an offense is <mask>, not burglary, if it involves \"entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).\" Further, no one \"who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.\" (\u00a7 459.5, subds. (a) & (b).)"], "id": "18122e8a-e741-47f6-8cff-dd7e9ef3c4e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Our holding does not affect the burden of proof on a petition for resentencing of a burglary conviction to a <mask> conviction under Proposition 47. The petitioner has the burden to demonstrate eligibility for resentencing relief. (People v. Romanowski , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 916, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 ; People v. Sherow (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 875, 880, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 295.)"], "id": "5cbc57b0-c39d-45b9-b2ce-312c288383b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As enacted by Proposition 47, section 459.5 redefines certain second degree burglaries as \"shoplifting\" if the value of the property involved is less than $950: \"(a) Notwithstanding Section 459 [ (the general burglary statute) ], <mask> is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary. Shoplifting shall be punished as a misdemeanor, except that a person with one or more prior convictions for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290 may be punished pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.[\u00b6] (b) Any act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.\" As the Legislative Analyst for Proposition 47 explained, \"Under current law, shoplifting property worth $950 or less (a type of petty theft) is often a misdemeanor. However, such crimes can also be charged as burglary, which is a wobbler. Under this *642measure, shoplifting property worth $950 or less would always be a misdemeanor and could not be charged as burglary.\" (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) analysis of Prop. 47 by Legislative Analyst, p. 35.)"], "id": "eb4e2499-f9c7-4e15-82d1-cc25ec4ecab2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In sum, the meaning of the text is clear. Despite the fact that many cases of <mask> also fall within the definition of burglary, if a prosecutor wishes to charge those cases as either shoplifting or burglary, then he must charge shoplifting and shoplifting alone. Here, on the other hand, the prosecution charged Brown with neither shoplifting nor burglary; instead, Brown was charged with receiving stolen property under section 496. Taking into account *731both the context and plain language of section 495.5, no issue arises under that statute in the instant case.2 *925Brown's reliance on People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 is misplaced. In that case, Gonzales pled guilty to one felony count of burglary, based on his entry into a bank to cash a stolen check in an amount less than $950. ( Id. at 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Relying on section 459.5, our Supreme Court agreed that the conduct underlying the burglary charge constituted misdemeanor shoplifting and remanded to the trial court for misdemeanor resentencing. ( Id. at 862, 877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Gonzales thus involved a case originally charged as a felony burglary under section 459, the very statute expressly referenced and targeted in section 459.5. The Gonzales court's statement that \"[a] defendant must be charged only with shoplifting when the statute [section 459.5] applies \" therefore does nothing to advance Brown's assertion that section 459.5 extends to defendants convicted under section 496, subdivision (a).3 ( Id. at 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "8edeaa33-9a8b-4604-9768-a2f7803c495a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"A felony burglary charge could legitimately lie if there was proof of entry with intent to commit a nontheft felony or an intent to commit a theft of other property exceeding the <mask> limit.\" (People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 (Gonzales ).) The prosecution did not prove those facts occurred in this case."], "id": "b38609c5-22e9-4475-a7ba-1b294ad2188e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["An extreme case would occur if a literal interpretation of section 459.5 would lead to absurd results. (See City & County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 52, 184 Cal.Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935 [\"an initiative measure should receive a practical construction, [and] its literal language may be disregarded to avoid absurd results\"].) It is not absurd that the electorate would want to maintain conspiracy to commit <mask> as a \"wobbler,\" i.e., punishable in the court's discretion as a misdemeanor or felony, instead of requiring that it be punishable as a misdemeanor in all cases."], "id": "c4a309a0-e5bb-49ff-8edc-62284677ffee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The People appeal from an order granting the petition of defendant Phillip Pernell Bias under Penal Code section 1170.181 to reduce defendant's conviction *485of second degree burglary (\u00a7 459) to misdemeanor <mask> (\u00a7 459.5). The People contend that defendant failed to meet his burden of proving eligibility for resentencing, and the trial court erred in granting defendant's petition because he remained guilty of second degree burglary, not misdemeanor shoplifting. We agree with the People and reverse the judgment."], "id": "96646fb8-7e66-4c4f-a906-c73eed23a504", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["[section 530.5, subdivisions (a) and (c)] in a section of the Penal Code chapter proscribing \u2018false personation and cheats,\u2019 not the section proscribing \u2018larceny\u2019 \u201d; that section 530.5(e) does not use the term \u201cgrand theft\u201d to define the crime it creates; and that section 530.5(e) does not set differing punishments for the crime of mail theft based on the value of the mail stolen. While those similarities do exist, the offense in Page was created by a statute that was outside the larceny chapter and the Penal Code altogether, did not use the term \u201cgrand theft,\u201d and did not base punishment on the value of the car at issue. (See Veh. Code, \u00a7 10851.) The reasoning by which the court in Jimenez held that Page did not apply to identity theft confirms that Page does govern the crime of mail theft under section 530.5(e). \u201cWhat we decided [in Page] is that one version of Vehicle Code section 10851\u2014'taking or driving a vehicle without the owner\u2019s consent\u2019\u2014established an offense qualifying as petty theft under the new . . . section 490.2 . . . [which] mandates misdemeanor punishment for a defendant who \u2018obtain[ed] any property by theft\u2019 [worth] . . . $950 or less. [Citation.] Although Vehicle Code section 10851 did not \u2018expressly designate the offense as \u2018 \u201cgrand theft\u201d \u2019 and its prohibitions swept more broadly than \u2018theft,\u2019 we had previously identified a theft and nontheft way to commit the offense. [Citation.] The theft version of the vehicular offense fully mapped on to the new petty theft statute, and we thus concluded that [that] version, alone, was eligible for reduction: \u2018 \u201c[A] defendant convicted under section 10851(a) of unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession\u201d has been convicted of stealing the vehicle.\u2019 [Citation.] [\u00b6] The same doesn\u2019t hold for Jimenez\u2019s offense. Where Vehicle Code section 10851 contemplates two permutations\u2014one fully satisfying the elements of petty theft after Proposition 47\u2014. . . section 530.5, subdivision (a) contains no separate provision that, when violated, exclusively constitutes <mask> or even"], "id": "dce6b983-25d8-42b3-a2d4-0beb8654cf4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["That is exactly the case here. The trial court could not lawfully impose a misdemeanor sentence for defendant's offense unless that offense qualified as <mask> under section 459.5. Despite the prosecutor's assurances at the time of resentencing, it did not. The record shows that defendant was charged with entering a storage locker with intent to commit larceny. He pleaded no contest, and his counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based in part on the preliminary hearing transcript. That transcript shows, without question, that the storage locker at issue was leased by an individual and kept locked; it was not open to the public as a commercial business. Therefore, defendant's entry into the locker to commit larceny did not constitute shoplifting, and he did not qualify for resentencing under Proposition 47. (See People v. Stylz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 530, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 ( Stylz ) [a privately leased storage locker in a storage facility is not a commercial establishment under the shoplifting statute].)"], "id": "67d05826-6b5a-48de-922c-0d7740fdaed0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Taken at face value, then, the crime of <mask> is committed by one who: (1) enters a commercial establishment; (2) with the intent to (a) take possession; (b) of personal property; (c) owned or possessed by another; (d) by means of trespass; (e) steal the property; and (f) carry it away; (3) while *675that establishment is open during regular business hours; and (4) where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed $950."], "id": "4a02f1f4-11c4-4384-b701-ad674ea50ec2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even if there was some greater reason to associate the crime of <mask> with *570the crime of burglary, as opposed to petty theft, there would be scant authority to expand the meaning of larceny. *682The burglary statute has used the term larceny since at least 1892. (See People v. Barry (1892) 94 Cal. 481, 482, 29 P. 1026 [\"Viewed in the light of section 459 ..., which says: 'Every person who enters any house, room, store, ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny, or any felony, is guilty of burglary,'-the ruling of the court is correct.\"] italics omitted.) Thus, regardless of the soundness of the conclusion, it is, at least as an initial matter, reasonable to consider whether the Legislature in 1927 considered the impact of section 490a on the burglary statute and proceeded despite the potential broadening of that statute. (See People v. Nguyen (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 31, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 ; compare People v. Myers (1929) 206 Cal. 480, 485, 275 P. 219 [finding that nomenclature change effected by \u00a7 490a did not disturb the substance of any law, making it \"unimportant to dwell upon the contention that this section is ineffectual to interpret the word 'larceny' to mean 'theft' in section 459\"] with People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 354, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 187 P.3d 1 [\"An intent to commit theft by a false pretense or a false promise without the intent to perform will support a burglary conviction.\"].)"], "id": "04696f35-4c3d-4957-a39f-cdcb1a5fff70", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [" The verdict, which rejected defendant's intoxication defense, was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations. Defendant was convicted of two burglaries, based on <mask> incidents on different days in a store from which he had been barred by way of a trespass notice. There was ample evidence to refute defendant's defense, including videos of both crimes, as well as a video of defendant signing the trespass notice, in which he exhibited no signs of intoxication. Nevertheless, defendant claimed that at the time of the two burglaries, as well as at the time he received the trespass notice, his intoxication permitted him to appear to be functioning normally, but caused \"blackouts\" that prevented him from understanding that he was prohibited from entering the store, or forming the intent necessary for burglary. This claim was based on defendant's own testimony, which the jury was entitled to discredit, and it was not corroborated by the medical records he introduced or by anything else in the record."], "id": "e4f2f591-9bd0-4fc8-91e4-a0d3679a9f76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*1204Because a person cannot commit burglary if he actually committed <mask>, a prosecutor who wishes to convict a defendant of burglary must prove that the defendant did not commit shoplifting. (See Evid. Code, \u00a7 500 [\"Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.\" (Italics added.) ]; Evid. Code, \u00a7 501 [\"Insofar as any statute, except Section 522 [relating to insanity defense], assigns the burden of proof in a criminal action, such statute is subject to Penal Code Section 1096\".]; \u00a7 1096 [the People have the burden of proving facts establishing a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt].) Evidence the defendant committed shoplifting disproves the elements of the charged commercial burglary. Under these circumstances, the court must instruct the jury the prosecution must disprove the element(s) of shoplifting beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a burglary conviction. (Cf."], "id": "988fd947-bac6-4b17-934a-23cac6c2e2b2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The following hypothetical illustrates this rule: If respondent and her coconspirators were secretly recorded by a police informant as they planned the commission of petty theft inside a department store and were apprehended by the police after committing an overt act but before entering the store, the crime of conspiracy would be complete. On the other hand, the People could not charge respondent with misdemeanor <mask> because it requires actual entry into the store. ( \u00a7 459.5, subd. (a) ; Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 871, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 [statute \"defin[es] shoplifting as an entry into a business with an intent to steal, rather than as the taking itself\"].)"], "id": "8b7d84d3-d494-4dd1-b282-c3de458c58b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although the Attorney General acknowledges a person cannot be charged with and convicted of burglary when he or she actually committed <mask>, he argues that a person who commits shoplifting may simultaneously commit burglary. Section 459 provides that a \"person who enters any ... room, ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.\" The Attorney General contends Proposition 47 \"did not amend section 459's definition of burglary itself to add any additional elements.\" Consequently, to prove second degree burglary here, the Attorney General concludes the prosecution only needed to prove the elements of burglary under section 459. In other words, it did not have to disprove any elements *1203unique to shoplifting, such as that \"the intended theft be of property valued at more than $950.\" We disagree."], "id": "e312b48c-1654-4c1d-b424-9661bc56b1ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The People amended the charges at the preliminary hearing to add the petty theft with a prior count, in addition to the <mask> charge. There was no objection by Lopez. The People contend Lopez has forfeited any challenge to the filing of the amended information and the additional charge of petty theft with a prior. Generally, a defendant's failure to object to an amended information forfeits his right to assert the error on appeal. ( People v. Carrasco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1057, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 768 ; People v. Carbonie (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 679, 691, 121 Cal.Rptr. 831 ; People v. Spencer (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 786, 799-800, 99 Cal.Rptr. 681 ; People v. Collins (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 310, 313, 31 Cal.Rptr. 587.)"], "id": "42bad4c8-d0f0-4f75-926f-a7b275b5c3d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["I dissent. I would affirm the order granting respondent's petition to recall her felony sentence and resentence her to misdemeanor <mask>. Generally it is proper to charge felony conspiracy even if the underlying conduct is a misdemeanor. ( People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 611-612, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 198.) But this *517general rule is \"subject to an exception in the case law which precludes the use of a conspiracy charge to elevate criminal conduct to felony status where there appears an 'affirmative legislative intent' to impose a lesser punishment or no punishment at all.\" ( People v. Pangelina (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 414, 420, 172 Cal.Rptr. 661 [reversing judgment of conviction of conspiracy to commit prostitution].) Proposition 47 evinces an affirmative electoral intent to impose a lesser punishment for any conduct that could be charged as shoplifting. ( People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 ( Gonzales ) [\"A defendant must be charged only with shoplifting when the statute applies. It expressly prohibits alternate charging and ensures only misdemeanor treatment for the underlying described conduct\"].)"], "id": "640211f2-040a-4809-aa60-5daef2592770", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This reading is consistent with People v. Martin (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 825, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 504, which addressed whether a defendant convicted of felony conspiracy to commit petty theft-based on conduct that unquestionably constituted <mask> under section 459.5-was eligible for resentencing after the enactment of Proposition 47. Construing section 459.5, Martin rejected the defendant's argument: \"The statute does not say that a conspiracy to commit shoplifting shall be charged as simple shoplifting. Without such language, we cannot construe section 459.5 as prohibiting the charging of a conspiracy.\" (Id . at p. 835, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 504.) Brown's reliance on section 490.4, which became effective on January 1, 2019, fares no better for the same reason. Section 490.4, which creates the new crime of \"organized retail theft,\" nowhere prevents the prosecution from charging section 496 when the conduct at issue would also support a section 490.4 charge. (\u00a7 490.4.)"], "id": "69c8b62b-05ce-4328-a93c-0b5b551629f6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["E.P. argues \"[b]ecause [he] committed an act of <mask>, he cannot also be prosecuted for the crimes of receiving stolen property. One cannot be convicted of both stealing and receiving the same property.\" (See \u00a7 459.5, subd. (b) [\"[a]ny act of shoplifting ... shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property\"]; \u00a7 496, subd. (a) [every person who conceals or withholds stolen property from the owner knowing the property is stolen commits a crime; a principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted pursuant to this section but no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property]; People v. Ceja (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 3, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 229 P.3d 995 [theft conviction operates as a bar to a receiving conviction].) The Attorney General concedes the point. We accept the concession and reverse the juvenile court's findings on counts 4, 5, and 6."], "id": "82e6b386-c134-433a-b0c0-1be5aa9a228a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At the hearing on Osotonu's petition, the trial court denied the petition as to count 10, concluding that Osotonu's use of explosives to blow open an ATM in the middle of the night could not be recast as the lesser offense of <mask>, which is defined as \"entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours ....\" (\u00a7 459.5.)"], "id": "33bbc139-cff5-4faf-bf76-0fbd2fb2f513", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In 1992, the Legislature amended section 496, subdivision (a) to provide that \"a principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted pursuant to this section.\" (Stats. 1992, ch. 1146, \u00a7 1.) Then, in 2014, voters passed Proposition 47, which created section 459.5 (shoplifting) and also amended section 496 to require only misdemeanor punishment where \"the value of the property does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).\" (\u00a7 496, subd. (a).) If, as Brown suggests, Proposition 47 also barred prosecution under section 496 of a thief whose conduct in fact constituted <mask>, then surely the language of section 496 would have been amended accordingly. Instead, Proposition 47 left intact the language expressly permitting a prosecutor to charge a principal in the actual theft with violating section 496."], "id": "3b445cbe-964c-40d7-a58a-f31924f7bdc5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In Gonzales , the Supreme Court held that a second degree burglary conviction for entering a bank to cash a stolen check for less than $950 was subject to the crime of <mask> created by Proposition 47, section 459.5.3 ( Gonzales, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The question in Gonzales was whether section 459.5 applied to theft by false pretenses or was limited to theft by larceny. ( Gonzales , at p. 864, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The Supreme Court noted that cases consistently applied section 490a to the burglary statute, section 459, replacing section 459's use of the term \"larceny\" with the term \"theft.\"4 ( Gonzales , at p. 867, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Although section 459.5 defined its crime as \"shoplifting,\" section 490a applied to it as well. Section 459.5 referred to section 459 and used the term \"larceny,\" indicating \"the electorate intended 'larceny' to have the same meaning in both provisions.\" ( Gonzales , at p. 869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) There were no exceptions to section 490a's provision that any statutory reference to larceny, embezzlement, or stealing shall be interpreted as referring to the term \"theft.\" ( Gonzales , at p. 869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Applying section 490a to section 459.5 was also \"consistent with the electorate's stated reason for enacting Proposition 47. 'One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.' [Citation.]\" ( Gonzales , at p. 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)"], "id": "4e376d3e-9e0d-4341-9e64-fde14308e9e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court found that the term \"shoplifting\" in section 459.5 modified the statute's reference to the term \"larceny\" in defining the requisite criminal act. Since defendant's criminal conduct did not come within the common definition of <mask>, i.e., \"[t]o steal (articles or an article) from a store that is open for business\" (American Heritage College Dict. (4th ed. 2007) p. 1282, col. 2), the trial court concluded that it did not constitute the crime of shoplifting, rendering him ineligible for resentencing."], "id": "905e0aad-3c63-4f0c-8a46-7edc07a5c6ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At common law, the crime of larceny contained an element of asportation or carrying away. Modern case law, however, places more emphasis upon intent and the exercise of dominion and control over the property. Thus, a person can be guilty of the theft of an automobile which has not moved (People v Alamo, 34 NY2d 453), or <mask> merchandise without leaving the store (People v Olivo, 52 NY2d 309)."], "id": "a48a25a9-88ce-4179-a0e5-46d46062a4db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In so ruling, it should be abundantly clear, this court is not requiring that the child testify at all. In that D. apparently alleges he and his father were \u201carrested\u201d for <mask>, and possibly for speeding, the moving parties are free to call either store security personnel, or the police, to corroborate the child\u2019s out-of-court statements. However, the father is also free to call the child as his witness, should he choose to put on a case, under the same conditions as discussed above. If the father calls D., he is reminded D. becomes his witness and will not be subject to cross-examination by him."], "id": "b5ea4b17-118c-4da0-8246-f596f830cb4d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Taken at face value, then, the crime of <mask> is committed by one who: (1) enters a commercial establishment; (2) with the intent to (a) take possession; (b) of personal property; (c) owned or possessed by another; (d) by means of trespass; (e) steal the property; and (f) carry it away; (3) while *675that establishment is open during regular business hours; and (4) where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed $950."], "id": "96b4d4a8-48a0-4357-a2e3-786dc83cdbca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Jimenez involved a defendant who entered a check-cashing business and cashed *397two checks in his name, neither of which were issued to him. ( Jimenez , supra , 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1285-1286, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 386, rev. granted.) He was convicted of two felony violations of section 530.5(a). ( Id. at p. 1286, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 386.) Relying on Gonzales , the court in Jimenez concluded that the convictions were properly reduced to misdemeanor <mask> offenses under Proposition 47's enactment of section 459.5. ( Id. at p. 1285, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 386.) Jimenez did not address whether the same offense would constitute petty theft under section 490.2. ( Id. at p. 1293, fn. 6, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 386.) Because Jimenez addresses section 530.5 and reclassification under section 459.5, its holding is inapposite here."], "id": "c00b8778-5653-4e8a-ab7c-23391bb6bcf3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["reduced to misdemeanor <mask> (\u00a7 459.5), and they agree that Jimenez compels us to reach the opposite conclusion as to defendant\u2019s five convictions of violating section 530.5, subdivisions (a) and (c), which cannot be reduced to shoplifting or petty theft pursuant to Proposition 47. (Jimenez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 58\u201359.) 3 The parties dispute only whether Jimenez precludes the application of Proposition 47 to redesignate defendant\u2019s misdemeanor mail theft conviction under section 530.5(e) as a misdemeanor petty theft conviction (\u00a7 490.2). We conclude that Proposition 47 does apply to mail-theft convictions in circumstances such as those involved in this case, and that defendant\u2019s mail theft conviction must be redesignated a petty theft conviction (\u00a7 490.2). Background In an amended felony information, defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted by a jury of, one count of violating section 530.5, subdivision (a) (unauthorized use of personal identifying information), four counts of violating section 530.5, subdivision (c)(2) (fraudulent possession of personal identifying information with a prior conviction), one count of violating section 530.5(e) (mail theft), and one count of violating section 459 (second degree commercial burglary). Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to establish these offenses. She now disputes only the proper designation of one of the offenses in light of the statutory amendments made by Proposition 47. No evidence was introduced indicating"], "id": "dd1d9bdd-ed5a-4eed-b224-b8e5e94ff964", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Section 218 of the General Business Law clearly was intended to reach the host of imaginative devices by which retail mercantile establishments are put upon, whether the method used is <mask>, use of stolen credit cards, issuance of worthless checks or other means. The elements that must be present to allow a defendant to invoke the statute are that the larceny take place in a retail mercantile establishment and that the object of the miscreant\u2019s industry be merchandise."], "id": "e48263ba-8ef4-49fb-842b-4f65fb421025", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Contrary to the Attorney General's contention, section 459.5 did amend section 459, as it expressly defined the new crime of <mask> \"[n]otwithstanding section 459.\" The language of section 459.5 reflects the fact that the new crime of shoplifting consists of certain wrongful conduct which previously was second degree burglary. Stated differently, the \"new crime of shoplifting ... displaces the prior felony of second degree burglary.\" ( People v. Chen (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 322, 324, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 375.) Thus, under the facts of this case, E.P. could not simultaneously commit shoplifting and second degree burglary.3"], "id": "05ec9376-ffdb-4ffe-b29c-ac9699539924", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We recognize that the explosion of the ATM in this case is difficult to characterize as either nonserious or nonviolent. Indeed, Osotonu was also convicted and is serving time for use of a destructive device to destroy property (former \u00a7 12303.3; see \u00a7 18740) based on this underlying event. Here, however, we are solely concerned with whether Osotonu's second degree burglary conviction arising out of the same incident-sentencing for which was stayed pursuant to section 654-meets the statutory criteria for <mask>."], "id": "3b0a37ff-0808-4f6a-9037-183f3a8edab2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In August 2016, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition. In rejecting E.P.'s challenge to the burglary charge, the court concluded the ice rink's locker rooms were not part of the commercial establishment and the crime of <mask> required the offender to steal from the business, not from private citizens. Consequently, the court declared E.P. a ward of the court, and placed him on probation."], "id": "6d069abd-6e20-49ca-a719-16eb178a78cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Osotonu's reliance on People v. Bunyard (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1237, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628 is unavailing. Bunyard was convicted of second degree burglary after he used a screwdriver in an attempt to break into a coin-operated soap dispenser in a 24-hour commercial laundromat. ( Id. at pp. 1240, 1244, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) In denying the petition for resentencing, the trial court reasoned that defendant's conduct did not \"comport with the commonsense meaning of '<mask>.' \" ( Id. at pp. 1239-1240, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) The appellate court reversed, concluding that when the defendant entered the laundromat during its regular business hours with the intent to commit larceny by theft, he met the statutory definition of shoplifting. ( Id. at p. 1244, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) In making this determination, the court held that it did not matter whether the defendant \"used a tool to effectuate the intended theft or force to attempt to break into the coin box.\" ( Ibid. ) Rather, it concluded that the electorate did not intend section 459.5 to cover \"only the theft of merchandise or goods displayed for sale,\" opining: \"It would make no sense to distinguish, for purposes of misdemeanor versus felony treatment, between the intended theft of merchandise worth $ 10 to $ 15 and the intended theft of coins worth $ 10 to $ 15, simply because the former is openly displayed and offered for sale and the latter is not.\" ( Id. at p. 1245, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) The court explained that expanding the scope of shoplifting beyond the so-called \" 'five-finger discount' \" furthered the \"readily apparent\" purpose of Proposition 47 \"to lessen punishment for 'nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession ....' [Citation.]\" ( Ibid. )"], "id": "55c4bd91-3bdb-456e-b2ed-b4b10fbefcaa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*564Were one to argue that section 490.2 does not apply because defendant did not in fact obtain the drugs he sought to obtain using an altered prescription, his offense would nonetheless constitute <mask> under section 459.5, subdivision (a), also added by Proposition 47. This section defines shoplifting as \"entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed\" $950. As the Supreme Court emphasized in People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, \"Section 490a provides: 'Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, ... said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word \"theft\" were substituted therefor.' \" Subdivision (b) of section 459.5 provides that \"Any act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting.\" (Italics added.) \"A defendant must be charged only with shoplifting when the statute applies.\" ( 2 Cal.5th at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Section 1170.18 also specifies section 459.5 as one of the provisions in accordance with which resentencing should be granted."], "id": "76b47e6a-0b6d-43fe-b61f-81efedeab964", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On appeal, petitioner contends, respondent concedes, and we agree that a burglary with the intent to commit identity theft may meet the statutory definition of <mask> under Proposition 47. However, respondent argues that the court's summary denial of the petition was correct because petitioner did not meet his initial burden of proof. Respondent argues that a Proposition 47 petitioner has the initial burden of showing three things: (1) he did not intend to commit a theft of property exceeding $950, (2) he did not intend to commit a nontheft felony, and (3) the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950."], "id": "2ac0cf9f-d82f-489d-9dd6-56b0289291f3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Far more compelling is defendant's argument that \"categorically excluding petty thefts charged under Health and Safety Code section 11368 contradicts *565Proposition 47's explicit purpose of reducing prison spending and maximizing alternatives for nonserious and nonviolent crime.\"3 The electorate intended Proposition 47 to \"reduce punishment for any theft of property worth less than $950 that could previously be charged as grand theft based on the type of property.\" ( People v. Romanowski, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 910, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633.) As the court pointed out in People v. Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 870, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, \" 'One of Proposition 47's primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.' [Citations.] The Act also expressly states an intent to '[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession, unless the defendant has prior convictions for specified violent or serious crimes.' \" As the court there stated with respect to the contention that larceny should be treated differently from other forms of theft, \"[t]here is no indication that the electorate somehow viewed ... differently\" obtaining a small amount of drugs by the use of an altered prescription from doing so by other means of petty theft or <mask>. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "4b8d83a9-6878-4ade-b631-e6d95e16076a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In November 2014, California voters approved Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. Proposition 47 added section 1170.18, which provides that any defendant currently \"serving a sentence for a conviction ... of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under [Proposition 47] had [it] been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing.\" ( \u00a7 1170.18, subd. (a) ; see Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, \u00a7 14, pp. 73-74.) Pertinent to this case, Proposition 47 added section 459.5, which establishes the offense of <mask>, defined as \"entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine *800hundred fifty dollars ($ 950).\" (\u00a7 459.5, subd. (a).) The statute further provides that \"[a]ny other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.\" (Ibid. ; see People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362.) Pursuant to section 459.5, shoplifting is punishable as a misdemeanor unless a defendant has previously been convicted of one or more specified offenses. (\u00a7 459.5, subd. (a).)"], "id": "0027aec2-c08d-456d-bbfd-966af13e9b83", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In sum, the juvenile court erred in denying E.P.'s motion to dismiss the burglary count either on the ground that stealing from private citizens is outside the statutory definition of <mask> or on the ground that the locker room was not part of a commercial establishment. No other ground supports the court's denial. Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court's order declaring E.P.'s offense a second degree burglary."], "id": "ad670559-fc77-42b3-8e9b-95c9696c88df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Hallam rejected the Attorney General's argument a \"room within the business where the buying and selling of goods or services does not occur\" could not be part of the \"commercial establishment.\" ( Hallam, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 912, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 812.) \"Turning to the words of the statute here, we find no indication that <mask> can occur only in specific areas of a commercial establishment. Nor does there appear any requirement that the business's commercial activity must be taking place in the area from which the theft occurs in order to qualify the offense as shoplifting. The trial court thus added an element to the offense that is absent from the plain language of the statute itself when it determined that appellant's theft would qualify as shoplifting only if it occurred in an area of the commercial establishment open to the public where merchandise is sold. Based on its impermissible revision of the definition of shoplifting, the court concluded that the crime was burglary rather than shoplifting because appellant entered the store through the back and stole an item from the employee restroom rather than an area of the store that was 'open for business.' \" ( Id. at p. 912, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 812.)"], "id": "e2e790f8-2fa2-4213-b4e3-c70a2857828c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court granted Jimenez's motion over the People's objection. It stated that it had reviewed Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th 858, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, and People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 ( Romanowski ), and concluded that under the reasoning and holding of those two cases, the \"[c]ourt's hands have been somewhat tied.\" The court explained: \"It appears indicated that when there's conduct that results in the theft, which was here theft of property when it was used to derive on two separate instances money less than $950, the Court is mandated to reduce those to misdemeanors. Those are the rulings put forth by the Supreme Court.\" The court further stated: \"And even though [this case] involves a different charge, it appears to be somewhat of a theft charge which was the focus of Gonzale [s ] and Romanowski .... And based on the Court's review of those two recent rulings, the Court feels it is obligated ... to grant the defense motion and reduce Count 1 and Count 2 to misdemeanors as it appears to be that conduct that has been described in Proposition 47 as a <mask> type of offense.\""], "id": "0edb8f50-8399-4705-9111-9c5b086f5fed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court granted Jimenez's motion over the People's objection. It stated that it had reviewed Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th 858, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, and People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 ( Romanowski ), and concluded that under the reasoning and holding of those two cases, the \"[c]ourt's hands have been somewhat tied.\" The court explained: \"It appears indicated that when there's conduct that results in the theft, which was here theft of property when it was used to derive on two separate instances money less than $950, the Court is mandated to reduce those to misdemeanors. Those are the rulings put forth by the Supreme Court.\" The court further stated: \"And even though [this case] involves a different charge, it appears to be somewhat of a theft charge which was the focus of Gonzale [s ] and Romanowski .... And based on the Court's review of those two recent rulings, the Court feels it is obligated ... to grant the defense motion and reduce Count 1 and Count 2 to misdemeanors as it appears to be that conduct that has been described in Proposition 47 as a <mask> type of offense.\""], "id": "bfb24858-dd4a-493e-b68d-2812c68431fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The People contend that defendant \"was not eligible for Proposition 47 relief because her burglary offense is not 'shoplifting' under Penal Code section 495.5.\" We disagree with the People based on the plain language of the <mask> statute. (See People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 354 P.3d 268 [in questions of statutory interpretation, courts \"begin with the text\" and \"[i]f no ambiguity appears in the statutory language, we presume that the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls\"].)2"], "id": "30180247-5ad6-4ffd-b471-c6d91bcd0579", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Section 1170.126 was enacted by voter initiative as part of the Three Strikes Reform Act, commonly referred to as \"Proposition 36.\" (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) text of Prop. 36, \u00a7 6, p. 109.) The primary goal of Proposition 36, as explained to voters, was to \"[r]estore the Three Strikes law [sections 667 and 1170.12] to the public's original understanding by requiring life sentences only when a defendant's current conviction is for a violent or serious crime\" and to \"[m]aintain that repeat offenders convicted of non-violent, non-serious crimes like <mask> and simple drug possession will receive twice the normal sentence instead of a life sentence.\" (Id. \u00a7 1, p. 105.) Specifically, Proposition 36 altered the Three Strikes sentencing scheme so that a recidivist felon would no longer be sentenced to an indeterminate life term for a third strike felony that was not defined as serious or violent, unless at least one other condition was pleaded and proved. Those other conditions included: (1) the current *575felony was a controlled substance charge involving large amounts of drugs; (2) the current felony was a specified type of sex offense; (3) the current felony involved the use of a firearm, was committed while armed, was intended to cause great bodily injury; or (4) a prior felony was especially egregious, such as murder, forcible sex offenses, sexual abuse of a child under 14, or any other felony punishable by life in prison or death. (\u00a7 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(i-iv).)"], "id": "00cce2fc-6eb9-45c6-a9dd-266954a4abf1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Proving a crime is not <mask> may be difficult in some circumstances, but such difficulty does not relieve the prosecution of its burden. Just as a factfinder must calculate the value of stolen property to determine whether a defendant committed a felony or misdemeanor theft crime under Proposition 47, so must the prosecutor evaluate the targeted property to determine whether the crime of shoplifting occurred. (See People v. Romanowski , supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 914, 915, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 [\"fact that stolen access card information is not sold legally does not relieve courts of ... duty\" \"to identify how much stolen access card information would sell for\"].) Moreover, due to the prohibition against alternate charging in section 459.5, subdivision (b), the prosecution must determine whether the evidence supports charging the crime of shoplifting or burglary. Here, in charging E.P. with burglary rather than shoplifting, the prosecution apparently had no difficulty in gathering the evidence to determine whether it could prove the elements of a burglary or whether it should charge E.P. with shoplifting. Thus, it would not be onerous for the prosecution to produce that same evidence at trial. In sum, the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that E.P. did not commit shoplifting.3"], "id": "7c46800b-6eee-411d-af7d-18de0a5271cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*390The trial court denied the petition. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal reversed, rejecting the Attorney General's argument that because Garrett intended to commit felony identity theft ( \u00a7 530.5 ), section 459.5 did not apply. ( Garrett , at pp. 86-90, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.) The court reasoned: \"[E]ven assuming [Garrett] intended to commit felony identity theft, he could not have been charged with burglary under ... section 459 if the same act -- entering a store with the intent to purchase merchandise with a stolen credit card -- also constituted <mask> under [s]ection 459.5.\" ( Id. at p. 88, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.) Based on this reasoning, the court held that the use of a stolen credit card to purchase merchandise valued at less than $950 constitutes shoplifting under section 459.5. ( Garrett, at p. 90, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.)"], "id": "603c7ee4-6e56-44f6-9d9d-42b4a0d58536", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The video surveillance footage involved in this case is believed to show the actual trip and fall and the surrounding circumstances. Many stores and enterprises set up video surveillance to reduce the number of thefts and <mask> by both employees and customers. The benefit of having a camera record the activities of customers and employees can be of value to the bottom line of a store\u2019s or enterprises\u2019 profitability."], "id": "670d5cc1-93d2-4832-861e-a315af4470ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine whether a defendant should be bound over for trial and on what charges he or she is to be tried. ( People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1459, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 625.) The evidence at the preliminary hearing was that Lopez maintained he formed no intent to *134steal until after entering Walmart. If true, then the charge of <mask> would not lie as Lopez did not have the intent to commit larceny when he entered Walmart. (\u00a7 459.5, subd. (a).) The prosecutor charged Lopez with shoplifting, the only charge that could be brought if he entered Walmart with the intent to commit larceny. The prosecutor also asked that Lopez be held to answer on a charge of petty theft with a prior, which does not require that Lopez have entered Walmart with the intent to commit larceny."], "id": "296e6669-207b-47e6-8972-9acff9f8bdcc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The New York Court of Appeals in the case of People v Kazmarick (52 NY2d 322, 327-328, supra) expressly ruled on defendant\u2019s contention in the above regard as follows: \u201cDefendant in an overly simplistic lumping of the two lines of cases argues from Samuels that the arrest warrant and accusatory instrument on the <mask> charge created a nonwaivable right to counsel and from Rogers that attachment of that right prevented interrogation on any other criminal matter. While the filing of an accusatory instrument triggers a right to counsel with respect to the charge made by the accusatory instrument, the right to counsel and representation by counsel are not the same thing. The fact that defendant Kazmarick may have been entitled to counsel on the shoplifting charge does not require, automatically and in all events, acting as though he was in fact represented by counsel and, therefore, protected even as to an unrelated charge. Simply put, the legal fiction of representation indulged by the Samuels line of cases is not tantamount to the actual or requested representation pro*52tected by the Rogers-Cunningham line. To accept the \u2018strict liability\u2019 rule for which defendant argues would tax. law enforcement officials anywhere with knowledge of accusatory instruments on unrelated charges everywhere, and unnecessarily and unrealistically limit police interrogation procedures (see People v Servidio, 77 AD2d 191; cf. People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576).\u201d"], "id": "daae0a19-b252-4d35-a6ac-65a778da83b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At the close of evidence, E.P. moved to dismiss the burglary count under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 701.1, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove he had not committed <mask> as defined in section 459.5.1 He argued the prosecution failed to present evidence (1) the value of the property taken or intended to be taken was more than $950; (2) the locker room was not part of a commercial establishment; or (3) that he entered the locker room during nonbusiness hours. E.P. also argued that the juvenile court must dismiss the receiving stolen property allegations (counts 4-6) because a person cannot be charged with shoplifting property and receiving the same stolen property under section 459.5. subdivision (b)."], "id": "63b13b0c-891f-4ec7-b92f-2f3814ca3ff7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> is defined in section 459.5\"as entering an open commercial establishment during regular business hours with the intent to commit 'larceny' of property worth $950 or less.\" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Section 459.5 does not distinguish between property belonging to a commercial establishment and property *895belonging to private citizens. The juvenile court's ruling that a person can commit shoplifting only if he or she intends to steal property from the commercial establishment erroneously adds an element not included within the statutory definition of shoplifting. Accordingly, the court erred in ruling that as a matter of law E.P.'s theft of property from private citizens could never be shoplifting. (See id . at p. 871, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 [as defined in section 459.5, shoplifting is a \"term of art, which must be understood as it is defined, not in its colloquial sense.\"]; People v. Bunyard (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1237, 1245, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 628 [shoplifting as defined in section 459.5 not limited only to \"theft of merchandise or goods displayed for sale\"].) *1206Turning to the second basis for the juvenile court's denial of E.P.'s motion to dismiss, we conclude the ice rink's locker room was part of a commercial establishment within the meaning of section 459.5. In Hallam, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 905, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 812, the defendant entered a computer store during business hours and used the employee restroom with express permission. He then left the store, but reentered through the back door. He returned to the employee restroom and stole an air compressor worth $350. Observing that the employee restroom was not an area to which the public generally had access, the district attorney argued the defendant intended to steal an item that belonged to the store, but was not store merchandise."], "id": "f8df52bb-013b-4196-8033-85dc2fff2ee7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, I note that this court has accounted for the concerns I highlight above in its jurisprudence on Arkansas Rule of Evidence 608(b), creating a puzzling tension between two consecutive rules. Rule 608(b) concerns the introduction of instances of conduct \"other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609\" to demonstrate a witness's \"character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.\" In Rhodes v. State , 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (1982), and subsequent cases, we have expressly limited Gustafson 's reach in the Rule 608(b) context. In Rhodes , we prohibited the introduction of past instances of <mask> that did not result in convictions, reasoning that \"while an absence of respect for the property rights of others is an undesirable trait, it does not directly indicate an impairment of the trait of truthfulness.\" Id. at 210, 634 S.W.2d at 111. This results in an uneasy status quo. Theft resulting in a conviction is treated as per se dishonest, and it is therefore admissible under Rule 609(a). Acts of theft not resulting in conviction are not considered probative of truthfulness, and they are therefore not admissible under Rule 608(b). Clever lawyering might construct a compelling difference between truthfulness and honesty, but the apparent strain is more than a plain reading of the rules can comfortably bear."], "id": "fe73359a-71be-4454-92e4-11774c1395fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Pertinent here, the Attorney General in Gonzales argued \"it would be absurd for the <mask> statute to encompass any form of theft other than larceny of openly displayed merchandise ,\" otherwise, section 459.5 \"would require a person to be prosecuted for shoplifting even if he enters a commercial establishment to commit a theft from an area of the store closed to the public, 'like a back office or a private locker room .... ' \" ( Gonzales, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 873, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437, italics added.) The court observed this argument was \"little more than a restatement of the rejected claim that the electorate intended to use 'shoplifting' in the colloquial sense.\" ( Id . at pp. 873-874, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The court explained if the voters had intended to limit the shoplifting statute to retail merchandise, \"it could have done so by using language similar to that in section 490.5.\" ( Id . at p. 874, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)2"], "id": "7074f3a8-6b52-4b68-b3da-da3fe6498cd3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At 8:30 p.m. on Dec. 19, 1974, Police Officer Van Sykle and his partner Police Officer Malkom, dressed in civilian clothes and in an unmarked car, drove into a parking lot adjacent to a supermarket. The area was known for its criminal activity, which consisted of purse-snatching and <mask>, and there had been narcotics sales and robberies in the vicinity. The police officers observed a van parked in front and to the right of their car, in the middle of the lot. They watched this vehicle for approximately 20 minutes. During that period of time they saw two or three individuals at a time exit the van, walk to the fence of the lot and to the store and return to the van, all without ever entering the store."], "id": "848658b5-cc39-4219-89fb-70ba571e06aa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["To accomplish its goal of requiring misdemeanors for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft, Proposition 47 created a new misdemeanor crime of \"<mask>,\" which covers conduct that previously would have been classified as a burglary. ( In re J.L. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1112, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 482. ( J.L. ).) Codified in section 459.5, this new crime is defined in subdivision (a) as follows: \"Notwithstanding Section 459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($ 950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.\" Subdivision (b) expressly limits the prosecutor's charging discretion: \"Any act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.\""], "id": "f6ebe86c-c55b-42e1-8b2c-ed6e6d43b23d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed R.A.G. and two other children from G.B.'s care after receiving a report that G.B., on December *64912, 2014, left the children unattended in a running vehicle while she went into a store where she was arrested for <mask>. She was also charged with three counts of endangering a child, a state jail felony.2 During the subsequent investigation, G.B. tested positive for cocaine. On May 8, 2015, the Department filed a petition requesting an order for G.B. to participate in services, and the trial court entered an order granting the petition. G.B. did not, however, participate in any services, including inpatient drug rehabilitation. The Department placed R.A.G. with his maternal aunt, S.O., and her husband on May 16, 2015."], "id": "123551f4-6a33-4c48-b6bd-ff3f63bc007a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Proving a crime is not <mask> may be difficult in some circumstances, but such difficulty does not relieve the prosecution of its burden. Just as a factfinder must calculate the value of stolen property to determine whether a defendant committed a felony or misdemeanor theft crime under Proposition 47, so must the prosecutor evaluate the targeted property to determine whether the crime of shoplifting occurred. (See People v. Romanowski , supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 914, 915, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 [\"fact that stolen access card information is not sold legally does not relieve courts of ... duty\" \"to identify how much stolen access card information would sell for\"].) Moreover, due to the prohibition against alternate charging in section 459.5, subdivision (b), the prosecution must determine whether the evidence supports charging the crime of shoplifting or burglary. Here, in charging E.P. with burglary rather than shoplifting, the prosecution apparently had no difficulty in gathering the evidence to determine whether it could prove the elements of a burglary or whether it should charge E.P. with shoplifting. Thus, it would not be onerous for the prosecution to produce that same evidence at trial. In sum, the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that E.P. did not commit shoplifting.3"], "id": "5a38f482-ee5b-4a10-a335-d5ce4f3ff9cf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In May of 1988, the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health brought a recommitment application pursuant to CPL 330.20 (14). In support of the application, Dr. Maurice Masse stated that S. was not compliant with his treatment. During the pendency of that application, S. continued his substance-induced violent behavior. On June 4, 1988, he was arrested and charged in New Jersey for <mask> and aggravated assault on a police officer. On July 27, 1988, he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Then, at around midnight on November 2, 1989, S. threatened a bartender and patrons at Canastel\u2019s restaurant, on the corner of 19th Street and Park Avenue South in Manhattan, with a 10-inch-long metal pipe wrapped in leather. Police Officer Daniel Pusateri encountered S. outside of the restaurant after he had been ejected but then tried to get back inside. Officer Pusateri asked S. to leave the area, but he refused and swung his arms around and yelled. As S. was being placed under arrest for disorderly conduct, he bit the officer on the hand. As a result, *9S. was charged with assault, resisting arrest, menacing and criminal possession of a weapon. On November 5, 1989 S. pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree and was sentenced to 30 days in jail."], "id": "66b082fc-d8d3-4bc0-872f-13b584fef57a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We acknowledge that this result may seem harsh in Amack's case. Although the record contains little information about his previous aggravated-burglary conviction, Amack suggests that it was for <mask> from a Walmart. Depending on the facts of that crime, it could fall under K.S.A. 21-5807(e)\u2014the exemption that the legislature added in 2016. So it is possible that what he did in 2010 would not be aggravated burglary under the law in effect when he committed the current crime of conviction. But that does not change our conclusion that applying the identical-or-narrower approach to"], "id": "e9eb72d9-f213-413e-8d59-e3e1a18b7d66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In contrast, \"[i]n enacting the <mask> statute as part of Proposition 47, the electorate signaled that these interests do not apply in the same way when a person intends to steal property in a place where he or she has been invited to peruse the goods and services that are on offer. Store owners and employees do not, of course, consent to the theft of property. But the core of the crime of burglary is not theft but physical intrusion , and owners and employees have every reason to expect that members of the public will enter where they have been invited.\" ( Colbert, supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 607, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 665, 433 P.3d 536, second italics added.)"], "id": "8c23b35c-3f49-40ad-9da6-af6bce299067", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeal rejected the People's argument: \"It follows under the plain text of the statute [ section 459.5 ] that prosecutors would have been required to charge her with <mask> and could not have charged her with burglary predicated on conspiracy had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of her offense. She therefore qualifies to have her burglary conviction redesignated as misdemeanor shoplifting.\" ( Huerta , supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 545, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 637, fn. omitted.) The court observed: \"Conspiracy played no role in the prosecution of Huerta. The People charged her with burglary, petty theft, and grand theft.\" ( Id . at p. 545, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 637.)"], "id": "71e8fbc0-2910-4f02-9432-56548bc41683", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In \"The Law and Private Police\u201d by Kakalik and Wildhorn (1977), the authors state (p 231): \"The public function theory could well be found applicable to private security activities. Many private security activities such as arresting shoplifters and investigating crimes, are quite similar to the functions usually performed by public police * * * Furthermore, as happened in Terry v. Adams (345 U.S. 461), allowing security activities to be free from constitutional restrictions might be used by the state to avoid actions called for by various Supreme Court decisions, such as Miranda v. Arizona, requiring state police to inform a suspect of his basic constitutional rights * * * In sum, constitutional restrictions are generally not applicable to purely private security activities; state action is required. But, depending on the circumstances, state action may well be found inherent in some private police activities.\u201d However, the argument that a private detective working for a merchant is given specific powers to detain persons suspected of <mask> and, therefore, is acting under color of State law has been rejected (see Warren v Cummings, 303 F Supp 803; Weyandt v Mason\u2019s Stores, 279 F Supp 283). In Warren v Cummings (supra), the court finding that although the store detectives are given special privileges of detaining a shoplifter, stated (p 807), \"There is not the slightest indication of state encouragement, participation or cooperation. Consequently, we see nothing in the nature of partnership with or agency of the state.\u201d"], "id": "a7ff10a3-9e3b-4133-9821-d6c3bb9f5587", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "shoplifting", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Some section 459 offenses have been reclassified as misdemeanors under section 459.5, which was added to the Penal Code by Proposition 47. Section 459.5, subdivision (a) provides: \"Notwithstanding Section 459, <mask> is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).\""], "id": "bacc6579-0a9d-485c-a3aa-9eec38a4650c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In McCullough v. Brodie (13 How. Pr. 346), the plaintiff sued the defendant for falsely representing that he had the secret of and the exclusive right to manufacture a certain kind of soap, upon which representation and the defendant\u2019s promise to instruct him how to make the soap, the plaintiff bought the secret for a valuable consideration, and incurred great expenses in establishing a factory and in purchasing materials, whereby he incurred loss. He moved for a reference, alleging that the items of damage resulting from the establishing of the factory *286and the purchasing of materials would involve the examination of a long account, but his application was denied upon the ground thas this was not an account in the ordinary acceptation of the term, as the trial would not involve an enquiry in relation to payments made by either to, or property received by either from, the other. This was the court\u2019s view of the species of account for which a reference would be ordered, and it applies to the present case. No such account exists here. The questions involved are fraud in the inception of the contract, and bad faith on the part of the plaintiff in the <mask> of the money entrusted to him by the company for the working of their mine, and it is the plaintiff\u2019s right to have these questions tried by a jury. The order directing the reference should therefore be reversed."], "id": "4d0d245d-248a-40f4-b094-2771b285f9d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The consignment of jewelry for purposes of sale at an agreed upon price is an ancient practice, and the conversion of such jewelry by unscrupulous consignees has always been regarded as larcenous. (See, e.g., Weyman v People, 4 Hun 511 [1st Dept 1875], affd 62 NY 623.) The theory of larceny generally applied has been <mask>, since the consignee is entrusted with possession of the property pursuant to an express agreement either to sell it and remit the proceeds or to return the unsold item to the owner. Such an agreement constitutes a bailment. (See, People v Hazard, 28 App Div 304 [1st Dept 1898], affd 158 NY 727.)"], "id": "3d6c6ea8-0551-4eb7-a08c-51eb36937802", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Vidana arose in the context of an employee charged with both larceny (\u00a7 484, subd. (a) ) and <mask> (\u00a7 503) arising from the same act of skimming cash from customer payments. ( Vidana , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 635, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.) The court concluded larceny and embezzlement are merely \"different statements of the same offense, and that a *690defendant may not be convicted of both based on the same course of conduct.\" ( Id. at p. 648, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805, fn. omitted.)"], "id": "4742bbf7-5f99-4a33-be72-142210724f1b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although removal of a personal representative for <mask> or fraud clearly requires an affirmative showing of moral wrongdoing, and we assume intentional wrongdoing by an administrator will normally establish mismanagement, we must disagree with Feeney that all bases for removal set forth in former section 521 or current section 8502, subdivision (a), of the Probate Code require a showing of intentional wrongdoing. For example, the same list that includes mismanagement, fraud and embezzlement as causes *109for removal also includes waste. ( Prob. Code, \u00a7 8502, subd. (a) ; see Estate of Foreman (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 180, 181-182, fn. 2, 74 Cal.Rptr. 699, quoting Prob. Code, former \u00a7 521.) Waste is defined as injury to the value of an inheritance through an unlawful act or through a simple omission of duty; it does not necessarily require a showing of malfeasance or bad faith. ( Avalon Pacific-Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1211-1212, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 ; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Real Property, \u00a7 385, pp. 444-445 ; see Civ. Code, \u00a7 818.)"], "id": "a1e34a2e-3803-48df-8510-86a4fae1ac0d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is clear that subdivisions (2) (b) (acquiring lost property), (2) (c) (issuing bad check), (2) (d) (false promise), and (2) (e) (extortion) are inapplicable to this matter. The only possible subdivision applicable is (2) (a). That subdivision states that larceny may be committed, \"By conduct heretofore defined or known as common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick, <mask>, or obtaining property by false pretenses\u201d."], "id": "19af6a27-efc6-4411-9bc5-2b2112004bbd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Legislature had already provided that \"Any person who is receiving an allowance from a public retirement system, who is charged by indictment or complaint, either in a court of this state or a federal court whose jurisdiction encompasses all or any portion of the state, with the commission of any felony involving or accepting or giving, or offering to give, any bribe, the <mask> of public money, extortion or theft of public money, perjury, or conspiracy to commit any of those crimes arising directly out of his or her official duties as a public officer, who has a legal obligation not to leave the jurisdiction of the court, but does leave, shall have his or her retirement allowance suspended while absent the jurisdiction of the court.\" (\u00a7 1235, subd. (a), added by Stats, 1994, ch. 991, \u00a7 2.)"], "id": "a49ee8e2-0acc-420f-a492-e65dd85919ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Yet respondents admit their failure to conduct even the most rudimentary background investigation upon any of these licensees\u2019 most recent applications, which at minimum would have disclosed the prosecutions against Donovan and Fricione for <mask>, theft, and misapplication of DOE property associated with their bid rigging. This disclosure easily would have led to disclosure of the scheme in which all eight licensees were implicated, for which the Special Commissioner of Investigation or DOE recommended the termination from employment of seven, and based on which DOE removed the eighth, Katz, from his supervisory position. The misconduct by Lombardi, Mulvihill, and Schmeidel also precipitated their placement on a list of former employees ineligible for future employment. Even if nothing in any of these eight licensees\u2019 applications on its face prompted an investigation, as respondents themselves point out, their own regulation, referring to the HPBOE license, requires that DCAS \u201cor the investigating agency, as the case may be, shall conduct an investigation of each candidate to determine the candidate\u2019s fitness and qualification for the license.\u201d (55 RCNY 11-02 [h] [1] [emphasis added]; see verified answer \u00b6 28.)"], "id": "4307e6a8-47a0-4586-a652-75eb5222f9b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is said in the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals in the case cited : \u201c Clearly, the statute never could have intended to convert a worthless debt into a demand, the payment of which might be enforced by making sureties liable who never intended or expected to assume any such obligation, and who were not understood to assume it at the time they became sureties.\u201d True, this is said in the dissenting opinion; but the prevailing opinion contains nothing in hostility to this view. Indeed, it is in entire consonance with this remark. The injustice of holding the sureties liable in this case is obvious and serious, and it should not be permitted save under the pressure of absolute necessity. The defendants\u2019 trouble here grows out of the express provision of the bond holding the sureties liable to absolute obedience by the executor to the order of the surrogate. (Schofield v. Churchill, 72 N. Y., 565; Thomson v. MacGregor, 81 N. Y., 592, on page 598.) Were the sureties here bound simply to fidelity on the part of the executor, the case would be widely different and without its present difficulty. Still we are inclined to the opinion that liability by the executor in this case for his own debt to the estate, as for money in hand, was not within the purview of the bond ; that such liability was not contemplated by those executing it, or, indeed, by the law pursuant to which it was required and given. Of course, we can but feel the force of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, fortified as it is by the numerous decisions cited *587by him. But, as we think, holding in mind the peculiar facts here certified to us, they are not directly in point, hence not conclusive of the question presented, and especially must we so conclude wheu we consider the strong intimation of the Court of Appeals, that the defendants might be entitled to their defense here interposed. We are of the opinion that the provision of the statute declaring that a debt due from an executor to the estate shall be treated, in the rendering of his account, as money in hand, must be construed with reference to the ordinary obligation, which imposed on him only diligent, faithful, honest action touching the administration of the estate committed to his charge. The Court of Appeals so held in effect by declaring that disobedience to the surrogate\u2019s decree to the extent of his (Barr\u2019s) own debt, would not here put him in contempt, or create against him a case of <mask>. His sureties did not, by their bond, guaranty the payment of his debt-to the estate, but only guaranteed obedience by the executors to all orders of the surrogate \u201c touching the administration of the estate committed to them.\u201d Has not Barr answered this obligation fully on his part ? What was the estate committed to his charge as executor? Was it not whatsoever of money or property which, with due diligence and entire honesty, could be made available by him for the payment of debts and for distribution ? The debt of Barr was of no value. It did not go to enhance the estate in fact; really and in fact it contributed no valuable or available part of the \u201c estate committed to \u201d the executors. But the orders, observance of which by the executors were guaranteed by the defendant\u2019s bond, were those made by the surrogate.\u201ctouching the administration\u201d of such estate. In this view of the case a breach of the bond in suit was not established."], "id": "18240494-f5f1-4025-bd29-67ab670cdd90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As enacted by Proposition 47, Section 490.2 neither redefines nor establishes a substantive theft offense. Instead, \"theft\" is defined in Penal Code section 484, subdivision (a), which provides: \"Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or *468real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft.\" (See People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 304-305, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165 [Pen.Code, \u00a7 484 consolidates several formerly distinct offenses into the single crime of theft, including larceny and theft by trick].) Penal Code section 490a, in turn, provides that any law referring to larceny, <mask>, or stealing is a theft offense. (Pen.Code, \u00a7 490a.)"], "id": "28cccaf4-0bef-4757-8b1e-8a91c7eb91b0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The <mask> scheme that resulted in plaintiffs\u2019 losses was devised by Robert Egan, the president and sole shareholder of MVMC, with the assistance of Bernard McGarry, MVMC\u2019s chief operating officer. Egan and McGarry arranged to use their customers\u2019 funds to finance MVMC\u2019s business operations, commingling customer funds to help conceal their misappropriation of the stolen funds, a practice referred to by plaintiffs and by the prosecutor in the criminal prosecution of Egan and McGarry as \u201cplaying the float\u201d (see United States v Egan, 811 F Supp 2d 829, 833 [SD NY 2011])."], "id": "1891b21e-3ad7-48c9-a5a4-442f66e6c348", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Terms such as larceny, <mask>, and theft by false pretenses continue to have independent meaning in the law. (Vidana , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 644, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805 *678[\"[T]he 1927 amendment to section 484 did not repeal or cross-reference then existing embezzlement and false pretenses statutes. These embezzlement and false pretenses statutory schemes continue to be in effect today.\"].) Indeed, recognizing these independent meanings, the Legislature has continued to utilize the names of historical theft offenses in more modern statutes. (Id. at pp. 645-646, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805 [providing several examples].) The result from the consolidation of historical theft-related offenses and the concomitant enactment of section 490a, is *567that the use of the word larceny, embezzlement, or the like, can be seen as a way of describing a specific type of conduct that is criminalized by the theft statute-not necessarily as the invocation of each and every type of theft. (Vidana , supra , at p. 649, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805 [\"Nor does the Legislature's continued use of the terms 'larceny' (or 'theft') and 'embezzlement' in various statutes transform larceny and embezzlement into different offenses. Rather, these terms are simply different ways of describing the behavior proscribed by those statutes.\"].)"], "id": "ca1a797e-83ae-4cb6-ae0c-f7310091ee5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Hpon the charge of the <mask>, the only defect of the testimony would be in some want of authority of the plaintiff to collect the moneys withheld by him (it being proved that he *310did withhold them), his right to retain them for his use, or disburse them for the defendant. Except the testimony of Mr. Hahn, there is no evidence in regard to such authority except the plaintiff\u2019s and defendant\u2019s. He states that the defendant once told him it was the same thing whether he paid his bills to himself or the plaintiff, who was his foreman; and again, that the latter did not come to his place of business because he was sick, and that he would have to give up the business unless he had a man who understood it. This was-three or four days after the plaintiff left, and the witness took his account of the money received by him to the defendant to procure a settlement. The testimony of the plaintiff and defendant is conflicting as to the authority of the former to receive and disburse the moneys of the latter. It is true the plaintiff is bound to establish a negative,\u2014viz., want of probable cause,\u2014but slighter evidence may do that than if he had to establish any affirmative. It is true the plaintiff\u2019s character for truth and veracity was assailed, but it was sustained by about the same number of witnesses, and his credibility was a proper question for the jury, as well as the relative credit to be given to his own account and the defendant\u2019s."], "id": "95182862-f424-4d4b-8652-fd015146aee6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The administration of the retirement fund was in the hands of three partners of the defendants (Retirement Board) and for some time the plaintiff\u2019s rights to his pension credit seem to have been held in abeyance. There is no evidence that at any time did he make a formal demand for payment. It was not until September, 1958 that the defendants learned that plaintiff had pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with grand larceny in relation to a dealing with a customer of the defendants which did not involve <mask> from the firm. The plaintiff had been sentenced to a term in prison upon his plea. In October, the Retirement Board determined that the plaintiff had forfeited his interest because his services \u201c had been terminated as a result of his dishonesty, within the meaning of the Plan \u201d, because his failure to answer \u201c relevant questions \u201d was \u201c tantamount, under the Plan, to a voluntary leaving of the firm\u2019s employ \u2019 \u2019, and because the plaintiff \u2018 \u2018 in failing and refusing to report to Ms employer after denial of his request for a leave of absence, had voluntarily left the firm\u2019s employ, within the meaning of the Plan \u201d."], "id": "2a88c971-8765-41e4-9b15-228594f047ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c Charge III: Violation of the 93d Article of War \u201c Specification I: \u2018 In that Private Bernard j. kadin, Company R, 1st Regiment, 9301 Technical Service Unit, Detachment No. 3, Army Service Forces Training Center (Ordnance), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, with intent to defraud The Western Union Telegraph Company at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, did, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, on or about 17 December 1945 forge the signature of Private Norman Fountain upon a Western Union Money Order\u2019.\u201d (Copy of Money Order on original of army papers.) The 93d Article of War reads: \u201c Any person subject to military law who commits manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking, robbery, larceny, <mask>, perjury, forgery, sodomy, assault with intent to commit any felony, assault with intent to do bodily harm with a dangerous weapon, an instrument, or other thing, or assault with intent to do bodily harm, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "b34429c6-d230-45f9-bad9-dd05da4e10be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As a general rule, the liability of a surety on a bond which is plain and unambiguous is governed, like any other contract, by the intention of the parties as expressed in the instrument. However, in determining the legal effect of a statutory bond such as is here before the Court, certain rules of construction are to be considered. A statutory bond will be reviewed in the light of the statute creating the duty to give security. It will be generally held that the provisions of the statute and regulations will be read into the bond. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 342, 40 S.Ct. 155, 64 L.Ed. 297 (1919) ; Whattoff v. United States , C.A. 8, 1966, 355 F.2d 473 ; Jones v. United States , C.A.8, 1951, 189 F.2d 601. So also, if a statutory bond contains provisions which do not comply with the requirements of law, they may be eliminated as surplusage and denied legal effect. Fort Smith Structural Steel Co. v. Western Surety Co. , W.D.Ark., 1965, 247 F.Supp. 674 ; 12 Am.Jur.2d, Bonds \u00a7 26. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Irvin , 426 F.2d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 1970). Kentucky has applied this approach, but only to public official bonds and not in recent years. Bankers' Surety Co. v. City of Newport , 162 Ky. 473, 172 S.W. 940, 941 (1915) (surety on elected treasurer's bond required to pay even though city failed to timely report <mask> because purpose of required bond was to protect government, not surety). We decline to extend this doctrine to performance bonds under the facts before us. Here, the state and City had legislation in place to protect the government, but it was ignored. Because no one paid Central Rock in conformity with its contract with JAH and Western made payment a condition of the bonds, Western cannot be liable to Governmental Entities under the bonds absent Central Rock having been paid."], "id": "a97ded87-c373-4cd3-8fd2-6f449de5ab48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". The Cannon opinion was careful to note that \"we do not, of course, say that Members of Congress or their aides may defraud the Government without subjecting themselves to statutory liabilities.\u201d (United States ex rel. Joseph v Cannon, 642d 1373, 1385.) The problem presented in Cannon was that representational activities of a legislator and his or her staff necessarily involve political aspects. This distinguishes Cannon from other cases in which Congressmen were prosecuted for paying legislative salaries to aides who performed only personal services (United States v Diggs, 613d 988 [DC Cir 1979]) or no service (Bramblett v United States, 348 US 503 [1955]; United States v Diggs, supra, at 1002; People v Hochberg, 87 Misc 2d 1024 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1976]). Also distinguishable are cases involving government officials who have no official representational function. (Cf., e.g., Board of Chosen Freeholders v Conda, 164 NJ Super 386, 396 A2d 613, 616-617 [1978] [Surrogate, although elected, could not use staff for political errands]; United States v Pintar, 630d 1270, 1281-1282 [8th Cir 1980] [<mask> conviction for salaries of secretaries in administrative agency assigned exclusively to political campaign work].)"], "id": "00fa9b42-62d9-4cce-8628-b2bb0d05e232", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The motion papers, as well as the testimony taken by the magistrate (See People v. Klinger, 164 Misc. 530) and that before the grand jury show that the prosecution charges the defendant with the felonious conversion or <mask>, upon the expiration of a lease, of the moneys deposited as security for the performance of the conditions of such lease, made by the Klinger & Company, Inc., of which the defendant is the treasurer, to the complainant, who claims he has become entitled to the return of his deposit at the end of the term for which it was given, he having fully complied with all the conditions of said lease."], "id": "307219fe-bfd8-47b1-aa65-5554a2f9d645", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Curiously, civil and criminal cases diverge in evaluating the trespass element. Civil conversion and larceny both require trespass. ( Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 126, 271 Cal.Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479 [conversion requires interference with plaintiff's ownership or right of possession]; Davis , supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 305, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165 [larceny requires a trespassory taking].) <mask> does not. ( Vidana , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 639, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805 [embezzlement, unlike larceny, involves \" 'an initial, lawful possession of the victim's property, followed by its misappropriation' \"].) A sales agent who pockets sales proceeds commits conversion of the principal's funds. ( Fischer v. Machado (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 [rejecting claim that principal had no specific right to funds received by agent].) Yet that same agent commits embezzlement , not larceny, because the initial taking is deemed lawful (non-trespassory). ( Frazier , supra , 88 Cal.App.2d at p. 103, 198 P.2d 325.)"], "id": "75ced8d8-20d2-4d4d-b996-3e0dfcee5629", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In support of treating larceny and <mask> as separate offenses, the Vidana court observed they \"have different elements,\" \"neither is a lesser included offense of the other,\" and they are found in \"self-contained\" statutes. ( Vidana , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 648, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.) On the other hand, the court observed that the Legislature enacted section 490a, which provides that any statute that \" 'mentions larceny, embezzlement, or stealing ... shall ... be hereafter read and interpreted as if the word \"theft\" were substituted therefor.' \" ( Vidana , at p. 648, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805, quoting \u00a7 490a.) The court concluded \"the obvious intent of this statute ... was to create a single crime of theft.\" ( Vidana , at p. 648, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.) The court also noted larceny and embezzlement \"generally have the same punishment.\" ( Id. at pp. 648-649, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.) On balance, the court concluded larceny and embezzlement \"are simply different ways of describing the behavior proscribed by those statutes.\" ( Id. at p. 649, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.) Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the striking of the defendant's larceny conviction. ( Id. at p. 651 & fn. 18, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.)"], "id": "7eab0d6e-03e9-4f8b-a705-ac730c83fba9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Brady, J. The plaintiff\u2019s assignor, E. B. Kinshimer, was employed by the defendant as his agent, to coliect the rent of premises on Madison avenue, in this city. On the fifth of Kovemher, 1857, as such agent, he received a check for three hundred and fifty dollars from the defendant\u2019s tenant, had it cashed, and used the proceeds in the payment of his own debts. On the fifth of December, 1857, having prior thereto endeavored to obtain payment of the sum named, from Kinshimer, and having commenced an action for the recovery the defendant also procured a warrant for his arrest on a charge of <mask>, and upon an affidavit in which the defendant alleged that Kinshimer. had acted as his servant in collecting rents, and had collected and embezzled the sum named. On the day the warrant was issued, the defendant and an officer named Spicer, proceeded to the vicinity of the residence of Kinshimer, where, about four or five o'clock P. M., he was arroste.d, almost immediately put into one of the Fourth avenue cars, and taken in that mode toward the Centre street prison, in custody of Spicer, and accompanied by the defendant. While thus in custody, and as he says, through fright and fear of being locked up in the Tombs, he let the defendant have his watch. The testimony is conflicting as to the facts and circumstances attending the delivery of the watch, but it is not disputed that the watch was offered by Kinshimer to the defendant, and accepted by the defendant, while Kinshimer was in custody under the warrant aforesaid, and soon after lii's arrest. There is also evidence in the case tending to establish that the defendant accepted the watch only in part settlement of che civil claim, without relinquishing, or expressing any intention of abandoning the criminal complaint, And it appears that that complaint after a hearing before the *74magistrate who granted the warrant, was by him dismissed. The judge in the Court below charged the jury that the arrest was illegal, inasmuch as Kinshimer was the agent, and not the servant, of the defendant, within the meaning or spirit of the statute defining or declaring the crime of embezzlement, hut that if they believed that Kinshimer voluntarily gave the watch to the defendant, the defendant was entitled to a verdict; if they believed he did not voluntarily deliver it to the defendant, then their verdict must he for the plaintiff. To the charge there was but one exception which \u2022was taken by the plaintiff, and to that part of it in which the jury were instructed, that if the watch was voluntarily given, the verdict must he for the defendant. The plaintiff\u2019s counsel, however, made three requests of the Oourt to charge as follows: . _"], "id": "8fb6d45f-cdc3-4e1a-8540-3bedb3146a0f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It didn't take long. Just a few months later, the Court of Appeal for the First District, Division Two addressed one variation of the issue in People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1150, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 ( Stanfill ). In Stanfill , the defendant stood accused of felony <mask> of public funds under section 504 alleged to have happened over the course of several years. The same statute provided the offense was a misdemeanor where the embezzled funds were not public or came to less than $400. (\u00a7 504.) After trial, Stanfill requested standard jury instructions on the lesser included misdemeanor offense and general instructions on the statute of limitations. ( Stanfill , at p. 1142, fn. 1, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885.) Ultimately, the court instructed the jury they could find Stanfill guilty of violating section 504 \"if the proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any one or more of the acts between the dates of August 6, 1993 and August 5, 1996\" and \"where a temporary use of property 'aggregates in excess of $400 in any period of twelve consecutive months between August 6, 1993 and August 5, 1996.' \" ( Id. at p. 1143, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885.) The court did not mention the one-year limitation period for the misdemeanor. The jury acquitted Stanfill of the felony offense, but found him guilty of the misdemeanor offense. ( Ibid. ) Stanfill then turned around and appealed the misdemeanor conviction on the ground the trial court had misinstructed the jury by telling them they could convict him of the lesser included misdemeanor without informing them of the one-year limitations period applicable to that offense. ( Id. at pp. 1142-1144, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885.)"], "id": "7fe5b5c6-cd79-400e-a043-5045a2393564", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Yet respondents admit their failure to conduct even the most rudimentary background investigation upon any of these licensees\u2019 most recent applications, which at minimum would have disclosed the prosecutions against Donovan and Fricione for <mask>, theft, and misapplication of DOE property associated with their bid rigging. This disclosure easily would have led to disclosure of the scheme in which all eight licensees were implicated, for which the Special Commissioner of Investigation or DOE recommended the termination from employment of seven, and based on which DOE removed the eighth, Katz, from his supervisory position. The misconduct by Lombardi, Mulvihill, and Schmeidel also precipitated their placement on a list of former employees ineligible for future employment. Even if nothing in any of these eight licensees\u2019 applications on its face prompted an investigation, as respondents themselves point out, their own regulation, referring to the HPBOE license, requires that DCAS \u201cor the investigating agency, as the case may be, shall conduct an investigation of each candidate to determine the candidate\u2019s fitness and qualification for the license.\u201d (55 RCNY 11-02 [h] [1] [emphasis added]; see verified answer \u00b6 28.)"], "id": "1f3be608-575a-4d9e-8756-012b9e7b6266", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Kaufman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for grand theft of personal property belonging to Emmet. He contends there was no theft because Emmet exercised his right of recourse. To the extent any crime occurred, he argues it was either theft by false pretenses as to Reinicke , or perhaps <mask> as to Emmet, but neither theory was included in the jury instructions."], "id": "c93fbaa9-fcc9-4cfb-837d-76aa3bddaae9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["For his fourth point on appeal, Swanigan contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to cross-examine one of the State's witnesses about his alleged <mask>. At a pretrial hearing, Swanigan argued that he should be allowed to question Michael Wright, the Garland County sheriff's deputy who acted as evidence custodian at the time of the shooting, about why he was no longer employed as a law-enforcement officer. At the time of the trial in this case, Wright was under investigation and had admitted to embezzling money from the Arkansas Narcotics Officers Organization. The court ruled that Swanigan could not use the prior bad act of embezzlement to impeach Wright under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 609 because there had been no conviction or under Rule 608 because embezzlement was not probative of truthfulness."], "id": "9589cd66-93b3-4f3f-977a-f067eeabebd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Where, in light of the general principles above set forth, should the result of the eserowee\u2019s dereliction fall? That question seems to have first arisen and been answered in 1925 in Hildebrand v. Beck (196 Cal. 141). In that case there was a deposit of money by a purchaser of real estate with an escrow agent which was to be paid to the vendor if and when a title guarantee was secured. The escrowee embezzled the moneys deposited before the guarantee was secured. In holding that the loss must fall upon the vendee because, at the time of the <mask>, the vendor had not yet acquired a right to receive the funds \u2014 a rule which has been uniformly followed in all subsequent cases \u2014 the court, sitting en banc, unanimously held (pp. 145-146):"], "id": "93e081fe-9483-4390-900c-b49bcb94671b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Recently, this court criticized Jonathan R. and declined to follow it. (See People v. Brunton (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1097, 1106, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 ( Brunton. )) In Brunton , the defendant was charged with violations of subdivision (a)(1) of section 245 and subdivision (a)(4) of the same statute for a single act of choking a cellmate with a tightly rolled towel. Based on the unique facts of the case before us, we concluded the subdivisions were merely different statements of the same offense and the defendant could not *62be convicted of violating both subdivisions. ( Brunton , at pp. 1105-1107, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 686, relying on People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 647-651, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805 [concluding larceny and <mask> were the same offense and \u00a7 954 does not authorize multiple convictions for different statements of the same offense].)"], "id": "71fe76a6-4129-4be2-8758-f47941fbb2ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The administration of the retirement fund was in the hands of three partners of the defendants (Retirement Board) and for some time the plaintiff\u2019s rights to his pension credit seem to have been held in abeyance. There is no evidence that at any time did he make a formal demand for payment. It was not until September, 1958 that the defendants learned that plaintiff had pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with grand larceny in relation to a dealing with a customer of the defendants which did not involve <mask> from the firm. The plaintiff had been sentenced to a term in prison upon his plea. In October, the Retirement Board determined that the plaintiff had forfeited his interest because his services \u201c had been terminated as a result of his dishonesty, within the meaning of the Plan \u201d, because his failure to answer \u201c relevant questions \u201d was \u201c tantamount, under the Plan, to a voluntary leaving of the firm\u2019s employ \u2019 \u2019, and because the plaintiff \u2018 \u2018 in failing and refusing to report to Ms employer after denial of his request for a leave of absence, had voluntarily left the firm\u2019s employ, within the meaning of the Plan \u201d."], "id": "e3811861-d09e-4b2b-99ab-9c827655ca5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In support of his contention arson is a single offense, Shiga points to the language at the beginning of section 451, which provides, \"A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any *476structure, forest land, or property.\"16 The People contend arson is not a single offense, but rather, each subdivision creates a separate offense, including section 451, subdivision (b), which criminalizes \"[a]rson that causes an inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn,\" and section 451, subdivision (c), which criminalizes \"[a]rson of a structure or forest land.\" *205To determine whether the subdivisions of section 451 set forth separate offenses or different ways of committing the same offense of simple arson, we look to the Legislature's intent as reflected in the language of the statute and, if the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider the legislative history. ( People v. Gonzalez (2014) 60 Cal.4th 533, 537, 539, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 335 P.3d 1083 ( Gonzalez ) [concluding oral copulation under former \u00a7 288a, subd. (f), prohibiting oral copulation of an unconscious person, and subd. (i), prohibiting oral copulation of an intoxicated person, describe separate offenses because \"[e]ach subdivision sets forth all the elements of a crime, and each prescribes a specific punishment\"]; see People v. White (2017) 2 Cal.5th 349, 351-352, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 386 P.3d 1172 ( White ) [considering legislative intent in concluding \u00a7 261, subd. (a)(3), prohibiting rape of intoxicated person, and (a)(4)(A), prohibiting rape of unconscious person, described separate offenses such that defendant may properly be convicted of both in the same proceeding]; People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 650, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805 ( Vidana ) [relying on legislative history to conclude larceny under \u00a7 484, subd. (a), and <mask> under \u00a7 503 are \"different statements of the same offense\"].)"], "id": "2596894a-9f14-4c4f-b5c8-ec562fc0ac08", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Catambay discovered that at the time Longview International recorded the abstract of judgment its corporate powers had been suspended. (The Delaware corporation had failed to provide an annual statement of information and pay a $ 25 fee to the state of Delaware.) She filed a motion in the Santa Clara County <mask> case, asking to intervene in the action and seeking to expunge the judgment *795lien from the Redwood City property. Longview International opposed the motion. It argued that its corporate powers had been reinstated, which retroactively validated any actions it took while suspended, including recording the abstract of judgment. The trial court denied Catambay's request to intervene and her request to expunge the lien."], "id": "82dee486-563b-4220-ba80-b835c57b54e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff\u2019s amended verified complaint set forth three causes of action: <mask> and conversion of government funds in violation of Haitian penal and civil law, as well as under New York law, and seeking declaration of a constructive trust for the benefit of Haiti relative to the funds in the bank, accounts at issue; embezzlement in violation of Haitian penal and civil law, and seeking recovery of the funds unlawfully taken from the public treasury by defendant and the proceeds of such funds, including the funds in the bank accounts; and conversion under New York law, also seeking recovery of funds as in the second count. Defendant sought dismissed on the same grounds alleged against the original complaint, and *382the motion was denied by Justice Grossman. Defendant appealed both of Justice Grossman\u2019s orders denying dismissal and this Court affirmed both orders without opinion on October 6, 1988 (Republic of Haiti v Irving Trust Co., 143 AD2d 1076, lv dismissed 73 NY2d 871)."], "id": "78dd7267-23a7-458c-82f1-f2e98deac4c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant challenges the validity of the false pretense count of the indictment on the ground that it omits the allegation of \u201c reliance on the false pretense \u201d by the complainants. There is only one crime of larceny in this State. (Code Crim. Pro., \u00a7 1290; People v. Lobel, 298 N. Y. 243.) If an indictment or a count thereof charges larceny by false pretenses, the form of pleading must meet the requirement of section 1290-a of the Penal Law which provides as follows: \u2018 \u2018 1290-a. Pleading and Proof. In any prosecution for larceny it shall be sufficient if: 1. The indictment or information charges -that the accused, with the intent to deprive or defraud another of his property or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of some person other than the true owner, stole any property of any of the kinds mentioned in section twelve hundred ninety of this article. If, however, the defendant made use of any false or fraudulent representation or pretence [sic.] in the course of accomplishing, or in aid of, or in facilitating the theft, evidence thereof may not be received at the trial unless the indictment or information alleges such representation or pretense, and it shall be immaterial whether the theft may have been previously denominated common law larceny by asportation, common law larceny by trick and device, obtaining property by false pretenses or <mask>. As long as one of the false or fraudulent representations or pretenses alleged be proven, any other related representation or pretense, though not alleged, may be given in evidence.\u201d"], "id": "f074153f-ef1f-4616-a5fd-1eacf12d88eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A thorough examination of the record indicated that there is absolutely nothing in it to bring the debt within the purview of any of the exceptions stated in the Bankruptcy Act barring discharge. This is a simple action on a contract obligation predicated on a direct promise of indemnity. The record does not reveal any evidence that the original liability was predicated *362either upon \u201c willful and malicious injuries to * * * property \u201d or upon the defendant\u2019s \u201c fraud, <mask>, misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity * * The plaintiff in effect is asking this court to indulge in inferences not justified by anything in the record and thus to conclude that the plaintiff sustained the loss because of a larceny committed by the defendant. This the court refuses to do. The actions of the defendant are just as consistent with an innocent and nonlarcenous loss as with a criminal defalcation. Actually the former conclusion is much more tenable in view of the defendant\u2019s unequivocal assertion of innocence. To sustain the plaintiff\u2019s position the court would necessarily be obliged to engage in an independent investigation to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss. This would necessarily entail an inquiry far beyond the judgment and the record before the court and this it is neither authorized nor obliged to do. (Multiple Trading Corp. v. Saggese, supra; Bronx County Trust Co. v. Cassin, 170 Misc. 962.)"], "id": "534717bc-bed3-4370-b0b7-3b7371b5d49d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Mr. Fox\u2019s claim to a derivative right to counsel is far weaker than the claim asserted in Kent (supra). Inasmuch as Mr. Fox is not being prosecuted for <mask> of estate assets, he cannot claim that the criminal solicitation prosecution arises out of the same matrix as the civil contempt proceeding. That Mr. Fox\u2019s motivation for soliciting his brother\u2019s murder was revenge for the contempt citation does not render the two proceedings \u201crelated\u201d within the meaning of Bing (supra). The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is to coerce compliance with the court\u2019s mandate. (Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 70 NY2d 233, 239 [1987].) Manifestly, the purpose of a criminal action is to secure a criminal conviction and accord punishment to the accused. As the Third Department accurately reasoned in Kent (supra), the disparate forms of relief sought in the two actions show that the present criminal prosecution is unrelated to the prior civil contempt proceeding. Thus, his representation by counsel in the civil contempt matter does not give rise to a derivative right to counsel in these subsequent criminal proceedings."], "id": "e3cb6707-a499-40fb-a831-428d6b20e98f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Curiously, civil and criminal cases diverge in evaluating the trespass element. Civil conversion and larceny both require trespass. ( Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 126, 271 Cal.Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479 [conversion requires interference with plaintiff's ownership or right of possession]; Davis , supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 305, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165 [larceny requires a trespassory taking].) <mask> does not. ( Vidana , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 639, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805 [embezzlement, unlike larceny, involves \" 'an initial, lawful possession of the victim's property, followed by its misappropriation' \"].) A sales agent who pockets sales proceeds commits conversion of the principal's funds. ( Fischer v. Machado (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 [rejecting claim that principal had no specific right to funds received by agent].) Yet that same agent commits embezzlement , not larceny, because the initial taking is deemed lawful (non-trespassory). ( Frazier , supra , 88 Cal.App.2d at p. 103, 198 P.2d 325.)"], "id": "6f90526a-df32-41e9-b168-f0dfc0658b82", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Yet respondents admit their failure to conduct even the most rudimentary background investigation upon any of these licensees\u2019 most recent applications, which at minimum would have disclosed the prosecutions against Donovan and Fricione for <mask>, theft, and misapplication of DOE property associated with their bid rigging. This disclosure easily would have led to disclosure of the scheme in which all eight licensees were implicated, for which the Special Commissioner of Investigation or DOE recommended the termination from employment of seven, and based on which DOE removed the eighth, Katz, from his supervisory position. The misconduct by Lombardi, Mulvihill, and Schmeidel also precipitated their placement on a list of former employees ineligible for future employment. Even if nothing in any of these eight licensees\u2019 applications on its face prompted an investigation, as respondents themselves point out, their own regulation, referring to the HPBOE license, requires that DCAS \u201cor the investigating agency, as the case may be, shall conduct an investigation of each candidate to determine the candidate\u2019s fitness and qualification for the license.\u201d (55 RCNY 11-02 [h] [1] [emphasis added]; see verified answer \u00b6 28.)"], "id": "ecf0f1d6-c6da-456a-a565-ca183a99ea16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b621 We are guided by our decision in Spears, which recognized that attorney fees are appropriately ordered as restitution when an attorney is reasonably necessary to remedy the harm caused by the criminal conduct. Spears, 184 Ariz. at 291\u201392. Thus, just as in the probate proceedings at issue in Spears, attorneys may be reasonably necessary to rectify harms directly caused by criminal conduct in several scenarios, including financial fraud, <mask>, or identity theft. Similarly, when a victim retains an attorney to enforce her rights in the criminal proceedings, the court should order payment of those fees as restitution when attorneys are reasonably necessary to enforce these rights. Setting this standard accommodates constitutional and legislative directives that restitution reimburse a victim for losses caused by criminal conduct and simultaneously avoids any STATE V. REED Opinion of the Court"], "id": "5d6e4ef3-dacc-4258-8b22-48e9f7d2121d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Horowitz (138 Misc. 794, at p. 800) the magistrate who rendered the decision in the Fleishman case, upon which defendant relies so heavily, specifically left open the point as to whether the defendant might set up the corporate entity of the landlord as a defense to the prosecution against him as an officer under sections 1290 and 1302 of the Penal Law: \u201c Since I hold that the landlord\u2019s conversion of this fund did not constitute larceny or <mask>, it is unnecessary to pass on the question as to whether this defendant may set up the corporate entity of the landlord as a defense to this prosecution against him as an officer thereof, under the ruling in People v. Fleishman (133 Misc. 288) and People v. Shatzkin (221 App. Div. 602).\u201d"], "id": "383c78e0-0a60-42c4-9b54-1ba318611170", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Catambay discovered that at the time Longview International recorded the abstract of judgment its corporate powers had been suspended. (The Delaware corporation had failed to provide an annual statement of information and pay a $ 25 fee to the state of Delaware.) She filed a motion in the Santa Clara County <mask> case, asking to intervene in the action and seeking to expunge the judgment *795lien from the Redwood City property. Longview International opposed the motion. It argued that its corporate powers had been reinstated, which retroactively validated any actions it took while suspended, including recording the abstract of judgment. The trial court denied Catambay's request to intervene and her request to expunge the lien."], "id": "2ca7191f-3680-4436-9385-b66ff3048267", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Third. \u201cQuestion, [to defendant\u2019s driver on cross-examination.] Is it not a fact that you left Ridleys\u2019 with money belonging to them? Answer. Yes, sir, I did. Q. Moneys that you had collected for them? A. Yes, sir.\u201d The defendant claims that a witness can be impeached in only three ways:- (1) By disapproving the facts stated by him; (2) by general evidence affecting his credit; (3) by proving that the witness has made statements out of court contrary to what he has testified at the trial,\u2014citing 1 Green]. Ev. \u00a7\u00a7 461, 462. We think the evidence was properly received. It did not ask as to an accusation, but a fact. The distinction is obvious. Thus, while you cannot ask a witness whether he has been arrested, (Wright v. People, 1 N. Y. Crim. R. 462,) or indicted, (Ryan v. People, 79 N. Y. 599,) or expelled from the fire department, (Nolan v. Railroad Co., 87 N. Y. 68,) you can ask him whether he was not guilty of a particular offense; for, as the court of appeals said in People v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 544: \u201cMere charges or accusations, or even indictments, may not so be inquired into, since they are consistent with innocence, and may exist without moral delinquency; but, where the witness is called upon to confess or deny his guilt of a crime, his answer, if in the affirmative, tends to impair the credit of the witness by its tendency to establish a bad moral character. The party putting such a collateral question is concluded by the answer of the witness, and, if he denies the offense, cannot be contradicted by other evidence.\u201d Conley v. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 618. The witness (the defendant\u2019s driver) testified that he had been discharged from Ridleys\u2019, and that lie had left with moneys which lie had collected for them. He had been in their employ as a driver. The unexplained failure to pay over these moneys constituted <mask>, under the statute, (3 Rev. St. 6th Ed. p. 952, \u00a7 73,) and is made larceny by thePenal Code, \u00a7 528. The driver had been called by the defendant to contradict the plaintiff, and did contradict him as to certain material matters ; and it was competent for the plaintiff to break down his credibility by proof from his own lips that he had been guilty of acts tending to prove his bad moral character. In People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 398, the prisoner, on his trial for murder, was called as a witness on his own behalf, and on cross-examinatian was asked as to other acts of wrong-doing committed by him. In sustaining the trial judge, the court of appeals said: \u201c When a prisoner offers himself as a witness on his own behalf, he is subject to the same rules of cross-examination as any other witness. He may be asked questions disclosing his past life and conduct, and thus impair his credibility. Such questions may tend to show that he has before been guilty of the same crime as that for which he is put on trial; but they are not on that account incompetent. * * * The extent to which such an examination may go to test the witness\u2019 credibility is largely in the discretion of the court. \u201d We think the right was not abused in the present instance."], "id": "b8fecfd2-f878-473e-a0da-4f32fb98c52c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the case before us, the cashier of the defendant bank embezzled certain Uhited States bonds belonging to the plaintiff, *357and pledged them as security for moneys which he borrowed for said bank. Such <mask> certainly was not within the authority, express or implied, of the cashier. Conceding that an .authority to borrow money for the bank may be implied from the nature of the cashier\u2019s employment, and his acts done under it, yet an act of embezzlement is quite foreign to such an authority. The authority to borrow would embrace all necessary and proper means to accomplish that object; but the stealing of another\u2019s securities, to pledge for that purpose, is not usual or proper, and .is not, therefore, within the authority conferred, but is an act altogether beyond the scope of the cashier\u2019s employment.. If the case stopped here, no liability could be cast upon the bank. But the bank received the money borrowed, by means of the pledge of the bonds, and still retains such moneys. Such acts, we think, must operate as a ratification of the cashier\u2019s embezzlement. It is true, indeed, that no one connected with the bank, except the \u2022cashier, had any knowledge that the money so received had been \u2022obtained by means of a pledge of the plaintiff\u2019s bonds. Still the receiving of money was strictly within the scope of the cashier's \u2022employment, and his knowledge will be imputed to the bank under the settled rule that notice to the agent is notice to the principal, if the agent' comes to the knowledge of the fact while he is acting for the principal, in the course of the transaction, which becomes the subject of the suit. (Bk. U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451 ; Holden v. N. Y. and Erie Bk., 72 N. Y., 286.) Nor can the bank retain the money in question, and repudiate the agency by which such money was obtained, for a principal will not be permitted to avow his agent\u2019s negotiations as to part, and disavow as to the residue. (Hov. on Fraud, 144 ; Bolton v. Hillersden, 1 Ld. Ray., 224 ; Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y., 238 ; Elwell v. Chamberlin, 31 id., 611.) The set-off was properly rejected."], "id": "8c56a1f6-8196-488d-9fe8-5aa977193cb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The statute defining the offense of <mask>, declares that, u if any clerk or servant of any private person, or of \" any copartnership, (except apprentices and persons within the age of eighteen years,) or if any officer, agent, clerk or servant of any incorporate company, shall embezzle or convert to his own use, take, make away with, or secrete with intent to embezzle, or convert to his own use, any money, goods, rights of actions, or other valuable securities or effects whatever, belonging to any other person which shall have come into his possession or under his care by virtue of such employment or office, he shall upon conviction be punished in the manner prescribed by law for feloniously stealing.\u201d &c,"], "id": "c513bd14-4dd9-4feb-a887-b3adef4732b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant Kaminsky argues that, at least in those instances in which he received invoices for the allegedly consigned property (indictment No. 4275 counts 1, 6, 7; indictment No. 4274 count 2), and in those instances when a partial payment was made prior to (indictment No. 4275 count 9), contemporaneously with (indictment No. 4275 counts 1, 6), or subsequent to (indictment No. 4275 counts 1,10; indictment No. 4274 counts 2, 3, 4) delivery, there was a conditional sale and transfer of title and, thus, neither <mask> nor larceny by trick. (See, e.g., Zink v People, 77 NY 114, 123 [1879].) As matters of fact the Grand Jury could justifiably have found that the purported invoices were merely a convenience and served as memoranda of possession and not evidence of a sale. The giving of personal notes or subsequent payment of a fraction of the value of the property could have been justifiably interpreted as part of the scheme to appropriate the greater part of the property\u2019s value without retribution by the owner, consistent with other conduct such as threats and flight. (See, People v Scharf, 217 NY, at pp 210-211; People v Hazard, 28 App Div, at p 307; Hansen v National Sur. Co., 257 NY 216, 220 [1931]; People v Kaye, 295 NY 9,13 [1945]; People v Rosenbaum, 107 Misc 2d 501, 506 [Sup Ct, Rockland County 1981].)"], "id": "8928cb0f-ba43-4583-b83f-610e2e3a39f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The exception to that part of the charge which stated that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover at least nominal damages, unless the defendant proved the truth of the whole charge is not well taken. The exceptions and argument of counsel upon it wholly ignore that part of the charge relating to the defense of probable cause; the jury were instructed that if they should find that the prosecution of the plaintiff was authorized by the corporation and that it had failed, they should then consider the question of probable cause. Upon this branch of the case they were to determine whether the charge of <mask> was true. If it was, then there was an end of the case; the verdict was to be for the defendant. If true in part only, then plaintiff might recover nominal damages, but if they should determine that the charge was not true the plaintiff was not necessarily to have a verdict. They were .tiien to consider whether the defendant had probable cause to *369believe the charge true, and if they had, then the verdict was to be for the defendant. The question of probable cause was very fully explained and illustrated to the jury. The exception is taken to an isolated part,of the charge, which, if it stood alone, would doubtless be susceptible to the criticism made upon it, but in the connection it was stated it was not misleading and constituted no ground for \u25a0error."], "id": "1c7eba2a-4e8b-45e2-b206-f4dfac195547", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the case before us, the cashier of the defendant bank embezzled certain Uhited States bonds belonging to the plaintiff, *357and pledged them as security for moneys which he borrowed for said bank. Such <mask> certainly was not within the authority, express or implied, of the cashier. Conceding that an .authority to borrow money for the bank may be implied from the nature of the cashier\u2019s employment, and his acts done under it, yet an act of embezzlement is quite foreign to such an authority. The authority to borrow would embrace all necessary and proper means to accomplish that object; but the stealing of another\u2019s securities, to pledge for that purpose, is not usual or proper, and .is not, therefore, within the authority conferred, but is an act altogether beyond the scope of the cashier\u2019s employment.. If the case stopped here, no liability could be cast upon the bank. But the bank received the money borrowed, by means of the pledge of the bonds, and still retains such moneys. Such acts, we think, must operate as a ratification of the cashier\u2019s embezzlement. It is true, indeed, that no one connected with the bank, except the \u2022cashier, had any knowledge that the money so received had been \u2022obtained by means of a pledge of the plaintiff\u2019s bonds. Still the receiving of money was strictly within the scope of the cashier's \u2022employment, and his knowledge will be imputed to the bank under the settled rule that notice to the agent is notice to the principal, if the agent' comes to the knowledge of the fact while he is acting for the principal, in the course of the transaction, which becomes the subject of the suit. (Bk. U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451 ; Holden v. N. Y. and Erie Bk., 72 N. Y., 286.) Nor can the bank retain the money in question, and repudiate the agency by which such money was obtained, for a principal will not be permitted to avow his agent\u2019s negotiations as to part, and disavow as to the residue. (Hov. on Fraud, 144 ; Bolton v. Hillersden, 1 Ld. Ray., 224 ; Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y., 238 ; Elwell v. Chamberlin, 31 id., 611.) The set-off was properly rejected."], "id": "689980f3-18e1-4edb-b86d-6497dfd7573f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff\u2019s amended verified complaint set forth three causes of action: <mask> and conversion of government funds in violation of Haitian penal and civil law, as well as under New York law, and seeking declaration of a constructive trust for the benefit of Haiti relative to the funds in the bank, accounts at issue; embezzlement in violation of Haitian penal and civil law, and seeking recovery of the funds unlawfully taken from the public treasury by defendant and the proceeds of such funds, including the funds in the bank accounts; and conversion under New York law, also seeking recovery of funds as in the second count. Defendant sought dismissed on the same grounds alleged against the original complaint, and *382the motion was denied by Justice Grossman. Defendant appealed both of Justice Grossman\u2019s orders denying dismissal and this Court affirmed both orders without opinion on October 6, 1988 (Republic of Haiti v Irving Trust Co., 143 AD2d 1076, lv dismissed 73 NY2d 871)."], "id": "a99ff073-14b1-4913-9df1-140049e3bf34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant served as Chief Executive Officer of IAR for nearly 20 years.1 Sometime around 2012, IAR discovered evidence that defendant had embezzled large sums of money from the corporation by, among other things, paying personal debts from the corporation's bank accounts and paying salary and retirement benefits to his wife, who was not an IAR employee. Accordingly, on September 7, 2012, IAR, represented by Valla, filed a civil lawsuit against defendant in San Mateo County Superior Court. In October 2012, Valla, on behalf of IAR, made contact with the Foster City Police Department to report the suspected crime(s). Trial in the civil case *855was then set for September 9, 2013. Just days before this first trial date, the San Mateo District Attorney (district attorney) charged defendant with felony <mask>.2"], "id": "2a46da1c-651f-407f-a08c-f3f6a0d16534", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to reform the field of employee welfare and pension plans after national disclosures of fraud, theft, and <mask> in the administration of such plans. Bluntly stated, through ERISA, \"Congress sought to correct the pattern of wasting and looting which had resulted in a devastating denial of benefits to the intended recipients of plans.\u201d (National Bank v International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local No. 3, 69 AD2d 679, 684 [2d Dept 1979].)"], "id": "615cca21-306b-4c67-921e-71c6c87c184d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As the court was not asked to charge the jury upon that point, it would not be available upon an exception; but as it was left to the jury, they evidently must have based their estimate of damages upon the ground of the malice of both accusations. Considering the proof of the previous conduct and character of the plaintiff in pecuniary transactions, where he *311received money for others, the damage to his character by a charge of <mask> would be highly overrated by the sum given. Even go far as his character for veracity is concerned^ positive testimony, if reliable, would be far more effectual than: negative from persons who have heard nothing; the experience of both with public opinion respecting it should be equally great to balance them. But the striking proof of particular transactions shows considerable and frequent disregard as to pecuniary obligations. Rone of them, however, approach the criminality of stealing, and I cannot but think the greater portion of the damages was given for that charge. The verdict ought, therefore, to be relieved against as excessive."], "id": "c829b89e-614b-4043-8bee-a6ac525c76f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs' citations to case authority do not suggest otherwise, but offer some guidance on assessing distinct and separate claims. In E-Fab , supra , 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 9, the court addressed circumstances in which claims against the defendant accrued at a different time than claims against a former employee. The plaintiff was the victim of <mask> by the employee; the defendant accounting agency had recruited and placed the employee with plaintiff upon representing that it had screened her background, credentials, and references."], "id": "ce900fd5-90e3-4ef1-b6fc-ea4b4fa964ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["An executor is required by law within a reasonable time after qualifying, with the aid of appraisers, to make a true and perfect inventory of all the goods, chattels and credits of his testator (2 R. S., 82, \u00a7 2). This inventory shall be filed with the Surrogate within three months after the issue of letters. If this is not done, he may be compelled, on the application of a creditor, or person interested in the estate, to perform such duty; and in case of default he maybe *128committed to jail (Code Civ. Pro., \u00a7\u00a7 2715, 2716). In actions and special proceedings, the inventory is presumptive evidence of the amount and value of the estate both for and against the executor. It would often be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove what property came into the possession of an executor if he were excused from making and returning an inventory thereof. If the executor converts to his own use, makes away with or fraudulently withholds any of the money or property of the estate, he is guilty of <mask> (L. 1877, ch. 208). If a testator can dispense with the making of an inventory by will, many of the safeguards thus thrown around the estate which comes to the hands of the. executor would be thrown down, and fraud and misappropriation of the trust property- would be rendered much easier and less liable to detection than at present. It is against public policy to permit such interference with -the forms of procedure established by law, or to remove the barriers designed to protect estates from misappropriation. The safety, preservation and honest distribution of decedent\u2019s estate require that, provisions like the one in question should be declared invalid and of no effect."], "id": "273c68a5-268a-4a9b-90d9-8c56baa2b6d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As the plurality observes, it has long been the general rule that when a single crime can be committed in various ways, jurors need not agree on the mode of commission. That rule is not only constitutional, it is probably indispensable in a system that requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict. When a woman's charred body has been found in a burned house, and there is ample evidence that the defendant set out to kill her, it would be absurd to set him free because six jurors believe he strangled her to death (and caused the fire accidentally in his hasty escape), while six others believe he left her unconscious and set the fire to kill her. While that seems perfectly obvious, it is also true, as the plurality points out, that one can conceive of novel \"umbrella\" crimes (a felony consisting of either robbery or failure to file a tax return) where permitting a 6-to-6 verdict would seem contrary to due process. Schad v. Arizona , 501 U.S. 624, 649-50, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). What the plurality pointed out was that \"nothing in our history suggests that the Due Process Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a charge of 'Crime' so generic that any combination of jury findings of <mask>, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering, for example, would suffice for conviction.\" Id. at 633, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (plurality op.)."], "id": "5fe96e89-cd27-4002-81a1-3fd961fcbd88", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As noted, the jury here was only instructed on theft by larceny, not <mask> or theft by false pretenses. Kaufman challenges the court's failure to instruct on theft by false pretenses under CALCRIM No. 1804. Citing Beaver , supra , 186 Cal.App.4th 107, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 and People v. Curtin (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 528, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 369 ( Curtain ), he argues the crime, if anything, was theft was by false pretenses, not larceny, and that the failure to instruct on the correct crime resulted in prejudicial error.10"], "id": "c370fd42-e36e-47d1-aef8-1e1a9da5c273", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The system of soliciting known heirs or known legatees in estates has been the subject of complaint by the Consuls of the various countries in New York and by reputable attorneys representing executors and administrators. It is charged that beneficiaries, who would have received their shares of estates in the ordinary course and without any deduction for attorney\u2019s fees or for the compensation of solicitors, have been imposed upon by foreign agents to sign unconscionable and exorbitant agreements to pay, and to execute accompanying powers of attorney. Cases have arisen, where foreign legatees or heirs, who would have received their shares in the full amount, have been led into signing agreements to pay as high as fifty per cent of the money due them. It is also charged that the foreign solicitors deduct an amount in excess of the agreed compensation. It is claimed that there has been delay in transmission and payment and that in some cases there has been <mask> of the moneys. It is asserted that the foreign agent in Poland of a New York company converted over $100,000. Certainly such a system should not be tolerated in probate courts under their policy to protect beneficiaries of estates from imposition or unnecessary expense."], "id": "06fdd879-d02e-4363-b16d-c1dd2f193754", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant nonetheless asks that we read section 1170.18, subdivision (a) to include within its scope his section 11368 offense, even though it is not one of the amended or added statutes. We decline to do so: \"The expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of *675other things not expressed.\" ( Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500, 863 P.2d 745.) And applying this well-established principle of statutory construction to our situation, the expression of a specific series of criminal offenses eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18, subdivision (a), we conclude, necessarily excludes from eligibility defendant's section 11368 offense, which was not one of the statutes expressly referenced therein. (Cf. People v. Warmington (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 333, 335-336, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 291 [trial court erred in finding defendant not eligible under \u00a7 1170.18 to have his felony conviction for <mask> (\u00a7 503) redesignated as a misdemeanor in light of \u00a7 490a, which provides, \"[w]herever any law or statute ... refers to or mentions larceny, embezzlement, or stealing , said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word 'theft' were substituted therefor\"] (italics added).)"], "id": "d3b9886e-a5a4-4ee0-bf81-4893c256de12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The <mask> scheme that resulted in plaintiffs\u2019 losses was devised by Robert Egan, the president and sole shareholder of MVMC, with the assistance of Bernard McGarry, MVMC\u2019s chief operating officer. Egan and McGarry arranged to use their customers\u2019 funds to finance MVMC\u2019s business operations, commingling customer funds to help conceal their misappropriation of the stolen funds, a practice referred to by plaintiffs and by the prosecutor in the criminal prosecution of Egan and McGarry as \u201cplaying the float\u201d (see United States v Egan, 811 F Supp 2d 829, 833 [SD NY 2011])."], "id": "13e13422-8a2f-4153-97c5-cf4b01eeb290", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Golia, J., dissents in part and votes to modify the judgment by dismissing defendant\u2019s counterclaim in the following memorandum: Pro se plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant on his counterclaim for libel in connection with a \u201cfaxed\u201d letter sent to defendant by plaintiffs. It is uncontroverted that the subject letter was sent by the plaintiffs and that it was libel per se in that it accused the defendant (an attorney) of committing the crime of <mask> concerning money retained in a prior matter. However, the thrust of the letter was an attempt to recover a sum of money which the defendant attorney had retained, as his fee, from an escrow account while handling a house closing for the plaintiffs."], "id": "95efec73-e05d-4e2c-abfe-ad6f30642658", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A Fifth Circuit opinion, Douglas v. Regions Bank (5th. Cir. 2014) 757 F.3d 460 ( Douglas ), is analogous. When Douglas opened an account with Regions Bank she signed an arbitration agreement that, like Uber's, delegated questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. Douglas's attorney later embezzled her proceeds from the settlement of a personal injury action. Douglas sued Regions Bank, where her attorney also had an account, on the ground that the bank negligently failed to report the <mask>, make reasonable inquiries or prevent further diversions from her account. ( Id . at p. 461 )"], "id": "d0f1483c-1438-429d-aa2c-5efcb08f3d17", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The cases relied upon in support of the objections taken at the *502trial will not sustain the defendant\u2019s appeal. In that of Commissioners v. Libbey (11 Metc., 64), the court held no more than that the statute of that State did not include an auctioneer or commission merchant, as an agent or servant, for in the course of his business he had the right to mingle the proceeds received with his own, and pay over any like amount in discharge of his liability. The same construction was given to the act in Commissioners v. Stearns (2 Metc., 343), and it was further held that a person collecting bills for the proprietor of a newspaper was not such an agent or servant as the statute designed should be punished for <mask> for failing to pay over the moneys collected by him. But the facts of this latter case would probably be sufficient to bring it within so much of this section of the Penal Code as has been mentioned if the accountability had arisen out c.f like transactions in this State, for the person charged did, in fact, collect the bills as the agent of the proprietor of the newspaper; while in Commissioners v. Foster (107 Mass., 221), the defendant was relieved solely on the ground that he was not an agent. The English authorities are not entirely harmonious in their construction of their acts relating to the crime of embezzlement. In Regina v. Goodbody (8 Car. & Payne, 665), the defendant was absolved for the reason that he was not a clerk or servant but an agent, which, to that extent, renders the case an authority against the defendant. In Rex. v. Carr (1 British Crown Cases, 198), the defendant was employed in selling and taking orders for goods for different employers and receiving moneys, and it was held that he was properly convicted for their misappropriation as a clerk or servant of the employer whose money was so used. The case of Queen v. May (30 L. J., N. S. Magistrate Cases, 81) seems, however, to be adverse to this ruling. But that of Queen v. Tite (Id., 142), followed and further enforced it. And so has the cases of Regina v. Turner (11 Cox C. C., 551); Regina v. Bailey (12 id., 56), and these cases certainly are authorities justifying such a construction and application of this section of the Penal Code as will include [that of the defendant. In State v. Kent (22 Minn., 41), the defendant was a collector of pew rents, and it was held that, as he was entitled to commissions from the amounts collected, he was not guilty under the statute for misappropriating the entire money received as part of it was his *503own property. But there seems to be no good reason for this discrimination, for as to the residue of the money received over the commissions, the person receiving it has it in his possession, custody or control, as the agent, bailee or trustee of his employer, and that has been so considered in the English cases which have not relieved the accused because of the circumstance that he was entitled to retain his commissions out of the moneys collected by him. But this decision is not applicable to this case for the further reason that it did not appear by the evidence that the defendant had used any portion of the money represented by or derived from the check, for the payment of the commissions he was entitled to retain. It appeared, on the contrary, by his own testimony, that he had probably used the money in the bank for the payment of the debts owing by him to other creditors. Some stress was made in his favor on the fact that he had become involved by the failure of Mr.\u2019 Dean, his brother-in-law. But that, in. truth, had no relevancy to the case. Eor it appeared by the testimony of the defendant that no money of the complaining witness went to Dean during the year 1885, and his transactions with her all took place after the failure of Dean. And no part of her money was loaned by the defendant to him. An effort was also made to excuse the defendant under his power to apply moneys received by him for the repair and management of the property, and it did appear, from his testimony, that $456.56 of the moneys received for rents in the month of August had been used in this manner, but it was not shown by any statement or account produced that this particular check, or any part of it, went in that direction."], "id": "249315e8-cb4c-46b1-a1c5-a37d9bdbf7d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Hall v. State (1923) 161 Ark. 453, 257 S.W. 61 ( Hall ) directly addressed whether larceny could occur if property was diverted before it could reach its rightful owner, who was the named victim. ( Id. at p. 64.) Defendant Hall served on a state board that owed money to a corporation for goods received. ( Id. at p. 62.) The board issued payment vouchers. Hall presented these vouchers to the state auditor, who issued warrants on the treasury that were made payable to the corporation. Hall lacked the authority to collect money due to the corporation on the warrants. Despite this, he went to the state treasurer's office, indorsed the warrants in his name, and pocketed the proceeds. ( Ibid. ) Charged with larceny and <mask>, he was convicted only of larceny. ( Id. at p. 62.)"], "id": "b76fab84-4eae-4e17-9ff3-50a783e0be98", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["For his fourth point on appeal, Swanigan contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to cross-examine one of the State's witnesses about his alleged <mask>. At a pretrial hearing, Swanigan argued that he should be allowed to question Michael Wright, the Garland County sheriff's deputy who acted as evidence custodian at the time of the shooting, about why he was no longer employed as a law-enforcement officer. At the time of the trial in this case, Wright was under investigation and had admitted to embezzling money from the Arkansas Narcotics Officers Organization. The court ruled that Swanigan could not use the prior bad act of embezzlement to impeach Wright under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 609 because there had been no conviction or under Rule 608 because embezzlement was not probative of truthfulness."], "id": "51ba1eb1-8bd7-4195-a378-9952759d160d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["includes, but is not limited to , the taking, carrying away or the sale, conveyance or transfer of title to or interest in or possession of property, and includes, but is not limited to , conduct known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by conversion, <mask>, extortion or obtaining property by false pretenses.... Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-11-106(a)(24)(B) (emphases added). Twice in this concise statutory definition the General Assembly emphasizes that \"[o]btain\" encompasses but is not limited in scope to conduct formerly categorized as theft. See also Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-14-101 (stating that theft under the 1989 statute embraces \"the separate offenses referenced before 1989 as embezzlement, false pretense, fraudulent conversion, larceny, receiving or concealing stolen property, and other similar offenses. \" (emphasis added)); State v. Young, 904 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (\"Even though the legislature intended to simplify the prosecution of theft crimes by consolidating them into a general statute, the legislature also clearly changed the definition of the crime and the elements needed to prove the offense.\"); State v. Nix, 922 S.W.2d 894, 900-01 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (explaining that a theft, for the purposes of defining robbery, no longer requires asportation under the 1989 theft statute).13"], "id": "d3b18322-ccb9-4087-b64b-d2a80a79419d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"The common law defined larceny as the taking and carrying away of someone else's personal property, by trespass, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. [Citation.]\" (People v. Williams (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 782, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 305 P.3d 1241.) However, the Legislature retreated from the common law use of the term by consolidating the formerly separate crimes of larceny, <mask>, and theft by false pretenses into the general crime of theft. (People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 258, 267 P.2d 271.) As part of the consolidation, the Legislature enacted section 490a, which provides: \"Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, embezzlement, or stealing, said law or *901statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word 'theft' were substituted therefor.\""], "id": "3655a537-8915-4732-9403-6e26bee87530", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This is as far as the courts in this State have gone. May we extend the principle of these cases, and say that this relationship of the landlord toward the tenant with respect to the security makes him a \u201c trustee \u201d or \u201c a person authorized by agreement \u201d as defined in section 1290, or \u201c a person acting as trustee of any description, appointed by a deed, will or other instrument \u201d as defined in section 1302? To answer that question, it is not necessary to go into an extended examination into the various kinds of trusts and trusteeships. Suffice it to say that throughout all the cases that discuss this comparatively new crime of <mask> there runs the underlying thought that there must be a breach \u00b0of trust to constitute the crime. \u201c The essence of the crime of larceny involving embezzlement is breach of confidence \u201d is the way the court expressed it in People v. Meadows (136 App. Div. 226, 235). While it is somewhat difficult to draw, with exact precision, the fine of demarcation between acts punishable as crimes under the embezzlement statutes and those that may not be embraced by them, I hold that, since the fiduciary relationship is entirely absent, the landlord is not the trustee of the tenant as contemplated by these provisions of law. True, the landlord holds the money for the tenant and may have to return it intact, but his holding is coupled with an interest, an interest that may ripen into a right upon the happening of certain contingencies specified in the lease. In the ordinary relation of trustee and cestui que trust the former has no such interest, contingent or otherwise. If, in civil suits between the parties, the landlord is sometimes regarded as a sort of trustee for the tenant, that relationship has been superinduced upon him by operation of law as a matter of equity and not because he was \u201c appointed \u201d as such when the lease was executed. As the Court of Appeals phrased it in People v. Epstein (245 N. Y. 234), to be regarded as a \u201c trustee \u201d within the meaning of these embezzlement statutes, he must be \u201c a person in whom a trust or confidence had voluntarily been imposed and by whom it had voluntarily been accepted.\u201d Tested by these standards, the landlord falls short of being a trustee."], "id": "a450b054-31a7-4acd-8233-11fa1af01a7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["While the terms of the decree in bankruptcy are general, assuming to discharge all provable claims and demands against the decedent, yet such decree must be read and construed with reference to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act under which \u25a0it is made. \u00a1Section 16 of the National Bankruptcy Act, approved July 1, 1898, provides: \u201cA discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, except (1) such 'as are due as a tax levied by the United States, the State, county, district or municipality in which he resides; (2) are judgments.in actions for fraud, or obtaining property'by false pretense or false representations, or for wilful or malicious injuries to the person or property of another; (3) have not been1 duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bank*238ruptcy; or (4) were created by bis fraud, <mask>, misappropriation or defalcation, while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.\u201d"], "id": "46e7058e-e08c-4775-94fc-0cd802fde3e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Third. \u201cQuestion, [to defendant\u2019s driver on cross-examination.] Is it not a fact that you left Ridleys\u2019 with money belonging to them? Answer. Yes, sir, I did. Q. Moneys that you had collected for them? A. Yes, sir.\u201d The defendant claims that a witness can be impeached in only three ways:- (1) By disapproving the facts stated by him; (2) by general evidence affecting his credit; (3) by proving that the witness has made statements out of court contrary to what he has testified at the trial,\u2014citing 1 Green]. Ev. \u00a7\u00a7 461, 462. We think the evidence was properly received. It did not ask as to an accusation, but a fact. The distinction is obvious. Thus, while you cannot ask a witness whether he has been arrested, (Wright v. People, 1 N. Y. Crim. R. 462,) or indicted, (Ryan v. People, 79 N. Y. 599,) or expelled from the fire department, (Nolan v. Railroad Co., 87 N. Y. 68,) you can ask him whether he was not guilty of a particular offense; for, as the court of appeals said in People v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 544: \u201cMere charges or accusations, or even indictments, may not so be inquired into, since they are consistent with innocence, and may exist without moral delinquency; but, where the witness is called upon to confess or deny his guilt of a crime, his answer, if in the affirmative, tends to impair the credit of the witness by its tendency to establish a bad moral character. The party putting such a collateral question is concluded by the answer of the witness, and, if he denies the offense, cannot be contradicted by other evidence.\u201d Conley v. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 618. The witness (the defendant\u2019s driver) testified that he had been discharged from Ridleys\u2019, and that lie had left with moneys which lie had collected for them. He had been in their employ as a driver. The unexplained failure to pay over these moneys constituted <mask>, under the statute, (3 Rev. St. 6th Ed. p. 952, \u00a7 73,) and is made larceny by thePenal Code, \u00a7 528. The driver had been called by the defendant to contradict the plaintiff, and did contradict him as to certain material matters ; and it was competent for the plaintiff to break down his credibility by proof from his own lips that he had been guilty of acts tending to prove his bad moral character. In People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 398, the prisoner, on his trial for murder, was called as a witness on his own behalf, and on cross-examinatian was asked as to other acts of wrong-doing committed by him. In sustaining the trial judge, the court of appeals said: \u201c When a prisoner offers himself as a witness on his own behalf, he is subject to the same rules of cross-examination as any other witness. He may be asked questions disclosing his past life and conduct, and thus impair his credibility. Such questions may tend to show that he has before been guilty of the same crime as that for which he is put on trial; but they are not on that account incompetent. * * * The extent to which such an examination may go to test the witness\u2019 credibility is largely in the discretion of the court. \u201d We think the right was not abused in the present instance."], "id": "93e4aa50-f51b-4cf5-8e89-fa59e0ca3368", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This question did not arise in People v. Lyon (99 N. Y., 210). The learned justice who delivered the opinion of the court in Mowrey v. Walsh (8 Cow., 238), which arose before the Revised Statutes, also delivered the opinion in Andrew v. Dieterich (14 Wend., 31), and in the latter case held that by making the offense a felony the statute had given to it the effect of a common-law crime of .that grade, and, therefore, title could not be taken from the fraudulent vendee by a purchaser in good faith. The doctrine of the Mowrey case has since been treated as unchanged in that respect by the statute, and the Andrew case has not been followed. (Peabody v. Fenton, 3 Barb. Ch., 451; Malcom v. Loveridge, 13 Barb., 312; Fassett v. Smith, 23 N. Y., 252.) The definition of the term larceny has now been broadened so as to take within it the offenses formerly known as false pretenses and <mask>. And as between them and the common-law offense of larceny a *126distinction remains which must be observed in the presentation by indictment. (People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y., 502.) And we thinV the change exists only in the definition and does not go to the legal effect, except so far as it is produced by the terms of the statute. And that, as relates to those offenses which have been given the names of larceny by the statute, the consequences in respect to the property taken continue the same as they were before. The principle upon which the distinction in that respect rested was that larceny at common law was the feloniously taking property, which was without the consent of the owner, while the obtaining it by false pretenses was produced by the consent and delivery of it by the owner to the fraudulent vendee, and when so delivered, with the intent at the time being to part with the title and invest it in the latter, the effect of a common law larceny was not given to it so as to defeat the title of a bona fide purchaser for value. (Zink v. People, 77 N. Y., 114.) The same reason for this rule exists now as before the application of the extended definition."], "id": "4f1a6994-11c3-4239-8378-083c59c29ea4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cWe think that it would be going further than any adjudicated case and further than any construction extending the scope and purpose of section 528 of the Penal Code should go, to conclude that the facts proven would justify a conviction for larceny. Were it otherwise then in every case where a customer deposits money with a broker to be used by him generally in his business, the failure of such broker to return the deposit, together with what might have been realized in the shape of profits upon the speculation, would leave him open to the charge of having embezzled his customer\u2019s money. We do not think it was the intention of the Legislature, nor is it the reading of the provisions of the Penal Code, that any such radical departure should be made so as to change a transaction that has always been regarded as establishing the relation of debtor and creditor into one which would place the broker in the position of a trustee who receives money in a fiduciary capacity which he is obliged at all times- to keep separate and apart from his own moneys and on demand return upon pain of indictment and conviction for <mask>.\u201d"], "id": "cc5c7e41-3e19-4dcb-bd2d-bcc2d0fbe201", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The <mask> scheme that resulted in plaintiffs\u2019 losses was devised by Robert Egan, the president and sole shareholder of MVMC, with the assistance of Bernard McGarry, MVMC\u2019s chief operating officer. Egan and McGarry arranged to use their customers\u2019 funds to finance MVMC\u2019s business operations, commingling customer funds to help conceal their misappropriation of the stolen funds, a practice referred to by plaintiffs and by the prosecutor in the criminal prosecution of Egan and McGarry as \u201cplaying the float\u201d (see United States v Egan, 811 F Supp 2d 829, 833 [SD NY 2011])."], "id": "a306680e-4168-4e65-a4c3-32ea0eae4a88", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Further reliance is placed by the bank upon the decision of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Matter of Hammer (237 App. Div. 497; affd., 261 N. Y. 677). The facts in that case were substantially different from those here. But far from having any controlling effect in favor of the bank, it supports the conclusion that jurisdiction over moneys in an account exists in a discovery proceeding. Presiding Justice Sears restated the rules that a discovery proceeding was limited to the recovery of specific personal property or moneys or the proceeds or value of such personal property and that a discovery proceeding may not be employed to enforce the collection of a debt. He cited Matter of Akin as authority for the existence of jurisdiction in the Surrogate\u2019s Court over deposits of moneys and stated that the \u201c property may be intangible, such as a right to a bank account.\u201d In the Hammer case (supra) none of the moneys remained on deposit in the respondent bank. There was a claim that the estate funds had been with*484drawn by one of the executors, deposited in his personal account and diverted to his own use. The proceeding apparently was predicated upon the the'ory that the bank was liable for paying the estate funds with knowledge of the diversion. What was , attempted to be enforced against the bank, therefore, was a liability ordinarily the subject of an action for damages sustained as a result of the bank\u2019s participation in the <mask>. (Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. 106; Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 287 id. 94; Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 id. 394.) Finally, despite the expressed doubt as to the jurisdiction of the surrogate to make the decree, the Appellate Division put aside the jurisdictional question and significantly said, \u201c we prefer to determine the controversy upon the merits.\u201d The affirmance by the Court of Appeals in the Hammer case was without opinion. By implication that court must be deemed to have followed its prior decisions in Matter of Akin (supra) and Matter of Wilson (supra) and to have sustained rather than overruled the jurisdiction of the Surrogate\u2019s Court in disputes involving bank deposits."], "id": "b756b863-d11d-49bb-be36-75de055ac308", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. Ark. R. Evid. 608 (2018). We specifically held in Sitz v. State , 23 Ark. App. 126, 128, 743 S.W.2d 18, 20 (1988), that <mask>, a form of theft, is not a crime that is probative of untruthfulness and thus is not admissible under Rule 608(b). See also Arendall v. State , 2010 Ark. App. 358, at 19, 377 S.W.3d 404, 416. We decline Swanigan's *752invitation to revisit this decision, and we do not find the present case to be distinguishable. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the evidence."], "id": "1ab13289-d0f5-45f6-8718-8eb9ca265fd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A classic example of conduct constituting larceny by <mask> is depicted by the facts in People v Meadows (supra). In that case a customer ordered through defendant, a member of a brokerage firm, the purchase of 700 shares of a stock at a specified price. Although the customer\u2019s check was deposited in the firm\u2019s account, the shares of stock were never purchased and the funds were found to have been diverted to other purposes. It was noted by the court (pp 6-7) that \u201c[t]he criminal act in this case was committed, and the criminal intent evidenced, when, departing from his duty to use the moneys in paying for the stock, the defendant diverted it to other purposes. Evidence of a criminal intent to defraud * * * [the customer] of his property was not wanting. The firm was heavily involved, the pressure of debt very great and the bank balance very low. The jurors were warranted in inferring that the defendant yielded to the temptation of relieving the pressure by diverting the funds received from * * * [the customer] to his own purposes; hoping, if not believing, that, during the latter\u2019s absence from the country, an opportunity might be afforded for restoration. A deliberate diversion of the moneys being shown, it required but slight evidence in the facts and circumstances to satisfy the jurors as to the existence of the felonious, or criminal, intent.\u201d"], "id": "caa46726-041f-4283-8896-adba6ec32cd5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Yet respondents admit their failure to conduct even the most rudimentary background investigation upon any of these licensees\u2019 most recent applications, which at minimum would have disclosed the prosecutions against Donovan and Fricione for <mask>, theft, and misapplication of DOE property associated with their bid rigging. This disclosure easily would have led to disclosure of the scheme in which all eight licensees were implicated, for which the Special Commissioner of Investigation or DOE recommended the termination from employment of seven, and based on which DOE removed the eighth, Katz, from his supervisory position. The misconduct by Lombardi, Mulvihill, and Schmeidel also precipitated their placement on a list of former employees ineligible for future employment. Even if nothing in any of these eight licensees\u2019 applications on its face prompted an investigation, as respondents themselves point out, their own regulation, referring to the HPBOE license, requires that DCAS \u201cor the investigating agency, as the case may be, shall conduct an investigation of each candidate to determine the candidate\u2019s fitness and qualification for the license.\u201d (55 RCNY 11-02 [h] [1] [emphasis added]; see verified answer \u00b6 28.)"], "id": "02a0d5c0-130d-4d94-92d0-15c6ec07f12a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*21In the second case, Vidana , the Supreme Court held that larceny under section 484, subdivision (a) and <mask> under section 503 are different statements of the same offense and cannot support multiple convictions based on the same act or course of conduct. ( Vidana , supra , 1 Cal.5th at pp. 647-648, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.) After observing it was not definitive that \"[l]arceny and embezzlement have different elements and neither is a lesser included offense of the other,\" the Court pointed out that the larceny statute also prohibited embezzlement. The Court further pointed out that, to the extent *762there was ambiguity, the legislative history of section 484 revealed an \"obvious intent ... to create a single crime of theft.\" ( Vidana , at p. 648, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.) And lastly, the Court found it significant that \"[l]arceny under section 484[, subdivision (a) ] and embezzlement under section 503 also generally have the same punishment.\" ( Id. at pp. 648-649, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805.)"], "id": "1ef92b7f-2b44-4620-b6c5-1b1cb69c4b7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The complaint contained sentence enhancement allegations under Penal Code section 186.11. That section provides an enhanced prison term for \"white collar crime\"-defined as two or more related felonies, a material element of which is fraud or <mask>, which pattern of conduct involves the taking of, or results in the loss of, more than $100,000. ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 186.11, subd. (a).) For our purposes, the statute also provides a means by which property in the hands of the white collar defendant may be *871\"preserved by the superior court in order to pay restitution and fines.\" ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 186.11, subd. (d)(1).) Upon conviction, the property \"may be levied upon by the superior court to pay restitution and fines\" if the facts supporting the white collar enhancement are \"admitted or found to be true by the trier of fact.\" (Ibid. ) For this reason, Penal Code section 186.11\"is sometimes known as the 'Freeze and Seize Law.' [Citation.]\" ( People v. Green (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 360, 363, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 736 [restitution award of seized property reversed for failure to file a Penal Code section 186.11 petition].)"], "id": "6a2618d2-6a8a-407d-9f4e-e25f3aac033f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In The Superior (22 F. 927 [D. Ct. N. Y.]) a woman was employed as a cook on a ship, under articles which provided that she was engaged for a round trip \u201c if not sooner discharged.\u201d She testified that she was not aware of the latter clause. She was discharged at an intermediate domestic port, for having an ungovernable temper, and using disrespectful, profane and obscene language to the master. Judge Cox stated at page 928: \u201c The weight of evidence has convinced me that her temper was ungovernable, her language obscene, profane, and direspectful, and her conduct, upon at least two occasions, reprehensible *252in the extreme. I fail, however, to find anything in the testimony which justified the master in turning her away penniless, friendless, and alone \u2014 a stranger in a foreign port. The books have been searched with some anxiety to find an authority sustaining the respondent\u2019s view, but without success. Discharges, pending the voyage, have been upheld where there has been \u2018 mutinous and rebellious conduct, persevered in; gross dishonesty or <mask>, or theft, or habitual drunkenness; or where the seaman is habitually a stirrer-up of quarrels, to the destruction of the order of the vessel and the discipline of the crew.\u2019 \u201d"], "id": "e86818ac-7b28-4b04-885d-1db3641d114e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The vanishing of the ship was a \"mysterious disappearance\u201d, not a theft, argues the defendant. There would be a \"mysterious disappearance\u201d if the ship had sailed off into the sunset and had never been heard from again. Here, the ship did not drift off, or quietly settle to the bottom. Incontrovertibly, there was a theft. It is precisely to negate the possibility of mysterious disappearance, purloining or pilfering by the ship\u2019s company, or the unaccountable loss of property aboard the ship that the policy calls for physical evidence to show the loss by marauders. \"Visible evidence of forcible entry\u201d there had to be, and visible evidence there was. That requirement is designed to exclude a consensual taking (fraud or trick), as well as to rule out conversion or <mask>. (Note that barratry of the Master and Mariners is still covered.) The breaking of the locks and the cut lines shows what occurred. Compare Swift v American Universal Ins. Co. (supra) where the plaintiff, returning to his yacht after it had been locked up for the night, found the locked doors had been forced open, and his property missing."], "id": "153b25e0-261f-45df-8be7-1b47f4f36494", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At one point in the memorandum (supra, p 135) the Attorney-General notes that: \"the commission of fraud as de\u00f1ned in the Martin Act is not made a crime under that Act. While the crimes of larceny, <mask>, forgery and other felonies would be involved in many security frauds, they require that the prosecutor prove criminal intent, thereby making conviction extremely difficult.\u201d (Emphasis added.) And at another point: \"These proposed amendments to the statute are not intended to narrow or to repeal the coverage of prior language but rather they are intended to expressly broaden those acts and practices coming within the condemnation of the statute.\u201d"], "id": "e8091d52-ce6f-4092-8013-d7d98262ce81", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Hilton, J. The defendants were sued jointly for maliciously procuring the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff, on the 21st day of November, 1855. The proof, on the trial before the referee, showed that the plaintiff was first arrested on the 20th of November, at the instance of the defendant Lawrence Delaney; that he was imprisoned for that night, and in the morning, on being brought before the police justice, was discharged, because it appeared that the money which it was alleged the plaintiff had embezzled did not belong to the defendant Lawrence, hut was the property of his wife. He therefore went for her, and she came before the justice and made her complaint for the <mask>. The plaintiff being still in the court room, was informed by the justice that he could not depart until he gave bail for his appearance on-the charge. Ho did so, and then left, and- it is for this last arrest the present action is brought, it appearing that Ann Delaney subsequently went before the Grand Jury to procure the plaintiff\u2019s indictment on the charge she thus made, when her complaint was dismissed. On the proofs the referee held the defendants jointly liable, and reported in the plaintiff\u2019s favor, fixing his damages at one thousand dollars."], "id": "c4c89c2e-8aaa-4c77-82cb-97483e2d01bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We hasten to add that several public policy concerns support our conclusion that defendant's crime is not eligible for reduction under our interpretation of Proposition 47. As other courts have recognized, an offense under section 11368 is not simple theft or forgery. Rather, it involves, as in defendant's case, \"forg[ing] or alter[ing] a prescription or ... obtain[ing] any narcotic drug by any forged, fictitious, or altered prescription,\" an offense \"punish[able] by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than six months nor more than one year, or in the state prison.\" ( \u00a7 11368.)7 We are aware of *677no legal authority, and defendant directs us to none, where a court conflates forgery and theft, much less forgery of a medical prescription and theft. (Compare People v. Wheeler (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 873, 878-879, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 138 [\"the ordinary meaning given to 'forgery' in California is related to the making or use of a counterfeit or fake document\"]. Compare People v. Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 869, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437 [\"Section 490a provides: 'Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, <mask>, or stealing, said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word 'theft' were substituted therefor.' ... Section 490a contains no exceptions. Nor does any part of the ballot language accompanying the initiative indicate a desire to modify the express and inclusive language of section 490a\"].) Nor should medical prescription forgery and theft be conflated. \"Prescriptions are the means by *560which physicians and other authorized practitioners achieve legitimate medical purposes. ( People v. Wheeler (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 873, 880 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 138].) 'The protection of the health and safety of the public in obtaining medical prescriptions is critical. [Citations.] Physicians, pharmacists, and patients must be able to rely on the integrity of the system. [Laws against prescription forgery are] aimed at helping preserve that integrity by prohibiting counterfeiting of a physician's authority to prescribe, deceiving of the pharmacist, corrupting the public's legitimate supply of medicine, and, potentially, defrauding of insurance companies or government programs. Far more is implicated than just an offender's personal involvement with drugs.' ( Ibid. ).\" ( People v. Brown (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1218, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 371.)"], "id": "3ade8c04-306a-46b3-8aa4-9a426f599b3d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, the sole question remaining is how much the defendant Robert W. Smith owes to the plaintiff. Jeanne M. Smith, as suggested earlier in this opinion, is not liable for the <mask> of her husband. No proof was offered imputing knowledge by her of his defalcations, that he was acting as her agent, or that she ratified his acts so as to make her liable along with her husband (see 15 N. Y. Jur., Domestic Relations, \u00a7\u00a7 270, 272, 273, 283, 301)."], "id": "f218c105-60b6-4fbc-9cfa-e8dc273dc8eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the Klinger case (supra), wherein a corporate landlord\u2019s secretary was prosecuted for <mask> of securities deposited with the corporation under a lease, it was shown that the defendant owned one half of the corporation\u2019s stock and, with her husband, controlled the corporation. The court held (p. 533) that \u201c Corporate officers may be criminally liable for their own acts although performed in their official capacity as such officers. * * * a corporate officer * * * is answerable where scienter or authority on his part are established, or when he is the actual, present and efficient actor behind the corporation.\u201d"], "id": "fe4cc45c-3d71-446b-a290-ea0341dd5b21", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Judge Cardozo elucidated the problem of defining dishonest in World Exch. Bank v Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., (255 NY 1, 5), when he stated: \"Dishonesty, unlike <mask> or larceny, is not a term of art. Even so, the measure of its meaning is not a standard of perfection, but an infirmity of purpose so opprobrious or furtive as to be fairly characterized as dishonest in the common speech of men. 'Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when making an ordinary business contract\u2019 (Bird v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 51; Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 81, 84).\u201d (Emphasis added.)"], "id": "8edec25c-bc55-4b73-938b-cc4a8ae3a350", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Chapter 208 of the Laws of 1877 makes the conversion to his own use, or the fraudulent withholding any money, goods, property, rights in action, &c., belonging to an estate or person, by any person acting as executor, administrator, trustee or guardian, <mask>, and punishable by fine and imprisonment. It is desirable that this law should- be called to the attention of all such trustees, and henceforth the letters issued should contain an indorsement by way of notice of its provisions. I have deemed it to be my duty to say thus much upon the general subject by way of calling attention to the duties and responsibilities of trustees, in the hope that it may result in a more diligent, faithful and honest administra*505tion of their trusts, blow, as to the proper disposition of this motion, the delinquent executrix may congratulate herself that the law just cited is not retroactive. I entertain no doubt on the evidence that she is substantially without the means of performing the decree in this matter, and that her imprisonment cannot aid the beneficiary, whose funds have been misappropriated, and as the widow, as dowress, has an interest in the premises, it seems to me that that interest should be devoted to reimbursing the claimant. She should be committed to prison until she shall pay the sum required to be paid by said decree, and fifty dollars cost of this proceeding, unless she shall execute a release of so much of her interest in the premises and to the rents thereof as shall be necessary to cover such sums."], "id": "fce2c3df-d5d0-4eaf-9831-d004c67c44ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*260Shortly after the decision in Williams , the First District Court of Appeal decided People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 ( Stanfill ). There, the defendant was charged with felony <mask> of public funds for which there was a three-year statute of limitations. He requested a lesser included misdemeanor offense instruction, which the trial court gave. The jury found the defendant guilty of the misdemeanor offense. He appealed, correctly claiming the one-year statute of limitations had run on the misdemeanor offense."], "id": "413174aa-8d8e-4be9-bb18-7adb71ab314b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Second, reading such a knowledge requirement into the offense of attempted violation of section 405a would be inconsistent with the law on mistake as a defense. There are circumstances in which a good faith mistake about the legal significance of the relevant facts may negate a defendant's specific intent and constitute a defense to a crime. For example, a mistaken belief about the ownership status of property can be a defense to the receipt of stolen property ( People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1431, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 ); a good faith mistake about the defendant's legal right to take or use property can be a defense to theft or <mask> ( People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137, 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ;"], "id": "dd126655-bd59-4f4b-a2f5-dca193e47738", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The second question, which, in my view, warrants consideration by the appellate court, is one which involves the application of section 1290-a of the Penal Law. Keeping in mind the opinions \u2014 -majority and minority- \u2014 of the Court of Appeals in People v. Lobel (298 N. Y. 243) this section was amended in 1950 to read as follows: \u2018 \u2018 If, however, the defendant made use of any false or fraudulent representation or pretense in the course of accomplishing, or in aid of, or in facilitating the theft, evidence thereof may not be received at the trial unless the indictment or information alleges such representation or pretense, and it shall be immaterial whether the theft may have been previously denominated common law larceny by asportation, common law larceny by trick and device, obtaining property by false pretenses or <mask>. \u201d"], "id": "344b4f07-245b-4d79-9e6b-d2115872b8e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There is no ambiguity in the shoplifting statute as it applies to defendant's conduct. Defendant entered Dole Transportation \"to inquire about a motor home that was possibly for sale.\" One appellate court has construed \"commercial establishment\" in this statute to mean \"one that is primarily engaged in commerce, that is, the buying and selling of goods or services.\" ( In re J.L. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1110, 1114, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 482 [a *959minor student who stole another student's cell phone out of a school locker had not engaged in theft from a \"commercial establishment,\" so the minor's offense was not eligible for reclassification as misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47].) At a minimum, Dole Transposition was engaged in selling motor homes, fitting within this definition of a \"commercial establishment.\" Defendant entered Dole Transportation, while it was open during regular business hours, around 11:45 a.m. and, while inside, committed theft of cigarettes and a wallet out of which she took $242, which is a form of larceny. (\u00a7 490a [\"Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, <mask>, or stealing, said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word 'theft' were substituted therefor\"].)"], "id": "16731e53-c1f9-4b40-be26-8efec68e6575", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["While the terms of the decree in bankruptcy are general, assuming to discharge all provable claims and demands against the decedent, yet such decree must be read and construed with reference to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act under which \u25a0it is made. \u00a1Section 16 of the National Bankruptcy Act, approved July 1, 1898, provides: \u201cA discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, except (1) such 'as are due as a tax levied by the United States, the State, county, district or municipality in which he resides; (2) are judgments.in actions for fraud, or obtaining property'by false pretense or false representations, or for wilful or malicious injuries to the person or property of another; (3) have not been1 duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bank*238ruptcy; or (4) were created by bis fraud, <mask>, misappropriation or defalcation, while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.\u201d"], "id": "cd001e7d-332e-4e0c-bc2f-1d2bc5e89d0b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Third. \u201cQuestion, [to defendant\u2019s driver on cross-examination.] Is it not a fact that you left Ridleys\u2019 with money belonging to them? Answer. Yes, sir, I did. Q. Moneys that you had collected for them? A. Yes, sir.\u201d The defendant claims that a witness can be impeached in only three ways:- (1) By disapproving the facts stated by him; (2) by general evidence affecting his credit; (3) by proving that the witness has made statements out of court contrary to what he has testified at the trial,\u2014citing 1 Green]. Ev. \u00a7\u00a7 461, 462. We think the evidence was properly received. It did not ask as to an accusation, but a fact. The distinction is obvious. Thus, while you cannot ask a witness whether he has been arrested, (Wright v. People, 1 N. Y. Crim. R. 462,) or indicted, (Ryan v. People, 79 N. Y. 599,) or expelled from the fire department, (Nolan v. Railroad Co., 87 N. Y. 68,) you can ask him whether he was not guilty of a particular offense; for, as the court of appeals said in People v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 544: \u201cMere charges or accusations, or even indictments, may not so be inquired into, since they are consistent with innocence, and may exist without moral delinquency; but, where the witness is called upon to confess or deny his guilt of a crime, his answer, if in the affirmative, tends to impair the credit of the witness by its tendency to establish a bad moral character. The party putting such a collateral question is concluded by the answer of the witness, and, if he denies the offense, cannot be contradicted by other evidence.\u201d Conley v. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 618. The witness (the defendant\u2019s driver) testified that he had been discharged from Ridleys\u2019, and that lie had left with moneys which lie had collected for them. He had been in their employ as a driver. The unexplained failure to pay over these moneys constituted <mask>, under the statute, (3 Rev. St. 6th Ed. p. 952, \u00a7 73,) and is made larceny by thePenal Code, \u00a7 528. The driver had been called by the defendant to contradict the plaintiff, and did contradict him as to certain material matters ; and it was competent for the plaintiff to break down his credibility by proof from his own lips that he had been guilty of acts tending to prove his bad moral character. In People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 398, the prisoner, on his trial for murder, was called as a witness on his own behalf, and on cross-examinatian was asked as to other acts of wrong-doing committed by him. In sustaining the trial judge, the court of appeals said: \u201c When a prisoner offers himself as a witness on his own behalf, he is subject to the same rules of cross-examination as any other witness. He may be asked questions disclosing his past life and conduct, and thus impair his credibility. Such questions may tend to show that he has before been guilty of the same crime as that for which he is put on trial; but they are not on that account incompetent. * * * The extent to which such an examination may go to test the witness\u2019 credibility is largely in the discretion of the court. \u201d We think the right was not abused in the present instance."], "id": "48dd5731-9f09-46a7-9f8c-7c463cb062a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["awards, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $6,600 in victim restitution to D.S. and T.S., a married couple, who were the victims of the conduct charged in count 23. We affirm the award. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The third amended felony information charged defendant with grand theft (Pen. Code, \u00a7 487, subd. (a);1 counts 1, 4, 6, 10-17, 23-24); filing a false or forged instrument with the county recorder\u2019s office (\u00a7 115, subd. (a); count 2); taking or driving a motor vehicle with intent to deprive the owner of title to or possession of the vehicle (Veh. Code, \u00a7 10851, subd. (a); count 3); identity theft (\u00a7 530.5, subd. (a); count 5); forgery (\u00a7 470, subds. (c), (d); counts 7-9); fraudulently inducing a person to sign a contract (Civ. Code, \u00a7 2945.4, subds. (a), (e), (f); counts 18-20); and unlawful practice of law (Bus. & Prof. Code, \u00a7 6126, subd. (a); count 21). The information also alleged as to counts 8 and 9 that defendant had been released on bail when those offenses were committed (\u00a7 12022.1) and as to all counts that defendant had engaged in a series of felonies the material element of which was fraud and <mask> in an amount exceeding $500,000 (\u00a7 186.11, subd. (a)) (a great-taking enhancement). Defendant resolved the matter by pleading no contest to counts 1, 2, 4, and 9, as well as admitting the on-bail enhancement and the great-taking enhancement in exchange for a stipulated prison sentence of 12 years. The remaining charges and allegations were dismissed with a Harvey2 waiver for purposes of restitution. On February 16, 2018, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. He was also ordered to pay certain fees and victim restitution. The court retained jurisdiction to award further restitution to other victims of defendant\u2019s crimes."], "id": "ef74734b-7bd1-45fe-a1df-25ab08562d96", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, under section 353-a of the General Business Law (Martin Act) plaintiff has the authority only to take custody of the identifiable property specified therein. (See Matter of Koch, 116 F. 2d 243, 246.) It is the court\u2019s opinion that the broad powers conferred by the order must be disregarded and that the employee\u2019s <mask> of defendant\u2019s securities was not a fraudulent practice as defined by the Martin Act. Mr. Justice Hecht in this very case (sub nom. People v. Phillips (4 Misc 2d 804, 809) said:"], "id": "67ae5fd1-3744-476b-ab6c-bb310017391d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Anne Catambay's husband was sued in Santa Clara County for <mask>. That lawsuit resulted in a judgment against him for over one million dollars. A corporation--Longview International, Inc.--is the judgment creditor. Longview International recorded an abstract of judgment in San Mateo County, creating a judgment lien on real property owned by Catambay's husband in that county (a house in Redwood City). Two days later, Catambay's husband conveyed the Redwood City house to her as part of a marital settlement agreement in their then-pending dissolution proceeding."], "id": "111d2521-5f95-432b-8ef8-ab7358f474e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A case dating back to 1942 held that a conviction for larceny by <mask> based on the failure to pay over city sales taxes was valid (People v Felber, 264 App Div 181). There, a corporation having two places of business filed only one sales tax return through the Bronx office, even though separate books were kept for each office. Entries were made in the Manhattan cash disbursement books showing that the tax had been paid. The Bronx office would then receive a check from Manhattan for the tax amount, but would record the check as received for other purposes. The returns filed with the city omitted the taxes collected in Manhattan. The court ruled that the company was in possession as a trustee for the city of funds collected from customers for sales taxes and, when the funds were applied to the company\u2019s own use, the larceny was complete. The court reached its conclusion by stating that it was the law of this State that the fraudulent conversion by a vendor of city sales taxes collected from purchasers was a larceny. No further analysis was made."], "id": "7ae13304-86d6-4cff-82a6-d52099a5ea85", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It didn't take long. Just a few months later, the Court of Appeal for the First District, Division Two addressed one variation of the issue in People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1150, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 ( Stanfill ). In Stanfill , the defendant stood accused of felony <mask> of public funds under section 504 alleged to have happened over the course of several years. The same statute provided the offense was a misdemeanor where the embezzled funds were not public or came to less than $400. (\u00a7 504.) After trial, Stanfill requested standard jury instructions on the lesser included misdemeanor offense and general instructions on the statute of limitations. ( Stanfill , at p. 1142, fn. 1, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885.) Ultimately, the court instructed the jury they could find Stanfill guilty of violating section 504 \"if the proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any one or more of the acts between the dates of August 6, 1993 and August 5, 1996\" and \"where a temporary use of property 'aggregates in excess of $400 in any period of twelve consecutive months between August 6, 1993 and August 5, 1996.' \" ( Id. at p. 1143, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885.) The court did not mention the one-year limitation period for the misdemeanor. The jury acquitted Stanfill of the felony offense, but found him guilty of the misdemeanor offense. ( Ibid. ) Stanfill then turned around and appealed the misdemeanor conviction on the ground the trial court had misinstructed the jury by telling them they could convict him of the lesser included misdemeanor without informing them of the one-year limitations period applicable to that offense. ( Id. at pp. 1142-1144, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885.)"], "id": "a2c3aeee-0207-4e19-b0a2-9ee9a545a57e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. Ark. R. Evid. 608 (2018). We specifically held in Sitz v. State , 23 Ark. App. 126, 128, 743 S.W.2d 18, 20 (1988), that <mask>, a form of theft, is not a crime that is probative of untruthfulness and thus is not admissible under Rule 608(b). See also Arendall v. State , 2010 Ark. App. 358, at 19, 377 S.W.3d 404, 416. We decline Swanigan's *752invitation to revisit this decision, and we do not find the present case to be distinguishable. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the evidence."], "id": "91d7f1be-770a-4242-8d99-71de515ce9bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["To elect is to choose. For an election it is essential that there should be presented at least two alternatives so related to one another that upon grasping one the other passes out of reach. The uncontroverted facts developed in this proceeding show that the petitioner never had the right to elect because there never were any alternative remedies. The decedent misappropriated $2,000. He said that this sum went to increase the $12,000 mortgage by that amount. But the parties by their proof demonstrate that nothing of the kind took place. The present petitioner, defrauded by this misappropriation, might perhaps have resorted to estoppel to prevent the decedent in his lifetime or his estate after his death from showing the true nature of the transaction. But the petitioner has not done this. On the contrary, the petitioner and respondent have collaborated to translate the actual facts into a legal record. And these facts show not an unauthorized investment by decedent but a plain <mask> of the petitioner\u2019s funds. Having waived the estoppel open to it, petitioner can recover only if it can now accept the offer made by the decedent in his lifetime to give an assignment of the second mortgage in discharge of his $2,000 debt. That offer was twice rejected, first, on the seventeenth and, thereafter, on the twenty-second of December. No principle is more obvious than that an offer terminated when its rejection is communicated to the offerer."], "id": "979f723b-08db-4cef-8af1-69d4abbcd7ed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff commenced this action to recover wages and damages for, inter alia, \u201c<mask>,\u201d \u201cinvoluntary servitude\u201d and \u201cdiscrimination.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s present claims, although slightly different from those interposed in his prior action against his former employer, and defendants\u2019 current employer, Bally\u2019s Total Fitness Corp. (Thomas v Bally\u2019s Total Fitness Corp., 12 Misc 3d 131[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51053[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]) are all related to alleged acts of Bally\u2019s employees in the course and scope of their employment and, therefore, fall within the ambit of Bally\u2019s Employee Dispute Resolution Procedures (EDRP). The EDRP provides for arbitration when any dispute arises between an employee against the employer Bally\u2019s. The EDRP further provides, inter alia, that the term \u201cEmployer\u201d therein \u201cis understood to include each of the Employer\u2019s subsidiary and/or affiliated entities . . . and all of their respective owners, stockholders, directors, officers, employees and pension or benefit plans and their fiduciaries\u201d (emphasis added). Plaintiff did not attempt below, and does not attempt on appeal, to show how his present claims fall outside the scope of the EDRP It should be noted that the only issue presented to this court upon plaintiffs appeal in his prior action against Bally\u2019s was whether the EDRP was procedurally or substantively unconscionable; we found that it was neither (id.; see also Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d 1 [1988])."], "id": "e97986d1-5fbe-4bfa-8630-f7205f73ca36", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In Valenza (supra), the Court of Appeals held that when a vendor collects taxes from customers, but fails to remit them to the State under circumstances evincing an intent to permanently deprive the State of the taxes, he may not be subject to criminal prosecution for larceny by <mask>. The court reasoned that the structure of the penalty provisions of the Tax Law, coupled with the Legislature\u2019s failure to consider the wrongful withholding of sales taxes as criminal conduct, evinces an intent by the Legislature to make the civil penalty the exclusive means of punishing that conduct. The Valenza court emphasized that when two or more statutes proscribe the same conduct, a prosecutor may generally choose among the statutes when initiating prosecution. However, \u201cthat discretion may be limited by a legislative intention to make a specific statute the exclusive means of punishing particular conducf\u2019 (60 NY2d, at p 371; emphasis added). The court further stated that \u201cwhen the Legislature has desired to make the breach of a statutorily imposed duty punishable under the Penal Law, it has done so in an unambiguous manner\u201d (supra, at pp 370-371)."], "id": "c526fd7b-530f-44f0-88bd-e05fb1e4344d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is manifest from the aforesaid that said debt arose out of a breach of a fiduciary relationship which existed between the defendant and the corporate plaintiff. Judgments arising out of such misconduct are not dischargeable in bankruptcy (U. S. *167Code, tit. 11, \u00a7 35, subd. [a], par. [4]) \u201c A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as * * * (4) were created by his fraud, <mask>, misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity\u201d. (Matter of Adelson [Pierpont Leasing Co.], 187 Misc. 691; Matter of Patersen, 25 F. Supp. 411 [U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. N. Y.]; Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Flanagan, 28 F. Supp. 415 [U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Ohio].)"], "id": "f457680d-32bd-45ff-94bd-7a996c901ad0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "embezzlement", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The instructions read to the Grand Jury in regard to larceny committed by <mask> are found to have been sufficient. The Grand Jury was read the appropriate statu*475tory provisions, as well as a definition of larceny by embezzlement. As the court noted in People v Calbud, Inc. (49 NY2d 389, 395, n 1), ordinarily instructions to the Grand Jury will be found to be proper where that body is read the appropriate sections of the Penal Law."], "id": "9e3f07b8-efb4-4eeb-be9b-778fdd695625", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["'While it is quite true tnat the seal fixed by the law on confiden*575tial communications to professional men is not removed by the death of the party, yet the rule is not to be so far extended as to permit a failure of justice. On an allegation of fraud, <mask> or mistake, instructions received by an attorney for making the will are not privileged communications within any just and proper construction or understanding of the rule of law. (Sheridan v. Houghton, 16 Hun, 628.)"], "id": "872791d8-ae8b-4b64-b4fb-17a7d4053a56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "FORGERY", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["(i.) <mask> OF BUSINESS RECORDS AFFIDAVIT TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE FIRST ILLEGALLY RECORDED TELEPHONE CALL Prosecutor committed the felony criminal act of forgery of a business records affidavit which had been notarized by himself as the public notary as witness to himself taking the statement of a witness who never had appeared before the court, been cross-examined by the defense, and who also had no personal knowledge of the contents of the recordings nor was present when they were made without the recorded party's knowledge or consent."], "id": "0f8a1c54-70b7-4c3c-b6b9-4151b6ca9514", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Such being the case, the issue is narrowed down to the performance of the work, and the partnership of the defendants, which Heilman denies. There is little room to doubt that the agreement sustains the allegations of the complaint in regard to the work and the price to be paid for it, and that Heilman can in no manner be held upon it except on the theory of partnership in the venture, a fact provable only by evidence aUimde. Having proved that the agreement was signed by the codefendants, and not by Heilman (a fact not disputed), there is no conceivable ground for asking an inspection on the theory of possible <mask>, as was allowed in Hepburn v. Archer, 20 Hun, 535."], "id": "78a032bb-e522-4e48-a05c-cffdbb216824", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["For this purpose, the material and operative allegations of the charge and specifications are to be considered. They are reflected in the <mask> statute of Maine in effect at the time of the commission of the crime (Revised Statutes, ch. 133, \u00a7 1), and thereafter renumbered without change (ch. 120, \u00a7 1) in 1944, the year of petitioner\u2019s conviction. This statute indicates clearly that the petitioner\u2019s prior conviction in question would have constituted the crime of forgery in the second degree if committed in New York. Consequently, as such felony conviction, it was properly considered as a basis for the imposition of punishment as for a multiple offense (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 887, 1942; Matter of Kaytes v. Donovan, supra; People v. Olah, 300 N. Y. 96)."], "id": "b25e91cf-d251-4bf9-bd6a-ca6c22794d79", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["According to petitioner, in December 2001, he applied for a security \u201clicense\u201d from respondents and paid a $75 fee for a criminal background check in order to be cleared to work at Rikers Island (petition \u00b6 26). Petitioner fully disclosed his criminal background on his application, which he states included convictions between 1972 and 1987 of weapons and cocaine possession, possession of stolen mail, conspiracy, and <mask>.3 Petitioner asserts that he was incarcerated from approximately 1987 until his release on parole on May 29, 1992."], "id": "cd50c65e-8a81-4d85-9b58-9efb024e317c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On December 14, 1978, a warrant was executed by the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, Judge of the Circuit Court of the State of Utah (Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department) commanding the arrest of relator for the offense of <mask>, based upon the complaint of one Jerry M. Campbell.1 Bail was set in the amount of $1,500. (State v Coster Case No. 78 CRS 1059.)"], "id": "86662bd8-d40c-49a9-a27f-fcb556a8784c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant further argues that in this case the presenter of the credit card was in fact authorized to use the credit card, making it legally impossible for the defendant to have committed the crime of <mask> in the second degree. It is this question of legal impossibility, the principal issue in this case, that this court must resolve in determining this motion to set aside the verdict and in considering what action, if any, this court should take."], "id": "031c04d7-4c06-48a2-9bad-4c3a71e56ad7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The body of the instrument and the signatures to it were written by one person and even the alleged signatures of the witnesses were written by the same person. Neither the handwriting of the body of the instrument nor the signature, in the slightest degree, resembles the authentic writings and proven signatures of Mrs. Wood. The instrument is clearly a <mask> and apparently fabricated as a basis of a written pedigree declaration to support a claim of kinship of certain of the Mayfield and Welch claimants."], "id": "8585d74a-a567-401a-bd6c-580249a70e8d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["All questions of fact, such as <mask> or fraud, not appearing on the face of a petition are to be determined in court proceedings only. (Matter of McGovern [Olson], 291 N. Y. 104, 108; Schwarts v. Heffernan, 304 N. Y. 474, 480, supra; Matter of Bednarsh v. Cohen, 267 App. Div. 133, 135, mot. for lv. to app. den. 292 N. Y. 578 and 723; Matter of Frankel v. Cheshire, 212 App. Div. 664, 667, 671.)"], "id": "bceb2ede-71d4-4af5-adc7-47050444b109", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*317The defendant however claims that Laing acquired title by virtue \u25a0of a contract entered into with Moncrief for the purpose of stifling a criminal prosecution against Moncrief, and therefore his title was void against bona fide creditors of Moncrief. The referee refused to find that there was any legal evidence that any of the notes paid by Laing, in consideration of the bill of sale to him, were forged. We have examined the case and there was evidence sufficient to require the finding that some of the notes which Laing, in consideration of the bill of sale to him, agreed to pay and did pay were forged, and that the inducement which led him to make the contract was a feeling of compassion and kindness for Moncrief, and especially for Laing\u2019s daughter, who was Moncrief\u2019s wife, and the hope that if the notes were paid a prosecution for the crime would be less likely to take place, but there was no agreement that Laing or any creditor should refrain from prosecution, or that the notes should be destroyed, or any evidence withheld. No prosecution had been commenced or threatened. The amount paid by Laing exceeded the value of the property transferred by the bill of sale, and no motive of gain induced him to enter into the contract. In Ward v. Allen (2 Metcalf, 53), it was held that in order to make a promise void on the ground that the consideration thereof was the stifling of a criminal prosecution, it is necessary that the promise should be made for gain, and not merely from motives of kindness and compassion. In Laing v. McCall (50 Vt., 658), a case arising in Vermont out of this transaction, it was held that the jury ought to have been instructed that if any part of the inducement moving the plaintiff to the execution of the contract was, that, by taking up said notes Moncrief would be less liable to be arrested for <mask>, then the contract was void as to bona fide creditors of Moncrief. The court rested the decision upon the proposition \u201c that the intent to do a criminal act and to carry out an illegal purpose, vitiates the whole transaction.\u201d The proposition is undoubtedly correct and the contract void if there was an intent to accomplish an illegal act by means of the transaction. The case is much like Marbury v. Brooks (7 Wheat., 556; again reported 11 id., 78). In that case one Fitzhugh had forged many notes. Marbury was his father-in-law. Fitzhugh had forged Marbury\u2019s name upon several of the *318notes. The notes were about due and disclosure imminent and prosecution probable. Fitzhugh executed an assignment to Marbury of all bis property in trust for his creditors, preferring tbe payment of these forged notes. The assigned property being insufficient to pay Fitzhugh\u2019s general creditors in addition to the forged notes, the plaintiffs, being such creditors, attached the property in the hands of Marbury, the assignee. The evidence tended to show that the object of the assignment on the part of both the assignor and assignee, was to provide for the forged notes, to the end that Fitzhugh would therefore be less liable to be punished, and in the hope that he would not; hut there was no agreement of that kind with any of the holders of the notes, and they were not parties to the transaction, otherwise than by being benefited by it in receiving their pay. The' assignment was upheld against the attaching creditors. Marshall, C. 1., in delivering the opinion of the court (7 Wheat., 575), said: \u201c To advance moiiey for a son-in-law to repair the frauds he had committed, even with the hope of concealing the perpetration of them, is not, we think, an offense which may not be excused; nor can a security taken for the repayment of money so advanced be deemed fraudulent. If the notes were to be taken, upon condition that the holders would forbear to prosecute the criminal, or if the repayment of the money advanced were to depend upon his escape from prosecution, the validity of the contract might well be questioned. But the undertaking of Marbury was unconditional, as was the security for the repayment of the money advanced. * * * It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender and to proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; hut the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty is too harsh for man.\u201d"], "id": "8065b8d6-c096-4321-8607-93edf0909351", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Roger S. Hayes, J. *367Defendant is charged with 15 counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 170.25), four counts of criminal possession of computer related material (Penal Law \u00a7 156.35), and three counts of criminal possession of <mask> devices (Penal Law \u00a7 170.40 [2]). Defendant has filed an omnibus motion seeking dismissal or reduction of the charges and other relief. Based on my findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in part I below, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss or reduce is denied. The remainder of defendant\u2019s omnibus motion is dealt with in part II of this decision."], "id": "176e62d8-7c9f-48a9-b59f-a793eb821230", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defense proffers the following analysis of the <mask> statutes in support of the motion. Penal Law \u00a7 170.25 in relevant part states that: \"A person is guilty of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree when, with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses any forged instrument of a kind specified in section 170.10.\u201d"], "id": "0f6fc413-4baf-43f7-9c01-c8946333c493", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is the sine qua non of any right to recovery by the plaintiffs under the second cause of action that a valid financing contract exists. A valid contract is a jurisdictional requirement of the Truth in Lending Act (Fairley v Turan-Foley Imports, 65d 475). Article 10 of the State\u2019s Personal Property Law deals generally with a valid, enforceable agreement, and the consumers\u2019 remedies for the unlawful conduct of lenders. The plaintiffs have alleged, and proven, the existence of a <mask>. No valid financing contract existed which would trigger the applicable laws. The plaintiffs cannot rely upon the protection of the forgery to negate any liability under the security agreement, and yet seek the remedies afforded by statutes which assume the existence of a contract."], "id": "f48ac16b-d798-42af-bdd2-608e1d9321b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It further appears from the testimony upon this hearing that the petitioner has had considerable experience in various criminal courts. For instance, he was convicted in the State of Florida of <mask> as a felony and after spending some time in a penitentiary or jail, by the intervention of petitioner\u2019s father to the Governor of the State of Florida, received a conditional pardon. He was convicted on a Federal charge in the State of Arkansas and was sentenced to two years in Leavenworth Prison. That at another time at Los Angeles in the State of California, he overdrew his account and received a suspended sentence there. It appears that petitioner was acquainted with criminal proceedings at the time of his plea."], "id": "c15f4118-5276-4923-8e2a-de36131124f6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It seems to me that in cases where resort must be had to informality to carry out the wishes or will of the soldier, it is safer to follow strictly the statute which now requires that the \u201c execution and the tenor thereof must be proved by at least two witnesses.\u201d The danger of relaxing this rule in favor of accepting unattested writings as testaments in themselves is obvious \u2014 it opens the' door to <mask> and fraud, coercion and undue influence and all of the evils which have sought to be eliminated by the Decedent Estate Law, which requires attestation by at least two subscribing witnesses."], "id": "afa45bfd-6e14-4878-b76e-1022dba6e48f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The holding in Bergland was incorporated into the initial 1989 legislation codifying the enforcement of no contest clauses. (See Recommendation Relating to No Contest Clauses (Jan. 1989) 20 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1990) (Revision Report) pp. 12-13; former \u00a7 21306, Stats. 1989, ch. 544, \u00a7 19.) The Commission characterized Bergland as holding that \"a no contest clause is not enforceable against a person who, in good faith, contests a will on the ground of ... revocation by execution of a subsequent will.\" (Revision Report, at pp. 12-13 & fn. 9.) That description of the good faith exception presumes that revocation through an attempt to enforce a subsequent bogus instrument would otherwise trigger a no contest provision. In place of a good faith exception, the new legislative scheme provided that a no contest clause was not enforceable against contests based on <mask> or revocation that were brought with probable cause . (See former \u00a7 21306; Stats. 1989, ch. 544, \u00a7 19.)"], "id": "c9d6c8af-0225-499b-abf8-f5eecea073b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Applying the Economos standard, this action overwhelmingly results in Florida being the most appropriate forum. The par*1022ties all reside in Florida, the witnesses will undoubtedly be primarily Florida residents since that is where the services were rendered and where the <mask> occurred and where the banks now involved are located. Not only is another forum available but an action has been brought in Florida. Unlike New York, jurisdiction over all the relevant parties is obtainable, the situs of the underlying action appears to be Florida, and Florida is the place where the forgery occurred and where the services defendant is counterclaiming for were rendered. Finally, an unnecessary burden is placed on this court which would be forced to interpret Florida law when a Florida forum is available. This court should not be required to adjudicate a case with such a negligible connection to New York."], "id": "87fbf371-94dd-4d02-89e7-2873a8857fba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This explanation does several things to support the conclusion that the electorate intended not only a narrow definition of larceny in the proposed shoplifting statute, but also the use of the historical definition of larceny. First, the analysis specifically describes shoplifting as \"a type of petty theft.\" (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra , analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35.) This description not only associates shoplifting with a specific type of crime, petty theft, but further identifies shoplifting as only a subset of that crime. At a minimum, then, the voters would expect shoplifting to be narrower than petty theft if relying on this description. Second, the analysis differentiates shoplifting from burglary, explaining that shoplifting is sometimes charged as burglary, as opposed to the petty theft of which it is a subset, and explicitly preventing that future practice. (Ibid .) Thus, voters relying on these statements would expect that shoplifting would be treated differently from burglary if Proposition 47 is passed. Finally, the analysis treats shoplifting as an existing crime, listing it with other known crimes which already have statutory definitions such as grand theft, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, <mask>, and drug possession, while consistently *680using language suggesting individuals are regularly incarcerated for committing such crimes. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra , analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, pp. 35-36 [\"the measure reduces the penalties for the following crimes\"; \"about 40,000 offenders annually are convicted of the above crimes\"; \"the above crimes are nonserious and nonviolent, most offenders are currently being handled at the county level\"].) As such, one reading the analysis would conclude that the crime of shoplifting already exists and, knowledgeable about the general description of the crime in California case law to that point (People v. Superior Court (Cervantes ), supra , 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 ), would likely understand the crime to be limited in line with the historical definition of larceny."], "id": "39beade9-8727-41cf-ad96-75a3a37d4ca8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The 1,000 checks lost or stolen from defendant\u2019s printer were, as noted above, merely blank checks. On the blank check here at issue, a person, or persons, unknown filled in the date of \u201cissuance\u201d, the name of the payee, the amount of the check and then proceeded to sign the check, on a line drawn above the word \u201cteller\u201d, \u201cJerry Smith\u201d. No such *951person is employed by the defendant. We thus deal here not with an alteration of a properly executed instrument but with a fabrication of all but the blank form of the instrument. Such a fabrication is possible in regard to the loss of any \u201cblank check\u201d, whether a personal or teller\u2019s check. Does it follow that liability should be imposed simply because the loss of the blank check was due to the negligence of the party in whose name the blank check was prepared? Neither the plaintiff nor the court below has presented authority for imposing liability upon the defendant under these circumstances, and I have found none in this jurisdiction. In Fred Meyer, Inc. v Temco Metal Prods. Co. (267 Ore 230), the plaintiff, as holder of 30 forged checks, sought to recover the loss it incurred after these checks had been stolen during a burglary of defendant\u2019s office and then cashed at several of plaintiff\u2019s stores. The complaint alleged that defendant had been negligent in failing to place the blank checks in safekeeping; in failing to place its check \u201cprotectograph\u201d (used in forging the checks) in safekeeping; and in failing to lock the \u201cprotectograph\u201d so as to render it unusable. While the plaintiff relied upon the Oregon counterpart to section 3-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code (i.e., Ore Rev Stats, \u00a7 73.4060), the trial court nonsuited the plaintiff on motion and that judgment was affirmed. In so affirming, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that while this is a case in which it is contended that defendant was negligent for failure to foresee that his conduct may involve harm to another through the \u201ccriminal\u201d conduct of a third person, under normal circumstances a person may reasonably assume that no one will violate the criminal law (Restatement, Torts 2d, \u00a7\u00a7 302 A, 302 B). Even if we could impute some responsibility to the defendant for the loss or theft of the 1,000 blank teller\u2019s checks, I do not believe that the bank may be held liable for the subsequent <mask> of the check here at issue."], "id": "8f8adfba-8056-4ab8-a5e0-aa1f3eccfeed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In order to determine whether there was authority for the court to issue the eavesdropping warrants on Bencosme\u2019s and *423other police officers\u2019 cell phones, the court, indeed, must decide whether the conduct of the defendants in fixing tickets can be fairly characterized as dangerous to life, limb or property. (See People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747, 763 [1980].) To be sure, the physical act of fixing a ticket is not inherently dangerous. However, the behavior that is encouraged by and could potentially flow from such conduct certainly is. The evidence adduced in the grand jury established that defendants fixed tickets by destroying them, by failing to file them, by not appearing to testify in traffic court, or by testifying falsely in traffic court. Some of the tickets so fixed were for reckless driving, failing to wear a seat belt, driving while talking on a cell phone, excessive speeding, failing to stop at a stop sign, parking at a fire hydrant, and failing to secure a child passenger with a seat belt.13 As a result of having their tickets deleted, motorists were allowed to escape the consequences of their reckless roadway behavior. Having not paid a fine, having not had their insurance premiums increased as a result of their reckless conduct, or having not had their licenses to drive suspended, these individuals had no disincentive to discontinue their illegal and reckless driving. Viewed in this fashion, it is not difficult to see how ticket-fixing endangered both people and property. (See People v Principe, 65 NY2d at 37 [<mask>, larceny and related crimes fell within the ambit of federal wiretapping law as crimes that are dangerous to life, limb or property where corrupt DMV employees provided forged certificates of title, driver\u2019s licenses without road tests and inspection stickers without inspections].)"], "id": "63ad2e4b-b915-459e-b867-e09e7a5e948f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The learned surrogate has found as a fact that the alleged second will \u201c was never in fact his (testator\u2019s) will or executed or intended by him as such, but was a <mask> and creation of *25and by the said Florine A. Kirkholder.\u201d If this finding is warranted by the proofs before him, then I think it follows, as he has held, that she did in offering it for. probate and seeking to sustain it by what must have been perjured testimony, thereby \u201c controvert,\u201d dispute or call in question the validity of \u201d the genuine will within the intent and meaning of those words as used by the testator."], "id": "4e78e2e7-28c3-4a1d-a917-282fdc084860", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant claims that he was only 16 years of age at the time he was convicted and that he pleaded guilty believing that the crime charged was a misdemeanor because the amount involved was $25. He further claims that he did not commit <mask>. He further claims that he was not aware of the fact that he was entitled to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceeding and that he was not adequately represented by counsel in all stages and was ignorant of the law and legal procedures."], "id": "dafd4ee9-1a8f-49ff-b2dd-e72a4d8aa004", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["When Mortimer received its bank statement disclosing both the certification of the check and the subsequent charging of the account, it promptly informed Underwriters that the signature was in fact a <mask>. Investigation disclosed that Mortimer had been the victim of a series of burglaries, and that in all probability the forgery was consummated during one such nocturnal visit when checks were removed from the back of its check book, the letter was typed, and the rubber stamp was affixed to the check and letter."], "id": "3655f0d7-c613-4f02-84c7-386ba20c3c7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Our conclusion is consistent with the voters' general intent behind Proposition 47. As noted, the initiative was designed to \"ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses, to maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime, and to invest the savings generated from this act into prevention and support programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment.\" (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, \u00a7 2, p. 70.) To achieve that end, the measure \"[r]equire[s] misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession....\" (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, \u00a7 3, p. 70.) Appellant's second degree burglary conviction based on using a forged check to obtain $148 is unquestionably a nonviolent offense, so reducing it to a misdemeanor certainly serves the purposes behind Proposition 47. We are confident the voters would agree, given Proposition 47 also reduced the offense of <mask> involving less than $950 from a wobbler to a straight misdemeanor. (\u00a7 473, subd. (b).)"], "id": "eff707dd-762d-4498-b559-21c8ef12fab9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Frank J. LaBuda, J. *813The defendants, Theresa and Wayne Vandermeulen, are on trial, as husband and wife, for defrauding Theresa Vandermeulen\u2019s 83-year-old and legally blind grandmother of more than $50,000 in violation of grand larceny in the second degree beginning in 2002 and continuing through May 2004 after the grandmother moved from Kisseemee, Florida, to Monticello, New York, to live with the defendants and their four minor children. It is further alleged that the defendants abused and misused a power of attorney, made unauthorized withdrawals from the grandmother\u2019s checking and savings accounts (<mask> in the second degree) and opened an unauthorized credit card account (identity theft in the third degree)."], "id": "776b180a-b9b3-45cc-9780-41004cc934d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["But enough has been said to justify our premises that the extreme doctrine maintained in Price v. Neale is not now the law of England; and such was evidently the opinion entertained by Mr. Chitty as late as 1840. See Chitty on B., 11 Am. ed., p. 431, where, after referring to the \u2019* old rule, the following comments will be found : \u201c But on the other hand it may be observed that the holder who obtained payment cannot be considered as having altogether shown sufficient circumspection ; he might, before he discounted or received the instrument in payment, have made more inquiries as to the signatures and genuineness of the instrument, even of the drawer or indorsers themselves; and if he thought fit to rely on the bare representation of the party from whom he took it, there is no reason that he should profit by the accidental payment, when the loss had already attached upon himself., and why he should be allowed to retain the money, when, by an immediate notice of the <mask>, he is enabled to proceed against all other parties, precisely the same as if the payment had not been made, and, consequently, the payment to him has not in the least altered his situation, or occasioned any delay or prejudice. It seems that of late upon questions of this nature these latter considerations have influenced the court in determining whether or not the money shall be *149recovered \"back ; and it will \"be found, on examining the older cases, that there were facts affording a distinction, and that, upon attempting to reconcile them, they are not in contradiction, as might on first view have \"been supposed.\u201d"], "id": "4340e90a-b241-4ed3-8e34-18862d905d28", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*817The defendant now moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff has failed to submit to an examination pursuant to the terms of the policy. In opposition to the motion the plaintiff alleges that since he stands accused of the crimes of arson, <mask> and other crimes in connection with the claim, which is the subject matter of this action, he could not very well submit to an examination under oath by the attorneys for, the defendant who are my accusers under circumstances tantamount to a Star Chamber inquisition without any safeguards with respect to my constitutional rights.\u201d He also states that he is now willing to submit to an examination under the supervision of the court."], "id": "e085e2f1-9628-47c4-ab5d-8cc9720c21db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court finds that plaintiff did not breach the warranty of presentment to the depositary or collecting bank, Ridgewood (see UCC 4-207), i.e., that defendant Brijlall had good title to *907the subject check and that the signature indorsed on it by Mrs. Brijlall for deposit into plaintiffs account was in fact genuine; and that defendant Brijlall\u2019s claim of <mask> was a subsequent, separate act which did not impair plaintiffs warranty."], "id": "a5f9c5b4-0b3b-4210-9154-25055a5b6ca4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The effect of UCC 3-405 is to put the loss on the drawer, who was induced by an imposter to draw a check, and not on the drawee bank. When the imposter rule applies, the drawee bank may properly charge the drawer\u2019s account with the amount of the check involved (Underpinnings & Found. Constructors v Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 AD2d 628, 643, supra, quoting Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code \u00a7 3-405:6 [2d ed]). Thus, the drawee bank cannot recover from the collecting bank for breach of warranty of the genuineness of the endorsement on the check pursuant to UCC 4-207, because the payee bank cannot establish that it suffered any loss incident to the <mask>. (Underpinnings & Found. Constructors v Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 AD2d 628, 643, supra, quoting Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code \u00a7 3-405:8 [2d ed].)"], "id": "f564b027-184c-4dff-a85c-3694ac3d95f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Great Northern now moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. It claims that the loss suffered by plaintiffs because their Renoir is a <mask> is not a covered loss under the terms of their homeowner\u2019s insurance policy. Great Northern *1044contends that plaintiffs\u2019 policy covers only \u201call risk of physical loss\u201d providing such loss occurred during the policy period. According to Great Northern, plaintiffs have not suffered a \u201cphysical loss.\u201d In fact, the Renoir still hangs in their residence. Further, to the extent that plaintiffs claim a loss due to fraud, such loss is not a physical loss. Moreover, even assuming that the alleged fraud resulted in a physical loss, the loss occurred in 1976 when plaintiffs purchased the forged Renoir, long before the issuance of this policy."], "id": "04ba4482-b5f5-49a7-91fe-629c5c297212", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plea counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion. Coon, 504 S.W.3d at 892 ; Stragliati, 556 S.W.3d at 664. The record establishes that a motion to dismiss based upon Meadors's right to a speedy trial *213would have been meritless because the time between when the State filed the information for the Jefferson County <mask> charge and when Meadors pleaded guilty was only eighty-four days-not the 1700 days Meadors alleges in his motion. See State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Mo. banc. 2015) (\"The delay in bringing a defendant to trial is measured from the time of a formal indictment or information or when actual restraints are imposed by an arrest [for the charged offense].\"); State v. Williams, 120 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (\"The right to a speedy trial attaches, and the defendant becomes an 'accused,' with the filing of either a formal indictment or information against the defendant or his arrest.\"). Under similar facts in Williams, the Western District held that the defendant was not \"arrested\" or \"accused\" on the pending charge for speedy trial purposes until the information was filed because the defendant was imprisoned on other charges. Williams, 120 S.W.3d at 299. Likewise, here, Meadors was not \"arrested\" or \"accused\" on the Jefferson County forgery charge until the State filed the information because Meadors was arrested on separate charges in other jurisdictions and no detainer was issued by Jefferson County. See ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1\">id. Meadors's situation thus contrasts with cases in which a defendant is arrested through a joint enterprise between multiple counties and is held for a particular jurisdiction via a detainer or functional equivalent. See State v. Holmes, 643 S.W.2d 282, 285-86 (Mo. App. W.D. 1982). Consequently, no prejudicial delay occurred between the filing of the information and Meadors's guilty plea to justify a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Williams, 120 S.W.3d at 300 ; Cummings v. State, 535 S.W.3d 410, 420-21 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017). Therefore, we will not deem Meadors's plea counsel ineffective for failing to make a meritless motion. Coon. 504 S.W.3d at 892 ; Cummings, 535 S.W.3d at 420-21."], "id": "637c7395-f463-418a-8e79-f51e80ea744c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*209The complaint alleges in substance: the City maintained with the Chase Bank an account subject to withdrawal by checks. The City drew its check upon the Chase Bank, payable to the order of a named payee. This check, bearing the purported indorsement of the payee, the Federal Reserve Bank indorsed, thereby guaranteeing all prior indorsements upon said instrument, and presented it for payment to the Chase Bank, which latter bank relying upon said indorsement and guarantee, paid the amount of said instrument to the Federal Reserve Bank. The indorsement in the name of the payee was a <mask>. Plaintiff had insured the City and any bank in which it carried an account, subject to withdrawal by checks, against certain losses sustained through payment of any instrument drawn by the City upon which the signature of any indorser had been forged. Plaintiff paid the loss and thereby became subrogated to all rights of salvage and the Chase Bank assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff, which received the assignment as a salvage operation."], "id": "53806eee-2e62-40f2-aab5-c3caf142264a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe Warden of the City Prison and Bridewell of the City of New York will receive and safely keep for examination the body of Martin Leland, charged with <mask> on oath of-. \u201c First District Police Court, New York, Sept. 4,1869. \u201cJ. Dowlixg, Police Justice. \u201cEustace and F ablet, Officers.\u201d The district-attorney \u2022 also produced an affidavit of one Carlisle K. Willits, who does not state where he (said Willits) resides, or where he can be found, and who says that Leland came to No. 57 South-street, Philadelphia, and bought a city warrant of the city of Philadelphia, of the value of two hundred and thirty-three dollars and ninety-five cents. He then testifies, on information and belief, that two warrants, exact counterparts of the one so bought by Leland, each for one thousand dollars, were sold to brokers in Philadelphia, and that said warrants were forged. Now, this is all the testimony in the case ; and upon this commitment and this proof I am asked to remand a citizen of this State, one who has formerly'borne an unblemished character, so that he may be sent to the State of Pennsylvania, to be there tried for this alleged crime."], "id": "e912decd-18a8-4175-b96c-3b2db42add98", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Upon completing this sentence in December 2020, Hibshman was released to his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s house to begin his term of supervised release. But soon after, the Indiana state court revoked his probation on his state <mask> conviction due to his federal escape conviction. Hibshman was ordered to report to the county jail to serve a two-year term of imprisonment for the state probation violation. He failed to do so. Hibshman instead moved out of his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s house and stopped communicating with his federal probation officer. Authorities found him more than three months later at the scene of a car accident where he gave a fake name and stated he was a minor."], "id": "2eb6e92f-491d-47e8-a86e-1c2fab2f9764", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*401Additionally, we will point out that section 530.5, subdivision (a) is not one of the listed offenses in section 1170.18 as being subject to reclassification. We will also note that section 473 (forgery) as revised in Proposition 47, specifically excludes cases where the person is convicted of both <mask> and identity theft in section 530.5 from the $950 minimum threshold."], "id": "a3b28b3e-5db2-4e81-8e61-49af0fc73456", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["I, therefore, hold that the notes in question were executed by Filomena Castelli and that she did place thereon the signature of her husband. That the separate defense of incompetency to act was not sustained by the proof offered herein. The defense of <mask>, interposed by the defendant, Vincent Castelli, of his signature on the notes in question, has been sustained by the proof produced herein. Since the proof has failed to show that the defendant, Vincent Castelli, is precluded from setting up the defense of forgery, then this court finds the defense will stand. Judgment is hereby granted against the defendant, Filomena Castelli, for the amount demanded in the complaint plus costs. The action against Vincent Castelli is dismissed."], "id": "910323d5-7d9f-48df-846d-b41197653cfa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The <mask> of checks, notes, drafts and other commercial paper is common. The annual loss through this means is said to be large. Unsuspecting merchants and other business men are frequently the victims. The check worker may ply his nefarious trade alone and unaided. The forged will is in a class of its own. The very nature of the act involves a conspiracy and requires the concerted action of several persons. Single-handed fraud is impossible. A will requires at least two attesting witnesses. It must *115be admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no haste or disregard of legal requirements. Every person having a legal interest in the estate is cited to appear in court. A will must run the gauntlet of many sharp eyes and keen inquiring minds. It may be subjected to attack by hostile heirs or next of kin. Before admitting a will to probate the surrogate is charged by the law to inquire particularly into all the facts and circumstances and must be satisfied of the genuineness of the will and the validity of its execution. (Surrogate\u2019s Court Act, \u00a7 144.)"], "id": "719f485e-6255-456d-874a-5f3b8bbe4d96", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Here, however, the subject check did not in fact bear a forged indorsement; the evidently never-investigated allegation of <mask> by defendant Brijlall has been discounted by the finding of this court. Secondly, even had there in fact been a forgery, the attempted charge-back of plaintiffs account by defendant Ridge-wood was untimely as a matter of law as it came more than two years after what the court, after trial, further finds was final settlement of the check (UCC 4-212, 4-213, 4-301)."], "id": "8f92d410-fe03-4265-86f7-5f2010974451", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Certain of the claims asserted in Waggoner's pro se motion (such as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; claims of instructional error; and claims of a variance between the charging instrument and the evidence at trial) are plainly claims that could-and should-have been raised in Waggoner's direct appeal. Those claims are not properly asserted in a motion for post-conviction relief, yet counsel retained them verbatim , and without any attempt to justify consideration of those claims in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Many of the other claims Waggoner asserted (such as claims of witness tampering; suborning perjury; <mask> of documents; interference in jury deliberations; alteration of the trial transcript; \"rampant judicial misconduct\" and juror misconduct; and \"[r]ampant perjury, forgery, [and] manufacture of false evidence\") are factually extravagant. Counsel retained all of those claims in Waggoner's \"amended\" motion, without reciting a single additional fact or legal authority, and without any indication that counsel had herself determined that a good-faith factual and legal basis actually existed for the claims. It is significant in this regard that the circuit court initially dismissed all of the claims in Waggoner's pro se motion as frivolous-yet appointed counsel later repeated all of those same claims, with no substantive revision or supplementation.8"], "id": "d1912d65-aa2c-4165-82f5-f4312f665081", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In Point I, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting Baker's Motion to dismiss Count I of the Amended Information because the facts alleged were sufficient to charge <mask>, in that the State could charge forgery, a more broad statute, or fraudulent use of a credit device, a more specific statute, at its discretion when the facts meet the elements of both crimes."], "id": "2ee13730-efbf-47ae-bc0d-97c8b498ed2a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Upon the reversal of his conviction, Briggins applied for reinstatement. As a result of that request Briggins appeared before a deputy trial commissioner charged with the original allegations of misconduct (<mask> and false identification), and was informed that \u201cif the matter [were] *977tried administratively [the] tribunal would have no choice but to dismiss the subject Charges and Specifications as * * * legally insufficient.\u201d"], "id": "b2db4a6e-521d-41ca-bf5a-2ba748a41dcd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["16363 A. <mask> 2, attempted grand larceny 2. 16363 B. Grand larceny 2. 16363 C. Grand larceny 2. 16363 D. Forgery 2, attempted grand larceny 2. Thereafter a justice of the Supreme Court overruled the discretionary denial of bail by this court and fixed bail in sums aggregating $7,500. Upon the indictments\u2019 being moved for trial this court learned of the admission of the defendant to bail, and now considers the question of revoking bail as fixed by the other justice and again holding the defendant for trial, without bail, as a matter of judicial discretion."], "id": "3ae94a95-d75e-4249-b112-7b90651a0fa5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the better and more concise language of counsel for the beneficiaries: \u201c If we treat the paper propounded as having four pages, the obverse and reverse sides of the first sheet being treated as pages 1 and 2, and of the second sheet as pages 3 and 4, we can then say that the will starts on page 1, is continued on page 4, and concluded on page 2.\u201d It is page 2 which contains the signature of testator. This signature is followed *190by the ordinary attestation clause, subsigned by the attesting witnesses in the usual manner. There being no allegation of fraud or <mask> in this cause, and no suspicious circumstance disclosed, the authenticity of the testamentary script propounded being admitted, the presumption is that the will propounded is in the same condition it was in when the testator and the attesting witnesses placed their respective signatures on it and the testator duly declared it to be his last will and testament and requested the attesting witnesses to act as such. Matter of Cattrall, 1863, 3 S. & T. 419, 421. But without the aid of legal presumption, the paper propounded bears both internal and external evidences of genuineness and that it was composed and written at the same time, and in its present order. When the draftsman of the will had ended writing on the first page he had finished only a part of the third dispositive clause of the will. He then reverted to the fourth blank page where, at the top of the page, he was at pains to note in writing, \u201c Third (continued),\u201d evidently meaning that the third clause of the will which began on the first page was to be continued on the fourth page as, in fact, it was."], "id": "12e5ef5f-a108-4c59-97c7-95032d13efa3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecution argues that the circuit court erred by quashing the bindover respecting this count because evidence showed that defendant violated MCL 750.248(1) by generating a false QVF that she submitted as a list of all voters who submitted an AV ballot which actually omitted 193 valid AV ballots. The prosecution argues that MCL 750.248(1) prohibits altering public records in addition to forging public records. The prosecution concedes that a <mask> requires making an instrument that purports to be something it is not, but argues that, even if defendant did not \u201cforge\u201d a public record, she altered one by removing the 193 names from the QVF."], "id": "8b93467c-07c0-4a88-aa7e-8a4a09b623c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court's current classification of theft of property goes back nearly four decades to Gustafson v. State , 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979). There, the court acknowledged that elements of Arkansas Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 are concerned with the distinction between crimes that involve dishonesty per se (e.g., \"<mask>, perjury, bribery, false pretense and embezzlement\") and crimes that do not involve dishonesty per se (e.g., \"murder, manslaughter or assault\"). Id. at 288-89, 590 S.W.2d at 859. So far, so good. Without analysis, however, the court then reached the abrupt conclusion that \"theft, as it is defined in the Arkansas Criminal Code, involves dishonesty.\" Id."], "id": "57095b33-b430-4a7b-8ba9-1bba88505ee2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The statute under which he was indicted and convicted is as follows: \u201c Every person who, with intent to defraud, shall make any false entry, or shall falsely alter any entry made in any book of accounts kept in the office of the Comptroller of this State, or in the office of the Treasurer, or of the Surveyor-General, or of any County Treasurer, by which any demand or obligation, claim, right or interest, either against or in favor of the people of this State, or any county or town, or any individual, shall be or shall purport to be discharged, diminished, increased, created, or in any manner affected, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of <mask> in the third degree.\u201d (2 R. S. [m. p.], 673, \u00a7 34.)"], "id": "47fd0fea-b69c-4696-8cc9-726df0e7502c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Having determined that the propounded paper is a concocted instrument and a <mask>, probate thereof is denied. Since the person otherwise entitled to letters is a non-resident alien, letters of administration will issue to the public administrator upon proper application. The facts in respect of this forgery have been called to the attention of the district attorney for appropriate action."], "id": "a40f6fb5-0f96-4765-a0a2-a88cc3888158", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It appears that following the defendant\u2019s arrest for driving while intoxicated and driving without a license he falsely identified himself to the arresting authorities as one Kenneth Riley and signed a fingerprint card with the same fictitious name. Following his release from custody, the defendant\u2019s true identity was learned and he was thereafter arrested and indicted for the crime of <mask> in the second degree in violation of subdivision 2 of section 170.10 of the Penal Law, which reads as follows:"], "id": "1132681b-144f-4bcc-8c1d-85369ca7ea96", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The moving papers show substantial and reasonable cause to believe that the document is a <mask> and that the forgery was committed by the defendant. The answering papers of the defendant do not refute this contention of the People. Indeed, the defendant\u2019s attorney avers that under the circumstances, not only would it be foolish for the defendant to use the document at trial but that the defendant has absolutely no intention of using it at trial."], "id": "26915957-cc5d-496c-ba59-13135521f1b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Silberzweig\u2019s work record was far from pristine. Over the course of six years, he was charged with various acts of misconduct and repeatedly disciplined. The conduct which had led to the prior disciplinary action ranged from relatively minor infractions, such as failing to safeguard the Department\u2019s telephone order book, to a more serious charge based on Silberzweig\u2019s conviction for <mask> in the third degree based on his unauthorized use of Department stationery to create a forged letter to participate in a sheriffs car auction. The disciplinary penalties imposed for these various prior infractions ranged from a written reprimand to two suspensions for a period of weeks without pay. However, at no point over the six-year period did the Commissioner find Silberzweig\u2019s conduct worthy of discharge until the incident at issue herein."], "id": "70f38d26-58c1-4aa9-b03e-a240ab3e054d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This was determined quite early, in Price v. Neal (3 Burr. 1354). In that case, two forged bills were drawn upon the plaintiff. Notice of the first bill was left at the plaintiff\u2019s house on the day it became due; plaintiff sent his servant to call on the defendant to pay it, which was done. The other bill the plaintiff accepted and paid at maturity.. On discover*291ing the <mask>, plaintiff brought an action for money had and received, to recover back the amount paid. The court held that the action would not lie. Lord Mansfield said it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to be satisfied that the bill drawn upon him was in the drawer\u2019s hand before he accepted or paid it, but that it was not incumbent on the defendant to inquire into it."], "id": "8654123b-0a29-489a-b697-a024724de933", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*330However, probation thereafter reported defendant had sustained two new criminal arrests, both for <mask> offenses. In light of defendant's failure to appear for sentencing and her subsequent criminal conduct the probation department dropped its split sentence recommendation, as it \"no longer appears appropriate.\" Instead, the department recommended denial of probation and \"imposition of the full incarceration period of three years.\""], "id": "60118d5f-f63c-4d7f-8856-8650c26599af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The following facts regarding the access card <mask> offenses at issue in this appeal (counts 1 & 5) are taken from the probation report. In January 2014, a taxi driver reported to police he had picked defendant up and driven her to several locations in Marin County. Defendant attempted to pay the $73.53 cab fare with a prepaid debit card, but the charge did not go through. When police searched defendant, they located a Green Dot prepaid Visa card with defendant's name and another individual's name embossed on it."], "id": "314a8da0-8aa5-46ba-b65f-b0d897c5e639", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court specifically finds that a Federally issued resident alien card, often referred to as a \u201cGreen Card\u201d, is covered by this State\u2019s <mask> laws. See People v Fury (279 NY 433 [1939]) to the effect that a Federal Reserve bank note is covered by the Penal Law on forgery. The fact that the Federal Government *191had. made uttering of counterfeit bank notes a crime and that only the Federal Government could coin money or issue legal currency or tender did not bar the State from making the uttering of counterfeit bank notes a felony. (People v Fury, supra; People v Kalmus 123 NYS2d 411 [Ct Gen Sess, NY County 1953].) The same act may constitute an offense against both the State and Federal Government. (People v Broady, 5 NY2d 500 [1959].)"], "id": "2cecbb77-35de-4d98-ad34-8a80dab404fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, the analysis in Romanowski is not inconsistent with our determination here. First, it is notable that in its analysis, the court referenced the specific language of section 473(b) expressly reducing punishment for the seven listed instruments, and characterized the statute by saying \"Proposition 47 specifically created a $950 threshold for check <mask>. \" ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 913, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633, italics added.) Second, while the court observed \"a check can contain some of the same information that is found on an access card, along with the owner's address and other details that would facilitate identity theft\" ( ibid . ), it did not consider whether concerns about the electronic use and storage of access card information, consumer privacy, and the arguably greater potential for identity theft in access card transactions would be a rational basis for the voters to conclude access card forgery crimes are more serious than check-related forgery crimes."], "id": "595761ff-961b-4741-9c8b-77c0e09e9d46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["All questions of fact, such as <mask> or fraud, not appearing on the face of a petition are to be determined in court proceedings only. (Matter of McGovern [Olson], 291 N. Y. 104, 108; Schwarts v. Heffernan, 304 N. Y. 474, 480, supra; Matter of Bednarsh v. Cohen, 267 App. Div. 133, 135, mot. for lv. to app. den. 292 N. Y. 578 and 723; Matter of Frankel v. Cheshire, 212 App. Div. 664, 667, 671.)"], "id": "bd3d2496-d7d8-44ff-aead-8f3fbf69bcc7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["After considering all the testimony, the court cannot find that <mask> of the 45 signatures was established. Where fraud is charged, it is elementary that the burden of proof lies on the party making the claim to establish it by clear and convincing evidence (Matter of McQuade v. Heffernan, 197 Misc. 990, affd. 277 App. Div. 947), consonant with the rule in any case when fraud is the issue that it is never presumed and cannot be based on conjecture or doubtful inference (Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N. Y. 400, 410; Ochenkowski v. Dunaj, 232 App. Div. 441). The court finds that the petitioner did not sustain the burden of proof as to the signatures claimed to be forgeries."], "id": "368f85ff-b62d-4679-b51f-f6eaf5578b06", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["While Mr. Henry C. Hyde appears in this case as counsel, his argument is of such a character that I feel justified in treating it in the category of expert testimony, for such -it is essentially, relieved of the constraint of cross-examination and free from the burden of an oath. Mr. Hyde has made a specialty of .the study of handwriting for thirty years or more, and had used the microscope in his examination of manuscripts for above twenty years, and had frequently been called upon to employ and exhibit his talents in court in judicial inquiries in controversies over disputed writings, and had been so engaged in noted cases in probate. Mr. Hyde in his expository statement undertook to confine himself entirely to the facts connected with the charge of <mask> and to the scientific proofs demonstrated; he assumed to elucidate the elementary principles that underlie proof of handwriting, and said that the handwriting of a man is as distinctive as any other phase of personality or individual character; the qualities and habits of writers are as various and distinct as the writers themselves; there are definite limits and possibilities to the capacity of a forger and the difficulty of the task of a *77forger is the reason why so few forgers have been successful; the forger only sees effects to imitate, but he does not see how those effects are produced; it has been argued that if a small number of characteristics can be simulated an indefinite number may be imitated, provided time be given\u2014the answer to this is, that the smaller the number of items to be imitated the easier the task of the forger and the more difficult detection; in the case at bar, Mr. Hyde asked, what was the necessity of simulating and manufacturing so many documents as are in dispute? Why should the forger act so recklessly? He must have had a sublime confidence in his own ability to fabricate and to deceive by his fabrication. It is difficult to imagine the magnitude of the task set to himself by the forger of this alleged' forged Will; it must have involved his perfect transformation into Dama himself; he \"must not only have acquired his habits of hand but have become possessed of his spirit; it would have been impossible for a forger to have accomplished all these forgeries unless he were in the possession of facts and gifted with powers not given to any other man than Dama himself; no other man could possibly have executed all these manuscripts in dispute; the difficulties in the path of the alleged forger rendered his success practically impossible; the excess of loops in the Will may be accounted for by the manifest, desire of Dama to make every letter perfect and distinct\u2014this is plain from an inspection of that instrument, and the expert counsel undertook to show the proportion of loops, blind loops, and mended loops in the various documents under examination. The expert, Doctor Piper, had set great store by the dots over the letter \u201ci,\u201d which, in his opinion, were enough to amount to a mathematical demonstration that the Will was a forgery, and expert Counsel Hyde engaged in an analysis of the exhibits of undisputed papers to offset and overthrow the opinion of Dr. Piper; upon an examination of the Exhibits E. S. 2, 8, 6, 5, 7, 9, respectively designated in evidence as Contestant\u2019s Exhibit C\u20143, letter signed \u201cLuigi\u201d and addressed to \u201cMy Dear Jennie,\u201d dated \u201cSan Francisco, *78March 28/86\u201d; Contestant\u2019s Exhibit I\u20149, letter signed \u201cLuigi,\u201d beginning \u201cBrot Benj,\u201d dated \u201cSan Francisco, Deer. 25/86\u201d; Contestant\u2019s Exhibit, signed \u201cLuigi,\u201d beginning \u201cMy Dear Sister Jennie\u201d and dated \u201cSan Francisco, Deer. 9/83\u201d; Contestant\u2019s Exhibit E\u20145, letter signed \u201cLuigi Dama,\u201d beginning \u201cBro Ben,\u201d dated \u201cSan Francisco, Octr. 6th, /85\u201d; Contestant\u2019s Exhibit H\u20148, letter signed \u201cLuigi Dama,\u201d beginning \u201cCaptn. E. W. Randall, Dear Sir,\u201d dated \u201cSan Francisco, Feby. 24/84\u201d; Contestant\u2019s Exhibit J\u201410, letter signed \u201cLuigi Dama,\u201d beginning \u201cDear Brother\u201d and dated \u201cSan Francisco, Deer. 15/84\u201d; it appears that in very few of these sample letters are there not dots over the \u201ci,\u201d angular or rounded mixed, that is to say, examples of each kind of dot; expert Counsel Hyde thought that it looked as if expert Doctor Piper had purposely selected his standards to support his theory. Expert Counsel Hyde claims to have shown that there are rounded \u201ci\u201d dots and angular \u201ci\u201d dots- scattered promiscuously in the documents disputed and undisputed; in the word \u201cburied,\u201d in line 10 of the alleged Will, there is a light dot over the \u201ci,\u201d a light stroke or touch of the pen, and there is a prevalence in Dama\u2019s writings to this form of dot, and the conical dot, or the dot with the point sharp downward, is often met with; there are in the alleged Will numerous examples corresponding to the \u201ci\u201d dots in the undisputed papers. Another point adverted to by the expert Doctor Piper and illustrated on his Tables is as to the form of the small \u201ca.\u201d Expert Counsel Hyde says that' there are certainly differences between the forms of the \u201ca\u201d small letter, but they are all made on the same principle, they are all begun with the curl on the inside, \u201c"], "id": "3e063015-d535-4640-a3e3-f978a07a6eb0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court held in the Fitzgerald case that the one act of drawing a check without funds on deposit constituted the crime of <mask>. That same act also made the defendant guilty of larceny when he received property and money from the payee in exchange for the worthless check. Therefore, consecutive sentences violated subdivision 2 of section 70.25 of the Penal Law."], "id": "39ddd73c-e779-4407-b8e0-1d1410e2a098", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court is aware of the contrary holding in People v Crean (115 Misc 2d 996, 1000-1002 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 1982]). In Crean, the defendant obtained in New York County a check payable to the victim in Westchester County, deposited the check and withdrew the proceeds from a bank in New York County. The Westchester court held that venue was proper there since Westchester was the situs of the loss to the *23victim as a result of the larceny. This holding was contrary to a previous holding in People v Brown (69 Misc 2d 412 [Suffolk County Ct 1972]), that Suffolk County did not have venue of the larceny of proceeds of a sale of land located in that county, where the sale was consummated and the proceeds thereof converted in New York County. The court in Crean distinguished Brown on the grounds that Brown was limited to considering whether an element of the offense occurred in Suffolk County. This analysis overlooks the requirement that the result upon which venue is based must be an element of the crime charged. CPL 20.10 (3) states that \"[a]n offense of which a result is an element is a 'result offense\u2019.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Crean relies on People v Schlatter (55 AD2d 922 [2d Dept 1977]), which does not support the proposition for which it is cited. In Schlatter, the Court held that in the absence of proof that forged checks were made or altered in Nassau County, the deposit of such checks in a Nassau County bank was not a sufficient basis for venue of the <mask> offense in Nassau County. The Court noted that forgery is not a result offense, meaning that obtaining money in Nassau County as a result of the forgery would not support venue. The Court remanded the larceny counts for trial in Nassau County, not because larceny is a result offense, but because the checks were deposited in and paid to an account in Nassau County. In other words, property in the form of money was obtained in Nassau County. (See also, People v Zaccaro, 132 AD2d 589, 590 [2d Dept 1987] [\"the only conceivable specific consequence or result of the crime of attempted grand larceny in the second degree by extortion is that an element of that crime would be obtaining property by extortion\u201d].) In fact, the result of the larceny in Schlatter was felt in New York County, since the offices of the corporation on whose account the checks were drawn were located in New York County."], "id": "9cd9baee-d31a-4951-b9eb-dd1479853d31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["the <mask> ring. Video footage was presented to the jury showing Agamiri with Dargbeh when Dargbeh cashed one of the fraudulent checks. Additionally, the State presented evidence that two cars rented to Dargbeh were used by other individuals cashing fraudulent checks. Further, the jury heard testimony from the vice president of accounting at Dacotah Paper who testified that Dacotah Paper issued no checks to Dargbeh and had never employed him."], "id": "a3916112-8aa7-4f3f-b3a5-53772c711602", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"Proposition 47's resentencing provision, section 1170.18, subdivision (a), provides, in pertinent part: 'A person who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence for a conviction ... of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section (\"this act\") had this act been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have been amended or added by this act.' The cited provisions include section 490.2, subdivision (a), added by Proposition 47, which provides in pertinent part: 'Notwithstanding [Penal Code] Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($ 950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor ....' [\u00b6] Under these provisions, a person serving a sentence for grand theft under Penal Code section 487 or another statute expressly defining a form of grand theft (e.g., Pen. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 484e, 487a, 487i ) is clearly eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18 if he or she can prove the value of the property taken was $ 950 or less. (See People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 910-914, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 ( Romanowski ) [defendant convicted for theft of access card information under Pen. Code, \u00a7 484e eligible for resentencing].)\" Also relevant here is that the proposition amended the <mask> statute, section 473, to make forgeries misdemeanors unless the threshold amount of loss is more than $950. Subdivision (b) of section 473 provides:"], "id": "6b1c8217-9784-4097-8810-45bd468cb67a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Subdivision (1) of section 3-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: \u201cNo person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon.\u201d Section 3-404 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that \u201c[an] unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it\u201d. The reference to \u201cunauthorized signature\u201d in the above section includes <mask>. (Uniform Commercial Code, \u00a7 1-201, subd [43].)"], "id": "a1391823-4ad0-4edb-9934-7f41ea076682", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA deed based on <mask> or obtained by false pretenses is void ab initia, and a mortgage based on such a deed is likewise invalid\u201d (Cruz v Cruz, 37 AD3d 754, 754 [2007]; see ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v Stephens, 91 AD3d 801, 803 [2012]; First Natl. Bank of Nev. v Williams, 74 AD3d 740, 742 [2010]; GMAC Mtge. Corp. v Chan, 56 AD3d 521, 522 [2008]). \u201cIf a document purportedly conveying a property interest is void, it conveys nothing, and a subsequent bona fide purchaser or bona fide encumbrancer for value receives nothing\u201d (ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v Stephens, 91 AD3d at 803; see Marden v Dorthy, 160 NY 39, 48 [1899]; Solar Line, Universal Great Bhd., Inc. v Prado, 100 AD3d 862, 863-864 [2012]; First Natl. Bank of Nev. v Williams, 74 AD3d at 741). Here, as the Supreme Court found, the plaintiff established that the 2006 deed was a forgery."], "id": "9004ff5a-4d77-4f87-b9c7-43c108f3f0db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant bank in its answer pleaded a general denial and an affirmative defense of <mask>, and interposed a third-party complaint impleading the Department of Welfare. On the trial, the bank proved that six months after it had credited plaintiff for the amount of the check, it was notified by its correspondent bank that the Department of Welfare claimed the *445indorsement had been forged, forwarded a copy of an affidavit to that effect, and that as a result the bank repaid the drawee bank and the amount of the check was deducted from plaintiff\u2019s account."], "id": "eae2a0d3-8f5c-4caf-9701-20de1edea413", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In contrast, plaintiff has demonstrated that defendant Bank accepted the checks for deposit at its own risk, having failed to require a signature verification or a guarantee of the endorsements on the checks. (See, Morgan, Melhuish, Monaghan, Arvidson, Abrutyn & Lisowski v Questex Corp., 159 Misc 2d 126, 129, affd sub nom. Morgan, Melhuish, Monaghan, Arvidson, Abrutyn & Lisowski v Republic Natl. Bank, 160 Misc 2d 244 [finding that a bank\u2019s negotiation of a check without a signature guarantee is done at its own risk and \u201cconstitutes prima facie negligence\u201d in the case of a <mask>, \u201cindicati[ng] * * * the absence of good faith and adherence to reasonable acceptable commercial banking standards\u201d].) No proof has been presented indicating that defendant Bank verified, or even attempted to verify, the endorsement as being the genuine signature of Maria Guttaudaria-Ellman, despite the fact that these checks were drawn for $35,401.77 and $33,751.77. (See, Lund v Chemical Bank, supra, 797 F Supp, at 270 [citing the Kelly court for the proposition that the large dollar amount of a check could lead to a reasonable inference that bank\u2019s handling *668of deposits recklessly gave substantial assistance to scheme to defraud].) It is clear that defendant bank was the party best situated to prevent the negotiation of the forged instruments and that it failed to do so."], "id": "f7387b86-dacd-4bb5-b67d-bf4940190e30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The statutory directions for submission to trial juries of \"lesser included offenses\u201d (CPL 300.30) must necessarily focus on the particular facts in each case rather than upon the conceptual statutory definition (CPL 1.20, subd 37; see, People v Johnson, 39 NY2d 364; People v Stanfield, 36 NY2d 467; People v Cionek, 35 NY2d 924; People v Hayes, 35 NY2d 907). Because no reasonable view of the evidence in this case, as determined by this court, would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense (of <mask> in the third degree), but did not commit the greater offense of forgery in the second degree, the court must, in this case, refuse to charge forgery in the third degree as a lesser included offense of forgery in the second degree."], "id": "6474ac0e-69ae-4f13-a6b2-485570d9809b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We are aware of only one published decision addressing the value of blank checks in the context of a Proposition 47 petition. The Third Appellate District has considered whether a defendant was entitled to have his felony conviction for possessing a blank check with intent to defraud (\u00a7 475, subd. (b)) designated a misdemeanor under the <mask> punishment provision as it was amended by Proposition 47 (\u00a7 473, subd. (b)). (People v. Gonzales (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1067, review granted Feb. 15, 2017, S240044, cited for persuasive value (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 ).) Our sister court concluded the blank checks did \"not have any face value, and thus also come within the ambit of section 473(b),\" which requires check forgery offenses be punished as misdemeanors if the value of the check does not exceed $950. (People v. Gonzales , at. p. 1072.) Other authorities suggest checks that do not have value as negotiable interests have a value greater than zero. (E.g., People v. Cuellar (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 833, 839, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 252 [holding a check known to be forged \"had slight intrinsic value by virtue of the paper it was printed on\" and \"as a negotiable instrument that, if legally drawn, would entitle its holder to payment on demand\"].) We conclude from these authorities that blank, unendorsed checks have a non-zero, de minimis value. The trial court therefore did not err by determining the fair market value of the checks Vandiver had in her possession did not exceed $950."], "id": "97b07130-5f99-46cf-b905-3e5dc46ca713", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["To return now to the question of the property possessed and owned by Luigi Dama at the date of the alleged Will, May 8, 1887. It is asserted by counsel for contestants that Dama never owned exactly eleven government bonds,' at the time of making the Will only $5;000 in bonds and before he had thirteen $1,000 bonds; it is claimed by contestants that the person who forged the Will slipped up on this point, as he did on some others; the forger knew he had bonds of this kind, but did not know the exact figures. Is it possible, queries counsel for contestants, that a man of Dama\u2019s intelligence would attempt to dispose of property he did not own? Or that a man of integrity would write down a deliberate lie in so solemn a document? This is a very important factor in determining this issue of <mask>. This provision of the alleged Will challenged attention- by reason of its inaccuracy and nonexistence, wherein he undertook to give what he did not possess; it is inexplicable, contends the counsel for the contestants, why he should have attempted to bequeath what he did not own, upon any hypothesis consistent with his mental competency. Dama knew very well, no man better, what he owned and what he did not pwn, and this vain bequest cannot be explained away on the ground of the testator\u2019s idiosyncratic character. Was it a vain bequest. Did he possess or own on May 8, 1887, eleven (11) government bonds *121of the United States of America, nine of one thousand dollars each ($1,000) and two of five hundred each ($500), as described in clause Fourthly of the alleged Will, and in clause Fourthly of the \u201cAltered Will,\u201d November 1, 1885, in the same terms? These are described in the same way in the \u201cLong Memorandum,\u201d Respondent\u2019s Exhibit No. 2."], "id": "19d645a9-a063-40ad-aeb3-17c9f42b5377", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Unlike Count I of the Amended Information, Count I of the First Information alleged a violation of section 570.090.1(1), which criminalizes the <mask> of a \"writing.\" As we discuss in our analysis of Point III, after seeking leave to amend its information to charge Baker with violation of section 570.090.1(3), instead of section 570.090.1(1), the State took affirmative steps to abandon its attempt to pursue criminal charges against Baker pursuant to section 570.090.1(1)."], "id": "c6004913-6d7c-491e-b2bc-3750c0439a5b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The bill charges that by fraudulent representations, Palmer obtained a letter from J. Livingston to the Sperrys, directing *522them to contract with him; and that the Sperrys without any \u00a1etter 0f attorney or authority whatever, other than the letter brought to them by Palmer, executed a deed under seal, with ^ covenants\u2019not to Palmer but to Murray. The letter was \u2019 a special authority, and must be strictly pursued: it authorized a contract with Palmer, but not with any other person% much less did it authorize a deed under seal. A deed under seal cannot be execcuted by attorney without an authority under seal. The deed executed by the Sperrys, professing to act as the attornies of J. Livingston, was not obligatory upon him ; as to him, I apprehend, it was void. It is said that a deed which is voidable only, must be avoided by special pleading ; but when it is absolutely void, the plea is non estfactum. If John Livingston were living, and an action were brought upon the deed in question, it would certainly be sufficient to plead the general issue ; and upon the trial it must be shewn that the person professing to act as attorney, had authority by deed. According to the facts in this case, as charged in the bill and admitted by the demurrer, no such authority could be shown ; of course, the deed is not the deed of John Livingston. The entry of Murray and Palmer was therefore without a deed; they are in no better situation as to adverse posses\u00bb ' sion than if they had no deed, and in that case, I have endeavored to show that the possession could not be adverse. It is true, that to sustain an adverse possession, it is not necessary that a deed should be a valid deed, but it must be such an one as might be valid, and which the grantee relies on. \u25a0The grantee in this case being privy to the manner in which this deed was obtained without authority, knew, for he was bound to know, as ignorance excuses no man, that the deed was inoperative and void. But the defendants, Murray and Palmer, not only knew that the deed was without authority, but they also knew that the authority which was given to contract the lot to Palmer was also void, as having been obtained by fraud. The letter in terms authorized a contract with Palmer ; and instead of this an absolute deed-is given to Murray, not even pursuing the authority of the letter. It seems to me, therefore, that the deed was a nullity, and that the defendants, Murray and Palmer, knew it to be so. It was *523therefore no foundation for an adverse possession. It did not divest the nominal grantor of any interest whatever; it vested no estate in the nominal grantee; he was a trespasser. The case of Bradstreet v. Huntington, has been cited to prove that an adverse possession may commence under a void deed, or one obtained by fraud. At common law, a feoffment could not be made without livery of seising or a delivery of the possession ; and where the owner was disseized of the possession, he could not convey to a third person, because he could not deliver possession, that being held by the disseizor; and yet it is settled law that such a deed is good between the parties to it; it is good as against the grantor and his heirs, it conveys all the interest of the grantor to the grantee, but the grantee cannot enforce it in his own name against the disseizor, though it may be done in the name of the grantor. It has been supposed in the above case that an adverse possession should more properly havebeen called an ouster or disseisin. Though they are sometimes synonimous, they are not always so. \u00c1 disseisin, it is said, may commence by force or fraud ; an adverse possession may commence by force, but, I apprehend, not by fraud, as for instance, under a deed obtained by fraud or by <mask>. The person guilty of the fraud or forgery cannot rely upon such a deed as conveying a valid title j and the arguments which have gone the greatest length in favor of adverse possession, have proceeded on the ground that the possessor relied on his title, and believed the property which he possessed to be his own. A man may think himself the true owner of property in the possession of another, and may take forcible possession under claim of title ; that is an adverse possession ; but if, with a full knowledge that such property belongs to another, a person procures a forged deed, and enters under that, what is the quo animo ? Is it an intent to enjoy his own, or to defraud another 1 And it has been often said and decided that the fact of possession and the quo animo the possession was taken, are the only tests. If the quo animo is a Iona fide intention to enjoy his own property, that intent can never exist where the possessor knows the property is not his own. If the quo animo is meant an intention to appropriate the property to his own use, right or wrong, then indeed is the possession of almost all intruders adverse."], "id": "323a68df-7e4c-414a-8928-330b676f28ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Comparison of signatures by the court, pursuant to CPLR 4536 was precluded by the State\u2019s failure to produce \"any writing proved * * * to be the handwriting of the person claimed to have made the disputed writing\u201d. None of the signatures admitted into evidence was proved to be the authentic signature of the U. A. Rodriguez to whom the checks were issued, since, as previously indicated, Ms. Greenstein did not personally know the interviewee, and the documents allegedly forming the basis of her comparison were not placed in evidence. (Cf. Matter of Gonzalez v Dumpson, 46 AD2d 861.) Consequently, although the signatures on the checks and the signature on the interview form are quite different, they bear equal claims to authenticity and, therefore, do not constitute evidence of <mask>."], "id": "2ffad96d-2b5e-4177-a677-e29829d4a01c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Assuming, in argument only, that the circumstances here disclosed did give rise to certain equities on the part of claimant, no estoppel through laches has been established for no injury through such delay has been proved. Although the claimant\u2019s complaint is the absence of Sadie Jaffe, there is nothing before the court to indicate that the delay herein has been the cause of claimant\u2019s inability to produce her. Whether the delay in this case has operated to the actual prejudice of claimant, and, if so, to what extent, remain matters of speculation and conjecture. There is no proof in the case that any person by the name of Sadie Jaffe ever existed. In view of the foregoing, and, further, of the finding by this court that the purported signature of the decedent upon the alleged instrument of guaranty was a <mask>, there is no inference, as contended by claimant, that Sadie Jaffe, if existent and if available to it, would have testified contrary to the facts as found by the court. On the contrary, the inference to be drawn herein is that no such person as the alleged witness ever existed. Finally, assuming all things favorable to claimant, there is no way of estimating, under the circumstances of this case, the effect of any such unknown testimony upon the court."], "id": "c7480798-de60-42c4-aafc-28fa038e3ca5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court specifically finds that a Federally issued resident alien card, often referred to as a \u201cGreen Card\u201d, is covered by this State\u2019s <mask> laws. See People v Fury (279 NY 433 [1939]) to the effect that a Federal Reserve bank note is covered by the Penal Law on forgery. The fact that the Federal Government *191had. made uttering of counterfeit bank notes a crime and that only the Federal Government could coin money or issue legal currency or tender did not bar the State from making the uttering of counterfeit bank notes a felony. (People v Fury, supra; People v Kalmus 123 NYS2d 411 [Ct Gen Sess, NY County 1953].) The same act may constitute an offense against both the State and Federal Government. (People v Broady, 5 NY2d 500 [1959].)"], "id": "cc21dfea-cb8c-485a-b8bd-8c983d7deb31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is true that Gaughan committed the crime of <mask>, both when he signed the name of the maker to the $1,000 check without authority, and when he uttered the instrument thus forged with criminal intent. However, there was no forged indorsement, because of the facts which I have recited with reference to the identity of the payee named in the $1,000 check and the man who owned the account with plaintiff to whose credit the check was placed. Neither can it be claimed, so far as the case at bar is concerned, that Gaughan committed any crime when he opened the account with plaintiff as \u201c Oawley,\u201d or when he transacted business pertaining thereto as \u201c Oawley,\u201d so long as he merely assumed that name to designate himself and not with criminal intent for the purpose of representing himself to be a \u201c Michael J. Oawley \u201d who really existed. The only conclusion I can reach from the facts presented is that the defendant has certified as good a forged signature to a check which the plaintiff, in good faith, in the ordinary course of business and with the exercise of due caution, has paid. Therefore, under our statute, the defendant is liable."], "id": "befb6e7a-31e9-4e6a-940b-736b9434b3bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Let us see. Is it a case of <mask> ? I am entirely with the proposition of the people that a person who exceeds his authority in filling up a paper of this character would be guilty of forgery. If he has specific authority and exceeds it,\u2014to wit, if he had authority to fill up a check to pay a certain bill and he filled it up to pay another, or if he liad authority to fill up a check for a certain amount and filled it up for a larger amount,\u2014either of those circumstances would make it forgery. There are a good many other circumstances under which it might be forgery. But, did the defendant exceed his authority \\ The people say \u201c Tes,\u20195 because lie filled this cheek up to his own order, and at the time had a fraudulent intent."], "id": "72ffe7d4-e034-47bd-a601-91e227a7a007", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The evidence of <mask> was sufficient as to the defendant Bilboa, however, despite his use of his own name to endorse the Murro check, since the Grand Jury could infer from Bilboa\u2019s act of depositing Murro\u2019s paycheck into his own account, that Bilboa knew Murro did not exist and therefore, *29also knew that he did not have authority to endorse the check as foreman (see, People v McLaughlin, 174 AD2d 418, 420 [1st Dept 1991]; United States v Brown, 236d 403 [2d Cir 1956]). This evidence also suffices to establish the pattern crime of conspiracy to commit grand larceny in regard to the Murro salary. Nonetheless, the evidence of enterprise corruption is insufficient as to Bilboa. The forgery and possession of a forged instrument alleged against Bilboa relate to a single check. The alleged forgery and possession of the forged check are therefore a single criminal act (see, e.g., People ex rel. Fitzgerald v Maher, 61 Misc 2d 22 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1969] [interpreting the phrase \"single act or omission\u201d in Penal Law \u00a7 70.25 (2)]; People v Rolling, 176 AD2d 973, 974 [2d Dept 1991]). The evidence therefore fails to establish that Bilboa committed three criminal acts included within the pattern of criminal activity. (Penal Law \u00a7 460.20 [2].)"], "id": "9a40bd4e-7d5a-4553-9450-02e7d5f3c936", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c I think that there is a marked difference between the two cases. Where a debtor has by fraud or <mask> obtained money or property from another, any disposition which he may make of what he has so received is unjust and unfair to the creditor whom he has defrauded, and when he applies for discharge from imprisonment in the action which his swindled creditor has brought against him, it is no reason for granting the discharge that he has lost or spent his creditor\u2019s money; no proof need be offered that he has wrongfully disposed of any other property, it is enough that he does not restore the propert}' out of which he has swindled his creditor. An intent to injure the creditor must be conclusively presumed from the bare fact that the debtor has wrongfully disposed of the property of the creditor."], "id": "b27de8c2-b3f2-430b-b74d-10d603ee47c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c Charge III: Violation of the 93d Article of War \u201c Specification I: \u2018 In that Private Bernard j. kadin, Company R, 1st Regiment, 9301 Technical Service Unit, Detachment No. 3, Army Service Forces Training Center (Ordnance), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, with intent to defraud The Western Union Telegraph Company at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, did, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, on or about 17 December 1945 forge the signature of Private Norman Fountain upon a Western Union Money Order\u2019.\u201d (Copy of Money Order on original of army papers.) The 93d Article of War reads: \u201c Any person subject to military law who commits manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking, robbery, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, <mask>, sodomy, assault with intent to commit any felony, assault with intent to do bodily harm with a dangerous weapon, an instrument, or other thing, or assault with intent to do bodily harm, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "9df901c8-a4e8-4599-a429-ada96edffc0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We agree with the superior court that Buck is instructive here. Like the victims in Buck , the Lorenzanas believed the Deo Deed of Trust they were signing was substantially different from what it actually was. Moreover, the Lorenzanas had no intention of encumbering the Wittman Property with the Deo loan or Deo Deed of Trust. To the contrary, they believed they were purchasing the Wittman Property with cash from the proceeds of the Corrals' loan with Bank of the Internet. The superior court found that they were not aware that they were borrowing additional money to be secured by the Wittman Property. Thus, the Deo Deed of Trust was a <mask>. (See Buck , supra , 232 Cal.App.2d at p. 162, 42 Cal.Rptr. 527 ; accord People v. Parker (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 664, 672, 63 Cal.Rptr. 413 ; People v. Johnson (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 331, 337, 55 Cal.Rptr. 450 ; People v. Bresin (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 232, 238-240, 53 Cal.Rptr. 687 ; People v. Carson (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 477, 480, 49 Cal.Rptr. 653.)"], "id": "39608e1e-4118-43a2-83a0-acf65282b24d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant\u2019s motion for leave to amend its pleadings to assert the affirmative defense of <mask> was properly granted *461pursuant to CPLR 3025, since such leave is to be liberally granted in cases such as this one, where the proposed amendment is not palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law and plaintiff would not be prejudiced (Shepherd v New York City Tr. Auth., 129 AD2d 574)."], "id": "acf832ac-fc9c-4715-a6a7-4cd35ae16de0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thus summary judgment cannot be granted plaintiff herein and accordingly its motion for same is denied. Even though the defendant has not moved for summary judgment for himself, this court would be empowered to grant same on its own by reason of the law as set forth above, except that this court finds that important triable issues of fact remain respecting whether or not defendant knew of the <mask> and whether or not he is a holder in due course. This is inherent in the unusual fact pattern of this case. Without prejudging the issues, one must still reflect that a check for $2,200 is a rather large check for a small establishment such as Rita\u2019s Grocery to be cashing, especially where the person cashing the check is only an employee of Rita\u2019s and not the owner, where it is apparent he was not personally acquainted with the Gordon Jackson whom the drawer of the check purported to be, and where the Village of Green Island being a rather small place geographically, one (including the defendant) might well wonder why the person representing himself to be Gordon Jackson, if he were the genuine article, didn\u2019t cash his check at plaintiff\u2019s bank himself (it being a branch of the very bank in which his account was located) instead of at Rita\u2019s Grocery."], "id": "76262935-4d35-4b3f-8094-70d411bf6159", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The requirements of the Statute of Wills are highly peculiar. This statute stands in some respects only in the same category with such enactments as the Statute of Frauds and its prototype, the French Ordormance de Moulms of the year 1566. These enactments nevertheless required, in almost every instance, a substantial compliance with the direction prescribed. But the Statute of Wills refers to unilateral act only. Without adherence in every respect to the'directions prescribed by statute, a unilateral act of a party may have no validity whatever. When a unilateral act is of a gwcm-public character, and a will is such, the state universally prescribes with particularity the formalities requisite for the authentication or validity of the act itself. The reason why the requirements of the Statute of Wills demand implicit obedience is that, as an act of testamentation is unilateral and to take effect after the death of the chief actor, it is peculiarly exposed to fraud, simulation, or even <mask>. Therefore it is, that for the making of wills special forms were required by law. The forms prescribed are then closely obligatory in order to give validity to the act. The motive of the legislative requirement may be, and in the instance of testamentation is, no doubt, corroboration or authentication, and to prevent fraud. In the instance of a testamentary act it may be stated generally as a rule of law that, *217without adherence to the prescribed forms, the act itself has no juridical value whatever. The Statute of Wills does not impose forms with a view to the convenience of the parties, and their omission is consequently not optional or immaterial, but the forms themselves\" go to the very essence of the legal act. It is an error to regard such directions as mere technicalities, for they are founded on the highest public policy, and a noncompliance is fatal to the validity of the act attempted."], "id": "fba8b53b-b7d0-415e-8d4e-becca33ba998", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Subsequently, in September 2005 Kay and Prudential applied to NASD for the appointment of an arbitrator to act upon the expungement request. The single arbitrator appointed issued the award without having held a hearing, apparently relying solely on the stipulation and communications from the broker. The award provided that the record of the NASD arbitration should be expunged from the CRD records because \u201c[t]he registered person was not involved in the alleged investment-*373related sales practice violation, <mask>, theft, misappropriation, or conversion of funds.\u201d It is noted that the arbitrator made such finding although Kay acknowledged that she had handled Abrams\u2019 account at Prudential, and the basis of the request for expungement was on a different ground, to wit, that the claim was \u201cfactually impossible or clearly erroneous.\u201d Kay seeks to have the award confirmed in this proceeding."], "id": "75b1b272-9f36-45b2-a7f0-8b0218836069", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In no act of the Legislature is the intent made more plain to differentiate acts which are declared forgeries, because of the different mental elements necessary to each, than in section 514 of the Penal Code, defining <mask> in the third degree. In the first subdivision it is necessary that the acts described be done corruptly and unlawfully; in the second, that the acts be done with intent to injure or defraud; in the third, that the acts be done with knowledge of their falsity; and in the fourth, that the acts be done with intent to defraud. These subdivisions were inserted in the Code by different enactments. See Laws of 1881, chap. 676; Laws of 1884, chap. 378; Laws of 1892, chap. 692."], "id": "2b92e849-f565-4911-96bc-7fdd0d65b27e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*531Examining the Grand Jury minutes for legal sufficiency, it is clear that the People have established a prima facie case with regard to counts 1-7 charging the crimes of advertisement or sale of unauthorized recording, failure to disclose the origin of a recording, and criminal possession of a forged instrument. In this regard it is noted that the Grand Jury was charged and voted as to the crime of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree. The indictment, however, in part indicates \"Penal Law 170.25\u201d. That section refers to second degree criminal <mask>. The body of the indictment indicates third degree forgery. The defendant is free to make any formal motion regarding this inconsistency. With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is legally sufficient for the crimes voted by the Grand Jury and the crimes contained in the body of the indictment."], "id": "83ec1039-3a67-4b8d-947b-6f411a7a4198", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["That case turned on the question of <mask>, and in reference to the admissibility of declarations the court held (relying upon Waterman v. Whitney, and Jackson v. Betts; 6 Cow., 377), that upon the probate, declarations of the testator made before the factum, that he intended to give his property to the legatees named in the will, and declarations made by him after the factum, that he made such a will, *308and stating who were the witnesses, and where the will was, were not admissible in proof of the execution of the will. But this point does not seem to have received so much consideration as others involved in the case, and the distinction pointed out by the surrogate in the case in the text, does not appear to have been adverted to."], "id": "319531ea-881d-4d2c-a392-d83793910d22", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even assuming that this Court's majority opinion correctly concludes that applicant's claim is not cognizable in a post-conviction habeas proceeding, I respectfully disagree with its assessment that his claim cannot be considered through the vehicle of mandamus due to the lack of a clear right to relief. In other situations, this Court has treated matters that would not otherwise be cognizable on habeas as *840presenting a viable basis for mandamus relief. See, e.g., In re Daniel , 396 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). And, as I have explained above, the relevant statutes and board policies make clear that the parole board has no discretion to treat applicant's <mask> and drug-delivery sentences as a single sentence for purposes of determining his parole eligibility-rather, each sentence triggers a distinct parole eligibility date and must be considered independently. See TEX. GOV'T CODE \u00a7 508.145(f) ; 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE \u00a7 145.3(4). This is particularly true in the context of an inmate who has a yet-to-commence consecutive sentence. The Government Code expressly contemplates the possibility of release on parole \"on paper\" as to a defendant's first stacked sentence so that he may commence serving his second stacked sentence sooner. TEX. GOV'T CODE \u00a7 508.150(a), (b)(2). As an alternative to habeas relief, applicant's complaint constitutes an appropriate basis for mandamus relief because, here, applicant has a clear right to relief under the relevant statutes and board policies and no other adequate remedy at law. See In re Bonilla, 424 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (a clear right to relief is shown when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision under unequivocal, well-settled, and clearly controlling legal principles; an issue of first impression can sometimes qualify for mandamus relief); In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Alternatively, therefore, if habeas relief is not permitted due to this Court's decision to overrule Sepeda , I would grant applicant mandamus relief."], "id": "c7c13453-c04f-4b36-9c44-89199bd5c88e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u25a0\u201c It is urged that the Surrogate\u2019s Court has no equity jurisdiction. It is undoubtedly true. And it is further 'urged that, therefore, the court could not decree that this appellant was not the widow of the testator; and in support of this proposition our attention is called to the well-established principle that the Surrogate\u2019s Court has no power to annul or set aside, on the ground of fraud, a release executed by the. parties interested in the estate to the executors thereof. But it has never been held that the Surrogate\u2019s Court had no power to try the question *309as to whether any such alleged release existed or not. The Surrogate\u2019s Court would undoubtedly have the right to try the question of a release presented before him as to whether it had' ever been signed, or whether it was a <mask>; and it is a similar question which was being determined by the surrogate in reference to the alleged marriage with the testator. He was not making a decree annulling the marriage. He was simply determining the question as to whether the contestant had any status in his court by reason of her being the testator\u2019s widow. In order that this performance in Hew Jersey between Hamilton and the appellant should be a marriage, it was necessary that both parties should be free to contract, and, if either party was under a disability, although the parties went through the forms of a marriage, there was no marriage, and that is all that the surrogate attempted to determine."], "id": "576d2764-bcdd-4c3d-973a-f70fccc90c47", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On August 13, 1924, the said Conrad Hammer, Jr., executor, drew a check to the order of Frank A. Heisz on the funds of said estate on deposit with the Citizens Trust Company, main office, in the sum of $5,000, which said check, at the request of said Conrad Hammer, Jr., was duly certified by said the Marine Trust Company of Buffalo, Citizens Branch, the Citizens Trust Company of Buffalo having merged with the Marine Trust Company of Buffalo and then being a branch of said the Marine Trust Company of Buffalo, which said check purports to be indorsed by the said Frank A. Heisz and was indorsed by Conrad Hammer, Jr., and deposited in his personal account in the Buffalo Trust Company, it appearing as a matter of fact that the indorsement of said Frank A. Heisz on said check was a <mask>, and said check was paid out of the funds of said estate on deposit in the Citizens Branch of the Marine Trust Company of Buffalo to the credit of said estate."], "id": "d9007cd4-47a4-4031-b4c4-d3f37a014d7f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court has consistently held that theft crimes involve dishonesty, regardless of the facts underlying the particular offense. See, e.g. , State v. Cassell , 2013 Ark. 221, 427 S.W.3d 663 (stating that the crime was infamous because it was a theft offense, which involves dishonesty); Edwards v. Campbell , 2010 Ark. 398, 370 S.W.3d 250 (holding that misdemeanor theft of property, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-36-103(a), is a crime of dishonesty); Webster v. State , 284 Ark. 206, 680 S.W.2d 906 (1984) (stating that grand larceny involves dishonesty); Floyd v. State , 278 Ark. 86, 643 S.W.2d 555 (1982) (holding that conviction for theft was admissible for impeachment because it is a crime of dishonesty); James v. State , 274 Ark. 162, 622 S.W.2d 669 (1981) (stating that prior convictions for theft, grand larceny, and <mask> all involved dishonesty); Gustafson v. State , 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979) (holding that convictions for larceny and burglary were indicative of dishonesty under Rule 609(a) ). Further, under Rule 609(a)(2), when considering the admissibility of a crime involving dishonesty, courts are not required to compare the weight of the probative value to the prejudicial effect, and we have held that these crimes are automatically admissible. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Tr. Dep't , 347 Ark. 826, 69 S.W.3d 20 (2002) (citing congressional commentary to Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), which is identical to our rule)."], "id": "f36a760e-e51b-4141-9700-65bcc2640748", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Counsel for contestant compared Burtis\u2019 statements with the testimony of Rev. Mr. Worcester in relation to the same matter. Mr. Worcester, said the counsel, stands head and shoulders over any witness here produced; no man can question his veracity; if he have any fault it is that of underestimating the force of the fact testified to by himself; there can be no doubt, according to the argument of counsel for contestant, that the visit of Burtis was made at 2 o\u2019clock, as he testified at first. The testimony of Burtis is not trustworthy as a whole; it is a mass of contradictions; the insertion of the \u201cShort Memorandum\u201d in the safe deposit box is claimed to have been effected through his agency; as soon as this paper was discovered they asked each other, \u201cWho is Mrs. Sara B. Smith?\u201d They all responded each to the other that they had never known nor heard of her; Mr. Worcester did not, neither did Mr. French, nor Mr. Burtis, but how was this professed ignorance of Burtis and French reconcilable with the finding of the \u201cAltered Will,\u201d Exhibit 3, in the drawer of decedent when they were looking over Ms papers? Burtis is the solitary exception of the old pupils of the professor who had never heard of Mrs. Sara Barker Smith, but she confessed that on one occasion she had heard Dama mention the name of Burtis at the time the professor gave her the ivory boat. Dama\u2019s last visit to the safe deposit was May 20, 1887; this was before he went east. The last date of a visit before the date of the alleged Will (May 8, 1887) was May 3, 1887. Between May 3 and May 20, 1887, there is no record of a visit to the Safe Deposit Company. The \u201cLong Memorandum\u201d is dated Novem*171her 1, 1885, and that is the date of the \u201cAltered Will.\u201d The counsel for contestant contends that this goes to show that the forger intended to have these two go together to holster up each other,- so the alleged Will and the \u201cShort Memorandum\u201d were dated the same day and intended by the forger to support each other; this was doubtless the design of the forger. Counsel asks the court to read and compare the testimony of Mrs. Sara Barker Smith at the original probate of the Will and upon this contest. At th\u00e9 probate she testified that she did not see what was on the envelope inclosed in the other marked \u201cPrivate Paper,\u201d and yet here, only a short time prior to the submission of the case, she swore that, she did know what was on it. Counsel for contestant claims that this is a most material variance. The words \u201cPrivate Paper\u201d is an emanation of her own; it is not an expression of Dama; it was her peculiar phrase; she testified that she gave the expression to him; it is by these little things that forgeries are detected; it is such \u201ctrifles light as air\u201d that aid in the detection of crime and contribute to the conviction of the criminal. (See Article \u201c<mask> as a Fine Art,\u201d San Francisco \u201cLaw Journal,\u201d Wednesday, January 6, 1892.) To show that everything was not straight, as it should be, counsel calls attention further to the testimony of Burtis. (See page 108, official reporter\u2019s transcript of testimony concerning the letter dated at San Jose, February 4, 1888, to Benjamin Randall from O. A. Hale, the brother in law of Burtis.) What prompted Mr. Hale \u201cin the interest of justice\u201d to write to Benjamin Randall? Why was this letter written, if there were nothing sinuous in the conduct of these persons and nothing crooked in the circumstances of the case? Was the conscience of Burtis beginning to smite him, or was he growing weak-kneed because of his connection with this crime? Why otherwise inspire such a letter? Reverting to the circumstances and incidents connected with"], "id": "fee69763-e205-49aa-a117-aaa13a7587dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Other courts considering similar drug paraphernalia legislation have also rejected facial challenges. These decisions issued prior to Hoffman and Brache, did not discuss coverage of single and multiuse items. Instead, they held that the definitional phrases \u201cdesigned for use\u201d and \u201cintended for use\u201d applied to the subjective intent of the alleged violator of the statute, and thus provided fair *886notice. (See, e.g., Franza v Carey, supra;.Brache v County of Westchester, 507 F Supp 566; Casbah, Inc. v Thone, 651d 551; New England Accessories Trade Assn, v Browne, 102 F Supp\" 1245; Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Assn, v Maryland, 500 F Supp 834; Delaware Accessories Trade Assn, v Gebelein, 497 F Supp 289; World Imports v Wood-bridge Twp., 493 F Supp 428 and Nova Records v Sendak, 504 F Supp 938; see, also, People v Taylor, 70 Misc 2d 970 [upholding Penal .Law, \u00a7 220.50, \u201c[cjriminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree\u201d, against a vagueness challenge]; Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 140.35 [criminal possession of burglar\u2019s tools], 170.40 [criminal possession of <mask> devices], containing \u201cdesigned for use\u201d language.)1"], "id": "5fdec802-0c85-4ab8-889f-3d97a761152e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The misstatement in question would seem covered by this statute. But, aside from that, is it a material variance to use the abbreviation \u201c Geo.\u201d instead of the full word \u201c George ? \u201d It is a common and well-understood abbreviation. There may be cases where it would be a question of fact for the jury to say whether the meaning was the same, but this is not such a case, nor did the defendant ask to leave it to the jury. In Lewis v. Few (5 Johns., 1, 28), wdiere the allegation was \u201c U. States,\u201d and the proof \u201c United States,\u201d the variance was held to be immaterial. In United States v. Hinman (1 Baldwin, 292) the indictment charged a <mask> of an order on \"the cashier of the corporation of the president and directors of the Bank of the United States,\u201d and the order in evidence was drawn on \u201c the cashier of the Bank of the United States; \u201d held, not fatal. The order was alleged to have been signed \" Jno. Ilulse,\u201d and that in evidence was signed \u201c Jna. Ilulse; \u201d held, matter for the jury to say whether the same person was meant. (See People v. Runkel, 9 Johns., 156; also State v. Kean, 10 N. H., 347; 1 Archbold\u2019s Cr. Pl. and Pr. [8th ed.], 242, 375, and notes.) The refusal to quash the indictment was not error."], "id": "47c34970-2c83-4b76-a4a8-8409daf3bd64", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant urges us to construe section 473(b) in the context of the entire statutory scheme for <mask>, but doing so further supports our conclusion section 473(b) was intended to provide a limited exclusion for seven specific types of forgery. In section 470, subdivision (d) (section 470(d)), the general forgery statute lists over 50 different instruments that constitute forgery-the first seven of which correspond precisely to the instruments identified in section 473(b). ( Martinez, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 242, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 480.) Had the drafters of Proposition 47 intended to redesignate all forgery offenses valued at less than $950 as misdemeanors, they could have listed each of the instruments identified in section 470(d), rather than only the first seven; or more, simply, they could have referred to \"forgery\" as defined in section 470. We will not rewrite the statute on their behalf. (See People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 761, 107 P.3d 860 [\" 'insert [ing]' additional language into a statute 'violate[s] the cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must not add provisions to statutes. [Citations.] ... [A] court must not 'insert what has been omitted' from a statute.' \"]; Martinez , at p. 242, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 480 [to adopt argument that \" 'receipt for goods' \" forgery convictions are misdemeanors, court would have to add \" 'receipt for goods' \" to language in section 473(b) ].)"], "id": "4d7e94fb-942d-40d1-b4c1-e58c70a6adff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Nor did the plaintiff bank owe a duty to the Riese appellants to authenticate or guarantee the genuineness of the signatures of their partner, defendant Elie Hirschfeld, on the March 1992 mortgage modification documents. There is no fiduciary duty or privity of contract arising out of the contractual arm\u2019s length debtor and creditor legal relationship between a borrower and a bank which would give rise to a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation (Bank Leumi Trust Co. v Block 3102 Corp., 180 AD2d 588, 589). Any failure by the bank mortgagee to be reasonably vigilant against the risk of <mask> by defendant Hirschfeld, a non-appellant, does not constitute a defense to a foreclosure because the bank mortgagee owes no duty to ascertain the true identities of other parties executing the mortgage (Money Store/Empire State v Lenke, 151 AD2d 256, 257; First Am. Tit. Ins. Co. v Kevlin, 203 AD2d 681)."], "id": "5ce545b8-bb82-4d51-bfde-b40359b91f32", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["If Mrs. Atkins was in Chicago and the decedent and proponent at Springside on October 23, 1901, of course the testimony of Mrs. Bell and Mrs. Atkins concerning the execution of the will of that date at the Bell house cannot be true, and the presence of the paper itself in the ease, instead of being evidence of the testator\u2019s purpose, inveighs strongly against the proponent\u2019s case. If this conclusion is correct, its importance to the history of the case cannot be misunnderstood. It stamps the motives and conduct of the parties most interested in the will offered for probate, and prepares the mind for the conclusion, already reached by an independent process, that the signature to that instrument is a <mask>. It tends to explain the origin of that instrument without intent to execute it on the part of the decedent, while the mere existence of the second will would signify that the decedent did not deem or consider that the first will was in force or effect."], "id": "3ddb89a2-20c1-4076-9beb-216563d92393", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This alleged Will is clothed in all the conceivable habiliments of crime; it bears upon its face the stamp of falsehood and the impress of fraud and all the indicia of <mask>, and those who forged it, who conceived, concocted, and consummated this crime, were in possession of the Will actually executed in May, 1887, attested in presence of Dellasanta, who did not sign as a subscribing witness, as Dama told him it was not necessary, as three were enough, Mathieu, Godard, and Bellini having already attested, and the conspirators and forgers used that document as a pattern in the execution of their pernicious purpose."], "id": "41ccc99a-f56c-4351-a959-274fbe42c2a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["I am satisfied that Rachel Mills, the chief beneficiary of the <mask>, conspired with Johnstone, the draftsman of the paper, to forge the instrument. They added to the separated portion of the instrument an introductory testamentary clause. They then added between the end of the genuine text of the will and the signature of deceased a forged paragraph intended to give Rachel Mills an interest in a bank account of deceased. Apparently on his own initiative the draftsman, Johnstone, later added another forgery to the will by inserting a provision which purported to name him executor. The use by these somewhat artless forgers of different inks and the necessity under which they were to write the forged additions in part through the creased portion of the paper enabled the handwriting expert called by the court to disclose vividly not only the extent of the forgery but the order in which the forgery was done."], "id": "be91c7bf-6dc1-493c-80f7-0f6d399acfd1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "forgery", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["First, that the will was not executed with due statutory formalities. Second, that the signature to the will was a <mask>. Third, that the execution of the will was procured by undue influence or fraud. Fourth, that at the time of the execution of the will the decedent was not of sound mind and memory. *582The material facts in this case are as follows: Roxalana Williams, who was the widow of John B. Williams, died in the month of October, 1888, at- the age of about 82 years. She was somewhat feeble in health for a year or two prior to her decease, but was not confined to* her bed or room until a short time prior to her death. For a number of years prior and down to the time of her death, she had been quite deaf, and Unable to hear any words spoken to her, but conversa? tion was carried on with her by use of a slate or tablet of paper, aided by signs or gestures. Questions were usually written upon paper or slate, and verbal answers given by her. She was an intelligent woman, of an apparently active mind, and a large number of witnesses testify that she conversed readily and intelligently in the method above described. Ever since the death of her husband, which occurred forty years or more prior to her death, she had resided with her brother, Jacob F. Hall, a bachelor, upon his farm of about 140 acres, situate in the town of Pittstown, which was of the value of about $5,000. Her brother was also possessed of personal property of the value of about $20,000. Mrs. Williams had a small property of her own, not to exceed $4,000 or $5,000; but no real estate. Jacob F. Hall died on the 28th of February, 1887, having been in feeble health for some months prior to his death. The disease was softening of the brain. He died intestate, leaving- his sister, Mrs. Williams, his sole heir at law and next of kin. On the 17th of February, 1887, the will iii question here is alleged to have been made. It .appears from the testimony offered by the proponent *583that about two weeks prior to the execution of the will, Merritt Snyder, who resided about two miles from the residence of Jacob F. Hall, where Mrs. Williams then lived, was requested by Mr. Carpenter, the husband of the principal beneficiary in this will, who lives upon the farm adjoining Mr. Snyder, to call upon Mrs. Williams, as she wanted him (Snyder) to do some writing for her. Mr. Snyder states that he went over and saw her; that they went into the room off from the kitchen, and that Mrs. Williams said she wanted him to do some writing for her,\u2014to draw her will. He wrote on the slate that he would do it, if she would dictate to him just what she wanted. She wrote, in reply: \u201c I don\u2019t know who I will get for witnesses.\u201d He wrote that \u201c he could be one, and his wife could be another.\u201d She said: \u201c I didn\u2019t think you could witness it if you wrote the will.\u201d He nodded that he could. This is all that took place between them at that time. Two or three days afterwards Mrs. Carpenter brought over and gave to him a memorandum for Mrs. Williams\u2019 will. The instructions were drawn in Mrs. Carpenter\u2019s handwriting. Within a day or two Mr. Snyder made a draft of the will from the memorandum, interlined it somewhat, to make it correspond with the instructions, and then made a copy of the draft, which he subsequently compared with his wife, she holding the draft, and he holding the completed copy. The next morning Mr. Snyder and his wife went over to the house of Jacob F. Hall; got there about 9 o\u2019clock. They found there, in the kitchen, Mrs. Williams, Mr. Hall, Mrs. Carpenter, Mr. Downey, and Hannah Eldredge. Shortly *584after his arrival Mr. Snyder handed Mrs. Williams the will.' She left the room, and went to her own room, and, after the lapse of about thirty minutes, she came into the sitting-room, a room adjoining the kitchen, where she found Mr. Snyder and his wife sitting by a fire, which in the meantime had been built by Mrs. Carpenter. When Mrs. Williams came in Mrs. Carpenter left, and' closed the door. On coming into the room, in the presence and hearing of Mr. Snyder and his wife, Mrs. Williams stated that it (referring to the will) was \u201call right; just as she wanted it.\u201d Then Mr. Snyder wrote upon the slate : \u201c Do you acknowledge this to be your last will and testament, and do you want us to sign it,\u2014my wife and I ? \u201d and she said : \u201c Yes; but I must first sign it myself.\u201d Mrs. Williams then sat down. Snyder gave her a pen, and she wrote her name as it appears in the will, \u201c Roxy Lany Williams.\u201d Thereupon Mr. Snyder and his wife wrote their names below as witnesses. The testatrix then said that \u201c that was her will, and she was glad it was done.\u201d Snyder then folded up the paper, handed it to her, and. she handed it back to him, saying she wished he would keep it for her."], "id": "b42d8f15-1f86-470d-809d-5044a3c90359", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["prison hanging o\ufb00 the skids of a helicopter.1 He was convicted in the Southern District of Illinois for drug and criminal en\u2010 terprise o\ufb00enses and in the Southern District of Florida for racketeering, and $60 million and $50 million forfeiture judg\u2010 ments were entered against him, respectively, as part of his sentences.2 Over a decade later, Kramer filed a motion for an accounting in the Southern District of Illinois of the amounts collected by the government to satisfy his $60 million forfei\u2010 ture judgment. The district court granted the motion but, given the complexity of his case, limited the accounting to what was collected in the Southern District of Illinois toward that judgment. On appeal, Kramer argues that the district court should not have credited to his judgment the amounts forfeited un\u2010 der a 2003 settlement agreement. He also claims that the dis\u2010 trict court abused its discretion in limiting the accounting only to the amounts that were collected in the Southern Dis\u2010 trict of Illinois. We disagree and a\ufb03rm the district court\u2019s judgment. In the 1980s, Kramer and his associates oversaw a nation\u2010 wide drug smuggling operation. The venture was lucrative, generating about $180 million in profits. To keep their ill\u2010got\u2010 ten gain, they sought the help of Sam Gilbert, who devised an elaborate international <mask> scheme. As"], "id": "a419efc3-51ca-4c84-b72b-4f09e7556e57", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On or about December 3, 1996, J&J presented the first of the four checks. It was dishonored. On or about December 10, 1996, J&J learned that Infinity had commenced bankruptcy proceedings. At the first meeting of creditors, Dilmanian learned from the testimony of Nathan Itzchaki, a principal of Infinity, that Republic had closed the account on October 10, 1996 (four days before Dilmanian\u2019s second conversation with Perkins) and had been investigating Infinity for <mask>."], "id": "6a85d207-03a3-48e8-9666-c3851dff0d91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Kenneth L. Gartner, J. A published news article recently reported that an investiga*10tion into possible <mask> being conducted through the racetracks operated by the defendant New York Racing Association was prompted by a small-time money laundering case in which a Queens bank robber used stolen money to purchase betting vouchers and then exchanged the vouchers for clean cash. (Newsday, Sept. 28, 2000, at A33, col 1.) The instant case does not involve any such question of wrongdoing, but does raise a novel legal issue regarding the negotiability of those same vouchers when their possession is obtained by a thief or finder. The defendant concedes that \u201cthere are no cases on point.\u201d"], "id": "16746327-d6ff-4761-9c7b-11b26162f5ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On the night of November 19, 2007, State Police investigators watched Baez carry a black bag into 80 Bennett Avenue in Washington Heights. The bag was seized and found to contain more than $500,000 in cash, claimed by the Special Narcotics Prosecutor to be the proceeds of narcotics traffic. By a one-count felony complaint filed November 20, 2007, Baez was charged based on these events with <mask> in the second degree."], "id": "270f8d8d-54a2-44e9-8008-e00e0a90f3fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["New York\u2019s <mask> statutes are substantially modeled on their modern federal counterparts {see Donnino, Supp Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 470, 2008 Pocket Part, at 192), and, like their *908chief federal analogue, allow for the prosecution of money laundering under what are sometimes termed \u201cconcealment\u201d and \u201cpromotion\u201d theories (see generally United States v Garcia-Torres, 341d 61, 65 [1st Cir 2003] [contrasting theories in the federal statute]; United States v Bolden, 325d 471, 486-487 & nn 19, 20 [4th Cir 2003] [same]).1 The felony complaint charge against Baez, brought under Penal Law \u00a7 470.15 (1) (b) (ii) (A) and (iii), rested exclusively on the concealment theory. That is, it alleged, in pertinent part, that Baez conducted one or more financial transactions \u201c[k] no wing that the transaction or transactions in whole or in part [were] designed to . . . conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified criminal conduct.\u201d (Id.)"], "id": "cd9c7f93-2884-40fe-afbd-17fd2c67d8ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Baez\u2019s prosecution then underwent an immediate and significant change in theory. In Supreme Court proceedings before me that same day, the prosecution requested that Baez waive indictment and consent to be prosecuted by a superior court information charging <mask> in the second degree exclusively under the promotion theory set forth in Penal Law \u00a7 470.15 (1) (b) (i) (A) and (iii). Under that theory, the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the transaction was designed to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of proceeds of past criminal conduct. However, it must prove, in pertinent part, that the defendant conducted one or more financial transactions \u201c[w]ith intent to . . . promote the carrying on of specified criminal *909conduct.\u201d (Id.) The variance from the felony complaint theory struck me as unusual, and I inquired of the prosecutor whether it was intended. I was told that it was. I allowed it, and Baez waived indictment by a document naming money laundering in the second degree exclusively under the statutory provisions defining the promotion theory."], "id": "2e7a78bf-f2f8-4420-8f32-47f958349673", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Baez relies on this rule. As noted above, the felony complaint charged the concealment theory of <mask> in the second degree, and it was with respect to the offense as so charged that I held Baez for grand jury action. As further noted, Baez thereafter waived indictment by a document naming the distinct, promotion theory of money laundering in the second degree, and the promotion theory underlay the sole count of the superior court information, to which Baez pleaded guilty. Baez therefore contends that he impermissibly waived indictment with respect to, and pleaded guilty under a superior court information charging, a crime other than that for which he had been held for the action of the grand jury."], "id": "cb0770ae-173f-486d-afad-a418cbaed7bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It follows that Baez was never held for grand jury action on the charge named in his indictment waiver, and alleged in the superior court information. Baez was held under a felony complaint the accusatory part of which alleged concealment <mask>. The determination to hold him for grand jury action required a judicial determination of probable cause to believe he committed \u201cthe crime charged in the accusatory part,\u201d and it is for this crime exclusively that he could validly have been held, irrespective of whether the complaint\u2019s allega*914tions would have supported holding him on the promotion theory which \u201cneed never have been considered.\u201d (Zanghi, 79 NY2d at 818.) Nor may Baez be deemed to have been held on the promotion theory on the supposition that any finding of probable cause to believe a defendant committed concealment money laundering necessarily implies a finding of probable cause to believe he committed the promotion variety too. (Cf. Menchetti, 76 NY2d at 474-477 [defendant held for grand jury action with respect to offense deemed held likewise on its lesser included offenses].) Simply put, one may knowingly hide the spoils of crime without intending to promote future criminal ventures. Thus, a defendant who commits concealment money laundering will not necessarily commit promotion money laundering concomitantly. (Cf. United States v Jackson, 935d 832, 842 [7th Cir 1991] [opining that \u201conly in the unusual case\u201d will one transaction support both theories].)"], "id": "0d2fed6d-cffe-4353-ab92-a3a82706fddc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Second, the prosecutor proffers an assertion that \u201cthe charge in the SCI was supported by the facts in the complaint.\u201d Even if true, this is immaterial. The People likewise asserted in Zanghi that the felony complaint supported the information charge, but, as noted, the Court dismissed the point as insignificant because the judge who held the defendant for grand jury action \u201cneed never have . . . considered\u201d whether they did so. (79 NY2d at 818.) Likewise here, there was no necessity, in holding Baez for grand jury action, to determine whether the felony complaint\u2019s allegations supported probable cause to believe he had committed promotion <mask>. Thus, even if the allegations did so, this would not alter the fact that, under Zanghi, he was held on a different offense. (Cf. Kohl, 19 AD3d at 1155-1156 [defendant held on credit card theory of grand larceny not held on credit card theory of felony possession of stolen property despite \u201ccommon elements of fact and law\u201d].)"], "id": "67b85855-89e0-4583-a685-28c8729eab39", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". Federal prosecutors have been permitted to allege both theories conjunctively in support of a single count, yet seek to convict on proof of either (Garda-Torres, 341d at 64-67; Bolden, 325d at 486-487 & nn 19, 20; United States v Booth, 309d 566, 571-573 [9th Cir 2002]; cf. United States v Jackson, 935d 832, 842 [7th Cir 1991] [trial court erred in supposing proof of both required]). Indeed, one federal court of appeals has concluded that it would be improperly multiplicitous to allege in one count that a defendant committed concealment <mask>, and in another, by the same conduct, promotion money laundering. (United States v Stewart, 256d 231, 246-249 [4th Cir 2001]; but see United States v Sierra-Garcia, 760 F Supp 252, 255-257 [ED NY 1991].) I take no view here concerning analogous pleading questions under the New York statutes."], "id": "04e25cdd-5937-49c3-bec8-fc66ed78b7cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants request the court to revisit the viability of the <mask> counts against these defendants (count 44 [originally 54 \u2014 Penal Law \u00a7 470.15 (1) (b) (ii) (A); (iii)];1 count 45 [originally 55 \u2014 Penal Law \u00a7 470.15 (1) (b) (ii) (A); (iii)]) and for a dismissal of those counts or an order precluding proof of them by the prosecutor at trial, based upon United States v Santos (553 US \u2014, 128 S Ct 2020 [2008])."], "id": "fc784ace-574d-4ecc-b648-267ebc66d2aa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is impossible for a trial court, faced with the imminent trial of an indictment for violations, inter alia, of a <mask> statute modeled on and very similar to its federal counterpart, to ignore the Santos decision. The Santos holding is that the rule of lenity requires that \u201cproceeds\u201d means and is limited to \u201cprofits\u201d in the context of the federal criminal money laundering statute (18 USC \u00a7 1956 [a] [1] [A] [i]).21 have decided to apply that holding to the instant Rozenberg indictment. Not only was the New York statute modeled on the federal statute, but it has been authoritatively stated that \u201cfederal case law to date should guide the interpretation of these [New York] stat*237utes.\u201d3 The New York statute is identical to the federal statute in many important respects \u2014 notably in failing to define \u201cproceeds\u201d within the four corners of that statute. I have found that the references submitted by the Attorney General to legislative history and other statutes, such as ones concerning civil forfeiture, are insufficient to overcome the United States Supreme Court analysis and application of the rule of lenity in the money laundering context.4 Federal and New York State civil forfeiture statutes have their own more expansive definition of proceeds \u2014 not found in the criminal statutes \u2014 and traditionally have had broader reach."], "id": "e010c0e6-bfe3-449b-859c-d699cabfa0be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecution\u2019s theory that Dr. Rozenberg\u2019s endorsements to the management companies of checks received by AR Medical amount to <mask> is too dependent on a string of inferences about which I now believe I was too deferential in allowing the grand jury to draw. (See People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976 [1987].) The inferences are: (1) that all or at least a large portion of these receipts were the proceeds of specified criminal conduct, which is contradicted in part by evidence that bona fide patients with real injuries were being treated at the clinic; (2) that all or a substantial number of such endorsements themselves constituted discrete illegal financial transactions; and (3) that Rozenberg by such endorsements intended to conceal the source of these receipts. Both inferences (2) and (3) *238are contradicted by the circumstances under which it was obvious that the management companies used much of these funds to pay expenses to run the clinic."], "id": "6a2cc565-7bb4-48be-8cc9-dac398285ba9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Upon further review of the grand jury presentation, prompted by this defense application under Santos, I have concluded that there was legally insufficient evidence to support the \u201cintent to conceal\u201d element of <mask> by Rozenberg. There was not a scintilla of direct evidence before the grand jury that Rozenberg knew what Polack and Kucherovsky did with those monies other than to run the clinic, which circumstance negates an intent to conceal. To impute knowledge to Rozenberg of concealment and money laundering by Kucherovsky and/or Po-lack was therefore too speculative and unwarranted."], "id": "52752d4a-a0ad-4917-80b9-6228db88fc3a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["An additional dubious inference regards the amounts of money involved. As the court\u2019s December 17, 2007 decision shows, 19 of the larceny and insurance fraud counts had to be reduced because of a failure of proof to meet the monetary thresholds. It is true that in that same decision the court implicitly allowed the grand jury to infer that a significant portion of the clinic\u2019s revenues could be considered proceeds subject to <mask>. However, it is one thing to extrapolate from the revenues of the \u201cstaged\u201d accident victims and the overtreated patients to reach larger threshold sums; it becomes quite another to do so using \u201cprofits.\u201d When the amounts of money are limited to \u201cprofits,\u201d and here I refer back to my decision to follow Santos, and the defense has rightly argued that a \u201cprofit analysis\u201d was never done in the grand jury, the inference drawn from these calculations to reach the required threshold monetary amounts becomes too speculative and untenable."], "id": "7f5d371a-f79f-4555-999e-be1679385fde", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". By written decision and order of December 17, 2007 the court dismissed this previous count 54 because the one and only predicate felony for this count, enterprise corruption (Penal Law \u00a7 460.20 [1] [a]) was dismissed on the Attorney General\u2019s motion. For the first time after that decision, on July 16, 2008, the Attorney General moved orally for that count to be restored and reduced to <mask> in the second degree on the ground that only this count included Mighty Management, L.L.C., as distinguished from the different management company charged in count 55, Mighty Management Group, Inc. I originally sustained count 55. Despite the delay I would grant the application were I not to dismiss all the money laundering counts."], "id": "0bfcb529-9c0c-4f1c-8143-fafdef2bfe00", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["MetLife contends that the payment of the premiums by Stanley may have been a form of illegal speculation in insurance, which is disallowed under its underwriting practices, in con*959junction with, and mandated by, the federal \u201cUSA PATRIOT Act,\u201d2 in order to avoid potential <mask> in furtherance of terrorism. It claims to have a \u201cstrict policy\u201d of not accepting third-party checks without knowledge of the source of the funds, especially where payment of the premiums is made by a party who is not closely related to the insured. MetLife argues that decedent falsely represented that he would be paying the premiums, and that plaintiffs actively concealed the identity of the true payor.3 It claims that it would not have issued the policy had it known that the decedent would not be paying as represented. MetLife maintains that \u201cat minimum, MetLife would have postponed issuing the policy while it conducted an investigation with respect to whether the intended premium payor had an acceptable explanation for paying the premiums\u201d so that it could \u201cproperly estimat[e] the degree and character of the risk it was assuming.\u201d (MetLife\u2019s mem of law in opposition at 2.)"], "id": "58161f02-d574-4a4b-9e64-7f63fc911d56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe MetLife Enterprise is firmly committed to complying with all applicable anti-<mask> laws, rules, and regulations. Specifically, the USA PATRIOT ACT requires MetLife to verify the identity of its customers and understand the source of all funds that it receives for the purchase of financial products. The task of certifying the source of funds for financial product purchases and subsequent payments is extremely difficult when we receive monetary instruments or funds from other than the owner of an account or policy.\u201d Consequently, MetLife has, as applicable here, devised procedures to track, among other things, third-party checks \u201cwritten on a checking account, annuitant, or insured of the MetLife account or policy.\u201d (Id.)"], "id": "65cc601a-f751-4dd7-97d6-28bfb1020a80", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Money Laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Title III of the PATRIOT Act (Pub L 107-56, 115 US Stat 272) is entitled the \u201cInternational <mask> Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001,\u201d and is, as its name suggests, concerned with the problem of money laundering within financial institutions. Pursuant to title III, as reflected in 31 USC \u00a7 5312 (a) (2) (M), an insurance company is a \u201cfinancial institution.\u201d 31 USC \u00a7 5318 (h) requires financial institutions, such as insurance companies, to \u201cestablish anti-money laundering programs,\u201d with particular attention toward *964\u201cthe development of internal policies, procedures, and controls\u201d (31 USC \u00a7 5318 [h] [1] [A]). 31 CFR 103.137, entitled \u201cAnti-money laundering programs for insurance companies,\u201d provides the regulatory framework for the insurance industry with regard to the creation of \u201canti-money laundering\u201d programs, with emphasis on possible money laundering through the purchase of insurance products. 31 CFR 103.137 (b) provides that \u201ceach insurance company shall develop and implement a written anti-money laundering program applicable to its covered products that is reasonably designed to prevent the insurance company from being used to facilitate money laundering or the financing of terrorist activities.\u201d Paragraph (c) sets forth the minimum requirements for the anti-money laundering programs, as applicable, as follows:"], "id": "daa53688-3af7-4169-a50d-32fd1d5ced66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[a]t a minimum, the program required by paragraph (b) of this section shall: \u201c(1) Incorporate policies, procedures, and internal controls based upon the insurance company\u2019s assessment of the <mask> and terrorist financing risks associated with its covered products. Policies, procedures, and internal controls developed and implemented by an insurance company under this section shall include provisions for complying with the applicable requirements of subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code and this part, integrating the company\u2019s insurance agents and insurance brokers into its anti-money laundering program, and obtaining all relevant customer-related information necessary for an effective anti-money laundering program.\u201d 31 CFR 103.137 also provides for the appointment of a compliance officer ([c] [2]), ongoing training ([c] [3]), and independent testing to see if the company is in compliance with the regulations ([c] [4])."], "id": "fbe11610-470f-4e15-8583-838f8f3d6c2a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the present action, MetLife\u2019s affiants have made reference to the existence of an anti-<mask> program, as required by the PATRIOT Act, by providing the court with internal policy statements apparently meant for its employees\u2019 edification and use in evaluating insurance practices and risks. MetLife has not produced any specific documentary evidence of its underwriting practices, although it has offered the affidavit of an underwriter reiterating that MetLife\u2019s decision to void the policies was made under the mandates of the PATRIOT Act."], "id": "a15ea70a-3e3d-41f5-8101-0a7ee81c2f9b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The PATRIOT Act is an important piece of legislation containing directives to the insurance industry concerning many aspects of the procurement of policies, revealed through the regulations which have been promulgated thereunder. Despite the paucity of specifics provided by MetLife as to what aspect of the PATRIOT Act would permit it to void the subject policies on the ground that the premiums were paid by Stanley rather than by decedent, this court finds that MetLife has put forth sufficient evidence to show that it may have had reason to revoke the policies, or at least to investigate the situation with regard to Stanley, under its legislatively-required anti-<mask> program, adequate to forestall summary judgment at this time. Whether MetLife\u2019s decision to void the policy was a reasonable exercise of its rights under the PATRIOT Act is a factual question."], "id": "99489499-1003-4e94-8df9-5649d02112c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe legislature deems it necessary, in order to enhance consumer protection, reduce fraud and ensure the public welfare, that mortgage loan originators who originate mortgage loans on residential real property be subject to regulation by the superintendent and that such regulation be consistent with Title V of The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, also known as the S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act, as it may be amended from time to time, and regulations thereunder or interpretations thereof, that may be adopted from time to time by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.\u201d In memoranda supporting the new legislation, it is specifically noted that no longer will applicants who have been convicted of a felony involving fraud, dishonesty, breach of trust or <mask> be eligible for an MLO license, absent a pardon. (Rampolla aff, exhibit F, at 1.)"], "id": "d94b429e-72b2-485a-abbd-cf9c176b94f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c1. Findings. Notwithstanding any other law, the superintendent shall not issue a mortgage loan origination license unless he or she makes, at a minimum, the following findings: . . . \u201c(b) No felony conviction. That the applicant has not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in a domestic, foreign, or military court: \u201c(i) During the seven-year period preceding the date of the application for licensing; or \u201c(ii) At any time preceding such date of application, if such felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, or a breach of trust, or <mask>, provided *168that for purposes of this subdivision, the superintendent may, in his or her discretion, disregard a conviction where the felon has been pardoned.\u201d These provisions are identical to those set forth in the Act."], "id": "1a247b1d-2051-4244-b098-0487a873b10c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Mark Dwyer, J. Defendant Pinchuk and five others have been indicted on multiple counts of conspiracy in the second and fourth degrees, for <mask> in the second degree, and on 37 counts of sale and possession of controlled substances. The People\u2019s theory is that between March 2009 and June 2010 defendant, based in California, supplied amphetamines, alprazolam, hydrocodone, and oxycodone to codefendant Pinchas Goldshtein and others in Brooklyn. Defendant would ship pills via Federal Express from Los Angeles to Brooklyn, often supplying Goldshtein with a tracking number in a text message. To pay for the pills Goldshtein would deposit money into a bank account in Brooklyn, and defendant would withdraw that money in Los Angeles. Over the course of their dealings, defendant and his California and New York accomplices exchanged numerous text and cell phone messages, many of which were intercepted pursuant to court order and were highly incriminating."], "id": "db359e17-919b-436d-8ae9-d35575406e05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There is no evidence that defendant left California during the period of the alleged conspiracy. Relying on People v Carvajal (6 NY3d 305 [2005]), defendant moves to dismiss the substantive counts of the indictment on jurisdictional grounds. The essence of his argument is that because he was never in New York, this state has no jurisdictional predicate for charging him with selling and possessing drugs or with <mask> in New York.1 For the reasons that follow, this court rejects defendant\u2019s claim."], "id": "661702f3-6711-4b14-923d-a169d6f2fe19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On February 7, 2011, a 107-count indictment was filed with the Nassau County Court Clerk charging 14 defendants, each with a count of enterprise corruption, conspiracy in the fourth degree and scheme to defraud in the first degree. Each defendant was charged with additional differing counts, including <mask> in various degrees, falsifying business records in various degrees, identity theft in the first degree and grand larceny in various degrees."], "id": "f4668afe-bd0f-4c5a-8480-1d497c04226c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff claims she provided money to defendant in several ways. Much of it she gave to him in the form of \u201cinvestment\u201d checks. These checks were paid in increments of $10,000, $12,000 or $13,000. Plaintiff signed, dated and wrote the amount on these checks, but left the payee portion blank. She provided these checks to defendant multiple times throughout any given month. Apparently, defendant cashed many of these checks in money exchange houses in South America and in the United States, including the Beacon Hill Service Corporation in New York. That company was later the subject of a criminal *352investigation for <mask> and for transmitting funds without a license. Plaintiff claims that between 1992 and 2004, she wrote checks to defendant for \u201cinvestments\u201d in the amount of $7,579,500."], "id": "52336569-4d1d-408d-ab6a-9abfdb860d95", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Martin Marcus, J. The defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Bronx County and charged with 21 counts of grand larceny in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 155.40 [1]); eight counts of grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7 155.35 [1]); and two counts each of <mask> in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 470.20 [1] [b] [i] [A]; [ii] [A]) and scheme to defraud in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 190.65 [1] [a], [b]). The defendant is also charged with two counts of fraudulent practices in respect to stocks, bonds and other securities (General Business Law \u00a7 352-c [5], [6] [hereinafter the Martin Act counts]). In essence, the defendant allegedly operated a \u201cPonzi scheme\u201d in which he fraudulently induced 29 people to place with him some or all of their retirement savings or other funds, totaling millions of dollars. Promising to invest their money either in a real estate project or in various financial instruments, and assuring them that they would receive a (more or less) guaranteed rate of return, he did not invest their funds as promised, and instead used their money to make some payments due to earlier investors and to pay airlines, casinos, restaurants and others for personal expenses. Some of the investors received none of the *566payments their agreements called for. A few initially received the monthly payments they were due, but soon those payments came in lesser amounts and then stopped altogether."], "id": "7ba984f6-5fb8-4b9d-ab72-557cb1c80443", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the first cause of action, the amended complaint alleges that \u201c[b]y virtue of its superior knowledge, BNY MELLON owed a common law duty of care to the Rye Funds to disclose material adverse facts affecting assets under BNY MELLON\u2019s administration.\u201d (Amended complaint \u00b6 100.)1 It further alleges that BNY Mellon acted with gross negligence, and breached its common-law duty of care, in the following respects: First, the Bank allegedly failed to disclose that Madoff reported bogus trades on the Rye Funds\u2019 behalf of BNY Mellon\u2019s own shares, and calculated the Rye Funds net asset value (NAV) as if the trades in such shares were \u201creal.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 101.) The amended complaint alleges that the Bank had business records reflecting *891the purchase and sale of its own shares and therefore had \u201csuperior knowledge of the true facts.\u201d (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 69-71.) Second, the Bank failed to disclose suspicious activities in the BMIS account that was also maintained at the Bank. (Id. \u00b6 102.) The amended complaint alleges that the Bank was required by the Bank Secrecy Act (31 USC \u00a7\u00a7 5311-5332) to conduct due diligence on accounts maintained with it and to report <mask> transactions to the government. The amended complaint further asserts that BNY Mellon therefore had superior knowledge about the BMIS account, and acted with gross negligence in not disclosing to the Rye Funds \u201cthe conflict of interest arising from Madoff s suspicious banking activities\u201d involving the BMIS account. {Id. \u00b6\u00b6 59-65.) Third, the Bank ignored \u201cred flags\u201d that should have alerted it to the fact that the Funds\u2019 assets were at risk for fraud. {Id. \u00b6 97.) The amended complaint catalogs red flags that included suspiciously consistent returns and patterns of purchases, suspect trading volumes, Madoff s role as both broker and custodian for all of the assets he managed, public reports questioning his operations, Madoff s use of paper trade confirmations, and the Rye Funds\u2019 lack of electronic access to their accounts at BMIS. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 9, 66-68.) Fourth, the Bank\u2019s predecessor acquired a subsidiary, Ivy Asset Management LLC (Ivy), which purportedly limited its investments with Madoff due to concerns about his operations. The amended complaint alleges that the predecessor \u201cundoubtedly conducted substantial due diligence on Ivy\u201d before acquiring it, and the Bank therefore knew or should have known that Mad-off was misusing client funds. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 72-82.) Fifth, as cash custodian for the Rye Funds, the Bank had common-law and fiduciary duties to \u201cmonitor and protect any and all cash and cash equivalents of the Rye Funds,\u201d and should have discovered and disclosed the inadequacy of Madoff s sub-custodial records of cash and cash flows. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 56-58.)"], "id": "e33ee56a-ce65-4c03-adfd-89848abd201b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Rye Funds entered into two substantially similar administrative services agreements\u2014a July 1, 2007 agreement between Rye Select Broad Market Fund LP and Rye Select Broad Market Prime Fund LP and BNY-AIS (Mehta aff, exhibit D); and a September 1, 2006 agreement between Rye Select Broad Market XL Fund LP and BNY-AIS. (Mehta aff, exhibit E.) The agreements provided for BNY-AIS to furnish the administrative services listed on schedule I, which include: establishing and maintaining accounts in the name of the Rye Funds; receiving and disbursing subscription payments in connection with the sale of the Funds\u2019 shares; receiving and paying fees and expenses on behalf of the Funds; acting as registrar and transfer agent with respect to the Funds\u2019 shares and, in that capacity, processing subscription applications and maintaining subscriber registers and ledgers; preparing and maintaining customary financial and accounting books and records; acting as liaison with the Rye Funds\u2019 independent public accountants; computing the net asset value of the Funds\u2019 shares; and providing specified anti-<mask> services involving subscribers."], "id": "23fac4e1-0fab-49c3-acec-1465ce76a00d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In asserting the applicability of this doctrine (although not referring to it by name), plaintiffs contend that BNY Mellon had superior knowledge about Madoff from three principal sources: First, they claim that BNY Mellon\u2019s predecessor, The Bank of New York, \u201cundoubtedly conducted substantial due diligence\u201d in acquiring Ivy, a subsidiary that had evidence that Madoff was a fraud risk, and that BNY Mellon therefore \u201cknew or should have known about the evidence that Madoff was misusing client funds.\u201d (See amended complaint \u00b6\u00b6 72-82.) Second, plaintiffs claim that BNY Mellon was obligated to maintain business records reflecting purchases of its own stock and, based on these records, \u201cwould have actual and/or constructive knowledge that Madoff had not actually purchased the numbers of shares\u201d he claimed. (Id. \u00b6 69.) In response to BNY Mellon\u2019s point that the shares were held in street name, plaintiffs argue that the Bank acted recklessly in not checking its own data. (Plaintiffs\u2019 mem in opp at 20-21.) Third, plaintiffs argue that because Madoff maintained a BMIS account at BNY Mellon, the Bank had obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act to identify and report suspicious <mask> activities to the government. (Amended complaint \u00b6\u00b6 59-64.) Plaintiffs assert that the Bank therefore \u201ceither was or should have been suspicious of Madoff\u2019s money laundering operations through the BMIS account,\u201d and \u201crecklessly overlooked or ignored evidence that something was wrong with the cash flows to and through the BMIS account.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 65.)"], "id": "83de7c7b-b01a-441d-adf3-992664e3a61c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". The complaint alleges that BNY Mellon had an obligation under the Bank Secrecy Act (31 USC \u00a7\u00a7 5311-5332) to conduct due diligence on BMIS in order to report <mask> transactions to the government; that BNY Mellon had a duty to avoid conflicting loyalties to Madoff and the Rye Funds; and that it failed to disclose its \u201cconflict of interest arising from Madoff s suspicious banking activities,\u201d thereby breaching both its duty of due care and its fiduciary duties. (Amended complaint \u00b6\u00b6 59-65.) In opposing defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, plaintiffs acknowledge that the Bank Secrecy Act did not impose any obligation on BNY Mellon to report to the Rye Funds about the BMIS account. Without withdrawing, or specifically addressing, the pleaded allegations, plaintiffs represent that they do not assert that BNY Mellon breached a duty under the Bank Secrecy Act, and assert generally that their claim is that the Bank breached its fiduciary and common-law duties as cash custodian and administrator to the Rye Funds. (Plaintiffs\u2019 mem in opp at 21.)"], "id": "07d54fc2-8ebf-49ee-ba60-ea7c025c698c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["DOE considered all the requisite elements. However, DOE erroneously concluded that the crime, and the facts which surrounded petitioner\u2019s plea, bore a \u201cdirect relationship\u201d to the license\u2019s requirement of working with children and failed to give effect to the presumption to which petitioner was entitled. This conclusion is arbitrary and capricious as there is no evi*313dence in the record concerning this \u201cdirect relationship\u201d nor does DOE ever articulate how petitioner\u2019s crime or his prior acts bear a \u201cdirect relationship\u201d with the job duties of a paraprofessional.3 Instead the denial appears to be based simply on supposition unsupported by facts. Such decision-making does not comport with the Correction Law, and runs athwart to the presumption of rehabilitation afforded by Correction Law \u00a7 753 (2) (see e.g. Matter of Dellaporte v New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 106 AD3d 446 [1st Dept 2013] [denial of the renewal of a stationary engineer license was arbitrary and capricious because the conviction for theft of funds bore no direct relationship to the duties of a stationary engineering license and respondent failed to afford petitioner with the mandatory presumption of rehabilitation attendant to petitioner certificate of relief from disabilities]; Matter of Gil v New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 107 AD3d 632 [1st Dept 2013] [respondents arbitrarily concluded that petitioner\u2019s convictions of mail fraud and <mask> bore a direct relationship to the duties and responsibilities attendant to a stationary engineer]; compare with Matter of Bonaventure v Perales, 106 AD3d 665 [1st Dept 2013] [direct relationship existed between petitioner\u2019s crimes including convictions for assault and larceny and his employment as a security guard whose duties consisted primarily of the protection of persons and property])."], "id": "4bad2e98-c57b-4fdc-9cdb-bf064da59139", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["DOE arbitrarily and capriciously concluded that the crime and facts surrounding petitioner\u2019s plea bore a \u201cdirect relationship\u201d to the license\u2019s requirement of working with *392children. According to DOE, as part of her licensing investigation, petitioner revealed that she was convicted of petit larceny for stealing merchandise while employed at Best Buy. DOE proffers no evidence demonstrating how such conduct would be relevant to petitioner\u2019s potential employment as a school bus attendant, where she would not be in charge of sales, handling cash, or taking in orders and processing returns (see Matter of Gil v New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 107 AD3d 632 [1st Dept 2013] [holding that respondents arbitrarily concluded that petitioner\u2019s conviction for mail fraud and <mask> bore a direct relationship to the duties and responsibilities attendant to a stationary engineer]). DOE\u2019s argument that petitioner would be responsible for the \u201cconfidential information\u201d of children during the performance of her duties is unpersuasive. DOE does not specify what, if any, \u201cconfidential information\u201d of children petitioner would be responsible for in her capacity as a school bus attendant. Had the potential for a financial benefit been shown here, DOE could have established a link between petitioner\u2019s prior offense and the license she now seeks. No such connection was established. Indeed, DOE has not shown that a situation could emerge wherein petitioner would use the \u201cconfidential information\u201d of children for the purpose of inuring a financial benefit to herself. Instead, DOE\u2019s denial appears to be based on supposition unsupported by facts."], "id": "ca069cf0-28e5-4c69-87d0-afbb75ce06ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeals amended the order of the Appellate Division which dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 entire proceeding against the bank since it determined that plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for commercial bad faith. The court held that the plaintiff pleaded \"not merely a lapse of Vary vigilance\u2019 * * * or even 'suspicious circumstance which might well have induced a prudent banker to investigate\u2019 \u201d but, instead, the plaintiff portrayed a scheme of massive dimension accomplished in part through a pattern of <mask> conducted on a near daily basis by a single individual concentrated within a few months at one branch (Prudential-Bache Sec. v Citibank, supra, at 276). The court held that using these facts prior to discovery the court was required to view plaintiffs\u2019 assertion favorably and as such they were sufficient to form the basis for a cause of action for commercial bad faith."], "id": "8bcc1870-3bee-4499-9194-45fc8e76687a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Renee A. White, J. On June 2, 1992 the defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, for the crimes of grand larceny in the second degree, two counts of criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree, two counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and <mask> in the second degree. Following the verdict, the People requested that bail be set. The court set bail in the amount of $25,000 and adjourned the matter to July 13, 1992 for sentence. On June 3, 1992 the defendant\u2019s wife, Gloria R. Mosesson, posted the bail and the defendant was released."], "id": "da677bd6-8bd1-415d-b4dd-0b32ebf3cd22", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is the contention of the plaintiff that the moneys attached in the brokerage accounts maintained by the various defendants in Panama and Miami, Florida, are proceeds of <mask> stemming from the activities of narcotics sales by the Cali Cartel in the State of New York. The defendants argue that the attachments must be vacated because the situs of the accounts are in Panama and Florida and are thus beyond the court\u2019s attachment power. Moreover, the cross-moving defendants claim that they are in no way involved in drug activity, that they are legitimate business people in Columbia and that their acquisition of the claimed tainted moneys coming from the United States was innocent of any criminality or knowledge of its source."], "id": "a490679e-f195-4320-ab85-5c0e8c75c9e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Capparelli\u2019s stated purpose in obtaining these checks was to make a down payment on the Queens house. With the aid of the checks, Capparelli was able to purchase the house, enabling Capparelli to benefit from the extortion by investing the cash derived from that crime and further aiding Capparelli to commit and profit from that crime by providing opportunity for the use of labor and materials extorted from McCormack International and its subcontractors on the Tudor project. (Penal Law \u00a7 470.10 [2]; see, e.g., United States v Saget, 991d 702, 712 [11th Cir 1993].) It is important to note that the purchase of the house with the proceeds of the crime is not <mask> under our statute, since real estate is not \"[equivalent property\u201d as defined by section 470.00 (2). The purchase of the house is relevant only insofar as it proved that the defendant\u2019s intent in converting the cash to checks, was to enable him to benefit from the proceeds of the crime, and to facilitate its commission. (See, e.g., United States v Montoya, 945d 1068, 1076 [9th Cir 1991] [applying 18 USC \u00a7 1956 (a) (1) (A) (i) defendant\u2019s deposit of bribe check sufficed under statute requiring proof that defendant engaged in the transaction with \" 'inten(t) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity\u2019 \u201d].) Accordingly, these counts are sustained."], "id": "1262ffd7-9c74-4dff-bd0d-af2e48c91a72", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The remaining counts of <mask> in the second degree are based upon the defendant\u2019s demand that McCormack International deposit $50,000 in an Irish bank account in his wife\u2019s name. This deposit, according to the victims of *1012the extortion, was a direct result of Capparelli\u2019s threats. Credit in an account in a financial institution is a form of \"[equivalent property\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 470.00 [2]), and a deposit of money into a bank account is a \"[transaction\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 470.00 [3]) within the meaning of the statute. However, not every transaction involving the proceeds of specified criminal conduct is money laundering. (See, e.g., United States v Sanders, 928d 940, 944-947 [10th Cir 1991].) The evidence must establish that the transaction involved an \"exchange\u201d of proceeds of criminal conduct for other monetary instruments or equivalent property. Had the defendant attempted to withdraw these funds, the withdrawal would have constituted a \"[t]ransaction\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 470.00 [3]) in which the proceeds were exchanged, and would have established money laundering. (See, e.g., United States v Jackson, supra, 935d, at 841.) Here, the $50,000 deposit was the product of the crime. Accordingly, only the first part of the required exchange occurred. Nonetheless, the evidence justifies the inference that the defendant intended by this deposit in his wife\u2019s name, to conceal the source of this money and to benefit from his extortion. Only the further requirement of his wife\u2019s personal presence to complete forms, prevented culmination of the exchange. Since the evidence showed that the McCormacks\u2019 deposit of the $50,000 put it within the defendant\u2019s power to complete the exchange, which he apparently failed to do only out of fear of detection, these counts are reduced to an attempt to commit money laundering in the second degree. (People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 191-192 [1989].)"], "id": "fe372320-6b76-45e6-b074-81a9ec71d7d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"(a) A corporate account was apparently controlled by three lawyers, who were listed as officers of this corporation. One of these persons was linked with a <mask> scheme in *700the Pablo Escobar indictment proceeding in April, 1990. Shortly after the public release of the Pablo Escobar information, the salesman in charge of the account * * * [agreed] that this account * * * would leave DLJ and come back repackaged as an offshore trust. Subsequently, this account came back with the same [government-backed $10 million] securities, not as a trust but as an offshore corporation. However, the papers at DLJ did not disclose (in violation of SEC and New York Stock Exchange rules) any of the persons in control of the corporation because the officers listed for this corporation were not individuals, but three other offshore corporations. \"(b) Money was being taken in from third parties and sent out to other third parties who had no apparent relationship to the accounts. Many of these accounts in which this occurred had no security transactions. The wiring of funds to third parties and the receipt of third party checks violated DLJ\u2019s rules * * * \"(c) Trades were done in apparently unrelated accounts, in a manner indicating that the salesman involved was using discretion without written authorization as required by DLJ rules * * * \"(e) Money was wired overseas to third parties, in large amounts, to accounts in countries generally regarded as secrecy countries. In three instances, funds were wired in such a manner as to conceal the true name of the DLJ customer wiring the funds. \"(f) Many accounts did not contain proper documentation for trading authorizations or disclose the individuals who actually controlled these accounts, in violation of DLJ and New York Stock Exchange rules.\u201d After his discharge, plaintiff maintained that he had been dismissed because of his reporting of the alleged violations of rules and regulations to, among others, the defendant Robert Albano, DLJ\u2019s compliance director. Thereafter, plaintiff brought an arbitration proceeding before the New York Stock Exchange. In the arbitration proceeding, plaintiff filed a statement of claim indicating DLJ\u2019s alleged motivation for his discharge. DLJ filed a response to statement of claim which vigorously denied plaintiff\u2019s allegations of violations of rules and regulations related to money laundering and maintained the plaintiff had been discharged because of poor job performance. In May 1993, the New York Stock Exchange issued an *701arbitration award in favor of Mulder in the amount of $114,668, and costs of $1,000. The decision did not specify the basis of the award. However, the award recited the following case summary: \"Ex-employee, Internal Auditor vs. Member Firm and Officers alleging that when he uncovered and brought to senior management\u2019s attention, by way of an audit report, a drug money laundering scheme within the firm, he was wrongfully terminated and his professional reputation was damaged. Claimant also alleges false reporting to the NYSE and seeks back pay and benefits, payment for his consulting services, future earnings and exemplary damages.\u201d"], "id": "b1867077-aa50-4c5a-b218-9d85798b8497", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is true that punitive damages are not normally granted unless there is a wrong to the public (Walker v Sheldon, 10 NY2d 401). However, punitive damages can be awarded for a breach of contract where there is bad faith or a dishonest failure to carry out a contract (Gordon v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 NY2d 427). Although punitive damages in contract actions are relatively rare, they can be awarded where the defendant\u2019s conduct is deemed by the court to be truly egregious. For example, in Aero Garage Corp. v Hirschfeld (185 AD2d 775 [1st Dept], lv denied 81 NY2d 701), in which a landlord deliberately prevented a tenant from obtaining a permit needed to operate the tenant\u2019s business, the Court awarded the tenant punitive damages against the landlord. In the instant case, if plaintiff\u2019s allegations are assumed to be true, as they must be for present purposes, DLJ dismissed plaintiff by reason of his attempt to report serious violations of securities laws and regulations designed to prevent <mask>. Certainly there is a strong public policy in favor of encouraging persons such as plaintiff to report violations of these laws without fear of retaliation by the employer. Thus, the claim for punitive damages in the first cause of action shall be sustained."], "id": "38ef4fb5-3653-4d0e-b82f-7feca618cf52", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the present case, the Wall Street Journal article, after briefly describing the nature of the arbitration proceeding and indicating that plaintiff had received an award of $114,668, set forth DLJ\u2019s position as follows: \"Donaldson Lufkin said it fired Mr. Mulder for poor performance unrelated to his <mask> report. 'The fanciful tale of intrigue and cover-up Mulder made regarding money laundering in DLJ\u2019s Miami office * * * is without basis in fact and is irrelevant to Mulder\u2019s termination,\u2019 the firm said in papers filed with arbitrators.\u201d"], "id": "1e7d3500-6b07-4409-98a3-411cd44ac922", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Concurrent with the diversion of funds from BNU an investigation of Steve\u2019s operations by the United States Department of Justice was underway. Two weeks after the hearing before this court on BNU\u2019s motion for a TRO on the funds in the accounts in New York City, the United States Attorney filed an indictment against Steve\u2019s principals, Steve Wangboje and Azie Guice, in the United States District Court in New Jersey. The indictment charged that they had engaged in \"money laundering\u201d of funds from narcotic operations, wire fraud and conspiracy. The affidavits of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency personnel in support of the orders for the interception of wire communications among the defendants indicated that the <mask> scheme was related to drug trafficking activities by car dealerships located in Nigeria. One such dealership was Skymit Motors, Ltd. in Lagos, Nigeria, to which Steve\u2019s shipped luxury vehicles and parts. Communications intercepted from Wangboje\u2019s home with the other defendants \"reflect that the Subject[s] themselves are actively involved in fraudulent schemes * * * and have customers who were/are engaged in drug trafficking.\u201d The wiretaps also revealed that Skymit attempted to impede the investigation in Nigeria by, inter alia, instructing Steve\u2019s to manufacture and alter documents, and \"stonewall\u201d the investigators."], "id": "449f68be-139e-49cf-8dfe-f767b8e09a12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There are two distinguishing factors which make Feathers (supra) inappropriate and inapplicable in the view of this court. First, assuming the truth of the allegations, Money Center is accused of having committed an affirmative act in New York, <mask>, via instructions conveyed to BONY. (See, Pilates, Inc. v Pilates Inst., 891 F Supp 175 [SD NY 1995].) Second, to allow a defendant to conspire and direct tortious activities in New York, in furtherance of that conspiracy, and then avoid jurisdiction because it directs those activities from outside the State or country, is to ignore the reality of modern banking and computer technology in the end of the 20th century! A defendant with access to computers, fax machines, etc., no longer has to physically enter New York to perform a financial transaction which may be criminal or tortious, i.e., conversion. He may secrete himself and/or direct activities from locations where jurisdiction may be impossible to acquire, including a boat beyond the three-mile limit. Thus, the emphasis should be on the locus of the tort, not whether defendant was physically here when the tortious act occurred. Once the court finds that the tort occurred within the State, it should look at the totality of the circumstances, to determine if jurisdiction should be exercised under CLPR 302 (a) (2) (see, Parke Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13 [1970] [which held that a telephone call during an auction from a buyer outside New York was sufficient to create an agency relationship to the gallery\u2019s employee]). Having found that the tort occurred within New York the court concludes that defendant\u2019s bodily presence is not an indispensable requirement for long-arm jurisdiction. It would be a travesty to permit the use of our institutions to channel stolen funds and/or the proceeds from *189heroin sales by those who impudently claim they are beyond our borders! It would be a gross violation of common sense and reality to shelter such activities."], "id": "c4556f2d-3483-4521-ba14-6a3cf3b1fee0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["However, an allegation of fraud may be based on \"an act or conduct by defendant\u201d that is intended to deceive plaintiff. Concealment of facts one has an obligation to disclose with the intent to defraud has the same legal effect as an affirmative misrepresentation. (See, Quadrazzi Concrete v Mastroianni, 56 AD2d 353 [1977].) Here, the complaint alleges that Money Center was part of the conspiracy to defraud BNU which began in Macau with Chan\u2019s misappropriation of the $6.5 million. The heart of the allegation is that Money Center willingly took part in a phase of the conspiracy. Money Center\u2019s financial links to Steve\u2019s, Keymon and Skymit are clear. There is a strong indication that those three entities were involved in a <mask> scheme that included the purloined BNU funds."], "id": "9aa5e8c0-8344-4543-bc42-ef598689c6fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, there are two other items that indicate that Money Center was not duped into participating in the <mask> scheme but was a knowing participant. First is the reference to Money Center in the DEA summaries of the wire taps monitoring the conversations between Skymit\u2019s principal, Tayo Ayeni, and Steve\u2019s principal, Steve Wangboje. The summary states: \"They discuss the guy with the Money Center, Mr. Ogbege [sic] and Skymit.\u201d Second is the conclusion stated in the \"Letter Of Request for the Apprehension of Funds\u201d from the Criminal Investigation Court of Macau which states, inter alia, referring to the Money Center BONY account, \"upon the holder[s] of those accounts exist strong suspicion of having received such funds, being well aware were originated of criminal activities\u201d. Taken as a whole there is enough to rebut a motion to dismiss."], "id": "f4b77be6-51e6-4ffb-910d-ca56712cc04b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["John A.K. Bradley, J. Among the many mundane cases that pass through this courtroom, occasionally a case more likely found in Hollywood than in New York Supreme Court arises. This is such a case, involving, among other things, high-priced call girls and a tony *468escort service, an allegedly corrupt senior police officer, a vengeful gun dealer and lover, relationship abuse, bigamy, alleged prosecutorial persecution, and much more. Before the court are a number of motions designed to parse through this exciting fact pattern and have this court rule on the efficacy of this prosecution for falsifying business records, <mask>, and promoting prostitution."], "id": "df2b6bd5-c869-4948-930d-6392a4af5f4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person is guilty of <mask> in the second degree when that person exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments which are the proceeds of specified criminal conduct and have a total value exceeding ten thousand dollars for one or more other monetary instruments and/or equivalent property when that person knows that the monetary instrument or instruments exchanged or received in exchange are the proceeds of any criminal conduct and that person: \u201c1. intentionally makes the exchange to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of such proceeds; or \u201c2. intentionally makes the exchange to aid himself or another person to commit or profit or benefit from specified criminal conduct\u201d. (Penal Law \u00a7 470.10.) As set forth in the Practice Commentaries to Penal Law article 470, the essential conduct involved in money laundering is the exchange of certain forms of ill-gotten money for other forms of money or equivalent property. (Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinneys Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 470, at 582.) Usually, cash is the medium of money laundering, but it need not be. Here the allegation is that credit with *471American Express was obtained, through which American Express would give checks and electronic deposits to the limousine companies, which would then give checks to defendant Carlyle, the escort service. The defendants\u2019 point is a technical one, that checks are not monetary instruments within the meaning and intent of the statute. The People argue that the statutory definition of \u201cmonetary instrument\u201d includes \u201ccoin and currency of the United States or of any other country; bank checks; traveler\u2019s checks; money orders; and investment securities and negotiable instruments in such form that delivery is sufficient to pass title.\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 470.00 [1].) Here, however, the checks at issue were none of these; they were personal business checks. The equivalent Federal statute tracks the State definition almost precisely (see, 18 USC \u00a7 1956 [c] [5]), except the Federal statute explicitly includes \u201cpersonal checks\u201d. While the People assert that this was a mere oversight and the Legislature intended to include personal checks, the court cannot agree. The inclusion of bank checks, which are independent obligations of the bank issued on behalf of, in some instances, an anonymous remitter, shows that the Legislature focused on the issue of checks, but deliberately excluded personal checks. The instruments here are not bank checks."], "id": "d0e6cbdb-5f8e-4284-b6ca-4e4850a973ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is true, as the People argue, that checks are negotiable instruments, but this is irrelevant because mere delivery of such a check is not sufficient to pass title, as the statute requires. The purpose of the <mask> statutes is to prevent criminals from moving the profits of criminal activity into one or more anonymous forms of consideration. Each of the items included in the statute qualifies as anonymous financial consideration, but a personal check does not. Not only is its provence traceable, but it may not be converted to cash without endorsement, literally a signature. (UCC 3-202.) A personal check (except perhaps one drawn to \u201ccash\u201d) may not be effectively passed without such identifying endorsement. Accordingly, these counts must be dismissed."], "id": "183d468e-94ee-42c4-88ba-4a0baec29228", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The magazine article, entitled Power Play, describes itself as an exclusive report revealing how the Russian mob has muscled its way into the National Hockey League. One of the subjects of the article is Slava Fetisov, who was questioned by the author, Mr. Friedman, in connection with the article. Mr. Fetisov is said to be linked to the mob, and a close associate of Vyacheslav Ivankov. The article quotes a confidential FBI report as describing Mr. Ivankov \u201cas a shrewd and respected leader over a group of ruthless members knowledgeable in business, financial, legal and government operations * * * In addition to extortion, <mask>, drug trafficking, Ivankov is suspected of not only arranging numerous murders but bragging about them.\u201d (Details, at 146.) Plaintiff Komarov is mentioned in the article in connection with the author\u2019s interview of Fetisov, as follows:"], "id": "33b25f72-d8b8-414a-8da6-e13faab59b77", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This is an action alleging libel based on an article written by Susan Edelman which contained a photograph by Devlin Barrett. The article was published on December 11, 2000 in the New York Post, which is published by NYP Holdings, Inc. The article reported that Boris Kotlyarsky was under a federal indictment charging him with conspiracy and <mask> for organized crime. It also described the alleged scheme, and reported that the government had stated that Reliable, a medical clinic run by the plaintiffs, was a \u201cmedical mill set up to defraud insurance companies.\u201d On December 12, 2000, Boris Kotlyarsky left a message for Susan Edelman, which she returned on December 19, 2000. During the course of the conversation, Boris Kotlyarsky requested a retraction, after advising Susan Edelman that the contents of the article were false, and that his reputation, his wife\u2019s, and that of his business, had been damaged. On January 3, 2001, he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to money launder. Thereafter, Boris Kotlyarsky attempted to contact Susan Edelman between January 20, 2001 and March 18, 2001. However, a meeting between the two parties was not convened until April 20, 2001 at the New York Post office. At this meeting, Boris Kotlyarsky brought court documents from his criminal case, attempting to prove the falsity of the article. During the course of the meeting, photographs were taken with either the expressed or implied promise that they would be used in a retraction. On May 29, 2001, Boris Kotlyarsky began serving his sentence. While he was incarcerated, he received no news of the retraction, so he wrote a letter to Susan Edelman requesting a copy of the retraction. Susan Edelman responded in a letter dated February 12, 2002 that she had left messages with his criminal attorney about a possible article, and that since she did not receive a response, the requested retraction article was withdrawn. Plaintiffs Boris Kotlyarsky, Alla Kotlyarsky, and Reliable Rehabilitation Center, Inc., commenced this action against defendants New York Post, Susan Edelman, Devlin Barrett, and NYP Holdings, Inc., by filing the complaint on August 12, 2002. On September 4, 2002, plaintiff served defendant NYP Holdings, Inc. with the summons and complaint. Neither Susan Edelman nor Devlin Barrett was served. Issue was joined on September 24, 2002. Defendants now move for *152summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on grounds that it was time-barred."], "id": "fa7ea424-ddf6-4300-82bc-e93a254b98f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Clement and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges. Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge: Adrian C. Hammond, Jr. pleaded guilty to bank fraud, <mask>, and obstructing the administration of internal revenue laws in 2017. At sentencing, the district court granted him a U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5K1.1 downward departure and a downward variance. It then sentenced him to one year and one day of imprisonment with three years of supervised release. Hammond was released in August of 2019. On March 29, 2021, the United States Probation Office (USPO) filed to revoke Hammond\u2019s supervised release, alleging two Class C violations. Case: 21-30433 Document: 00516191695 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/04/2022"], "id": "e958ab86-aaf4-45a0-847b-85f3cb7e7ff4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Hammond admitted to the first violation and the district court found him guilty of the second violation. The district court calculated Hammond\u2019s guideline range at 5 to 11 months. It then upwardly departed pursuant to \u00a7 7B1.4 cmt. n.4 and imposed a 24-month sentence, stripping him of the previous benefits afforded to him. Hammond timely appealed, claiming that the district court failed to put him on notice that it might upwardly depart under \u00a7 7B1.4 cmt. n.4. We affirm the district court\u2019s sentence. I. On November 6, 2016, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Hammond. The indictment was superseded on May 23, 2017. Following the superseded indictment, Hammond pleaded guilty on August 23, 2017, to bank fraud, <mask>, and obstructing the administration of internal revenue laws. His white-collar scheme included the following: (1) he knowingly and intentionally defrauded a bank when he provided it with falsified documents to obtain a loan; (2) he then laundered some of the proceeds from that loan; and (3) he did all this while attempting to subvert IRS\u2019 efforts to collect taxes by filing false court documents and engaging in business transactions intended to conceal his earnings. After pleading guilty and initially refusing to cooperate with law enforcement, Hammond eventually provided the authorities with some information. As the government describes in its brief, however, that information \u201cwarranted only a \u2018very modest benefit.\u2019\u201d The government accordingly recommended a one-point reduction under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5K1.1. On August 22, 2018, the district court held Hammond\u2019s sentencing hearing. According to his presentence report, Hammond initially faced 41 to 51 months of imprisonment as a Level 20, category III offender. The district court then granted Hammond a \u00a7 5K1.1 one-level reduction for his"], "id": "9ab2bfc1-666b-44dd-8d49-373da582f1bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["to forfeiture, rather than the amount that was received by the entire criminal enterprise. We therefore conclude that the DHS can meet its burden of demonstrating a loss in excess of $10,000 to the victims of an offense involving fraud or deceit under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) by showing that a respondent was subject to criminal forfeiture for such an amount and that the forfeiture ordered was traceable and sufficiently tethered to the conviction. See Chiao Fang Ku v. Att\u2019y Gen. U.S., 912 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2019) (considering a forfeiture allegation contained in the information and holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343 constituted an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i)); Eversley-MacClaren v. Holder, 578 F. App\u2019x 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining that the Board appropriately relied on a forfeiture order, along with other sentencing documentation, to find the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000 under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i)); cf. Barikyan v. Barr, 917 F.3d 142, 146\u201347 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that an order of forfeiture showing a respondent laundered more than $10,000, established that he was convicted of aggravated felony <mask> pursuant to section 101(a)(43)(D) of the Act). In the instant case, the respondent was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1349 and 1343. He agreed in his plea agreement that he was subject to forfeiture for his offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C) (subjecting to forfeiture all property derived from proceeds traceable to the offense, or a conspiracy to commit the offense). See Thompson, 990 F.3d at 683 (involving a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1349 and 1343 who was subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C)); United States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1375\u201376 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing when a forfeiture order is appropriate under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C)). The sentencing judge applied the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Honeycutt in determining the forfeiture amount, specifically linking this amount to proceeds directly traceable to the respondent. See Thompson, 990 F.3d at 689 (determining Honeycutt applies to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C)); see also Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1632\u201335 (holding that forfeiture is limited to property or proceeds in the defendant\u2019s possession that are directly traceable to his or her conduct). According to the amended judgement, the respondent was ordered to pay \u201c[f]orfeiture traceable to the offense, in the amount of $346,717.08.\u201d The amended judgment and the letter from the Federal prosecutor both explicitly state that the $346,717.08 forfeiture amount was traceable to the respondent\u2019s criminal conduct of conspiring to defraud cell phone customers. 3 This amount is thirty-four times greater than $10,000. The respondent asserts that the prosecutor\u2019s letter is not sufficiently reliable to establish that he agreed to the $346,717.08 forfeiture amount. However, as we previously noted,"], "id": "b084993a-1b54-471b-a727-29890bd95688", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This was not the only fraud in this matter, but was the only one discussed in the affidavit. Nyamekye was tried on charges of conspiracy to commit <mask>, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1956(h), and engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, \u00a7 1957(a). The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291."], "id": "ee13fa2b-d388-422e-8643-d2094d805fd3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["When Triggs\u2019s employer confronted her about the payments, she said another employee was responsible and had threatened her. Triggs quit her job in May 2015, and she told her employer her husband had died. Triggs later admitted her husband was alive and she was responsible for the fraudulent payments. She promised to pay back the money she took. On January 2, 2018, the People filed an information charging Triggs with identity theft (\u00a7 530.5, subd. (a); count 1), false personation for a written instrument (\u00a7 529, subd. (a)(2); count 2), three counts of grand theft (\u00a7 487, subd. (a); counts 3\u20135), and <mask> (\u00a7 186.10, subd. (a); count 6). As to the grand theft charges, the People further alleged that Triggs engaged in a related pattern of felony conduct resulting in the loss of more than $100,000, within the meaning of section 186.11, subdivision (a)(3). On January 7, 2020, Triggs pleaded no contest to the charges and admitted the section 186.11 allegation. The court postponed sentencing because Triggs agreed to make scheduled restitution payments to her employer. Specifically, she agreed to make a $14,000 payment within a week, an $11,000 payment by June, and $2,000 payments each month beginning in February. The court noted if Triggs \u201cfall[s] short on restitution, this is clearly a [state] prison case\u201d and it would not \u201chesitate to send her to prison . . . .\u201d Triggs had not made any payments to her employer as of early February 2020. On February 13, 2020, the employer received an envelope from Triggs, but it was empty. It appears Triggs claimed she mailed a check, but someone took it out of the envelope before it got to the employer. The prosecutor believed Triggs was lying."], "id": "5c763365-1f21-49dd-8097-afab1052b16b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["consecutive terms of 60 months and 84 months that were required for his two 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c) convictions. Lewis was also convicted of one count of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by threats or violence, a violation of the Hobbs Act; eleven counts of <mask>; one count of money transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity; seven counts under the Hobbs Act for interference with commerce by threats or violence; and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. Lewis first challenges the district court\u2019s application of the five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) to two robberies. The enhancement applies if a firearm is brandished during a robbery. With respect to the robbery in Strongsville, Ohio, the district court did not clearly err in determining that it was reasonably foreseeable to Lewis that a firearm would be brandished. See United States v. Jordan, 945 F.3d 245, 263-64 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2698 (2020), and cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 606 (2020). Although Lewis did not commit the Strongsville robbery himself, the evidence sufficiently connected him to the robbery and the unknown person who brandished the firearm while committing the robbery. The evidence showed that Lewis entered the jewelry store about two weeks before the robbery and discussed the availability of high-priced diamonds with the manager. The unknown person later stole diamonds from the same case of large diamonds where Lewis spoke to the manager. Lewis also stayed at a hotel near the store, and he later possessed diamonds that were consistent with ones taken in the robbery. He also had personal knowledge that brandishing a firearm was one way to commit a robbery because he earlier provided a different accomplice with a firearm and that accomplice brandished the firearm during two other robberies. Lewis also challenges the application of the \u00a7 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) enhancement to the robbery of Wright Pawn and Jewelry Company. Contrary to Lewis\u2019s argument that the Government failed to rebut the"], "id": "a7be532c-1300-4f12-ad10-9411b3e8dd20", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Significantly, the defendants in Paul for Councilconceded that their conduct was illegal, but argued that despite the illegality, their conduct was nevertheless entitled to the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Paul for Council, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1366, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864[\"Defendants contend their campaign <mask> activity was taken 'in furtherance ' of their constitutional right of free speech, and therefore such activity comes within the parameters of section 425.16's protection, even though such activity was found to be illegal\"].) The same is not true here. Defendants do not concede that all of the conduct underlying Sweetwater's complaint was illegal. As a result, Paul for Council is not as similar to this case as Sweetwater suggests, and it is clearly not controlling."], "id": "b836f569-3951-49cc-a441-84b815fb27ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Lastly, DeskSite posits that <mask> is a \"known concern\" within the automobile industry, especially with high-end exotic cars. Even if we accept this to be true, the use of a third party's check to pay for a car by itself is still not a red flag of money laundering, particularly where, as here, the check contains a memo line with the customer's initials on it. Further, courts have refused to fashion new duties to deal with similar endemic problems such as identity theft and have justified that refusal with reasoning that is equally applicable here: \"Given the scope of the problem and the consequences to the community of imposing a noncontractual duty with resulting liability for breach, a decision to shift the burden of loss from the actual victim to a third party duped by the thief is one to be made, if at all, by the Legislature, not the judiciary.\" ( Rodriguez , supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 466, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 543.)"], "id": "5de7abd7-ac0e-43f6-b8a7-0a2f51b22ea6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The People originally filed a criminal complaint, but later dismissed it in favor of *721a grand jury hearing. On May 16, 2016, a Riverside County criminal grand jury returned an indictment against petitioner and codefendants Cary Abramowitz, Ana Solis, and Gladys Ross3 in Riverside County case No. RIF1670175. The indictment charges count 1 for conspiracy (\u00a7 182, subd. (a)(1) ), for conspiring to knowingly make or causing to be made any false or fraudulent claims for payment of health care benefits, in violation of section 550, subdivision (a)(6) (Heidary, Abramowitz, Solis, and Ross); counts 2 through 19 for false or fraudulent claims for payment of health care benefits to 18 different, named insurers (\u00a7 550, subd. (a) ) (Heidary, Abramowitz, Solis, and Ross); counts 20 through 37 for willfully and unlawfully making and causing to be made a knowingly false and fraudulent material statement and material representation to 18 different named insurers for payment of workers' compensation ( Ins. Code, \u00a7 1871.4, subd. (a)(1) ) (Heidary, Abramowitz, Solis, and Ross); counts 38 through 66 for <mask> ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 186.10, subd. (a) ) (Heidary); count 67 for unlicensed practice of medicine ( Bus. & Prof. Code, \u00a7 2052, subd. (a) ) (Heidary); count 68 for \"capping\" ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 549 ) (soliciting, accepting or referring any business with the knowledge that, or with reckless disregard for whether, the individual or entity intends to violate Pen. Code, \u00a7 550 or Ins. Code, \u00a7 1871.4 ) (Heidary, Abramowitz, and Solis); and count 69 for the unlicensed practice of law ( Bus. & Prof. Code, \u00a7 6126, subd. (a) ) (Heidary and Abramowitz). The indictment also alleges a white-collar crime enhancement ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 186.11, subd. (a)(2) ) (Heidary, Abramowitz, Solis, and Ross)."], "id": "4c961eb5-d46e-45e8-b832-28be0be2ffab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["First, only a portion of the 69 counts in the operative indictment involve aggregation of multiple acts into single counts. Notably, counts 2 through 19 for insurance fraud in violation of Penal Code section 550, subdivision (a)(6), explicitly allege that \"the aggregate amount of claims and amount at issue exceeded Nine Hundred Fifty dollars ($950) ....\" Counts 20 through 37 for violations of Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(1) (the workers' compensation claims as defined in Lab. Code, \u00a7 3207 ), do not overtly use the term \"aggregate\" regarding multiple acts, but the counts are based on such multiple acts. Further, petitioner argues as much in the petition and in his traverse, contending that the insurance and workers' compensation fraud claims are improperly aggregated, violate the due process requirement of adequate notice of the charges against him (discussed in the next section), and that the other counts against him (e.g., conspiracy, capping, etc.) must fall if the fraud claims are improper. Counts 38 through 66 for <mask> ( Pen. Code. \u00a7 186.10, subd. (a) ), addressed solely against this petitioner, do not aggregate claims, nor do the remaining counts. Accordingly, we will only address the aggregation issue with respect to counts 2 through 19 and 20 through 37."], "id": "f7c1768b-93e9-4aa6-8003-6bbb87c56c1e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The November 5, 2016 article noted Flater's relationship to Gallaher and that Flater had spent \"nearly $192,000 on mailers and canvassing in support of three of the six candidates for City Council.\" That spending \"accounts for more than a third of the total in the race, including spending by candidates' campaigns.\" The article observed, \"The record-breaking infusion of private cash into the race has highlighted the inequity between the $500 limits Santa Rosa puts on individual contributions to local campaigns and the unlimited amounts state law allows donors and groups to spend on independent expenditures not associated with candidates' campaigns.\" The article also reported that \"Gallaher was cleared earlier this year of a similar complaint alleging\" one of his companies \"`engaged in campaign <mask> by making contributions in the name of'\" persons who received reimbursement from the company."], "id": "6dcfc79e-5c4b-4c7b-845f-88142fbc3fc6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant Jedadiah Ray Bolding was convicted of one count of grand theft and eight counts of <mask>. On appeal, he challenges his money laundering convictions, in part, on the ground that the prosecution failed to offer sufficient evidence tracing the illegally obtained money to the monetary transactions involved in each of the money laundering counts. We conclude there was sufficient evidence supporting defendant's money laundering convictions based on the language of Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (a), and current analogous federal law on money laundering."], "id": "cd8410d2-00f7-4ffa-a059-2b223c82806c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We hold that, in a prosecution for <mask> under Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (a), when the prosecution proceeds on the theory that the defendant conducted money laundering activities \"knowing that the monetary instrument represents the proceeds of, or is derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of, criminal activity,\" the prosecution must demonstrate that the amount of the illegally obtained funds equals or exceeds the amount of the monetary transaction. Acknowledging the fungibility of money, we also hold that, whether or *762not the illegally obtained funds have been commingled with legally obtained funds, the prosecution need not prove full or dollar for dollar tracing between the illegally obtained funds and the monetary transaction, as Mays held. Because the statutory basis on which Mays rested its holding has changed, we publish our opinion to clarify the current state of the law."], "id": "5fb83897-6fbb-40e7-9ed6-c4a1e46a363d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the unpublished portions of this opinion, we conclude that (1) there was sufficient evidence of <mask> in count 25 of the operative charging document; (2) defendant forfeited an issue regarding the jury instructions for the money laundering counts; (3) the sentencing enhancements for white collar crime must be reversed; (4) the trial court did not err by imposing consecutive rather than concurrent sentences on the money laundering counts; and (5) the minute order and abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the correct amount of defendant's custody credits."], "id": "ad8ea385-bb20-41bd-8166-93a8179a9792", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A forensic accountant identified a total of 524 unauthorized checks written against the law firm's payroll account that were made out to defendant, totaling $ 1,115,396. The unauthorized checks had all been signed by defendant. The forensic accountant also charted deposits into and expenditures from defendant's personal Wescom Credit Union account from 2007 through October 2013. In analyzing the transactions from defendant's credit union account, the forensic accountant identified the following, which comprised the basis for the <mask> counts:"], "id": "d2e52a09-2c49-478b-87cb-537bb92f1f94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A jury convicted defendant of one count of grand theft ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 487, subd. (a) [count 1] ), and eight counts of <mask> (id. , \u00a7 186.10, subd. (a) [counts 20 through 27] ). The jury found defendant not guilty of 18 counts of fraudulently falsifying records. (Id. , \u00a7\u00a7 470, 471 [counts 2 through 19].) The jury found true the sentencing enhancement allegations that the conduct in counts 1 and 20 through 27 involved the taking of more than $ 500,000 (id. , \u00a7 186.11, subd. (a)(1), (2)); that the transactions represented by counts 20 through 27 involved more than $ 50,000 but less than $ 150,000 (id. , \u00a7 186.10, subd. (c)(1)(A)); and that the value of the property loss in count 1 was in excess of $ 200,000 (id. , \u00a7 12022.6, subd. (a)(2))."], "id": "d66e78ba-71e4-4b91-bda5-19e9832efe8c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years in state prison: an aggravated term of three years on count 1; a consecutive five-year term for the Penal Code section 186.11, subdivision (a) enhancement; and a consecutive two-year term for the Penal Code section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(2) enhancement on count 1. The court imposed a three-year aggravated term on each of the <mask> charges, and ordered that those sentences be served concurrently to the sentence on count 1. The Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (c)(1)(A) enhancements on counts 20 through 27 were stricken for purposes of sentencing. In addition to other fees and fines, the court ordered defendant to pay $ 1,115,396 plus interest in restitution."], "id": "d4949a18-7bee-4c07-9fef-8e5b614a55b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As is relevant to the theory pursued by the prosecutor, Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (a) provides: \"Any person who conducts or attempts to conduct a transaction or more than one transaction within a seven-day period involving a monetary instrument or instruments of a total value exceeding five thousand dollars ($ 5,000) ... through one or more financial institutions ... knowing that the monetary instrument represents the proceeds of, or is directly or indirectly from the proceeds of, *764criminal activity, is guilty of the crime of <mask>.\""], "id": "fac6fa0a-2a22-48d1-8aa1-a63e9a499437", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Mays, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th 13, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 356 was the first, and remains the only, published case in California addressing tracing under Penal Code section 186.10. In Mays , the defendant was convicted of pimping and <mask>. The money laundering counts involved checks written for rent on the office through which the defendant ran his prostitution business, rent on a residence at which the prostitutes lived, and bills for cell phones used in the business. ( Mays, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 18, 20, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 356.) The trial court concluded that a prosecution, based on the same theory employed here, namely that a defendant conducted \"a transaction through a financial institution with a monetary instrument of $ 5,000 or more based on the knowledge of criminal proceeds theory, requires proof that (1) the defendant's entire business was illegal, (2) there were deposits of $ 5,000 or more in criminally derived funds, or (3) there was a transfer of all funds out of the account.\" ( Id. at p. 32, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 356.)"], "id": "b2904783-0fb1-451e-971e-d9998b6ec7ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Attorney General argues that Mays was incorrectly decided and should not be followed by this court. To determine whether tracing was required for a Penal Code section 186.10 violation, the court in Mays looked to the federal <mask> statutes: sections 1956 and 1957 of title 18 of the United States Code (hereafter \" section 1956\" and \" section 1957,\" respectively), and to federal cases interpreting those statutes."], "id": "61d65cb1-27af-4a30-86c3-dc75d110e8ed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The majority view, as summarized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, is: \"Money is fungible, and when funds obtained from unlawful activity have been combined with funds from lawful activity into a single asset, the illicitly-acquired funds and the legitimately-acquired funds (or the respective portions of the property purchased with each) cannot be distinguished from each other [citation]; that is, they cannot be traced to any particular source, absent resort to accepted, but arbitrary, accounting techniques [citation]. As a consequence, it may be presumed in such circumstances, as the language of section 1957 permits, that the transacted funds, at least up to the full amount originally derived from crime, were the proceeds of the criminal activity or derived from that activity. [Citations.] A requirement that the government trace each dollar of the transaction to the criminal, as opposed to the non-criminal activity, would allow individuals effectively to defeat prosecution for <mask> by simply commingling legitimate funds with criminal proceeds.\" ( U.S. v. Moore (4th Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 969, 976-977 ; see U.S. v. Silver (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 184 F.Supp.3d 33, 51-52.)"], "id": "81f376e0-f5d7-4ae9-b9bf-c3e373f925f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even before Rutgard was decided, a majority of other courts had employed an analysis when tracing in <mask> cases recognizing that money is fungible. As explained by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: \"The government had the burden of showing that the criminally derived property used in the monetary transactions was in fact derived from specified unlawful activity. This does not mean, however, that the government had to show that funds withdrawn from the defendant's account could not possibly have come from any source other than the unlawful activity. Once proceeds of unlawful activity have been deposited in a financial institution and have been credited to an account, those funds cannot be traced to any particular transaction and cannot be distinguished from any other funds deposited in the account. The 'tainted' funds may be commingled with 'untainted' funds, with the result being simply a net credit balance in favor of the depositor. The credit balance gives the depositor a claim against the bank and allows him to withdraw funds *767to the extent of the credit. In the context of a withdrawal, the portion of \u00a7 1957 requiring a showing that the proceeds were in fact 'derived from specified unlawful activity' could not have been intended as a requirement *1046that the government prove that no 'untainted' funds were deposited along with the unlawful proceeds. [Citation.] Such an interpretation would allow individuals to avoid prosecution simply by commingling legitimate funds with proceeds of crime. [Citation.] This would defeat the very purpose of the money-laundering statutes.\" ( U.S. v. Johnson (10th Cir. 1992) 971 F.2d 562, 570.)"], "id": "f9ee83ab-1edd-44e7-bd18-a4ff2bf06994", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Second, since both Rutgard and Mays were decided, section 1957 has been amended to include a definition of \"proceeds.\" In U.S. v. Santos (2008) 553 U.S. 507, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912, the Supreme Court held that the word \"proceeds\" in section 1956 was ambiguous and could mean profits or receipts. ( U.S. v. Santos, supra, 553 U.S. at p. 511, 128 S.Ct. 2020.) Under the rule of lenity, the court interpreted proceeds as meaning profits because to trace the <mask> transaction to the defendant's profits would require more from the prosecution in order to obtain a conviction. ( Id. at pp. 513-514, 128 S.Ct. 2020.)"], "id": "6ab91617-35d9-4bd5-abb0-6473621dfc99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We hold that, when a defendant is charged with <mask> \"knowing that the monetary instrument represents the proceeds of, or is derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of, criminal activity,\" the prosecution must demonstrate that the amount of the illegally obtained funds equals or exceeds the amount of the monetary transaction, whether or not the illegally obtained funds have been commingled with legally obtained funds. ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 186.10, subd. (a).) The prosecution need not trace every illegal dollar to the monetary instrument. In this case, there was sufficient evidence that the amount of money defendant embezzled from the law firm and placed in his Wescom Credit Union account was greater than the amount of the monetary transactions charged in the money laundering counts. Therefore, defendant's convictions for money laundering must be affirmed."], "id": "4bb6085a-f30b-4c83-bbc9-79542f36acac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In 2010, the BLP collapsed and Plaintiffs lost their investments. An FBI investigation revealed that Sigillito operated the BLP as a Ponzi scheme. Unsealing the indictment in May 2011, the United States charged Sigillito with <mask>, wire fraud, and mail fraud. The federal indictment asserted that, inter alia , Sigillito and Brown retained unauthorized placement fees after transferring their clients' assets. A jury found Sigillito guilty, and the federal district court sentenced him to forty years in prison. Sigillito's convictions and sentences were affirmed. United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 941 (8th Cir. 2014)."], "id": "dd42c9a6-ecfd-46c6-8f4c-d6b9d0021732", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Applying the capable-of-ascertaimnent test objectively, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs demonstrate that their damages were capable of ascertainment by May 2011, The parties agree that the BLP collapsed after an FBI investigation in 2010 and that Plaintiffs received notice of their extensive investment losses shortly thereafter. The parties acknowledge that Sigillito's federal indictment was unsealed in May 2011. Sigillito's indictment revealed the charges of <mask>, wire fraud, and mail fraud arising from BLP operations. The federal indictment exposed the wrongful nature of the BLP venture, linking Plaintiffs' investment losses to, and unveiling the damage caused by, the BLP's administration. The federal indictment also established that Sigillito, in managing the BLP, retained numerous unauthorized placement fees before directing the distribution of his clients' assets to overseas borrowers and committed improper self-dealing in these transfers."], "id": "35d731c2-5311-4fc9-8143-ecf81763bd40", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant was tried on one count of engaging in organized criminal activity. That count alleged that Appellant, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination3 or in the profits of a combination, committed second degree theft or second degree <mask>.4 The theory was that Appellant was part of a criminal ring that committed multiple jewelry store heists. The biggest heist, and the focus of the trial, was that of a Houston store called Karat 22, which was owned by Aku Patel. As the name might imply, Karat 22 specialized in high-quality gold jewelry."], "id": "3178e6cb-a977-43ce-b9b8-34fd3e56aa91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, KELVIN LYNN O'BRIEN, heretofore on or about August 13, 2007 and continuing through April 12, 2013, did then and there unlawfully, with intent to establish, maintain or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination, said combination, consisting of Kelvin O'Brien and at least two of the following: John O'Brien and/or Derenda O'Brien and/or Jason Kennedy, commit the offense of theft in that the defendant on or about February 6, 2011 did unlawfully appropriate by acquiring or otherwise exercising control over property, namely, gold, jewelry, gems and watches owned by C. Patel or Karat 22 Jewelers of the value of over two hundred thousand dollars with the intent to deprive C. Patel or Karat 22 Jewelers of the property then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment; or If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, KELVIN LYNN O'BRIEN, heretofore on or about August 13, 2007 and continuing through April 12, 2013, did then and there unlawfully, with intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination, said combination consisting of Kelvin O'Brien and at least two of the following: John O'Brien and/or Derenda O'Brien and/or Jason Kennedy, commit the offense of <mask>, namely in that he heretofore on or about August 13, 2007 and continuing through April 12, 2013, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly transfer, invest or expend funds which constituted the proceeds of criminal activity, of the value of at least two hundred thousand dollars by purchasing a house, by purchasing a pool, by purchasing motor vehicles, by purchasing a boat, by purchasing a watch, by purchasing heavy equipment, by moving funds from one bank account to another or by paying bondsmen's fees, then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. The word \"unanimously\" appeared in the section of the jury charge dealing with selection of the jury foreman:"], "id": "7b045755-6562-435a-8418-3650b60bd8c7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["After you retire to the jury room, you should select one of your members as your Foreman. It is his or her duty to preside at your deliberations, vote with you, and when you have unanimously agreed upon a verdict, to certify to your verdict by using the appropriate form attached hereto and signing the same as Foreman. *382Without objection, the prosecution explained at closing, as it had in voir dire, that the jury did not have to agree on whether Appellant committed the predicate offense of theft, or that of <mask>. Appellant was convicted and punishment was assessed at life in prison."], "id": "a7c70b17-c86d-44dd-86bf-d3eb8f21ff11", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Though Appellant did not object to the jury charge at trial, he argued on appeal that the jury instructions permitted a non-unanimous verdict. Specifically, he argued the application paragraph did not require the jury to be unanimous regarding which predicate offense had been committed by Appellant and his criminal combination. According to Appellant, the predicate offenses of theft and <mask> were essential elements of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity rather than alternate manner and means."], "id": "b04b9a00-c483-4881-9045-01de176db1d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["If the specific enumerated offense was an essential element of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity, then the use of the term \"one or more\" would be meaningless, because the commission of each enumerated offense would constitute a separate instance of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity.8 Appellant petitioned this Court to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that unanimity is not required with respect to the predicate offenses of theft and <mask>. As he points out, his case is unique in that he was charged with committing two different predicate offenses rather than multiple instances of the same predicate offense. We therefore granted review."], "id": "f8d0abe6-0217-463e-bc33-8debd3c46e9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As we explain more fully below, engaging in organized criminal activity is a \"circumstances of the conduct,\" offense, the circumstance being the existence or creation of a combination that collaborates in carrying out criminal activities.23 Consequently, the jury was not required to be unanimous regarding the individual predicate offenses because they are a different manner and means of committing the same offense. Moreover, treating the predicate offenses as manner and means in this case does not run afoul of due process because the offenses at issue are morally and conceptually equivalent. Consequently, the trial court properly instructed the jury in the disjunctive with regard to the predicate offenses of theft and <mask>."], "id": "ae4edd35-d5fd-4c18-8ad8-f53b22fd78a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In sum, we must return to eighth-grade grammar to determine what elements the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt. At a minimum, these are: the subject (the defendant); the main verb; and the direct object if the main verb requires a direct object (i.e. the offense is a result-oriented crime); and the specific occasion (the date phrase within the indictment, but narrowed down to one specific intent regardless of the date alleged). Generally, adverbial phrases, introduced by the preposition \"by,\" describe the manner and means of committing the offense. They are not the gravamen of the offense, nor elements on which the jury must be unanimous.36 In this case, the indictment and the jury charge used the preposition \"by\" to describe the manner in which the predicate offenses were alleged to have been committed rather than as a way to differentiate between the two predicate offenses of theft and <mask>.37 According to Appellant, this indicates that predicate offenses are elements rather than manner and means."], "id": "866628f7-be3d-4d68-b567-c740d4e83f7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant argues, however, that engaging in organized criminal activity is one of those crimes. We need not decide that question in this case because it is enough to say that the two predicate offenses alleged here-theft and money laundering-are morally and conceptually equivalent.85 Significantly, the <mask> statute requires proof of a temporal connection or nexus between the transferred money and some criminal activity, in this case the theft of the jewelry.86 So the jury was required to determine, when reaching its verdict, whether the \"proceeds of criminal activity\" came from the alleged theft in order to convict Appellant under a money laundering theory of engaging. In this way, the different predicate offenses are tied together similar to the way the underlying felonies are tied together in the felony murder statute.87 Moreover, the degree of offense for both theft and money laundering is tied to the same value ladder rendering both offenses first degree felonies.88 Consequently, the Legislature's decision to treat these predicate offenses as alternate manner and means of committing the same offense did not run afoul of due process.89"], "id": "47548d0c-84f5-4ad0-b6e4-cc3f8fb6bed8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant essentially argues that permitting a conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity without requiring unanimity as to the predicate offense seems \"contrary to due process\" given the broad range of enumerated predicate offenses (e.g. , gambling to capital murder). There are two flaws with appellant's position. First, as this Court's majority opinion points out, here the two offenses that were pleaded in the alternative were both first-degree felonies involving the unlawful treatment of property-theft and <mask>. Second and perhaps more importantly, appellant fails to consider the statute as a whole, as required by this Court's precedent. See Yazdchi v. State , 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The punishment range for engaging in organized criminal activity is dependent on the punishment classification of the highest predicate offense found by the jury.3 Given the plain statutory language *397prescribing the punishment range for engaging in organized criminal activity, it is clear that the jury must unanimously determine any predicate offenses on which it relies as alternative manner and means if they are not the same grade misdemeanor or felony. Here, the two predicate offenses that the jury was permitted to find in the disjunctive were both first-degree felonies and thus, under the plain language of the statute, appellant would be sentenced to the same punishment range regardless of which predicate offense had been found by the jury. Appellant has made no argument to explain how there could be a due process violation under the circumstances here where the two predicate offenses alleged are both first-degree felonies involving property.4"], "id": "d5f738ff-17b0-43d3-bb8c-0da2e215bccc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Additionally, even though the majority already holds that the jury does not need to be unanimous as to the predicate offenses, it nevertheless engages in Schad analysis to reach the holding that the theft and <mask> in this case are both morally and conceptually equivalent. The majority's analysis in this regard is hedging its bets: in case it is wrong about whether the predicate offenses need unanimous verdicts as a general rule of law, at least the predicates in this case do not. As far as the actual analysis about why the offenses are morally and conceptually equivalent, I am unsure if the majority's reasoning is sound. Essentially, the reasoning is: (1) the offenses are connected because the money laundering is laundering the proceeds of the theft; (2) they are both first degree felonies in this case. This is nowhere near the same as the kill-and-burn/burn-and-kill example given by Justice Scalia."], "id": "0017561b-2cea-4224-8dd4-086043e5e1f6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["O'Brien , 482 S.W.3d at 607 (\"The indictment states that Kelvin committed the enumerated offense of theft 'by acquiring and otherwise exercising control over property ... owned by' Karat 22 and the enumerated offense of <mask> 'by purchasing a house, by purchasing a pool, by purchasing motor vehicles,' etc.\"). The application paragraph of the jury charge adopts this construction."], "id": "bee990f2-a32d-4ea4-87c2-db12d5b6a59f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Tex. Penal Code \u00a7 34.02(a)(1) ; see also Deschenes v. State , 253 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) (\"In order for a conviction for <mask> under \u00a7 34.02(a)(1) to be upheld, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence of a temporal connection, or nexus, between the money and some criminal activity.\"). Arguably, the State could have even chosen to charge Appellant with theft of money rather than money laundering, making this case conceptually identical to the different thefts at issue in Renteria . This would further suggest that the underlying brute facts of the two alleged predicate offenses were morally and conceptually equivalent."], "id": "b3a99982-a76e-4a1d-8533-e7d4e3a001b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Compare Tex. Penal Code \u00a7 31.03(e)(7) (listing theft as a first degree felony if the value of the property stolen is $300,000 or more) with Tex. Penal Code \u00a7 34.02(e)(4) listing <mask> as a first degree if the value of the funds is $300,000 or more); see also White , 208 S.W.3d at 469 (holding that the state-jail-offenses of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and evading arrest or detention in a vehicle were morally and conceptually equivalent)."], "id": "28ca1258-9b00-4137-8d5d-2cf9ca36502e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["smuggling or failing to report cash is more serious than the Court is willing to acknowledge. The drug trade, <mask>, and tax evasion all depend in part on smuggled and unreported cash. Congress enacted the reporting requirement because secret exports of money were being used in organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, pp. 12-13 (1970). Likewise, tax evaders were using cash exports to dodge hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes owed to the Government."], "id": "4ddbf441-1fd8-483e-bac5-276261e871c7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["524 U.S. at 351 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent noted that because <mask> and drug smuggling are so difficult to prove, and \u201c[o]ne of the few reliable warning signs of some serious crimes is the use of large sums of cash,\u201d Congress made a strategic decision to punish all cash smuggling or nonreporting with heavy fines, so long as the conduct was \u201cwillful.\u201d Id. at 353-54. State v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass\u2019n, No. 99407-2 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)"], "id": "cf5cb011-49e1-46b4-a8e8-a5db107dccef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Per Curiam. On February 8, 2013, in the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chun, J.), the respondent pleaded guilty to 13 felony counts: 10 counts of grand larceny in the second degree, a class C felony, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 155.40 (1); <mask> in the first degree, a class B felony, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 470.20 (1); scheme to defraud in the first degree, a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 190.65 (1) (b); and conspiracy in the fourth degree, a class E felony, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 105.10 (D."], "id": "2512e74d-94bb-41c3-84de-3b98748f4119", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On March 20, 2013, the Supreme Court sentenced the respondent to concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 2 to 6 years for each of the grand larceny convictions, 3 to 9 years for the <mask> conviction, 2 to 6 years for the scheme to defraud conviction, and 1 to 3 years for the conspiracy conviction. The respondent was also directed to pay a crime victims\u2019 assessment fee of $25, a DNA fee of $50, and a surcharge of $300. The respondent failed to notify the Court of his convictions."], "id": "c4cfc6a2-e7bc-4a03-bddc-a12a5d54130e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Per Curiam. On February 8, 2013, in the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chun, J.), the respondent pleaded guilty to 13 felony counts: 10 counts of grand larceny in the second degree, a class C felony, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 155.40 (1); <mask> in the first degree, a class B felony, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 470.20 (1); scheme to defraud in the first degree, a class E felony in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 190.65 (1) (b); and conspiracy in the fourth degree, a class E felony, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 105.10 (D."], "id": "7f0ec994-55dd-4a0b-b338-18d7f3f71d27", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On March 20, 2013, the Supreme Court sentenced the respondent to concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 2 to 6 years for each of the grand larceny convictions, 3 to 9 years for the <mask> conviction, 2 to 6 years for the scheme to defraud conviction, and 1 to 3 years for the conspiracy conviction. The respondent was also directed to pay a crime victims\u2019 assessment fee of $25, a DNA fee of $50, and a surcharge of $300. The respondent failed to notify the Court of his convictions."], "id": "d577851d-8686-4a7f-82a5-dc7164181eec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In September 1994 the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York informed petitioner of an investigation her office had conducted in 1990, which implicated respondent in narcotics trafficking and <mask>. Respondent\u2019s alleged involvement in these activities was through her relationship with one Selwyn Wilson, a young man whom her firm had represented in a criminal matter in the mid-1980\u2019s. Charged with assault and robbery, Wilson had pleaded guilty to reduced charges and received a sentence of probation, on condition that he maintain lawful employment. Respondent developed a \"warm familial relationship\u201d with Wilson (counsel describes him as respondent\u2019s \"surrogate son\u201d), employing him briefly as an office clerk and then as her personal assistant and driver. According to Wilson, he escorted respondent in the latter capacity to meetings and social functions, and on those occasions he often spent the night at her homes in the Bronx or in Brookville, Long Island."], "id": "4fc32b0f-144e-4161-bb15-1c471f35812d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "money laundering", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Subsequently, respondent was convicted in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, of one count of conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 371 and one count of <mask> in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 1956 (a) (1) (B) (i). By order and decision entered November 15, 1994 (Matter of Stern, 205 AD2d 162), this Court determined that respondent\u2019s convictions constituted \"serious crimes\u201d within the meaning of Judiciary Law \u00a7 90 (4) (d) and 22 NYCRR 608.12 (b), suspended respondent from the practice of law pursuant to Judiciary Law \u00a7 90 (4) (f) and referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee for a hearing as to sanction."], "id": "01167e1c-674f-4288-94c1-6c905441fa48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Two weeks before the scheduled trial date, and four months before the trial actually commenced, Suh filed an ex parte application to stay this action indefinitely. Counsel for Suh had recently learned the district attorney was investigating Suh's participation in the <mask> scheme. Citing her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Suh argued: \"Clearly, any discovery sought by plaintiffs in this matter, or testimony offered by [Suh] in her defense at trial, would necessarily require [Suh] to answer questions related to the very documents and events that would form the basis of a criminal prosecution for insurance fraud.\" During a brief hearing on the application, counsel for Allstate observed that Suh was \"one of two ringleaders in this case\" and \"a central witness\" and that, if the court were to issue a stay, the stay should apply only to discovery. The trial court denied the ex parte application."], "id": "762f824b-7247-4c66-8a14-83466e8cd768", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court is of the firm belief that the public policy goal announced in Schaubman v Blum (supra) and pointedly affirmed in Matter of Camperlengo v Blum (supra, at 255) and Grand Jury v Kuriansky (supra), that is, an assurance that public funds from Medicaid will not be fraudulently diverted into the hands of an untrustworthy provider of services, is equally applicable to the inherent design and orderly functioning of the Federally funded Medicare program. No rational distinction may be drawn, insofar as record keeping and reporting requirements are concerned, between these two publicly funded health insurance programs. It should be a matter of sound public policy that those officials, who are charged with maintaining vigilance over public funds dedicated to the Medicare program, have available to them a legitimate and unqualified means of access to medical reports required for specific investigations, in light of the potential for massive <mask>."], "id": "99ba7308-251e-40c1-b431-d500d64a4977", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although posited slightly differently than the argument in MBIA Ins. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (34 Misc 3d 895 [2012] [MBIA v Countrywide]), a related case also before this court having arguments corresponding to those made in this matter by both plaintiff therein and Countrywide, defendants in both cases, the base issue before the court in this motion is when causation occurs in claims for <mask> and breach of representations and warranties. Syncora asserts in both its fraud and breach claims that causation occurred, and liability results, when Countrywide made misrepresentations that were material and which induced Syncora to issue financial guaranty insurance policies. Syncora asserts that had it known the true facts of the underlying mortgage loans, it may have either declined to issue its financial guaranty insurance policies or issued the policies on different terms. Syncora contends that it was denied the opportunity to examine the facts based on proper information, and, thus, all payments it has made pursuant to the policies result from Countrywide\u2019s alleged misrepresentations."], "id": "985c43cd-9c1f-42f8-bb10-6b1631bdf7a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs, moreover, have remedies available to them that are not available to the millions of New York motorists that pay the additional premium costs that the Court of Appeals has identified as resulting from automobile <mask> (see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 861 [2003]). Service providers may explicitly include in their assignment documents provision for recourse against the assignor if the insurer does not pay because of lack of coverage, and the providers may bring an assignor into any action against the carrier when the carrier defends nonpayment on the ground of lack of coverage."], "id": "53ac96d7-507b-4969-a4f8-051f8a537536", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". People v Alfaro (121 Misc 2d 804 [Sup Ct, Queens County], affd 108 AD2d 517 [2d Dept 1985]), cited by defendant, is not controlling. In Alfaro, the defendant\u2019s fraudulent claim was rejected by the insurer. In the absence of evidence that defendant\u2019s claim included any dollar amounts the court found defendant guilty only of the misdemeanor <mask>. The situation here, involving claims settled for a sum certain, is distinguishable."], "id": "7c0e7f20-08fe-4d2a-953e-11ea2f506f42", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*594Lastly, in Rosenberg , the defendant, a physician, retained an attorney for an investigation related to alleged <mask> and any criminal litigation that may result from it. The United States charged the defendant with two counts of knowingly receiving and retaining stolen property of the United States. The defendant pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to two years' probation and ordered to pay restitution of $209,435.78."], "id": "8d1f79ed-7d47-4c0a-9a34-2ba95ec26d59", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment before the jury charges the defendant, Paul Novak, for the murder of his estranged wife, arson in connection with the burning of the marital residence, burglary, grand larceny and <mask>. Jury selection for this trial began on August 5, 2013. At some point prior to jury selection, defendant sought out and gave an interview to the reporter for the Record who has been reporting on this case for some time.2 That interview occurred on August 2, 2013. The Times Herald-Record ran a front-page story about the defendant and on the *751interview in the August 4, 2013, Sunday edition of the paper. It also posted a \u201cportion\u201d of the video recorded interview on its website on August 4, 2013. The running of the story and posting of the interview detrimentally affected the jury pool, but the parties were eventually able to seat 12 jurors and eight alternate jurors. Opening statements and testimony commenced the following week, on August 12, 2013."], "id": "88c2c3d6-389c-4214-b510-2c509f1854b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The present indictment charges the defendant, a lawyer whose office is in Manhattan, with <mask> and falsifying business records of Dr. Kaiser and the insurer. The charges, clarified by a bill of particulars, allege that the defendant solicited Kaiser on the telephone to make up and submit back-dated bills for fictitious visits by two clients, to beef up claims on insurance policies for injuries from automobile accidents. During the conversation, Kaiser was in Kings County, having telephoned the defendant\u2019s office in Manhattan from the District Attorney\u2019s office in Brooklyn."], "id": "8eb45c4c-f256-436e-9432-df662d21f38b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On November 7, 2017, the Fourth District, Division Three, issued Hoffman v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1086, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 818, after an order to show cause on substantially similar issues at the direction of the Supreme Court. Hoffman involved similar <mask> charges, aggregated to form felony counts, contained in an information and reviewed for probable cause at a preliminary hearing. It was also subject to a demurrer, which that superior court overruled. Here, petitioner was indicted by a grand jury, which heard testimony and received exhibits into evidence. The case is presented here as a writ petition following denial of a section 995 motion. Substantively, the cases are closely related. The Supreme Court denied review of Hoffman on February 14, 2018. Because of the difference in procedural posture in this case from Hoffman and because this case also addresses Insurance Code section 1871.4, which Hoffman does not, we issue Heidary v. Superior Court as a published opinion."], "id": "ae199c5c-d394-487c-bd97-56d546b5344b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Here, an attempted larceny or attempted <mask> within the unlawfully entered premises can be inferred from the conduct at the Regency Warehouse. \"A person is guilty of an attempt * * * when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 110.00.) Evidence that an insured has arranged for his own property to be destroyed or \"stolen\u201d in preparation for filing a false insurance claim has been held to constitute an attempted insurance fraud. (People v Vastano, 117 AD2d 637; see also, People v Trepanier, 84 AD2d 374.)"], "id": "4259e338-4f40-4ea1-81c5-c5515543a466", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"The business of insurance involves many transactions that have the potential for abuse and illegal activities,\" and \"[a]utomobile <mask> is the biggest and fastest growing segment of insurance fraud ....\" ( Ins. Code, \u00a7 1871, subds. (a), (b).) The Insurance Frauds Prevention Act ( Ins. Code, \u00a7 1871 et seq. ) addresses this problem by creating civil liability for violating several insurance fraud provisions of the Penal Code, including section 550."], "id": "5226546e-c826-4c92-8fa7-5b7227b4e06e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The issue of materiality has already been discussed in connection with the charges of <mask>, and the same reasoning would apply in regard to the charge of perjury in the first degree. In other words, false testimony, to the effect that the defendant did not have other insurance coverage, would be material only if it altered the insurance carrier\u2019s financial liability, or, otherwise, adversely affected the carrier\u2019s position."], "id": "673b4140-428f-4504-83f3-26780c0781dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, identity is not at issue; thus, the court fails to see how this exception to admission is applicable. Furthermore, the *744People have not demonstrated that the evidence is admissible under the common plan or scheme since it is not so inextricably interwoven as in some of the cases upon which they rely to support this proposition.6 Additionally, although this case does involve a crime of intent, it is this court\u2019s opinion that intent, and thus absence of mistake or accident, may be inferred from the charged crimes for which defendant is on trial involving two incidents of <mask> with two different undercover officers. (See People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 856 [1996] [court properly denied admission of prior uncharged sexual misconduct to prove intent, although it was element of crime, since issue was one of credibility whereby defendant claimed consent and intent could be inferred from act itself].)"], "id": "eadea9f0-9555-428e-bdab-757c7625988b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On March 5, 2009, petitioner pleaded guilty to the felonies of falsifying business records in the first degree, <mask> in the fifth degree, and leaving the scene of an accident which resulted in death. On April 28, 2009 he was sentenced to a \u201csplit\u201d sentence of six months \u201cshock\u201d incarceration at the Westchester County Jail and five years\u2019 probation. Petitioner\u2019s *580driver\u2019s license was revoked for one year and the order of revocation, signed by petitioner, required him to obtain the permission of both the Westchester County Department of Probation and the court before reapplying for a license. Despite this license revocation, petitioner, shortly after his release from six months\u2019 incarceration, drove his car to an appointment with his Probation Officer. He was promptly arrested. On November 24, 2009, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (the AUO conviction) for so doing, and received a 30-day jail sentence."], "id": "7157f0d6-d45a-4ecc-bb6f-fac7c3d14cb5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Frank J. LaBuda, J. Defendant in the above-captioned matter is on trial by indict*734ment charged with murder in the first and second degrees, burglary, arson, larceny and <mask> involving the death of his estranged wife, Catherine Novak, on December 13, 2008. The case is currently before a jury on the People\u2019s direct case as the trial enters its fourth week."], "id": "fc65feb2-44f9-4235-8624-241c090ea16a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The crimes alleged are <mask>, for soliciting the doctor to change the MRI findings with intent to defraud insurers; falsifying business records, the MRI reports at the radiologist\u2019s office; and attempted grand larceny, an attempt by false pretenses to gain money in a lawsuit against the New York City Transit Authority. At the time of the crimes charged in the indictment, the doctor, unknown to the defendant Lessoff, was working undercover with the District Attorney\u2019s office during the Grand Jury investigation and was secretly recording his telephone conversations with Lessoff. The indictment alleges 10 separate transactions involving 10 separate clients of Lessoff and the partnership. At all times Lessoff was acting in the name of the law firm. There is no evidence implicating anyone else in the firm in the alleged crimes."], "id": "40a318b8-0293-4a6d-b5dc-4faec919aa7b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At issue is whether the statutory funding scheme for the investigation and prosecution of workers' compensation <mask> ( Ins. Code, \u00a7 1872.83 ) created a conflict of interest for the district attorney. As argued by Pierce, a conflict exists because the Kern County Workers' Compensation Fraud Unit receives grant funding from the California Insurance Commission. The funds, based *343on assessments statutorily imposed upon insurance companies, are used to criminally prosecute workers' compensation fraud cases, and includes the salaries and benefits of the two prosecutors in the unit (the prosecutor in this case being one of the two), as well as the salaries of the unit's investigator and paralegal, the computers and software. The grant funds are determined by the Fraud Assessment Commission, as outlined in Insurance Code section 1872.83, which provides in relevant part:"], "id": "8a226664-ecc8-42e0-8aad-1e73e62f38ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The essence of <mask> is the filing of a false written statement as part of a claim for insurance. (People v Alfaro, 108 AD2d 517, 520, affd 66 NY2d 985; People v Dybdahl, 144 AD2d 949, 950). Contrary to the contention of defendant, the fact that County Court found her not guilty of arson did not mean that she could not be. convicted of insurance fraud. The proof at trial was overwhelming that defendant was fully aware that the fire was intentionally set to collect on the insurance policy. The fact that defendant presented sworn proofs of loss to the insurance company, knowing that they contained materially false information, or that they concealed information for the purpose of misleading, is sufficient to establish the crime of insurance fraud (see, People v Dybdahl, supra, at 950). The People established that defendant gave materially false information on her proofs of loss when she swore that the cause of the fire was unknown. She also gave materially false information when she claimed that the microwave oven was new when, in fact, it was old and broken."], "id": "f856d95c-e3ce-4d2a-9b9f-fa61ea00d4d6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". It is worth noting that by this argument, defendant undermines his claim, discussed in point I, supra, that the prosecution failed to prove the value of the <mask>. If, as he states, \"neither Kramer nor his client were entitled to the proceeds of any insurance claim\u201d then the entire settlement amount received from each issue would constitute the value of the proven fraud \u2014 in each case, over $1,500."], "id": "42a50c5b-f851-4566-8405-2e4416bbe5ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". People v Alfaro (121 Misc 2d 804 [Sup Ct, Queens County], affd 108 AD2d 517 [2d Dept 1985]), cited by defendant, is not controlling. In Alfaro, the defendant\u2019s fraudulent claim was rejected by the insurer. In the absence of evidence that defendant\u2019s claim included any dollar amounts the court found defendant guilty only of the misdemeanor <mask>. The situation here, involving claims settled for a sum certain, is distinguishable."], "id": "dcd87943-9cdc-4e92-919b-81b259ca0a20", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Board has promulgated a list of \u201cdishonorable or unethical\u201d conduct under 24 Del. Admin. C. \u00a7 1700\u20138 (hereinafter \u201cRegulation 8\u201d). According to Regulation 8, \u201c[t]he phrase \u2018dishonorable or unethical conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or harm the public\u2019 as used in 24 Del.C. \u00a7 1731(b)(3) shall include, but not be limited to . . . [a]ny . . . act tending to bring discredit upon the profession.\u201d43 Imhof\u2019s assertion that the Board\u2019s conclusions were \u201csummary [in] nature\u201d44 are not supported by the Order, which found that Imhof committed acts, to which he admitted, that included 1) intentionally damaging his spouse\u2019s vehicle, (2) committing <mask> in connection with contemporaneous damage to his own vehicle, 3) accessing his spouse\u2019s home without permission and destroying clothing and bedding within; and 4) peering through the window of his spouse\u2019s home to watch her and another individual engage in sexual activity.45 It is not difficult to perceive how these actions would bring discredit to the profession.46 Imhof argues that because his actions involved \u201cprivate conduct between spouses,\u201d it was not likely to \u201cdeceive, defraud, or harm the public.\u201d Imhof\u2019s actions, however, affected not just his spouse, but others as well: e.g., during both the \u201ckeying\u201d incident and the incident involving surreptitious entry into his"], "id": "2072f90e-0571-4728-bc47-654898399591", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the instant case, the defendant\u2019s submissions in support of its defense of fraud fail to establish a lack of coverage defense that may be deemed exempt from the preclusion remedy. The expert\u2019s conclusions are insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the medical services rendered \u201cdo[ ] not arise out of an insured incident\u201d (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 199), so as to implicate a lack of coverage issue. Moreover, the acts allegedly constituting the fraudulent conduct are inadequate to demonstrate that the accident was in furtherance of an <mask> scheme so as to invoke the lack of coverage defense and exemption from the preclusion remedy (see Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002], supra)."], "id": "1fc44f12-ac24-4418-84b1-106f0e95b713", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The respondent was indicted in or about March 1993 in Kings County and charged under Indictment No. 13104/92 with <mask>, attempted grand larceny, and falsifying business records. The respondent entered a plea of guilty, on March 1, 1994, before the Honorable Michael R. Juviler in the Supreme Court, Kings County, to attempted falsifying of business records in the first degree, a class A misdemeanor and a serious crime. On May 3, 1994, Justice Juviler ordered the respondent to pay $5,000 in reparation to the Lawyers\u2019 Fund for Client Protection and to perform 300 hours of community service."], "id": "e120c5a3-f2c0-4741-a7a8-4d8e93e3b4d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We are as mindful as our dissenting colleague of the steep increase in fraudulent no-fault benefits claims arising both from traffic incidents staged to defraud and from provider claims where the services or supplies were either never rendered or are based on excessive or unwarranted treatment or supplies (e.g. Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 571 [2005] [\u201cAbuse . . . abounds\u201d]). The Court of Appeals clearly determined that only defenses based on the former are not subject to the preclusion sanction (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 199). Indeed, juxtaposed to that holding is the concurring opinion in Chubb which, recognizing the majority\u2019s rejection of the argument, sought to merge claims based on unnecessary or excessive treatment, however fraudulently sought, with the mandatory endorsement\u2019s limitation on recoverable benefits to items of \u201cbasic economic loss,\u201d that is, the \u201cnecessary expenses\u201d incurred by eligible injured persons (90 NY2d at 203 [Wesley, J., concurring]; see Insurance Law \u00a7 5102 [a] [1]). However, we are bound by the majority\u2019s unequivocal construction of the No-Fault Law which limits an insurer\u2019s ability to resist \u201cill-founded, illegitimate and fraudulent claims\u201d submitted by providers of medical services or medical equipment to the \u201cstrict, short-leashed contestable period\u201d set forth in, the verification protocols (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d at 285 [emphasis added]). The clear *79implication is that a defense based on a provider\u2019s alleged fraudulent claim for no-fault benefits is precluded by an insurer\u2019s failure effectively to invoke its remedies in the \u201ccontestable period,\u201d one of the \u201ctradeoff[s] of the no-fault reform\u201d which the Legislature recognized as the cost of providing \u201cprompt uncontested, first-party insurance benefits\u201d (id.). The dissenter\u2019s conjoining of a provider\u2019s fraudulent claim arising from an otherwise covered accident with the exception to the preclusion rule of claims based on traffic incidents staged to defraud, elides the critical distinction between claims based on noncovered, fraudulent events, which implicate an insurer\u2019s obligations under an insurance contract, with claims based on fraudulent excessive treatment or supplies, or unprovided treatment or supplies, or fraudulent overbilling therefor, which concern only the extent of an insurer\u2019s liability for no-fault benefits following a covered accident. The former are not subject to preclusion because an insurer has not contracted to provide benefits for such events, while the latter are subject to preclusion because, if arising from a covered incident, they \u201cdo[ ] not ordinarily constitute ... [a] lack of coverage classification\u201d but merely excessive no-fault benefits otherwise payable under an insurance contract (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 202 [excessive no-fault payments are merely \u201ca matter of degree\u201d]). Indeed, we see no meaningful distinction between a fraudulent claim for a $25 item of unprovided medical equipment following a covered accident, a fraudulent claim for $500 medical equipment where the item\u2019s cost to the provider was $25 (that is, well in excess of 150% of cost), and a $500 claim for physical therapy treatments where only $25 of such treatments were medically necessary or, for that matter, were actually administered. In essence, the Court of Appeals declined to distinguish forms of provider fraud according to the method of perpetration; thus, fraudulent provider claims, whether by \u201cfraudulent overbilling\u201d or whatever other forms of fraud the dissent means by \u201cclassic fraud,\u201d remain collectively subject to the preclusion rule. Only coverage defenses are not subject to the preclusion sanction. The dissent attempts to expand the coverage defense exception to provider fraud which is contrary to prevailing Court of Appeals decisions and applicable law which only the Legislature is empowered to change. We note in passing that an insurer precluded from defending a claim based on provider fraud is not without remedy; after paying such a claim, the insurer, for example, may have an action *80to recover benefits paid under a theory of fraud or unjust enrichment (cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313, 322 [2005]) and it may seek criminal sanctions for <mask> and obtain restitution (Penal Law \u00a7 176.00 et seq.; \u00a7 60.27)."], "id": "200f56fe-953d-4b30-8886-7f7e307d2d23", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment before the jury charges the defendant, Paul Novak, for the murder of his estranged wife, arson in connection with the burning of the marital residence, burglary, grand larceny and <mask>. Jury selection for this trial began on August 5, 2013. At some point prior to jury selection, defendant sought out and gave an interview to the reporter for the Record who has been reporting on this case for some time.2 That interview occurred on August 2, 2013. The Times Herald-Record ran a front-page story about the defendant and on the *751interview in the August 4, 2013, Sunday edition of the paper. It also posted a \u201cportion\u201d of the video recorded interview on its website on August 4, 2013. The running of the story and posting of the interview detrimentally affected the jury pool, but the parties were eventually able to seat 12 jurors and eight alternate jurors. Opening statements and testimony commenced the following week, on August 12, 2013."], "id": "644ef61c-6300-4ace-a062-690c560f7606", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*594Lastly, in Rosenberg , the defendant, a physician, retained an attorney for an investigation related to alleged <mask> and any criminal litigation that may result from it. The United States charged the defendant with two counts of knowingly receiving and retaining stolen property of the United States. The defendant pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to two years' probation and ordered to pay restitution of $209,435.78."], "id": "0fdbb882-0f80-4e16-a921-37f6c0d93be9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Insurance Fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Based on all of these factors, and after consultation with Hazel Johnson, the original claims representative who had forwarded the file to her, Ms. Pryce determined that the accident was staged and therefore not a covered incident, and had the subject claims denied on that basis. She also duly notified the National Insurance Crime Bureau and the New York State <mask> Bureau."], "id": "4512f775-9fc5-46c7-b4db-cb86d171cc6b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["From an entirely different perspective, a criminal purpose within the warehouse may be inferred in that the break-in and removal of the crates were part of the actus reus of the intended larceny from the insurer. That is to say, apart from constituting a variety of discrete, anticipatory crimes, the bogus theft of the collection from the warehouse was one act in a series of acts required before the larceny from Lloyds could be consummated. The break-in and removal of the collection, in other words, constituted a partial performance or an \"ingredient act\u201d of the object crime of stealing from Lloyds; the <mask> or theft may be deemed to have partially occurred inside the warehouse."], "id": "488ca3b1-b702-42d3-855c-6dc703079ed6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Suh and Chang perpetrated a deceitful insurance scheme designed to acquire insurance proceeds illegally for personal gain. Suh and Chang deceived Allstate into believing the attorneys whose names they were using actually and lawfully represented its insureds. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, \u00a7 2695.2(c) [only attorneys, family members, adjusters, or other persons authorized by law may represent insureds].) In their communications with Allstate, Suh and Chang misrepresented that attorneys represented the insureds. They concealed the fact they were masquerading as attorneys when they filed the insurance claims. And the misrepresentations were material: Allstate would not have released settlement proceeds to Suh or Chang or their sham law firms had Allstate known the truth. The conduct of Suh and Chang constituted <mask> under section 550 and section 1871.7.1"], "id": "90a84d61-25bb-441c-8f5d-7a90ffb4b36f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court respectfully declines to adopt the reasoning of the majority. opinion of the Second Department in People v Alfaro (108 AD2d 517), i.e., that the jury may have concluded the defendant intended to defraud the insurance company but did not intend to steal property. As pointed out by the dissent in that case, \"[Tjhere does not appear to be any logical way that a person could engage in <mask> by knowingly and with intent to defraud submitting papers in support of a false claim for payment, without at the same time attempting to commit a larceny. That is, when one submits false papers in support of a claim for payment for his own benefit or that of another, he is concomitantly attempting to commit a larceny by wrongfully obtaining property by false pretenses from the insurer * * * Thus, even though the language of the statutes is not the same, the underlying meaning clearly coincides.\u201d (People v Alfaro, 108 AD2d 517, 528-529 [Eiber, J., dissenting].)"], "id": "6532b031-8a1b-49fa-9176-2d8a7042ccdd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thereafter, defendant was arrested and charged on or about December 11, 2002 with commission of these crimes. On September 2, 2003, a four-count indictment was filed charging defendant with acting in concert to commit two counts of <mask> in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7 176.20) and two counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 175.10). The trial in this matter is currently pending before this court."], "id": "3cd9fcb8-0cef-4c99-b035-9c71e7f23486", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". People v Alfaro (121 Misc 2d 804 [Sup Ct, Queens County], affd 108 AD2d 517 [2d Dept 1985]), cited by defendant, is not controlling. In Alfaro, the defendant\u2019s fraudulent claim was rejected by the insurer. In the absence of evidence that defendant\u2019s claim included any dollar amounts the court found defendant guilty only of the misdemeanor <mask>. The situation here, involving claims settled for a sum certain, is distinguishable."], "id": "aedbcdcc-ed9a-47cf-8b4f-c06ca2739361", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["This court previously inspected the grand jury minutes and found that there was legally sufficient evidence establishing all of the charges against all of the abovenamed defendants. The evidence presented to the grand jury established sufficiently that defendants, all of whom were New York City police officers and/or PBA (Patrolmen\u2019s Benevolent Association) delegates or trustees, engaged in a scheme involving the fixing1 of summonses given for illegal parking and for moving violations. As will be discussed, the investigation into ticket-fixing was an outgrowth of an earlier investigation into the illegal activities of Police Officer Jose Ramos (who is separately indicted) which *413included, amongst other activities, the sale of large quantities of marijuana and counterfeit DVDs from two barbershops in the Bronx owned by Ramos, as well as a robbery, a burglary and <mask>. The investigation into Ramos\u2019 illegal activities included the use of court-authorized eavesdropping on Ramos\u2019 cell phone. During the course of the eavesdropping on Ramos, a number of conversations were intercepted in which Ramos was overheard communicating with fellow police officers in order to fix summonses for moving violations that had been issued to people known to Ramos. Those interceptions formed the basis for this court\u2019s order, issued on December 23, 2009, authorizing eavesdropping on Police Officer Virgilio Bencosme\u2019s cell phone, this court having found that there was probable cause to believe that Bencosme\u2019s phone had been used and would continue to be used in furtherance of the crime of grand larceny in the fourth degree and the conspiracy and the attempt to commit this crime. Following the December 23, 2009 order authorizing eavesdropping on Bencosme\u2019s phone, this court authorized wiretaps to investigate ticket-fixing on 16 additional mobile telephones operated by 13 other Bronx police officers who were either delegates or officers of the Bronx PBA or SBA (Sergeants Benevolent Association). The eavesdropping, which ended on December 14, 2010, resulted in the interception of over 10,000 telephone conversations and text messages."], "id": "5996ab7d-f5ea-4a56-8287-3bbe3a0fe225", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, even if I was required to determine whether the <mask> charges were \"related\u201d to defendant\u2019s pursuit of her insurance claim for which she had retained counsel, I would conclude, based on Smith (supra) and Snyder (supra), that the two investigations were not so related. (See also, People v Cortes, 224 AD2d 309 [1st Dept 1996] [defendant\u2019s right to counsel did not indelibly attach in an arson investigation based on prior representation by an attorney in purchasing the building set afire].) Because defendant\u2019s civil and criminal cases are not related as a matter of law, the burden is on defendant to establish that John Biller represented her on the criminal charges. (See, People v Rosa, 65 NY2d 380, supra.) For the reasons given above, defendant has failed to sustain that burden."], "id": "32ae4072-fbd8-4628-bdf4-a5dff934beb1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Insurance Fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On the issue of decedent\u2019s medical condition at the time he executed the applications, evidence of decedent\u2019s end-stage medical history, less than a year and a half after signing the applications, shows a very sick man, suffering, at the time of his death, from ailments which appear likely to have been of long standing. These include end-stage renal disease, end-stage liver disease secondary to hepatitis C, and diabetes. (See aff of James J. McCarthy, exhibit B, death summary.) However, decedent answered in the negative when asked on the applications if he had any preexisting medical conditions. The evidence of the severity of decedent\u2019s health so soon after he filled out and signed the applications strongly indicates that the representations made on the applications may have been false and made with knowledge of their falsity. As MetLife has a cause of action under the New Jersey <mask> Prevention Act, it also has a viable defense to plaintiffs\u2019 action on the ground of possible fraudulent representations made on the applications. Disclosure remains to be taken to determine whether decedent misrepresented his physical health when he executed the applications. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate on this issue."], "id": "8a88127e-3aa2-48ae-bfc3-d76036dcb270", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*816Insurance Code section 1871.7(b) has three sentences. The first sentence provides that a \"civil penalty\" of no less than $5,000 and no more than $10,000, plus an assessment of no more than three times the amount of the underlying claim for compensation, \"shall\" be imposed on \"[e]very person who violates any provision of this section or Section 549, 550, or 551 of the Penal Code.\" As noted, ante , sections 549 through 551 of the Penal Code criminalize various forms of <mask>, including but not limited to the filing of a fraudulent claim. The second sentence of Insurance Code section 1871.7(b) provides that the superior court also has the power to grant equitable or injunctive relief as necessary to protect the public from insurance fraud. Finally, the third sentence provides that the \"civil penalty\" mentioned in the first sentence \"shall be assessed for each fraudulent claim presented to an insurance company by a defendant and not for each violation.\""], "id": "63507133-72b2-4f17-953e-e20594aefce1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the instant case, the defendant\u2019s submissions in support of its defense of fraud fail to establish a lack of coverage defense that may be deemed exempt from the preclusion remedy. The expert\u2019s conclusions are insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the medical services rendered \u201cdo[ ] not arise out of an insured incident\u201d (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 199), so as to implicate a lack of coverage issue. Moreover, the acts allegedly constituting the fraudulent conduct are inadequate to demonstrate that the accident was in furtherance of an <mask> scheme so as to invoke the lack of coverage defense and exemption from the preclusion remedy (see Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002], supra)."], "id": "e357a2d1-1f14-419e-8bd4-4d2c52953a22", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants argue that, notwithstanding the incorporation of all predicate violations of Penal Code sections 549 through 551 into the first sentence of Insurance Code section 1871.7(b), the third sentence limits penalties to the sole predicate violation of filing a fraudulent claim, and that the only available remedies for other predicate violations is the equitable and injunctive relief mentioned in the second sentence. But \"[t]he meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.]\" ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299 ; accord, Weitzman , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 544, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 165.) The most reasonable reading of Insurance Code section 1871.7(b), which harmonizes all three sentences, is that the \"civil penalty\" mentioned *877in the first sentence may only be assessed once per underlying claim for compensation regardless of how many predicate violations occurred, and the equitable and injunctive remedies mentioned in the second sentence are supplementary to the civil penalty. In other words, rather than limiting the IFPA's statutory penalties to one type of predicate violation, the most reasonable reading of Insurance Code section 1871.7(b) is that it limits the number of penalties that can be imposed for <mask> violations related to a single claim."], "id": "03a6d6d5-ecd2-4180-a614-bdcecf4b0017", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Insurance Fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Chicago Complaint asserts 10 counts: (I) Consumer Fraud-Deceptive Practices; (II) Consumer Fraud-Unfair Practices; (III) Misrepresentations in Connection with Sale or Advertisement of Merchandise; (IV) False Statements to the City; (V) False Claims; (VI) Conspiring to Defraud By Getting False or Fraudulent Claims Paid or Approved by the City; (VII) Recovery of City Costs of Providing Services; (VIII) <mask>; (IX) Civil Conspiracy; and, (X) Unjust Enrichment. Of these, counts I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, and X are asserted against Watson. Against Watson, the Chicago Complaint seeks injunctive relief, restitution, treble restitution, civil penalties, disgorgement of profits based on unjust enrichment, treble damages, and costs incurred by the City of Chicago that were related to the violations of state, federal, and local law."], "id": "d0d92e70-59df-4dd0-a864-cb58933db160", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["At issue is whether the statutory funding scheme for the investigation and prosecution of workers' compensation <mask> ( Ins. Code, \u00a7 1872.83 ) created a conflict of interest for the district attorney. As argued by Pierce, a conflict exists because the Kern County Workers' Compensation Fraud Unit receives grant funding from the California Insurance Commission. The funds, based *343on assessments statutorily imposed upon insurance companies, are used to criminally prosecute workers' compensation fraud cases, and includes the salaries and benefits of the two prosecutors in the unit (the prosecutor in this case being one of the two), as well as the salaries of the unit's investigator and paralegal, the computers and software. The grant funds are determined by the Fraud Assessment Commission, as outlined in Insurance Code section 1872.83, which provides in relevant part:"], "id": "948cbe20-ed30-4d8f-b01c-eca6ce84ea1c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioners acknowledge that the courts have created an exception to the privilege in Medicaid and Medicare fraud investigations, citing Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Dec. 14, 1984 (supra) and People v Bhatt (160 Misc 2d 973 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1994]), but maintain that there is no rationale for extending this exception to no-fault <mask> investigations. They assert that the situations are not analogous because (1) New York\u2019s no-fault insurance program provides a system for the payment of contested claims, citing 11 NYCRR part 65; (2) Medicaid and Medicare impose stringent record-keeping requirements on participating health care providers, which are not imposed on health care providers seeking payment from no-fault insurance carriers; and (3) there *189are no public funds at issue in the payment of no-fault insurance claims. The petitioners contend that unlike Medicaid/ Medicare fraud, no-fault insurance fraud victimizes \u201cnot the state and not the patients,\u201d but only private insurance companies, and declare that \u201cthis [defrauding of insurance companies] is hardly a sufficient competing interest to justify the abrogation of a privilege of confidentiality long held sacrosanct by the legislature and the courts.\u201d"], "id": "d9513b5e-e953-465d-969c-9f7ed079b02c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, the proof is legally sufficient to establish that defendant attempted to wrongfully obtain property valued in *875excess of $3,000 (Penal Law \u00a7 176.20), thus satisfying the value element of <mask> in the third degree. The proof establishes that defendant submitted sworn proofs of loss in which she attempted to obtain from the insurance company $50,000 in damages to the building and $25,000 in damages to its contents. (Appeal from Judgment of Wayne County Court, Sirkin, J.\u2014Insurance Fraud, 3rd Degree.) Present\u2014Green, J. P., Pine, Balio, Callahan and Boehm, JJ."], "id": "632d7e94-10d2-4087-9956-d43a200b4fd0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*977In the case at bar, the defendant maintains his right to assert the physician-patient privilege on behalf of the subject patients, since the patients were not the \"victims\u201d of the alleged fraudulent billing practices. According to Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (1405 [5th ed 1979]), a victim is \"[t]he person who is the object of a crime or tort, as the victim of a robbery is the person robbed.\u201d The object(s) of the alleged crimes under this indictment, that is, the victim(s) of the <mask>, grand larceny and scheme to defraud are, in fact, found to be GHI, the insurance carrier, and the United States Government, the funding source of the Medicare program. This finding is made upon a literal reading of the express language contained within the enumerated counts of the indictment and a review of the evidence adduced before the Grand Jury."], "id": "7d0287d8-df8e-4c37-83c7-594e2b5af012", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant, by his counsel, relies upon the definition of <mask>, as contained in section 176.05 of the Penal Law, which requires materiality to be established as an essential element of the crime. This section, in relevant part, reads as follows: \u201cA fraudulent insurance act is committed by any person who, knowingly and with intent to defraud presents * * * to * * * an insurer or purported insurer, or any agent thereof * * * a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy for commercial or personal insurance which he knows to: (i) contain materially false information concerning any fact material thereto; or (ii) conceal, for the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In essence, the defendant contends that the failure to disclose other insurance coverage, in connection with submitting each of his proofs of loss of his personal property, could not be material because his total loss exceeded the combined liability coverage of the three policies, and, therefore, each of the insurance companies would not be relieved from payment of the respective policy limits. At the time of the loss, which resulted from an alleged burglary at the defendant\u2019s residence on September 5, 1983, the total liability coverage for the three insurance policies maintained in effect was $68,000 (Travelers Ins. Co. \u2014 $28,000, General Acc. Ins. Co. \u2014 $25,000, Royal Ind. Co. \u2014 $15,000)."], "id": "2795ef38-6c11-4a82-9efd-2beb75744b0b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Howard E. Goldfluss, J. The defendants above named are two of several who have been indicted for grand larceny and other related counts in connection with an alleged larcenous scheme resulting in a widespread <mask>. The People in this application request that the court order the said defendants to submit exemplars of their handwritings giving as reason for such request that numerous file cards which were seized pursuant to a search warrant contain instructions by defendants to codefendants and employees. The People allege that by reason of the fact that these instructions were carried out, the defendants were able to defraud insurance companies."], "id": "1037c438-b96d-449e-8254-ce5c1651c3b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On May 21, 1997 plaintiff, Dr. Martin A. Lehman, an orthopedic surgeon, was arrested and charged with <mask>. His arrest was in connection with an undercover sting operation which was conducted in part to investigate insurance fraud by medical providers in the area of automobile no-fault, disability and workers\u2019 compensation claims. The District Attorney\u2019s Office of Nassau County, along with other government agencies, conducted the undercover investigation. As a result of the investigation, 20 individuals were arrested, including plaintiff. *3The sting operation was widely reported by the media. Eighteen of the 20 individuals pleaded guilty; however, plaintiff went to trial and, on March 3, 1999, was acquitted of all charges."], "id": "0888b0c4-d7d8-4c7f-b724-5abfe9d81929", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Insurance Fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Michael D. Stallman, J. In this action to recover under two insurance policies, plaintiffs Janet Johnson and Albert Nicklas (Nicklas) move, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment on the complaint, and for the dismissal of defendant\u2019s counterclaims. Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) cross-moves for leave to amend its answer to include a claim under the New Jersey <mask> Prevention Act (FPA)."], "id": "366ad8ed-2852-4d04-adc2-2a11138b75ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although posited slightly differently than the argument in MBIA Ins. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (34 Misc 3d 895 [2012] [MBIA v Countrywide]), a related case also before this court having arguments corresponding to those made in this matter by both plaintiff therein and Countrywide, defendants in both cases, the base issue before the court in this motion is when causation occurs in claims for <mask> and breach of representations and warranties. Syncora asserts in both its fraud and breach claims that causation occurred, and liability results, when Countrywide made misrepresentations that were material and which induced Syncora to issue financial guaranty insurance policies. Syncora asserts that had it known the true facts of the underlying mortgage loans, it may have either declined to issue its financial guaranty insurance policies or issued the policies on different terms. Syncora contends that it was denied the opportunity to examine the facts based on proper information, and, thus, all payments it has made pursuant to the policies result from Countrywide\u2019s alleged misrepresentations."], "id": "f9b43df6-7b8a-4ffb-9d74-630d8554d980", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court is mindful that there was no direct evidence that any of the plaintiffs here knowingly participated in any <mask> scheme, or even suspected one. But \u201c[w]here a loss is caused by the fraud of a third party, in determining the liability as between two innocent parties, the loss should fall on the one who enabled the fraud to be committed.\u201d (Fidelity Natl. Tit. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Consumer Home Mtge., 272 AD2d 512, 514 [2d Dept 2000].) Although any fraudulent conduct of the assignors might not be \u201cproperly imputed\u201d to plaintiffs (see id.; see also A&S Med. v Allstate Ins. Co., 196 Misc 2d 322, 324 [App Term, 1st Dept 2003], affd 15 AD3d 170 [1st Dept 2005]), plaintiffs would be among the \u201cprimary beneficiaries of [the] fraud\u201d (see Chubb & Son v Consoli, 283 AD2d 297, 299 [1st Dept 2001]). And, generally, \u201c[a]n assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor\u201d (see Arena Constr. Co. v J. Sackaris & Sons, 282 AD2d 489, 489 [2d Dept 2001])."], "id": "5c3c3597-9098-48bf-80ba-574ba9c0a1e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*180With respect to the indictment filed in October 2012, respondent pleaded guilty to identity theft in the first degree in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 190.80 (1), a class D felony, and <mask> in the third degree in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 176.20, a class D felony, based on his admission that he had assumed the identity of a woman, who was not a client, had used her name and personal identifying information to settle an insurance claim, and then had stolen the proceeds of the settlement that he had fraudulently negotiated."], "id": "7b0ced95-55b0-4de4-9dd7-34e267ce3fa1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to vacate the respondent superior court's order denying his motion to set aside indictment, and that such motion be granted with charges against petitioner dismissed. He broadly argues that *116the indictment lacks reasonable or probable cause on all counts for various reasons, and that the indictment cannot be amended to effect a demand for an election. Among his arguments are that the <mask> and workers' compensation fraud claims are improperly aggregated, and that the indictment does not give due process notice of the charges against him to prepare a defense for trial. The Supreme Court's order quoted above focuses on these last two points. We disagree with petitioner and specifically address the petition as framed by the particular issues the Supreme Court articulated."], "id": "a89128b8-2f28-4efe-83a0-af7bed16e092", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The People charged defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, with four counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 175.30), <mask> in the fifth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 176.10), and petit larceny (Penal Law \u00a7 155.25), alleging that over a period of several years, defendant had filed reports with the Workers\u2019 Compensation Board (Board), affirmed under the penalty of perjury, to the effect that his patient was totally disabled from his work as a corrections officer and was not, in fact, working, while knowing, from his own examinations of the patient and his observations of the patient engaged in substantial work activities, that these reports were false. Following a nonjury trial, defendant was found guilty of the often*27ses charged. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the proof, arguing that the questions at issue on the reports (the C-4 forms) were sufficiently vague and ambiguous as to permit the inference that defendant\u2019s responses thereto were both responsive to the questions and factually true. Defendant also argues that the proof was legally insufficient to establish defendant\u2019s knowledge of facts sufficient to establish that his answers were knowingly false, and that the verdict, in any event, was against the weight of the evidence."], "id": "c109962f-6bfa-49e9-83f8-c9a2333f6948", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant first contends that section 954 prohibits the People from alleging multiple acts, each of which constitute a distinct offense, in a single count. Because each count describes multiple patient files over an extended timeframe, and because <mask> is completed upon the preparation of a fraudulent document ( \u00a7 550, subd. (a)(5) ), or the submission of a fraudulent claim (subdivision \u00a7 550, subd. (a)(6) ), defendant contends each count contains multiple discrete offenses. (See People ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Cruz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1193, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 566 [a violation of section 550\" 'is complete when a false claim for payment of loss is presented to an insurance company or a false writing is prepared or presented with intent to use it in connection with such a claim whether or not anything of value is taken or received' \"].)"], "id": "24532ed9-ada9-4b82-be02-aad90a8d8d31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["An illustration of this principle is found in People v . Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690, 129 Cal.Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353, overruled on a different point as stated in People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 503-504, footnote 9, 170 Cal.Rptr. 1, 620 P.2d 587. In Ruster , the Supreme Court held that the defendant's crime could be prosecuted only under the specific statute criminalizing as a misdemeanor fraudulent representation to obtain unemployment benefits as opposed to the general statute criminalizing forgery. The general forgery statute had an element not contained in the specific statute-that the defendant sign the name of another to one of the documents enumerated in the statute. ( Ruster , supra , at p. 698, 129 Cal.Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353.) The Supreme Court, however, applied the Williamson rule, concluding that \"the Legislature unquestionably contemplated that the special statute might be violated by means of forgery. Indeed, applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is apparently one of the *488most common forms of unemployment <mask>.\" ( Id . at p. 699, 129 Cal.Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353.)"], "id": "5c148ff8-9e4c-4ad0-b801-4a7bf8385ae8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We find these principles applicable to the facts herein, and we are satisfied that the proof supported the City Court\u2019s conclusion that defendant understood the nature of the questions as to the meaning and scope of the patient\u2019s disability (see Rubeis v Aqua Club, Inc., 3 NY3d 408, 417 [2004]) and whether the patient was working at any job. The evidence was also legally sufficient to establish that defendant had falsely answered the questions, knowing that, if his answers were credited by the Board, the natural and inevitable consequence would be that the patient would obtain workers\u2019 compensation benefits to which he was not entitled. Such conduct also established that defendant had committed <mask> and larceny. Whether or not the patient was compensated for his work is of no consequence (Matter of Bottieri v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 27 AD3d 1035 [2006]). As there was no challenge at trial to the legal sufficiency of the proof of the remaining elements of the offense of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree, defendant failed to preserve any issue with respect thereto (CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19-21 [1995])."], "id": "0584fe98-38fe-4913-b4ff-fd259a9448a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"(e) Therefore, in order to ensure the efficient, just, and orderly administration of the workers' compensation system, and to accomplish substantial justice in all cases, the Legislature declares that it is necessary to enact legislation to provide that any lien filed by, or for recovery of compensation for services rendered by, any provider of medical treatment or other medical-legal services shall be automatically stayed upon the filing of criminal charges against that provider for an offense involving fraud against the workers' compensation system, medical billing fraud, <mask>, or fraud against the federal Medicare or Medi-Cal programs, and that the stay shall remain in effect until the resolution of the criminal proceedings.\" (Stats. 2016, ch. 868, sec. 16.)"], "id": "f63a8412-6bcb-4730-9ef5-d316217c31fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Insurance Fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"Many older policyholders have years-old whole-life policies that have accumulated a sizable cash surrender value. An insurance agent encourages them to trade in these policies and buy new ones that pay higher death benefits. This practice, known as churning, earns the agent a large sales commission while substantially increasing the policyholder's premium cost.... [\u00b6] Insurance agents' selling annuities of dubious value under the guise of estate planning is common.\" (Lawrence A. Frolik, <mask> on the Elderly (June 2001) TRIAL p. 2, at < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428476> [as of June 2, 2017].)"], "id": "970eff48-6c5c-4575-b8ed-238706505ad6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["MBIA contends that to succeed on an <mask> claim, the insurer must prove only that the application for insurance made a material misrepresentation that, had the insurer known of the true facts, would have led the insurer to either not issue the policy or issue the policy on different terms. MBIA also asserts that to succeed on a breach of warranty claim, the insurer must prove only that the breach of warranty materially increased the insurer\u2019s risk. MBIA argues that it is not required to establish a causal link between Countrywide\u2019s alleged misrepresentations and claims MBIA paid under the insurance policies. MBIA supports its argument with Insurance Law \u00a7\u00a7 3105 and 3106, respectively."], "id": "48c92a29-033a-4836-81c3-c2b364e87c67", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The section under consideration (Penal Law \u00a7 176.20) was enacted in 1981 as part of article 176 \u2014 <mask>. Previously, the Penal Law had contained only a single misdemeanor statute prohibiting personal injury insurance fraud. That section (Penal Law former \u00a7 175.50 [presenting a false insurance claim]) prohibited knowingly presenting \"with intent to defraud an insurer with respect to an alleged claim of loss upon a contract of insurance * * * a written instrument containing a false material statement relating to such claim.\u201d The article 176 definition of a \"fraudulent insurance act\u201d is an almost verbatim reenactment of this quoted language. Under the new legislation \"committ[ing] a fraudulent insurance act\u201d is, in itself, insurance fraud in the third degree \u2014 a class A misdemeanor. The newly created felony-level first and second degrees of insurance fraud include as additional elements \"wrongfully * * * obtaining] or, attempting] to * * * obtain * * * property with a value in excess of\u2019 $1,500 or $250, respectively. While the Governor\u2019s memorandum approving this 1981 legislation mentions that the three-tier insurance fraud system tracks that of grand larceny, there is no other mention of the relationship, if any, between the two statutes *758(Governor\u2019s approval memorandum, 1981 NY Legis Ann, at 384)."], "id": "4092e1ca-caf8-4044-b87a-9a0b13ed8d99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["However, there are certain industries that require intensive and regular governmental oversight. Their practices are so fraught with criminality or danger, it is reasonable, indeed prudent government requires, that they be closely regulated and inspected to insure compliance with health, fire, safety and reasonable regulatory laws to insure that they do not become dangers, menaces or nuisances to the general community. The Supreme Court has upheld warrantless entries upon the premises of \"pervasively regulated\u201d or \"closely regulated\u201d businesses and industries (United States v Biswell, 406 US 311, 316; Colonnade Corp. v United States, 397 US 72). Indeed some businesses, liquor, bars, hazardous chemicals, explosives and firearms have had a long history of governmental regulation and oversight. Understandably any entrepreneur embarking upon such a business accepts the burdens with the benefits and voluntarily subjects himself to plenary and intrusive governmental regulations. He has no reasonable expectation of privacy. (Marshall v Barlow\u2019s, Inc., 436 US 307). This does not mean that the 4th Amendment\u2019s benefits are denied him. It is still a bar to a trespassing police officer seeking evidence of criminality without an appropriate search warrant (See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541). When an entrepreneur embarks upon a closely regulated business, he tacitly consents to entry by the authorities upon his premises for the purposes of inspection and enforcement of valid regulatory schemes (Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266). New York (along with many other States) has long licensed and regulated the junk industry. Automobile dismantlers are part of both the junk and automobile repair industries. While both industries have honest practitioners, many junkyards, body shops and dismantlers are little more than fronts or essential elements of stolen car rings and <mask> schemes."], "id": "ee9dd061-72e5-425b-a76e-b3bd18dbb0f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although the case had originally been adjourned until March 19, 1985 for the court\u2019s decision on the motions, the matter was advanced at the People\u2019s request to February 26, 1985, since the People had apparently decided to \"acquiesce in the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and to request leave to represent.\u201d On that date, the court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss on the ground that an insufficient number of grand jurors had heard the evidence presented and granted the People\u2019s application for leave to re-present. In doing so, this court expressed its concern over the delay in prosecution. The case was then adjourned to April 1, 1985, pending re-presentation. On April 1, 1985, the People were not yet ready to proceed with the new indictment and the matter was again adjourned. On April 19, 1985, the Grand Jury voted a true bill and returned indictment number 1300/85, charging defendants with conspiracy in the fifth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 105.05), with attempted grand larceny in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 155.35), with 16 counts of <mask> in *270the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 176.20) and with 16 counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 175.10). The indictment was filed on that date and defendants were directed to appear for arraignment on April 22, 1985, at which time the People announced their readiness on the record. This was the first time that the People announced their readiness on either indictment. The defendants were arraigned on the new indictment on May 3, 1985. On that date the People announced for the second time on the record that they were ready for trial. Motions were served and filed on July 15, 1985. Defendant Alexander\u2019s motion papers, in which defendant Gelfand joined, requested, inter alia, dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1) (g) on the ground that the People had not been ready to proceed within the time set forth by CPL 30.30 (1) (a)."], "id": "22dc4758-5c4c-4df4-8562-cc2b1793a52e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The AG maintains that the underlying purpose of the physician-patient privilege will not be subverted by ruling that it does not apply in no-fault <mask> investigations; to *191the contrary, the AG posits that such a ruling could not encourage less candid patient-physician communications where they have not been candid in the first place, and would not deter honest accident victims, whom the AG submits would prefer not to undergo unnecessary treatments \u201cto enable a scam,\u201d from seeking medically appropriate care. Moreover, the AG notes, records produced for grand jury consideration are \u201ccloaked with secrecy\u201d by law (CPL 190.25 [4] [a])."], "id": "b05d0ff4-09bc-4ff1-b732-d63123db887e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Nevertheless, our appellate courts commonly invoke the term \u201cfraud\u201d when discussing the defense of lack of coverage; this may be because so many cases involving allegedly noncovered incidents center on accidents purportedly staged for the purpose of generating fraudulent insurance claims. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Laguerre, 305 AD2d 490, 491 [2d Dept 2003] [\u201cA deliberate collision caused in furtherance of an <mask> scheme is not a covered accident\u201d]; see also Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2d Dept 2002]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Encompass Ins., 10 Misc 3d 127LA], 2005 NY Slip Op 51892[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Misc 3d 138[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51745[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; Careplus Med. Supply Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Misc 3d 131[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51598[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v State-Wide Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 136[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50785[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; Melbourne Med., P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]; A.B. Med. Servs. v Eagle Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 8 [App Term, 2d Dept 2003].) Perhaps the seminal embodiment of this formulation is the Second Department\u2019s pronouncement that \u201c[a] deliberate collision caused in furtherance of an insurance fraud scheme is not a covered accident.\u201d (State Farm v Laguerre, 305 AD2d at 491.) No-fault insurers and practitioners (including the parties and their counsel in this case) have also adopted the nomenclature of fraud when litigating claims involving allegedly staged accidents. This is true even though the no-fault regulations do not mention \u201cfraud\u201d as a defense to payment, but rather refer only to noncovered incidents. (See, e.g., 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [e] [2].)"], "id": "cd3f4073-45d3-4a8e-ba21-03685bae599c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The present indictment charges the defendant, a lawyer whose office is in Manhattan, with <mask> and falsifying business records of Dr. Kaiser and the insurer. The charges, clarified by a bill of particulars, allege that the defendant solicited Kaiser on the telephone to make up and submit back-dated bills for fictitious visits by two clients, to beef up claims on insurance policies for injuries from automobile accidents. During the conversation, Kaiser was in Kings County, having telephoned the defendant\u2019s office in Manhattan from the District Attorney\u2019s office in Brooklyn."], "id": "049936e1-5799-4f09-af8e-2b9fd8801e72", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant argued at trial that there was no coverage for plaintiffs assignor\u2019s alleged injuries because the injuries, were not sustained in a covered accident. Following the nonjury trial, the Civil Court dismissed the complaint, finding that defendant had sustained its burden of proving lack of coverage by a preponderance of the evidence. On appeal, plaintiff contends that defendant had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged injuries were the result of an <mask> scheme. Plaintiff further argues that even if the Civil Court correctly determined that defendant\u2019s burden could be satisfied by defendant proving its defense by a mere preponderance of the evidence, the evidence presented by defendant was insufficient to satisfy this burden."], "id": "fa702879-181b-4f9a-875d-7cbe514b3b01", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The conclusion that <mask> in the first degree is completed upon the filing of the statement is supported further by a comparison of the various degrees of insurance fraud. When one commits a \"fraudulent insurance act\u201d without claiming a dollar loss, he commits insurance fraud in the fifth degree. (People v Alfaro, supra.) However, when one commits a \"fraudulent insurance act\u201d and claims in excess of $1,000, he now commits insurance fraud in the fourth degree. (Penal Law \u00a7 176.15; see also, Hechtman, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law \u00a7 176.10, at 236 [1987 Pocket Part].)"], "id": "553a094c-e4e9-47d7-8f90-92a3784c6f04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA deliberate collision caused in furtherance of an <mask> scheme is not a covered accident.\u201d (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Laguerre, 305 AD2d 490, 491 [2d Dept 2003]; see also Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751, 751-752 [2d Dept 2002].) Indeed, when a collision is \u201can intentional act, not an accident,\u201d there is no coverage (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 309 AD2d 927, 928 [2d Dept 2003]), \u201cregardless of whether the intentional col*824lision was motivated by fraud or malice\u201d (see Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Shaulskaya, 302 AD2d 522, 523 [2d Dept 2003])."], "id": "3dfb9996-b2c3-4125-a258-7d5b70693095", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The facts are not in dispute. By a decision and order, dated November 30, 1987, claimant\u2019s conviction for <mask> and other crimes was reversed on appeal and the indictment dismissed. (People v Rohany, 134 AD2d 627, lv denied 70 NY2d 1010.) He filed a claim under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act of 1984 (Court of Claims Act \u00a7 8-b) on April 14, 1988 and the State answered. No objection was contained therein with respect to the timeliness or manner of service of the claim."], "id": "b67ab519-0c7f-4247-8ca9-32e9268fc269", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Allstate discovered Suh's fraudulent scheme and filed this action. Allstate alleged, not that the insurance claims contained false or fraudulent statements about the insureds, but that obtaining insurance proceeds by posing as law firms was <mask> in violation of applicable provisions of the Penal and Insurance Codes. Allstate sought civil penalties and assessments and an injunction under the unfair competition law."], "id": "77fab480-1948-40c9-b059-07fe464db0c7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, identity is not at issue; thus, the court fails to see how this exception to admission is applicable. Furthermore, the *744People have not demonstrated that the evidence is admissible under the common plan or scheme since it is not so inextricably interwoven as in some of the cases upon which they rely to support this proposition.6 Additionally, although this case does involve a crime of intent, it is this court\u2019s opinion that intent, and thus absence of mistake or accident, may be inferred from the charged crimes for which defendant is on trial involving two incidents of <mask> with two different undercover officers. (See People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 856 [1996] [court properly denied admission of prior uncharged sexual misconduct to prove intent, although it was element of crime, since issue was one of credibility whereby defendant claimed consent and intent could be inferred from act itself].)"], "id": "4c5eb871-53ef-4e70-80c0-4e2faeb6987e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Renewing an argument made at the close of the prosecution\u2019s case, defendant asserts that because there was no evidence establishing what portion of the settlements was specifically attributable to the fraudulent medical reports, the verdict cannot stand. Citing the requirement under the grand larceny statute,2 that the value wrongfully obtained must be shown, defendant maintains that the same element exists in prosecutions for <mask>."], "id": "2b8dc085-63c0-4af7-80ce-c19d25b5aead", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The present indictment charges the defendant, a lawyer whose office is in Manhattan, with <mask> and falsifying business records of Dr. Kaiser and the insurer. The charges, clarified by a bill of particulars, allege that the defendant solicited Kaiser on the telephone to make up and submit back-dated bills for fictitious visits by two clients, to beef up claims on insurance policies for injuries from automobile accidents. During the conversation, Kaiser was in Kings County, having telephoned the defendant\u2019s office in Manhattan from the District Attorney\u2019s office in Brooklyn."], "id": "3e86c95c-c615-4bb1-a75b-72a348b31988", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["An analysis of the statute itself shows that it is the commission of the \"fraudulent insurance act\u201d itself which is the actus reus, and further, that it is that act alone which completes the crime of <mask> in the first degree. The presentation to an insurer of a written statement knowing that it contains materially false information, or that it conceals information for the purpose of misleading, is the criminal activity. Once such written statement has been presented the crime of insurance fraud, in one of its degrees, has been committed. This is evidenced by the fact that an unsuccessful attempt to fraudulently obtain insurances moneys in excess of $1,500 *1013constitutes the crime of insurance fraud in the first degree. There is no requirement that the perpetrator of the crime actually obtain the money; the attempt to obtain the money wrongfully is treated the same way as the actual obtaining of the money, by the statute. It is clear that said provision of the statute is only meant to define what degree of crime is committed \u2014 and said degree of the crime is a function of the amount of money involved; at the time involved herein, a fraudulent insurance claim in the amount of $1,500 was classified as insurance fraud in the first degree. In 1986, the statute was amended, in that the amounts and degrees of crime were changed; otherwise the operative language of the sections was retained."], "id": "b4a3933c-2bdc-4dd4-874d-60403b95be51", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["MBIA contends that to succeed on an <mask> claim, the insurer must prove only that the application for insurance made a material misrepresentation that, had the insurer known of the true facts, would have led the insurer to either not issue the policy or issue the policy on different terms. MBIA also asserts that to succeed on a breach of warranty claim, the insurer must prove only that the breach of warranty materially increased the insurer\u2019s risk. MBIA argues that it is not required to establish a causal link between Countrywide\u2019s alleged misrepresentations and claims MBIA paid under the insurance policies. MBIA supports its argument with Insurance Law \u00a7\u00a7 3105 and 3106, respectively."], "id": "b9fe9955-8585-4ad2-93d3-7dadbb525a59", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The amended indictment alleged that Pierce conspired to commit <mask> pursuant to section 550, subdivision (a), subsections (1), (2), (5), (7), and (8) and pursuant to Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(2). A violation of section 550, subdivision (a), subsections (1), (2), and (5), is designated as a felony, whereas a violation of subsections (7) and (8) is either a misdemeanor or felony wobbler. ( \u00a7 550, subd. (c)(1) and (2)(A)(B).)"], "id": "9bf64ed0-cabc-4d22-bf57-49ad4f1dc3f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The plain language of Penal Law \u00a7 10.00 (7) authorizes an indictment of the partnership on such facts. That section provides that a \"person\u201d \u2014 which includes a person charged with a crime \u2014 means, \"where appropriate,\u201d \"a partnership.\u201d Similarly, the section defining the crime of <mask>, Penal Law \u00a7 176.00 (3), provides that a \"person\u201d chargeable *1098with the crime of insurance fraud includes any \"firm, association or corporation\u201d; under the Partnership Law, a partnership is \"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.\u201d (\u00a7 10 [1] [emphasis added].) Unmistakably, therefore, the Penal Law applies to a law \"firm,\u201d whether it be a partnership or a professional corporation, and the law firm may be charged if one partner has committed a crime in the name of the law firm, as alleged in this case. Presumably, if there is a conviction of a partnership, the sentence can be a fine, a conditional discharge, or an unconditional discharge, as for a corporation. (See, Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 60.01, 60.25.)"], "id": "f0d8673d-cc28-4602-b455-7d1843f2ba2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The amended indictment alleged that Pierce conspired to commit <mask> pursuant to section 550, subdivision (a), subsections (1), (2), (5), (7), and (8) and pursuant to Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(2). A violation of section 550, subdivision (a), subsections (1), (2), and (5), is designated as a felony, whereas a violation of subsections (7) and (8) is either a misdemeanor or felony wobbler. ( \u00a7 550, subd. (c)(1) and (2)(A)(B).)"], "id": "9b4d6f80-87c8-4f3e-81af-5eeb23bc79a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Here, an attempted larceny or attempted <mask> within the unlawfully entered premises can be inferred from the conduct at the Regency Warehouse. \"A person is guilty of an attempt * * * when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 110.00.) Evidence that an insured has arranged for his own property to be destroyed or \"stolen\u201d in preparation for filing a false insurance claim has been held to constitute an attempted insurance fraud. (People v Vastano, 117 AD2d 637; see also, People v Trepanier, 84 AD2d 374.)"], "id": "1e872024-ddcc-4a01-9fbe-9f49ab1d6e73", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Jospeh Kevin McKay, J. *236These defendants are the only ones now remaining in a multidefendant, multicount indictment brought by the New York State Attorney General, alleging larceny, <mask> and similar charges in a scheme to defraud certain insurance companies during the operation of a medical clinic, which treated no-fault patients. Their present application is deemed to be one for reargument of that part of this court\u2019s decision and order of December 17, 2007 sustaining original count 55 (now count 45). Reargument is hereby granted and for reasons addressed infra the court now amends its decision and order in accordance with this opinion."], "id": "a17a3f24-4a47-4937-b9e4-a53a93cd93d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*828Whereas in McNair application of the litigation privilege supported the public policy of encouraging unfettered disclosures of confidential medical information in the interest of public safety ( McNair , supra , 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1167-1168, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 267 ), applying the privilege to fraudulent communications made in support of or in opposition to a claim for insurance benefits would frustrate the remedial purpose of the IFPA. Civil statutes enacted for the protection of the public are to be construed broadly in favor of their protective purpose. ( Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores , Inc . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 530, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 246 P.3d 612 ; People ex rel . Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 313, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042.) The Legislature was \"presumably aware of the extant broad litigation privilege in section 47\" ( Komarova , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 340, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ) when it enacted the IFPA to provide civil liability for fraudulent communications related to claims for insurance benefits, including liability for communications that are otherwise at the core of the privilege. This strongly suggests the Legislature balanced the public interest in preventing <mask> with the interest in encouraging free and unfettered communications in litigation, and \"struck that balance\" in favor of preventing insurance fraud. ( Begier , supra , 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 885, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158.) Applying the privilege here would \"encour[age] rather than suppress[ ]\" ( Banuelos , supra , 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 332, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 772 ) the type of fraud the IFPA was designed to *887combat and would upset the legislative balance enshrined in the Act."], "id": "e91c10b7-5a1c-47ed-9c78-a10c561d2997", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Here, an attempted larceny or attempted <mask> within the unlawfully entered premises can be inferred from the conduct at the Regency Warehouse. \"A person is guilty of an attempt * * * when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 110.00.) Evidence that an insured has arranged for his own property to be destroyed or \"stolen\u201d in preparation for filing a false insurance claim has been held to constitute an attempted insurance fraud. (People v Vastano, 117 AD2d 637; see also, People v Trepanier, 84 AD2d 374.)"], "id": "5529ea52-57db-4c63-a719-bc50469c9432", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant argues otherwise. Plaintiff is entitled to payment on these claims under the workers\u2019 compensation fee schedule and under the no-fault regulations only if Dr. Kogen provides \u201cactive and personal supervision over an authorized psychologist.\u201d Defendant alleges that plaintiff is misrepresenting Dr. Kogen\u2019s active role in these cases, and specifically in the case of Monise Chery, and that this misrepresentation negates the necessity for a 30-day denial. Defendant cites Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group (90 NY2d 195 [1997]) to support this proposition. The Court of Appeals in this case ruled that the insurer\u2019s untimely disclaimer does not prevent it from raising a defense of lack of coverage based upon the fact or founded belief that the alleged injury did not arise out of an insured incident. Defendant analogizes that an insurer\u2019s untimely disclaimer should not prevent it from raising a defense of lack of coverage based upon the fact or founded belief that the claims are a result of claimant\u2019s fraud or misrepresentation of a critical issue; in this case plaintiff\u2019s misrepresentation of Dr. Kogen\u2019s active role in this case. Defendant also cites Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co. (293 AD2d 751, 752 [2d Dept 2002]), where the Court held that \u201cif the collision at issue was a deliberate event caused in the furtherance of an <mask> scheme, it would not be a covered accident,\u201d and the insurer \u201cwas not precluded from asserting [that] defense despite [the insurer\u2019s] untimely denial of the claim.\u201d"], "id": "df10c862-236f-453c-86e7-0a3b093be233", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In any event, assuming arguendo that the trial court should have struck the section 550, subdivision (a)(5) allegation, Pierce can show no prejudice. The remaining allegations against him in the count 1 conspiracy to commit <mask> ( \u00a7 182, subd. (a)(1) ), was that Pierce did so by knowingly presenting a false claim or multiple false claims for health care benefits ( \u00a7 550, subd. (a)(7) & (8) ) and knowingly presenting any false or fraudulent material statement in support of a claim for workers' compensation benefits ( Ins. Code, \u00a7 1871.4, subd. (a)(2) ). The jury found count 1 true based on one or more of the alleged overt acts, none of which involved the preparation of a fraudulent document, as alleged in section 550, subdivision (a)(5). Thus, even had the section 550, subdivision (a)(5) allegation been struck, Pierce would still have been found guilty."], "id": "30c3d053-e19b-4983-9777-b1a48e3b7073", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["MBIA contends that to succeed on an <mask> claim, the insurer must prove only that the application for insurance made a material misrepresentation that, had the insurer known of the true facts, would have led the insurer to either not issue the policy or issue the policy on different terms. MBIA also asserts that to succeed on a breach of warranty claim, the insurer must prove only that the breach of warranty materially increased the insurer\u2019s risk. MBIA argues that it is not required to establish a causal link between Countrywide\u2019s alleged misrepresentations and claims MBIA paid under the insurance policies. MBIA supports its argument with Insurance Law \u00a7\u00a7 3105 and 3106, respectively."], "id": "318a2b5c-8af6-4c1b-956d-0735d3569e58", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Jospeh Kevin McKay, J. *236These defendants are the only ones now remaining in a multidefendant, multicount indictment brought by the New York State Attorney General, alleging larceny, <mask> and similar charges in a scheme to defraud certain insurance companies during the operation of a medical clinic, which treated no-fault patients. Their present application is deemed to be one for reargument of that part of this court\u2019s decision and order of December 17, 2007 sustaining original count 55 (now count 45). Reargument is hereby granted and for reasons addressed infra the court now amends its decision and order in accordance with this opinion."], "id": "b073b4be-715e-4fd1-96a2-1895a76645cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Between 1992 and 2001, reports of suspected automobile <mask> increased by 275% the bulk of the increase occurring in no-fault insurance fraud. Reports of no-fault fraud rose from 489 cases in 1992 to 9,191 in 2000, *571a rise of more than 1,700%. No-fault fraud accounted for three quarters of the 16,902 reports of automobile-related fraud received by the Insurance Department\u2019s Frauds Bureau in 2000, and more than 55% of the 22,247 reports involving all types of insurance fraud. In 1999, the Superintendent established a No-Fault Unit within the Frauds Bureau to focus specifically on no-fault fraud and abuse. By one estimate, the combined effect of no-fault insurance fraud has been an increase of over $100 per year in annual insurance premium costs for the average New York motorist."], "id": "ccc69568-5193-482d-9deb-2d288965a4e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The instant case is distinguishable from Goldfinger (supra) in a number of important ways. First, in the case at bar, the civil and criminal investigations, while both involving the same incident, each had a different focus, and were thus, not \"virtually the same\u201d. The criminal investigation focused on whether arson had been committed; whereas, the civil investigation focused on whether <mask> had been committed. Granted, defendant Wright was ultimately only charged with one count of insurance fraud based, in part, on her statement. However, the mere fact that at the conclusion of his investigation, Ryan only had probable cause to arrest defendant for insurance fraud, and not arson, does not alter the reality that *682Ryan \u2014 a member of the Arson and Explosion Squad \u2014 was primarily interested in whether arson was committed. Given the wholly different purposes of the instant criminal and civil investigations, to shield defendant from the questioning that occurred here would place an undue limitation on law enforcement\u2019s ability to investigate potential criminal charges."], "id": "4bd56083-fc1c-4f65-ab25-7229902f396f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although the case had originally been adjourned until March 19, 1985 for the court\u2019s decision on the motions, the matter was advanced at the People\u2019s request to February 26, 1985, since the People had apparently decided to \"acquiesce in the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and to request leave to represent.\u201d On that date, the court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss on the ground that an insufficient number of grand jurors had heard the evidence presented and granted the People\u2019s application for leave to re-present. In doing so, this court expressed its concern over the delay in prosecution. The case was then adjourned to April 1, 1985, pending re-presentation. On April 1, 1985, the People were not yet ready to proceed with the new indictment and the matter was again adjourned. On April 19, 1985, the Grand Jury voted a true bill and returned indictment number 1300/85, charging defendants with conspiracy in the fifth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 105.05), with attempted grand larceny in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 155.35), with 16 counts of <mask> in *270the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 176.20) and with 16 counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 175.10). The indictment was filed on that date and defendants were directed to appear for arraignment on April 22, 1985, at which time the People announced their readiness on the record. This was the first time that the People announced their readiness on either indictment. The defendants were arraigned on the new indictment on May 3, 1985. On that date the People announced for the second time on the record that they were ready for trial. Motions were served and filed on July 15, 1985. Defendant Alexander\u2019s motion papers, in which defendant Gelfand joined, requested, inter alia, dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1) (g) on the ground that the People had not been ready to proceed within the time set forth by CPL 30.30 (1) (a)."], "id": "48e8002b-c8eb-4fa1-87a9-b2409512b236", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Jospeh Kevin McKay, J. *236These defendants are the only ones now remaining in a multidefendant, multicount indictment brought by the New York State Attorney General, alleging larceny, <mask> and similar charges in a scheme to defraud certain insurance companies during the operation of a medical clinic, which treated no-fault patients. Their present application is deemed to be one for reargument of that part of this court\u2019s decision and order of December 17, 2007 sustaining original count 55 (now count 45). Reargument is hereby granted and for reasons addressed infra the court now amends its decision and order in accordance with this opinion."], "id": "a1e07b70-e201-4f56-88f1-bd9ec67e4ce2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although the case had originally been adjourned until March 19, 1985 for the court\u2019s decision on the motions, the matter was advanced at the People\u2019s request to February 26, 1985, since the People had apparently decided to \"acquiesce in the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and to request leave to represent.\u201d On that date, the court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss on the ground that an insufficient number of grand jurors had heard the evidence presented and granted the People\u2019s application for leave to re-present. In doing so, this court expressed its concern over the delay in prosecution. The case was then adjourned to April 1, 1985, pending re-presentation. On April 1, 1985, the People were not yet ready to proceed with the new indictment and the matter was again adjourned. On April 19, 1985, the Grand Jury voted a true bill and returned indictment number 1300/85, charging defendants with conspiracy in the fifth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 105.05), with attempted grand larceny in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 155.35), with 16 counts of <mask> in *270the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 176.20) and with 16 counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 175.10). The indictment was filed on that date and defendants were directed to appear for arraignment on April 22, 1985, at which time the People announced their readiness on the record. This was the first time that the People announced their readiness on either indictment. The defendants were arraigned on the new indictment on May 3, 1985. On that date the People announced for the second time on the record that they were ready for trial. Motions were served and filed on July 15, 1985. Defendant Alexander\u2019s motion papers, in which defendant Gelfand joined, requested, inter alia, dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1) (g) on the ground that the People had not been ready to proceed within the time set forth by CPL 30.30 (1) (a)."], "id": "39755e09-96b5-494c-aaaf-bea6e9e7c18e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even assuming, arguendo, that competent evidence had been presented to the grand jury, the facts of this case would impermissibly stretch the acceptable limits of CPL 20.60 (1). Criminal Procedure Law \u00a7 20.60 (1) should in fact be given a narrow application. (People v R., 160 Misc 2d 142 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1994].) In People v R., the prosecution relied on CPL 20.60 (1) to establish jurisdiction in Kings County over an <mask> and related crimes. The defendant created the fraudulent bills in his Manhattan office and submitted them to the insurer\u2019s office in Nassau County. (Id. at 143-144.) The Kings County District Attorney sought jurisdiction based on a single phone call made by an informant at the behest of the Kings County District Attorney from a telephone at the Kings County District Attorney\u2019s Office to the defendant\u2019s office in Manhattan. People v R. held that a contextual analysis of section 20.60 (1) compelled rejection of this jurisdictional claim:"], "id": "c984e026-2ea3-46ab-8ae0-e012b8fe51a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although posited slightly differently than the argument in MBIA Ins. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (34 Misc 3d 895 [2012] [MBIA v Countrywide]), a related case also before this court having arguments corresponding to those made in this matter by both plaintiff therein and Countrywide, defendants in both cases, the base issue before the court in this motion is when causation occurs in claims for <mask> and breach of representations and warranties. Syncora asserts in both its fraud and breach claims that causation occurred, and liability results, when Countrywide made misrepresentations that were material and which induced Syncora to issue financial guaranty insurance policies. Syncora asserts that had it known the true facts of the underlying mortgage loans, it may have either declined to issue its financial guaranty insurance policies or issued the policies on different terms. Syncora contends that it was denied the opportunity to examine the facts based on proper information, and, thus, all payments it has made pursuant to the policies result from Countrywide\u2019s alleged misrepresentations."], "id": "4db61bec-d4a0-41b9-9bd2-ea1479de08d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The crimes alleged are <mask>, for soliciting the doctor to change the MRI findings with intent to defraud insurers; falsifying business records, the MRI reports at the radiologist\u2019s office; and attempted grand larceny, an attempt by false pretenses to gain money in a lawsuit against the New York City Transit Authority. At the time of the crimes charged in the indictment, the doctor, unknown to the defendant Lessoff, was working undercover with the District Attorney\u2019s office during the Grand Jury investigation and was secretly recording his telephone conversations with Lessoff. The indictment alleges 10 separate transactions involving 10 separate clients of Lessoff and the partnership. At all times Lessoff was acting in the name of the law firm. There is no evidence implicating anyone else in the firm in the alleged crimes."], "id": "12e77547-30a6-4ca4-83c9-12996a633c49", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Although the evidence indicated that defendant Hirsch did call the Metropolitan office and ask when a check would be forthcoming, the People failed to sustain their burden in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the statement was meant to be a claim for a payment in excess of $1,500. The court cannot simply regard the statement as a claim for payment and circumstantially ascribe a specific value to the repairs without additional proof of such cost. Therefore, the People having proven a fraudulent insurance act, but having failed to prove the value thereof to the defendants, the court finds both defendants guilty of violating section 176.10 of the Penal Law committing an <mask> in the third degree, a class A misdemeanor."], "id": "928583cb-ff1b-486c-b9af-08e4d1eb0649", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Distinctions have to be made between charges which go to the heart of the integrity of a sport or business and those charges which are extrinsic to the sport or business itself. There is a serious risk in keeping a possible race fixer, an *955embezzler, or a crooked policeman in a position where he can continue his misdeeds. A jockey accused of throwing a race, or a trainer accused of doping a horse, if he is kept on without further inquiry, can continue to tip the scale in future events, much more than one who has committed past perjury or tax fraud. The crimes here charged, although involving egregious cruelty to animals, do not directly impact on the conduct or the outcome of future horse shows and exhibitions. Even if plaintiffs had been guilty of <mask>, in the coming meets their horses would run no faster, jump no higher, nor perform any better. If they are suspect, they may not be given universal public approbation. But even under a cloud they may perform. If ultimately plaintiff Lindemann is convicted of the crime charged, he can be stripped of any titles and trophies he may have won. If he is acquitted after having been suspended, he has been denied any chance to compete, and unlike the ordinary job holder, he cannot be reinstated or compensated with back pay."], "id": "250686a8-a3e3-4d78-9759-38bb47d88d35", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The clause in question, which applies in cases where an insured maintains concurrent insurance on the same property, provides, in effect, that an insurance carrier is not necessarily liable for the policy limits but only the percentage which such amount bears to the total amount of insurance covering the loss. As aforesaid, this is a standard clause contained in various types of insurance policies, and *823has been sanctioned by the Legislature. (See, e.g., Insurance Law, \u00a7 168, subd 3, par [a].) Thus, for example, if the total loss sustained as a result of the burglary had been the same as the limit of liability, as contained in the Travelers policy, to wit, $28,000, the Travelers Insurance Co. would only be responsible for paying approximately $11,500. If this insurance carrier, in such an instance, were unaware of the other insurance coverage and paid the defendant the full amount of such a loss, to wit, $28,000, they would have been defrauded by an amount in excess of $16,000. Article 176 of the Penal Law, which contains the definition of <mask> as well as the different degrees thereof, was part of the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act, which was enacted by chapter 720 of the Laws of 1981. The Governor\u2019s memorandum, upon approving the legislation, states as follows: \u201cThe amendments to the Penal Law, particularly the classification of insurance fraud involving pecuniary values in excess of fifteen hundred dollars as class D felonies, track the classifications for larcenies and will be an indication by the Legislature that the State will no longer tolerate crime in the insurance field, and should encourage the prosecution of such crimes by prosecutors.\u201d (McKinney\u2019s Session Laws of NY, 1981, p 2618.) The felony crime of insurance fraud in the first degree, as well as second degree, require a defendant, by his conduct, to attempt or actually take, obtain, or withhold property in excess of a specified value. This, of course, is analogous to the degrees of larceny. Although the misdemeanor crime of insurance fraud in the third degree does not include the theft of property as a necessary element, materiality must nevertheless be established."], "id": "e15f88db-5734-485d-9299-ca56e6dec621", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In conclusion, the crime of <mask> in the first degree, allegedly committed by defendant, was complete upon the filing, on or about November 4, 1981, of the proof of loss *1014statement. Therefore, the agreement to extend the Statute of Limitations executed on December 11, 1986, was ineffectual because the Statute of Limitations had already expired as of the date of the agreement. (See, letter agreement, supra.)"], "id": "bbaa112d-ee1f-457d-a965-ff4690418635", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Section 176.05 of the Penal Law defines <mask> as a presentation of a fraudulent or false statement to an insurer for the issuance of rating of an insurance policy, or for a claim for payment or other benefit. To be guilty, a person must (1) submit the statement or claim knowing that it contains materially false information concerning any fact material thereto, or (2) conceal, for the purpose of misleading, information concerning any facts material thereto. The statute is directed against \u201cfraudulent activities related to the business of insurance.\u201d (See Hechtman, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, 1983-1984 Pocket Part, Penal Law, \u00a7 176.00, p 123.) It contemplates fraud in the inducement, either on the issuance of a policy or the payment of a claim. If any malfeas*566anee existed here, it occurred after the payment of the claim was made, and as in the other counts, the Grand Jury testimony lacks the basis for a finding of criminal intent. Unquestionably, the third-party beneficiaries would be entitled to legal redress, but we are not dealing with a civil matter herein."], "id": "8e02340f-16ae-40ab-ba80-58d5cf7ff827", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Taken to its logical conclusion, defendants' position would mean that whenever the district attorney or insurance commissioner takes over an IFPA lawsuit filed by an employee who alleges workers' compensation <mask>, those officials would also be forced to pursue civil penalties before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. In addition, defendants' argument would mean that a third party whistleblower who files a qui tam lawsuit on behalf of the People, based on fraud in the grant or denial of workers' compensation benefits, would similarly be required to pursue civil penalties before the board. We are not convinced that the Legislature intended the workers' compensation exclusivity rule to work such mischief."], "id": "f9119c45-9135-45e3-98ac-6d0ba6d51b9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "insurance fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment before the jury charges the defendant, Paul Novak, for the murder of his estranged wife, arson in connection with the burning of the marital residence, burglary, grand larceny and <mask>. Jury selection for this trial began on August 5, 2013. At some point prior to jury selection, defendant sought out and gave an interview to the reporter for the Record who has been reporting on this case for some time.2 That interview occurred on August 2, 2013. The Times Herald-Record ran a front-page story about the defendant and on the *751interview in the August 4, 2013, Sunday edition of the paper. It also posted a \u201cportion\u201d of the video recorded interview on its website on August 4, 2013. The running of the story and posting of the interview detrimentally affected the jury pool, but the parties were eventually able to seat 12 jurors and eight alternate jurors. Opening statements and testimony commenced the following week, on August 12, 2013."], "id": "26bd54c1-b49d-4cad-b963-3ea00416d5c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The classification of chain promotional schemes under article 23-A of the General Business Law, however, indicates that \"the Legislature has sought to isolate <mask> from losses at games of chance contingent upon the happening (or not) of some specific event\u201d (Coyle v Richetti, supra, at 605; see also, Highsmith v Smith, supra). General Business Law \u00a7 359-fff contains no language abrogating the common-law rule that a party in pari delicto is without remedy at law or equity. Had the Legislature intended to create a comparable right of action to recover money lost at chain distributor schemes, it would have expressly included it, and its omission is an indication that the Legislature intended its exclusion (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 74). The court thus acted in excess of its authority by expanding the scope of the statute on public policy grounds, so as to provide the plaintiff with a remedy not expressly contained therein. In so doing, the court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Legislature, by \"read[ing] into [the] statute that which the Legislature might have inserted but did not\u201d (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes \u00a7 73)."], "id": "bde48eac-f8b6-44cf-8b09-565361ff8e49", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The court\u2019s analysis shows that there is no overwhelming reason to deny the application. Professor Wigmore has noted that open proceedings improve the quality of testimony and justice; officers of the court are more conscientious under \"public gaze\u201d; there is an \"educative effect of public attendance\u201d; and it increases public confidence in judicial remedies. (6 Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7 1834 [Chadbourn rev 1976].) Indeed, a case such as the one at bar is the typ\u00e9 of civil proceeding where public exposure will be of great value. The proceeding involves an alleged pyramid scheme. Publicity could encourage others who claim injury to seek redress in the courts; it could also discourage future involvement in <mask>. The court takes no position on the merits of the case but notes that access to the small claims procedure to alleviate alleged wrongs is precisely the type of \"significant community therapeutic value\u201d the Supreme Court found in the First Amendment\u2019s right to public trials. (Richmond Newspapers v Virginia, 448 US 555, 570, supra.)"], "id": "63f64500-fe36-4c45-9f1b-542edeabbd29", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The \u201cgifting board\u201d presents a four-level, three-step, pyramid with a CEO at the top, two presidents beneath the CEO position, four vice-presidents beneath them, and eight newly recruited members at the bottom. When the \u201cgifting\u201d process is complete and the CEO \u201cretires,\u201d the remainder of the pyramid splits, everyone advances up in rank and two new pyramids are formed, each containing a new CEO and six other officers, all of whom then must actively seek eight new recruits so as to enable the process and new pyramid boards to continue ad infinitum to everyone\u2019s monetary benefit, or so everyone is led to believe. What is presented is thus not a singular ever-expanding pyramid, but one which spawns a chain of multiple ongoing pyramids, each of which are linked to its predecessor. The club, however, apparently in an effort to distance itself from chain distributor <mask>, uses the characterization \u201cgifting board,\u201d rather than pyramid, and provides its own self-serving definition of a pyramid.2"], "id": "552d5b6a-35c5-4454-904e-f6919bbb51ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In New York, no provision of the law specifically and expressly addresses itself to \u201c<mask>.\u201d However, the Martin Act, which is incorporated in article 23-A of the General Business Law, states that it is \u201cillegal and prohibited for any person * * * to promote, offer or grant participation in a chain distributor scheme.\u201d (General Business Law \u00a7 359-fff [1].) The Act, which clearly includes chain-linked pyramid schemes, defines a chain distributor scheme as: \u201ca sales device whereby a person, upon condition that he make an investment, is *857granted a license or right to solicit or recruit for profit or economic gain one or more additional persons who are also granted such license or right upon condition of making an investment and may further perpetuate the chain of persons who are granted such license or right upon such condition.\u201d (General Business Law \u00a7 359-fff [2].)"], "id": "147e8c0c-dba1-4c54-a439-5388ddbfc183", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In any event, it is clear that, except for semantical differences, the Network chain recruiting operation appears virtually identical to other <mask> which have consistently been held to violate the General Business Law. (See, e.g., Solon v Meuer, 141 Misc 2d 993 [Civ Ct, NY County 1987]; Cochran v Dellfava, 136 Misc 2d 38 [Rochester City Ct 1987].) In Cochran (supra), the promoters structured a four-leveled pyramid characterized as an \u201cairplane game\u201d in which new recruits would, for the sum of $2,200, become a \u201cpassenger\u201d on one of eight seats on an \u201cairplane,\u201d which also has four \u201cflight attendants,\u201d two \u201ccopilots\u201d and one \u201cpilot.\u201d When all passenger seats are filled, the pilot \u201cbails out\u201d after receiving $17,200 (i.e., $2,200 from each of the new eight passengers). The airplane would then split into two airplanes; the former eight passengers would now become flight attendants (4 in each new airplane); the former four crew members would become copilots (2 in each airplane); and the former two copilots would each become a pilot on the new airplanes. The new crew and officers of each airplane would then seek to obtain new passengers in order to keep the process continuing and keep the plane from \u201ccrashing.\u201d In Cochran, the plane ultimately \u201ccrashed\u201d and the plaintiff sued to recover the funds lost. The Cochran court held that the airplane game was clearly a chain distributor scheme which was prohibited by the General Business Law; and that, since the plaintiff was a willing participant in an illegal scheme and in pari delicto with the defendant, she should not be entitled to the exception to the general rule which would allow such cause of action. The court explained that \u201cby entering the so-called \u2018airplane game\u2019 as a passenger, one is in fact *863\u2018promoting\u2019 the game in violation of the General Business Law (e.g., encouraging the pilot to make an illegal profit; encouraging others to enter the game by example; and eventually hoping to make an illegal profit).\u201d (Cochran v Dellfava, supra, at 41.) The court further noted that: \u201c \u2018It is the settled law of this State (and probably of every other State) that a party to an illegal contract cannot ask a court of law to help him [her] carry out his [her] illegal object\u2019 \u201d (Cochran v Dellfava, supra, at 40 [citations omitted])."], "id": "7e5d2a82-71cf-4e2e-9e56-d8b23dca48c7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In Ford (supra), the plaintiff sought the return of $1,500 paid to defendants as an entry fee to join and participate in a pyramid scheme. The trial court, following the approach of Solon v Meuer (supra), held that, on public policy grounds, plaintiff was entitled under the General Obligations Law to \u201crecovery of money lost at wagering games.\u201d The Appellate Term of the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, and dismissed the' complaint, stating: \u201cThe classification of chain promotional schemes under article 23-A of the General Business Law, however, indicates that \u2018the Legislature has sought to isolate <mask> from losses at games of chance contingent upon the happening (or not) of some specific event\u2019 [citations omitted]. General Business Law \u00a7 359-fff contains no language abrogating the common-law rule that a party in pari delicto is without remedy at law or equity. Had the Legislature intended to create a comparable right of action to recover money lost at chain distributor schemes, it would have expressly included it, and its omission is an indication that the Legislature intended its exclusion [citation omitted]. The court thus acted in excess of its authority by expanding the scope of the statute on public policy grounds, so as to provide the *864plaintiff with a remedy not expressly contained therein. In so doing, the court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Legislature, by \u2018reading] into [the] statute that which the Legislature might have inserted but did not\u2019 [citation omitted].\u201d (Ford v Henry, at 194.)"], "id": "4b88d1ca-7aa0-4dc1-bd78-1c1c7f35b824", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Despite the general provisions of General Obligations Law \u00a7 5-419, permitting the recovery of sums lost at various illegal betting ventures, the Legislature has sought to isolate <mask> from losses at games of chance contingent upon the happening (or not) of some specific event. Section 359-fff of the General Business Law makes such pyramid schemes misdemeanors punishable by jail or fine, or both, upon conviction."], "id": "ed0b4bde-3dcf-4a97-a68e-6a5287edb670", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Even if Federated breached its contract(s) with Alliance by assessing charge-backs, such actions are markedly different from the previously discussed deceptive and misleading practices. General Business Law \u00a7 349 \u201cwas designed to protect \u2018the little guy\u2019 from false advertising, <mask>, bait-and-*307switch sales tactics, and other mischievous machinations by swindlers and scallywags.\u201d (Exxonmobil Inter-Am. Inc. v Advanced Info. Eng\u2019g Servs., Inc., 328 F Supp 2d at 450.) Federated neither made false or misleading statements, nor did its conduct deceive or mislead plaintiff or the public. While plaintiff claims Federated\u2019s policies are unfair and unjustified, defendant\u2019s actions do not constitute a deceptive and misleading practice as contemplated by General Business Law \u00a7 349 and as interpreted by relevant case law. Accordingly, defendant is granted partial summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action for deceptive trade practices in violation of General Business Law \u00a7 349."], "id": "7416412f-2dc6-4176-bb96-2edd306af30e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The kinds of trade practices which have been considered as deceptive in the past include false advertising (Eastern Air Lines v New York Air Lines, 559 F Supp 1270; State of New York v Ginzburg, supra), <mask> (State of New York *126v Phase II Sys., 109 Misc 2d 598), deceptive preticketing (Benrus Watch Co. v Federal Trade Commn., 352d 313, cert denied 384 US 939), misrepresentation of the origin, nature or quality of the product (Century Metalcraft Corp. v Federal Trade Commn., 112d 443), false testimonial (Federal Trade Commn. v Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 US 374), deceptive collection efforts against debtors (In re Scrimpsher, 17 Bankr 999), deceptive practices of insurance companies (Sulnar v General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 122 Misc 2d 597) and \"bait and switch\u201d operations (Electrolux Corp. v Val-Worth, Inc., 6 NY2d 556)."], "id": "19f7891b-bd4b-4e59-ad4c-c790b7a35871", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Based on the foregoing the court finds that the plaintiff has asserted the following cognizable causes of action against the defendant: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of New York State General Business Law \u00a7 359-fff (<mask> prohibited); (3) rescission based upon (a) want of consideration, (b) failure of consideration, (c) unconscionability and (d) misrepresentations; and (4) violation of New York State General Business Law \u00a7 349 (deceptive and unfair business practices)."], "id": "09d1f7af-1f4b-49ae-a84c-fa82dbb8fe2a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["New York State General Business Law \u00a7 349 prohibits deceptive business practices and applies to <mask> (see, e.g., Teller v Bill Hayes, Ltd., 213 AD2d 141 [2d Dept 1995] [General Business Law \u00a7 349 applies to pyramid schemes]; Goldberg v Manhattan Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 129 Misc 2d 123 [1985]; State of New York v Phase II Sys., supra; State of New York v ITM, supra; Kugler v Koscot Interplanetary, supra [New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act applies to cosmetics pyramid scheme]) and to educational contracts (see, e.g., Andre v Pace Univ., supra, 161 Misc 2d, at 623-624; James v SCS Bus. & *509Tech. Inst., supra; Matter of State of New York v Interstate Tractor Trailer Training, 66 Misc 2d 678 [1971] [\"The representations * * * have no basis in fact and would clearly tend to deceive or mislead those persons seeking to better themselves in a new field of employment\u201d])."], "id": "df376e5f-5e23-4200-969d-208816f71acd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "pyramid schemes", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Courts have traditionally applied General Business Law \u00a7 349 in the context of consumer sales transactions. \"The typical violation contemplated by the statute involves an individual consumer who falls victim to misrepresentations made by a seller of consumer goods usually by way of false and misleading advertising\u201d (Genesco Entertainment v Koch, 593 F Supp 743, 751, supra). And, \"[t]he New York cases where plaintiffs have recovered under section 349 (h) further reflect its consumer orientation since they uniformly involve transactions where the amount in controversy is small\u201d (Genesco Entertainment v Koch, supra, at 752). The court in Goldberg v Manhattan Ford Lincoln-Mercury (129 Misc 2d 123, 125-126) digested some of the relevant case law to provide a sample list of typical transactions cognizable under General Business Law \u00a7 349: \"The kinds of trade practices which have been considered as deceptive in the past include false advertising (Eastern Air Lines v New York Air Lines, 559 F Supp 1270; State of New York v Ginzburg [104 Misc 2d 292]), <mask> (State of New York v Phase II Sys., 109 Misc 2d 598), deceptive preticketing (Benrus Watch Co. v Federal Trade Commn., 352d 313, cert denied 384 US 939), misrepresentation of the origin, nature or quality of the product (Century Metalcraft Corp. v Federal Trade Commn., 112d 443), false testimonial (Federal Trade Commn. v Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 US 374), deceptive collection efforts against debtors (In re Scrimpsher, 17 Bankr 999), deceptive practices of insurance companies (Sulnar v General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 122 Misc 2d 597) and 'bait and switch\u2019 operations (Electrolux Corp. v Val-Worth, Inc., 6 NY2d 556)\u201d."], "id": "bb66595f-2e44-488d-939f-c10e9dd00149", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeals also looked to the legislative intent underlying the Martin Act: \"The majority of this court holds that an implied private action is not consistent with the legislative scheme underlying the Martin Act and, specifically, section 352-c; that the specific purpose of the statute was to create a statutory mechanism in which the Attorney-General would have broad regulatory and remedial powers to prevent fraudulent securities practices by investigating and intervening at the first indication of possible <mask> on the public and, thereafter, if appropriate, to commence civil or criminal prosecution; and that consistency of purpose with the *598statute includes consistency with this enforcement mechanism (see, General Business Law \u00a7\u00a7 352, 353, 353-a, 354, 358; Kaufman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 19, General Business Law art 23-A, at 19-20).\u201d (CPC Intl. v McKesson Corp., 70 NY2d 268, 276-277, supra.)"], "id": "bdadf91a-bd9c-4d74-a165-ce1794ba8cba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There is scant decisional precedent to guide the court on this question. In United States v Chiarella (588d 1358 [2d Cir 1978]), the federal Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court\u2019s ruling that in a <mask> and insider trading case, as a matter of federal law, the apparent state-court privilege embodied in Labor Law \u00a7 537 yields to federal rules and precedent. The court noted that Federal Rules of Evidence rule 501 and established precedent show a strong federal policy favoring admissibility of the type of statement which Labor Law \u00a7 537 appears to protect. The court specifically declined to decide whether section 537 creates a privilege under New York law, since the court did not need to resolve that question in order to decide its own case."], "id": "2a080f36-fc1a-4c56-965a-6190880eb705", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Barbara Gunther Zambelli, J. Defendant is charged with three misdemeanor counts of <mask> in violation of section 352-c of the General Business Law, also known as the Martin Act. He moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument filed against him on three grounds: (1) the District Attorney lacks authority to prosecute violations of the Martin Act; (2) the District Attorney must be disqualified because of a conflict of interest; and (3) the prosecution is barred by the Statute of Limitations."], "id": "0f731033-eec9-4ede-b155-8fee7ccf3cec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[T]he Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. 79a *211et seq.) . . the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (15 U.S.C. 77aaa et seq.), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b et seq.) . . ., and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.).\u201d (15 USC \u00a7 78c [a] [47].) Additionally, \u201cthe doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply to the statute of limitations in <mask> cases.\u201d (De la Fuente v DCI Telecom., Inc., supra, 259 F Supp 2d 250, 263 [2003].) Finally, \u201cin applying the Statute of Limitations [courts] look for the reality, and the essence of the action and not its mere name.\u201d (Brick v Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 NY 259, 264 [1937]; Meyer v Shearson Lehman Bros., 211 AD2d 541 [1st Dept 1995]; see also von Bulow by Auersperg v von Bulow, 657 F Supp 1134, 1140 [SD NY 1987] [\u201c(w)hen applying a statute of limitations, courts look at the essence of the stated claim and not the label by which plaintiff chooses to identify it\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)].) Petitioner argues that all of respondent\u2019s claims arise from petitioners\u2019 investment of her money, are governed by 28 USC \u00a7 1658 (b), and under CPLR 7502 (b), require the court to permanently stay the arbitration."], "id": "4e2327c0-2edb-4c88-adbf-3e662094b593", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In determining that a failure by FNIC to exercise reasonable supervision over its securities salespeople in a branch office can be a violation of the Martin Act, this court relies upon the following. When passing securities legislation, Congress has always preserved a role for state \u201cblue sky\u201d laws, which predated the federal securities laws of the 1930s, including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (see Mihaly and Kaufmann, Introduction and Commentary *999Overview, Securities, Commodities and Other Investments, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 19, General Business Law art 23-A, at 11-12; see also Matter of Gardner v Lefkowitz, 97 Misc 2d 806, 812-813 [Sup Ct, NY County 19783). Further, despite FNIC\u2019s allegation that the Martin Act does not specifically address the issue of broker-dealer supervision, section 353 clearly addresses secondary liability for <mask>, providing that the Attorney General may seek relief for fraudulent practices against a perpetrator as well as \u201cany other person or persons theretofore concerned in or in any way participating in or about to participate in such fraudulent practices\u201d (General Business Law \u00a7 353 [1] [emphasis supplied]). Here, FNIC hired certain of the other defendants as its representatives and clothed them with the \u201cgood name\u201d of a national broker-dealer. If, as alleged by plaintiff, FNIC failed to adequately train or supervise the individuals who operated with FNIC\u2019s express authority in selling other products, FNIC was necessarily \u201cconcerned in\u201d the FNIC individual defendants\u2019 fraudulent outside sales practices."], "id": "fefe48a5-520f-4ee7-b8b4-b5ee535cbec7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The rules of a private industry self-regulating group cannot deprive a state securities commission of jurisdiction over such an important area of <mask>. Instructive on this point is Jones v Securities & Exch. Commn. (115d 1173 [4th Cir 1997], cert denied 523 US 1072 [1998]), a case cited by FNIC. Jones ruled that res judicata did not bar the SEC from prosecuting an individual defendant after he had already been sanctioned by the NASD for the identical conduct (id. at 1180). The Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory scheme for supervision of securities salespeople, among other issues:"], "id": "5cfaada0-4824-428a-98f7-b6800622baca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Charles Edward Ramos, J. This is a declaratory judgment action brought to resolve a controversy regarding insurance coverage for numerous <mask> lawsuits brought by individuals, classes of individuals and regulators against the Xerox Corporation and many of its present and former directors and officers based on their alleged fraudulent reporting of Xerox\u2019s finances from 1997 through 2000.1 In this action, plaintiff National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. contends that the directors and officers insurance policy it issued to Xerox does not afford coverage to defendants with respect to these lawsuits, and/or that the policy should be rescinded based on the failure to satisfy a condition precedent, fraudulent inducement and/or the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing."], "id": "a4a473e9-5156-4a52-9d90-e891c1f2f74e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*585By letter dated October 18, 2004, counsel for Wyly wrote to Barry Weprin, Esq. of respondent Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP to request that a motion be filed pursuant to rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to relieve the settlement class from the final judgment approving the settlement. The request was based on (i) a guilty plea by Steven Woghin, CA\u2019s former general counsel, who admitted that he had impeded the governmental investigation of CA\u2019s accounting practices in 2002, and (ii) the revelation in a September 24, 2004 Wall Street Journal article that CA\u2019s outside counsel had in its possession 23 boxes of previously undisclosed documents that purportedly indicated that CA engaged in <mask>, and that its employees made false statements to lawyers and governmental investigators. The letter also noted that Mr. Weprin had represented that he knew nothing about the 23 boxes of documents until the publication of the Wall Street Journal article."], "id": "2ba9dfae-f513-4c35-bb67-93919067c673", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On August 11, 2004, Strafaci pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to one count of criminal <mask>, admitting that he knowingly, willfully and intentionally made untrue statements of material fact in connection with his valuation of the securities contained within the portfolios of Lipper Convertibles and the Series II Fund. At his sentencing on May 20, 2005, the District Court (Swain, J.) observed, \u201cHis motive in undertaking this conduct is not clear to me. It was, however, clearly not his motive simply to maximize his own financial gain.\u201d (Transcript at 42.) In 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Lawrence Stoler, the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) partner assigned to the Lipper account, with knowingly, recklessly, and/or negligently ignoring generally accepted auditing standards and generally accepted accounting principles in conducting the 2000 audit. Stoler entered into a consent order in which the SEC found, among other things, that Stoler ignored, discounted, or failed to apprise himself of the substantial audit evidence that Strafaci\u2019s valuations were materially overstated."], "id": "df7d1042-67d4-4056-b855-8a93a3252e9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cBY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT YOU AND BEAR STEARNS AGREE, THAT CONTROVERSIES ARISING UNDER OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY ACTIVITY BETWEEN YOU AND BEAR STEARNS, . . . SHALL BE DETERMINED BY ARBITRATION. ANY ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE HELD ONLY AT THE FACILITIES OF, BEFORE AN ARBITRATION PANEL APPOINTED BY, AND PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., OR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR SECURITIES DEALERS, INC.\u201d (Petition 11 3, quoting \u00a7 25 [a] of Customer Agreement, annexed as exhibit A thereto.) *609The underlying arbitration arises out of ICMC\u2019s claims that petitioners committed common-law and <mask> in connection with the hedge fund, and that Bear Stearns failed to process and revoked ICMC\u2019s alleged irrevocable redemption of its investment in the hedge fund in October 2006 (see petition 1i 6, exhibit B annexed thereto). In the statement of claim, filed on July 25, 2008, ICMC sought recovery for breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation. It sought, in addition to other damages, reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees, and other costs and expenses (exhibit B to petition, statement of claim 1f 106). Petitioners filed a statement of answer in which they denied all claims and any liability, asserted affirmative defenses, and requested that ICMC be directed to pay costs, fees and expenses, including reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees (exhibit C to petition, statement of answer at 24)."], "id": "aacd3fa5-a464-4fda-9589-d77914afe8cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff was sued in federal court, in the Southern District of New York, in several actions alleging <mask>, together entitled In Re Forest Labs., Inc. Sec. Litig. (US Dist Ct, SD NY, No. 05-CV-2827-RMB, Berman, J.). The securities action was settled for $65 million, which was paid by plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that considerable unpaid extra claims and defense costs exist, adding several millions of dollars over the $65 million settlement amount."], "id": "be0e2538-e3fe-4ce1-9d92-397d04dd9bdd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". The federal courts continue to maintain that the New York common-law fraud standard for claims arising from the sale of securities, including RMBS, includes the element of loss causation. (See Bank of Am,., N.A. v Bear Stearns Asset Mgt., \u2014 F Supp 2d \u2014, \u2014, 2013 WL 4734495, *5, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 125700, *14-15 [SD NY, Sept. 3, 2013, No. 08-Civ-9265 (AJN)].) It is important to note that \u201cwarranty fraud\u201d cases, where a fraud claim is allowed to proceed with a breach of contract claim, is not the same as a garden variety <mask> claim. Fraud based on breach of a warranty, as in monoline cases (e.g. MBIA Ins. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 39 Misc 3d 1220[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50677[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]), have separate legal considerations, such as insurance law, and are guided by unique principles *865that do not affect the normal loss causation standard. (See generally Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. v Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500d 171, 183-184 [2d Cir 2007]; DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C., 15 NY3d 147 [2010].) As this court has explained, it has long been the law that \u201cthe analysis of reliance in a tort action based on fraud or misrepresentation (tort reliance) differs from the analysis of reliance in actions for breach of express contractual warranties (warranty reliance).\u201d (Project Gamma Acquisition Corp. v PPG Indus., Inc., 34 Misc 3d 771, 778 [Sup Ct, NY County 2011]; accord CBS Inc. v Ziff-Davis Publ. Co., 75 NY2d 496 [1990].)"], "id": "2229f19a-2d73-451d-8088-4bec0c8a35f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In contrast, in Matter of Schmidt v Roberts (74 NY2d 513, 522 [1989]), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant convicted of the federal crimes of interstate transportation of stolen property (18 USC \u00a7 2314), and conspiracy to commit that crime (18 USC \u00a7 371), could not be prosecuted in New York for grand larceny in the second degree, former Penal Law \u00a7 155.35, now Penal Law \u00a7 155.40. The Court concluded that the federal and state crimes were not designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil, since \u201c[t]he Federal crime of interstate transportation of stolen property and the State crime of larceny are both designed to punish thieves and to protect property owners from thefts.\u201d (Id.) Similarly, the federal wire fraud statute and New York\u2019s scheme to defraud are both designed to protect the unwary from schemes to deprive them of their property by fraud. Thus, scheme to defraud in the first degree and wire fraud are not, as CPL 40.20 (2) (b) requires, designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil. (See also Matter of Kaplan v Ritter, 71 NY2d 222, 230-231 [1987] [\u201ccounts in the New York County indictment, which charge petitioners with <mask> and grand larceny, cannot be prosecuted (pursuant to exceptions in CPL 40.20 [2] [b] and [e]) in light of the prior Federal prosecution for RICO violations and fraud\u201d].)"], "id": "93e59b10-92f4-4a3c-98e0-ff2c2beeb6fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants are charged with 85 counts of <mask>, scheme to defraud, criminal possession of stolen property and grand larceny. The charges arise out of nine alleged fraudulent \u201cpump and dump\u201d penny stock promotion schemes. Defendant Anthony Thompson moves here to suppress approximately 100,000 of his emails recovered in the execution of two search warrants directed to his Internet service providers in 2012."], "id": "a7a3b4a5-b321-4326-b690-747c7a970ca0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Similar issues arose in United States v Metter (860 F Supp 2d 205 [ED NY 2012, Irizarry, J.]), a <mask> overseizure case in which the court suppressed computer files recovered from the defendant\u2019s home and business as well as personal email messages which had been obtained from his Internet service providers.19 Fifteen months after the initial seizure, the government had not yet completed its privilege review or determined whether any of the seized material fell outside the scope of the warrants. The court concluded the government\u2019s 15-month delay in isolating responsive communications constituted a search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment because of the unreasonable period of time the government had consumed searching the defendant\u2019s files. The court did not address the third-party doctrine, although part of the materials which were suppressed were email communications seized from ISPs. Thus, the court apparently implicitly recognized that the third-party doctrine was not applicable to those seizures."], "id": "2191cf50-19a7-4859-b7ba-6e3998a7a88d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[a]lmost all <mask> complaints will allege that the defendants did what they did in order to benefit themselves in some way. If such an allegation were sufficient to invoke the protections of 4(a) [the personal profit exclusion], the broad coverage for \u2018Securities Claims\u2019 provided by the National Union Policy would be rendered valueless by this exclusion . . . and would swallow up the very securities coverage that the National Union policy purports to grant\u201d (see also In re Donald Sheldon & Co., Inc., 186 BR 364). Similarly, accepting the Insurers\u2019 construction that any profit or advantage gained by an insured is sufficient to trigger the exclusion essentially renders the coverage afforded by the policies illusory, as it would exclude most coverage for securities violations that the policies are intended to grant."], "id": "d83e4151-491a-4ce5-bf25-f707d04f6254", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["While the three Levines were still stockholders, while the plaintiff was still director and subsequent to the commencement of this action, the individual defendants procured the merger of Biddle Sawyer into another Delaware corporation; and, as the Levines held less than 10% of Biddle Sawyer stock, the defendants were enabled to and did divest the Levines of their shares in both the old and new corporations (Delaware Corporation Law, \u00a7 253) making the Levines creditors to be paid out at the appraised value of their former shares. (The Levines, as stockholders, have pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York a <mask> action seeking among other relief their reinstatement as stockholders of Biddle Sawyer. An attack on that complaint has been successfully withstood.)"], "id": "a9bae4e9-fd6a-4f5a-9632-3bf71ad29fae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Irving Lang, J. In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner contests his rendition to the State of Alabama to answer an indictment for <mask> on two unusual grounds. First, he claims that no date is alleged in the indictment, thereby depriving him of the constitutional and statutory right to resist extradition on the ground that he was not in the demanding State at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. Secondly, he claims that the specific acts of which he is accused do not substantially charge him with a crime under Alabama law. Rather, he asserts the demanding State is attempting to use criminal process to enforce what is a civil obligation. He claims that since the indictment does not \"substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law\u201d of Alabama, the writ should be granted (CPL 570.08)."], "id": "8f7d317a-9b4b-40af-bc8d-8ce91c102d57", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Applying these tests to the three counts of the indictment (which contain the requisite specificity), petitioner has not come forward with any law from the State of Alabama indicating that the acts are not criminal.* Count I, which alleges that Lewis diverted the proceeds of securities to his own use, clearly describes actions which suggest intent to perpetrate <mask>."], "id": "c16c141d-209b-490f-9471-c5bf5eb87e90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It was stipulated that defendant Norman Forsyth was served with a subpoena issued by the Attorney-General pursuant to article 23-A of the General Business Law (New York\u2019s \u201cBlue Sky\u201d law) requiring his appearance at the office of the Attorney-General on August 31, 1979. It was *235undisputed that defendant was aware that the purpose of the subpoena was to seek the defendant\u2019s testimony in an investigation of <mask> of which he was the prime suspect. Defendant had, pursuant to earlier subpoenas and upon adjourned dates requested by him, appeared at the office of the Attorney-General. Following his failure to appear on an adjourned date, the subpoena, which is the subject of this indictment, was served upon him."], "id": "aa34ae8d-a568-449c-833e-748b767a90fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There are two California cases which are on point. Bradshaw v Pardee (78 Cal App 3d 567) was cited by the defendant and discussed in his brief but, unfortunately, the opinion was deleted from the reporter on the direction of the California Supreme Court for an unstated reason. According to the defendant\u2019s brief, the case concerned a client who pleaded guilty to a criminal charge on the advice of counsel. The client later brought a malpractice action against the attorney, alleging that he was negligently advised to plead guilty. The court dismissed the complaint on the theory that the client\u2019s prison sentence was caused by his guilt and not the lawyer\u2019s alleged negligence. In Weiner v Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp (114 Cal App 3d 39), a former client who had been convicted of <mask> brought an action charging his former attorneys with malpractice in the criminal case. The California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, noted that the client\u2019s conviction estopped him from relitigating the issue of guilt. The court then unanimously held (p 48) \u201cwe must, therefore, accept as the proximate cause of his indictment, and of all the damages which occurred to him by reason of it, his guilt and his guilt alone. This means that all of the various causes of action alleged in tort against defendants in plaintiff\u2019s second amended com*435plaint founder on the complete lack of proximate causation between the torts alleged therein and the injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered thereby. Stated otherwise, without proximate causation between the torts alleged and the damages allegedly suffered, there can be no cause of action in tort.\u201d"], "id": "440201e0-c163-4d5b-b653-ee0212dbe177", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The first and second causes of action of plaintiff\u2019s complaint assert State securities law violations, specifically alleging violations of subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 352-c and section 339-a of the General Business Law. However, just as the time-deposit accounts herein are not securities within the meaning of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 (US Code, tit 15, \u00a7 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (US Code, tit 15, \u00a7 78a et seq.) (Marine Bank v Weaver, 455 US 551), so they are not securities or commodities as defined in section 352 of the General Business Law or within the meaning of section 339-a of the same statute. (See, generally, Matter of Gardner v Lefkowitz, 97 Misc 2d 806, 812.) Inasmuch as plaintiff\u2019s allegations fail to state a cause of action for <mask>, the first and second causes of action of her complaint are insufficient."], "id": "8cba330a-2150-4b31-bbc3-6905eb4ad66c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In April, 1973, Vall became employed as a salesman for a commodities brokerage firm known as Collins and Day. That firm ceased operations some time in June, 1973, with substantial losses to its clients. Thereafter an investigation was commenced by the Attorney-General. That investigation revealed that neither the firm, its principals nor *1001its salespeople were registered and licensed to sell securities in this State and that Collins and Day was what is colloquially known as a \u201cbucket shop\u201d. The loss to investors was estimated to be in excess of $2,000,000. As a result the Attorney-General obtained indictments against the principals of Collins and Day as well as all of its salespeople. Vail was indicted and charged with 35 counts of grand larceny in the second and third degree; the sale of securities without a license; and <mask> under the Martin Act. Prior to trial Vail entered a plea of guilty to a violation of section 359-e of the General Business Law (failure to register as a salesman), a misdemeanor, and this plea was accepted to cover the entire indictment. Vail received a sentence of incarceration for four successive weekends and was fined $500. The sentencing Judge thereafter granted Vail a certificate of relief from civil disabilities pursuant to section 702 of article 23 of the Correction Law. A civil proceeding pursuant to the Martin Act was then initiated by the Attorney-General to obtain orders permanently enjoining all the defendants in the Collins and Day operation from participating in the purchase and sale of securities. Vail subsequently consented to the entry of judgment and the permanent injunction which he now seeks to dissolve"], "id": "f4879e69-b5fe-4969-8dff-86be3134a1b2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The regulation of the purchase and sale of securities pursuant to the Martin Act is a creation of the Legislature and the primary purpose of the statute is remedial in character (People v Lexington Sixty-First Assoc., supra; People v Federated Radio Corp., 244 NY 33). As such it is the prerogative of the Legislature to establish the availability and applicability of the remedy and in so doing does *1004not infringe upon the jurisdiction of the court (People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v La Fetra, 230 NY 429). Section 359-g is penal in operation (People u Federated Radio Corp., supra) and it is within the authority of the Legislature to punish those convicted of fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities (Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v Du Mond, 309 NY 537). In the context of the Martin Act, the Legislature has stated that the remedy of dissolution or modification of the injunction is not available to those convicted of <mask> (NY Legis Ann, 1963, pp 107-108). This is a clear proscription of the jurisdiction of the court and is binding (Thrasher v United States Liab. Ins. Co., supra; People v Darling, supra)."], "id": "414ed50e-231f-4ada-a491-f3250966b5e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In October 1986, the petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York claiming that Drexel, through one of its agents, had engaged in fraudulent transactions in violation of Federal securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 USC \u00a7 1961 et seq.) and in breach of its fiduciary duties to the petitioners.2 At the time there was disagreement among the several circuits concerning the arbitrability of. controversies involving securities transactions. However, since this specific issue was before the United States Supreme Court, the District Court (Conner, J.) stayed the action pending the resolution of that case. In Shearson/American Express v McMahon (482 US 220), the Supreme Court held the provisions of the FAA applicable to RICO and <mask> claims. Thereafter, petitioners discontinued the Federal action."], "id": "2fb066af-cbe6-448f-ac0a-d560374a9a12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, the dealers recognize that Ehrlich-Bober (supra) is a State court doctrine inapplicable in Federal court. Greater governance over the financial markets in New York is provided by Federal law than by State law. And yet, for example, <mask> claims can be brought in any district in the country and, notwithstanding the possibility of nationwide cacophony in judicial rulings, the securities markets function. This suggests that disaster will not befall plaintiffs and the market in Government securities if the Ehrlich-Bober doctrine is not transformed into exclusive New York jurisdiction over cases involving the markets."], "id": "04dcd8a6-9c01-4127-8df2-75531a1b4435", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants have argued that the June 2,1988 extension of the Citron warrant was not based on probable cause because no evidence of <mask> was uncovered during the execution of the original warrant. Eavesdropping warrants must meet the \"probable cause\u201d requirements that are applicable to search warrants. (CPL 700.15 [2], [3]; 700.20; People v Tambe, 71 NY2d 492.) A finding of probable cause requires that facts be presented to the issuing officer sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that evidence of a crime will be obtained through the use of electronic surveillance. (United States v Fury, 554d, at 530, supra.) Requests for extension of the warrant must, in addition to the requirement of probable cause, contain a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained."], "id": "14796055-6331-4985-9053-e184fba50555", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A partner at First Investors\u2019 primary outside accounting firm states that FICON was not insolvent at the time of The Contested Transactions; that as of December 31, 1989 FICON had \"reported stockholders\u2019 equity of approximately $83 million\u201d; that as of December 31, 1990 FICON had \"reported stockholders\u2019 equity of approximately $76 million\u201d; that FI-CON was actually worth more than the $83 million book value of its outstanding shares; that contrary to plaintiff\u2019s assertion, and for \"several reasons\u201d (e.g., plaintiff\u2019s calculations omit both \"net investment income earned\u201d and \"gains earned by investors prior to the limited time period 1987 to 1990 used by the State to calculate losses\u201d), First Investors was not liable for a total restitution of $1.6 billion to investors at the time of The Contested Transactions; that at the time of The Contested Transactions as a matter of general accounting practice, no liability attached to First Investors pursuant to the instant suit since (1) it was not \"probable\u201d that there would be a loss, and (2) as an independent ground, the amount of any loss could not reasonably be estimated. Defendants note that plaintiffs damage calculations assume that every investor in First Investors was the victim of fraud, whereas a plaintiff in a <mask> suit can only collect net losses which stem from defendant\u2019s fraudulent act(s) (see, Abrahamson v Fleschner, 568d 862, 878 [2d Cir 1977]). Plaintiff rejoins that \"a contingent liability * * * must be reduced to its present, or expected, value before a determination can be made whether the firm\u2019s assets exceed its liabilities.\u201d (Matter *218of Xonics Photochemical, 841d 198, 200 [7th Cir 1988] [\"(t)o value (a) contingent liability it is necessary to discount it by the probability that the contingency will occur\u201d].)"], "id": "e6cd2b7b-94a6-4689-8931-e315613528c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Milken and Levine have served time for their convictions of felonies and have been fined substantial sums. Their company, the investment brokerage house of Drexel Burnham Lambert, itself ultimately pleaded guilty to mail and <mask> for its part in the crimes on September 1, 1989 and agreed to pay $650 million in criminal and civil penalties. It also settled a complaint filed against it by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)."], "id": "275226bc-03f0-4550-bfb9-f0d766d455f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Levine was indicted in 1986 for <mask> and other crimes to which he pleaded guilty, and he also settled charges against him brought by the SEC, agreeing to disgorge his gains. Drexel notified the insurers on September 4, 1986 that *207Levine had been charged with insider trading and had pleaded guilty to the criminal charges and had settled with the SEC in June, and that as a result claims by third parties against Drexel might thereafter be asserted."], "id": "1d1a9c70-8aa0-48ae-bd47-d1b466733b06", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The complaint further alleges that Boesky also pleaded guilty and settled charges of <mask>, implicating Michael Milken, the head of Drexel\u2019s high yield bond division. Michael Milken and other Drexel employees (Lowell Milken, Cary Maultasch, Bruce Newberg, Martin Siegel and Pamela Mouzert) were charged with securities fraud involving the shares of numerous companies from 1984 to 1986 including insider trading, stock parking and manipulation. Milken pleaded guilty in 1990 to six felony counts including conspiracy, securities fraud and mail fraud, agreed to pay $200 million in fines and penalties, and $400 million to defray claims against him."], "id": "ef30c317-9ad9-4811-b811-0ea5c9b8a642", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On January 30, 1990, Moore & Schley filed a petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In March 1990, Moore & Schley submitted written proofs of loss to the defendants based upon the dishonest and fraudulent acts of Militano and Sonneberg. In March 1991, after waiving indictment, Militano pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit <mask> and making a false statement to a Federal official, and Sonneberg pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud. In April 1991, defendants disclaimed coverage. The SEC\u2019s civil action against Militano and Sonneberg culminated in a judgment against them enjoining them from engaging in securities fraud and requiring them to disgorge their profits."], "id": "5714eff1-4463-4114-914b-14a1427faf5f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Movants in their counterclaim allege plaintiffs intentionally and tortiously induced the breach of a settlement agreement entered into on July 12, 1990, of an action then pending in Illinois. Beigel & Sandler, Ltd., the predecessor firm of plaintiffs\u2019 counsel herein, specifically entered into that agreement on its *31clients\u2019 and on its own behalf. The defendants James Haber and Harvey Minors were also defendants in the Illinois action; and the settlement agreement was entered into on their behalf. The claims in the Illinois action which were resolved included claims of <mask> and Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations violations unrelated to this action. Movants allege that plaintiffs, by retaining the Beigel firm to represent them in the instant action, caused the Beigel firm to breach paragraph 10 of the settlement agreement which prohibits the Beigel firm from representing or assisting claimants asserting certain claims against Haber, such as the claims asserted herein."], "id": "565e3446-6593-4996-84ed-82dc651ec79f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"It is settled in this State that there are limits upon the power of public officials authorized to issue subpoenas. In the *171leading case of Carlisle v. Bennett (268 N. Y. 212, 217-218) it was stated that the power of the Attorney-General in investigating alleged <mask>, is necessarily limited to a 'proper case\u2019, 'one where the books and papers * * * have some relevancy and materiality to the matter under investigation [citations omitted].\u2019 The court further stated that the statutory authorization to issue subpoenas would not be construed to allow the Attorney-General to embark upon a roving course to pry into the affairs of any person."], "id": "8e0eb7d1-9483-468a-8a3b-44504c41ac5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["been paid in full by the Company more than 60 days previously. In April 2018, plaintiffs commenced an action in federal district court, where, in due course, plaintiffs\u2019 <mask> claims were eventually dismissed on the merits, and plaintiffs\u2019 remaining state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. See Iafrate v Angelo Iafrate, Inc, 827 F Appx 543, 547 (CA 6, 2020). In July 2019, plaintiffs filed their complaint underlying this appeal which primarily concerned defendants\u2019 refusal to honor the expired Warrants. Plaintiffs raised four claims: (1) breach of contract, (2) reformation, (3) unjust enrichment, and (4) fraud."], "id": "46691057-d9aa-4c6e-99dd-1687552c0e83", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claims on the basis of collateral estoppel, holding that the dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 <mask> claims in federal court precluded plaintiffs\u2019 common law fraud claims. \u201cCollateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue in a new action arising between the same parties or their privies when the earlier proceeding resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue in question was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding.\u201d Leahy v Orion Twp, 269 Mich App 527, 530; 711 NW2d 438 (2006). Collateral estoppel may bar subsequent litigation in state courts based on issues determined in a prior federal action. Pierson Sand and Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 380-381; 596 NW2d 153 (1999). The trial court also held that, in any event, plaintiffs failed to plead the necessary elements of fraud."], "id": "eb71fd32-a0f6-4654-a4b3-a7a78c0f9119", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs\u2019 fraud claim is based in part on the general contention that Adcock undervalued the Company\u2019s performance, which undermined the value of the stock to be redeemed under the Warrants. Having determined that the Company properly regarded all but Angelo Jr.\u2019s warrants as expired, this claim applies only to Angelo Jr.\u2019s Warrant. Plaintiffs\u2019 <mask> claim in federal court alleged a violation of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 USC \u00a7 78j(b), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR \u00a7 240.10b-5, for precisely that reason: that Adcock and the Company had intentionally undervalued the Company\u2019s stock price in an effort to manipulate the value of the Warrants. Iafrate, 827 F Appx at 546-547. Consistent with the allegations in the complaint in this matter, the federal courts observed that Adcock admitted to the undervaluing to Angelo Jr. before Angelo Jr. exercised his Warrant. Id. at 551. In Michigan, as in federal courts, an essential element of fraud is that the plaintiff not only relied on a misrepresentation but did so genuinely and reasonably. Cooper v Auto Club Ins Ass\u2019n, 481 Mich 399, 414-415; 751 NW2d 443 (2008).13 Plaintiffs alleged that Angelo Jr. relied on defendants\u2019 \u201cmaterially false and misleading statements\u201d and upon an earlier presentation regarding the methodology to be used in calculating the fair market value of the stocks. However, as the Sixth Circuit found, Angelo Jr. actually knew that defendants had manipulated the Company\u2019s stock value and, instead of challenging the valuation or suing for breach of contract immediately, he"], "id": "e5dfcae7-04ca-49e2-b97c-ce1cf4a1c935", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The SEC sued Ms. Baylor, the Baylor & Jackson law firm, the Milan Group, Inc., and other individuals as \u201cPrincipal Defendants\u201d for conducting an alleged <mask> from which victims suffered losses amounting to millions of dollars. See S.E.C. v. Milan Group, 962 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D.D.C. 2013), aff\u2019d in part, vacated in part, 595 Fed. Appx. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Ms. Jackson was named as a \u201cRelief Defendant,\u201d which the District Court described as a \u201cperson[] who allegedly received money resulting from the fraudulent activities but who [is] not charged with personally engaging in the fraud.\u201d Milan Group, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 186. During the pendency of the case and trial, the SEC required that Ms. Jackson keep the Baylor & Jackson law firm intact as \u201ca going concern\u201d to preserve the law firm\u2019s accounts and assets that would eventually contribute toward the monetary judgment to satisfy the victims\u2019 monetary losses. The District Court entered summary judgment against Ms. Baylor, the Baylor & Jackson law firm, and other defendants jointly and severally liable for over $2.6 million in ill-gotten profits. Id. at 211. The money judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2015. Milan Group, 595 Fed. Appx. at 2."], "id": "51e705ab-fb68-4cbf-9a42-fcd042863272", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["A black box warning is an FDA warning to alert consumers about serious or life-threatening side effects the drug may have. It is the most serious warning given by the FDA. The black box warning here stated that Xyosted \u201ccan cause blood pressure increases that can increase the risk for major adverse cardiovascular events (MACE), including non-fatal myocardial infarction, non-fatal stroke and cardiovascular death, with greater risk for MACE in patients with cardiovascular risk factors or established cardiovascular disease.\u201d App. 171. Plaintiff\u2019s first two complaints were similarly dismissed by the District Court for failure to adequality plead <mask>. Each time, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint. These statements were made in (1) a press release dated December 21, 2016; and (2) a press release dated February 27, 2017. App. 159\u201361."], "id": "0fdacc47-cf6b-4977-86fd-813b159660b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In this instance, that is even more clear as Kinder Morgan, like Comforce, could have purchased errors and omissions coverage but declined to do so. (See, e.g. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1276-1277, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 [rejecting broad interpretation of \" 'advertising injury' \" because insureds only reasonably expect such broad coverage by purchasing additional, e.g., errors and omissions, liability coverage]; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Interbank Fin. Servs. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 825, 831, 264 Cal.Rptr. 25 [explaining that it was unreasonable for insured to expect CGL policy to cover <mask> and noting that if such coverage had been desired a professional liability policy could have been obtained].) It can be reasonably inferred that, at the outset, Comforce understood that the ACE commercial umbrella policy provided no coverage for claims arising out of its professional services. Just as Comforce did not expect that its policy would cover claims of professional errors, Kinder Morgan could not reasonably expect that such claims would be covered under the policy."], "id": "824fe82b-a29f-412d-98d9-69bd6d752ff9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*470Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 132, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 300 ( Talley ) addresses the nature of \"appropriate proceedings\" to obtain relief from a later judgment. The plaintiff in Talley sued three individual defendants and two corporate defendants in state court for <mask>. The plaintiff also initiated a related federal court proceeding. The state trial court sustained, without leave to amend, demurrers in favor of the defendants. In Talley v. Miller & Schroeder (Sept. 12, 2007, D048438) [nonpub. opn.], the Court of Appeal had affirmed the judgments in favor of three individual defendants and reversed and remanded for further proceedings the judgments in favor of the two corporate defendants. (Talley, supra , 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 136-137, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 300.) On remand, the trial court again sustained, without leave to amend, demurrers by the corporate defendants, and judgment was entered in their favor. ( Id. at p. 137, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 300.) The plaintiff neither made a direct attack on that judgment by appeal nor obtained a stay order pending the resolution of his related federal court action. ( Ibid. ) After the Court of Appeal's decision became final and the time for California Supreme Court review had passed, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision \"analyzing, modifying and narrowing the Bar orders\" that had served as the basis for the earlier judgments based on the demurrers. ( Id . at pp. 137, 141, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 300.)"], "id": "2705966d-39b5-4a1f-94af-ba18a4902854", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["These consolidated appeals challenge the award of attorney fees to respondents Kim Agasaveeran and Jeffrey Bryant (respondents) under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 ( section 1021.5 ). Respondents specially appeared in an already-settled <mask> action brought by the Commissioner of the Department of Business Oversight (DBO) against real estate investment company Investco Management & Development LLC (Investco M&D) and its promoters, Christopher P. Epsha, Steven G. Thompson, Barry D. LeBendig, and Douglas R. Hanson (the promoters). Respondents-victims of the securities fraud-successfully opposed a motion that would have stayed all individual actions by them and other defrauded investors against these defendants. Respondents also raised several issues concerning the fairness of the settlement, resulting in substantive changes to the stipulated interlocutory judgment *602and special master order in the DBO action."], "id": "6a2754f7-a1d8-46bc-9b50-74cc2fd9055e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that respondents: were successful parties against the DBO, Investco M&D and the promoters; enforced an important right affecting the public and a large group of <mask> victims; and provided necessary, non-duplicative, and significant benefits to this group of investors, while incurring litigation expenses that were out of proportion to their personal interests. Accordingly, we affirm."], "id": "e56546fe-8a3c-4d36-ac53-fad6c3d81485", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, unlike the newspaper's success on the motion to unseal in Savaglio , respondents' success was not \"ancillary\" or \"entirely unrelated to the objective of the lawsuit.\" ( Savaglio , supra , 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 603, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 215.) The interlocutory judgment and order setting forth the powers and duties of the special master comprised the core relief negotiated in the DBO action. The trial court sharply criticized this settlement structure in several respects, referring to one of the key terms as \"illusory,\" and respondents were successful in causing substantive changes to be made to the settlement. These successes were related to the objective of the DBO action because, *611in the court's reasonable view, they provided better protections to the victims of the <mask>."], "id": "fb8b3e1e-f16b-412e-8a32-8e916829446e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The general purpose of the CSL is to protect the public against the imposition of unsubstantial, unlawful and fraudulent stock and investment schemes and the securities based thereon. ( People v. Rankin (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 93, 96, 325 P.2d 10 ; see also People v. Martinson (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 894, 899, 233 Cal.Rptr. 617 [intent behind Corp. Code, \u00a7 25530 was to create governmental cause of action to protect investing public].) In its complaint against Investco M&D, the promoters, and the Investco AV LLCs, the DBO stated that it was bringing the action \"in the public interest in the name of the People of the State of California.\" The <mask> scheme at issue targeted the investing public in California and reached hundreds of individual investors, raising approximately $22,725,000. Thus, the statutory rights under the CSL enforced here were important and affected the public interest."], "id": "0d7de7c8-3100-4afe-afba-83dc1c44b04b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The DBO argues that respondents did not enforce any such rights in relation to the DBO because the only CSL violations at issue were those of the moving defendants. However, as discussed above, the DBO was an \"opposing party\" in this context because it stood on opposite sides of respondents in the context of the motion to modify. During these proceedings, the trial court took seriously the concerns raised by *615respondents about due process, lack of notice to the investors, and \"cutting off their rights to sue,\" and criticized the settlement terms negotiated by the DBO. Even if these matters did not rise to the level of strict constitutional violations, the trial court reasonably concluded that the efforts of respondents strengthened the settlement in ways that were important to hundreds of victims of <mask>."], "id": "8dfa4547-4fa1-49ba-921f-45da374652ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Consumer Cause and Karuk Tribe are distinguishable in that they involved procedural successes that did not result in any substantive changes. In Karuk Tribe , the fee claimants simply obtained a court order requiring a regional water quality control board to provide an \"augmented explanation\" on the same decision it had previously made. ( Karuk Tribe , supra , 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 369, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40.) In Consumer Cause , the fee applicant's successful objection to a class action settlement simply \"[f]ree [d] [the] putative class members from *465the constraints of a proposed settlement agreement they had the right to disregard by exercising their opt-out right.\" ( Consumer Cause , supra , 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 404, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 514.) In contrast, respondents obtained actual, substantive changes to the interlocutory judgment and special master's powers that, in the trial court's reasonable estimation, better protected hundreds of victims of <mask>. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an important public right was enforced."], "id": "083d262b-e108-43fc-8d84-1b5a5abd701f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["After Howard's employment was terminated in 2013, he signed a \"Separation Agreement and Release\" (the separation agreement). The agreement recited that the parties wished to resolve \"any and all disputes, claims, complaints, grievances, charges, actions, petitions, and demands that [Howard] may have against the Company and any of the Company Releasees as defined below, including, but not limited to, any and all claims arising out of or in any way related to [Howard's] employment with or separation from the Company.\" As \"Consideration,\" Kaggle agreed to continue paying Howard's base salary and health benefits for four months, and accelerated the vesting date of some of the restricted shares that had not yet been released under the stock agreement. The parties also agreed on how to determine the number of shares in which he was entitled to be vested. Howard agreed to release Kaggle from all claims \"relating to any matters of any kind, whether presently known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, that [Howard] may possess against any of the Company Releasees arising from any omissions, acts, facts, or damages that have occurred up until and including the Effective Date of this Agreement , including, without limitation: [\u00b6] a. any and all claims relating to or arising from [Howard's] employment relationship with the Company and the termination of that relationship; [\u00b6] b. any and all claims relating to, or arising from, [Howard's] right to purchase, or actual purchase of shares of stock of the Company, including, without limitation, any rights under an Equity Arrangement dated October 25, 2011 between [Howard] and Anthony Goldbloom, claims for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty under any applicable state corporate law, and <mask> under any state or federal law ...\" (Italics added.)"], "id": "4893238f-336f-4a60-99b0-f1a7b579c353", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On April 20, 2015, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, alleging causes of action for <mask> in violation of the California Corporations Code, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, declaratory relief, promissory estoppel, rescission for fraud in the inducement, and legal malpractice. They also filed a motion for summary judgment. Also on April 20, defendants filed a second motion to stay the action and compel arbitration, based on the same arbitration provisions in the applicable operating agreements *375they relied on in the first motion to compel arbitration."], "id": "7f17a0f2-dbe3-4369-9a11-6f9149d1d907", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Shortly before the Phase I trial, the trial court signed an order aligning Choudhri as the plaintiff and Latif and Mokaram (collectively the \"Latif Parties\") as the defendants for the Phase I trial. The Phase I trial lasted over two weeks. The trial court submitted questions to the jury concerning Choudhri's claim that Mokaram converted Choudhri's interest in the Lamborghini, and Mokaram's claim that Choudhri committed <mask> in the 2008 transaction, upon which Mokaram sought rescission of the 2008 transaction. The court also submitted the following question concerning the 2010 transaction:"], "id": "135b6eaf-a63e-46ff-8863-dcb8fd30b47a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [" Plaintiff Gordon Ostojic seeks to enforce an agreement purporting to settle a federal <mask> action that he and 54 other plaintiffs (together, the SDNY plaintiffs) commenced in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York against defendants Life Medical Technologies, Inc. and its former CEO and president Carol Fitzgerald, both of whom are the defendants in the action underlying this appeal. Eventually, the parties to the federal action agreed to settle. As a result of the parties' agreement, the federal court granted an order of discontinuance dismissing the action without prejudice, stating that if the matter were not settled within 30 days of the order, the parties were obliged to make a letter application within the 30-day period, requesting that the matter be reinstated. Ostojic alleges that although the parties orally agreed upon a final written settlement agreement that settled all material terms, defendants never signed the agreement. Furthermore, Ostojic alleges, because no party requested that the matter be reinstated, the SDNY lost jurisdiction over the matter. Ostojic maintains that although he performed all conditions and promises required of him by the proposed settlement agreement, defendants failed to make the monetary payments owed to him under the agreement."], "id": "19eb4b07-f05e-4071-b46a-bc3a4b7ba4e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [" Plaintiff Gordon Ostojic seeks to enforce an agreement purporting to settle a federal <mask> action that he and 54 other plaintiffs (together, the SDNY plaintiffs) commenced in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York against defendants Life Medical Technologies, Inc. and its former CEO and president Carol Fitzgerald, both of whom are the defendants in the action underlying this appeal. Eventually, the parties to the federal action agreed to settle. As a result of the parties' agreement, the federal court granted an order of discontinuance dismissing the action without prejudice, stating that if the matter were not settled within 30 days of the order, the parties were obliged to make a letter application within the 30-day period, requesting that the matter be reinstated. Ostojic alleges that although the parties orally agreed upon a final written settlement agreement that settled all material terms, defendants never signed the agreement. Furthermore, Ostojic alleges, because no party requested that the matter be reinstated, the SDNY lost jurisdiction over the matter. Ostojic maintains that although he performed all conditions and promises required of him by the proposed settlement agreement, defendants failed to make the monetary payments owed to him under the agreement."], "id": "3cbb5732-12ad-439c-848f-681065a32a2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["for further investigation and possible criminal prosecution. Request Letter at 3. SEC staff contemplates that a significant part of the FST\u2019s investigative efforts would involve contacting individuals suspected of conducting criminal <mask> schemes through e-mail, mail, or telephone. Id. at 3\u20134. FST investigators would pose as potential investors in the schemes and seek information from the promoters in an attempt to develop evidence to support criminal prosecutions. Id. at 4. A cadre of SEC staff members would be designated to serve on the FST and would be specially trained and separately supervised in connection with their FST activities. Request Letter at 4\u20135. 2 The FST would under- take an investigation only if its staff had a bona fide basis to believe that the targets were engaged in conduct amounting to a criminal violation of one of the securities laws. Id. at 4. The FST would maintain the infor- mation that it collected in its investigations in a separate system of rec- ords, which would not be utilized for other purposes and would not be generally accessible to Commission staff performing non-FST duties. Id. at 5; E-mail for Matthew D. Roberts, Senior Counsel, OLC, from George S. Canellos, Director, New York Regional Office, SEC (Dec. 22, 2011, 5:02 PM) (\u201cFollow-up E-mail\u201d). Limited, summary information in the FST records system\u2014for example, a description of the general nature of the information that prompted the investigation, the persons or entities contacted, and the other investigative steps taken\u2014would, however, subsequently be recompiled into another SEC records system or systems, which would be more broadly available to Commission staff. Request Letter at 5 & n.9; Follow-up E-mail."], "id": "dd4b9241-dd03-4f02-8eee-6e1f680541ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["3 In accord with Dun & Bradstreet, lower courts considering credit rating agencies\u2019 First Amendment defenses to claims for defamation, fraud, and various other business torts (as well as breach of contract in at least one instance) have looked in part to whether the reports were distributed to a public audience or tailored to a discrete group of clients. See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. Moody\u2019s Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 525\u201334 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of credit rating agency defend- ant on defamation and breach of contract claims based on \u201cactual malice\u201d requirement where ratings were made available to the public); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 08-Civ-7508 (SAS), 2009 WL 2828018, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2009) (rejecting First Amendment defense to various common law tort claims, including fraud, in part because \u201cplaintiffs have plainly alleged that the . . . ratings were never widely disseminated, but were provided instead in connection with a private placement to a select group of investors\u201d); In re Nat\u2019l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (rejecting First Amendment defense to <mask> and various common law claims in part because ratings disseminated to a \u201cselect class of investors\u201d); In re Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 820 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (finding that the First Amendment shielded credit rating agency from negligent misrepresentation claim where the \u201ccredit rating reports regarding Enron by national credit rating agencies were not private or confidential, but distributed \u2018to the world\u2019 and were related to the creditworthiness of a powerful public corporation that operated internationally\u201d). At least one court of appeals has invoked the same consideration as one of its reasons for ruling that a credit rating agency could not avail itself of a statutory state-law journalist\u2019s privilege to refuse to comply with a subpoena. In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2003) (\u201cUnlike a business newspaper or magazine, which would cover any trans- actions deemed newsworthy, Fitch only \u2018covers\u2019 its own clients.\u201d); see also id. at 110 (\u201cFitch\u2019s information-disseminating activity does not seem to be based on a judgment about newsworthiness, but rather on client needs. We believe this weighs against Fitch being able to assert the privilege for the information at issue.\u201d)."], "id": "78adb835-a974-4e0b-8c99-a6fe4a6ee493", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*49On or about July 5, 1994 the respondent was found guilty, after a jury trial in the Supreme Court, New York County, of eight counts of scheme to defraud in the first degree, nine counts of real estate <mask>, three counts of grand larceny in the second degree, three counts of grand larceny in the third degree and one count of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree. Respondent\u2019s conviction arose out of his participation in the sale of cooperative interests in several different buildings, in connection with which he made false representations and concealed material facts including necessary information about the financial status of the buildings. The Departmental Disciplinary Committee, by petition dated September 20, 1994, has moved for an order striking the respondent\u2019s name from the roll of attorneys pursuant to Judiciary Law \u00a7 90 (4) (b) on the ground that the respondent was automatically disbarred upon his conviction of a felony as defined by section 90 (4) (e). Pursuant to Judiciary Law \u00a7 90 (4) (a) respondent ceased to be an attorney and counselor-at-law or to be competent to practice as such, upon his conviction of a felony. There is no question that the crimes of scheme to defraud in the first degree, Grand Larceny in the second and third degrees and offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree are all felonies. The facts that the respondent has not yet been sentenced and that there may be a motion to set aside the verdict, do not serve as impediments to the Committee\u2019s petition. For the purposes of disbarment, a conviction occurs at the time of plea or verdict (see, Matter of Kourland, 172 AD2d 77; Matter of David, 145 AD2d 150)."], "id": "738d4303-8aab-4127-9e69-7a1f337a35ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Charge One alleges that the respondent was convicted of a serious crime within the meaning of Judiciary Law \u00a7 90 (4) (d) and within the meaning of section 691.7 (b) of the Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys within this Department (22 NYCRR). On March 21, 1994, the respondent pleaded guilty before the Honorable Jack Mackston of the Nassau County Court, Trial Term, Part VI, to a charge of intentional real estate <mask>, in violation of General Business Law \u00a7 352-c (1) (c) (iv), a class A misdemeanor. The crime of which the respondent was convicted involves false swearing, misrepresentation, or fraud."], "id": "66593b19-df67-4bdd-85c1-3c345f53025a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On April 18, 1991, respondent was convicted, upon a plea of guilty, in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, of one count of conspiracy to commit <mask>, in violation of 18 USC \u00a7 371 and 15 USC \u00a7 77q (a) and \u00a7 77x, a felony under the United States Code. On August 25, 1993, respondent was sentenced to one year of \"administrative\u201d probation and a $5,000 fine. Respondent\u2019s probation has been completed. Respondent\u2019s conviction resulted from filing a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that failed to disclose that the named officers and directors were mere figureheads and that actual control of the corporations was by third parties and that stated falsely that the nominee officers and directors had purchased stock in the corporation."], "id": "a4680d95-80bd-47d3-864e-1ea758a01f7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "securities fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Several months after closing on the loan, respondent and his brother continued to deceive the Bi-Coastal investors concerning Larry\u2019s criminal status. The investors claimed that only after they learned about Larry\u2019s guilty plea did they audit GTI\u2019s books and discover its true state of insolvency and serious tax delinquencies. The Bi-Coastal investors sued respondent and his brother for <mask>, inter alia, in Federal District Court in New Jersey in 1988, asserting that misrepresentations and failures to disclose had been material to their making of the loan. During the course of that lawsuit, respondent submitted under oath an allegedly doctored bank statement misrepresenting the status of his account prior to closing on the loan."], "id": "9e65c546-85a4-43f3-931b-e3f9d9b4b303", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Movants were tenants in common of a parcel of land, a portion of which was appropriated by the State of New York for the construction of the Long Island Expressway. The affidavit supporting the motion indicates that (1) the movants retained one Harold William Harrison, a Judge of the Justice Court of Great Neck, to represent them in connection with the State\u2019s appropriation, in April of 1968; (2) thereafter Harrison closed his law offices and abandoned his files and (3) a receiver was appointed to preserve them by the Second Department\u2019s Joint Grievance Committee. It also indicates that during a period from 1970 to 1974, (1) Harrison was charged by the United States with income <mask>, (2) was convicted and *455spent time in jail and (3) not until August of 1974 did he advise the movants to engage other counsel. (A written retainer agreement was entered into on August 30, 1974 by and among movants, movants\u2019 present counsel and Harrison.) When movants\u2019 present counsel undertook the representation they noted in their retainer that the time to file a claim had expired in January, 1974 and that enabling legislation would be required."], "id": "2c7be9bb-6e27-4e33-aa1e-1609c1b3b4b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Again in People v. Laino (10 N Y 2d 161) the principle of Steuding was reaffirmed. The defendant there was a prospective defendant and he was subpoenaed with his books and records. The Grand Jury was investigating bidding practices in the City of Utica. Defendant appeared, claimed his privileges, was told he was not a defendant, but answered all questions and submitted his books not interposing a privilege. He was indicted for <mask>. The court said, on the record, he was a prospective defendant and held (p. 172): \u201c The violation of the privilege occurred when the testimony and the records were given under compulsion of subpoena \u201d. The indictment for a crime not connected with the subject of the investigation was dismissed. Here it appears that the subpoenas duces tecum has the same compelling force as a subpoena ad testificandum and its use constitutes the gathering of testimony in violation of the privilege. In People v. Defore (242 N. Y. 13, 27) Judge Casdozo refers to the words of the court in Haywood v. United States (268 F. 795) \u201cA defendant is \u2018 protected from producing his documents * * * for his production of them *448in court would be his voucher of their genuineness.\u2019 There would be \u2018 testimonial compulsion \u2019 \u2019 \u2019. Further on in the Laino case (p. 173), the court stated reindictment was possible but only on evidence independent of the evidence, links and leads furnished by the prospective defendant."], "id": "33efaaa3-7bd1-444c-86f8-1d096f685a2d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Again in People v. Laino (10 N Y 2d 161) the principle was reaffirmed. The defendant then was a prospective defendant and he was subpoenaed with his books and records. The Grand Jury was investigating bidding practices in the City of Utica. Defendant appeared, claimed his privilege, told he was not a defendant, but answered all questions and submitted his books not interposing the privilege. He was indicted for income <mask>. The court said on the record he was a prospective defendant and held (p. 172) \u201c The violation of the privilege occurred when the testimony and records were given under compulsion of supoena \u201d. The indictment for a crime not connected with the subject of the investigation was dismissed. Here it appears the subpoena duces tecum has the same compelling force as the subpoena ad testificandum and its use constitutes the gathering of testimony in violation of the privilege."], "id": "a060c01d-3017-4215-b154-9f1a8f30a794", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": [". The article is laced with such phrases as \u201ccarrying on something of a bizarre puppet show\u201d; \u201c[i]n addition to its roles as a document custodian and <mask> broker,\u201d \u201cMERS has become the veiled man wielding the home foreclosure axe\u201d; and \u201ca willingness on the part of courts to let financiers seize homes in whatever manner is most convenient for them.\u201d (78 U Cin L Rev at 1362-1363, 1385.)"], "id": "a314041c-c9df-44cc-9972-f54e95c1b3b0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c\u2022 Section 394.5(a): \u2018the conviction of the licensee or any partner, officer, agent or employee of such licensee, of a felony, or of any crime involving violence, dishonesty, deceit, indecency or moral *463turpitude.\u2019 The Department has received information that, on or about July 2008, Yehezkel Elia \u2018. . . was convicted of conspiracy, <mask>, and subscribing to false corporate and individual tax returns.\u2019"], "id": "f2b4aa86-f207-4a09-9b8f-897de37b16ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Respondent opposes the petition and argues that the record supports her determination, as it demonstrates that petitioner was convicted of conspiracy, <mask> and subscribing to false corporate and individual tax returns; accordingly, respondent submits, petitioner\u2019s license was appropriately revoked in accordance with Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 394 (5) (a). Respondent contends that \u201c[bjecause the plain language of the applicable statute supports the Commissioner\u2019s decision, the court\u2019s inquiry ends, and the instant petition should be denied.\u201d (Verified answer and objections in point of law 1\u00cd12.) Respondent argues that Elia\u2019s conviction for a crime involving dishonesty or deceit by itself warranted the revocation penalty, but notes that Elia also denied having this conviction on petitioner\u2019s application, which respondent submits, is a material false statement that also on its own supports revocation of petitioner\u2019s license. As to Elia\u2019s claim of difficulty with the English language, respondent notes that Elia received a B.S. degree from Adelphi University in 1977 (AR at 97) and passed a written road test in English to be a driving instructor, which included a section for written responses, which Elia completed in English (AR at 89-93). Accordingly, respondent submits that the petition should be denied."], "id": "773f21fc-d0df-47ee-9310-b47d3cc2aad2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As an initial matter, it is noted that respondent failed to set forth findings of fact in regard to the imposition of revocation of petitioner\u2019s drivers\u2019 school license as the penalty herein. The statute provides that respondent \u201cmay suspend or revoke\u201d a drivers\u2019 school license for any of the causes set forth in the statute (Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 394 [5]); thus, the penalty to be imposed is at respondent\u2019s discretion (cf. Matter of Caso v New York State Pub. High School Athletic Assn., 78 AD2d 41, 48 [4th Dept 1980]). Findings of fact which demonstrate actual grounds of a determination are necessary for intelligent judicial review of an administrative determination (Matter of Paloma Homes, Inc. v Petrone, 10 AD3d 612, 613 [2d Dept 2004]; Matter of South Blossom Ventures, LLC v Town of Elma, 46 AD3d 1337, 1338 [4th Dept 2007], lv dismissed 10 NY3d 852 [2008]). Other than the indication in the record that the respondent \u201cprefer[red] to revoke\u201d the license (AR at 7), the record is devoid of any basis for the selection of revocation as the penalty to be imposed against petitioner. While respondent argues in its objections in point of law herein that Elia\u2019s conviction for conspiracy, <mask> and subscribing to false corporate and individual tax returns involved \u201cdishonesty and deceit\u201d which justified respondent\u2019s revocation of petitioner\u2019s license (verified answer 1112), respondent did not invoke this ground (or any other ground, for that matter) as a basis for imposing revocation as a penalty for Elia\u2019s violations of the statute (AR at 211-212)."], "id": "6f515782-a643-4125-a11a-e12ca61a467e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c Their attorney, Vincent White, a nephew and former associate of David A. White who represented Walter\u2019s first cousin, Joseph J. Kendzie licensed under Mag. RL-1743 in Lockport after making four other applications, one of them subsequent to Mag. RL-1743, for his premises, and after being originally disapproved by the State Liquor Authority on that application on January 8, 1953 was finally licensed thereunder on March 4, 1954. In the meanwhile, said White appealed the first disapproval of the S. L. A. to the Appellate Division which in a divided vote held that the S. L. A.\u2019s determination of questionable finances had not been supported in the hearing. That was because the S. L. A. introduced the local board\u2019s investigative reports into the record without calling the persons who made them which incidentally was not objected to by said attorney. Instead of appealing as a matter of right or holding a second hearing and conducting it properly, the S. L. A. went \u2018 chicken \u2019 and issued the license. Then, the federal government after a lapse of many, many years during which some of the witnesses died and others were unavailable prosecuted Joseph Kendzie for income <mask> with one of the most incompetent attorneys I ever have seen. No need to narrate the result. The S. L. A. and the government fumbled one of the best cases any one ever had. In fact, a member of the U. S. Attorney\u2019s office told me they had a strong case but he still \u2018 blow \u2019 it."], "id": "f0e09b48-3ee7-411c-8f74-813f6ad52d74", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cthe Town states that the request for Ippolito\u2019s financial disclosure forms is \u2018unique\u2019 because the documents \u2018were the subject of activities by law enforcement agencies.\u2019 Presumably, the Town was making reference to the fact that Ippolito was the subject of a federal indictment (the indictment was unsealed in March 2015) and charged with six *415counts of <mask> based on his receipt, from 2008 through 2013, of over $2 million from Lizza and a principal of Lizza that he failed to report. Ip-polito eventually pleaded guilty to one felony count of tax evasion in January 2016. The Town argues that \u2018[a]s materials that are the subject of law enforcement investigations and/or proceedings are generally kept secret ... it would have been improper for the Town to disclose those documents to Newsday, which would have undoubtedly published a story. . . .\u2019 In support of this argument the Town cites to Fed. R. Crim Proc. 6 and CPL \u00a7 190.25(4)(a). Both of these provisions relate, among other things, to the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. \u201cThe argument of the Town is wholly without merit. The Newsday requests have nothing to do with grand jury proceedings nor any criminal investigation. Instead, they ask for government contracts and financial disclosure forms required to be in the Town\u2019s possession\u2014documents that undoubtedly are proper subjects of a FOIL request. They were not compiled for law enforcement purposes and therefore cannot possibly be subject to the law enforcement [purposes] exemption. Whether the contents of these made-in-the-ordinary-course Town documents reveal or establish nefarious or criminal conduct and as such may be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding is material only to the extent that Newsday, as the public\u2019s representative, is able to bring such conduct to public light\u2014precisely part of Newsday\u2019s mission, as well as that of the FOIL statutes. The Town\u2019s argument to the contrary reveals a misunderstanding (or perhaps contempt) of the purpose of the FOIL statutes, and the materials must be produced.\u201d (2016 NY Slip Op 32749[U], *14-15 [emphasis added].) As noted by the petitioners, the New York Committee on Open Government (hereinafter, the Committee) agrees with this position. However, unlike the court in Matter of Newsday, LLC v Town of Oyster Bay, which fails to mention or cite John Doe Agency, the Committee at least acknowledges its existence. Petitioners cite Committee FOIL-AO-19480 (2016), wherein the Committee responds to a request for information similar to that of the instant request with respect to Percoco. *416The opinion first acknowledges that \u201cFOIL does not contain exactly the same language as the federal FOIA. However, the thrust of the \u2018law enforcement purposes\u2019 exception is similar.\u201d (Comm on Open Govt FOIL-AO-19480 [2016].) Additionally, that"], "id": "245d88a1-a089-4a52-9412-ad239dafcc94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The witness, Carmine Lombardozzi, appeared before the Grand \u00bfJury on September 16. He was advised of the purpose of the investigation, of his right to consult with counsel, of his right to assert his privilege against self incrimination under the Federal and State Constitutions, and of his right to assert *587such privilege in response to any questions put to him. Questions were put to him which he declined to answer on the ground that it would degrade and incriminate him. He advised the Grand Jury that he would continue to assert the privilege against self incrimination in respect to any and all questions put to him unless he was granted immunity. He thereupon left the room. Upon his return he was advised that in his absence the Grand Jury had voted to grant immunity to him and was explained the meaning of the immunity granted. He then was asked if he knew certain individuals. He replied that he is under charges of assault in Kings County in the State court and under indictment in a Federal court for income <mask> for the years 1961 and 1963. He stated that he was prepared to answer all questions the law required him to answer but challenged the Grand Jury\u2019s power to inquire into his personal finances and business transactions on the ground that they were not material or relevant to the investigation. He also requested a determination by the court as to \u201cwhat relevancy, if any, his personal business affairs have to do with this investigation and upon what basis he has been selected as a witness, whose commercial and personal financial transactions should be investigated.\u201d"], "id": "6f4acea9-4a20-4ba6-8a54-02932bc34d8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Second, the evidence Hawkinson gave before the Grand Jury. It was a compulsory appearance. Plaintiffs assert the falsity of his testimony with its consequent damage. Defendant claims that both privilege and secrecy attaches to it. The Grand Jury before which Hawkinson appeared returned an indictment against the plaintiffs for income <mask>. It was later dismissed. A District Court Judge signed an order giving plaintiffs a copy of Hawkinson\u2019s testimony, which plaintiffs sought to use on this trial. Defendant presses the point that secrecy prevents such use, since the court\u2019s order *876did not specifically permit its use in this action. But was not the aura of secrecy lost immediately upon legally-permitted disclosure?"], "id": "21274269-3c85-4a8e-9184-eda09236f247", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioners in their memorandum cite United States v. Roberts (293 F. Supp. 195, 198 [S. D. N. Y., 1968]). In this case the defendant\u2019s case was put on the calendar more than five years after he was indicted for <mask>. They also cite Smith v. Hooey (393 U. S. 374). In this case the defendant was indicted in 1960 for theft and, though he requested numerous times that he be brought to trial, no action was taken by the People for over six years."], "id": "5fac2d9b-6ef8-48fd-a1dd-3c16a2448486", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["An analogy may be drawn to the banking cases wherein the courts have consistently held that a depositor has no right to challenge a subpoena issued against his bank. See United States v Miller (425 US 435), where a depositor was being charged with <mask> and the court held he had no right to challenge a subpoena directed against his bank. This Federal rule has been adopted by New York State in the following cases: Matter of Cappetta (42 NY2d 1066); Shapiro v Chase Manhattan Bank (53 AD2d 542); Cunningham & Earning v Nadjari (53 AD2d 520); Matter of Democratic County Committee of Bronx County v Nadjari (52 AD2d 70)."], "id": "e9847c6a-abfa-47de-9025-76bdf6545d51", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The tort of injurious falsehood is also an outgrowth of the action on the case; it is grounded in the same policy consideration as prima facie tort, that unjustified harm should be justly compensated. As codified by the Restatement, \u201cOne who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is subject to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if (a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely to do so, and (b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.\u201d (Restatement, Torts 2d, \u00a7 623A.) Intent to injure is thus equated with the scienter applicable to defamation actions brought by public officials, i.e., actual malice (see New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254), based on the familiar concept of the foreseeability of harm. This principle was recognized in Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. (7 AD2d 441), an action having a strikingly similar fact pattern to that at bar. Defendant allegedly furnished the Internal Revenue Service with false and misleading information which suggested that the parties had conducted a fraudulent business transaction. A resulting indictment, charging plaintiff with <mask>, was later dismissed. The court explained: \u201cBy its very nature a false statement intentionally made is wrongful. If it inflicts material harm upon another, which was or should have been in the contemplation of the actor, and it *475results in actual damage to the plaintiff\u2019s economic or legal relationships, an action may lie * * * It logically follows that to sustain a complaint, it is not necessary that the pleading must allege that the defendant was solely motivated to injure the plaintiff. It is enough if the falsehoods charged were intentionally uttered and did in fact cause the plaintiff to suffer actual damage in his economic or legal relationships.\u201d (P 444.)"], "id": "9cecf599-6232-467c-9a6f-089379320b06", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Harold J. Rothwax, J. On October 20, 1983 this court issued a warrant which authorized the search of the premises of a restaurant, Tom\u2019s Shangri-La, owned and operated by Tom\u2019s Associates, Inc., for books and records of the corporation which constituted evidence, inter alia, of sales tax and corporate income <mask>. The search was upheld under the Fourth Amendment (US Const, 4th Arndt) in a separate opinion. Following the return of the warrant, the documents were placed in custody of the District Attorney (CPL *898690.55, subd 2). In November and December, 1983, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance issued notices of deficiency in regard to personal income tax owed by officers of Tom\u2019s Associates, Inc., individually, for the years 1976 through 1979, and in regard to income tax owed by the corporation for the tax years 1979 and 1980, together with a delinquent sales tax assessment. The New York City Department of Finance has also instituted a proceeding to recover $67,000 in business taxes from the corporation for 1980. The petitioner is president of the corporation. He is before the court under indictment for the alleged bribery of a tax auditor, which in turn led to the issuance of the warrant. The District Attorney concedes that documents seized pursuant to the warrant have been made available to civil tax authorities and that the tax assessments are undoubtedly based, in large part, upon such documents. The petitioner seeks to have the documents or copies of the documents in possession of civil agencies returned to the District Attorney and to preclude these civil agencies from using the documents or copies in any civil litigation or proceeding. The court has previously held, in a related action, that the District Attorney could enlist the assistance of experts within the city or State government to evaluate business records for presentation to a Grand Jury (CPL 190.25, subd 4). To the extent that members of civil tax authorities were given access to the documents upon that basis, the court approved the procedure. The court\u2019s previous order did not, however, contemplate the obtaining by civil authorities from the District Attorney of documents or copies of documents seized pursuant to the search warrant, for use in civil tax proceedings. The propriety of this disclosure is the only issue presently before the court."], "id": "13060dc2-f829-4242-a5f8-929b3d05cec6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On November 2, 1982 the defendant, admitting to schemes and swindles perpetrated against John P. Maguire and Co. and the United States Government, pleaded guilty to mail fraud and <mask> charges in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New *1035York. These charges stemmed from an investigation into the bankruptcy of Candor Diamond Corporation, the sole shareholders of which were defendant and his wife. Among the accusations was that Candor had defrauded creditors of over $5,000,000."], "id": "cc1d037a-b946-463e-8df4-074b07308dfe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In 1984, legislation was enacted, known as the Tax Omnibus Bill, which called for increased vigilance in the investigation and prosecution of so-called white collar crimes in the area of criminal <mask>. In response thereto, the Department requested the creation of new positions to be known as tax investigators. For reasons not clearly articulated in the submissions before the court, apparently the Department determined that the duties and minimum qualifications of those positions were inadequate to ensure competent performance as envisioned under the new program. It therefore requested the approval of noncompetitive jurisdictional classification of a new series of positions to be known as revenue crimes specialist."], "id": "395bc96a-ad41-4fb2-b5e4-343d207d84f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["It is petitioner\u2019s contention that since he was a witness and not the subject of the investigation, the questions asked of him related not to his own official duties or fitness, but rather to another\u2019s. Petitioner further contends that the questions asked about his cabin were personal in nature and outside the scope of anything having to do with Officer Centola\u2019s alleged <mask>."], "id": "cb3abbc3-adf2-43b5-a67b-31602410d35b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["There is ample authority in Evangelista v City of Rochester (580 F Supp 1556, 1559), cited by petitioner as well as respondents, for \"a minimal governmental intrusion for a limited and legitimate purpose\u201d (emphasis in original). In that case the United States District Court for the Western District of New York upheld the City of Rochester\u2019s requirement that city employees disclose their ownership of rental property within the city limits. The purpose of such requirement was to ensure that city employees were not receiving preferential treatment with regard to the handling of building code violations not contributing to the generally poor conditions existing in such housing. Surely the governmental interest in investigating citizen complaint concerning alleged <mask> by one of the city\u2019s police officers justifies the minimal intrusion upon petitioner\u2019s privacy for the purpose of clarifying the circumstances surrounding the questionable check."], "id": "12650897-69d6-4ead-b5c9-98f3fcf61995", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner moves pursuant to sections 701 and 702 of the Correction Law granting her relief from civil disabilities incurred as a consequence of her convictions in the United States District Court upon a multicount indictment of the following crimes: conspiracy to commit tax offenses or mail fraud or to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (18 USC \u00a7 371); 3 counts of income <mask> (26 USC \u00a7 7201); 3 counts of willfully subscribing false personal income tax returns (26 USC \u00a7 7206 [1]); 16 counts of aiding and assisting the filing of false corporate and partnership tax returns (26 USC \u00a7 7206 [2]); and 10 counts of mail fraud which alleged a scheme to defraud the taxing authority of New York State, based on the mailing of New York State personal income tax returns and corporate tax reports (18 USC \u00a7 1341). The petitioner was sentenced upon these convictions to four years\u2019 imprisonment, followed by three years\u2019 probation, with 250 hours of community service during each year of probation, and a $7,152,000 fine. Additionally, she was ordered to pay restitution to the State of New York in the amount of $469,300 (unpaid taxes) plus interest, and to the Federal Government $1,221,900 in unpaid taxes, plus penalties and interest, plus the cost of the prosecution. She is currently free on $25,000,000 bail pending her appeal."], "id": "0ff07bd1-b841-42d7-81f8-e5f0f94796d6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"Industry stated that there was significant liquor <mask> occurring at the importation and retail levels (both off-and on-premises) and the evasion was having an impact on legitir *746mate businesses. After examining the circumstances and discussing this issue with the Advisory Group, this Department was of the opinion that evasion was occurring and that legitimate businesses were being injured by the unlawful activity * * *"], "id": "f99223ff-2d66-4a28-b1cc-29f0ffb9c15e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"Respondents vigorously object to the limitation of wholesaler\u2019s tax-exempt cigarette sales through the 'probable demand\u2019 mechanism. We are persuaded, however, that New York\u2019s decision to stanch the illicit flow of tax-free cigarettes early in the distribution stream is a 'reasonably necessary\u2019 method of 'preventing fraudulent transactions,\u2019 one that 'polices against wholesale evasion of [New York\u2019s] own valid taxes without unnecessarily intruding on core tribal interests.\u2019 Colville, 447 U.S., at 160, 162, 100 S.Ct. at 2084-2085, 2085. The sole purpose and justification for the quotas on untaxed cigarettes is the State\u2019s legitimate interest in avoiding <mask> by non-Indian consumers.\u201d (Emphasis added.)"], "id": "d4765470-6029-4b5e-ad3c-721813e8748c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the case at bar, the State has a valid interest in ensuring compliance with lawful liquor taxes that might easily be evaded through purchase of tax-exempt liquor on reservations; and the sole purpose and justification of chapter 508 of the Laws of 1993 is the State\u2019s legitimate interest in avoiding <mask> by non-Indian consumers through this enforcement statute."], "id": "ed61c9b6-9e70-4957-b5be-4321a937da6e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner counters that such review is now a well-worn path and that higher legal authority has preempted further consideration, having decreed that New York\u2019s interest in collecting its lawful taxes and in preventing <mask> by non-Indians does not unnecessarily intrude on \"core\u201d tribal interests. Thus, State taxing regulations which seek to enforce their tax impact upon non-Indian purchasers by imposing the minimal burdens of a precollection regime upon Indian traders have already been found to be valid and enforceable. (Citing Department of Taxation & Fin. v Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 US 61 [1994]; Snyder v Wetzler, 193 AD2d 329 [1993], affd 84 NY2d 941 [1994].)"], "id": "082fac0c-bc84-41a9-af98-116d5d8b0618", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The decedent was involved in an astounding course of events concerning his business transactions, his marital difficulties and his troubles with respect to Federal income taxes. Although decedent\u2019s earnings were substantial, he failed to pay his income taxes, with the result that he was convicted of <mask> and sentenced in October, 1955. The United States has asserted a claim for unpaid income taxes which on its face appears to be valid and which, as above stated, exceeds $600,000, as a result of which a tax lien was filed against the decedent in September of 1955, more than two years prior to his death in 1958. The decedent\u2019s difficulties with the United States were equalled, if not exceeded, by the numerous controversies and protracted litigation between him and his wife. The parties were married in August, 1935. The only child of such marriage was born in September of 1942 and the parties separated in July of 1946. Decedent\u2019s will dated April 19, 1955, was admitted to probate by a decree of this court dated June 26, 1958, following the decedent\u2019s death in March of 1958. The litigation between the decedent and his wife ran the gamut of every court from the Magistrates\u2019 Court in the City of New York to the Court of Appeals. Until his death in 1958 decedent and his wife had been involved in more than 70 actions and proceedings against each other. (See Matter of Rosenfield, 213 N. Y. S. 2d 1009, 1013.)"], "id": "159b43dd-a27c-4e81-b26d-f033040561da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The cases cited by the petitioner, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Procter (142 F. 2d 824, cert. den. 323 U. S. 756) and United States, v. Taylor (254 F. Supp. 752), are not in point. There is a vast difference between legal tax avoidance and attempted <mask>. The testator could and did make valid tax-exempt charitable bequests and the legislative intent to encourage such gifts has been clearly expressed and supported by our courts (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Upjohn\u2019s Estate, 124 F. 2d 73; Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61; Arthur Jordan Foundation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 210 F. 2d 885). In these days of high taxation the testator\u2019s concern with the payment of taxes and his attempt by legal means to avoid their full impact is readily understandable."], "id": "f1d38681-9f86-4de1-9f76-855acfa02014", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["JONES, Judge: Petitioner, John M. Larson, along with two other individuals, Robert A. Pfaff and David Amir Makov, promoted a fraudulent tax shelter transaction known as Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure (BLIPS). Mr. Larson was convicted of <mask> for his involvement in BLIPS, but the central issue in this case concerns the use of a restricted stock agreement to defer recognition of income earned from these transactions."], "id": "a2e217ea-d2db-4e1a-acef-586ce1093ed0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Craig P. Orrock was accused of <mask> for concealing income he received from the sale of a vacant lot that he controlled. Rather than report the sale proceeds on his personal tax return, he belatedly disclosed the sale in the return of a partnership that he also controlled. In that return, he significantly underreported the sale proceeds. For this offense, the government charged Orrock with evading the 4 UNITED STATES V. ORROCK"], "id": "71d7d1c3-d7f3-48cc-9c5b-384061a022ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["But the government advances a different view. Although the government agrees that the statute of limitations can start once all the elements of the offense are satisfied, it also maintains that the limitations period can run from the last affirmative act furthering the <mask>. Under that interpretation, the government alleges that Orrock committed another, final act of evasion on May 9, 2011, when he filed the partnership tax return. If the government is right\u2014that Orrock\u2019s last act of evasion restarts the statute of limitations\u2014then the indictment was brought 13 months before the expiration of the limitations period."], "id": "e5419e89-bd7f-42d2-acd6-2104eeadd1cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We thus conclude that the statute of limitations for \u00a7 7201 evasion of assessment offenses runs from the last act necessary to complete the offense, the later of either: (1) a tax deficiency, or (2) the last affirmative act of <mask>. In so ruling, we align evasion of assessment cases with evasion of payment cases, see Carlson, 235 F.3d at 470 (\u201c[T]he six year limitations period in evasion of payment cases runs from the last act of evasion[.]\u201d), and join all the other circuit courts that have addressed the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Ferris, 807 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. DiPetto, 936 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir."], "id": "29fc819f-86b3-4df6-a905-34aac34d3837", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Second, we later recognized in Carlson that the statute of limitations may \u201crun[] from the last act of evasion\u201d for evasion of payment cases. Id. We do not think that Carlson intended to create separate rules for evasion of assessment and evasion of payment cases, which Congress enacted by the same statutory text and designed to punish the same, \u201csingle crime of <mask>.\u201d Mal, 942 F.2d at 688. Thus, no reason exists to \u201cdraw[] a distinction between evasion of assessment and payment for the purposes of applying the statute of limitations.\u201d United States v. Hunerlach, 197 F.3d 1059, 1065 (11th Cir. 1999). We therefore read Carlson as treating evasion of assessment and evasion of payment cases the same for calculating the limitations period. 12 UNITED STATES V. ORROCK"], "id": "db63a77a-007f-4341-b8ff-e46bb451bbe5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As also set forth in Kaplan's affidavit, in 1993, the federal district court sentenced the deputy to 16 years in prison \"for stealing money seized in drug investigations, conspiracy to commit perjury, <mask>, aiding and abetting perjury, submitting false documents on a loan application, and attempting to possess and distribute 66 pounds of cocaine for $6 million profit.\" In connection with his section 1473.7 motion, Ogunmowo submitted newspaper articles detailing the corruption scandal as a whole and this particular deputy's criminal case and resulting prison sentence."], "id": "9e2ad81d-f598-482d-98d3-fe66c2d08e7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Looking at the legislative intent, the SDL was enacted to \"curtail the dissemination of stolen property and to facilitate the recovery of stolen property by means of a uniform, statewide, state-administered program of regulation of persons whose principal business is the buying, selling, trading, auctioning, or taking in pawn of tangible personal property and to aid the State Board of Equalization to detect possible sales <mask>.\" ( Bus. & Prof. Code, \u00a7 21625.)"], "id": "b7f660fc-12e8-4a62-8cd8-89791c6a6c4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Essentially, what the court held is that, to prevent <mask> by non-Indians who purchase cigarettes, Montana may enlist tribal sellers in an effort to collect tax owed by these shoppers. ( Moe , supra , 425 U.S. at pp. 481-483, 96 S.Ct. 1634.) The court explained, \"Since nonpayment of the tax is a misdemeanor as to the retail purchaser, the competitive advantage which the Indian seller doing business on tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers, within and without the reservation, is dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax.\" ( Id. at p. 482, 96 S.Ct. 1634.) Noting that the burden imposed on Indian sellers \"is not, strictly speaking, a tax at all\" because the ultimate tax burden falls on purchasers-which is why cases invalidating direct taxation of reservation Indians did not apply-the court held that the precollection requirement was nothing more than an expedient \"minimal burden designed to avoid the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.\" ( Id . at p. 483, 96 S.Ct. 1634.)"], "id": "44d9e70a-5750-49f5-97c4-43530bbf87c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*397... We are persuaded ... that New York's decision to stanch the illicit flow of tax-free cigarettes early in the distribution stream is a 'reasonably necessary' method of 'preventing fraudulent transactions,' one that 'polices against wholesale evasion of [New York's] own valid taxes without unnecessarily intruding on core tribal interests.' Colville, 447 U.S. at 160, 100 S.Ct. 2069 [ ]. The sole purpose and justification for the quotas on untaxed cigarettes is the state's legitimate interest in avoiding <mask> by non-Indian consumers. ... [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] ... [And b]y requiring wholesalers to precollect taxes on, and affix stamps to, cigarettes destined for nonexempt consumers, New York has simply imposed on the wholesaler the same precollection obligation that, under Moe and Colville, may be imposed on reservation retailers.\" ( Milhelm , supra , 512 U.S. at pp. 73-76, 114 S.Ct. 2028, fns. omitted.)"], "id": "f9f61f6e-024b-479f-bf7c-630a1dbc0b4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Essentially, what the court held is that, to prevent <mask> by non-Indians who purchase cigarettes, Montana may enlist tribal sellers in an effort to collect tax owed by these shoppers. ( Moe , supra , 425 U.S. at pp. 481-483, 96 S.Ct. 1634.) The court explained, \"Since nonpayment of the tax is a misdemeanor as to the retail purchaser, the competitive advantage which the Indian seller doing business on tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers, within and without the reservation, is dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax.\" ( Id. at p. 482, 96 S.Ct. 1634.) Noting that the burden imposed on Indian sellers \"is not, strictly speaking, a tax at all\" because the ultimate tax burden falls on purchasers-which is why cases invalidating direct taxation of reservation Indians did not apply-the court held that the precollection requirement was nothing more than an expedient \"minimal burden designed to avoid the *93likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.\" ( Id . at p. 483, 96 S.Ct. 1634.)"], "id": "f1d507c5-917d-4e84-979f-f6ca0ec26d48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\"Although Moe and Colville dealt most directly with claims of interference with tribal sovereignty, the reasoning of those decisions requires rejection of the submission that [a provision of the Indian Trader Statutes] bars any and all state-imposed burdens on Indian traders.... [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] ... We are persuaded ... that New York's decision to stanch the illicit flow of tax-free cigarettes early in the distribution stream is a 'reasonably necessary' method of 'preventing fraudulent transactions,' one that 'polices against wholesale evasion of [New York's] own valid taxes without unnecessarily intruding on core tribal interests.' Colville, 447 U.S. at 160 [100 S.Ct. 2069] [ ]. The sole purpose and justification for the quotas on untaxed cigarettes is the state's legitimate interest in avoiding <mask> by non-Indian consumers.... [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] ... [And b]y requiring wholesalers to precollect taxes on, and affix stamps to, cigarettes destined for nonexempt consumers, New York has simply imposed on the wholesaler the same precollection obligation that, under Moe and Colville , may be imposed on reservation retailers.\" ( Milhelm , supra , 512 U.S. at pp. 73-76, 114 S.Ct. 2028, fns. omitted.)"], "id": "47c60a08-30aa-4457-8414-ca5b4db973a0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Monica Murphy, previously a physician, was granted use immunity upon the prosecutor's request before her testimony. Following a conviction for <mask> in 2003, Murphy was not able to practice on her own and was hired as a physician by Rios to work for Visalia Industrial and P & R. She later lost her medical license and worked for P & R as a medical assistant for about a year."], "id": "aa1f1e77-5834-4542-874d-75c09dd55335", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As the plurality observes, it has long been the general rule that when a single crime can be committed in various ways, jurors need not agree on the mode of commission. That rule is not only constitutional, it is probably indispensable in a system that requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict. When a woman's charred body has been found in a burned house, and there is ample evidence that the defendant set out to kill her, it would be absurd to set him free because six jurors believe he strangled her to death (and caused the fire accidentally in his hasty escape), while six others believe he left her unconscious and set the fire to kill her. While that seems perfectly obvious, it is also true, as the plurality points out, that one can conceive of novel \"umbrella\" crimes (a felony consisting of either robbery or failure to file a tax return) where permitting a 6-to-6 verdict would seem contrary to due process. Schad v. Arizona , 501 U.S. 624, 649-50, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). What the plurality pointed out was that \"nothing in our history suggests that the Due Process Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a charge of 'Crime' so generic that any combination of jury findings of embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, <mask>, or littering, for example, would suffice for conviction.\" Id. at 633, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (plurality op.)."], "id": "10269d64-9e3f-4720-b041-e39c94b8d677", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["smuggling or failing to report cash is more serious than the Court is willing to acknowledge. The drug trade, money laundering, and <mask> all depend in part on smuggled and unreported cash. Congress enacted the reporting requirement because secret exports of money were being used in organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, pp. 12-13 (1970). Likewise, tax evaders were using cash exports to dodge hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes owed to the Government."], "id": "ecf8d487-c783-4f79-bc5d-5a2ba0637198", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["\u2022 In 1987, President Reagan gave notice of the termination of the United States-Netherlands Antilles Income Tax Convention, on the ground that it had facilitated <mask> using accounts and companies based in the Antilles. See id. \u2022 In 1995, President Clinton gave notice of the termination of a 1980 tax treaty with Malta, on the ground that recent changes in Maltese law allowed exploitation of the terms of the treaty. See id. at 203\u201304; Dep\u2019t of the Treasury, United States Terminates Tax Treaty with Malta, Treas. RR-717, 1995 WL 685012 (Nov. 20, 1995). \u2022 In 2007, President George W. Bush gave notice to terminate a tax treaty with Sweden because Sweden had abolished the tax in question. Dep\u2019t of the Treasury, United States Terminates Estate and Gift Tax with Sweden, Treas. HP-436, 2007 WL 1724190 (June 15, 2007). \u2022 In 2016, President Obama gave notice to withdraw the United States from the South Pacific Tuna Treaty in accordance with that treaty\u2019s withdrawal provision. See Treaty Amendment, 2016 Di- gest of United States Practice in International Law, ch. 4, \u00a7 B, at 149 (\u201c2016 Digest of U.S. Practice\u201d). 8 In view of these historical examples of presidential action, combined with what has usually been congressional acquiescence, there can no longer be serious doubt that the President may terminate a treaty in ac- cordance with its terms. See Validity of Congressional-Executive Agree- ments That Substantially Modify the United States\u2019 Obligations Under an Existing Treaty, 20 Op. O.L.C. 389, 395 n.14 (1996) (\u201c[T]he executive branch has taken the position that the President possesses the authority to terminate a treaty in accordance with its terms by his unilateral ac- tion[.]\u201d); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699\u2013708 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) (upholding President Carter\u2019s authority to terminate a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China according to the treaty\u2019s terms), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign"], "id": "e42c45aa-e88e-462b-8281-0684ddb7915b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Appraisal District had more than a \u201ctangential, tenuous, or remote relationship\u201d with the appraised value of Kinder Morgan\u2019s mineral interests. The final question is whether the Appraisal District is a \u201cgovernmental body.\u201d CIV. PRAC. & REM \u00a7 27.001(4)(B). The TCPA does not define the term \u201cgovernmental body.\u201d However, \u201cgovernmental\u201d means \u201c[o]f, relating to, or involving a government,\u201d Governmental, BLACK\u2019S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), and the most applicable common definition of the term \u201cbody\u201d is \u201c[a]n aggregate of individuals or groups\u201d or \u201ca deliberative assembly,\u201d Body, BLACK\u2019S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The Appraisal District is a political subdivision of the State. TAX \u00a7 6.01(c). It is governed by a board of directors, which are selected by the Taxing Units, id. \u00a7 6.03(a), and has the responsibility to determine the value of property in Scurry County for purposes of ad valorem taxes, id. \u00a7 6.01(b). Therefore, as an aggregate of individuals or a deliberative assembly related to or involving the government, the Appraisal District is a \u201cgovernmental body.\u201d See Enter. Crude GP LLC v. Sealy Partners, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 283, 295 (Tex. App.\u2014 Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (holding that the City of Sealy was \u201ca \u2018governmental body\u2019 and a political subdivision of this state\u201d). The Taxing Units argue that the TCPA is intended to protect constitutional rights; that Kinder Morgan had a constitutional duty to pay taxes without fraud and did not have a constitutional right to engage in criminal behavior or to commit civil wrongs; that the TCPA\u2019s broad definition of the exercise of the right to petition is necessarily restricted by the statute\u2019s purpose to protect constitutional rights; and that \u201c[a]ny application of the TCPA to taxpayer fraud for property <mask> would be contrary to the purpose of the TCPA, the constitutional requirement that equal and uniform taxes be paid, and the comprehensive tax scheme established by the Legislature.\u201d However, in determining whether the TCPA applies to a legal action, we are required to apply the statutory definitions, which are not co-extensive with rights protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 133\u201334 (Tex. 2019); Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 680\u201381 (\u201cIt does not follow from the fact that the TCPA professes to safeguard the exercise of certain First Amendment rights that it should only apply to constitutionally guaranteed activities.\u201d); Beving v. Beadles, 563 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex. App.\u2014Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (\u201c[D]espite the TCPA\u2019s express purpose to protect constitutional rights, the TCPA\u2019s definition of \u2018the right to petition\u2019 is far broader.\u201d). Based on the statutory definitions, Kinder Morgan established that it exercised its right to petition because its communications to the Appraisal District, a governmental body, had more than a tangential, tenuous, or remote relationship with an issue, the value of Kinder Morgan\u2019s mineral interests in Scurry County, that was under consideration by the Appraisal District for purposes of imposing ad valorem taxes. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. \u00a7 27.001(4)(B); Enter. Crude, 614 S.W.3d at 294 (holding that applications for land disturbance and building permits to the city was the exercise of the right to petition under Section 27.001(4)(B) of the TCPA); CVK Enters., L.L.C. v. Pullen, No. 13-20-00047-CV, 2020 WL 6602153, at *5 (Tex. App.\u2014Corpus Christi\u2013Edinburg Nov. 12, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a rezoning application was \u201cindisputably\u201d the exercise of the right to petition under Section 27.001(4)(B) of the TCPA). 5 The TCPA applies to the Taxing Units\u2019 claims if those claims are based on, related to, or in response to Kinder Morgan\u2019s exercise of the right to petition. CIV. PRAC. & REM. \u00a7 27.003(a), .005(b). Kinder Morgan, as the TCPA movant, was required to establish a nexus between its exercise of the right to petition and the Taxing Units\u2019 claims. See Davis v. Gulf Coast Auth., No. 11-19-00309-CV, 2020"], "id": "6bc1576e-d830-44fd-898b-1fb428085f4d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Per Curiam. Respondent was admitted to practice law at the First Judicial Department in 1975, and has maintained an office for such practice within this Department at all relevant times since then. In May 1994 respondent pleaded guilty, in United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, to three counts of mail fraud (18 USC \u00a7 1341) and one count of <mask> (26 USC \u00a7 7201). Each of these counts is a Federal felony (18 USC \u00a7 3559), but there is no New York felony analog (Matter of Teplin, 82 AD2d 296, 297; see, Matter of Levine, 168 AD2d 116). Thus, disbarment is not automatic (cf., Judiciary Law \u00a7 90 [4] [b]), and a \"serious crime\u201d inquiry would normally be warranted (subd [4] [d]), unless the criminal conduct admitted to in the Federal plea allocution satisfies the elements of a New York felony."], "id": "76994f29-1a13-4c31-be9b-6735bcc844f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In general, legislation will not be stricken as unconstitutional, even though it may interfere with existing contracts, if the legislation is \" 'addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end\u2019 \u201d (Matter of Department of Bldgs. [Philco Realty Corp.], 14 NY2d 291, 297; see also, Crane Neck Assn. v New York City/ Long Is. County Servs. Group, 61 NY2d 154, 167, cert denied 469 US 804; New York State Socy. of Enrolled Agents v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, 161 AD2d 1, 9). The means used here of requiring direct payment to the Commissioner is a reasonable and appropriate measure to deal with the problem of sales <mask> in motor vehicle repairs. In any event, we find that the plaintiffs\u2019 claim of harm in this regard is premature, as the State indicated that Regulation 64 would be amended in light of the statute, and is speculative, as it rests on the assumption that claimants will not be able to find motor vehicle vendors who will accept the vouchers."], "id": "b614e586-4881-41e8-8d31-d2146e48d3d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["We conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the statute, and accordingly, grant the State\u2019s cross motion for summary judgment and declare the statute constitutional. Although the Supreme Court questioned the wisdom of the statute and noted the potential for misuse of the refund provisions, courts are not free to invalidate a statute because they disagree with its wisdom (see, Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Serv. Commn., supra; New York State Socy. of Enrolled Agents v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, supra). Our review is limited to determining \"if any state of facts known or to be assumed, justifies the disputed measure\u201d (Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip, 41 NY2d 7, 11-12). We conclude that the Legislature\u2019s concern regarding sales <mask> in the repair of motor vehicles justifies the statutory scheme."], "id": "8f165612-9001-4398-ab0f-ec1f7567d3c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As a result of FBI surveillance of petitioners\u2019 business on 50th Street in Manhattan between September and December 1982, petitioners, Gelb and others, were indicted on a variety of Federal charges, including a scheme to evade a large portion of sales tax on the gross sales of P&G. After a jury trial, petitioners and Gelb were found guilty of, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (see, 18 USC \u00a7 1961 et seq.), mail fraud regarding filing of State sales tax returns and <mask>. These convictions were upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (see, United States v Ianniello, 808d 184, cert denied 483 US 1006). In its decision, the Second Circuit noted that Gelb had acted as a front for petitioners who actually, but secretly, directed and supervised the affairs of an enterprise which included the Mardi Gras as well as other bars and restaurants in Manhattan. The court further found that P&G, through its operation of the Mardi Gras, was the most profitable business of said enterprise and that from 1979 through 1982 petitioners and Gelb regularly \"skimmed\u201d its cash receipts, dividing over $2 million in unreported income equally among themselves."], "id": "70b2b6ff-44ee-4ec9-bf5d-3ac2e0dfb5a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "tax evasion", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In 1984 respondent was invited to become a general partner and manager of a limited partnership involved in thoroughbred breeding syndication. Respondent\u2019s patron in this venture was Irwin Feiner, a racehorse owner, who respondent soon learned was under criminal investigation. (Feiner would later be convicted of fraud and <mask>, and sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment.) In an effort to raise working capital for the partnership, respondent applied for a series of loans from the North Florida Production Credit Association. Inasmuch as respondent did not have reportable income sufficient to justify the needed credit, he submitted to the lending agency a copy of his girlfriend\u2019s 1983 income tax return, with pertinent data fraudulently altered to make it appear that the return was his own. The Credit Association approved the application and granted respondent about $500,000 in loans."], "id": "da19284c-39e7-4d9c-9a55-76f569c7a335", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "White Collar Crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["On December 5, 2007, the People called Investigator Robert Grudzinski, an investigator with the <mask> Unit. Investigator Grudzinski testified that he went to the Village of North Syracuse Police Department on November 21, 2006 accompanied by Investigator Donald Markert.1 Prior to going to the North Syracuse Police Department, they obtained permission from the Chief of Police, Thomas Conley, to look at the computers and the network.2 Upon arriving at the police department, they were met by Thomas Johnson, a contract employee of the department, who took them to the basement of the *416department where the network is maintained.3 After downloading e-mails of the defendants to a computer disk, they went to the defendants\u2019 individual computers to retrieve any e-mails that were not on the network.4 Investigator Grudzinski requested Mr. Johnson to turn on Captain Casey\u2019s computer and was immediately confronted with a document with a heading entitled \u201cdiscrepancies, 2001 \u2014 Marcellus Police Department.\u201d5 Investigator Grudzinski described the document as a work sheet in grid form.6 He immediately directed Mr. Johnson to remove the document from his view, and he called Assistant District Attorney Matt Doran for direction on how to proceed.7 Doran advised Grudzinski to obtain a search warrant, and Grudzinski prepared an affidavit which was faxed to the District Attorney\u2019s Office.8 Ultimately, a search warrant was signed by the Honorable Anthony Aloi, a judge of this court, and both Casey\u2019s and Wilkinson\u2019s computers were seized.9"], "id": "d06085a3-9e8b-4984-8e18-94f7b53249a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "white collar crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the case at bar, it is clear that the Department and Commission were able to establish minimum qualifications for the positions of tax investigator I, II, III and IV. It is equally clear that the Department \"found that the emphasis originally placed on investigating <mask> lead to insufficiently stringent minimum qualifications\u201d. Thus, it cannot be seriously questioned that those qualifications were capable of determination. What is apparent is that it was simply the minimum qualifications which were insufficient, rather than the ability to determine merit and fitness by the examination process. As such, the inescapable conclusion is that the qualifications need to be refined, altered or upgraded to reflect the actual qualification requirements for those persons needed to perform the function envisioned by the Commissioner. Vague references to the ability to make permanent appointments or afford greater latitude in the selection process simply do not form a rational basis for abrogating the constitutional man*326date of examination, in some form, to determine merit and fitness."], "id": "de4050ca-aee6-4640-994f-d46a83e68366", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "white collar crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the published portion of this opinion, we agree that the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence because a <mask> enhancement *1237is a disqualifying factor under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (operative Oct. 1, 2011, as added by Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 12, \u00a7 1). Accordingly, the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence as it lacked discretion to strike the white collar enhancements under section 1385, and thus could not impose a split sentence."], "id": "f8ff69ea-f007-477c-8aa3-58e206368e30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "white collar crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["The information alleged <mask> sentencing enhancements under section 186.11, subdivision (a)(2) and (3) against the Avignones. It further alleged that the Avignones were subject to mandatory state prison incarceration under section 1170, subdivisions (f) and (h)(3). At the start of the change of plea hearing, the trial court stated it had discussed its indicated sentence with counsel during \"a series of unreported chambers conferences\" and when they met today, the court had given \"an indicated sentence ... if there were a plea to the sheet.\"4 The trial court informed the Avignones:"], "id": "a419bf11-1d38-4d95-914e-d56961049ef3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "white collar crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["*1243Section 1170, subdivision (h) makes suffering a white collar enhancement a disqualifying factor for sentencing to county jail under that statute. ( People v. Sheehy (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 445, 450, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 899 [section 1170 requires that a prison sentence be imposed if a defendant, among other things, has sustained a section 186.11 aggravated <mask> enhancement]; Lynch , supra , 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 357, 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 811 [same].) Section 1170, subdivision (f) provides that the trial court's striking of the white collar enhancement was unauthorized. Read together, the plain language of section 186.11 and subdivisions (f) and (h)(3) of section 1170 provide that the trial court lacked the authority to strike the white collar enhancements and that any sentence imposed on the enhancements must be served in state prison, not local custody. Accordingly, the trial court's split sentence was unauthorized."], "id": "8acc25bd-f49f-4191-a71a-392f3df363db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "white collar crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["As to the first requirement, the statute provides that the defendant's property may be levied to satisfy restitution if the defendant is convicted of white collar felonies and \"the existence of facts that would make *876the person subject to the aggravated <mask> enhancement ... have been charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted or found to be true by the trier of fact.\" ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 186.11, subd. (d)(1).) Here, it is clear that the white collar enhancement was alleged, but there is no evidence that Tesfai admitted it or that it was found true by any trier of fact. The County has established that Tesfai was charged with numerous crimes to which a while collar enhancement could have attached, and the enhancement was alleged; but the County offered no evidence that she admitted the enhancement or the facts supporting it.7 At trial, the County relied solely on the abstract which *909identified the four counts of which Tesfai was convicted. The County argued only, \"These crimes meet the definition of 'white collar crimes' defined by Penal Code [section] 186.11.\" But the abstract shows only conviction of the four offenses, which do not constitute white collar crimes under the statute unless the crimes constitute a pattern of related felony conduct involving the taking of, or resulting in the loss of, more than $100,000. ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 186.11, subd. (a)(1).) The abstract shows Tesfai's sentence was not increased for the white collar enhancement, nor did the County submit any evidence suggesting that Tesfai admitted her offenses caused losses exceeding $100,000."], "id": "23ed3ec4-fc5a-486d-aa91-0854705593ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "white collar crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Also, it is alleged under the aggravated <mask> enhancement that Avignone committed two or more related felonies involving fraud or embezzlement resulting in loss to another person of more than $500,000 (\u00a7 186.11, subd. (a)(2); count 10), and Avignone committed two or more related felonies involving fraud or embezzlement involving loss to another person of more than $100,000 but less than $500,000 (\u00a7 186.11, subd. (a)(3); count 10). In addition, it is alleged that neither the victim or law enforcement had actual or constructive knowledge of the offense prior to the offense discovery date; thus, there was no violation of any limitation of time for the offense to be charged. (\u00a7 803, subd. (c); counts 1, 3, 5.) It is alleged that in the commission or attempted commission of count 3, Avignone did take, damage, and destroy property with the intent to cause such taking, damage, and destruction and the loss exceeded $200,000. (\u00a7 12022.6, subd. (a)(2); count 3.) It is further alleged that in the commission and attempted commission of some of the charged offenses, Avignone did take, damage, and destroy property, with the intent to cause such taking, damage, and destruction, and the loss exceeded $65,000. (\u00a7 12022.6, subd. (a)(l); counts 5, 7.)"], "id": "7879980d-92a2-40f2-8c3e-72cc0c014f07", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "white collar crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["In the unpublished portions of this opinion, we conclude that (1) there was sufficient evidence of money laundering in count 25 of the operative charging document; (2) defendant forfeited an issue regarding the jury instructions for the money laundering counts; (3) the sentencing enhancements for <mask> must be reversed; (4) the trial court did not err by imposing consecutive rather than concurrent sentences on the money laundering counts; and (5) the minute order and abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the correct amount of defendant's custody credits."], "id": "1b655d34-cb26-405e-bf82-2c1c3c888800", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "white collar crime", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Dora sought an accounting of Rick's businesses to understand the full scope of his affairs, so she hired Karon Murff, a *425certified public accountant who specializes in <mask>. Murff pored through more than 30,000 pages of Rick's books, but despite that volume of data, Murff only received access to a limited portion of Rick's business records because Rick destroyed some of those records in advance of trial."], "id": "598d14cd-4be2-416f-839c-a135c2ed640f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Telemarketing Fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Respondent now operates through an independent Internet \"host\u201d source. Fifty disgruntled consumers found their way to the New York State Attorney-General, the Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan New York, Inc., the National Fraud Information Center, and the <mask> Database. The Telemarketing Fraud Database is jointly maintained by the United States Federal Trade Commission and the National Association of Attorneys General. Thereafter, the complaints were collected and the New York State Attorney-General then commenced this action."], "id": "bbd25c02-e6fb-48f7-a3b8-d4f0a71c6906", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "telemarketing fraud", "legal_topic": "Monetary", "masked_sentences": ["Section 2703 procedures for obtaining customer records covered by the SCA afford two distinct layers of protection to the customer or subscriber. First, a government entity may compel disclosure of records that identify the customer and provide details about the customer's use of the provider's service by issuing an administrative subpoena authorized by a federal or state statute. (\u00a7 2703(c)(1)(E) & (c)(2).) Second, to compel disclosure of other customer records pertaining to a subscriber or customer of an ECS or RCS (not including content of communications) the government entity must obtain one of the following: (1) a warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a court order based upon a showing that the information is pertinent to an ongoing criminal investigation; (3) consent of the customer or subscriber; or (4) authorization pursuant to a written request to a law enforcement agency investigating <mask>. (\u00a7 2703(c)(1)(A)-(D).)"], "id": "00cb9fc7-cca0-47b6-8a77-593538506fad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["This court adheres to the opinion heretofore expressed by it that, under the authority of Peo. v. Mansi, 129 App. Div. 386, <mask> tending to a breach of the peace may render a person liable under section 1459 of the Consolidation Act, although the acts be not specifically described in section 1458 of the same statute (Laws of 1882, chap. 410). Still in every case the judicial condemnation must be justified by proof of facts bringing the individual instance within the general description included in the statute."], "id": "81e0be3e-ca50-4f9e-aa0a-44c1a08332cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the \u201cbench warrant\u201d it appears, through the testimony of the defendant himself, that sometime in March, 1981 he was arrested for petit larceny and arraigned in Albany Police Court; at arraignment he was automatically assigned a Public Defender, whose name he never knew, pleaded guilty to <mask>, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $100. He believes his mother paid *625the fine that very day of his guilty plea but apparently the records of Albany Police Court failed to reflect this and on April 3, 1981, Judge Keegan issued the subject bench warrant for nonpayment of the fine."], "id": "8e35368b-d505-47fd-80f1-64cfe5ee612c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, both committees in the United States Congress that studied section 232 prior to its enactment concluded that the legislation was needed because in certain instances \"Indian Tribes\u201d were not enforcing the law covering offenses committed by Indians. As noted before, Indians had residual jurisdiction over crimes under section 1153 of title 18 of the United States Code. The overriding need to correct the ineptitude of the Indian courts was further pointed out in letters that were made a part of the congressional committee report on this matter. The first letter was from the United States Attorney in Buffalo, New York. (See US Code Cong & Admin News, 1948, vol 2, pp 2285-2286.) The United States Attorney stated that while in theory \"petty offenses\u201d, such as <mask>, were within the jurisdiction of the . Indian courts, no provisions existed for punishment in those courts. He further complained that nothing was being done about these petty offenses and requested that if the United States did not wish to do anything about it, then it should allow the State of New York the privilege to do so. The second letter was from the Under Secretary of the Interior who stated: \"None of the Indian groups in the State [New York] have courts which now handle crimes not subject to Federal jurisdiction * * * I am sure they [Indians] would be benefited by the imposition of State criminal laws which would not con\u00f1ict with Federal jurisdiction.\u201d (US Code Cong & Admin News, 1948, vol 2, p 2287; emphasis added.)"], "id": "3228da84-b734-453f-84e3-20f5abf937e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff testified that in March, 1959, subsequent to the decision herein, defendant waved at her, as she was leaving her place of employment, a colored photograph which exhibited plaintiff\u2019s face and bare bust and that shortly thereafter plaintiff found on the windshield of her car a photograph of her private parts with the picture part facing the inside of the car, on the back of which *348was a note from the defendant requesting her to meet him. Suffice it to say plaintiff did meet the defendant and subsequently caused a summons to be issued out of the Magistrate\u2019s Court for his <mask>. Plaintiff produced no other witnesses who saw either photograph. Defendant, prior to the hearing in the Magistrate\u2019s Court, surrendered to the plaintiff all of the photographs taken of nude portions of her body which she had voluntarily posed for during the time that their relations had been more amiable. There was no testimony by plaintiff that she became ill or was injured because of these pictures. It was further conceded by plaintiff that the car on which the photograph had been left was actually owned by John Benson and that her association with him continued subsequent to the decision rendered herein which association had been found by this court to constitute misconduct on her part."], "id": "1591ad35-5133-4d75-8b8e-e4fc11a71e7f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Court proceedings are accorded a presumption of regularity (see Richardson, Evidence [10th ed], \u00a7 72; People v Rosello, 97 Misc 2d 963). In this case, the presumption is augmented by the evidence that the arraignment court had replaced the yellow file back with a blue back and that the Judge himself noted the charges against defendant as sections 265.01 and 240.20 of the Penal Law at a Bench conference. Given this evidence, the court reporter\u2019s failure to record the addition of the charge of <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 240.20) is certainly not enough to render the addition improper or the proceeding irregular."], "id": "da8ab96f-63ed-4bae-9fde-5999a9d12e37", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court found defendant guilty of: (1) attempted assault in the third degree; (2) <mask> (two counts); and (3) harassment in the second degree. The court found defendant\u2019s testimony regarding her demeanor at the scene \u201cincredible and unbelievable.\u201d It also found that the videotape introduced by the defense corroborated the police officers\u2019 account because it showed \u201cmayhem\u201d at the scene."], "id": "c44e9f59-18c3-44d1-b82f-8c976eca5729", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Plateau next argues that the informations are legally insufficient on their face. For an information to be legally sufficient on its face, every element of the offense charged and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof must be alleged, and the failure to do so renders any resulting conviction jurisdictionally defective. (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; 100.15 [3]; People v Hall, 48 NY2d 927 [1979].) For example, in Hall, a defendant\u2019s conviction of harassment was reversed because the information upon which he was tried failed to allege an essential element of that offense, which was that the defendant acted \u201cwith intent to harass, annoy or alarm.\u201d (48 NY2d at 928; see also e.g. People v Tarka, 75 NY2d 996 [1990] [<mask> conviction reversed because the information charging defendant failed to allege an essential element of that offense of either intent or recklessness]; People v *777Caravousanos, 2 Misc 3d 7 [2003] [conviction of Executive Law \u00a7 382 reversed and case dismissed because the accusatory instrument upon which defendant was tried did not contain nonhearsay allegations of fact that established, if true, every element of the offense charged].)"], "id": "e16d9603-11f4-42a7-b42f-135f257e39ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Jonathan testified that he had been arrested for <mask>, assault, and failure to pay fines during the pendency of the case. As to the assault charge, he explained that it involved a neighbor who had been harassing him but that he and Whitney had since moved and the issue had been resolved. He testified that he did not have a driver's license and that due to his disability, he is unable to understand or retain the information necessary to obtain a license. He stated that Whitney would obtain a license. He testified that his visitations with the children had gone well but that he had also noticed the bruises and the boils on them. He admitted that he had spanked the children frequently in the past but stated that he had learned to appropriately discipline the children through the parenting classes; he does not \"believe\" in spanking the children anymore. He agreed with Whitney that they had not attended counseling sessions because they had not received a referral from DHS."], "id": "5156f8c8-9a2f-4ac6-adbc-f3670afa55e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The courts of this State and of the United States have sanctioned the right of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses to try.to convert those of different religious beliefs. To that end, they have invalidated ordinances prohibiting the distribution of literature (People v. Barber, 289 N. Y. 378; Lovell, v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141); they have permitted parading without a license (People v. Kiernan, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 291); and they have reversed convictions for <mask> even where there has been persistent, inconsiderate and offensive disrespect for the right of privacy (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; People v. Ludovici, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 88; People v. Guthrie, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 289; People v. Reid, 180 Misc. 289)."], "id": "6b0df346-8843-4f17-bd96-930e1ff6043c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The remaining charge is violation of section 205.30 of the Penal Law (resisting arrest). Such a violation requires that the peace officer must be prevented \"from effecting an authorized arrest\u201d. Since the evidence shows that there was no proper basis for the charges of <mask> and assault, which were the grounds upon which the complainant was arresting the defendant, there is no legal support for the charge of resisting arrest. Section 35.27 of the Penal Law, which prohibits the use of physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized, does not expand the substantive scope of the section charging resisting arrest. (People v Stevenson, 31 NY2d 108; People v Barton, 30 AD2d 726; People v Lyke, 72 Misc 2d 1046; People v Ailey, 76 Misc 2d 589.)"], "id": "2a23b4d0-fd4c-4a3d-ad20-d37846b170f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Paragraph 15 of the affidavit of appeal alleges that after the defendants were arraigned, the court called the defendants before the bench and addressed certain remarks to them \u2018 \u2018 stating that they had not been convicted of a crime but of an offense and it would not affect their applying for a job or going into the service but that they were not advised that they would have to state on any application where the question was asked if they had ever been arrested, that they would have to say yes, and that if the disposition of the arrest was asked they would have to say they were convicted of <mask> and deponent understands that such a conviction might affect their going into the service or applying for a job or applying for a civil service job or going to college or military academy and they were not advised that the certificate of their convictions for disorderly conduct, which is sometimes called a criminal offense would be required to be filed in the book of convictions in the Otsego County Clerk\u2019s Office at Cooperstown, New York; that as the defendant is advised and believes, a certificate of defendant\u2019s conviction for disorderly conduct was filed in the Otsego County Clerk\u2019s Office February 19, 1957, setting forth that defendant was convicted February 14, 1957, before Judge Db Angelo and fined Ten ($10.00) Dollars and given six months\u2019 suspended sentence, Otsego County Jail and one year probation. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "2c07cca2-7d60-4385-be54-780a682841bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b66 Based on his testimony, Estrada requested a jury instruction that justifies a defendant\u2019s use of physical force against another. The State objected, noting Estrada did not merely use physical force against the driver, but deadly physical force. Agreeing with the State, the trial court instructed the jury on Estrada\u2019s use of deadly physical force as a justification defense. The jury found Estrada guilty of theft of means of transportation, aggravated assault, <mask>, possession of dangerous drugs, and four counts of child abuse, but not guilty of armed robbery."], "id": "91bdfde0-5102-422c-ac4f-421f46c9ae84", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The record shows that appellants were charged with a violation of section 722 of the Penal Law in relation to <mask> in that, among other things, on November 13, 1957, in company with others, they extinguished the lights on certain flares placed on Main Street in the city of Oneida to guard barricades where road repairs had been made, and left said flares out. The testimony shows that the offense was committed between the hours of eight and nine o\u2019clock that night."], "id": "b39be12d-e0bc-4610-9839-ae98620349b0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The respondent is correct and the petition must be dismissed. While there has always been a distinction between a \u201c crime \u201d and minor violations dealt with by Magistrates or Justices of the Peace (People v. Grogan, 260 N. Y. 138, 141-42; Matter of Cooley v. Wilder, 234 App. Div. 256) the latter are regarded as special proceedings of a criminal nature (People v. Du Pont, 28 A D 2d 1135, citing People ex rel. Burke v. Fox, 205 N. Y. 490; Steinert v. Sobey, 14 App. Div. 505). The revision of the Penal Law, particularly section 10.00 thereof, recognized the difficulty in classifying the petty or noncriminal offense or violation, such as <mask>, and gave a new noncriminal definition to the words \u201cviolation\u201d and \u201coffense\u201d while retaining criminal procedures and actions for trying and sentencing offenders. It follows, therefore, that the holding in People v. Du Pont (supra) has not been altered by the change in the Penal Law, effective September 1, 1967. Interestingly, the new Criminal Procedure Law, effective September 1, 1971, does not carry over the provisions of section 552-a of the old code. In fact, the new CPL is much more stringent in that it enlarges the instances when fingerprints and photographs may be taken and provides no machinery for their return."], "id": "2f8fef4a-361c-4802-b418-cd778d4b0a3b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On July 3, 1961, at approximately 3:55 a.m. the defendants were seen entering a fenced-in area behind a large building housing Bomboy\u2019s Garage. The arresting officers, two State Troopers, drove their car on to the property, behind the building and ascertained that the enclosed area was a swimming pool. The officers asked the defendants several times to identify themselves and they refused. The defendants were thereupon advised that they were under arrest for <mask> for *1003refusing to answer the officers\u2019 inquiries. Thereafter the defendants engaged in some loud conversation with the arresting officers and used vile and obscene language in refusing to identify themselves and in ordering the officers to remove themselves from the property. The defendants were handcuffed together and at that time defendant Peter Bomboy, Jr., while handcuffed, struck one of the arresting officers on the nose with his fist. Defendants were then brought before this Justice and informations were filed charging them with violations of the sections hereinbefore mentioned. Defendants were not charged with the offense of disorderly conduct, although they had been advised they were under arrest for committing the same."], "id": "e252f59d-ab0d-4092-a8ec-fa07e92ed56b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["It is plain that the city has attempted to expand the definition of <mask> beyond the limits of the Penal Law. This it may not do. In Fields v. Taylor (274 App. Div. 810) the Appellate Division held invalid an ordinance of the City of Mount Yernon purporting to authorize stay of warrants of eviction for longer periods than provided for in the Civil Practice Act."], "id": "e1c89b29-7dd9-4682-9be4-ee11e38e62a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c It is most salutary that our subway and elevated trains be kept free of drunks, vagrants and loafers i:= * # However, it is even more important that the rights of every individual * * * be safeguarded \u201d, said the court in People v. Sustek (204 Misc. 514, 515) * * * in dismissing a complaint charging the defendant with sleeping on a train. To constitute 1 \u2018 <mask> \u2019 \u2019 there must be an actual or threatened breach of the peace (People v. Perry, 265 N. Y. 362, 365). \u201c The key phrase of the statute is \u2018 breach of the peace \u2019 and, traditionally, that language means a violation of public order and tranquility \u201d. (People v. Chesnick, 302 N. Y. 58, 60.) Until such time as the Legislature makes sleeping on a train an offense, the\" courts cannot make it so, desirable as it may be to keep our subway trains free of questionable characters."], "id": "a7498cfd-6dff-4ed6-b49a-c44302f02b15", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["It has been urged, in support of the action taken at the trial, that the dismissal of the complaint was justified under chapter 186 of the Laws of 1880. But while there was evidence in a measure tending to prove <mask> on the part of the plaintiff, it was controverted by his own testimony and that of other witnesses taken at the trial. Hpon that subject a question of fact was created by this state of the evidence which could only be legally solved by submitting the case to the jury. It was likewise in the same condition as to the charge made at the station-house against the plaintiff."], "id": "7d40639a-03a9-4295-983f-e7887bd6c095", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*526Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the crime of resisting arrest is also denied. The information contains nonhearsay allegations establishing every element of the offense, including that the arrest was authorized and that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for the underlying crime of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and for the offense of <mask>. The allegations in the information that defendant grabbed a metal fence, refused to remove his hands, then flailed his hands and twisted his body adequately established the element that defendant attempted to prevent his arrest."], "id": "32c433c1-90eb-413e-8657-8acfadd109ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, we acknowledge that in order to receive qualified immunity, a police officer must have at least \"arguable probable cause\" to make an arrest. Bernini v. City of St. Paul , 665 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2012). \"Arguable probable cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based in probable cause if the mistake is objectively reasonable.\" Ulrich v. Pope Cty. , 715 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2013). Despite Harris's argument as to the existence of probable cause to arrest Parrish on charges of <mask>, obstructing governmental operations, and resisting arrest, we do not reach the merits of this argument. As previously discussed in Martin , supra , the question whether there was arguable probable cause for Harris to arrest Parrish for purposes of qualified immunity in this excessive-force claim and under these particular circumstances lends itself to be a legal question that \"sits near the law-fact divide\" and is a matter to be resolved at the trial court level."], "id": "51351947-4f04-4e59-af94-3f1dbfdf0fd7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the instant case no action was brought by the village of Alexandria Bay to recover the penalty in a civil action, but a proceeding criminal in its nature was begun by the arrest of the defendant, appellant, under section 338 of the Village Law, for the violation of an ordinance, which violation constituted <mask>. The question now raised for the first time on appeal as to the sufficiency of the information or the warrant by reason of failure to set out the elements of the offense in more detail or the failure to charge the defendant specifically with disorderly conduct, is not before me and does not need to be decided at this time. If no appeal was properly taken, according to the statutes, that question and others cannot be now determined."], "id": "94974131-fa6f-4fa3-856f-edabbe6f93ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\"[a] person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person * * * \"2. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture\u201d. (Penal Law \u00a7 240.25 [2]; People v Dietze, supra, at 51.) The portion of the <mask> statute which the defendant challenges in this case states, in relevant part, that:"], "id": "a6a40eaf-fd76-4025-9e56-9a8d46a166e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["That portion of chapter 287 of the Laws of 1916 (Parole Board Act) pertaining to this case is as follows: \u201c that no person convicted in any of said cities of vagrancy, <mask> tending to a breach of the peace, public prostitution, soliciting on the streets or public places for the purpose of prostitution, or the violation of section one hundred and fifty of chapter ninety-nine of .the laws of 1909, as amended, shall be sentenced to any such workhouse for a definite term until the finger print records of the city magistrates\u2019 courts of said city are officially searched with reference to the particular defendant and the results thereof duly certified to the court; and provided, further, that if it shall appear to the court at any stage of the proceeding prior to the imposition of sentence and after due notice and opportunity to the defendant to be heard in opposition to such accusation of prior convictions that any person convicted of any or each of these offenses last enumerated has been convicted of any or each of these offenses two or more times during the twenty-four months just previous, or three or more times previous to that conviction, thei^the court shall sentence such offender to a workhouse of the said department of correction in said city for an indeterminate period. The' term of imprisonment of any person convicted and sentenced to any *29such workhouse for an indeterminate period shall not exceed two years and shall be terminated by the parole commission in the manner prescribed in section five of this act and not otherwise.\u201d"], "id": "b5c71de6-742f-4efa-aad3-48cdacb33b87", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Section 182 of the Village Law (amd. L. 1927, ch. 650), in referring to a police justice of a village, provides, in part: \u201c Such police justice shall have exclusive jurisdiction to take the examination of a person charged with the commission in such village of a felony and also to hear, try, and determine charges against a person of being a vagrant or disorderly person within such village, or of having committed <mask> therein * *"], "id": "91dc974e-513d-4d8e-9f4b-5b008dc9dbf7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The information charges the defendant with the offense of <mask> committed by willfully, wrongfully and unlawfully engaging in an illegal occupation; that illegal occupation is set forth as the sale of alcoholic beverages at a house in the city of Norwich without a license or authority to so engage. It was intended to charge an offense as described in subdivision 11 of section 722 of the Penal Law. In order to sustain the conviction, it must appear that the defendant engaged in some illegal occupation. A review of the evidence taken on the trial shows the sale to the complainant of a pint of liquor. The evidence was confined to one sale. There was no evidence given as to appellant\u2019s occupation or the business, if any, in which he was legally engaged. The deposition of Le\u00edan Brookins, one of the police officers of the city, showed that the appellant had no license authorizing him to sell alcoholic beverages. In order to convict of disorderly conduct, because of engaging in some illegal occupation, it is necessary to show that the defendant was so engaged. The general business of selling alcoholic beverages without authority and unauthorized by law would be an illegal occupation and doubtless would constitute disorderly conduct under the section referred to. A single sale is not sufficient, however, to constitute an occupation. An occupation is not acquired by a single transaction. It involves a continuous series of transactions; acts engaged in with continuity sufficient to become a business. \u201c Occupation \u201d is defined in Bouvier\u2019s Law Dictionary as \u201c a trade, business or mystery; as, the occupation of a printer.\u201d Webster defines the meaning of the word as: \u201c That which occupies, or engages, the time and attention; the principal business of one\u2019s life; vocation; employment; calling; trade.\u201d"], "id": "109600b7-ce50-41b3-907b-5e9c19b5131d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cIn People v Munafo (50 NY2d 326 [1980]), this Court stated that \u2018[<mask> is \u00e1 statutory creation. Intended to include in the main various forms of misconduct which at common law would often be prosecuted as public nuisances * * * [A] common thread that ran through almost all of this legislation was a desire to deter breaches of the peace or, more specifically, of the community\u2019s safety, health or morals * * * And, although it has always been difficult to essay any precise definition of \u201cbreach of the peace\u201d * * *, this court has equated that term with \u201cpublic inconvenience, annoyance or alarm\u201d, the governing phrase of our current disorderly conduct statute\u2019 (id., at 330-331 [citations omitted; emphasis added]).\u201d The allegations in the instant case, as set out in the complaint, make no reference to a public nuisance. The sine qua non of the offense in question is an \u201cintent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof\u2019 (Penal Law \u00a7 240.20). In fact, said complaint makes no reference to the number of individuals present at the time of the arrest. No indication is given as to whether or not anyone other than the arresting officer was present. There is an allegation that the defendant \u201cwas told several times to please lower her voice, defendant refused.\u201d Nevertheless, no other information was provided as to whether defendant\u2019s voice caused any public disturbance, such as a third party complaining about a disturbance or loud noises. The allegations that the defendant \u201cstarted to yell and make unreasonable noise\u201d are conclusions unsupported by any evidence of their effect on individuals not involved in the situation. Again, the allegation *652that the defendant used \u201cobscene language\u201d is not only a conclusion, but said language is not prescribed by the subdivision in question. Nor is the court assisted by the presentation of a supporting deposition. Thus the court is left with only the face of the complaint to consider. The only way the court could hold that the People have established a prima facie case would be to speculate using unsworn documents such as the crime investigation report. The court is constrained from so doing based on Criminal Procedure Law \u00a7 100.15 (3), which states the requirement that when a misdemeanor complaint is used to charge a defendant, \u201cThe factual part of such instrument must contain a statement of the complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges.\u201d This complaint fails to meet that standard as same is established by prior case law, since no reference as to a public disturbance is made. In fact, one could conclude from the complaint that only the arresting officer and the defendant were present at the scene and that no one else was affected by the situation."], "id": "3727164f-6884-4bfb-87dd-8b36e473b080", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["A turkish bath is located at 10 St. Marks Place. The police officer testified as set forth in the complaint, amplifying that the transaction was exclusively between him and the defendant, that he had never seen the defendant before, that the whole Occurrence took \u2018' approximately a minute or two \u2019 \u2019, that it was *838in an ordinary conversational tone of- voice, that nobody stopped to look and listen while it was going on, that the defendant did not speak loud' or boisterously and that he was rather friendly, and that after this brief and friendly conversation which lasted a couple of minutes, no one else being present, the policeman identified himself and placed the defendant under arrest, and that the foregoing was the whole story. In dismissing the complaint the court said to the police officer: \u201c I am dismissing this complaint not because I doubt what you said. I believe what occurred is as you testified. I am granting the motion to dismiss this complaint because this defendant is not charged with sexual deviation, not with indecency or lewdness. He is charged with <mask> which can only occur if and when the defendant acts with intent to provoke a breach of the public peace or behaves in a manner whereby the public peace is breached or may be breached. Also, the law is that a police officer is a peace officer charged with the preservation of the public peace. This transaction was entirely between you and this defendant; as you said, a friendly conversation. Surely, this defendant did not intend to breach the public peace. He did not want to attract public attention. Had he known you were a policeman he would have had nothing to do with you. And so, notwithstanding the fact that I do not doubt you told the truth, I am required to dismiss this complaint, the law under which this prosecution occurs being what it is.\u201d"], "id": "9c4a0b57-4544-4457-9aec-a8138ca0c922", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In that case it was held that a prior prosecution for public intoxication did not bar a later prosecution for <mask>, based upon some of the same actions, for one can be drunk without being disorderly and, therefore, different facts would have to be proved at the second trial, and that although the crimes may be closely related on the facts, they are separate and distinct as a matter of law."], "id": "8af2e700-be0b-4680-a7a5-231394e40bf5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner contends, however, that the Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over a 16-year-old school delinquent where the charge of assault in the third degree arose out of the same facts upon which the determination of school delinquency was made. That contention is without merit. There is a substantial difference between the conduct of a school delinquent as defined in section 3214 of the Education Law and an assault in the third degree as defined in section 120.00 of the Penal Law. The District Attorney points out that a school delinquent is one who is habitually truant, habitually insubordinate, or habitually disorderly, and that \u20181 disorderly \u2019 \u2019 has a recognized meaning in the law. \u201c Disorderly \u201d means such acts as are defined to be <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 240.20) and harassment (Penal Law, \u00a7 240.25). Under the Education Law it also includes habitual misconduct and disruptive behavior in school as opposed to the standard of good conduct. 1 \u2018 \u2018 Misconduct \u2019 perhaps refers more particularly to demeanor within the walls of the institution or in connection with the ordinary activities of student life * * * But the implied stipulation of good conduct [is] variable in its meaning and incapable of precise definition as that term must always be * * * (Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146,150, affd. 181 App. Div. 936). \u2019 \u2019 (Matter of Carr v. St. John\u2019s Univ., 17 A D 2d 632, 634.)"], "id": "402b4bbb-67be-4d1b-96b7-c65acd7e72ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In discussing the subject of <mask>, distinction must be made between the cases involving conduct upon private property and conduct upon the public streets or in public places. Many of the authorities cited relate to conduct on private property. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct who, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, acts in such a manner as to *257interfere with or he offensive to others or causes a crowd to collect except where lawfully addressing the same. A breach of the peace is an offense well known to the common law. It is a disturbance of the public order by an act of violence or an act likely to produce violence or which, by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community. (People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423.) But, where such an offense is charged, much must depend upon the time, place and circumstances of the act. Thus, where the disturbance took place in a restaurant without actual annoyance, disturbance or interference with anyone, it cannot be said to constitute disorderly conduct in violation of the Penal Law. (People v. Perry, 265 N. Y. 362.) The same is true of a quarrel between husband and wife in their own apartment with no other persons present (People v. McCauliff, 267 N. Y. 581) and, also, of a conversation over the telephone, the possibility of a breach of the peace being occasioned thereby being too remote. (People v. Monnier, 280 N. Y. 77.) The same rule would apply to the unreported authorities cited by the defendants. (People v. Ludovici, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 88; People v. Guthrie, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 289.) In the Ludovici case, the defendant, like the defendants in the instant case, was a member of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses. She called at private residences to interest the occupants in her religious belief and on their private property attempted to engage in conversation those who answered the door and to leave printed matter with them. Although the occupants informed her that they were not interested and requested her to leave, she lingered. She spoke, however, only in an ordinary tone of voice and it could not be said that there was an noise, alarm, consternation or disorder to the disturbance of the public and, consequently, nothing tending to a breach of the peace. So, too, in the Guthrie case, the action took place entirely within a private home and the enclosed porch thereof. Following the decisions of the Court of Appeals in the Perry and Mormier cases (supra), the court held that the actions of the defendant within a private home, in the presence of the occupant thereof, only, did not constitute disorderly conduct."], "id": "0ad4609b-a9be-4350-ab3b-12401e2bcef7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Therefore, by reason of imputation from the police officers\u2019 and the District Attorney\u2019s own affirmative conduct in regard to the yellow sheet, I conclude there was a suppression of the facts of the 1966 <mask> conviction and the psychiatric history of Febles which would have become evident. To label such suppression intentional or negligent is unnecessary. It is enough that the prosecution was the active and effective cause of the nondisclosure of the evidence. If the prosecutor did not erect a barrier to the evidence it certainly enshrouded the information in fog. If such not be a willful suppression, the result was a de facto suppression."], "id": "167919f1-ddcc-4844-984d-9e3072936296", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Police Officer Joseph J. Bonaimo says that on March 8, 1982 he assisted in the arrest of Raymond Brookshire after a search of his rented car. The search was allegedly based on probable cause. Drug paraphernalia \u201ccommingled\u201d with United States currency amounting to $8,605 was found on the floor behind the driver\u2019s seat. Several suitcases of marihuana were found in the trunk of the car. Bonaimo states that Brookshire confessed that he was a \u201crunner\u201d from Florida who brought marihuana to the New York City area for sale and returned to Florida with the proceeds of the sales. Brookshire was arrested on felony and misdemeanor charges but was permitted to plead guilty to <mask>, a violation, and was sentenced to a conditional discharge."], "id": "d87c0a92-3773-4998-bd33-95b7bc1dfad8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Mr. Presiding Justice Postee of the Appellate Division, Third Department (now an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals) said in Matter of Erway v. MacAffer (282 App. Div. 287, 290) : \u20181 This we conclude was clear legislative recognition of a distinction between crimes and offenses.\u201d In that case a unanimous court annulled the certificate of a Supreme Court Justice permitting the removal under section 57 of the code of a <mask> case under section 722 of the Penal Law from a Police Justice\u2019s Court for prosecution .by indictment."], "id": "482ea726-2023-49fa-a6ec-aca2eb62e533", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Even if the written information contained allegations that the defendants were noisy and boisterous in a public restaurant, this court seriously doubts that such acts standing alone would be sufficient to constitute <mask>. The defendants are all college students. It often happens that young people, while congregated in a restaurant, laugh and speak in a loud and boisterous manner. Unless they persisted in such conduct after they had been admonished by the proprietor or someone in charge of the restaurant, it would seem unreasonable to brand mere conviviality as disorderly conduct. It is entirely possible that the conduct of these defendants on this particular occasion, resulting in their arrest, was more aggravated than the record indicates. However, if this were so, the defendants have not been confronted with the specific accusation. The information to which they pleaded guilty was defective and insufficient and, consequently, the conviction must be reversed and the information dismissed as to each defendant. An order may be submitted accordingly."], "id": "651fecfc-82da-4c85-8a2d-824bb8cff465", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*763The learned magistrate\u2019s vigorous dissent necessitates a further reference, not to what was, but to what was not, decided by me. It was not held that the Eighteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or the National Prohibition Act prohibits the drinking of intoxicants. The dissenting magistrate correctly states that \u201cAny person who is in legal possession of liquor may offer a drink to his guests with impunity and what he may offer they may consume.\u201d But the possession is illegal which comes from unlawful transportation. It was not decided that the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act are enforcible in the courts of the State of New York. New York has no enforcement act. Because the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act cannot be enforced, according to their tenor in a State court, it does not follow that they may be flouted with impunity. When the violation is public, offensive and annoying, section 722 of the Penal Law of the State of New York is adequate to punish the offenders. In the absence of such a general statute so defining \u201c <mask>,\u201d the offensive act may not be punishable in a State court."], "id": "c50b73eb-f92c-4640-8caf-e1f4fbc6e696", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant was initially charged with grand larceny based on allegations that she used her mother\u2019s debit card, without consent, to withdraw $1,000 from her mother\u2019s account. On May 21, 2012, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petit larceny in full satisfaction of the accusatory instrument. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, if defendant was not arrested during the next year, paid restitution and complied with an order of protection, she would be allowed to replead to <mask> and receive a sentence of time served. The plea allocution thoroughly advised defendant of the rights she was waiving by pleading guilty (see Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238 [1969])."], "id": "71b5a99e-4f1a-43b2-86bd-eaaca4c39f70", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Regarding the claim that the officers had probable cause to arrest Wood for \u201cyelling\u201d and \u201cscreaming\u201d at Blair, the defendants provide no further argument or any case citations as to how that constituted <mask>. Forfeiture aside, see United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 846 (6th Cir. 2006), the claim is meritless. Even assuming, as the defendants argue, that the \u201clevel of noise [Wood] was making could itself violate Section (A)(2),\u201d under the statute\u2019s clear language, \u201ca disorderly conduct charge against h[im] can stand only if []he \u2018recklessly caused inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm\u2019 by \u2018unreasonably\u2019 making the noise.\u201d Goodwin, 781 F.3d at 333\u201334 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 2917.11(A)(2))."], "id": "2338770c-c759-4c5a-9685-a7299432a9a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The relator was arrested by a police officer and charged with the offense of <mask> in violation of subdivision 2 of section 722 of the Penal Law. Said section provides: \u201c Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct: * # * 2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct or be offensive to others \u201d."], "id": "abaf6c78-2dce-41d6-9c7c-9a868ac4c196", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["This case would certainly bolster the authority of a decision like People v. Bellows (281 N. Y. 67 [1939]), in which our Court of Appeals sustained a conviction for <mask> arising out of picketing in a secondary boycott situation. But People v. Bellows was decided before the Supreme Court had laid down the proposition that picketing was an expression of labor\u2019s right to freedom of speech. Two years later, in the case of People v. Muller (286 N. Y. 281 [1941]), the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for disorderly conduct in a similar situation by a split decision of four to three. One may doubt whether this case would have been decided the same way if it had come after the decision of Carpenter\u2019s Union v. Ritter\u2019s Cafe (supra). Nevertheless, the majority of the Court of Appeals in People v. Muller (supra), made a far more logical application of the principles of the Thornhill and Carlson cases than did the Supreme Court in the Ritter case.2"], "id": "95331821-ac70-4b86-bffa-22be97aec4b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Does the act of the defendant in writing the word \u201c Yes \u201d in answer to the question 7 (in compliance with the printed requirement beneath the space set out therefor that it should be answered \u201c Yes \u201d or \u201c Ho \u201d) and thus indicating that he stated orally that being a subject of Austria he was willing and desir *109ous of returning to that country and entering its military service and fighting against the United States, constitute <mask> under the State statutes defining that charge %"], "id": "742eff10-53e1-4aba-9ddd-6e0b56922472", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["It is further the observation of this corut, although it is not a fact in this instance, where women have been convicted of <mask> of this and similar character and subsequently physically examined, that at least approximately ninety per cent of them are infected with one or more types of virulent and highly infectious venereal diseases. The court has also observed in its experience that some of these women, knowing themselves to be thus infected, and with utter indifference and criminal disregard of the hygienic security of the men they contact, approach and seek to entice these men into sexual relationship with them."], "id": "a336d176-3ff7-4250-8bfa-a493586ea872", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Beyond Greene and Kennedy, we had already made clear by 2016 that profanity alone is insufficient to constitute fighting words under Ohio\u2019s <mask> statute. See D.D., 645 F. App\u2019x at 425, 427 (denying qualified immunity to officer on false arrest claim because \u201cOhio\u2019s disorderly conduct statute and the First Amendment require more than the uttering, or even shouting, of distasteful words,\u201d and \u201cno competent officer would have found probable cause to arrest [the plaintiff]\u201d); Leonard, 477 F.3d at 359 (\u201cThe Supreme Court has held that a state may not make a \u2018single four-letter expletive a criminal offense.\u2019\u201d (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26)); McCurdy v. Montgomery Cnty., 240 F.3d 512, 515, 520 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiff\u2019s \u201cright to challenge verbally\u201d officer\u2019s conduct, including stating \u201cwhat the fu*k do you want\u201d and \u201cwhat the fu*k is your job,\u201d was \u201cwell-established\u201d); Sandul, 119 F.3d at 1256 No. 20-3599 Wood v. Eubanks, et al. Page 16"], "id": "a25b66b1-08fb-420a-a6fb-891af043d244", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The statute provides that the Criminal and Family Courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over acts which *51constitute \u201c<mask>, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree or an attempted assault between spouses\u201d (Family Ct Act, \u00a7 812). In this indictment, which charges criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, we do not have one of the charges specifically enumerated in the statute, but there is a claim that the charge occurred in conjunction with a charge of menacing which was the subject matter of an action in the District Court. Inasmuch as the language of the present statute is substantially similar to the prior section of the Family Court Act, we can look to the cases under that earlier provision for some guidance."], "id": "87aa8bad-37bf-4855-b17d-3d9663960715", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["If this court were to attempt to try a sovereign of Europe upon an allegation of <mask> the proceedings would *225be defective on the ground that we had no jurisdiction of the person involved. If, however, a person is subject to the authority of the court and due notice has been given him, and there has been a contact between the court and the person charged, so that the person charged has had an opportunity to defend his rights, then the jurisdiction of the person has been accomplished. Here in this particular case, the defendant has appeared in court and taken part in the proceedings, he appeared here and plead not guilty. The Criminal Courts Act says that there are certain cases which the magistrate may send to the Court of Special Sessions for determination. These papers have been filed with the clerk of the court, they have duly come into his hands from the district attorney\u2019s office. The district attorney follows that custom. Looking at that record, we find the commission of an offense by this defendant, of which offense this court has jurisdiction. There is absent the formal opening and that the district attorney makes the charge, and there is absent the signature of the district attorney, but all the essential elements of the charge of the offense is there in the papers. That paper has been read to the defendant at his pleading. It has been recognized throughout the litigation in this court, and to all intents and purposes, it has served as the necessary pleading on the part of the people. I think the spirit of modern times in the improvement of procedure in court, usually is to disregard technicalities, so as to prevent the waste of time and the consideration of mere formalities. I am of the opinion that judgment can be pronounced."], "id": "5d41f221-5cc3-4923-8644-a658f4790c82", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The officer that made the arrest is the only witness for the People. He says that at the time and on the day mentioned he was regulating traffic, when a car pulled up at the side of the street. The appellant was seated with the chauffeur of the car, and the officer, addressing the chauffeur, said, \u201c Parking limit is one hour.\u201d That the appellant who had alighted from the car said to the officer, \u201c Hey, we just came from Headquarters.\u201d The officer Said, \u201c I am not talking to you in the first place, and if you don\u2019t keep quiet why I will lock you up.\u201d Then the officer said to the chauffeur, \u201c I think that Auburn was on the other side of the street this morning. Now the parking regulation is one hour.\u201d The officer then states that the appellant kept on hollering. On being asked what the appellant said, the officer stated that he said, \u201c We did not park there this morning.\u201d The officer then said to the appellant, \u201cAll right if you want to keep on talking and hollering like that I will lock you up for <mask>.\u201d- The officer then took *603the appellant to the station house, and the lieutenant ordered the officer to give him a summons for disorderly conduct. The officer also testified that this altercation had ca \u2019.sed a crowd to collect."], "id": "e1ecbf98-3d79-4004-bf89-b13f04cf896a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disorderly Conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The information on which the warrant of arrest was issued states that the defendant \u201c did commit the crime of <mask> in Viol Sect 722 Penal Sub-Divs. 1 & 2 against the person or property of Gertrude E. Huyck by wrongfully, unlawfully, willfully, corruptly, and knowingly did use offensive, disorderly and abusive or insulting Language conduct or behavior and did annoy disturb others, he did call me a liar and a Hell Hore did grab me by the arm and try to pull me Back & down stairs and Mrs. Beardslee\u2019 came to my assistance.\u201d While it is charged in the information that defendant committed the crime, in that he violated subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 722 of the Penal Code, there is no statement of any fact showing that he acted in such a manner \u201c as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct or be offensive to others;\u201d the statement that he \u201c did annoy or disturb \u201d others is a conclusion rather than an \u201c allegation made to a magistrate that a person has been guilty of a designated crime.\u201d (Code Crim. Proc. \u00a7 145.) Neither is the statement in the information that attempts to designate a crime under subdivision 1 of said section sufficient to charge the defendant with disorderly conduct. In People v. Wacke (77 Misc. 196), in discussing the sufficiency of an information under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (at p. 197), it is said: \u201c It performs the same function as an indictment in a court of record, and must set forth facts to establish the crime; not with the exactness of an indictment, but with sufficient preciseness to inform the magistrate that a designated crime has been committed. If it charges the crime in the words of the statute, it should allege the time, place, person and other circumstances that constitute such crime. *. * * All the material facts constituting the offense must be stated. No essential element of the crime can be omitted.] *469The principal facts must be charged.\u201d There is no statement that the alleged acts complained of were done with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace or that a breach of the peace might have been occasioned thereby. There is no allegation to show that the acts alleged to have been committed took place in a public place and, so far as appears from the information, whatever was said or done by the defendant may have been within his own home. (People v. Oczko, 272 N. Y. 604.)"], "id": "42d12bf8-d7d0-466a-884b-126a0ecda8d6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant has been living in the Rochester area for 22 years. In cross-examination the defendant admitted that he had been convicted of <mask> in 1961, but explained that it arose out of an occurrence when he tried to stop a fight between two other men and was arrested, together with one of the men involved, after he had taken him into his car to take him home. Cross-examination also brought out evidence of a prior arrest in 1957 on charges which were dismissed before trial."], "id": "1e0d39ef-8877-4637-86f7-cc819b598aea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Section 9. *' 3' * A risk shall not be entitled to insurance nor shall any subscriber be required to afford or continue insurance under the following circumstances: (A) If the applicant or anyone who usually drives the automobile is engaged in an illegal enterprise, or has been convicted of any felony or high misdemeanor during the immediately preceding thirty-six months or habitually disregards local or state laws as evidenced by two or more non-motor vehicle convictions during the immediately preceding thirty-six months. * * * See. 14. 'Garners Notice to Applicant. * * * (a) Issue a policy or a binder if all information necessary for the carrier to fix the proper rate is contained in the application form, such policy or binder to become effective 12:01 A.M. on the day following the second working day, or * * *. See. 18. Cancellations. (A) Cancellation at Request of Insured. If for any reason the insured requests cancellation, the carrier shall retain the short rate earned premium for the period covering or the sum of $10.00 per car, whichever is greater, and return the balance to the insured. *835(B) Cancellation by Company. A carrier which has issued a policy or binder under this Plan, shall have the right to cancel the insurance by giving notice as required in the policy or binder if the insured (1) is not or ceases to be eligible or in good faith entitled to insurance, or ' (2) has failed to comply with reasonable safety requirements, or (3) 'has violated any of the terms or conditions upon the basis of which the insurance was issued, or (4) has obtained the insurance through fraud or misrepresentation, or (5) has failed to pay any premium due under the policy. Each such cancellation shall be on a pro rata basis, subject to the minimum charge of $10.00 per car, and a copy of each such cancellation notice shall be furnished to the producer of record. A statement of facts in support of each such cancellation shall be furnished to the Manager and, except in the ease of cancellation for nonpayment of premium, to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State, ten days prior to the effective date of cancellation. Cancellation shall be effective on the date specified and coverage shall cease on such date. Section 19. Right of Appeal. An applicant denied insurance or an insured given notice of cancellation of insurance under the Plan, may appeal such action to the Committee. Each notice of cancellation or denial of insurance shall contain dr be accompanied by a statement that the insured or applicant has a right of appeal to the Governing Committee of the Plan. A subscriber to the Plan shall also have the right of appeal to the Committee. The action of the Committee may be appealed to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State. The Manager shall promptly notify the company, the insured or applicant, and the producer of record, of the disposition of the appeal, which notification in the case of refusal to sustain a cancellation shall include notice that upon payment of the deposit premium to the insurer a policy or binder will be issued. An appeal shall not operate as a stay of cancellation, provided, however, that if either the Committee or the Superintendent of Insurance refuses to sustain the cancellation, the carrier which issued the policy or binder shall, within two working days after receipt of the deposit premium, provided such deposit premium is received within 30 days after determination of the appeal, issue a new policy or binder effective for a period of one year from the date of issuance of such new policy or binder. The balance of the premium shall be payable as provided in Section 14. Had .\u00bfEtna Co. known of O\u2019Connor\u2019s police record it could, under the terms of the Plan, have refused the application. It could also have cancelled the policy at any time for the same reason, i.e., \u201c during the period of thirty-six months prior to the application convicted on four occasions of <mask> and drunkenness \u201d."], "id": "a9833edd-0d89-4778-956a-5bc2cd5a39b2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The section of the Penal Law applicable here is as follows: \u201d \u00a7 722. <mask>. Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct: 1. Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or behavior; 2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "1e787ea5-57ca-4b5a-8ce0-947a695b421f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["As to the nature of the evidence, were the facts of the sexual basis of the <mask> conviction the only issue here, I might be inclined to agree that such evidence would be merely cumulative of the trial attempt to impeach the witness and not sufficiently material under Brady or the criteria of People v. Salemi (309 N. Y. 208, supra). This would be so even if it advanced a new theory challenging credibility (People v. Mark-*288man, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 746, 751; but, cf., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308). But the quintessential evidence here is the long-standing and on-going mental condition of a major eyewitness, in conjunction with an apparent sexual aberration. This mental condition raises the question of the accurateness, perception, truthfullness and susceptibility to suggestion of Febles as a witness. His capacity to be a witness may even be in question. As our Court of Appeal's recognized in People v. Rensing (14 N Y 2d 210, 213) .evidence of mental illness is a special type of evidence in that it is a fact a jury would be entitled to know to \u201c assess and evaluate the \u2022 testimony given by him and not accept it * * * as the statement of a \u2018 normal \u2019 individual \u201d. This is especially so where a witness acts normally throughout the trial, and his demeanor in the courtroom and on the witness stand furnishes no basis for inferring that there is \u201c \u2018 something mentally wrong \u2019 \u201d with him (p. 214). There was no indication at the trial here that Febles had any psychiatric disorders. His conduct was not extraordinary. During summations, the District Attorney held him out as an ordinary witness. Febles himself hid his mental history. It is well recognized that mistaken identification \u201c \u2018 probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor \u2019 \u201d (United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 229). Of the three eyewitnesses, Febles\u2019 description of the defendant most accurately fit his actual attributes. His testimony remained relatively unimpeached."], "id": "9ff072a6-40b7-4431-b6bd-402c07ee25a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*526Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the crime of resisting arrest is also denied. The information contains nonhearsay allegations establishing every element of the offense, including that the arrest was authorized and that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for the underlying crime of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and for the offense of <mask>. The allegations in the information that defendant grabbed a metal fence, refused to remove his hands, then flailed his hands and twisted his body adequately established the element that defendant attempted to prevent his arrest."], "id": "7a5cecd4-fa95-4c7f-9f4a-9d9bab43aa5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["A person is guilty of <mask> under Penal Law \u00a7 240.20 (5) \u201cwhen, with intent to cause public inconvenience, *14annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof . . . [sh]e obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.\u201d Notwithstanding the majority\u2019s focus on mens rea being conceded, nonetheless, the other necessary elements were not proved. At most, the People proved a mere \u201ctemporary inconvenience\u201d caused to pedestrians, which is insufficient. While the Penal Law does not define \u201cobstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic,\u201d the Court of Appeals has made clear that \u201c[s]omething more than a mere inconvenience of pedestrians is required to support the charge\u201d (People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 262 [2007] [emphasis added]; People v Pearl, 66 Misc 2d 502 [App Term, 1st Dept 1971] [something more than the temporary inconvenience caused to pedestrians by the demonstrators\u2019 blocking of the crosswalk, resulting in pedestrians entering the roadway to get to the other side, was required to sustain a conviction for obstructing pedestrian traffic]; see also People v Nixon, 248 NY 182, 187-188 [1928], revd on other grounds People v Santos, 86 NY2d 869 [1995])."], "id": "f802492a-88cd-4559-bda0-5ff582ebad52", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c In the past, wives and other members of the family who suffered from <mask> or assaults by other members of the family or household were compelled to bring a 1 criminal charge \u2019 to invoke the jurisdiction of a court. Their purpose, with few exceptions, was not to secure a criminal conviction and punishment, but practical help. \u201c The family court is better equipped to render such help, and the purpose of this article is to create a civil proceeding for dealing with such instances of disorderly conduct and assaults. It authorizes the family court to enter orders of protection and support and contemplates conciliation procedures. If the family court concludes that these processes are inappropriate in a particular case, it is authorized to transfer the proceeding to an appropriate criminal court.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) The stated purpose is to provide a civil proceeding and to extend help in dealing with family altercations which properly are correctable by orders of protection or conciliation proceedings and which do not lend themselves to criminal court treatment (see, also, Joint Legis. Committee Report on Court Reorganization [1962], Family Ct. Act, p. 2). In light of such expressed legislative intent and our previous discussion, we do not find the directive \u2018' shall be transferred \u2019 \u2019 as mandatory but rather permissive (Family Ct. Act, \u00a7 813) in the case of felonious assaults."], "id": "d3cb3ec6-8ace-4f2e-b6e5-933165e6422a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the course of its routine investigation relating to the desirability of the petitioner as a tenant the respondent discovered, among other things, that petitioner\u2019s husband, during the past eight years, has been arrested seven times. On four of these occasions he has been adjudicated a youthful offender or a juvenile delinquent. On at least two occasions he has been incarcerated. In addition to the four juvenile and youthful offender offenses, he was, in 1964, arrested for <mask>, found guilty and sentenced to 10 days in the Workhouse. In July of 1965 he was arrested for possession of drugs, which charge was ultimately dismissed. The record further reveals that the first juvenile delinquency adjudication was as a result of an altercation with one of the respondent\u2019s public housing guards."], "id": "85009d34-f8d3-42b3-a235-0ec93bc8f27b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["I think that upon the entire record it can be found that there was sufficient evidence for the Trial Justice to make such a determination. It is true that the <mask> statute is unfortunately often abused. There is no quarrel here with the opinion of the City Court of New York Magistrate in People v. Tinston (6 Mise 2d 485) denouncing such abuse. On the other hand, we have in the instant ease a situation in which a police officer has obtained a tow truck to clear the intersection at the scene of an accident. There is evidence that he performed this act with the consent of the owner of the automobile. It appears that a growing number of people were present in the heart of a residential section, having been attracted by the action of the *979defendant in arguing with the policeman in a loud voice. There is also evidence that traffic was being interfered with at the intersection by the events that were transpiring. Under these circumstances, it seems clear to me that the officer was within his rights and in the proper exercise of his duties to admonish the defendant to stop interfering with the- procedure that was taking' place. Instead of acquiescing, however, the defendant apparently continued the argument until, in order to clear the intersection, the policeman and a fellow officer, who patrolled the area in a prowl car, felt compelled to arrest the defendant and to restrain him with the use of handcuffs. As a matter of fact, although just how it happened is not clear, it appears that one of the police officers received an injury to a finger in the course of the altercation which required hospital treatment."], "id": "c32e58e2-b8ac-4f19-9d1e-5dfb7fe52a2f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Goldfarb (152 App. Div. 870, affd. 213 N. Y. 664) a defendant had been charged with <mask>. On the trial of the charge and before all the evidence was in, the court directed that a new complaint be made and the. defendant discharged. The appellate court said that what occurred was in effect an acquittal and ruled that defendant could not be subsequently tried."], "id": "a358d623-7642-4a26-bd77-815ee55ee4f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In discussing the police command to disperse and its validity in light of the constitutional issues, the court undertook a painstaking review of the case law in this area, including most of the holdings referred to in the instant opinion. The court specifically and very carefully distinguished the Supreme Court decisions in Edwards and Cox, precisely on the same grounds explained earlier in this opinion. The heart of the opinion follows (p. 625): \u201c Contrary to appellants\u2019 assertion, subdivision 3 [of the <mask> statute] would not, by its terms, \u2018 prohibit all street meetings \u2019. It requires both that defendant 1 congregates with others \u2019 and \u2018 refuses to *996move on when ordered by the police There must be a showing of an actual or potential breach of the peace together with a congregating and refusal to obey the police order. Although those congregating may do so in an orderly and inoffensive way, in the absence of a showing that the police direction \u2018 was purely arbitrary and was not calculated in any way to promote the public order \u2019, the refusal to obey violates the statute"], "id": "313ceefa-8923-4b23-8327-e2a277cc6ee7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In Property Clerk, N. Y. City Police Dept. v Corbett (116 *131Misc 2d 1097, 1100 [Sup Ct, NY County 1982]), cited with approval by the Appellate Division in Hurlston (supra), it was held that a plea to <mask> does not necessarily bar a forfeiture, the court observing that \"neither a decision to abandon criminal charges, nor even a judgment of acquittal, necessarily represents a finding (much less a finding conclusive in a later civil proceeding) that no crime was committed\u201d. Justice Edith Miller, in Property Clerk, N. Y. City Police Dept. v Conca (NYLJ, Oct. 26, 1987, at 16, col 1), came to a conclusion contrary to that reached in Corbett, differentiating the Appellate Division decisions on the ground that they involved procedural dismissals rather than determinations on the merits. However, this court agrees with the rationale in Corbett as in forfeiture proceedings we are dealing with the civil preponderance of the evidence burden of proof concept, and there is nothing in the statute that makes the decision not to criminally prosecute serve as a bar to the subsequent civil action. (See also, Property Clerk, N. Y. City Police Dept. v Covell, 139 Misc 2d 707 [Sup Ct, NY County].)"], "id": "04811ae6-24b8-4f3c-9e89-18cac77315e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Hyman T. Maas, J. The defendants-respondents were charged by an information dated November 29, 1980, with <mask> in violation of subdivisions 1, 2 and 5 of section 240.20 of the Penal Law. Defendants-respondents moved in Rochester City Court before Judge William H. Bristol, to dismiss the apeusatory instruments on the grounds that the information was defective and that subdivisions 1, 2 and 5 of section 240.20 of the Penal Law were unconstitutional for vagueness. This appeal is confined to only that portion of the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the charge under subdivision 2 of section 240.20 of the Penal Law as unconstitutional."], "id": "f4200338-4f64-4659-886f-b3226b488165", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant contends that subdivision 3 of section 240.20 of the Penal Law is overbroad and facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and cites three United States Supreme Court cases in support of his claim. A review of these decisions does not substantiate the assertion that the violation charged herein is necessarily unconstitutional. In two of the cases (Lewis v City of New Orleans, 415 US 130; Hess v Indiana, 414 US 105) it was indicated by the Supreme Court that the statutes under review had been applied to punish only \"spoken words\u201d, and as a result any enforcement thereunder would certainly affect speech protected by the Constitution. Also the laws being interpreted by the said court in the two cases were somewhat different from the New York <mask> statute which latter statute by its language *267is directed against utterances which would or could inflict possible public alarm or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, and is not limited to speech alone. In the other cited case (Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518) the Supreme Court said that since the State of Georgia by its rulings had not limited the application of its statute to \"fighting words\u201d likely to create or excite a breach of the peace, the law had to be stricken. The constitutionality of subdivision 3 of section 240.20 of the Penal Law had been indicated by the New York State Court of Appeals in People v Todaro (26 NY2d 325) and though this decision antedated the United States Supreme Court cases referred to by the defendant, the constitutionality of the charged statute has not been affected by these subsequent rulings since the New York law has been applied consistently to instances involving the use of language which provokes or produces, or recklessly creates the risk of, an \"immediate breach of the peace\u201d."], "id": "8a2c4b79-b918-4d7f-b90a-b5bf5e13f20a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Even where the misstatement went to the nature of the dispute itself, a conviction for <mask> was recently reversed in a similar situation. The County Court, Nassau County, speaking through Johnson, J., stated in People (Complaint of Broder) v. Heller (166 Misc. 155): \u201c In my opinion the evidence fails to sustain such finding. To be sure it shows that resort was had to a false statement of fact, i. e., that a strike was in progress at the picketed premises, a type of picketing which has been enjoined as unlawful. [Citing cases.] However, although such a false statement may be enjoined, it does not follow that it so tends to a breach of the peace as to constitute disorderly conduct.\u201d"], "id": "69d286df-eab3-4e5e-9f7f-1435f8d9179c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the Perry case the facts were these: The defendants-appellants, while in a restaurant, at 4:00' in the morning, struck the defendant with their fists so as to cause him to fall twice to the floor. Three persons attempted to enter the restaurant but were waved away with the information that the place was closed. The court held this proof was insufficient to warrant the conviction of the defendants of the crime of <mask> as defined by subdivision 2 of section 722 of the Penal Law where it appears that no appropriate language was heard, the restaurant was not fully lighted, only one employee was present and there was no one in the adjacent street except three witnesses who, instead of finding the defendant\u2019s conduct offensive, testified that they voluntarily looked on to gratify curiosity or for amusement. The acts of the defendants cannot reasonably be held to have tended to such a disturbance of the tranquility of the people as to have constituted 1 \u2018 disorderly conduct \u201d in violation of the statute. They were guilty of no offense other than assault either at common law or under the Penal Law."], "id": "1098789f-395a-4576-b687-465ced43d045", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c (a) Any criminal complaint charging <mask> or an assault between spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household shall be transferred by the criminal court, not more than three days from the time the complaint was made, to the family court in the county in which the criminal court is located, unless"], "id": "d154e02e-12a4-47e1-a08b-29929f2ed94b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court found defendant guilty of: (1) attempted assault in the third degree; (2) <mask> (two counts); and (3) harassment in the second degree. The court found defendant\u2019s testimony regarding her demeanor at the scene \u201cincredible and unbelievable.\u201d It also found that the videotape introduced by the defense corroborated the police officers\u2019 account because it showed \u201cmayhem\u201d at the scene."], "id": "f759fce3-e82c-4f3a-ad34-050e11a52189", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c Intoxication in Public Places \u2014 No person shall be intoxicated on any public street, avenue, alley or lane, or in any public place in the Village of Johnson City. \u201c Any person violating this section shall pay a penalty of not to exceed Ten Dollars or be imprisoned for not to exceed six months or both such fine and imprisonment for each offense. Any violation of this section shall constitute <mask> and any person violating the same shall be a disorderly person.\u201d The defendant contests the validity of this ordinance upon the ground that a State statute, namely, section 1221 of the Penal Law, already prohibits \u201c Intoxication in a public place \u201d and therefore any attempt of a municipality to enact an ordinance covering the same subject is illegal and void."], "id": "ec88379c-74d9-460d-a8a3-5b5954d557ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Here, the police only observed the car for a short time, as it traveled a distance of about 40 yards, less than the length of most city blocks. Moreover, the evidence adduced at the hearing was nearly devoid of information about the attendant circumstances, e.g., whether there were any gas stations or businesses (other than a McDonald\u2019s restaurant) in the neighborhood, whether any of these establishments were open at the time (1:00 a.m.), whether there were any people out on the street or whether the area included residential buildings. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to give the police reason to believe that any of the occupants of the car intended or risked causing public annoyance, i.e., that the \u201cpublic harm\u201d aspect of the statute would be satisfied. Accordingly, the stop of the car cannot be justified based on a perceived violation of the <mask> statute."], "id": "cc8e2c92-3a8a-4f0f-8e0b-2ced2ca9d277", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Based upon the foregoing, the defendant was charged with two counts of <mask> in violation of subdivisions 1 and 3 of section 240.20 of the revised Penal Law. The trial was held before this court. The People\u2019s case consisted solely of the testimony of the two police officers. The defense called no witnesses and rested at the conclusion of the People\u2019s case."], "id": "de6a3c92-8f9e-4fad-9f15-a1978e766847", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Felix J. Catena, J. Appeal from three judgments of the Justice Court, Town of *399Minden (Patterson, J.), rendered February 3, 2000, convicting the defendant twice of <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 240.20 [3]) and once for harassment in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 240.26 [1]) based upon three separate incidents allegedly occurring in the Village of Fort Plain, New York."], "id": "57f0bde2-5c11-461f-83f2-fdec886eb6e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["It seems to me that all of the elements of the pertinent provisions of section 722 of the Penal Law can be found here. There Avas certainly a disturbance. There Avas certainly interference Avith the removal, under police instructions, of the automobile by \u201c Mike\u2019s \u201d \u00edoav truck. There Avas, furthermore, obstruction of the plan adopted by the police officer to clear the scene of the accident. The question of \u201c annoyance \u201d or the element of a person\u2019s being \u201c offensiA'e \u2019\u2019 are matters that are somewhat \u25a0subjective. Apparently the police officer felt annoyed and considered the actions of the defendant to be offensive. The defendant\u2019s appearance on the scene and his subsequent conduct seemed to stem from the fact that he wanted to handle the towing and repair job himself. There Avas, presumably, nothing to prevent him from proceeding Avith the repair work after the emergency clearance of the scene had been accomplished. From all that appears, 1 \u2018 Mike\u2019s \u2019 \u2019 \u00edoav truck could have been directed to take the damaged' automobile to the defendant\u2019s garage. It does not appear from the record, however, that the defendant himself had a tow truck present or that he or Miss Newell made any attempt to direct \u201c Mike\u2019s \u201d tow truck operator to have the car taken to the defendant\u2019s garage. Certainly a citizen in a legitimate business is entitled to compete for customers \u2018 \u2018 in the market \u201d, so to speak. The time and place for such competition, hoAvever, is not in the center of a busy intersection while a police officer is correcting a situation that has arisen as the result of an accident. The officer\u2019s action, under all the circumstances, was clearly not an abuse of the enforcement of the <mask> statute, such as is referred to in the Tinston case."], "id": "7d13e923-d61b-43da-aaa3-061f0945215b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The case of People ex rel. Price v. Warden (73 App. Div. 174) has been cited but that case applies to a conviction in the city of New York where the charter of the city of New York expressly provided that the magistrates of the city of New York might hold court on Sunday, and that case has no application here. There are a number of other cases, which have been decided, having reference to conviction on Sunday in the city of New York, and among these is the case of People ex rel. Burke v. Fox (205 N. Y. 490). In this case Judge Werner discussed section 5 of the Judiciary Law and said \u201c there are many minor offenses colloquially classified as crimes, which are merely violations of police regulations.\u201d Among these are' vagrancy, public drunkenness, and various kinds of <mask>. He stated that these and other minor offenses, all of which appear to disturb the public peace, fall within the meaning of the language of section 5 of the Judiciary Law."], "id": "d3f004a1-63c0-41f6-bf83-d92d4fcc7816", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["A person is guilty of <mask> pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 240.20 (5) when \u201cwith intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof . . . [h]e obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.\u201d Similarly, a person is guilty of disorderly conduct pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 240.20 (6) when \u201cwith intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof . . .[h]e congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse.\u201d The nonhearsay allegations relating to both charges are found in the \u201cto wit\u201d portion of each accusatory instrument.4 In the factual portion of the information charging the defendant with violating Penal Law \u00a7 240.20 (5), Albany Police Officer M. Geraci affirms, upon his direct knowledge, that"], "id": "71f1a78d-8a05-4b34-924f-6e79ceec0714", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> - is not a nebulous fancy, but a legal reality, and disorderly conduct which tends to a\u2019 breach of the peace, while not of the body of the sphere of crime, is a near satellite, and when committed in this city is mildly- punishable as a public offense under the unrepealed sections of the Consolidation Act on the subject (People v. Mansi, 129 App. Div. 386; People ex rel. Burke v. Fox, 205 N. Y. 490)."], "id": "77f44bdd-76c4-4061-857d-b9d68c5e648f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Donegan (19 Misc 2d 541 [1959]) the court stated at page 543, \u201c To constitute <mask> there must be proof not only that (1) the defendant committed the acts charged, but also that (2) they were committed with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or under circumstances likely to cause a breach of the peace. Each case must depend upon the time, place and circumstances of the act. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "236b5a68-9f00-446b-8b68-afd0063fd29d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In many instances there is a presumption in criminal matters which has the effect of relieving the prosecution of proving a necessary element of the criminal act unless and until the defendant comes forward with substantial evidence to rebut the presumption. Then of course the presumption is dissipated and the People must prove all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. There is a presumption of sanity and in a criminal case the prosecution is enabled to establish a prima facie case without introducing evidence of sanity at the time of commission of the crime. (Penal Law, \u00a7 815.) The burden of coming forward with evidence of insanity is upon the defendant. (People v. Egnor, 175 N. Y. 419.) There is a presumption of guilt from the recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime if unexplained by the defendant. (Richardson, Evidence [8th ed.], \u00a7 88.) There is a presumption that a person is responsible for his acts. (Penal Law, \u00a7 815.) There is a presumption in a prosecution of a <mask> charge under subdivision 11 of section 722 of the Penal Law that a person who is engaged *795in an illegal occupation or bears an evil reputation and who consorts with persons of like reputation or criminals is doing so for an unlawful purpose. Under section 1312 of the Penal Law, failure to provide a deed of title as set out in section 1311 of the Penal Law, is presumptive evidence of misappropriation of funds held in trust. A person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. (People v. Lieberman, 3 N Y 2d 649, 652.) Under section 1400 of the Penal Law, the infliction of a maiming injury is presumptive evidence of the intent to maim. There is a presumption that the proof of possession of any policy slip is presumptive evidence of possession thereof knowingly. (Penal Law, \u00a7 975.) When a machine gun is found in any room, dwelling or structure, the presence thereof is \u2018 presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all the persons occupying the place where\u201d it is found. (Penal Law, \u00a7 1897, subd. 1-a.)"], "id": "afda6bf1-e0c6-472c-b4d5-3e52cfbb07fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In a family offense proceeding, the allegations asserted in a petition seeking the issuance of an order of protection must be supported by \u201ca fair preponderance of the evidence\u201d (Family Ct Act \u00a7 832). The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, and that court\u2019s determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed if supported by the record (see Matter of Gray v Gray, 55 AD3d 909, 909 [2008]; Matter of Kraus v Kraus, 26 AD3d 494, 495 [2006]). While the record does not support a determination that the appellant committed the family offense of reckless endangerment in the second degree against the petitioner, even if he committed that offense against other members of the subject household, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence supports the Family Court\u2019s determination that the appellant committed the family offenses of menacing in the second degree and harassment in the first degree against the petitioner, as well as <mask>, thus warranting the issuance of an order of protection (see Matter of Banks v Opoku, 109 AD3d 470, 470 [2013]; Matter of Nettles v Fearrington, 95 AD3d 1131, 1131 [2012]; Matter of Gray v Gray, 55 AD3d at 909-910; Matter of Rankoth v Sloan, 44 AD3d 863, 864 [2007]; Matter of Onuoha v Onuoha, 28 AD3d 563, 564 [2006])."], "id": "f13749d9-c7a6-4eed-befe-0c54f5fcb3aa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In this action, plaintiff seeks damages sustained as a result of his being arrested for <mask> pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7240.20. Plaintiff asserts claims against defendant for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution stemming from defendant\u2019s initiation of a criminal complaint against plaintiff as a result of an incident occurring on November 24, 1991 at a bar known as \"Joe\u2019s East-West\u201d in the Town of New Paltz, Ulster County. Based on the criminal complaint, plaintiff was arrested by Troopers Rudolph Simmons and Kevin Kesick and taken before a Magistrate where he was arraigned and imprisoned pending the posting of bail. The disorderly conduct charge was ultimately dismissed in the interest of justice. The disposition order also notes that complainant failed to appear."], "id": "0a98c022-98a5-476e-a4f8-d2d6d43c4a21", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant fled on foot as Newby arrived. Defendant ran to apartment number 17 where Koval and Newby observed him punch and break a window in the screen door to the apartment. The two officers pursued defendant into a second floor bedroom of the apartment and Koval again informed defendant that he was under arrest for <mask>. Defendant was handcuffed and led out of the apartment. As defendant and Newby descended the stairs, defendant began to struggle and jerked away from Newby, causing both defendant and Newby to fall down the stairs. Newby injured his leg in the fall. Defendant was taken to the police station and continued to physically struggle and curse; he was ultimately placed under protective restraints."], "id": "d727be00-f661-4c75-8b72-6b28210cabac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*356This\" is the view I take of the case, and I think it does not conflict with any rule of law, or any adjudged case in this State. While it is beyond the power of the law to rectify men\u2019s minds, and to infuse into them that spirit which prompts them to the doing of praiseworthy things promotive of the peace and comfort of the community, still it is within the power, yes, the duty, of the law to take from those who are indifferent and evil-minded, the ability of doing public mischief, and to limit and restrain them of their liberty, if needs be, when they grossly abuse it. Courts, I think, would but poorly discharge their obligations, if by the judgments which they announce they did not endeavor to secure the comfort of the community by taking from such people the power, at least for the time, of disturbing the public mind. Indeed, it would do violence to the understanding of men to maintain that the defendant\u2019s conduct was not disorderly. That it inevitably tended to a breach of the peace is clearly sustained by the evidence; because it actually resulted in a flagrant breach of the peace. Upon consideration' the court cannot say that there was not abundant evidence before the magistrate to support the judgment of conviction of the defendant of <mask> tending to a breach of the peace."], "id": "236b7fef-b2f8-4e57-9135-bde5078c504a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, section 813 of the Family Court Act applies only to charges involving: \u201c <mask>, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, an assault or an attempt [sic] assault between spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household \u201d. Not only is there an absence of such relationship in this case (People v. Allen, supra), but the crimes charged here are not included among those enumerated in the statute. In People v. Lewis (29 N Y 2d 923) holding that the crime of incest did not come within the jurisdiction of the Family Court under sections 812 and 813, the court stated at page 924: \u201c Neither the original enactment of section 812 specifying disorderly conduct and assault nor its subsequent amendment to include acts which would constitute *997harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment and attempted assault (L. 1969, ch. 736), purport to include incest, which, thus, under the familiar rule of construction, will be deemed excluded (McKinney\u2019s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 1, Statutes, \u00a7 240). Neither do we find that act within its intendment \u201d. The concurring opinion of Chief Judge Full in that case is instructive. It must be concluded that the rationale of Lewis {supra), referable to incest, is equally applicable to an indictment for sodomy, precluding Family Court jurisdiction even on a preliminary basis."], "id": "bf3874fd-6f7b-44e6-94f2-660aae071d86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["5 The criminal court found Husband incompetent for trial in separate orders in October and December 2012. Vurimindi 1, 2018 WL 2423608, at *4 n.7. Although it is unclear when the criminal court found Husband competent, Husband was incarcerated in October 2013 for a violation of his bail in the criminal matter and remained in custody throughout the remaining litigation of the bifurcated divorce decree. Id. at *1, *4 n.7; see also Com. v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1034 (noting that mental health competency evaluations were conducted in the criminal case between February 2012 and July 2013). Although the Commonwealth charged Husband with stalking and <mask>, Husband\u2019s criminal matter did not involve any of the other individuals mentioned in the present appeals."], "id": "062ddee1-6475-4c8d-99c6-f6e7dbf64387", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the present proceeding, in which he seeks to restrain the Magistrate\u2019s Court from proceeding with the present charge of <mask> pending against him, petitioner raises several serious questions of law and procedure, and they will be separately discussed. His first contention is that Domroe is not a special patrolman, but merely an employee of the Department of Sanitation of the City of New York; that he may not be and never was effectively appointed a special patrolman or a peace officer; and that in any event, neither the prevention nor detection of disorderly conduct or enforcement of the laws pertaining thereto, come within the scope of the functions or purposes of the Department of Sanitation. He urges that by reason thereof, the Board of City Magistrates of the City of New York, acting through the Police Department, or in any other manner, lacked the authority to issue a blank book of summonses to the said Domroe for completion and service thereof; and that Domroe lacked the authority to issue such a summons in the name of the Chief Magistrate of the City of New York."], "id": "7ab290ac-28e5-4840-8c4b-3da4bd111c81", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disorderly Conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["(now here) were in premises No. 301 Schermerhorn Street, in a hall which is being rented by its owners for use for meetings and amusement purposes, and they did with about 280 others commit the offense of <mask> tending to a breach of the peace, in that they were present in said premises while an indecent performance was in progress with some women partly nude and one woman, Bobby Jennings, all nude, dancing in an indecent and suggestive manner and in a manner so as to be sensuous, in the course of which, and during the period of time from the hour of 9 o\u2019clock and to the hour of 10.30 o\u2019clock p. m., those present were shouting, yelling during the night and disturbing persons residing in the vicinity of said premises, all in violation of the law for such cases made and provided by the Legislature of the State of New York."], "id": "4037f538-a324-4b43-a27a-02276eb9474b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On the other hand, in People v. Perry (265 N. Y. 362 [1934]) the defendants\u2019 convictions for <mask> were reversed where they had waged a fist fight in a restaurant after closing. The court ruled that the defendants had not annoyed, disturbed or interfered with any members of the public, and coined the phrase, subsequently much quoted, that a breach of the peace sufficient to sustain a conviction for disorderly conduct must be \u201c a disturbance of the tranquillity of the People of the State \u201d (p. 365). 1"], "id": "cc0ea3a2-b78d-4544-8170-1976ba31ee05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The next objection is to the mode by which the prisoners were transferred from the city prison to the workhouse on Blackwell\u2019s Island. The act abolishing the almshouse and creating the Department of Public Charities and Correction (Laws of 1860, 1026, ch. 510), authorizes the board of commissioners to transfer and commit from the city prison to the workhouse,' vagrants, disorderly persons and persons committed for crime. There might be some doubt whether persons committed to the city prison for <mask> would be included in either of the classes above specified ; but that doubt is set at rest by the passage of the act of 1864 (Laws of 1864, 1342, ch. 586), which is not\" only a legislative recognition that such was the intention, but an act designating the time at which the transfers may be made in such cases. This disposes of the first objection made upon this ground."], "id": "f3ebc687-d815-4a96-b429-68dfa21e41af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In addition to these specific acts, there was credible testimony to the effect that the general reputation of the Premises in 1987 was that it was used for prostitution. The building manager of the Brooklyn Academy of Music testified to that fact as did several other individuals including one James MacArther. One witness testified that he had personally been \"solicited\u201d by the women known to him to frequent the Premises. A security guard at the nearby Brooklyn Public Library testified that he also was personally \"accosted\u201d by some of the \"regulars\u201d at the Premises who have become familiar to him. A plainclothes policeman, Marlon Mountcastle, related that on May 11, 1986, when he approached the Premises, a female who was in front of the building offered to \"have sex\u201d with him for money. She led him to a room in the Premises. Mountcastle arrested the woman, and she later pleaded guilty to a charge of prostitution. This same woman, one Anna Williams, was convicted three additional times of loitering for purposes of prostitution and once for <mask>. Further testimony presented is merely cumulative in *652regard to a finding that the Premises was being operated by defendants for the purpose of prostitution."], "id": "48f22b63-8269-429c-80df-18607abc9263", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["1Defendants did not raise the obstruction charge as a basis for summary judgment. And, although they argued probable cause existed to arrest Wood for <mask> and littering, \u00a7 3767.32(A), because Wood \u201cthrew his refunded money on the ground,\u201d DE 31, Mot. for Summ. J., Page ID 205, 208, the district court did not address the littering argument and the defendants do not press it on appeal. No. 20-3599 Wood v. Eubanks, et al. Page 8"], "id": "d63a6302-e8cb-4ac4-b25f-a07e41b548ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c In cities of five hundred thousand inhabitants or over any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of <mask>: \u201c 2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct or be offensive to others; \u201d The transportation of intoxicating liquors into hotels or other public places, or the public sale thereof anywhere within the State, or dispensation or consumption thereof in public places, and any other course of conduct indicating a similar open or public defiance to the United States Constitution, constitutes an affront to the government of the United States and is a resistance to and attempted nullification of its organic law, and tends to place the administration of government and law in disrepute and contempt, is annoying, disturbing and offensive to the law abiding, and tends towards a breach of the peace, and all who by their acts or acquiescence participata in such conduct, are guilty of disorderly conduct under section 722 of the Penal Law of the State of New York. So too, a place in which such practices are conducted or permitted \u201c offends public decency \u201d and is a public nuisance (Penal Law, \u00a7 1530), and may be abated, and those who conduct or permit such use are guilty of a misdemeanor. (Penal Law, \u00a7 1532.)"], "id": "48bb7b9f-813d-4ed7-8f18-535c340d7f88", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The theory of the prosecution is obvious from the statement of the district attorney at the trial. He said: \u201c We can disregard the strike and everything else, but the fact that the sidewalk is only four feet wide and these men walked two by two, blocking the sidewalk, is <mask>.\u201d The learned trial judge at page 5, stenographer\u2019s minutes, said: \u201c I say they have the right to lawfully picket, but they cannot exaggerate it. They can do so in a lawful manner. They can induce anybody in that bakery in a lawful manner to leave. \u2019\u2019"], "id": "ab9bed33-eabf-4e39-9d06-68e5ff03929b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["A refusal to present a ticket and the use of loud and boisterous language resulting therefrom may well constitute <mask>. But the defendant was acquitted of that charge. How the court arrived at a conclusion of the defendant\u2019s guilt for a violation of the Penal Law section under discussion is beyond my understanding. This defendant had a perfect right to be on *886that train. He had paid for that ride and he had the right to take that ride between Island Park and Pennsylvania Station as often as he wished during the week in question. How can he steal that which is his and unencumbered! To brand him a thief under the circumstances disclosed in this record is unjust, illegal and contrary to common sense."], "id": "79db1d0f-d43a-4f4c-9823-ca0b5e8bf88c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court of appeals affirmed. Relying on our opinion in May v. State (addressing a vagueness challenge to the pre-1983 harassment statute),7 the court of appeals concluded that the term \"alarm,\" as it appears in Section 42.01(a)(8), is unconstitutionally vague-and is therefore necessarily \"of indeterminate or variable meaning\" when used without clarification in a charging instrument.8 The court of appeals ultimately held that \"when a defendant is charged with <mask> under section 42.01(a)(8), he is entitled to notice of how the manner in which he displayed [the] firearm was calculated to 'alarm' because absent such notice the defendant would be unable to prepare a defense.\"9"], "id": "f8453154-be67-473e-a948-2b00ab30c60a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Beyond Greene and Kennedy, we had already made clear by 2016 that profanity alone is insufficient to constitute fighting words under Ohio\u2019s <mask> statute. See D.D., 645 F. App\u2019x at 425, 427 (denying qualified immunity to officer on false arrest claim because \u201cOhio\u2019s disorderly conduct statute and the First Amendment require more than the uttering, or even shouting, of distasteful words,\u201d and \u201cno competent officer would have found probable cause to arrest [the plaintiff]\u201d); Leonard, 477 F.3d at 359 (\u201cThe Supreme Court has held that a state may not make a \u2018single four-letter expletive a criminal offense.\u2019\u201d (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26)); McCurdy v. Montgomery Cnty., 240 F.3d 512, 515, 520 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiff\u2019s \u201cright to challenge verbally\u201d officer\u2019s conduct, including stating \u201cwhat the fu*k do you want\u201d and \u201cwhat the fu*k is your job,\u201d was \u201cwell-established\u201d); Sandul, 119 F.3d at 1256 No. 20-3599 Wood v. Eubanks, et al. Page 16"], "id": "2ef5d4e0-ab10-449f-95ad-d51ce80a3a2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["While there are no reported cases on this issue, any rational interpretation of the word \"appeals\u201d in CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [a]), especially in the light of statutory (CPL 450.10, subd 1; 460.20) and constitutional rights to appeal to our higher courts, indicates that the word \"appeals\u201d refers to appeals from preconviction proceedings and motions and not appeals from a judgment of conviction in an unrelated case. To take an extreme example, assume that a defendant was convicted of <mask> and at the same time had a homicide indictment pending. Under the District Attorney\u2019s reasoning, if the defendant appealed the disorderly conduct conviction to the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court (as of right) and to our Court of Appeals (discretion) and perhaps to the Supreme Court of the United States, a process which might take years, he would thereby forego his right to a speedy trial on the homicide indictment. Indeed under the District Attorney\u2019s reasoning, it would not even matter if the defendant was in custody during this period. It is apparent that CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [a]) excludes from speedy trial computations those situations where it is legally or practically difficult, if not impossible, to commence a trial. Thus a defendant cannot be tried if he is being examined to determine his competency to stand trial, or if he is found to be incompetent to stand trial. He cannot be tried if a Judge has to determine whether to *234suppress vital evidence. He cannot be tried while on trial in another case. And although pretrial decisions and orders in criminal cases are generally interlocutory and nonappealable, there are pretrial appeals (such as from a denial of habeas corpus on a bail issue) which would inevitably delay the commencement of a trial and should not be chargeable to the People. To put it simply, the District Attorney\u2019s interpretation of the statute in question would render it unconstitutional. When a court is faced with varying interpretations of a statute, one of which creates an absurd unconstitutional result, the other being reasonable and legal, the option is obvious (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, \u00a7 150, subd c)."], "id": "ead66085-f8fa-4077-8727-57fcbcec195c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["We are of the opinion that the law has been complied with and that the fingerprints were properly proved to be the fingerprints of the defendant. These fingerprints show the defendant to have been previously convicted on four separate occasions of <mask> that tends to a breach of the peace (loitering); that she was convicted of a violation of the Tenement House Law and also convicted of violating section 887 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."], "id": "b7d39a89-8888-403b-bf07-fe008446e678", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In responding to the arguments raised by counsel, the court notes that the People\u2019s argument that the search here must be sustained as a search incident to lawful arrest pursuant to Chimel v California (395 US 752 [1969]) and People v De Santis (46 NY2d 82 [1978]) must be rejected. Neither the defendant nor his would-be combatant were arrested or charged with <mask>."], "id": "2b283f3c-d27f-4365-8ad5-c9de87b36fb2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*843Here, the proof required to establish the offense of <mask> varies significantly depending on the manner in which the word \"calculated\" is understood. If it means \"likely,\" and using the Court's definition of \"alarm\" and the reasonable-person standard, then the statute merely requires proof that the defendant intentionally or knowingly displayed a firearm in a public place in a manner that he knew was likely to frighten an ordinary person. Using the reasonable-person standard shifts the inquiry from whether the actor subjectively believed his actions would alarm the target audience to whether a reasonable person would be stricken with fear as a result of the actor's display of a firearm. Thus, displaying a gun in a manner \"likely\" to alarm necessitates a determination of whether a reasonable person would be alarmed in that situation. A judge or jury could easily find that a reasonable person would be alarmed by seeing a gun openly displayed in public in a holster on someone's hip. Thus, there is a good possibility that a person who is lawfully openly carrying a weapon could be convicted of disorderly conduct for \"display[ing] a firearm ... in a public place in a manner [likely] to [frighten]\" a reasonable, ordinary citizen-even if he did not subjectively intend to alarm anyone and believed his conduct to be fully compliant with open-carry requirements."], "id": "b9e9c87d-b2d1-4f7c-b760-f8c666f4477e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The record shows that appellants were charged with a violation of section 722 of the Penal Law in relation to <mask> in that, among other things, on November 13, 1957, in company with others, they extinguished the lights on certain flares placed on Main Street in the city of Oneida to guard barricades where road repairs had been made, and left said flares out. The testimony shows that the offense was committed between the hours of eight and nine o\u2019clock that night."], "id": "3cbb9177-d158-486c-9d9e-6249892ff499", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Paragraph 15 of the affidavit of appeal alleges that after the defendants were arraigned, the court called the defendants before the bench and addressed certain remarks to them \u2018 \u2018 stating that they had not been convicted of a crime but of an offense and it would not affect their applying for a job or going into the service but that they were not advised that they would have to state on any application where the question was asked if they had ever been arrested, that they would have to say yes, and that if the disposition of the arrest was asked they would have to say they were convicted of <mask> and deponent understands that such a conviction might affect their going into the service or applying for a job or applying for a civil service job or going to college or military academy and they were not advised that the certificate of their convictions for disorderly conduct, which is sometimes called a criminal offense would be required to be filed in the book of convictions in the Otsego County Clerk\u2019s Office at Cooperstown, New York; that as the defendant is advised and believes, a certificate of defendant\u2019s conviction for disorderly conduct was filed in the Otsego County Clerk\u2019s Office February 19, 1957, setting forth that defendant was convicted February 14, 1957, before Judge Db Angelo and fined Ten ($10.00) Dollars and given six months\u2019 suspended sentence, Otsego County Jail and one year probation. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "da0fc78b-dc29-483a-b735-466855a28107", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The section of the Penal Law applicable here is as follows: \u201d \u00a7 722. <mask>. Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct: 1. Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or behavior; 2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "8b5e4100-606e-4990-8a16-a93e497d99db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Much learning and research have been displayed by counsel for the appellant on the points urged for a reversal of this judgment; much wider range, perhaps, has been taken than the cause requires. Most of the questions depend, I think, upon a fair and reasonable construction of the statutes relating to \u201c <mask> tending to a breach of the peace.\u201d The points argued for a reversal of the judgment for errors committed on the trial I regard as neither substantial nor tenable. The magistrate saw and heard the witnesses. The proof was satisfactory to him that the defendant placed his hands on the person of Samuel Gordon and that he was seen to stretch one of his hands in the direction of his pocket. The magistrate, therefore, was justified in inferring that his intention was to pick a pocket, and in finding that the act was one which tended to a breach of the peace."], "id": "514af016-10ce-4439-be4e-a318aa629033", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disorderly conduct", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In any event, all persons are proscribed from resisting or interfering. One of the alleged examples of resistance in the instant case is the uttering of an obscenity at the police officer. Without getting into First Amendment arguments concerning freedom of speech, it is difficult to see how the uttering of an obscenity is resistance or interference. It may be <mask>, but Mr. Flinn was not charged with that."], "id": "f7c801d2-4825-4960-87ab-8157b0e2bb0a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment was for keeping a disorderly house. Its averments in that respect were well enough. It is insisted, in substance, that the evidence was not sufficient to uphold the indictment, because it did not show that the house was a nuisance in <mask> of the general public, or of the particular neighborhood. But a bawdy house may also be a disorderly house, and it is so whenever it is shown to be a house of prostitution, open promiscuously to the public, and to which large numbers of persons resort for purposes of prostitution. In Jacobowsky v. The People (6 Hun, 524), Daniels, J., said: \u201cFor that purpose it would have been sufficient to have shown that the prisoner kept a house of prostitution. Its direct tendency was to corrupt and deprave public morals, and disturb the peace, and for that reason it was a common nuisance. That has uniformly been held to be the law.\u201d (1 Whart. Grim. Law,' \u00a7 2392; 1 Bui. Grim. Law, \u00a7\u00a7 665, 1046; 1Y Rich, 80, and other eases cited.)"], "id": "1b5c24ad-9bdd-4278-818b-2eafcf209f3b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["19. Convictions: Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Complaints: Appeal and Error. Where an appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evi- dence to sustain a conviction under a municipal ordinance, an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record, but, instead, may apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint. 20. Ordinances: Complaints. Absent anything to the contrary, the language of a city ordinance as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 21. Constitutional Law. Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 22. ____. Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a desig- nated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 23. ____. Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically associated with expression, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, including those which run through residential neighborhoods, whereas designated public forums are those that have not been historically associated with expression but which the government has opened for such use, such as civic auditoriums or public theaters. 24. ____. Nonpublic forums include government-owned property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, such as government offices and military bases. 25. Property: Words and Phrases. Private property is property which is protected from public appropriation, over which the owner has exclusive and absolute rights. 26. Constitutional Law: Public Health and Welfare: <mask>. The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals, and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community, including the power to prevent disturbing noises. 27. Constitutional Law. The right to be let alone is one of the rights most valued by civilized society. The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings. 28. ____. In either a traditional or designated public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions (1) are content neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. - 703 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "2a351179-07dd-4901-9099-d5c55b49d5da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 Whether the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, however, is a question of law, and an appellate court will therefore review the district court\u2019s rul- ings on those issues de novo. 7 [7,8] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, an appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits. 8 A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly unten- able, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition. 9 IV. ANALYSIS 1. Conviction for <mask> Grant assigns, first, that his conviction for disturbing the peace was in error because the speech underlying his convic- tion was protected by U.S. Const. amend. I and Neb. Const. art. I, \u00a7 5. Grant argues that because his speech was protected, it could not be criminally proscribed. Grant does not claim his conviction for assault or menacing threats is unconstitutional; hence, we need not consider it in any constitutional analysis. [9,10] The 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, appli- cable to the states via the 14th Amendment, 10 provides in relevant part that \u201cCongress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .\u201d Similarly, under the Nebraska Constitution, \u201c[e]very person may freely speak . . . on all sub- jects . . . .\u201d 11 We have recognized that the \u201c\u2018parameters of the constitutional right to freedom of speech are the same under See id. See, Carney v. Miller, 287 Neb. 400, 842 N.W.2d 782 (2014); State v. Drahota, 280 Neb. 627, 788 N.W.2d 796 (2010). See State v. Greer, 309 Neb. 667, 962 N.W.2d 217 (2021). Id. NIFLA v. Becerra, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018). Neb. Const. art. I, \u00a7 5. - 709 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "c709dc79-a37e-4e5b-9725-82f491f800e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Heavican, C.J. The appellant, Kenneth W. Grant, Jr., accused of shouting in a loud, menacing, and persistent manner from his apart- ment\u2019s balcony at persons across the street, was convicted of <mask> and of assault or menacing threats, both in violation of city ordinances in Lincoln, Nebraska. He asks us to overturn those convictions and their resulting 10-day jail sentences. We do not analyze whether Grant\u2019s speech included fight- ing words or true threats, because even if Grant\u2019s speech was protected, we conclude the State may regulate it through reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. Thus, we affirm Grant\u2019s 10-day jail sentence for that conviction. We find that Grant\u2019s conviction for assault or menacing threats was supported by sufficient evidence. We also affirm that conviction."], "id": "93eba17d-3570-476a-9f43-491a12e05e26", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Village Ordinance 1.3(b) provides: \u201c Ordinance 1.3 \u2014 <mask>. No person shall indulge in disorderly, or *558noisy or disturbing conduct within the Village. Any person who commits any of the following acts will be considered in violation of this provision: * * * (b) Acts in such manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct or be offensive to others.\u201d"], "id": "87add9d9-7068-42ae-aa85-d295234e5143", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["J.G. participated in a fist fight at his school and, when a teacher tried to stop the fight, used a racial slur against that teacher. He called the teacher a \"nigger.\" He admitted in juvenile court that he committed the misdemeanor of <mask> on school grounds. ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 415.5, subd. (a)(1).)1 The juvenile court judge granted probation on several conditions, including the condition that his electronic devices would be subject to *1087search. Appellant contends the electronic search condition bears no relationship to his offense and is unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm."], "id": "870e75e3-18e1-464f-a604-bf58d5a9d5cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner testified that he was charged with aggravated robbery in this case because \u201cOfficer D. Williams involved me in this case.\u201d The petitioner said that he \u201cdiscussed with [trial counsel] that Officer D. Williams had a personal vendetta against me, that we have had run-ins several times.\u201d He said that on a prior occasion, Officer Williams \u201ctried to remove me from my house and then he tried to take me to jail,\u201d but \u201cwe got into a big argument.\u201d Officer Williams \u201cwrote me a citation for <mask> and . . . . I vowed to try to take some action. I balled the citation up in front of him.\u201d Approximately one month later, Officer Williams \u201cpicked me up walking and lied to me"], "id": "1cf4782f-438d-4117-bb88-114c77de72cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself or to someone else, attacking, striking, threatening, battering or, having been restrained from doing so by a valid court order, coming within a specified distance of or <mask> of a named family member. [\u00b6] . . . [\u00b6] If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit domestic violence and, based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit burglary, the violation of a court order, and/or brandishing of a deadly weapon, in the manner alleged in this case. If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of burglary, violation of a court order, and brandishing of a deadly weapon. The People must still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [\u00b6] Except as otherwise provided in Instruction 375, do not consider this evidence for any other purpose.\u201d"], "id": "1e2dca00-ff99-420b-b458-94739511bacd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Under section 6211 of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act ( Fam. Code, \u00a7 6200 et seq. ), neither proof of physical violence nor the threat of imminent physical violence is necessary to establish abuse. (\u00a7 6203, subd. (b); Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844, 853, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 492 ( Phillips ).) To the contrary, abuse includes \"engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.\" ( Fam. Code, \u00a7 6203, subd. (a)(4).) \"Section 6320, subdivision (a) permits the court to enjoin a party from 'harassing ... or <mask> of the other party. ...' [\u00b6] ' \"[T]he plain meaning of the phrase 'disturbing the peace of the other party' in section 6320 may be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party. ... Therefore, the plain meaning of the phrase 'disturbing the peace' in section 6320 may include, as abuse within the meaning of the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act], a [defendant]'s alleged conduct in destroying the mental or emotional calm of his [former cohabitant, former girlfriend, or the mother of his child]. ...\" [Citation.]' ( Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1146 [167 Cal.Rptr.3d 664].)\" ( Phillips , supra , at pp. 852-853, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 492.)"], "id": "df3afdab-14d4-4987-8779-3198480a38d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Village Ordinance 1.3(b) provides: \u201c Ordinance 1.3 \u2014 <mask>. No person shall indulge in disorderly, or *558noisy or disturbing conduct within the Village. Any person who commits any of the following acts will be considered in violation of this provision: * * * (b) Acts in such manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct or be offensive to others.\u201d"], "id": "19673587-5874-4e5f-9560-71627e2f26e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["2. Conviction for Assault or Menacing Threats Having determined that Grant\u2019s conviction for <mask> must be affirmed, we next consider his conviction for assault or menacing threats. Grant does not challenge the constitutionality of this conviction, but, rather, he assigns that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction. We disagree. [31] When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 Our analysis would generally begin with the language of the ordinance that Grant was convicted of violating. 47 But, again, the defendant has failed to include the ordinance at issue in the record, so we may not consider that ordinance\u2019s text. 48 We must instead apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the See State v. Estrada Comacho, supra note 4. See In re Interest of Elainna R., supra note 28. See State v. Buescher, supra note 29. - 717 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "f1b377f4-d69d-40ec-811e-1d5f9b468d9b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["listed in Family Code section 6230, subdivision (a)(4)\u2014provided that the events occurred within five years of the charged offense. Thus, encompassed within the meaning of \u201coffense involving domestic violence\u201d in section 1109 is an offense involving conduct constituting <mask> of the victim. Defendant misplaces reliance on People v. Zavala (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 758 (Zavala). In Zavala, the defendant was charged with stalking and asserted that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of prior violent acts evidence to prove that offense. (Id. at pp. 761, 770.) The defendant \u201cnote[d] that . . . .section 1109 is a limited exception to the general ban (under Evid. Code, \u00a7 1101) against using prior acts to infer the defendant\u2019s disposition to commit the charged acts, and permits such evidence as the basis for such inference if the defendant is accused of a crime involving domestic violence within the meaning of section 13700.\u201d (Id. at p. 770, italics added.) The defendant in Zavala further asserted that \u201cto the extent the stalking offense does not require that the threat induced the victim to fear great bodily injury or death, stalking is concomitantly not a crime of domestic violence (as defined by [Penal Code] section 13700) and therefore the prior violent acts evidence may not be used by the jury to infer Zavala had a disposition the type of which made it likely he committed the stalking offense.\u201d (Id. at pp. 770-771.) The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, without further analysis or explanation, \u201cagree[d] it was error to give the [section 1109] instruction as to the count charging Zavala with stalking.\u201d (Id. at p. 771.) Approximately five years later, the Second Appellate District, Division Six, decided People v. Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Ogle), upon which the Attorney General relies. The appellate court in Ogle declined to follow Zavala and essentially rejected the same arguments defendant makes here. In Ogle, the defendant asserted that his prior conviction for stalking should not have been admitted to prove his propensity to commit the charged criminal threats because stalking was not domestic violence within the meaning of section 1109. (Ogle,"], "id": "bcf45489-0c3e-4885-82b5-4d62cae8c57a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["State\u2019s evidence, and Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report. According to Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report, Grant was 50 years old at the time of sentencing and had a criminal history dating back to his youth, including convictions in 1996 for third degree assault and in 1987 for attempted burglary. Grant also had recent minor traffic offenses. He had dropped out of high school during the 11th grade, and then for about 2 years, he had been part of a criminal gang. Throughout his life, Grant had struggled to maintain steady employment and was currently unemployed. He reported maintaining few healthy relationships throughout his adulthood. After reviewing this evidence, the county court ordered 10 days in jail for each conviction, to run concurrently, noting that \u201cany less sentence this Court would impose would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect for the law.\u201d Despite Grant\u2019s emphasis on his positive achievements, the record provides a sound basis for the sentences imposed. Accordingly, Grant\u2019s convictions and resulting sentences were not in error. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, we affirm Grant\u2019s con- victions for <mask> and for assault or menacing threats and find that the resulting sentences were not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed."], "id": "21f62c77-076f-4c5f-a856-f7bd5526d2be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner testified that he was charged with aggravated robbery in this case because \u201cOfficer D. Williams involved me in this case.\u201d The petitioner said that he \u201cdiscussed with [trial counsel] that Officer D. Williams had a personal vendetta against me, that we have had run-ins several times.\u201d He said that on a prior occasion, Officer Williams \u201ctried to remove me from my house and then he tried to take me to jail,\u201d but \u201cwe got into a big argument.\u201d Officer Williams \u201cwrote me a citation for <mask> and . . . . I vowed to try to take some action. I balled the citation up in front of him.\u201d Approximately one month later, Officer Williams \u201cpicked me up walking and lied to me"], "id": "7c3af280-9298-43aa-ab79-a2adad6c3de1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The officers began discussing whether they could arrest Wood for disorderly conduct and <mask>. One officer asked another \u201chow long [they] [were] going to allow\u201d Wood to keep talking. Johnson Cam, 4:00\u201303. That officer replied that \u201cwe could do disorderly conduct.\u201d Id. at 4:02\u201306. Blair, catching up with Wood, turned and said to the officers that Wood was \u201cdisturbing my peace\u201d and shouted, \u201cCharge him!\u201d Yates Cam #1, 4:20\u201322; Troutman Cam #1, 2:37\u201343. One officer asked the others what they should do, commenting that Wood was \u201ctalking the whole way out the door, he\u2019s still talking.\u201d Yates Cam #1, 4:40\u201350; Troutman Cam #1, 3:00\u201305. Another officer said, \u201cWell, make an arrest,\u201d to which another asked, \u201cMake an arrest?\u201d Yates Cam #1, 4:49\u201352."], "id": "42f4254f-3abe-4b59-b867-020474625f83", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["And the referenced section 6320 provides in subdivision (a) that: \"The court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating as described in Section 528.5 of the Penal Code, falsely personating as described in Section 529 of the Penal Code, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or <mask> of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members.\""], "id": "18a71c43-3eef-46cd-b2e2-8dad1672b278", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["3. Excessive Sentences Argument Having affirmed Grant\u2019s convictions, we turn last to his claim that his sentences were excessive. [33] The first step in analyzing whether a sentence is exces- sive is to examine the statutory limits on penalties for such offenses. 56 But because Grant failed to include the ordinances at issue in the appellate record, they may not be consulted on appellate review and the information contained in the com- plaint must suffice. 57 According to the complaint, the maxi- mum penalties listed for <mask> are a \u201c$500 fine\u201d and \u201c3 months jail.\u201d The maximum penalties listed for assault State v. Starks, 308 Neb. 527, 955 N.W.2d 313 (2021). See State v. Hill, supra note 30. - 720 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "d6f96622-5cdd-42ee-a0c4-720c1731ad25", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In this country, every man may publish temperate investigations of the nature and forms of government, such matters are proper for public information ; but if such publication is seditiously, maliciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of the United States, or the constitution thereof, or of any other State, the publisher would be guilty of a libel. Yates\u2019 Rep. vol. 4. p. 270, 271. 2 Campb. 402. But care must be taken that this important privilege be not abused ; private character must not be wantonly assailed; even \u201c if one uses the wea- \u201c pons of truth wantonly, for <mask> of families, he is \u201c guilty of a libel.\u2019\u2019 Johns. Cases, vol. 2, p. 70. Yates\u2019 Rep. vol. 4, p. 269."], "id": "ed5a30cf-b058-4552-8ecd-f625054492b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["State\u2019s evidence, and Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report. According to Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report, Grant was 50 years old at the time of sentencing and had a criminal history dating back to his youth, including convictions in 1996 for third degree assault and in 1987 for attempted burglary. Grant also had recent minor traffic offenses. He had dropped out of high school during the 11th grade, and then for about 2 years, he had been part of a criminal gang. Throughout his life, Grant had struggled to maintain steady employment and was currently unemployed. He reported maintaining few healthy relationships throughout his adulthood. After reviewing this evidence, the county court ordered 10 days in jail for each conviction, to run concurrently, noting that \u201cany less sentence this Court would impose would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect for the law.\u201d Despite Grant\u2019s emphasis on his positive achievements, the record provides a sound basis for the sentences imposed. Accordingly, Grant\u2019s convictions and resulting sentences were not in error. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, we affirm Grant\u2019s con- victions for <mask> and for assault or menacing threats and find that the resulting sentences were not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed."], "id": "3b74b577-5ad0-41d2-8c7a-f2012edc9732", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Under section 213.5, subdivision (a), after \"a petition has been filed ... to declare a child a dependent child of the juvenile court, and until the time that the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated,\" a juvenile court may issue an order \"enjoining any person from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, ... destroying the personal property, contacting, ... or <mask> of the child ....\" The subdivision also permits the court to issue orders including the child's parent as a person protected from the behaviors listed above."], "id": "d5d9cbab-295e-4d03-ae7d-6f23dd7d1fbe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["this mediation may be verified outside of the mediation process and used as evidence in subsequent legal proceedings.\u201d (Italics added.) The mediation agreement itself also specifically provides, immediately above the signature line, that \u201cthis written settlement may be disclosed in a court of law. Upon disclosure, this agreement may be admitted as evidence and/or enforced as determined to be appropriate by the court.\u201d Thus, the parties\u2019 agreements as a whole counsel against an expansive reading of the nondisparagement clause. Second, the mediation agreement is inextricably linked to the broader context in which it was negotiated \u2014 i.e., in a proceeding for a civil harassment restraining order. This context is critical. (See Civ. Code, \u00a7 1647 [\u201cA contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which it relates.\u201d]; id., \u00a7 1648 [\u201cHowever broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract.\u201d].) Such a proceeding is statutorily designed to narrowly focus on interpersonal conflict. Its purpose, when warranted by the circumstances, is to prevent threatened future injury through a resulting \u201corder enjoining a party from harassing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, abusing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls, as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of, or <mask> of, the petitioner.\u201d (\u00a7 527.6, subd. (b)(6)(A).) The narrow focus of these proceedings is communicated to petitioners through instructions issued by the Judicial Council."], "id": "7d1dc118-37c6-4fba-a545-aebf0130a8ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Under section 213.5, subdivision (a), after \"a petition has been filed ... to declare a child a dependent child of the juvenile court, and until the time that the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated,\" a juvenile court may issue an order \"enjoining any person from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, ... destroying the personal property, contacting, ... or <mask> of the child ....\" The subdivision also permits the court to issue orders including the child's parent as a person protected from the behaviors listed above."], "id": "e29332d8-c597-412e-b693-62903e597b36", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["19. Convictions: Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Complaints: Appeal and Error. Where an appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evi- dence to sustain a conviction under a municipal ordinance, an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record, but, instead, may apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint. 20. Ordinances: Complaints. Absent anything to the contrary, the language of a city ordinance as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 21. Constitutional Law. Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 22. ____. Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a desig- nated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 23. ____. Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically associated with expression, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, including those which run through residential neighborhoods, whereas designated public forums are those that have not been historically associated with expression but which the government has opened for such use, such as civic auditoriums or public theaters. 24. ____. Nonpublic forums include government-owned property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, such as government offices and military bases. 25. Property: Words and Phrases. Private property is property which is protected from public appropriation, over which the owner has exclusive and absolute rights. 26. Constitutional Law: Public Health and Welfare: <mask>. The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals, and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community, including the power to prevent disturbing noises. 27. Constitutional Law. The right to be let alone is one of the rights most valued by civilized society. The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings. 28. ____. In either a traditional or designated public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions (1) are content neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. - 703 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "4fbcf42d-c24d-4c89-99d5-c6c32be0e919", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 Whether the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, however, is a question of law, and an appellate court will therefore review the district court\u2019s rul- ings on those issues de novo. 7 [7,8] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, an appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits. 8 A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly unten- able, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition. 9 IV. ANALYSIS 1. Conviction for <mask> Grant assigns, first, that his conviction for disturbing the peace was in error because the speech underlying his convic- tion was protected by U.S. Const. amend. I and Neb. Const. art. I, \u00a7 5. Grant argues that because his speech was protected, it could not be criminally proscribed. Grant does not claim his conviction for assault or menacing threats is unconstitutional; hence, we need not consider it in any constitutional analysis. [9,10] The 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, appli- cable to the states via the 14th Amendment, 10 provides in relevant part that \u201cCongress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .\u201d Similarly, under the Nebraska Constitution, \u201c[e]very person may freely speak . . . on all sub- jects . . . .\u201d 11 We have recognized that the \u201c\u2018parameters of the constitutional right to freedom of speech are the same under See id. See, Carney v. Miller, 287 Neb. 400, 842 N.W.2d 782 (2014); State v. Drahota, 280 Neb. 627, 788 N.W.2d 796 (2010). See State v. Greer, 309 Neb. 667, 962 N.W.2d 217 (2021). Id. NIFLA v. Becerra, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018). Neb. Const. art. I, \u00a7 5. - 709 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "a3a85cbb-d5ac-4cc4-97d5-b81eef9c387f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["colleague. Patterson also recalled Grant\u2019s shouting of racial epithets at him. Patterson recounted Grant\u2019s shouts of \u201c\u2018Fuck all them [racial epithet]\u2019\u201d and \u201c\u2018Kill them all\u2019 and \u2018send them back to Africa.\u2019\u201d Grant had also shouted, \u201c\u2018Yeah, I\u2019d kill them [racial epithet], too. I\u2019d kill him [Patterson], too.\u2019\u201d When asked whether Patterson viewed Grant\u2019s words on the day in question as threatening, Patterson testified that \u201cI was the only black person there, so [Grant\u2019s statement about kill- ing] had to be towards me.\u201d However, Patterson acknowledged that \u201cthis ain\u2019t the first time [Grant\u2019s] said something about killing blacks and Mexicans\u201d; \u201che was doing this all the time.\u201d Patterson also recounted that \u201cthis ain\u2019t nothing new. He\u2019d always sit on the porch and holler racial slurs, all the time, towards me, towards the neighbors, even towards people walk- ing down the street.\u201d The State\u2019s final witness was Breanna Callese, the officer with the Lincoln Police Department who responded to Ponce\u2019s call. Callese said that during her investigation, Grant admit- ted to calling Patterson a racial epithet and to telling Ponce that \u201che was going to . . . \u2018light them up.\u2019\u201d Grant maintained, however, that such expression was protected by his \u201c[F]irst [A]mendment right.\u201d Unpersuaded, Callese cited him with dis- turbing the peace. Callese recalled being summoned again to the same loca- tion a short time later because Grant\u2019s shouting had apparently continued unabated. This time, Grant claimed that his yelling had not been directed at Ponce and Patterson, but, rather, that it had been directed into his phone at his sister. Callese refrained from citing Grant with a second count of <mask>. Grant was officially charged on July 26, 2019, with one count of disturbing the peace and an additional count of assault or menacing threats. Grant called no additional witnesses and offered no other evidence of his own. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the county court for Lancaster County found Grant guilty of both counts alleged in the complaint. The county court then - 707 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "418751d3-13ab-4921-9ab8-3295479b2d43", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the present case before this court, proof has been submitted by the People that the Hilton Curfew Law was passed with a more specific governmental interest in mind \u2014 that is, to curb disturbances and vandalism caused by minors, and also to protect the children of the municipality. (See Hilton Village Code \u00a7 5-2.) As submitted in the affidavit of Village Manager Janet Surridge and the affirmation of Village Attorney Lawrence Schwind, it appears that the impetus behind the Hilton Curfew Law was an ongoing issue with minors <mask> and engaging in vandalism after dark. The Village Board received numerous complaints from village residents and reports from the Monroe County Sheriffs Department about minors in the village. In short, the aim of the Hilton Curfew Law was to curb specific behavior perpetrated by minors in particular. The proof offered in support of the Hilton Curfew Law is hardly scientific in nature, but as the United States Supreme Court has held, the Village need not prove the relationship between its curfew and its stated goals with scientific certainty. (See Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 642-643 [1968].) In showing a substantial nexus between the burdens imposed by the Hilton Curfew Law and the goals of protecting minors and preventing juvenile crime, the Supreme Court has explained that although the government need not produce evidence of this relationship to a scientific certainty (see Ginsberg at 642-643), the \u201cpurpose of requiring [proof of] that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.\u201d (City of Rochester, 13 NY3d at 48, quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 725-726 [1982].) The proof also offered to this court demonstrates that the Hilton Curfew Law was enacted in response to complaints about minors specifically and there is no question that \u201cthe population targeted by the [curfew] represents] that part of the population causing trouble.\u201d (Id. at 49.)"], "id": "9ea5531c-815a-4efd-bacf-058875eb4b75", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["19. Convictions: Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Complaints: Appeal and Error. Where an appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evi- dence to sustain a conviction under a municipal ordinance, an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record, but, instead, may apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint. 20. Ordinances: Complaints. Absent anything to the contrary, the language of a city ordinance as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 21. Constitutional Law. Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 22. ____. Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a desig- nated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 23. ____. Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically associated with expression, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, including those which run through residential neighborhoods, whereas designated public forums are those that have not been historically associated with expression but which the government has opened for such use, such as civic auditoriums or public theaters. 24. ____. Nonpublic forums include government-owned property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, such as government offices and military bases. 25. Property: Words and Phrases. Private property is property which is protected from public appropriation, over which the owner has exclusive and absolute rights. 26. Constitutional Law: Public Health and Welfare: <mask>. The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals, and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community, including the power to prevent disturbing noises. 27. Constitutional Law. The right to be let alone is one of the rights most valued by civilized society. The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings. 28. ____. In either a traditional or designated public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions (1) are content neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. - 703 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "cb5a6ace-f629-49e5-9c8f-5f94fe17af3b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["According to the State\u2019s complaint, \u201cCount 1\u201d defined Grant\u2019s offense of \u201cdisturbing the peace\u201d as \u201cIntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood.\u201d The prohibition against <mask>, as described by the State in its charging document, makes no reference to the content of speech and does not target particular speech on its face due to the content discussed or the viewpoint expressed. Instead, the rule is content neutral. We recognize that the State elicited and relied on evidence of the content of Grant\u2019s speech at trial. Such evidence was unnecessary, however, to establish a violation under the lan- guage of the disturbing the peace charge in the complaint (i.e., \u201c[i]ntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood . . .\u201d). We also note that Grant registered no contemporaneous objection to the admis- sion of evidence regarding the content of his speech. [21] Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 32 [22-25] Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a designated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 33 Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically \u201c\u2018have been devoted to assembly and debate,\u2019\u201d 34 \u201c\u2018communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.\u2019\u201d 35 Public streets, sidewalks, and parks fall into this category, including streets and sidewalks which run through residential See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983). See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985). See id., 473 U.S. at 802. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., supra note 32, 460 U.S. at 45. - 713 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "9b2673c6-21f3-4f86-8250-b8ec0cdd9f9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["(b) Sentencing The presentence investigation (PSI) report considered by the court prior to sentencing was 400 pages. It showed as Blake\u2019s adult criminal history a recent conviction in another case, case No. CR 18-846, for attempted first degree sexual assault, the conviction for assault in case No. CR 19-914 that was part of the plea bargain agreement, two prior convictions for third degree assault, and a conviction for <mask>. Blake had earned his diploma through the GED program and completed a \u201cDBT skills program\u201d while incarcerated. A review of misconduct reports showed Blake \u201croutinely violates the rules.\u201d Blake described himself as a \u201csex addict.\u201d However, he denied having committed the attempted sexual assault for which he was being sentenced. The PSI report demonstrated that Blake has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder, adolescent antisocial behavior, mood disorder, \u201cADHD,\u201d borderline intellectual functioning, post- traumatic stress disorder, schizophreniform disorder, and oppo- sitional defiant disorder. An evaluation completed in November 2019 showed Blake was in the \u201cvery high or high-risk range\u201d to reoffend. The PSI report showed Blake had become a state ward at the age of 9. Blake reported he was physically abused by his father and had experienced sexual abuse in some of his \u00adout-of-home placements. Before his removal from his parents\u2019 home, Blake \u201cwalked in on [his parents] having sex \u2018all the time,\u2019\u201d because they did not lock their door and he did not have his own room. In his placements as a juvenile, Blake had a history of inappropriate sexual behavior toward younger peers. This - 778 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BLAKE Cite as 310 Neb. 769"], "id": "2d9aa1ba-dc52-4edb-9a2e-90cd23f7deef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On January 9, 2018, SFPD Officer MacMahon responded to 923 Market Street to investigate a report of a man making threats with a possible gun. Officer MacMahon ultimately arrested petitioner. Officer MacMahon performed an inventory search of petitioner's backpack, seizing 21.8 grams of marijuana and $574.21 in cash. On January 11, 2018, petitioner was charged by misdemeanor complaint with two counts of criminal threats ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 422 ) and one count of <mask> ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 415, subd. (3) ). These charges were dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 on March 7, 2018."], "id": "8b20beb2-c362-4f5b-9e97-ac598d0accf0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["sentenced him to 10 days in jail for each conviction, the sen- tences to run concurrently. After sentencing, Grant perfected a timely appeal to the district court for Lancaster County. Sitting as an intermediate court of appellate review, that court affirmed. Grant again per- fected a timely appeal, and we moved his appeal to our docket. II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Grant assigns that the district court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences. Specifically, Grant contends that (1) the speech for which he was convicted of <mask> was constitutionally protected, (2) there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to support his convictions, and (3) his sentences were excessive. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [1-3] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the district court sits as an intermediate court of appeals. 1 Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record. 2 When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court\u2019s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 3 [4-6] In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. 4 Such matters are for the finder of fact. 5 Absent prejudicial error, a conviction will generally be affirmed so long as the evidence admitted at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the elements of conviction See State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (2021). Id. See id. See State v. Estrada Comacho, 309 Neb. 494, 960 N.W.2d 739 (2021). Id. - 708 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "b3bc2171-e64e-4bfd-be57-42c9ca455669", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["According to the State\u2019s complaint, \u201cCount 1\u201d defined Grant\u2019s offense of \u201cdisturbing the peace\u201d as \u201cIntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood.\u201d The prohibition against <mask>, as described by the State in its charging document, makes no reference to the content of speech and does not target particular speech on its face due to the content discussed or the viewpoint expressed. Instead, the rule is content neutral. We recognize that the State elicited and relied on evidence of the content of Grant\u2019s speech at trial. Such evidence was unnecessary, however, to establish a violation under the lan- guage of the disturbing the peace charge in the complaint (i.e., \u201c[i]ntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood . . .\u201d). We also note that Grant registered no contemporaneous objection to the admis- sion of evidence regarding the content of his speech. [21] Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 32 [22-25] Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a designated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 33 Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically \u201c\u2018have been devoted to assembly and debate,\u2019\u201d 34 \u201c\u2018communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.\u2019\u201d 35 Public streets, sidewalks, and parks fall into this category, including streets and sidewalks which run through residential See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983). See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985). See id., 473 U.S. at 802. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., supra note 32, 460 U.S. at 45. - 713 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "c2a1c7db-8112-4e91-9d8d-f5b1fed2797b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*627In a brief argument, David states that Joannie's \"reading and disclosure of David's private text messages was also abuse,\" that it was \"<mask> under the\" Act. The argument is based on Joannie's admitted reading through some 20 text messages, and her talking to her four close friends about them. The trial court found this was not harassment. Properly so."], "id": "cb78f4de-b055-43bd-bde9-aeae6d798fcf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In March 2017, appellant, who was then 15 years old, got into a fight on school grounds. A teacher stepped in to stop the fight. Appellant pushed the teacher away using a racial slur in the process. Appellant admitted <mask> on school grounds. The probation report reflected numerous past instances in which appellant displayed \"defiant behavior,\" used aggressive or threatening language, refused to do work, or was disruptive in class. Appellant also admitted to using marijuana."], "id": "84f43125-b59e-40b6-b9ad-bf584cfffc0b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["3. Excessive Sentences Argument Having affirmed Grant\u2019s convictions, we turn last to his claim that his sentences were excessive. [33] The first step in analyzing whether a sentence is exces- sive is to examine the statutory limits on penalties for such offenses. 56 But because Grant failed to include the ordinances at issue in the appellate record, they may not be consulted on appellate review and the information contained in the com- plaint must suffice. 57 According to the complaint, the maxi- mum penalties listed for <mask> are a \u201c$500 fine\u201d and \u201c3 months jail.\u201d The maximum penalties listed for assault State v. Starks, 308 Neb. 527, 955 N.W.2d 313 (2021). See State v. Hill, supra note 30. - 720 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "319f6d3b-e0a9-42c2-80f7-4ce4849635d2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["listed in Family Code section 6230, subdivision (a)(4)\u2014provided that the events occurred within five years of the charged offense. Thus, encompassed within the meaning of \u201coffense involving domestic violence\u201d in section 1109 is an offense involving conduct constituting <mask> of the victim. Defendant misplaces reliance on People v. Zavala (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 758 (Zavala). In Zavala, the defendant was charged with stalking and asserted that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of prior violent acts evidence to prove that offense. (Id. at pp. 761, 770.) The defendant \u201cnote[d] that . . . .section 1109 is a limited exception to the general ban (under Evid. Code, \u00a7 1101) against using prior acts to infer the defendant\u2019s disposition to commit the charged acts, and permits such evidence as the basis for such inference if the defendant is accused of a crime involving domestic violence within the meaning of section 13700.\u201d (Id. at p. 770, italics added.) The defendant in Zavala further asserted that \u201cto the extent the stalking offense does not require that the threat induced the victim to fear great bodily injury or death, stalking is concomitantly not a crime of domestic violence (as defined by [Penal Code] section 13700) and therefore the prior violent acts evidence may not be used by the jury to infer Zavala had a disposition the type of which made it likely he committed the stalking offense.\u201d (Id. at pp. 770-771.) The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, without further analysis or explanation, \u201cagree[d] it was error to give the [section 1109] instruction as to the count charging Zavala with stalking.\u201d (Id. at p. 771.) Approximately five years later, the Second Appellate District, Division Six, decided People v. Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Ogle), upon which the Attorney General relies. The appellate court in Ogle declined to follow Zavala and essentially rejected the same arguments defendant makes here. In Ogle, the defendant asserted that his prior conviction for stalking should not have been admitted to prove his propensity to commit the charged criminal threats because stalking was not domestic violence within the meaning of section 1109. (Ogle,"], "id": "31eb77e5-1b41-4900-b9a7-2dc6e288fc4c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["colleague. Patterson also recalled Grant\u2019s shouting of racial epithets at him. Patterson recounted Grant\u2019s shouts of \u201c\u2018Fuck all them [racial epithet]\u2019\u201d and \u201c\u2018Kill them all\u2019 and \u2018send them back to Africa.\u2019\u201d Grant had also shouted, \u201c\u2018Yeah, I\u2019d kill them [racial epithet], too. I\u2019d kill him [Patterson], too.\u2019\u201d When asked whether Patterson viewed Grant\u2019s words on the day in question as threatening, Patterson testified that \u201cI was the only black person there, so [Grant\u2019s statement about kill- ing] had to be towards me.\u201d However, Patterson acknowledged that \u201cthis ain\u2019t the first time [Grant\u2019s] said something about killing blacks and Mexicans\u201d; \u201che was doing this all the time.\u201d Patterson also recounted that \u201cthis ain\u2019t nothing new. He\u2019d always sit on the porch and holler racial slurs, all the time, towards me, towards the neighbors, even towards people walk- ing down the street.\u201d The State\u2019s final witness was Breanna Callese, the officer with the Lincoln Police Department who responded to Ponce\u2019s call. Callese said that during her investigation, Grant admit- ted to calling Patterson a racial epithet and to telling Ponce that \u201che was going to . . . \u2018light them up.\u2019\u201d Grant maintained, however, that such expression was protected by his \u201c[F]irst [A]mendment right.\u201d Unpersuaded, Callese cited him with dis- turbing the peace. Callese recalled being summoned again to the same loca- tion a short time later because Grant\u2019s shouting had apparently continued unabated. This time, Grant claimed that his yelling had not been directed at Ponce and Patterson, but, rather, that it had been directed into his phone at his sister. Callese refrained from citing Grant with a second count of <mask>. Grant was officially charged on July 26, 2019, with one count of disturbing the peace and an additional count of assault or menacing threats. Grant called no additional witnesses and offered no other evidence of his own. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the county court for Lancaster County found Grant guilty of both counts alleged in the complaint. The county court then - 707 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "65cf9a09-7d42-42ec-8f8d-57460458fcc6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["colleague. Patterson also recalled Grant\u2019s shouting of racial epithets at him. Patterson recounted Grant\u2019s shouts of \u201c\u2018Fuck all them [racial epithet]\u2019\u201d and \u201c\u2018Kill them all\u2019 and \u2018send them back to Africa.\u2019\u201d Grant had also shouted, \u201c\u2018Yeah, I\u2019d kill them [racial epithet], too. I\u2019d kill him [Patterson], too.\u2019\u201d When asked whether Patterson viewed Grant\u2019s words on the day in question as threatening, Patterson testified that \u201cI was the only black person there, so [Grant\u2019s statement about kill- ing] had to be towards me.\u201d However, Patterson acknowledged that \u201cthis ain\u2019t the first time [Grant\u2019s] said something about killing blacks and Mexicans\u201d; \u201che was doing this all the time.\u201d Patterson also recounted that \u201cthis ain\u2019t nothing new. He\u2019d always sit on the porch and holler racial slurs, all the time, towards me, towards the neighbors, even towards people walk- ing down the street.\u201d The State\u2019s final witness was Breanna Callese, the officer with the Lincoln Police Department who responded to Ponce\u2019s call. Callese said that during her investigation, Grant admit- ted to calling Patterson a racial epithet and to telling Ponce that \u201che was going to . . . \u2018light them up.\u2019\u201d Grant maintained, however, that such expression was protected by his \u201c[F]irst [A]mendment right.\u201d Unpersuaded, Callese cited him with dis- turbing the peace. Callese recalled being summoned again to the same loca- tion a short time later because Grant\u2019s shouting had apparently continued unabated. This time, Grant claimed that his yelling had not been directed at Ponce and Patterson, but, rather, that it had been directed into his phone at his sister. Callese refrained from citing Grant with a second count of <mask>. Grant was officially charged on July 26, 2019, with one count of disturbing the peace and an additional count of assault or menacing threats. Grant called no additional witnesses and offered no other evidence of his own. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the county court for Lancaster County found Grant guilty of both counts alleged in the complaint. The county court then - 707 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "b1690516-fa83-4453-840b-9e00015207a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In this context, <mask> means \" 'conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.' [Citation.]\" ( Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 401, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 873.) Plainly, there was substantial evidence that father \"disturbed the peace\" of Bruno and Allison. Father hit mother when Bruno was two years old, and continued *641to abuse her three times a month thereafter. Five-year-old Bruno and two-year-old Allison were frequently present to witness the abuse. Bruno reported that the attacks scared him-a point the court stressed below. He yelled at his father to stop. Allison covered her ears. At one point, Bruno thought his unconscious mother was dead."], "id": "c37f8988-0573-4928-9852-846850a8c22c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\"For purposes of this section, a person has 'perpetrated domestic violence' when he or she is found by the court to have intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to cause bodily injury, or sexual assault, or to have placed a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another, or to have engaged in any behavior involving, but not limited to, threatening, striking, harassing, destroying personal property or <mask> of another, for which a court may issue an ex parte order pursuant to Section 6320 to protect the other party seeking custody of the child or to protect the child and the child's siblings.\" (\u00a7 3044, subd. (c), emphasis added.)"], "id": "b88a550f-c2e3-41ae-a37c-64917045234f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Heavican, C.J. The appellant, Kenneth W. Grant, Jr., accused of shouting in a loud, menacing, and persistent manner from his apart- ment\u2019s balcony at persons across the street, was convicted of <mask> and of assault or menacing threats, both in violation of city ordinances in Lincoln, Nebraska. He asks us to overturn those convictions and their resulting 10-day jail sentences. We do not analyze whether Grant\u2019s speech included fight- ing words or true threats, because even if Grant\u2019s speech was protected, we conclude the State may regulate it through reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. Thus, we affirm Grant\u2019s 10-day jail sentence for that conviction. We find that Grant\u2019s conviction for assault or menacing threats was supported by sufficient evidence. We also affirm that conviction."], "id": "69e79688-d908-4514-943c-e97d239ab510", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The owner of land is not justified in killing domestic animals .found trespassing (Mathews v. Fiestel, 2 E. D. Smith, 90); but any person may kill a vicious dog permitted to run at large (Putnam v. Payne, 13 Johns, 312; Maxwell v. Palmerton, 21 Wend. 700; Dunlap v. Snyder, 17 Barb. 561); or a dog running at large who has lately been bitten by a mad dog (Putnam v. Payne, supra); or a dog in the habit of flying at persons in the public street (People v. Board of Police, 15 Abb. Pr. 167; 24 How. Pr. 481); or a dog on the land of the defendant killing fowl (Leonard v. Wilkins, 9 Johns. 233); or <mask> (Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354). If two dogs .are fighting and cannot be separated, the the one making the attack may be killed if necessary to separate them (Boecher v. Lutz, 20 Week. Dig. 484)."], "id": "7fe178cb-1f6e-497c-9d78-e30436710379", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["19. Convictions: Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Complaints: Appeal and Error. Where an appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evi- dence to sustain a conviction under a municipal ordinance, an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record, but, instead, may apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint. 20. Ordinances: Complaints. Absent anything to the contrary, the language of a city ordinance as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 21. Constitutional Law. Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 22. ____. Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a desig- nated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 23. ____. Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically associated with expression, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, including those which run through residential neighborhoods, whereas designated public forums are those that have not been historically associated with expression but which the government has opened for such use, such as civic auditoriums or public theaters. 24. ____. Nonpublic forums include government-owned property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, such as government offices and military bases. 25. Property: Words and Phrases. Private property is property which is protected from public appropriation, over which the owner has exclusive and absolute rights. 26. Constitutional Law: Public Health and Welfare: <mask>. The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals, and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community, including the power to prevent disturbing noises. 27. Constitutional Law. The right to be let alone is one of the rights most valued by civilized society. The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings. 28. ____. In either a traditional or designated public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions (1) are content neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. - 703 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "39b5f197-9229-47f4-bee0-2d29aa198b0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On January 9, 2018, SFPD Officer MacMahon responded to 923 Market Street to investigate a report of a man making threats with a possible gun. Officer MacMahon ultimately arrested petitioner. Officer MacMahon performed an inventory search of petitioner's backpack, seizing 21.8 grams of marijuana and $574.21 in cash. On January 11, 2018, petitioner was charged by misdemeanor complaint with two counts of criminal threats ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 422 ) and one count of <mask> ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 415, subd. (3) ). These charges were dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 on March 7, 2018."], "id": "bb80cbf0-4838-415e-8bbc-b3f9e18c9f91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["According to the State\u2019s complaint, \u201cCount 1\u201d defined Grant\u2019s offense of \u201cdisturbing the peace\u201d as \u201cIntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood.\u201d The prohibition against <mask>, as described by the State in its charging document, makes no reference to the content of speech and does not target particular speech on its face due to the content discussed or the viewpoint expressed. Instead, the rule is content neutral. We recognize that the State elicited and relied on evidence of the content of Grant\u2019s speech at trial. Such evidence was unnecessary, however, to establish a violation under the lan- guage of the disturbing the peace charge in the complaint (i.e., \u201c[i]ntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood . . .\u201d). We also note that Grant registered no contemporaneous objection to the admis- sion of evidence regarding the content of his speech. [21] Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 32 [22-25] Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a designated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 33 Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically \u201c\u2018have been devoted to assembly and debate,\u2019\u201d 34 \u201c\u2018communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.\u2019\u201d 35 Public streets, sidewalks, and parks fall into this category, including streets and sidewalks which run through residential See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983). See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985). See id., 473 U.S. at 802. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., supra note 32, 460 U.S. at 45. - 713 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "d60199ef-7159-4f44-81a7-c8b3f25877e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["colleague. Patterson also recalled Grant\u2019s shouting of racial epithets at him. Patterson recounted Grant\u2019s shouts of \u201c\u2018Fuck all them [racial epithet]\u2019\u201d and \u201c\u2018Kill them all\u2019 and \u2018send them back to Africa.\u2019\u201d Grant had also shouted, \u201c\u2018Yeah, I\u2019d kill them [racial epithet], too. I\u2019d kill him [Patterson], too.\u2019\u201d When asked whether Patterson viewed Grant\u2019s words on the day in question as threatening, Patterson testified that \u201cI was the only black person there, so [Grant\u2019s statement about kill- ing] had to be towards me.\u201d However, Patterson acknowledged that \u201cthis ain\u2019t the first time [Grant\u2019s] said something about killing blacks and Mexicans\u201d; \u201che was doing this all the time.\u201d Patterson also recounted that \u201cthis ain\u2019t nothing new. He\u2019d always sit on the porch and holler racial slurs, all the time, towards me, towards the neighbors, even towards people walk- ing down the street.\u201d The State\u2019s final witness was Breanna Callese, the officer with the Lincoln Police Department who responded to Ponce\u2019s call. Callese said that during her investigation, Grant admit- ted to calling Patterson a racial epithet and to telling Ponce that \u201che was going to . . . \u2018light them up.\u2019\u201d Grant maintained, however, that such expression was protected by his \u201c[F]irst [A]mendment right.\u201d Unpersuaded, Callese cited him with dis- turbing the peace. Callese recalled being summoned again to the same loca- tion a short time later because Grant\u2019s shouting had apparently continued unabated. This time, Grant claimed that his yelling had not been directed at Ponce and Patterson, but, rather, that it had been directed into his phone at his sister. Callese refrained from citing Grant with a second count of <mask>. Grant was officially charged on July 26, 2019, with one count of disturbing the peace and an additional count of assault or menacing threats. Grant called no additional witnesses and offered no other evidence of his own. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the county court for Lancaster County found Grant guilty of both counts alleged in the complaint. The county court then - 707 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "357189c3-6952-418c-abc7-a3569bbe3d52", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["And the referenced section 6320 provides in subdivision (a) that: \"The court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating as described in Section 528.5 of the Penal Code, falsely personating as described in Section 529 of the Penal Code, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or <mask> of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members.\""], "id": "b537a7e5-02a6-43da-8d72-d37075ffb914", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The juvenile court's restraining order referenced Family Code section 6218, which in turn references Family Code section 6320. Section 6320 allows for an ex parte order \"enjoining a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, ... harassing, telephoning, ... contacting ..., coming within a specified distance of, or <mask>,\" and Family Code section 6340 allows for the same order following a noticed hearing."], "id": "edec0963-4f16-458f-b1e0-4f26b77ada30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The officers began discussing whether they could arrest Wood for disorderly conduct and <mask>. One officer asked another \u201chow long [they] [were] going to allow\u201d Wood to keep talking. Johnson Cam, 4:00\u201303. That officer replied that \u201cwe could do disorderly conduct.\u201d Id. at 4:02\u201306. Blair, catching up with Wood, turned and said to the officers that Wood was \u201cdisturbing my peace\u201d and shouted, \u201cCharge him!\u201d Yates Cam #1, 4:20\u201322; Troutman Cam #1, 2:37\u201343. One officer asked the others what they should do, commenting that Wood was \u201ctalking the whole way out the door, he\u2019s still talking.\u201d Yates Cam #1, 4:40\u201350; Troutman Cam #1, 3:00\u201305. Another officer said, \u201cWell, make an arrest,\u201d to which another asked, \u201cMake an arrest?\u201d Yates Cam #1, 4:49\u201352."], "id": "5bde5591-b689-49a2-ab8a-5132cb6b5f5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant contends that the \"statutorily mandated imposition\" on him of an \"enhanced 40-year-to-life prison term for second degree murder as a passive aider-abettor, under a 'natural and probable consequences' theory of criminal liability, based on <mask>,\" which includes a 25-year-to-life vicarious gun discharge enhancement, \"with no statutory discretion *751allowed to the trial court to consider [his] age or personal circumstances or passive and nonviolent criminal behavior in mitigation of the punishment, constituted excessive punishment and violated, as applied to him, [his] constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and article I, section 17, of the California Constitution.\" He concludes \"automatic reversal of the enhanced sentences imposed on Counts 1 through 3 is warranted.\" He requests this court to strike his section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) gun enhancements and to reduce his sentence to 15 years to life."], "id": "44f0780e-d7a2-446f-b38d-ee734f6fa5a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Poochigian, J. and Pe\u00f1a, J. Letticia Baraona appeals the denial of her request for a restraining order under California\u2019s Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 6200\u20136460).1 The request was made to the superior court handling the dissolution of her marriage to Alexander Baraona. The court heard the parties\u2019 testimony and argument and denied the request. The court stated it \u201cdoes not feel there\u2019s sufficient evidence for a domestic violence restraining order in this matter.\u201d Letticia contends the superior court committed legal error by focusing on physical abuse and by failing to consider the nonphysical aspects of domestic violence as provided for in section 6320 and section 6203, subdivisions (a)(4) and (b). Under section 6320, a court may enjoin a party from harassing or \u201c<mask> of the other party.\u201d As explained below, it is difficult for an appellant to establish by inference that a court failed to consider a particular point or applied an incorrect legal standard. Here, Letticia has not overcome that difficulty and affirmatively demonstrated the court did not consider nonphysical types of abuse or otherwise misinterpreted the DVPA. Accordingly, she has not demonstrated reversible error. We therefore affirm the order denying the request for a restraining order. FACTS Letticia and Alexander were married in September 2017. Letticia had a son and a daughter from a previous relationship. In July 2018, Alexander moved to Visalia to start his new job as a sergeant at Corcoran State Prison. Previously, he had worked as a correctional officer at San Quentin State Prison. In August 2018, Letticia and her children arrived in Visalia. In June 2019, Letticia and Alexander separated. In July 2019, Alexander filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The evidence relating to the grounds on which Letticia based her request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) is not described in detail in this opinion"], "id": "d3fb4252-22b7-46c5-b267-9291abcfb1d2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The fact that Rybolt did not allege an apprehension of future physical abuse as Riley argues is of no moment and does not mean that the court could not evaluate whether Rybolt's apprehension of future abuse was reasonable. Fear of physical abuse is not required to renew a restraining order. ( Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1464, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 162 [\"there is no requirement that the party requesting a renewal have a fear of physical abuse\"].) The Act covers a myriad of conduct beyond mere physical abuse. Under section 6320, subdivision (a) for example, courts may enjoin stalking, *585threatening, harassing, telephoning, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or <mask> of the other party. The court could reasonably conclude that Riley's behavior, while not physically threatening, sufficiently disturbed Rybolt's peace and emotional well-being that her apprehension of such future abuse was reasonable."], "id": "cf6f7046-511c-408a-b8af-7c5af507c6f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Heavican, C.J. The appellant, Kenneth W. Grant, Jr., accused of shouting in a loud, menacing, and persistent manner from his apart- ment\u2019s balcony at persons across the street, was convicted of <mask> and of assault or menacing threats, both in violation of city ordinances in Lincoln, Nebraska. He asks us to overturn those convictions and their resulting 10-day jail sentences. We do not analyze whether Grant\u2019s speech included fight- ing words or true threats, because even if Grant\u2019s speech was protected, we conclude the State may regulate it through reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. Thus, we affirm Grant\u2019s 10-day jail sentence for that conviction. We find that Grant\u2019s conviction for assault or menacing threats was supported by sufficient evidence. We also affirm that conviction."], "id": "088d048e-7e44-4a7b-87b6-4cbe97394f9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["3. Excessive Sentences Argument Having affirmed Grant\u2019s convictions, we turn last to his claim that his sentences were excessive. [33] The first step in analyzing whether a sentence is exces- sive is to examine the statutory limits on penalties for such offenses. 56 But because Grant failed to include the ordinances at issue in the appellate record, they may not be consulted on appellate review and the information contained in the com- plaint must suffice. 57 According to the complaint, the maxi- mum penalties listed for <mask> are a \u201c$500 fine\u201d and \u201c3 months jail.\u201d The maximum penalties listed for assault State v. Starks, 308 Neb. 527, 955 N.W.2d 313 (2021). See State v. Hill, supra note 30. - 720 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "ef1b0594-03c8-4306-8c00-0ac5e21fc8f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 Whether the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, however, is a question of law, and an appellate court will therefore review the district court\u2019s rul- ings on those issues de novo. 7 [7,8] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, an appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits. 8 A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly unten- able, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition. 9 IV. ANALYSIS 1. Conviction for <mask> Grant assigns, first, that his conviction for disturbing the peace was in error because the speech underlying his convic- tion was protected by U.S. Const. amend. I and Neb. Const. art. I, \u00a7 5. Grant argues that because his speech was protected, it could not be criminally proscribed. Grant does not claim his conviction for assault or menacing threats is unconstitutional; hence, we need not consider it in any constitutional analysis. [9,10] The 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, appli- cable to the states via the 14th Amendment, 10 provides in relevant part that \u201cCongress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .\u201d Similarly, under the Nebraska Constitution, \u201c[e]very person may freely speak . . . on all sub- jects . . . .\u201d 11 We have recognized that the \u201c\u2018parameters of the constitutional right to freedom of speech are the same under See id. See, Carney v. Miller, 287 Neb. 400, 842 N.W.2d 782 (2014); State v. Drahota, 280 Neb. 627, 788 N.W.2d 796 (2010). See State v. Greer, 309 Neb. 667, 962 N.W.2d 217 (2021). Id. NIFLA v. Becerra, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018). Neb. Const. art. I, \u00a7 5. - 709 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "3542f12a-bbdc-48e2-9e20-7f866703e138", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["create an alternative forum for resolution of every dispute between such individuals.\u201d Here, the trial court found that \u201cnot all name calling or yelling or accusations or disagreement are sufficient for a restraining order.\u201d The court further found the evidence failed to show \u201canything beyond disputes and disagreements about what\u2019s a proper way of engaging in the custody exchanges.\u201d We will not reverse the trial court\u2019s decision unless the trial court \u201c \u2018 \u201c \u2018exceeded the bounds of reason\u2019 or it can \u2018fairly be said\u2019 that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the same circumstances.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 212, 223.) \u201c \u2018 \u201cWhen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) Applying these principles to the record here, we cannot say no judge would reasonably have made the same decision denying Mother\u2019s request for a restraining order. (See id. at p. 781 [affirming order denying request for restraining order where trial court\u2019s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and trial court applied proper legal principles]; see also S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1265-1266 [father\u2019s \u201cbadgering\u201d conduct of mother during custodial dispute did not rise to the level of harassment or abuse to support the issuance of a restraining order]; K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 981 [offensive name-calling and failing to show up at custody exchanges demonstrated a lack of ability to communicate but did not reach the level of <mask> of the party seeking the restraining order].) Mother also argues the court applied the wrong legal standard in denying her request. She makes two arguments to support this claim. First, Mother argues the DVPA broadly defines \u201cabuse\u201d to include non-violent acts."], "id": "9d1be843-b5be-4c0f-ace8-c3895a6678f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["19. Convictions: Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Complaints: Appeal and Error. Where an appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evi- dence to sustain a conviction under a municipal ordinance, an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record, but, instead, may apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint. 20. Ordinances: Complaints. Absent anything to the contrary, the language of a city ordinance as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 21. Constitutional Law. Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 22. ____. Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a desig- nated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 23. ____. Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically associated with expression, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, including those which run through residential neighborhoods, whereas designated public forums are those that have not been historically associated with expression but which the government has opened for such use, such as civic auditoriums or public theaters. 24. ____. Nonpublic forums include government-owned property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, such as government offices and military bases. 25. Property: Words and Phrases. Private property is property which is protected from public appropriation, over which the owner has exclusive and absolute rights. 26. Constitutional Law: Public Health and Welfare: <mask>. The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals, and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community, including the power to prevent disturbing noises. 27. Constitutional Law. The right to be let alone is one of the rights most valued by civilized society. The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings. 28. ____. In either a traditional or designated public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions (1) are content neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. - 703 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "efe7cc9d-0f9e-450c-ab58-cdb71875148a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["An elder who has suffered abuse may petition the superior court for an order \"enjoining a party from abusing, intimidating, ... threatening, ... harassing, ... or <mask> of, the petitioner.\" (\u00a7 15657.03, subds. (a)(1), (b)(4)(A).) The petitioner has the burden to prove a past act of elder abuse by preponderance of the evidence. ( Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1139-1140, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 2 ( Bookout ).)"], "id": "366b1c31-00d3-496f-a31a-34cc671b5845", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["State\u2019s evidence, and Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report. According to Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report, Grant was 50 years old at the time of sentencing and had a criminal history dating back to his youth, including convictions in 1996 for third degree assault and in 1987 for attempted burglary. Grant also had recent minor traffic offenses. He had dropped out of high school during the 11th grade, and then for about 2 years, he had been part of a criminal gang. Throughout his life, Grant had struggled to maintain steady employment and was currently unemployed. He reported maintaining few healthy relationships throughout his adulthood. After reviewing this evidence, the county court ordered 10 days in jail for each conviction, to run concurrently, noting that \u201cany less sentence this Court would impose would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect for the law.\u201d Despite Grant\u2019s emphasis on his positive achievements, the record provides a sound basis for the sentences imposed. Accordingly, Grant\u2019s convictions and resulting sentences were not in error. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, we affirm Grant\u2019s con- victions for <mask> and for assault or menacing threats and find that the resulting sentences were not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed."], "id": "44d17ed3-5cb5-410d-af8e-db2a3a221658", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["listed in Family Code section 6230, subdivision (a)(4)\u2014provided that the events occurred within five years of the charged offense. Thus, encompassed within the meaning of \u201coffense involving domestic violence\u201d in section 1109 is an offense involving conduct constituting <mask> of the victim. Defendant misplaces reliance on People v. Zavala (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 758 (Zavala). In Zavala, the defendant was charged with stalking and asserted that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of prior violent acts evidence to prove that offense. (Id. at pp. 761, 770.) The defendant \u201cnote[d] that . . . .section 1109 is a limited exception to the general ban (under Evid. Code, \u00a7 1101) against using prior acts to infer the defendant\u2019s disposition to commit the charged acts, and permits such evidence as the basis for such inference if the defendant is accused of a crime involving domestic violence within the meaning of section 13700.\u201d (Id. at p. 770, italics added.) The defendant in Zavala further asserted that \u201cto the extent the stalking offense does not require that the threat induced the victim to fear great bodily injury or death, stalking is concomitantly not a crime of domestic violence (as defined by [Penal Code] section 13700) and therefore the prior violent acts evidence may not be used by the jury to infer Zavala had a disposition the type of which made it likely he committed the stalking offense.\u201d (Id. at pp. 770-771.) The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, without further analysis or explanation, \u201cagree[d] it was error to give the [section 1109] instruction as to the count charging Zavala with stalking.\u201d (Id. at p. 771.) Approximately five years later, the Second Appellate District, Division Six, decided People v. Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Ogle), upon which the Attorney General relies. The appellate court in Ogle declined to follow Zavala and essentially rejected the same arguments defendant makes here. In Ogle, the defendant asserted that his prior conviction for stalking should not have been admitted to prove his propensity to commit the charged criminal threats because stalking was not domestic violence within the meaning of section 1109. (Ogle,"], "id": "9d9d5776-6871-44ce-bc18-d0eebb45132a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["State\u2019s evidence, and Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report. According to Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report, Grant was 50 years old at the time of sentencing and had a criminal history dating back to his youth, including convictions in 1996 for third degree assault and in 1987 for attempted burglary. Grant also had recent minor traffic offenses. He had dropped out of high school during the 11th grade, and then for about 2 years, he had been part of a criminal gang. Throughout his life, Grant had struggled to maintain steady employment and was currently unemployed. He reported maintaining few healthy relationships throughout his adulthood. After reviewing this evidence, the county court ordered 10 days in jail for each conviction, to run concurrently, noting that \u201cany less sentence this Court would impose would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect for the law.\u201d Despite Grant\u2019s emphasis on his positive achievements, the record provides a sound basis for the sentences imposed. Accordingly, Grant\u2019s convictions and resulting sentences were not in error. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, we affirm Grant\u2019s con- victions for <mask> and for assault or menacing threats and find that the resulting sentences were not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed."], "id": "99f87d3f-e53d-499a-a720-65c951ea2389", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Indisputably, the first two prongs of Lent are satisfied here. The electronic search condition bears no relationship to J.G.'s crime of <mask> on school grounds or his social history. And \"the typical use of electronic devices and social media is not itself criminal.\" ( In re Erica R. , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919.)"], "id": "8b60bc4b-6d49-44e6-9081-1f26e3d8e57c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["3. Excessive Sentences Argument Having affirmed Grant\u2019s convictions, we turn last to his claim that his sentences were excessive. [33] The first step in analyzing whether a sentence is exces- sive is to examine the statutory limits on penalties for such offenses. 56 But because Grant failed to include the ordinances at issue in the appellate record, they may not be consulted on appellate review and the information contained in the com- plaint must suffice. 57 According to the complaint, the maxi- mum penalties listed for <mask> are a \u201c$500 fine\u201d and \u201c3 months jail.\u201d The maximum penalties listed for assault State v. Starks, 308 Neb. 527, 955 N.W.2d 313 (2021). See State v. Hill, supra note 30. - 720 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "15adee17-737a-4929-8423-e6a64c31b12c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["State\u2019s evidence, and Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report. According to Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report, Grant was 50 years old at the time of sentencing and had a criminal history dating back to his youth, including convictions in 1996 for third degree assault and in 1987 for attempted burglary. Grant also had recent minor traffic offenses. He had dropped out of high school during the 11th grade, and then for about 2 years, he had been part of a criminal gang. Throughout his life, Grant had struggled to maintain steady employment and was currently unemployed. He reported maintaining few healthy relationships throughout his adulthood. After reviewing this evidence, the county court ordered 10 days in jail for each conviction, to run concurrently, noting that \u201cany less sentence this Court would impose would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect for the law.\u201d Despite Grant\u2019s emphasis on his positive achievements, the record provides a sound basis for the sentences imposed. Accordingly, Grant\u2019s convictions and resulting sentences were not in error. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, we affirm Grant\u2019s con- victions for <mask> and for assault or menacing threats and find that the resulting sentences were not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed."], "id": "cfb530d7-ed53-42cf-ba50-e1de8b2c06b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\"For purposes of this section, a person has 'perpetrated domestic violence' when he or she is found by the court to have intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to cause bodily injury, or sexual assault, or to have placed a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another, or to have engaged in any behavior involving, but not limited to, threatening, striking, harassing, destroying personal property or <mask> of another, for which a court may issue an ex parte order pursuant to Section 6320 to protect the other party seeking custody of the child or to protect the child and the child's siblings.\" (\u00a7 3044, subd. (c), emphasis added.)"], "id": "df966312-eb6d-40d0-b02b-13b5f649506e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The denial of Jane\u2019s request to renew the restraining order is appealable as an order refusing to grant an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). (See Molinaro v. Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824, 831, fn. 6 [appeal from issuance of restraining order]; Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 332 [appeal from denial of application for temporary restraining order].) The DVPA broadly defines abuse to include conduct that puts a person \u201cin reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury,\u201d (\u00a7 6203, subd. (a)(3)) or any other behavior that may be enjoined under the statute (id., subd. (a)(4)), including threatening, sexually assaulting, or \u201c<mask> of the other party\u201d (\u00a7 6320, subd. (a)) by conduct that, under the totality of the circumstances, \u201cdestroys [their] mental or emotional calm.\u201d (Id., subd. (c); see Rodriguez, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 820.) A restraining order under the DVPA may be based on a showing of \u201creasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse\u201d (\u00a7 6300, subd. (a)) and may be renewed \u201cwithout a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order.\u201d (\u00a7 6345, subd. (a).) Courts have interpreted the standard for restraining order renewal in a contested case as requiring an objective showing that the protected party entertains a \u201c \u2018 \u201creasonable apprehension\u201d \u2019 \u201d of future abusive conduct. (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463 (Eneaji), citing Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1279 (Ritchie); see also Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 332\u2013333 (Lister).) Under this standard, a request to renew a restraining order may not rest solely on the requesting party\u2019s \u201csubjective fear the party to be restrained will commit abusive acts in the future.\u2019 \u201d (Ritchie, at p. 1288.) Instead, \u201c[a] trial court should renew the protective order, if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a \u2018reasonable apprehension\u2019 of future abuse.\u201d (Id. at p. 1290.) In making this determination, the trial court decides whether \u201cthe evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party\u2019s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.\u201d (Ibid.) The standard of review for an order granting or denying injunctive relief, including the trial court\u2019s ruling on a request to renew a domestic violence prevention restraining order, is abuse of discretion. (Eneaji, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463; see Rodriguez, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 820; Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 850 [stating rule that orders to grant or deny \u201c \u2018 \u201ca permanent or preliminary injunction rest[] in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case\u201d \u2019 \u201d].) Because every exercise of discretion must be guided by applicable legal principles, which are derived from the statute under which discretion is conferred, \u201c \u2018a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.\u2019 \u201d (Eneaji, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463.) Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in exercising its discretion to decide the underlying issue is a question of law subject to de novo review. (Ibid.) B. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Standard in Assessing the Renewal Request Jane contends that in analyzing the request to renew the restraining order, the trial court incorrectly placed too much emphasis on whether Morning had violated the restraining order during the period it had been in effect, when in fact the pertinent issue was the reasonableness of Jane\u2019s apprehension of future abusive conduct. To assess Jane\u2019s contention, we consider both the standard for renewal and the trial court\u2019s application of that standard here. First, regarding the standard, it appears from the record that the trial court articulated the correct standard for renewal of a domestic violence restraining order according to statutory and case authority. At the outset of the hearing, the court explained to the parties that the burden was with the petitioner, Jane, to \u201cprove beyond a preponderance of the evidence . . . that there is a reasonable apprehension of future harm if the restraining order is not renewed.\u201d The trial court reiterated the applicable standard in considering the arguments of the parties at the end of the hearing. The court\u2019s articulation of the standard is consistent with appellate case authority as set forth in cases like Ritchie, Lister, and Eneaji."], "id": "6eeecb08-1911-4af0-abf0-4d9a2e3acb55", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Heavican, C.J. The appellant, Kenneth W. Grant, Jr., accused of shouting in a loud, menacing, and persistent manner from his apart- ment\u2019s balcony at persons across the street, was convicted of <mask> and of assault or menacing threats, both in violation of city ordinances in Lincoln, Nebraska. He asks us to overturn those convictions and their resulting 10-day jail sentences. We do not analyze whether Grant\u2019s speech included fight- ing words or true threats, because even if Grant\u2019s speech was protected, we conclude the State may regulate it through reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. Thus, we affirm Grant\u2019s 10-day jail sentence for that conviction. We find that Grant\u2019s conviction for assault or menacing threats was supported by sufficient evidence. We also affirm that conviction."], "id": "c809d0db-afb8-4800-a456-b02392be3a83", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In this country, every man may publish temperate investigations of the nature and forms of government, such matters are proper for public information ; but if such publication is seditiously, maliciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of the United States, or the constitution thereof, or of any other State, the publisher would be guilty of a libel. Yates\u2019 Rep. vol. 4. p. 270, 271. 2 Campb. 402. But care must be taken that this important privilege be not abused ; private character must not be wantonly assailed; even \u201c if one uses the wea- \u201c pons of truth wantonly, for <mask> of families, he is \u201c guilty of a libel.\u2019\u2019 Johns. Cases, vol. 2, p. 70. Yates\u2019 Rep. vol. 4, p. 269."], "id": "56e49349-a33d-45da-80f0-6128af497f43", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["According to the State\u2019s complaint, \u201cCount 1\u201d defined Grant\u2019s offense of \u201cdisturbing the peace\u201d as \u201cIntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood.\u201d The prohibition against <mask>, as described by the State in its charging document, makes no reference to the content of speech and does not target particular speech on its face due to the content discussed or the viewpoint expressed. Instead, the rule is content neutral. We recognize that the State elicited and relied on evidence of the content of Grant\u2019s speech at trial. Such evidence was unnecessary, however, to establish a violation under the lan- guage of the disturbing the peace charge in the complaint (i.e., \u201c[i]ntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood . . .\u201d). We also note that Grant registered no contemporaneous objection to the admis- sion of evidence regarding the content of his speech. [21] Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 32 [22-25] Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a designated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 33 Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically \u201c\u2018have been devoted to assembly and debate,\u2019\u201d 34 \u201c\u2018communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.\u2019\u201d 35 Public streets, sidewalks, and parks fall into this category, including streets and sidewalks which run through residential See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983). See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985). See id., 473 U.S. at 802. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., supra note 32, 460 U.S. at 45. - 713 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "63bcfb07-9b66-41e4-992d-78bd8b58e92d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["According to the State\u2019s complaint, \u201cCount 1\u201d defined Grant\u2019s offense of \u201cdisturbing the peace\u201d as \u201cIntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood.\u201d The prohibition against <mask>, as described by the State in its charging document, makes no reference to the content of speech and does not target particular speech on its face due to the content discussed or the viewpoint expressed. Instead, the rule is content neutral. We recognize that the State elicited and relied on evidence of the content of Grant\u2019s speech at trial. Such evidence was unnecessary, however, to establish a violation under the lan- guage of the disturbing the peace charge in the complaint (i.e., \u201c[i]ntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood . . .\u201d). We also note that Grant registered no contemporaneous objection to the admis- sion of evidence regarding the content of his speech. [21] Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 32 [22-25] Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a designated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 33 Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically \u201c\u2018have been devoted to assembly and debate,\u2019\u201d 34 \u201c\u2018communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.\u2019\u201d 35 Public streets, sidewalks, and parks fall into this category, including streets and sidewalks which run through residential See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983). See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985). See id., 473 U.S. at 802. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., supra note 32, 460 U.S. at 45. - 713 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "c7c70205-8ce9-4958-96ff-6e0b95b6c5e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["sentenced him to 10 days in jail for each conviction, the sen- tences to run concurrently. After sentencing, Grant perfected a timely appeal to the district court for Lancaster County. Sitting as an intermediate court of appellate review, that court affirmed. Grant again per- fected a timely appeal, and we moved his appeal to our docket. II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Grant assigns that the district court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences. Specifically, Grant contends that (1) the speech for which he was convicted of <mask> was constitutionally protected, (2) there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to support his convictions, and (3) his sentences were excessive. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [1-3] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the district court sits as an intermediate court of appeals. 1 Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record. 2 When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court\u2019s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 3 [4-6] In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. 4 Such matters are for the finder of fact. 5 Absent prejudicial error, a conviction will generally be affirmed so long as the evidence admitted at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the elements of conviction See State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (2021). Id. See id. See State v. Estrada Comacho, 309 Neb. 494, 960 N.W.2d 739 (2021). Id. - 708 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "b84f8ca5-95ad-4f36-b322-b060d89ed611", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["19. Convictions: Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Complaints: Appeal and Error. Where an appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evi- dence to sustain a conviction under a municipal ordinance, an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record, but, instead, may apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint. 20. Ordinances: Complaints. Absent anything to the contrary, the language of a city ordinance as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 21. Constitutional Law. Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 22. ____. Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a desig- nated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 23. ____. Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically associated with expression, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, including those which run through residential neighborhoods, whereas designated public forums are those that have not been historically associated with expression but which the government has opened for such use, such as civic auditoriums or public theaters. 24. ____. Nonpublic forums include government-owned property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, such as government offices and military bases. 25. Property: Words and Phrases. Private property is property which is protected from public appropriation, over which the owner has exclusive and absolute rights. 26. Constitutional Law: Public Health and Welfare: <mask>. The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals, and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community, including the power to prevent disturbing noises. 27. Constitutional Law. The right to be let alone is one of the rights most valued by civilized society. The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings. 28. ____. In either a traditional or designated public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions (1) are content neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. - 703 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "ae221061-d993-43e7-a5e1-99aae3cfc5bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["19. Convictions: Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Complaints: Appeal and Error. Where an appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evi- dence to sustain a conviction under a municipal ordinance, an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record, but, instead, may apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint. 20. Ordinances: Complaints. Absent anything to the contrary, the language of a city ordinance as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 21. Constitutional Law. Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 22. ____. Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a desig- nated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 23. ____. Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically associated with expression, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, including those which run through residential neighborhoods, whereas designated public forums are those that have not been historically associated with expression but which the government has opened for such use, such as civic auditoriums or public theaters. 24. ____. Nonpublic forums include government-owned property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, such as government offices and military bases. 25. Property: Words and Phrases. Private property is property which is protected from public appropriation, over which the owner has exclusive and absolute rights. 26. Constitutional Law: Public Health and Welfare: <mask>. The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals, and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community, including the power to prevent disturbing noises. 27. Constitutional Law. The right to be let alone is one of the rights most valued by civilized society. The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings. 28. ____. In either a traditional or designated public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions (1) are content neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. - 703 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "9bd8c11e-92bf-4e17-b12d-84926a526fca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["2. Conviction for Assault or Menacing Threats Having determined that Grant\u2019s conviction for <mask> must be affirmed, we next consider his conviction for assault or menacing threats. Grant does not challenge the constitutionality of this conviction, but, rather, he assigns that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction. We disagree. [31] When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 Our analysis would generally begin with the language of the ordinance that Grant was convicted of violating. 47 But, again, the defendant has failed to include the ordinance at issue in the record, so we may not consider that ordinance\u2019s text. 48 We must instead apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the See State v. Estrada Comacho, supra note 4. See In re Interest of Elainna R., supra note 28. See State v. Buescher, supra note 29. - 717 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "005062d7-e461-444c-bfab-ebeb5d983d31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The second factor, whether the alleged offense included violence, the evidence is undisputed that it did. Lohman is alleged to have struck the victim from behind with some type of metal rod. This factor weighs in favor of retention. Lohman claims that the third factor, motivation for the offense, weighs in favor of transfer because he was acting in defense of his brother when he struck the victim. He describes the motive as \u201ca typically juvenile motivation. A dispute over a girl.\u201d The district court acknowledged Lohman\u2019s reason for striking the victim, but also recognized that other witnesses indicated that the victim was not engaged in the fight prior to being struck by Lohman. The court described the motivation as \u201cmuddled\u201d but concluded it weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction. We find no abuse of discretion in this finding. Given Lohman\u2019s close proximity to his 18th birthday, the district court reasoned that the time during which the juvenile court would have jurisdiction over him was \u201crapidly coming to an end.\u201d Therefore, because of Lohman\u2019s age and the circumstances of others involved in the offense, this factor weighed in favor of retention. Lohman argues that since the participants were between the ages of 16 and 18 years of age and had apparently gone to the park to fight, \u201cthe ages of the participants supports the transfer of this case to the juvenile court.\u201d Brief for appellant at 21. We disagree, and find that Lohman\u2019s age weighs in favor of retention. One of the most influential factors for retaining jurisdiction is Lohman\u2019s previous history with the juvenile court system. Although Lohman refers to his prior juvenile adjudications as involving \u201crelatively minor offenses,\u201d the evidence supports the district court\u2019s characterization of them as \u201cregular and consistent involvement\u201d with the court. His prior brushes with the law include charges for criminal mischief (damaging the hood of an automobile causing damage of $0-$500), minor in possession, including marijuana and drug paraphernalia, theft (which was ultimately dismissed), possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, another charge of theft, criminal mischief with damage between $501 and $1,499, and terroristic threats, amended to <mask>. As a result of these adjudications, Lohman has had a myriad of services provided to him, yet his actions continue to escalate. This factor weighs in favor of retention. The district court found that consideration of public safety and Lohman\u2019s ability to appreciate the nature and seriousness of the crime both weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction. Considering the fact that Lohman went to the park with a weapon and given his prior experience with the juvenile court, we agree with the district court that public safety is a concern and that Lohman had an appreciation of the consequences of his action and the danger that it posed. Lohman argues that because the altercation involved a female acquaintance, there \u201cis no evidence that [Lohman] is out, wandering the streets of Sidney looking for his next victim.\u201d Brief for appellant at 26. However, given the escalating nature of Lohman\u2019s aggressive behavior, it is uncertain as to who, or what, may next set him off. These factors weigh in favor of retention. The only factor that the court found weighed in favor of transfer was a consideration of Lohman\u2019s best interest, but recognized that it \u201cis difficult to readily evaluate\u201d his best interests. The remaining factors it found either neutral or irrelevant to the facts of this case. After considering all of the evidence, given the services which have already been provided to Lohman, the violent nature of the offense, Lohman\u2019s age and previous history with the juvenile court system, and the need for public safety, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court\u2019s order denying transfer of Lohman\u2019s case to the juvenile court."], "id": "ddb339a7-eba9-4afc-9b60-e41bb8ba5c76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Heavican, C.J. The appellant, Kenneth W. Grant, Jr., accused of shouting in a loud, menacing, and persistent manner from his apart- ment\u2019s balcony at persons across the street, was convicted of <mask> and of assault or menacing threats, both in violation of city ordinances in Lincoln, Nebraska. He asks us to overturn those convictions and their resulting 10-day jail sentences. We do not analyze whether Grant\u2019s speech included fight- ing words or true threats, because even if Grant\u2019s speech was protected, we conclude the State may regulate it through reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. Thus, we affirm Grant\u2019s 10-day jail sentence for that conviction. We find that Grant\u2019s conviction for assault or menacing threats was supported by sufficient evidence. We also affirm that conviction."], "id": "375e7f44-3824-4e73-a716-e56917c87afd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["listed in Family Code section 6230, subdivision (a)(4)\u2014provided that the events occurred within five years of the charged offense. Thus, encompassed within the meaning of \u201coffense involving domestic violence\u201d in section 1109 is an offense involving conduct constituting <mask> of the victim. Defendant misplaces reliance on People v. Zavala (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 758 (Zavala). In Zavala, the defendant was charged with stalking and asserted that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of prior violent acts evidence to prove that offense. (Id. at pp. 761, 770.) The defendant \u201cnote[d] that . . . .section 1109 is a limited exception to the general ban (under Evid. Code, \u00a7 1101) against using prior acts to infer the defendant\u2019s disposition to commit the charged acts, and permits such evidence as the basis for such inference if the defendant is accused of a crime involving domestic violence within the meaning of section 13700.\u201d (Id. at p. 770, italics added.) The defendant in Zavala further asserted that \u201cto the extent the stalking offense does not require that the threat induced the victim to fear great bodily injury or death, stalking is concomitantly not a crime of domestic violence (as defined by [Penal Code] section 13700) and therefore the prior violent acts evidence may not be used by the jury to infer Zavala had a disposition the type of which made it likely he committed the stalking offense.\u201d (Id. at pp. 770-771.) The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, without further analysis or explanation, \u201cagree[d] it was error to give the [section 1109] instruction as to the count charging Zavala with stalking.\u201d (Id. at p. 771.) Approximately five years later, the Second Appellate District, Division Six, decided People v. Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Ogle), upon which the Attorney General relies. The appellate court in Ogle declined to follow Zavala and essentially rejected the same arguments defendant makes here. In Ogle, the defendant asserted that his prior conviction for stalking should not have been admitted to prove his propensity to commit the charged criminal threats because stalking was not domestic violence within the meaning of section 1109. (Ogle,"], "id": "64478a58-4baf-4907-ae29-5477c2a59724", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Village Ordinance 1.3(b) provides: \u201c Ordinance 1.3 \u2014 <mask>. No person shall indulge in disorderly, or *558noisy or disturbing conduct within the Village. Any person who commits any of the following acts will be considered in violation of this provision: * * * (b) Acts in such manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct or be offensive to others.\u201d"], "id": "8db6bec6-7c24-4962-8e87-f769979b6e37", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["really intended to incorporate all forms of abuse that fall within the broader Family Code definition.\u201d (Ogle, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144.) We reject that argument, as did the Ogle court. (Ibid.) Section 1109 clearly and unambiguously incorporates the Family Code definitions of domestic violence and abuse without the limitation urged by defendant. 6 (Ogle, at p. 1144.) As was the case in Ogle (Ogle, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143), the Family Code definitions of domestic violence and abuse apply here because defendant\u2019s prior conduct at issue occurred within five years of trial. (\u00a7 1109, subd. (d)(3).) Consequently, the prior incidents at issue here qualify as domestic violence within the meaning of section 1109, as defined in Family Code section 6211. In each of the instances, a restraining order was in place against defendant. In each instance, defendant came to the house where defendant\u2019s mother and brother lived in violation of the effective restraining order and committed acts which, at the least, would constitute conduct <mask> of the victims. (Fam. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 6211, 6203, 6320.) As noted, disturbing the peace for purposes of this Family Code provision means \u201cconduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.\u2019 \u201d (Sorden, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) This brings us to the question of whether the prior acts evidence was admissible to prove the burglary count, an issue not addressed in any published case. The prosecutor advanced two theories as to defendant\u2019s intent when he broke into the family home"], "id": "60132078-bf44-4c80-b228-7975184f9bf1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["DCFS then learned of Mother's criminal history spanning from 1993 until as recently as late 2017. In October 2017, six months before the DCFS referral, Mother was arrested and charged with driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol and reckless driving. As a result, she was convicted of reckless driving. Six months earlier, in March 2017, Mother had been arrested and charged with another DUI and *356convicted of an unknown misdemeanor offense. In 2013, she was arrested for possession of paraphernalia and battery on a police officer; she was convicted of the latter charge. In 2005, she was convicted of <mask>. In 1996 and 1997, she successfully completed diversion after being charged for possession of controlled substances. In 1993, she was charged with resisting arrest and convicted of presenting false identification to a peace officer."], "id": "42afbe48-7fec-4d5a-8a09-7ad2619cdaf8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner said that when Officer Williams arrested him in this case, the officer told him that he \u201cfit the description of someone hav[ing] something to do with a robbery\u201d and that he was taking him in for an identification. The petitioner said that, at the police station, he was placed in an interview room and that he identified himself from a photographic array, at which point he saw Detective Frias make a copy of the photograph and \u201ccircle my face twice.\u201d Detective Frias then told the petitioner that he was under arrest. The petitioner said that when he told Officer Williams that he was not involved in the robbery, the officer \u201ctold me, we know you didn\u2019t do nothing, prove it to the judge.\u201d The petitioner said that he told all of this to trial counsel but that counsel never sought a copy of the citation for <mask> that Officer Williams gave him. The petitioner said that he wanted trial counsel \u201cto let the [c]ourt know that Officer D. Williams threatened me with this\u201d but that counsel \u201cwent about my case trying to prove where I was at the time of the crime.\u201d"], "id": "667ba3bd-3265-4643-a1b3-7427a6ea6b94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["sentenced him to 10 days in jail for each conviction, the sen- tences to run concurrently. After sentencing, Grant perfected a timely appeal to the district court for Lancaster County. Sitting as an intermediate court of appellate review, that court affirmed. Grant again per- fected a timely appeal, and we moved his appeal to our docket. II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Grant assigns that the district court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences. Specifically, Grant contends that (1) the speech for which he was convicted of <mask> was constitutionally protected, (2) there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to support his convictions, and (3) his sentences were excessive. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [1-3] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the district court sits as an intermediate court of appeals. 1 Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record. 2 When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court\u2019s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 3 [4-6] In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. 4 Such matters are for the finder of fact. 5 Absent prejudicial error, a conviction will generally be affirmed so long as the evidence admitted at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the elements of conviction See State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (2021). Id. See id. See State v. Estrada Comacho, 309 Neb. 494, 960 N.W.2d 739 (2021). Id. - 708 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "d3c40f88-02ce-42a1-b943-73a447030ffb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the present case before this court, proof has been submitted by the People that the Hilton Curfew Law was passed with a more specific governmental interest in mind \u2014 that is, to curb disturbances and vandalism caused by minors, and also to protect the children of the municipality. (See Hilton Village Code \u00a7 5-2.) As submitted in the affidavit of Village Manager Janet Surridge and the affirmation of Village Attorney Lawrence Schwind, it appears that the impetus behind the Hilton Curfew Law was an ongoing issue with minors <mask> and engaging in vandalism after dark. The Village Board received numerous complaints from village residents and reports from the Monroe County Sheriffs Department about minors in the village. In short, the aim of the Hilton Curfew Law was to curb specific behavior perpetrated by minors in particular. The proof offered in support of the Hilton Curfew Law is hardly scientific in nature, but as the United States Supreme Court has held, the Village need not prove the relationship between its curfew and its stated goals with scientific certainty. (See Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 642-643 [1968].) In showing a substantial nexus between the burdens imposed by the Hilton Curfew Law and the goals of protecting minors and preventing juvenile crime, the Supreme Court has explained that although the government need not produce evidence of this relationship to a scientific certainty (see Ginsberg at 642-643), the \u201cpurpose of requiring [proof of] that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.\u201d (City of Rochester, 13 NY3d at 48, quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 725-726 [1982].) The proof also offered to this court demonstrates that the Hilton Curfew Law was enacted in response to complaints about minors specifically and there is no question that \u201cthe population targeted by the [curfew] represents] that part of the population causing trouble.\u201d (Id. at 49.)"], "id": "3de3bd42-bb21-41cf-9bda-c40fc749ee40", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["J.G. participated in a fist fight at his school and, when a teacher tried to stop the fight, used a racial slur against that teacher. He called the teacher a \"nigger.\" He admitted in juvenile court that he committed the misdemeanor of <mask> on school grounds. ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 415.5, subd. (a)(1).)1 The juvenile court judge granted probation on several conditions, including the condition that his electronic devices would be subject to *1087search. Appellant contends the electronic search condition bears no relationship to his offense and is unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm."], "id": "22cf4345-047c-45c2-84fc-4ec23c0b0f3e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["this mediation may be verified outside of the mediation process and used as evidence in subsequent legal proceedings.\u201d (Italics added.) The mediation agreement itself also specifically provides, immediately above the signature line, that \u201cthis written settlement may be disclosed in a court of law. Upon disclosure, this agreement may be admitted as evidence and/or enforced as determined to be appropriate by the court.\u201d Thus, the parties\u2019 agreements as a whole counsel against an expansive reading of the nondisparagement clause. Second, the mediation agreement is inextricably linked to the broader context in which it was negotiated \u2014 i.e., in a proceeding for a civil harassment restraining order. This context is critical. (See Civ. Code, \u00a7 1647 [\u201cA contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which it relates.\u201d]; id., \u00a7 1648 [\u201cHowever broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract.\u201d].) Such a proceeding is statutorily designed to narrowly focus on interpersonal conflict. Its purpose, when warranted by the circumstances, is to prevent threatened future injury through a resulting \u201corder enjoining a party from harassing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, abusing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls, as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of, or <mask> of, the petitioner.\u201d (\u00a7 527.6, subd. (b)(6)(A).) The narrow focus of these proceedings is communicated to petitioners through instructions issued by the Judicial Council."], "id": "aa8d3042-4cc1-4ef9-b042-420326985f91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["(b) Sentencing The presentence investigation (PSI) report considered by the court prior to sentencing was 400 pages. It showed as Blake\u2019s adult criminal history a recent conviction in another case, case No. CR 18-846, for attempted first degree sexual assault, the conviction for assault in case No. CR 19-914 that was part of the plea bargain agreement, two prior convictions for third degree assault, and a conviction for <mask>. Blake had earned his diploma through the GED program and completed a \u201cDBT skills program\u201d while incarcerated. A review of misconduct reports showed Blake \u201croutinely violates the rules.\u201d Blake described himself as a \u201csex addict.\u201d However, he denied having committed the attempted sexual assault for which he was being sentenced. The PSI report demonstrated that Blake has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder, adolescent antisocial behavior, mood disorder, \u201cADHD,\u201d borderline intellectual functioning, post- traumatic stress disorder, schizophreniform disorder, and oppo- sitional defiant disorder. An evaluation completed in November 2019 showed Blake was in the \u201cvery high or high-risk range\u201d to reoffend. The PSI report showed Blake had become a state ward at the age of 9. Blake reported he was physically abused by his father and had experienced sexual abuse in some of his \u00adout-of-home placements. Before his removal from his parents\u2019 home, Blake \u201cwalked in on [his parents] having sex \u2018all the time,\u2019\u201d because they did not lock their door and he did not have his own room. In his placements as a juvenile, Blake had a history of inappropriate sexual behavior toward younger peers. This - 778 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BLAKE Cite as 310 Neb. 769"], "id": "021f9408-3ac8-414f-a383-baf7f5ef627e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*627In a brief argument, David states that Joannie's \"reading and disclosure of David's private text messages was also abuse,\" that it was \"<mask> under the\" Act. The argument is based on Joannie's admitted reading through some 20 text messages, and her talking to her four close friends about them. The trial court found this was not harassment. Properly so."], "id": "576b0f2f-5a01-4f89-910c-17c020b9cd33", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["19. Convictions: Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Complaints: Appeal and Error. Where an appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evi- dence to sustain a conviction under a municipal ordinance, an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record, but, instead, may apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint. 20. Ordinances: Complaints. Absent anything to the contrary, the language of a city ordinance as reproduced in the State\u2019s long-form complaint is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 21. Constitutional Law. Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 22. ____. Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a desig- nated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 23. ____. Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically associated with expression, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, including those which run through residential neighborhoods, whereas designated public forums are those that have not been historically associated with expression but which the government has opened for such use, such as civic auditoriums or public theaters. 24. ____. Nonpublic forums include government-owned property that is not a traditional or designated public forum, such as government offices and military bases. 25. Property: Words and Phrases. Private property is property which is protected from public appropriation, over which the owner has exclusive and absolute rights. 26. Constitutional Law: Public Health and Welfare: <mask>. The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals, and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community, including the power to prevent disturbing noises. 27. Constitutional Law. The right to be let alone is one of the rights most valued by civilized society. The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home and its immediate surroundings. 28. ____. In either a traditional or designated public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions (1) are content neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. - 703 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "ce15317e-f863-4de7-b7bb-e417afd48865", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["2. Conviction for Assault or Menacing Threats Having determined that Grant\u2019s conviction for <mask> must be affirmed, we next consider his conviction for assault or menacing threats. Grant does not challenge the constitutionality of this conviction, but, rather, he assigns that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction. We disagree. [31] When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 Our analysis would generally begin with the language of the ordinance that Grant was convicted of violating. 47 But, again, the defendant has failed to include the ordinance at issue in the record, so we may not consider that ordinance\u2019s text. 48 We must instead apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the See State v. Estrada Comacho, supra note 4. See In re Interest of Elainna R., supra note 28. See State v. Buescher, supra note 29. - 717 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "5415f315-899a-4eb7-9bdc-50f29771bdd2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["According to the State\u2019s complaint, \u201cCount 1\u201d defined Grant\u2019s offense of \u201cdisturbing the peace\u201d as \u201cIntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood.\u201d The prohibition against <mask>, as described by the State in its charging document, makes no reference to the content of speech and does not target particular speech on its face due to the content discussed or the viewpoint expressed. Instead, the rule is content neutral. We recognize that the State elicited and relied on evidence of the content of Grant\u2019s speech at trial. Such evidence was unnecessary, however, to establish a violation under the lan- guage of the disturbing the peace charge in the complaint (i.e., \u201c[i]ntentionally or knowingly disturb the peace and quiet of any person, family, or neighborhood . . .\u201d). We also note that Grant registered no contemporaneous objection to the admis- sion of evidence regarding the content of his speech. [21] Where a law is content neutral on its face, the court must then determine the forum in which the speech takes place, as the government\u2019s ability to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech varies according to the type of forum. 32 [22-25] Speech may take place in a traditional public forum, in a designated public forum, in a nonpublic forum, or on private property. 33 Traditional public forums are those places which are owned by the government and historically \u201c\u2018have been devoted to assembly and debate,\u2019\u201d 34 \u201c\u2018communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.\u2019\u201d 35 Public streets, sidewalks, and parks fall into this category, including streets and sidewalks which run through residential See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983). See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985). See id., 473 U.S. at 802. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Assn., supra note 32, 460 U.S. at 45. - 713 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "859def88-2d82-4a78-826f-69c998e4baf6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["2. Conviction for Assault or Menacing Threats Having determined that Grant\u2019s conviction for <mask> must be affirmed, we next consider his conviction for assault or menacing threats. Grant does not challenge the constitutionality of this conviction, but, rather, he assigns that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction. We disagree. [31] When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 Our analysis would generally begin with the language of the ordinance that Grant was convicted of violating. 47 But, again, the defendant has failed to include the ordinance at issue in the record, so we may not consider that ordinance\u2019s text. 48 We must instead apply the ordinance\u2019s text as reproduced in the See State v. Estrada Comacho, supra note 4. See In re Interest of Elainna R., supra note 28. See State v. Buescher, supra note 29. - 717 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "023331e1-2870-4ee3-8ae5-ddfd1dda8d09", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["An elder who has suffered abuse may petition the superior court for an order \"enjoining a party from abusing, intimidating, ... threatening, ... harassing, ... or <mask> of, the petitioner.\" (\u00a7 15657.03, subds. (a)(1), (b)(4)(A).) The petitioner has the burden to prove a past act of elder abuse by preponderance of the evidence. ( Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1139-1140, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 2 ( Bookout ).)"], "id": "5553ad9e-9394-474f-9a71-c119cf28cdd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["sentenced him to 10 days in jail for each conviction, the sen- tences to run concurrently. After sentencing, Grant perfected a timely appeal to the district court for Lancaster County. Sitting as an intermediate court of appellate review, that court affirmed. Grant again per- fected a timely appeal, and we moved his appeal to our docket. II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Grant assigns that the district court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences. Specifically, Grant contends that (1) the speech for which he was convicted of <mask> was constitutionally protected, (2) there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to support his convictions, and (3) his sentences were excessive. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [1-3] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the district court sits as an intermediate court of appeals. 1 Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record. 2 When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court\u2019s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 3 [4-6] In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. 4 Such matters are for the finder of fact. 5 Absent prejudicial error, a conviction will generally be affirmed so long as the evidence admitted at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the elements of conviction See State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (2021). Id. See id. See State v. Estrada Comacho, 309 Neb. 494, 960 N.W.2d 739 (2021). Id. - 708 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "a5099e8b-3140-4a60-9a7b-748d89f0ed99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["State\u2019s evidence, and Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report. According to Grant\u2019s presentence investigation report, Grant was 50 years old at the time of sentencing and had a criminal history dating back to his youth, including convictions in 1996 for third degree assault and in 1987 for attempted burglary. Grant also had recent minor traffic offenses. He had dropped out of high school during the 11th grade, and then for about 2 years, he had been part of a criminal gang. Throughout his life, Grant had struggled to maintain steady employment and was currently unemployed. He reported maintaining few healthy relationships throughout his adulthood. After reviewing this evidence, the county court ordered 10 days in jail for each conviction, to run concurrently, noting that \u201cany less sentence this Court would impose would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect for the law.\u201d Despite Grant\u2019s emphasis on his positive achievements, the record provides a sound basis for the sentences imposed. Accordingly, Grant\u2019s convictions and resulting sentences were not in error. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, we affirm Grant\u2019s con- victions for <mask> and for assault or menacing threats and find that the resulting sentences were not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed."], "id": "82747b25-ef25-4cb4-b49f-473e21c3f9ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["(b) Sentencing The presentence investigation (PSI) report considered by the court prior to sentencing was 400 pages. It showed as Blake\u2019s adult criminal history a recent conviction in another case, case No. CR 18-846, for attempted first degree sexual assault, the conviction for assault in case No. CR 19-914 that was part of the plea bargain agreement, two prior convictions for third degree assault, and a conviction for <mask>. Blake had earned his diploma through the GED program and completed a \u201cDBT skills program\u201d while incarcerated. A review of misconduct reports showed Blake \u201croutinely violates the rules.\u201d Blake described himself as a \u201csex addict.\u201d However, he denied having committed the attempted sexual assault for which he was being sentenced. The PSI report demonstrated that Blake has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder, adolescent antisocial behavior, mood disorder, \u201cADHD,\u201d borderline intellectual functioning, post- traumatic stress disorder, schizophreniform disorder, and oppo- sitional defiant disorder. An evaluation completed in November 2019 showed Blake was in the \u201cvery high or high-risk range\u201d to reoffend. The PSI report showed Blake had become a state ward at the age of 9. Blake reported he was physically abused by his father and had experienced sexual abuse in some of his \u00adout-of-home placements. Before his removal from his parents\u2019 home, Blake \u201cwalked in on [his parents] having sex \u2018all the time,\u2019\u201d because they did not lock their door and he did not have his own room. In his placements as a juvenile, Blake had a history of inappropriate sexual behavior toward younger peers. This - 778 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BLAKE Cite as 310 Neb. 769"], "id": "b080312b-ec67-4176-8bab-d600ae121078", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Heavican, C.J. The appellant, Kenneth W. Grant, Jr., accused of shouting in a loud, menacing, and persistent manner from his apart- ment\u2019s balcony at persons across the street, was convicted of <mask> and of assault or menacing threats, both in violation of city ordinances in Lincoln, Nebraska. He asks us to overturn those convictions and their resulting 10-day jail sentences. We do not analyze whether Grant\u2019s speech included fight- ing words or true threats, because even if Grant\u2019s speech was protected, we conclude the State may regulate it through reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. Thus, we affirm Grant\u2019s 10-day jail sentence for that conviction. We find that Grant\u2019s conviction for assault or menacing threats was supported by sufficient evidence. We also affirm that conviction."], "id": "53bd8ee4-2963-4f25-9cf4-795420d97a6c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In Cox v. Louisiana (supra) appellant, a leader of approximately 1,500 students who had peacefully demonstrated in the vicinity of the Baton Rouge Court House, against discrimination generally and particularly the jailing of 23 fellow students subsequently refused a Sheriff\u2019s order to break up the demonstration as it was about to move uptown to several luncheon counters to protest discrimination there by means of a sit-in. Tear gas dispersed the demonstrators, and the following day appellant Cox was arrested, and later convicted of <mask>, obstructing public passages and picketing before a court house. The court, in reciting the facts, pointed out that the entire demonstration was orderly and peaceful and there was no obstruction of traffic. There was further evidence that the police had condoned the demonstration at the courthouse so long as the group remained on the \u201c west sidewalk \u201d and that Cox had kept them there. The only evidence of potential unrest was some \u201c muttering and grumbling \u201d by some whites as Cox spoke of the \u201c illegal arrest \u201d of the 23 students and then asked the crowd to move uptown to the lunch counters and sit in for an hour if they were refused service."], "id": "91444b93-bf64-4f35-9534-b2bc92d00a19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Under section 213.5, subdivision (a), after \"a petition has been filed ... to declare a child a dependent child of the juvenile court, and until the time that the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated,\" a juvenile court may issue an order \"enjoining any person from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, ... destroying the personal property, contacting, ... or <mask> of the child ....\" The subdivision also permits the court to issue orders including the child's parent as a person protected from the behaviors listed above."], "id": "bb7c9f32-86eb-4fc9-a236-f221665393b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Disturbing the Peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 Whether the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, however, is a question of law, and an appellate court will therefore review the district court\u2019s rul- ings on those issues de novo. 7 [7,8] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, an appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits. 8 A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly unten- able, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition. 9 IV. ANALYSIS 1. Conviction for <mask> Grant assigns, first, that his conviction for disturbing the peace was in error because the speech underlying his convic- tion was protected by U.S. Const. amend. I and Neb. Const. art. I, \u00a7 5. Grant argues that because his speech was protected, it could not be criminally proscribed. Grant does not claim his conviction for assault or menacing threats is unconstitutional; hence, we need not consider it in any constitutional analysis. [9,10] The 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, appli- cable to the states via the 14th Amendment, 10 provides in relevant part that \u201cCongress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .\u201d Similarly, under the Nebraska Constitution, \u201c[e]very person may freely speak . . . on all sub- jects . . . .\u201d 11 We have recognized that the \u201c\u2018parameters of the constitutional right to freedom of speech are the same under See id. See, Carney v. Miller, 287 Neb. 400, 842 N.W.2d 782 (2014); State v. Drahota, 280 Neb. 627, 788 N.W.2d 796 (2010). See State v. Greer, 309 Neb. 667, 962 N.W.2d 217 (2021). Id. NIFLA v. Becerra, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018). Neb. Const. art. I, \u00a7 5. - 709 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GRANT Cite as 310 Neb. 700"], "id": "5ea392df-3be3-48d5-9ae4-7a97547d5a07", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "disturbing the peace", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In Cox v. Louisiana (supra) appellant, a leader of approximately 1,500 students who had peacefully demonstrated in the vicinity of the Baton Rouge Court House, against discrimination generally and particularly the jailing of 23 fellow students subsequently refused a Sheriff\u2019s order to break up the demonstration as it was about to move uptown to several luncheon counters to protest discrimination there by means of a sit-in. Tear gas dispersed the demonstrators, and the following day appellant Cox was arrested, and later convicted of <mask>, obstructing public passages and picketing before a court house. The court, in reciting the facts, pointed out that the entire demonstration was orderly and peaceful and there was no obstruction of traffic. There was further evidence that the police had condoned the demonstration at the courthouse so long as the group remained on the \u201c west sidewalk \u201d and that Cox had kept them there. The only evidence of potential unrest was some \u201c muttering and grumbling \u201d by some whites as Cox spoke of the \u201c illegal arrest \u201d of the 23 students and then asked the crowd to move uptown to the lunch counters and sit in for an hour if they were refused service."], "id": "a4deee10-df4d-4242-853e-d8d537076c03", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff asserts that she was subjected to verbal <mask> while performing her duties in Dr. Stein\u2019s medical office. In this connection, Ms. Goldman avers that, \u201cat least two (2) to three (3) times a day,\u201d she was the subject of remarks made by Dina Stein\u2019s mother (Dr. Stein\u2019s mother-in-law), Rachel Reichmann (named herein as Jane Doe) as follows: \u201coh you can\u2019t do anything all you do is sit like a glump\u201d and \u201cyou are so fat, so heavy.\u201d Ms. Goldman asserts that such comments created a hostile work environment and that such comments were condoned by Dr. and Mrs. Stein insofar as they did not repudiate them nor did they discipline Mrs. Reichmann for intoning such remarks."], "id": "8226883a-28bf-472c-8b61-5d7a3641c750", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["This prosecution for second degree criminal contempt (Penal Law \u00a7 215.50 [3]) and second degree <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 240.26 [1]) is founded upon allegations that defendant verbally harassed the complainant on May 7, 1996 and July 28, 1996, and pushed the complainant during the July 28th incident in violation of separate orders of protection. These orders were issued without any hearing to establish their truth. The only direct evidence inculpating the defendant was the complainant\u2019s own testimony. A potential witness to the July 28, 1996 incident, then employed by the complainant as a babysitter, was not called to testify. It appears she did testify in the Supreme Court action."], "id": "28b78b37-11dd-42fe-b74a-d4c076071f48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\"The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale * * * \"No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant\u2019s social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified *281physician\u201d (3A Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7 924a, at 736-737 [Chadbourn rev 1970]; italics deleted). Fortunately, the Wigmore position does not now seem to be accepted in any jurisdiction (Government of Virgin Is. v Scuito, 623d 869). Social and legal considerations that weigh heavily against ordering a complainant to undergo psychiatric examination in a sex case include the concepts that: (a) forced psychiatric examination may seriously impinge on a witness\u2019 right to privacy; (b) the trauma that attends the role of complainant to sex offenses is sharply increased by the indignity of a psychiatric examination; (c) the examination itself could serve as a tool of <mask>; and (d) the impact of all these considerations may well deter the victim of such a crime from lodging any complaint at all (Government of Virgin Is. v Scuito, supra; United States v Benn, 476d 1127, 1131)."], "id": "e2eeb9c5-e5b4-4043-9231-4dfb1b99f075", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*417Rose argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of <mask>. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Castrellon v. State , 2013 Ark. App. 408, 428 S.W.3d 607. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Armour v. State , 2016 Ark. App. 612, 509 S.W.3d 668. This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Reese v. State , 2018 Ark. App. 336, 552 S.W.3d 47. We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial nor do we weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses are for the trier of fact. Robinson v. State , 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003). The fact-finder is not required to believe any witness's testimony, especially the testimony of the accused, because the accused is the person most interested in the outcome of the trial. Mooney v. State , 2009 Ark. App. 622, 331 S.W.3d 588. With these standards in mind, we turn our attention to the evidence presented at trial."], "id": "f96563c6-de73-4bd5-b1ae-195fb7189da8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Accepting the defendant\u2019s argument would require acceptance of the proposition that the alleged later-in-time verbal threat was necessarily an integral part of the intent involved *359in the earlier allegation of <mask>. At the first trial the defendant was acquitted of harassment by letter. The alleged act of verbal abuse submitted to the jury on the intent issue was considerably separate in time from the writing of the December and February letters. Thus, even though the defendant may have been found not to have had the intent to harass by letter, it is entirely possible that a fact finder may reach the conclusion that the defendant intended at a later point in time to violate the order prohibiting harassment of the complainant. Moreover, such determination would not conflict with the possible determination made by the earlier panel that defendant did not have the intent requisite to convict on the aggravated harassment charge."], "id": "3608fa4b-8933-4820-8d9a-039750d85730", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["of the petitioner treat a petition for a sexual assault protection order as a request for a domestic abuse protection order or <mask> protection order, fulfilling the requirements of the amended \u00a7 28-311.11, it did not make clear to Juan that such action was applicable where an ex parte protection order had already been entered against him. Instead, the forms served upon Juan seemed to indicate that such action was applicable only if the judge had set the petition for hearing to allow the parties to present evidence prior to issuing an order. As a result, this notice did not reasonably inform Juan of the subject and issues involved in the proceeding."], "id": "e3100aeb-0fac-41ca-b510-dcc71c367dcb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["26. Hearsay. Statements offered to show their effect on the listener are not hearsay. 27. ____. Statements are not hearsay to the extent they are offered for con- text and coherence of other admissible statements and not for the truth or the truth of the matter asserted. 28. Witnesses: Impeachment: Prior Convictions. The basic premise underlying impeachment of a witness by evidence of a prior felony conviction is that any past felony committed by the witness is to some degree relevant to that individual\u2019s credibility. 29. Witnesses. Credibility of a witness is not at issue when the truth of the assertions are not in dispute. 30. Judges: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The exercise of judicial dis- cretion is implicit in determinations of relevancy, and a trial court\u2019s decision regarding relevancy will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 31. Constitutional Law: Trial: Witnesses. The Confrontation Clause guar- antees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, but not in what- ever way or to whatever extent the defendant might wish, and trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross- examination based on concerns about, among other things, <mask>, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness\u2019 safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 32. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To show that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient, a defendant must show that counsel\u2019s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law. 33. Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions. In assessing deficiency in counsel\u2019s performance, a court presumes that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reason- able professional judgment. 34. Effectiveness of Counsel. Trial counsel\u2019s decisions that amount to rea- sonable trial strategy do not constitute deficient performance. 35. ____. Decisions about whether to engage in cross-examination, and if so to what extent and in what manner, are strategic in nature and generally will not support an ineffective assistance claim. 36. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. An appellate court does not use perfect hindsight to criticize unsuccessful trial strategies or second-guess trial strategy. 37. Expert Witnesses: Words and Phrases. An expert does not have to couch his or her opinion in the magic words of reasonable certainty, but it must be sufficiently definite and relevant to provide a basis for the fact finder\u2019s determination of a material fact. - 395 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WOOD Cite as 310 Neb. 391"], "id": "bb2d221a-1c8b-40ee-b8f4-5c1420240b48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, the Court's definition of \"harass\" actually narrows the statute unduly by reading a repetition element into the statute that the language does not require. As explained above, not all definitions of \"harass\" require repetition. If the legislature had intended to require repeated communications, it could have easily specified that, as it did in the telephone <mask> statute.19 A repetition requirement would also seem inconsistent with the pairing of \"harassing\" with \"threatening\" in the protective-order statute, because repetition is clearly not required for a communication to be \"threatening.\"20 Although repetition may generally be necessary to show the harassing nature of communication, under any reasonable understanding of \"harassing manner,\" a single unwanted communication, if severe enough, could qualify (e.g., calling the complainant at 3:00 a.m. to tell her, untruthfully, that her house was burning down). And if repetition is not required, then \"substantial emotional distress\" again becomes a necessary marker for \"harassing manner.\""], "id": "13ba7667-17bc-43f6-979a-b91370946229", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*713Rudow\u2019s reliance on the fact that there were no firsthand witnesses to the incidents of sexual <mask> is similarly misplaced, since, as the Court of Appeals has noted \u201c \u2018One intent on violating the Law Against Discrimination cannot be expected to declare or announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and elusive \u2014 for we deal with an area in which \u201csubtleties of conduct * * * play no small part\u201d.\u2019 \u201d (State Div. of Human Rights v Kilian Mfg. Corp., 35 NY2d, at p 209.) Nor does Alvarez\u2019s failure to produce as witnesses the professionals whose aid she sought seriously detract from her claim."], "id": "20729644-8792-42cd-81f4-0085ed668917", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The motion was supported by declarations from three attorneys representing certain current and former PG&E employees who were witnesses or potential witnesses in the Camp Fire investigation. Attorney Britt Evangelist declared that she represented a number of current or former PG&E employees in low- to mid-supervisory roles in the company, who were witnesses or potential witnesses in the Camp Fire investigation. Evangelist grouped her clients into two categories that corresponded to the first two of the eight categories described in the motion. She described seven clients in the first category, all of whom lived in or near the area affected by the Camp Fire. Evangelist described three clients in the second category. The geographic location of these employees was not included in their descriptions. Evangelist declared that the majority of her clients in the first category \u201cwho live and work in the Table Mountain and/or Camp Fire region have either experienced <mask> of some sort firsthand or have knowledge of close co-workers or family members who have.\u201d According to Evangelist, these PG&E employees had taken steps to hide that they work for PG&E, only telling friends and family and not wearing their PG&E uniforms in restaurants and public places. One client did not use his company vehicle for a year after the fire to avoid harassment. Evangelist set forth specific examples of harassment experienced by these local PG&E employees including: cars slowing down for the occupants to yell insults and obscenities; a confrontation with the driver of a pickup truck where the client feared for his safety; neighbors and others making obscene gestures at her clients when they drove PG&E vehicles; a PG&E truck being egged in front of an employee\u2019s home; signs in stores or restaurants that PG&E employees were not welcome; construction or other work requiring a police or security escort on the property of certain customers; and the driver of a vehicle coming on to a PG&E construction site, pointing a gun out the window, firing and driving off."], "id": "9e3a477a-101d-4053-a995-631348a470a1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant\u2019s answer alleges lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, defendant asserts counterclaims seeking recovery for retaliatory eviction, breach of warranty of habitability, <mask> and abuse of process. In April 1985, plaintiff served a demand for a bill of particulars with respect to the above. In July 1985, defendant consented to an order precluding her from proving the counterclaims unless she served the bill within 45 days. Since the 45-day period has passed, the counterclaims should be dismissed as abandoned."], "id": "66b6ff0c-6d60-4820-8815-493b783f213e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Brooks and Dobbs-Weinstein do not support defendant's assertion that plaintiff \"did not experience an adverse employment action.\" Brooks was a retaliation case, and the plaintiff \"allege[d] that her performance review was downgraded from 'satisfactory' to 'needs improvement' because of her complaint about [an episode of sexual <mask> by a coworker].\" ( Brooks, supra, 229 F.3d at p. 929.) The court observed that \"an undeserved negative performance review can constitute an adverse employment decision.\" ( Ibid. ) But in Brooks , the evaluation \"was not an adverse employment action because it was subject to modification by the [employer].\" ( Id. at pp. 929-930.) (The plaintiff had refused to accept the review and submitted a written appeal to her employer, expressing her view that the evaluation was intended to retaliate against her for complaining about the coworker's harassment. While her employer was considering her appeal, the plaintiff \"left work and never returned.\" ( Id. at p. 922.)) The court concluded that, \"[b]ecause the evaluation could well have been changed on appeal, it was not sufficiently final to constitute an adverse employment action.\" ( Id. at p. 930.)"], "id": "ccfb4120-6022-4884-9b98-f5989ea7961f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Dissenting, Judge W. Fletcher wrote that, while the physical location of the <mask> can be an important indicator of a school\u2019s control over the \u201ccontext\u201d of alleged harassment, the key consideration is whether the school had disciplinary authority over the harasser in the setting in which the harassment took place. Judge W. Fletcher wrote that an off-campus residence paid with scholarship funds that Brown\u2019s former boyfriend received from the university, and where students reside with permission of the school, is such a setting. Accordingly, the university had control over the \u201ccontext\u201d in which Brown was assaulted."], "id": "f903d042-f6fc-4ab5-85dd-e827c5f6b056", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The pro se plaintiffs move for a protective order (1) to have a Judge or Referee appointed to supervise disclosure, (2) to order that the party who takes a deposition bear the expenses thereof, (3) against defendants\u2019 \u201c<mask>, abuse, false innuendos, and prejudice, etc.\u201d, and (4) to suppress the deposition of plaintiff Urmas Mollerson, or improperly or irregularly taken information from the deposition; for an award of compensatory and nominal damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation; for a determination whether inquiry as to the pro se plaintiffs\u2019 personal backgrounds is relevant; to compel disclosure and impose CPLR 3126 penalties; to order defendants in action No. 1 to pay the pro se plaintiffs\u2019 litigation expenses, including those for serving and copying fees, and transportation costs; and to order those defendants not to bring up the issue of whether one pro se plaintiff wrote all of the papers for all of the pro se plaintiffs to sign. City Defendants cross-move to suppress the handwritten transcript of the deposition of plaintiff Urmas Mollerson and for leave to amend their answer to assert defenses of the Statute of Limitations, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and res judicata. The pro se plaintiffs cross-move to deny City Defendants\u2019 cross motion. Plaintiffs in action Nos. 2, 3, 7, and 9 move to consolidate action Nos. 2 through 9 for purposes of discovery and a joint trial, and to sever action No. 1 for all purposes. No one opposes the consolidation branch of the motion and only the pro se plaintiffs in action No. 1 oppose the severance part of the motion."], "id": "1e88f199-e417-475a-b11e-6798ef693255", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*160According to Siegel, Practice Commentary (McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3217:15, at 736), \u201c[t]he automatic \u2018on the merits\u2019 label that appends to a discontinuance by notice in the second action when a previous discontinuance has been had by any method is another step designed to protect the defendant from <mask>. When it is clear that the plaintiff has no harassment in mind in discontinuing the second action by notice, but only a legitimate purpose to effect, the \u2018on the merits\u2019 label will be held not to attach.\u201d"], "id": "a3e23a3b-43f6-4423-a72b-7f38125da6fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["However, even where trial courts have made such spe- cific findings, they should be attentive to potential issues of due process. [6] First, we have previously stated that the legal theories supporting either a sexual assault, domestic abuse, or harass- ment protection order are significantly different from one another and each require different offerings of proof. 27 For example, a domestic abuse protection order requires proof of abuse between family or household members. 28 A <mask> protection order requires proof that the petitioner was seriously terrified, threatened, or intimidated, for no legitimate purpose, as a result of a knowing and willful course of conduct by the respondent. 29 And a sexual assault protection order requires proof that the petitioner was subjected to sexual contact or penetration by the respondent without consent. 30 Despite the different offerings of proof required to support entry of any of these types of protection orders, the court, per the amended statute, is allowed to sua sponte change theories after the close of evidence and at a time when the defendant is no longer able to respond or present a defense regarding the newly selected theory, as long as it gives a good reason on the record. 31 Accordingly, the only way that a respondent in this situation could adequately prepare his or her defense is to prepare to defend against all possible theories that may be raised at a show cause hearing. To uphold our longstanding principles of due process, which embody and require a funda- mental fairness to all parties, 32 courts should ensure, prior to See Linda N. v. William N., supra note 11. See \u00a7\u00a7 42-903(1) and 42-924 (Cum. Supp. 2020). See Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 28-311.02 (Reissue 2016) and 28-311.09(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020). See \u00a7 28-311.11(1) and (14) (Cum. Supp. 2020). See \u00a7 28-311.11 (Supp. 2019). D.W. v. A.G., supra note 15. Accord In re Interest of Spencer O., 277 Neb. 776, 765 N.W.2d 443 (2009). - 766 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "cb844339-27cf-4671-b0e9-ffc2a365f53d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\"Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681 et seq. ) ( [t]itle IX), applicable to universities receiving any federal financial assistance, requires institutions of higher education to address discrimination on the basis of sex.\" (Doe v. University of Southern California (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1212, 1215, fn. 2, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 146.) At all relevant times, CSUSM had a designated title IX coordinator who also served as the university's discrimination, <mask>, and retaliation administrator. We refer to this person throughout this opinion as the \"title IX coordinator.\""], "id": "aac6f6d3-bd9c-4f4e-ab12-d8ec16d1e73e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Metro's actions that Ridley complains of happened both before and after her discrimination complaints. Granted, in some situations, \"an escalating pattern of <mask>, or that became worse after the [protected] report\" can be indicative of retaliatory motive. Id. Here, Ridley asserts that is exactly what happened, i.e., that Metro's allegedly adverse employment actions escalated after her protected reporting. But, on this record, it is clear that the measures taken with regard to Ridley coincided with a change in her supervisor, not with her reporting discrimination. Because we conclude that Ridley did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, we sustain Metro's third issue (no causal connection). Given this disposition, we need not reach Metro's first issue (no adverse employment action) or second issue (no constructive discharge)."], "id": "4d9fd2ca-4c9d-49fc-af66-82ee5fb70a9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the second element of favorable termination, Borja and Bancy argue that, since Pugach was convicted on one count of <mask> in the second degree, the underlying prosecution cannot be viewed as having been terminated in his favor. Although Pugach seeks to have this court ignore the conviction and focus only upon his acquittal on the criminal contempt charge, it may not properly do so. Plainly, all of the charges arise out of and relate to an alleged persistent course of conduct, carried out over a period of time."], "id": "3a496215-1e84-40ed-9bd5-68625a4625be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["and intentionally would take my personal property, mishandle my Epi-Pen with intent to break it, make inappropriate noises and comments about the Epi-Pen\u2019s shape and my use of it. I reported to [AHS band director] Nathan Carter numerous times that [J.F.] was bullying me, that he was taking possession of my personal belongings including the Epi-pen, threatening to break my Epi-pen, and damaging my purse. I reported to Mr. Carter that [J.F.] was name-calling and would use his body to make inappropriate movements. I asked Mr. Carter to make [J.F.] stop. Mr. Carter did not do anything to stop [J.F.] and the bullying continued. These allegations, however, describe only generalized bullying and do not suggest that AISD staff had knowledge that J.F. was engaged in the kind of <mask> \u201con the basis of sex\u201d with which Title IX is concerned. They do not create a genuine dispute of material fact as to AISD\u2019s actual knowledge of sexual harassment. See I.F. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 915 F.3d 360, 377 (5th Cir. 2019) (student telling administrators that she was \u201cseverely bullied\u201d did not put them on notice of sexual harassment); Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2008) (student telling administrators that boys were \u201cbothering her\u201d did not put staff on notice of sexual harassment). Even if we construe the references above to \u201cinappropriate\u201d comments by J.F. as describing sexually suggestive remarks, Title IX does not impose liability on school administrators based on their knowledge that a student made remarks \u201cmerely tinged with offensive sexual connotations.\u201d Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2002)). Nor does Ruvalcaba\u2019s reliance on R.M.\u2019s claim (recounted secondhand in Jaso\u2019s statement) that J.F. was spreading sexually suggestive"], "id": "7f24b5f3-0460-4650-83c7-824fe0119773", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThat being the case, defendant\u2019s arrest was not *496\u2018authorized,\u2019 nor did her striking his arm in reaction to the officer\u2019s attempt to detain her constitute <mask>. \u201c . . . Penal Law \u00a7 35.27, as its title indicates, is concerned with the defense of justification and does not amend Penal Law \u00a7 205.30 to make resistance to an unauthorized arrest an offense\u201d (People v Peacock, 68 NY2d 675, 677 [1986]). The judgment of the Wheatland Town Court, entered August 24, 2016, dismissing the charges is hereby affirmed and the People\u2019s appeal is dismissed."], "id": "6e3d7ef8-b49c-42ae-a0b8-d9fc0880f376", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Carolyn E. Demarest, J. Defendant Hector Dieppa stands convicted upon a jury verdict of two counts of discrimination as defined in subdivision (2) of Civil Rights Law \u00a7 40-c and one count of aggravated <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 240.30 [3]) arising out of two separate incidents on January 10, 1992 and *585February 6, 1992, in which the defendant either physically attacked or verbally threatened the life of the complainant Abdul Ghaffor Mohibi, an employee of a fast food store located on Eastern Parkway in Kings County."], "id": "66837705-bc1a-41df-a3a8-d5165632a1ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The main article was published under the headline \u201cHandcuff Principal is Probed\u201d. It reported that the Board of Education was investigating Jee in connection with charges of corporal punishment and other misconduct at the school and that Jee had been removed from control of the Livingston School by the Superintendent of Schools for Special Education. The alleged misconduct on Jee\u2019s part included the handcuffing of students, <mask> of teachers and the diversion of school resources, such as books and computers, for the possible operation of a private money-making enterprise known as Livingston Enterprises."], "id": "91285ed2-3ec4-41db-98a5-0b6322a3eb66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In August 2012, Hurley accepted an SSA position at DPR's Monterey location. On October 17, 2012, Hurley filed a complaint, alleging causes of action against both DPR and Seals for: (1) <mask> based on sex and sexual orientation in violation of FEHA; (2) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (3) IIED; and (4) NIED. It also alleged causes of action against DPR for: (1) failure to prevent harassment based on sex and sexual orientation in violation of FEHA; (2) employment discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to remedy harassment in violation of FEHA; and (4) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. On April 29 and 30, 2013, during the course of discovery in this case, Seals's counsel delivered to Hurley over 9,000 pages of documents, including the supervisory drop file that Seals had retained after her retirement and given to her (Seals's) counsel. On or about December 20, 2013, Hurley filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint, which would add causes of action against Defendants for: (1) invasion of constitutional *225right to privacy; (2) invasion of privacy by public disclosure; (3) breach of medical confidentiality; and (4) violation of the IPA. On that date, the trial court granted Hurley's motion for leave and her first amended complaint was filed. The court subsequently granted in part DPR's motion for summary adjudication and dismissed the causes of action against DPR for IIED, NIED, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. The court denied Seals's motion for summary adjudication on the four privacy causes of action."], "id": "ed5044ac-1b7f-4608-8905-ed72b7ff0e8a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The DVD that was introduced through Captain Torraca showed the incident in *270the jail, and the circuit court watched the video and relied on it in reaching its decision to revoke Caldwell's SIS. The DVD, therefore, is an item that is \"essential for the appellate court to understand the case and decide the issues on appeal\" and is thus required to be in the addendum. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8)(A)(i). Caldwell's addendum, however, contains only a photocopy of a photograph of the DVD, not the disc itself. We must therefore order Caldwell to submit a supplemental addendum that includes a physical copy of the DVD. See Fennell v. State , 2015 Ark. App. 523, at 2, 2015 WL 5734394 (ordering rebriefing where the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his <mask> conviction, and a DVD-which was not included in the addendum-included appellant's exchanges with the victim-witnesses at the event where appellant was alleged to have committed harassment). Caldwell shall have seven calendar days to submit the supplemental addendum. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)(4)."], "id": "4f0c9bd8-e575-4baf-a31b-4732195fa57b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Wassmann filed this lawsuit in December 2013 after receiving the right to sue notice from the DFEH. The second *723amended complaint asserted six causes of action: (1) age discrimination, (2) racial discrimination-disparate treatment, (3) <mask> (hostile environment), (4) wrongful termination, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (6) unfair business practices. The first, second, fourth and sixth causes of action were against only the District Defendants. The third and fifth causes of action were against all Defendants. Wassmann alleged that, as a proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory conduct, she suffered: (1) loss of employment and employment benefits; (2) loss of \"employment-related opportunities;\" and (3) \"humiliation, mental anguish, emotional and physical harm.\""], "id": "0774beb7-bc1b-44f7-b9c8-3330e8a08b4c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to petitioner\u2019s demand for records showing who was on duty in the LDU on the dates in question, the hospital argues that \u201cwithout the appropriate showing of relevancy it can be deemed as a potentially <mask> tactic.\u201d (Russo affirmation U 7.) The material is relevant as a record of potential witnesses, and with respect to petitioner\u2019s defense that someone else is responsible for the manner in which morphine was administered or accounted for. Therefore, it must be produced."], "id": "fd7b5545-7860-4c51-84cd-059c5c54e80e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["When the court decided Carrisales, former section 12940, subdivision (h)(1) provided: \"It shall be an unlawful employment practice ...: [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] For an employer ... or any other person, because of ... sex, ... to harass an employee [or] applicant. ... <mask> of an employee [or] applicant ... by an employee other than an agent or supervisor shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. An entity shall take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment from occurring.\" (See Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1135, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.)"], "id": "aa314639-300f-46d3-9bfe-58e3f18c44ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Further, \u201c Section 11a provides that a suit may be stayed which \u2018 is founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be a release.\u2019 This dischargeability of the debt, as covered by \u00a7 17 of the Act, is made the basis of jurisdiction and there should be no stay granted unless the debt or claim involved will be discharged under the provisions of the Act, even though the claimant is listed as a creditor in the bankrupt\u2019s schedule.\u201d (Collier, Bankruptcy Manual, p. 162.) It is therefore obvious that the purpose of the stay is to prevent the <mask> of a bankrupt or the dissipation of his assets. A stay cannot be obtained for a debt which is not dischargeable, or where a discharge is even debatable. Thus, one could not be available to the bankrupt, in the case at bar, before, during, or after his bankruptcy petition had been filed."], "id": "6feed90e-e04b-4a55-ae8e-f89c9a7a7cfc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*526\" Section 821.6 provides that '[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.' This immunity provision is to be construed broadly so as to further 'its purpose to protect public employees in the performance of their prosecutorial duties from the threat of <mask> through civil suits.' [Citations.] For purposes of this immunity provision, investigations are deemed to be part of judicial and administrative proceedings.\" ( Strong v. State of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1461, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 ( Strong ).)"], "id": "52457a61-c8f6-4a1f-9897-2ae7b9e6846d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants interposed four counterclaims against Cortes claiming damages for conversion of money and corporate property for his own purposes, misrepresentation of corporate expenses, breach of the contract to sell his shares to defendants for the sum paid for such shares and various alleged breaches of his duty to perform his duties as manager in a responsible manner. This court dismissed defendants\u2019 first and second counterclaims for conversion and fraud as a matter of law based upon inadequacies in the pleading. In response to plaintiffs in limine motion prior to trial, the court precluded any evidence of sexual <mask> as alleged in the fourth counterclaim as no such evidence had been adduced in response to discovery demands."], "id": "2761d059-4abf-4ed3-9b97-ed20433bb282", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court is also aware that another line of cases has developed which indicates that acquittal on the underlying charges is not a bar to prosecution of a resisting arrest charge. (People v Simms, 36 AD2d 23; People v Santiago, 69 Misc 2d 1098.) In any event, the present case is not directly controlled by either line of cases. We note that in this case there has *121been no adjudication as to the merits of the <mask> charge. The reason for this failure was the refusal of the defendant\u2019s wife to sign the information charging harassment. It appears to this court that a dismissal of the resisting arrest charge merely because of a refusal to prosecute the underlying charge would discourage the efforts of the police in assisting in civilian arrests, as they are required to do by CPL 140.40 (subd 1). Such a result would frustrate the legislative intent apparent in CPL 140.30 and 140.40. The court therefore concludes that the proper inquiry in situations such as the one now before it is whether the underlying arrest was in fact \"authorized\u201d at the time it was made. Any subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute is irrelevant to this inquiry. We therefore now turn to the second theory upon which defendant moves to dismiss."], "id": "88505109-06f1-40a0-a2d4-1fc2e70e6ee3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Professor David Siegel, in his commentary to CPLR 3101 at page 8 of McKinney\u2019s Consolidated Laws of New York (Book 7B) observed: \"Acknowledging that the unfettered use of the disclosure devices can in a given instance work to the undue detriment of a litigant with limited resources, or otherwise be used more for the purpose of <mask> and delay than the legitimate ends of litigation, article 31 supplies a device known as a 'protective order\u2019 (CPLR 3103). That provision, which affords the court a wide discretion in preventing abusive resort to the disclosure devices, has general application to all of article 31, and so it, too, should be kept in mind by the lawyer who wants to familiarize himself with the Article\u2019s structure.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.)"], "id": "07a8f76c-119e-4b11-a1af-8ebe1f478814", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["submitted from Evangelist detailed incidents of <mask> and threats received by her PG&E employee clients who lived in the community affected by the Camp Fire. Evangelist admitted that her nonlocal PG&E employee clients had not experienced such harassment and threats. Rather, they were concerned because of incidents reported in the media and company bulletins. Kane stated in her declaration that most of her PG&E employee clients were local and many had been subjected to harassment and mistreatment from members of the community due to the fact her clients wore PG&E uniforms and operated PG&E vehicles. Gourse did not identify any of his clients as local. He described two incidents of harassment reported by one client that had occurred since the Camp Fire: one incident involved a PG&E employee being held at gun point that occurred in Napa because of a planned power outage and another incident involved a hostile conversation that may have included an indirect reference to the Camp Fire. PG&E\u2019s exhibit compiling incidents from 2010 through 2020 included only three reports of hostile communications and threats made outside the local community mentioning the Camp Fire. To be sure, of the many incidents since the Camp Fire included in the exhibit, only 13 took place in the counties included in the superior court\u2019s order, but at least four of those involved gunshots at or in the vicinity of PG&E vehicles, and one an encounter with a person who threw PG&E gear in the garbage and caused a PG&E crew to evacuate the area and call the police when the person returned with a gun. Incidents of post-Camp Fire harassment and violence, not just threats, against PG&E employees outside the affected area were not connected to the fire. With respect to PG&E\u2019s Power Point of electronically communicated threats, petitioners have not provided any evidence that these messages, some of which involved threats to murder named PG&E employees, led to any other conduct that posed a risk to a PG&E employee. One message was from an individual who claimed to have collected and intended to publish the personal cell phone numbers of PG&E executives. This"], "id": "c23839d0-7d8a-43c8-b840-0da8f4414c3e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Second. When they have reason to believe that a crime has been committed, they have the power to summon and compel the attendance of any witness and examine him upon all matters that are relevant or material to the subject of inquiry. They have not the power to summon a witness and examine him upen matters that are wholly unconnected with or unrelated to the subject of inquiry. The process of the grand jury can be used only for the purpose of aiding a lawful inquiry, and it must not be used for the purpose of oppression or <mask>."], "id": "fdfd3ab5-2df8-4e3f-a7fc-93068bd30e7b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In this derivative action, plaintiffs, individual and institutional shareholders of W. R. Grace & Co. (Grace),1 assert two causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendant directors in their amended complaint. The allegations arise out of three separate, but purportedly related, incidents. The first incident involves the payments and perquisites made to former Grace CEO, J. Peter Grace, Jr. (Grace Jr.) beyond that required by his employment agreement, and the efforts of the Board to avoid public disclosure of the terms of those payments. The second incident relates to an alleged misappropriation of Grace funds by J. P. Grace, III (Grace III), in connection with his operation of a Grace subsidiary. The third incident involves J. P. Bolduc, Grace Jr.\u2019s successor as CEO, who resigned after allegations of his sexual <mask> of several employees were apparently substantiated by Judge Harold Tyler, the special investigator appointed by the Board. It is alleged that Bolduc received a substantial and unjustified severance package. The defendants include Bolduc, Grace III, the estate of Grace Jr. and the members of the Board at the time of the incidents."], "id": "042690ed-a63f-4079-8e9b-ca558dc29029", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Mack filed her notice of appeal in propria persona. Because Mack has been found to be a vexatious litigant within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, subdivision (a), we stayed the appeal and ordered Mack to show \"that the litigation has merit and has not been taken for purposes of <mask> or delay.\" ( Code Civ. Proc., \u00a7 391.7, subd. (b).) Instead, Mack retained counsel and substituted retained counsel for herself on March 2, 2017. On June 20, 2017, we discharged the order to show cause \"[i]n light of retention of counsel\" and reset the briefing schedule."], "id": "08ba877b-3841-4644-abe5-a204b5d2d9ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The unanimous verdicts rendered in favor of plaintiff, Maureen McIntyre (plaintiff), on June 3 and June 4, 1997, on her claims of sexual <mask>, retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress and the award by the jury of $6.6 million in damages ($5 million of which were punitive damages) reflect the abhorrence of such behavior by contemporary society. Defendant, Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. (defendant), now moves herein for judgment, posttrial, setting aside the verdicts as a matter of law, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) or, alternatively, for a new trial on all issues; or to set aside or substantially remit the jury\u2019s compensatory and punitive damage awards."], "id": "5440f2f3-a9b5-4f36-8147-2b9d41a3484b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["they agree not to disparage one another, can lead to liability for statements made in a later unlimited civil lawsuit arising from the same alleged misconduct. II. The parties\u2019 dispute centers on the construction of their mediation agreement, which was reached within the context of a civil <mask> restraining order proceeding. (\u00a7 527.6.) We begin with some background on this specialized civil procedure. The Legislature enacted section 527.6 in 1978 in order \u201cto protect the individual\u2019s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.\u201d (Stats. 1978, ch. 1307, \u00a7 1, p. 4294; see Cal. Const., art. I, \u00a7 1.) The provision was intended to \u201c \u2018establish an expedited procedure for enjoining acts of \u201charassment\u201d \u2019 \u201d in order \u201c \u2018to provide quick relief to harassed persons.\u2019 \u201d (Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 400, 405 (Smith).) In the Legislature\u2019s view, \u201cprocedures under [then-]existing law\u201d \u2014 namely \u201ca tort action based either on invasion of privacy or on intentional infliction of emotional distress\u201d \u2014 were \u201cinadequate to remedy the mental and emotional distress suffered by a person,\u201d and \u201c[t]he length of time it takes to obtain an injunction in many cases is too long.\u201d (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3093 (1977\u2013 1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 1978, pp. 1\u20132.) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) enables a victim of \u201charassment\u201d to \u201cseek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.\u201d In its current form, section 527.6 provides \u201cfor the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice . . . on the same day that the petition is submitted to the court\u201d (\u00a7 527.6, subd. (e)) and generally requires the court to hold a hearing on the petition within 21 days (id., subd. (g))."], "id": "db0f9910-b7cb-4dae-a772-d4bae058125c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The patient, Dwayne Doxen, was apprehended in 1991 after a bizarre incident in the subway when he attempted to steal another passenger\u2019s bag, and then threatened and menaced other riders with a carpenter\u2019s saw. He threatened to chop one person\u2019s head off. He was arrested by the police, but pursuant to a plea he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease *328or defect. He was sent to Kirby Psychiatric Center, a secure facility. In July of 1992 he consented to a one-year order of retention, and was transferred to Manhattan Psychiatric Center. Shortly thereafter, he allegedly threatened other patients and staff, and was arrested after hitting another patient over the head with a sock full of batteries. He was arrested, and pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree, and he served six months in jail. Then, having again been found to be dangerously mentally ill, he was recommitted to Kirby. In October of 1993 he consented to a further order of retention and was transferred back to Manhattan State. Based on assessment by the staff, he was granted unescorted privileges. He eloped but returned, and then, in November of 1994, while being taken to court on yet another arrest, he escaped and remained at large until arrested for <mask> and violence against his common-law wife."], "id": "9cf03a2a-111c-46d4-8671-65af69eb1903", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["A Family Court petition under Family Court Act \u00a7 846 is not an \u201caccusatory instrument\u201d as defined by CPL 1.20. (People v Arnold, supra at 595.) The fact that Family Court Act \u00a7 812 would have permitted prosecution for aggravated <mask> in the second degree is irrelevant as the proceeding was brought pursuant to Family Court Act \u00a7 846. Moreover, as already discussed at great length above, Family Court Act \u00a7 846 specifically bars the Family Court from adjudicating the underlying behavior which gives rise to contempt of its orders. Accordingly, this court, in adhering to the plain language of New York\u2019s applicable statutes, finds no bar to this criminal prosecution and the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the aggravated harassment in the second degree charges as barred by double jeopardy is dismissed."], "id": "2b6d731b-5c60-4068-a8d9-180b33e8b205", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["It does not matter that Dixon was not on the payroll. Rather if true, it emphasizes the failure to properly supervise and manage the hotel in view of the previous convictions and general poor reputation of the hotel and the area. Section 2324 (subd 3, par [b]) states, \"finding of guilt of any person of a violation of section 230.40 of the penal law at such place shall be presumptive evidence of the nuisance\u201d. There was no unfair discrimination practiced by the police. The entire area was policed and there was no showing of undue <mask> on these premises."], "id": "f654eeb7-a9c5-45fd-830c-26ceb4d6dee9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u2018 \u2018 Many substantial complaints concerning fraud upon consumers, undue <mask> of debtors caused by abuse of the venue statutes, abuse of the long-arm statute, and lack of jurisdiction over party defendants (sewer service) have been brought to my attention. This is compounded by the hundreds of thousands of default judgments entered each year many of which are subsequently vacated by the court. Numerous other complaints have been received concerning similar breaches in other commercial actions and torts."], "id": "b55f405d-a2aa-4930-916b-f706eb9ef9b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder has supported substantial awards for emotional distress in sexual <mask> cases in federal courts. (See O\u2019Rourke v City of Providence, 235d 713, 733-734 [1st Cir 2001] [$275,000]; Gotthardt v National R.R. Passenger Corp., 191d 1148, 1152, 1155 [9th Cir 1999] [$300,000]; Baty v Willamette Indus., 172d 1232, 1244 [10th Cir 1999] [$300,000 compensatory and punitive]; Lockard v Pizza Hut, Inc., 162d 1062, 1075 [10th Cir 1998] [$200,000].) The amount of the award may reflect evidence of future consequences. (See, for example, O\u2019Rourke v City of Prov*584idence, 235d at 734 [PTSD \u201cprobably permanent\u201d].) In cases that have not involved sexual harassment, New York courts have also upheld substantial awards for emotional distress with evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder. (See Blakesley v State of New York, 289 AD2d 979 [4th Dept 2001] [$200,000]; McKay v Ciani, 288 AD2d 587 [3d Dept 2001] [$375,000].)"], "id": "7d293cd2-6825-4511-b36d-cd28af9f481c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant repeatedly moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument, arguing that all of the counts were jurisdictionally infirm owing to the lack of sufficient factual averments to establish the offenses and, additionally, that the aggravated <mask> in the second degree statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Criminal Court (Lenora Gerald, J.) denied the motions to dismiss, and, in the last of the orders, enjoined the defense \u201cfrom making any further applications to the court on the issue of facial sufficiency or pursuant to CPL 170.30 and CPL 170.35.\u201d"], "id": "c532d376-5d51-452b-88c8-fd417de4aefe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["These defects in procedure, coupled with others previously noted, are so egregious as to infect the entire proceeding with unfairness (see, Matter of Ackerman v Ambach, 142 AD2d 842, supra) of such a magnitude as to have led to substantial prejudice (see, Matter of Rudner v Board of Regents, 105 AD2d 555 [1984]) and a denial of justice (see, Matter of Sowa v Looney, 23 NY2d 329 [1968]), that the hearing process can be seen as nothing but fundamentally unfair and pursued in bad faith. Before the hearing was opened, therefore, Starishevsky\u2019s right to a fair and reasonable hearing pursued in good faith had been violated. This lack of essential fairness and good faith continued during the inquiry process, as evidenced by the posthearing private interview of Haggerty which this court noted previously. This lack of essential fairness and good faith culminated in the panel\u2019s and Shuart\u2019s finding that Starishevsky was not guilty of sexual <mask> but should no longer remain at Hofstra because of behavior which was *147unethical, unprofessional and inappropriate (not bases for disciplinary action under the sexual harassment guidelines) and because of campus concerns."], "id": "48b4420f-ac13-4176-b80b-5787cd11ad7b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Wieland was an Owner-Operator employee when she was served at her workplace with an ex parte order of protection sought and secured by Alan Lovelace, her ex-boyfriend. Wieland told Owner-Operator's director of human resources the allegations of <mask> supporting the ex parte order of protection were acts Lovelace was committing against her, not vice versa. Wieland told the director she was scared and felt threatened by Lovelace. The director asked Wieland to provide a description and photograph of Lovelace, which Wieland did. The director gave the description and photograph to the supervisor of the front desk receptionists to disseminate. The director also told her supervisor and Owner-Operator's volunteer safety team about the situation."], "id": "5d27a9b9-3d9d-40b3-867d-70e4161d9003", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The essential facts are not in dispute. Respondents are rent-stabilized tenants at 500 East 85th Street, apartment 19D, New York, New York, pursuant to a written lease. They moved into the apartment in May 1985, and in 1987 they became the owners of a Great Dane named Xam. Petitioner alleges, through an affidavit of its superintendent, that it first learned of the dog in 1988. In October 1994 Xam died, and on December 7, 1994 the respondents obtained a new puppy, Xam II (Twoie). Two days later, by letter dated December 9, 1994, petitioner\u2019s management advised respondents to remove the puppy, as they were in violation of the lease. On January 5, 1995, petitioner served respondents with a notice to cure. Respondents kept Twoie and petitioner served a notice of termination on January 23, 1995. This holdover proceeding was commenced by service of a notice of petition and petition on February 14, 1995. Prior to the commencement of this proceeding, respondents, on February 9, 1995, filed, and DHCR accepted, a <mask> *164complaint alleging, inter alia, that this eviction is retaliatory as respondent Eimicke was \"responsible for * * * the development and passage of the laws on succession for rent stabilized apartments\u201d (affidavit of William B. Eimicke, Mar. 19, 1995, para 7). In January 1995, shortly after the November 1994 election, the same month petitioner notified respondents to remove the puppy, respondent Eimicke lost his job as the Director of Housing and Commissioner of the Division of Housing and Community Renewal, which he held under former Governor Cuomo."], "id": "695c5714-2d98-4664-839a-105c4bdfe46b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In Contreras I, we considered cross-appeals from an order granting in part and denying in part the Butterworths' special motion to strike Contreras's complaint. We held that Contreras's claims against the Butterworths for malicious prosecution, wrongful eviction, and tenant <mask> all arose, at *786least in part, from protected activity. The first part of the anti-SLAPP test was thus satisfied with respect to all of those causes of action, and our focus was on the second step of the test-whether Contreras had established a probability of prevailing on any of those causes of action. We noted Contreras's causes of action for tenant harassment and wrongful eviction were \"mixed\" in that they were based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity. We concluded, however, that she had shown a probability of prevailing based on the allegations of unprotected conduct. *716In Contreras II, we considered Stuart's appeal from the trial court's denial of his special motion to strike. The then-operative complaint alleged \"Stuart aided and abetted the Butterworths in some of the wrongful conduct that gave rise to Contreras's action against them.\" Our opinion discussed the effect of Contreras I on Stuart's appeal. We explained, \"Contreras I establishes that Contreras has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on her claims against the Butterworths for malicious prosecution, tenant harassment, and wrongful eviction. [Citation.] It does not mean that the court below was relieved of the obligation to determine whether Contreras's claims against Stuart arise from protected activity, and if they do, of determining whether she has a reasonable probability of prevailing on them.\" We went on to hold Stuart had forfeited his argument that Contreras's claims against him arose from protected activity, because his opening brief did not even address the first prong of the section 425.16 analysis. In dictum, we noted we had already held that some of the Butterworths' actions did not arise from protected activity, and thus Stuart's alleged aiding and abetting of those actions did not arise out of protected activity. But since Stuart had not met his threshold burden of showing her claims against him arose out of protected activity, we had no need to consider whether Contreras had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on those claims. (See Clark v. Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1290, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 24 [where movant failed to show suit was based on protected activity, court had no need to consider whether opposing party had demonstrated she was likely to succeed on the merits].)"], "id": "adcb46f2-0c7b-42d4-bfe8-2a61393d566d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["A retaliation claim may survive even if the underlying discrimination or <mask> claim is unsuccessful. Soto , 502 S.W.3d at 48. \"[I]t is irrelevant to a claim of retaliation that the act complained of was not legally actionable. The only issue is whether the person making the complaint has a reasonable good faith belief that there were grounds for the claim of discrimination or harassment.\" Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)."], "id": "f58bb38e-69df-445e-91eb-c319490754c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cmust be allowed to independently consider the facts of a case and advocate the best interests of the child, free from the threat of <mask> for retaliatory litigation. Opening the door to negligence liability * * * would likely result in a decline in the number of attorneys willing to serve as GALs in child custody proceedings. In addition, fear of liability could warp the judgment of those GALs who are appointed toward the appeasement of disappointed parents or children and away from protecting the best interests of the child\u201d (Paige K.B. v Molepske, 219 Wis 2d 418, 433-434, 580 NW2d 289, 296, citing Short v Short, 730 F Supp 1037, 1039). That court further stated that,"], "id": "5c38ffe4-1f35-4cf4-b539-9aec88bc657f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["NYSDHR\u2019s determination of no probable cause for petitioner\u2019s claims of racial discrimination provides no justification for its conclusion that Weston United may do nothing to address petitioner\u2019s complaints of racial slurs and <mask>. Nor does NYSDHR justify its insistence that petitioner has failed to show Weston United responded to her complaints differently from complaints by residents who are not white. Petitioner has shown that Weston United did not respond to white residents\u2019 complaints of racial slurs and harassment. No evidence shows that Weston United also ignored complaints by African American residents. More importantly, since they were in the racial majority, no evidence indicates they were the victims of racial slurs or harassment. Therefore the record fails to negate the inference that Weston United\u2019s failure to respond to white or other non-African American residents\u2019 complaints of racial slurs or harassment was unrelated to their race or color, rendering NYSDHR\u2019s contrary determination unsupported and hence arbitrary. (CPLR 7803 [3]; Polayes v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 426; East Riv. Hous. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 116 AD3d at 563; Gutierrez v Rhea, 105 AD3d at 486.)"], "id": "ffc72668-18be-4565-825e-dca1ce616630", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In order to prove a case of sexual <mask>, the Henson court (supra) required that five criteria be met: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, which it defined as \u201c \u2018sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature\u2019 *720* * * that the employee regard[s] as undesirable or offensive\u201d (supra, p 903); (3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected a \u201cterm, condition, or privilege\u201d of employment; and (5) the employer was liable. A number of courts have adopted this test and applied it to find causes of action for sexual harassment under title VII. (See, e.g., Katz v Dole, 709d 251; Phillips v Smalley Maintenance Servs., 711d 1524; Cummings v Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F Supp 872; Coley v Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F Supp 645.)"], "id": "f891e32d-7c71-4e82-b0aa-3bd2c518efe3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Regarding \u201cthe preclusive effect of a prior final judgment on the merits. [Citation.] The doctrine has two distinct aspects: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. [Citation.] Claim preclusion, often referred to as res judicata, provides that \u2018a valid, final judgment on the merits precludes parties or their privies from relitigating the same \u201ccause of action\u201d in a subsequent suit.\u2019 [Citation.] Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, \u2018 \u201cprecludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.\u201d \u2019 [Citations.]\u201d (City of Oakland, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 227.) Application of this doctrine \u201c \u2018is intended to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, promote judicial economy, and protect litigants from <mask> by vexatious litigation.\u2019 [Citation.] It \u2018rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d (Id. at p. 228.) Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel applies in a particular case is a question of law reviewed de novo. (City of Oakland, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) Wage Garnishment and Consent CSEA describes the \u201ccentral issue\u201d here as \u201cwhether [the District] has legal authority for deducting money from employees\u2019 paychecks without those employees\u2019 consent and without obtaining wage garnishment orders pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 706.010 et seq.\u201d We conclude that employee consent is not required, nor is a wage garnishment order. Taking the wage garnishment issue first, we conclude that California attachment and wage garnishment law does not apply, because payments in excess of available leave that the District court docks are not wages. (Steinhebel, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 704-705.) Rather, they are contingent advances pending the District\u2019s determination"], "id": "91bbb726-e7ed-4367-8c55-26d60f383b0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["There is no evidence in the record that AutoZone subjected Meeks to an adverse employment action after she reported Fajardo's alleged <mask>. When she testified at trial in May 2014, she continued to be employed by AutoZone in the role of store manager. She \"never experienced a loss or reduction in her classification, position, salary, benefits and work hours; and her employment was not terminated.\" ( Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation , supra , 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 200.) She has not argued that she suffered working conditions so intolerable or aggravated as to constitute constructive discharge, that her performance evaluations suffered, or that she was ever denied any promotion or assignment that might have led to promotion. Meeks testified that Ledesma threatened her with an adverse employment action-to fire her and her husband, if she did not \"squash\" her complaint about Fajardo-but there is no evidence that the threat was carried out. Meeks has presented no authority, and we are aware of none, holding that a single threat of an adverse employment action, never carried out, could itself constitute an adverse employment action under the standard articulated in Yanowitz and its progeny. On these facts, summary judgment in favor of AutoZone on the retaliation claim was appropriate."], "id": "e5db7c62-fe4e-4e1b-87d8-4428a640e9ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Clark moves this court to dismiss the appeal, arguing it is frivolous. An appeal is frivolous \"when it is prosecuted for an improper motive-to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment-or when it indisputably has no merit-when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit.\" (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650, 183 Cal.Rptr. 508, 646 P.2d 179.) We agree with Clark that the appeal is frivolous and grant her motion. The contentions Kinney raises on appeal in opposition to Clark's entitlement to attorney fees and costs lack merit and are asserted in furtherance of his decade-long campaign of <mask> of Clark."], "id": "395d6f73-f0c2-40c9-8b03-20c8e7c3c75f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The Board of Trustees, in 1984, adopted an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Policy Statement (E.O./A.A.). *719Later, a Sexual <mask> Policy (Policy) was promulgated by the President, without specific endorsement by the Trustees, which provided that harassment complaints would be handled under another policy document, entitled Guidelines for Resolving Discrimination Complaints (Guidelines). The Guidelines establish a Discrimination Complaint Review Committee to hear appeals and make recommendations to the President, whose decision is described as final."], "id": "ac7cb794-a681-4b3d-bd2f-a2d470cf0473", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["1. Protection Orders: Judgments: Injunction: Appeal and Error. A protection order is analogous to an injunction. Accordingly, the grant or denial of a protection order is reviewed de novo on the record. In such a de novo review, an appellate court reaches conclusions independent of the factual findings of the trial court. 2. Due Process: Words and Phrases. While the concept of due process defies precise definition, it embodies and requires fundamental fairness. 3. Constitutional Law: Due Process. Generally, procedural due process requires parties whose rights are to be affected by a proceeding to be given timely notice, which is reasonably calculated to inform the person concerning the subject and issues involved in the proceeding; a reason- able opportunity to refute or defend against a charge or accusation; a reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and present evidence on the charge or accusation; representation by counsel, when such representation is required by constitution or statute; and a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker. 4. Constitutional Law: Protection Orders. Because the intrusion on a respondent\u2019s liberty interests is relatively limited, the procedural due process afforded in a protection order hearing is likewise limited. 5. Courts: Judgments: Statutes. To satisfy the requirement of specific findings, the court must set forth the reasoning for its order, explaining why its conclusion is appropriate; specific findings cannot be satisfied by simply quoting the statutory language. 6. Protection Orders: Proof. The legal theories supporting either a sexual assault, domestic abuse, or <mask> protection order are signifi- cantly different from one another, and each require different offerings of proof. - 750 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "966e4a2f-b5c5-4839-bfde-0526e5b4d446", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The verdict convicting defendant of second-degree <mask> was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the trial court\u2019s credibility determinations. The evidence established that defendant, who became angry and unruly while in custody when he was informed by complainant that he could not immediately make a second telephone call, spat upon complainant with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm him."], "id": "a679211a-bfd6-455b-9206-055c10ee9964", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In February 2008, DHCR revoked the finding of <mask> and \u201cprospectively eliminated\u201d all sanctions. Based upon this revocation, landlord commenced the underlying nonpayment summary proceeding against tenant seeking a \u201cfirst rent\u201d of $1,400 per month based upon the 1989 reconfiguration of the apartment. On the parties\u2019 competing motions for summary judgment, Civil Court dismissed the petition and awarded tenant a money judgment for a rent overcharge, holding that (1) the 1988 harassment order precluded the establishment of a first rent; and (2) upon DHCR\u2019s revocation of the harassment order, landlord could only collect a prospective increase based upon the $138.36 monthly rent. We disagree and modify the order."], "id": "4dfec7aa-96c8-45a0-810e-f747cbd06534", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\"I was Vicki\u2019s 'ear\u2019 during that most traumatic time when Mr. Garson\u2019s machinations succeeded in stripping her abruptly of husband, children, home and possessions. When she first came she looked like a concentration camp victim and her reactions were such that if she caused a spill or similar insignificant household accident, she would look frightened and look at you expecting ridicule. She had been subjected to such humiliations and cruel behavior, one could not think beyond trying to give a little human kindness, freedom from <mask> and whatever shreds of comfort or support could be offered in a time of such shock."], "id": "edfcecb5-c01e-4c38-8639-6d016c8590dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": [". [4] The wrong committed by defendants in this case, statutorily defined as employment discrimination, also constitutes tortious conduct under the common-law theory of intentional infliction of emotional harm. (See, e.g., Micari v Mann, 126 Misc 2d 422; Ford v Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz 38, 734 P2d 580 [Sup Ct 1987].) There is no need, however, to address that overlapping legal claim. Under circumstances such as these, where relevant common-law tort theories are subsumed within the ban on sexual <mask>, a statutorily authorized judicial award of appropriate damages pursuant to Executive Law \u00a7 297 (9) will \"fully redress the wrong committed.\u201d (Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442, 449 [1984].)"], "id": "704a7337-4c19-4074-b611-71f67c91a369", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In considering whether to expand the egregious conduct standard to include a pattern of physical and emotional abuse during a lengthy marriage, the court looked to other States for guidance. In an article entitled The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law (28 Ariz St LJ 773 [Fall 1996]), Professor Ira Mark Ellman noted that courts in approximately 15 States consider marital fault in the distribution of marital property. For example, the article indicates that in Connecticut, the trial courts are provided wide discretion in property allocations and *731alimony decisions, allowing the court to consider \u201c \u2018the causes for the * * * dissolution of the marriage\u2019 \u201d (id., at 832, quoting Conn Gen Stat Annot \u00a7\u00a7 46b-82, 46b-81 [c]; see also, Robinson v Robinson, 187 Conn 70, 444 A2d 234, 235-236 [1982]). In Georgia, fault is relevant to alimony by statute (Ga Code Annot \u00a7 19-6-1 [c]), and case law has established that \u201cthe conduct of the parties * * * is relevant and admissible\u201d in equitable distribution (Peters v Peters, 248 Ga 490, 491, 283 SE2d 454, 455 [1981]). At least one court in Missouri has held that \u201cthe conduct factor becomes important when the conduct of one party to the marriage is such that it throws upon the other party marital burdens beyond the norms to be expected in the marital relationship\u201d (Burtscher v Burtscher, 563 SW2d 526, 527 [Mo Ct App 1978]). Accordingly, in Divine v Divine (752 SW2d 76, 79 [Mo Ct App 1988]), the court held that the husband\u2019s failure to communicate with the wife, as well as his physical abuse, telephone <mask>, and false accusation of her, placed undue stress on the wife during the marriage. Similarly, Professor Ellman noted that a New Hampshire statute, which is apparently applicable to both alimony and property division, allows consideration of fault where it caused the breakdown of the marriage as well as \u201csubstantial physical or mental pain and suffering\u201d or an economic loss. (NH Rev Stat Annot \u00a7 458:16-a [II] [l] [1], [2].)"], "id": "47581e9e-4e4b-430d-8951-cf818af48147", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; Danielson, 9 NY3d 342), we accord great deference to the fact-finder\u2019s opportunity to view the witness, hear her testimony, and observe her demeanor (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon a review of the record, in light of McDonald\u2019s credible testimony, we are satisfied that, as to the remaining counts, the verdict convicting defendant of stalking in the fourth degree and <mask> in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 240.26 (2) was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006])."], "id": "57eda1dd-0f0e-42cb-a118-d2ddbfb29186", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Valerie Alexander, J. The issue of exactly what conduct constitutes the violation of aggravated <mask> is one that continues to be raised in mo*704tions and case law. The defendant is accused of having committed a violation of Penal Law \u00a7 240.30 (1), aggravated harassment in the second degree. He moves, pursuant to CPL 170.30, 170.35, 100.15 and 100.40, for a dismissal of the charges against him on the grounds that the accusatory instrument is insufficient on its face, defective, and unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. The People oppose the defendant\u2019s motion, but also move, pursuant to CPL 170.35, to amend the information, should the court find it defective."], "id": "bdf7dbbe-9bb5-4bfa-b12e-dc4b1478be9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Smith resigned over winter break. In her exit paperwork, she indicated that she did not get playing time, was not given a valid reason why, and did not want to waste anyone's time. At deposition, she explained that she quit the team rather than face Jennum's discriminatory treatment. She felt Jennum had ruined her love for the game, making her not want to *767return. She never reported the <mask> to university officials because Jennum's treatment worsened when Mackey complained."], "id": "611c41f3-8e64-4b19-897c-466df0144502", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Hofstra receives such assistance and in accordance with this regulation Hofstra\u2019s affirmative action office published a pamphlet entitled \"Sexual <mask> is Illegal\u201d. The pamphlet indicates in pertinent part: \"Complaints about sexual harassment will be responded to promptly and equitably. The right to confidentiality of all members of the academic community will be respected in both informal and formal procedures, insofar as is possible * * * An individual found to be guilty of sexual harassment is subject to disciplinary action for violations of this policy, consistent with existing procedures.\u201d"], "id": "3ad631bd-cb29-49d5-9742-73da6b80f152", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["We agree. Defendants' requested special instruction No. 17 was both duplicative and argumentative. The court's instructions already told the jury that in order to find <mask>, Caldera needed to prove all of the required elements, including: \"That the harassing conduct was severe or pervasive.\" If the court would have further instructed the jury that \"[t]he law requires the plaintiff to meet a threshold standard of severity or pervasiveness[,]\" the court would have been restating the same concept. Further, the phrase: \"The law does not exhibit 'zero tolerance' for offensive words or conduct[,]\" is perhaps a logical argument, but it is not a statement of law. Defendants were free to make that argument to the jury."], "id": "25a230fb-86f0-4078-93a9-6099160f6e4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["We are cognizant that the superseding information contained other allegations by the complainant, including that defendant\u2019s actions were in direct violation of a legally issued order of protection. However, we need not reach the issue of whether a communication in violation of an order of protection would establish prima facie the existence of the element of the crime of aggravated <mask> in the second degree consisting of a call \u201cwith no purpose of legitimate communication,\u201d since no certified copy of the order of protection was annexed to the information so as to bolster its factual allegations (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 361-362 [2000]), and a facial examination of the information does not reveal whether the complainant\u2019s allegations were based on direct knowledge of the order of protection or on hearsay. Thus, the nonhearsay requirement of CPL 100.40 (1) (c) remained unsatisfied and a motion was properly brought by defendant seeking dismissal of the aggravated harassment count on this ground (People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 361)."], "id": "965df12e-45cf-4544-8665-afefab88bb1d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["According to the factual account in the accusatory instrument, Monroe County Sheriffs deputies went to defendant\u2019s home at 4:13 p.m., and served the defendant with the order. The defendant \u201cintentionally refused to comply with said order,\u201d and upon being advised that he would be arrested, \u201cbecame agitated with deputies, and while being taken [in]to custody . . . attempted to pull away from deputies as well as punch a . . . Deputy as he was being taken into custody.\u201d He was brought before Chili Town Court for arraignment that same evening and charged with one count each of a violation of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 195.05); resisting arrest (Penal Law \u00a7 205.30); and <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 240.26 [1])."], "id": "417a6bd2-bb24-4f87-bf9c-4621f424f0f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On appeal, defendant argues that the charge of <mask> in the second degree should have been dismissed upon the People\u2019s undisputed failure to obtain and produce the videotape which, defendant argues, is Brady material; that the witness\u2019s testimony that defendant\u2019s appearance matched that of the person believed to be a thief unduly prejudiced the defense; and that, in light of the adverse inference charge, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm."], "id": "1100d184-f6bf-4e70-9ce2-4630e06c4b54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "HARASSMENT", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["That on or about 2-25-18, in Craighead County, Arkansas, [K.O.] did violate Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 5-71-208 , with the purpose to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, without good cause, he, in a public place, repeatedly insults, taunts, or challenges another in a manner to provoke a violent response, namely by, grabbing the head of an eleven (11) year old female and forcing her face in his crotch, while telling her he wanted \"some head,\" which is slang for oral sex, thereby committing the offense of <mask> (A-M) against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas. A bench trial was held on April 4, 2018. Following the presentation of testimony regarding the factual basis for the State's petition, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict,1 arguing the following:"], "id": "7c75e974-0795-4d2f-85dd-0bbc19938a86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The parties own adjoining parcels of property on Schroon Lake in the Town of Schroon, Essex County. Following a nonjury trial in 1988, Supreme Court found that plaintiff has a prescriptive easement over a parking area on defendants\u2019 property that can accommodate three cars. The judgment entered on the decision did not specify the extent of the easement other than to note that the parties could enter into an agreement insuring that each had a place to park.1 Instead of heeding Supreme Court\u2019s advice, the parties engaged in a campaign of <mask> against each other that culminated in the commencement by plaintiff of this action seeking a permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering with her use of the entire easement area. In conjunction with this action, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. Thereafter, she commenced a second action for a permanent injunction and moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from, inter alia, interfering with her use of a common private road easement. Defendants responded by requesting Supreme Court to reform its judgment to set forth the nature, quality and extent of plaintiff\u2019s easement. Supreme Court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction.2 On reargument, Supreme Court granted the motion to the extent of providing that plaintiff shall have a nonexclusive right to park one registered vehicle in the easement area. Plaintiff appeals from both orders."], "id": "8ec91257-efe3-46f2-acf2-179b5f1c2e71", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["She marked the box A which states, \u201cI am an active or retired police officer, probation officer, parole officer, or corrections officer.\u201d In addition, the applicant marked box 4 which provides, \u201cI have reason to believe that I may be subject to unwarranted <mask> upon disclosure.\u201d She then did not provide any facts in the space provided after box 4 that supported the conclusion in statement 4."], "id": "fa36eaa9-a896-4ddd-b262-a5ac58a37372", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[o]ne-third or more of the tenants occupying a dwelling located in the city of New York . . . may maintain a special proceeding . . . upon the ground that there exists in such dwellings or in any part thereof a lack of heat or of running water or of light or of electricity or of adequate sewage disposal facilities, or any other condition dangerous to life, health or safety, which has existed for five days, or an infestation by rodents, or any combination of such conditions; or course of conduct by the owner or the owner\u2019s agents of <mask>, illegal eviction, continued deprivation of services or other acts dangerous to life, health or safety.\u201d Once one third or more of the tenants/petitioners demonstrate the existence of"], "id": "1fde99c8-1f56-41ee-9543-ce422a3aa117", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Jesse M. Eisen, J. The defendant herein originally was accused of violating subdivision 3 of section 120.05 of the Penal Law, assault in the second degree, a felony. Subsequently he was charged in a superseding information to that of the felony with three *416offenses as follows: count 1 \u2014 resisting arrest, section 205.30 of the Penal Law, a misdemeanor^ count 2 \u2014 <mask>, subdivision 1 of section 240.25 of the Penal Law, a violation; and count 3 \u2014 disorderly conduct, subdivision 3 of section 240.20 of the Penal Law, a violation, and had pleaded not guilty to the various charges. A trial of the issues was held before the court and jury, and the latter returned a verdict of not guilty as to counts 1 and 2 and guilty of cotint 3, a violation."], "id": "7769f00f-7dba-4fe8-a464-98e3cb7b2a0b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["An award of back pay will be sustained when not \u201cso arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an abuse of discretion,\u201d as such an award \u201cwould seem to be a rather normal sanction to be imposed.\u201d (Matter of Mize v State Div. of Human Rights, 33 NY2d 53, 55-56 [1973]; see also Imperial Diner v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 NY2d at 79; Rio Mar Rest, v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 270 AD2d 47, 48 [1st Dept 2000]; *585Matter of Grand Union Co. v Mercado, 263 AD2d 923 [3d Dept 1999]; Young Fu Hsu v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 241 AD2d at 913; Matter of Bronx County Med. Group v Lassen, 233 AD2d 234 [1st Dept 1996]; 121-129 Broadway Realty v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 48 AD2d 975, 976 [3d Dept 1975]; Ryan v New York State Thruway Auth., 889 F Supp 70, 81 [ND NY 1995] [plaintiffs claim that \u201cshe was unable to act on . . . offers (of employment) because of . . . post traumatic stress disorder, caused by\u201d sexual <mask> presented jury issue as to back pay].) In a private action for retaliatory discharge because of plaintiffs complaint of sexual harassment, the court upheld a jury award of lost earnings, apparently back pay, finding that the award was warranted and not excessive. (See Gleason v Callanan Indus., 203 AD2d at 753.)"], "id": "41fbf53b-9d9f-48f9-a519-bd02143dbe76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In March of 1992, a Hofstra student, Alison Reutershan (hereinafter Reutershan), lodged a complaint of sexual <mask> with the University\u2019s affirmative action office. Reutershan alleged that on February 3, 1992 Starishevsky, the director of Hofstra\u2019s counseling center, kissed her on the lips at the end of a counseling session. The University\u2019s affirmative action officer, Roland Davis, obtained a written response from Starishevsky, interviewed Reutershan and Starishevsky and concluded that with no witness to the alleged incident, a finding of whether the alleged sexual harassment occurred could not be made. In April of 1992, the affirmative action office considered the case closed."], "id": "b9a95703-4c99-429d-a021-cfad4cf18b38", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["President and his immediate advisers that the benefit of providing such testimony as an accommodation to a committee\u2019s interests outweighs the potential for <mask> and harm to Executive Branch confidentiality. Such testimony, moreover, may be provided on terms negotiated to focus and limit the scope of the questioning. Because voluntary testimony represents an exercise of presidential autonomy rather than legally required compliance with congressional will, it does not implicate the separation of powers in the same manner, or to anything like the same extent, as compelled testimony."], "id": "e78b19e8-a65c-4a5c-94a3-6769e19ec90a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Generally, the doctrine of judicial immunity extends to those parties acting in a \"quasi-judicial\u201d capacity in the course of their performance of court-appointed duties. This privilege is based upon the public policy that expert witnesses must be *845encouraged to perform public services without fear of <mask> or threat of litigation. In analogous situations in which court-appointed psychiatrists or physicians have been sued for their alleged misdiagnoses, the courts have deemed these findings privileged and thereby immune from legal action. (See, Tolisano v Texon, 75 NY2d 732 [1989], revg 144 AD2d 267 [upon the reasons stated in the dissent of Smith, J.]; Deed v Condrell, 150 Misc 2d 279, 281-282 [Sup Ct, Erie County 1991], affd 177 AD2d 1055 [4th Dept 1991]; Schanbarger v Kellogg, 35 AD2d 902, 903 [4th Dept 1970]; Klapper v Guria, 153 Misc 2d 726, 730 [Sup Ct, NY County 1992].)"], "id": "ba1551cb-3610-40f3-9670-02faffc019c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Before turning to the merits, we begin with a brief overview of res judicata. \"The tenets of res judicata prescribe the preclusive effect of a prior final judgment on the merits.... Application of the doctrine of res judicata 'is intended to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, promote judicial economy, and protect litigants from <mask> by vexatious litigation.' [Citation.] It 'rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination.' \" ( City of Oakland , supra , 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 227-228, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ; accord, Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297 ; In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 622-623, 94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206.) \"The doctrine has two distinct aspects: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. [Citation.] Claim preclusion, *1326often referred to as res judicata, provides that 'a valid, final judgment on the merits precludes parties or their privies from relitigating the same \"cause of action\" in a subsequent suit.' \" ( City of Oakland , at p. 227, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ; see DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823-825, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378 ( DKN Holdings ) [pointing out the terminological confusion that arises from imprecise use of the umbrella term res judicata and explaining the differences between claim preclusion and issue preclusion].)"], "id": "af15a920-95d5-4cdb-a7b3-6f0eebcc705d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Section 1 of chapter 989 of the Laws of 1958 created the Commission of Investigation effective May 1, 1958. The constitutionality of the act itself has already been sustained. (Matter of Commission of Investigation of State of N. Y. v. Lombardozzi, 7 A D 2d 48, affd. 5 N Y 2d 1026, rearg. den. 6 N Y 2d 878, cert. den. sub nom. Castellano v. Commission of Investigation of State of N. Y., 360 U. S. 930.) Moreover, the validity of the subpoenas issued by the commission, valid on their face, has been upheld despite the claim of <mask>. (Matter of Ryan v. Temporary State Comm. of Investigation, 16 A D 2d 1022, affd. 12 N Y 2d 708.) Similarly, subpoenas have not been quashed as against the claim, in advance of the hearing itself, of no personal knowledge of the facts about which the testimony *837was sought. (Matter of Pennock v. Lane, 18 A D 2d 1043.) Finally, where a petitioner claimed his privilege against self incrimination the court held that such claim of privilege may he made only at the time the questions are propounded and that even in the face of such claim of privilege the C'ommissioner would he empowered to grant immunity from prosecution (L. 1958, ch. 989, \u00a7 7) and thus compel the petitioner to testify. (Matter of Bonanno v. Ryan, 18 Misc 2d 711, affd. 9 A D 2d 605.)"], "id": "f5023299-6c16-4126-97a9-878dc500af13", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["(c) Fundamental Fairness and Advocacy by Court Yerania has suggested that the language of \u00a7 28-311.11 sufficiently made clear the court may issue a <mask> pro- tection order rather than a sexual assault protection order if such is deemed appropriate based on the facts in the petition, affidavit, and evidence presented at a show cause hearing and that thus, Juan\u2019s rights were not violated because he was given a show cause hearing on the matter. But even if Juan had himself understood that \u00a7 28-311.11, as amended, granted the court authority to consider a different form of protection order as the result of evidence provided at the show cause hearing, after such hearing had concluded, and even when an ex parte order had already been entered, his due process rights would still have been violated. [5] With its amendments, \u00a7 28-311.11(8) grants the court authority to consider an alternative protection order, even after the show cause hearing has concluded and without a request by the petitioner, as long as it makes specific findings. To satisfy the requirement of specific findings, the court must set forth the reasoning for its order, explaining why its conclusion is appropriate; specific findings cannot be satisfied by simply quoting the statutory language. 26 Here, the district court did not make specific findings: Within the harassment protection order entered against Juan, it included a statement of general findings, i.e., that it had jurisdiction of the parties and the sub- ject matter and that \u201ca Harassment Protection Order is more appropriate,\u201d but left blank the portion of the form in which the court is apparently meant to enter its specific findings. Such failure to make specific findings, on its own, is already enough to warrant a reversal of the protection order entered against Juan. See, Castellar Partners v. AMP Limited, 291 Neb. 163, 864 N.W.2d 391 (2015); Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). - 765 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "42246052-a13e-4bb5-9ef5-bf20d71706a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Two California Supreme Court cases in particular illustrate the principle that employees need not complain with the clarity and precision of lawyers to engage in protected conduct: Miller and Yanowitz. In Miller, the plaintiffs asserted they complained about improper sexual relationships between a supervisor and several of his subordinates, favoritism accorded to those subordinates, and subsequent hostile or harassing treatment by those subordinates after the plaintiffs expressed their complaints. (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 452, 472-473, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77.) The Court of Appeal concluded that, although the plaintiffs opposed the supervisor's conduct, \"they had not expressed opposition to sex discrimination or sexual <mask>. As the court understood the record, '[p]laintiffs were not complaining about sexual harassment but unfairness. This is not protected activity under the FEHA.' \" (Id. at p. 474, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77.) The Court of Appeal concluded the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' retaliation claim. (Id. at p. 460, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77.) Our Supreme *692Court reversed, holding that although the plaintiffs \"may not have recited the specific words 'sexual discrimination' or 'sexual harassment,' the nature of their complaint certainly fell within the general purview of FEHA, especially when we recall that this case is before us on review of a grant of summary judgment.\" (Id. at p. 475, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77.)"], "id": "7522c214-3192-452d-9782-fc13274edd2b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["We agree with the court below that the accusatory instrument failed to contain facts supporting the allegation that the defendant engaged in a \u201ccourse of conduct,\u201d since there is no factual detail as to the manner in which he tried to continue the verbal dispute (see, People v Sullivan, NYLJ, Mar. 12, 1997, at 29, col 5 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). We also note that the use of abusive language would not support a conviction of <mask> (see, People v Dietze, 75 NY2d 47)."], "id": "1e9d5817-f90f-45a1-8c55-f04aca89ff1c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Baxter alleges she continued to be promoted, get favorable performance evaluations, and receive salary increases during her tenure at Genworth. At some point in 2011, Baxter's role was expanded to include supervisory responsibilities. Baxter alleges she expressed concern about employee evaluation forms that included race, age, and gender coding. Baxter, an African American woman, opposed and protested Genworth's evaluation protocol based upon her good faith belief that evaluating employees on the basis of age, race, and gender was discriminatory and unlawful. She claims she was admonished and subjected to ongoing <mask> and retaliation as a result of her concerns about the evaluation protocol. In early 2013, Baxter requested and was granted a medical leave of absence under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) in order to care for her mother. Baxter was scheduled to return to work in the middle of June 2013."], "id": "1cfcf497-e303-4e8f-8e07-e920b0f66fcc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["At a jury trial, after the court dismissed the first count of aggravated <mask> in the second degree and denied defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct on summation, the jury convicted defendant of the four remaining counts of the accusatory instrument. At sentencing, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion, pursuant to CPL 330.30, to set aside the verdict on the ground that the order of Judge Gerald had prevented him from moving to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds (see CPL 30.30), thereby violating his right to due process."], "id": "1114c96e-2fcd-4e98-9ced-a95a54a06705", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Third, the plaintiff suffered aggravation, annoyance, <mask>, inconvenience and discomfort because she was forced to move out prior to the expiration of her lease. Such damages are appropriate under a breach of contract (see, e.g., Kupferman v Pakistan Intl. Airlines, 108 Misc 2d 485 [1981] [breach of contract]) and under a breach of warranty of quiet enjoyment (see, I. H. P. Corp. v 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 16 *492AD2d 461, affd 12 NY2d 329 [1963] [breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; compensatory and punitive damages awarded]). The court awards plaintiff $250 for her discomfort and aggravation."], "id": "91ad86d9-940e-4401-b289-c04780427069", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Therefore, the new rule of presumption of <mask> which the city urges is purely a nonstringent local administrative extension of the State law, serves only as an obstructive satellite in the newly-created atmosphere of open competition and tends to perpetuate the existence of local control. Further, by obstructing transition, the new rule is inconsistent with the *731State law. The inconsistency of a local law must he subservient to the State statute, since rent control is primarily a matter of State concern. (See City of New York v. State of New York,, 67 Misc 2d 513; F. T. B. Realty Corp. v. Goodman, 300 N. Y. 140, 148.)"], "id": "ea42a4fd-35e4-4ae0-b389-f30c1177701e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The Department also complains that the verdict directors failed to require the jury to find that Mignone had a \"good faith\" belief that the conduct she opposed violated the MHRA. Under Missouri law, it is unnecessary for a plaintiff claiming retaliation to prove that the conduct they opposed was actually unlawful. Instead, a plaintiff need only have \"a reasonable good faith belief that there were grounds for the claim of discrimination or <mask>.\" Soto , 502 S.W.3d at 48. Here, Instructions No. 12 and No. 13 both required the jury to find that Mignone \"reasonably believed\" that Fagan's and Nuckols' conduct was wrongful. The instructions did not separately require the jury to find that Mignone believed in the wrongfulness of their actions in \"good faith.\""], "id": "93d2e27f-9e6d-49ce-bcaa-544060bb7a0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["However, even where trial courts have made such spe- cific findings, they should be attentive to potential issues of due process. [6] First, we have previously stated that the legal theories supporting either a sexual assault, domestic abuse, or harass- ment protection order are significantly different from one another and each require different offerings of proof. 27 For example, a domestic abuse protection order requires proof of abuse between family or household members. 28 A <mask> protection order requires proof that the petitioner was seriously terrified, threatened, or intimidated, for no legitimate purpose, as a result of a knowing and willful course of conduct by the respondent. 29 And a sexual assault protection order requires proof that the petitioner was subjected to sexual contact or penetration by the respondent without consent. 30 Despite the different offerings of proof required to support entry of any of these types of protection orders, the court, per the amended statute, is allowed to sua sponte change theories after the close of evidence and at a time when the defendant is no longer able to respond or present a defense regarding the newly selected theory, as long as it gives a good reason on the record. 31 Accordingly, the only way that a respondent in this situation could adequately prepare his or her defense is to prepare to defend against all possible theories that may be raised at a show cause hearing. To uphold our longstanding principles of due process, which embody and require a funda- mental fairness to all parties, 32 courts should ensure, prior to See Linda N. v. William N., supra note 11. See \u00a7\u00a7 42-903(1) and 42-924 (Cum. Supp. 2020). See Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 28-311.02 (Reissue 2016) and 28-311.09(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020). See \u00a7 28-311.11(1) and (14) (Cum. Supp. 2020). See \u00a7 28-311.11 (Supp. 2019). D.W. v. A.G., supra note 15. Accord In re Interest of Spencer O., 277 Neb. 776, 765 N.W.2d 443 (2009). - 766 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "e87eb768-ea7f-4d3b-91ae-497b47641d7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. The Trial a. Thompson\u2019s case Thompson, a trained plumber, worked for the City for 23 years, most recently as a utility service planning supervisor in both the water and power supply divisions. In 2012 Aurora Isabel, a City employee in a different department, sued the City for discrimination, retaliation and sexual <mask> in violation of FEHA, alleging, in part, she was denied a promotion due to discrimination and retaliation by her direct supervisor. In May 2014, while Isabel\u2019s lawsuit was pending, the City transferred her to Thompson\u2019s department. The City\u2019s human resources director told Thompson that Isabel had a pending lawsuit against the City and that, when evaluating her, he should take a \u201ckinder and softer\u201d approach. In September 2015 Thompson wrote a favorable performance evaluation for Isabel, recommending her for a promotion. He shared his performance review with Isabel. Thompson testified at trial he did not know much about Isabel\u2019s pending lawsuit at the time he wrote her performance review and did not fill out the evaluation with that in mind. Thompson\u2019s actions angered his supervisor, Joe Awad, who told Thompson he violated City policy by not obtaining Awad\u2019s approval before recommending a subordinate for a promotion. Thompson had recommended other people for promotion without consequences and was surprised by Awad\u2019s reaction."], "id": "30907ee2-4fe8-4e71-b675-569c6d85b41f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On February 6, 2003, plaintiff Thomas Farrugia, a white male lab technologist at North Shore University Hospital, filed a complaint alleging sexual <mask>, sexual discrimination, and national origin discrimination under both the New York State and New York City Human Rights laws. The crux of his complaint is that he has been sexually harassed by a female lab technologist and that the hospital has refused to do anything about it. He also alleges that the majority of lab technologists and supervisors are Asian-Filipino and that they, with the hospital\u2019s consent, have discriminated against him because of his national origin. Given the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [2]; Executive Law \u00a7 297 [9]; Administrative Code of *742City of NY \u00a7 8-502 [d]), plaintiffs allegations are presented pre- and post-February 6, 2000."], "id": "24d7e4a8-f527-43a6-bc0a-0b6c170c3ade", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The People allege that on August 7, 1982 at approximately 6:45 p.m. at the American Airlines terminal (building No. 57) at JFK International Airport, Queens County, the defendant struck the complainant in the face causing injury to his eyes. At the time of the incident, the defendant, a native of the island of Jamaica, was on duty as a security guard, directing cars that approached the terminal to pick up arriving passengers. The complainant was a driver for a limousine service. A dispute arose over whether the complainant could park his limousine in front of the terminal, or whether he was required to park in a designated area for limousines away from the terminal entrance. The complainant exited his vehicle whereupon, he claimed, the defendant struck him and threatened him *1014with a knife (not recovered). Thereafter, complainant entered the terminal and spoke with the defendant\u2019s superiors. The Port Authority police were called to the scene and, at the complainant\u2019s behest, arrested the defendant and charged him with assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and menacing. As a result of the defendant asserting his innocence and insisting that the complainant struck him first, the police also arrested the complainant but only charged him with a violation for <mask>. Both received desk appearance tickets."], "id": "5ad04810-7ce1-4dd7-80ab-a609db24f20c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the second place, Coates itself strongly suggests an that otherwise-vague law, even one containing a constitutionally perilous word like \"annoy,\" might be saved if the reviewing court can determine \"whose sensitivity\" the actor must pay attention to in complying with the law.60 And that is exactly the situation we are faced with here. Even if the word \"alarm\" raises some prima facie vagueness concerns in the context of Section 42.01(a)(8), those concerns are greatly alleviated by the inclusion of an objective reasonable-person standard.61 For these reasons, we conclude that the concerns expressed in Kramer and May about the vagueness of the former <mask> statute do not apply to the disorderly conduct statute."], "id": "1bc4ee5e-6fd9-4347-9541-ee38c2bcd069", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["According to Musel-Winn, plaintiff became upset about his low scores and stated that \u201c[t]his is par for a lab with its staffing, with all the females in the lab\u201d and that he had told her about it before. Musel-Winn responded that she did not recall having any conversations with him about the women in the lab, to which he stated, according to Musel-Winn, for the first time that he was \u201ctired of the sexual <mask> in the laboratory, all the innuendos that go on in the laboratory concerning\u201d him because he was the only male on the evening shift. He also allegedly told her that \u201cthat woman, she is always after me. She is always looking at me and laughing. She must like me and I don\u2019t want to deal with her. Tell her to stop.\u201d According to Musel-Winn, plaintiff did not identify the person allegedly harassing him."], "id": "1f603b7c-8b9d-46ed-bc21-09e8a9bfef56", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The assessment of the propriety of prelitigation discovery lies within the broad discretion of the court. (Thomas v New York City Tr. Police Dept., 91 AD2d 898.) Respondents\u2019 interpretation of the scope of preaction discovery pursuant to CPLR 3102 (c) is too narrow. The provision is not limited to disclosure to aid in bringing an action; it includes preaction disclosure \"to preserve information\u201d. Thus this case is distinguishable from cases where preaction disclosure was sought to aid in framing a complaint and the information sought was available to the prospective plaintiff. (See, e.g., Hoffman v Batridge, 155 Misc 2d 862 [1992].) Similarly, this is not a case where plaintiff has requested information concerning other employees or applicants \"without limit as to time, nature, or geographical location.\u201d (Neuschatz v Society Generate, 176 AD2d 134 [1st Dept 1991] [denying unlimited discovery request in sexual <mask> suit].)"], "id": "657090cb-bce0-49d4-9d40-88a9d72b8d2b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Claimant alleges that he also complained to Lieutenant Jeff Keenan at Sullivan CF about Maxwell\u2019s \u201c<mask> and retaliation\u201d (defendant\u2019s exhibit A, claim \u00b6 14). However, Keenan disregarded his complaints and condoned the conduct of Maxwell and others (defendant\u2019s exhibit A, claim \u00b6\u00b6 14, 15). In fact, claimant alleges that Keenan himself made derogatory racial and sexual remarks to both inmates and staff at the facility (defendant\u2019s exhibit A, claim \u00b6\u00b6 16, 17). Claimant alleges that he complained to Superintendent James Walsh about Lieutenant Keenan\u2019s conduct but that no disciplinary action was taken. For reasons not detailed in the claim, Maxwell instituted disciplinary action against the claimant resulting in a meeting on September 22, 2004 in which Superintendent Walsh indicated that the charge against the claimant for insubordination could not be established (defendant\u2019s exhibit A, claim \u00b6 19). On November 8, 2004 claimant allegedly notified DOCS Deputy Commissioner Lucien Leclaire of the retaliation by Maxwell and Keenan. Claimant alleges that on November 19, 2005 a racist cartoon was posted in a public area of the prison and that on or about December 2, 2005 he was harassed and assaulted by another white correction officer as the result of his \u201cwhistle blowing\u201d (defendant\u2019s exhibit A, claim \u00b6 25). Allegedly with the encouragement of DOCS supervisors, the other white officer filed a false charge of harassment in the second degree against the claimant, resulting in his suspension from employment. Following his complaints to Governor Pataki and a State Senator, *945the claimant was reinstated to his position as a correction officer. Claimant also alleges that since the filing of his first complaint with his superiors in 2002, he has continuously been denied a promotion. Based on the foregoing, the claimant alleges that \u201cDOCS has a policy and practice of allowing and condoning discriminatory and retaliatory conduct and allowing the existence of a hostile working environment to the detriment of the Complainant\u201d (defendant\u2019s exhibit A, claim \u00b6 31)."], "id": "5167321c-51bd-4ccd-8c8c-385ff1dbe844", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The case herein is similar to the facts in Be Bour (supra) only in that it involved a concern for narcotics. Unlike Be Bour, however, the stop was not brief, nor devoid of <mask> or intimidation in that it involved removal of defendants from the relatively neutral atmosphere of the bus terminal concourse to the obviously intimidating atmosphere of the Niagara Frontier Police office (see, Florida v Royer, 460 US 491). The questioning was more extensive and involved more than a mere request for identification, in that the agents questioned defendants concerning their residence, their employment, and their citizenship."], "id": "0227da18-5ee6-40e9-a40f-a85531841126", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "harassment", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In Sassower v Signorelli (99 AD2d 358 [2d Dept 1984]) the Second Department held that in light of plaintiff\u2019s palpable abuse of judicial process, it was well within the judicial discretion of the IAS court to enjoin plaintiff from pursuing additional litigation against defendants and related parties in the absence of judicial approval. The \"court will not tolerate the use of the legal system as a tool of <mask>.\u201d (Supra, at 359.)"], "id": "7b52bc0e-a745-4637-9d2b-a98f8ffbae1e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In opposition, Demeter argued he had been injured by TAXI's alleged violations of the FTSL (and, correspondingly, the UCL) because he would not have paid TAXI's membership fee if he had known TAXI was violating legal requirements and thus was \"an illegal company.\" He acknowledged he had not attempted to cancel his contract with TAXI (i.e., invoked his contractual right to a refund) prior to filing suit, but claimed a full-blown lawsuit was nevertheless a proper means for seeking to void the contract. Demeter further asserted TAXI's \"<mask> horse\" argument was meritless because TAXI had not presented evidence demonstrating Demeter had knowledge of TAXI's violation before purchasing a membership."], "id": "6b092b04-fe7e-454f-8905-95a2e1a5e420", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Nor is Penal Law \u00a7 120.45 any more difficult to interpret and obey because it lacks a specific intent component. The Legislature\u2019s choice of general over specific intent reflects sound public policy and is consistent with the approach taken by the drafters of the national model anti<mask> statute (National Institute of Justice, Project to Develop a Model Anti-stalking Code For States 43-48 [1993]). By focusing on the behavior of the accused stalker rather than on the stalker\u2019s motivation, Penal Law \u00a7 120.45, like the model code, ensures that accused stalkers do not escape criminal liability \u201cby saying that however outrageous [their] conduct might have been, it was not [their] actual intent to cause the requisite fear.\u201d (New Jersey v Cardell, 318 NJ Super 175, 184, 723 A2d 111, 115, certification denied 158 NJ 687, 731 A2d 46; accord, Iowa v Neuzil, 589 NW2d 708, 712 [Iowa]; see also, Greyson, Comment, California\u2019s Antistalking Statute: The Pivotal Role of Intent, 28 Golden Gate U L Rev 221, 242 [1998].) Indeed, Penal Law \u00a7 120.45, with its use of the phrase \u201clegitimate purpose\u201d in tandem with a general intent standard, parallels stalking statutes from other jurisdictions that have withstood constitutional vagueness challenges (see, e.g., Bouters v Florida, 659 So 2d 235 [Fla], cert denied 516 US 894; Snowden v Delaware, 677 A2d 33 [Del]; People v White, 536 NW2d 876 [Mich]; cf., Oregon v Norris-Romine, 134 Or App 204, 894 P2d 1221)."], "id": "7ecf347f-e092-4a30-ba6e-ad42f200cca1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["never speak publicly about her relationship with Masterson or sue him for any reason. In addition to events occurring while still a Scientology member, each petitioner alleged an invasive Fair Game campaign occurring entirely after she had left the church.6 Bixler alleged that she formally terminated her relationship with the Church in October 2016, then reported Masterson to the police. It was only after her report that she was declared a Suppressive Person and she and her husband were subjected to the Fair Game campaign. Jane Doe #1 learned in June 2005 that she had been declared a Suppressive Person and was no longer permitted to engage in religious services at the Church. More than a decade later (after she asked the LAPD to reopen its investigation into Masterson), the Church commenced its Fair Game campaign against her. Jane Doe #2 ceased practicing Scientology entirely in 2004. In 2017, she reported Masterson\u2019s assault to the LAPD, at which point the Fair Game harassment began. As to whether the conduct that occurred while petitioners were still Church members was actionable, or merely background, the complaint was not entirely clear. Plaintiffs included conspiracy allegations, which alleged Scientology \u201cengaged in wrongful conduct, including but not limited to information suppression, coercion, deception, <mask>, harassment, surveillance, threats, vandalism, theft, and/or fraud.\u201d \u201cInformation suppression\u201d and \u201ccoercion\u201d could include"], "id": "0ce73e5a-e01e-4b1f-bee2-551580b9d513", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Following the hearing, the court filled out and signed a pre-printed Order of Protection form. The top right-hand corner of the form contains five options: domestic violence order, amended domestic violence order, interpersonal protective order, and amended interpersonal protective order. The court checked the box labeled \"Domestic Violence Order.\" On the second page of the form, the court checked a box indicating that James was to be restrained from any contact or communication with Janet. On the next line the court handwrote the number \"500\" in the blank indicating that James should stay at least 500 feet away from Janet at all times. However, the court failed to check the box indicating that this section was applicable. On the section of the form stating \"in order to assist in the eliminating future acts of domestic violence and abuse, dating violence and abuse, <mask> or sexual assault\" the court stamped the following in black ink: \"RESPONDENT IS FURTHER ORDERED NOT TO POSSESS, PURCHASE OBTAIN OR ATTEMPT TO POSSESS, PURCHASE OR OBTAIN A FIREARM DURING THE DURATION OF THIS ORDER.\" Once again, however, the court failed to check the box indicating this section was applicable."], "id": "3759ad8b-f1da-4d98-93b9-470bec6241e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["the violence.\u201d (\u00a7 6220.)7 To effectuate this purpose, trial courts may issue a restraining order based on \u201creasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.\u201d (\u00a7 6300, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 225 (Marriage of Davila).) \u201cThe DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d (Marriage of Davila, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) \u201cAbuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.\u201d (\u00a7 6203, subd. (b).) Rather, \u201c \u2018abuse\u2019 \u201d includes causing or attempting to cause bodily injury (id., subd. (a)(1)), \u201cplac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury\u201d (id., subd. (a)(3)), and behavior such as \u201c<mask>, threatening, . . . harassing, . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party\u201d (\u00a7 6320, subd. (a); see \u00a7 6203, subd. (a)(4)). \u201c \u2018[T]he plain meaning of the phrase \u201cdisturbing the peace of the other party\u201d in section 6320 may be"], "id": "74dd3345-5b15-4b04-b770-273fde423dbd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, as of the time of this decision and order the following charges Eire pending against the defendant: Attempted assault in the third degree as charged by an information affirmed on September 28, 2008; <mask> in the third degree as charged by an information affirmed on September 28, 2008; resisting arrest as cheirged in an information affirmed on September 28, 2008; reckless endangerment of property as charged in an information affirmed on September 28, 2008; no bell or signal device on bicycle as charged in simplified information affirmed on July 16, 2008; no/inadequate lights on bicycle as charged in simplified information affirmed on July 16, 2008; no reflector wheel/bicycle as charged in simplified information affirmed on July 16, 2008; improper or unsafe turn signal as charged in simplified information affirmed on July 16, 2008; and failure to keep right as charged in simplified information affirmed on July 16, 2008."], "id": "d0116e06-bf01-4647-8fec-06f67149b73e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On May 9, 2013, a hearing was commenced before a Referee. Although informed of the hearing, respondent notified the Committee by email that he would not appear. In response, the Committee advised respondent that the hearing would proceed and that, upon his failure to appear, the charges against him would be deemed admitted pursuant to 22 NYCRR 605.12 (c). The Committee submitted documentary evidence at the hearing. In light of respondent\u2019s failure to appear, the Referee deemed the charges admitted. The Committee argued before the Referee that respondent should be disbarred. By a report dated June 28, 2013, the Referee recommended disbarment citing respondent\u2019s aforementioned failure to cooperate with the Committee as well as his egregious conduct consisting of his \u201cmailing of box cutters, obscene email and voicemail messages, and the fear he put into numerous judges and lawyers due to his <mask> and harassment of them.\u201d"], "id": "a3d79a03-7e83-4951-837d-17a4d7e689d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court initially expressed some concern regarding Juror No. 5's impartiality, finding it \"unusual\" that a juror would be reading a book on <mask> during the trial. After questioning the juror, however, the court concluded that her exposure to The Gift of Fear did not affect her ability to be fair, impartial, and objective. In reaching that conclusion, the court found that Juror No. 5 had been given the book by her chiropractor rather than having sought out the material herself, and that she had read the book only briefly before seeing a reference to the prosecutor and setting it aside. These findings, which are based on the court's assessment of the credibility of Juror No. 5's responses to questions posed by the court and the parties, are supported by substantial evidence."], "id": "ddcc6e50-9215-44a8-81d7-57bd929b4fab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant was charged with the crimes of murder, <mask>, and arson. In connection with the stalking count, the trial court permitted the prosecution to elicit from several witnesses Kerr's out-of-court statements regarding her fear of defendant. (See former \u00a7 646.9, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 825, \u00a7 4, p. 5162; id ., ch. 826, \u00a7 1, p. 5166; CALJIC No. 9.16.1 (1999 rev.) (6th ed. 1996) [the crime of stalking under former \u00a7 646.9 requires a showing that the harassing conduct directed at a specific person actually caused that person \"substantial emotional distress\"]; cf. People v. Ewing (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 199, 211-212, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 [evidence that the victim experienced sleepless nights and had joined a support group for battered women was insufficient to show that she suffered substantial emotional distress for purposes of establishing the stalking charge].)"], "id": "d4975e51-18d8-4184-b043-2b8e5f7ae7dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code \u00a7 85.025(a) (generally providing for two-year duration of protective order due to finding of family violence, except in specified situations in which the judge determines that a longer period is needed and the judge makes specific required findings in support of that determination); but see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7A.07 (imposing no limitation on duration of protective order in cases involving sexual assault or abuse, <mask>, or trafficking)."], "id": "ce930c6c-ced6-4f98-ace2-cea429a000c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["(a) A person commits the offense of internet <mask> of a child if the person being twenty-one (21) years of age or older knowingly uses a computer online service, internet service, local internet bulletin board service, or any means of electronic communication to.... Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-306(a) (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). Duren contends that the amendment is significant because it demonstrates that the prior statute, which applies to him, was limited to internet communications and did not criminalize other types of electronic communication like texting that takes place over the phone line. While the amendment does broaden the reach of the statute beyond the use of the internet, it lacks the significance claimed by Duren because substantial evidence supports the jury's conclusion that Duren used the internet when he exchanged photographs with \"B.T.\""], "id": "12fce559-0dbb-4466-8686-2c0765bfeab6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff has proved by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence both of the elements of <mask> in the fourth degree. She has established that defendant, by deliberately moving in close proximity to her vacation home the moment the order of protection expired and continuing to rent there, has engaged in a course of conduct for no legitimate purpose \u2014 \u201cmeaning] the absence of a reason or justification to engage someone, other than to hound, frighten, intimidate or threaten.\u201d (People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 428.) She has also demonstrated that defend*1121ant has done this with the knowledge that he has caused her and continues to cause her the type of fear required under Penal Law \u00a7 120.45. Accordingly, the court finds that defendant Jay Weiner has committed the family offense of stalking in the fourth degree."], "id": "00b669e8-362d-40b6-9be3-ad2bb34d9703", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["2 There were two felony counts of <mask>. Count 1 alleged that between April 7 through April 23, 2019, defendant \u201cdid willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow and did willfully and maliciously harass G.K., and made a credible threat with the intent that she be placed in reasonable fear for her safety and the safety of her immediate family,\u201d and that defendant was \u201csubject to a temporary restraining order, injunction and other court order prohibiting the above described behavior against G.K.\u201d Count 2 alleged the same conduct, but for the earlier period between March 1, 2019 and April 6, 2019, and when there was no court order. 3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754."], "id": "1907ae79-2eba-43c7-aadd-c23dac37acd5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Conviction of an offense that another jurisdiction treats with severe potential penalties may satisfy Public Officers Law \u00a7 30 (1) (e) even if the violation would be a minor offense or even no criminal offense at all under New York law. (Graham v Coughlin, 72 NY2d at 1015; Quaranta v Jacobson, 167 Misc 2d at 1036.) Therefore the court must consider not only how New York classifies a similar offense, but how severely Pennsylvania punishes the offense. (Quaranta v Jacobson, 167 Misc 2d at 1038.) Just as in evaluating New York\u2019s most similar offense for purposes of Public Officers Law \u00a7 30 (1) (e), the court considers the elements of the offense, not the circumstances of petitioner\u2019s commission, so, too, in evaluating whether the punishment fits New York\u2019s definition of a felony, the court considers the maximum penalty that may be imposed, not the sentence actually imposed on petitioner. (Penal Law \u00a7 10.00 [5]; Feola v Carroll, 10 NY3d at 573; Duffy v Ward, 81 NY2d at 130.) Penal Law \u00a7 10.00 (5) defines a felony as an offense potentially punishable by more than one year in prison. Although a first offense of <mask>, absent aggravating factors, constitutes only a misdemeanor of the first degree under Pennsylvania law (18 Pa Cons Stat Ann \u00a7 2709.1 [c]), the offense is punishable by up to five years in prison. (18 Pa Cons Stat Ann \u00a7 106 [b] [6]; \u00a7 1104 [1].) Stalking under Pennsylvania law thus satisfies New York\u2019s definition of a felony."], "id": "4b697628-635c-4b6a-beea-d6d4ec260937", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the RVR, female Correctional Officer M.M. reported: \"On Friday January 31, 2014 at approximately 0713 hours while performing my duties as housing unit 15 control officer, I released all the inmates from the unit for breakfast. I observed [appellant] remaining in the unit standing at the urinal behind the podium continuously staring at me. I gave [appellant] an order to exit the unit and he complied. As he entered the sally port he completely stopped directly beneath me looking up at *348my crotch through the control booth window. He proceeded to breakfast. [\u00b6] At approximately 0755 hours while releasing morning medication I opened cells 201 through 209. [Appellant] exited cell 204 completely naked. Utilizing his right hand holding his erect penis stroking it back and forth while directly looking at me. I contacted Officer Strong to respond to the area. Officer Strong observed [appellant] masturbating and gave him a direct order to stop and step inside his assigned cell and I closed the cell door. I notified Sergeant Wall of the incident and yard staff cuffed and escorted [appellant] out of the unit. I fear for my safety with him on the yard, due to his <mask> behavior. His progression from stalking to masturbating directly at me leads me to fear he may take it further. I was offered EAP [Employee Assistance Program] which I declined.\""], "id": "aad7618a-c568-4e7b-ab82-d921a10db968", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["1. The Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction, as well as jurisdiction over both parties, [Bethany] and [Jared], involving the State\u2019s Application for Protective Order pursuant to Article 7A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court finds that [Jared] did not engage in acts of sexual assault, <mask>, or trafficking and poses no threat in the foreseeable future to [Bethany]."], "id": "ef061d88-97b6-450d-922f-053e34c83384", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Regarding the charge of <mask>, the People assert that two incidents can establish a course of conduct sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The People further argue that defendant\u2019s conduct was of such a nature that it reasonably put the complainant in fear of losing her job. In addition, the People assert that irrespective of the fact that the post office is open to the public and that the defendant may have complained about Ms. Varma, such \u201cdoes not negate defendant\u2019s intentions to go there with the sole intent to stalk Ms. Varma\u201d (Brody affirmation 111113, 14)."], "id": "f3ae24af-bc5f-4c15-b0aa-9316723bf7cf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Accepting the court's credibility determinations and factual findings, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the record as a whole, we conclude there is no substantial likelihood *417that Juror No. 5 was actually biased against defendant. Juror No. 5's exposure to the out-of-court information occurred because her chiropractor had loaned her The Gift of Fear, a book her chiropractor had enthusiastically touted as something that \"all women should read.\" That Juror No. 5 did not herself seek out information on <mask> belies any substantial probability of actual bias. We observe furthermore that Juror No. 5's exposure to the out-of-court information was brief and unremarkable, which further dispels any inference of bias. According to the juror, the 17 pages she read before putting down the book conveyed information that she already knew. Finally, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Juror No. 5 interjected any of the book's contents, or its references to the prosecutor, into her deliberations with follow jurors, which also tends to negate the inference of bias. Notably, Juror No. 5 expressly **552denied having done so. (See In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 657, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985 [that the juror had not revealed the forbidden out-of-court information *100to any other juror tends to negate the inference that the juror was biased because one would expect a biased juror to tell the other jurors what she had learned].)"], "id": "6dd09215-1bd4-4cd0-9e8f-854a65aa1492", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court stated, \"I'm going to restrain each party from harassing or following or <mask>, or any of those things to the other party, and I'm going to issue a restraining order against communicating with the other party.... [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] So, I'm going to eliminate their contact.... I'm going to order each person to stay 100 yards away from the other person....\""], "id": "b46193e1-4455-4e2b-a0ff-db7ea4f59eb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["person who is or has been in a social relationship of a romantic or inti- mate nature with the abuser,\u201d and it specifies that \u201c[t]he existence of such a relationship is based on a consideration of\u201d \u201cthe length of the relation- ship,\u201d \u201cthe type of relationship,\u201d and \u201cthe frequency of interaction be- tween the persons involved in the relationship.\u201d 8 As we have explained, materially identical language supports the conclusion that an \u201cintimate partner\u201d may be the same sex as the abuser, and we see no reason for reaching a different conclusion as to this language when it defines the term \u201cdating partner.\u201d In both cases, the relevant definitions contained in section 2266 state that the terms \u201cintimate partner\u201d and \u201cdating partner\u201d in section 2261 refer to a \u201cperson\u201d with a particular sort of relationship to the abuser. They do not further suggest any limitation based on the sex of either the abuser or the victim or any requirement that the abuser and the victim not be the same sex. The limited legislative history that bears on the pertinent VAWA provi- sions is consistent with our reading of the terms \u201cintimate partner\u201d and \u201cdating partner.\u201d The 2006 VAWA amendments added the definition of \u201cdating partner\u201d and amended the definition of \u201cspouse or intimate part- ner\u201d for purposes of VAWA\u2019s criminal provisions. Those amendments also sought to strengthen the health care system\u2019s response to domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and <mask>. A finding pertain- ing to these latter changes discusses the \u201chealth-related costs of intimate partner violence\u201d and notes that \u201c[t]hirty-seven percent of all women who sought care in hospital emergency rooms for violence-related injuries were injured by a current or former spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend.\u201d Pub. L. No. 109-162, \u00a7 501(1)\u2013(2), 119 Stat. at 3023 (emphases added). This finding\u2019s reference to \u201cintimate partner\u201d violence between women and their girlfriends comports with our conclusion that two individuals"], "id": "a8ec4e71-db29-40e3-af97-fd649930332f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[a] person is guilty of <mask> in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: \u201c1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person, a member of such person\u2019s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted.\u201d The Court of Appeals has emphasized that the statutory requirement of intent for this offense was appropriately limited to an intent to engage in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person, and did not include an additional intent to cause a specific result, such as fear (see People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 427 [2003]). The statute thus focuses on what the *7offenders do, not what they mean by it or what they intend as their ultimate goal. Furthermore, the sheer volume of unwanted attempted communications can establish the \u201cno legitimate purpose\u201d element of the offense (see People v Sonee, 25 Misc 3d 128[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52076[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2009]). Therefore, despite the fact that defendant contends that she had a legitimate purpose in pursuing McDonald in an effort to get her job back, the \u201cno legitimate purpose\u201d element can be inferred from the frequency of the alleged course of conduct. Moreover, although defendant was not alleged to have made any verbal threats, the sheer volume of her attempts at communicating with McDonald make defendant\u2019s course of conduct one which was likely to have caused reasonable fear of material harm to McDonald\u2019s safety (see People v Wong, 3 Misc 3d 274 [Crim Ct, NY County 2004]). Thus, as to the count of stalking in the fourth degree, the information was sufficient on its face, as it contained nonhearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary nature which established, if true, every element of Penal Law \u00a7 120.45 (1) and defendant\u2019s commission thereof (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1]). Additionally, as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational trier of fact could have determined that defendant\u2019s guilt of stalking in the fourth degree was proved beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007])."], "id": "a93d4a07-7a03-424b-b107-3dc6669b7dfc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The first prong of Fariss' point challenges the sufficiency of the pro se petition requesting an order of protection. She contends the petition was inadequate because, apart from the checked boxes on the pre-printed form, it contained only \"bare\" factual allegations which did not constitute either <mask> or harassment under the Act. This issue is not preserved for appellate review because the record before us, consisting only of the legal file, does not demonstrate that this issue was presented to and decided by the trial court. See Rule 78.09; Brown v. Brown , 423 S.W.3d 784, 787-88 (Mo. banc 2014) ; Stander v. Szabados , 407 S.W.3d 73, 81 (Mo. App. 2013) (due to the amendment of Rule 55.27(g), the defense of failure to state a claim is waived when not presented to the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal)."], "id": "b1108f13-3948-4d0c-b78f-13bf9fa6a27c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person is guilty of <mask> in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: \u201c1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person, a member of such person\u2019s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted.\u201d Thus, in order to establish that defendant has committed the crime of stalking in the fourth degree, there are two things that must be proved. The first is that his presence in the Hideout is without legitimate purpose. The second is that he knows or should know that his presence there is likely to cause plaintiff fear for her physical health, safety or property."], "id": "37d05a8b-2ddb-43cc-a9f6-49a0fe0849b0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["person who is or has been in a social relationship of a romantic or inti- mate nature with the abuser,\u201d and it specifies that \u201c[t]he existence of such a relationship is based on a consideration of\u201d \u201cthe length of the relation- ship,\u201d \u201cthe type of relationship,\u201d and \u201cthe frequency of interaction be- tween the persons involved in the relationship.\u201d 8 As we have explained, materially identical language supports the conclusion that an \u201cintimate partner\u201d may be the same sex as the abuser, and we see no reason for reaching a different conclusion as to this language when it defines the term \u201cdating partner.\u201d In both cases, the relevant definitions contained in section 2266 state that the terms \u201cintimate partner\u201d and \u201cdating partner\u201d in section 2261 refer to a \u201cperson\u201d with a particular sort of relationship to the abuser. They do not further suggest any limitation based on the sex of either the abuser or the victim or any requirement that the abuser and the victim not be the same sex. The limited legislative history that bears on the pertinent VAWA provi- sions is consistent with our reading of the terms \u201cintimate partner\u201d and \u201cdating partner.\u201d The 2006 VAWA amendments added the definition of \u201cdating partner\u201d and amended the definition of \u201cspouse or intimate part- ner\u201d for purposes of VAWA\u2019s criminal provisions. Those amendments also sought to strengthen the health care system\u2019s response to domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and <mask>. A finding pertain- ing to these latter changes discusses the \u201chealth-related costs of intimate partner violence\u201d and notes that \u201c[t]hirty-seven percent of all women who sought care in hospital emergency rooms for violence-related injuries were injured by a current or former spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend.\u201d Pub. L. No. 109-162, \u00a7 501(1)\u2013(2), 119 Stat. at 3023 (emphases added). This finding\u2019s reference to \u201cintimate partner\u201d violence between women and their girlfriends comports with our conclusion that two individuals"], "id": "adaa99cf-138f-4049-9c6b-926221392068", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants\u2019 second argument appears to be that the definition of a hate crime as set forth in Penal Law \u00a7 485.05 (1) (a) is unconstitutionally vague unless it is read to require that the crimes against Sandy were actually motivated by bias, prejudice or hate. The law is well settled, however, that a court examining a statute on vagueness grounds is required to determine whether the existing statutory language sufficiently informs persons of ordinary intelligence of the forbidden conduct and provides law enforcement officials with clear standards for enforcement. (See People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 420-421.) If the statute as drafted accomplishes these goals then the constitutional challenge must be dismissed notwithstanding an assertion that the inclusion of an additional element in the statute would have made it easier for members of the public and law enforcement officials to understand the conduct prohibited by the statute. (See People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 426-427 [rejecting claim that anti<mask> statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied because it did not require the People to prove that an offender \u201cintend(ed) a specific result, such as fear or harm\u201d because the statute, as written, provided citizens with clear notice of the prohibited conduct]; People v Nelson, 69 NY2d at *294307-308 [rejecting claim that jostling statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied because it did not require the People to prove larcenous intent since the statute as written provided innocent citizens with clear notice of the prohibited conduct].)"], "id": "0f9015ae-3a5b-43c7-b726-40b1d81d4879", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant's conviction of felony indecent exposure, however, does not encompass the alleged \"<mask> behavior\" he exhibited prior to his commission of the offense. As we have previously recognized, \"other crimes the prisoner may have committed in perpetrating the commitment offense are irrelevant to the determination whether that offense meets the criteria for MDO treatment.\" ( People v. Kortesmaki (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 922, 926-927, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 706, citing People v. Green (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 907, 913, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 464.)"], "id": "30efac42-d390-42e3-8963-2f46694d8e3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On May 9, 2013, a hearing was commenced before a Referee. Although informed of the hearing, respondent notified the Committee by email that he would not appear. In response, the Committee advised respondent that the hearing would proceed and that, upon his failure to appear, the charges against him would be deemed admitted pursuant to 22 NYCRR 605.12 (c). The Committee submitted documentary evidence at the hearing. In light of respondent\u2019s failure to appear, the Referee deemed the charges admitted. The Committee argued before the Referee that respondent should be disbarred. By a report dated June 28, 2013, the Referee recommended disbarment citing respondent\u2019s aforementioned failure to cooperate with the Committee as well as his egregious conduct consisting of his \u201cmailing of box cutters, obscene email and voicemail messages, and the fear he put into numerous judges and lawyers due to his <mask> and harassment of them.\u201d"], "id": "3595693a-d6bc-4c60-ad1c-05f50aba476b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On May 9, 2013, a hearing was commenced before a Referee. Although informed of the hearing, respondent notified the Committee by email that he would not appear. In response, the Committee advised respondent that the hearing would proceed and that, upon his failure to appear, the charges against him would be deemed admitted pursuant to 22 NYCRR 605.12 (c). The Committee submitted documentary evidence at the hearing. In light of respondent\u2019s failure to appear, the Referee deemed the charges admitted. The Committee argued before the Referee that respondent should be disbarred. By a report dated June 28, 2013, the Referee recommended disbarment citing respondent\u2019s aforementioned failure to cooperate with the Committee as well as his egregious conduct consisting of his \u201cmailing of box cutters, obscene email and voicemail messages, and the fear he put into numerous judges and lawyers due to his <mask> and harassment of them.\u201d"], "id": "edb75cc9-3d3f-43f0-835e-feb1b3503d05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Only one conclusion can be drawn from the uncontested facts under the correct legal standards: Appellant has established a prima facie case of contempt and the burden shifted to Respondent to prove that he was financially unable to pay and that the inability was not a consequence of his own intentional and contumacious conduct. Respondent's only effort to meet this burden was getting Appellant to agree on cross-examination that he could not send her money while he was in custody awaiting resolution of the <mask> charges beginning in August 2016. But this was a month after the order of protection expired, and being in jail for those few months only explains--at best--his physical inability to personally put a check in the mail. Respondent has not produced any evidence to demonstrate that he was financially unable to make payments during those few months he was in jail, much less *422during the three previous years the order of protection was in effect. In any case, the inability to send Appellant money while in custody was a direct consequence of his admitted act of stalking her and cannot excuse Respondent's noncompliance with his financial obligation to her under the order of protection. Respondent wholly failed to rebut Appellant's prima facie case of contempt."], "id": "47d063dd-df63-4f49-8cd4-3075483bbc14", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Any person who has been subject to domestic violence by a present or former family or household member, or who has been the victim of <mask> or sexual assault, may seek relief under sections 455.010 to 455.085 by filing a verified petition alleging such domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault by the respondent. A family or household member includes persons, such as Petitioner and Respondent, who have resided together in the past. Section 455.010(7). Accordingly, Petitioner filed a verified petition alleging she had been subject to domestic violence. Section 455.010(5) states that domestic violence is \"abuse or stalking committed by a family or household member, as such terms are defined in this section.\" Section 455.010(1)(a)-(f) provides that \"Abuse\" includes but is not limited to the occurrence of any of the following acts, attempts or threats against a person: assault, battery, coercion, harassment, sexual assault and unlawful imprisonment."], "id": "48fdd64e-7d47-4bb7-8a9c-d205e1aa4cae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["2 There were two felony counts of <mask>. Count 1 alleged that between April 7 through April 23, 2019, defendant \u201cdid willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow and did willfully and maliciously harass G.K., and made a credible threat with the intent that she be placed in reasonable fear for her safety and the safety of her immediate family,\u201d and that defendant was \u201csubject to a temporary restraining order, injunction and other court order prohibiting the above described behavior against G.K.\u201d Count 2 alleged the same conduct, but for the earlier period between March 1, 2019 and April 6, 2019, and when there was no court order. 3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754."], "id": "9c8134b7-e1a9-4ac9-8fc5-60372a17fad8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The elements of the offense to which petitioner pleaded guilty (18 Pa Cons Stat Ann \u00a7 2709.1 [a]), most closely equate to the elements of <mask> in the third degree under New York law, which New York also classifies as a misdemeanor. (Penal Law \u00a7 120.50.) Although stalking in the second and first degrees are felonies under New York law, these offenses require the use of weapons, an age disparity, previous convictions, or the infliction of actual injuries, none of which is an element of the Pennsylvania statute. (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 120.55, 120.60.)"], "id": "c11d8baa-41e7-4d3f-9bd1-eadea9c246ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant claims the trial court found she must show Respondent caused Child to subjectively fear physical harm and that a reasonable person under the same circumstances also would have feared physical *516harm. Appellant asserts that in support, the trial court cited M.D.L. v. S.C.E., 391 S.W.3d 525 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013), an action under the Adult Abuse Act (AAA), Sections 455.010 through 455.090. Appellant argues actions under the AAA generally have no application to actions brought under the CPOA. Appellant maintains a full order of protection under the CPOA is appropriate when a child has been subject to <mask> by any person, Section 455.505, and \" 'stalking' is when any person purposely engages in an unwanted course of conduct that causes alarm to another person, or a person who resides together in the same household with the person seeking the order of protection when it is reasonable in that person's situation to have been alarmed by the conduct.\" Section 455.010(14) (emphasis added). Appellant maintains the reason the CPOA allows for orders to be entered to protect a child under the age of seventeen and does not require alarm to the child is because many children of tender years are not capable of recognizing a dangerous situation or of giving testimony concerning it. Therefore, Appellant concludes, to require a subjective fear of the child as an essential element would preclude relief in some cases where it is most appropriate."], "id": "e8375296-527b-44d8-9ad2-88ae0016c6fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant pleaded no contest to <mask> his ex-wife in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a). As part of a negotiated disposition, the District Attorney agreed to dismiss several misdemeanor charges involving a trespass on the Apple campus in Cupertino in exchange for defendant's no contest plea to the stalking charge. Defendant was granted probation for a period of five years. One of the conditions of probation imposed by *411the trial court is that defendant \"stay away from the Apple campus.\"1 *1244II. DISCUSSION"], "id": "d67e1a1c-cf56-4fa1-97de-e578db0490a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person is guilty of <mask> in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: \u201c2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional *872health of such person, where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such person\u2019s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.\u201d Again, the defendant is accused of contacting the complainant\u2019s family and friends as listed on her Facebook account. The defendant\u2019s motion for insufficiency argues that the factual portion of the information and the supporting deposition fails to meet the requirements of CPL 100.40 (1) (c) which requires that the \u201c[n] on-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof.\u201d The defendant argues that the people fail to set out four nonhearsay allegations, which if true, would establish them as elements of the offense of stalking in the fourth degree, i.e, lack of legitimate purpose, course of conduct, material harm and a previous demand to cease the specific conduct."], "id": "f1fe813b-7d1d-4513-b25d-4d012b3df03c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Although, at first blush, there may seem to be some tension between the rule of construction that each word be accorded meaning if reasonably possible and the rule that words in a list likely share some commonality in meaning, the rules actually complement each other.12 Ordinarily, each word in a list will have a different, a broader, or a narrower meaning than other words in the list, but all the words in a list are likely to share some commonality in meaning. Which of these two rules has the most effect on a statutory construction analysis will depend on the context, which can be illustrated by comparing Long v. State to the present case. In the prior <mask> statute that we addressed in Long , the term \"harass\" was contained in a series with a number of other terms of varying emotional intensity: \"harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass.\"13 What these words have in common is that they denote unwelcome emotional distress. Given the range of emotional distress *319from \"annoy\" to \"torment,\" one could not conclude from the list itself that any of the words denote a similar level of emotional intensity-to the contrary, they seem to denote varying levels of emotional intensity. But in the present statute, the pairing of \"harassing\" solely with \"threatening\" suggests that, while words conveyed in a \"harassing manner\" need not contain a threat, those words would convey an emotional impact similar to a threat, which would be a relatively high emotional intensity level-substantial emotional distress.14"], "id": "54efdae9-6e0e-4f36-b3e2-03c79fc0e17f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*409(See id. at p. 885, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282 [appellate claim that the language of a probation *747condition is unconstitutionally vague or facially overbroad \"does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts\"].) When the electronic search conditions are viewed in this light, they may be understood as not being facially overbroad. Although it is readily apparent that application of this search condition could be constitutionally overbroad as applied to certain probationers in some circumstances, it is equally apparent that such a search condition may be entirely appropriate, and constitutional, in other circumstances. J.S. essentially concedes this point by listing circumstances in which he believes application of such conditions would be constitutionally sound-i.e., where the \"defendant has a history of storing illegal content on his computer, utilizing electronic means to embezzle money, <mask>, hacking, or otherwise perpetrating an offense that is related to usage of a computer.\" We agree that certain probationers may require more intensive supervision and monitoring-in particular, with respect to their use of computers and other electronic and recordable media-based on the specific facts of the case. For this reason, we reject J.S.'s constitutional challenge to the electronic search conditions to the extent that he contends they are facially overbroad."], "id": "cd96d97d-5ee6-4d3e-a258-2d0c9310345a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of felony <mask>, with a maximum sentence of four years in state prison.2 The remaining counts were dismissed with a Harvey3 waiver, and no promises were made as to the sentence. Sentencing was initially scheduled for February 3, 2020, but was continued multiple times, first due to defense counsel\u2019s motion to withdraw (which was granted) and, later, at the requests of new defense counsel. Defendant was eventually sentenced on February 26, 2021 to the midterm of three years in state prison. The Underlying Offenses We draw the essential facts of the offense from the probation presentence report prepared in early February 2020. G.K. ended a three-year relationship with defendant, moving to a location with her elderly mother that she believed defendant could not find. She feared for her safety after ongoing incidents of domestic violence throughout her relationship with defendant. Defendant then \u201ccontinuously harassed\u201d her with \u201cpervasive\u201d phone calls. He used tracking technology to track her whereabouts, and \u201cidentity hiding applications\u201d on the phone he used to harass her."], "id": "f5aa76ca-69c7-4b65-bd1f-d35683b61614", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "STALKING", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["VIOLATION OF CERTAIN COURT ORDERS OR CONDITIONS OF BOND IN A FAMILY VIOLENCE, CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT, SEXUAL ASSAULT OR ABUSE, <mask>, OR TRAFFICKING CASE (a) A person commits an offense if, in violation of a condition of bond set in a family violence, sexual assault or abuse, stalking, or trafficking case and related to the safety of a victim or the safety of the community, an order issued under Chapter 7A, Code of Criminal Procedure,6 an order issued under Article 17.292, Code of Criminal Procedure,7 an order issued under Section 6.504, Family Code,8 Chapter 83, Family Code, if the temporary ex parte order has been served on the person,9 or Chapter 85, *308Family Code,10 or an order issued by another jurisdiction as provided by Chapter 88, Family Code,11 the person knowingly or intentionally: ... (2) communicates: (A) directly with a protected individual or a member of the family or household in a threatening or harassing manner[.] Id. \u00a7 25.07(a)(2)(A).12 By its terms, the statute applies only in the very limited context of situations where, at the time of the challenged conduct, a defendant was actively subject to one of these seven types of judicial conditions or orders in a family violence, sexual abuse, stalking, or trafficking case that expressly prohibited him from communicating in threatening or harassing manner with a protected person."], "id": "21bd7665-e163-48b9-8899-900f776198af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Two Florida statutes were cited on Cobb's journal entry of judgment for his Florida battery conviction: Fla. Stat. \u00a7 741.28 and Fla. Stat. \u00a7 784.03. The first statute defines domestic violence under Florida law as: \"any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, <mask>, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or household member.\" (Emphasis added.) Fla. Stat. \u00a7 741.28(2). The second statute defines battery under Florida law as (1) actually and intentionally touching or striking another person against their will, or (2) intentionally causing bodily harm to another person. Fla. Stat. \u00a7 784.03(1)(a). Because Cobb was convicted of domestic felony battery in Florida, the first alternate"], "id": "306eb8f5-78df-42f6-9184-a2de6b312497", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Later, over defense counsel's Evidence Code section 352 objection, the court permitted Kerr's friend Cheryl Zornes to testify briefly regarding a telephone conversation in which Kerr told her she was afraid of defendant because \"every time she turned around [defendant] was there, following her.\" Another friend, Kim Hyer, likewise was permitted to testify regarding Kerr's statements suggesting she feared defendant. Specifically, Hyer told the jury that Kerr made her promise to take care of Kerr's young son were anything to happen to her. Immediately after this part of *367Hyer's testimony, the court reminded the jury that the limited purpose of this evidence was its relevance to the fear element of the <mask> charge. The court also included a limiting instruction when instructing the jury prior to its deliberations."], "id": "8b9f985d-0bcc-464a-aa0e-d7362043c2a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["T.J. (\"Appellant\") appeals the judgment of the trial court granting a full order of protection under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act, \u00a7\u00a7 455.005-455.090,1 (the \"Act\"). E.D.H. alleged harassment and <mask> under the Act. Appellant argues, among other things, there was insufficient evidence to \"support\" an order of protection against her. Appellant's conduct would not have caused fear of physical harm in a reasonable person. Appellant's conduct did not cause E.D.H. substantial emotional distress. We hold there was insufficient evidence to support the order of protection entered against Appellant. We therefore reverse."], "id": "80c89544-244a-4667-aea2-a8afd4bbafc1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant's conviction of felony indecent exposure, however, does not encompass the alleged \"<mask> behavior\" he exhibited prior to his commission of the offense. As we have previously recognized, \"other crimes the prisoner may have committed in perpetrating the commitment offense are irrelevant to the determination whether that offense meets the criteria for MDO treatment.\" ( People v. Kortesmaki (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 922, 926-927, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 706, citing People v. Green (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 907, 913, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 464.)"], "id": "372c6f1f-1d06-4f50-8a16-b5f4056e1678", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*520As a second aspect of this inquiry, the court requested legal memoranda covering the issue of whether defendant\u2019s acts amounted to \u201cengaging in a course of conduct\u201d as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 120.50 (3) (<mask> in the third degree) and Penal Law \u00a7 215.51 (b) (ii) (contempt in the first degree) and/or whether defendant\u2019s actions amounted to \u201crepeatedly following such person\u201d or \u201crepeatedly committing acts over a period of time\u201d as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 215.51 (b) (ii) (contempt in the first degree)."], "id": "27922825-7019-4df2-abf3-cabfa424abc4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["ny that conducted animal testing). We thus conclude that, in referring to \u201canother person,\u201d sections 2261A and 2262 apply to otherwise-covered conduct when the offender and victim are the same sex, and irrespective of the relationship between the offender and victim. Section 2261A also applies when an offender places the target of the <mask> in \u201creasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to,\u201d the target\u2019s \u201cspouse or intimate partner\u201d or \u201ccauses substantial emotional distress\u201d to the target\u2019s \u201cspouse or intimate partner.\u201d For purposes of VAWA, the term \u201cspouse\u201d cannot be read to cover an individual who is the same sex as the target of the stalking, even if they are married under state law, because the Defense of Marriage Act (\u201cDOMA\u201d) provides that \u201c[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, . . . the word \u2018spouse\u2019 refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.\u201d 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7 (2006). 4 DOMA does not, however, address the additional term \u201cintimate part- ner,\u201d which, for purposes of section 2261A, is defined in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2266(7) (2006). That section provides that the composite phrase \u201cspouse or intimate partner\u201d means \u201ca spouse or former spouse of the target of the stalking, a person who shares a child in common with the target of the stalking, and a person who cohabits or has cohabited as a spouse with the target of the stalking\u201d; \u201ca person who is or has been in a social relation- ship of a romantic or intimate nature with the target of the stalking, as determined by the length of the relationship, the type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction between the persons involved in the relation- ship\u201d; or \u201cany other person similarly situated to a spouse who is protected"], "id": "f7e9c35c-37ab-49cb-b086-8c47a5a69b20", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["*785Thus a lack of moral integrity is not implicit in criminal trespass because the offense may arise in the heat of argument or from \u201can unreasonable belief that one had license to enter or remain.\u201d (Duffy v Ward, 81 NY2d at 135.) In contrast, the Pennsylvania <mask> statute requires a course of conduct or repeated commission of the elements of the offense. This definition precludes the possibility that the offense arose suddenly in the heat of an argument. (18 Pa Cons Stat Ann \u00a7 2709.1 [a].) The Pennsylvania statute\u2019s requirement that the offender intended to place the victim in fear or emotional distress also precludes the possibility that the offender mistakenly believed he had license to commit the acts that placed the victim in fear or distress. (Id.)"], "id": "5dfd0ba3-ca5b-4bab-8e2f-6968b2047a66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["<mask>, which is an unreasonable and unacceptable attempt to exert control over someone, takes many shapes and forms. In enacting the \u201cClinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999,\u201d which created the crime codified under Penal Law \u00a7 120.45, the Legislature recognized that the \u201cunfortunate reality is that stalking victims have been intolerably forced to live in fear of their stalkers\u201d and that \u201c[s]talkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write, confront, threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims, often inflict immeasurable emotional and physical harm upon them.\u201d (L 1999, ch 635, \u00a7 2, cited in People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 416, 417 [emphasis added].) Defendant is in every sense of the word a stalker who has \u201cunacceptably intruded\u201d on his victim. As such, he continues to pose a real and ongoing danger to plaintiffs safety and well-being. Accordingly, the court will grant her application for a final order of protection that will require him to not only stay away from her but to stay away from the Hideout."], "id": "9c596ede-3e35-455c-a0bd-ec0096ddcfd4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Patrick J. McGrath, J. The above named defendant stands charged with the crimes of <mask> in the second degree, criminal contempt in the first degree, criminal contempt in the second degree (eight counts), in violation of sections 120.55 (2), 215.51 (b) (iii) and 215.50 (3) *711of the Penal Law. The defendant filed an omnibus motion on February 1, 2002, and the People filed an affirmation in opposition thereto on February 21, 2002."], "id": "b8d0aff6-9a88-40b8-9e1f-c4e93cd75969", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Turning directly to the case at bar, we note that \"[d]omestic violence and abuse\" is defined as \"physical injury, serious physical injury, <mask>, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]\" Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.720. Additionally, KRS 403.750(1) states that \"[a]ny family member or member of an unmarried couple\" may file a petition for a protective order under the domestic violence statutes. The definition of \"[m]ember of an unmarried couple\" includes \"each member of an unmarried couple which allegedly has a child in common....\" KRS 403.720(5)."], "id": "96cdb8bf-7b2b-4d01-a593-3346bd7de22b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person is guilty of <mask> in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: \u201c2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional *872health of such person, where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such person\u2019s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.\u201d Again, the defendant is accused of contacting the complainant\u2019s family and friends as listed on her Facebook account. The defendant\u2019s motion for insufficiency argues that the factual portion of the information and the supporting deposition fails to meet the requirements of CPL 100.40 (1) (c) which requires that the \u201c[n] on-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof.\u201d The defendant argues that the people fail to set out four nonhearsay allegations, which if true, would establish them as elements of the offense of stalking in the fourth degree, i.e, lack of legitimate purpose, course of conduct, material harm and a previous demand to cease the specific conduct."], "id": "948fae19-be9a-4f27-bd86-a922ab7036cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff also testified credibly and convincingly as to what might be called the fear factor. This is the second element of the *1120crime of <mask> in the fourth degree, which requires that the conduct at issue be such that it can reasonably be expected to cause fear for one\u2019s health, safety and property. The fear on plaintiff\u2019s part as she confronted her ex-husband in the courtroom was actually palpable. Asked if she was afraid of him, she responded as follows:"], "id": "89376dda-3a85-4b63-b994-808dfa60c7ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c(a) (1) To intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury. [\u00b6] (2) Sexual assault. [\u00b6] (3) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another. [\u00b6] (4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320. [\u00b6] (b) Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.\u201d (Italics added.) Family Code section 6320, subdivision (a), referenced in subdivision (a)(4) of Family Code section 6211, lists the following behaviors as subject to being enjoined: \u201cmolesting, attacking, striking, <mask>, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating as described in Section 528.5 of the Penal Code, falsely personating as described in Section 529 of the Penal Code, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party.\u201d (Italics added.) \u201c \u2018[T]he plain meaning of the phrase \u201cdisturbing the peace of the other party\u201d in [Family Code] section 6320\u2019 \u201d includes \u201c \u2018conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 601 (Sorden), some italics added, quoting In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497 (Nadkarni).) As the Nadkarni court reasoned: \u201cThe ordinary meaning of \u2018disturb\u2019 is \u2018[t]o agitate and destroy (quiet, peace, rest); to break up the quiet, tranquility, or rest (of a person, a country, etc.); to stir up, trouble, disquiet.\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018Peace,\u2019 as a condition of the individual, is ordinarily defined as \u2018freedom from anxiety, disturbance (emotional, mental or spiritual), or inner conflict; calm, tranquility.\u2019 [Citation.] Thus, the plain meaning of the phrase \u2018disturbing the peace of the other party\u2019 in [Family Code] section 6320 may be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.\u201d (Nadkarni, at p. 1497, italics added.)"], "id": "e4c9b3a5-9ac6-4c92-ac24-5a120d9ced8c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court stated, \"I'm going to restrain each party from harassing or following or <mask>, or any of those things to the other party, and I'm going to issue a restraining order against communicating with the other party.... [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] So, I'm going to eliminate their contact.... I'm going to order each person to stay 100 yards away from the other person....\""], "id": "c2136d14-e97c-4828-9917-61572a3c3b18", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person is guilty of <mask> in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: \u201c1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person * * * or \u201c2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person, where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person * * * and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.\u201d"], "id": "0ef49a83-cca4-4230-97ff-c2fc43401d88", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court initially expressed some concern regarding Juror No. 5's impartiality, finding it \"unusual\" that a juror would be reading a book on <mask> during the trial. After questioning the juror, however, the court concluded that her exposure to The Gift of Fear did not affect her ability to be fair, impartial, and objective. In reaching that conclusion, the court found that Juror No. 5 had been given the book by her chiropractor rather than having sought out the material herself, and that she had read the book only briefly before seeing a reference to the prosecutor and setting it aside. These findings, which are based on the court's assessment of the credibility of Juror No. 5's responses to questions posed by the court and the parties, are supported by substantial evidence."], "id": "d6840ab1-d029-4bf4-8ac0-bbe2ddd8c690", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Cavin v. Abbott , 545 S.W.3d 47, 70-71, No. 03-16-00395-CV, 2017 WL 3044583, at *16, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6511, at *41 (Tex. App.-Austin July 14, 2017, no pet.) ; see id. at 49, 2017 WL 3044583, at *1, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6511, at *1-2 (summarizing holdings that TCPA applied \"in the context of litigation arising from family tumult over an adult daughter's choice of a husband,\" including requiring dismissal of claims based on alleged <mask> and car theft); Elite Auto Body LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc. , 520 S.W.3d 191, 193 (Tex. App.-Austin 2017, pet. dism'd) (summarizing holdings illustrating TCPA's use \"to defend against claims seeking to remedy alleged misappropriation or misuse of a business's trade secrets or confidential information.\")."], "id": "047ae673-299c-4cb0-93a0-dc89060b6095", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant Paul Stuart stands convicted, following a nonjury trial, of <mask> in the fourth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 120.45 [1], [2]).* The proof presented by the People, including the credited testimony of the complainant and an eyewitness, was strong and persuasive, and established the following facts: that on February 14 and February 26, 2000, defendant approached the then 21-year-old complainant, a stranger, and offered her unsolicited gifts, among them flowers and a box of chocolates; that during the February 26 encounter the complainant told defendant that she could not speak to him because she had a boyfriend; that later that day and on nearly every day for more than five weeks thereafter (through April 7, 2000), defendant \u201cstared at\u201d and followed the complainant throughout the area surrounding her home and school, often \u201clingering\u201d or \u201ccircling around\u201d the complainant and \u201cduckling]\u201d into buildings or behind objects to avoid detection; and that as a result of defendant\u2019s unwanted and extended course of conduct the complainant felt \u201cvery scared\u201d and \u201cvery uncomfortable.\u201d This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, clearly was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s stalking conviction. In view of the persistent pattern of conduct painfully depicted *543in the record, the trial court, as factfinder, rationally and reasonably rejected defendant\u2019s proffered explanation that he unintentionally came into contact with the complainant while handing out flyers on behalf of his employer. Upon an independent review of the facts, we find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence."], "id": "0558ef99-77bb-4a6c-8f1b-4123d8fb8b7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecutor argued that the proffered evidence \"makes it very clear that this woman correctional officer was in a position to see this as <mask> behavior and an acceleration of activity.\" The prosecutor added that \"[appellant] did admit that the staff was aware of this past sexual situation. And it seems to me that makes *349the fear of this female correctional officer all the more reasonable. And when the court fits this in with the testimony of Dr. Shenouda and the totality of circumstances here, your Honor, there is no reasonable doubt. All [MDO] criteria are met.\""], "id": "897a4dda-e3d2-40e3-8ba4-0d81fbf0a1b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c1. Jurisdiction. The family court and the criminal courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over any proceeding concerning acts which would constitute disorderly conduct, harassment in the first degree, harassment in the second degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree, sexual misconduct, forcible touching, sexual abuse in the third degree, sexual abuse in the second degree as set forth in subdivision one of section 130.60 of the penal law, <mask> in the first degree, stalking in the second degree, stalking in the third degree, stalking in the fourth degree, criminal mischief, menacing in the second degree, menacing in the third degree, reckless endangerment, assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree or an attempted assault between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household except that if the respondent would not be criminally responsible by reason of age pursuant to section 30.00 of the penal law, then the family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such proceeding. Notwithstanding a complainant\u2019s election to proceed in family court, the criminal court shall not be divested of jurisdiction to hear a family offense proceeding pursuant to this section. In any proceeding pursuant to this article, a court shall not deny an order of protection, or dismiss a petition, solely on the basis that the acts or events alleged are not relatively contemporaneous with the date of the petition, the conclusion of the fact-finding or the conclusion of the dispositional hearing. For purposes of this article, \u2018disorderly conduct\u2019 includes disorderly conduct not in a public place. For purposes of this article, \u2018members of the same family or household,\u2019 shall mean the following: \u201c(a) persons related by consanguinity or affinity; \u201c(b) persons legally married to one another; \u201c(c) persons formerly married to one another regardless of whether they still reside in the same household; \u201c(d) persons who have a child in common regardless of whether such persons have been married or have *299lived together at any time; and \u201c(e) persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time. Factors the court may consider in determining whether a relationship is an \u2018intimate relationship\u2019 include but are not limited to: the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship. Neither a casual acquaintance nor ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to constitute an \u2018intimate relationship.\u2019 \u201d Petitioner and respondent are not family members under the Family Court Act. (Contra Turner v Lewis, 434 Mass 331, 749 NE2d 122 [2001] [interpreting a statute for victims of family violence whose language is virtually identical to section 812 (1) (a), and holding that the court has jurisdiction because the grandparent is related by blood through the grandchild to the grandchild\u2019s parent].) Since petitioner and respondent\u2019s son were never married, the parties are not related by affinity. \u201c[A] relation of affinity is based upon marriage (see, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 59 [6th ed 1990]) and divorce destroys the foundation of that relation.\u201d (Matter of Orellana v Escalante, 228 AD2d 63, 65 [4th Dept 1997].) However, the court finds that this relationship is sufficiently \u201cintimate\u201d to be captured by Family Court Act \u00a7 812 (1) (e). One of the indicia of an intimate relationship is its duration. The parties can be expected to have a relationship for a lifetime where, as here, the father maintains a relationship with the child and respondent maintains a relationship with her son and her grandchild. (See Matter of R.M.W. v G.M.M., 23 Misc 3d 713 [Fam Ct, Nassau County 2009] [intimate relationship based on connection through child between mother and father\u2019s resident paramour].) Indeed, one of the alleged incidents occurred on a subway platform where paternal grandmother, father, mother and baby were present and another incident occurred when paternal grandmother rushed up to the child when the grandmother saw the child at McDonald\u2019s. Clearly, by all the testimony, the grandmother wishes to maintain a relationship with the child."], "id": "1bb711e4-018f-41e1-b09e-18511f6be9a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In May 2019, a jury convicted Robert Gross of two counts of interstate <mask> (Counts 1 and 2), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2261A(1)(B) and 2261(b), and six counts related to his unlawful receipt and possession of firearms. The district court sentenced him to a total of 420 months of imprisonment. Gross appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts 1 and 2, alleging error in the denial of his motion for new trial, and arguing that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. I."], "id": "e99c9a6d-d714-4607-aca0-197baca45705", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c(a) Requirement to make reasonable accommodation to the needs of victims of domestic violence, sex offenses or <mask>. Except as provided in paragraph (c), any person prohibited by this section 8-107.1 from discriminating on the basis of actual or perceived status as a victim of domestic violence or a victim of sex offenses or stalking shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person who is a victim of domestic violence, or a victim of sex offenses or stalking to satisfy the essential requisites of a job provided that the status as a victim of domestic violence or a victim of sex offenses or stalking is known or should have been known by the covered entity.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.)"], "id": "117f08d3-61a7-4bd3-ae08-cab336ef9511", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The federal <mask> statute defines two separate crimes: one prohibiting stalking via interstate travel under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2261A(1), and another prohibiting stalking via interstate communications (often called cyberstalking) under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2261A(2). See United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 180 (3d Cir. 2018) (listing elements for both crimes). Only cyberstalking includes a \u201ccourse of conduct\u201d requirement. In contrast, interstate travel stalking requires that a defendant cause emotional distress \u201cin the course of, or as a result of, such travel.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2261A(1). Thus, for an interstate travel stalking charge, a single interstate trip is sufficient. See United States v. Lee, 790 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming stalking conviction over challenges to sufficiency of the evidence where defendant took a single interstate trip); United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 224\u201325 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the interstate trip can itself be sufficient to convict where the victim suffered emotional distress as a result of that trip)."], "id": "bf432435-0cb9-4c47-9cb8-99dcb8968310", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On the facts and circumstances presented, the time frame alleged in the instrument accusing defendant of <mask> in the fourth degree was not per se unconstitutional (People v Sedlock, 8 NY3d 535, 538 [2007]; People v Bennett, 57 AD3d 688, 690 [2008]; People v Rozarlo, 20 Misc 3d 76, 81 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]; cf. People v Boyette, 41 Misc 3d 48, 50-51 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]) and, absent timely objection, we decline to reach the issue (CPL 470.05 [2])."], "id": "12b7aad0-2b3f-4489-a039-fd0f414dcdd4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Accepting the court's credibility determinations and factual findings, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the record as a whole, we conclude there is no substantial likelihood *417that Juror No. 5 was actually biased against defendant. Juror No. 5's exposure to the out-of-court information occurred because her chiropractor had loaned her The Gift of Fear, a book her chiropractor had enthusiastically touted as something that \"all women should read.\" That Juror No. 5 did not herself seek out information on <mask> belies any substantial probability of actual bias. We observe furthermore that Juror No. 5's exposure to the out-of-court information was brief and unremarkable, which further dispels any inference of bias. According to the juror, the 17 pages she read before putting down the book conveyed information that she already knew. Finally, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Juror No. 5 interjected any of the book's contents, or its references to the prosecutor, into her deliberations with follow jurors, which also tends to negate the inference of bias. Notably, Juror No. 5 expressly **552denied having done so. (See In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 657, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985 [that the juror had not revealed the forbidden out-of-court information *100to any other juror tends to negate the inference that the juror was biased because one would expect a biased juror to tell the other jurors what she had learned].)"], "id": "86461610-8c23-407d-9d97-32000c857913", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c(a) (1) To intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury. [\u00b6] (2) Sexual assault. [\u00b6] (3) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another. [\u00b6] (4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320. [\u00b6] (b) Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.\u201d (Italics added.) Family Code section 6320, subdivision (a), referenced in subdivision (a)(4) of Family Code section 6211, lists the following behaviors as subject to being enjoined: \u201cmolesting, attacking, striking, <mask>, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating as described in Section 528.5 of the Penal Code, falsely personating as described in Section 529 of the Penal Code, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party.\u201d (Italics added.) \u201c \u2018[T]he plain meaning of the phrase \u201cdisturbing the peace of the other party\u201d in [Family Code] section 6320\u2019 \u201d includes \u201c \u2018conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 601 (Sorden), some italics added, quoting In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497 (Nadkarni).) As the Nadkarni court reasoned: \u201cThe ordinary meaning of \u2018disturb\u2019 is \u2018[t]o agitate and destroy (quiet, peace, rest); to break up the quiet, tranquility, or rest (of a person, a country, etc.); to stir up, trouble, disquiet.\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018Peace,\u2019 as a condition of the individual, is ordinarily defined as \u2018freedom from anxiety, disturbance (emotional, mental or spiritual), or inner conflict; calm, tranquility.\u2019 [Citation.] Thus, the plain meaning of the phrase \u2018disturbing the peace of the other party\u2019 in [Family Code] section 6320 may be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.\u201d (Nadkarni, at p. 1497, italics added.)"], "id": "4a973145-ade3-4fd2-a155-ff89b5d21463", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 215.50 (3), and <mask> in the fourth degree, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 120.45 (2). It was alleged that on November 4, 2010 the defendant violated paragraph \u201c14\u201d of a \u201cno contact\u201d order of protection issued on July 15, 2008 by Judicial Hearing Officer Sidney T. Farber of Monroe County Family Court.1 In particular the order of protection directed that the defendant have no contact with a Maureen Perry, the mother of his two children, \u201cincluding personal or through third person.\u201d The criminal complaints specifically alleged that the defendant violated the statutes in question on November 4, 2010 by gaining \u201caccess to Maureen\u2019s \u2018Friend List\u2019 on \u2018Facebook\u2019 and began to contact and communicate to these friends and family members accusing Maureen L. Perry of using their children against their father to prevent the respondent *869from seeing or communicating with their two children.\u201d2 The supporting deposition signed by the complainant states, \u201cCarl gained access to my \u2018friends list\u2019 on facebook and began to send out letters accusing me of using our children against Carl and preventing Carl from contacting or visiting with them.\u201d The defense has filed a motion to dismiss the charges herein as being facially insufficient pursuant to CPL 170.30 (1) (a)."], "id": "74e60359-7ceb-44fb-b6ab-186fb9abd3a7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In the RVR, female Correctional Officer M.M. reported: \"On Friday January 31, 2014 at approximately 0713 hours while performing my duties as housing unit 15 control officer, I released all the inmates from the unit for breakfast. I observed [appellant] remaining in the unit standing at the urinal behind the podium continuously staring at me. I gave [appellant] an order to exit the unit and he complied. As he entered the sally port he completely stopped directly beneath me looking up at *348my crotch through the control booth window. He proceeded to breakfast. [\u00b6] At approximately 0755 hours while releasing morning medication I opened cells 201 through 209. [Appellant] exited cell 204 completely naked. Utilizing his right hand holding his erect penis stroking it back and forth while directly looking at me. I contacted Officer Strong to respond to the area. Officer Strong observed [appellant] masturbating and gave him a direct order to stop and step inside his assigned cell and I closed the cell door. I notified Sergeant Wall of the incident and yard staff cuffed and escorted [appellant] out of the unit. I fear for my safety with him on the yard, due to his <mask> behavior. His progression from stalking to masturbating directly at me leads me to fear he may take it further. I was offered EAP [Employee Assistance Program] which I declined.\""], "id": "a2fcf838-c736-4c7f-96b0-ef9c5c635c3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["2 There were two felony counts of <mask>. Count 1 alleged that between April 7 through April 23, 2019, defendant \u201cdid willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow and did willfully and maliciously harass G.K., and made a credible threat with the intent that she be placed in reasonable fear for her safety and the safety of her immediate family,\u201d and that defendant was \u201csubject to a temporary restraining order, injunction and other court order prohibiting the above described behavior against G.K.\u201d Count 2 alleged the same conduct, but for the earlier period between March 1, 2019 and April 6, 2019, and when there was no court order. 3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754."], "id": "15e6f6f9-7c12-4316-97af-d538a584f531", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Any person who has been subject to domestic violence by a present or former family or household member, or who has been the victim of <mask> or sexual assault, may seek relief under sections 455.010 to 455.085 by filing a verified petition alleging such domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault by the respondent. A family or household member includes persons, such as Petitioner and Respondent, who have resided together in the past. Section 455.010(7). Accordingly, Petitioner filed a verified petition alleging she had been subject to domestic violence. Section 455.010(5) states that domestic violence is \"abuse or stalking committed by a family or household member, as such terms are defined in this section.\" Section 455.010(1)(a)-(f) provides that \"Abuse\" includes but is not limited to the occurrence of any of the following acts, attempts or threats against a person: assault, battery, coercion, harassment, sexual assault and unlawful imprisonment."], "id": "fe3b688a-4912-444f-9741-3bc1ee8c7590", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Nor is Penal Law \u00a7 120.45 any more difficult to interpret and obey because it lacks a specific intent component. The Legislature\u2019s choice of general over specific intent reflects sound public policy and is consistent with the approach taken by the drafters of the national model anti<mask> statute (National Institute of Justice, Project to Develop a Model Anti-stalking Code For States 43-48 [1993]). By focusing on the behavior of the accused stalker rather than on the stalker\u2019s motivation, Penal Law \u00a7 120.45, like the model code, ensures that accused stalkers do not escape criminal liability \u201cby saying that however outrageous [their] conduct might have been, it was not [their] actual intent to cause the requisite fear.\u201d (New Jersey v Cardell, 318 NJ Super 175, 184, 723 A2d 111, 115, certification denied 158 NJ 687, 731 A2d 46; accord, Iowa v Neuzil, 589 NW2d 708, 712 [Iowa]; see also, Greyson, Comment, California\u2019s Antistalking Statute: The Pivotal Role of Intent, 28 Golden Gate U L Rev 221, 242 [1998].) Indeed, Penal Law \u00a7 120.45, with its use of the phrase \u201clegitimate purpose\u201d in tandem with a general intent standard, parallels stalking statutes from other jurisdictions that have withstood constitutional vagueness challenges (see, e.g., Bouters v Florida, 659 So 2d 235 [Fla], cert denied 516 US 894; Snowden v Delaware, 677 A2d 33 [Del]; People v White, 536 NW2d 876 [Mich]; cf., Oregon v Norris-Romine, 134 Or App 204, 894 P2d 1221)."], "id": "58793c6d-078b-494e-8fca-0eead9a0c7b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Gross was charged in a Superseding Indictment with four counts of interstate <mask> (Counts 1\u20134), alleging that he stalked four different women by traveling from his residence in Missouri to Kansas with the intent to harass and intimidate each of them, causing substantial emotional distress. 1 Counts 1 and 2 arose out of Gross\u2019s conduct toward Yuling Liu and Chunqiu Wu, 2 respectively."], "id": "7c03fdea-95a9-4f57-9b1a-bc7b3d91c096", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On June 26, 2009, Lottie Rae Kogut (Lottie) appeared in Nassau County Family Court seeking an order of protection on her own behalf and on behalf of her son, David Kogut (David), against plaintiff Rudolph Lodichand (Lodichand). Defendant Dorothy A. Phillips, a Family Court Attorney Referee (Referee Phillips), upon reviewing Lottie\u2019s family offense petition,1 issued an ex parte temporary order of protection in favor of Lot*893tie and against Lodichand, but declined to issue an order of protection in favor of David. The order of protection required that Lodichand (misspelled in the petition as Lodichard), refrain from communicating with Lottie and from assaulting, <mask>, harassing, and menacing her. In addition, the order prohibited Lodichand from engaging in other criminal acts against Lottie. The family offense petition summons accompanying the order of protection indicated that proceedings pertaining to the order of protection were scheduled to be heard on July 29, 2009."], "id": "e1dd5433-3e71-44eb-aba9-96cd2bc6938a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code \u00a7 85.025(a) (generally providing for two-year duration of protective order due to finding of family violence, except in specified situations in which the judge determines that a longer period is needed and the judge makes specific required findings in support of that determination); but see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7A.07 (imposing no limitation on duration of protective order in cases involving sexual assault or abuse, <mask>, or trafficking)."], "id": "f021fbcc-cecb-42f7-9ec2-6d5f19e0e4fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c(a) (1) To intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury. [\u00b6] (2) Sexual assault. [\u00b6] (3) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another. [\u00b6] (4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320. [\u00b6] (b) Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.\u201d (Italics added.) Family Code section 6320, subdivision (a), referenced in subdivision (a)(4) of Family Code section 6211, lists the following behaviors as subject to being enjoined: \u201cmolesting, attacking, striking, <mask>, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating as described in Section 528.5 of the Penal Code, falsely personating as described in Section 529 of the Penal Code, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party.\u201d (Italics added.) \u201c \u2018[T]he plain meaning of the phrase \u201cdisturbing the peace of the other party\u201d in [Family Code] section 6320\u2019 \u201d includes \u201c \u2018conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 601 (Sorden), some italics added, quoting In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497 (Nadkarni).) As the Nadkarni court reasoned: \u201cThe ordinary meaning of \u2018disturb\u2019 is \u2018[t]o agitate and destroy (quiet, peace, rest); to break up the quiet, tranquility, or rest (of a person, a country, etc.); to stir up, trouble, disquiet.\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018Peace,\u2019 as a condition of the individual, is ordinarily defined as \u2018freedom from anxiety, disturbance (emotional, mental or spiritual), or inner conflict; calm, tranquility.\u2019 [Citation.] Thus, the plain meaning of the phrase \u2018disturbing the peace of the other party\u2019 in [Family Code] section 6320 may be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.\u201d (Nadkarni, at p. 1497, italics added.)"], "id": "e7f7ed71-92ba-4e44-8a01-c32e201831ed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Conviction of an offense that another jurisdiction treats with severe potential penalties may satisfy Public Officers Law \u00a7 30 (1) (e) even if the violation would be a minor offense or even no criminal offense at all under New York law. (Graham v Coughlin, 72 NY2d at 1015; Quaranta v Jacobson, 167 Misc 2d at 1036.) Therefore the court must consider not only how New York classifies a similar offense, but how severely Pennsylvania punishes the offense. (Quaranta v Jacobson, 167 Misc 2d at 1038.) Just as in evaluating New York\u2019s most similar offense for purposes of Public Officers Law \u00a7 30 (1) (e), the court considers the elements of the offense, not the circumstances of petitioner\u2019s commission, so, too, in evaluating whether the punishment fits New York\u2019s definition of a felony, the court considers the maximum penalty that may be imposed, not the sentence actually imposed on petitioner. (Penal Law \u00a7 10.00 [5]; Feola v Carroll, 10 NY3d at 573; Duffy v Ward, 81 NY2d at 130.) Penal Law \u00a7 10.00 (5) defines a felony as an offense potentially punishable by more than one year in prison. Although a first offense of <mask>, absent aggravating factors, constitutes only a misdemeanor of the first degree under Pennsylvania law (18 Pa Cons Stat Ann \u00a7 2709.1 [c]), the offense is punishable by up to five years in prison. (18 Pa Cons Stat Ann \u00a7 106 [b] [6]; \u00a7 1104 [1].) Stalking under Pennsylvania law thus satisfies New York\u2019s definition of a felony."], "id": "ee316ab0-7636-4b65-9334-6ec1341b88cf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Courts have the authority to enjoin <mask> and/or cyberstalking under section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2015). \u201cA person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking ....\u201d \u00a7 784.048(2), Fla. Stat (2015). \u201c\u2018Harass\u2019 means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.\u201d \u00a7 784.048(1)(a)."], "id": "08faee2c-bd74-49c4-91e0-080353d8658b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant testified on cross-examination that she had filed several reports with the NLRPD against Murry for harassment and <mask> and that she had gone to the prosecuting attorney's office several times. However, she stated that nothing had been done about Murry's actions. She said that Murry had harassed her over the past eight years and that she filed reports each time. She stated she did not know what the NLRPD did with eight years' worth of police reports. She testified that Murry has harassed her since she shot him and that the last police report she filed against him was on December 28, 2017. She admitted that she did not get an order of protection against Murry, but she said that was because Murry had one against her. She said that the day she shot Murry, he \"had come over there [and] was disrespecting [her] in [her] auntie's yard, putting his hands on [her].\" She stated that Murry was disrespecting her \"in front of everybody. It was a gang of people out there. And I shot him. And then I shot him after he put his hands on me. I put my hand on him after he put his hands on me. He proceeded to draw back and hit me again, and that is when I shot him, as I stated.\" She testified that Murry was in the process of hitting her in her face with his fist when she shot him. She acknowledged that she did not live with Martin and that she did not try to leave. However, she stated that she tried to walk away and that she kept telling Murry to leave."], "id": "06f9f144-50b8-4145-8ec3-80316328d235", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On the facts and circumstances presented, the time frame alleged in the instrument accusing defendant of <mask> in the fourth degree was not per se unconstitutional (People v Sedlock, 8 NY3d 535, 538 [2007]; People v Bennett, 57 AD3d 688, 690 [2008]; People v Rozarlo, 20 Misc 3d 76, 81 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]; cf. People v Boyette, 41 Misc 3d 48, 50-51 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]) and, absent timely objection, we decline to reach the issue (CPL 470.05 [2])."], "id": "22730d59-24d6-45db-a61b-c88968a64ec6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code \u00a7 85.025(a) (generally providing for two-year duration of protective order due to finding of family violence, except in specified situations in which the judge determines that a longer period is needed and the judge makes specific required findings in support of that determination); but see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7A.07 (imposing no limitation on duration of protective order in cases involving sexual assault or abuse, <mask>, or trafficking)."], "id": "278d3f04-b9bb-43cd-9b48-9971c2128465", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Graham's second point on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for Count II. Count II charged Graham with purposely harassing A.L. through a course of conduct in which he made a credible threat on November 1, 2014. Specifically, the State alleged that Graham sent text messages to R.T. and called the Boone County Sheriff's Department on November 1, 2014, for the purpose of harassing A.L. with a credible threat. To prove that Graham committed aggravated <mask> as charged in Count II, the State was thus required to establish that: (1) Graham, through a course of *421conduct; (2) purposely harassed A.L.; and (3) made a credible threat. Section 565.225.3(1). Graham's second point on appeal challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the second element: whether Graham purposely harassed A.L."], "id": "f27e64c3-86bb-47f2-87d3-92fa50845e78", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Respondent further testified that on May 25, 2001, she commenced a family offense proceeding against petitioner and *146obtained a temporary order of protection from Family Court. The order, which was admitted into evidence, directs petitioner Samuel Billips to \u201cstay away\u201d from the \u201chome\u201d and \u201cplace of employment\u201d of Mildred Billips and to refrain from \u201cassault, <mask>, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, disorderly conduct, intimidation, threats or any criminal offense against Mildred Billips.\u201d The order further provides that it \u201cshall remain in effect until August 31, 2001,\u201d the date the family offense proceeding is scheduled to be heard."], "id": "b03efdf3-9883-478b-950e-42ecba1e5c4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Consequently, to prove that Lazinger committed aggravated <mask>, the State was required to establish three elements: (1) Lazinger, through a course of conduct; (2) purposely harassed M.L.;5 and (3) Lazinger previously pleaded guilty to \"any other crime where [M.L.] was the victim.\" Lazinger challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the first and second elements of aggravated stalking as charged in Count I.6 The essence of Lazinger's complaint is that her contact with S.L. at lacrosse practice did not purposely harass M.L., and thus cannot be used to establish a course of conduct.7"], "id": "3d782c10-2dd0-41cb-989e-65f3e546f0a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The court stated, \"I'm going to restrain each party from harassing or following or <mask>, or any of those things to the other party, and I'm going to issue a restraining order against communicating with the other party.... [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] So, I'm going to eliminate their contact.... I'm going to order each person to stay 100 yards away from the other person....\""], "id": "980dee6e-10d2-413a-a04e-9df7f40e1766", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["In urging that the <mask> statute is void for vagueness, defendant primarily argues that the term \u201clegitimate purpose\u201d is subjective and incapable of precise definition. Defendant\u2019s argument inappropriately lifts the statutory term out of context and ignores the fact that the statute measures a defendant\u2019s actions by an objective standard, in that the offending course of conduct must be such as would likely cause the targeted person to reasonably fear specified physical harm or actually causes the targeted person to suffer specified mental or emotional harm. In our view, the term \u201clegitimate purpose,\u201d when read in conjunction with the rest of the statutory language, including the requirement that the course of conduct be undertaken \u201cintentionally,\u201d does not require a person of ordinary intelligence, law enforcement officials or triers of fact to guess at its meaning. The legislative use of inherently imprecise language does not render a statute fatally vague where, as here, that language \u201cconveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices\u201d (People v Shack, 86 NY2d 529, 538, supra, quoting United States v Petrillo, 332 US 1, 8). Further, it does not avail defendant to advance theoretical applications of the term \u201clegitimate purpose\u201d which would be outside the stalking *544statute\u2019s intended reach, such as the investigatory work of a private detective or the collection efforts of a \u201crepo man.\u201d The insidious actions of this defendant, a stranger to the complainant, were not remotely legitimate in purpose, and \u201c[t]his court cannot consider the possibility that the statute may be vague as applied in other hypothetical situations.\u201d (People v Nelson, 69 NY2d 302, 308, supra.)"], "id": "3bde9adb-ff52-45ef-8f79-28c95b151849", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The elements of the offense to which petitioner pleaded guilty (18 Pa Cons Stat Ann \u00a7 2709.1 [a]), most closely equate to the elements of <mask> in the third degree under New York law, which New York also classifies as a misdemeanor. (Penal Law \u00a7 120.50.) Although stalking in the second and first degrees are felonies under New York law, these offenses require the use of weapons, an age disparity, previous convictions, or the infliction of actual injuries, none of which is an element of the Pennsylvania statute. (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 120.55, 120.60.)"], "id": "c6021ee8-8a32-46de-a99f-f82eddf7d1f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The following day, Jeannetta filed the instant petition seeking entry of a DVO. In her petition, she alleged Omar's disposal of the items of personal property made her scared because \"he use (sic) to threaten stuff like this to me\" and she didn't \"know what he is capabile (sic) of at this point or if he is still <mask> me[.]\" A two-hour hearing was conducted at which the trial court heard testimony from multiple witnesses. Both parties were represented by counsel. Omar denied having contact with Jeanetta apart from during court appearances and denied intentionally damaging any of her belongings. Jeanetta testified consistently with her petition, but further alleged past physical abuse and threats, none of which were materially substantiated by any witness."], "id": "6d662bd5-e263-4881-9161-646807638cca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The federal <mask> statute defines two separate crimes: one prohibiting stalking via interstate travel under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2261A(1), and another prohibiting stalking via interstate communications (often called cyberstalking) under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2261A(2). See United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 180 (3d Cir. 2018) (listing elements for both crimes). Only cyberstalking includes a \u201ccourse of conduct\u201d requirement. In contrast, interstate travel stalking requires that a defendant cause emotional distress \u201cin the course of, or as a result of, such travel.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2261A(1). Thus, for an interstate travel stalking charge, a single interstate trip is sufficient. See United States v. Lee, 790 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming stalking conviction over challenges to sufficiency of the evidence where defendant took a single interstate trip); United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 224\u201325 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the interstate trip can itself be sufficient to convict where the victim suffered emotional distress as a result of that trip)."], "id": "fe22744f-4d90-41bd-9895-fc088b1cb864", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["The accusatory instrument charged defendant with, inter alia, <mask> in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7 120.50 [3]) and harassment in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 240.25). After a nonjury trial, defendant was found guilty of, as relevant to this appeal, attempted stalking in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 120.50 [3]) and harassment in the first degree. This appeal ensued."], "id": "8c7ae8bc-6d76-4dee-9270-b4bf2869bb8e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["ny that conducted animal testing). We thus conclude that, in referring to \u201canother person,\u201d sections 2261A and 2262 apply to otherwise-covered conduct when the offender and victim are the same sex, and irrespective of the relationship between the offender and victim. Section 2261A also applies when an offender places the target of the <mask> in \u201creasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to,\u201d the target\u2019s \u201cspouse or intimate partner\u201d or \u201ccauses substantial emotional distress\u201d to the target\u2019s \u201cspouse or intimate partner.\u201d For purposes of VAWA, the term \u201cspouse\u201d cannot be read to cover an individual who is the same sex as the target of the stalking, even if they are married under state law, because the Defense of Marriage Act (\u201cDOMA\u201d) provides that \u201c[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, . . . the word \u2018spouse\u2019 refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.\u201d 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7 (2006). 4 DOMA does not, however, address the additional term \u201cintimate part- ner,\u201d which, for purposes of section 2261A, is defined in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2266(7) (2006). That section provides that the composite phrase \u201cspouse or intimate partner\u201d means \u201ca spouse or former spouse of the target of the stalking, a person who shares a child in common with the target of the stalking, and a person who cohabits or has cohabited as a spouse with the target of the stalking\u201d; \u201ca person who is or has been in a social relation- ship of a romantic or intimate nature with the target of the stalking, as determined by the length of the relationship, the type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction between the persons involved in the relation- ship\u201d; or \u201cany other person similarly situated to a spouse who is protected"], "id": "87b902a3-5bfa-4a38-9a96-142a4e3dc461", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["We recently upheld the issuance of an IPO based on <mask> by a neighbor (with no other dating, familial or other special relationship with the victim noted) in an unpublished opinion \u2013 where apparently no argument was made on appeal that the lack of other relationship made the IPO invalid. See Steward v. Buckman, No. 2020-CA-1559-ME, 2021 WL 2484025 (Ky. App. Jun. 18, 2021). This unpublished case is not binding authority, and we do not cite it as such. See CR 76.28(4)(c). Instead, we simply note its existence."], "id": "e13e147f-4d71-4494-b7b6-5dc28b9fd8d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant argues that the court prejudicially erred by refusing to allow the defense to use Kerr's welfare fraud conviction to impeach her out-of-court statements that she feared defendant and that he was <mask> her, because preventing the defense from demonstrating Kerr was willing to lie cloaked her hearsay statements with a false air of truthfulness. Defendant's claim does not succeed: As explained below, even were defendant to show that the court abused its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence, the error did not prejudice him."], "id": "f08fb8a9-2b56-407c-a177-b6db89857422", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["On May 9, 2013, a hearing was commenced before a Referee. Although informed of the hearing, respondent notified the Committee by email that he would not appear. In response, the Committee advised respondent that the hearing would proceed and that, upon his failure to appear, the charges against him would be deemed admitted pursuant to 22 NYCRR 605.12 (c). The Committee submitted documentary evidence at the hearing. In light of respondent\u2019s failure to appear, the Referee deemed the charges admitted. The Committee argued before the Referee that respondent should be disbarred. By a report dated June 28, 2013, the Referee recommended disbarment citing respondent\u2019s aforementioned failure to cooperate with the Committee as well as his egregious conduct consisting of his \u201cmailing of box cutters, obscene email and voicemail messages, and the fear he put into numerous judges and lawyers due to his <mask> and harassment of them.\u201d"], "id": "1ae44f6e-853e-44c4-9c27-4399340a92c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["<mask>, which is an unreasonable and unacceptable attempt to exert control over someone, takes many shapes and forms. In enacting the \u201cClinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999,\u201d which created the crime codified under Penal Law \u00a7 120.45, the Legislature recognized that the \u201cunfortunate reality is that stalking victims have been intolerably forced to live in fear of their stalkers\u201d and that \u201c[s]talkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write, confront, threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims, often inflict immeasurable emotional and physical harm upon them.\u201d (L 1999, ch 635, \u00a7 2, cited in People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 416, 417 [emphasis added].) Defendant is in every sense of the word a stalker who has \u201cunacceptably intruded\u201d on his victim. As such, he continues to pose a real and ongoing danger to plaintiffs safety and well-being. Accordingly, the court will grant her application for a final order of protection that will require him to not only stay away from her but to stay away from the Hideout."], "id": "f76c9dcf-7c3a-45c8-826b-a38616dcf9e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["<mask>, which is an unreasonable and unacceptable attempt to exert control over someone, takes many shapes and forms. In enacting the \u201cClinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999,\u201d which created the crime codified under Penal Law \u00a7 120.45, the Legislature recognized that the \u201cunfortunate reality is that stalking victims have been intolerably forced to live in fear of their stalkers\u201d and that \u201c[s]talkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write, confront, threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims, often inflict immeasurable emotional and physical harm upon them.\u201d (L 1999, ch 635, \u00a7 2, cited in People v Stuart, 100 NY2d at 416, 417 [emphasis added].) Defendant is in every sense of the word a stalker who has \u201cunacceptably intruded\u201d on his victim. As such, he continues to pose a real and ongoing danger to plaintiffs safety and well-being. Accordingly, the court will grant her application for a final order of protection that will require him to not only stay away from her but to stay away from the Hideout."], "id": "5e1d9bfc-2ca4-4494-ac82-950ff89df77e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["Around the same time that Kerr was starting to confide in others that she feared defendant, defendant was talking to friends about the affair, saying he was frustrated with being \"led on\" by Kerr, and expressing open hostility toward Kerr's husband. One of the individuals with whom defendant spoke about the situation was Dwayne Kari, who also knew Kerr and was a good friend of Kerr's husband. Kari disapproved of the affair and repeatedly advised defendant to put an end to it. One morning in November 1998, Kari observed defendant driving his van toward Kerr's home. Kari gave chase and eventually caught up with defendant, accusing him of <mask> Kerr and telling him it needed to stop. Kari also warned defendant that \"it was going to get personal\" after defendant admitted having previously told Kari that he planned to stab Kerr's husband. Defendant responded by saying Kerr was \"screwing him around.\" To prove his point, defendant retrieved some items from his van. The first item was a tape-recorded message that Kerr had left on defendant's answering machine that said, \"All I can say about last night was 'yummy.' \" The other item was a piece of paper on which Kerr had written \"Lisa Brooks.\" Defendant said he was going to show these items to Kerr's husband \"if she doesn't leave him.\""], "id": "ba6b689a-e94d-4b8a-84f1-754fb96961e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["We note the challenged stay-away provision in the CPO, preventing defendant from having any contact with A.H., is not technically a condition of his probation but instead was issued under section 1203.097 governing domestic violence. Subdivision (a) of this statute provides in relevant part: \"If a person is granted probation for a crime in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the Family Code,[3 ] *896the terms of probation shall include all of the following: ... (2) A criminal court protective order protecting the victim from further acts of violence, threats, <mask>, sexual abuse, and harassment, and, if appropriate, containing residence exclusion or stay-away conditions.\" (Italics added.)"], "id": "9a8c00fc-b621-4d9c-a72a-5703057966a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["With regard to the <mask> charge, defendant argues that two incidents occurring six months apart do not constitute a course of conduct. In addition, defendant asserts that there is no allegation that his actions were likely to cause the complainant to *765be in reasonable fear that her employment would be threatened (McGrath affirmation 1\u00cd1\u00cd 24-26). Last, defendant argues that the accusatory instrument is defective because it fails to allege that he was present at the post office solely to stalk the complainant (McGrath affirmation 1\u00cd 27)."], "id": "897bd2a2-7945-4f94-ab5c-42e1c3327111", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["the violence.\u201d (\u00a7 6220.)7 To effectuate this purpose, trial courts may issue a restraining order based on \u201creasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.\u201d (\u00a7 6300, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 225 (Marriage of Davila).) \u201cThe DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d (Marriage of Davila, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) \u201cAbuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.\u201d (\u00a7 6203, subd. (b).) Rather, \u201c \u2018abuse\u2019 \u201d includes causing or attempting to cause bodily injury (id., subd. (a)(1)), \u201cplac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury\u201d (id., subd. (a)(3)), and behavior such as \u201c<mask>, threatening, . . . harassing, . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party\u201d (\u00a7 6320, subd. (a); see \u00a7 6203, subd. (a)(4)). \u201c \u2018[T]he plain meaning of the phrase \u201cdisturbing the peace of the other party\u201d in section 6320 may be"], "id": "7eb2aa5c-b713-443a-85fe-60c63a399337", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> requires Appellant's course of conduct would cause alarm to a reasonable person. \"Alarm\" is defined as \"fear of danger of physical harm.\" In K.L.M. v. B.A.G. , the respondent sent anonymous letters warning the petitioner about the petitioner's boyfriend, the respondent's former boyfriend. 532 S.W.3d at 708-09. The respondent later sent another letter that attempted to persuade the petitioner to leave her boyfriend. Id. at 708. Finally, the respondent hacked the petitioner's Facebook *65page, downloaded her \"profile picture,\" and inserted it into her own profile. Id."], "id": "d17e06c1-e358-49f8-8abc-96654dfc122d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "stalking", "legal_topic": "Pattern of Behavior", "masked_sentences": ["ny that conducted animal testing). We thus conclude that, in referring to \u201canother person,\u201d sections 2261A and 2262 apply to otherwise-covered conduct when the offender and victim are the same sex, and irrespective of the relationship between the offender and victim. Section 2261A also applies when an offender places the target of the <mask> in \u201creasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to,\u201d the target\u2019s \u201cspouse or intimate partner\u201d or \u201ccauses substantial emotional distress\u201d to the target\u2019s \u201cspouse or intimate partner.\u201d For purposes of VAWA, the term \u201cspouse\u201d cannot be read to cover an individual who is the same sex as the target of the stalking, even if they are married under state law, because the Defense of Marriage Act (\u201cDOMA\u201d) provides that \u201c[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, . . . the word \u2018spouse\u2019 refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.\u201d 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7 (2006). 4 DOMA does not, however, address the additional term \u201cintimate part- ner,\u201d which, for purposes of section 2261A, is defined in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2266(7) (2006). That section provides that the composite phrase \u201cspouse or intimate partner\u201d means \u201ca spouse or former spouse of the target of the stalking, a person who shares a child in common with the target of the stalking, and a person who cohabits or has cohabited as a spouse with the target of the stalking\u201d; \u201ca person who is or has been in a social relation- ship of a romantic or intimate nature with the target of the stalking, as determined by the length of the relationship, the type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction between the persons involved in the relation- ship\u201d; or \u201cany other person similarly situated to a spouse who is protected"], "id": "f7b59471-94f8-43fe-813f-074fe9cca1f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The court recognizes that there is case law that would suggest a different allocation of evidentiary burdens for allegations of a \u201cstaged accident.\u201d \u201cIn an action to recover the proceeds of a fire insurance policy, it is the insurer\u2019s burden to establish the affirmative defense of <mask>,\u201d and the \u201cmeasure of persuasion is that of clear and convincing evidence.\u201d (Hutt v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 95 AD2d 255, 256-257 [2d Dept 1983]; see also 3910 Super K v Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 219 AD2d 589, 589-590 [2d Dept 1995].) There are important differences, however, between the \u201caffirmative defense of arson\u201d and the issue of coverage for an intentional collision."], "id": "cceb781e-0f56-4f6e-b94c-0d4e691c76be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Steven W. Fisher, J. In two consolidated indictments, defendant Gerald G<mask>, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the Second Judicial District, stands charged with one count of bribe receiving in the third degree, six counts of receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree, three counts of official misconduct, and one count of receiving unlawful gratuities. All the charges relate to the defendant\u2019s conduct as a judge presiding over matrimonial cases in the Supreme Court of Kings County."], "id": "4d979d1b-8da7-4e7a-87c1-9e9e8e4d5767", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["While the plaintiffs here, as successor attorneys in the matrimonial litigation, did not themselves apply for fees, their client, the wife, did so elect on behalf of herself and the prior attorneys \u2014 an election of remedies which binds plaintiffs. \u201c The wife\u2019s attorney is in privity with her and he has no rights which are not derived through her, stemming as they do from the husband\u2019s obligation to supply the wife with necessaries. If the application for counsel fees is made in advance of trial it is made by the wife in her suit * * * Just a.s the. wife eon Id not maintain an action for counsel fees after the determination of the merits of the principal litigation against her (Pe<mask> v. Pearson, 230 N. Y. 141) her attorney, may not do so in his own right or claim for himself any different consideration, or standard of determining his right to compensation.\u201d (Weidlich v. Richards, 276 App. Div. 883, 385-886, supra,) A substituted attorney Is bound by the fixation of Joes *243prior to Ms entry into the case, and if the original award will not he sufficient it is up to him to move for an additional allowance when he appears in the matrimonial action. (Weidlich v. Richards, supra, pp. 385-386; Schaefer v. Schaefer, 30 Misc 2d 278.)"], "id": "1d434a9e-9c12-475b-93c5-da6b8223bea9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["It is provided by statute, however, that an insured\u2019s failure to file a proof of loss as required by the insurance contract (Insurance Law, \u00a7 168, subd 5, lines 90-101), shall not invalidate or diminish his claim under the policy unless the insurer, after the occurrence of the loss, gives the insured written notice that it desires such a proof of loss (Insurance Law, \u00a7 172, subd 1). No such demand was ever made in this case and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to prosecute this action and to recover the amount of its loss in spite of the fact that a proof of loss was never filed as required by the insurance policy (compare Lentini Bros. Moving & Stor. Co. v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriters Assn., supra; Do-Re Knit v National Union Fire Ins. Co., supra). Under those circumstances the defendant must be deemed to have breached the parties\u2019 agreement as of the date of service of its answer wherein it denied any liability under the policy on the grounds that the loss was caused by the plaintiff\u2019s own act of <mask> (see Beckley v Otsego County Farmers Coop. Fire Ins. Co., supra). The jury having found that denial to have been unjustified, interest on the amount of the plaintiff\u2019s loss shall be computed from that date."], "id": "882d6491-7334-4499-b741-936457c2b438", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["A request to replead allegations properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 \u201cshall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the opposing party has good ground to support his cause of action\u201d (CPLR 3211 [e]; see also, Ceres v She<mask> Lehman Bros., 227 AD2d 222, 223 [1st Dept 1996] [leave to replead is not appropriate where \u201cthere is no reason to believe that plaintiffs could correct the deficiencies of the pleading\u201d]). Here, with respect to those causes of action in the complaint which the court has dismissed against some or all of the defendants, National Union has not shown, nor given the court any reason to believe, that an amended pleading would correct the defects in question (see also, Zigabarra v Falk, 143 AD2d 901, 902-903 [2d Dept 1988]). Therefore, the court declines National Union\u2019s request for leave to replead."], "id": "c035e03c-e12c-43fd-a42d-c4a67aa050c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["*613Besides his life est\u00e1te Alfred Severin Bourne, Jr., possesses only a general testa\u00ednent\u00e1ry power Of appointment over the principal of the trust without any right to reach or control thfe disposition of the principal during his life, with his surviving issue, as a class, now consisting of his three infant children, owning a remainder in the principal, subject only to the valid exercise of this power of appointment. (Crackanthorpe v. Sickles, 156 App. Div. 753 [1st dept., 1913]; Matter of Burchell, 299 N. Y. 351 [1949].) It was, in fact, observed by Surrogate Foley in a leading case (Matter of Weekes, 174 Misc. 930, 931 [Surrogate\u2019s Ct., N. Y. County, 1940], affd. 260 App. Div. 1014 [1st dept., 1940]) that the \u201c usual method \u201d to create a remainder \u201cis to provide for a gift to the issue of the life tenant \u201d. (See, also, Matter of Rumph, 205 Misc. 404 [Surrogate\u2019s Ct., Richmond County, 1954]; Matter of Pe<mask>, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 489, 491 [Surrogate\u2019s Ct., N. Y. County, 1954]; Matter of Ryan, 284 App. Div. 102, affd. 309 N. Y. 703.)"], "id": "0166c1ec-73d1-40fe-b59a-c7956faf30c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["and is not required.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.) The Attorney General argues remand is not necessary because the trial court emphasized numerous aggravating circumstances, which shows it would not have struck the enhancement had it recognized its authority to do so. The court, however, also found several mitigating circumstances, and it declined to impose the greatest possible sentence. Moreover, unlike other cases in which courts have found remand was unnecessary, the trial court here did not explicitly state that it would decline to strike the enhancement if it had authority to do so. (See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1894, 1896.) On this record, it is not sufficiently clear how the trial court would have acted had it recognized its authority under section 1385. (See People v. Johnson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 26, 69 [remanding so the trial court could consider whether to strike a firearm enhancement, even though the court made statements showing it was not sympathetic to the defendants].) The Attorney General alternatively argues remand is not necessary because it would have been an abuse of discretion to strike the enhancement. (See People v. DeGuzman (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055 [\u201cWhether the trial court believed it had discretion to strike the alleged prior felony convictions or not, appellant has suffered no prejudice since it would have been a manifest abuse of that discretion to exercise it on this record.\u201d].) When deciding whether to exercise its authority under section 1385, a trial court must consider any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as the general objectives of sentencing as set forth in the California Rules of Court. (People v. Pe<mask> (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 112, 117.) The court"], "id": "84d56507-530e-428e-8b07-921bdd074255", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["This action arises out of the death of Jonathan David L<mask>, a 35-year-old composer, lyricist, and playwright whose play \u201cRent\u201d is now appearing on Broadway. It is undisputed that, at the time of his death on January 25, 1996, Larson was not married, had no children and was survived only by his father, plaintiff Allan S. Larson, his mother, Nanette Larson, and his sister, plaintiff Julie Larson McCollum, and her two sons."], "id": "66294b27-2209-4459-867e-2893f5cb6393", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["An information charged LaDuke with <mask> ( \u00a7 451, subd. (d) ), vandalism of a building owned and occupied by a religious educational institution (\u00a7 594.3, subd. (a) ), and vandalism causing damage in excess of $400 and also in excess of $10,000 (\u00a7 594, subds. (a), (b)(1) ). At trial, the prosecution presented evidence substantially as described ante . In his defense, LaDuke testified that he was 63 years old, unemployed, and homeless. He stated that he was upset that \"the Jews are always blamed for the crucifixion of Jesus\" and decided to relieve himself of the burden of being \"blamed for crucifying Christ.\" He admitted he bought a lighter and \"some barbecue things\" (e.g., lighter fluid), poured lighter fluid all over the University's sign, and lit the sign on fire. On cross-examination, LaDuke admitted he knew the sign had the name, \"John Paul the Great Catholic University,\" on it. He knew the University was a Catholic *190university. He also saw that the sign had a cross on it, symbolizing Christ on the cross. He knew burning the sign was wrong, but he did not care. He stated a priest at the University refused to talk to him. He did not consider the University a religious organization. He asserted that Catholicism was a \"group of teachings\" with which he did not agree."], "id": "e4243747-f7b0-4355-9f82-f04197264ae4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Nor is the second cause of action sufficient merely because the plaintiff has alleged therein that the publication of the letter caused \u2018 \u2018 his business associates to terminate the then two pending financial promotions, undertakings and joint ventures which would have resulted in financial gains to him of $50,000.00 each, because of their loss of confidence in him \u201d. Where a publication is not defamatory upon its face, the plaintiff is required \u201c to plead and prove special damage arising from injury to * * * [his] business as a result of the publication of words, however falsely or maliciously spoken or written \u201d. (Frawley Chem. Corp. v. L<mask> Co., 274 App. Div. 643, 644, and the authorities therein cited.) The conclusory allegation of temporal damage allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as the result of the publication of the letter here involved is insufficient to spell out the cause purported to be stated in the second cause of *593action. To state such a cause of action, the plaintiff must plead his special damages with such particularity as would enable the defendant to meet the same (Reporters\u2019 Assn. v. Sun Print. & Pub. Assn., 186 N. Y. 437, 442), by giving \u201c a plain and concise statement of the material facts * * * but not the evidence by which they are to be proved \u201d (Civ. Prac. Act, \u00a7 241). The general allegation of special damages contained in the second cause of action is clearly insufficient without revealing the names of the business associates who terminated the alleged financial promotions, undertakings and joint ventures and the nature and status thereof at the time of the publication of the letter. As presently alleged, the special damages claimed by the plaintiff are left to the realm of speculation. (National Organization Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Curtis Pub. Co., 81 N. Y. S. 2d 920, 922; Philipp Co. v. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 165 App. Div. 377; Trachtenberg Bros. v. Henrietta Stein Inc., 64 N. Y. S. 2d 565.)"], "id": "90a0d7fd-f3df-4386-8e34-cb4d4c13c0ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff did submit an affidavit from a Dr. Angelo L. Pisani, Jr., a fire and explosion investigator certified by the National Association of Fire Investigators. In his affidavit, Dr. Pisani states that, like Mr. Mellusi, he too is a member of the International Association of <mask> Investigators and that the NFPA 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations is indeed *802the recognized guide and standards utilized by arson investigators and that the manual is endorsed and taught by those organizations. In addition, the guide is recognized as an authoritative manual in the field of fire and explosion investigations by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, as well as other courts across the nation."], "id": "890b45e1-b816-4d00-baf0-a5e772f50820", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["assault with a deadly weapon, as well as multiple prior misdemeanor convictions, including false imprisonment. The trial court further noted the probation report indicated defendant had \u201cattack[ed] another inmate . . . without provocation\u201d while at the jail. The trial court then noted defendant was 32 years old at the time of the current offense and provided a brief overview of the facts of this case, noting \u201ca common element\u201d shared by the current offense, defendant\u2019s jailhouse conduct, and two of his prior convictions, i.e., \u201cviolence against someone else.\u201d The trial court then stated: \u201cThe flip side of this, as you know, and it\u2019s entitled to some consideration is that [defendant] is a relatively young person and we like to think that anyone can change over time.\u201d The trial court then noted the loss suffered by the victim and his family and concluded: \u201cThe Court can\u2019t find that in the interest of justice that the enhancement should be stricken, so the Court\u2019s going to deny that motion.\u201d \u201c \u2018 \u201c[A] court\u2019s discretionary decision to dismiss or to strike a sentencing allegation under section 1385 is\u201d reviewable for abuse of discretion.\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, \u201c \u2018[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.\u2019 \u201d [Citation.] Second, a \u201c \u2018decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. \u201cAn appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.\u201d \u2019 \u201d [Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (People v. Pe<mask> (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 112, 116.) Defendant argues the trial court\u2019s decision declining to strike his firearm enhancement amounted to an abuse of discretion because \u201cthe fight precipitating the"], "id": "99236a8e-7fb7-421c-a45f-c4b1c96f3646", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Under New York law, an indictment is a written accusation by the Grand Jury charging the defendant with at least one felony and serves as the jurisdictional basis for a prosecution in a superior court (CPL 1.20, subd. 3; 200.10; 210.05). Its common-law and constitutional function is to identify the charge so that the defendant may have notice of the nature and character of the offense in order to prepare his defense, and, it also serves to identify the offense for double jeopardy purposes. (People v. Bogandoff, 254 N. Y. 16; People v. F<mask>, 244 N. Y. 413; 4 Blackstone\u2019s Comm., p. 302.)"], "id": "5ba237b8-01bc-4a35-a8eb-cd02c328aa9b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["There is ample authority for charging a defendant with a single continuous crime for a course of conduct over a period of time which comprises the commission of any criminal acts of the same nature motivated by a single common illegal intent or forming part of a general plan or scheme. (People v. F<mask>, 244 N. Y. 413; People v. Cox, 286 N. Y. 137; Sturgis v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 446; People v. Parkinson, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 690; People v. Fay, 184 Misc. 684.)"], "id": "2c57a2b3-2b95-4f46-b645-c02c139c6209", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, petitioner 446 Realty Co. purchased the building directly from the landlord whom both the criminal courts and the administrative State housing agency found intentionally caused these conditions. Petitioner purchased the building with full actual and constructive knowledge of the conduct of its immediate predecessor in interest as, in the words of its former principal, the prior landlords were on their way to jail. Petitioner, for purposes of the substantial rehabilitation exemption to the rent stabilization laws, must stand in the shoes of its predecessor in interest. Free from rent stabilization, the building would be worth profoundly more than if continued rent stabilized. This statute, designed to create affordable, *640decent housing in this city, was not created to embrace a windfall to the old or present landlord based upon intentional criminal destruction of basic systems in the building. DHCR acknowledges this policy in its operational bulletin which, in pertinent part, precludes a finding of substantial rehabilitation where, as here, there is an outstanding finding of harassment of tenants or the commission of <mask>."], "id": "9505ac78-efc5-4cd5-9976-701a436b1671", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Based on these facts, BorgWarner and Emerson challenge the District's ability to prove that its response costs were \"necessary\" under the HSAA's third element, i.e., whether there is evidence that VOC releases from the Emerson site pose a threat to human health or the environment. (See C<mask> Harbor, supra , 270 F.3d at pp. 871-872 ; see also Alcoa, supra , 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 327-328, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 474.) BorgWarner and Emerson argue there is no triable issue of fact regarding whether the releases are such a threat because the RWQCB found that VOC's at the Emerson site were not a threat to beneficial uses of groundwater, and they further argue the District's expert did not rebut that conclusion."], "id": "c1631e45-64ac-418e-89a0-34003c61a373", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["This proceeding is premature. Shorter periods for instituting certiorari proceedings than the four months\u2019 period prescribed in article 78 of the Civil Practice Act are valid and must be complied with. (Matter of City of Rochester v. Annis, 185 Misc. *165518; Matter of Island Trees Civic Assn. v. Town Bd. of Hempstead, 198 Misc. 1064. Cf., also, Matter of Layman v. Persons, 133 Misc. 661 and Matter of L<mask> v. Howland, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 231.)"], "id": "fd7a9ae4-ae5f-4e43-96bb-681ce25f1c8d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["According to Ms. Argentina, the decedent told her that he wanted to change his will, revocable trust and health care proxy before boarding the plane. On September 30, 2005, the day they were to travel to New York, he visited the offices of Shirley Wahl, Esq., of the law firm of C<mask>, Messinger, in Arizona and asked her to change the beneficiaries of the 2004 will and trust. The decedent executed a new will, an amendment of the 2004 trust and a health care proxy in Ms. Wahl\u2019s office. The 2004 trust was amended to provide that, upon the decedent\u2019s death, *192his sister receives one half of the trust principal, his granddaughter receives three eighths of the trust principal and his grandson receives one eighth. The decedent then left immediately for the airport, without stopping to get his glasses, clothes or medicine. They traveled back to New York that day, September 30, 2005."], "id": "56f5dad6-1af7-4020-8e91-e12f6b23504f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Even more significant are two gifts in two separate trusts of $500,000 each for the benefit for life of her sisters, Mary P. Davidson and Maude P. L<mask>, respectively, with remainders to certain designated persons. In these gifts contained in paragraphs eighth and ninth of the will the language used is illuminative of a purpose to create these benefits in the full amount of the fund and undiminished by the apportionment and charge of any estate taxes. In each case the gift of the trust fund was to her executors in \u201c the sum of Five *444Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000), or property which they may value at that amount, such valuation, when made by a majority of my executors to be conclusive for all purposes, * * *.\u201d (Italics mine.) The direction to set aside securities in the fixed amount precludes an inference that taxes were to be deducted."], "id": "ea68c149-2859-4c3b-ad68-8913d2efdc1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[t]his doctrine prevents a trustee from asserting a claim against a third-party where management has participated with that third-party in the wrongful acts. \u2018Because management\u2019s misconduct is imputed to the corporation, and because a trustee stands in the shoes of the corporation, the rule bars a trustee from suing to recover for a wrong that he himself essentially took part in.\u2019 (Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219d 79, 86-87 [2d Cir 2000]; She<mask> Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944d 114, 117 [2d Cir. 1991]).\u201d (Morgado Family Partners, LP v Lipper, 6 Misc 3d 1014[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51791[U], *3 [Sup Ct, NY County 2004], affd 19 AD3d 262 [1st Dept 2005].) Justice Moskowitz did not reach the merits of the in pari delicto defense raised in Morgado by PwC but did comment that the trustee was the \u201cbest choice\u201d to sue PwC because he was independent and, if successful, would benefit the entire partnership. (2004 NY Slip Op 51791[U], *5.) On appeal from the portion of that decision issuing a stay of derivative claims, the First Department noted, \u201c[I]t is unsettled that in pari delicto can ever apply against an innocent, nonbankruptcy trustee.\u201d (19 AD3d at 263.)"], "id": "a12f0fea-bca4-4519-94f5-57f9642b8d95", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants also argue that their statements to Museum officials are protected by a qualified privilege. Under New York law, \"communications protected by a qualified privilege do not provide the communicant with an immunity against the imposition of liability in a defamation action\u201d (Toker v Poliak, supra, at 219). Rather, good-faith communications by a party having an interest in a subject, or a moral or societal duty to speak, are protected by a qualified privilege if made to a party having a corresponding interest (Byam v Collins, 111 NY 143, 150; Buckley v Litman, 57 NY2d 516, 518-519; Bald*259win v Shell Oil Co., 71 AD2d 907, 910; Jung Hee Lee Han v State of New York, 186 AD2d 536, 537; Van Wyck v Aspinwall, 17 NY 190, 193). Indeed, the application of qualified privilege is not restricted within the narrow limits of absolute privilege but, rather, its application is widespread (G<mask> v Hendlin, 141 AD2d 55, 60, lv denied 74 NY2d 603; 44 NY Jur 2d, Defamation and Privacy, \u00a7 76, at 41 [1985 ed])."], "id": "d14424e8-df02-4be4-8032-69582b441cde", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner urges (1) that the law of New York applies in the determination of the nature and extent of the bequest under the will to testator\u2019s nephew, James C<mask> Agnew; (2) that the condition attached to the gift, namely, that the share passing to this nephew be held in trust so long as he is married to his present wife, and in the event the marriage relationship is dissolved that the trust terminate and the principal be immediately paid over to him, is invalid as against public policy; and (3) that in any event the trust is invalid because it violates the Statute against Perpetuities. The nephew makes the same contention and further urges that he is entitled to one fourth of the residuary estate outright, as if no condition were annexed to the gift or as if the void condition had been complied with. The special guardian on behalf of infant remaindermen, submits that the court should declare inoperative the condition for the termination of the trust based upon dissolution of the marital status, should uphold the trust as far as possible in all other respects, and should apply the law of Minnesota as to the duration and administration of the trust."], "id": "67298137-0fa9-4c33-8105-e71b81ee9457", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Here, as in both P<mask> and Rippe , the only evidence presented to support the existence and extent of Yousey's brain injury and resulting impairment were his subjective complaints, the results of his neuropsychological testing, and the opinions of his treating physicians. While I recognize that Yousey's injuries were significant, I cannot ignore the statutory requirements set forth by our legislature. Because there were no objective findings of the brain injury, the Commission's award of a 29 percent permanent-impairment rating for this injury was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority's decision to reinstate this award."], "id": "4b508950-1d16-41fa-8f91-3d5e64fe94e7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c The term \u2018 abandonment \u2019 means neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support. If a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection and neglects to lend support and maintenance, such a parent relinquishes all parental claim, and abandons the child.\u201d (Matter of Hayford, 109 Misc. 479, citing Matter of L<mask>, 31 Hun, 539.)"], "id": "edaf33ee-dc37-4253-9e31-b2b24d662542", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["This was purely and simply a ruse, a subterfuge, a pretext, or a sham to bring defendant to the police precinct for questioning. His statements, after 9 to 11 hours of questioning were clearly the fruits of the poisonous tree. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment were circumvented since no Judge ever ruled on the question of probable cause as to the <mask>. Such misuse of court process cannot be countenanced as proper police action."], "id": "58aa431d-b2c4-491e-963f-2619c735dce3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The dissent states that our invocation of the forfeiture rule is premised on the requirement that a defendant create a record in support of an objection for use on appeal and suggests that the record here would have been the same if defendant had objected. (Dis. opn., post , at pp. 209, 211-12.) Again, we respectfully disagree. It is true that a defendant's failure to object can result in an undeveloped record. We also note again that one court has already rejected a defendant's confrontation clause objection because he failed to make the objection in the trial court, resulting in an undeveloped record as to the testimonial nature (solemnity and primary purpose) of the hearsay statements. ( Ochoa, supra , 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 584, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 703 [noting that \"[h]ad defendant lodged contemporaneous objections during trial, the People, as the proponent of the evidence, would have had the burden to show the challenged testimony did not relate testimonial hearsay\"].) Nevertheless, underlying our decision are the other purposes of the forfeiture rule and Evidence Code section 353 : giving the trial court an opportunity to make an informed decision to avoid prejudice ( Davis, supra , 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 627, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 55 ), and giving the proponent of the evidence the opportunity to cure the defect or take other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal. ( Pe<mask>, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 438, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 297 P.3d 793 ; Morris, supra , 53 Cal.3d at pp. 187-188, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949.)"], "id": "0bf72ee9-0bf2-4caf-90df-20a675d8e854", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["spirit.\u201d (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) Those factors support denial of the Romero motion here. The current crimes were serious\u2014bank robbery and attempted robbery in which bank employees were ordered to the ground and guns pointed in their faces. The crimes were sophisticated, with the robbers wearing masks and gloves, switching vehicles, and jamming police radios. Although perhaps not the \u201cmastermind,\u201d Wallravin\u2019s role was neither \u201cpassive\u201d nor \u201cminor.\u201d The trial court imposed a three-strikes sentence of 25 years to life based on two prior robbery convictions from 1991. (\u00a7\u00a7 211, 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(ii).) In a Romero motion, the court may consider the age of the prior offenses. (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1141.) But the court may not strike a prior solely because it is remote in time. (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 812-813 [error to strike 20-year-old strike]; People v. Pe<mask> (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749-750 [strikes 24, 15, and 10 years old properly imposed].) Wallravin had been crime free between his release from prison in 2009 and the current offense in 2019. But his background included other criminal convictions, including a 2004 grand theft in which he pushed a woman down and took her purse. (\u00a7 487, subd. (c).) His record reflected a large number of theft convictions. The trial court found no \u201creason to believe that . . . a mental health condition played any part in this incident.\u201d And although Wallravin was 62 years old and a sentence of 25 years to life might result in him spending the rest of his life in prison, \u201cmiddle age, considered alone, cannot take a defendant outside"], "id": "b134148c-5376-41e9-bb8c-331312300f2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff also relies on Regulation T, National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rule 2520 and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rule 431 in support of his argument that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires defendant to make a margin call before selling plaintiff\u2019s securities and an opportunity to cure a deficiency. Plaintiff claims that implicit in any mention of the term \u201cmargin calls\u201d in Regulation T, e.g., definition of \u201cmargin call\u201d and \u201cpayment period,\u201d or the rules is a requirement that defendant make a margin call before liquidating. Plaintiffs reliance is misplaced. Regulation T and the rules are intended to protect the integrity of the market and to do so, brokers must be able to exercise their discretion without fear of subsequent claims of bad faith when market conditions improve. (Capital Options Invs., Inc. v Goldberg Bros. Commodities, Inc., 958d 186, 190 [7th Cir 1992].) Neither Regulation T nor the rules create a private right of action. (See e.g. Berliner Handels-und Frankfuter Bank, N.Y. Branch v Coppola, 214 AD2d 426, 427 [1st Dept], lv denied 86 NY2d 829 [1995]; Bennett v United States Trust Co. of N.Y., 770d 308, 311 [2d Cir 1985], cert denied 474 US 1058 [1986]; Establissement Tomis v She<mask> Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F Supp 1355, 1360-1361 [SD NY 1978].) Likewise, plaintiff has not identified language in any of these rules that imposes an obligation to give customers notice of and an opportunity to cure margin deficiencies. Indeed, Regulation T provides that a broker may *258impose additional requirements or take action for its own protection (12 CFR 220.1 [b] [2]), as defendant has done here."], "id": "e41ac3b7-786c-4693-b5e2-3e4f5ddeca84", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant\u2019s attorney, Darrow, has rendered legal services on behalf of the defendant, M<mask>, and the issue of the marriage, which were necessitated in the defense of the within action. I find that the reasonable value of said services is the sum of $3,500. Deducting the sum of $500 that defendant\u2019s attorney, Darrow, has received from defendant, Marson, I find in favor of defendant\u2019s attorney, Darrow, on his counterclaim and against the plaintiff in the sum of $3,000 for moneys that are due the defendant\u2019s attorney for legal services rendered by him as a necessary for the defendant, Marson."], "id": "3bbf4d54-e222-4da8-bfbd-2dcabf4008f3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The recovery for wrongful death is the pecuniary value of the interrupted life to the statutory distributees. Young children being more a liability than a present asset, the dependence of parents upon them is largely in expectancy, as a return for the support *337and maintenance given the child until it grow up and be emancipated as to its own earnings. Obviously, if the parent has utterly cut the child off in that regard, he himself should be absolutely cut off. What Surrogate Slater once said in another connection may be copied here to explain the meaning of this word: \u201c The term \u2018 abandonment \u2019 means neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support. If a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection and neglects to lend support and maintenance, such a parent relinquishes all parental claim, and abandons the child.\u201d {Matter of Hayford, 109 Misc. 479; citing Matter of L<mask>, 31 Hun, 539.)"], "id": "f79517e6-7204-42cb-a115-2507532d61ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Respondents argue that the information redacted is confidential proprietary information which, if not protected, will adversely affect publication, credit, funding, and the researcher\u2019s career. They contend releasing the redacted information may have a chilling effect on the researcher\u2019s productivity because of fears of retaliation. In addition, respondents elucidated incidents of break-ins, thefts and <mask> at animal laboratory facilities throughout the county, as well as fear of harassment. As this court found in Matter of American Socy. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Board of Trustees of State Univ. (143 Misc 2d 522, 525, supra) \"Although initially compelling, the argument by respondent that public disclosure of proposed research will stifle research at the University cannot prevail. The chilling effect on research complained about by respondent can enure only if detailed descriptions of a particular project are revealed to the public.\u201d"], "id": "afae75b0-14ee-419a-b4d8-39341edeef39", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The petition asks, in the alternative, whether the petitioners are constituted donees of a power in trust over the infant\u2019s property or whether they are constituted trustees of the property of the infant during his minority. In the construction herein-above made the court has answered the only questions presented by the petition. The petition does not ask the court to define the respective rights and duties of the testamentary trustees and of the donees of the powers in trust. The will names the same persons as testamentary trustees and as testamentary guardians. Note should be made of the fact that the fourth paragraph of the will instructs the trustees \u2018 \u2018 to apply so much of the net income thereof as my Trustees, in their sole and absolute discretion, may deem necessary and appropriate to the care, maintenance, support and education of my son, * * * and to accumulate any balance of said net income for the benefit of my said son, until he shall attain the age of twenty-one (21) years and thereupon to pay over to him any accumulated net income The construction of the will in respect of the powers in trust, must not b.e understood as implying that either the decisions cited above or section 194-a of the Surrogate\u2019s Court Act clothe the donees with powers or authority that are explicitly given by the will to another. Properly speaking, the petitioners are not trustees of the infant\u2019s property during his minority; they are trustees under the will of this testator, for the term stated in the will, and with all of the powers and discretion granted to them in the will. There are numerous decisions which define the duties and responsibilities of trustees who are directed to apply income to the support of an infant. (Moore v. Hegemon, 72 N. Y. 376, 384; Matter of McCormick, 40 App. Div. 73; New York Trust Co. v. Black, 178 App. Div. 4, affd. 223 N. Y. 703; Matter of G<mask>, 161 Misc. 720, 723; Matter of Welwood, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 882, 884; Matter of Souren, 199 Misc. 583, 587; Matter of Connolly, 71 *999Misc. 388; Matter of Smidt, 135 Misc. 578; Matter of Quinlan, 147 Misc. 483, 484; Matter of Rosenthal, 155 Misc. 295, 298; see, also, Matter of Beams, 251 App. Div. 222, affd. 276 N. Y. 590.) The fact that the same persons are both trustees and donees does not justify them in ignoring the difference between the two separate functions, particularly as rights or interests hereafter asserted may depend upon the status in which they hold funds."], "id": "623aeabe-15fe-42c7-88a6-f6af3fc3b055", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In Bank of Centerville v. L<mask> (47 S. D. 374; 199 N.. W. 46) the plaintiff purchased the defendant\u2019s obligation on the faith of a letter signed by the defendant, directed to the plaintiff, stating \u201c you are at liberty to purchase my note of this date for $12,500 if you desire. There are no offsets or conditions against this note.\u201d The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the defendant was estopped from setting up fraud or failure of consideration as a defense, and said: \u201cWe hold that the maker of this instrument, under the facts disclosed, is estopped from asserting any defense against the note in the hands of the purchaser made in good faith without any notice of the vices connected with the transaction at the time of the purchase. Even if the note was obtained by fraud, the defendant could not escape from the written assurance that induced the purchase.\u201d"], "id": "554a5e06-342e-445e-91d5-a26731ce3e45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["I agree with the majority that Dodson mandates our holding that the trial court did not err in submitting a punitive damage instruction premised upon the parties' conduct showing a \"complete indifference and conscious disregard to the safety of others.\" However, it is well settled that MAI and its Notes on Use are not binding to the extent they conflict with the substantive law. \"Procedural rules adopted by MAI cannot change the substantive law and must therefore be interpreted in the light of existing statutory and case law.\" State v. C<mask>, 941 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Mo. banc 1997) ; see also State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 158 (Mo. banc 2011). The apparent strain between the Dodson court's analysis and clear language of Sections 538,205 and 538.210 suggests that this instructional issue merits further review by the Supreme Court."], "id": "57f3d6a7-3d9c-4843-9bf2-043e148a685d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Among the theories the prosecutor advanced in support of a verdict of guilt on the count charging first degree murder were premeditated and deliberate murder, and murder during the commission of kidnapping and <mask>. The jury was instructed accordingly. Defendant claims he was deprived of various constitutional rights by the court's failure to also instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree whether defendant was guilty of murder based on premeditation and deliberation, or on the felony-murder doctrine. As defendant acknowledges, this court has repeatedly rejected the precise arguments he raises here. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 413, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 280, 247 P.3d 515 ; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 626, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 87, 229 P.3d 12 ; People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 616-617, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 170 P.3d 129.) He presents no persuasive grounds for reconsidering this court's prior pronouncements on the issue."], "id": "d59acd51-0c54-4764-a18c-59fcddf07a38", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["GEICO relies on the following cases: City Chiropractic v State Farm (Civ Ct, Kings County, Feb. 24, 2016, Thompson, J., index No. 37182/14 [relying on Department of Insurance opinion letters dated Oct. 15, 2002 and Dec. 22, 2006]); Gotham Massage Therapy v State Farm (Civ Ct, Bronx County, Dec. 20, 2010, Taylor, J., index No. 30502/09); and Karina K. Acupuncture v State Farm (Civ Ct, Kings County, Jan. 3, 2012, G<mask>, J., index No. 1702/11) as well as various arbitration awards and judgments entered thereon, all holding that the insurer has no obligation to state any reason for an EUO of the provider. (The *533court opinions and. orders are annexed as exhibit 5 to GEICO\u2019s moving papers, and the arbitration awards are annexed as exhibit 6.)"], "id": "fdad4e8a-49ac-4955-8dd8-fc66638b935d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Where the sole proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff employee is the negligence of a coemployee, since the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law has freed the fellow employee from liability giving to the injured party a remedy in compensation, the employer also is made immune to the injured employee\u2019s suit. For if this were not so, then the employer against whom recovery were had under such circumstances would have the right to recover from the active tortfeasor, the coemployee, and the purpose of the statute freeing the latter of liability would be defeated. (Naso v. Lafata, N Y 2d 585; see, 2 L<mask>, Workmen\u2019s Compensation [1959 Cum. Supp.], \u00a7 72.20, pp. 51-52.) That in Rauch v. Jones (4 N Y 2d 591) a derivative liability of the owner of the offending motor *343vehicle arising by virtue of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was involved does not distinguish it from the case at bar. In fact, it Was there held that recovery, against the owner of the motor vehicle whose liability was based solely on consent to its use implied by the statute, would be disallowed on a plea that its operator was the plaintiffs\u2019 coemployee."], "id": "aec95c03-f687-499f-9f9e-0977668e00bd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Violations of OSHA standards, however, do not provide a basis for liability under Labor Law \u00a7 241 (6). (See, Schiulaz v Arnell Constr. Corp., 261 AD2d 247 [1st Dept 1999]; see also, Greenwood v She<mask>, Lehman & Hutton, 238 AD2d 311 [2d Dept 1997].) Bender also maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law \u00a7 241 (6) claims based upon 12 NYCRR 23-1.5. However, the First Department has recently held that this section, entitled \u201cGeneral responsibility of employers,\u201d is insufficient as a predicate for Labor Law \u00a7 241 (6) liability. (See, Hawkins v City of New York, 275 AD2d 634 [1st Dept 2000].) Additionally, 12 NYCRR 23-5.1 has been held insufficiently concrete or specific to support a Labor Law \u00a7 241 (6) claim. (See, Schiulaz v Arnell Constr. Corp., supra.) Therefore, Bender may not predicate his Labor Law \u00a7 241 (6) claims on either 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 or 23-5.1."], "id": "874b2bc7-e656-4b83-998f-54605bea6636", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Based upon all of the foregoing, this court must conclude that plaintiff is entitled to judgment in this case. The final issue to be determined is the sum to which plaintiff shall be entitled. Pursuant to subdivision b of section 170-a of the Domestic Relations Law, the value of the economic and property rights and interest to which the plaintiff is entitled \"shall be calculated as though the defendant died intestate and as if the death of the defendant had immediately antedated the divorce.\u201d At the conclusion of defendant\u2019s divorce action before Mr. Justice Berman, the court at that time, and under date of July 19, 1976, rendered its decision. That decision of Mr. Justice Berman covered in great detail the income and assets of the respective parties herein, particularly that of Mr. Pe<mask>. Mr. Justice Berman concluded after hearing all of the evidence that \"Plaintiff\u2019s total net worth, taking into consideration his one-half equity in the Harrison home occupied by the defendant, and the value of his later acquired home at Atlantic Beach, and another parcel of property in which he has a small interest, according to the Court\u2019s calculation amounts to approximately $1,650,000.\u201d This court accepts and adopts Judge Berman\u2019s evaluation of Mr. Pearson\u2019s net worth at $1,650,000 \"at a time immediately antedating the divorce\u201d. Accordingly, therefore, the plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendant in the amount of $550,000, with costs and disbursements."], "id": "07b10785-0c56-45a2-ab6d-1bceb8093b32", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["There is yet another reason for assessing punitive damages against the defendant, which has nothing to do with the plaintiffs interests but affects the interests of all those who purchase fire insurance (both business and personal). The court takes judicial notice of the fact that <mask> fires have doubled in the past 10 years and that such losses are running at an annual rate in excess of $125,000,000. Further, that as a result of this tremendous increase in arson losses, fire insurance premiums have risen dramatically. Defendants\u2019 complete *827lack of interest in investigating its suspicion of arson is symptomatic of the insurance industry\u2019s abandonment of its public obligation to defeat fraudulent claims in favor of seeking higher premiums from the public. The defendants\u2019 own witness admitted they completely abandoned the defense of arson because the fire marshal\u2019s report \"didn\u2019t contain enough evidence.\u201d It is well established that the burden of proof in a civil case is far less than in a criminal case. In a recent press release, the head of the New York State Professional Firefighter\u2019s Association said, \"Fire insurance premiums have soared because insurance companies would rather hike rates and have consumers absorb the cost of arson than restore routine investigations of suspicious fires.\u201d (Rap, Insurance Firms on Arson, Long Island Press, Feb. 28,1977, p 3.)"], "id": "aa6a9562-0252-48d0-882a-96e120a4264f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["2. Detective Dugan was of the opinion that the three fires underneath the stairway were set after the fire had been extinguished. It was Dugan\u2019s opinion that the fire beneath the stairway had been set by the Fire Department in order to benefit the families of the deceased fire personnel. While defense counsel knew that the Police Department believed that the Fire Department had planted certain evidence of <mask>, he did not know that it was Detective Dugan who had made such an accusation. Indeed, a memorandum prepared by Assistant District Attorney Weinger merely states that the Police Department accused the Fire Department of setting the fire. In People v Young (79 NY2d 365), the Court held that *723although defendant knew the information he did not know the information was from the witness. This was a Rosario violation (supra, at 369-370)."], "id": "200999cd-21e7-4de2-a087-c659e54e47b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The petition asks, in the alternative, whether the petitioners are constituted donees of a power in trust over the infant\u2019s property or whether they are constituted trustees of the property of the infant during his minority. In the construction herein-above made the court has answered the only questions presented by the petition. The petition does not ask the court to define the respective rights and duties of the testamentary trustees and of the donees of the powers in trust. The will names the same persons as testamentary trustees and as testamentary guardians. Note should be made of the fact that the fourth paragraph of the will instructs the trustees \u2018 \u2018 to apply so much of the net income thereof as my Trustees, in their sole and absolute discretion, may deem necessary and appropriate to the care, maintenance, support and education of my son, * * * and to accumulate any balance of said net income for the benefit of my said son, until he shall attain the age of twenty-one (21) years and thereupon to pay over to him any accumulated net income The construction of the will in respect of the powers in trust, must not b.e understood as implying that either the decisions cited above or section 194-a of the Surrogate\u2019s Court Act clothe the donees with powers or authority that are explicitly given by the will to another. Properly speaking, the petitioners are not trustees of the infant\u2019s property during his minority; they are trustees under the will of this testator, for the term stated in the will, and with all of the powers and discretion granted to them in the will. There are numerous decisions which define the duties and responsibilities of trustees who are directed to apply income to the support of an infant. (Moore v. Hegemon, 72 N. Y. 376, 384; Matter of McCormick, 40 App. Div. 73; New York Trust Co. v. Black, 178 App. Div. 4, affd. 223 N. Y. 703; Matter of G<mask>, 161 Misc. 720, 723; Matter of Welwood, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 882, 884; Matter of Souren, 199 Misc. 583, 587; Matter of Connolly, 71 *999Misc. 388; Matter of Smidt, 135 Misc. 578; Matter of Quinlan, 147 Misc. 483, 484; Matter of Rosenthal, 155 Misc. 295, 298; see, also, Matter of Beams, 251 App. Div. 222, affd. 276 N. Y. 590.) The fact that the same persons are both trustees and donees does not justify them in ignoring the difference between the two separate functions, particularly as rights or interests hereafter asserted may depend upon the status in which they hold funds."], "id": "0b06d32b-d1c6-4b83-94a4-969dfd506567", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The evidence clearly shows that after the execution of this agreement they came together, and lived as man and wife. The rule of law is well settled that separation agreements, are annulled by any subsequent cohabitation between husband and wife, even though such cohabitation be for ever so- short a time, provided, when such cohabitation takes place, it was their inten*340tion to resume permanently the marital relation. C<mask> v. Murray, 3 Paige, 483."], "id": "88b44999-1564-4a04-ac71-62dac0a26cf1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant is charged pursuant to the Juvenile Justice Act of 1978 (L 1978, ch 481). He is charged as a juvenile offender with a designated felony which is not an armed felony. A \"juvenile offender\u201d is \"(1) a person thirteen, fourteen or fiteen years old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting murder in the second degree as defined in section 125.25 of the penal law and (2) a person fourteen or fiteen years old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes defined in section 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree); 150.20 (<mask> in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 120.10 (assault in the first degree); 125.20 (manslaughter in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 130.35 (rape in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 130.50 (sodomy in the first degree); 140.30 (burglary in the first degree); subdivision one of section 140.25 (burglary in the second degree); 150.15 (arson in the second degree); 160.15 (robbery in the first degree) or subdivision two of section 160.10 (robbery in the second degree) of the penal law; or defined in the penal law as an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the first degree.\u201d (CPL 1.20, subd 42.)"], "id": "eff4c942-40d0-423e-9c23-dbb430e2720d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, the court finds that Harbeck\u2019s actions could be found to be a proximate cause of the accident (see Rhea v Green, 29 Col App 19). According to the testimony of Deputy Simm, Harbeck\u2019s acts of striking the parked vehicles and his failure to stop caused the pursuit which resulted in the death of the infant. The fact that the chain of causation was interrupted by the intervening acts of the defendant Simm is not significant; Harbeck\u2019s conduct had such an effect in producing the harm that reasonable persons might regard it as a \"cause\u201d (see Daas v Pe<mask>, 66 Misc 2d 95, 101-102, affd 37 AD2d 921; Restatement, Torts 2d, \u00a7 431; 1 NY PJI2d 212)."], "id": "48fea8a7-934f-4b09-b2c4-e743fc8291de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["V~Many other States have accomplished modification of the felony-murder concept by specifically limiting the felonies involved. In the majority of these States the underlying felonies are, in the main, crimes of violence against the person (e.g., <mask>, rape, riot, robbery and burglary) where reasonable foreseeability indicates that serious harm might flow as a natural consequence therefrom, j Where a lesser felony is the underlying crime, a lesser degree of murder or manslaughter is provided. Thus, whether the codification be by way of specifying \u25a0'ofi\u00edy a felony of violence, as distinguished from a nonviolent felony, or where the legal limit of criminal responsibility is fixed by restricting the theory of proximate causation, all of the statutes involved curtail the broad and rigorous application of common-law felony murder. The result is the prevention of the stringent results which could conceivably flow if the common-law.concept were left unbridled."], "id": "6d4c1b89-e244-42cc-b751-ed831d504fb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Subdivision 3 of section 125.25 of the Penal Law provides that: \u201cA person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: * * * (3) [ajeting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, <mask>, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants\u201d."], "id": "0dd321e2-eecd-4830-99d4-518d993c78ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was previously charged by indictment with the crime of criminal possession of marijuana in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 221.25), a class D felony, based upon a search of apartment B at 118 Bridge Street in the city of Plattsburgh, Clinton County, conducted on May 24, 2013. The indictment was dismissed by this court (see People v Hardy, 42 Misc 3d 211 [2013]), because the evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient to support each and every element of the crime. Specifically, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant knowingly possessed more than 16 ounces of a substance containing marijuana based upon \u201cconstructive possession\u201d (see Penal Law \u00a7 10.00 [8]; People v Francis, 79 NY2d 925 [1992]; People v Manini, 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992]; People v Pe<mask>, 75 NY2d 1001 [1990]; People v Torres, 68 NY2d 677, 678-679 [1986]). No admissible evidence was presented to the grand jury establishing, inter alia, that the defendant was the lessee of the apartment, resided there, maintained any personal clothing or effects there, or that he was regularly observed coming and going from those premises."], "id": "5d9d5307-670c-4cf7-8176-f2fe199c5943", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Nor did the IAS Court err in dismissing the fourth cause of action, seeking to set aside plaintiff\u2019s 1979 settlement with She<mask>, as barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations for causes of action for fraud, rescission and duress set forth in CPLR 213, since defendant Shearson presented prima facie proof establishing that the six-year Statute of Limitations had expired in July of 1985, more than six years before the commencement of the underlying action, and since the plaintiff failed to produce evidentiary proof establishing that the limitation period was tolled by its inability to discover Shear-son\u2019s alleged fraud until 1992 (see, Watts v Exxon Corp., 188 AD2d 74)."], "id": "04a2fded-0ae1-4ad1-aa4d-1f8165f93c33", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\" 'security guard\u2019 shall mean a person employed by a security guard company to principally perform one or more of the following functions within the state: \"a. protection of individuals and/or property from harm, theft or other unlawful activity; \"b. deterrence, observation, detection and/or reporting of incidents in order to prevent any unlawful or unauthorized activity including but not limited to unlawful or unauthorized intrusion or entry, larceny, vandalism, abuse, <mask> or trespass on property.\u201d Defendants maintain that a plain reading of the definition indicates that the Act may be applied to armored car carriers. Plaintiff and interveners maintain that the statute is ambiguous at best and makes no reference to armored car carriers. This court is mindful of the previous case law that states \"where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, this court in interpreting a statute will give effect to the words used by a coequal branch of government, unless 'such applica*567tion would cause an anachronistic or absurd result contrary to the contextual purpose of the enactment\u2019 \u201d (People v Boston, 75 NY2d 585, 588 [1990]). However, the courts have not foreclosed review of a statute for a lack of unambiguity. Rather the courts have stated that: \"[w]hile the statutes may appear literally 'unambiguous\u2019 on their face, the absence of ambiguity facially is never conclusive. Sound principles of statutory interpretation generally require examination of a statute\u2019s legislative history and context to determine its meaning and scope.\u201d (New York State Bankers Assn. v Albright, 38 NY2d 430, 434 [1975].)"], "id": "25d50455-4d09-47de-b75f-fc4fb57d42d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Courts have struggled to determine fault without much success. This court concludes that the Court of Appeals holding, that interest should be awarded from the date of the liability finding, should be applied; however, the court\u2019s implied ratification of the Trimboli dictum should be disregarded. Further, the courts should directly acknowledge that the fault rule is simply unworkable. Delay need not be the fault of either party. In Love v State of New York (supra) and Zegman v State of New York (99 Misc 2d 473) delay resulted only from the trial court\u2019s scheduling difficulties. In the case at bar, it is not possible to allocate all fault to either party. Defendant delayed entering the judgment of dismissal for *965seven months. Plaintiffs were justified in their timely appeal from that judgment. Without doubt, the delay in the appellate process cannot be ascribed to either side. Delay in commencing the damages trial resulted from the court\u2019s trial backlog.2 The facts here illustrate just how artificial and unproductive the analysis of fault can be. Moreover, a fault analysis does not relate to the reason for the award of interest \u2014 to compensate a plaintiff for the defendant\u2019s use of plaintiff\u2019s funds. The plaintiff lacks access to the money while defendant has use of it, regardless of fault. Once liability is determined, the unliquidated nature of the obligation does not change the equity of the result (Gunn<mask> v State of New York, supra, 70 NY2d, at 924; Malkin v Wright, supra)."], "id": "5a97c011-4612-4609-a770-8b0a9328c75d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Consequently, while George might certainly have intended the offense of criminal mischief in setting fire to McFadden's property inside the vehicle, had the fire spread and destroyed the vehicle as well, he could have been charged with <mask>. Of course, as noted above, McFadden did not have to show that a jury would have found George guilty of arson on these facts. Rather, she need only have presented some evidence from which a jury could have found that she reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was immediately necessary to prevent him from committing arson. Yet, the reasoning behind Section 6.04(b)(1) that would have allowed the State to prosecute George for arson had the fire spread to the vehicle likewise supports the conclusion that McFadden could reasonably have believed that he was in the process of committing arson."], "id": "a5f47530-0e72-49ec-8635-274858877759", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["He also testified that DHS had explored placement with relatives, including the maternal grandmother, Candida Pe<mask>, whose home was appropriate, but who was later rejected as having an issue with her background. She had failed to disclose that her daughter had once been in foster care. In addition, her husband, the children's grandfather, had not ever visited the children while they were in foster care for the year before the hearing. Mr. Baker also said he spoke with a cousin, Sarah Thompson, *425who was approved for provisional placement but who did not want to be considered for placement. Finally, he said that he had spoken with Catherine Griggs, the children's maternal great-aunt, who was a potential placement. The paperwork on Ms. Griggs was completed on October 16, 2017, several days before the termination hearing."], "id": "1c319dc7-fdab-4759-9449-94d3e530e9b0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["It is well established that, when an instrument is expressed in terms that clearly and unequivocally give up a right or discharge a claim (such as a waiver or release or renunciation), \u201ceffect must be given to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language employed\u201d (Metz v Metz, 175 AD2d 938, 939 [1991]). Concomitantly, in determining the extent to which Laurent gave up his claims upon decedent\u2019s estate, the language of the instrument he executed must be read without resort to extrinsic evidence unless we find such language is ambiguous as a matter of law (Wells v She<mask> Lehman/Am. Express, 72 NY2d 11, 19 [1988])."], "id": "dc7409dd-3cef-4633-9ef0-88dc9f07a529", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In my opinion there is ho such legal, moral, social or material distinction as the courts should recognize, between a separation *383immediately followed by the written agreement, and a written agreement immediately followed by the public separation. In each set of circumstances, the open or public separation is, in all probability, the culmination of considerable thought and conference, and the document merely records the previous oral stipulations of the parties. In either situation there is not much doubt that, prior even to the oral arrangements, there has been an actual separation in the marital relationship, in private if not in public. This view is sustained by authoritative decisions, for it has also been held, both on the principle of stare decisis and on well-considered reasoning, that a written separation agreement, executed immediately prior to the open or public separation of the parties, is valid. (Clark v. Fosdick, 118 N. Y. 7,12, and cases therein cited; C<mask> v. Murray, 3 Paige, 483, 501; Leary v. Leary, 136 Misc. 13; Marks v. Marks, 127 id. 416; Fives v. Fives, supra; Landes v. Landes, 94 Misc. 486, 499; affd., 172 App. Div. 758.)"], "id": "11c52c1b-b3f1-4ea9-b02f-7b0bcd08ca0d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The attempted appointment of one third of the trust principal in further trust for the lives of the two granddaughters is plainly invalid. The property appointed is the property of the donor of the trust who died in 1910 and the two grandchildren who were born respectively in 1918 and 1921 were not in being at the time of his death. Thus the attempted appointment for the benefit of the grandchildren violates the Statute against Perpetuities and is invalid. (Personal Property Law, \u00a7 11; Hillen v. Iselin, 144 N. Y. 365; Fargo v. Squiers, 154 N. Y. 250; Matter of Pe<mask>, 20 Misc 2d 1020; Matter of Sheedy, 20 Misc 2d 900, affd. 12 A D 2d 461; Real Property Law, \u00a7\u00a7 178, 179.)"], "id": "b5e830c6-5684-4fde-909b-a2fa487b2bb2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["*848Section 275, so far as here material, provides that the indictment must contain \u201c a plain and concise statement of the act constituting the crime, without unnecessary repetition.\u201d Section 276 of the Code gives the form of a simplified indictment. In People v. Weiss (252 App. Div. 463; revd. on other grounds, 276 N. Y. 384) Mr. Justice Johnston said: \u201c In determining the sufficiency of an indictment the test is: Does it identify the charge against the defendant so that his conviction or acquittal will bar a subsequent charge for the same offense; does it notify him of the nature and character of the crime with which he is charged so as to enable him to prepare his defense and to permit the court to pronounce judgment according to the right of the case? (People v. F<mask>, 244 N. Y. 413; People v. Williams, 243 id. 162.) In applying this test courts should be liberal, not technical. Thus construed, the indictment is sufficient and the defendants were not prejudiced by the failure to plead the crime charged in the identical words of the statute. To hold otherwise \u2018 would be to sacrifice substance to form and abandon much that has been accomplished to simplify procedure upon criminal trials.\u2019 (People v. Marcus, 235 App. Div. 397, 400.) \u201d Tested by that rule, the indictment is clearly sufficient. The second ground of the demurrer is overruled."], "id": "c2a6ad6e-a525-4c8d-acd7-d3de6bb16224", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The court in Corrigan also relies on In re Jonathan R. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 963, 971, in which the Court of Appeal concluded section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and (4), created separate offenses of assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, respectively, because under Gonzalez each subdivision stated the elements of the offense. (Corrigan, supra , 34 Cal.App.5th at p. ----, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 756, 2019 WL 1513202, *5.) But the Court of Appeal in People v. Brunton (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1097, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 declined to follow In re Jonathan R. , noting the Supreme Court's holding in Vidana supported consideration of the legislative history, which the Brunton court concluded supported its holding the Legislature did not intend by its 2011 amendment to section 245 to create two separate offenses of aggravated assault. (Brunton , at pp. 1106-1107, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 686.) We likewise follow Vidana and conclude the legislative history and statutory scheme show the Legislature intended to create a single offense of simple <mask>."], "id": "5051cfcd-0239-4fc3-a2f7-0b1581fbf564", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The court has inspected the grand jury minutes which disclose the following: after ascertaining that the Ferrara family was absent, and while Michael Smyth acted as lookout, James Robertson and Matthew McC<mask> broke a door security device and invaded the defendants\u2019 home. Once inside, each went to a separate room and executed a carefully planned scheme to steal. The fruits of the criminal enterprise included a coin collection and cash. The exact amount stolen is difficult to determine, if only because neither burglar was honest with the other as to the nature of his larcenous gain. The defendants discovered the identity of the thieves and threatened to turn them over to the police unless a certain sum of money was received."], "id": "058d1391-868a-4080-89f5-22130d7d3ebd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant asserts that the jury received \"conflicting\" instructions regarding the mental state required for <mask>, a general intent crime, because the felony-murder instruction told the jury that a killing committed during arson is first degree murder \"when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that crime.\" His argument is beside the point. The instruction on arson correctly informed the jury that to establish the elements of arson causing great bodily injury in violation of section *399451, subdivision (a), the prosecutor must prove (1) that \"a person set fire to or burned or caused to be burned *77property,\" (2) \"the fire was set or burning was done willfully and maliciously,\" and (3) \"the fire caused great bodily injury to another.\" The definition of arson created no inconsistency with the felony-murder instructions and would not have confused the jury."], "id": "808d5a7a-95c7-485d-976b-28304f87fa5e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["John R. LaCava, J. Defendant Louis Cipolla, a former United States customs officer and firearms instructor, is charged under indictment number 94-1680 with various crimes arising out of a bombing incident that took place on May 18, 1994. They include: attempted <mask> in the first degree; criminal possession of a dangerous weapon in the first degree; and arson in the third degree. By indictment number 94-0999, he is also charged with numerous other crimes, the commission of which were discovered upon the investigation of the charges underlying indictment 94-1680. Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (11 counts) and criminal possession of a dangerous weapon in the first degree are among those charges."], "id": "43afff44-b501-4c26-b941-2aa4f3f987b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Hartford further argues that it would create an incongruity in the law if a carrier were made subject to common-law liability and, at the same time, have the statutory right of subrogation against itself to recover paid compensation benefits when an employee recovers in a third-party action (see Workers\u2019 Compensation Law, \u00a7 29, subd 1). The Legislature, it is contended, could not have intended such an incongruous result. Professor L<mask>, however, has neatly answered this: \"By now the law is becoming quite accustomed to apparent incongruities of this kind, what with corporations, insurers, and even individuals 'wearing different hats.\u2019 Increasingly common is the spectacle of an insurance carrier acting as compensation subrogation plaintiff and as defendant insurer on a third party\u2019s automobile liability risk. Problems of conflict of interest and of public policy may arise, but no one worries much any more about the conceptual problem of whether the carrier can sue itself. The present issue is not essentially different once it is recognized that the compensation carrier is being sued, not as compensation carrier, but as clinic operator or safety inspection service, in which role it is just as differentiable as the automobile liability insurer.\u201d (Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Insurer as Suable Third Party, 1969 Duke LJ 1130-1131, supra; citations omitted.)"], "id": "50e73e44-1bdd-44f6-bbf6-0866a37b2285", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["a new judge rule on Ortiz\u2019s 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 habeas application on the ground that they were legally unsupported, denied Ortiz leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. In the second appeal, the district court imposed sanctions, denied Ortiz leave to proceed IFP, and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Ortiz moves this court for leave to proceed IFP in both appeals. By seeking leave to proceed IFP, Ortiz is challenging the district court\u2019s certifications that his appeals are not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). To obtain leave, Ortiz must show that he is financially eligible and that he will present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. See C<mask> v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). If an appeal is frivolous, this court may dismiss it sua sponte. 5th Cir. R. 42.2. In appeal No. 20-40508, Ortiz seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court\u2019s denial of the two nunc pro tunc motions. Because the motions were not authorized by rule or statute and could not provide the relief sought therein, we DENY a COA as unnecessary to appeal them. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2253(c)(1); see Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672, 677\u201379 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141\u201342 (5th Cir. 1994). Rather than remand, we DISMISS Ortiz\u2019s appeal from the denial of the motions as frivolous. See Early, 27 F.3d at 141-42. In light of Ortiz\u2019s failure to identify a nonfrivolous issue to raise in this appeal, his motion for leave to proceed IFP in this appeal also is DENIED. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2. In appeal No. 20-40702, Ortiz fails to address the district court\u2019s imposition of sanctions. Accordingly, he has waived review of that issue and fails to present a nonfrivolous issue for this court\u2019s review. See Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 1999); Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202; Howard,"], "id": "d4e1a0be-a4c6-4f42-a6be-042efdb51cb8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Pe<mask> (188 Misc. 744 [1947]), at page 745 the court stated, 1 \u2018 These observations suffice to show that even under our present Penal Law [referring to \u00a7 722] the offense of disorderly conduct is at least closely related to the crime of misdemeanor. It is in the nature of a crime and has all the attributes of a crime. The same rules of law and procedure are followed with regard to it as in the case of a crime. The right to a summary arrest exists; the complaint must be definite and state a specific charge; the burden of proving a defendant guilty is upon the People and must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; a trial on a charge of disorderly conduct constitutes jeopardy within the meaning or the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution. \u201d"], "id": "d9bb4b11-1854-46c2-b638-f1c3cfa787f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["(2) A tenant in common of the fee has a title in the fee, separate and distinct from that of his cotenants with only a unity of possession between them. (3) A tenant in common of the fee has a right of possession exclusive against all other persons, except as to his cotenants or as to any incumbrances placed on it by the tenancy in common. (4) One tenant in common may maintain summary proceedings to evict a lessee of the tenancy in common who is holding over, even though his cotenant did not unite in the summary proceeding with him, but instead may have given or expressed a desire to give a new lease to the holdover tenant. *459(5) Under the provisions o\u00a3 subdivision (d) of section 8 of the commercial Bent Law, a tenant in common of the fee could be a \u201c landlord [who] owned or acquired an enforceable right to buy or take possession of the building1 or other rental area on or before January twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred forty-five \u201d, and thus would be entitled to maintain summary proceedings in his own name or in the name of the cotenancy to recover possession of the premises for his immediate and personal use, provided he could establish that he met the other requirements of the subdivision; or he could be \u201c a person who acquires title to the building or other rental area subsequent to January twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred forty-five,\u201d and thus would be entitled also to maintain summary proceedings in the same manner and under the same conditions as stated above. Hence, tenants in common do not hold the fee as if they together constituted one person as is the case in joint tenancy where the fictitious unity of the tenants gives an entirety of interest whereby they hold together but one estate in the land. Though the estates of these five persons here mentioned were created by the same deed so that it may be said the four unities of time, title, interest and possession were present at the creation of the tenancy (Walsh on Property, \u00a7 200, p. 354), a tenancy in common was the estate granted by the deed to the five named individuals in their own right. (Real Property Law, \u00a7 66.) Tenancies in common are characterized by unity of possession, the only unity which exists in all forms of co-ownership, as there is no necessity for unity of interest or title. A tenant in common, though owner of an undivided share only in the land, differs from a joint tenant, in having a several and distinct estate therein, and except for the fact that he has not the exclusive possession, he has the same rights in respect to his share as a tenant in severalty. Each tenant in common holds his title and interest independently of the other tenants in common. (2 Tiffany on Real Property, \u00a7 426; Le Vee v. Le Vee, 93 Ore. 370; Tilton v. Vail, 42 Hun 638, 640; Chittenden v. Gates, 18 App. Div. 169, 172; Manhattan Real Estate Assn. v. Cudlipp, 80 App. Div. 532, 535.) Thus, a tenant in common may transfer, devise, convey, lease, mortgage or otherwise incumber his interest in the land, without seeking the consent or joinder of his cotenants to the transaction. (McKay v. Mumford, 10 Wend. 351; Valentine v. Healey, 178 N. Y. 391; B<mask> v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306.)"], "id": "4aae948f-f1fb-4ba9-ba35-86798ad61338", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["For the detailed reasons set forth above, and after consideration of the totality of the circumstances, particularly the necessity of additional litigation due to defendant\u2019s failure comply with court orders, plaintiff\u2019s application for counsel fees has merit. (See Moore v Moore, 93 AD3d 827 [2d Dept 2012].) However, defendant is correct that the application must be denied at this time, regardless of merit, as plaintiff\u2019s counsel has failed to provide any billing documentation whatsoever which would allow the defendant, or the court, to determine if the amount requested is properly supported. In order to receive an award of attorney\u2019s fees there must be sufficient documenta*790tion in the form of time records including the time expended relative to each service. (See Fackelman v Fackelman, 71 AD3d 724 [2d Dept 2010]; see also Darvas v Darvas, 242 AD2d 554 [2d Dept 1997].) Counsel\u2019s affirmation in support of plaintiff\u2019s application, which includes an approximation of time expended without supporting billing documentation, is insufficient to meet this burden. (See B<mask> v Barson, 32 AD3d 872 [2d Dept 2006]; see also Reynolds v Reynolds, 300 AD2d 645 [2d Dept 2002].)"], "id": "07be604a-b531-4673-8a71-13f2ff4a3937", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Under the authority of Pe<mask> v. Pearson, 46 Cal. 609, the declarations of P. N. Mackay in his will devising to \u201cHattie Schenck, housekeeper, \u2019 \u2019 a certain legacy, and in his deed, acknowledged before Notary King, that he was an unmarried man, are the very best evidence as to the truth of the facts so stated. According to the doctrine of Pearson v. Pearson, 46 Cal. 609, an entry in a family Bible, an inscription on a tombstone, a pedigree hung up in the family mansion, are all good evidence; declarations of parents in their lifetime are statements made without any temptation to exceed or fall short of the truth. So the statement of P. N. Mackay in his will, when he said \u201cHattie Schenck, housekeeper,\u201d was the natural effusion of the party who knew the truth. So the declaration before the commissioner that he was an unmarried man was the natural effusion of the party who knew the truth."], "id": "2c325513-2539-46a5-9bce-c4b5fe615cfb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c Upon a revision and codification of the statutes relating to the insane, effected by chapter 446 of the Laws of 1874, it was provided by section 20 of that act,' that \u2018 if any person in confinement under indictment for the crime of <mask>, murder, or attempt at murder, or highway robbery, shall appear to be insane, the Court of Oyer and Terminer, in which such indictment is pending, shall have power, with the concurrence of the presiding judge of such court, summarily, to inquire into the sanity of such person * * * and for that purpose may appoint a commission to examine such person and inquire into the facts of his case and report to the court, etc.\u2019 Section 22 provides that \u2018 if any person in confinement under indictment for the crime of arson, or murder, or attempt at murder, shall appear to be insane, the county judge of the county where he is confined, shall institute a careful investigation; call two or more reputable physicians and other credible *171witness; invite the district attorney to aid in the examination, and, if it be necessary, call a jury * * * and if it is satisfactorily proved that such person is insane, said judge may discharge such person from imprisonment and order his safe custody and removal to one of the state lunatic asylums \u2019 \u201d (pp. 606, 607)."], "id": "604f500a-0f40-47e4-a594-6c105b5a525b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["This is a third marriage for each of the parties. The husband had been married to two sisters, with each of whom he lived about 15 years. The wife had been married and then, following a divorce, remarried a previous husband. The parties to this suit had known each other only seven days prior to their present marriage and I am persuaded that one of its inducements was the wife\u2019s desire to terminate her then employment and the husband\u2019s desire that she help him in his business. The cruelty here perpetrated was essentially of the mental type, founded on a course of mutual misconduct and retaliation, culminating in the wife\u2019s refusal to assist her husband after he had spent several thousands of dollars to erect and furnish an office for that purpose. There is no proof, however, that she became ill as a result of such mental cruelty. Indeed, she testified that work generally made her ill and for that reason she did not return to work after marriage. In the absence of evidence of illness there is a failure of proof of a cause based on cruelty (Traylor v. Traylor, 3 A D 2d 727 ; Pe<mask> v. Pearson, 230 N. Y. 141)."], "id": "cd6dde7a-4de9-4454-8c12-2b7fe3f00d10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant Long, in a supplemental brief, argues that his conviction should be set aside and the charge against him dismissed on the authority of Green v. United States (355 U. S. 184). That case, however, involved the question of double jeopardy and does not impress me as being controlling here. Green was tried originally for murder in the first degree and <mask>. He was convicted of murder in the second degree and arson. The conviction of second degree murder was reversed on evidentiary grounds and the case was sent back for a new trial. This time Green was convicted of murder in *458the first degree. The Supreme Court now says that the original verdict amounted to an acquittal, for double jeopardy purposes, of the charge of murder in the first degree. The court stated, therefore, that he could not again be tried for murder in the first degree. The court did not hold that his first conviction of murder in the second degree meant that he could not properly have been convicted of murder in the second degree. The analogy with the Long case merely means that Long cannot be tried again for the crime of robbery in a degree higher than robbery third degree, if the current verdict is upset. It does not mean that Long\u2019s conviction is invalid. At page 190 of the Green opinion, the court specifically stated that at his new trial \u2018 \u2018 Green was tried again, not for second degree murder, but for first degree murder \u201d (italics supplied). The necessary inference, of course, is that a new trial could have been had for murder in the second degree. The original verdict would have been sustained except for questions of evidence that led to a reversal. The Green case, if anything, is an example of a jury\u2019s exercising leniency in bringing in a lesser verdict than was sought by the People. In the Green ease, it would seem that the first jury should have brought in a verdict of guilty in the first degree, because it clearly found a felony murder to have been involved in the light of the verdict of guilty under the arson charge. As in the Long case however, mercy was exercised, a procedure that, rightly or wrongfully, jurors have always taken upon themselves to follow where they felt it warranted, regardless of all the instructions to the contrary that the court might give them."], "id": "409f40a7-e8ca-4bd4-b62b-d865b86b86f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["A husband was excluded where the court found it necessary to do so in order to protect the wife\u2019s safety and the proper care of the children (see Mayeri v. Mayeri, 26 Misc 2d 6). G<mask> v. Garson (271 App. Div. 961) is authority for the court\u2019s power to issue such an order, pursuant to sections 1170 or 878 of the Civil Practice Act. So is Lindley v. Lindley (162 N. Y. S. 2d 217). The Second and Third Departments seem to hold otherwise (see Donnelly v. Donnelly, 272 App. Div. 779 and Cox v. Cox, 266 App. Div. 38)."], "id": "31ca0d57-240c-4337-9bff-9601ef66520c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The literal construction of section 735 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law suggested by the landlord ignores an essential purpose of that section, to wit: to give the tenant notice and an opportunity to be heard (Dobkin v Chapman, 21 NY2d 490). There is of course a presumption of official regularity; and an item mailed will be presumed delivered. Where proof, however, is adduced that there has been no delivery of process, the court may conclude that service has not been properly effectuated notwithstanding proof of mailing (cf. G<mask> v Hohenleitner, 73 Misc 2d 192)."], "id": "b08c21e3-7534-46ca-a026-0bf26fd1d64d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The record contains little information about the facts of the Defendant\u2019s crime. However, the indictment reflects that the Defendant was charged with aggravated <mask>, and the judgment reflects that on June 22, 2011, he pleaded guilty to arson and received a fifteen-year community corrections sentence. The judgment also notes that the Defendant agreed to \u201cplead outside of range\u201d and was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender."], "id": "84f50b94-b94b-4cb7-99fb-715eaa46da03", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The will provides as follows: \u20181 fifth : All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, both real and personal, * * * I give, devise and bequeath to my trustee hereinafter named, in trust, nevertheless, to invest and reinvest the same and to pay one-half of the net income therefrom to ruth louise goodwin, * * *, and the remaining one-half thereof to mildred o<mask> donaldson * * * during the life of each respectively, and upon the death of either or both of said persons, to transfer and pay over to my nephew wesley e. donaldson, jr. * * * absolutely and forever such part and/or all the said rest, residue and remainder of my estate.\u201d"], "id": "51f9c4e2-4435-408f-a541-3b3aeda9ee48", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that although the restraint on noncompete clauses constitutes an unwaivable statutory right, the statutory scheme in the Business and Professions Code itself created an exception to the policy. ( SingerLewak , supra , 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 624, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 672.) \"[T] he arbitration award, even if legally erroneous, did not contravene a public policy indicating that certain issues not be subject to resolution by the arbitrator. [Citation.]\" ( Ibid. ) Further, \"[i]n contrast to Pe<mask> , any arbitrator error did not '[misconstrue] the procedural framework under which the parties agreed the arbitration was to be conducted, rather than misinterpreting the law governing the claim itself.' [Citation.] Indeed, [the defendant's] argument is precisely that the arbitrator misinterpreted the law governing the claim itself.\" ( Ibid. )"], "id": "55979839-4ad6-4727-b660-522729aeeed3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The United States Supreme Court in Mastrobuono v She<mask> Lehman Hutton, Inc. (514 US 52 [1995]) confronted a case in which an arbitrator had awarded punitive damages in contravention of New York law which prohibited arbitrators from doing so. In Mastrobuono, the arbitration agreement, a standard form client agreement, provided that it was to be governed by New York law, but that \u201cany controversy arising out of or related to\u201d the agreement was to be settled by arbitration according to the NASD rules \u201c[u]nless unenforceable due to federal or state law.\u201d (Id. at 59 n 2 [internal quotation marks omitted].) The NASD permitted punitive damage awards by arbitrators. (Id. at 61.)"], "id": "5e674382-0c48-4fc5-b0d9-56911f710993", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Under our law, the mere entry of judgment creates no lien against the personal property of the judgment debtor. The lien comes into existence only upon issuance of execution to the Sheriff (CPLR 5202; United States v. Pe<mask>, 258 F. Supp. 686; Dean Constr. Co. v. Simonetta Concrete Constr. Corp., 37 F.R.D. 242; Ruppert v. Community Nat. Bank, 22 A D 2d 165, affd. 16 N Y 2d 589). Thus, the race, under State law, is to the swift. Since the assignment was first in time it is, absent *766some statutory inhibition, entitled to precedence over the execution (Stathos v. Murphy, 26 A D 2d 500; Matter of Aird Is. v. De Paula, 29 Misc 2d 666; Matter of Neilson Realty Corp. v. MVAIC, 47 Misc 2d 260; Seamon v. Federated Films, 142 N. Y. S. 2d 324; Matter of Ideal Mercantile Corp., 143 F. Supp. 810, affd. 244 F. 2d 828, cert. den. 355 U. S. 856; Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F. 2d 892, cert. den. 317 U. S. 700; cf. Matter of City of New York [Nassau Expressway], 56 Misc 2d 602)."], "id": "ea222228-dda3-4067-9a28-86cc9c4eb27e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["[Hines] considered hiding the truck in a park. He considered burning the truck and burning the DNA-or burning the DNA in the truck, but he said he changed his mind because he knew that was a crime, <mask>. And he said that if he did something else with [Chime's body], it would be something else against Hines. And he said: I was-I was-I didn't feel like I was going to have much luck with the legal situation. Ultimately, he decided, as he put it, to leave the vehicle where he thought somebody would be able to find it quickly so that [Chime's] body would be able to have some hope of being displayed in an open casket at a funeral. And so, he said, he chose a neighborhood that was close to a house that he built and that was close to the high school he graduated from. *301Based on his review of Hines's medical records, the videotaped police interrogations, and this interview, Dr. Coates opined that any mental illness symptoms that Hines experienced at the time he killed Chime did not render him unable to know that murder was wrong."], "id": "8e5ca981-b911-494d-82da-c44c98f7a6e3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["When faced with a constitutional challenge to a restriction on speech activity occurring in a Pruneyard public forum, we must first determine whether the speech activity is protected by the California Constitution. Like its federal counterpart, the California Constitution does not extend to every form of speech or expressive activity. ( Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn. (2011) 564 U.S. 786, 791, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 ( Brown ); L<mask> v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1283, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 ( Larson ).) Rather, there are \" 'well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech' \" which are entirely unprotected and, thus, may be restricted or prohibited without raising a constitutional problem. ( Brown , at p. 791, 131 S.Ct. 2729 ; see Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 513, 217 Cal.Rptr. 225, 703 P.2d 1119 ( Spiritual ), disapproved of on other grounds as stated in *105Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 968, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243.) Those categories are obscenity, fighting words, defamation, and speech intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action. ( U.S. v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S. 460, 468-469, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 ( Stevens ); Larson, supra , 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283-1284, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 40.)"], "id": "4a810751-1495-40b8-93c7-032904516099", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["California's DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998 (Database Act), section 295 et seq, \"requires the collection of tissue samples for DNA analysis from all persons convicted of felonies (\u00a7\u00a7 295, 296, subd. (a)(1)), adults arrested or charged with a felony (\u00a7 296, subd. (a)(2)(C)), and all persons required to register as a sex or <mask> offender *54as a result of the commission of a *785felony or misdemeanor (id. , subd. (a)(3)). Except as provided in section 296, subdivision (a)(3), persons convicted solely of misdemeanors are not required to provide DNA samples.\" ( J.C., supra , 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 731.) Subdivision (b) of section 296 provides that the requirements for DNA submission \"shall apply to all qualifying persons regardless of sentence imposed ... or any other disposition rendered in the case of an adult or juvenile tried as an adult....\""], "id": "56759ec4-e8e4-49dd-8a2e-12f10f14874b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The fact that plaintiff incurred expense to the knowledge of the defendant (promisor), and in the reasonable belief that defendant would keep its promise, is, probably, ample to sustain this contract even in the absence of any other consideration. (Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, 374.) However, there is nothing illusory about the obligation of the respective parties to this writing. (Cf. 1 Williston Cont. \u00a7\u00a7 36, 36-a, 43, 47-49.) The writing clearly constitutes an enforcible bilateral contract. (Cf. Benedict v. Pincus, 191 N. Y. 377; Saltzman v. B<mask>, 239 id. 332, 335, 336; North Side News Co. v. Cypres, 75 Misc. 129; Post v. Frank & Co., Id. 130; Geringer v. Friedman, 80 id. 212; Meyer v. Schwinger, 141 N. Y. Supp. 504; Bozzone v. Stafford, 85 Misc. 53; Gabriel v. Opoznauer, 89 id. 611; Goldblatt & Schaeffler v. Skudowitz, 172 N. Y. Supp. 339.)"], "id": "fd6df1cd-9cbb-414e-b693-be8450394b16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Prom the wording of Indictment No. 48, in order for the People to successfully prosecute the defendant, it would be necessary to present evidence to prove that the defendant burned the same dwelling house specified in the dismissed <mask> indictment. In view of the well-settled principles of law pertaining to double jeopardy such a prosecution cannot be had and Indictment No. 48 must therefore be dismissed."], "id": "f1de300d-64bc-4cb2-a950-87a38882018d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["A person who starts a fire under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life and recklessly causes the death of another person may properly be charged with both <mask> and homicide (Penal Law, \u00a7 125.15, subd 1 or \u00a7 125.25, subds 2, 3). If the other person is not killed but is seriously injured, the perpetrator may then be properly charged with both arson and assault (Penal Law, \u00a7 120.00, subd 2; \u00a7 120.05, subd 4 or 6; \u00a7 120.10, subd 3). It follows that if the other person is neither killed nor seriously injured, but is recklessly exposed to a grave risk of death, then the perpetrator may be properly charged with both arson and reckless endangerment."], "id": "f334b499-d542-463c-bb75-aa0a71974c10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Other courts have adopted various tests for admissibility based on criteria designed to measure the integrity of the hypnosis procedure, and to reduce the dangers of suggestibility, bias, incompetence, and the like, by requiring taping, prehypnotic memorialization, and other safeguards. This approach was taken in New York in People v Lewis (103 Misc 2d 881), People v Lucas (107 Misc 2d 231) and People v McDowell (103 Misc 2d 831; see, also, State v Hurd, 173 NJ Super 333, affd 86 NJ 525; State v Pe<mask>, supra; Use of Hypnosis to Refresh Memory: Invaluable Tool or Dangerous Device? 60 Wash U LQ 1059, referring to Hurd safeguards of Dr. Martin Orne; see Orne, Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 Int J of Clin and Exp Hypnosis, No. 4, pp 311, 335 [1978]; and to articles and views of Dr. Herbert Spiegel, who testified before us at this hearing; see, also, Schafer and Rubio, Guidelines for Use of Hypnosis with Witnesses, Int J Clin and Exp Hypnosis [April, 1978])."], "id": "fd95c50c-a910-4240-a8c0-45347a8ee705", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["It is well settled that an agreement like this between the husband, the wife and a trustee, for a separation during life is valid and effectual, both at law and in equity (Calkins v. Levy, 22 Barb. 106, 107 ; C<mask> v. Murray, 3 Paige, 483 ; Selling v. Crowley, 2 Vern. 386). And as respects the wife, it would not be invalidated, although the provision in the agreement in respect to the children might be void (Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 N. Y. 19, 37; Parsons on Contracts, 428); nor,'if we assume, upon the authorities cited by the appellant, that the provision respecting the children was one that the court would not enforce, being void as against public policy, does it *515necessarily follow that the defendant is not answerable to the trustee for the support of the wife and children, so far as the agreement has in good faith been executed. In Vansittart v. Vansittart (2 De Gex & J. 255), where such a stipulation in respect to the support of the children in an agreement for a separation was held to be void as against public policy, a distinction was made between enforcing the specific performance of an agreement for a separation, containing such a provision, and questions that may arise where such agreements have been executed in whole or in part. It was said in that case that the father has not only a right to his children, but duties to discharge towards them, and that he should not be allowed to fetter and abandon his parental power to the extent that he might do, if agreements of this character were sustained."], "id": "86dc42c1-ce76-4c45-8024-0ff60f5d692d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["As to the allegation that Tumminia testified falsely that he had not been previously convicted of the crimes of <mask> and rape, the District Attorney contends that the petitioner failed to establish the falsity of Tumminia\u2019s testimony in this respect. The official criminal record established conclusively that he had not been convicted of these crimes, but had been adjudged a youthful offender on April 28, 1955, when sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation by Judge Joyce of the Kings County Court. Under section 913-n of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is specifically provided that: \u201c no youth shall be denominated a criminal by reason of such determination, nor shall such determination be deemed a conviction\u201d. (See Matter of Anonymous, 4 A D 2d 953.) While the Assistant District Attorney\u2019s statement to the jury that Tumminia had never been convicted of a crime was technically true, his choice of language cannot be construed to have been falsely made in view of the full explanation of Tumminia\u2019s background before the jury."], "id": "99d56da8-ffec-44fe-86ee-9628b0123b88", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["in the affidavits stating the names of the witnesses who will be eonvenienced by a change of the place of trial, it is simply stated that the moving defendant expects to prove certain facts by the witnesses named, but it is nowhere- stated that those facts can be proved by those witnesses, nor do the affidavits disclose grounds showing that the facts can probably be established by the persons designated, and it is insufficient. (Thurfjell v. Witherbee, 70 Hun, 401; McPhail v. Ridout, 83 id. 446; White v. Hall, 8 App. Div. 618; S. C., 40 N. Y. Supp. 945. See Hayes v. G<mask>, 25 App. Div. 115.)"], "id": "8858e82d-f260-4ced-a4d6-376550b2a5a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["However, it appears that plaintiff is a closed corporation having two equal stockholders who are its two directors. In *179November, 1966 it was duly agreed that the business terminate and that Myra Schillinger, secretary of plaintiff corporation, be in charge of the liquidation which is apparently still in process. It further appears that said Myra Schillinger, the individual defendant herein, is also sole proprietor of the corporate defendant. It is charged that accounts receivable due to plaintiff in the amount of $6,031 have been paid to the name of defendant corporation and deposited in such defendant\u2019s account. C<mask> Albert, president and equal stockholder of plaintiff, objects to the procedure and brings this action in the name of plaintiff corporation."], "id": "fb95ad4f-c244-424b-8262-f3437c049223", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Cases addressing licensing schemes in a variety of contexts have found the placing of unfettered discretion into the hands of an administrative agency to be facially unconstitutional. (See, Saia v New York, 334 US 558 [1948] [ordinance prohibiting use of sound amplifiers without permission of police chief]; *743Kunz v New York, 340 US 290 [1951] [ordinance barring public worship on streets without permit from administrative official]; 414 Theater Corp. v Murphy, 360 F Supp 34 [SD NY 1973], affd 499 F 2d 1155 [2d Cir 1974]; Natco Theatres v Ratner, 463 F Supp 1124 [SD NY 1979], supra; Avon 42nd St. Corp. v Myerson, 352 F Supp 994 [SD NY 1972] [ordinance lacking sufficient standards to guide Commissioner of Consumer Affairs in ruling on licenses to operate movie theaters]; Bayside Enters. v C<mask>, 450 F Supp 696 [MD Fla 1978]; People v Mitchell, 74 Misc 2d 1053 [Crim Ct, NY County 1973].)"], "id": "0413eab1-94dd-4904-8e8a-cfb87f2c4c90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The foreseeability rule was recently discussed by our high court in Rangel , supra , 62 Cal.4th 1192, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649. There, the court addressed the question of whether a confrontation clause objection grounded on Crawford was forfeited. The defendant objected on appeal to the admissibility of statements under the adoptive admissions hearsay exception on confrontation clause grounds. ( *185Rangel , at p. 1215, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649.) Before the trial was conducted in 1998, the California Supreme Court had squarely held that statements qualifying for admissibility under the adoptive admissions exception were admissible over a confrontation clause objection based on the analysis in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 607-608]. ( Rangel , at p. 1215, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649.) The Rangel court noted that Crawford is \" 'flatly inconsistent' \" with that prior governing precedent and reasoned that the failure to object on confrontation clause grounds was excusable because the \" ' \"governing law at the time ... afforded scant grounds for objection.\" ' \" ( Rangel , at p. 1215, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649, italics added; see also Edwards , supra , 57 Cal.4th at pp. 704-705, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 306 P.3d 1049 [given the existing case law, \"defendant's failure to object [on confrontation clause grounds] during his 1996 trial 'was excusable, since governing law at the time ... afforded scant grounds for objection' \" (italics added) ].) Citing other California Supreme court cases holding that trial counsel \"could not have anticipated Crawford 's sweeping changes to federal confrontation clause case law,\" and that Crawford represented \" 'an unforeseen change in the law \"that competent and knowledgeable counsel reasonably could [not] have been expected to have anticipate[ ]\" at defendant's [pre- Crawford ] trial,' \" the Rangel court held that the defendant in that case did not forfeit a Crawford challenge. ( Rangel , at pp. 1215-1216, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649, citing People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1288, fn. 8, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 347, 324 P.3d 183, & Pe<mask>, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 462, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 297 P.3d 793.) The Rangel court concluded its discussion on the doctrine of forfeiture by emphasizing that \"the relevant question is whether requiring ... an objection ' \" ' \"would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law.\" ' \" ' \" ( Rangel , at p. 1217, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649, italics *929added.) It then added, \"[b]ecause that standard is satisfied here, we conclude that defendant has not forfeited his Crawford claim.\" ( Rangel , at p. 1217, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649, italics added.)"], "id": "9e8c02ff-d24d-420b-834c-6b9b6efbbc0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants served notices for an examination before trial returnable on March 29, 1965, together with certain notices for discovery and inspection returnable the same day and time and in their notices made a request to obtain copies of statements *191of defendants Markert, Duke and Pe<mask>, pursuant to CPLR 3101, subd. (e). It is these notices which the plaintiff seeks to vacate. It is the State\u2019s contention that the defendants\u2019 notice for an examination before trial of the general managers, trustees, etc., of the State University Construction Fund, a public benefit corporation, is improper because: (a) these individuals are not employees of the State of New York but, rather, are employees of the State University Construction Fund, which is a public benefit corporation; (b) because there is no statutory or other authority for examination before trial of the State even if these individuals are determined to be employees of the State of New York; and, (c) because the notice for examination before trial is vague and constitutes \u201ca fishing expedition\u201d; (d) because the documents demanded to be presented at the time and place are in possession of nonparties. The State has also moved to vacate the discovery and inspection requested by defendants on the grounds that: (a) the State is not subject to disclosure: (b) the action is governed by the procedures set up in the General Business Law (art. 22) and not by the CPLR; (c) that the material in the hands of the plaintiff State is: (1) privileged, (2) confidential, (3) prepared for litigation, (4) represents an attorney\u2019s work product; (e) that the requests for \u201c statements \u201d should be denied because the so-called \u201c statements \u201d are depositions given at a hearing and under oath and are not discoverable; (f) that the information is otherwise available or it is already in the defendants\u2019 possession; and (g) that the demand for discovery and inspection was \u20181 prolix, vague, and constitutes a fishing expedition\u201d. The State specifically moves to vacate the demand made by the three defendants to obtain copies of their own statements on the grounds that: (a) the State is not subject to disclosure, (b) the General Business Law imposes criminal sanction for unauthorized disclosures, (c) they are not statements but depositions, (d) that defendant Pearson is not \u201c a party to this action \u201d, (e) that the depositions in the State\u2019s hands constitute a work product of an attorney, material prepared for litigation and is privileged and confidential, (f) that the testimony of defendants Markert, Duke and Pearson is peculiarly within their own knowledge."], "id": "4caa15dd-891b-44c1-941f-3db32716266a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The subpoenas issued to petitioners ask for two classes of records relating to the petitioners and the subject property and do seek relevant information to, for example, (a) identify all persons with an interest in and/or control of 2961 Atlantic Avenue and (b) provide essential information concerning the value and management of this property and any insurance claims filed for fire damage to the premises. However, the subpoenas also request production of books and records that are not presented relevant to the Commission\u2019s investigation into an alleged <mask> for profit scheme, such as corporate minutes, tax returns and financial statements. To this extent, the subpoenas are too far-reaching and constitute an improper \u201cfishing expedition\u201d on the Commission\u2019s part. Therefore, items numbered l-III are hereby deleted from each subpoena and need not be furnished by petitioners."], "id": "56518d0a-2418-4065-8e22-86436d64379e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["20 Additionally, we have suggested that jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(1) may obtain 21 where the district court enters a directive that has the \u201cpractical effect\u201d of an injunction. 22 Commodity Futures Trading Comm\u2019n v. Walsh, 618 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing C<mask> v. 23 American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981)). To avail itself of this possibility, however, the 24 appellant must \u201cshow that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a serious, 25 perhaps irreparable consequence, and that the order can be effectively challenged only by an 26 immediate appeal.\u201d Carson, 450 U.S. at 84; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465, 27 467 (2d Cir. 2007); HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 632 (2d Cir. 1995). No such 28 showing has been made here. The parties have identified no basis for concluding that the"], "id": "dbdf0cf0-6d4c-48ef-bd59-754dde0bfa08", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The record discloses that the parties were married on August 22, 1986 when petitioner was 22 and respondent 15. Soon after they arrived at their marital residence in Norfolk, Virginia, petitioner began to engage in spousal abuse. Besides assaulting respondent on a number of occasions, he fired a weapon and shot out the passenger window of a truck he was driving and in which respondent was riding as a passenger, he pointed a weapon at respondent and fired a shot at her foot, and set a fire inside respondent\u2019s residence. As a result of this latter incident, he was arrested and pleaded guilty to a felony <mask> charge, receiving a sentence from a Virginia court of three months in jail, 10 years\u2019 probation and was ordered to pay $30,000 in restitution."], "id": "64c5d2ad-f2fe-4bcd-bd0d-f979390aa0a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["There not being the evidence required by law,\"to authorize the marriage of Ann C<mask> with the prisoner in the bar, it is clearly the opinion of the court that it was, to all intents and purposes, null and void. This being the case, it follows that she was guilty of adultery vrith Smith ; that the rights of Smith, as a third person, have no legal foundation or existence; that Carson had an undoubted right to proceed at law against his wife for a divorce, and to settle with her, and withdraw the suit, whenever he thought, proper, without the consent of the prisoner, or any other person. The law now1 under consideration supposes a case of this very kind, by enacting, that in any suit for a divorce on the ground of adultery, if the defendant shall prove that the plaintiff admitted the defendant into conjugal embraces after he knew she had been guilty of adultery, it shall operate as a perpetual bar to his obtaining a divorce."], "id": "01319912-84a0-415c-b244-f9adff6b3f40", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant pleads that his right to privacy in his property is protected by the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures (Katz v United States, 389 US 347). He also directs the court\u2019s attention to People v Tyler (399 Mich 564) which held that police and fire officials who enter a recently burned building to gather evidence of <mask> come within the Fourth Amendment\u2019s warrant requirement regardless of whether the entry is in the nature of a criminal investigation or has the administrative purpose of determining the cause and source of the fire. The court did, however, acknowledge that a lesser standard of probable cause applies to an administrative entry than to an entry for the purpose of a criminal investigation."], "id": "5b48d781-fbec-42bf-8e14-b70f353f9530", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The fifth cause of action, wherein the plaintiff sought a fee for breach of contract to pay plaintiff a finder\u2019s fee for certain pension fund business which the plaintiff had allegedly brought to She<mask>, was also properly dismissed as barred by the Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law \u00a7 5-701 [a] [10]), which provides in pertinent part that an oral agreement is void if it is one \"to pay compensation for services rendered in * * * negotiating the purchase, sale, exchange, renting or leasing of * * * a business opportunity\u201d (see, Sporn v Suffolk Mktg., 56 NY2d 864; Dura v Walker, Hart & Co., 27 NY2d 346, 348-349)."], "id": "a46bff88-b209-4c70-b0ee-7a5a93835434", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["3. But there was no such evidence and consequently no basis for submission of the case as murder resting on the lowest degree of felony in the <mask> category (id., \u00a7\u00a7 2, 224, subd. 3). For the same reason, the felony grade of malicious mischief {id., \u00a7 1433, subd. 1) was also out of the question, although I regarded the act and intent constituents of the conduct as necessarily included in the collateral felony charged in the murder indictment. And since the act established by the evidence was not shown to have amounted to arson (People v. Knatt, 156 N. Y. 302, 305) nor, so far as I have been able to determine, was it otherwise specifically penalized by law (Penal Law, \u00a7 1421; People v. Costello, 305 N. Y. 63, 65; Hazak Inc. v. Robertson Goetz Bldg. Co., 298 N. Y. 478, 480) it could be and was submitted as the misdemeanor predicate of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 1433, subd. 2; \u00a7 1050, subd. 1; People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 152-153; People v. Levan, 295 N. Y. 26, 33, 34; People v. Draper, 278 App. Div. 298, 306, affd. 303 N. Y. 653). However, before that point was reached there was a denial of the District Attorney\u2019s request that the case be given to the jury as deliberate and premeditated murder (Penal Law, \u00a7 1044, subd. 1)."], "id": "90cc2cf5-c189-4cd6-add1-df45ace63278", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Id. at 275, 813 P.2d at 1388 (citing 2 A. L<mask>, Workmen's Compensation Law \u00a7 57.61(c) at 10\u2013178). Moreover, The item missing from claimant's list of considerations is any evidence as to specific availability of employment. In other words, there is a presumption that, if claimant suffers physically, and bears the additional characteristics, then he has proved the prima facie case. The employer then has the burden to prove the existence of regular suitable employment."], "id": "536010e5-c85b-411e-82af-47792f6cda23", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "arson", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The clear intent behind Section 9.42's defense of property is to permit persons to use deadly force to prevent the actor from committing <mask> in specific, prescribed instances. In other words, a person does not have to wait for the actor to complete the offense before using deadly force. Indeed, if deadly force could only be used after the actor committed the offense, the defense would never apply. Therefore, the issue of whether McFadden had a reasonable belief that deadly force was immediately necessary to stop George from committing arson is different from the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to convict George of arson. While there is some overlap between the two concepts, a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary to prevent the actor from committing the offense of arson can be developed on facts which would be insufficient to prosecute the actor for arson. Accordingly, for the defense to apply, the evidence need show only that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was immediately necessary to prevent the actor from committing arson."], "id": "d3ea9bd6-11df-4a7a-9585-64bdd14937c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The extent of the damage has been sharply contested. Plaintiff\u2019s Exhibit 3 contains a list of almost 100 items of damages to various parts of the building. It was introduced into evidence during the testimony of Frank Olshansky, an expert called by the plaintiff, subject to cross-examination by the defendant with respect to any items. Defendant\u2019s Exhibit B was a list introduced into evidence during the testimony of Raymond Eisenhauer an expert called by the defendant. The total estimated cost of repairs set forth in Exhibit B was $26,563.45, plus $3,984.52, representing an allowance to the builder for his profit and overhead, making a total of $30,547.97. For unexplained reasons the defendant excluded from such estimate the following items: emergency and temporary work; floor coverings; window shades or Venetian blinds; damage due to <mask> or theft; further damage due to exposure to the elements; interior painting, gas ranges or refrigerators, dumbwaiter installation, kitchen and bathroom fixtures, bell wiring."], "id": "9f91f6a3-4688-443d-89e0-a834b11ae2a1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Claimant\u2019s appraiser, as he amended his appraisal at the trial, valued the entire property before the taking at $41,000 and after the taking at $32,600. This resulted in a difference of $8,400 which, in his opinion, was the total damage suffered by the claimant. His land valuation was $18,500 an acre based on three comparable sales some two to three years after the State\u2019s *1019taking of the subject property. This resulted in a land valuation of $6,300 for the ,338\u00b1 acres directly taken. To this he added $1,000 for a cost to cure related to the northern remaining portion and $1,000 for a cost to cure relating to the remaining southern portion. These two items included the installation of culverts and fill to obtain access to these portions from the new highway being installed there (Stewart Avenue) during the course of construction and also for the cost of a gate and fencing on the theory that the new Stewart Avenue had the-effect of exposing the back of claimant\u2019s property to the risk of theft and <mask> of personal property and equipment stored thereon. In addition, there was a $100 figure for the difference between his appraisal of the benefit to the northern portion as against severance damage to the southern portion."], "id": "a11cad16-1283-4ab5-a101-1f12b5bf72d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant and codefendant Donald J. Aitken were charged in a joint 21-count indictment with crimes stemming from their alleged involvement in multiple acts of <mask>, theft, burglary and arson in Delaware County in 2009, culminating in the destruction of a church by fire. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree (two counts), burglary in the third degree (three counts), arson in the third degree (four counts), arson in the fourth degree, arson in the fifth degree, attempted arson in the fifth degree, criminal *1085mischief in the third degree (three counts), reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal trespass in the second degree, trespass and petit larceny.1 Supreme Court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 23 to 69 years, which was later reduced pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 70.30 to an aggregate term of 12 to 20 years. The court further ordered defendant to pay restitution in the aggregate amount of $814,771.48. Defendant appeals."], "id": "8af7d9c6-93a5-404f-a8f8-b8c90428c809", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The mortgage business is one where the lender must weigh the consequences of the loan. In the event of a default, the bank must act not only to safeguard its financial investment but to safeguard the lives and safety of those who occupy the building. Greenpoint had a duty to inspect and secure the building and to seal off any vacant apartments as well as areas exposed to the weather, <mask> and criminal activity. It had a duty to provide essential services to those living in the apartments and to collect rent to defray the expenses while deciding what to do with the building. The testimony showed the plight of the tenants of the building. It is fortunate that no one was seriously injured or hurt in any way other than by the lack of heat and hot water and that the building stayed intact and remained viable and that the pipes did not freeze during this time. The building only needed the gas meter to be reinstalled to alleviate the cold and unhealthful conditions caused by no heat and no hot water."], "id": "c7f94ed4-f4f2-4e5e-8432-e7fd398283e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The insurance policy was in the standard form of the fire insurance policy under section 167 of Insurance Law with an addition of certain extended insurance as follows: \u201c Section 2 *271Perils Insured Against. 3. <mask> and malicious mischief being only wilful and malicious damage to or destruction of the described property and including damage to the building (s) covered hereunder caused by burglars.\u201d"], "id": "cfc99ef5-0d58-414b-9494-20b3b2bc6da6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Under Hertz\u2019 usual rental agreement, Hertz bears the risk of any loss of or damage to a rented vehicle due to causes other than collision or roll over (e.g., fire, <mask>, theft and storms), irrespective of the presence or absence of neglect by the renter. The renter, however, is liable to Hertz for any damage to the rental vehicle caused by collision or roll over, irrespective of fault. At the time the customer signs the rental agreement, he or she is given the option of electing or declining to obtain the renter\u2019s waiver of the right to look to the customer for collision damage by checking an appropriate box on the form. If the customer elects to accept the CDW, there is an additional charge. The effect of accepting CDW is to shift the risk of collision damage eo instante from the customer to Hertz."], "id": "c24b7cea-3dcd-4130-b3d4-b507f6ebd49d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["We find that substantial justice was not done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1807). The lease agreement between the parties stated that defendant, a self-service storage facility (see Lien Law \u00a7 182), is not a warehouse. It also contained several exculpatory clauses, including a clause stating that defendant is not responsible for any personal property stored by plaintiff. Under the facts presented, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, including section 7-204 thereof, which provides that a warehouseman is responsible for negligent damage to goods in his custody and sets forth the sole manner in which a warehouse owner may properly limit his liability, do not apply (see Lien Law \u00a7 182 [1] [a]). Moreover, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the damage to his camper, which he attributed to <mask>, was the result of defendant\u2019s willful or grossly negligent acts, in which case the exculpatory clauses would not be enforced (see Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v City of New York, 58 NY2d 377, 384-385 [1983]). Under these circumstances, there was no basis for the District Court\u2019s determination of liability. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the action is dismissed."], "id": "dd535380-8eec-4989-9387-dcc50711fe16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["*656Defendants' reliance on Penal Code section 415 is also misplaced. They argue Thomas violated Penal Code section 415 by \"start[ing] an unlawful fight in public\" and his actions constitute a defense to the <mask> charge. Thomas was not charged with such a crime and, in any event, comparative fault is not a defense in criminal proceedings. ( People v. Armitage , supra , 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 420, 239 Cal.Rptr. 515.) Accordingly, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610 [defense counsel is not required to make frivolous objections].)"], "id": "3cc1e979-d06e-4394-a6a4-5e13e336e1f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Indeed, father's criminal history spanned almost 30 years, with multiple arrests for possession of narcotics for sale, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of crack cocaine. Recent arrests include petty theft (2010); possession of a controlled substance and violation of probation (2010); second degree robbery, possession of a controlled substance, and trespass (2012); possession of a controlled substance for sale, possession of paraphernalia, and carrying dirk/dagger (2012); burglary, assault with great bodily injury, receiving known stolen property, and committing an offense while on bail (2012); unlawful driving/taking of a vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, and probation violation (2013); second degree burglary, <mask>, and battery (2014); possession of a controlled substance (2015); domestic violence (2015); assault with great bodily injury, possession of a switch blade, and resisting/obstructing police officer/EMT (2016); reckless driving, forgery of registration, driving without a valid license, and receiving stolen property (2016); and petty theft (2016)."], "id": "9c07397e-7c77-473c-8671-8f6031b065d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Similarly, in the instant case, the Village has failed to adequately substantiate its claim with respect to the adverse impact of 24-hour uses on neighboring properties. There is no evidence that overnight business operations per se have a greater impact on neighboring properties than such business operations during regular hours. Close examination of the record reveals that the complaints received by the Village prior to enactment of the Zoning Ordinance related primarily to trafile, garbage and parking problems arising at other locations in the *753Village, problems that were unrelated to the hours of operation. The Village expresses concern about the potential disruption of sleep caused by light and noise from all-night businesses in close proximity to residential property. However, as in Old Country Burgers, such concern is conjectural at this point, supported only by a consultant\u2019s report on 24-hour uses commissioned by the Village after instituting its 90-day moratorium. (Defendants\u2019 submission, exhibit 48.) The record is devoid of prior complaints related to noise or light, or to the hours of operation of any of the existing 24-hour businesses. (Compare, Matter of Sheer Pleasure Lingerie v Town of Colonie Planning Bd., 251 AD2d 859 [upholding the determination of the town planning board to cut back hours of operation of an adult lingerie modeling business (a nonconforming use), that had been inadvertently expanded through administrative error; the Third Department noted residents\u2019 complaints relating to an increase in crime, <mask> and other disturbances such as outdoor urination and motor vehicle traffic, that were based on the residents\u2019 actual experiences during the one-year period in which the hours were extended].)"], "id": "a1ce990f-9d24-45d5-a1e1-4a52d75a6804", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The account presents the question of the trustees\u2019 power in relation to property taken over in foreclosure of a mortgage. Here the trustees took over in foreclosure a one-story building and found themselves confronted with the necessity of protecting a building already substantially injured by <mask>. They were confronted with the need to invest substantial additional principal sums to rehabilitate the building or to find a purchaser who was willing to take it in its then condition. They pursued the latter course and the purchaser gave back a purchase-money mortgage for the entire purchase price and after taking possession rehabilitated the building and put it into good order and condition. It is now operating satisfactorily and the trustees are obtaining income on the purchase-money mortgage. The purchase-money mortgage no doubt exceeds the limit permissible to these trustees if they were making a new mortgage loan on the same property. The special guardian objects to the transaction on that ground. There is presented, therefore, the question whether the limits upon trustees in respect of new mortgage investments are applicable to the acts of trustees in .disposing of property which they are forced to take over in the effort to protect an original mortgage investment lawfully made."], "id": "d3e4308b-4f50-4b35-8e7d-7f1a8bbecbba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Trial was commenced and the thrust of plaintiff\u2019s case was *630that as a result of the gross negligence on the part of Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) in causing the blackout, certain conditions were created in the community which led to the looting and <mask> of plaintiffs supermarket. In support of such position plaintiff introduced expert testimony tending to show that in a lower socioeconomic area such as was claimed to be here involved, a blackout such as occurred on July 13, 1977 would have certain adverse effects on the behavior of the people in that community. The expert testified that because of the absence of street lights, traffic lights, building lights, and the general sense of confusion and disorder that followed, the looting, vandalism and other antisocial activities occurred."], "id": "ff4b6dda-8b7d-4182-a5f4-9960194b6703", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecutor then questioned Turner about his earlier arrest. Turner denied that he had possessed a box of identical ammunition on that occasion or that he had ever possessed such ammunition. In rebuttal, another San *408Pablo police officer testified that he had previously arrested Turner for <mask>. Turner had had a different bag with him at the time, and when the officer conducted an inventory search of it approximately 30 minutes after the arrest, he discovered a 50-round box of Fiocchi .38 caliber Super-Auto ammunition inside."], "id": "c6ab9472-c348-4e0b-b4b1-ed701f0114ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Mr. Cohen then went on in his affidavit: \u201c (2) among the four proposals that were received, the first and second low bids did not state any bid prices for Item 76 M \u2014 Maintenance and Protection of Traffic, but the next two bids did contain a bid price for this item, and, an award of the contract to Bielec could well generate a lawsuit by the third bidder whose proposal was complete in all respects including Item 76 M. The conferees regarded No. 3 of the bidders as constituting a potential and valid threat to an award to Bielec, whose bid could be challenged by the third bidder on the grounds that, aside from the said \u2018 atmosphere of confusion the bid was incomplete and certainly not in conformance with the long established standards of the New York State Department of Public Works with respect to similar situations. The conferees also considered the situation with regard to the buildings which are to be demolished for the highway construction project and learned from reports from the Syracuse district office of the Department that the uncommon <mask> had already reduced the value of salvageable material from the buildings, the point being that even if an award were to be made to Bielec after the decision by Justice Bruhn, Bielec could well claim that conditions at the site had changed which would permit him to sue the State in the Court of Claims.\u201d"], "id": "1b442e5a-850b-4264-b8a4-c5b4ffb83523", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["It is conceded by both parties that the terms \"vacant\u201d and \"unoccupied\u201d are not generally considered synonymous, since \"vacant\u201d means without inanimate objects, while \"unoccupied\u201d refers to the absence of animate occupants. Unlike most insurance policies, which refer to both of the above terms, the contract between these parties only excludes from coverage any loss occasioned by <mask> \"if the described building(s) had been vacant beyond a period of 30 consecutive days immediately preceding the loss\u201d (emphasis supplied). Thus the evidence of occupancy by the plaintiff and her family recited in the agreed facts has no bearing on the applicability of the exclusion clause."], "id": "99b637a6-e751-41ad-88c9-96176a037058", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In January 2017, Nicole was arrested for <mask> after she broke Stephen's bedroom window during an argument. Nicole and Stephen denied they were in a relationship. Stephen said he was willing to care for M.F. but first needed to find suitable housing and childcare. Stephen had health issues, including heart problems, leg pain, severe asthma, and high blood pressure. At times, he had difficulty walking even short distances. The Agency detained M.F. in the home of the paternal grandmother (caregiver) of one of his half siblings."], "id": "7dcf24a2-9207-4b6e-beaf-cb5222f31198", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court found a 40-year-to-life term was not a life without possibility of parole sentence nor was it a \"de facto\" life sentence (in light of defendant's life expectancy of 76 years, as well as the statutory \"juvenile parole hearing\"). The court believed it had the discretion to impose a lesser sentence. The court stated it had \"considered the defendant's youth, the attend[ant *182] circumstances here, the nature of the crime, [and] the juvenile's lesser culpability in this case because he's an aider and abettor as opposed to a perpetrator.\" The court further stated that it had considered the factors outlined in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 ( Miller ) regarding a \"juvenile's lesser culpability[,] seemingly a concept that includes more than simply age,\" \"a juvenile's greater capacity for change,\" and \"a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill [having] a twice diminished moral culpability\" \"when compared with an adult murderer.\" The court noted defendant's record of multiple prior juvenile adjudications starting when he was 13 years old, including weapons possessions, battery, felony burglary, <mask>, possession of stolen property, and a gang-related assault with a deadly weapon. The court gave defendant \"the benefit of the doubt\" that he was trying to remove his gang tattoos \"because he was trying to get out of the gang lifestyle.\" The court looked \"at the big picture,\" in which a group of young people had hunted down another gang and all of them had arrived \"for purposes of inflicting violence, even though some of them [were] only there for back up,\" in what was basically \"an *753ambush [when] they called the [rivals] out of the pool hall.\" The court sentenced defendant to a principal aggregate term of 40 years to life for second degree murder with a vicarious gun enhancement."], "id": "62f58d10-083c-4e40-b507-055269053123", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant acknowledged in his written opposition in the trial court to the prosecution's section 1291 motion that Chatman was exposed to criminal liability for: \"(1) a violation of Sacramento probation (2) a possible assault and <mask> charge arising from the incident involving [defendant], and (3) charges arising from a visit to [defendant]'s residence the day following the incident charged in this case.\""], "id": "20b39ae3-fed3-459c-9813-180d5efa9822", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cAn appraisal shall determine the actual cash value, the replacement cost, the extent of the loss or damage and the amount of the loss or damage which shall be determined as specified in the policy and shall proceed pursuant to the terms of the applicable appraisal clause of the insurance policy and not as an arbitration. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an appraisal shall not determine whether the policy actually provides coverage for any portion of the claimed loss or damage.\u201d (Insurance Law \u00a7 3408 [c].) Respondent asserts that it has paid petitioner for all covered losses and that petitioner is seeking payment for replacement of the following various components of his home that did not sustain direct physical damage in the <mask> incident: a fireplace, siding for the entire garage, a bathroom and portions of the plumbing and electrical systems. Respondent characterizes its objections as constituting issues regarding the scope of coverage that may not be determined in an appraisal."], "id": "ed7566f5-8aec-4f08-ab83-83265380622e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["McDONALD, J. Connecticut\u2019s insurance law provides that, \u2018\u2018[w]hen a covered loss for real property requires the replacement of an item or items and the replacement item or items do not match adjacent items in quality, color or size, the insurer shall replace all such items with material of like kind and quality so as to conform to a reasonably uniform appearance.\u2019\u2019 General Statutes \u00a7 38a-316e (a) (matching statute). The principal issue in this case is whether a dispute as to the extent of an insurer\u2019s replacement obligation under the matching statute is a question properly relegated to the appraisal arbitral process or a question of coverage to be resolved by the court in the first instance before appraisal may proceed. The defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Com- pany, appeals from the trial court\u2019s judgment granting the application of the plaintiff, Karl Klass, to compel appraisal with regard to such a dispute. We affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. In 2018, the plaintiff contacted his insurer, the defendant, to report damage to the roof of his home. The defendant sent a representative to examine the loss, who\u2014consistent with the plaintiff\u2019s observation\u2014noticed a few shingles missing from the dwelling portion of the rear slope of the roof. The repre- sentative concluded that the missing shingles were con- sistent with wind damage, a covered loss under the homeowners policy of the plaintiff. The defendant accept- ed coverage and issued an estimate to replace the rear slopes of both the dwelling roof and the attached garage roof. The plaintiff\u2019s contractor inspected the roof and provided an estimate that contemplated replacement of the plaintiff\u2019s entire roof, dwelling and attached garage, at nearly double the cost of the defendant\u2019s estimate. As a result of the parties\u2019 different repair estimates, the plaintiff notified the defendant that he was demand- ing appraisal under his homeowners policy. The policy provides that a dispute as to \u2018\u2018amount of loss\u2019\u2019 is to be resolved by a panel comprised of a disinterested appraiser selected by each party and an umpire selected by those appraisers, effectively an arbitration panel.1 See Covenant Ins. Co. v. Banks, 177 Conn. 273, 279\u201380, 413 A.2d 862 (1979) (holding that appraisal clause in insurance policy constituted \u2018\u2018 \u2018written agreement to arbitrate\u2019 \u2019\u2019 and, thus, was governed by arbitration stat- utes). In a written reply, the defendant took the position that the plaintiff was not entitled to invoke the appraisal process in the absence of a \u2018\u2018competing\u2019\u2019 estimate (i.e., one that addressed the claim for which the defendant had accepted coverage). The defendant stated that any dispute regarding the matching of the front and rear roof slopes was a question of coverage rather than an issue for appraisal. Nevertheless, citing its interest in amicably resolving the dispute, the defendant agreed to appoint an appraiser to investigate the loss while reserving its right to contest the appraisal panel\u2019s author- ity to decide an issue of coverage. The defendant\u2019s appraiser thereafter inspected the plaintiff\u2019s roof and issued a report concluding that, \u2018\u2018 \u2018given the roof configuration, it is reasonable to con- clude that the shingles along the [east facing] (rear) slopes and ridge caps of the residence and garage can be replaced such that a reasonable uniform appearance of the roof covering is maintained.\u2019 \u2019\u2019 The defendant cited these conclusions in a letter it thereafter sent to the plaintiff denying \u2018\u2018coverage\u2019\u2019 for the front slopes of the plaintiff\u2019s roof. The defendant noted that its adjust- ment of the claim\u2014providing for the replacement of the entire rear slopes of both the dwelling and garage roofs\u2014exceeded the requirements of the matching stat- ute. In light of its denial of \u2018\u2018coverage\u2019\u2019 for the front roof slopes, it contended that there was no valuation issue remaining for the appraisal process. The plaintiff subsequently filed an application to com- pel appraisal in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 38a-307 and 52-410, casting the dispute between the parties as one concerning the amount of loss under the subject policy. The defendant filed an objection to the application, characterizing the dispute as one involving coverage, which, as a purely legal issue, must be resolved by the courts before an appraisal can proceed. In support of that proposition, the defendant cited a Second Circuit case, Milligan v. CCC Informa- tion Services Inc., 920 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2019). The plaintiff then filed a motion requesting that the trial court order that any purported coverage dispute does not preclude the parties from moving forward with an appraisal, citing Giulietti v. Connecticut Ins. Place- ment Facility, 205 Conn. 424, 534 A.2d 213 (1987), as support. The trial court initially issued a summary decision denying the plaintiff\u2019s application to compel appraisal, citing Milligan for the proposition that \u2018\u2018the issue of coverage [must] be decided before the court makes a determination whether an appraisal is required.\u2019\u2019 The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and reconsider, contending that the trial court had overlooked control- ling precedent\u2014namely, this court\u2019s decision in Giu- lietti\u2014and had misapprehended Milligan. The defen- dant objected to the plaintiff\u2019s motion, arguing that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there was some decision or principle of law that had been overlooked that would have controlling effect on the case. The trial court granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to reargue and reconsider, and, following supplemental briefing, issued an order directing the parties to proceed to appraisal. In reaching its decision, the trial court explained that it had misapprehended Milligan and con- cluded that Milligan simply confirms that appraisers cannot make coverage determinations. In light of that conclusion, the court rendered judgment granting the plaintiff\u2019s application to compel appraisal. The defen- dant appealed from the trial court\u2019s judgment to the Appellate Court, and we thereafter transferred the appeal to this court. See General Statutes \u00a7 51-199 (c) and Practice Book \u00a7 65-1. The defendant raises three claims on appeal. First, it claims that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to reargue and reconsider following its initial denial of the plaintiff\u2019s application to compel appraisal. Second, it contends that the dispute between the parties is ultimately a coverage dispute, and, thus, it was improper for the trial court to compel appraisal before the legal issue regarding the coverage dispute was resolved by the court. Finally, to resolve the pur- ported coverage dispute, the defendant asks this court to adopt an interpretation of the matching statute that would limit the scope of replacement to, at most, the rear slopes of the plaintiff\u2019s roof. We conclude that the trial court properly granted the plaintiff\u2019s application to compel appraisal. Because that conclusion rests in large part on our determination that the dispute between the parties is an appraisable dis- pute not involving coverage, we need not address the defendant\u2019s claims relating to resolution of coverage disputes. I The defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court improp- erly granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to reargue and recon- sider merits little discussion. We review the adjudica- tion of a motion to reargue and reconsider for an abuse of discretion; see Weiss v. Smulders, 313 Conn. 227, 261, 96 A.3d 1175 (2014); which means that \u2018\u2018every rea- sonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court\u2019s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or [when] injustice appears to have been done.\u2019\u2019 (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co., 304 Conn. 679, 698, 41 A.3d 1013 (2012). \u2018\u2018[T]he purpose of a reargument is . . . to demon- strate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used to address [alleged inconsistencies in the trial court\u2019s memorandum of decision as well as] claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have a second bite of the apple [or to present additional cases or briefs which could have been presented at the time of the original argu- ment] . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hud- son Valley Bank v. Kissel, 303 Conn. 614, 624, 35 A.3d 260 (2012); see Rider v. Rider, 200 Conn. App. 466, 486 n.14, 239 A.3d 357 (2020). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff\u2019s motion to reargue and reconsider. In its initial decision denying the plaintiff\u2019s application to compel appraisal, the trial court cited the Second Cir- cuit\u2019s decision in Milligan for the proposition that cov- erage determinations must precede appraisal; Milligan v. CCC Information Services, Inc., supra, 920 F.3d 152; without responding to the plaintiff\u2019s contention that this court stated a different rule in Giulietti and that Milligan should not be interpreted to conflict with Giu- lietti. The trial court\u2019s decision to grant reconsideration implies that it agreed with the plaintiff that it had over- looked Giulietti and that its prior order was in error. \u2018\u2018If a court believes that it has made a mistake, there is little reason, in the absence of compelling circum- stances to the contrary, to stick slavishly to a mistake.\u2019\u2019 Beeman v. Stratford, 157 Conn. App. 528, 540, 116 A.3d 855 (2015). II We therefore consider the defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff\u2019s application to compel appraisal. The defendant makes several argu- ments regarding the propriety of this decision, all of which rest on the premise that the dispute between the parties is one pertaining to the legal question of cover- age.2 Although not expressly stated, we interpret the trial court\u2019s summary order as an implicit rejection of that premise. In its final decision, the trial court cited Milligan as holding \u2018\u2018that appraisers cannot make cov- erage determinations [or decide] questions of law.\u2019\u20193 The only dispute on which the plaintiff sought appraisal was the extent of the defendant\u2019s replacement obliga- tion pursuant to the matching statute. The trial court thus would not have ordered the parties to proceed to appraisal unless it viewed the dispute as a factual determination that did not pertain to coverage. There- fore, the threshold, and ultimately dispositive, issue before us is whether a dispute as to the scope of an insurer\u2019s replacement obligation under the matching statute is a question of coverage to be resolved by the courts or a question of the amount of loss to be resolved by the appraisal panel. We conclude that it is the latter. With regard to the standard of review, although the plaintiff is correct that whether the insurance policy manifests the parties\u2019 intent to arbitrate a matter is generally a question of fact subject to review for clear error; see A. Dubreuil & Sons, Inc. v. Lisbon, 215 Conn. 604, 608\u2013609, 577 A.2d 709 (1990); the legal obligation at issue in the present case is one engrafted by operation of law as a result of the legislature\u2019s enactment of the matching statute. See Garcia v. Bridgeport, 306 Conn. 340, 351, 51 A.3d 1089 (2012). The relevant question in this case, therefore, is whether the legislature consid- ered determinations like the one before us as a question relating to the amount of loss to be determined in the appraisal process or, alternatively, by a court when determining an insurer\u2019s coverage responsibilities. This is a question of law subject to plenary review. See, e.g., Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Ins., 315 Conn. 196, 209, 105. A.3d 210 (2014); Nelson v. State, 99 Conn. App. 808, 813, 916 A.2d 74 (2007). Our analysis begins with the statutory text. See Gen- eral Statutes \u00a7 1-2z (permitting court to consider extra- textual sources only when statutory text is ambiguous or construction yields absurd or unworkable result). The matching statute provides in relevant part: \u2018\u2018When a covered loss for real property requires the replace- ment of an item or items and the replacement item or items do not match adjacent items in quality, color or size, the insurer shall replace all such items with mate- rial of like kind and quality so as to conform to a reason- ably uniform appearance. . . .\u2019\u2019 General Statutes \u00a7 38a- 316e (a). Plainly, the text of the statute does not resolve the dispute before us. The statute does not explicitly indicate whether the resolution of matching disputes are to be decided by the courts in the first instance or by an appraisal panel; nor does it expressly characterize the scope of an insurer\u2019s replacement obligation as a question of coverage or one relating to amount of loss. By making a \u2018\u2018covered loss\u2019\u2019 the precondition to an insurer\u2019s replacement obligation, however, the statute appears to suggest that the replacement obligation is of a different nature than the coverage obligation. More- over, the guideposts for the making of such decisions\u2014 \u2018\u2018adjacent\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018reasonably uniform appearance\u2019\u2019\u2014are strongly indicative of factual judgments based on visual inspection rather than legal determinations. General Statutes \u00a7 38a-316e (a); see Welles v. East Windsor, 185 Conn. 556, 560, 441 A.2d 174 (1981) (stating that \u2018\u2018[t]he term \u2018adjacent\u2019 has no fixed meaning but must, instead, be interpreted in light of the relevant surrounding cir- cumstances\u2019\u2019 and is \u2018\u2018[n]ecessarily relative\u2019\u2019); Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) p. 1290 (defin- ing \u2018\u2018uniform\u2019\u2019 as \u2018\u2018presenting an unvaried appearance of surface, pattern, or color\u2019\u2019). Because the text of the statute does not unambigu- ously answer the question before us, we look to extra- textual sources for guidance. See, e.g., Mayer v. His- toric District Commission, 325 Conn. 765, 775, 160 A.3d 333 (2017) (\u2018\u2018[w]hen a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and [common-law] principles governing the same gen- eral subject matter\u2019\u2019 (internal quotation marks omit- ted)). We begin with the legislative history of the match- ing statute, which is instructive in two respects. First, it reflects that the legislature intended to codify the existing insurance industry practice. See 56 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 2013 Sess., pp. 2402\u20132403, remarks of Representa- tive Robert W. Megna. Apparently, some insurers had not been following industry practice and were replacing only damaged portions of covered property without regard to whether the property was restored to a compa- rable preloss condition. See id., p. 2403, remarks of Representative Megna; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Insurance and Real Estate, Pt. 4, 2013 Sess., pp. 1115, 1119, remarks of Phil Flaker, public insurance adjuster. Second, that history reveals that the legislature contemplated that matching would be a \u2018\u2018subjective\u2019\u2019 determination made on a case-by-case basis; 56 H.R. Proc., supra, pp. 2418\u201319, remarks of Representative Megna; with disputes resolved through the appraisal process. Representative Megna, the primary sponsor of the bill, explained that, if the insured and insurer dis- agree over the necessary scope of replacement, \u2018\u2018they have a process in most policies called the appraisal process. They can\u2014they can start that process going if they contest it.\u2019\u20194 (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 2422. The legislative history is devoid of any contrary indication that the legislature viewed the extent of an insurer\u2019s replacement obligation as a coverage issue or disputes as to matching as matters to be resolved by courts in the first instance. The conclusion supported by the text of the statute and by its legislative history is consistent with case law from other jurisdictions. Other courts that have addressed this issue\u2014whether applying their version of a matching statute or recognizing industry practice\u2014 have treated similar disputes as within the purview of appraisal. For instance, in In re Pottenburgh v. Dryden Mutual Ins. Co., 55 Misc. 3d 775, 48 N.Y.S.3d 885 (2017), following a <mask> incident that gave rise to a cov- ered loss under the homeowners policy of the insured, the insurer submitted an estimate for replacement of the siding on the garage wall that had been vandalized, while the insured submitted an estimate for replace- ment of the siding on all of the garage walls. Id., 776\u201377. The insured\u2019s estimate for full replacement was based on the lack of availability of siding for installation on the vandalized wall that would match the faded color of the undamaged siding on the remaining walls. Id., 777. The insurer refused to participate in the appraisal process on the ground that the dispute was one regard- ing the scope of coverage, i.e., the insured sought pay- ment for components of the home that were not \u2018\u2018cov- ered\u2019\u2019 because they did not sustain direct physical damage from the vandalism incident. Id. The trial court concluded that the disagreement between parties was an appraisable dispute. The court noted that the insurer had not denied liability for damages sustained by the vandalism incident. Id., 778. Rather, \u2018\u2018the basis for [the insurer\u2019s] objections to an appraisal is limited to the extent of work required to repair the damage caused by the vandalism incident. Such disputes are factual questions that fall squarely within the scope of the poli- cy\u2019s appraisal clause . . . .\u2019\u2019 (Citations omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The Supreme Court of Minnesota similarly character- ized the extent of the insurer\u2019s replacement obligation to ensure matching \u2018\u2018as mere incidents to a determina- tion of the amount of loss or damage, [which] are appro- priate to resolve in an appraisal in order to ascertain the amount of loss.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cedar Bluff Townhome Condominium Assn., Inc. v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 857 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. 2014); see id. (reviewing appraisal panel\u2019s determination as to whether insurer was obligated to replace siding on only sides of building damaged by hail, which was covered loss under policy, or on all sides to ensure matching); see also Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Summit Park Townhome Assn., 100 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1104 (D. Colo. 2015) (holding that, while apprais- ers cannot resolve parties\u2019 legal issues, they can make factual conclusions, such as \u2018\u2018address[ing] the cost of replacing undamaged property to achieve matching\u2019\u2019); State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. 2009) (\u2018\u2018Sometimes it may be unreasonable or even impossible to repair one part of a roof without replacing the whole. The policy provides that [the insurer] will pay reasonable and necessary costs to \u2018repair or replace\u2019 damaged property, and repair or replacement is an \u2018amount of loss\u2019 question for the appraisers.\u2019\u2019 (Footnote omitted.)); Edelman v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, Massachusetts Supe- rior Court, Docket No. 1784CV02471 (May 7, 2019) (\u2018\u2018to the extent the [insurer] disputes the amount of matching loss . . . a reference proceeding [namely, appraisal] may be appropriate\u2019\u2019). The defendant cites no case law adopting a contrary view.5 In this regard, we observe that the defendant\u2019s own conduct in this case was consistent with insurance industry practice and supports the propriety of having appraisers decide the extent of the insurer\u2019s replace- ment obligation to ensure matching of adjacent items. The defendant\u2019s own appraiser reached a conclusion on the very issue that the defendant claims is a legal question that is improper for resolution by appraisers. The report by the defendant\u2019s appraiser stated that the purpose of his examination of the plaintiff\u2019s property was to \u2018\u2018determine the scope of damage to the roof . . . .\u2019\u2019 He noted that, on the basis of his examination, both sides of the roof presumably were not visible from the ground at the same time and, in light of that fact, reached a conclusion that replacement of only the dam- aged rear sides of the roofs and the roof ridges \u2018\u2018would [not] compromise the uniform appearance of the roof covering.\u2019\u2019 The defendant\u2019s posture in this case also undermines its position that the present dispute raises a question of law. The defendant argued in its trial brief that the parties\u2019 dispute turned on the judicial construction of \u2018\u2018 \u2018reasonable uniform appearance\u2019 \u2019\u2019 but then argued in its appellate brief that the dispute turns on construction of \u2018\u2018 \u2018adjacent.\u2019 \u2019\u2019 None of the defendant\u2019s briefs, however, offered a definition for either term. At oral argument before this court, the defendant proffered a definition of \u2018\u2018adjacent,\u2019\u2019 but one suited to resolution of the present case, not a universally applicable definition. The defendant\u2019s reliance on Kamansky v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hart- ford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (April 30, 2019) (68 Conn. L. Rptr. 449), to support its position is misplaced. The court in Kamansky was faced with a question of pure statutory construction, presented in a declaratory judgment action, as to whether an insurer\u2019s obligation to replace \u2018\u2018all such items\u2019\u2019 was limited to \u2018\u2018adjacent\u2019\u2019 items or extended to all items of the same kind as the damaged item, adjacent or not, so as to create a reasonably uniform appearance.6 Id. This question could be\u2014and ultimately was\u2014resolved without refer- ence to specific facts, and the court\u2019s construction applied universally. It appears to us that, at bottom, the defendant\u2019s under- lying concern is that \u00a7 38a-316e (a) employs terms that afford too much discretion to decide what is \u2018\u2018adjacent\u2019\u2019 and what is necessary to create a \u2018\u2018reasonably uniform appearance.\u2019\u2019 In response to that concern, we note that the appraisal panel\u2019s umpire, in exercising their discre- tion to make the matching determination in this case, ultimately may agree with the defendant\u2019s appraiser that the defendant\u2019s obligation extends only to the rear sides of the roofs and the roof ridges. Alternatively, the umpire may conclude that the defendant is required to repair the plaintiff\u2019s entire roof. Regardless, it seems to us that the necessarily fact intensive, case-by-case inquiry inherent in the task of matching requires that appraisers be afforded discretion in making matching determinations. We further note that, if the statutory terms are too elastic, the defendant\u2019s recourse is with the legislature. See, e.g., Neighborhood Assn., Inc. v. Limberger, 321 Conn. 29, 45, 136 A.3d 581 (2016) (\u2018\u2018[t]o the extent that the plaintiff\u2019s concerns arise from the expansive definitions in the act, its recourse lies with the legislature\u2019\u2019). We conclude that, when an insurer concedes the existence of a covered peril to an insured\u2019s premises, issues concerning the extent of the insurer\u2019s obligation to replace adjacent, undamaged items to achieve a rea- sonably uniform appearance are a component of the \u2018\u2018amount of loss\u2019\u2019 and are, therefore, part of the appraisal process. Here, the defendant concedes that the damage to the plaintiff\u2019s roof resulting from wind damage was a covered loss under the homeowners policy of the plaintiff. The parties\u2019 disagreement regarding how many shingles need to be replaced\u2014whether it be only the missing shingles, the rear slopes of the garage and dwelling roofs, or the entire roof\u2014in order to make the plaintiff whole is a factual dispute that falls within the scope of the insurance policy\u2019s appraisal clause. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. * January 11, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. The appraisal clause in the defendant\u2019s policy essentially mirrors the one in the standard form set forth in General Statutes \u00a7 38a-307. For example, the defendant argues that, if we conclude that the appraisal panel has the authority to decide this coverage dispute, the courts should review the decision de novo, and that this court should resolve this coverage dispute by interpreting the statutory terms \u2018\u2018adjacent items\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018reasonable uniform appearance\u2019\u2019 in \u00a7 38a-316e (a) to determine its replacement obliga- tion to the plaintiff under the matching statute. The parties agreed, and the law is well settled, that\u2014in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary\u2014coverage is a legal question for the courts. See, e.g., Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 190, 203 (2d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 828 So. 2d 1021, 1025\u201326 (Fla. 2002); Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 2012); Clark v. Sputniks, LLC, 368 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tenn. 2012); Factory Mutual Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 288 Wis. 2d 730, 736, 709 N.W.2d 82 (App. 2005). Representative Megna contemplated a situation factually similar to the one before us: \u2018\u2018[I]f a\u2014a claim is [made] today, you could have an insurance company representative come out and say, you know, I\u2019m just going to replace one piece of siding, I don\u2019t care that the other siding is [twenty] years old and faded by the sun. They could actually make that argument now. It\u2019s not common practice so they can do that. If they do and the homeowner or the business owner wants to contest it, they have a process in most policies called the appraisal process. They can\u2014they can start that process going if they contest it.\u2019\u2019 56 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 2422. The National Association of Public Insurance Adjusters filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff, in which it confirmed that matching determinations have been routinely performed as a part of the appraisal process. The defendant cites cases holding that questions of causation (i.e., how much of the damage to the affected property was caused by a covered event) present an issue of coverage. We view this determination to be an entirely distinct question from the one raised in the present case. Moreover, there is a split of authority on the question of whether causation is a matter of coverage; compare Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 2012) (holding that appraiser\u2019s evaluation of \u2018\u2018amount of loss\u2019\u2019 requires con- sideration of causation), with Rogers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 984 So. 2d 382, 391\u201392 (Ala. 2007) (limiting appraiser\u2019s duty to determining monetary value of property damage and, accordingly, deciding that apprais- ers cannot make determinations as to causation); and the present case does not provide us with the occasion to weigh in on that debate. We note that, although we rely on one case that decided the causation question, State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, supra, 290 S.W.3d 891, we rely on it only for the Texas Supreme Court\u2019s acknowledgment that the determination of whether replacement must extend beyond the damaged items is an amount of loss question for appraisers. The defendant misconstrues the trial court\u2019s decision in Kamansky as concluding that the undamaged sides of the insured\u2019s house were not \u2018\u2018adja- cent\u2019\u2019 to the damaged side. In Kamansky, the insured conceded that the undamaged garage sides were not \u2018\u2018adjacent\u2019\u2019 to the damaged side. Kaman- sky v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co, supra, 68 Conn. L. Rptr. 451. Therefore, the issue of whether nondamaged sides were \u2018\u2018adjacent\u2019\u2019 to the damaged garage siding was not before the court."], "id": "193382ae-63e4-4073-8486-b70d96cff04d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff Mary C. Giamboi when she was struck by a bottle thrown by an unknown person from the elevator station of the Bay Parkway B Train platform on June 1, 1982. Plaintiffs contend that the platform station is not fully enclosed, has open areas which permit objects to be thrown or to fall from said platform, *34and as such constitutes a dangerous condition conducive to <mask> and criminal activity. Plaintiffs cite several newspaper articles reciting similar incidents in the same vicinity. Plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the Transit Authority is liable, is grounded on the theory that they failed to take any measures to enclose the platform or otherwise rectify the dangerous condition in spite of their awareness of repeated acts of vandalism in the area."], "id": "827eebac-bada-4c33-9a54-8fbe25dedb28", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant then cites instances of past <mask> in order to negate a finding of exclusive control. \u201cThe exclusiveness of control which is required to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not require the positive exclusion of all other possible agencies other than defendant, as the cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\u201d (Scimeca v New York City Tr. Auth., supra, p 597.)"], "id": "97fbd6a5-edda-46ba-85c7-1c069b9dc8f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, defendant contends his conviction on count 2 must be reversed because his counsel's concession at the beginning of closing argument that defendant was *764guilty of this <mask> charge was tantamount to a guilty plea *491on that count. In support of this contention, defendant relies almost exclusively on People v. Lopez (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 758, 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 465 ( Lopez I ). Following briefing in the instant case, the court vacated Lopez I , after granting the respondent's petition for rehearing and after receiving additional briefing on the issue and found on \"reexamination of this issue ... defense counsel's statements during argument were not tantamount to a guilty plea.\" (See People v. Lopez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 55, 58, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 451 ( Lopez II )."], "id": "c561cece-8e1f-4ed0-b841-2134bb42bb42", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["We note the Legislature did not expressly provide that a violation of *566Commercial Code section 9609 is a defense to a criminal charge of <mask> under Penal Code section 594. In the absence of express statutory language, we find no basis to read in such a defense and defendants cite no authority for doing so. (See People v. Berry (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 788, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 [finding civil statute inapplicable to criminal case because \"nothing in th[e] civil statute suggest[ed] that it creates a defense in a criminal action\"].) We further note the remedies for a violation of Commercial Code section 9609 are delineated in Commercial Code section 9625. Defendants' conduct to retrieve the car was conspicuously not one of the lawful remedies listed in the Commercial Code."], "id": "be8810fc-4509-4675-aa9d-de97d0ea7e87", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["3. With respect to claimant\u2019s items for cost to cure and net severance damage, totaling $2,100, the court finds that the $1,000 amount claimed to provide for temporary access to the southern portion and for a gate and fencing should be awarded to the claimant. (As to justification for allowing for the cost of the culvert and fill for such temporary access during construction, see O\u2019Brien v. New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R. R. Co. [148 App. Div. 733, 738]; Morton v. State of New York [8 A D 2d 49, 53, app. dsmd. 6 N Y 2d 993]; J. Hughes Corp. v. State of New York [199 Misc. 979, 980]; Nichols, Eminent Domain [3d Ed., vol. 2, \u00a7 6.4442, subd. [2] and vol. 4, \u00a7 14.24]; and as to justification for allowing for the cost of the gate and fencing, see New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Belard Props. [2 A D 2d 791], and Mitchell v. State of New York [20 Misc 2d 374, 379].) This is because the court finds that during the course of construction claimant was unable, without installing the culvert and fill, to utilize the southern portion and because the gate and fencing became necessary by virtue of the exposure to theft and <mask> of personal property and equipment stored on the southern portion."], "id": "b5cee088-0f98-4ad4-bd4b-f5eaeed8a17c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant and codefendant Donald J. Aitken were charged in a joint 21-count indictment with crimes stemming from their alleged involvement in multiple acts of <mask>, theft, burglary and arson in Delaware County in 2009, culminating in the destruction of a church by fire. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree (two counts), burglary in the third degree (three counts), arson in the third degree (four counts), arson in the fourth degree, arson in the fifth degree, attempted arson in the fifth degree, criminal *1085mischief in the third degree (three counts), reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal trespass in the second degree, trespass and petit larceny.1 Supreme Court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 23 to 69 years, which was later reduced pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 70.30 to an aggregate term of 12 to 20 years. The court further ordered defendant to pay restitution in the aggregate amount of $814,771.48. Defendant appeals."], "id": "40b3a9e5-a25e-4887-8734-5a4f77669fe8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Further, \" '[i]n the usual case, where counsel's trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel's acts or omissions.' \" ( People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1051, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 354 P.3d 90.) The record reveals at least one tactical reason for not providing additional guidance to the jury. The jury's question indicated the jury was confused as to which items formed the basis for the <mask> charge. By leaving the jury to its own devices based on the existing instructions, defendants' counsel could have believed he was increasing defendants' chance of an acquittal or hung jury because the question suggested there was a disagreement on what items, if any, the prosecution proved were vandalized. Thus, the record on this appeal does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel."], "id": "4ffbcc60-f244-4a8e-954e-7061f380f076", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["(5) Policy of hazard insurance as defendant may request issued by companies satisfactory to the defendant, in addition to a fire insurance policy including extended coverage and <mask> and malicious mischief coverage, boiler and public liability insurance, rental and business interruption insurance, each having at least one year unexpired term, containing terms, provisions and conditions, satisfactory to the defendant and their counsel as to form and substance and amount."], "id": "4f5d1bd8-e900-4817-a381-d6a6883f7d82", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["When an inventory search is conducted based on a decision to impound, the impoundment itself must be warranted. \"Whether 'impoundment is warranted under this community caretaking doctrine depends on the location of the vehicle and the police officers' duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers or being a target for <mask> or theft.' \" (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 162 ; accord, People v. Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 787-789, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 48.) Here, Officer Ambrose did not testify as to whether the car was located in a high crime area, illegally parked or otherwise posed a hazard to motorists or pedestrians. Nor did he indicate whether the department's policy was to impound vehicles regardless of where they were located or how they were parked. This raises further questions about whether the prosecution met its burden of proof to establish that the decision to impound, if any, and an inventory search resulting from impoundment, were called for by department policy and constitutionally reasonable."], "id": "c9f3c97f-75fb-45c7-985f-db5cb07114de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff Mary C. Giamboi when she was struck by a bottle thrown by an unknown person from the elevator station of the Bay Parkway B Train platform on June 1, 1982. Plaintiffs contend that the platform station is not fully enclosed, has open areas which permit objects to be thrown or to fall from said platform, *34and as such constitutes a dangerous condition conducive to <mask> and criminal activity. Plaintiffs cite several newspaper articles reciting similar incidents in the same vicinity. Plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the Transit Authority is liable, is grounded on the theory that they failed to take any measures to enclose the platform or otherwise rectify the dangerous condition in spite of their awareness of repeated acts of vandalism in the area."], "id": "84da1b02-a6a4-4a57-bc3d-2abe81b54901", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the northern portion, as it faced upon new Stewart Avenue, the court views the matter differently. Access during construction of Stewart Avenue was still possible by way of the frontage on Union Avenue and, therefore, no award should be made for culverts and fill to provide temporary access off new Stewart Avenue during construction. However, the northern portion, as it faced on new Stewart Avenue, was mqde *1021open to theft and <mask> and, accordingly, the court finds an allowance for a gate and fencing to be appropriate and, accordingly, awards $500 of the $1,000 claimed for the northern portion."], "id": "c8633b9c-2e60-444e-a31d-72dcc8b9b618", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The court finds that the defendant violated its duty to provide reasonable supervision to guard against a recurrence of <mask> and the wrongful conduct of others under all the circumstances of the case. Inadequate security is no security. The lack of due care in this case was a substantial factor in bringing about the incident which caused damages to plaintiffs\u2019 property on May 13, 1957."], "id": "021ab093-01e4-4513-9fbb-8ba94965be67", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In Palazzo v Katz Parking Systems (64 Misc 2d 720), the plaintiff\u2019s auto was vandalized while parked in defendant\u2019s parking garage, where plaintiff himself parked the car and took his keys. The court stated that to recover, the plaintiff must show a bailment, and bailment will depend on whether possession was delivered. That question will in turn depend on the intention of the parties, whether express or implied. \u201cIntent may be drawn from the circumstances of the case, i.e., the place, conditions and nature of the transaction\u201d. (Supra, p 721.) The court found that it was the intent of the parties that plaintiff\u2019s auto be protected from <mask>, and therefore there was a bailment."], "id": "b6e6e9c5-ec80-4799-8a9f-e7ba0a2aa67a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["During the past year there have been intrusions into the building by nonresident teen-agers and considerable <mask>, burglary and abusive conduct, both verbal and physical, toward tenants. Several of the tenants who gave evidence identified one Ann Marie, a nonresident teen-ager, as a central figure in these disturbances, both personally and by her invitation of many other teen-age nonresidents into the building."], "id": "29503bfe-6e49-43c3-8da4-867b66243207", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The trial record is replete with evidence of actual notice to the defendant of the conditions at the hospital. In 1981, a meeting was attended by State and local elected officials, representatives of the fire district and the New York State Office of General Services. Minutes of the meeting reflect discussions about the fires, <mask> and the need to seal the buildings. Minutes of a similar meeting in June 1984, attended by representatives from New York State Office of General Services and Department of Environmental Conservation, reflect the same problems and concerns. The local fire commissioner predicted that it is only a matter of time until a fireman or child would be seriously hurt or killed."], "id": "f1758556-68d7-455b-a5f4-63da0b682784", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Indeed, father's criminal history spanned almost 30 years, with multiple arrests for possession of narcotics for sale, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of crack cocaine. Recent arrests include petty theft (2010); possession of a controlled substance and violation of probation (2010); second degree robbery, possession of a controlled substance, and trespass (2012); possession of a controlled substance for sale, possession of paraphernalia, and carrying dirk/dagger (2012); burglary, assault with great bodily injury, receiving known stolen property, and committing an offense while on bail (2012); unlawful driving/taking of a vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, and probation violation (2013); second degree burglary, <mask>, and battery (2014); possession of a controlled substance (2015); domestic violence (2015); assault with great bodily injury, possession of a switch blade, and resisting/obstructing police officer/EMT (2016); reckless driving, forgery of registration, driving without a valid license, and receiving stolen property (2016); and petty theft (2016)."], "id": "31251feb-bf05-47ed-99aa-d415e7318ffb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["We note the Legislature did not expressly provide that a violation of *566Commercial Code section 9609 is a defense to a criminal charge of <mask> under Penal Code section 594. In the absence of express statutory language, we find no basis to read in such a defense and defendants cite no authority for doing so. (See People v. Berry (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 788, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 [finding civil statute inapplicable to criminal case because \"nothing in th[e] civil statute suggest[ed] that it creates a defense in a criminal action\"].) We further note the remedies for a violation of Commercial Code section 9609 are delineated in Commercial Code section 9625. Defendants' conduct to retrieve the car was conspicuously not one of the lawful remedies listed in the Commercial Code."], "id": "f93c22a1-b16e-4a2e-9cea-d642f5d211c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["At the conclusion of the trial, Moore asked the court to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as a defense to the charges of resisting an officer and <mask>. The prosecutor did not oppose the instruction as applied to the charge of resisting an officer, but asserted the defense was not applicable to vandalism because vandalism is not a specific intent crime. After extensive argument, the trial court ultimately agreed with the prosecutor that the voluntary intoxication evidence was not applicable to the vandalism charge. Thus, the court instructed the jury on voluntary intoxication only as a potential defense to the charge of resisting an officer, and further clarified that the jury could not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication as a defense to vandalism. The court did, however, permit Moore's counsel to argue during closing that Moore was not guilty of vandalism because he was so high on PCP that he had no idea what was going on and, thus, did not act maliciously."], "id": "c6821746-0c35-4a1f-a1a7-77d61c768561", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The court observes, and it is significant, that despite such violations the building continued to be fully rented in July-August, 1967, when it was first appraised by the city\u2019s appraiser and it was not vacated until the tenants were showered with notices by the Housing Authority of the proposed condemnation and offers of new apartments and payment of moving expenses for those who moved out prior to condemnation. The court is convinced that it was the activities of the Housing Authority and not building violations that prompted the tenants to vacate and leave an almost empty building which as might be expected became a target for theft, <mask> and destruction, which, according to the city\u2019s own appraiser, was reduced in value by some $27,000 in a period of 10 months, when the city appraiser appraised it for the second time."], "id": "74eaa873-c0f4-427e-91e9-44d80b47bb8a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["At the same time, we see no rational basis for the Board's determination that Moustafa's act of <mask> bore on her fitness to practice nursing. The ALJ did not explain why this conduct was substantially related to nursing except for the conclusory assertion that it \"evidence[d] unfitness to practice consistently with the public health, safety[,] or welfare.\" In our view, *1141removing and damaging a vehicle boot cannot reasonably be considered to constitute unprofessional conduct substantially related to nursing, and it therefore was not conduct that independently qualified as a basis for the license restriction."], "id": "36d12367-7c62-4e6c-8510-56f26162f8e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Mu and NE, as part of their contract, agreed to an insuring plan designed to minimize project costs by eliminating redundant and expensive policies of insurance. The plan was also designed to prevent disputes and litigation between the parties and the multiplicity of insurers often involved in such projects. The centerpiece of the insuring plan is found at paragraph 11.3.1 of the General Conditions of the Mu-NE contract which required Mu to buy property insurance in the amount of the initial \u201ccontract sum\u201d (i.e., $664,200), plus any increase in such costs brought about by change orders. The owner is obliged to maintain such insurance until completion. The property insurance specified in the contract would insure against fire and provide extended coverage for physical loss or damage including theft, <mask>, architect services and other consequential items (para 11.3.1.1)."], "id": "c4f192ac-b57e-4377-a458-271b693fc856", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\"A new petition was filed on December 9, 2014. It alleged <mask> ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 594, subd. (d)(2) ). The minor admitted the charge at the initial hearing on December 15, 2014. The San Mateo court transferred the case to San Francisco and San Francisco accepted the transfer. On January 23, 2015, the court continued the minor as a ward but ordered out-of-home placement. Appellant filed a timely appeal.\" ( In re W.R., supra, A144659/A145118, at pp. 3*-*4.) All six petitions were transferred to San Francisco under case No. JW14-6119."], "id": "1f69d4be-6d66-4620-be2a-e84195c7c693", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c Coverage D. (1) Comprehensive (excluding collision) (2) Personal Effects \u201c (1) To pay for loss caused other than by collision to the owned automobile or to a non-owned automobile. For the purpose of this coverage, breakage of glass and loss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft or larceny, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or <mask>, riot or civil commotion shall not be deemed to be loss caused by collision. \u2019 \u2019 Collision is defined in the policy as: \u201c \u2018 Collision \u2019 means collision of an automobile covered by this policy with another object or with a vehicle to which it is attached or by upset of such automobile. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "c1985dc7-47c7-432e-84cf-6e5bbbb4392a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["On September 14, 2015 Seidner's attorney, Andrew Stearns, sent an e-mail to Valdez's attorney, David Valdez, with an attached draft \"settlement agreement and release of claims.\" Under the draft settlement agreement, Seidner *604denied all allegations in Valdez's CLRA notice. Seidner agreed to pay off the outstanding loan balance, pay $ 5,126 to reimburse the down payment and monthly payments,4 and $ 2,750 for attorney's fees and costs within 10 days after surrender of the vehicle. The draft settlement agreement required Valdez to return the vehicle \"without damage or <mask>, save normal wear and tear,\" and allowed Seidner to void the settlement agreement if it determined the vehicle was \"in unacceptable condition.\""], "id": "da524e89-8ebd-47f0-a3ac-4aee2fabf9ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The court further finds that the attendant\u2019s failure to observe the acts of <mask> \u2014 which, by nature of the damage caused, had to be overt and observable \u2014 was also negligence, attributable to the defendant. This is true, whether the attendant was officially on duty or not, since the defendant cannot establish when the damage took place. Even though the plaintiff has the burden of proof, since he was not present and the defendant\u2019s employee was, the burden of coming forward with those facts shifts to the defendant."], "id": "497b8589-e59d-45a1-bc6d-0abe516222f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["*569\" 'Private security guard\u2019 shall mean an individual employed by a security guard company to principally perform one or more of the following functions: \"a. protection of individuals and/or property from harm or theft; \"b. prevention, observation or detection of any unlawful or unauthorized intrusion, entry, activity, larceny, <mask>, abuse, arson or trespass on private property; \"c. control, regulation or direction of the flow or movements of the public; \"d. street patrol service; \"e. transportation of currency, jewelry, securities, works of art or other valuables in a specially equipped motor vehicle which offers a high degree of security; and \"f. response to but not installation of service of a security system alarm installed and/or used to prevent or detect unauthorized intrusion, robbery, burglary, theft, pilferage, and other losses and/or to maintain security of a protected premises.\u201d In response to this inclusion the armored car carrier industry raised concerns and contacted Senator Mega, author and sponsor of the bill. In response to those concerns and on behalf of Senator Mega, Richard Olsen, the Executive Director of the Judiciary Committee, responded by letter which represented that armored car services had been removed from the bill. That decision was apparently reached after lengthy review and discussion."], "id": "9a905661-4a0b-48eb-be9a-1c795cbdfa22", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Briefly, the cause is predicated upon (1) negligence on the part of the defendant in maintaining its plumbing fixtures in the subject premises \u201cin a defective, rotten and worn-out condition, causing them to break and burst \u201d and (2) defendant\u2019s failure to take prudent and reasonable precautions to protect the subject premises so as to prevent <mask> and the entry of trespassers."], "id": "f1631023-cf9f-45b2-977c-d59001ef939f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant claims Visalia violated the California Environmental Quality Act ( Pub. Resources Code, \u00a7 21000 et seq. ; \"CEQA\") by failing to analyze the potential for the land use policy to cause a phenomenon called urban decay. \"CEQA does not define urban decay\" but some have defined it as \"visible symptoms of physical deterioration that invite <mask>, loitering, and graffiti that is caused by a downward spiral of business closures and multiple long term vacancies.\" ( Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance v. County of San Bernardino (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 677, 685, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 ( Joshua Tree ).)"], "id": "851a3e1d-767a-4538-9e24-69bec4f366e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, we are not limited to the application of this common-law presumption. Where we have, as we do here, a proof of actual tampering as opposed to malfunction, plus a proof of protracted and continuous receipt of current charge, or at inordinately low charge, we have a classic case of circumstantial evidence. And the suggestion has never been successful that an indictment may not be grounded on circumstantial evidence. The only limitation is that such circumstantial evidence must exclude, to a moral certainty, every reasonable hypothesis except guilt. (People v Eckert, 2 NY2d 126.) And search as we may, we are unable to extract any reasonable hypothesis as to why someone other than the subscriber himself would tamper with a meter so as to deprive the supplier of its lawful charges. Vandalism? Not with respect to the deliberate purposeful kind of diversion we find in these cases \u2014 <mask> is simply, here, not a reasonable alternate hypothesis."], "id": "97da6080-ffd3-4e4c-912a-b073c2158f4d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Lot 50E was originally used for dumping of the residue from the village incinerator. In 1960 a metered parking lot was constructed on a small portion of lot 52. In 1963 after the State of New York had completed a pedestrian overpass which ended at the property herein involved, the village constructed blacktop walkways where paths had been worn by the people using the overpass. In addition lights were installed, which were later removed because of <mask>, and some park benches placed along the paths. A short time later a few shrubs and trees were planted to discourage ball playing due to complaints. The testimony established that people use the walks and that children play on the property. In addition some use of the benches was established."], "id": "d748500a-ccad-41f0-8abb-d069d9ffde70", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecutor then questioned Turner about his earlier arrest. Turner denied that he had possessed a box of identical ammunition on that occasion or that he had ever possessed such ammunition. In rebuttal, another San *408Pablo police officer testified that he had previously arrested Turner for <mask>. Turner had had a different bag with him at the time, and when the officer conducted an inventory search of it approximately 30 minutes after the arrest, he discovered a 50-round box of Fiocchi .38 caliber Super-Auto ammunition inside."], "id": "a1de8007-83e6-43b2-95aa-5f2ffe3ffc80", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["On appeal, defendant contends that there is insufficient record evidence to support his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon; that the court *478prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of the phrase \"deadly weapon\"; and that defense counsel violated his constitutional rights by allegedly conceding during closing argument that defendant was guilty of the <mask> charge in count 2. As we explain, we disagree with these contentions and affirm the judgment."], "id": "e88ec136-e26a-4c4a-8f10-0dffb6dd2a1c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["People ex rel. Gallo v Acuna (14 Cal 4th 1090, 929 P2d 596, supra, cert denied Gonzalez v Gallo, 521 US 1121) is the case closest to this in terms of the factual setting and in terms of *548the injunctive relief upheld. The contrasts between the situations, however, the remedies employed and the sources of the courts\u2019 authority are stark and instructive. The court in Acuna confronted what it described as an \u201curban war zone\u201d and \u201can occupied territory.\u201d (14 Cal 4th, at 1100, 929 P2d, at 601.) Several urban gangs had commandeered a residential neighborhood known as Rocksprings for their drug bazaar, taking over the streets, lawns and homes, making \u201c[mjurder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery, <mask>, arson, and theft * * * commonplace.\u201d (14 Cal 4th, at 1100, 929 P2d, at 601.) Utilizing both criminal and civil public nuisance statutes as authority, the California court issued an injunction in which it addressed the gang activity. The injunction consisted of 25 provisions, of which the one relevant here is the first. The defendants were enjoined from:"], "id": "886aced1-529f-489e-90ff-f21b0f8951f8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The probation department's dispositional report indicated Juan was chronically truant, received poor grades, and had been suspended from school twice, as well as disciplined for sexual harassment and <mask>. Although Juan denied being in a gang, several of his coparticipants were admitted gang members affiliated with the Norte\u00f1os.1 Juan reported experimenting with alcohol and using marijuana regularly to \"stop [himself] from getting mad.\" Juan's mother reported violence and substance abuse in the family home. Juan's father had been deported approximately a year prior, and Juan's mother reported being illiterate and feeling overwhelmed by Juan's behavior."], "id": "e8ff92d2-8a19-4e1d-95b2-7a17d20c5925", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[t]he Village Board has determined that large numbers of minors have been congregating in the Village after dark causing general disturbance to residents. In order to reduce juvenile crime and <mask>, protect the children of this municipality, and reinforce parental authority, it is necessary that a curfew be established to keep minors out of public areas after dark.\u201d (Hilton Village Code \u00a7 5-2.) The actual curfew \u201cRestrictions\u201d set forth in the Hilton Curfew Law is embodied in section 5-3. That section states that"], "id": "f4ac5c3b-6dfb-431d-b35f-1fb3e832e263", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In January 2020, Mother was arrested for vandalizing a car. She pled guilty in November 2020 to misdemeanor <mask>. During trial, Mother acknowledged that she had pled guilty to vandalism and stated: \u201cI ain\u2019t worried about that. My kids was getting abused in their home.\u201d The affidavit of complaint identifies Jordan L., who is apparently a sister of Ramone L., as the victim and states that Mother had punctured all four tires on the vehicle, destroying them. It states that she also \u201cscratched and scribbled deep the word"], "id": "9ee1d25c-55b7-4e1f-987f-c4aa3cb129f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["penetration offenses (\u00a7 667.6, subd. (d)9) plus a consecutive term of eight months (one-third the middle term of two years) on the <mask> offense. The court imposed the lower term of 16 months on the second- degree burglary offense, but stayed execution of that term as it found it was \u201cobligated to\u201d do so under section 654. The court explained that it was imposing the aggravated terms for the forcible sexual penetration offenses based on several aggravating factors described in the California Rules of Court10, including that the offenses disclosed a high degree of \u201ccallousness\u201d (rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victims were \u201cparticularly vulnerable\u201d (rule 4.421(a)(3)); the manner in which the crimes were carried out indicated \u201cplanning,\u201d \u201csophistication,\u201d and \u201cprofessionalism\u201d (rule 4.421(a)(8)); and defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cviolent\u201d and posed a \u201cdanger to society,\u201d involving \u201csexual assault by force\u201d that was not \u201cslight\u201d (rule 4.421(b)(1))."], "id": "2877258b-4846-4d5c-98a7-b7d07fc2eb4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In Moore , the Court of Appeal rejected essentially the same argument in connection with the crime of <mask> (\u00a7 594, subd. (a) ) and held the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on voluntary intoxication. ( Moore, supra , 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 891, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 261.) As the court explained, section 594 \"is part of a set of statutes dealing with malicious injury to property, and follows the language of the original malicious mischief statutes.\" ( Moore , at p. 894, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 261.) Section 591, at issue here, is also one of these statutes.2"], "id": "c71ef748-ed5a-4289-a33a-420e1e2fa809", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["robbery, one year for the weapons enhancement, and three one-year terms for three prison prior enhancements. The trial court then sentenced Lewis to the agreed-upon two-year sentence in the new cases\u2014one eight-month term for the grand theft count and two eight-month terms for each of the <mask> counts, to run consecutively. Lewis appealed. While that appeal was pending, on October 8, 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 483, effective January 1, 2022, which added section 1171.1, subdivision (a): \u201c(a) Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.\u201d (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, \u00a7 3.) Section 1171.1 further provides that once the sentencing court identifies defendants serving a term including a one-year prior prison term enhancement, the court \u201cshall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant,\u201d (\u00a7 1171.1, subd. (c)), and that such resentencing \u201cshall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.\u201d (\u00a7 1171.1, subd. (d)(1).) And the legislation provides: \u201cIt is the intent of the Legislature that any changes to the sentence as a result of [Senate Bill No. 483] shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.\u201d (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, \u00a7 1.)"], "id": "c7573a21-ef61-454d-aac9-63c6f97c1aca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["On December 27, 2018, a felony complaint was filed against Del Castillo alleging residential burglary with a hot prowl allegation, <mask>, and receiving stolen property. On December 28, 2018, he was arraigned on the complaint, and the preliminary hearing was set for January 10, 2019. On January 10, the court granted the People's request for a one-day continuance. On January 11, 2019, Del Castillo waived his right to a preliminary hearing within 10 days, but expressly preserved his right to have the hearing commence within 60 days. The preliminary hearing was set for February 19, 2019."], "id": "3cccbaf0-a228-4771-ba67-d82b00b6b105", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["During the past year there have been intrusions into the building by nonresident teen-agers and considerable <mask>, burglary and abusive conduct, both verbal and physical, toward tenants. Several of the tenants who gave evidence identified one Ann Marie, a nonresident teen-ager, as a central figure in these disturbances, both personally and by her invitation of many other teen-age nonresidents into the building."], "id": "59c86ff7-6f0d-4693-bd74-b1b1b94d1c2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the northern portion, as it faced upon new Stewart Avenue, the court views the matter differently. Access during construction of Stewart Avenue was still possible by way of the frontage on Union Avenue and, therefore, no award should be made for culverts and fill to provide temporary access off new Stewart Avenue during construction. However, the northern portion, as it faced on new Stewart Avenue, was mqde *1021open to theft and <mask> and, accordingly, the court finds an allowance for a gate and fencing to be appropriate and, accordingly, awards $500 of the $1,000 claimed for the northern portion."], "id": "4c85db86-1adf-4aa0-b40b-8d7803173885", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The ALJ then considered the conduct underlying the convictions and determined that it constituted unprofessional conduct, independently justifying a restricted license. Both petty-theft convictions were for shoplifting from Macy's. The first time, Moustafa \"attempted to switch the price tags on two items and was detained by store security while attempting to pay.\" The second time, \"she 'stole a BCBG dress ..., hid it in [her] purse[,] and was *1127detained as [she] attempted to walk out with the merchandise.' \" Finally, she was convicted of <mask> after her \"forcible removal\" of a boot placed on her car for unpaid parking tickets. After the police contacted her, she returned the boot, which she was required to pay for because it was so damaged that it \"appeared unusable.\""], "id": "6fb95284-7ca1-4622-b3d1-2ef01d74181a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["During the 1960\u2019s, however, parental responsibility statutes, enlarging the scope of parents\u2019 common-law liability, were routinely introduced in the Legislature, and were routinely either killed in committee, or vetoed by Governor Rockefeller.2 Bill Jacket documents reveal that persistent proponents of these bills were the New York State School Boards Association, seeking fiscal remedies for escalating <mask> in the schools,3 and the New York State Association of Cemeteries, citing the appalling rise in cemetery maintenance costs due to desecrations by juveniles.4 Equally persistent opponents comprised the New York State Department of Social Services, who resisted the measures because they would most seriously affect parents who were poor,5 and the Association of the Bar of the *675City of New York, whose objections were two-fold: (1) imposing nonfault liabilities on parents and shifting burdens of proof to parents to demonstrate diligence raised constitutional due process issues, and (2) severely limiting the amount of liability (the proposed statute set a limit of $500) foreclosed any practical deterrent objectives which the bills sought to achieve.6"], "id": "fbb2a674-4c42-4ead-bc16-16ac8e999b26", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The account presents the question of the trustees\u2019 power in relation to property taken over in foreclosure of a mortgage. Here the trustees took over in foreclosure a one-story building and found themselves confronted with the necessity of protecting a building already substantially injured by <mask>. They were confronted with the need to invest substantial additional principal sums to rehabilitate the building or to find a purchaser who was willing to take it in its then condition. They pursued the latter course and the purchaser gave back a purchase-money mortgage for the entire purchase price and after taking possession rehabilitated the building and put it into good order and condition. It is now operating satisfactorily and the trustees are obtaining income on the purchase-money mortgage. The purchase-money mortgage no doubt exceeds the limit permissible to these trustees if they were making a new mortgage loan on the same property. The special guardian objects to the transaction on that ground. There is presented, therefore, the question whether the limits upon trustees in respect of new mortgage investments are applicable to the acts of trustees in .disposing of property which they are forced to take over in the effort to protect an original mortgage investment lawfully made."], "id": "d23ff652-9282-4b2b-9943-960de1f94dc8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Section 1217 of volume 30 of New York Jurisprudence explains and discusses comprehensive automobile insurance and its genesis as follows: \u201cIn addition to the risks covered by policies insuring against fire, theft, or collision or upset, damages or destruction may be caused by a variety of other events such as windstorm, hail, flood, explosion, <mask>, or malicious mischief, and lightning, falling objects, or civil riot or commotion. Moreover, the cause of the loss, damage, or destruction may be of such an unusual nature that not even an extremely prudent person would, in advance of the occurrence, be prone to anticipate such a happening. To cope with this situation, therefore, automobile insurers have developed what are commonly called \u2018 comprehensive coverage \u2019 policies or clauses, which are, generally speaking, designed to afford protection against all causes of loss, damage, or destruction not specifically excluded. These policies include all of the conventional coverages, such as theft, fire, and windstorm, as well as providing blanket coverage in other respects, but usually exclude collision losses, since collision coverage is a comparatively expensive one and can be obtained separately by the insured if he so desires, and usually also exclude other specified causes of loss.\u201d"], "id": "32db1396-a550-4a8f-8abf-aef9eeaab057", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["*656Defendants' reliance on Penal Code section 415 is also misplaced. They argue Thomas violated Penal Code section 415 by \"start[ing] an unlawful fight in public\" and his actions constitute a defense to the <mask> charge. Thomas was not charged with such a crime and, in any event, comparative fault is not a defense in criminal proceedings. ( People v. Armitage , supra , 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 420, 239 Cal.Rptr. 515.) Accordingly, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610 [defense counsel is not required to make frivolous objections].)"], "id": "8fa2162f-8cf0-43a9-b1fd-4fd7ed3c4cb2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cYou know that FIC 64r-7 in the letting of March 5 1964 is for highway construction project and the unit items include the demolition of the same buildings that were in the letting of *974October 24, 1963. However, there is an express optional provision in the construction specifications of FIG 64-7 which permit DPW to exclude the demolition work. \u2018 \u2018 Experience over a considerable period of time has demonstrated that when a project reaches the stage of complete design and is ready for bidding, the unit price for demolition is frequently less than if the demolition were undertaken earlier by another contractor. <mask> has influenced separate contracts for demolition well in advance of construction operations. Also, the highway contractor has the responsibility of the demolition work, and if he employs a subcontractor, the highway contractor cannot blame the State for delay in the demolition work."], "id": "0c3f4a74-de84-40a2-9c70-d6f85b2b8cfe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The affirmation submitted in opposition by Lawrence Schwind states that Attorney Schwind has served as the attorney for the Village of Hilton since 1989 and argues that this court is not required to find the Hilton Curfew Law unconstitutional under the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in City of Rochester based upon the fact that the Court of Appeals did not hold that all curfew laws are unconstitutional. Attorney Schwind argues that the Court of Appeals rather provided the framework under which curfew laws should be analyzed for constitutional purposes. Attorney Schwind submits further that the Hilton Curfew Law is distinguishable from that at issue in the City of Rochester case and states that this court must examine the impetus behind the curfew and decide whether the ends justify the means. Attorney Schwind states that the purpose of the ordinance was to reduce juvenile crime and <mask>, protect the children of the municipality, and reinforce parental authority."], "id": "88d82c95-6882-4b5d-8c68-ff672eda9c58", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c As a result of the inordinately long and dilatory tactics of the defendants, the vicinity of the plaintiff\u2019s property has suffered a condemnation blight which has transformed the area into one which is highly undesirable for either residential or commercial purposes. The area has become a high-crime area, <mask> is rampant, and it is not safe to live or work there. Both residential and' commercial tenants have moved from the area, the plaintiff has lost substantial amounts of rental income, he has been placed in a special insurance pool which has forced him to pay excessive premiums, he has been compelled to expend *127monies to protect the property from vandalism, and his property has been drastically reduced in value."], "id": "c1a98863-cef4-497a-ae08-07ed4ddd1e2d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": [". (See also e.g. Seltzer v Bayer, 272 AD2d 263, 264 [1st Dept 2000] [allegations of <mask> (tossing lighted cigarettes and eggs into plaintiff\u2019s yard) and threats of vandalism (threatening to paint a swastika on the front of plaintiffs home) not enough to be held as outrageous conduct]; Zimmerman v Carmack, 292 AD2d 601 [2d Dept 2002] [allegations of excessive noise and intentional accumulation of dog waste, rotting food, and garbage did not impose liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but rather stated a claim for trespass]; Owen v Leventritt, 174 AD2d 471 [1st Dept 1991] [threat made to kill plaintiff at meeting where plaintiff was not present was not outrageous conduct to support claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress]; see also Roth v El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 709 F Supp 487, 490-491 [1989]; James v Saltsman, 99 AD2d 797, 798 [2d Dept 1984]; Sirianni v Rafaloff, 284 AD2d 447 [2d Dept 2001].)"], "id": "d227d897-ac93-4a5b-b185-dd6d8d7921f3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In arguing that the standard for exclusion under section 352 was met, Turner relies on People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, which he contends establishes that evidence of prior arrests, as opposed to convictions, \"is *462not admissible for impeachment.\" In Williams , the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that evidence of a defendant's prior arrests for various crimes \"was inadmissible either as proof of guilt or for impeachment.\" ( Id. at pp. 609-610, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 401.) The court observed, \"Generally, evidence of mere arrests that do not result in convictions is inadmissible because such evidence invariably suggests the defendant has a bad character,\" and \"prior convictions minimize the risk the jury would be tempted to punish the defendant for the uncharged acts.\" ( Ibid. ) Williams is distinguishable, however, because in that case evidence of the defendant's prior arrests was admitted to prove gang-related crimes and enhancements, and there is no indication that this evidence impeached his testimony on any particular point as opposed to just reflecting negatively on his general veracity. (See id. at pp. 595, 598-600, 603, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 401.) Williams does not stand for the proposition that an arrest is inadmissible for any type of impeachment. Moreover, although Turner's possession of ammunition was uncovered during his arrest for <mask>, it was his possessing ammunition, not the arrest, that was relevant to impeach his testimony."], "id": "e7c30f26-2fa5-425b-844e-f1b4334d22bb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In July 2016, defendant pleaded no contest to charges of stalking Christina T. between January 14, 2016, and February 23, 2016 ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 646.9, subd. (a) ),1 felony <mask> of Elizabeth T.'s home (\u00a7 594, subd. (a)), and disobeying a domestic relations order (\u00a7 273.6, subd. (a)). The victims were mother and daughter. The issue of restitution was considered at the sentencing hearing, held in September 2016. The victims' losses totaled $17,639.68, including $5,796.79 to install a residential security system. The system included a monitored alarm system in the house with four cameras, installed on or about January 27, 2016. Two more cameras were installed in March 2016, along with motion detectors and security lights. Insurance paid $9,642.66 toward repair of the house and car but paid nothing toward the security system."], "id": "951bd601-b364-4dd3-8586-54a630f635ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Based upon the above law and facts, it is the decision of the court that, for purposes of this discovery motion and hearing only, defendant has met his burden of showing *371under CPL 240.40 (subd 1, par [b]) that additional discovery is material in the preparation of his defense and that such request is reasonable based upon the fact and holding of this court that at the time of the alleged crime(s) defendant was suffering a retrograde amnesia or alcoholic blackout of his recollection of the dates, times, places and events in question. It is for the People to now show under the Wilson standards above that defendant can get a fair trial given such finding. To assist in that determination, which is properly left for the Trial Judge, this court orders that the People supply defendant with any and all prior written, recorded or oral statements of the actual witnesses to the alleged crimes (not including statements of police who were nonwitnesses), including the Grand Jury statements of such witnesses, if any. However, keeping in mind that the evidence now shows that defendant is capable of acting without memory of his actions, and assuredly without reflection or insight during the course of such alcoholic binges; defendant\u2019s prior criminal record involving at least, crimes of <mask> and possession of weapons; the violent nature of the instant allegations involving the use or display of a firearm; the court in its discretion under CPL 240.50 orders that the names, addresses and any other identifying characteristics of the witnesses shall be redacted from any and all prior statements released, noting also that under CPL 240.50 (subd 2) this court further orders that the release of such statements or material derived therefrom shall be maintained in the exclusive possession of the attorney for defendant only, and shall be used for the exclusive purpose of preparing for the defense of this instant action. Fictitious names may be used and noted, if desired."], "id": "f848afd9-66d9-4489-8e90-03636a7cceab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The account presents the question of the trustees\u2019 power in relation to property taken over in foreclosure of a mortgage. Here the trustees took over in foreclosure a one-story building and found themselves confronted with the necessity of protecting a building already substantially injured by <mask>. They were confronted with the need to invest substantial additional principal sums to rehabilitate the building or to find a purchaser who was willing to take it in its then condition. They pursued the latter course and the purchaser gave back a purchase-money mortgage for the entire purchase price and after taking possession rehabilitated the building and put it into good order and condition. It is now operating satisfactorily and the trustees are obtaining income on the purchase-money mortgage. The purchase-money mortgage no doubt exceeds the limit permissible to these trustees if they were making a new mortgage loan on the same property. The special guardian objects to the transaction on that ground. There is presented, therefore, the question whether the limits upon trustees in respect of new mortgage investments are applicable to the acts of trustees in .disposing of property which they are forced to take over in the effort to protect an original mortgage investment lawfully made."], "id": "27235b5b-8cd5-4848-a66f-20f9c68f1e47", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In opposition, the plaintiff in the foreclosure action contends that the purchaser\u2019s claim that the price bid was excessive is without merit since the bid was made solely on the purchaser\u2019s own volition. Furthermore, it is contended that a purchaser at a judicial sale bids for the property as it is at the time of the bid; that after the foreclosure sale neither the plaintiff nor the Referee had legal title to the property or any right or responsibility to enter onto the property for the purpose of protecting or repairing it. It is claimed that the risk of loss or deterioration in any improvements on the premises is on the purchaser and he can minimize any such loss by taking title from the Referee immediately after the sale. Finally, it is argued that there is no proof submitted that the alleged damage due to <mask> took place after the foreclosure sale or that the cost of repairing such damage would equal the sum of $1,500 as claimed by the purchaser."], "id": "4a2e713f-a3b3-4192-9c34-e63e351ff842", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In the City of Buffalo, the money saving bailment rationale *954is in violation of public policy. Public policy can be established by this court taking notice of the ordinances of the City of Buffalo. Section 393 of chapter V, of the Ordinances of the City of Buffalo states: \"Every application for a license here under [annually applied for license of a parking lot] shall be accompanied by a policy of * * * legal liability insurance up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) for fire, theft, and <mask>, covering vehicles parked or stored on the licensed premises.\u201d (Parking lot is defined under section 340 of Chapter V of the Ordinances of the City of Buffalo, as \"any open, outdoor space * * * where more than five (5) motor vehicles may be parked\u201d.)"], "id": "ae11397a-679a-4934-b181-a506ea9ea0da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["A third petition (Petition C) was filed on November 14, 2014, and it alleged a single count of misdemeanor <mask> ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 594 ). On November 19, G.C. admitted the vandalism allegation. On February 13, 2015, a fourth petition (Petition D) was filed alleging a single count of felony vandalism. On February 19, Petition D was amended to add a misdemeanor petty theft ( Pen. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 484, 488 ) allegation, which G.C. admitted, and the felony count was dismissed. The four petitions, which were all pre-disposition, were then transferred to Alameda County."], "id": "051dc2d0-dc73-43e5-9332-55888e648f06", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In the instant proceedings by the owner of the premises, joined in by the first mortgagee, there are but two issues with which this court is concerned. One issue which this court must determine is whether the dangerous conditions, constituting the nuisance upon which the order of receivership was predicated, have been corrected or removed. Multiple Dwelling Law (\u00a7 309, subd. 5, par. d, cl. 4) authorizes the termination of the receivership once the nuisance has been eliminated. It is conceded that since his appointment, the Receiver has had no construction work done on the premises and has confined his activities to \u2018 \u2018 housekeeping \u2019 \u2019 chores such as the removal of rubbish and debris and the boarding-up of the premises to prevent <mask>. Perforce the receivership, the owner and mortgagee have not had any work done at the premises since the Receiver took possession. It therefore follows that the dangerous conditions which were found to exist on November 22, 1963 continue to exist up to the present time. At the request of the court, a current reinspection of the premises was made on January 14, 1965, by inspectors of the New York City Department of Buildings, who testified at the hearings that the building is still in a hazardous state. Inspector Edward Krishok testified that \u2018\u2018 if a fire started it would go through the entire building like a flue The court finds that the physical status of the building remains unchanged from the date the Receiver was appointed. Therefore the court determines that the movants have failed to sustain the first ground for removal and discharge of the Receiver."], "id": "cb8b6777-4421-4705-ae86-a15881c45951", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, there is a question of fact regarding the policy terms. The insurance company sets forth in its affidavits at various times that the policy provides limits of insurance for physical damage coverage quoting \u201cSection IV \u2014 physical damage coverage, subparagraph A. and C.\u201d There is no dispute that the plaintiff\u2019s policy was on a nonreporting premium basis. Commercial\u2019s affidavits indicate that the application of the language contained in the policy at section IV, Physical Damage Coverage, C.2.c. leads to the conclusion that they owe only $1,725.75. However, at no time do the affidavits give specific references to the policy terms or coverage as to how this conclusion is reached. The only limit of insurance is stated under item seven of the \u201cGarage Coverage Form \u2014 Auto Dealers\u2019 Supplementary Schedule\u201d. This limitation is stated as being for the limit for each location and for comprehensive coverage. There is no indication of the limit for collision coverage which is marked above as a coverage for used autos and autos owned. This entire check box is under item seven for physical damage coverage. In addition, the limit of insurance for each location states an amount of $26,250 \u201cminus $250 deductible for each covered auto for loss caused by theft or mischief or <mask> subject to $1000 maximum deductible for all such loss in any one event.\u201d This does not indicate limitations on losses for collision."], "id": "3b525eec-f49b-43d0-87fb-478ea8aad27c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Exhibit C of plaintiff\u2019s affidavit in opposition to the motion consists of a series of eight letters, written during a period of eight months from June 20,1974 through February 6,1975, in which plaintiff had complained to defendant *657that extensive <mask> had resulted from inadequate security due to defendant\u2019s improper supervision, failure to coordinate the work of the other contractors, and failure to accept the work in a timely manner."], "id": "753340e1-7dd5-4fdc-b280-e2fb94683fbf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["*925The initial investigation ordered by the State Authority, a copy of which is annexed to their answer, appears \"to be thorough and painstaking. The areas of inquiry include \u201c accessibility of stores, social conditions, traffic movement in area, population density and retail business activity.\u201d The investigator found this to be primarily a residential section with the area adjoining to the north \u201c characterized, principally, by warehouses, junkyards and factories.\u201d There has been no population increase since the 1960 census and the number of housing units has decreased as a result of abandonment and closing of property by owners. Windows and doors of many small units have been boarded up, with consequent <mask> and extreme deterioration, so that they are \u201c unfit for immediate re-occupancy.\u201d No new housing construction is now in progress or planned for the immediate future. Petitioner alleges additionally that an entire square block of housing property adjacent to the premises has been demolished for the erection of a new public school. This is denied in the answer of respondent but the report of its investigator submitted October 18, 1966 does state that \u201c a new school is being built at the present time \u201d one block from the premises."], "id": "9fb09916-7573-46be-96c8-c6fa50675953", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["*529In 1989, in case number MCR97449, appellant was placed on probation after being convicted of one misdemeanor count of evading a peace officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.1. In 1996, in case number *93SCR22536, appellant was convicted after a jury trial of one felony count of criminal threats under section 422 and three misdemeanor counts: child abuse under section 273a, subdivision (b), <mask> under section 594, subdivision (a), and being under the influence of a controlled substance under Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a). He was denied probation and sentenced to prison."], "id": "956742ea-f62c-4bce-90b7-0b8aec688df9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["case arising from the <mask> arrest was filed in the Bellflower Courthouse. At a February 15, 2019 probation violation hearing in the instant case, Simpson\u2019s counsel informed the trial court that the vandalism case had been dismissed, and the prosecution recommended Simpson admit to a probation violation in this case\u2014apparently based on the vandalism\u2014in exchange for time served. Simpson stipulated to a probation violation, and the court found Simpson in violation of his probation in this case. The court revoked and reinstated probation. The terms and conditions of probation in this case included: serving 77 days in county jail (with credit for 77 days); and reporting to his probation officer within 48 days of his release, in addition to the terms and condition previously imposed and not modified. IV. July 2020 Probation Violation Hearing On July 29, 2020, Simpson pleaded no contest to misdemeanor simple battery (\u00a7 242) in case number OBL04328 (Bellflower Courthouse). The trial court sentenced him to 60 days in county jail. Pursuant to the plea, the court dismissed two misdemeanor charges for driving with a suspended or revoked license and driving without proof of insurance (Veh. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 14601.1, subd. (a) & 16028, subd. (a)) in case number OBL04059. At the same hearing, Simpson admitted he violated his probation in the instant case based on the battery conviction. The trial court found Simpson in violation of his probation in this case. The court revoked and reinstated probation. Simpson agreed to a one-year extension of his probation until September 25, 2021. The terms and conditions of probation in this case included serving 60 days in county jail (concurrent to the jail"], "id": "213b88f9-75da-4a4c-bb58-43fd0b892266", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Cash (supra) was cited as holding that a landowner\u2019s request for removal justifies impoundment in People v Schultz (93 Ill App 3d 1071, 418 NE2d 6, 9 [1981]), which held that without such a request impoundment and related search of a lawfully parked car were unlawful. Similarly, State of Iowa v Kuster (353 NW2d 428, 432 [Sup Ct, Iowa]) held that: \"where the vehicle was in no imminent danger of <mask>, theft, or other injury to it or its contents and was so attenuated from the actual site of the defendant\u2019s arrest as to negate any need for protection by the police, that the impoundment was unreasonable.\u201d The court took note of circumstances also present in Bonneau\u2019s case: that defendant \"was not near the vehicle when he was arrested; the vehicle was locked, legally parked, and it presented no danger to the public. There was no evidence the vehicle was in danger of theft or vandalism as to it or its contents.\u201d (Supra, at 432.)"], "id": "38484e4d-5bde-4ee1-adad-c2231a432e30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Assuming that the gates and board were open, the claimant has not established fault or negligence on the part of the state, unless it is to be found that the state\u2019s witnesses, particularly Eastman, testified at variance from the facts, and it is to be inferred that some state employee was thus being protected. Such a conclusion is not justified, and the claimant presented his case on the theory that the negligence of the state consisted in maintaining gate stems of the simple design and in the exposed situation of those at the weir, thus permitting their manipulation by unauthorized persons, and because Eastman failed to discover opportunely, or at all, that they were open. The case is barren of any proof of the identity of the individual who opened them, or the manner in which it was done. Having refused to infer that Eastman opened the gates and flashboard, the question remains if the state is, responsible for their manipulation by an unauthorized agency. No evidence was afforded that it is necessary or usual to equip gates at waste weirs, or in similar situations, differently from these. There was testimony that in water supply systems, and at dams, arid barge canal locks, devices are in use to prevent unauthorized interference. These consist of houses *16built over the gate mechanism, or irregular shaped stems, requiring a wrench of special design, or the securing of the stems by Yale locks. However proper and usual in such situations, they have not been shown reasonably necessary for the waste weir of a canal feeder. These stems are not readily operable. They require a large wrench, and Eastman kept his in the care of a relative living near the weir. This was sufficient protection against ordinary <mask> and small boys. Due care did not require the state to anticipate any other interference with the gates. What motive was to have been anticipated for such interference, and who could have the motive? This was not an important hydraulic mechanism, and no one could profit by interfering with it. The likelihood and consequences of interference were not such as to require the state to take special precautions. Furthermore, any one interested to the extent of bringing to the scene and applying a large wrench necessarily would have found little difficulty in entering a house or shanty erected over the stems, or in applying a iStillson wrench to a specially shaped or designed gate stem, or destroying a lock and operating the gates. The use of Yale locks and the necessity for having the appropriate key might result in delay in operation at times when the necessity was immediate. But, in any event, the main fact is that reasonable care and precaution did not require the state to anticipate that any one would interfere with the gates. Due care to guard against overflow of the feeder and danger to the banks might have required more efficient patrol than Eastman gave but we are not interested in that phase of the matter. Negligence is imputed to him by the claimant, in not visiting the weir to observe the condition of the gates, \u2014 a different proposition. There was no negligence in that respect. He testified to the condition in which *17he left the weir, and that the gates were closed and the flashboard in place. He had no reason to anticipate that they had been interfered with, or to visit and inspect the weir with great frequency to see if they had. He testified that his son visited there daily and that he personally went to the gates on July third. His omission to be there July second was not negligence for which the state is liable."], "id": "d630aa30-c088-4013-b0e2-8198456934cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["In the case at bar the court is of the opinion that the purchaser\u2019s contentions with regard to the alleged overbid would not warrant the court invoking its equity powers and exercising its discretion and thus relieve the purchaser of the purchase, since the bid was made upon the purchaser\u2019s own volition which, if excessive, was due to the purchaser\u2019s own negligence. Furthermore, the court is of the opinion that the purchaser\u2019s contention with respect to the alleged damage inflicted by <mask> is also without merit. The purchaser has failed to submit any evidence which would substantiate the allegation that the property was in fact damaged and that it was damaged prior to the foreclosure sale. Nor is there any proof that the extent of the alleged damage is as the purchaser claims."], "id": "34611aef-7a0d-401b-be40-fcb11489f2db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants\u2019 affidavits do not substantially controvert the basics of the picture outlined. They argue, instead, that the stay is too broad in scope; that plaintiff failed to show irreparable injury; that, in fact, cessation of classes resulted from student boycott because of the announced increase in tuition, not disruption, and that the few who wished to attend classes in Shuster Hall could have been accommodated in another building at little expense or injury to plaintiff. The theft and <mask> are described as an isolated incident; nor, say defendants, were they shown to have been involved in the incident. They also *980state that students remained overnight in the library with the permission of a dean; and further, that at a meeting of the faculty, a motion was adopted urging the president of the college to instruct the Corporation Counsel to discontinue the action."], "id": "99c6d4ab-3c8b-4b4f-ae39-668d1355debf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["It was undisputed on the argument that official inspections of the building have established and noted over 600 violations. A substantial number involve hazardous conditions, dangerous to the life and health of the occupants. There are defective, rotten and sagging floor beams; parts of the floor areas are sagging ; brick parapet walls are eroded and out of bond; the steel and concrete arch in the cellar is broken; steel supports are corroded and defective; fire alarm systems are not working; plaster walls and ceilings throughout the building are broken and many are sagging. Garbage and debris are strewn about. There is no janitorial service. There have been several fires. As recently as March 16, 1972, four fire companies responded to put out a fire in the building. There are open vacant rooms subject to <mask>. The plumbing is broken and unworkable. There is no hot water, gas or electricity. Many other bad, serious and hazardous conditions exist."], "id": "20b87d03-f061-478c-b05f-3a009dd66582", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["During that time and on March 15, 1975, certain acts of <mask> occurred and damage was done to the premises. Charles F. Flanagan, Bureau Chief, Office of General Services, acknowledged claimant\u2019s notification of the vandalism and consequent damage by letter to claimant of March 27, 1975. By letter dated June 18, 1975, Richard J. Higgins, Executive Deputy Commissioner of the Office of General Services, advised claimant that, despite the vandalism, the State was precluded from reducing the sale price of the property after *240public sale in which other bidders participated. He noted that the information, with regard to the vandalism, was being investigated and that any claim of vandalism or other damage to the premises would be treated as a separate matter."], "id": "70aa1df6-1e8f-4476-81b5-8d65ec2eb77c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c[t]he Village Board has determined that large numbers of minors have been congregating in the Village after dark causing general disturbance to residents. In order to reduce juvenile crime and <mask>, protect the children of this municipality, and reinforce parental authority, it is necessary that a curfew be established to keep minors out of public areas after dark.\u201d (Hilton Village Code \u00a7 5-2.) The actual curfew \u201cRestrictions\u201d set forth in the Hilton Curfew Law is embodied in section 5-3. That section states that"], "id": "36a19a7a-455a-4c60-8f93-a8cb54fb2009", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Until the kettle was effectuated by SLMPD officers, people were freely entering and exiting the area even after the Officers purportedly issued dispersal orders. The video evidence does not show any real sense of urgency or confrontation visible in the crowd. There was no attempt by SLMPD officers to separate the subset of people previously engaged in earlier acts of violence or <mask> or any unlawful assembly from the innocent bystanders milling about. The Officers\u2019 assertion that they had probable cause or arguable probable cause to believe some members of the crowd violated laws earlier in the day and that \u201cmany\u201d were apparently violating the law by refusing to disperse is insufficient to establish a \u201cunit\u201d that may justify a mass arrest as a matter of law. Police may be entitled to qualified immunity protections if they arrest individual offenders with at least arguable probable cause, see White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1074 (8th Cir. 2017), but officers cannot enjoy such protections by alleging that \u201cthe unlawful acts of a small group\u201d justify the arrest of the mass, Bernini, 665 F.3d at 1005."], "id": "2d413f77-1fe1-4e72-a5d8-104999ed218f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Testimony further revealed that during such construction project other improvements were made on behalf of the Village by the Department, including the construction of a service road and the provision of electrical service. Thereafter, the Village conducted yearly inspections of the property, intermittently tested the wells, monitored the wells to prevent <mask> and trespassing, and maintained the property by plowing the access road and clearing out the culverts. On April 12, 1976, the Village acquired title to all of the permanent improvements and salvaged items remaining on the property under a written agreement between itself and the State."], "id": "ba8131c0-8c10-4033-b619-d66976a98db0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants' trial counsel argued it was up to the jury to decide which items, if any, the prosecution proved were included in the <mask> charge, and the trial court instructed the jury that it was the jury's duty to make that factual determination and referred the jury back to the jury instructions. The pertinent part of CALCRIM No. 2900, as read to the jury, provides: \"To prove that a defendant is guilty of [vandalism], the People must prove that: [\u00b6] 1. The defendant maliciously damaged personal property; [\u00b6] 2. The defendant did not own the property; [\u00b6] AND [\u00b6] 3. The amount of damage caused by the vandalism was $400 or more.\" CALCRIM No. 2901 provides: \"If you find the defendants guilty of vandalism ... you must then decide whether the People have proved that the amount of damage caused by the vandalism was $400 or more.\" These instructions provided a complete and accurate statement of the governing law to the jury, and defendants do not discuss how trial counsel should have sought to clarify these instructions, or *657how such clarification would have resulted in \"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.\" ( People v. Kelly , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 520, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.)"], "id": "ed589b84-3238-42d3-b449-18085280e379", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant is a labor organization representing approximately 250 security guards and maintenance employees employed by the plaintiff. Apparently the last collective bargaining agreement between the parties terminated at midnight on October 31, 1978. Thereafter the members of defendant went on strike. It is alleged that shortly thereafter certain acts of violence and <mask> were committed against the persons of *1082employees of a private security firm hired by plaintiff and against the buildings and property of the plaintiff."], "id": "eb593aba-7722-4362-9cbf-6e495cd00c84", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["While perhaps one or two of the foregoing incidents might have been attributed to the unfortunate results of a boyish prank, it must be remembered that petitioners are engaged in the business of renting some 154 apartments tenanted by persons seeking quiet, safety and the esthetic benefits of a finely decorated building for which they pay substantial rentals. When as here, the acts of wanton destruction increase to the point where they border upon <mask>, the landlord should not be unduly prevented by technicalities from asserting those rights which he needs must assert in order to protect his own interest as well as those of his tenants."], "id": "12b2260b-c774-4f1f-b6dd-64195df7ced2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["While certainly the stairway here was located within the basement, and connected the basement area with outside, it can hardly be conceived that a stairway leading to trapdoors set in the sidewalk would constitute a \u201crequired exit.\u201d (See Rivera v Nelson Realty, LLC, 7 NY3d 530 [2006] [radiator was not \u201cpiping,\u201d as that term is used in the 1968 Building Code].) While admittedly an access stair is defined as \u201ca stair between two floors [in a building], [that] does not serve as a required exit\u201d (\u00a7 27-232 [emphasis added]), and this stairway did not join two floors in a building, nevertheless, it is clear that this type of stairway, found throughout the City of New York, is more akin to an \u201caccess\u201d stair than an \u201cinterior stair.\u201d Cellar stairs into vaults have commonly been used, and were designed for, deliveries of merchandise into cellars and basements, and not the passage of persons seeking an exit to the outside of a building. Such doors are often locked to protect against <mask> and to avoid pedestrians falling into open vaults. (See Cuevas v 73rd & Cent. Park W. Corp., 26 AD2d 239 [1966], affd 21 NY2d 745 [1968] [holding that there was no requirement that cellar doors be locked, although noting that this is often the case].) It would not be logical to think that stairways leading from basements to locked doors in the sidewalk would serve as required exits from buildings. Nor did the plaintiff establish that the basement or cellar, used for commercial storage, required an exit to the outside for safety reasons. The requirements of the Code, as to enclosures, handrails, and other particulars do not logically apply to the type of stairs at issue, which are used only for access *663for storage. This court holds that the stairway at issue is not an \u201cinterior stair\u201d within the meaning of the 1968 Building Code."], "id": "62006770-2ae6-4f7f-8e8f-773e86b2c46c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the northern portion, as it faced upon new Stewart Avenue, the court views the matter differently. Access during construction of Stewart Avenue was still possible by way of the frontage on Union Avenue and, therefore, no award should be made for culverts and fill to provide temporary access off new Stewart Avenue during construction. However, the northern portion, as it faced on new Stewart Avenue, was mqde *1021open to theft and <mask> and, accordingly, the court finds an allowance for a gate and fencing to be appropriate and, accordingly, awards $500 of the $1,000 claimed for the northern portion."], "id": "8c8b21c3-64e6-4140-a0b6-b766cd827e36", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["Aitken contradicted defendant\u2019s testimony as to his principal *1087role in the arsons, testifying that it was defendant who proposed, planned and committed each of the crimes \u2014 which occurred in April, June, September and October 2009 \u2014 while Aitken was the passive follower. The jury plainly did not credit all of this self-serving testimony, as it acquitted defendant of everything but trespass charges in relation to the April and June arsons despite his acknowledged presence at both scenes and Aitken\u2019s claims that defendant committed them.3 Nevertheless, a jury is entitled to accept the testimony of a witness in part while rejecting the rest (see People v Alteri, 49 AD3d 918, 920 [2008]). Here, the jury could have credited Aitken\u2019s testimony, at least in part, regarding defendant\u2019s participation in the subsequent crimes \u2014 consisting of serial acts of <mask> and arson at three gravel banks and two residences on a single night in September, followed in October by the arson of the church and a barn \u2014 and refused to credit defendant\u2019s claims of continued ignorance and uninvolvement. We find that the totality of the evidence, viewed in a neutral light, supports the conclusion \u201cthat the crimes of which defendant was convicted represented the culmination of a continuum of events in which he continued to participate after the intentions of [Aitken] became manifest, so as to justify the jury\u2019s conclusion that he shared [Aitken\u2019s] criminal intent and aided in commission of the crimes\u201d (People v McDonald, 257 AD2d 695, 696-697 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 876 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Allah, 71 NY2d 830, 832 [1988]; People v Gage, 259 AD2d 837, 839 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 924 [1999], lv denied on reconsideration 93 NY2d 970 [1999])."], "id": "230ef56d-2320-4a8d-9274-5335c58dd0bc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "vandalism", "legal_topic": "Property", "masked_sentences": ["The People note that the Legislature amended section 594.3 in 1983 to add subdivision (b),4 which subdivision defines the separate, but related, \"hate crime\" offense of <mask> of religious property and, in so doing, the *103Legislature stated that the amendment was in response to an \"alarming increase in the number of incidents involving acts of vandalism to religious institutions,\" which acts were often done to intimidate and deter individuals \"from freely exercising their religious beliefs.\" (Stats. 1983, ch. 726, \u00a7 2(a), (b).) Although that amendment involved a different subdivision and different offense, we believe it is reasonable to presume the Legislature held the same concerns when originally enacting section 594.3, subdivision (a) two years earlier. Therefore, the Legislature's expressed concerns in 1983 are instructive in interpreting section 594.3, subdivision (a), which was enacted in 1981. (Stats. 1981, ch. 211, \u00a7 2.) In particular, we infer that in enacting that statute, the Legislature sought to protect the rights of persons to freely exercise their religious beliefs by making it a criminal offense to vandalize certain religious properties, including buildings owned and occupied by religious educational institutions. To further that legislative purpose, we presume the Legislature intended to prohibit malicious damage not only to the actual physical structures within which religious or religious educational activities are conducted, but also to personal property or fixtures located on or attached to the real property of, and related to, that structure or \"building owned and occupied by a religious educational institution.\" (\u00a7 594.3, subd. (a).)"], "id": "814525b2-859c-4b29-ad7c-a85894332492", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["McCreary informed Stricklin that after he told them what happened she could help him get his affairs in order and tried to persuade Stricklin to tell her what happened. Stricklin said, \"Tell me I ain't going to jail tonight.\" Officer Minze responded, \"I can't do that.\" Stricklin said, \"Tell me I can get out tomorrow.\" Officer Minze responded, \"That would be whatever bond they set. I mean, if you go, I can't tell you that.\" Stricklin said, \"I want to know you're, what exactly is I'm being charged with right now? What exactly are you charging the person that did this with right now?\" Officer Minze stated it would be <mask>. Stricklin said, \"I want tomorrow to get my affairs in order. Please?\" Officer Minze responded, \"I can't promise you that. I mean, you'll have bond.\" Stricklin asked if he would get a public defender if he admitted to causing Victim's injury and Officer Minze told him he would get a public defender if he did not have the means for an attorney. Stricklin stated, \"[i]f that's what it takes to keep her out of trouble,\" then admitted he accidently put his finger in Victim's vagina. Stricklin said Victim was crying in the middle of the night and he found her in the closet with her diaper around her ankles so he picked her up, tripped over a toy, fell, and when he did, his finger went inside Victim's vagina. He said he did not see any blood."], "id": "1c5956b8-8ece-498b-80d9-04883e7e3bb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On August 10, 2016, the State filed two counts of <mask> against Gilton. The first count stemmed from the February *2592016 allegations, and the second count stemmed from actions that were alleged to have occurred between October and November 2014. On September 15, 2017, the State filed an amended information charging Gilton as a habitual offender. Gilton waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial ensued."], "id": "e7576d56-e1ec-42f0-ada6-218c587bb120", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Heavican, C.J. Yerania O. and Juan P. worked together in the early morn- ings at a grocery store in Lincoln, Nebraska, for approximately 2 years. Yerania quit this job in December 2020, and in March 2021, she sought and obtained an ex parte <mask> pro- tection order against Juan. Yerania\u2019s petition alleged that Juan had \u201c[p]ester[ed]\u201d her at work, verbally and physically, and that he had followed her when she took her children to school and threatened to kidnap Yerania and her children. Juan requested and was granted a show cause hearing on whether the sexual assault protection order should remain in effect, at which hearing he denied Yerania\u2019s allegations and asserted that their relationship had been consensual. After the case was submitted, the district court, sua sponte, filed Yerania\u2019s petition under a new case number, then entered a harassment protection order. The court found that it had jurisdiction and concluded a harassment protection order was - 751 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "4f8ecee0-3e5b-48bd-96bb-35547432b1bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant asserts that he was denied important constitutional rights by the exclusion of 112 of Elaine's social-media posts. He argues that these posts established three defensive theories: (1) \"her motive to lie about the <mask> was to get herself out of trouble with her parents by falsely blaming all her negative conduct on Appellant, including the allegation that he assaulted her\"; (2) Elaine was not embarrassed by her conduct as she stated at trial and actively sought relationships with older men; and (3) because some of the posts extolling her use of drugs and alcohol occurred shortly before her trial testimony, they would \"impeach her capacity and competency to testify in a drug induced state.\""], "id": "a01b813a-0578-41e0-a772-5d480d7f0d6b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". Predatory <mask> is a class A-II felony, with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony are class B violent felonies, each with a maximum determinate sentence of 25 years, followed by up to 25 years postrelease supervision (see generally Penal Law \u00a7 70.00 et set/.; Penal Law \u00a7 70.45 [2-a]; \u00a7 70.80)."], "id": "fd99c9c0-352e-4ad6-bbc9-c91d1b22546a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Carla Thomas, a sexual-assault nurse examiner with the Pine Bluff Children's Advocacy Center, testified that she completed a sexual-assault examination on D.D. on 3 March 2016 and that the results were indicative of <mask>. D.D. also told Thomas that she had sex with Shaw. On cross-examination, Thomas said that she completed a sexual-assault kit, including a combing of the vaginal area and a DNA swab, and that the kit had been picked up by the police."], "id": "b382707d-1387-4928-bf1b-9993796c5e61", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Dr. Parkin-Joseph explained that her \u201cdiagnosis\u201d was not based on any of her objective findings and instead was based solely on the reports from AB\u2019s mother. Essentially, Dr. Parkin- Joseph\u2019s testimony could be viewed as saying, \u201cBecause AB\u2019s mother said it happened, I too am saying it happened.\u201d This type of testimony is inadmissible. MRE 704 provides that \u201c[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.\u201d Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, however, that \u201can examining physician cannot give an opinion on whether a complainant had been sexually assaulted if the conclusion [is] nothing more than the doctor\u2019s opinion that the victim had told the truth.\u201d People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 255; 934 NW2d 693 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). An examining physician\u2019s testimony is objectionable if, absent evidence qualifying her as an expert in assessing credibility, \u201c[her] opinion was based solely on what the victim had told [her].\u201d People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 109; 387 NW2d 814 (1986). This is because the physician\u2019s testimony lacks a \u201creliable foundation,\u201d and jurors are just as qualified to evaluate the complainant\u2019s credibility. Id. Even so, \u201can examining physician, if qualified by experience and training relative to treatment of <mask> complainants, can opine with respect to whether a complainant had been sexually assaulted when the opinion is based on physical findings and the complainant\u2019s medical history.\u201d Thorpe, 504 Mich at 255."], "id": "60fba00d-6740-4aac-b4c8-436d5ba4150f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Religious Technology Center \u201calong with a network of Scientology organizations that sit underneath [them], including [Celebrity Centre International], make up what is informally known to the public as \u2018The Church of Scientology\u2019 or \u2018Scientology.\u2019 \u201d We collectively refer to the institutional defendants as \u201cScientology\u201d or \u201cthe Church.\u201d Defendant Masterson is an individual member of the Church. Plaintiffs allege both that Masterson was an agent of the Church, and that the Church was an agent of Masterson.2 The Church and Masterson are real parties in interest in this writ proceeding. Plaintiffs Bixler, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, and Riales each allege that Masterson raped them. This, however, is not the gravamen of their complaint in this case; in fact, they state no cause of action against Masterson for <mask>.3 Instead, they allege causes of action against all defendants for stalking"], "id": "0463fb67-a6e3-4726-9982-7aef7385044a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court finds that on January 2, 1965, Patrolman G-iordano received a police call instructing him to go to a certain intersection in Inwood. At a service station at that location he was met by the complainant who stated that he had been robbed and *892had been the subject of a <mask> and that these acts had been committed by a male, whom he described. Accompanied by the complainant, his father, and a probationary patrolman, the officer went to the scene of the alleged attack and there inquired of the owner of a used car business at that location whether he had seen a person answering the description given by the complainant. The owner of the business stated that he had seen such a person a few minutes earlier walking towards Far Rockaway. The time was about 6 o\u2019clock and darkness had fallen. The officer and companions drove toward Far Rockaway and about a quarter of a mile from the area where the incident allegedly occurred saw a man who they thought fitted the description given. The complainant made a positive identification of the defendant who was then standing in front of a laundromat in Far Rockaway. A goodly number of passers-by were moving about in the vicinity. The officer arrested the defendant. He searched the defendant on the sidewalk and found nothing. The defendant was placed in the police automobile and on the way to the police headquarters the officer asked the-defendant if he had a knife. The officer patted the defendant\u2019s clothing and while engaged in doing this the defendant himself withdrew the knife from a shirt pocket. This knife is one of the subjects of this motion."], "id": "e43ea35c-8e21-4ba9-b8c8-485d323892c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The jury convicted Movant of the deviate <mask> charge, and the trial court sentenced Movant, as a prior offender, to seven years' imprisonment. Movant appealed his conviction, which this Court affirmed in State v. Esters, 482 S.W.3d 825 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) ; this Court's mandate was entered on March 23, 2016. Movant prematurely filed his pro se Rule 29.15 motion for PCR on April 13, 2015, while his direct appeal was still pending, which the court accepted as timely-filed pursuant to Rule 29.15(e)3 . Movant was appointed post-conviction counsel on May 4, 2015. Pursuant to Rule 29.15(g), Movant's amended Rule 29.15 motion was due by May 23, 2016; however, the motion court granted Movant's counsel's request for an extension of thirty days to file the amended motion.4 Movant's amended Rule 29.15 motion was timely filed on June 22, 2016. Movant argued in his PCR motion that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make an offer of proof at trial regarding evidence of the drive-by shooting and for failing to object to Victim's outburst and subsequent apology and explanation. The motion court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Movant's Rule 29.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing."], "id": "8806a43d-52ef-4a38-9921-e88ad95bb3bd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The definition of predatory <mask> is unambiguous in its language and intent. In order to be charged with the crime, a defendant must commit one of the four designated violent sexual felonies, along with one of four aggravating factors. The aggravating factor defined by Penal Law \u00a7 130.95 (2) is that the defendant has engaged in conduct constituting any one of the same four violent sexual felonies against one or more additional persons. Nothing in the language indicates that this subdivision of the statute is connected to or dependent upon the next subdivision of the statute. In fact, the subdivisions of the statute that define the four aggravating factors end in the conjunction \u201cor,\u201d which indicates that they are independent factors, commission of any one of which completes the crime of predatory sexual assault. No reasonable interpretation of Penal Law \u00a7 130.95 (2) would find that it is limited to convicted juvenile sexual offenders and defendants with out-of-state violent sexual felony convictions."], "id": "dd499e3b-717f-4e6e-96ce-11f8a25b92a0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child has five elements: (1) a person (2) who is seventeen or older (3) commits a series of two or more acts of sexual abuse (4) during a period of thirty or more days, *782and (5) each time the victim is younger than fourteen. Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 21.02(b) ; Carter v. State , No. 04-15-00319-CR, 2016 WL 2595071, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Indecency by contact with the genitals as alleged in this case is one of the predicate \"acts of sexual abuse\" for the continuous sexual abuse offense and, thus, is a lesser-included offense of continuous sexual abuse. Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 21.02(c), \u00a7 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011); see Soliz v. State , 353 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ; Bleil v. State , 496 S.W.3d 194, 214 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd). Likewise, aggravated <mask> by (a) intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of the sexual organ of a child younger than fourteen or (b) intentionally or knowingly causing the sexual organ of a child younger than fourteen to contact the mouth of the actor are predicate \"acts of sexual abuse\" constituting lesser-included offenses of continuous sexual abuse. Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii) (West Supp. 2016)."], "id": "26e65b75-2a59-4dd4-bcb1-c70651ae6775", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant argues that Penal Law \u00a7 130.95, predatory <mask>, does not apply to the case at bar because the legislature intended it to apply only to \u201cegregious acts of sexual assault\u201d and the instant matter does not satisfy this requirement (defendant\u2019s affirmation at 14). Repeating the traditional definition of \u201cegregious\u201d conduct as that which \u201cshocks the conscience\u201d (id. at 14-15 [citations omitted]), he suggests that the conduct alleged \u201cis not of such a heinous character\u201d as to warrant prosecution under this section (id.).1 He argues, instead, that since the alleged offense is properly encompassed by Penal Law \u00a7 130.35 (1), rape in the first degree, predatory sexual assault must be dismissed."], "id": "5b626bfb-3f0f-49a1-90c4-c2ad3103a1f3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cWe decline to apply the reasoning set forth in Goldberg. Instead, we conclude that the clear intent of section 2801-d was to expand the existing remedies for conduct that, although constituting grievous and actionable violations of important rights, did not give rise to damages of sufficient monetary value to justify litigation.\u201d Instead, the Doe court (at 110) found that the rape of the plaintiffs decedent \u201cis precisely the sort of conduct that [section 2801-d] was designed to target, but recovery for such conduct is often barred for plaintiffs who sue at common law.\u201d In this regard, the Doe court pointed out, claims for <mask> based on negligent hiring, training and supervision usually flounder due to the absence of foreseeability. Because nursing home patients are a particularly \u201cvulnerable population,\u201d the Doe court noted (at 111), the Legislature provided them with an easier route for enforcing rights and holding their caretakers liable. Citing the provision of Public Health Law \u00a7 2801-d (4) that the statutory remedies are \u201cin addition to\u201d other remedies, the Court found (at 112) that \u201c[i]t is precisely because of the inadequacy of the existing common-law causes of action to redress abuse of patients in nursing homes that Public Health Law \u00a7 2801-d was enacted.\u201d Therefore, the Doe court reasoned, the Legislature could not have intended to prevent patients from asserting a statutory claim merely because their common-law claims survived a motion to dismiss. (Id.)"], "id": "ec0b03f8-9a81-463c-afe6-a7626a4886de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cIn this state, evidence that a victim of <mask> promptly complained about the incident is admissible to corroborate the allegation that an assault took place (see, People v Rice, 75 NY2d 929, 931 [1990]; People v Deitsch, 237 NY 300, 304 [1923]; People v O\u2019Sullivan, 104 NY, at 486-487; Richardson, Evidence \u00a7 292 [Prince 10th ed]). Historically, the doctrine evolved from the common-law requirement of \u2018hue and cry,\u2019 where all victims were required to prove they immediately alerted the community that a crime had occurred (State v Hill, 121 NJ 150, 157, 578 A2d 370, 374 [1990]; Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim\u2019s Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 Brooklyn L Rev 1087, 1089 [1988]).\u201d (People v McDaniel, supra at 16.) Prompt outcry is admissible as an exception to what would otherwise be hearsay but testimony concerning the statement must be a concise and accurate representation which does not convey any details except those necessary to elicit the nature of the complaint. (People v McDaniel, supra; People v Green, 298 AD2d 209 [1st Dept 2002].)"], "id": "71513f1d-4a9d-4448-baa1-e21d60a05304", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["cause[d] bodily injury to Melanie Molien by striking [her] head or body with [his] hands, and [he] did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: water, during the commission of said assault. After trial, the jury convicted Appellant of non-aggravated <mask> and of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon while acquitting him of assault/family violence. The jury assessed a seven year sentence for the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction and a ten year sentence, suspended to community supervision, for the sexual assault conviction."], "id": "e3843eea-48fc-470b-956f-3f9fc9258a59", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["J.R.\u2019s mother testified that she was on the porch when J.R. returned home that morning and that J.R., who usually avoided her, sat down on the porch and looked like she wanted to talk. According to J.R.\u2019s mother, J.R. then voluntarily told her what had happened. J.R.\u2019s mother then called the police, who responded to the call at J.R.\u2019s home. Subsequently, J.R. went to the hospital and was treated for <mask>. The responding officers went to the hotel, where they found Dickerson and Jenkins asleep in the hotel room. Both men were arrested."], "id": "30eed2c3-1c2b-42f9-aa47-502c78f45b3b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On the other hand, there are numerous decisions which sustain an arbitrator\u2019s award in reducing dismissal as a punishment for sexual misconduct. In Communication Workers v Southeastern Elec. Coop. (882d 467 [10th Cir 1989]), the court upheld the arbitrator\u2019s decision that an electric *1007company lineman accused of <mask> should be suspended for one month without pay rather than be discharged, noting that the employee\u2019s conduct could be remedied by punishment less severe than discharge."], "id": "0611ea7b-1fec-4142-acdb-7a2c3a0dbe7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["MULLINS, J. The issue before us in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly dis- missed the appeal of the petitioner, Robert Goguen, from the judgment of the habeas court on the ground that he failed in his brief to the Appellate Court to brief the claim that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal pursu- ant to General Statutes \u00a7 52-470 (g).1 The petitioner, proceeding as a self-represented party, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1996 convic- tion, pursuant to a guilty plea, of <mask> in the second degree. The habeas court declined to issue the writ for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner was not in the custody of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction. The petitioner then filed a petition for certification to appeal to the Appel- late Court pursuant to \u00a7 52-470 (g), which the habeas court denied. Notwithstanding that ruling, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, challenging the merits of the habeas court\u2019s ruling declining to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, 195 Conn. App. 502, 503, 225 A.3d 977 (2020). The Appel- late Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the petitioner failed to brief any claim that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. See id., 505. This court then granted the petitioner\u2019s petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court on the following issue: \u2018\u2018Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the self-represented petitioner\u2019s appeal because he failed to brief whether the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal?\u2019\u2019 Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, 335 Conn. 925, 234 A.3d 980 (2020). Our task in this appeal is to harmonize the legislative mandate of \u00a7 52-470 (g) that no appeal may be taken from a habeas court\u2019s judgment unless certification is granted with this court\u2019s interpretation of that statute in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994) (Simms II), which provides guidance on the procedure to be followed when a habeas court denies certification to appeal. In light of the statutory require- ment, we explained in Simms II that, if a habeas court denies certification to appeal, a petitioner may obtain review only if he makes a \u2018\u2018two part showing\u2019\u2019 on appeal: first, as a threshold matter, he must \u2018\u2018demonstrate that the habeas court\u2019s ruling constituted an abuse of discre- tion,\u2019\u2019 and, second, \u2018\u2018[i]f the petitioner succeeds in sur- mounting that hurdle, the petitioner must then demon- strate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.\u2019\u2019 Id. What Simms II leaves unclear is what exactly is required of an appellant to satisfy the threshold showing of an abuse of discretion before plenary review of the merits by a reviewing court is warranted. As we discuss more fully in this opinion, the Appellate Court has concluded in several cases that the petitioner can satisfy the threshold requirement by expressly alleg- ing in his brief that the arguments on the merits of the appeal demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal. Conversely, the Appellate Court has held that, when a petitioner fails to expressly allege or brief that the denial of certification was an abuse of discretion and simply briefs the merits of his underlying claim without any reference to the requirement of Simms II, the petitioner\u2019s appeal must be dismissed. See part I of this opinion. We conclude that, in order to make sense of the statutory requirement and Simms II, a petitioner must at least expressly allege and explain in his brief how the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certifi- cation. We recognize, just as the Appellate Court has, that this may be done by expressly referring the reviewing court to the portion of the brief addressing the merits of the appeal and pointing out that, if the appeal is successful on the merits, then an abuse of discretion necessarily has been demonstrated. The peti- tioner must at least do that, however, in order to comply with the statute and Simms II. The petitioner may not simply disregard the require- ment of Simms II and brief only the merits of the underlying claim without any effort to comply with the \u2018\u2018two part showing\u2019\u2019 required by Simms II, which includes the discrete question of whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification. Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 612. In this appeal, the petitioner never expressly alleged that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. He argued only that the habeas court erred in declining to issue the writ. Accordingly, the Appellate Court\u2019s dismissal of his appeal appropriately adheres to the dictates of \u00a7 52-470 (g) and Simms II and its progeny, and must be affirmed. The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. In 1996, the petitioner was con- victed, after entering a guilty plea, of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) \u00a7 53a-71 (a) (3). The petitioner was sentenced on October 25, 1996, to ten years in prison, execution suspended after four years, and five years of probation. Thereafter, in 1998, the legislature passed legislation, now codified at General Statutes \u00a7 54-250 et seq., requir- ing persons who have been convicted of certain sexual offenses, including the petitioner\u2019s offense, to register as sex offenders. See Public Acts 1998, No. 98-111. The legislation applied to the petitioner because he was released from prison after its effective date. On April 11, 2017, the petitioner, proceeding as a self- represented party, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, among other things, that he should be allowed to withdraw his 1996 guilty plea because, due to ineffective assistance of his counsel, his plea had not been made voluntarily. Specifically, he alleged that, while he was residing in Maine in 2012, he was convicted under federal law of failing to register as a sex offender\u2014a requirement imposed as the result of his 1996 Connecticut conviction.2 He further alleged that, as of the date he filed his habeas petition, he was incarcerated as a result of violating the conditions of supervised release that were imposed on him under federal law as a result of the federal 2012 conviction. Pursuant to Practice Book \u00a7 23-24 (a),3 the habeas court declined to issue a writ for lack of jurisdiction because, at the time that the petitioner filed the petition, he was no longer in the custody of the respondent as a result of the 1996 conviction.4 Although the habeas court did not elaborate on its basis for this determina- tion,5 it is undisputed that neither the petitioner\u2019s term of incarceration nor his term of probation for the 1996 conviction was in effect on the date that he filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court\u2019s judgment pursuant to \u00a7 52-470 (g), which the habeas court denied. Despite the denial of his petition for certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court from the habeas court\u2019s judgment declining to issue a writ of habeas corpus.6 In his brief to that court, the petitioner did not allege that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. He also did not ask the Appellate Court to con- strue his argument on the merits as a demonstration of the habeas court\u2019s abuse of discretion. Instead, the petitioner claimed only that the habeas court had incorrectly determined that he was not in the custody of the respondent and that he should be allowed to withdraw his 1996 guilty plea because it was unintelli- gently and involuntarily made.7 The respondent con- tended in his brief that the habeas court had not abused its discretion in denying the petitioner\u2019s petition for certification to appeal and that it had properly declined to issue the writ. The Appellate Court noted in a per curiam opinion that, under Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994) (Simms I), the petitioner was required, as a threshold matter on appeal, to \u2018\u2018demonstrate that the denial of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 195 Conn. App. 504. The Appellate Court further noted that, to establish such an abuse of discretion, the peti- tioner was required to demonstrate that the habeas court\u2019s resolution of the underlying claim involved issues that \u2018\u2018are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encourage- ment to proceed further.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see, e.g., Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 616 (same). Finally, the Appellate Court noted that it had held previously that, \u2018\u2018[i]f this burden is not satisfied, then the claim that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed does not qualify for consider- ation by [the Appellate] [C]ourt.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goguen v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, supra, 504. Because the petitioner had failed to brief this threshold issue, the Appellate Court declined to review the merits of the petitioner\u2019s claims and dis- missed the appeal.8 Id., 505. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration in which he claimed that the habeas court had abused its discretion when it denied his petition for certification to appeal. In support of this claim, the petitioner argued the merits of his underlying claim that the habeas court had incorrectly determined that he was not in the respondent\u2019s custody. The Appellate Court denied the motion. This certified appeal followed. On appeal to this court, the petitioner contends that his argument in his brief to the Appellate Court concerning the merits of his underlying claim that the habeas court incorrectly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain his habeas petition because he was not in the respondent\u2019s custody \u2018\u2018inherently demonstrate[s] that the habeas court [had] abused its discretion in . . . denying the petition for [certification to appeal].\u2019\u2019 He further con- tends that, because he was proceeding as a self-repre- sented party, the Appellate Court should have liberally construed his brief on the merits as demonstrating that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification for appeal, even though he had not expressly made that allegation. Accordingly, he argues, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that he was not entitled to review of his claims on appeal. The respondent contends that, to the contrary, the Appellate Court correctly determined that it had no authority to entertain the merits of the petitioner\u2019s appeal under \u00a7 52-470 (g), as that statute was construed by this court in Simms I and Simms II. Specifically, the respondent argues that, under Simms II, the petitioner must \u2018\u2018make a two part showing\u2019\u2019 when the habeas court has denied his petition for certification to appeal. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 612. To allow a petitioner to ignore the threshold requirement of dem- onstrating that the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied the petition for certification, the respon- dent argues, would entirely eviscerate the mandate of \u00a7 52-470 (g) that \u2018\u2018[n]o appeal from the judgment ren- dered in a habeas corpus proceeding . . . may be taken unless the appellant\u2019\u2019 petitions the habeas court for certification to appeal and the habeas court grants the petition. We conclude that the Appellate Court prop- erly declined to review the petitioner\u2019s claims and dis- missed the appeal. I Whether the Appellate Court had the authority to review the petitioner\u2019s claims on appeal from the judg- ment of the habeas court when he failed even to allege that the habeas court had abused its discretion in deny- ing his petition for certification to appeal pursuant to \u00a7 52-470 (g) is a question of statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., General Statutes \u00a7 1-2z (plain meaning rule); Canty v. Otto, 304 Conn. 546, 557\u201358, 41 A.3d 280 (2012) (general rules of construction are aimed at ascertaining legislative intent)."], "id": "cd42bff8-ef84-4374-818c-173907d962ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the resentencing hearing, the State argued Fisk's sodomy conviction under Article 125, irrespective of Article 134, required mandatory life sentences under section 12.42(c)(2). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7 12.42(c)(2). The trial court agreed with the State and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court concluded the elements of sodomy under the former version of UCMJ Article 125 were substantially similar to <mask> under section 22.011 of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7 22.011. Under Texas Penal Code section 12.42(c)(2), the trial court again imposed a life sentence for each of Fisk's convictions for indecency with a child."], "id": "176550c5-b88b-443b-adac-40aedc6fe6d5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [" \r \r Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert M. Mandelbaum, J.), rendered September 17, 2018, as amended November 14, 2018, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of two counts of predatory <mask> against a child, three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, three counts of rape in the second degree, seven counts of criminal contempt in the second degree, and one count each of endangering the welfare of a child and attempted assault in the third degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 52 years to life, unanimously modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to the extent of directing that the sentences for the predatory sexual assault convictions be served concurrently, resulting in a new aggregate term of 32 years to life, and otherwise affirmed."], "id": "bb1a4822-9b3c-47d2-95a5-c6e6b2c7a620", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss for appellee. Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ. Freudenberg, J. I. INTRODUCTION Marvin L. Wood appeals from his conviction of first degree <mask> of a child. He asserts the trial court erred by refusing to appoint him a DNA expert, sustaining the prosecu- tion\u2019s objection to further use of a forensic video to refresh the victim\u2019s recollection, and sustaining the State\u2019s relevancy objection to his attempt to adduce the fact that the declarant of certain out-of-court statements was a convicted felon. Wood also makes numerous claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, including the failure to adequately support the motion for a DNA expert, the handling of the State\u2019s DNA evi- dence, and the cross-examination of the victim. We affirm the judgment below. II. BACKGROUND With counsel different from trial counsel, Wood appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of first degree sexual assault of a child pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-319.01(1)(a) (Reissue 2016). Trial counsel did not request that the jury be instructed on a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree assault of a child. The victim was friends with Wood\u2019s daugh- ter, and the assault occurred during a sleepover with Wood\u2019s daughter at Wood\u2019s apartment. The victim was 8 years old at the time of the assault and 9 years old at the time of trial. 1. Motion to Employ Expert Witness Wood was charged in September 2019. Due to laboratory delays in DNA testing, trial was continued to August 3, 2020, with a pretrial conference set for July 2. The DNA test results became available to the defense on June 8. At the July 2 pre- trial conference, defense counsel indicated readiness to go - 397 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WOOD Cite as 310 Neb. 391"], "id": "842c2d57-5a8a-4c20-82e8-8a849077bcad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Booto claims that three specific comments by the trial judge constitute error: (1) the comment to the jury that the trial's late start was Booto's fault; (2) an order for defense counsel to refer to A.P.'s <mask> examination as a \"rape kit\"; and (3) questions the judge personally posed to A.C. about her musical interest. Each will be addressed in turn."], "id": "b4d465e3-3ab1-4dab-ad22-c5ce49280fc6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["assault and then have a pediatrician examine her \u201con a part of her body that isn\u2019t normal for an eight-year-old girl to have examined.\u201d Lastly, the prosecution described the testimony indicating the victim\u2019s changes in behavior and demeanor after the assault. Trial counsel emphasized in closing arguments the burden of proof. Trial counsel pointed out that the victim had told three different stories and that there were multiple inconsistencies in her statements about the alleged assault. In fact, trial counsel had counted the inconsistencies to be \u201cinto the teens.\u201d Trial counsel asserted, \u201cIt\u2019s easy to remember the truth. It\u2019s very hard to remember a lie.\u201d Trial counsel also emphasized that its expert found no injury demonstrating <mask> and that the presence of epithelial cells in underwear worn overnight while in Wood\u2019s \u201cmessy apartment\u201d was not incriminating, given that the cells can be transferred via surfaces."], "id": "1b87f7ee-d3ef-477a-a824-5eec74c65fbc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Heavican, C.J. Yerania O. and Juan P. worked together in the early morn- ings at a grocery store in Lincoln, Nebraska, for approximately 2 years. Yerania quit this job in December 2020, and in March 2021, she sought and obtained an ex parte <mask> pro- tection order against Juan. Yerania\u2019s petition alleged that Juan had \u201c[p]ester[ed]\u201d her at work, verbally and physically, and that he had followed her when she took her children to school and threatened to kidnap Yerania and her children. Juan requested and was granted a show cause hearing on whether the sexual assault protection order should remain in effect, at which hearing he denied Yerania\u2019s allegations and asserted that their relationship had been consensual. After the case was submitted, the district court, sua sponte, filed Yerania\u2019s petition under a new case number, then entered a harassment protection order. The court found that it had jurisdiction and concluded a harassment protection order was - 751 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "effc4d4a-23f2-40b7-9d71-5d85ea17d1be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Here, section 22.011(f) contains objective criteria-\"prohibited from marrying\" the victim-alerting an actor to the type of situation in which a <mask> may be enhanced to a first-degree felony. See id. The fact that Senn could have violated this prohibition in more than one way does not make the statute vague as applied to Senn. Cf. Earls v. State , 707 S.W.2d 82, 86-87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (stating that the fact that a person's conduct violates two parts of a statute or even two different statutes does not make the statute vague as long as the proscribed conduct is described so as to give a person fair notice that it violates the statute); State v. Empey , 502 S.W.3d 186, 193-94 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (holding that section 31.03 did not violate due process and did not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement merely because prosecutor could choose between pursuing alternative but clearly-defined penalties that may apply to the same act of theft). Because section 22.011(f) is general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that the actor will be penalized more harshly if he is prohibited from marrying the victim-as Senn is here, it is not vague as applied to Senn and therefore does not permit arbitrary enforcement. See Colten , 407 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. at 1957 ; Watson , 369 S.W.3d at 871."], "id": "ae39cfa1-ea82-4a89-b10e-e0cdc2ef4858", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant has not addressed the specific criteria set forth in CPL 210.40 (1), but argues, in sum and substance, that the penalty for a conviction of predatory <mask> would be unjust in light of his lack of a criminal record. It is clear, however, that the absence of a criminal record, by itself, is an insufficient basis for granting dismissal in the interest of justice (see People v Varela, 106 AD2d 339, 340 [1st Dept 1984], lv denied 64 NY2d 893 [1985]). Even the \u201c \u2018exemplary\u2019 background\u201d of an individual \u201cdoes not immunize him from the normal processes of the criminal law\u201d {id.). The possibility that a defendant could face a lengthy period of incarceration upon conviction does not present a compelling reason to simply dismiss the charge."], "id": "ec53e6fd-e0c2-49da-8b75-f5bf66cb9407", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The pediatrician testified that she observed during the physi- cal examination \u201can extreme amount of redness and irritated tissue from about 3 o\u2019clock going around to about 9 o\u2019clock on the face of a clock.\u201d She explained, \u201cLots of young girls have redness down there, but this was impressive, much more than you see on a standard exam of a child.\u201d The pediatrician also observed a superficial, vertical lac- eration at about the 9 o\u2019clock position and in the folds of the labia minora adjacent to the vaginal opening. The tissue of the vagina heals very quickly; therefore, she concluded the observed injuries were recent. The victim\u2019s injuries, the pediatrician explained, could have caused bleeding when they first occurred, as well as burning during urination. Further, there would not necessarily be blood on the victim\u2019s underwear given the injuries and reported bleeding. Rather, \u201c[t]he way that it\u2019s hidden up in these tis- sues,\u201d it was possible that \u201cwhen [she] wiped over it, it opened it up again or that that blood had sort [sic] been tucked up in that tissue.\u201d The pediatrician stated the observed injuries could be con- sistent with digital or penile penetration of the vagina. On cross-examination, the pediatrician conceded it was \u201cpossible\u201d the observed injuries were caused by acts that were not \u201ccrimi- nal or nefarious.\u201d 8. Defense Expert Witness The defense called as an expert witness the <mask> nurse examiner, who was also a nurse practitioner with a doctorate degree in nursing. The expert works as the assistant manager of a forensic assessment consultation and treatment program. She had reviewed the police records, a transcript of the forensic interview, the medical records from the hospital, and the medical records from the forensic examination. The expert testified that redness is a nonspecific finding that \u201creally holds no significance to the exam.\u201d She observed no physical injuries from the photographs taken during the examination. - 413 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WOOD Cite as 310 Neb. 391"], "id": "5d049b9b-fb8f-4f23-89db-afa29222fe63", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["(f) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree, except that an offense under this section is a felony in the first degree if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under Section 25.01.1 Appellant argues that this statute differentiates between married and unmarried sex offenders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Appellant is incorrect. The classification at issue in this statute is rationally related to enforcing the prohibition against bigamy and <mask> committed pursuant to a bigamous relationship. As such, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, I concur in the Court's conclusion, though I disagree with its reasoning. However, because the Court chooses to remand the case to the court of appeals rather than address the appropriate standard of review for Appellant's equal protection claim, I respectfully dissent."], "id": "6e1e07b6-c945-4a64-9ff7-321f26839f49", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Reflecting modern thought in attempting to lessen the effects of complaining of a <mask>, a number of jurisdictions have enacted laws which restrict the admissibility of evidence concerning a victim\u2019s prior sexual conduct (see, e.g., Fed Rules Evid, rule 412). Such statutes go far toward making sex crime prosecutions less special, by treating those complaining of sex crimes as equals to complainants in other criminal cases (Government of Virgin Is. v Scuito, supra, at 876, citing Berger, Man\u2019s Trial. Woman\u2019s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum L Rev 1, 97 [1977]). In 1975, New York enacted its own version of a so-called rape shield law,1 and in the State of New York, the general rule is that *282evidence of a victim\u2019s sexual conduct is not admissible in a prosecution for an offense defined in article 130 of the Penal Law (which defines sexual offenses). Four exceptions to the rule are strictly limited, and the fifth, a catch-all, permits the Trial Judge discretion to admit otherwise proscribed evidence of the victim\u2019s sexual conduct where the court finds it \"relevant and admissible in the interests of justice\u201d. To accomplish this the statute requires the Trial Judge to first take an offer of proof by the accused outside of the jury\u2019s hearing or to conduct such other hearing as may be required (CPL 60.42 [5]). The obvious purpose of CPL 60.42 is to bar harassment of victims with respect to irrelevant issues while also keeping from the jury confusing and prejudicial matters which have no proper bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused (Bellacosa [now Judge Bellacosa of NY Ct App], Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws NY, Book 11 A, CPL 60.42, at 564-565). To accomplish this twofold objective, the Legislature attempts to strike a reasonable balance between protecting the privacy and reputation of a complaining witness, while permitting an accused, when it is found relevant, to present evidence of a victim\u2019s sexual conduct (ibid.)."], "id": "79d4bf7c-1aaf-47db-807d-3075080cd465", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child has five elements: (1) a person (2) who is seventeen or older (3) commits a series of two or more acts of sexual abuse (4) during a period of thirty or more days, *782and (5) each time the victim is younger than fourteen. Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 21.02(b) ; Carter v. State , No. 04-15-00319-CR, 2016 WL 2595071, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Indecency by contact with the genitals as alleged in this case is one of the predicate \"acts of sexual abuse\" for the continuous sexual abuse offense and, thus, is a lesser-included offense of continuous sexual abuse. Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 21.02(c), \u00a7 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011); see Soliz v. State , 353 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ; Bleil v. State , 496 S.W.3d 194, 214 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd). Likewise, aggravated <mask> by (a) intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of the sexual organ of a child younger than fourteen or (b) intentionally or knowingly causing the sexual organ of a child younger than fourteen to contact the mouth of the actor are predicate \"acts of sexual abuse\" constituting lesser-included offenses of continuous sexual abuse. Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii) (West Supp. 2016)."], "id": "06747f33-641b-4d71-bbe2-68cd3bf38935", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cwhether a liability insurer is obligated to defend and indemnify its insured . . . in an action brought against the insured based on an alleged <mask> by the insured\u2019s employee. We hold that the alleged assault was an \u2018accident\u2019 within the meaning of the policy, and that the policy\u2019s exclusions for injuries expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured and for bodily injury arising out of body massage do not apply. We therefore hold that the insurer is obligated to defend and indemnify.\u201d In RJC, a hair salon brought an action against its insurer seeking indemnification for a claim against it arising out of the alleged improper sexual contact committed by one of its employees."], "id": "72217dd4-98cc-4e82-b99d-6853797cab5e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Prudholm first compared California's sexual battery statute with Texas's <mask> statute and observed that sexual battery encompassed \"a markedly different range of conduct\" than sexual assault. 333 S.W.3d at 599. California's sexual battery statute criminalized \"touching\" - i.e., physical contact with - an \"intimate part\" - i.e., sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person or the breast of a female - whereas Texas's sexual assault statute criminalized the \" 'penetration or contact' of a person's 'anus' or 'sexual organ[.]' \" Id. Moreover, the sexual battery statute explicitly excluded rape and sexual penetration from its scope. Id. For those reasons, Prudholm held that while the elements of sexual battery and sexual assault might \"be similar in a general sense, they do not display the high degree of likeness required to be substantially similar.\" Id."], "id": "20678b80-9b5b-441d-85fe-822172a11bc8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the outset, we reject defendant's and the trial court's reliance on this court's decision in People v. Walker (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 424 ( Walker ). In Walker , a sheriff's detective had circulated an e-mail about a <mask> that had occurred a week earlier at a downtown San Jose light rail station. The e-mail contained a description of the two suspects and photographs of the suspects taken from a surveillance video. The description of one suspect was: \" '[B]lack male adult, approximately in his 20's, approximately six[-]one, 195, short afro, clean shaven, light complected, appeared unkempt[,] wearing a backpack.' \" The description of the second suspect was: \" '[B]lack male adult, 30's, approximately five[-]five, 195, short hair[,] unkempt with a body odor[,] wearing a black sweatshirt jacket with a hood and black pants.' \" ( Walker , at p. 1378, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 424.)"], "id": "ca865c2b-9aaf-4e90-9824-4cb908e14d31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["After again noting the issues of advocacy by the court, as previously discussed in Sherman, this court explained that the procedure had been insufficient where A.G. had \u201crequested a show cause hearing as to whether a <mask> protection order should remain in effect.\u201d 19 It was not until after the close of evidence that the trial court \u201cbrought up the harassment pro- tection order on its own initiative.\u201d 20 We found that by the time A.G. was aware that the court was considering a harassment protection order in place of a sexual assault protection order, A.G. no longer had the opportunity to present a case that such an order was not warranted. Further, we discussed how the procedure followed by the lower court was not meaningfully different from that of Linda N., a procedure which we found to be inconsistent with due process. We noted, again: Whether a new theory for a protection order is asserted for the first time on appeal or after the close of evidence at the show cause hearing, the respondent does not have an opportunity to defend against the entry of the protec- tion order on the new theory and is denied procedural due process. 21 Because the entry of a harassment protection order did not comply with procedural due process, we reversed entry of the harassment protection order and remanded the cause with directions to vacate it. 22"], "id": "953c0780-5259-4ef3-9e72-593e92f1b7df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The flaws in Dr. Allee's investigation, which formed the basis of her factual findings, illustrate well the significant dangers created by USC's system. This case turned on witness credibility. There are inconsistent accounts from Roe and Doe about whether their sexual encounter was consensual. The only physical evidence is photographs of small bruises on Roe's arms, breast and thigh. That evidence could support either Doe's claim of vigorous consensual sex, or Roe's charge of <mask>. Evaluation of the credibility of the only witnesses to the event was pivotal to a fair adjudication."], "id": "030f771f-2be8-42c5-abff-19ea4ecba38c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On May 31, 2018, the circuit court held the permanency-planning hearing. At the hearing, caseworker Felicia Kirksey explained that an emergency staffing was held on April 3 due to a report from the prosecutor's office that Arazola had requested that the no-contact order be lifted so that she could marry Cordova.1 At the time, Cordova was incarcerated for possession of firearms by certain persons, theft of property, criminal use of a prohibited weapon, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The charges of second-degree <mask> and third-degree domestic battery had been nolle prossed. The Department submitted a court report stating it had received information that Arazola had allowed AA and CA to talk to Cordova on the phone in violation of the no-contact order. Kirskey explained that initially Arazola denied that any phone calls had taken place between her and the children and Cordova, and she denied that she had plans to marry Cordova. Eventually, Arazola admitted that she had spoken to Cordova on the phone between twelve and sixteen times and that the children were involved in some of the phone calls. A transcript of one phone call was submitted to the court, and though it was not dated, Kirksey stated that she believed that the call took place after the emergency staffing because Cordova and Arazola discussed the matters discussed at the staffing. Kirksey testified that Arazola encouraged Cordova to continue to write letters to her and the children under a false name but that she instructed him not to call until after her court date."], "id": "0ef52778-6ea9-4119-a998-08b65774bf86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Sexual Assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*80SI (1) is authorized by the <mask> Reform Act (SARA)1 in conjunction with CPL 200.62. These statutes provide, in substance, that whenever a person is charged with a sex offense as defined in article 130 of the Penal Law, and the victim\u2019s age is not an element of the offense, the indictment may be accompanied by a special information alleging that the victim was in fact less than 15 years old. (CPL 200.62.) If the accused does not concede the victim\u2019s age, it must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (CPL 200.62 [2] [b].)2"], "id": "2e44e717-2f83-4d7d-8279-59b8cf9bf457", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Let me make clear at the outset that I entirely agree that if Mother has incurred expenses for counseling or other treatment for emotional trauma due to the <mask> of her child, she is entitled to assistance from the state Restitution Fund as a \"derivative\" victim ( Gov. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 13950, subd. (a), 13951, subd. (c), (e), 13955, subd. (a)(2), (c), (f),15 13957, subd. (a)(2)16 ) and *189also is entitled to statutory restitution for these economic losses as a \"victim\" as defined by the restitution statute ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 1202.4, subd. (k)(3)(A) ).17 The majority observes there is a reference in the record to several claims for assistance having been submitted to the Restitution Fund. It *328acknowledges, however, neither a copy of these claims, nor any information as to the kind and amount of assistance they request, are in the record. A sentencing court cannot, of course, order statutory restitution without at least some showing as to the nature and amount of loss. (See In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 204, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 635 [no \"evidence in the record\" supported claimed economic loss]; People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 653, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 [claim for burial expenses not supported with documentation or testimony; while \"mention\" of such claim in probation report provided notice to defendant of a potential claim, that did not \"take the place of evidence\"].18 ) In any case, since assistance from the Restitution Fund is limited to economic losses, the claims presumably seek assistance for such losses, which I agree are compensable losses recoverable through statutory restitution. The issue before us, however, concerns restitution for noneconomic losses."], "id": "1407945f-b16b-4975-a1f1-af57383f0d8b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["specifically allege and argue prejudice, because doing so would often require details unlikely to be found in the record or known to the defendant without further inquiry. 53 It is, never- theless, advisable for appellate counsel to specifically argue prejudice if counsel believes the details in the trial record perti- nent to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry are sufficient to adequately review the question. Appellate courts are free to determine on direct appeal the effectiveness of trial counsel on the prejudice prong if the record affirma- tively proves or rebuts the claim on that ground. 54 We conclude that Wood has adequately assigned and argued the issue of his trial counsel\u2019s deficient conduct with respect to the motion for appointment of an expert, but neither the ques- tion of deficiency nor of prejudice can affirmatively be proved or rebutted by the trial record. We have already determined defense counsel\u2019s motion and support thereof was inadequate to compel, under procedural due process, the appointment of a DNA expert. However, defense counsel would only have been constitutionally ineffective in this regard if adequate support actually existed. Wood argues defense counsel could have at least proffered an affidavit by Wood\u2019s appointed expert <mask> nurse examiner. We agree with the State this was unlikely to have made a difference, because her opinions about the need for a DNA expert would fall outside the range of her expertise. But Wood does not limit his allegations to trial counsel\u2019s failure to proffer the sexual assault nurse examiner\u2019s affidavit. For instance, he additionally refers to the possibility, reflected in the discussion at the hearing on the motion, that someone at the Nebraska State Patrol Crime Laboratory had said no male DNA was detected on any of the swabs. See id. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 286 Neb. 556, 837 N.W.2d 543 (2013); State v. Hubbard, 267 Neb. 316, 673 N.W.2d 567 (2004); State v. Cody, 248 Neb. 683, 539 N.W.2d 18 (1995). - 427 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WOOD Cite as 310 Neb. 391"], "id": "03d8306c-c0bc-49e5-b3d1-65bca2490d32", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness\u2019 safety, or inter- rogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 64 In making its ruling, the trial court agreed with the pros- ecution that if the defense was trying to refresh the victim\u2019s recollection in an attempt to impeach her testimony at trial, defense counsel could do so through other means, such as through the testimony of the forensic interviewer. It cited to State v. Molina, 65 in which we held that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to play for the jury a video recording of a witness as extrinsic evidence of an inconsistent statement, because its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. We see nothing amiss in the trial court\u2019s ruling, and we find no merit to Wood\u2019s arguments that seek to avoid the applicable standards pertaining to the trial court\u2019s discretion by framing the error as an act of the guardian ad litem who stopped the victim from watching the video in its entirety, as had been ordered. The court was free to order that the victim watch the remainder of the video, if it had continued to believe that was a reasonable approach. The court did not err in determining it was not. Wood alternatively argues trial counsel was ineffective by apparently abandoning further attempts to refresh the victim\u2019s recollection after the court\u2019s ruling and by having impeached the victim\u2019s every inconsistent statement in an allegedly clumsy manner that Wood argues bolstered the forensic interviewer\u2019s testimony that child victims of <mask> do not always disclose all the details of an assault in a linear fashion. We find these contentions of ineffective assistance of counsel are affirm\u00adatively refuted by the trial record. See State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. 393, 745 N.W.2d 742 (2008). See, also, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). State v. Molina, 271 Neb. 488, 713 N.W.2d 412 (2006). - 431 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WOOD Cite as 310 Neb. 391"], "id": "26fd81be-de4e-4e4e-86e4-5634360bfabe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Section 22.011(f) of the penal code enhances the offense of <mask> from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony \"if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under Section 25.01.\" Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.011(f). Section 25.01 (the bigamy statute) states,"], "id": "61c40715-aa80-43d4-88ff-3c3b023e38bd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court notes that it could find no guidance whatsoever from any appellate decisions on how to charge the lesser inclusory concurrent count in a case, such as this, where the court deems it appropriate to do so. The elements are identical, so there is no way, based upon a strict reading of the statutes, that the jury could ever convict of the lesser crime without convicting on the greater crime as well. It would seem then that, in reality, charging both crimes is simply inviting the jury to engage in nullification, which the court is not permitted to sanction. \u201cWhile there is nothing to prevent a petit jury from acquitting although finding that the prosecution has proven its case, this so-called \u2018mercy-dispensing power\u2019 ... is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by the court\u201d (People v Goetz, 73 NY2d 751, 753 [1988]). On the assumption that defendant will raise this issue again on appeal, the court entreats the Appellate Division to provide some guidance as to how to proceed in a situation, such as this, where the trial court has determined that it is appropriate to charge criminal sexual act in the first degree as an inclusory concurrent count of predatory <mask> against a child."], "id": "f0fb5fa6-b3ff-46be-9772-cc186f4b5b54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["MULLINS, J. The issue before us in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly dis- missed the appeal of the petitioner, Robert Goguen, from the judgment of the habeas court on the ground that he failed in his brief to the Appellate Court to brief the claim that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal pursu- ant to General Statutes \u00a7 52-470 (g).1 The petitioner, proceeding as a self-represented party, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1996 convic- tion, pursuant to a guilty plea, of <mask> in the second degree. The habeas court declined to issue the writ for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner was not in the custody of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction. The petitioner then filed a petition for certification to appeal to the Appel- late Court pursuant to \u00a7 52-470 (g), which the habeas court denied. Notwithstanding that ruling, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, challenging the merits of the habeas court\u2019s ruling declining to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, 195 Conn. App. 502, 503, 225 A.3d 977 (2020). The Appel- late Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the petitioner failed to brief any claim that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. See id., 505. This court then granted the petitioner\u2019s petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court on the following issue: \u2018\u2018Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the self-represented petitioner\u2019s appeal because he failed to brief whether the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal?\u2019\u2019 Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, 335 Conn. 925, 234 A.3d 980 (2020). Our task in this appeal is to harmonize the legislative mandate of \u00a7 52-470 (g) that no appeal may be taken from a habeas court\u2019s judgment unless certification is granted with this court\u2019s interpretation of that statute in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994) (Simms II), which provides guidance on the procedure to be followed when a habeas court denies certification to appeal. In light of the statutory require- ment, we explained in Simms II that, if a habeas court denies certification to appeal, a petitioner may obtain review only if he makes a \u2018\u2018two part showing\u2019\u2019 on appeal: first, as a threshold matter, he must \u2018\u2018demonstrate that the habeas court\u2019s ruling constituted an abuse of discre- tion,\u2019\u2019 and, second, \u2018\u2018[i]f the petitioner succeeds in sur- mounting that hurdle, the petitioner must then demon- strate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.\u2019\u2019 Id. What Simms II leaves unclear is what exactly is required of an appellant to satisfy the threshold showing of an abuse of discretion before plenary review of the merits by a reviewing court is warranted. As we discuss more fully in this opinion, the Appellate Court has concluded in several cases that the petitioner can satisfy the threshold requirement by expressly alleg- ing in his brief that the arguments on the merits of the appeal demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal. Conversely, the Appellate Court has held that, when a petitioner fails to expressly allege or brief that the denial of certification was an abuse of discretion and simply briefs the merits of his underlying claim without any reference to the requirement of Simms II, the petitioner\u2019s appeal must be dismissed. See part I of this opinion. We conclude that, in order to make sense of the statutory requirement and Simms II, a petitioner must at least expressly allege and explain in his brief how the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certifi- cation. We recognize, just as the Appellate Court has, that this may be done by expressly referring the reviewing court to the portion of the brief addressing the merits of the appeal and pointing out that, if the appeal is successful on the merits, then an abuse of discretion necessarily has been demonstrated. The peti- tioner must at least do that, however, in order to comply with the statute and Simms II. The petitioner may not simply disregard the require- ment of Simms II and brief only the merits of the underlying claim without any effort to comply with the \u2018\u2018two part showing\u2019\u2019 required by Simms II, which includes the discrete question of whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification. Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 612. In this appeal, the petitioner never expressly alleged that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. He argued only that the habeas court erred in declining to issue the writ. Accordingly, the Appellate Court\u2019s dismissal of his appeal appropriately adheres to the dictates of \u00a7 52-470 (g) and Simms II and its progeny, and must be affirmed. The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. In 1996, the petitioner was con- victed, after entering a guilty plea, of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) \u00a7 53a-71 (a) (3). The petitioner was sentenced on October 25, 1996, to ten years in prison, execution suspended after four years, and five years of probation. Thereafter, in 1998, the legislature passed legislation, now codified at General Statutes \u00a7 54-250 et seq., requir- ing persons who have been convicted of certain sexual offenses, including the petitioner\u2019s offense, to register as sex offenders. See Public Acts 1998, No. 98-111. The legislation applied to the petitioner because he was released from prison after its effective date. On April 11, 2017, the petitioner, proceeding as a self- represented party, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, among other things, that he should be allowed to withdraw his 1996 guilty plea because, due to ineffective assistance of his counsel, his plea had not been made voluntarily. Specifically, he alleged that, while he was residing in Maine in 2012, he was convicted under federal law of failing to register as a sex offender\u2014a requirement imposed as the result of his 1996 Connecticut conviction.2 He further alleged that, as of the date he filed his habeas petition, he was incarcerated as a result of violating the conditions of supervised release that were imposed on him under federal law as a result of the federal 2012 conviction. Pursuant to Practice Book \u00a7 23-24 (a),3 the habeas court declined to issue a writ for lack of jurisdiction because, at the time that the petitioner filed the petition, he was no longer in the custody of the respondent as a result of the 1996 conviction.4 Although the habeas court did not elaborate on its basis for this determina- tion,5 it is undisputed that neither the petitioner\u2019s term of incarceration nor his term of probation for the 1996 conviction was in effect on the date that he filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court\u2019s judgment pursuant to \u00a7 52-470 (g), which the habeas court denied. Despite the denial of his petition for certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court from the habeas court\u2019s judgment declining to issue a writ of habeas corpus.6 In his brief to that court, the petitioner did not allege that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. He also did not ask the Appellate Court to con- strue his argument on the merits as a demonstration of the habeas court\u2019s abuse of discretion. Instead, the petitioner claimed only that the habeas court had incorrectly determined that he was not in the custody of the respondent and that he should be allowed to withdraw his 1996 guilty plea because it was unintelli- gently and involuntarily made.7 The respondent con- tended in his brief that the habeas court had not abused its discretion in denying the petitioner\u2019s petition for certification to appeal and that it had properly declined to issue the writ. The Appellate Court noted in a per curiam opinion that, under Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994) (Simms I), the petitioner was required, as a threshold matter on appeal, to \u2018\u2018demonstrate that the denial of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 195 Conn. App. 504. The Appellate Court further noted that, to establish such an abuse of discretion, the peti- tioner was required to demonstrate that the habeas court\u2019s resolution of the underlying claim involved issues that \u2018\u2018are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encourage- ment to proceed further.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see, e.g., Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 616 (same). Finally, the Appellate Court noted that it had held previously that, \u2018\u2018[i]f this burden is not satisfied, then the claim that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed does not qualify for consider- ation by [the Appellate] [C]ourt.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goguen v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, supra, 504. Because the petitioner had failed to brief this threshold issue, the Appellate Court declined to review the merits of the petitioner\u2019s claims and dis- missed the appeal.8 Id., 505. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration in which he claimed that the habeas court had abused its discretion when it denied his petition for certification to appeal. In support of this claim, the petitioner argued the merits of his underlying claim that the habeas court had incorrectly determined that he was not in the respondent\u2019s custody. The Appellate Court denied the motion. This certified appeal followed. On appeal to this court, the petitioner contends that his argument in his brief to the Appellate Court concerning the merits of his underlying claim that the habeas court incorrectly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain his habeas petition because he was not in the respondent\u2019s custody \u2018\u2018inherently demonstrate[s] that the habeas court [had] abused its discretion in . . . denying the petition for [certification to appeal].\u2019\u2019 He further con- tends that, because he was proceeding as a self-repre- sented party, the Appellate Court should have liberally construed his brief on the merits as demonstrating that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification for appeal, even though he had not expressly made that allegation. Accordingly, he argues, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that he was not entitled to review of his claims on appeal. The respondent contends that, to the contrary, the Appellate Court correctly determined that it had no authority to entertain the merits of the petitioner\u2019s appeal under \u00a7 52-470 (g), as that statute was construed by this court in Simms I and Simms II. Specifically, the respondent argues that, under Simms II, the petitioner must \u2018\u2018make a two part showing\u2019\u2019 when the habeas court has denied his petition for certification to appeal. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 612. To allow a petitioner to ignore the threshold requirement of dem- onstrating that the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied the petition for certification, the respon- dent argues, would entirely eviscerate the mandate of \u00a7 52-470 (g) that \u2018\u2018[n]o appeal from the judgment ren- dered in a habeas corpus proceeding . . . may be taken unless the appellant\u2019\u2019 petitions the habeas court for certification to appeal and the habeas court grants the petition. We conclude that the Appellate Court prop- erly declined to review the petitioner\u2019s claims and dis- missed the appeal. I Whether the Appellate Court had the authority to review the petitioner\u2019s claims on appeal from the judg- ment of the habeas court when he failed even to allege that the habeas court had abused its discretion in deny- ing his petition for certification to appeal pursuant to \u00a7 52-470 (g) is a question of statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., General Statutes \u00a7 1-2z (plain meaning rule); Canty v. Otto, 304 Conn. 546, 557\u201358, 41 A.3d 280 (2012) (general rules of construction are aimed at ascertaining legislative intent)."], "id": "a05fdb77-b5b8-4884-8f52-a4451d17001d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Mondy's final challenge on appeal is to the court's denial of his request for an alternative-sentencing instruction to the jury. Giving alternative-sentencing instructions is discretionary, but courts must exercise that discretion on a case-by-case basis. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-97-101(4) (Repl. 2016); Miller v. State , 97 Ark. App. 285, 287, 248 S.W.3d 487, 489 (2007). Mondy argues that the court improperly applied a blanket rule of refusing to give alternative-sentencing instructions in multicount cases. We disagree. After reviewing the record, it is clear that while the court considered the fact that the case contained multiple counts, it did not apply a blanket rule but instead treated the issue as one factor in evaluating the propriety of giving such instructions in the present case. The court also considered the fact that Mondy had now been convicted of three counts of <mask> against very young children."], "id": "d9a4ae94-9258-4386-b1dc-f03e5e65dde3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The majority notes Dr. Parkin-Joseph\u2019s acknowledgment that \u201cAB\u2019s allegation of <mask> was not proven or disproven by the medical exam but, nevertheless, the child\u2019s disclosure could still be consistent with child sexual abuse,\u201d and believes that these were \u201cisolated answers\u201d that although \u201cawkward and confusing, they were not inadmissible.\u201d But Dr. Parkin-Joseph\u2019s testimony is contrary to this Court\u2019s decision in People v Del Cid, 331 Mich App 532; 953 NW2d 440 (2020). There, this Court held that \u201can examining physician\u2019s testimony diagnosing a child- complainant with \u2018possible sexual abuse\u2019 is inadmissible without corroborating physical evidence . . . .\u201d This Court explained:"], "id": "2920d0bf-170f-46ed-b71d-14a01a23003c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Any person who has been subject to domestic violence by a present or former family or household member, or who has been the victim of stalking or <mask>, may seek relief under sections 455.010 to 455.085 by filing a verified petition alleging such domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault by the respondent. A family or household member includes persons, such as Petitioner and Respondent, who have resided together in the past. Section 455.010(7). Accordingly, Petitioner filed a verified petition alleging she had been subject to domestic violence. Section 455.010(5) states that domestic violence is \"abuse or stalking committed by a family or household member, as such terms are defined in this section.\" Section 455.010(1)(a)-(f) provides that \"Abuse\" includes but is not limited to the occurrence of any of the following acts, attempts or threats against a person: assault, battery, coercion, harassment, sexual assault and unlawful imprisonment."], "id": "2f64a35c-a9d9-4d1a-babb-880c51cc46f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This is an action to recover damages based on alleged violations of article 15 of the Executive Law of the State of New York (also known as the Human Rights Law) for wrongful discharge because of refusal to accede to sexual advances and <mask> and battery. The factual assertions in the complaint allege that plaintiff was employed by defendants Technical Aid Corporation and Tac/Temps as a salesperson; was sexually harassed by defendant Curtis Stern, her immediate superior, culminating in her wrongful discharge \u201cas a result of plaintiff\u2019s refusal to submit to defendant\u2019s constant sexual harassment and advances\u201d."], "id": "ea5b021e-6054-4031-934c-cc2dea315ce6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As an example, appellant indicates that the continuance would have enabled him to obtain phone records of K.A.T. and that those records might have shown that K.A.T. was not where she claimed that certain instances of <mask> occurred. However, since appellant did not offer such evidence at the hearing on his motion for new trial or in some other manner, we would have to speculate that those records would be relevant and exculpatory."], "id": "478eb3d5-3fd5-4675-a3c5-94a2c692fc1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["However, the Mintiks Court never held, as plaintiff incorrectly contends, that \u201cbecause the woman who was raped and *780murdered did not know the criminal, it was apparent that the rape and murder did not arise out of the deceased employee\u2019s employment\u201d (plaintiffs mem, at 5). Nor is there support in Mintiks (supra) for the bald assertion that the Court \u201crefused to accept a finding that a <mask> and murder arose out of the employee\u2019s work relationship\u201d (plaintiffs mem, at 8), since as noted, the Court, troubled by what it perceived to be an incomplete record, remitted the matter for clarification. (Matter of Mintiks v Metropolitan Opera Assn., 153 AD2d, at 138.) Finally, plaintiff fails to acknowledge the holding of the Mintiks Court that \u201cIn the context of assaults upon an employee, the causal link may be supplied by a work environment which increased the risk of attack\u201d (153 AD2d 133, 137)."], "id": "8ef2fb74-1995-4f68-bc28-1f77cbbd8bd5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["We conclude that the Illinois offense of aggravated criminal <mask> contains elements substantially similar to the Missouri offense of statutory sodomy in the first degree. First, the element of the victim's age-under thirteen in Illinois and under fourteen in Missouri-is very much alike in both offenses. Although the Missouri offense includes one additional age (fourteen-year-olds) and the Illinois offense includes an age-gap provision (excepting offenders who are close in age to their victims) not found in the Missouri offense, the overall class of victims and offenders encompassed by this element of the two offenses are substantially similar. Second, the element identifying the prohibited acts in each offense, although there are some differences, contain several characteristics in common; primarily, both offenses criminalize skin-to-skin touching of the genitals and penetration, however slight, of another's sex organ or anus.9"], "id": "8bfc3ca1-0980-430e-b035-003559391317", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cwhether a liability insurer is obligated to defend and indemnify its insured . . . in an action brought against the insured based on an alleged <mask> by the insured\u2019s employee. We hold that the alleged assault was an \u2018accident\u2019 within the meaning of the policy, and that the policy\u2019s exclusions for injuries expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured and for bodily injury arising out of body massage do not apply. We therefore hold that the insurer is obligated to defend and indemnify.\u201d In RJC, a hair salon brought an action against its insurer seeking indemnification for a claim against it arising out of the alleged improper sexual contact committed by one of its employees."], "id": "4cd52099-fbe6-41b7-9294-3f6b039012cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["That's not quite what's going on in this case, though. Here, there is some indication, both in the text of the statute and in the legislative history, as to why the Legislature drew the distinction it did. As we have said, the literal text of the statute \"is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators (and perhaps the Governor) had in mind when the statute was enacted into law.\"45 As set out above, the text of Penal Code Section 22.011(f), as it enhances the offense of <mask>, reads as follows:"], "id": "c89d592b-904a-4187-8abd-de8ab2a9ddea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Subsequent Court of Appeal decisions, in turn, have refused to allow the recovery of emotional distress damages in the absence of the predicate requirements laid down by our Supreme Court, including in cases where family members sought emotional distress damages based on the molestation or <mask> of another family member. (See, e.g., Steven F. v. Anaheim Union High School Dist. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 904, 906, 911, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 [parents could not recover emotional distress damages against school *352district for teacher's sexual relationship with their daughter]; Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 127-131, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 [sister could not recover emotional distress damages against care facility as either \"bystander\" or \"direct victim\" based on sexual molestation of her sister while a patient in the facility]; Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 838-840, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 748 [sister could not recover emotional distress damages against church as \"bystander\" or \"direct victim\" based on the molestation of her brother].)"], "id": "f2f25ec6-2989-46dc-ba74-34303c662582", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The case was called for trial on October 17, 2016. Before trial began, the State abandoned two of the eight counts alleged. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all remaining counts. After hearing the evidence presented, which included the testimony of K.A.T., as well as the recording of the phone call between K.A.T. and appellant, the jury found appellant guilty of one count of indecency with a child, one count of <mask> of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child. After hearing punishment evidence, the jury returned a verdict sentencing appellant to five years' incarceration and $10,000 fine for the indecency conviction, thirteen years' incarceration and a $10,000 fine for the sexual assault conviction, and forty years' incarceration and a $10,000 fine for the aggravated sexual assault conviction."], "id": "8a20aec0-7f3d-468e-b6d0-502f95548961", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In reviewing a statute for an equal protection violation, we must first determine the level of scrutiny required.73 I dissent from the Court's refusal to answer that question. I also disagree with the Court's resolution of Appellant's challenge to statutory classification at issue through resort to rational speculation rather than first considering the text and history of the statute itself. However, I agree with the Court that the punishment enhancement for <mask> in Section 22.011(f) serves a legitimate purpose because it allows the State to punish more harshly sexual assault committed through a bigamous or polygamous relationship. Absent a showing that the statute significantly interferes with the fundamental right to marry, the statute does not have to be narrowly tailored to its intended goal. If the statute sweeps too broadly, it is up to our Legislature to pick a different broom."], "id": "80d30c8d-2589-434d-8e20-473682ead2e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the indictment now before the court, the evidence presented to the grand jury is sufficient (Jennings, 69 NY2d 103; Jensen, 86 NY2d 248). The defendant confessed to punching the complainant repeatedly in the face, taking her wallet, and inserting his finger in the complainant\u2019s vagina. Since there was no physical injury sustained from the <mask>, the only evidence of a sexual assault came from the defendant\u2019s confession. There is, however, sufficient corroborating evidence *907from the complainant\u2019s testimony to infer that a crime of a sexual nature occurred (Cuozzo, 292 NY 85; Daniels, 37 NY2d 624; Lytton, 257 NY 310). The complainant testified that she was initially struck from behind and knocked into a tree, her assailant began to rip off her clothing, and then she lost consciousness. A reasonable inference of an intent to sexually assault the complainant can be drawn from the defendant ripping off the complainant\u2019s clothing (Jennings, 40 AD2d 357). It is irrevelant, for the purposes of evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, that the defense may be able to argue another purpose for removing the complainant\u2019s clothing (Lipsky at 571). The defendant\u2019s admission, when coupled with the testimony of the complainant, establishes that the defendant intended not only to rob the complainant, but to sexually assault her as well (Daniels at 629; see also Lipsky at 571). While the corroborating evidence does not establish every element of a sexual assault, there is sufficient proof, of some weight, to establish that a crime of a sexual nature occurred (Chico, 90 NY2d 585; Cuozzo, 292 NY 85). Since there is sufficient evidence to show that the defendant did not confess to an imaginary crime (Booden, 69 NY2d 185), the charges are sufficiently corroborated and are best left to a jury (Lipsky at 571)."], "id": "aa1bc3d0-4409-4e0d-bf93-e910f7a41fd1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The jury convicted Robert Charles Moody of three sexual offenses against a child: (1) aggravated <mask> of a child by intentionally or knowingly causing his sexual organ to contact the sexual organ of a child under the age of fourteen; (2) indecency with a child by contact by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual contact with a child under seventeen years of age with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire; and (3) indecency with a child by exposure by intentionally or knowingly exposing his genitals to a child younger than seventeen years of age with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7\u00a7 22.021(a)(1)(B), (2)(B), 21.11(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016). By agreement of the parties, only the aggravated sexual assault of a child was submitted to the jury for punishment. After hearing additional evidence, the jury assessed punishment at twenty years' confinement, and the trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly."], "id": "473ef05f-0238-4989-bfa0-62402acefa52", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Lastly, in Point IX, Mother asserts that the court erred in admitting and relying upon evidence of a <mask> perpetrated against her because the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial. At trial and over Mother's objection, the court allowed the Division to present evidence that Mother was sexually assaulted by a cab driver in June 2016 after she allowed him into her home. In its judgment, the court cited the incident as an example of Mother's making poor and unsafe decisions that could negatively impact Son, which the court determined is a condition of a potentially harmful nature that continues to exist."], "id": "2347bdc8-bc62-4e3f-b4fc-cd74411ca48b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The jury found Appellant not guilty of the digital penetration of Elaine but found him guilty of <mask> by oral contact and of the three counts of delivery of marijuana to minors. After a punishment trial, the jury assessed Appellant's punishment at fifteen years' confinement for the sexual assault and at seven years' confinement for each of the delivery convictions.5 The trial court rendered judgment on the jury's verdicts and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08(a) (West Supp. 2017)."], "id": "1c015304-7d98-4a68-86b9-5cb0965b1e4d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Prudholm first compared California's sexual battery statute with Texas's <mask> statute and observed that sexual battery encompassed \"a markedly different range of conduct\" than sexual assault. 333 S.W.3d at 599. California's sexual battery statute criminalized \"touching\" - i.e., physical contact with - an \"intimate part\" - i.e., sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person or the breast of a female - whereas Texas's sexual assault statute criminalized the \" 'penetration or contact' of a person's 'anus' or 'sexual organ[.]' \" Id. Moreover, the sexual battery statute explicitly excluded rape and sexual penetration from its scope. Id. For those reasons, Prudholm held that while the elements of sexual battery and sexual assault might \"be similar in a general sense, they do not display the high degree of likeness required to be substantially similar.\" Id."], "id": "1e4d9bae-d88a-462d-8991-0390edcb58c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["more appropriate, but did not make specific findings. Juan appealed. We moved the appeal to our docket. We find that the procedure utilized in this case deprived Juan of sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, in violation of his due process rights. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the cause with direc- tions to vacate the harassment protection order. I. BACKGOUND Yerania and Juan worked together at a Lincoln grocery store for approximately 2 years, until December 2020. Their shifts were generally 3 to 7 a.m., and there were typically no other employees present in the store during this time. Both parties were married to other people. In March 2021, Yerania filed a petition and affidavit to obtain a <mask> protection order against Juan. The peti- tion alleged Juan had \u201c[p]ester[ed]\u201d Yerania at work; showed her his genitals; and touched her breasts, genitals, and buttocks \u201cfor several weekends.\u201d It also alleged Juan forcibly kissed Yerania and forced her to touch his penis while they were in a walk-in cooler. According to Yerania, Juan followed her when she took her children to school and threatened to kidnap both her and her children. Yerania alleged that she was very afraid and did not feel safe working alone with Juan. The same day Yerania\u2019s petition was filed, the district court entered an ex parte sexual assault protection order against Juan. Approximately 2 weeks later, Juan filed a request for a hear- ing on the protection order. After several delays, a hearing was held on May 14, 2021. At the hearing, Yerania testified through an interpreter. Yerania admitted that she did not understand English; that the allegations contained in the typed, English portion of her petition were \u201cuncertified\u201d; and that they were translated with the help of a friend. Over Juan\u2019s objection, the petition and affidavit were admitted into evidence; the court noted that the English portion of the petition is what it had relied on in entering its ex parte order due to a \u201clanguage barrier.\u201d - 752 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "b9c8a991-b7ff-43e2-bb52-9c0dae3ec073", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["(c) Fundamental Fairness and Advocacy by Court Yerania has suggested that the language of \u00a7 28-311.11 sufficiently made clear the court may issue a harassment pro- tection order rather than a <mask> protection order if such is deemed appropriate based on the facts in the petition, affidavit, and evidence presented at a show cause hearing and that thus, Juan\u2019s rights were not violated because he was given a show cause hearing on the matter. But even if Juan had himself understood that \u00a7 28-311.11, as amended, granted the court authority to consider a different form of protection order as the result of evidence provided at the show cause hearing, after such hearing had concluded, and even when an ex parte order had already been entered, his due process rights would still have been violated. [5] With its amendments, \u00a7 28-311.11(8) grants the court authority to consider an alternative protection order, even after the show cause hearing has concluded and without a request by the petitioner, as long as it makes specific findings. To satisfy the requirement of specific findings, the court must set forth the reasoning for its order, explaining why its conclusion is appropriate; specific findings cannot be satisfied by simply quoting the statutory language. 26 Here, the district court did not make specific findings: Within the harassment protection order entered against Juan, it included a statement of general findings, i.e., that it had jurisdiction of the parties and the sub- ject matter and that \u201ca Harassment Protection Order is more appropriate,\u201d but left blank the portion of the form in which the court is apparently meant to enter its specific findings. Such failure to make specific findings, on its own, is already enough to warrant a reversal of the protection order entered against Juan. See, Castellar Partners v. AMP Limited, 291 Neb. 163, 864 N.W.2d 391 (2015); Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). - 765 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "8afd8ad3-0cee-4166-9e70-9553b972174d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant in this case has offered what could be considered compelling grounds in support of his position that he should be released on bail while he pursues an appeal from his criminal conviction. Seeking such relief from this court, he asserts that \u201cit is within this Court\u2019s jurisdiction under CPL \u00a7 460.50, 460.60 and 510.30, in this Court\u2019s discretion and in the interest of justice to stay sentence pending appeal and release [him] ROR or at least at the bail previously imposed prior to trial\u201d (Reply Affidavit, at 6). Unfortunately for him, this State\u2019s Legislature has determined that individuals convicted of certain serious <mask> crimes against children \u201crepresent! ] * * * an insular group\u201d as to whom \u201cthe entitlement of postconviction bail\u201d shall not be extended (see, Matter of Gold v Shapiro, supra, 62 AD2d at 65, 68). Since \u201c[t]he determination of which offenses shall be bailable [after conviction] is primarily a question for the Legislature,\u201d8 which has \u201cabsolute [ly] bar [red]\u201d this court from releasing defendant under any conditions pending the appeal from his conviction, the merits of his application may not be considered, and defendant\u2019s motion is denied in all respects (see, id. at 68)."], "id": "0693e0c7-29ed-4337-aef6-bb1e02a4c463", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Sexual Assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Bureau of Justice Statistics, the statistical agency of the U. S. Department of Justice, in its National Crime Victimization Survey dated August 1995, indicates that about 500,200 rape/sexual assaults were reported by women in 1992-1993.7 The Bureau of Justice gives the comparable figure for men as 48,500. Mezey and King, in Male Victims of <mask> (at 1 [1992] [hereinafter Mezey and King, Male Victims of Sexual Assault]), estimate rape of men to be 5-10% of total rapes reported. The American Medical Association, bringing attention to an epidemic of sexual assault, recently reported that males are the victims in 5% of reported sexual assaults. (NY Times, Nov. 7, 1995, at 21, col 1.)"], "id": "b2617dc4-adbb-42b2-b7bd-d58151865a1d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["attended, \u201c\u2018interfering with [her] educational experience.\u2019\u201d 16 An ex parte <mask> protection order was entered against A.G., who then requested a show cause hearing on whether the sexual assault protection order should remain in place. After the close of evidence at the hearing, the trial court stated that the sexual assault protection order would not remain in effect, but that it would \u201center a protection order.\u201d 17 The trial court subsequently dismissed the sexual assault protection order and, after sua sponte filing D.W.\u2019s petition and affidavit under a new case number, entered a harassment protection order in that case. On appeal, we held that the respondent, A.G., was not pro- vided with sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard and that the entry of the harassment protection order had violated A.G.\u2019s right to procedural due process. In our analysis, we discussed and distinguished both Linda N. and Sherman. We stated: \u201cInherent in both Linda N. and Sherman is a recogni- tion that a respondent in a protection order proceeding must be notified of the grounds upon which a protection order is sought and provided with an opportunity to respond to those grounds at the show cause hearing.\u201d 18 In accordance with reasoning supplied by the Linda N. and Sherman opinions, we found that A.G. was not provided with sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding a harassment protection order. The original petition, ex parte order, and show cause hearing had all either alleged a sexual assault or focused on whether the sexual assault protection order entered against A.G. should remain in place. D.W. did not request a harassment protection order or make allegations sufficient to give notice that she sought such an order, and no evidence could be identified at the show cause hearing that tended to show A.G. harassed D.W. Id. at 44, 926 N.W.2d at 654. Id. at 43, 926 N.W.2d at 654. Id. at 50, 926 N.W.2d at 657. - 761 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "c402674c-188e-4abc-8a4c-da1efc941a62", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Docket No. 159493, Jordan Smits filed an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against the same defendants in May 2017, alleging workplace harassment in violation of the ELCRA; negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligence, gross negligence, and wanton and willful misconduct. Smits later filed a second complaint against Morse individually, alleging <mask> and battery, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct. Smits was employed as a paralegal at the firm. In December 2015, she attended the firm\u2019s Christmas party. At the party, according to Smits, Morse approached her from behind and grabbed her breasts. Smits reported the assault to human resources, but no action was taken. Smits later resigned and declined to accept two weeks\u2019 severance pay in exchange for signing a nondisclosure agreement. Defendants moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, citing the MDRPA, which Smits had signed when she began working for the firm. The trial court, Daniel A. Hathaway, J., granted defendants\u2019 motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable and that Smits\u2019s claims were related to her employment and therefore subject to arbitration. Smits appealed in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, JANSEN, P.J., and BECKERING, J., (O\u2019BRIEN, J., dissenting), consolidated all three cases and affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of Smits\u2019s complaint against Morse individually but reversed the circuit court rulings in the other two cases. 327 Mich App 375 (2019). The Court of Appeals majority concluded that plaintiffs\u2019 claims of sexual assault were not subject to arbitration because sexual assault was not \u201crelated to\u201d plaintiffs\u2019 employment. Further, the Court of Appeals stated that the fact that the alleged assaults would not have occurred but for plaintiffs\u2019 employment with the firm did not provide a sufficient nexus between the terms of the arbitration agreement and the alleged sexual assaults. The Supreme Court granted defendants\u2019 application for leave to appeal. 504 Mich 962 (2019)."], "id": "60b8bc49-648f-4437-bd83-dd9522737e34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was indicted, inter alia, for various crimes relating to a <mask> in 1992. The People moved, prior to trial, for leave to introduce evidence on their direct case concerning the underlying facts and circumstances of sexual misconduct by the defendant in connection with the defendant\u2019s 1982 burglary convictions. The court ruled that the People could introduce evidence with respect to four prior incidents in which the defendant had used force to sexually abuse women. The defendant then abandoned his consent defense, and the People did not introduce the evidence concerning the prior sexual misconduct. The defendant contends that the ruling \"forced\u201d him to abandon his defense that the complainant consented to his sexual advances, and thereby constituted reversible error."], "id": "d4818d85-3b58-4121-a14c-be1e8780db3f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant Michael Ray Senn sexually assaulted and impregnated his eighteen-year-old mentally-disabled biological daughter Brenda.1 A jury convicted Senn of <mask>, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment after his conviction was statutorily enhanced from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony under Texas Penal Code section 22.011(f).2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.011(f) (West 2011). In four issues, Senn challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to trigger the enhancement, the constitutionality of section 22.011(f) as applied to him, and the absence of a bigamy instruction from the jury charge. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.3"], "id": "e60ccd18-f964-4759-af6a-086b634eb291", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Under a plain reading of section 22.011(f), a <mask> may be enhanced to a first-degree felony when the victim is a person (1) whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or (2) with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under section 25.01. See id. \u00a7 22.011(f). Section 22.011(f)'s phrase \"prohibited from marrying\" is not modified by the phrase \"under Section 25.01\"; there is no comma preceding \"under Section 25.01\" to indicate that it was intended to modify the preceding clauses and not just the last one. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. \u00a7 311.011(a) (West 2013) (requiring courts to construe words and phrases \"according to the rules of grammar and common usage\"); Ludwig v. State , 931 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that \"[g]enerally, the presence of a comma separating a modifying clause in a statute from the clause immediately preceding is an indication that the modifying clause was intended to modify all the preceding clauses and not only the last antecedent one\" and presuming that this convention of punctuation applies equally to phrases as to clauses); William Strunk, Jr. & E.B. White, The Elements of Style 30 (4th ed. 2000) (\"Modifiers should come, if possible, next to the words they modify.\"); Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Modern American Usage 431 (1998) (\"When a word refers to an antecedent, the true antecedent should generally be the closest possible one.\"). Moreover, a comparison of the text of section 22.011(f) to the text of section 25.01 reveals that section 25.01 defines the offense of bigamy using the phrases \"purports to marry\" or \"lives with ... under the appearance of being married.\" See Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 25.01(a). Section 25.01 does not include the phrase \"prohibited from marrying.\" See id. Thus, under both a plain reading of the statute-applying the rules of grammar, and a comparison of the language used in section 25.01-looking to other provisions within the statutory scheme, it is clear that the phrase \"prohibited from marrying\" is not tied to the phrase \"under Section 25.01.\" The State was therefore not required to show that Senn was engaged in a bigamous relationship with Brenda under section 25.01 in order to trigger application of penal code section 22.011(f)'s enhancement provision."], "id": "9976efa5-6c04-4740-b2d3-4cd383b7ede1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["We interpreted the statutory exception for facilities which are \"not in fact open to the public\" in Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas City, Missouri School District , 372 S.W.3d 43 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). In Subia , an elementary-school student alleged that a school district's failure to protect the student from sexual harassment and <mask> in the school \"constituted sex discrimination that deprived him of the full, free, and equal use and enjoyment of the School District's elementary school, a public accommodation.\" Id. at 46."], "id": "baa700f8-8ea2-484d-a356-50a937c67f8a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Judicial acceptance of a syndrome associated with <mask> is not limited to cases involving rape or attempted rape. People v Taylor (supra) is authority for the recognition of a child sexual abuse syndrome where a female child was sodomized or otherwise sexually abused, but not raped. (People v Califano, 216 AD2d 574, 575, Iv denied 86 NY2d 791; People v Sansevero, 185 AD2d 256; People v Knupp, 179 AD2d 1030 [syndrome recognized but conviction reversed because expert testimony introduced to prove crime took place].)"], "id": "9662840c-d401-4806-b605-3ddc02eeeb9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In reviewing a statute for an equal protection violation, we must first determine the level of scrutiny required.73 I dissent from the Court's refusal to answer that question. I also disagree with the Court's resolution of Appellant's challenge to statutory classification at issue through resort to rational speculation rather than first considering the text and history of the statute itself. However, I agree with the Court that the punishment enhancement for <mask> in Section 22.011(f) serves a legitimate purpose because it allows the State to punish more harshly sexual assault committed through a bigamous or polygamous relationship. Absent a showing that the statute significantly interferes with the fundamental right to marry, the statute does not have to be narrowly tailored to its intended goal. If the statute sweeps too broadly, it is up to our Legislature to pick a different broom."], "id": "7f9d2743-0e08-46db-ae65-35bfae42e2ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["McDaniel was initially charged with four counts of first-degree <mask> of the same minor victim for two acts that occurred in June 2015 and two acts that occurred in July 2015. The first two counts were nolle prossed by the State because the alleged sexual acts occurred outside the Thirteenth Judicial District. McDaniel was subsequently charged in the second amended information with two counts of first-degree sexual assault for engaging in sexual intercourse and/or deviate sexual activity with the victim, M.F., on July 6 and July 8, 2015. He was convicted on the first count and acquitted on the second count."], "id": "96754797-6cdb-4c13-be0e-58f58446b88f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss for appellee. Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ. Freudenberg, J. I. INTRODUCTION Marvin L. Wood appeals from his conviction of first degree <mask> of a child. He asserts the trial court erred by refusing to appoint him a DNA expert, sustaining the prosecu- tion\u2019s objection to further use of a forensic video to refresh the victim\u2019s recollection, and sustaining the State\u2019s relevancy objection to his attempt to adduce the fact that the declarant of certain out-of-court statements was a convicted felon. Wood also makes numerous claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, including the failure to adequately support the motion for a DNA expert, the handling of the State\u2019s DNA evi- dence, and the cross-examination of the victim. We affirm the judgment below. II. BACKGROUND With counsel different from trial counsel, Wood appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of first degree sexual assault of a child pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 28-319.01(1)(a) (Reissue 2016). Trial counsel did not request that the jury be instructed on a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree assault of a child. The victim was friends with Wood\u2019s daugh- ter, and the assault occurred during a sleepover with Wood\u2019s daughter at Wood\u2019s apartment. The victim was 8 years old at the time of the assault and 9 years old at the time of trial. 1. Motion to Employ Expert Witness Wood was charged in September 2019. Due to laboratory delays in DNA testing, trial was continued to August 3, 2020, with a pretrial conference set for July 2. The DNA test results became available to the defense on June 8. At the July 2 pre- trial conference, defense counsel indicated readiness to go - 397 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WOOD Cite as 310 Neb. 391"], "id": "feadc6d6-b30d-4004-95a1-ea5493d99008", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> protection order \u201con its own initiative\u201d raised questions as to the source of the harassment protection order theory, stating: The trial court appears to have correctly sensed that there was something standing in the way of its entering a harassment protection order in the case filed by D.W. We can discern no other reason why the trial court would take the puzzling step of sua sponte refiling D.W.\u2019s initial petition under a new case number and then entering the harassment protection order in that case. 39 There is a danger that by sua sponte selecting an alternate the- ory and form of protection order by making specific findings, but without a request by the petitioner, a court may erroneously act as an advocate for the petitioner. Simply put, the amendments made to \u00a7 28-311.11 in 2019 and since that time do not relieve courts of their duty to ensure the due process described by this court in D.W. and Linda N. and by the Court of Appeals in Sherman. To avoid future due process violations, courts faced with similar circumstances should continue to utilize the procedure as laid out by Sherman: When presented with a situation in which an ex parte protection order has been entered, but at the hearing, it becomes apparent that the matter may more prop- erly be considered as a different type of protection order than the type previously entered ex parte, the judge should explain the requirements for each type of protection order and allow the petitioner to choose which theory to pursue. If the peti- tioner chooses to pursue an alternative theory to the petition and affidavit filed, and the respondent objects, the court should inquire if the respondent is requesting a continuance, which should be granted if so requested, while leaving the ex parte protection order temporarily in place. Here, Juan was not provided with sufficient notice inform- ing him of the court\u2019s authority to consider a harassment D.W. v. A.G., supra note 15, 303 Neb. at 51, 52, 926 N.W.2d at 658. - 768 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports YERANIA O. v. JUAN P. Cite as 310 Neb. 749"], "id": "680aed53-951d-4afa-b445-8ce04693e4c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Wood assigns that the district court erred when it (1) denied his motion that a DNA expert be appointed, (2) refused to allow Wood to refresh the victim\u2019s recollection by having her watch the video of her forensic interview, and (3) prohibited Wood from asking the victim\u2019s mother if Price, who was Wood\u2019s employer, was a convicted felon. Wood assigns that trial counsel was ineffective in (1) fail- ing to request a lesser-included instruction of attempted first degree <mask> of a child, (2) \u201cFailing to Investigate the Case Fully,\u201d (3) presenting \u201cVirtually No Evidence in Support of his Motion to Employ an Expert Witness and for Payment of the Same,\u201d (4) failing to object to \u201cClearly Irrelevant and Unduly Prejudicial Testimony About DNA Testing Results with No Statistical Significance,\u201d (5) failing to object to the biologist\u2019s \u201cTestimony\u201d regarding the Y-STR DNA testing conducted by her supervisor, (6) offering exhibit 20, (7) \u201cin - 415 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WOOD Cite as 310 Neb. 391"], "id": "47b2372f-6c10-46c1-a8b9-2cc2b6b0151b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA person is guilty of predatory <mask> when he or she commits the crime of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, as defined in this article, and when: . . . \u201c2. He or she has engaged in conduct constituting the crime of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, as defined in this article, against one or more additional persons[.]\u201d Defendant\u2019s first contention is that the People fail to state a crime or offense in counts twelve through fifteen of the indict*785ment. Since the four counts in question are uniformly worded and defendant\u2019s arguments on this point are exactly the same for each, an analysis of one count will be sufficient to address them all."], "id": "4a122c07-ee6d-4f2d-b09b-fb489c67d26e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Substantively as well, the City's approach to the privilege issue is flawed. The City relies primarily on the fact that Gilleon's initial group text was sent to third parties as support for the proposition that the entire subject of the <mask> investigation was never intended to be confidential. The fact that the sexual assault case was first discussed in a group text certainly suggests that the text itself was not confidential, but it hardly follows that Hoover's subsequent private conversation with Gilleon was not in confidence."], "id": "ea648a3f-13f4-416e-b33b-5d94daf8e025", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"Any adult who has been subject to domestic violence by a present or former adult family or household member, or who has been the victim of stalking, may seek relief under section 455.010 to 455.085 by filing a verified petition alleging such domestic violence, stalking, or <mask> by the respondent.\" Section 455.020. \"As such, a full adult protection order may be entered only upon proof that the petitioner was: (1) subjected to abuse by a present or former adult family or household member or (2) subjected to stalking.\" H.K.R. v. Stemmons , 295 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009)."], "id": "28eb2f14-3176-4bf9-83da-9deb2c6ac297", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This case presents a somewhat unique set of circumstances. Unlike some others (compare In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 592, 283 Cal.Rptr. 732 ), here we know exactly what was and was not disclosed when the City elected to question Hoover regarding her phone call with attorney Gilleon. We have the transcript of the March 22 interview. Reviewing that transcript, there is nothing Hoover said during the interview that could \"likely be used advantageously against\" her in her case against the City. ( Gregori , supra , 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 309, 254 Cal.Rptr. 853.) Hoover told the investigators she gave Gilleon no information about the <mask> case. And although she acknowledged that Gilleon provided her with some information, she could not specifically identify what that information was because she had learned so many more details from the public press, particularly the Voice of San Diego article."], "id": "f1ba0ddf-ef1c-4d1e-b9f9-5fff491a4054", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of <mask> in the first degree and risk of injury to a child, sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assis- tance. Following a trial, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition, concluding that trial counsel\u2019s performance was not deficient. Thereafter, the habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court correctly concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that his trial counsel\u2019s performance was deficient: the habeas court reasonably concluded that the petitioner did not overcome the presumption that his trial counsel had familiarized himself with topics germane to child sexual assault cases, as the petitioner failed to present credible evidence that his counsel had failed to achieve a reasonable degree of familiarity with various materials relevant to child forensic interview protocol, disclosure literature and validation criteria; moreover, this court could not second-guess on appeal the court\u2019s credibility determinations regard- ing trial counsel\u2019s testimony that he had retained an expert, S, to assist with the defense, and the petitioner did not overcome the presumption that trial counsel\u2019s decision regarding what topics to develop during the examination of S and which topics to reserve for cross-examination of the state\u2019s expert witnesses was based on sound trial strategy. Argued November 29, 2021\u2014officially released February 8, 2022"], "id": "08fae5ab-9843-4d33-b966-327dc5dfc846", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["(b) Sentencing The presentence investigation (PSI) report considered by the court prior to sentencing was 400 pages. It showed as Blake\u2019s adult criminal history a recent conviction in another case, case No. CR 18-846, for attempted first degree <mask>, the conviction for assault in case No. CR 19-914 that was part of the plea bargain agreement, two prior convictions for third degree assault, and a conviction for disturbing the peace. Blake had earned his diploma through the GED program and completed a \u201cDBT skills program\u201d while incarcerated. A review of misconduct reports showed Blake \u201croutinely violates the rules.\u201d Blake described himself as a \u201csex addict.\u201d However, he denied having committed the attempted sexual assault for which he was being sentenced. The PSI report demonstrated that Blake has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder, adolescent antisocial behavior, mood disorder, \u201cADHD,\u201d borderline intellectual functioning, post- traumatic stress disorder, schizophreniform disorder, and oppo- sitional defiant disorder. An evaluation completed in November 2019 showed Blake was in the \u201cvery high or high-risk range\u201d to reoffend. The PSI report showed Blake had become a state ward at the age of 9. Blake reported he was physically abused by his father and had experienced sexual abuse in some of his \u00adout-of-home placements. Before his removal from his parents\u2019 home, Blake \u201cwalked in on [his parents] having sex \u2018all the time,\u2019\u201d because they did not lock their door and he did not have his own room. In his placements as a juvenile, Blake had a history of inappropriate sexual behavior toward younger peers. This - 778 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BLAKE Cite as 310 Neb. 769"], "id": "e020d8bc-0c03-4bac-82c7-32eaca16ee9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["specifically allege and argue prejudice, because doing so would often require details unlikely to be found in the record or known to the defendant without further inquiry. 53 It is, never- theless, advisable for appellate counsel to specifically argue prejudice if counsel believes the details in the trial record perti- nent to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry are sufficient to adequately review the question. Appellate courts are free to determine on direct appeal the effectiveness of trial counsel on the prejudice prong if the record affirma- tively proves or rebuts the claim on that ground. 54 We conclude that Wood has adequately assigned and argued the issue of his trial counsel\u2019s deficient conduct with respect to the motion for appointment of an expert, but neither the ques- tion of deficiency nor of prejudice can affirmatively be proved or rebutted by the trial record. We have already determined defense counsel\u2019s motion and support thereof was inadequate to compel, under procedural due process, the appointment of a DNA expert. However, defense counsel would only have been constitutionally ineffective in this regard if adequate support actually existed. Wood argues defense counsel could have at least proffered an affidavit by Wood\u2019s appointed expert <mask> nurse examiner. We agree with the State this was unlikely to have made a difference, because her opinions about the need for a DNA expert would fall outside the range of her expertise. But Wood does not limit his allegations to trial counsel\u2019s failure to proffer the sexual assault nurse examiner\u2019s affidavit. For instance, he additionally refers to the possibility, reflected in the discussion at the hearing on the motion, that someone at the Nebraska State Patrol Crime Laboratory had said no male DNA was detected on any of the swabs. See id. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 286 Neb. 556, 837 N.W.2d 543 (2013); State v. Hubbard, 267 Neb. 316, 673 N.W.2d 567 (2004); State v. Cody, 248 Neb. 683, 539 N.W.2d 18 (1995). - 427 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WOOD Cite as 310 Neb. 391"], "id": "6765160c-838e-4ba6-a53a-ce534585f6e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As noted by the Court of Appeals, \u201cThe term of art, accidental injury, lacks a statutory definition\u201d (Matter of Johannesen v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 84 NY2d 129, 136, supra). Plaintiffs argument that rape is not a compensable injury within the purview of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law is unsupported in this context by the cited cases which plaintiff purports stand for this assertion. In Joshua S. v Casey (206 AD2d 839), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in granting a motion made by defendant employer to dismiss a claim of sexual abuse under the doctrine of respondeat *779superior, held that the alleged <mask> by its employee was not within the scope of employment and could not be said to have been in furtherance of the employer\u2019s business. Similarly, in the cited First Department case of Nicollette T. v Hospital for Joint Diseases/Orthopaedic Inst. (198 AD2d 54), workers\u2019 compensation was not an issue and the Court, in affirming dismissal of the complaint, held that the employee\u2019s acts fell outside the scope of his employment. Equally unavailing is plaintiffs reliance on Noto v St. Vincent\u2019s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. (160 AD2d 656) or Curtis v City of Utica (209 AD2d 1024). All of these cases deal with the employer\u2019s liability for intentional tortious acts committed by an employee, and are irrelevant in this context. None support the plaintiffs contention that rape, as an intentional act, cannot be considered an accidental workplace injury."], "id": "19301789-e94e-476f-b5ef-a3657e26a96b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Under a plain reading of section 22.011(f), a <mask> may be enhanced to a first-degree felony when the victim is a person (1) whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or (2) with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under section 25.01. See id. \u00a7 22.011(f). Section 22.011(f)'s phrase \"prohibited from marrying\" is not modified by the phrase \"under Section 25.01\"; there is no comma preceding \"under Section 25.01\" to indicate that it was intended to modify the preceding clauses and not just the last one. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. \u00a7 311.011(a) (West 2013) (requiring courts to construe words and phrases \"according to the rules of grammar and common usage\"); Ludwig v. State , 931 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that \"[g]enerally, the presence of a comma separating a modifying clause in a statute from the clause immediately preceding is an indication that the modifying clause was intended to modify all the preceding clauses and not only the last antecedent one\" and presuming that this convention of punctuation applies equally to phrases as to clauses); William Strunk, Jr. & E.B. White, The Elements of Style 30 (4th ed. 2000) (\"Modifiers should come, if possible, next to the words they modify.\"); Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Modern American Usage 431 (1998) (\"When a word refers to an antecedent, the true antecedent should generally be the closest possible one.\"). Moreover, a comparison of the text of section 22.011(f) to the text of section 25.01 reveals that section 25.01 defines the offense of bigamy using the phrases \"purports to marry\" or \"lives with ... under the appearance of being married.\" See Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 25.01(a). Section 25.01 does not include the phrase \"prohibited from marrying.\" See id. Thus, under both a plain reading of the statute-applying the rules of grammar, and a comparison of the language used in section 25.01-looking to other provisions within the statutory scheme, it is clear that the phrase \"prohibited from marrying\" is not tied to the phrase \"under Section 25.01.\" The State was therefore not required to show that Senn was engaged in a bigamous relationship with Brenda under section 25.01 in order to trigger application of penal code section 22.011(f)'s enhancement provision."], "id": "48e966ff-ce36-49cb-b504-7b3a3f9c0f5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["A.P. went to the hospital and underwent a <mask> exam. The examining nurse detected a tear in A.P.'s vagina that was consistent with a sexual assault. Meanwhile, Officer Tom Meiers spoke with Booto and Booto expressed his desire to be in a relationship with A.P. because he believed he loved her. Booto recounted how they went to A.P.'s dorm room where he kissed and touched her, removed her clothing, and had sexual intercourse with her."], "id": "25d3884c-2b7f-462a-9485-011ca81aab3f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681 et seq. ) (Title IX), forbids sex-based discrimination in all schools, colleges and universities that receive federal funding. (See 20 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1681 -1688.) Title IX does not specifically address <mask>, but the United States Supreme Court has held that a school may be liable for discrimination and face, among other things, a loss of federal funding, if it mishandles a student's sexual assault claim. (See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ . (1999) 526 U.S. 629, 633, 647-648, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839.)"], "id": "af64ee4f-6161-4e68-8241-44b3ce08f88d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["R.H. testified that she met petitioner at her church. She testified that religion was important to her and that she told petitioner prior to October 7, 2018, that \u201c[b]ecause of [her] faith,\u201d she \u201cwas waiting until marriage to have sex.\u201d As to the events of October 7, 2018, she testified she had made plans to meet petitioner at Ritter Park but they ultimately got in the car to drive around. Thereafter, petitioner anally raped her. R.H. testified that she told her Bible study leader, Janna Salyers, about the <mask>. She then told her parents and ultimately reported the incident to law enforcement. Defense counsel cross-examined R.H. about how she came to know petitioner and their budding relationship. Petitioner\u2019s counsel also cross-examined R.H. about text messages between petitioner and R.H. that discussed God and living a Christian life."], "id": "54213b4e-41c0-4445-a59e-e0a712ec25be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Sexual Assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Count I: Aggravated <mask> of a Child Count II: Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Count III: Indecency with a Child by Sexual Contact Count IV: Indecency with a Child by Sexual Contact Count V: Indecency with a Child by Sexual Contact Count VI: Indecency with a Child by Sexual Contact Count VII: Indecency with a Child by Sexual Contact The State concedes the evidence only supports six counts in the indictment; and, that this court should reform the judgment to enter a judgment of acquittal as to count VII."], "id": "f767d866-6f30-4aef-b385-8339b4f356d2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["McCreary informed Stricklin that after he told them what happened she could help him get his affairs in order and tried to persuade Stricklin to tell her what happened. Stricklin said, \"Tell me I ain't going to jail tonight.\" Officer Minze responded, \"I can't do that.\" Stricklin said, \"Tell me I can get out tomorrow.\" Officer Minze responded, \"That would be whatever bond they set. I mean, if you go, I can't tell you that.\" Stricklin said, \"I want to know you're, what exactly is I'm being charged with right now? What exactly are you charging the person that did this with right now?\" Officer Minze stated it would be <mask>. Stricklin said, \"I want tomorrow to get my affairs in order. Please?\" Officer Minze responded, \"I can't promise you that. I mean, you'll have bond.\" Stricklin asked if he would get a public defender if he admitted to causing Victim's injury and Officer Minze told him he would get a public defender if he did not have the means for an attorney. Stricklin stated, \"[i]f that's what it takes to keep her out of trouble,\" then admitted he accidently put his finger in Victim's vagina. Stricklin said Victim was crying in the middle of the night and he found her in the closet with her diaper around her ankles so he picked her up, tripped over a toy, fell, and when he did, his finger went inside Victim's vagina. He said he did not see any blood."], "id": "0dd5bbe4-7cae-406e-8d5f-50c298f22a85", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Sexual Assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["on or about October 28, 2016, did then and there, while knowing that he was required to register with the local law enforcement authority in the county *907where the defendant resided or intended to reside for more than seven days, to-wit: Waller County, because of a reportable conviction for Aggravated <mask> of a Child, the defendant failed to report a change in Online Identifiers to the Waller County Sheriff's Office. Odom filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, challenging Article 62.0551(a) as facially unconstitutional for five reasons. At the hearing on the habeas petition, Odom's counsel stated that Odom was moving forward on only two grounds-his First Amendment and overbreadth arguments, both of which the trial court rejected."], "id": "000541ec-9037-4c97-82e5-e2bf64adbd1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-356 provides that if a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for second-degree <mask>, the court shall order a sex-offender *483screening and risk assessment.6 This statute provides that the court may order sex-offender screening and a risk assessment if a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for any offense with an underlying sexually motivated component (i.e., fourth-degree sexual assault).7 Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-356(b)(2) further provides that the court may require that a juvenile register as a sex offender upon recommendation of the sex-offender-assessment committee and following a hearing.8 Regarding issues of statutory interpretation, this court has stated the following:"], "id": "5e7eb991-a17c-4769-a413-20f6f80e8b10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Inmates have a due process right secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that entails reasonable protection from acts of violence and <mask> perpetrated by fellow inmates. Prison officials have a correlative duty to exercise \u201creasonable care to prevent prisoners from intentionally harming others or from creating an unreasonable risk of harm.\u201d (Woodhous v Commonwealth of Virginia, 487d 889, 890; Penn v Oliver, 351 F Supp 1292; Van Horn v Lukhard, 392 F Supp 384.)1"], "id": "a1641762-05ad-46ba-9a92-e0813c94ccbb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Miles v. State , 468 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015), aff'd on other grounds , 506 S.W.3d 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016), the judgment recorded that the defendant had been convicted of <mask> \"of a child 14-17 years of age\" and compelling prostitution \"less than 18 years of age.\" On appeal, the defendant argued that the judgment should be reformed because the Penal Code only authorized convictions for \"sexual assault\" and \"compelling prostitution.\" Id. at 736-737. The court disagreed, holding that these phrases accurately described the offenses and that these statutes criminalize different types of conduct which have varying defenses and punishments. Id. at 737-738. The court specifically held that there was no authority for the proposition that a judgment had \"to include only the title of the offense identified in the Penal Code.\" Id. at 738. Similar results and reasoning are found in several cases which, while without precedential value, are instructive. See e.g., Rodriguez v. State , No. 14-15-00339-CR, 2016 WL 4922608, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (declining to reform judgment for \"assault-family member\" to \"assault\" because *509defendant failed to provide any reason compelling such reformation); Ayles v. State , No. 01-10-00049-CR, 2011 WL 941259, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that trial court did not err by entering judgment for \"Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Under 14\" rather than \"Aggravated Sexual Assault\"); Torres v. State , No. 01-09-00936-CR, 2011 WL 148055, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 13, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding trial court did not err by entering judgment for \"burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft\" rather than \"burglary\"). The thread that runs through these cases is based on the concept that so long as the judgment includes \"an accurate description of the offense\" then pedagogical precision is not required. See Davis v. State , 501 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Under this standard, the offense described in the judgment in the case before us is not incorrect and is, therefore, no error."], "id": "3326a9c5-571d-4a12-a45e-57eebfc48a45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Sexual Assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On June 28, 2015, two days after the alleged assault, Jane was medically examined by the Santa Barbara County <mask> Response Team (SART). She reported the sexual assault to campus police, but declined to divulge the identity of the suspect or location of the sexual battery. On June 30, 2015, Jane's complaint was sent to UCSB's Title IX office. The office attempted to contact Jane for further information, but she did not respond and the file was closed."], "id": "b56c5324-e1da-4491-8764-e4f46aebcbaf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant was indicted for the <mask> of Elaine by digital penetration, alleged to have occurred on February 24, 2015, and for the April 6, 2015 sexual assault of Elaine by oral contact, both of which occurred when she was younger than seventeen. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.011(a)(2). He was also indicted in three counts for the March 29, 2015 delivery of marijuana to Mary, Elaine, and Christy, who were all younger than eighteen at the time. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. \u00a7 481.122(a)(1)."], "id": "c1b71f89-e534-4694-b683-76de4e662072", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court\u2019s implicit finding that defendant\u2019s <mask> on AB caused physical injury requiring medical treatment was not clearly erroneous. Although Parkin-Joseph testified that such an infection is not abnormal for \u201clittle girls\u201d and not necessarily indicative of sexual abuse, the presence of the infection could be evidence of an assault. On the basis of this testimony, coupled with the temporal closeness of the sexual assault and infection, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the sexual assault caused the infection. Accordingly, the trial court properly assessed 10 points for OV 3. See McDonald, 293 Mich App at 298 (affirming the trial court\u2019s assessment of 10 points for OV 3 because the evidence \u201cestablished that the victim suffered an infection as a consequence of the rape.\u201d )."], "id": "5aec6767-236b-4e5e-a999-d1012a9ea0fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["affidavit had been executed by the defendant more than 45 days before the filing of the notice of appeal and, Neb. Ct. R. App. P. \u00a7 2-101(B)(4) (rev. 2015), in effect at the relevant time period, stated: The clerk of the district court shall within 2 business days of receipt of a notice of appeal send the following items to the Clerk of the Supreme Court: .... (4) [A] copy of the application to proceed in forma pauperis and accompanying poverty affidavit which has been executed no more than 45 days prior to the filing of notice of appeal[.] II. BACKGROUND Brandon L. Blake presents a new direct appeal from his plea-based conviction and his sentence for attempted <mask> in case No. CR 19-527. Blake\u2019s appellate counsel is different from his trial counsel. 1. Postconviction Proceedings In pro se motions filed February 11, 2020, Blake alleged his plea in case No. CR 19-527 was the result of ineffective assist\u00ad ance, that counsel was ineffective in failing to present mitigat- ing evidence at sentencing relating to Blake\u2019s mental health, and that his attorney denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel by refusing his request to file a direct appeal. He asked for appointment of counsel. The State summarized these allegations as presenting two claims: whether counsel was ineffective for failing to uncover and present evidence of Blake\u2019s mental health and whether counsel denied Blake his right to a direct appeal. The State argued that the trial record affirmatively showed trial counsel was not ineffective on the first claim but that it was insufficient to determine the second claim. Following a hearing, the court ordered, on June 12, 2020, that counsel be appointed for Blake with respect to his claim that he was deprived of his direct appeal. The court scheduled - 774 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BLAKE Cite as 310 Neb. 769"], "id": "9b11e109-0bb4-44e5-bc05-29588779affa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "sexual assault", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Hoover does not object to questions by the investigators about the initial group text from Gilleon that mentioned the <mask> investigation. Although this was clearly a \"communication between client and lawyer\" ( \u00a7 954 ), it was presumably not \"confidential\" because Hoover knew it was shared with a number of other individuals. (See \u00a7 952 [communication is made \"in confidence\" if transmitted \"by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons ....\"].) She instead focuses on the investigators' inquiries regarding her subsequent phone call to Gilleon."], "id": "26e98397-e3d3-4b9e-838a-7cfb19c17380", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Holt v Sarver (309 F Supp 362, affd 442d 304), relied upon by the defendants, the Federal court had in fact found an Eighth Amendment violation by the Arkansas penal system based upon evidence that prisoners were tortured by guards, required to perform jobs so onerous that some preferred solitary confinement, were murdered, often blackmailed by prisoner-guards, and in general severely mistreated. While homosexual <mask> was a factor, it was by no means the only one, in the court\u2019s decision."], "id": "55d86463-6d8d-4f6b-92e9-238a2c081e6f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The first prong is subjective; it requires a determination of whether the defendant had the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary to avert death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, <mask>, or forcible sodomy. The factfinder is required to place itself in the shoes of the defendant, determine the point of view which the defendant had at the time of the incident, and \"view the conduct of the [victim] with all its pertinent sidelights as the [defendant] was warranted in viewing it.\" State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 238, 850 P.2d 495, 504 (1993) (quoting State v. Tribett, 74 Wash. 125, 130, 132 P. 875 (1913)). Evaluating the evidence from a subjective point of view ensures that the factfinder \"fully understands the totality of the defendant's actions from the defendant's own perspective.\" Id. at 239, 850 P.2d at 505."], "id": "03803468-1a81-49e3-8dfe-11bd5a5b24a0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["For example, in Apodaca v. People (Colo. 1985) 712 P.2d 467 ( Apodaca ), the trial court refused to rule in advance of the defendant's testimony on whether the defendant's prior military conviction for <mask> was unconstitutionally obtained and therefore inadmissible for impeachment purposes. ( Apodaca , at p. 469,.) The defendant presented two witnesses but did not testify in his own defense. ( Apodaca , at p. 470.) Because Luce involved only a federal rule of procedure and not a constitutional issue, the Apodaca court found the Luce rule barring appellate review \"neither compelling nor applicable\" when the defendant raises \"an issue of constitutional dimension-that is, whether the trial court's refusal to rule on the defendant's motion to prohibit prosecutorial use of prior conviction evidence until such time as the prosecution actually sought to impeach the defendant constituted an impermissible burden on the defendant's constitutional right to testify in his own defense.\" ( Apodaca , at p. 473, fn. 9.)"], "id": "41906aa0-df50-4a7e-a135-0e6454aaeb54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["A state police lab sent vaginal swabs from a <mask> victim to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory (Cellmark); Cellmark sent back a DNA profile. ( Williams v. Illinois , supra, 567 U.S. at p. 59, 132 S.Ct. 2221.) Earlier (as a technician ultimately testified), she had personally developed a DNA profile from the defendant's blood and entered it into a state database. ( Id . at pp. 59, 123, 132 S.Ct. 2221.)"], "id": "2a2a7e2a-0965-4157-982d-783baf2abc95", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The jury was instructed as to the elements of <mask> (count 2) and forcible oral copulation (count 3) in concert pursuant to CALCRIM Nos. 1000, 1001, 1015 and 1016. In addition, the jurors were instructed concerning the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) kidnapping qualifying circumstance in compliance with CALCRIM No. 3179 : \"If you find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 2 and/or 3, you must then decide whether, for each crime, the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant kidnapped Diane [ ]. You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime. [\u00b6] To decide whether the defendant kidnapped Diane [ ] please refer to the separate instructions that I have given you on kidnapping. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this additional allegation. [\u00b6] The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.\""], "id": "c37600e8-8330-459c-818e-e6cd4f7a8de9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Gerard E. Delaney, J. The defendant has been indicted for the crimes of <mask> in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 130.35), sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 130.65) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 265.01). He seeks omnibus relief, inter alia, suppression of identification testimony. It is the decision of this court that under Manson v Brathwaite (432 US 98), Neil v Biggers (409 US 188) and recent New York case law (infra), an improper \"civilian\u201d identification process, conducted by nonlaw enforcement personnel may, in a proper case, constitute a \"grounds\u201d for *172suppression of such evidence under CPL 710.20 (subd 5) and 710.60."], "id": "4b244a59-8184-4725-8ca2-399c7526cd04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It seems to this court a matter of how far the rule should be extended. So far, it has been extended by the Court of Appeals only to crimes included in the <mask> itself. It could be that further extension will be mandated. Lacking appellate determination and direction, however, this court will not so far extend it for the reasons stated."], "id": "48c5f1fb-10a0-41b8-8aa2-f9d8c0c819ab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On August 20, 2014 Dr. Allee concluded her investigation and issued her summary administrative review. Dr. Allee observed, \"Although the complainant did not recall many of the events from approximately 2 am until 3:30 or 4 am, she stated that she had spoken to [Emily, Sarah, and Andrew] to help reconstruct that time.\" Dr. Allee noted Jane reported \"there was a long-haired person always near me with a USC shirt,\" and Dr. Allee inferred that person was John because the elevator camera footage showed he \"had long hair and was wearing a cardinal-colored USC t-shirt and khaki shorts.\" As part of the investigation, Dr. Allee considered the witness statements, the two photographs of John's clothing, records of Jane's phone calls and text messages, Jane's photographs of her apartment, elevator security camera footage,20 the DPS and LAPD reports, and the verification of services letter from the <mask> treatment center. Dr. Allee summarized the witness statements and found John violated the student conduct code."], "id": "7047f765-968b-404b-bb18-b7479f360a2a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The language of the statute under which the second count of the indictment was framed, is as follows: \u201c Every person who shall be convicted of an assault with the intent to commit any robbery, burglary, <mask>, manslaughter, or any other offense, punishment for which assault is not hereinbefore prescribed, shall be punished by imprisonment in a State prison for a term not exceeding five years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine, not exceeding $500, or by both such fine and imprisonment.\u201d (2 R. S., 666, \u00a7 39; 3 id. [6th ed.], 938, \u00a7 49.) We think that under this statute the offense was sufficiently charged in the second count of the indictment."], "id": "55e812ea-80eb-4fb0-94fc-62ad748bb73f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["With regard to the alleged problem of fabricated complaints, there is no evidence to suggest that this either will or will not occur. However, it is clear that in light of the social stigma associated with <mask> most women, even wives, would not wish to be publicly identified as a rape victim. \u201cThe one thing that has not happened, and which I stressed in my testimony to (the California) Senate Judiciary Committee, is that embittered and vengeful wives are not rushing to their District Attorney to falsely claim rape in order to gain leverage on their husbands in a divorce. Victims are very reluctant to report the crime.\u201d (Letter from Peter F. Sandrock, Jr., District Attorney, Benton County, Ore, to The Women\u2019s History Research Center, Berkeley, Cal [July 7, 1980].)"], "id": "c3d9c169-fbe9-486a-94c0-59f904cddb4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, plaintiff has offered to prove her contention that employees of defendant DePaul acted in concert to \"cover up\u201d her disclosures of <mask> in the Churchville home. However, in view of the fact that plaintiff has come forth with no evidence of any rape, the alleged improprieties in defendant\u2019s handling of patient records would not rise to the level of creating a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety."], "id": "f97d7f60-ccfe-48af-8e6a-4af878acbd38", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The information also alleged numerous sentencing enhancements against appellants. Enhancement allegations arising from the sexual assault and robbery included those against Chioma for inflicting great bodily injury on Reynolds (\u00a7 667.61, subd. (d)(6) ), against Edwards for Chioma's infliction of great bodily injury on Reynolds in the course of Edwards's violation of section 288a, subdivision (d) (in-concert oral copulation with force and fear) (\u00a7 667.61, subds. (e)(7) and (d)(6) ), and against both Chioma and Edwards for personal use of a firearm (\u00a7\u00a7 667.61, subd. (e)(3), 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b), and 12022.53, subd. (g) ). If found true by the jury, these enhancements would mandate that appellants each serve a sentence of at least 25 years to life on count 1 (forced oral copulation in concert), count 3 (forcible <mask> in concert), and count 4 (forcible rape in concert). (\u00a7 667.61, subds. (c)(3) & (c)(7).)"], "id": "db3deebd-0e62-47f5-939d-f3db41c0e4b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Ronald Brouillard pled guilty to child pornography offenses involving the <mask> and molestation of his granddaughter, begin- ning when she was two years old, and the possession of 19 videos and more than 1,500 images that depicted child pornography. The investigation also revealed that Brouillard had molested his step- great-niece, who was eight years old. For this horrifying conduct, the district court sentenced Brouillard to a total of 960 months in prison, which was the sentence recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. 1 Brouillard appeals his sentence on the ground that it is sub- stantively unreasonable. He contends that the district court failed to adequately consider various mitigating factors, including his re- morse, abusive parents, stable employment, acceptance of respon- sibility, old age (72 at sentencing), poor health, and low risk of re- cidivism. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer- ential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Brown, 772"], "id": "766ee633-be31-480b-8016-166faeec9c3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*469I am informed by counsel for defendant that provision of an adequate police force in its various projects would have been an excessively heavy economic burden. My response to that argument is that it is high time that they assumed that burden. What system of mathematics can we use to balance financial limitations with the tortures suffered by this young soul during her half-hour ordeal ? How can we equate a dollars and cents philosophy with the physical agonies suffered by her until a merciful death extinguished all pain in this defiled and broken body? Notice there was here in overwhelming measure. The number of recorded crimes in this one project brought to this court\u2019s attention reveal it as a lawless jungle, a paradise for criminals. Most startling of all, it is an acknowledged fact that one-half hour before the incident involving the Bass girl, another child, seven years of age, residing in the same building, just barely avoided a similar fate. Defendant takes no issue with these statistics, does not deny that it was the recipient of notice of these conditions in embarrassing abundance. It takes refuge in what it considers settled law \u2014 that exposure of defenseless and innocent occupants in these projects to these hazards is a necessary concomitant to life in a housing project and that their potection is beyond its province and no part of its obligations. There was no question here whether there would be a robbery or a <mask> or an assault, or any other crime against person or property on an almost daily basis. The only question was who would be the next target."], "id": "a861f892-ef2c-4731-b965-dd9e5030d052", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Eugene L. Nicandri, J. Before the court is an application by counsel for the parents of Katherine Hawelka for leave to make an oral statement at the time of sentencing of the defendant. She was killed in the course of an attempted <mask>. On August 13, 1987 the defendant entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree and is scheduled for sentencing on September 11, 1987. The defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to murder in the second degree was entered without any promise or commitment as to what his *624sentence would be. A presentence investigation was ordered at the time of his plea."], "id": "08e822c8-229c-4b26-9450-ddbc499c91d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["No doubt, the jurors impliedly found that the movement of Diane increased the risk of harm to her. As noted, the jurors were instructed on the charge of kidnapping for the purpose of <mask> or oral copulation pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1203. The jurors were instructed, \"The movement must have increased the risk of physical or psychological harm to that person beyond that necessarily present in the *557rape or oral copulation.\" As instructed, in order to convict defendant of aggravated kidnapping within the meaning of section 209, subdivision (b)(1), the jurors were required to find the movement increased the risk of harm to Diane. As we have noted, after January 1, 1998, an increase in the risk of harm was an essential element of section 209 subdivision (b)(1) aggravated kidnapping. Thus, the jury impliedly found that there was an increase in the risk of harm because of the lengthy asportation that occurred in our case. (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 438, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388 [\"[A] trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not prejudicial if, as here, the jury necessarily resolved the factual question adversely to the defendant under other instructions.\"]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 99, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23 [\"By finding the firearm-use allegation to be true, the jury impliedly found that defendant was a direct participant, or, at a minimum, that he aided the robbery with the requisite intent.\"].) Thus, the sole prejudicial error issue that remains relates to the \"substantial\" increase in the risk of harm element in section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2). While deciding the aggravated kidnapping charge in count 4, the jurors impliedly found that there had been an increase in risk of harm during the lengthy asportation."], "id": "b8ba4369-6de2-4d2c-9f49-0d75b2cbacfa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe Grand Jury of the County of Kings by this indictment, accuses the defendant of the crime of Predatory Sexual Assault [Penal Law \u00a7 130.95 (2)] committed as follows: \u201cThe defendant, on or about May 14, 2011, in the County of Kings, committed the crime of <mask> in the First Degree and engaged in conduct constituting Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree, namely: contact between the penis of the defendant and the mouth of [M.B.].\u201d Courts have long recognized that the indictment as a document \u201chas traditionally served several purposes .... First . . . an indictment [is] considered . . . the necessary method of providing the defendant with fair notice of the accusations made against him [in order to allow him] to prepare a defense.\u201d (People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 594 [1978].) Second, the indictment \u201cprovides some means of ensuring that the crime for which the defendant is brought to trial is [the] one for which he was indicted by the Grand Jury [and not] some alternative seized upon by the prosecution [based upon] subsequently discovered evidence\u201d (id.). Third, the indictment specifies the crime or crimes for which the defendant has been tried so as to avoid any issue of double jeopardy (id. at 595; see also People v Spann, 56 NY2d 469 [1982]; People v Martinez, 52 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 791 [2008])."], "id": "b3fabc49-dfff-4074-847c-84d3fc92a09e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["For instance, if one engaged in the commission of a burglary should lull another, even without design to effect death, the crime would undoubtedly come under this subdivision and would be murder in the first degree. So if the prisoner, while engaged in the commission of this <mask>, had strangled some person other than the girl in order to prevent that person\u2019s interference, and had thus killed such person without design to effect death, the crime would have come within this same subdivision."], "id": "32ae6185-16ea-43cf-9032-bf4364b1f778", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In any event, no expert, no matter how qualified, would be permitted to conclusively evaluate the complainant\u2019s mental state at trial. Expert testimony informs but does not preempt the jury\u2019s evaluation of the evidence. (See, e.g., People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d 81 [1995] [expert testimony is not required to prove mental incapacity of <mask> victim].) Expert testimony before this court would be superfluous because the evaluation of witness credibility is the sole province of the trier of fact. In this case, the jury was denied opportunity to make this judgment."], "id": "e324c1e4-0e78-4aae-9a39-b4f02aeed2aa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Respondent took her action pursuant to DOCCS regulations, 9 NYCRR 8005.20 (c) (6). This provision first recognizes that, under Executive Law \u00a7 259-i (3) (f) (x): \u201cA decision within these guidelines may be made by the presiding officer as a final and binding decision for all categories of violators, other than those serving sentences for felony offenses under article 125, 130, 135 or 263 of the Penal Law or section 255.25 thereof.\u201d The excepted categories of offenses include homicide, kidnapping, and sex crimes, which comprise <mask> in the first degree of which petitioner was convicted. (Penal Law \u00a7 130.35.) For violators convicted of these offenses, section 8005.20 (c) (6) fails to recognize that, under the governing statute, \u201ca hearing officer who is not a Parole Board member may \u2018fix\u2019 time assessments without Board approval, regardless of the underlying conviction.\u201d (May-*176field v Evans, 93 AD3d at 105.) Instead, the regulation requires that"], "id": "8b399db4-11b7-4d0c-bc89-d4be141f598a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On the count alleging incest, the jury was instructed, in substance, that the gravamen of the offense was an act of intercourse with a relative within the prescribed line of consanguinity. The jury was further instructed that if <mask> was to be the basis for *882a finding of incest, corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix was necessary and that if mutual consent to an act of sexual intercourse was to be the basis for such a finding, there would also have to be corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, since under such circumstances the half sister would be an accomplice. While there was no exception to the charge and it is not directly challenged, or is it even the subject of comment by the defendant on this motion, its accuracy is nonetheless involved in the defendant\u2019s contention that the jury\u2019s verdict is contrary to law because an incestuous act presupposes mutual consent."], "id": "1a303724-c524-49e6-8902-00c70b93a033", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Therefore, the question must logically turn to a determination of what efforts the People have made in attempting to locate the defendant, and what chance exists that the defendant, if located, could or would be returned to the jurisdiction to face the charges. To that end, Detective Hess testified at length regarding his efforts to find Mr. Cruz. In addition to visiting the defendant\u2019s last known address and place of employment, the detective sent letters, met with the Freeport Police, went to New York City to interview witnesses and ultimately determined, in all likelihood, where the defendant *291was. In regard to his efforts to secure the defendant\u2019s return from the Dominican Republic, Detective Hess testified that he made several phone calls to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the United States Attorney\u2019s Office to inquire about the existence of extradition treaties and procedures to follow in attempting to secure the defendant\u2019s return from the Dominican Republic. When asked to summarize those efforts, Detective Hess\u2019 response to questioning by the People was, \u201cNo luck so far.\u201d When questioned further by defense counsel, Detective Hess was more specific in his responses as to who he had spoken with at the FBI and the name of the Assistant United States Attorney and the dates of those conversations. He also indicated during his testimony that he was aware of an extradition treaty that exists between the United States and the Dominican Republic, that he was aware that <mask> was an offense included in that treaty, and that he had never formally applied to the Governor, the State Department or the Department of Justice for an extradition warrant. He then reiterated his position that he had no luck thus far, and was still waiting to hear back from someone."], "id": "bde95a9c-c2a6-489d-9760-fe265baaeca1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our decision in Kennedy v. State , 411 S.W.3d 873 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013), controls the resolution of this appeal. In Kennedy , the trial court granted Kennedy's petition to have his name removed from Missouri's sexual offender registry in connection with two convictions for statutory <mask> in the second degree under section 589.400.3(4) and .7. Id. at 874-75. Although not specifically addressed in the opinion, it appears that Kennedy's requirement to register under federal law for these two convictions had expired. Id. at 878 n.6 (\"Both parties concede that Kennedy was required to register as a sex offender under federal law for his convictions of second-degree statutory rape.... In fact, Kennedy specifically acknowledged 'since [he] was previously required to register as a sex offender under federal law for his convictions of statutory rape in the second degree, he is required to register as a sex offender [under section] 589.400.1(7).' \"). In reversing the trial court, we stated:"], "id": "2b496539-64f5-4a9f-a97b-2f2ae306e14f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["With the above rule in mind, let us examine again what the situation is in this particular case. The facts are admitted to be the same. It is not now charged that the defendant committed <mask> but attempted rape. If rape were charged, then it would appear clearly that additional facts must be proved to constitute that crime than the facts admitted to constitute the misdemeanors and that the facts as to the crime of rape had never been passed upon or adjudicated. The felony charged here, however, is an attempt to commit rape."], "id": "1ae74712-d65f-4d53-aabf-4f94ed164557", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". The need for judicial intervention in this area of the law was to discourage the perceived prosecutorial practice of trying to \"balloon\u201d the potential severity of sentences for <mask>, robbery, and/or assault offenses by combining them with a kidnapping charge (and hopeful conviction) since, under the Penal Law prior to its 1967 revision, the latter was punishable by substantially more than any of the former."], "id": "e29050c4-477e-448a-bf8b-ded28dc91bb9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["T.C.A. \u00a7 39-13-518(b)(1), (2). Multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child means engaging in three or more incidents of sexual abuse of the same child on separate occasions, or engaging in five or more incidents of sexual abuse of two or more different children on separate occasions. Id. \u00a7 39-13-518(a)(1)(A)(i), (iii). <mask> of a child and aggravated sexual battery both qualify as sexual abuse of a child. Id. \u00a7 39-13-518(a)(2)(C), (D). As relevant here, subsection (e) sets out that the jury must unanimously agree that the defendant:"], "id": "1c1c1dc7-201f-4843-b757-f2191677b5e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Thereafter, petitioner was able to obtain the vacatur of two of the three prior convictions (two burglary convictions in York County, Pennsylvania), as the basis for a multiple felony sen*864tence, and on October 14, 1952 he was ordered returned to this court for resentence. (Wyoming County Court, Conable, J.) On February 18, 1953 he was arraigned for resentence, and, a jury having determined that petitioner was the same person previously convicted in Philadelphia on October 11, 1938 of the crime of assault with intent to commit the crime of <mask>, he was on February 26, 1953 resentenced as a second felony offender to from 25 to 40 years on the rape conviction and to from 5 to 15 years on the immoral practices conviction."], "id": "6995b8e5-4867-493f-a969-19da89360dc8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to Mr. Moreland, similar sentences were imposed as to counts 2, 3 and 4. However, Mr. Moreland had been subject to a prior serious felony juvenile dispositional order and was a minor when the present crimes were committed. Thus, Mr. Moreland's sentence differs in several respects from that imposed on Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams was not a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offenses specified in the second amended information. As to count 2, Mr. Moreland received a sentence of 50 years to life (25 years to life doubled because of his prior serious felony juvenile disposition) plus an additional: 10-year term pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b) ; 5 years for great bodily injury pursuant to section 12022.8, subdivision (a) ; plus 10 years as a result of the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) gang enhancement finding. As to count 3, Mr. Moreland received a 50-years-to-life sentence plus 10 years for firearm use and the gang enhancement. The sentences as to counts 2 and 3 were ordered to run consecutively pursuant to section 667.6 subdivisions (c) and (d). As to count 4, the kidnapping to commit <mask> or oral copulation conviction, defendant received a life sentence. The oral pronouncement of judgment makes no reference to counts 2 and 3, the sexual assault charges, running consecutively to the aggravated kidnapping sentence. The abstract of judgment states that counts 3, oral copulation in concert, and 4, kidnapping to *189commit rape and oral copulation, were ordered to run consecutively. Pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5), Mr. Moreland received a 15 year minimum parole eligibility term. As noted, Mr. Moreland was a juvenile when he engaged in the crimes alleged in the second amended information. Pursuant to People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268-269, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 282 P.3d 291, the trial court imposed a minimum parole eligibility date of 35 years from the date of sentencing. (See Graham v. Florida, (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.)"], "id": "db8183aa-1699-48ec-9d32-97d7706e861d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, where the jury convicted the defendant of all three of the counts for the same month, it is clear, based on the younger daughter\u2019s testimony, that they were unanimous in convicting him of each of the three different crimes. However, as the People correctly concede, where the defendant was convicted of only one or two of the counts charging <mask> or incest in a particular month, it is impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously found the defendant guilty of the same crime, because neither the wording on the verdict sheet, nor the jury charge, linked \u201cthe testimony of vaginal intercourse sequentially or otherwise to the different counts of the indictment\u201d (People v Foote, 251 AD2d 346, 346 [1998]). Accordingly, where the jury found the defendant guilty of only one or two of the crimes charged for that month, which *878occurred with respect to October and December 2006, February, April, September, and December 2007, and February 2008, the counts of rape in the second degree were duplicitous (see People v Black, 65 AD3d at 813; People v White, 41 AD3d at 1037-1038; People v Bracewell, 34 AD3d at 1198-1199; People v Dalton, 27 AD3d at 781). Accordingly, we vacate the defendant\u2019s convictions of rape in the second degree under counts 3, 4, 9, 15, 16, 21, 22, 28, 29, 36, 42, and 43, vacate the sentences imposed thereon, and dismiss those counts of the amended indictment. The relevant counts of incest in the second degree arising out of these incidents have already been dismissed as multiplicitous, as discussed above."], "id": "cb9007f1-2f16-42f0-bfd2-2ef8f9f8da5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Even assuming that the People\u2019s obligation to preserve evidence extended until the time that the last appellate court determination was reached on April 3, 1991, I find that no legal consequence flows from the September 20, 1990 destruction of a <mask> kit, jeans and panties. No demand had been made for the items during the period during which preservation was required, nor did the People have any reason to believe that they would be."], "id": "273f5d09-2130-4520-ab7b-9b1b453d4b7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Over two years later, on November 22, 1999, because of a pending CPL article 440 motion brought by Mr. O\u2019Donnell\u2019s appellate attorney, the still-sealed kit was brought by Officer Nazzaro to David Frey, a Richmond County Assistant District Attorney (ADA). Conceding that he had never done so for any other piece of evidence, Frey testified that he kept the Emma R <mask> kit locked in his desk drawer until December 28, 1999, when still sealed, it was brought to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner by Officer Nazzaro and logged in."], "id": "7426d394-c2c7-478c-9def-c18b16d34df8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Reeder testified that REACH ruled out any metabolic issues and that there was no medical finding that could explain Greg's injuries, which aided her conclusion that they were inflicted by trauma. Mother acknowledged that six doctors came to the same conclusion that Greg's injuries were inflicted, but disagreed with their assessment. She also agreed that Greg had no broken bone while in the hospital or in the Department's care, but had suffered twenty-four broken bones while in her and her husband's care for ten weeks. Yet, she still believed a medical condition was responsible for Greg's injuries. When asked how many times she had suffered a broken bone due to EDS, Mother testified she did not know because she \"did not go to the doctor every time [she] did something to hurt [herself],\" but acknowledged that she had never received medical treatment for a broken bone. According to W<mask> and John Armstrong, a court-appointed special *349advocate, Greg had not suffered any broken bones or unexplained bruising in the past year while in his foster home placement."], "id": "cbce01b9-0128-448c-9c17-6c011345b642", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant\u2019s various objections to the methods and manner of the Grand Jury proceedings are also rejected. In particular, the minutes reveal that a quorum of grand jurors was present during the proceedings and at the time the Assistant District Attorney instructed the Grand Jury on the law, and that it was instructed that only those grand jurors who had heard all of the evidence could participate in voting on the matter. Furthermore, despite the defendant\u2019s various surmises to the contrary, an inspection of the Grand Jury minutes demonstrates that the manner and tone of the Grand Jury proceedings concerning the defendant, as well as those *773concerning Mr. Marchisello, appear to be unremarkable and unprejudicial to the defendant. Moreover, while Mr. Marchisello\u2019s name did come up in the testimony concerning the defendant, there was no prejudice to the defendant resulting from the fact that over a period of time, ending weeks before the presentation concerning the defendant, the same Grand Jury had heard evidence that Mr. Marchisello had committed other offenses. There is no evidence that the panel could not separate the cases and the charges against each defendant. (See, People v Vargas, 150 Misc 2d 1053, 1057 [Sup Ct 1991] [defendant was not prejudiced by presentation of separate murder cases and <mask> case to the same Grand Jury].)"], "id": "5491e1b0-abd2-4401-9ebb-6d22c6ba32eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Stanley B. Katz, J. The defendant, charged in a multiple count indictment for <mask> and sodomy, made an omnibus motion for certain relief but did not request any hearings, although he had received a CPL 710.30 (1) (a) notice that a statement had been made to a social worker in the presence of a police officer. Such notice was served subsequent to the Criminal Court arraignment of the defendant, but not after the Supreme Court arraignment."], "id": "0f85b9f8-7f83-4cb0-94b6-69480ca4c44d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defense counsel first argues that the court should reduce the charge in counts one and two to charge <mask> in the first degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.35 (4) (actor over 18 and victim under 13) under CPL 210.20 (1) (h) and the rule of lenity.* Defense counsel notes that the elements of predatory sexual assault against a child are identical to those of rape in the first degree as charged in this indictment. Predatory sexual assault against a child is a class A-II felony, with a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years to life and a maximum of 25 years to life. By contrast, rape in the first degree is a class B felony, with *893a mandatory determinate sentence having a minimum of five years and a maximum of 25 years, followed by at least five years of postrelease supervision. (See Penal Law \u00a7 70.80 [4] [a] [i]; \u00a7 70.45 [2-a] [f].) The two crimes also have different plea bargain restrictions: with respect to the predatory sexual assault against a child charge, the plea must be at least to a class C violent felony; whereas a defendant may plead guilty to a class D violent felony in satisfaction of a charge of rape in the first degree."], "id": "567fdc75-54ea-4268-927f-782f7a3d24dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["fn. 4; cf. People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1158, 1163 [defendant has a personal liberty interest to \u201c \u2018suffer only . . . deprivation\u2019 \u201d of liberty warranted by crimes and order summarily declining to exercise discretion to follow CDCR\u2019s recommendation for recall and resentencing under \u00a7 1170, subd. (e), is an appealable order].) CDCR\u2019s letter advised the trial court of a clerical error as to the designation of the statutory basis for the <mask> charge, an error the trial court could correct on its own authority. (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705.) The trial court ordered that clerical error corrected. CDCR\u2019s letter also advised the trial court of an illegal sentence as to the One Strike allegation, either because it could not be imposed on a section 261(a)(1) conviction or because it had not been pleaded in the information. Based on the illegal sentence, CDCR\u2019s letter advised the trial court it could \u201creconsider all sentencing choices,\u201d citing to People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831. Accordingly, the letter invoked the trial court\u2019s authority to resentence under section 1170(d)(1).9 An order declining to exercise section 1170(d)(1) discretion is an appealable order. Forfeiture The People contend this claim is forfeited by defendant\u2019s failure to object in the original proceedings, on direct appeal, or on petition for review. Defendant contends imposing sentence based on the One Strike allegation was an unauthorized sentence, subject to correction at any time, and is the type of error the court should exercise its discretion to address. In supplemental briefing, defendant claims if the issue was forfeited, he received ineffective assistance of counsel."], "id": "914a9aa5-876c-4fc4-91c0-7556307e9ae5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, in the third case, People v. White (2017) 2 Cal.5th 349, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 386 P.3d 1172 ( White ), the Supreme Court applied Gonzalez -the case involving oral copulation under former section 288a-to hold that a defendant could be convicted of both <mask> of an intoxicated person under section 261, subdivision (a)(3) and rape of an unconscious person under section 261, subdivision (a)(4)(A) based on the same act or course of conduct. ( White , at pp. 351-352, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 386 P.3d 1172.) In relevant part, section 261 provides: \"(a) Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances: [\u00b6] ... [\u00b6] (3) Where a person is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been known by the accused. [\u00b6] (4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this paragraph, 'unconscious of the nature of the act' means incapable of resisting because the victim meets any one of the following conditions: [\u00b6] (A) Was unconscious or asleep.\""], "id": "d291823f-c22b-48bb-b69d-e4d89965d1f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The second major argument put forth in favor of the proposed changes in the Penal Law of New York, was the fact that awareness of women\u2019s rights was rapidly changing in today\u2019s society, and it was time to discard the anachronistic *968concept that women who are raped had probably \"asked for it,\u201d a concept which held them to be equally guilty in the eyes of many. Many women\u2019s groups sought changes in the law in order \"to focus attention exclusively on the actor\u2019s conduct. In every other crime except a sex crime the only factor that is considered important is the behavior of the defendant. It is only in sex crimes that the victim has had to 'prove\u2019 himself or herself, and in many cases the victim has been, effectively, put on trial along with the defendant to have his or her conduct judged.\u201d (Snyder, Reform of New York\u2019s <mask> Law Proposed, NYLJ, Dec. 14, 1978, p 4, col 2.)"], "id": "79b6a034-c459-49eb-b16a-6c5880d15777", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["1. The trial judge erred in refusing to allow a defendant to exercise a peremptory challenge; 2. The trial judge erred in refusing to sever J. Carr's trial from R. Carr's trial; 3. The trial judge erred in admitting Linda Ann Walenta's statements through law enforcement testimony; 4. The trial judge gave a faulty instruction on the sex-crime-based capital murders; 5. Three of the multiple-homicide-based capital murder convictions were multiplicitous with the first; 6. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any sex crime charges based on coerced victim-on-victim sex acts; 7. The trial judge erred by automatically excluding testimony from an expert on the reliability of eyewitness identifications; 8. The trial judge erred by giving an aiding and abetting instruction that discussed foreseeable crimes; and 9. One count of <mask> by digital penetration is muliplicitous with another."], "id": "3d738b9e-f6d8-4c39-b85b-e4fa78ac2e12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["After granting a review of the Grand Jury minutes in camera, the court finds no evidence therein of any alleged act of sodomy in the first degree. Female complainant testified concerning the alleged <mask> (Count One). The court finds sufficient facts to warrant the indictment for rape or any of its lesser included offenses (CPL 210.20, subd 1, par [b]; 210.30, subd 1; People v Leichtweis, 59 AD2d 383), and, if those facts were not otherwise controverted at trial, that there would be sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction for rape in the first degree or any lesser included offense. (See Mildwoff v Cunningham, 432 F Supp 814.) However, the only testimony by complainant in support of the alleged act of sodomy (Count Two) was \u201che raped me *** he placed his penis in my vagina *** and he also put his finger in my anus.\u201d"], "id": "6ac99c98-5f1a-4833-9ae9-95b020010a4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It was clearly and understandably the legislative intent by enactment of this statute to protect the right of privacy of victims of sex offenses. There can be no serious dispute that reasonable cause exists to believe that Jane Doe was the victim of <mask> in the first degree. Section 130.35 (2) of the New York Penal Law reads \"A male is guilty of rape in the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with a female * * * [w]ho is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless.\u201d"], "id": "a51078ed-c21c-4a3a-bba3-732e9641cdfe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b63 There is no dispute that the charged <mask> and kidnapping took place in Indian Country, i.e., the Choctaw Reservation.1 This claim turns on the district court's resolution of the first question on remand, namely Wadkins's Indian status.2 Indian status has two components. Defendants, like Wadkins, must produce prima facie evidence that: (1) he or she has some Indian blood; and (2) he or she was recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government. See State v. Klindt, 1989 OK CR 75, \u00b6 5, 782 P.2d 401, 403 (holding a defendant has the burden to prove his or her Indian status for dismissal based on lack of state jurisdiction). The parties agree that Wadkins has some Indian blood and satisfies the first prong of the Indian status test. Indian blood alone, however, is insufficient to warrant federal criminal jurisdiction because \"jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country does not derive from a racial classification but from the special status of a formerly sovereign people.\" St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988). Within the ambit of federal criminal jurisdiction, the term \"Indian\" \"includes both racial and political components of the Indian community.\" Parker v. State, 2021 OK CR 17, \u00b6 39, 495 P.3d 653, 666. The recognition prong \"in essence probes whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a formerly sovereign people.\" St. Cloud, 702 F.Supp. at 1461. While recognition is often proven by evidence of tribal membership, Parker, 2021 OK CR 17, \u00b6 36, 495 P.3d at 666, recognition is in dispute in this case because Wadkins, although presently a citizen of the Choctaw Nation, was not a member when the charged offenses occurred."], "id": "9b239e7b-349e-4459-a1ef-8c3b5b2e697c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The original Practice Commentary to subdivision 4 is especially enlightening: \u201cThe only purpose for this provision is to avoid repetition of a phrase in defining the crimes of sexual misconduct (\u00a7130.20) and <mask> (\u00a7\u00a7130.25-130.35), i.e., without this drafting device each of these offenses would have to describe the female-victim as one who is not married to the actor. This scheme does not suggest, however, that a husband may not be convicted of rape, as a principal (\u00a7 20.00), when he aids another male in raping his wife. (\u00a7 20.05 [3]) * * * If a woman is in fact legally married to the actor, it is immaterial that they are separated, with or without a judicial decree.\u201d (Hechtman, *119Practice Commentaries, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law, \u00a7 130.00, p 447; emphasis added.)"], "id": "e68d87cd-6226-41aa-b99e-465e96fafe81", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v Taylor (75 NY2d 277 [1990]), the Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony of \u201c<mask> Trauma Syndrome\u201d. In Taylor (at 288), the Court acknowledged that it has \u201cupheld the admission of expert testimony in * * * child abuse cases despite the fact that childrearing and family life are familiar to the lay juror because the dynamics of sexually and physically abusive relationships within a family are not as familiar.\u201d The Court concluded (at 293) that evidence of \u201cRape Trauma Syndrome\u201d is inadmissible when it \u201cinescapably bears solely on proving that a rape occurred\u201d. Also, in People v Mercado (188 AD2d 941 [3d Dept 1992]), the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of expert testimony regarding \u201cRape Trauma Syndrome\u201d. The Court held (at 942) such testimony may be admitted only \u201c \u2018to explain [the victim\u2019s] behavior that might appear unusual\u2019 \u201d or that jurors might not be expected to understand. However, the Mercado Court found impermissible expert testimony about general behavioral characteristics and symptoms manifested by children who have suffered sexual *33abuse. The Court held this testimony went beyond merely serving to explain what would otherwise be viewed by the jury as evidence tending to exculpate the person charged. This comparison of the complainant\u2019s behavior (the rape victim) with that commonly associated with victims of these crimes is impermissible."], "id": "c411d035-b626-4e42-80dc-54730203c430", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". Examples of other article 130 crimes that do not include age as an element are: sexual misconduct (Penal Law \u00a7 130.20); <mask> in the first, second and third degrees (Penal Law \u00a7 130.35 [1], [3]; \u00a7 130.30 [2]); sodomy in the first, second and third degrees (Penal Law \u00a7 130.50 [1], [2]; \u00a7 130.45 [2]; \u00a7 130.40 [1], [3]); and second and third degree sexual abuse (Penal Law \u00a7 130.60 [1]; \u00a7 130.55)."], "id": "9bf947d1-23f9-4cff-be62-40028fc4f0b5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is well settled that the requirement for legal sufficiency is satisfied if there was competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and a defendant\u2019s commission thereof (CPL 70.10 [1]; see, People v Moquin, 142 AD2d 347, revd on other grounds 77 NY2d 449). We must conclude that in dismissing the <mask> charge, County Court credited the statement of defendant. However, \"[t]hat other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from the facts is irrelevant on this pleading stage inquiry, as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference; the standard that every hypothesis but guilt be excluded to a 'moral certainty\u2019 is to be applied only by the trier of fact\u201d (People v Deegan, supra, at 979). Thus, the Grand Jury could have chosen to ignore defendant\u2019s statement and could quite possibly have inferred forcible compulsion from defendant\u2019s \"conduct and the surrounding circumstances\u201d (People v Pereau, 64 NY2d 1055, 1057). Although defendant contends that there was no proof of forcible sexual intercourse, it is well settled that a gynecological examination need not show evidence of laceration or trauma for forcible compulsion to be determined (see, People v Murphy, 188 AD2d 742, lv denied 81 NY2d 890)."], "id": "6332078e-6f14-417e-bcb3-2b524017a49b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Here no act shown appears to have been a mere malum prohibitum violation of sumptuary law; or so remote in time from those others shown as to have no present materiality. Interrogation as to each act will flow from a reasonable \"basis in fact\u201d (People v Kass, 25 NY2d 123, 126); i.e., the sworn accusation laid. No adjudication in defendant\u2019s favor on the merits reaches any act. No reason appears to distinguish between criminal gratification of sexual as opposed to financial desires as-denoting greater \"honesty and integrity\u201d (People v Sandoval, supra, p 377) in the one as over the other. Questioning will have a \"purpose other than to show that [the] defendant is of a criminal bent or character and thus likely to have committed the crime charged\u201d (People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 247), since the paramount and critical issue of respective credibilities of two persons so clearly appears. The alleged victim may be assured of the usual searching cross-examination customary to <mask> cases, and, except as the same may be limited by CPL 60.42, past acts of hers comparable to those allegedly engaged in by defendant, if any, will be fully exploited."], "id": "33fe8b5e-a77d-456a-b449-f715c81b6ab5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Family Court made the following relevant COLs: 9. \"The use of force upon or towards another person is justified when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present occasion.\" HRS \u00a7 703-304(1) (2014). The reasonableness of the Minor's belief that the use of such protective force was immediately necessary shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the Minor's position under the circumstances of which the Minor was aware or as the Minor reasonably believed them to be. The amount of force used by Minor was not reasonable under the circumstances. 10. \"Deadly force\" means force which the actor uses with the intent of causing or which the actor knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.\" HRS \u00a7 703-300 (2014). The act of Minor stabbing [CW] in the abdomen constituted deadly force. 11. \"The use of deadly force is justifiable ... if the actor believes that deadly force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, <mask>, or forcible sodomy.\" HRS \u00a7 703-304(2). The Court does not find the use of deadly force by Minor was justifiable, and the use of said force was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances in this case."], "id": "ef291335-4a8b-44d6-8823-9de29a32d00a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*880After Sharp left, B.R. shut and deadbolted the door, grabbed her gun and cellphone, barricaded herself in the closet, and called 911. Deputy Jerry Simpson of the Garland County Sheriff's Office responded to B.R.'s call. While securing the scene, Simpson noticed an open window in the guest bedroom and discovered smudges on the outside of the window that were consistent with a handprint. He closed the window and then collected sheets and the washcloth that B.R. and Sharp had used to clean up. Medical personnel transported B.R. to the hospital where a <mask> kit was performed. A pelvic examination revealed that B.R. had a small vaginal-wall tear and that her vagina was red and inflamed."], "id": "0e46bf13-8b3a-489f-bb69-6fbd3d1e8522", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Conceivably the court today would not arrive at the same conclusions reached in the three early cases involving incarceration in an insane asylum, a brutal beating and <mask>. Though not disagreeing with the necessity of granting a parent such immunity as may be necesary to retain the cohesiveness of the family as the *455most important basic unit of society, the court is of the opinion that it was never intended that such doctrine should become a protective cloak, under civil law, for willful and wanton offenses."], "id": "b6a82d1d-5ced-47ae-a979-1b45db8708e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the Nelson case, decided in May, 1897, it became necessary to determine whether the conviction of the defendant was barred by the two-year provision contained in section 285 of the Penal Code (now section 2176 of the Penal Law). In that case there was no suggestion that the defendant had been absent from the state. The question upon which the attention of the court was focussed was whether the consent of the complainant to the defendant\u2019s advances being an essential element of the crime of seduction could, as matter of law, be given before she arrived at the age of sixteen years. It was held that it could, and reasons were assigned\"for this decision. This question was material in that case in the determination of the question whether more than two years had elapsed between the commission of the offense and the time of the finding of the indictment. In that case the two-year provision in the statute is spoken of as a statute of limitations. It is spoken of in this way, first, when Judge Vann, in delivering the opinion of the.court, alludes to the contention of the defendant being \u201c that his conviction was barred by the limi*171tation prescribed by section 285 of the Penal Code \u201d (p. 92), and secondly, when Judge Vann in the opinion contrasts what would have been the period of limitation if the defendant had been charged with <mask> with what it was in view of the fact that he was charged with seduction, remarking in that connection that if the charge had been of the crime of rape \u201c the Statute of Limitations would have been five years instead of two (Code of Crim. Procedure, sec. 142).\u201d"], "id": "488fea7a-a2fd-4db2-8dc7-481e5db2e1b0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The People argue correctly that Dr. Buckhout\u2019s testimony will be prejudicial to their case. In a sense, however, this is true of all testimony which tends to disprove a party\u2019s contention. It is only undue prejudice which the law prohibits. While it is true that the testimony of Dr. Buckhout will lend a certain aura of reliability to the contentions which defense counsel ordinarily makes in summation, this effect is not so substantial that a manifest injustice will result. The jury is still free to accept or reject Dr. Buckhout\u2019s testimony, in whole or in part, and will be so instructed. In similar circumstances, the People have been allowed to introduce expert testimony on the subject of \u201c<mask> trauma syndrome\u201d (see, People v Fisher, 53 NY2d 907). Essentially, this allows the People to bolster in advance the less than certain testimony of a rape victim with scientific evidence that the psychological trauma caused by the rape prevented her from coming forward immediately. The prejudice to the People resulting from Dr. Buckhout\u2019s testimony would be no greater than that suffered by the defendant confronted with rape trauma syndrome testimony. Furthermore, the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to due process of law includes the right to present any relevant evidence in his behalf (see, People v Gilliam, 37 NY2d 722, revg 45 AD2d 744, on dissenting opn of Hopkins, J.; People v Scott, 104 AD2d 667); the People benefit from no such protection."], "id": "5367755e-5d08-4cf8-b403-83d3182b1b12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant was charged in an 11-count indictment with various sex crimes related to a 2010 <mask> of a 26-year-old victim and the sexual abuse of three children between the ages of 9 and 14 during 2002 and 2003. Defendant was tried on the charges related to the 2010 crimes and was convicted by a jury of rape in the third degree and assault in the second degree. He ultimately pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts) *1197and sodomy in the third degree in full satisfaction of the charges related to the 2002-2003 crimes, with the understanding that the plea agreement would also resolve the sentencing aspect of his convictions on the 2010 crimes. As part of the plea agreement, defendant waived his right to appeal. In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was thereafter sentenced, as a second felony offender, to concurrent prison terms of four years, with 10 years of postrelease supervision, for the rape conviction and seven years, with five years of postrelease supervision, for the assault conviction. For the convictions related to the 2002-2003 crimes, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison sentences of 3 to 6 years for the sexual abuse convictions and 2 to 4 years for the sodomy conviction, with these sentences to run consecutively to the sentences for the rape and assault convictions. Defendant appeals.*"], "id": "6465d9b1-dec9-41d8-90b5-d4db5423aa2b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["These defendants were found guilty following a trial by jury of the crime of <mask> in the first degree, and were sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment with a maximum of six years. The case, like the question it raises for determination, is not an ordinary one. It was closely contested by both sides, and it is the very \"contest\u201d which caused the reversal on the ensuing appeal."], "id": "dfc8a441-e8a9-4581-849a-d98799b86687", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Further, it is undisputed red paint was used at the party. Sarah told Mirkovich she had red paint behind her ears and on her body for days after the party and the red paint looked like \"bruises and blood.\" Jane similarly texted J.D. to say she looked like a \"battered convict\" because \"the paint looks like bruises.\" Jane recalled she put on a maxi dress before going to the <mask> treatment center \"to cover the blood and paint.\" Thus, determination of whether there was blood or red paint (or neither) in the apartment after the incident was important to the university's determination. Indeed, in Dr. Allee's report she noted \"it is possible that some of the red substance on the sheets, air mattress, and carpet was paint,\" but pointed out that Jane and Andrew \"specifically described blood.\""], "id": "2f0833df-151c-4fd3-aae9-df9dbf5fdcf5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Some of the cases cited by the defense do take cognizance of the incidence of homosexual <mask> in prison, and in two, People v Harmon (53 Mich App 482) and People v Unger (33 Ill App 3d 770), the majority did observe that homosexual rapists may be more likely to take advantage of younger, more effeminate, or more defenseless-looking inmates. Nevertheless, in neither case was the defendant excused from confinement. The only questions in those cases, as in State v Green (470 SW2d 565 [Mo]) and Lewis v State (318 So 2d 529 [Fla]), was whether the escaped prisoner could plead, in defense to a subsequent prosecution for the escape, that he had been raped and then threatened (Lewis), threatened with death (Unger, Green) or severely beaten (Harmon). In all four cases the original prison sentence was allowed to stand; in Green, the court held that the defendant could not, in the subsequent proceedings, plead that the rapes and threats justified his escape on the grounds of either coercion or necessity."], "id": "5bb172a0-80a6-4ef0-9b79-e365d46bf628", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["One final point is that the Legislature is obviously empowered to allow criminal prosecutions which are subject to no statute of limitations at all for some crimes. (See CPL 30.10.) Indeed, one of the very acts which the State alleges was previously committed by the respondent in this case, forcible <mask>, is not currently subject to any statute of limitations under the criminal law, although it was subject to a five-year statute of limitations at the time the respondent\u2019s crimes were committed. (CPL 30.10 [2] [a].) Given the fact that the Legislature may choose to impose no statute of limitations in criminal cases, it is difficult to understand why it would not be entitled to make the same determination in a civil proceeding like the one here."], "id": "19a00d7a-e32b-43bb-b009-3c49da4e380f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Analogously, just as a prosecutor cannot evade the statutory requirements of corroboration where a <mask> was actually committed by charging a lesser or different offense not requiring such stringent proof (People v. Doyle, 31 A D 2d 490; People v. Lo Verde, 7 N Y 2d 114), so similarly he may not evade the strict requirements for proving obscenity where, as here, it is *411clear that a \u20181 performance \u2019 \u2019 was involved as defined in subdivision 3 of section 235.00 of the Penal Law and dealt with under subdivision 2 of section 235.05 of the Penal Law."], "id": "b57ac037-8829-4cdc-9e9f-4cea5148f689", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On June 22, 1972 the petitioner pleaded guilty to indictment No. 33161 and was released on bail pending sentence. Thereafter, on August 18, 1972 while out on bail petitioner was arrested for <mask>, sexual abuse and possession of a weapon. Ten days later on August 28, 1972 petitioner was sentenced under indictment No. 33161 to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of up to three years and on September 18, 1972 he was transferred up-State for service of that sentence."], "id": "70d8e3d6-71cb-4ae8-a17f-2ad148f571ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It was also clear that the prosecution had the burden to prove that Martinez committed every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The court told jurors that, to convict Martinez of <mask> in concert, they had to find that the prosecution proved that he \"voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted [his] commission\" of the rape. ( CALCRIM No. 1001.) Similarly, it told jurors that, to convict Martinez of sexual penetration in concert, they had to find that the prosecution proved that he either \"voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted [his] commission\" of sexual penetration or \"voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who personally committed sexual penetration.\" ( CALCRIM No. 1046.) The court *731specified that whenever it told jurors that the prosecution had the burden to prove something, it had to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. ( CALCRIM No. 220.)"], "id": "d6a89e48-cd61-46ce-8f6c-6abdc1522db6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In any event, this court is not bound by Virelli v Goodson-Todman Enters, (supra), a Third Department case, because of the conflict created by the decision in the First Department of Doe v American Broadcasting Cos. (152 AD2d 482), where the court in July 1989, six months after the decision in Virelli, affirmed the denial of a motion for summary judgment in actions for breach of contract and negligence. There the plaintiffs, including two <mask> victims, agreed to participate in a television broadcast upon the promise that neither their faces nor their voices would be recognizable. The failure to keep this promise, the court held, was a cognizable claim. In the absence of a Fourth Department ruling on the point, preference is given to the view of the First Department."], "id": "36d2935f-4d3f-49ed-add5-3c710ecea25d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Nicholas Colabella, J. In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, petitioner seeks to compel the respondent District Attorney to permit DNA testing of physical evidence presented at the trial of his criminal action in which he was convicted for <mask> in the first degree (indictment No. 81-367). The judgment of conviction was affirmed (see, People v Dabbs, 141 AD2d 664) and petitioner is presently serving 12 Vi to 25 years. Petitioner\u2019s discovery request is made as a prelude to a possible motion to vacate the conviction pursuant to CPL article 440 based on newly discovered evidence."], "id": "48a2e2ad-30b9-4e2b-87b7-c53c4c9b811c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["For the same reasons, I conclude, that to examine plaintiff as to her subsequent sexual conduct on the issue of damage, there must be a showing of special circumstances. A party seeking compensatory damages in any personal injury action does place her physicial and psychological condition in issue and waives her physician-patient privilege (6 NY Jur 2d, Assault-Civil Aspects, \u00a726, p 221). However, a female plaintiff seeking damages for assault or <mask> need not be humiliated simply because she seeks compensatory damage. In this case no special circumstances are shown to permit such inquiry. The defendants have had a psychological examination of plaintiff. There has been ample opportunity for exchange of medical information. This is sufficient to permit the defendants to evaluate plaintiff\u2019s claim for damages."], "id": "eec95d7d-d0ed-4438-a038-a458300a6877", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the pretrial hearing on these motions, Dolson's counsel argued that the bad conditions in the house were not relevant. He claimed that the evidence would serve only to inflame the jury and that it had nothing to do with the elements of <mask> that had to be proved. Defense counsel urged that the dissent in Lindsey, supra , should be followed and that evidence of the \"nasty\" house would not help the jury determine whether rape of the children had occurred. Defense counsel also claimed that Lindsey could be distinguished because Dolson was not the father of the alleged victims, whereas the father had been the perpetrator in Lindsey ."], "id": "c497f5b3-85f0-473d-9ffd-cc9fca406dd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["(a) A person may be convicted under a law of this state of an offense committed by his or her own or another person's conduct for which he or she is legally accountable if: (1) Either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs within this state; (2) Conduct occurring outside this state constitutes an attempt to commit an offense within this state; (3) Conduct occurring outside this state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within this state and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within this state; (4) Conduct occurring within this state establishes complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction that is also an offense under the law of this state; (5) The offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by *463a law of this state based on domicile, residence, or a relationship to a person, thing, or transaction in the state; or (6) The offense is defined by a statute of this state that expressly prohibits conduct outside the state and the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this state and the person knows or should know that his or her conduct is likely to affect that legitimate interest of this state. (b) When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the physical contact causing death constitutes a \"result\" within the meaning of subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Torres concedes that the State had jurisdiction to try him for murder pursuant to subsection (b) because the death occurred in Arkansas. However, Torres contends that the statute is void of language that would authorize a <mask> prosecution. The plain language of subsection (a)(1) provides that a person may be convicted under Arkansas law of an offense committed by his own conduct for which he is legally accountable if either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs within this state. In other words, based on the plain language of the statute, to establish jurisdiction over the predicate felony of rape, there are two options:"], "id": "af8f639e-a27c-464e-a65a-67ea5dd92cc5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our presumption is that the legislature does not intend to perform a useless *412act in enacting statutes or in amending statutes, but rather it intends such act to have some effect or accomplish some legislative purpose. Walker , 352 S.W.3d at 391. By making the changes it did in 1994, separating forcible <mask> into a separate statutory section from statutory rape and creating separate punishment provisions for each, the legislature intended that forcible rape and statutory rape be separate and distinct crimes with separate punishments. Id. We perceive no reason to accept the notion rejected by the Walker court \"that the legislature changed the statutory scheme in such a manner, yet intended that there be only one offense for which an offender could be convicted for a single act.\" Id. at 391-92. To do so would render the legislature's acts meaningless. Id. at 392. \"The statutes protect against separate and distinct evils: (1) the use of force to compel sexual intercourse; and (2) the exploitation of children.\" Id. In raping the young victim here, Treta violated two different prohibitions that the legislature codified as separate criminal offenses: \"[h]e forced his victim to engage in sex against her will, and he chose a victim to whom the legislature afforded additional protection because of her age.\" Id."], "id": "d8edff8f-1d6f-47be-bcca-c86bf20de22c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["According to Sergeant Bryerton, on June 24, at approximately 1:00 a.m., he was on patrol in Lancaster in a marked police vehicle. After receiving a call that a black male adult suspected of attempted <mask> was driving a white SUV with \"disabled\" license plates, he saw appellant drive past him. Because appellant and his vehicle appeared to fit the description provided in the call, Bryerton followed appellant. In an effort to pull appellant over, Bryerton activated his sirens and flashing lights. Instead of stopping, appellant accelerated and drove through residential neighborhoods, exceeding the posted speed limits and failing to halt at stop signs. Appellant then accelerated to 75 miles per hour along a street with open businesses and a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. The pursuit ended when appellant drove into a motel parking lot, stopped, and ran into a motel room, where he was detained. Bryerton testified that in the course of the pursuit, appellant committed eight traffic violations assigned at least one point under the traffic violation point system."], "id": "a722e609-dd01-4ce6-9b8e-908f22e8083a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was tried upon all three counts and was convicted of the three crimes alleged. He was sentenced on the first count, assault, to a term of from 5 to 10 years in Clinton Prison. On the second count, abduction, he was sentenced to a term of from 10 to 20 years. On the third count, <mask>, the sentence was 20 to 40 years. The court directed that the three sentences run consecutively not concurrently. The defendant now contends that the consecutive sentences were in violation of section 1938 of the Penal Law, which provides as follows \u2022 *\u2018 An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, but not under more than one; *198and a conviction or acquittal under one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other provision \u2019"], "id": "0dd64d45-6ca5-49a6-8c82-d9217ba23bd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Naturally, the sanction shall be imposed only if the <mask> kit is relevant to the issues at trial. Thus, should defendant admit having had sexual intercourse with the complainant on the date of the alleged incident, any evidence that might have been derived from testing the kit would be irrelevant. In such case, there should be no adverse inference. On the other hand, should defendant deny having had intercourse, an adverse inference charge would be appropriate since the information which would have been gleaned from the examination and tests of the kit would have a direct bearing upon the underlying issues of rape and sexual abuse. Upon this basis, final resolution of this matter, relating to an adverse inference instruction as a sanction, is dependent upon the nature of the proof to be adduced at trial and, thus, is best reserved to the trial court."], "id": "77cec0ab-d035-4273-bf7b-f8767852163c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201csince the expert \u2014 and not the jury \u2014 draws conclusions from the facts, which the jury is then asked to adopt. Such testimony, however, is admissible where the conclusions to be drawn from the facts \u2018depend upon professional or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence.\u2019 (Dougherty v Milliken, 163 NY 527, 533; De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296.)\u201d (People v Cronin, 60 NY2d 430, 432 [1983]). Testimony by experts in social science has long been held to be admissible on subjects such as <mask> trauma syndrome, abused child syndrome and similar conditions to explain the behavior of a victim \u201cthat jurors may not be expected to understand.\u201d (People v Carroll, 95 NY2d 375, 387 [2000]; also see People v Taylor, 75 NY2d 277, 288 [1990]; People v Keindl, 68 NY2d 410, 422 [1986].) In recent years, the Court of Appeals has observed, with respect to identification testimony, that although \u201cjurors may be familiar from their own experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification, it cannot be said that psychological studies regarding the accuracy of an identification are within the ken of the typical juror.\u201d (People v Lee, 96 NY2d 157, 162 [2001].)"], "id": "881baaad-67df-4e31-a5e0-0cb7ee46f7dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The police were investigating the knifepoint <mask> of a prostitute, who provided a description of the rapist, and also provided a detailed description of the rapist\u2019s car, including the presence of dents on particular areas of the car. The night after the rape, approximately 24 hours after it was committed, the police saw defendant in the same area as the crime scene in a *462car precisely matching the description. Furthermore, that area is notorious for prostitution, and it would have been reasonable for the police to draw an inference that the rape suspect had returned to look for a similar victim. Based on all these factors, viewed collectively, the police reasonably suspected that defendant was the perpetrator (see People v Caponigro, 76 AD3d 913, 913 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 952 [2010]; see also People v Harmon, 293 AD2d 303 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 676 [2002]). Accordingly, the police lawfully stopped the car and ordered defendant to get out, whereupon officers saw an illegal gravity knife in plain view, which provided probable cause to arrest defendant. Defendant was arrested and handcuffed, and one of the officers searched the front of the car. A homemade razor knife was recovered from the glove compartment."], "id": "c1d97dd9-1ef4-4e20-ae48-b9d2abd56d71", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["At about 3:00 or 3:30 that afternoon, Genao who was yelling and threatening the staff was given an injection of Haldol and placed for observation in what is known as the quiet room. By that time, lithium, Ativan and Cogentin, as well as the Haldol, had been administered; all but Cogentin can cause drowsiness and/or lethargy. There was no documentation or testimony from the hospital staff as to when Genao was released from the quiet room. The claimant testified that she was tired and sleepy after receiving the Haldol injection, and went to the first empty room on the unit and fell asleep \u2014 room 814. Genao\u2019s drowsiness lasted the rest of the day; the emergency room record of Staten Island Hospital, where claimant was taken after the <mask>, contained the entry that she \u201csleeps @ intervals\u201d (claimant\u2019s exhibit 12-A)."], "id": "cdbb82c7-4240-46cf-9a60-a389168c21ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["1. The trial judge erred in refusing to allow R. Carr to exercise a peremptory challenge; 2. The trial judge erred in refusing to sever R. Carr's trial from Jonathan Carr's (J. Carr's) trial; 3. The trial judge erred in admitting Linda Ann Walenta's statements through law enforcement testimony; 4. The trial judge erred in interpreting and applying the third-party evidence rule and the hearsay rule, preventing R. Carr from pursuing his defense to some of the charged crimes; 5. The trial judge gave a faulty instruction on the sex-crime-based capital murders; 6. Three of the multiple-homicide-based capital murder convictions were multiplicitous with the first; 7. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any sex crime charges based on coerced victim-on-victim sex acts; 8. One of R. Carr's convictions for <mask> of one victim was multiplicitous with his other rape conviction relating to the same victim;"], "id": "5e6b0a6d-2dad-4ec0-91f0-71929b0f8997", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Rubin, J. Defendant was arrested on February 19, 1982 by New York City police officers for a <mask> which took place at approximately 5:15 a.m. on July 19, 1981. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the victim\u2019s identification of him as her assailant. On November 28, 1984, Supreme Court conducted a Wade hearing and denied defendant\u2019s motion. Jury trial commenced on December 3, 1984 and, on December 7, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Defendant was sentenced on January 10, 1985 to concurrent terms of imprisonment totalling a minimum of 16% years and a maximum of 50 years."], "id": "545d1fbf-a064-48aa-b84e-a39296ce9bbe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended death. It found Ford's murder involved torture and, pursuant to section 565.032.2(7), the murder was \"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.\" Additionally, the jury *8found Ford was a potential witness against Collings in a pending investigation of her <mask> and was killed as a result of her status. See sec. 565.032.2(12). The trial court sentenced Collings to death, and this Court affirmed the judgment and sentence on direct appeal. Collings , 450 S.W.3d 741."], "id": "4b8ae365-953e-45cc-bec4-ff5e18da4afc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Egan Jr., J. In October 2010, defendant pleaded guilty to <mask> in the third degree in Washington County and thereafter was sentenced to 10 years of probation.1 In April 2012, a petition was filed alleging that defendant violated the terms of her probation by failing to report to her probation officer, consuming alcohol and failing to report contact with a police officer within 24 hours thereof. When defendant appeared before County Court in May 2012, the parties agreed that, in exchange for defendant\u2019s admission to the violations alleged, sentencing would be adjourned in order to allow defendant to complete a 28-day inpatient alcohol and substance abuse treatment program and follow-up outpatient treatment. The parties further agreed that, if defendant successfully completed the required treatment, she would be restored to probation; if defendant failed to complete treatment, however, she would receive a sentence of up to 1V3 to 4 years in prison. No mention of postrelease supervision was made during the course of this appearance. Following a colloquy with County Court, wherein defendant waived her right to appeal, defendant admitted to violating the terms of her probation and was remanded to the Warren County Jail until a bed at a treatment facility became available."], "id": "81346460-5b5d-4396-93c6-cbcbc1cedada", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cDefendant did not introduce medical evidence or expert testimony to establish that hypersexuality is a mental illness that would impact the victim\u2019s credibility or control her behavior; indeed, all references to the victim\u2019s \u2018hypersexuality\u2019 in her medical history are to her wholly voluntary inappropriate, promiscuous behavior\u2014conduct intentionally designed to shock and draw attention\u2014which is precisely the kind of evidence the <mask> Shield Law prohibits (see CPL 60.42; People v Simonetta, 94 AD3d 1242, 1246 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1029 [2012]).\u201d (People v McCray, 102 AD3d 1000, 1007-1008 [3d Dept 2013], affd 23 NY3d 193 [2014].) Defendant\u2019s application to admit the proffered materials should, therefore, be also denied as violative of the Rape Shield Law, as well as for all of the reasons set forth above on relevancy and ESI authentication."], "id": "54fbc915-de76-4c88-99bd-20291c909d8d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, except that in all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, <mask>, assault with intent to commit rape, criminal sexual act, bastardy or filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court.\u201d (Judiciary Law \u00a7 4.) Public trials are an essential facet of our judicial system. As Justice Holmes stated in Cowley v Pulsifer (137 Mass 392, 394 [1884]):"], "id": "a061fc78-7a96-48a4-9dd7-94000283fdf4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In light of the foregoing, the court declines to follow the lead of Mary M. v City of Los Angeles (54 Cal 3d 202, 285 Cal Rptr 99), which plaintiffs ask to be applied, in which the Supreme Court of California held that defendant City might be liable under respondeat superior for a <mask> by an on-duty policeman of a woman taken into custody by him. In reversing the vacatur of a jury verdict for plaintiff and remanding for further consideration, the court placed great emphasis on the fact that police officers are vested by the public entity with authority to arrest and to use deadly force, and one resisting an officer\u2019s proper exercise of authority is subject to criminal prosecution. In that circumstance the court held that \"[wjhen police officers on duty misuse that formidable power to com*832mit sexual assaults, the public employer must be held accountable for their actions. ' \"It is, after all, the state which puts the officer in a position to employ force and which benefits from its use.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (54 Cal 3d, at 221, 285 Cal Rptr, at 110.) The coercive authority possessed by the police officer in Mary M. serves to distinguish it from the present case. Inasmuch as plaintiffs have tendered no case in this jurisdiction imposing respondeat superior liability for intentional sexual misconduct by an employee, which on its face scarcely seems to fall within the scope of employment of a priest, the eighth cause of action will be dismissed."], "id": "b5f65f32-8adc-4c51-b639-7f80fed9f880", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, where the jury convicted the defendant of all three of the counts for the same month, it is clear, based on the younger daughter\u2019s testimony, that they were unanimous in convicting him of each of the three different crimes. However, as the People correctly concede, where the defendant was convicted of only one or two of the counts charging <mask> or incest in a particular month, it is impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously found the defendant guilty of the same crime, because neither the wording on the verdict sheet, nor the jury charge, linked \u201cthe testimony of vaginal intercourse sequentially or otherwise to the different counts of the indictment\u201d (People v Foote, 251 AD2d 346, 346 [1998]). Accordingly, where the jury found the defendant guilty of only one or two of the crimes charged for that month, which *878occurred with respect to October and December 2006, February, April, September, and December 2007, and February 2008, the counts of rape in the second degree were duplicitous (see People v Black, 65 AD3d at 813; People v White, 41 AD3d at 1037-1038; People v Bracewell, 34 AD3d at 1198-1199; People v Dalton, 27 AD3d at 781). Accordingly, we vacate the defendant\u2019s convictions of rape in the second degree under counts 3, 4, 9, 15, 16, 21, 22, 28, 29, 36, 42, and 43, vacate the sentences imposed thereon, and dismiss those counts of the amended indictment. The relevant counts of incest in the second degree arising out of these incidents have already been dismissed as multiplicitous, as discussed above."], "id": "420e35cf-f1cc-455f-b860-1379b3c317a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, Sergeant Moran\u2019s knowledge of the descriptions of the perpetrators of these other crimes was so generic as to render such meaningless. Thus, it could not form a basis for the stop of the livery cab in the case at bar. In the recent case of Matter of Rubin M. (271 AD2d 291), the Appellate Division, First Department, suppressed a gun recovered, where the defendant was stopped on the street because he fit a description in a \u201c<mask> Hot Sheet\u201d which was vague and generic and could be applied to countless New Yorkers (the defendant was stopped in the same precinct where the rape and robbery incidents had occurred). Unlike the description provided in Rubin M. (which at least provided a range of age, height and weight), the description in the case at bar was even more generic, only describing the perpetrators as two black males and a black female (with regard to the robberies) and a black male, a black or Hispanic male and a black female (with regard to the shooting). This is insufficient, especially given the fact that no female was observed in the cab in the instant case. (See, People v Hernandez, 180 AD2d 555; People v Herrera, supra.) Moreover, as in Rubin M., the description which Sergeant Moran possessed would apply to countless law-abiding members of the community who use livery cabs in Manhattan, especially in the early evening hours."], "id": "2c259aeb-0d1b-4c84-a368-756930ab2038", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["(6) a false imprisonment claim, alleging that the cruise line had \u201cpurposefully and intentionally restrained [Doe] against her will on the cruise ship and did not permit her to leave the cruise ship to go ashore for medical treatment\u201d in Seattle; (7) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, alleging \u201cseparate and independent torts committed by\u201d the cruise line, its agents, and its employees related to Doe\u2019s <mask> and the way that they handled the situation and treated her after learning of the rape; (8) a spoliation of evidence claim, alleging that the cruise line breached its duty to preserve evidence after one of its crew members sexually assaulted and battered Doe; (9) an invasion of privacy claim, alleging that the cruise line, th[r]ough its agents, breached its duty to protect Doe\u2019s confidentiality and privacy as a rape victim by repeatedly disclosing her real name in an effort to intimidate and embarrass her; and (10) a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, alleging that officers of the cruise line who were on the ship repeatedly and falsely told Doe after she had been drugged and raped that she could not disembark the ship to get medical treatment and counseling by doctors of her own choosing. [Id. at 1212 (first alteration in original).]"], "id": "102132b8-03cf-47d8-80da-57592683ef2b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defense counsel\u2019s omission to request a bill of particulars did not deprive defendant of effective assistance of counsel, since the 23-day time span set forth in the indictment was, in view of the tender ages of the victims, sufficient to give defendant adequate notice of the <mask> and sodomy charges against him (see, People v Bass, 179 AD2d 568, lv denied 79 NY2d 997; Matter of Jermaine B., 180 AD2d 607), and defendant\u2019s claim that counsel was otherwise ineffective is without merit (see, People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184)."], "id": "d0cf319d-1b45-4251-8f94-7e8b8dd37b30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Dr. Carmine Casella, a clinical psychologist, testified that following the incident, he treated Mrs. Skaria six times during the period April 26, 1978 to May 30, 1978. It was his testimony that as the result of the <mask>, Mrs. Skaria is suffering from a phobic reaction and rape syndrome. He described it as a severe emotional disorder resulting in exaggerated fears, which prevent a patient from functioning properly. He ceased treating Mrs. Skaria when she moved to Texas, but recommended that she seek *716further help. During the course of the trial he examined her again, at her lawyer\u2019s request, and found that her condition had worsened. He tested her and found that her responses showed more phobic reaction and that she is unable to deal with reality. Dr. Casella testified that Mrs. Skaria told him that she did not seek treatment in Texas because she did not want anyone to know about the rape. Dr. Casella advised her to seek help and opined that her condition would be permanent, unless she sought help."], "id": "d9ab3d2f-dbd7-4368-b05e-245f66b2bc7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*4After apparently reserving that question for future determination, the Court of Appeals thereafter rejected the contention that a defendant could not be convicted of assault with intent to commit <mask> upon the female\u2019s unsupported testimony of a completed rape (People v. Chimino, 270 App. Div. 114, affd. 296 N. Y. 554). In that case the Appellate Division, whose decision was affirmed without opinion, said (p. 115):"], "id": "44910d85-32cd-4d47-b45e-43cf74b100fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*806With respect to the attempted <mask> charge, Mr. Smith, on January 18, 1995 \u2014 11/2 years prior to the entry of the within plea \u2014 entered a plea of guilty in satisfaction thereof. Despite the elapsation, now, of two years, he has yet to be sentenced in New York County. Notwithstanding, and following four monthly adjournments before this Bench, he claims a violation of CPL 380.30 (1), moving to divest the court of jurisdiction that his conviction be vacated and the accusatory instrument dismissed. Defendant contends a failure to pronounce sentence \"without unreasonable delay\u201d has prejudiced him. By way of explanation, he sets forth that the 24 months of postponement(s) of sentencing in New York County has been by acquiescence. While the motion is in all respects denied, central to its prayer is the novel question of whether an intended consecutive sentence can be imposed prospectively."], "id": "03ae163a-1371-4624-829c-f1de0ec58370", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On appeal, Kain asserts several arguments to warrant issuance of the writ of error coram nobis, but the only issue that was raised in his petition to the circuit court and preserved for our review is his coerced guilty plea argument.1 Kain's allegation is that, while he was innocent of the 1995 <mask> conviction, he pled guilty pursuant to advice of counsel after the prosecution spoke with Kain's attorneys on the morning set for trial. Kain asserts that the prosecution showed Kain's attorneys a \"Suspended Imposition of Sentence Order\" relating to a kidnapping charge from a 1984 prosecution against Kain in which he had also been charged with rape. It is undisputed that Kain pled nolo contendere to the 1984 rape charge, after which he entered custody of the Arkansas Department of Correction (the ADC) and was later released on parole, but as will be explained in greater detail later in this opinion, the disposition of the 1984 kidnapping charge is disputed."], "id": "64e7f1a1-7e0d-4508-9cbe-74c1b2b4fda8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Excusal of the grand juror did not prejudice petitioner. To the contrary, the record shows that, if anything, the excused grand juror was arguably unfavorable to the defense, since he had met the victim several times and had read newspaper accounts of her <mask> and murder. Further, while the prosecutor excused the prospective juror in the presence of the other grand jurors, he did so with the stated objective-communicated to the entire grand jury-of ensuring a fair and impartial proceeding: \"I want to make sure, again, that what we do here is transparent and has integrity and stands up to scrutiny.\" And again: \"I just want to be careful and make sure that ... we don't have you sit through something that may trigger something in you that you won't be able to be fair.\""], "id": "e2970dc9-eb5a-4fe3-8695-eb01da194d20", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is now urged in this court that a trial upon the indictment would likewise subject the defendant to a second jeopardy in violation of his statutory and constitutional rights; that the charges in the indictment filed herein arose out of the same circumstances as the vagrancy accusation, of which the defendant was duly convicted and sentenced. It is further contended that the <mask> charge against the defendant cannot be sustained upon the basis of a seized photograph since penetration is a necessary ingredient of the crime of rape in the second degree, and that the act of intercourse is denied by the defendant, and it is urged that it is likewise denied by the complainant who is alleged to have testified before the grand jury. With respect to this second ground urged in behalf of the defendant, I have read the Grand Jury minutes and although the testimony of the complainant is somewhat vague and by no means satisfactory, in my opinion the same presents a question of fact and therefore I cannot dispose of it as a matter of law."], "id": "63065b9a-fc17-4871-9d57-658d86afda42", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is the decision of the court that upon all of the evidence adduced at the trial, Vernon Douglas perpetrated a forcible assault and <mask> on the person of Elizabeth Cobb which resulted in her pregnancy and subsequent miscarriage; that the State was negligent in failing to provide adequate care and .supervision of its ward, the infant claimant; and that the State is liable for the conduct of its employee, Vernon Douglas."], "id": "f1fff56d-58ad-44c8-8634-7ef55f185311", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["T.B. further testified that she witnessed Rogers abusing her sisters. One night, she was sleeping in the top bunk of the bedroom that she shared with Mi.B. and Ma.B., and she saw Rogers performing oral *836sex on Ma.B. On a later date, when it was only T.B. and Mi.B. in the house, T.B. heard a \"clapping noise\" and saw Rogers in the living room having sex with Mi.B. as Mi.B. was bent over the sofa. T.B. also stated that Rogers had shown her videos of her older sister, L.W., and Rogers having sex with L.W. on the couch. T.B. stated that Mi.B. disclosed the rapes to their mother one afternoon after school in November 2014, and T.B. confirmed that it had happened to T.B. as well. T.B. stated that Rogers had moved to a nearby home in October 2013 and that the abuse stopped at that time, although the family continued to have some contact with him until the allegations of <mask> were disclosed in 2014."], "id": "0703b13e-761e-4d8c-bed6-467072da1587", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The first statute in this State to require supporting evidence of a prosecutrix, testimony was adopted not in connection with the crime of <mask> but for the crime of abduction for the purpose of prostitution. Chapter 105 of the Laws of 1848 made it a crime to \u201c inveigle, entice or take away * * * for the purpose of prostitution \u201d any female \u201c Provided, that no conviction shall be had under the provisions of this act on the testimony of the female so inveigled or enticed away, unsupported by other evidence \u201d."], "id": "09fe2b52-7dfa-4996-9022-82e684e285fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Error did not occur here. The record is clear why the judge instructed defense counsel to refer to the exam as a \"<mask> kit.\" A.P. was unfamiliar with the phrase \"SANE/SART\" exam and responded that she only knew the medical procedure performed upon her as a \"rape kit.\" Thus, the witness offered the term, not the judge. The judge issued a directive to \"just refer to it as the rape kit\" to avoid further confusion for the witness. The comment did not disparage or result in prejudice to the defense."], "id": "ef99ef58-2e9c-4ad9-9e38-a7688d4e4c3e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["rape] was merely part of or incidental to the commission of that murder, then the special circumstance has not been proved.\u201d The bench notes for CALCRIM No. 730 direct the trial court to give this optional paragraph \u201cif the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the felony was committed merely to facilitate the murder.\u201d The bench notes cite to several cases, including People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 (Green), overruled on another ground by People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 241, and People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505 (Navarette)). In Green, the Court found insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support the jury\u2019s finding of robbery as a special circumstance to the murder. (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 62.) There, the defendant lured his wife to an isolated area, shot and killed her. He then took her belongings to prevent her from being identified. (Ibid.) The Court held the crime was not a murder committed during the commission of a robbery because the primary crime was murder and the \u201crobbery was incidental to that murder.\u201d (Id. at pp. 61-62.) However, if the defendant has an \u201c\u2018independent felonious purpose\u2019 (such as burglary or robbery) and commits the murder to advance that independent purpose, the special circumstance is present.\u201d (Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 505; Green, at p. 61; see People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 609.) Here, the trial court was not required to give the optional language because the evidence did not support a \u201creasonable inference\u201d that the burglary and <mask> were committed merely to \u201cfacilitate the murder\u201d or that they were incidental to the murder. We reject appellant\u2019s contention that there was \u201csufficient evidence\u201d that appellant intended to kill Sarah B. and the \u201ctheft and rape were afterthoughts prior to her death.\u201d"], "id": "61b929e2-175e-45f2-9c28-13f6649c25c5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Regardless of the strength of each individual piece of evidence, we agree with the People that considered together the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom lead to the conclusion that defendant\u2019s guilt was proven to a moral certainty. There is evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the perpetrator drove a motorcycle, was light skinned, wore Nike sneakers which were partly red and had a black leather jacket. Defendant fit this description. Defendant\u2019s blood type was compatible with that of the perpetrator. DNA testing included defendant as a possible perpetrator of the <mask>. Defendant\u2019s fingerprint was found on a drawer *734of a dresser in the bedroom where the murders occurred. Defendant sold several pieces of the victims\u2019 jewelry within a month after the murders. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury\u2019s verdict, which is not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v Giomundo, 209 AD2d 953; see also, People v Sparacino, 150 AD2d 814, lv denied 74 NY2d 747)."], "id": "e7ac1189-3c10-499b-87a5-1807e6633c7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Before considering this application, a review of the prior history is necessary. The defendant herein was indicted on July 28, 1988, and charged with 13 counts of sexual abuse involving his infant daughter. The charges include <mask>, sodomy, and sexual abuse as well as endangering the welfare of a child. These accusations arose out of a bitter divorce action in which defendant\u2019s estranged wife accused her husband of abusing his four-year-old daughter. The case was assigned to the Honorable Arthur J. Cooperman who heard all pretrial motions and conducted a nonjury trial."], "id": "b8b28f90-7638-4088-84be-0ea8b93ed1ec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the case before us, defendant contends that because the New York statutes in question are also \"gender-based\u201d they, too, should be held violative of the equal protection clause. In response, the People emphasize that the Meloon holding was explicitly limited to the statute in question and the record before the court, as noted in the concluding paragraph of Chief Judge Coffin\u2019s decision, to wit (supra, p 609): \"We want to take care to indicate the limited nature of our holding. We have found only one particular statutory <mask> law to be unconstitutional. We have not reflected nor do we intend to question the constitutionality of the laws of other states. We *404express no opinion as to whether on a different record some other statute would pass constitutional scrutiny.\u201d"], "id": "f154e200-b424-480e-91a9-6d27661f4d0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although New York courts have often admitted record entries setting forth the manner in which injuries were inflicted to the patient, decisions considering entries naming the person inflicting those injuries are more restrictive. In fact, it appears that a substantial majority of the courts of this state that have addressed the issue of the admissibility of an identification of a perpetrator contained in a medical record have concluded that such evidence is not admissible on the grounds that, under the facts of those cases, the identity of the perpetrator was not necessary for treatment and diagnosis of the victim. (See, e.g., People v Thomas, supra [portion of statement identifying defendant as perpetrator of assaultive behavior not relevant to diagnosis and treatment and should have been excluded]; People v Tarver, 161 AD2d 1162 [4th Dept 1990] [error to permit emergency room physician to testify about statements made to her by <mask> victim regarding identity of perpetrator and the manner in which the victim and perpetrator slept together the night before]; People v Harris, 132 AD2d 940 [4th Dept 1987] [error to permit examining physician to testify with respect to statements made to him by rape victim regarding location of alleged attack and identity of perpetrator].)"], "id": "fc05724a-eb90-42b7-9515-25a36f75e6f3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["2 See 18 Pa.C.S. \u00a7\u00a7 2702(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), (3), 2902(a)(1), 2903(a), and 2709(a)(3), respectively. Appellant was also originally charged with several sexual offenses, including <mask> and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, based upon S.B.\u2019s report to police that Appellant forced her to have anal sex on January 16, 2012. See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 4/26/12, at 2. However, the Commonwealth agreed to withdraw all of the sexual crimes in exchange for Appellant\u2019s negotiated plea. See Appellant\u2019s Guilty Plea Colloquy, 12/3/12, at 4."], "id": "431592ae-3ce3-48ac-b764-70e9581a8590", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The People argue correctly that Dr. Buckhout\u2019s testimony will be prejudicial to their case. In a sense, however, this is true of all testimony which tends to disprove a party\u2019s contention. It is only undue prejudice which the law prohibits. While it is true that the testimony of Dr. Buckhout will lend a certain aura of reliability to the contentions which defense counsel ordinarily makes in summation, this effect is not so substantial that a manifest injustice will result. The jury is still free to accept or reject Dr. Buckhout\u2019s testimony, in whole or in part, and will be so instructed. In similar circumstances, the People have been allowed to introduce expert testimony on the subject of \u201c<mask> trauma syndrome\u201d (see, People v Fisher, 53 NY2d 907). Essentially, this allows the People to bolster in advance the less than certain testimony of a rape victim with scientific evidence that the psychological trauma caused by the rape prevented her from coming forward immediately. The prejudice to the People resulting from Dr. Buckhout\u2019s testimony would be no greater than that suffered by the defendant confronted with rape trauma syndrome testimony. Furthermore, the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to due process of law includes the right to present any relevant evidence in his behalf (see, People v Gilliam, 37 NY2d 722, revg 45 AD2d 744, on dissenting opn of Hopkins, J.; People v Scott, 104 AD2d 667); the People benefit from no such protection."], "id": "b54ecbef-0a82-4ff9-b31a-fe5858fe2988", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Similar constitutional contentions raised to invalidate <mask> statutes have been rejected, and the. courts have found that differences between the sexes bear a rational relationship to the prohibition of prostitution by females, and excluding males. (State v Devall, 302 So 2d 909 [La]; State v Mertes, 60 Wis 2d 414; State v Griffin, 226 Ind 279; Wilson v State, 258 Ind 3.)"], "id": "c49683aa-ef9e-46bd-aec3-688c1205fd5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the hearing, it was established that the crimes of which the respondent was convicted were committed in concert with two other men. The three individuals agreed to set up a series of dummy corporations whose only function would be to establish merchant accounts with credit card companies and in turn offer the use of those accounts to so-called escort services. Customers of the escort services could then charge the services to their credit cards and the companies established by the respondent would pay the escort services the face amount of the charge less a servicing fee. The respondent\u2019s companies would then collect the face amount of the charge. The theory of the prosecution against the respondent was that he was laundering money and facilitating <mask>. Respondent\u2019s co-conspirators pleaded guilty and did not stand trial. They were not lawyers. In mitigation the respondent affirmed that he was innocent of any fraudulent or deceptive intent. Respondent\u2019s characterization of his acts reflects that he believed that he was doing nothing more than providing a service for escort companies."], "id": "e26de1aa-efeb-441a-84b2-9b0bbe1f7ec1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In reaching its decision on the constitutionality of the statute on the two grounds as set forth, the court does so only as the statute applies to the particular facts and circumstances before it. Other facts may warrant an entirely different decision, particularly in light of People v Smith (44 NY2d 613), which upheld the constitutionality of the statute which prohibits loitering for the purpose of <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 240.37, subd 2) on the grounds that this activity interfered with the commercial life and the public use and enjoyment of the streets and other areas effected."], "id": "34d7e78d-7bb2-4024-8f27-232894e964b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As has been indicated, People v Uplinger (supra) concluded that the statute prohibiting loitering for the purpose of engaging in deviate sexual intercourse between consenting adults was legally impermissible. In the event a concerned citizen reported to the police that he or she observed a male and female engaging in sodomy, a police officer would certainly be remiss in his duty were he to immediately assume that the couple was simply involved in conduct encompassed in an unconstitutional statute. That officer would and should investigate whether the female was being forced (sodomy, first degree in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 130.50 [1]), underage (sodomy, third degree in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 130.40 [2]), or a prostitute (<mask> in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 230.00). An approach under such circumstances would come under the auspice of an articulable reason."], "id": "b5400b38-fd9f-4e19-b284-7777bcf5252b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to the male defendants, allegedly the ones controlling the business, the proof is that they have not been arrested for <mask> offenses, much less gone through a revolving door. While there was proof that at least some of the female defendants have been arrested for prostitution offenses on numerous occasions, most of those arrests were not in the Queens Plaza area, but in the East New York section of Brooklyn and so are irrelevant here. Those who were arrested in Queens Plaza, save one as noted above, have not been served with process and are not properly before the court. There was no proof whatever that the female defendants have not received appropriate sentences when convicted."], "id": "95b595c1-02c4-4fb8-b942-9ca1b11959f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court stated that express contracts between nonmarital partners are enforceable unless the sexual services rendered form the exclusive consideration of the contract. In referring *971to the kind of relationship the court would not countenance, the court stated (p 683): \"the nonenforceability of agreements expressly providing for meretricious conduct rested upon the fact that such conduct, as the word suggests, pertained to and encompassed <mask>. To equate the nonmarital relationship of today to such a subject matter is to do violence to an accepted and wholly different practice.\u201d"], "id": "318f8f44-e40f-4052-a1f3-31e7f0c4db18", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This was all the evidence. There was no proof as to the reputation of the house or that any act of <mask> had ever theretofore been undertaken by any one residing therein, or that the defendant had any knowledge of any prior similar occurrence in the house; there was no evidence that the other woman, who had solicited the officer, resided in the premises, or how long she had been in the house, or that the defendant had any prior acquaintance with her, or that the defendant knowingly resided in the premises after this occurrence, for she was immediately arrested by the officer."], "id": "0d08a015-3c6c-4c4e-8295-e81814ec151e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["To the extent defendant is making an as-applied challenge to this statute-a challenge the People properly note was not made in the trial court-we reject it as well. The defense theory was defendant was trying to wean the girls from <mask> by teaching them to make a living by robbing their customers. In addition to defendant's testimony to the effect both girls were already prostitutes, B. testified she had been a prostitute before she met defendant, and D.'s juvenile record was introduced, showing her history of loitering for purposes of prostitution. Thus, it was not disputed in this case that both girls were prostitutes before the charged offenses, and defense counsel so argued to the jury. Therefore, regardless of the trial court's in limine ruling excluding evidence, we fail to see-and defendant fails to explain-how the statute deprived defendant of any relevant evidence in this case . Defendant does not explain how further details about the prior prostitution history of either girl would have bolstered his defense, he merely assumes that the statute impaired his case. In short, defendant does not establish with reference to the record how he was prejudiced by the statute in this case, given the state of the evidence admitted."], "id": "e5619795-34b7-4b07-9d3b-a474fabd53bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As counsel correctly observes in her memorandum of law, \u201c[t]he cumulative effect of New York and Federal law in this area is a strong expression that those engaging in <mask>, or commercial sex, under the age of eighteen are to be viewed as victims of trafficking, rather than perpetrators of crime.\u201d The People concur in the court\u2019s determination that defendant is precisely the type of victim intended to be protected under both state and federal law. At oral argument, Assistant District Attorney Abodeely made the following record:"], "id": "6eb2db11-a1d5-43b2-8e06-5bfacaf457c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Indeed, although these statutes have been typically applied to recover premises utilized for <mask>, gambling and narcotics, they have also been applied to recover premises used for other illegal enterprises, including the storage and distribution of fireworks in violation of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (Tsang Realty v Sepulveda & Nunez, index No. L&T 109064/94 [Civ Ct, NY County 1994]), the sale and distribution of obscene material in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 235.05 (Cohen v Carroll, 63 Misc 2d 222 [Civ Ct, NY County 1970]), the operation of a lodging or rooming house in violation of the former Tenement Housing Law and the current Multiple Dwelling Law (Saportes v Hayeck, 111 Misc 620 [App Term, 1st Dept 1920]; 47 E. 74th St. Corp. v Simon, 188 Misc 885 [App Term, 1st Dept 1947]), and the selling of liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act (Matter of Elmore v Berti, 128 Misc 74 [NY City Mun Ct 1926])."], "id": "850832c7-e846-45d5-bf3c-062fb5ad7064", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The larger question as to the statute\u2019s constitutionality remains since the statute is seeking to ban loitering to engage in what is now a constitutionally recognized and protected activity. The situation is very much unlike that in People v Smith (44 NY2d 613) where the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a law proscribing loitering for the purpose of <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 240.37, subd 2) which is a prohibited activity. But, as this court pointed out in People v Butler (supra) the courts of this State have prohibited loitering to perform an act which a person may have a perfect right to perform. In People v Johnson (6 NY2d 549) the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a statute which prohibits what may amount to no more than simple loitering in or about schools (Penal Law, \u00a7 240.35, subd 5) because of the possible danger this activity poses to children. From this and other cases, this court in Butler concluded that simple loitering can be legitimately banned depending on where it occurs and other circumstances. Therefore, despite the fact that persons have a lawful right to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, loitering in public for this purpose may be constitutionally proscribed depending on its effect on the public welfare. As in People v Smith there must be some connection shown between the proscription and a legitimate public concern. But, because male homosexuals are being singled out from the entire population, the People must show a strong connection between their activities and the public welfare."], "id": "dc053b3f-06a3-4c10-874a-526b245fabd3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant contends that title II is inapplicable as against the Store because it applies only to houses of <mask>, as that term is generally and commonly known. On a constitutional level, it is defendant\u2019s position that if plaintiff obtained the relief requested under title II defendant would be prevented from continuing to show movies or sell books and magazines which are presumptively protected due to allegations that acts and/or conduct other than the sale or exhibition of books, magazines, and movies occurred at the Store in the past. Defendant con-, tends that the issuance of an injunction would constitute a total and final prior restraint upon presumptively protected activity and would restrain defendant from continuing to disseminate materials clearly protected by the Federal and State Constitutions and thus reach far beyond the *509alleged activity asserted. Defendant further maintains that the presumptively protected activity which takes place at the Store would be impermissibly restrained by application of the sanctions provided by title II since that title does not contain required procedural and constitutional safeguards."], "id": "7c8f7682-e537-435e-bf26-3c32f6c225e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*67Respondent, by her attorney, has moved to dismiss the <mask> charge on constitutional and other grounds.5 For the reasons stated below, the court holds that sections 230.00, 130.38 and 130.00 (subd 2) of the Penal Law are unconstitutional under the New York State Constitution in that these statutes constitute a denial of equal protection and invade respondent\u2019s constitutionally protected right of privacy."], "id": "f2ca11eb-5c0d-45dd-b81a-de9ad579e972", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Farringer v. McBurney, 5 Cowen, 253, which was for the board of a female who had been living with the defendant, and had by him an illegitimate child, and the defence was that the contract was made with the view of facilitating *581the continuance of the state of <mask> between the defendant and the female boarded, the court say, \u201c The simple circumstance that the plaintiff had knowledge of the previous cohabitations did not furnish legal ground for an intent to sanction their repetition; something more was necessary.\u201d"], "id": "19db0a94-4c3c-4107-9b2e-0d1583871a50", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["To maintain the plea that the plaintiff had expelled him from the possession, the defendant offered to prove, upon the trial, that the plaintiff introduced into the part of the house which he occupied, lewd women and prostitutes at various times, keeping them all night for the purpose of <mask>; that he *118was in the habit of introducing other men, who, with himself, kept company with the women, and who, together, kept up such noise and disturbance throughout the night, using obscene and indecent language, as to disturb the rest of persons sleeping in the part of the house demised to the defendant\u2014 in consequence of which the defendant was compelled to leave the house before the rent became due for which the action was brought."], "id": "2be6e315-1d2d-4717-8414-3e19f4d4b4fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defense counsel emphasized the presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the rule that if two reasonable interpretations of circumstantial evidence exist, the jury must interpret that evidence in favor of the defendant. She emphasized discrepancies or exaggerations by B., and *330argued B. became angry at defendant and made up her story. She also emphasized that D. did not testify and argued defendant's testimony that he was trying to wean the girls from <mask> to robbery was plausible."], "id": "cda2e38a-6f8e-49e6-959b-5677b52480c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner, in his effort to justify his failure to serve the required notice of termination, relies on RPAPL 711 (5), which states that in a proceeding to recover possession, a tenant shall not be removed from possession except in a special proceeding and that a special proceeding may be maintained if \u201d[t]he premises, or any part thereof, are used or occupied as a bawdy-house, or * * * place * * * of <mask>, or for any illegal trade or manufacture, or other illegal business.\u201d"], "id": "505ea48d-83ea-4538-ac6c-d72ff6949894", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Girardy v. Richardson, (1 Esp. Rep. 13,) the action was assumpsit for the use and occupation or certain rooms belonging to the plaintiff. For the defendant, it was proved that she was a woman of the town; that the rooms had been let to her by the wife of the plaintiff, who, it was proved, managed the business of his house in letting the lodgings; that at the time of letting them, she was informed of the defendant\u2019s mode of life, and consented that she should be at liberty to receive male visitors, for the purpose of <mask>. Lord Kenyon ruled that under these circumstances the action was not maintainable; that the contract was contra bonos mores, and therefore could not support an action, and directed a verdict for the defendant."], "id": "9d4c200b-8963-4bf3-8983-a023452fe5be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["After the court reserved decision on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The court then granted the motion, set the verdict aside, and dismissed the accusatory instrument because, inter alia, the instrument, having alleged that defendant transported a prostitute for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts, failed to allege that the prostitute engaged in said acts \u201cfor a fee\u201d (cf. Penal Law \u00a7 230.00) and that defendant did so with the requisite intent to establish his guilt of promoting <mask> in the fourth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 230.20; see People v Rollova, 124 AD2d 886, 889 [1986]). We conclude that the allegations of the information and attached supporting depositions established every element of the offense charged (CPL 100.15 [2], [3]; 100.20)."], "id": "93c9b750-729b-4715-999b-39367f160ec9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Bowry v. Bennett, 1 Camp. 348, where an action was brought to recover for clothes sold to a prostitute, and the defence was that the articles were sold for the purpose of enabling her to carry on her business of <mask>, Lord Ellenborough said it must not only be shown that the plaintiff had notice of the defendant\u2019s way of life, but that he sold the clothes to enable her to carry it on."], "id": "d825fa65-6042-4371-a142-f9491c0a908f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the current case, both parents admitted to their long histories of substance abuse. According to mother, she began abusing alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine at age 12, with her drug of choice being crack cocaine. She also reported a history of <mask>, criminal behavior, and being \" 'out on the street.' \"3 Mother acknowledged that she had never completed a substance abuse program. Nevertheless (and despite her recent positive drug test), mother denied using any illegal substances during her pregnancy, and claimed to have been clean for a year. She further stated that she had matured since her previous children were born, and was ready to get *754clean. As for father, he acknowledged a thirty-five year history of drug use and an extensive criminal record.4 He reported smoking marijuana from age 13, starting to abuse other drugs, and becoming an addict. His drug of choice was also crack cocaine. Father additionally stated, however, that he had completed drug court in the *1119past and claimed that he had not abused drugs since graduating from a substance abuse treatment program in 2014. According to father, \"he got his life together after seeing that he lost everything he cared about living that way.\""], "id": "5ab6d72e-b150-4b28-9cbd-ad2b71c6a10a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["bene\ufb01t such as [a tax exemption] to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.\u201d Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. How does one tell the di\ufb00erence between an unconstitu- tional condition and a permissible congressional choice about whom to include in a government spending or subsidy pro- gram? It can be di\ufb03cult in close cases, but the Supreme Court provided guidance in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013), where the Court addressed grants to non-governmental or- ganizations to combat HIV/AIDS around the world. Congress had prohibited using the money to promote legalization of <mask> or human tra\ufb03cking. That condition was not even challenged in the case and posed no First Amendment problem. But the statute also required grant recipients to adopt a policy \u201cexplicitly opposing prostitution and sex traf- \ufb01cking.\u201d Id. at 210, quoting 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 7631(f). The Court struck down that policy requirement. The Court explained the familiar scope of the govern- ment\u2019s spending power: \u201cAs a general matter, if a party ob- jects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its re- course is to decline the funds.\u201d 570 U.S. at 214. \u201cAt the same time, however, we have held that the Government \u2018may not deny a bene\ufb01t to a person on a basis that infringes his consti- tutionally protected \u2026 freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that bene\ufb01t.\u2019\u201d Id. (omission in original), quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006). To distinguish between permissible limits on spending programs and unconstitutional conditions, the Court clari\ufb01ed that \u201cthe relevant distinction \u2026 is between conditions that de\ufb01ne the limits of the government spending program\u2014those that specify the activities Congress wants to 16 No. 21-2589"], "id": "8ae0097e-ddb8-4af5-b8a9-e10507851f18", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The larger question as to the statute\u2019s constitutionality remains since the statute is seeking to ban loitering to engage in what is now a constitutionally recognized and protected activity. The situation is very much unlike that in People v Smith (44 NY2d 613) where the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a law proscribing loitering for the purpose of <mask> (Penal Law, \u00a7 240.37, subd 2) which is a prohibited activity. But, as this court pointed out in People v Butler (supra) the courts of this State have prohibited loitering to perform an act which a person may have a perfect right to perform. In People v Johnson (6 NY2d 549) the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a statute which prohibits what may amount to no more than simple loitering in or about schools (Penal Law, \u00a7 240.35, subd 5) because of the possible danger this activity poses to children. From this and other cases, this court in Butler concluded that simple loitering can be legitimately banned depending on where it occurs and other circumstances. Therefore, despite the fact that persons have a lawful right to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, loitering in public for this purpose may be constitutionally proscribed depending on its effect on the public welfare. As in People v Smith there must be some connection shown between the proscription and a legitimate public concern. But, because male homosexuals are being singled out from the entire population, the People must show a strong connection between their activities and the public welfare."], "id": "e2327b3d-6dad-4b16-ba88-5900b5bcfa4b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["POBRA was enacted to give employment protection to peace officers who, because of the nature of their interaction with the public, are particularly vulnerable to complaints from the public. As examples, POBRA has been properly invoked in the case of a citizen's complaint of police brutality ( Aguilar v. Johnson (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 241, 247 Cal.Rptr. 909 ), an investigation into an officer's involvement in a <mask> business ( Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271, 1293, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 ), and an internal affairs investigation into whether an officer was conducting police officers' association business while on duty ( Upland Police Officers Association v. City of Upland (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1297, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 629 ). In this case, Manavian's CEA position was terminated because Oules was unsatisfied with the way Manavian was managing the Bureau, not because of complaints that Manavian had committed some misconduct. The CEA provisions were specifically designed for this situation, while the POBRA provisions were not."], "id": "caa8e786-673b-478d-a8d4-eed22767f11d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*552The City has absolutely failed to prove its scandalous innuendo that the Judges of the Criminal Court have been unwilling to enforce the law. The City\u2019s attorneys claimed at the hearing that part of their lack of effectiveness in enforcing the <mask> laws in the Queens Plaza area is due to the low priority placed on this offense by the Criminal Court. They claimed to be faced with a classic \u201crevolving door\u201d situation, where the court puts the prostitutes back on the streets on the same night they are arrested, in effect allowing them to pay their fines by repeating their offenses."], "id": "78003c5a-56d0-4814-864e-d759bfc724e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants vigorously deny the <mask> rap and assert that, in any event, an order closing Plato\u2019s Retreat would be unconstitutional as an impermissible prior restraint on activities protected by US Constitution 1st Amendment and NY Constitution, article I, \u00a7 8. On the same basis and on the additional constitutional basis of intrusion on the right of privacy, defendants cross-move to dismiss the first two causes of action in the city\u2019s complaint relating to prostitution."], "id": "e777b98f-4877-4236-9b4f-aed63d104cfb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants were indicted for three counts of promoting <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 230.25). The first count of the indictment charged the defendants with violation of subdivision 1 of section 230.25 of the Penal Law which states: \u201cA person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree when he knowingly: 1. Advances or profits from prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or owning, either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes \u201d."], "id": "3e11d41b-2602-4eaf-9d56-3805da55e7ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["police officers.\u201d He also asked Ryan \u201cto step out of the vehicle, which he willingly did so.\u201d Pham then asked, \u201cWhat\u2019s going on?\u201d Ryan responded that he was \u201c[j]ust trying to find a place to smoke weed\u201d and that he \u201ckn[e]w what goes on right here,\u201d namely that the area was \u201cknown for <mask>.\u201d Pham accepted Ryan\u2019s statement that he was \u201cnot trying to get any hookers.\u201d He assured Ryan that was not their concern (\u201cNobody\u2019s here to judge\u201d) and told Ryan that \u201cwe\u2019re definitely not worried about, you know, any, any bit of marijuana.\u201d Pham added, \u201c[W]e\u2019re trying to, we\u2019re trying [to] get things figured out, we\u2019re just get[ting] things sorted out. You\u2019re not under arrest. You understand that, right?\u201d Ryan answered, \u201cOkay.\u201d Pham turned the conversation to \u201clast Saturday night,\u201d asking, \u201cHey, um, Kyle where were you at, um, last Saturday night?\u201d Ryan answered, \u201cLast Saturday? Huntington Beach.\u201d When Pham asked if there was an \u201coccasion\u201d for Ryan to be there, Ryan claimed he was working there that night, but then made no further mention of work. Instead, as Pham and Ryan continued to talk about Ryan\u2019s day in what the trial court characterized as \u201ca casual conversation\u201d in which both parties were \u201ccalm,\u201d and Ryan \u201cwas consenting to this verbal exchange,\u201d Ryan stated he arrived down at \u201cthe pier\u201d by himself about 10:00 a.m., stayed \u201c[a]bout two hours,\u201d then left to retrieve his camera at a friend\u2019s house in Costa Mesa before returning to the pier area for \u201cpretty much . . . the whole day.\u201d Ryan acknowledged this was \u201conly a few days ago\u201d and then added detail to his account. On his return from Costa Mesa \u201clike around 2:00 or so,\u201d he stopped at a liquor store where he bought a \u201ctall can\u201d of beer that he consumed at the beach. Ryan said he hung out on Main Street, where he \u201ctalk[ed] to . . . people with dogs\u201d since he trained dogs, and he \u201ctalked with the street, street artists [and] I think two girls,\u201d at which time Pham asked, \u201cum, did you get any phone numbers from girls, dog trainers, or anybody like that?\u201d Ryan said no."], "id": "dd7ef545-f492-4ba5-bee3-2d6d41a2ba32", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In McKinney\u2019s Consolidated Laws of New York, book 14, page 30, section 8 of the Domestic Relations Law is annotated as follows: \u201c Re-marriage of one divorced for adultery as bigamous. For the purpose of enforcing a statute which declares that every person having a husband or wife living who shall marry again, shall, except in specified cases, be adjudged guilty of bigamy, a person against whom a divorce has been obtained because of adultery and who has not received a judicial permit to remarry, is regarded as having a husband or wife living. A person, therefore, so divorced and so under a disability, who marries, is guilty of bigamy. (People v. Faber, [1883] 92 N. Y. 146; 44 Am. Rep. 357; reversing 29 Hun, 320, and over-ruling People v. Hovey, 5 Barb. 117; compare Moore v. Moore, [1877] 8 Abb. N. Cas. 171.) \u201d (6) The United States Code, title 18, section 398, provides as follows: \u201c Any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of <mask> or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or the District of Columbia, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other unmoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, *13or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (June 25, 1910, c. 395, \u00a7 2, 36 Stat. 825.) \u201d (7) Decedent was a dominant character who had reached the pinnacle of far-reaching power and prominence in the theatrical world, his properties and business being located in many of the populous cities in this country. His brother, one of the proponents, was, until recently retired, a Supreme Court judge; until recently he was a bachelor and lived during the period of the relationship of the parties with his unmarried sister, Ray, who died during the trial of this issue. Contestant was a daughter of Rudolph Fixel and Deha Ferdelin, and a cousin of Olivia Leventritt and a niece of the late Supreme Court Judge David Leventritt. She took up voice culture with Clara Kalisher in 1902 and later went on the stage, appearing in many well-known productions. \u201c In cases of this kind the character of the parties to the alleged marriage is of much importance.\u201d (Surrogate Fowler in Matter of Eichler, 84 Misc. 672, 673, citing Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 71 N. Y. 423; Matter of Brush, 25 App. Div. 610.)"], "id": "89e630da-5077-43aa-ad71-94154c3cd075", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our problem in analyzing the ease stems in considerable part from the draftsmanship of section 2460 of the Penal Law. The principal object of this statute and its forerunners is to get the tycoons of organized vice, which it is conceded that Jelke was not, men such as the defendant in People v. Luciano (277 N. T. 348). The main purpose is not to reach the lowly pimp. To be sure, subdivision 8 of section 2460 is aimed at such unlovely characters, but defendant has not been convicted under that subdivision. The purpose has frequently been adverted to in opinions of the courts, e.g., \u201c The legislation dealt with the systematizing of <mask> and concubinage upon a commercial basis; it sought to prevent prostitution and concubinage as a business \u201d. It was designed to punish those \u201c conscienceless vampires who make merchandise of the passions of men \u201d."], "id": "ddf90b2b-2e83-48ca-bdba-21173f226416", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The facts offered to be proved\u2019 on the trial are, substantially, that in February, 1820, from time to time; and at sundry times, the plaintiff introduced into the-house, (two rooms upon the second floor and two rooms upon the third floor whereof had- been leased to the' defendant,) divers lewd women or prostitutes,- and kept and detained them- in the said house all night, for the purpose- of <mask>; - that the said- lewd- women or prostitutes would frequently enter the said house in the'day time,- and- after staying all night, would leave the- same by day-light in the- morning; that the plaintiff sometimes introduced! other men into the said premises; who, together with him, kept company with the said lewd; women-or- prostitutes during the night; that on suoh occasions, the plaintiff and-the said* lewd women \u00f3r prostitutes, being in company in certain parts of the said house,, not included in the lease to the defendant, but- adjacent thereto, and in the occupation-or use of the plaintiff, were accustomed to make a great deal of indecent noise *736an<^ disturbance, sa^ women or prostitutes often scream ing extravagantly, and so as to be heard throughout the house, and by the near neighbors, and frequently using 0l3Scene and vulgar language so loud as *to be understood at a considerable distancethat such noise and riotous proceedings, being from time to time continued all night, greatly disturbed the rest of persons sleeping in other parts of the said house, and particularly in , those parts thereof demised to the defendant; that the practices aforesaid were matters of conversation and reproach in the neighborhood, and were of a nature to draw, and did draw, odium and infamy, upon the said house, as being a place of ill fame, so that it was no longer respectable for moral and decent persons to dwell or enter therein; that all the said immoral, indecent' and unlawful practices and proceedings were by the procurement or with the permission and concurrence of the plaintiff; that the defendant, being a person of good and respectable character, was compelled, by the repetition of the said indecent practices and proceedings, to leave the said premises, and did, for that cause, leave the same on or about the beginning of March, 1820, after which he did not return thereto, &c."], "id": "7d693621-0ba8-437a-b028-ccc6a0b31447", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants are both charged under count one with attempted promoting <mask> in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00 and 230.25 (1), in that the defendants, each aiding the other, on or about and between May 1, 1997 and May 15, 1997 in the County of Queens, knowingly attempted to advance and profit from prostitution. Under count two the defendants are charged with criminal facilitation in the fourth degree in that the defendants, each aiding the other, on or about and between May 1, 1997 and May 15, 1997, in the County of Queens, when believing it was probable that they were rendering aid to a person who intended to commit a crime, engaged in conduct which provided such person with the means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aided such person in committing a felony, to wit: promoting prostitution in the third degree."], "id": "4cebbd22-83fc-431a-b75c-c21a2953b7e4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On February 3, 1928, an order which was not offered in evidence but which apparently had been issued by the Magistrates\u2019 Court adjudging the defendant to be a disorderly person, on the complaint of his wife, was vacated on the ground that the complainant\u2019s conviction for <mask> terminated the defendant\u2019s duty to support her. Whether it was an order adjudging the defendant a disordery person after trial or a consent order it is impossible to determine from the record."], "id": "cdb16e7c-51f1-448f-ba87-cbfea57d5993", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In only one case that the People cite, People v. Bhakta (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 973, 978-979, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 ( Bhakta ), did the appellate court apply the gist-of-the-action analysis to conclude a government enforcement action was properly tried by the court. In that case, the government sought injunctive relief and statutory penalties under the Red Light Abatement Law ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 11225 et seq. ) and the UCL, against a motel owner who allegedly ran a <mask> ring. ( Bhakta , at p. 976, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 421.) The government first obtained preliminary injunctive relief, which was affirmed on appeal, and then obtained a permanent injunction and $10,000 in statutory penalties. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's claim that he was *460entitled to a jury trial, stating \" ' \"the right of trial by jury did not exist at common law in a suit to abate a public nuisance\" ' \" and \"the unfair competition law provides for only equitable remedies.\" ( Id . at p. 979, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 421.) Respectfully, this is not an accurate description of the remedies under the UCL. Indeed, in its analysis, the court did not even mention the availability of statutory penalties. The availability of statutory penalties is critical , however, to the analysis of whether the right to jury trial is constitutionally secured. (See Tull , supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 418-425, 107 S.Ct. 1831 ; 1941 Chevrolet , supra , 37 Cal.2d at p. 295, fn. 15, 231 P.2d 832.) We thus conclude Bhakta 's analysis was incomplete, and we decline to follow its holding.11"], "id": "dcaf7ac5-977c-4d2b-a267-97442c3928bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the present case, the first defence sec up in the answer, is in. substance that the defendant entered into the contract for the hiring of the dwelling house in the complaint specified/ *101without the knowledge of the fact that it had been previously occupied as a brothel, with the assent of the plaintiff, who with intent to defraud and deceive, suppressed that fact from the defendant at the time of such hiring. That he entered into the occupation of the house with his wife and family, and was annoyed and insulted by lewd persons calling at all times during the day and evening, to obtain entrance for purposes of <mask>, that he could not quietly and peacefully occupy the premises, and was therefore evicted therefrom by the wrongful acts of the plaintiff."], "id": "2ec4375b-e2fd-435f-9716-d8b2815cb34a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Girardy v. Richardson, (1 Esp. Rep. 13,) the action was assumpsit for the use and occupation or certain rooms belonging to the plaintiff. For the defendant, it was proved that she was a woman of the town; that the rooms had been let to her by the wife of the plaintiff, who, it was proved, managed the business of his house in letting the lodgings; that at the time of letting them, she was informed of the defendant\u2019s mode of life, and consented that she should be at liberty to receive male visitors, for the purpose of <mask>. Lord Kenyon ruled that under these circumstances the action was not maintainable; that the contract was contra bonos mores, and therefore could not support an action, and directed a verdict for the defendant."], "id": "03693e4c-dd9d-4563-a1c5-953e4077c566", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["After the prosecutor had completed redirect examination of D.T., defense counsel asked the court to reconsider its ruling due to her testimony that Calhoun had been her only pimp and was responsible for prostituting her to 20 customers. Defense counsel argued that D.T.'s testimony created the misleading impression that she ceased engaging in <mask> once Calhoun was in custody. The trial court confirmed its ruling that evidence of D.T.'s subsequent acts of prostitution was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1161(b)."], "id": "c10cc2f3-b8c5-4e24-94a8-b98f29633607", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*86It is not entrapment in a <mask> case where a police officer secures ready acquiescence by a defendant and the defendant was not overly persuaded or put under any compulsion of any description, the only deception practiced upon defendant being that the person with whom she expected to unlawfully associate was a police officer, and such decoy did no more than others seeking to avail themselves of the opportunity to so associate and the defendant did exactly what she would have done in any other instance.18"], "id": "aca9b4da-b39c-415d-aa07-0121c7d8a554", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["To maintain the plea that the plaintiff had expelled him from the possession, the defendant offered to prove, upon the trial, that the plaintiff introduced, into the part of the house' which he occupied, lewd women and prostitutes at various times, keeping them all night for the purpose of <mask>; that he was in the habit of introducing other men, who, with himself, kept company with the women, and who together kept up such noise and disturbance throughout the night, using obscene and indecent language, so as to disturb the rest of persons sleeping in the part of the house demised to the defendant, in consequence of which the defendant was compelled to leave the house before the rent became due for which the action was brought.' It was held by the Supreme Court (4 Cow. 584), that the evidence was properly excluded; that there could be no eviction without an actual entry and expulsion; that the matter complained of simply amounted to a nuisance, which the defendant could have abated by applying to the police; that he was under no necessity, physical or moral, to abandon the premises; and that his abandonment was voluntary, and was no answer to the covenant for the payment of rent."], "id": "2e4dbd55-e02c-46e6-b1b1-d769b8589069", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Relevant to this appeal, Mother testified at trial that she had previously been employed as a prostitute in Nevada but that she was no longer so employed. She stated that she accepted employment at the Moonlight Bunny Ranch for financial reasons due to the large amount of debt she had accumulated pursuing her master's degree and Father's failure to provide child support for the minor children. When questioned about why she did not disclose her relocation to Nevada and her employment there, she stated that she was not asked about it. At the time of trial, Mother was employed as a social worker, and she provided documentation to that effect. She indicated that she would not return to <mask> because that line of work seemingly affected the court's decision with regard to her continuing to be the primary residential parent and because the code of ethics of her current career strictly forbade such work."], "id": "c04e00da-b7ca-4500-ba33-9f1e18b5afc2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Tbe charge contained in tbe tenth paragraph of tbe complaint is much more indefinite by reason of tbe omission of any specific place. Tbe individual has been named and tbe times between which tbe intercourse is stated to have occurred are set forth, but a statement of tbe places has been omitted. Tbe allegation on that subject is that it was at various bouses of <mask> or assignatio a in tbe city of New York. A charge so general even the most alert could not be expected to be prepared to meet with evidence. It comprehends too much space and too many suspected localities, and evidence under it could not fail to operate as a surprise upon tbe defendant. This should be rendered definite and certain as to tbe place intended to be referred to or it should be stricken from tbe complaint. Reasonable certainty as to these charges can only be secured by stating tbe place or places intended, and they can be given if tbe misconduct alleged has sufficient color of foundation to. render it a proper subject of legal investigation. As to this paragraph tbe complaint should be made more definite and certain by stating tbe places where tbe misconduct is supposed to have occurred; and tbe order should be so far modified as to require that to be done. Tbe former practice allowed tbe defect to be corrected by putting tbe issue to be submitted to tbe jury in definite form. (Wood v. Wood, supra, 113.) But tbe provision of the Code, under which a reasonable degree of definiteness and certainty in pleadings can be secured by motion, renders it unnecessary for tbe defendant to resort to that alternative."], "id": "8d81acaa-733b-4a59-9003-03da78373ee9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["McCunn, J. In effect, this is an action of covenant for a quarter\u2019s rent, alleged to be due August 1, 1862. *63The defense interposed is, that by consent and connivance of the landlord the basement of the house in question'was converted into a place of <mask>, and that, by reason thereof, the appellant (lessee) was obstructed and defeated in his business ; and that, in consequence, and before the rent in controversy, or any portion of it, accrued due, he abandoned the premises. In other words, the answer sets up a plea of eviction."], "id": "471373ec-b7ef-4513-8ec6-301bd90b1713", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["McCunn, J. In effect, this is an action of covenant for a quarter\u2019s rent, alleged to be due August 1, 1862. *63The defense interposed is, that by consent and connivance of the landlord the basement of the house in question'was converted into a place of <mask>, and that, by reason thereof, the appellant (lessee) was obstructed and defeated in his business ; and that, in consequence, and before the rent in controversy, or any portion of it, accrued due, he abandoned the premises. In other words, the answer sets up a plea of eviction."], "id": "be5e48b1-d212-49d1-8af2-7d54f5563a54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The respondent contends that this case is similar to Edwards v \u201cRoe\u201d (68 Misc 2d 278) which involved a proceeding under RPAPL 711 (subd 5) to evict a tenant from her residence based on the fact that she was engaging in an adulterous relationship. The respondent quotes Judge Irving Younger\u2019s decision at length to support the proposition that any and all consensual sexual conduct not harmful to others and not involving either disorder, or <mask> is protected behavior and may not constitute a basis for eviction under RPAPL 711 (subd 5)."], "id": "99e3ba91-ae23-481b-89f2-7d52c2210f58", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["For that purpose it would have been sufficient to have shown that the prisoner kept a house of <mask>. Its direct tendency was to corrupt and deprave public morals, and disturb the peace, and for that reason it was a common nuisance. That has uniformly been held to he the law. (1 Whart. Grim. Law, \u00a7 2392; 1 Bish. Crim. Law, \u00a7\u00a7 665, 1046; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 17 Pick., 80; Ros. Crim. Ev. [6th Am. ed.], 735 ; Warren v. People, 3 Park., 544; Lowenstein, v. People, 54 Barb., 299; People v. Carey, 4 Park., 238.) The indictment in the case of Hunter v. Com. (2 Sergt. & R., 297) did not charge the keeping of a house of prostitution, and for that reason it was not within these authorities and the principle which they sustain."], "id": "e52247f5-b67a-4a74-a617-98223c0f8b4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The prohibition of the offensive public conduct associated with the solicitation of <mask> may be a legitimate State objective. Since it has been demonstrated that only this, public element of prostitution may make that conduct harmful, and that public conduct may be dealt with separately from the sexual conduct itself, it would be unreasonable for the State to completely proscribe private, sexual conduct in order to reach *83distinct public solicitation. Members of the public may have a protectible privacy interest: not to be repeatedly accosted on the streets by a prostitute any more than a religious zealot, peddler, alcoholic or panhandler, and not to have a group of street musicians, noisy teenagers, solicitors for charities, or streetwalkers converging at his or her doorstep. These public interests can be protected, but by less intrusive means than those now employed by the State. Private, consensual sexual conduct between adults, whether or not performed for a fee, is protected by the right of privacy. If the State has a legitimate interest in curbing public disorder, it can and must accomplish this objective without depriving the individual of his or her right to engage in private, consensual, sexual relations. The constitutionally protected right of privacy makes it incumbent upon the State to implement its policy by more reasonable, less intrusive means."], "id": "27ae78d9-127a-43dc-a1aa-66fcb657ca54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["That portion of chapter 287 of the Laws of 1916 (Parole Board Act) pertaining to this case is as follows: \u201c that no person convicted in any of said cities of vagrancy, disorderly conduct tending to a breach of the peace, public <mask>, soliciting on the streets or public places for the purpose of prostitution, or the violation of section one hundred and fifty of chapter ninety-nine of .the laws of 1909, as amended, shall be sentenced to any such workhouse for a definite term until the finger print records of the city magistrates\u2019 courts of said city are officially searched with reference to the particular defendant and the results thereof duly certified to the court; and provided, further, that if it shall appear to the court at any stage of the proceeding prior to the imposition of sentence and after due notice and opportunity to the defendant to be heard in opposition to such accusation of prior convictions that any person convicted of any or each of these offenses last enumerated has been convicted of any or each of these offenses two or more times during the twenty-four months just previous, or three or more times previous to that conviction, thei^the court shall sentence such offender to a workhouse of the said department of correction in said city for an indeterminate period. The' term of imprisonment of any person convicted and sentenced to any *29such workhouse for an indeterminate period shall not exceed two years and shall be terminated by the parole commission in the manner prescribed in section five of this act and not otherwise.\u201d"], "id": "acf6bb0a-7e01-4754-84fc-a027e7f002b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Failure to define terms does not render a statute unconstitutional when the terms have a commonly understood meaning (Matter of Gold v Lomenzo, 29 NY2d 468). The only reported case construing the terms \"sexual conduct\u201d and \"fee\u201d as regards the <mask> statute is People v Block (71 Misc 2d 714). In the Block case the court defined \"sexual conduct\u201d by engrafting the d\u00e9finition of that term contained in section 235.20 of the Penal Law. The definition in section 235.20 is expressly restricted in its application to sections 235.21 and 235.22 of the Penal Law, which deal with the dissemination of indecent materials to minors. Since this restriction prevents its application to other sections in article 235, it clearly cannot be engrafted to the prostitution article. Moreover, the definition of sexual conduct in section 235.20 includes contact with the clothed genital areas, clothed buttocks and clothed female breasts, types of activity not normally included within the concept of prostitution."], "id": "2d6d39a9-61f3-416e-b81f-9572c04496ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*716It is unquestionable that <mask> can be profitable and that such activity should be deterred by every available legal means, particularly in view of the escalating number of victims of \"AIDS\u201d and other sexually transmitted diseases. Prostitution is, however, a class B misdemeanor (Penal Law \u00a7 230.00), and absent appropriate legislative enactment, a District Attorney lacks the authority to seek the forfeiture of the proceeds of prostitution, no matter how profitable the activity, nor how strong the public policy may be in deterring such activity."], "id": "89e12799-966c-4be6-b6a1-bf0130f69381", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In only one case that the People cite, People v. Bhakta (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 973, 978-979, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 ( Bhakta ), did the appellate court apply the gist-of-the-action analysis to conclude a government enforcement action was properly tried by the court. In that case, the government sought injunctive relief and statutory penalties under the Red Light Abatement Law ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 11225 et seq. ) and the UCL, against a motel owner who allegedly ran a <mask> ring. ( Bhakta , at p. 976, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 421.) The government first obtained preliminary injunctive relief, which was affirmed on appeal, and then obtained a permanent injunction and $10,000 in statutory penalties. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's claim that he was *460entitled to a jury trial, stating \" ' \"the right of trial by jury did not exist at common law in a suit to abate a public nuisance\" ' \" and \"the unfair competition law provides for only equitable remedies.\" ( Id . at p. 979, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 421.) Respectfully, this is not an accurate description of the remedies under the UCL. Indeed, in its analysis, the court did not even mention the availability of statutory penalties. The availability of statutory penalties is critical , however, to the analysis of whether the right to jury trial is constitutionally secured. (See Tull , supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 418-425, 107 S.Ct. 1831 ; 1941 Chevrolet , supra , 37 Cal.2d at p. 295, fn. 15, 231 P.2d 832.) We thus conclude Bhakta 's analysis was incomplete, and we decline to follow its holding.11"], "id": "28b90a14-9878-45c7-8c26-c8a78449c0ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Supreme Court explained the section 236.1 statutory scheme: \u201cThe first two subdivisions of section 236.1 define human trafficking as \u2018depriv[ing] or violat[ing] the personal liberty of another with the intent to obtain forced labor or services,\u2019 ([\u00a7 236.1, subd. (a)]), or with \u2018the intent to effect or maintain . . . violation[s] of\u2019 various laws regulating <mask>, pimping and pandering, pornography, and extortion ([\u00a7 236.1, subd. (b)]). Subdivision (c) does not speak of violating a victim\u2019s personal liberty. Instead it defines human trafficking another way: the inducement of a minor to engage in commercial sex acts. Subsequent provisions make clear that neither a minor\u2019s consent ([\u00a7 236.1, subdivision (e)]), nor a mistake of fact as to a victim\u2019s age ([\u00a7 236.1, subd. (f)]), is a defense. Subdivision (c) specifically targets trafficking minors. A completed violation of subdivision (c) will, obviously, involve the inducement of a particular person, and that person must be a minor. By contrast, to violate subdivision (c) as an attempt, the defendant must intend to induce a minor, but the target of that inducement need not be an actual minor. This understanding of the statute supports a conclusion that, as long as the defendant has attempted to induce a person and intends that the object of his inducement be a minor, the elements of the attempt provision are satisfied. This understanding honors the general law of attempt that punishes a criminal intent coupled with an ineffectual act done towards its commission.\u201d (Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 907-908, fn. omitted.) The Moses I court clarified that section 236.1, subdivision (c)\u2019s sentence structure \u201cdoes not reflect an intent by voters to deviate from the established law of attempt. Instead, it conveys the voters\u2019 intent that human trafficking of a minor, whether successfully completed or merely attempted, is to be punished in a uniform way.\u201d (Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 908.)"], "id": "c0159cf6-50b0-4f7f-a734-ab9b80b583d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit concluded that \u201c[w]hile it is true that [the prostitute] did have a child in the area, and they could have been traveling in order to visit the child, this fact is not inconsistent with the <mask> plan. A reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the group was traveling to New Mexico to visit [the prostitute\u2019s] daughter and engage in prostitution.\u201d Id. (emphasis in the original); see also United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 152 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that evidence that the defendants \u201cengage[d] in a grooming process designed to reduce [the victim\u2019s] resistance to sexual advances\u201d was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants \u201ctransported the victim to Louisiana with an efficient and compelling purpose to engage in illicit sexual activity\u201d) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)."], "id": "07f7d5cd-c703-4117-9b92-3e12de0bb1d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The testimony of the witnesses Moss and Thompson, together with their affidavits, is substantially to the effect that in conversations with the witness Gladys Clayton immediately after the alleged killing, she stated that she was unable to identify any one connected with the killing. They also aver that she told them that she identified the defendant because of police compulsion. Gladys Clayton on her cross-examination upon the trial was interrogated as to whether she identified the defendant because of police pressure and threats to charge her with <mask>. This she denied."], "id": "670859ea-e10a-458e-9259-38df2b97c3c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*543I certainly do not accept the defeatist attitude that nothing can be done to limit or suppress the world\u2019s oldest profession, or the equally defeatist attitude that since total eradication is unattainable, more limited remedies are pointless. The success of the Nuisance Abatement Law (Administrative Code \u00a7 7-701 et seq.) as a tool in the suppression of open and notorious houses of <mask> in this City shows firmly to the contrary (see, e.g., City of New York v Taliaferrow, 158 AD2d 445; City of New York v Jai Balaji, 176 Misc 2d 719). Indeed, as the Justice assigned to all nuisance abatement cases in Queens, over the last few years I have directed the closing of dozens of houses of prostitution, pursuant to the provisions of that law, in all parts of Queens. Similarly, I have pursuant to that law directed the closing of well over a hundred other illegal businesses which created a nuisance in their neighborhoods, such as crack houses, fencing operations, illegal sales of liquor, gambling dens, nude dancing establishments and the like. Other Justices have done the same in the other counties of this City."], "id": "1e0a264f-deb9-4003-a49c-7203180eb8d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As St. Louis Metropolitan Police officers were patrolling an area associated with a high rate of <mask>, drug sales, and robberies, they pulled over to speak with Stragliati and another individual, who were standing on a street corner. The officers asked for Stragliati's pedigree information, which she provided. The officers ran Stragliati's information through the computer system and discovered active warrants for Stragliati's arrest relating to a forgery. The officers placed Stragliati under arrest and conducted a search incident to arrest. Inside a briefcase Stragliati carried, the officers found a glass tube commonly recognized as a smoking device for narcotics. The officers seized the glass tube, which a laboratory test later revealed had cocaine base residue."], "id": "94b16ab6-5993-4b97-b404-d7b8527d5b4b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The pleaded Penal Law \u00a7 240.37 charge under docket number 2013BX041375 stated that, at a specified time and street location, defendant \u201cloitered and wandered about the above location for a period of approximately five minutes, during which time defendant beckoned to passing traffic and stopped or attempted to stop 1 male motorist.\u201d These allegations, describing only a single instance of conduct alleged to have occurred, were insufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant engaged in the type of repeated conduct proscribed by Penal Law \u00a7 240.37 (2), i.e., \u201crepeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop, or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or repeatedly interferes with the free passage of other persons, for the purpose of <mask>.\u201d"], "id": "66fb1a9e-6258-4552-94f2-e90fedd1e676", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["We conclude that counsel\u2019s failure to provide meaningful representation deprived defendant of a fair trial (see, People, v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 146-147). Although the failure to make motions does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance, the failure to request a Sandoval ruling, in combination with subsequent occurrences at trial, exhibited counsel\u2019s ignorance of that fundamental and prophylactic rule of law, and of the related Ventimiglia protection. In that connection, we note that counsel failed to insulate defendant from cross-examination concerning prior similar charges of weapon possession and prior bad acts involving cocaine. Moreover, counsel opened the door and failed to object to prejudicial evidence of prior uncharged crimes and bad acts introduced by the prosecutor. Further, counsel elicited prejudicial hearsay testimony that defendant was trying to force the victim into <mask>. Finally, counsel failed to request a missing witness charge concerning the victim of the shooting. We perceive no tactical explanation for those failures and conclude that, viewed as a whole, counsel\u2019s representation was constitutionally inadequate (cf., People v Felder, 186 AD2d 1050; People v Donovan, 184 AD2d 654, 655-656; People v Dombrowski, 163 AD2d 873, 874). (Appeal from Judgment of Monroe County Court, Connell, J.\u2014Rape, 1st Degree.) Present\u2014Denman, P. J., Lawton, Wesley, Balio and Boehm, JJ."], "id": "a03087d4-8865-41b6-8c40-d82c842e7e27", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["omission of a unanimity instruction. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576 [\u201cThere is a split of opinion in the appellate courts as to whether the Chapman standard or Watson standard for harmless error applies in a unanimity instruction case\u201d; court held alleged error was harmless under either standard].) C. Analysis The two underlying statutes on which the prosecution based the human trafficking charge in this case, pandering and pimping, have been held to be continuous crimes not requiring unanimity instructions: \u201c[S]ection 266i (the pandering statute) is somewhat similar to [ ] section 266h (the pimping statute). Under [ ] section 266h, the offense is one ongoing offense\u2014a defendant deriving support or maintenance from the earnings of a prostitute. [Citation.] [S]ection 266i, subdivision (c), is similar to section 266h since, once the female is procured for a house of <mask>, the one offense becomes ongoing as long as the female plies her trade in such house. \u2018The pandering statute and [ ] section 266h (pimping) are both designed to discourage prostitution by discouraging persons other than the prostitute from augmenting and expanding a prostitute\u2019s operation, or increasing the supply of available prostitutes.\u2019 \u201d (People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151-152.) As this court pointed out in a case involving pandering and pimping, \u201cThe language of the charging document, specifying that the acts . . . took place over a specified period of time, reflects that the prosecution intended to charge [the defendant] in this manner.\u201d [Citation.] \u2018This language alerts the jury that the charge consists of a continuous course of conduct, to be proved by evidence of more than one individual act.\u201d (People v. Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465, 491-492.)"], "id": "b9932f88-7d08-46c4-beb8-019d548eb4f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On June 2, 2016, at about 3:06 a.m., Santa Ana Police Officer Robert Velasco was patrolling the area of Harbor Boulevard and Hazard Avenue in *287Santa Ana. The area is known as the Santa Ana Blade and is well known for pimping and trafficking of juveniles. Velasco had conducted over 100 pimping and <mask> investigations during his four and a half years as a police officer."], "id": "f01f0e8d-7e24-4ef7-b1f8-c225bcc43347", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The facts set forth in the accusatory instrument herein were sufficient to apprise the defendant of the charge against him under section 230.40 of the Penal Law. The factual portion of the accusatory instrument described the alleged activities of the defendant in aiding and abetting <mask> on his bar premises. The complaint is not invalidated because it did not state that the defendant failed to make reasonable efforts to halt or abate prostitution. That neglect is fairly implied from the claim that he facilitated prostitution on his premises."], "id": "f3d2407e-8447-4848-8647-72a89b66a078", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*256Destiny told Yolanda that if Yolanda tried to get help or run away, she would beat her. Yolanda was afraid of defendant and Destiny. Destiny dressed Yolanda in leggings and a see-through blouse and defendant drove them to Harbor Boulevard in Santa Ana, which was an area known for <mask>. Yolanda \"made it clear [to defendant and Destiny] several times\" that she did not want any of this to happen."], "id": "3de39c65-32ff-49c2-b58e-e7a980a21112", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["I will briefly consider the validity of the reasons thus assigned. The construction which it behoves a court of justice to put on a publication which is alleged to be libellous, is to be derived as well from the expressions used, as from the whole scope and apparent object of the writer. Now, what was that in this case ? The writer imputes the authorship of a certain publication, which professes to have for its object, among other things, the maintenance and support of religion, to the plaintiff. He calls public attention, and seeks to enlist public prejudice against him, as practising hypocrisy in that respect, for sinister purposes; a species of hypocrisy of all others the most odious and detestable; and, by way of ensuring public odium and settling public opinion, it is admitted that he charges the plaintiff with a <mask> of \u201c hypocrisy and deception,\u201d in effecting the passage of an important bill through a branch of the legislature, of which he was a member, sworn to a faithful discharge of the duties attached to his station. In construing such a publication, it does not seem to me, that the purposes of justice would be best effected by testing it by the rules of grammatical accuracy, or weighing it with scrupulous precision; nor can I consider the construction I adopt, as at all \u201c straining the libel\u201d to a sense in any other degree odious than the author has made it, but, on the contrary, I am well satisfied that it is consistent with the spirit and object of the publication."], "id": "00e29f2d-8c9f-4a82-94ff-bccf2acaa1a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Section 2320 of the Public Health Law provides that whoever shall \u201cerect, establish, continue, maintain, use, own, or lease any building, erection, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or <mask> is guilty of maintaining a nuisance.\u201d If the existence of the nuisance is admitted or established the court is mandated to enter an order of abatement directing the removal from the subject premises of all furnishings used in conducting the nuisance and directing their sale and the effectual closing of the premises against its use for any purpose for a period of one year (Public Health Law, \u00a7 2329, subd 1). Such order of abatement may be canceled upon payment by the owner of all costs of the proceeding and filing a bond in the full value of the property and on the condition that the owner will immediately abate the nuisance and prevent it from being established within a one-year period (Public Health Law, \u00a7 2332, subd 1)."], "id": "a8893575-a7a9-47a9-96fb-0a5cda7e1897", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*297The issue presented here is whether Evidence Code section 1161(b) applies only to the human trafficking victim's sexual conduct and acts of <mask> committed before the alleged human trafficker was placed in custody. Calhoun argues that Evidence Code section 1161(b), by referring to \"sexual history \" and \"history of any commercial sex act,\" only excludes evidence of D.T.'s conduct prior to his arrest. (Italics added.) The Attorney General argues that nothing in the text of the CASE Act limits the scope of Evidence Code section 1161(b) to sexual acts and acts of prostitution committed before the alleged human trafficker was placed in custody. In resolving this question, we work on a blank slate. No reported decision has addressed the scope of Evidence Code section 1161(b)."], "id": "66a21934-eb05-4faf-b541-c16511ca2b7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In City of Costa Mesa , supra , 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 698 a city sued a commercial landlord for injunctive relief to abate a public nuisance and refused to issue any new business licenses for the property until the landlord *836complied. ( Id. at pp. 365-366, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 698.) The landlord filed a cross-complaint for slander, trade libel, and interference with prospective economic advantage, alleging city employees made certain statements to the landlord's prospective tenants and potential contractors about illegal activity at the landlord's property, including that the landlord \" 'ha[d] been convicted of <mask> and drug dealing that occurred at the Property' \" and that \" 'the entire building' \" would be \" 'shut down because of illegal activity that [was] conducted there.' \" ( Id. at pp. 365-367, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 698.) On appeal from an order granting a special motion to strike under section 425.16, the court held the landlord's causes of action arose from \"oral statements 'made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a[n] ... executive ... body' \" under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). ( City of Costa Mesa , at p. 372, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 698.)"], "id": "32357946-0a0f-47f9-b95f-ce17f6dde451", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["She tore up or burned paper currency but not coins. It appears Ms. Brown offered at least two versions to the hospital doctors to explain this behavior. One hospital psychiatrist testified she perceived those who offered her money as people trying to exercise control over her. Burning the offered money was her way to dispel the control. In the other version, she saw the offerers as Black males, whether they were or not, who wanted to buy sex. The destruction of the currency was her attempt to purge herself of the taint of <mask> and elicit respect. This behavior, say the hospital psychiatrists, is delusional. Also, when asked why she urinated and defecated on herself, she responded with a totally irrelevant account of events in Connecticut. The hospital psychiatrists find this nonassociation of thought delusional thinking."], "id": "5b33bce6-297e-49a0-b595-92addceffe2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is this court\u2019s opinion that the Legislature was justified in concluding that the crimes classified as class A drug felonies represent a most serious and constant threat to our society. Drug *77trafficking .and its consequences are a problem foremost in the minds of \u00a1all citizens. The contention that the .statute here must-be -struck down because other so-called more serious and violent crimes are dealt with le-ss -severely cannot prevail. In fact, such an argument begs the question before the court. In the -words of Justice Joseph D. Quinn, Jr., who recently upheld the constitutionality of these same statutes: \u201cWe are not * * * dealing with 1 nonviolent \u2019 offenses here. Realistically, we deal with but \u2022one phase of a large scale, well entrenched criminal activity that springs from human greed and preys on man\u2019s weakness \u2014 one that turns buyers into sellers, makes addicts out of newborn infants and sets addicts to mugging, thievery, <mask>, robbery and murder to support an insatiable appetite.\u201d (People v. Gardner, 78 Misc 2d 744, 750.)"], "id": "f2624884-0e20-4b13-aa2a-cd10d1f3eca3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Count two charges that: \"The defendant, in the County of New York, during the period from January 1, 1977 through April 26, 1977, knowingly and intentionally advanced and profited from <mask> by managing, supervising, controlling, and owning, alone and in association with others, a house of prostitution business, and an enterprise involving prostitution activity by two and more prostitutes.\u201d Defendant has moved, inter alia, for an order dismissing these counts upon the ground that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish the offense charged or any lesser included offense."], "id": "a3c601bf-f39c-4c95-85b5-988b6c6f2964", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As such, the sentencing range for promoting <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 230.30 [1]), a nonviolent class C felony, is an indeterminate sentence of from 1 to 3 years to 5 to 15 years for a first felony offender such as defendant. The *562sentencing range for rape in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7 130.25), a nonviolent class E felony, is an indeterminate sentence of from 1 to 3 years to lVs to 4 years. However, for the third degree rape charge only, pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 70.00 (4), if this court,"], "id": "372426bc-ce6c-4f78-b4d0-25a2d5113da9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In McKinney\u2019s Consolidated Laws of New York, book 14, page 30, section 8 of the Domestic Relations Law is annotated as follows: \u201c Re-marriage of one divorced for adultery as bigamous. For the purpose of enforcing a statute which declares that every person having a husband or wife living who shall marry again, shall, except in specified cases, be adjudged guilty of bigamy, a person against whom a divorce has been obtained because of adultery and who has not received a judicial permit to remarry, is regarded as having a husband or wife living. A person, therefore, so divorced and so under a disability, who marries, is guilty of bigamy. (People v. Faber, [1883] 92 N. Y. 146; 44 Am. Rep. 357; reversing 29 Hun, 320, and over-ruling People v. Hovey, 5 Barb. 117; compare Moore v. Moore, [1877] 8 Abb. N. Cas. 171.) \u201d (6) The United States Code, title 18, section 398, provides as follows: \u201c Any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of <mask> or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or the District of Columbia, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other unmoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, *13or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (June 25, 1910, c. 395, \u00a7 2, 36 Stat. 825.) \u201d (7) Decedent was a dominant character who had reached the pinnacle of far-reaching power and prominence in the theatrical world, his properties and business being located in many of the populous cities in this country. His brother, one of the proponents, was, until recently retired, a Supreme Court judge; until recently he was a bachelor and lived during the period of the relationship of the parties with his unmarried sister, Ray, who died during the trial of this issue. Contestant was a daughter of Rudolph Fixel and Deha Ferdelin, and a cousin of Olivia Leventritt and a niece of the late Supreme Court Judge David Leventritt. She took up voice culture with Clara Kalisher in 1902 and later went on the stage, appearing in many well-known productions. \u201c In cases of this kind the character of the parties to the alleged marriage is of much importance.\u201d (Surrogate Fowler in Matter of Eichler, 84 Misc. 672, 673, citing Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 71 N. Y. 423; Matter of Brush, 25 App. Div. 610.)"], "id": "3ff916a0-9210-4f36-8ba9-fcac4b91d38f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As the trial court acknowledged in its decision, no similar statute exists for local criminal court cases (People v Harris, 14 Misc 3d 497, 510 [2006]). Clearly, the Legislature, without referencing CPL 200.60, has specified in CPL 100.45 that certain other provisions of article 200, applicable to indictments, also apply to informations filed in local criminal courts, i.e., CPL 200.20 (severance of counts and defendants), CPL 200.40 (consolidation of indictments) and CPL 200.95 (bills of particulars). Indeed, in recognition of this omission, several lower court decisions have held that in order to raise the level of an offense based upon the fact of prior convictions, such fact must be alleged in the information and/or in the accompanying supporting deposition (see People v Lazzar, 3 Misc 3d 328, 330 [2004], citing People v Powlowski, 172 Misc 2d 240, 242 [Rochester City Ct 1997]; People v Jackson, 177 Misc 2d 657 [1998]). A different approach, however, was taken in the earlier case of People v Denise L. (159 Misc 2d 1080, 1082 [1994]), wherein the court held that the People were required, pursuant to CPL 200.60, to file a special information charging prior qualifying convictions in order to prosecute the violation of loitering for the purpose of engaging in a <mask> offense as a class B misdemeanor (no special information required where the defendant admits the prior conviction during the plea allocution)."], "id": "dea05533-3f29-4e0f-ae7d-652069758c74", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Administrative Code \u00a7 C16-2.2 (now \u00a7 7-703) provides: \"The following are declared to be public nuisances: (a) Any building, erection or place, including one-or two-family dwellings, used for the purpose of <mask> as defined in section 230.00 of the penal law. Two or more criminal convictions of persons for acts of prostitution in the building, erection or place, including one-or two-family dwellings, within the one-year period preceding the commencement of an action under this title, shall be presumptive evidence that the building, erection or place, including one-or two-family dwellings, is a public nuisance.\u201d"], "id": "e00769fc-5f9a-49b7-b414-991936596527", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["(i) of any person with the intent to extort money or pecuniary benefit, (ii) of any person with intent to defile such person, (iii) of any child under sixteen years of age for the purpose of concubinage or <mask>, (iv) of any person for the purpose of prostitution, or (v) of any minor for the purpose of manufacturing child pornography[.]"], "id": "f4107a06-a55d-4c83-8207-c9975006e249", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The allegation of the complaint as to the inability of the police to stop the criminal activity is fleshed out in the affidavits by allegations that the female defendants are hardened recidivists, who have already been arrested numerous times for <mask> activities and returned to them. It is claimed that these arrests are of little enforcement value, since they are \u201croutinely disposed of through plea bargaining to a disorderly conduct charge and the imposition of a modest fine and release.\u201d (Plaintiffs posthearing mem, at 9.) The male defendants, the pimps, have allegedly escaped arrest because while they brazenly appear in the street and in a local donut shop, they are never seen taking money from the prostitutes, and a prostitute would be risking her life to testify against them."], "id": "229b0f04-f7fe-4f50-a318-d5a468d8dbc5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Padlock Law, effective August 6, 1984, authorizes the Police Commissioner to impose sanctions for public nuisances *327by barring the use of property in violation of penal laws, such as those relating to <mask>, gambling and drugs. Specifically, the Padlock Law defines, as a public nuisance, any building where violations of certain provisions of the Penal Law (such as Penal Law art 225, relating to gambling) are occurring, and where at least two such criminal convictions have occurred within one year of commencement of proceedings pursuant to Administrative Code \u00a7 436-8.1. The law creates a statutory presumption of continuing criminal activity, where an arrest for violation of the relevant provisions was made within 30 days of issuance of notice pursuant to section 436-8.1 (Administrative Code \u00a7 436-8.0). The Police Commissioner\u2019s regulations provide for notice of arrests to the owner of property, informing him that if two or more convictions are obtained within 12 months for such public nuisances, proceedings may be commenced resulting in possible closure of the premises. The proceedings are commenced by service of notice of hearing on the owner, lessor, lessee and mortgagee, pursuant to CPLR article 3. A public hearing presided over by a hearing officer, employed by the police department, is held to determine whether a public nuisance exists, and to report to the Police Commissioner with recommendations, either for abatement of any nuisance, or for vacatur of a closing order."], "id": "09363c19-5ffc-405f-bff4-8a157dff6dd4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["earned while engaging in <mask> supported [Whisenton]. [T.D.] describes she turned the money over to [Whisenton], but you don\u2019t even need that. [\u00b6] [Whisenton] asked for payment or received payment for soliciting prostitution customers. The deal was, they go out, they walk the streets, they make money, they give the money back. [\u00b6] Even though [L.D.] didn\u2019t make any money, there was still the understanding that they were out there to make money and that she was supposed to provide money if she made it. And [T.D.] and [L.D.] were minors under the age of 16. [\u00b6] Prostitution is synonymous with commercial sex.\u201d The prosecutor argued that the online advertisements sufficed for the jury to convict Whisenton for conspiring with K.S.: \u201cWhen [Whisenton and K.S.] took the pictures and they started to advertise [T.D. and L.D.], they were pimping them out. They were putting them on the market. They were looking for customers. They were engaging in pandering and pimping.\u201d The prosecutor pursued a conspiracy theory, arguing to the jury: \u201cWe have two people. We have [K.S.] and we have [Whisenton] and they were both sort of working together to traffic these two young ladies. And they committed acts in furtherance of that conspiracy. [\u00b6] And those are the acts . . . about the defendant driving [T.D.] and [L.D.] to [Oakland]; or driving them to [San Jose]; or directing [them] to pose for photographs [ ]; these are all acts that occurred during the commission of the two and a half day conspiracy to traffic these two young women. [\u00b6] All you have to agree is one of those acts occurred, and that they had an agreement to commit the crime, and you can convict the defendant under a conspiracy theory.\u201d Defense counsel argued his theory of the case to the jury, challenging the victims\u2019 credibility, and claiming they were biased against Whisenton. Defense counsel also argued Whisenton\u2019s identification was an issue because"], "id": "a6e47484-991a-4a2a-a212-93a0a11f9a23", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Citing section 230.35 of the Penal Law, defendant argues that since the complainant was not under 17 years of age, she is deemed to be an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated before the Grand Jury in order for same to be legally sufficient. (CPL 60.22, 70.10.) Such is certainly not the intent of the statute and defendant reaches this conclusion by means of convoluted logic. The apparent intent of this provision of law is to insure that a prostitute witness under the age of 17 \u201cshall be deemed not to be an accomplice.\u201d (Hechtman, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law, \u00a7 230.35, p 189.) Even if it were implicit in the statute that a prostitute is an accomplice of his or her pimp as a matter of law, there has been not one scintilla of evidence presented to the Grand Jury which would warrant the assumption that the complainant was a prostitute, or that the defendant acted as her pimp. There is, however, sufficient uncontradicted and unexplained evidence that the complainant was abducted and restrained by the defendants to promote the crime of <mask> in the third degree. Certainly, the victim of a kidnapping was never intended by the Legislature, implicitly or otherwise, to be deemed an accomplice within the meaning of the law."], "id": "557a4436-c25b-45c7-9ba8-9b8820217795", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, facts that are irrelevant should not be considered. This includes information found on Ms. Cotten's personal computer after her death suggesting that she may have been involved in <mask> or X-rated filmmaking, or both. There is no evidence that these activities contributed to her suicide. Our focus should be on what Dr. Wilson knew or should have known in November 2014 that would make Ms. Cotten's suicide with his gun reasonably foreseeable. Information that Dr. Wilson learned from Ms. Cotten's computer after her death cannot be made relevant by suggesting that she did not share with Dr. Wilson, her family, or friends every private detail of her life. What is relevant is the ample evidence in the record-undisputed by Dr. Wilson-that he knew he should not leave someone with Ms. Cotten's mental health issues and history of attempted suicide alone with access to a gun and ammunition. The information about Ms. Cotten's alleged \"illicit activities\" has no bearing on the issue of foreseeability, makes an assumption unsupported by the evidence, fails to allow all reasonable inferences in favor of the Estate as required, and serves to cast Ms. Cotten in a bad light to justify a result."], "id": "d7f55223-b222-463a-a555-01291d752a5c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*688Mr. Gonzalez, who is a hotel employee, also testified he feared someone would rape the child. His fears were not unjustified given Officer Alvarez's testimony that the InTown Suites was in an area subject to numerous police calls for assaults, vehicle thefts, shootings, <mask>, rapes, and drug activity. He specifically stated he had responded to calls at the hotel for disturbances by the homeless, drug activity, family violence, assaults, burglaries, thefts, and stolen vehicles. The jury could have reasonably concluded that an unsupervised child in this area was subject to impending peril."], "id": "42b51cfd-fdf8-4941-b5f0-f0795f716b45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The prosecutor disclosed to the defendant that one of the park employees to whom the victim ran for assistance after the sexual assault, who was a prosecution witness, possessed information which would be material to the defense. The witness could testify that approximately 10 months after the attack his truck was flagged down by the victim who asked him if he wanted to party because she needed $20 to purchase diapers for her baby. He could further testify that there were other instances when he had seen the woman attempting to solicit the drivers of automobiles for the purpose of <mask>. This latter proffered testimony was summarily excluded as it involves sexual contact with other than the defendant (People v Bergeron, supra; People v Clark, supra)."], "id": "f84b4a1c-2405-4f4c-9e9e-6aff58e6f286", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["had consensual vaginal and anal sex at the hotel. Victim did not think that Simmons knew that he had penetrated her anus during sex. Afterwards, Simmons took victim back to her school. Victim met Simmons again that same month. Simmons went to victim\u2019s school to pick her up, and he took her to a different hotel where they had consensual vaginal and oral sex. Simmons told victim that she could make money by sleeping with other men, but victim did not pay attention to this comment. A few days later, victim called Simmons. During their conversation, Simmons brought up the topic of making money. Victim understood that Simmons was talking about <mask>. On February 4, 2015, about a week after their last conversation, victim called Simmons and told him that she was ready to make money. Later that same day, victim called Simmons and told him to come pick her up at a class that she was taking at a church. Simmons drove victim to a store to buy a phone and to a house in Oakland, where they had vaginal sex. Victim\u2019s mother filed a missing person\u2019s report when she did not return from her class. The next day, victim received a few calls on her new phone. Simmons drove victim to an \u201coutcall,\u201d but nobody showed up at the designated address.4 Sometime later, Simmons drove victim to meet a \u201cdate\u201d in Hayward. 5 Simmons also put an ad for victim\u2019s prostitution services on a website called Backpage. Simmons wrote the language of the Backpage ad and gave victim a false name. After staying in Hayward, Simmons took victim to San Francisco, where he was violent with her for the first time. Simmons became angry after victim failed to pick up"], "id": "0cb8abb3-e49c-4284-b088-354a3209310a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". To the degree that petitioner relies on People ex rel. Colletti v Morehead (50 NYS2d 78), that case disproves his contentions. In Colletti (p 80), the court quoting from the People\u2019s memorandum, apparently agreed that a keeper (Rubenstein) of two young women in a mistress-type relationship would have been found guilty if charged with promoting <mask>. It should be noted that Colletti was decided in 1944, long before the statutes being challenged were enacted."], "id": "225e7b9b-d1c3-4e8c-bfbc-e4bc1ba22fe2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The SLA hearing officers sustained the Island Steak House charges against Mock. After a subsequent hearing on the remaining charges, the hearing officer determined that several named persons had sexual relations with a woman introduced by Mock, that Mock had called the woman to the Gam Wah premises itself on eight occasions for the purposes of <mask>, and that Mock himself had relations with the woman."], "id": "8df4a26e-9ad7-40ce-9cd4-9e7dc681de32", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In opposition to this evidence, defendant\u2019s principal submits his own affidavit, in which he does not deny the allegations of the moving affidavits, but merely urges that \"it has never even been asserted that there is any <mask> or that there has ever been any solicitation for prostitution on the premises. We have always employed professional dancers who have never been permitted to touch patrons.\u201d On oral argument of this motion, counsel for defendants, in unsworn hearsay, denied that the \"performance\u201d at the subject premises is lewd. In fact, he likened it to a performance of the ballet \"Swan Lake\u201d."], "id": "d16e7a90-188d-4b24-8f59-721159e24f06", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". Indictment No. 656/14 charges defendant with multiple counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, attempted criminal sexual act in the first degree, attempted promoting <mask> in the second degree, attempted sex trafficking, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and related charges in connection with his conduct with respect to T.C. In addition the court has granted the People\u2019s motion to consolidate indictment No. 3153/14 with indictment No. 656/14. Indictment No. 3153/14 charges defendant with sexual abuse in the first degree, sex trafficking and related charges in connection with his conduct with respect to then 17-year-old S.W. Defendant also stands separately indicted under indictment No. 1195/14 which charges him with attempted rape in the first degree and related charges in connection with his conduct with respect to C.S. For the purpose of publication, only the initials of the victims are used to identify them."], "id": "588b355a-bc4b-4865-be18-ba99c2aeda2b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["#I bow to the rule, as I find it established : but I lament the complicated and artificial anomalies in the relations of domestic life, which have grown, and are still growing, out of the practice of marriage-settlements. They give to the wife the amphibious character of a feme covert and t\u00ed feme sole. I view it as an adulteration of that holy union : as a divorce, pro tanto, Of the marriage contract. A wife, in the \u201c independent enjoyment of her separate estate,\u201d armed with distrust of her husband, and shutting out his affections and confidence, by refusing to give her own in mutual exchange, is an object of compassion and disgust. Legal chastity cannot be denied to her.: but there is danger, that the sacred institution of marriage may degenerate into mere form. It is sometimes, in practice, little more than legalized <mask> ; and the parties seem to have no higher objects than sexual intercourse, and the sanction of legitimacy for their offspring. If, in the rapid progress of refinement in civilization, it shall be thought expedient to go one step further, and to allow the wife, by ante-nuptial contract, to stipulate for an exemption from personal control over her by the husband, then the quasi divorce would be extended one degree further, so as to confer on her the independent enjoyment of the rights and privileges of a kept mistress. But she would have little claim, indeed, to the endearing appellation and character of a wife."], "id": "b468b401-dff7-4389-81cf-ac61de4b0eaa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Reviewing the testimony in the Williams case, the credible testimony supports the conviction. The offer of money is always an inducement. The testimony of the defendant acknowledges the offer and receipt of the money in the bar for the purpose of <mask> although defendant denies any purpose on her part to so act. Overpersuasion cannot be found as a matter of law in this case and the alleged compulsion to remove her clothes is not persuasive."], "id": "ae2b0e72-edf7-47cb-97d3-5aaea313dd7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Mother's criminal history includes arrests for receiving stolen property, taking a vehicle without consent, and threatening a crime with intent to terrorize (2000); failure to obey a juvenile court order and loitering with the intent to commit <mask> (2001); possession of marijuana for sale (2003); battery on a person and obstructing/resisting a public officer (2008); assault with a deadly weapon (not a firearm) with great bodily injury likely (2008); domestic battery and vandalism (2008); transportation/sale of narcotics (2011); and possession of a controlled substance (2016)."], "id": "23eae18e-040b-4cd2-bea3-4dcad94ebd8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["During a break in D.T.'s cross-examination, the trial court returned to the issue of evidence of D.T.'s acts of <mask> after Calhoun had been placed in custody. The court stated: \"There is so far uncontroverted testimony that [D.T.] had not been a prostitute until the defendant brought her into the business, this is from direct examination from the prosecution, the testimony that [Calhoun] caused it by having her make money, a term she stated that she had never heard before. Going into her subsequent sexual history as a prostitute is not relevant to the case. It is inflammatory. And even if [ Evidence Code section] 1161 hypothetically did not exist, this would be a very simple [ Evidence Code section] 352 analysis which also applies here because any probative value is outweighed by the prejudice. [\u00b6] Now if that becomes an issue, we can talk about that. So far the only evidence that the witness prostituted herself was because of how the defendant taught her to do that. That's after the fact, after the defendant was arrested. According to her, he gave her the tools. The subsequent conduct does not become relevant at that point.\""], "id": "109379b9-a8c0-4f75-b614-01d8eefc996f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Section 230.00 of the Penal Law of the State of New York: \"A person is guilty of <mask> when such person engages *992or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee.\u201d Section 230.40: \"A person is guilty of permitting prostitution when, having possession or control of premises which he knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to halt or abate such use.\u201d"], "id": "acf055f5-3401-4729-9bf4-647e6b6dc469", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In determining whether a dominant purpose exists, we instead ask whether the illicit behavior is one of the efficient and compelling purposes of the travel. Accordingly, many purposes for traveling may exist, but, as long as one motivating purpose is to engage in <mask>, criminal liability may be imposed under the Act. When no dominant purpose exists, it is because any UNITED STATES V. FLUCAS 23"], "id": "5b41d66b-2396-48e0-883d-a0de6e139e6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*256Destiny told Yolanda that if Yolanda tried to get help or run away, she would beat her. Yolanda was afraid of defendant and Destiny. Destiny dressed Yolanda in leggings and a see-through blouse and defendant drove them to Harbor Boulevard in Santa Ana, which was an area known for <mask>. Yolanda \"made it clear [to defendant and Destiny] several times\" that she did not want any of this to happen."], "id": "a2a51b87-ba9f-4ccd-81ce-3591fcc2481c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On June 23, 2008, the New York State Legislature passed the Safe Harbour for Exploited Children Act (L 2008, ch 569, codified at Family Ct Act \u00a7\u00a7 311.4, 712 [a]; \u00a7 732 [a]; Social Services Law \u00a7\u00a7 447-a, 447-b). The law seeks to provide support and services to youths who are victims of sexual exploitation. (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2008, ch 569, at 13.) In 2010, the Legislature amended CPL 440.10 to add a provision allowing a judgment to be vacated where defendant was arrested for loitering for the purposes of <mask> or engaging in prostitution and defendant\u2019s participation in the offense was a result of sex trafficking under Penal Law \u00a7 230.34 or the TVPA (CPL 440.10 [1] [i])."], "id": "ed77ea38-7abc-4562-8275-00e232ae5a9a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As such, the sentencing range for promoting <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 230.30 [1]), a nonviolent class C felony, is an indeterminate sentence of from 1 to 3 years to 5 to 15 years for a first felony offender such as defendant. The *562sentencing range for rape in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7 130.25), a nonviolent class E felony, is an indeterminate sentence of from 1 to 3 years to lVs to 4 years. However, for the third degree rape charge only, pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 70.00 (4), if this court,"], "id": "abd26b17-a3d5-4b6b-b59f-a5f27654def2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> is big business for commercial gain and may be regulated under the police power of the State (People v Fegelli, *358163 App Div 576, 578-580, supra; People v Draper, 169 App Div 479, 484; Matter of Dora P., 68 AD2d 719, 731, supra; Tisdale v State, 640 SW2d 409, 413, 414 [Tex], supra; State v Allen, 37 Conn S 506, 424 A2d 651, 654, supra; 63A Am Jur 2d, Prostitution, \u00a7 3, at 343). This court does not sit to legislate morality, that is within the province of the Legislature (see, People v Onofre, 51 NY2d 476, 488, n 3, supra; People v Costello, 90 Misc 2d 431, 434, supra; People v Johnson, 60 Ill App 3d 183, 376 NE2d 381, 386; State v Price, 237 NW2d 813, 818 [Iowa], supra). The narrow question before this court is whether Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 230.00 and 230.03 violate due process. This court holds that they do not."], "id": "70204d3f-d6cc-4699-b02f-3a3fa7195d9e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c It was the opinion of the court below, that, irrespective of the tenant, the law prohibiting the use of premises for purposes of <mask> is not violated, unless it is established by direct or circumstantial evidence that the premises were actually used for such purpose by the occupant of a room. Such a strained construction would virtually nullify the statute in question. * * *"], "id": "49fdc0d1-9199-4f98-9a28-95d49bda737e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["OL\u2019s aunt\u2019s boyfriend saw the advertisements with pictures of OL and called to set up a faux date for a large sum of money. After setting up the date, he called police, who arrived at the motel, investigated the situation, and ultimately arrested Jones and Miles-Johnson. The State charged Jones with two counts of promoting the commercial sexual abuse of a minor, one for OL and one for TC; two counts of second degree promoting <mask>, again one for each of the girls; third degree rape of a child for allegedly having sex with OL; and attempted tampering with a witness and violation of a protection order for phone calls Jones made to OL after his arrest."], "id": "96fab4e1-fb02-49da-a9ef-0e154eecb84c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Reviewing the testimony in the Freeman case, it is apparent that the defendant readily acquiesced and was not persuaded in any manner except by the money tendered to her. She admitted previous acts of <mask> to the officer and apparently relies more upon the claim of an invasion of her constitutional rights by the use of wire tap information, than upon the defense of entrapment."], "id": "949487bb-4e3a-470c-ab49-9f73096c42ac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This court is not unmindful of the fact that a literal *418interpretation of the <mask> laws, and their vigorous enforcement may create potentially a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. It is not inconceivable that a person involved in the filming of a sexually explicit film, may unexpectedly find him or herself criminally prosecuted for sexual conduct which occurred during that filming, whether or not the film itself is actually obscene or even whether or not the explicit sexual conduct appears in the final edited version of the film. However, when a State undertakes to regulate a social evil such as prostitution, or pornography, it has a greater power to regulate the nonverbal physical conduct which may occur than to suppress depictions or descriptions of the same. (United States v O\u2019Brien, 391 US 367, reh den 393 US 900.) While First Amendment considerations may protect the dissemination of printed or photographic material regardless of the manner in which it was obtained, this protection will not shield one against a prosecution for a crime committed during the origination of the act. As noted in People v Fixler (supra, p 326): \"The fact that a motion picture of an actual murder, rape or robbery in progress may be exhibited as a news film or a full length movie without violating the law does not mean that one could with impunity hire another to commit such a crime simply because the primary motivation was to capture the crime on film.\u201d"], "id": "a0a6ed8d-ac5e-421f-a8bc-2ecd9144dbfa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "prostitution", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The testimony of the witnesses Moss and Thompson, together with their affidavits, is substantially to the effect that in conversations with the witness Gladys Clayton immediately after the alleged killing, she stated that she was unable to identify any one connected with the killing. They also aver that she told them that she identified the defendant because of police compulsion. Gladys Clayton on her cross-examination upon the trial was interrogated as to whether she identified the defendant because of police pressure and threats to charge her with <mask>. This she denied."], "id": "472bdff5-5ed5-4207-bb9d-f50f3ff8ff09", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["We note Edwards rejected the employer's argument that the Legislature meant the word \" 'restrain' \" in section 16600 to mean \" 'prohibit,' \" such that a \"mere limitation on an employee's ability to practice his or her vocation would be permissible under section 16600, as long as it was reasonably based.\" ( Edwards , supra , 44 Cal.4th at p. 947, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 282, 189 P.3d 285, italics added.) Moyes use of a reasonableness standard in analyzing the non<mask> clause there at issue thus appears to conflict with Edwards's interpretation of section 16600, which, under the plain language of the statute, prevents a former employer from restraining a former employee from engaging in his or her \" 'lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind ,' \" absent statutory exceptions not applicable here. ( Edwards , at p. 945, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 282, 189 P.3d 285, italics added.)"], "id": "ee2f9362-cf4f-4402-ba1a-f43ff233c9ad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In September 2015, Cybertron purchased customer lists, existing customer contracts, and accounts receivable from one of its competitors, ITK, which was owned by Capps and Garland Egerton. Capps was paid an initial sum of cash and was given Cybertron stock. He further agreed to accept additional monthly payments from Cybertron to ITK and was hired by Cybertron as its vice president of technology services. Capps also entered into a 60-month RCA with Cybertron beginning September 1, 2015, which contained, among other things, noncompete, nondisclosure, non<mask>, and liquidated damages clauses. In relevant part, the RCA provided:"], "id": "3f74cbaf-d447-40a3-9713-4745cacd2198", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants have moved to dismiss that portion of the in-formations charging criminal <mask> in the fourth degree.2 The defendants assert that this charge must be dismissed on the grounds that (1) the informations are defective within the meaning of CPL 100.15, 100.40 and 170.30, and (2) there exists a legal impediment to conviction. The People oppose these motions. Oral argument was held on May 5, 1995.3"], "id": "f06c7545-b3f4-4e1a-bb72-b9bf10e75e53", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the merits of this application, the supporting affidavits of both the Assistant Special Prosecutor and the Assistant District Attorney include several allegations pertaining to the underlying facts in the disputed case in an attempt to show that the alleged criminal activity does, or does not, fit the following language: \"arising out of, relating to, or in any way connected with the offer, payment, acceptance or <mask> of funds or other consideration in connection with the obtaining or retaining of public employment or public office, or with the obtaining or retaining of any contract or other benefit from a public employee, public officer, public agency or the State or any of its political subdivisions\u201d. (Executive Order No. 42, 9 NYCRR 3.42.)"], "id": "3708ae1f-9669-4c56-9a4e-2be6f070d21c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["A summary of, that statute is set forth in Martindale Hubbell Law Directory of 1976 (vol VI, Law Digests, p 347) as follows: \"Personal jurisdiction over nonresident individual or foreign partnership, or his or its executor or administrator, may be exercised where he or it, in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts business in state; or (2) commits tortious act other than defamation of character in state; or (3) commits tortious act outside state causing injury to person or property within state, if (a) regular doing or <mask> of business, persistent conduct, or revenue from within state, or (b) in interstate commerce, and expects or should expect act to have consequences in state; or (4) interest in real property in state. Jurisdiction based on any of these acts does not confer jurisdiction for unrelated cause of action. (52-59b). Constructive service on Secretary of State and registered or certified mailing to defendant\u2019s last known address required (33-41 l[c], added by 52-59b).\u201d"], "id": "2aaaab25-31d2-4a1f-9a49-9b53bcde2684", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, the first writing in the case in hand provided that the defendant would pay \u201c commission on all shipment Gross Billings \u201d and the second that it would pay \u201c commissions on all merchandise manufactured and shipped to Bobbie Brooks, Inc.\u201d Neither promise is qualified by any requirement that *466the plaintiff should activate himself in obtaining for the defendant future business or further orders. As I see the ease, neither the original oral agreement nor the subsequent oral modification contemplated the <mask> or servicing of orders by the plaintiff, and there seems no reason to read into the writings an unexpressed restriction upon a promise stated unconditionally. The second agreement did not \u201c supersede \u201d the first, as suggested by the defendant. The word \u201c supersede \u2019 \u2019 may not be read so literally. It is plain that the parties intended only to modify the first agreement by substituting a commission computed at the rate of 35 cents per dozen for one of 3%."], "id": "c9bf0283-9ffd-41a6-8674-6d7775e37176", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Only one of the four statutory elements in the instant statute is the same as in the statute that was held to be facially invalid in Lo , and, therefore, this similarity is not enough to require consideration of the merits of appellant's challenge. Here, there are material differences between the two statutes that would require this Court to conduct an entirely different substantive First Amendment analysis than the one that this Court conducted in Lo because the improper-relationship statute, as compared to the Lo statute, is much narrower in some ways and potentially much broader in some ways. On the one hand, the improper-relationship statute is narrower than the Lo statute in that it applies only to certain employees of certain types of schools, certain students at certain types of schools, and only when the employee works where the complainant is a student. On the other hand, the improper-relationship statute is broader in that it applies to all school employees and not just people who are seventeen years old or older, and to a \"student\" of any age and not just a \"minor,\" as that word is defined in the Lo statute. Given the substantial differences between the two statutes, we cannot conclude that appellant's facial challenge is cognizable merely because the complained-of statute incorporates as one of its several elements the same language that had been found to be facially unconstitutional in Lo . As we have explained above, this Court's holding in Lo was necessarily based on the online-<mask> statute's overbreadth in reaching all sexually explicit electronic communications between all adults and all minors, but that same analysis would not apply to the improper-relationship statute, given its far narrower focus on the school environment. We note, however, that, if a facial challenge to a statute were premised on a contention that the complained-of statute was nearly identical to a statute that had been found to be facially unconstitutional, then there might be a more persuasive argument that this Court should consider the merits of the claim under the rationale in Smith v. State , 463 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Because this case does not present that situation in light of the significant differences between the two statutes that we have described above, we leave that question for another day."], "id": "e35448f1-4514-4394-b970-e0b79b9b0626", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"[T]he mere <mask> of employee grievances prior to an election is not a per se violation.\" ( Idaho Falls Consol. Hospitals, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (9th Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 1384, 1386.) Nor is it a violation merely to have an open door policy or to express a willingness to listen to grievances. ( Id . at p. 1387.) By itself, \"a simple offer to hear any complaints the employees may have, or to set up machinery to that end, is ... non-coercive.\" ( N.L.R.B. v. K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc . (3rd Cir. 1981) 640 F.2d 460, 466.) Again, a mere \"willingness to listen and to consider\" employee concerns is not a violation. ( Id . at p. 467.)"], "id": "b1a4754b-61ea-472c-966a-77ddb131ccdd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff, M Co., which had obtained a judgment in California against the defendants, J and G, sought to enforce that judgment in Connecticut and to recover damages in connection with a home staging services and lease agreement between the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, M Co., a California corporation, was to provide design and decorating services, including the delivery and installation of rental furniture and de\u0301cor, for the purpose of making the defendants\u2019 Connecticut residence more attractive to potential buyers. J was the sole signatory to the agreement, but M Co. negotiated the agreement exclusively with G. The lease required an initial payment and had an initial term of four months. If the residence was not sold within that term, the lease would continue on a month-to-month basis at a monthly rate. One provision of the agreement contained both a choice of law clause, providing that Califor- nia law governed the agreement, and a forum selection clause, which vested courts in Los Angeles, California, with jurisdiction over disputes arising under the agreement and provided that the parties consented to the jurisdiction of that court. Beneath that provision, G amended the choice of law clause, writing in that, \u2018\u2018[s]ince this is a contract for an agreement taking place in the state of Connecticut, Connecticut laws will [supersede] those of California.\u2019\u2019 Additionally, although G did not sign the agreement, he signed an addendum to the agreement authorizing M Co. to charge his credit card for the initial payment. G made the initial payment to M Co., which then delivered and installed the rental furniture and de\u0301cor. Thereafter, the defendants defaulted on their pay- ment obligations. The defendants denied M Co. access to the premises when it attempted to repossess its furniture and de\u0301cor, which ultimately remained in the residence for approximately three years. M Co. filed an action in California Superior Court, which rendered a default judgment against the defendants after they failed to appear. When the default judgment remained unsatisfied, M Co. filed the present action, seeking enforcement of the California judgment and alleging breach of contract and quantum meruit. As to the claim seeking enforcement of the Califor- nia judgment, the trial court concluded that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over J, but not over G, and that the California court\u2019s judgment was entitled to full faith and credit as to G. As to the breach of contract claim, the court found that J had breached the home staging services agreement. In doing so, it rejected J\u2019s special defense that the agreement was unenforceable because it failed to comply with certain provisions of the Home <mask> Sales Act (\u00a7 42-134a et seq.) (HSSA). The court specifically determined that a home staging agree- ment, which involves the use of goods and services to facilitate the sale or rental or real property, was excluded from the purview of the HSSA, which exempts transactions \u2018\u2018pertaining to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019 from its requirements. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for M Co. and against G in connection with the enforcement of the California judgment and awarded M Co. the full amount of that judgment. In connection with the breach of contract claim, the court rendered judgment for M Co. and against J, and awarded M Co. damages for the conversion of M Co.\u2019s furniture and de\u0301cor, as well as for the associated rental loss of that inventory. Having done so, the court declined to address M Co.\u2019s quantum meruit claim as to J. Thereafter, M Co. withdrew the breach of contract and quantum meruit claims as to G, and the defendants appealed. Held: 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the California court had personal jurisdiction over G, G having consented to jurisdiction in California by virtue of the agreement\u2019s forum selection clause, and, accordingly, the trial court properly found that the California judgment was enforceable against G: although a nonsignatory to a contract generally is not bound by a forum selection clause contained therein, under the \u2018\u2018closely related\u2019\u2019 doctrine, a nonsignatory may be bound by that clause if he was so intimately involved in the negotiation, formation, execution, or ratifica- tion of the contract that it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be bound by it, considering factors such as the nonsignatory\u2019s relation- ship to the signatory and whether the nonsignatory received a direct benefit from the agreement; in the present case, the defendants did not dispute that the forum selection clause in the agreement was valid and enforceable, and G was so closely related to the agreement that he was bound by its forum selection clause, especially when G was married to J and lived in the residence she owned, in which they wrongfully used M Co.\u2019s inventory for three years; moreover, in addition to receiving a direct benefit under the agreement, only G, and not J, participated in the negotiations, he made a substantive change to the agreement prior to its execution, notably amending the choice of law clause while leaving the forum selection clause in that same provision untouched, and he executed an addendum to the agreement, pursuant to which he author- ized the sole payment made to M Co. that prompted M Co.\u2019s full perfor- mance of its contractual obligations. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the home staging services agreement was unenforceable due to M Co.\u2019s noncompliance with certain provisions of the HSSA, as the trial court correctly con- cluded that the transaction between the parties was not a \u2018\u2018home solicita- tion sale,\u2019\u2019 as defined therein, and, therefore, was outside the purview of the HSSA: the provisions of the HSSA apply only to \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale[s],\u2019\u2019 the statutory (\u00a7 42-134a (a) (5)) definition of which excludes any transaction \u2018\u2018pertaining to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019; moreover, although a narrow construction of that language that applied only to contracts for the sale or rental of real property was inconsistent with the dictionary definitions of the phrase \u2018\u2018pertaining to,\u2019\u2019 this court none- theless concluded that it would yield absurd results to construe the real property exception as applying to all transactions for goods and services that relate to, or are an adjunct or accessory to, the sale or rental of real property; accordingly, this court turned to extratextual sources, including legislative history, the federal regulations on which the real property exception was based, and sister state precedent, and, consistent with the liberal construction afforded to remedial statutes such as the HSSA, concluded that a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 is not strictly limited to the sale or rental of real property but, instead, includes a limited category of consumer goods and services that may be excluded under the real property exception; in the present case, the sale of the residence was the stated purpose of the agreement, the duration of the agreement was defined by how long it took for the property to sell, and the sale of the property delimited the agreement\u2019s various terms by, for example, allowing M Co. to remove the furniture and de\u0301cor if the defendants\u2019 residence was not listed for sale within a prescribed period of time, such that the terms of the agreement were so intertwined with the sale of the defendants\u2019 property that the agreement was inextricably related to, or an integral adjunct or accessory to, the sale of the home. 3. There was no merit to the defendants\u2019 claim that the award of damages was improper insofar as the trial court awarded M Co. double damages by rendering judgment against both G and J for the same loss and included the conversion value of the furniture and de\u0301cor in the amount of damages for which J was liable in connection with the breach of contract claim; although a party may recover just damages for the same loss only once, it was undisputed that M Co.\u2019s loss was wholly unsatisfied when the trial court rendered judgment in its favor on the claim against G concerning the enforceability of the California judgment and on the breach of contract claim against J, and the trial court was not foreclosed from rendering judgment in favor of M Co. against both defendants, jointly or separately, for injuries for which each is liable; moreover, the trial court\u2019s award of damages for the conversion value of the furniture and de\u0301cor was not clearly erroneous in light of the fact that J caused M Co.\u2019s total loss of that inventory by keeping and using it in her personal residence for three years, as M Co.\u2019s loss of the furniture and de\u0301cor was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of J\u2019s breach of the home staging services agreement. (Two justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in one opinion) Argued September 8, 2020\u2014officially released September 22, 2021* Procedural History"], "id": "3cf6182d-a82f-450e-97ee-60dd2448b843", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The bribery statute in Minnesota in that case, \"M.S.A. \u00a7 613.02,\u201d in substance defines bribery \"as giving or offering or causing to be given or offered to a public official a bribe or any money, property, or value of any kind, or promise with intent to influence him\u201d. The court there held that something more than mere <mask> of another to commit the crime of bribery was required, since in that case the intended crime of bribery was unaccompanied by overt acts pursuant to the bribe offer; that at no time did the defendant or his agent make contact with the person to be bribed, and that therefore the intended crime fell short of establishing an attempt at bribery."], "id": "933a7d56-00ec-49bb-b0dc-8ce0bd15ed50", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In sum, the improper-relationship statute is an entirely different statute that applies in a much narrower context than did the former online-<mask> provision. Thus, this Court's decision in Lo that invalidated the online-solicitation provision did not also automatically invalidate the improper-relationship statute. Because no binding judicial authority from this Court or the Supreme Court has ever declared the improper-relationship statute to be invalid, the Smith exception does not apply. We, therefore, agree with the court of appeals's conclusion that, absent the Smith exception, appellant's first-time facial constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction falls under the general rule that provides that such complaints may not be presented for the first time in a post-conviction habeas proceeding. See Beck , 2016 WL 2732131, at *6. We hold that, under these circumstances, appellant has forfeited his complaint that the improper-relationship statute is facially unconstitutional, and he may not now litigate that issue in the instant post-conviction habeas proceeding."], "id": "9ea9e215-5ac7-4f21-b06d-8590211a1156", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["To establish a \u201csubstantial nexus\u201d with the taxing state, \u201cphysical presence of the vendor is required, [however] it need not be substantial. Rather, it must be demonstrably more than a \u2018slightest presence.\u2019 And it may be manifested by . . . economic activities in the taxing State performed by the vendor\u2019s personnel or on its behalf\u2019 (Matter of Orvis Co. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 86 NY2d 165, 178 [1995] [citation omitted], cert denied sub nom. Vermont Info. Processing, Inc. v Commissioner, N.Y. State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 516 US 989 [1995]). As Amazon acknowledges, physical presence \u201ccan be *424actual or imputed based on the in-state <mask> of sales by an employee, agent, or independent contractor of the retailer on its behalf\u201d (Amazon\u2019s mem of law [Amazon mem] at 14)."], "id": "006ffbfc-a614-4992-aa22-db93552548db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["An order mailed or given to a foreign corporation outside the State creates of itself no inference that the corporation was doing business in the State of New York. To be \u201c doing busi*671ness \u2019 \u2019 in this State implies a continuity of conduct, a systematic and regular course of conduct, in furtherance of its normal business dealings, rather than an isolated transaction or a casual or occasional transaction of a temporary character. In Debrey v. Hanna, (182 Misc. 824, 827) it was said (Eder, J.): \u201c The cases are many that merely soliciting orders within the State which are accepted outside the State does not constitute doing business within the State \u201d. Here, too, the affidavits merely indicate a mere <mask> of an order, even accepting the defendant\u2019s version of the transaction, with a claim of delivery of an order for a small part of the work to the secretary of the plaintiff in Brooklyn, New York. There is no showing of Nicetown\u2019s acceptance of the order at that time and place (People ex rel. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Barker, 157 N. Y. 159, 165; Penn Colleries Co. v. McKeever, 183 N. Y. 98, 103). In International Text Book Co. v. Tone (220 N. Y. 313, 318) the distinction between service of process on a foreign corporation allegedly \u201c doing business here \u201d and the \u201c doing business \u201d which gives rise to the requirement to take out a license is made by Judge Cabdozo where it was stated: \u201cBusiness may be sufficient to subject the foreign corporation that does it to the service of process, and yet insufficient to require it to take out a license. In Tausa v. Susquehanna Coal Co. (220 N. Y. 259), decided herewith, this distinction is emphasized. The question before us here is not one of the jurisdiction of courts under the rules of private international law. It is one of statutory construction. We have steadily upheld the right of foreign corporations, without the aid of any license, to engage in activities incidental to commerce between the states.\u201d"], "id": "2a11c113-0b6a-4df1-862a-48f05b7983d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["be at some slight inconvenience in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent <mask> by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience.\u201d"], "id": "27e22d73-9921-4399-ab03-5f0e4636a055", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c In connection with your comments concerning the appointment of an agent of the Soviet Union to represent the Lithuanian heirs and obtain possession of the funds willed, you may be interested in the enclosed copy of a letter dated March 26, 1948, which the Department sent to the Governors of the states informing them that since this Government does not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, it consequently does not regard Soviet officials or their attorneys as having any right to act on behalf of non-resident Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian nationals with respect to distributing shares owed to them from estates of persons dying in the United States. (Emphasis supplied.) \u201c The effect to be given to such a power of attorney, when executed in the Soviet Union by nationals of Lithuania, is of course one for the Courts of New York to decide, and the action of the consul places no obligation on the Courts of New York to recognize such power of attorney.\u201d It is therefore not necessary for the invalidation of the power of attorney to respondents to indulge in surmise and suspicion and find the existence of duress in its procurement, as claimed by petitioner, whether or not based upon proof (cf. Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 18 F. R. D. 77, 151 F. Supp. 17; The Denny, 127 F. 2d 404), or upon judicial notice of Soviet law and \u201c police state \u201d conditions which some courts have held sufficient *678basis to discredit such instruments (Sobko Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 76; Matter of Azna, Sheboygan County Ct., Wis., decided Dec. 14, 1959, infra; Matter of Mikenes [Mikshis v. Palionis], Probate Court of Suffolk County [Mass.], decided Feb. 20, 1962, infra; cf. Matter of Geiger, 7 N Y 2d 109). Petitioner in fact has not produced any direct evidence of legal duress practiced upon the distributees, nor of their alleged illiteracy or ignorance of the contents of the instrument. Such evidence, it may be conceded, is not easily procurable. Nor is petitioner\u2019s claim of unlawful <mask> of legal business by \u201cIniurcolleguia\u201d well taken. Soviet nationals have no choice under Soviet law other than to use the services of \u201c Iniurcolleguia \u201d in their foreign legal matters. Heir-hunting for that reason is not involved here (cf. Matter of Wellington, 154 Misc. 271; Matter of Lynch, 154 Misc. 260; Ann. 171 A. L. R. 351-359; Penal Law, \u00a7 270-d). Moreover, respondents accepted the matter and their appointment in good faith. The fatal defect in their relationship to the Lithuanian distributees based upon the power of attorney running to them stems from the covert intervention and direct control exercised by a Soviet official body in its procurement and the attempt to accomplish indirectly what may not be accomplished directly, namely, Soviet representation of nationals of the. Baltic countries."], "id": "5f2850c4-2b15-4d6f-a2b7-4eed89f689a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Examination of the general sales agency contract between BOAC and BCPA reveals that BOAC performed in this State an integral part of BCPA\u2019s activities and functions which consisted of something more in degree than a mere <mask> of transpacific flight passage. The \u201c Schedule of G-eneral Provisions \u201d of said general sales agency contract specifically enumerated such duties and responsibilities, on the part of BOAC in behalf of BCPA, in addition to those hereinbefore described, so as to reasonably conclude that BCPA is doing business here. The obligations and duties include, among others, \u201c the reasonable cost of office accommodations so arranged and of any other expenses specifically incurred in connection therewith shall be recharged to the Airline \u2019\u2019; full liaison with BCPA staff members and arrangements for their accommodations; indemnification of BOAC by BCPA against all actions, claims, proceedings, costs, losses, damages, charges and defenses which BOAC may sustain, incur or pay by reason of any service rendered by BOAC."], "id": "2f3d2e01-165e-4fb5-9d89-0f50c53c352e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The informations charging some of the defendants with criminal <mask> in the fifth degree allege that they attempted to buy a \"marihuana-type substance\u201d or \"fake\u201d marihuana from undercover police officers.2 Because the allegations that the defendants \"attempted to buy\u201d \"marihuana-type substance\u201d or \"fake\u201d marihuana do not allege that the defendants solicited any conduct constituting a crime, a necessary element of criminal solicitation, as set forth above, the informations in those cases are dismissed as defective. Had they alleged that the defendants solicited the officers to sell them marihuana, the informations would be dismissible because of the exemption provision in the Penal Law with respect to criminal solicitation charges, as set forth above. Had they alleged an attempt to possess marihuana they would be dismissible as defective because there can be no attempt under the Penal Law to possess marihuana in amounts that would only be chargeable as violations if actually possessed."], "id": "3eb18aca-8d5c-4416-973f-aa7beef8449e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The \"super strikes\" are: (1) \" 'a sexually violent offense' \" as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code, section 6600, subdivision (b) ; (2) oral copulation or sodomy, or sexual penetration of a child under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant, as defined in Penal Code sections 286, 288a, and 289 ; (3) a lewd and lascivious act involving a child under 14 years of age, in violation of Penal Code section 288 ; (4) any homicide offense, including attempted homicide, as defined in Penal Code sections 187 through 191.5 ; (5) <mask> to commit murder, as defined in Penal Code section 653f, subdivision (b) ; (6) assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or firefighter, as defined in Penal Code section 245, subdivision (d)(3) ; (7) possession of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Penal Code section 11418, subdivision (a)(1) ; and (8) any serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death (Pen. Code, \u00a7 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv) (I-VIII) )."], "id": "5c9e847c-4fff-4e27-a9b9-09a903940845", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe court will not make appointments of attorneys for absent or minor heirs except in cases where it is manifestly *523necessary, and in no case upon the suggestion of an executor or administrator, or other person in possible adverse interest to the party sought to be represented. The judge of the court prefers to use his own judgment, without being hampered by <mask> or importunity.\u201d Despite this rule based upon reason and experience, Mr. Lyons applied to the court in a letter of which a copy is here inserted:"], "id": "d63d3674-b4ff-47e6-8891-800018d439ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is this court\u2019s opinion that the defendants in the instant cases were merely \u201c crying his own wares in his own establishment.\u201d It is conceded by the prosecution that such outcries were made by these defendants while standing on private property. It is further conceded that these defendants did not personally accost and personally approach the pedestrians with direct and personal importunities, urgings, or <mask>. The acts of the defendants were simply the manifestations of a technique of ballyhoo common to barkers and hawkers. It is this court\u2019s opinion that without personal accosting there can be no \u201c pulling-in.\u201d"], "id": "f3394853-b364-4b9c-b4e2-d8b03f44d326", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff responds that closure of the Store is sought not because of promotion of materials which might be obscene but to enjoin a nuisance consisting of proscribed sexual activity and <mask>. Plaintiff maintains that title II applies to any building, erection or place used for purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution and does not legitimize such activity solely because books, magazines or movies are also promoted thereat. Plaintiff asserts that the sanctions of injunction, confiscation of property, fine or imprisonment which might flow under title II would be occasioned not by virtue of any constitutionally protected activity occurring at the Store but solely on the basis of activity not so protected. Plaintiff also maintains that summary relief is improper as questions of fact have been raised by joinder of issue herein and since the determination of constitutional issues of the magnitude asserted by defendant is not proper on a motion for summary judgment."], "id": "464878c4-3daa-4a1b-8b5e-fedcebfe150a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court applauds the interest of the neighbors and the police and their determination to eliminate those open-air drug markets. Unfortunately, the laws of the State of New York do not include any statute or combination of statutes that would allow for the prosecution of these defendants for the conduct alleged. On the contrary, the exemption statute in the section of the Penal Law that governs prosecutions for criminal <mask> states specifically that under certain situations \"A person is not guilty of criminal solicitation\u201d (see, Penal Law \u00a7 100.20, criminal solicitation; exemption [emphasis added]). For this reason, as is more fully set forth below, the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss the charges of criminal solicitation in the fifth degree must be granted in those cases where the informations allege the defendants solicited the undercover police officers to sell them marihuana. The cases in *859which the informations allege the defendants were attempting to buy a \"marihuana-type substance\u201d or \"fake\u201d marihuana are dismissed because the informations are defective. The two types of informations, and the two separate grounds for dismissal, are set forth below."], "id": "de16dcdf-8d4b-45aa-bb5a-7459ae819f22", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is well settled that a stockholder is entitled to inspect the corporation\u2019s stock book in order to be able to communicate with other stockholders and seek to persuade them, by <mask> of proxies and otherwise, to oust the existing directors and management and substitute a slate nominated or approved by the stockholder seeking the inspection (Matter of Durr v. Paragon Trading Corp., 270 N. Y. 464; Matter of Martin v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 282 App. Div. 686; Matter of Joslyn [Universal Labs.], 191 Misc. 512, affd. 273 App. Div. 945; Matter of Ditisheim, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 622). The fact that the existing management may be innocent of charges of mismanagement made by the petitioning stockholder is not a valid reason for denying inspection of the stock list (Durr v. Paragon Trading Corp., supra, Matter of Joslyn [Universal Labs.], supra)."], "id": "e326322a-52f0-4a23-a10c-c7f707cf704c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The People allege in their responding papers that the crime solicited could also be criminal possession of marihuana in the fifth degree, because the defendant(s) were urging the undercover police officers to provide them with marihuana in open view on a public street, in violation of section 221.10. As discussed above, there are no factual or other allegations set forth in the information, however, that would support the People\u2019s argument and the court finds that the informations do not sufficiently allege <mask> of the crime of criminal possession of marihuana in the fifth degree."], "id": "cb7dc209-a702-48ca-9bb3-2cbc17abceed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["1. To ask for earnestly; seek to obtain by persuasion or entreaty. 2. To beg or entreat (a person) persistently. 3. To influence to action; tempt; especially, to entice (one) to an unlawful or immoral act. The Grand Jury could easily have inferred that defendant\u2019s bringing forth the suggestion of a commission constituted a <mask>, especially when a specific percentage was mentioned. Defendant also indicated that in return for a \u201chousewarming present\u201d he would do his best to see that Quabbin was awarded each of the four contracts, even though he eventually conceded that his influence might not be sufficient to secure all of them. (Cf. People v Adams, 86 Misc 2d 634.) This type of commercial bribe seeking is *344exactly the kind of activity the statute was meant to prohibit. (See People v Jacobs, 309 NY 315; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Kelly, 1 Misc 2d 624; People v Davis, 33 NY Grim Rep 460; United States v Seregos, 655d 33 [interpreting New York commercial bribery statute].)"], "id": "cff8c521-0b3d-4d2a-910f-f58b9628e252", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner was found guilty after a disciplinary hearing of violating State-wide rules prohibiting unauthorized <mask> of goods, unauthorized exchange of personal items, possession of contraband, solicitation of smuggling and unauthorized provision of legal assistance for compensation. The misbehavior report states that, while conducting an \"area frisk\u201d of petitioner\u2019s desk at the law library, the author found an order form for clothing in the name of an inmate Lopez among the legal papers of Lopez, that the clothing subsequently arrived at the facility and that a search of petitioner\u2019s cell disclosed the presence of the clothing in his cell. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of unauthorized exchange of personal items. Further, in his testimony at his disciplinary hearing petitioner conceded that he had performed legal work for Lopez and assisted him in filling out the order form, and gave no credible explanation for his possession of the ordered clothing."], "id": "443a779c-ee0b-45ab-9207-02f6f81d4e39", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On June 4, 1992, by means of a proxy <mask>, the Co-op gave notice of an annual meeting of the shareholders to be held on June 25, 1992, where votes would be taken on the proposed amendments to the proprietary leases, including one requiring persons involved in litigation or administrative proceedings with the Co-op to settle those proceedings prior to selling their shares in the Co-op. Mrs. Hoving\u2019s proprietary lease presently contains no provision restricting the sale of the apartment during the pendency of litigation of claims between a tenant and the Co-op. The proposed amendment appears to be directed at plaintiffs and is designed to prevent the Co-op from becoming further indebted thereby allowing the Co-op to resolve its current financial problems by forcing persons bringing actions against the Co-op, to settle or discontinue those actions as a condition of selling their shares."], "id": "635ca8fa-0e02-466d-839e-f6b4ca819a7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Careful attention must be paid, in attributing the actions of a nonculpable agent to the accused, to the evidence of causation. (See, Lanham: Accomplices, Principles and Causation, 12 Melbourne U L Rev 490 [1980].) The overbearing influence of the accused upon the unwitting actor is the functional substitute for the community of purpose to commit the crime, which is the usual predicate for accomplice liability, and must be proved to the same extent. (See, e.g., People v La Belle, 18 NY2d 405, 411-413 [1966].) In this sense, the accused may be said to have solicited the actor\u2019s conduct, rather than have aided it, insofar as <mask> includes the \u201cattempt to cause\u201d a criminal result. (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 20.00, 100.05-100.13; see, 18 USC \u00a7 2 [b].) Moreover, there must be proof that the defendant\u2019s mentally culpable state applied to his own actions in regard to the agent, as well as to the agent\u2019s actions in regard to the prohibited result. (Penal Law \u00a7 15.15 [1]; cf. Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability, 35 Stanford L Rev 681, 734-735 [1983].) In other words, with regard to perjury, there must be proof that the defendant intentionally caused the witness to make a false statement under oath, which statement the defendant did not believe to be true, and by which he intended to deceive. (Penal Law \u00a7 210.00 [5].)"], "id": "3d32251a-a2c1-45e4-a5cf-908f450bde84", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants sell \u201ccloseout\u201d merchandise over the Internet. This action allegedly \u201carises from a sale of goods between the parties over the internet\u201d (see affirmation of Meyer Y. Silber in support of defendants\u2019 motion \u00b6 3). According to plaintiff\u2019s complaint, he received an e-mail <mask> from defendants in *164August 2010, offering for sale 50,000 pairs of white tube socks (complaint \u00b6 14). Defendants\u2019 Web site represented that its closeout merchandise \u201cshould all be first quality . . . excess inventory\u201d from \u201c[n]ame-brand companies\u201d (complaint \u00b6 16). Based upon that Web site representation, plaintiff alleges that it agreed to purchase 50,000 pairs of tube socks from defendants for an agreed price of $6,000, plus $1,146 in shipping costs (complaint \u00b6\u00b6 17, 19)."], "id": "2c5a52ba-41e5-4b15-853b-c0ba5173f95d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["If the plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of this legislation were adopted, various entities which advertise temporary locations for sales would be required to comply with the provisions of article 10-A. Summer flea markets, antique shows whereby dealers commonly assemble at a central location, various art sales and jewelry sales often held at the Empire State Plaza, estate sales held \u201con premises\u201d and other such activities would require the issuance of a three-day notice *867with each purchase. As in the case of the defendant herein, these types of business activities involve situations where a potential consumer makes an affirmative determination to attend same. Thus, the need to be protected from \u201chigh pressure door-to-door sales tactics\u201d through personal <mask> is not present."], "id": "a9b94820-3e58-4ea5-a3a0-4368755eb910", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["After the court had precluded further testimony by the witness as to other alleged acts of <mask> that he had observed subsequent to the alleged rapes and sodomies, the prosecutor did not move to strike this testimony. During jury deliberations the jury requested a read-back of the witness\u2019 testimony relative to this incident. The court directed the court reporter to read back the testimony concerning the one incident only and to refrain from reading back the testimony given in derogation of the court\u2019s ruling. The defendant objected that since there had been no motion to strike, the inadmissible testimony should be read back to the jury. This objection was overruled, and the testimony as to the one event only was read back to the jury."], "id": "0acbfcf7-da95-4d37-9d8b-046b5eef43b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, the first writing in the case in hand provided that the defendant would pay \u201c commission on all shipment Gross Billings \u201d and the second that it would pay \u201c commissions on all merchandise manufactured and shipped to Bobbie Brooks, Inc.\u201d Neither promise is qualified by any requirement that *466the plaintiff should activate himself in obtaining for the defendant future business or further orders. As I see the ease, neither the original oral agreement nor the subsequent oral modification contemplated the <mask> or servicing of orders by the plaintiff, and there seems no reason to read into the writings an unexpressed restriction upon a promise stated unconditionally. The second agreement did not \u201c supersede \u201d the first, as suggested by the defendant. The word \u201c supersede \u2019 \u2019 may not be read so literally. It is plain that the parties intended only to modify the first agreement by substituting a commission computed at the rate of 35 cents per dozen for one of 3%."], "id": "ba9ba092-8674-4a60-9093-2f116e9a0a9c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Since the interdicted acts are presently forbidden \u201c in the city of New York \u201d, instead of within the erstwhile narrower compass of \u201c upon the public streets or highways \u201d, the result would appear to be the same whether operators of unlicensed vehicles solicited the public for hire, on or off the public thoroughfares. Such <mask>, under the clear terms of the statute, would be a violation of the law wherever patronage was sought, so long as the act were done \u201c in the city of New York \u201d. The specific place of solicitation within the city no longer being the pivotal factor, evidently, then, the nature of the service itself, offered or rendered, must be."], "id": "37f38fde-d427-428e-a88b-d85d3ddd2c87", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant, to sustain his claim that the complaint is insufficient, cites the case of Prince v. Ridge (32 Misc. 666), where the court held that the illicit <mask> of sexual intercourse was not actionable on the theory that damages from mental suffering, unaccompanied by physical injuries, were not compensable. The holding in that case conforms with those in some other jurisdictions. Prosser in his Law of Torts slates ([2d ed.], p. 45): \u201c Thus far it has been held that no action will lie for the insult involved in inviting a woman to illicit intercourse\u201d (citing cases) and then, quoting from Harvard Law Review (Vol. 49, pp. 1033, 1055), \u201c the view being, apparently that there is no harm in asking.\u201d There are, however, authorities to the contrary. (See cases collated in 1936 Report of N. Y. Law Rev. Comm., p. 437.)"], "id": "3fd14aad-833a-49a9-8090-46c4ba4f7295", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In finding this <mask> of grievances was unlawful, the Board relied on the fact that Gerawan did not have a past practice of soliciting grievances from its workers. The evidence showed the purported solicitations began as a new course of action starting in November of 2012. Since there was no past practice shown here, the Board applied the rebuttable presumption that Gerawan's solicitations of grievances involved an implied promise to remedy such grievances. That presumption, combined with the general antiunion tone of the flyers, mailers and DVD signaling the employer's opinion that the union was unnecessary to protect the workers' interests, led the Board to conclude that Gerawan had committed the unfair labor practice of solicitation of grievances."], "id": "cc559e64-8dce-4a36-9d5f-fb90af094a99", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In conclusion, this court holds that part of the defendant corporation\u2019s business is the <mask> and servicing of New York accounts and these activities constitute \u201cdoing business\u201d within the meaning of CPLR 301. These activities are systematic, regular and continuous and lead to the conclusion that the foreign corporation defendant and the individual defendant are \u201cpresent\u201d in New York for the purpose of in personam jurisdiction. This suit does not offend the \u201ctraditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d"], "id": "23b759a6-6278-4e6a-b32c-0e430343746c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In short, section 12.0 does not prohibit the use of public streets to tow cars nor does it prohibit all <mask> of towing work. What it does prohibit is unregulated solicitation that interferes with the free choice by the damaged car owner who is in a poor position or condition at that moment to properly protect himself, the racing to the scene of an accident by tow car operators to first solicit and garner the towing contract with the resultant interference with the rights of other motorists and traffic in general, and the interference with the proper police investigation and other necessary police work at the scene of the accident. \u25a0"], "id": "d891806e-5950-45e5-8166-570efd391b64", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In short, the Court finds nothing unreasonable about the Army\u2019s technical evaluation of Plaintiff\u2019s proposal. 14 The <mask> plainly required 2FA. If 2FA was to be accomplished via a token, as Plaintiff\u2019s design proposes, the authentication period would end upon removal of the token, absent agreed upon conditions. Plaintiff provided no such conditions or evidence thereof. An additional USB port was therefore needed for the NGLD-M to simultaneously perform other critical functions. Plaintiff\u2019s design proposal\u2014under any reasonable or rational reading\u2014 incorporates a single USB port, which, as was reasonably determined by the Army, cannot carry out necessary functions simultaneously. Accordingly, the Army evaluators were neither arbitrary nor capricious in assigning two deficiencies to Plaintiff\u2019s design methodology."], "id": "5de314d4-d42d-4834-8ca1-8df2da48177b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In this stage of the proceedings, when the appellants were about entering his house, for the purpose of selling his furniture, the respondent, at the urgent <mask> of his friends, *177consented to propose a compromise with M\u2019Donald. M\u2019Donald offered to stop the sale, and procure a restoration, to the respondent of all the property that had already been sold, if he would pay him the amount of a judgment which he held against his son John Neilson, jun., for 1600 dollars, and also a note of his son,' for 800 dollars, endorsed by one Jacob Boyce, together with the judgment upon which the sale had taken place ; and the respondent finally consented to give him his bond and mortgage, for 2500 dollars, payable in five annual instalments ; and M\u2019Donald accordingly restored to him the property sold, discharged his judgment, and assigned to him the securities against his son and Boyce. John Neilson, jun., and Boyce are both proved then to have been, and still to be insolvent."], "id": "b931d36d-41b8-40bc-8e4a-bc735915c8fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Marks has represented the defendant in New York City for the past twenty-two years. He employs an assistant salesman, whose salary he pays. In addition to his <mask> and selling activities in defendant\u2019s behalf, Marks investigates complaints of customers and makes recommendations to defendant concerning adjustments for defective merchandise, and so forth. Sometimes these recommendations are accepted, and at other times they are rejected. When the defendant has refused to make an adjustment with one of Marks\u2019 good customers, Marks has sometimes himself paid a small amount of money out of his own pocket in order to satisfy the customer. Occasionally Marks will reroute a shipment from a customer who has rejected it to another customer, after having first obtained permission to do so from defendant\u2019s Pennsylvania office. Marks has made some collections on behalf of defendant. He testified that he collects about thirty-six checks a year, aggregating approximately $3,600. The checks are invariably made out to the order of the defendant, and Marks has simply forwarded them to the defendant\u2019s Pennsylvania office."], "id": "890cd2cc-f0fb-4c1d-baaa-7a08af006f62", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Despite these facts and transactions, the surviving life beneficiary, the legal representatives of the other and the remainderman have interposed objections to the account predicated solely on the improper acquisition of the mortgage on the noted property which was located outside the city of New York. No assertion has been made that any false or misleading representations were made by the trustee to induce the approval of the account and the execution of the release; indeed, so far as the remainderman was concerned, it was effectively insulated by its attorneys from any contact with the trustee whatsoever. As to the life beneficiaries the only <mask> by the trustees, if it is capable of such appellation, was the letter of transmission of the account for what it was worth, with the suggestion that if it was satisfactory the acceptance and release *267be executed, but if they entertained any doubt on the subject, they would best consult their own counsel."], "id": "97956024-a346-4c46-9b98-56f4a1dfd90a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The County Committee of a political party in New York State is a creature of statute (Election Law, \u00a7 10 et seq.). I't is the local arm of the party and is the body through which the party\u2019s internal affairs are handled at a county level. The functions include the promotion of the party\u2019s candidates for public office, the raising of campaign funds and the <mask> of new party members (see Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F. 2d 308)."], "id": "5864126a-ae84-4aa6-8f22-ccba8c34cf05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The informations charging some of the defendants with criminal <mask> in the fifth degree allege that they attempted to buy a \"marihuana-type substance\u201d or \"fake\u201d marihuana from undercover police officers.2 Because the allegations that the defendants \"attempted to buy\u201d \"marihuana-type substance\u201d or \"fake\u201d marihuana do not allege that the defendants solicited any conduct constituting a crime, a necessary element of criminal solicitation, as set forth above, the informations in those cases are dismissed as defective. Had they alleged that the defendants solicited the officers to sell them marihuana, the informations would be dismissible because of the exemption provision in the Penal Law with respect to criminal solicitation charges, as set forth above. Had they alleged an attempt to possess marihuana they would be dismissible as defective because there can be no attempt under the Penal Law to possess marihuana in amounts that would only be chargeable as violations if actually possessed."], "id": "0c8baf0c-d6e2-4ba8-9e15-997e26bf99e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Respondent\u2019s final application concerns the lifting of the so-called gag order. Since the order was designed to prevent extrajudicial communication with the jury during the pendency *124of the <mask> trial, and it is not clear when those charges will be retried, the court sees no reason to extend the order. Although it is this court\u2019s expectation that the contempt hearing will be scheduled for the near future, the court\u2019s ruling that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial makes it unnecessary to continue the gag order with respect to that matter. Accordingly, the court\u2019s September 22, 1999 order is lifted in its entirety."], "id": "e31596ba-9147-43a4-865d-433e3213e854", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["A similar question was before this court in the case of People v. Milne, 86 Mise. Rep. 417. In that case, the defendant was driving a taxicab belonging to the Yellow Taxicab Company, which had a starter on Broadway in front of the entrance to Churchill\u2019s restaurant. The defendant was seen standing in front of the restaurant for about seven minutes and when approached by one whom he recognized to be an officer drove away, subsequently taking up the position in which the complainant had first seen him and was thereupon arrested and charged with a violation of article 3, section 1, of the public hack ordinance of the city of New York, adopted May 27,1913, approved June 2, 1913, which provides that no public hack shall ply for hire upon the. streets of the city of New York without first obtaining a license from the bureau of licenses. The defendant\u2019s vehicle had a taximeter affixed and was equipped with a movable flag or device which when up displayed the word \u201c vacant.\u201d The court held that the placing of such a cab on a public street where it is accessible to those who may wish to hire it and the <mask> of passengers for hire by word, act or exhibition of appropriate signs or devices was a plying for hire within the ordinance. Judge Crain said: \u201c Being actually hired is not the test of whether or not there is a plying for hire. One may ply for hire without being hired.\u201d And further \u201c A taxicab, not a public hack, can doubtless lawfully be called for an ascertained patron or hirer to a given place and may proceed to such place and stop there, although such place be a public hack stand, and remain there subject to the orders of such person so engaging it, provided that no unreasonable use be made by such taxicab of such public stand and provide that such taxicab is not subject to hire by any person other than such ascertained person or hirer from the time that it is called until the time when it returns to the *350garage in which it is kept; and, for the purpose of securing customers taxicab companies may, by agreement, keep representatives in hotels, public restaurants and other places, but such representatives cannot be permitted to evade the ordinance in question by summoning taxicabs, not public hacks, from such garages to such places ostensibly for ascertained patrons or hirers, but in reality without such, but with a view to having them hired by any one from the public streets.\u201d"], "id": "9bec8d7c-d646-4b15-864d-20b42b18dabe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On August 10, 2021, the Almy awarded SNC and GDMS contracts on the NGLD-M <mask>. AR Tabs 52, 55. The Almy notified Plaintiff on August 11, 2021, that it was \"not selected for award\" and that the \"decision was driven by the unacceptable rating.\" AR 7137-38. The notification also highlighted the ratings of the three offerors' proposals and included a summaiy of Plaintiff's deficiencies and weaknesses. Id. The Almy, pmsuant to FAR 15.506, provided a post-award debriefing to CACI. See generally AR Tab 58. Additionally, the Almy,"], "id": "faa3b95b-6b02-43af-ace1-e722b8113ec8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Criminal <mask> is a defined and recognized crime distinct from the object crime and distinct from an attempt to commit a crime. The exemption is a limited one and not to be construed to exclude any incidental conduct but only \u201cnecessarily\u201d incidental conduct (Penal Law \u00a7 100.20 [emphasis added]). A solicitation is not necessarily incidental to a sale though it may be incidental to a sale of marihuana. The law defines \u201csell\u201d as \u201cto sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to do the same\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 220.00 [1]). Thus a person can be convicted of criminal sale of marihuana by offering the *1049same for sale without a requisite solicitation for such sale (see, e.g., Penal Law \u00a7 221.35; 3 CJI [NY] PL 221.35, at 1834-1836)."], "id": "4fb899a8-423f-4f75-8ad6-2d133ab691cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The basis of the complaint is that the board acted improvidently in selling school property with' an alleged value of nearly $2,000,000 for only $20,000. The complaint also alleges violations of sections 402, 403 and 405 of the Education Law and the State and Federal Constitutions, together with irregularities in the <mask> of the sale and the consideration of offers of purchase."], "id": "4f3e7c31-910f-4c7a-907e-7ae087c75c0f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In adherence to the Federal cases on the issue, the New York courts have also recognized that \"<mask> is endemic to class action certification cases.\u201d (Stern v Carter, 97 Misc 2d 775, 779, mod on other grounds 82 AD2d 321.) Upon this basis, the late Hon. Seymour Lakritz of this court, citing the propriety of considering the ethical conduct, competence, experience and zeal of plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, observed in Cannon v Equitable Life Assur. Socy. (106 Misc 2d, supra, at 1069): \"Class action status should be denied where counsel\u2019s unethical conduct has been or is prejudicial to the interests of the class or results in creating a conflict of interest between the attorney and the class and the attorney is therefore unable to protect the interests of the class (Korn v Franchard Corp., 456d 1206; Taub v Glickman, 14 FR Serv 2d 847). Generally, the unethical conduct condemned by the courts has been egregious misconduct or extreme examples of solicitation and champerty\u201d. (Citations omitted.)"], "id": "45abc521-862f-407d-b476-55aa23d79a31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Berner v. United Airlines (supra), cited by Ward in its brief, the court (p. 13), citing Holzer v. Dodge Bros. (233 N. Y. 216), recognizes the concept of 11 doing business\u201d even that resting on mere <mask> by a salesman, has been broadened by International Shoe Co. v. Washington (326 U. S. 310, decided before the McGee case). (Cf. Benware v. Acme Chem. Co., 284 App. Div. 760.)"], "id": "3e09578e-3b51-4a8d-88be-bbfb7cee70d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In December 2006, UBS and Declaration solicited IKB, seeking Loreley\u2019s investment in Draco. (IT 94.) In January 2007, UBS provided IKB with a term sheet and marketing book (the Draco offering materials) that represented that Declaration would serve as Draco\u2019s independent collateral manager. (U 96.) The Draco offering materials provided, inter alia, that (1) Declaration would select and manage Draco\u2019s portfolio of assets for the benefit of Draco\u2019s investors; (2) Draco would not enter into CDS contracts that referenced the ABS Home Equity Index (the ABX); and (3) all CDS collateral would be acquired on an arm\u2019s length basis for fair market value. (IfIf 99, 104, 106.) Draco and Declaration were also parties to a collateral management agreement that provided that all proposals to enter into or terminate CDS transactions must only be initiated by Declaration and that CDS transactions cannot be entered into upon the recommendation, request, or <mask> of a counterparty to such transaction. (If 103.)"], "id": "86de858d-ad17-4f54-a25d-f49b3fabf2a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["If the Legislature had intended to restrict the applicability of section 105.17 to agreements contemplating specified actions by the person under 16 years of age \u201cit easily could have and surely would have written the statute to say so\u201d (Matter of Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d 232, 240 [2003]), for example, by writing \u201cagrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age that one or more persons under sixteen years of age will engage in or cause the performance of such conduct,\u201d or words to similar effect. In enacting the facilitation in the first degree and <mask> in the first degree statutes, at the same time as the conspiracy in the first degree statute, the Legislature did just that \u2014 limiting first degree facilitation to cases where the adult believes it probable that he is rendering aid to \u201ca person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct that would constitute a class A felony\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 115.08), and first degree solicita*236tion to cases where the adult acts with intent that \u201canother person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a class A felony\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 100.13; see L 1978, ch 422). The Legislature chose not to so limit the application of the conspiracy in the first degree statute."], "id": "ebfc1460-5f7a-4ce2-bc21-b967425e05cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["George R. Bartlett III, J. On May 28, 1997, the Schoharie County Grand Jury, in a single indictment (97-13), charged defendants Donna Arroyo, Cary Wayne McKinley and Daniel Edwards with murder in the first and second degrees, conspiracy in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in the shooting death of Frank Arroyo on May 12, 1997. Defendant Arroyo was also charged with criminal <mask> in the second degree. Notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed by the District Attorney against all three defendants, and was withdrawn in the case of Cary McKinley."], "id": "39a6e5eb-077a-4467-9f89-61e97d8b4573", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["An epitome of the relations subsisting between the creditor and the debtor will conduce to a proper and just consideration of the motion. On January 23, 1908, the creditor obtained a judgment for $773.18. On March 6, 1908, an*385other judgment was obtained for $775.77. Neither action was defended; but, before either action was commenced, the debtor had transferred his property to a corporation created for the purpose of liquidating his debts. On March 7, 1908, the debtor was examined by virtue of the judgment obtained in January. It appears that he testified that he had no property and, especially interesting for the purpose of this application, no bank account. After one adjournment and considerable' discussion, the attorney for the creditor (relying upon the testimony and the debtor\u2019s expostulations of pecuniary embarrassment) and the debtor entered into an agreement whereby the debtor was to give a check and notes falling due at various periods in full payment of both judgments and the creditor to withhold all action under the proceedings supplementary; and, if the notes and checks were paid, the motion for the appointment of a receiver was to be withdrawn and the proceedings discontinued without costs to either party. The agreement was dated March 9, 1908. After repeated adjournments, made according to the terms of the agreement, the debtor, on April 7, 1908, by direction of the court was compelled to sign his testimony adduced in the supplementary proceedings. In the interim between March 9, 1908, and April 17, 1908, the creditor*, through his attorney, discovering that the debtor had a large sum of money deposited in the bank with which he testified he had ceased dealing, obtained an order restraining the said bank from paying to the debtor any part of the money. Upon the <mask> of the debtor this order was vacated, after the debtor promised, in return for this consideration, to procure an assignment of a large parcel of realty of which his wife held the title. The. transfer was never effected, because of the refusal of the debtor\u2019s wife. When this refusal was communicated to the creditor\u2019s attorney, he, having lost all patience with the debtor, obtained an order to examine the said bank under the judgment obtained on March 6, 1908, for the vacating of which order this motion is made."], "id": "b203f986-c99a-48d1-bfdb-8ee106fbb131", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As a general matter, \u201c\u2018in order to be eligible to protest, one who has not actually submitted an offer must be expecting to submit an offer prior to the closing date of the <mask>.\u2019\u201d Id. at 1308 (quoting MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. United States, 878 F.2d 362, 365 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). In other words, the \u201cprospective offeror\u201d prong generally applies only in a pre-award protest. Aero Spray, Inc. v. United States, No. 21-1079, 2021 WL 5023371, at *17 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 28, 2021). As a result, \u201c\u2018the opportunity to qualify either as an actual or a prospective bidder ends when the proposal period ends.\u2019\u201d Rex Serv. Corp., 448 F.3d at 1308 (quoting MCI Telecomms. Corp., 878 F.2d at 365). \u201cAfter the date for submission of proposals has passed, however, the would-be protestor can no longer realistically expect to submit a bid on the proposed contract, and, therefore, cannot achieve prospective bidderhood with regard to the original solicitation.\u201d MCI Telecomms. Corp., 878 F.2d at 365."], "id": "8fbcaba4-d473-4813-9735-ce0d9e8d20ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This type of nondisclosure by national banks such as defendant is emphatically proscribed by Federal regulations. (See, generally, Regulation Q, 12 CFR Part 217.) Thus time or amount requirements for interest rates on deposits as well as penalties for early withdrawals must be \u201cclearly and conspicuously stated\u201d in all advertisements (12 CFR 217.6 [d], [e]) and must be \u201cexpressly called to the attention of the customer.\u201d (12 CFR 217.4 [e].) In these contexts Federal regulation is clear: \u201cNo member bank shall make any advertisement, announcement, or <mask> *** that is inaccurate or misleading or that misrepresents its deposit contracts.\u201d (12 CFR 217.6 [g].)"], "id": "e699abb8-7920-40cd-9879-3e05b98d9313", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["conveyed all of his ownership stake in his various companies to Blue Mountain. While Owen initially retained ownership of all of Blue Mountain\u2019s membership shares (for four days), he did so by conveying his personal ownership in all of the Blue Mountain Entities to Blue Mountain LLC, a separate and distinct legal entity. (See Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214, 220 [\u201cOrdinarily a corporation is considered a separate legal entity, distinct from its stockholders, officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations. [Citation.] The same is true of a limited liability company (LLC) and its members and managers.\u201d].) Contrary to Owen\u2019s contentions on appeal, he received valuable consideration in return for his contribution by receiving a 100 percent membership interest in the new company. (See Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Ins. Servs. v. Robb (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1812, 1824 (Hilb) [discussed below].) Owen unquestionably \u201csold\u201d or \u201cotherwise disposed of\u201d his entire ownership stake in the Blue Mountain Entities when he conveyed that interest to Blue Mountain under the Contribution Agreement. (Ibid.) Owen seeks to avoid this result by asserting that Acolyte is \u201cthe party through which Blue Mountain sought to enforce the allegedly anticompetitive covenant.\u201d Not so. The plaintiff in this case is Blue Mountain, the sole entity that acquired all of Owen\u2019s business interests under the Contribution Agreement and assumed contractual obligations with Owen under the Employment Agreement at issue in this appeal. Owen also challenges whether Blue Mountain can enforce a non<mask> covenant that is contained in the Employment Agreement rather than the Contribution Agreement. As discussed above, the Contribution Agreement was part of a global joint venture comprised of four interrelated contracts that must be read together. Blue Mountain\u2019s ability to"], "id": "2f28cfe6-6844-4f23-80af-af63bc0c246d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["A summary of, that statute is set forth in Martindale Hubbell Law Directory of 1976 (vol VI, Law Digests, p 347) as follows: \"Personal jurisdiction over nonresident individual or foreign partnership, or his or its executor or administrator, may be exercised where he or it, in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts business in state; or (2) commits tortious act other than defamation of character in state; or (3) commits tortious act outside state causing injury to person or property within state, if (a) regular doing or <mask> of business, persistent conduct, or revenue from within state, or (b) in interstate commerce, and expects or should expect act to have consequences in state; or (4) interest in real property in state. Jurisdiction based on any of these acts does not confer jurisdiction for unrelated cause of action. (52-59b). Constructive service on Secretary of State and registered or certified mailing to defendant\u2019s last known address required (33-41 l[c], added by 52-59b).\u201d"], "id": "637e0bff-1e5c-4164-b488-11afdab5a416", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Further, that this child ten years of age at the time of the hearing and though baptized a Catholic and a religious follower of such faith until the age of eight years, converted by the mother to another faith (Jehovah\u2019s Witness) has often been observed on the streets and at various homes at different hours of the day or night carrying a bag of their literature for sale, <mask> or distribution among followers and the general public."], "id": "ad372cc0-3f2e-4fb9-a965-e84074a4ffb2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, the trial court erred by not entertaining, and granting Merrill Lynch\u2019s application for a preliminary injunction (CPLR 7502 [c]; see, Blumenthal v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 910d 1049), due to the likelihood of the respondent\u2019s success on the merits, given the nature of the employment and non-<mask> agreements, the waiver signed by the petitioner, and the prejudice which would flow from denying this relief. Concur\u2014Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Rosenberger and Ross, JJ."], "id": "c563cd54-c92e-4425-8b5c-29135a45aa88", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Subsection (b) of the online-solicitation-of-a-minor statute was amended in 2015. See Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 61 (S.B. 344), \u00a7\u00a7 1, 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2015. Subsection (b) now provides that a person commits an offense if, with the intent to commit one of several specified sexual offenses, he intentionally communicates in a sexually explicit manner with a minor or distributes sexually explicit material to a minor through an electronic or online message. Tex. Penal Code \u00a7 33.021(b) (West 2017). All references in this opinion are to the 2010 version of the online-<mask> statute."], "id": "3195e05b-1812-4f61-bd73-d13afcc2bb3f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The same principles have been applied by New York State and federal courts in the context of Internet defamation, which concluded that the posting of allegedly defamatory material outside New York about a New York resident on a Web site merely accessible in New York does not, without more, provide a basis for jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for the purposes of CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Gary Null & Assoc., Inc. v Phillips, 29 Misc 3d 245 [2010], citing Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490d 239 [2007]; SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v American Working Collie Assn., 74 AD3d 1464 [2010] [defendants were not subject to long-arm jurisdiction in a defamation action based on writings posted on their Web site]; see also Ehrenfeld v Bin Mahfouz, 9 NY3d 501 [2007] [defendant, a Saudi Arabian citizen, did not \u201ctransact business\u201d in New York by, inter alia, posting the result of his English libel action against New York plaintiff on his Web site]). Instead, a nonresident\u2019s Internet activity must be expressly targeted at or directed to the forum state to establish minimum contacts necessary to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction (Best Van Lines, supra; see Capitol Records, LLC v VideoEgg, Inc., 611 F Supp 2d 349 [SD NY 2009]; cf. Intellect Art Multimedia, Inc. v Milewski, 24 Misc 3d 1248[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51912 [U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2009] [holding that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to show that defendant transacts business in New York through its \u201cRipoff Report\u201d *337Web site, given the high level of interactivity of the Web site, the undisputed fact that information is freely exchanged between Web site users, defendant\u2019s alleged active role in manipulating users\u2019 information and data, and defendant\u2019s <mask> of companies and individuals to \u201cresolve\u201d the complaints levied against them on the Ripoff Report])."], "id": "a9b03fbb-9342-42e7-bc35-7b4ebd48ee1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Vital then moved for a preliminary injunction. It asked the district court to enjoin its former employees from violating their non-compete covenants by working for Elegance or another com- petitor during the one-year term of those covenants, \u201cas such pe- riod may be extended due to tolling.\u201d It also sought to enforce Al- fieri\u2019s employee non-<mask> covenant. And it asked that Ele- gance be enjoined from interfering with the former employees\u2019 re- strictive covenants and from using any confidential information be- longing to Vital. Perry settled with Vital before the district court ruled on the motion. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion in part. It first determined that the restrictive covenants were valid and enforceable under Florida law. See FLA. STAT. \u00a7 542.335. Specifically, it concluded that the covenants were justified by Vital\u2019s \u201clegitimate business interests\u201d in its product for- mulae, in its other confidential information, and in its customer re- lationships. See id. \u00a7 542.335(1)(b). And it rejected the argument that Vital was required to \u201cidentify specific customers\u201d to establish a legitimate business interest in its customer relationships. The district court then concluded that Vital \u201cha[d] shown a substantial likelihood of succeeding on its claims against Maros . . . but not [against] Alfieri or LaRocca.\u201d It explained that Vital had \u201cpresented . . . more than sufficient evidence . . . that Maros ha[d] breached the [agreement] she signed\u201d because the evidence estab- lished that \u201cMaros accepted a position at Elegance while still em- ployed [by] and collecting [a] salary from [Vital].\u201d And it reasoned USCA11 Case: 20-14217 Date Filed: 01/20/2022 Page: 6 of 34"], "id": "80be1d53-d7b4-4340-a170-affe03b4cb94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On June 14, 1988, Mr. Hamada solicited the consent of the limited partners to replacing him with Brady. The reason given for replacement was that it was \"required\u201d by a financing institution which was to refinance the existing mortgages on the property. A majority of the limited partners consented. The letter of <mask> did not indicate that Mr. Hamada would receive any consideration for such transfer."], "id": "35ff9e50-21ae-4dbf-8bf3-f730a2df47c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Respondent\u2019s final application concerns the lifting of the so-called gag order. Since the order was designed to prevent extrajudicial communication with the jury during the pendency *124of the <mask> trial, and it is not clear when those charges will be retried, the court sees no reason to extend the order. Although it is this court\u2019s expectation that the contempt hearing will be scheduled for the near future, the court\u2019s ruling that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial makes it unnecessary to continue the gag order with respect to that matter. Accordingly, the court\u2019s September 22, 1999 order is lifted in its entirety."], "id": "afb62c41-1d59-4e07-8dad-b7e37ad7085d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Grievance Committee now moves to confirm the report of the Special Referee to the extent that the charges were sustained, and requests that discipline be imposed accordingly. In this regard, the Grievance Committee disputes the Special Referee\u2019s finding that the respondent made, without more, a \u201cserious error in judgment.\u201d Counsel for the respondent contends that, to the extent that \u201cany discipline is imposed,\u201d *33the Court should exercise leniency, and give \u201ccareful consideration\u201d to the Special Referee\u2019s findings, including, but not limited to, findings made with respect to the respondent\u2019s credibility, and the absence of either venality, <mask> of the subject bequest, or any deliberate pattern of misconduct. Counsel also asks the Court to consider the mitigation offered, including, but not limited to, the respondent\u2019s reputation for honesty and integrity, as well as his lack of any prior disciplinary history."], "id": "66ea2f50-6e7b-415e-ab48-5787207787b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["A proposal is submitted at a point in time and is evaluated over what is often a lengthy period. The Court agrees, of course, that an offeror must have a reasonable basis for all facts and representations made in its proposal \u2014 and may not knowingly or recklessly include false statements of material fact. A court\u2019s assessment of an offeror\u2019s knowledge of facts and representations, however, is made with respect to the point in time at which the offeror submitted its proposal. Software versions may change, planned approaches to contract performance might be altered or improved by the time of contract award, and employees may come and go \u2014 none of those are problems per se. Rotech Healthcare, Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 387, 400 (2015) (\u201cEven if [the awardee] ultimately did hire individuals other than those listed in its proposal, . . . that would not be evidence that [the awardee] misrepresented itself given the fact that so much time has passed since it submitted its proposal.\u201d); Wackenhut Int\u2019l, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 93, 99 (1998) (\u201cIf at some point after submitting its proposal [the awardee] decided to change its approach to securing the required license, such a change does not constitute fraudulent misrepresentation.\u201d). And, where contemplated in a <mask>, the government typically has discretion to engage in discussions to verify proposal details, to extract more details and ultimately include them into an awarded contract, or to seek final proposal revisions (\u201cFPRs\u201d) for the purpose of confirming key personnel. But, the Court will not conjure up a rule \u2014 and particularly not one untethered from a statue, regulation, or Federal Circuit decision \u2014 requiring offerors or quoters to routinely update the government when facts and circumstances change post-proposal or quote submission, during the course of the government\u2019s evaluation period.39"], "id": "078e70a4-8c38-460f-b798-2e420fbfac66", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The first issue to be resolved is whether the defendant may constitutionally be subject to prosecution for the con*740duct here charged. The court rejects any contention that the defendant\u2019s conduct may be equated with speech, within the meaning of the First Amendment. The defendant\u2019s conduct in soliciting these juveniles to have sex with other juveniles for pay; asking them to undress; and showing them sexually explicit photographs is clearly of a sort that is within the police power of the State to punish. (See, e.g., Penal Law, \u00a7260.10, subd 1; \u00a7\u00a7235.05, 235.21, 230.30, subd 2; \u00a7230.15, subd 1.) The defendant was not engaged in the dissemination of ideas, and his conduct was not a form of protected expression. (See United States v O\u2019Brien, 391 US 367; cf. Tinker v Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 390 US 942; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v Regents, 360 US 684.) The fact that the defendant may have intended to photograph the boys, for purposes of commercial distribution, does not necessarily bring his activities within the parameters of the First Amendment. (See People v Radich, 26 NY2d 114; People v Smith, 44 NY2d 613, 623.) Unlike the Ferber case, the defendant here was not charged with engaging in the dissemination of any book, film, photograph or other expressive visual representation, for which he was prosecuted based upon its content. The defendant\u2019s crime was that he attempted to employ juveniles to engage in sexual conduct purportedly to be subsequently depicted in photographs or on film. The focus of the prosecution here is not upon the probable content of the photographs which the defendant may have subsequently produced, but upon the deleterious effects of the <mask> and inducement to perform such sexual conduct upon the well-being of the minors themselves. (See, e.g., Education Law, \u00a7 3229, subd 7; Labor Law, \u00a7\u00a7 130-133; Casey v Kastel, 237 NY 305.)"], "id": "227c160c-2078-4314-864f-b7f01b5e3540", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Zelda Jonas, J. On February 11, 1997, a criminal proceeding was scheduled for trial before the Honorable Peter B. Skelos in the First District Court, 99 Main Street, Hempstead, New York, under information No. 15390/96 charging the defendant, Jon Christian Sajous, with the crime of criminal <mask> in the fourth degree (Penal Law \u00a7 100.05 [1]) and attempted tampering with a witness in the third degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 215.11 [1]). The allegations in the information provide in sum and substance that \"the defendant, an attorney representing [J.W.] on charges pending in Nassau County Court, attempted to prevent Adolfo Smith from testifying against [J.W.] by engaging Gilbert Pagan to threaten Smith with physical injury should Smith testify.\u201d Attached to the information is a sworn supporting deposition from Gilbert Pagan alleging, insofar as it is pertinent to this application, that: \"On May 6, 1996, I went with my attorney, Jon Christian Sajous, to the District Court Courthouse on Main Street in Hempstead, NY. When we left the courthouse, I gave Sajous a ride back to his office. At that time, Sajous asked me to contact a person who is a witness against another client of his, [J.W.]. Sajous told me that he wanted the witness, Adolfo Smith, threatened. Sajous told me that he wanted to be certain that Smith would be so afraid of being beaten up that he would not testify against [J.W.] in [J.W.\u2019s] robbery case.\u201d"], "id": "aa61bf36-8a49-4517-b61e-75a5ae9fcfdf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to what is known as the one thousand dollars ($1,000) claim upon the Carrothers note, the facts are briefly as follows: There was held by the petitioner and the deceased, as trustees for the benefit of the deceased as life tenant and the petitioner as remainderman, this property which is known as the Carroth*300ers note. The petitioner was an officer in an insurance company in this city against which a judgment had been obtained. For the purpose of enabling the. company to appeal and stay the execution of a judgment against it an undertaking was made,, which was signed by the deceased. This case had been finally affirmed by the Court of Appeals and it became necessary to. pay the judgment thereon. The insurance company was practically insolvent and it is apparent that the petitioner was making efforts to raise the money in different directions to pay this judgment, and thus save his sister from the necessity of meeting the heavy obligation which she would incur from having-signed this undertaking. Being unsuccessful in raising the money in any other way, the petitioner .and the deceased raised it on this Oarrothers note, which was given to the petitioner and with which he paid the judgment in question, thus relieving his sister, the deceased, from any further liability under her undertaking. It is now the claim of the petitioner that this action by her in disposing of the trust fund deprived him of his right to the same as a remainderman and that, therefore, he is entitled to the judgment he has obtained against her estate. This is not only unconscionable, but is little short of actual villainy. Without reviewing the evidence in detail it is perfectly apparent that the deceased, when she went upon this undertaking, did so at his <mask> and under the moral, obligation, if not the legal obligation, that she would be saved harmless therefrom ;- and, when the money was raised on this Oarrothers note, in which he was the remainderman, he acquiesced in its use for this purpose, and the only person who- really had cause for complaint was the deceased, because the trust fund which was created for her benefit was invaded to this extent. Therefore-, this does not constitute a debt of the deceased which can be made the basis of this proceeding."], "id": "4b96f1e9-bd2a-4f5b-a0b9-73446a43687e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Milne (supra) the court was interpreting an ordinance of the City of New York which regulated taxicabs within its boundaries pursuant to the provisions of section 436-2.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. The provisions of that statute are similar to the Hempstead Taxicab Ordinance. It has frequently been held that a vehicle not plying for hire, but rather operating solely in response to previous engagements, need not be licensed (People v. Sullivan, 199 Misc. 524, affd. 303 N. Y. 757; Yellow Taxicab Co. v. Gaynor, 82 Misc. 94, affd. 159 App. Div. 893; People v. Cuneen, 94 Misc. 509; People v. Milne, supra). However, regardless of the apparent purpose to which the vehicle is put, if it actually is used as a taxicab and is soliciting business, a license can be required (People v. Reser, 297 N. Y. 922). The enabling statute (Village Law, \u00a7 91, subd. 1) for the Hempstead ordinance requires two elements to be present, namely running on the streets for hire and <mask>. Insofar as section 345 of the Ordinances of the Village of Hempstead requires a license for taxicabs running on the streets for hire without the requirement of plying for trade, it is invalid."], "id": "f11ab096-cd7c-430e-95b0-94072afce8b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On December 19, 2013, in response to the election objections,38 the Board issued an order in Gerawan Farming, Inc . (2013) 39 ALRB No. 20, to indicate which matters would be set for hearing. The Board determined that the objections alleging the employer unlawfully instigated or significantly assisted the decertification campaign would be set for a hearing.39 Additionally, the objection alleging disparate treatment would also be set for hearing, conditioned on the outcome of the General Counsel's pending investigation.40 Many of the other objections were also set for hearing, conditioned on the outcome of the General Counsel's investigation thereof, but with the further proviso that, as to such other *118objections, \"a ballot count\" would be required to determine whether the misconduct at issue \"had a tendency to affect free choice in the November 5, 2013 election.\" (Id . at pp. 5-15.) Among the specific claims of objectionable conduct as to which a ballot count would have to be considered was the alleged employer support *1158of anti-UFW protests (including the October 2, 2013 bus trip), the one-day piece-rate increase, and the claims of direct dealing or <mask> of grievances. (Id. at pp. 5-13.)41"], "id": "a77c3c6a-5d5e-40d6-b4d5-162fd41a1492", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*836That argument ignores the difference in the language between the crimes of receiving unlawful gratuities and ones related to bribery and bribe receiving. The essence of the crime of receiving unlawful gratuities is the action of the public servant in soliciting, accepting or agreeing to accept a benefit. He or she need not actually receive the gratuity in order to have committed the crime; the crime is complete upon the <mask> or agreement to accept. The essence of the crimes of bribery or bribe receiving, on the other hand, \u201cis not the payment of money, but rather the \u2018agreement or understanding\u2019 under which a witness accepts or agrees to accept a benefit.\u201d (People v Harper, 75 NY2d 313, 317 [1990]; see also People v Bac Tran, 80 NY2d 170, 177-178 [1992].) Those crimes are complete when an agreement or understanding has been achieved, at least in the mind of defendant; the bribe giver or the bribe receiver, as the case may be, has, however, attempted to commit that crime by the mere offer or solicitation of the bribe."], "id": "1e55d049-000c-472b-b508-f11fa7b75d6a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In this stage of the proceedings, when the appellants were about entering his house, for the purpose of selling his furniture, the respondent, at the urgent <mask> of his friends, *177consented to propose a compromise with M\u2019Donald. M\u2019Donald offered to stop the sale, and procure a restoration, to the respondent of all the property that had already been sold, if he would pay him the amount of a judgment which he held against his son John Neilson, jun., for 1600 dollars, and also a note of his son,' for 800 dollars, endorsed by one Jacob Boyce, together with the judgment upon which the sale had taken place ; and the respondent finally consented to give him his bond and mortgage, for 2500 dollars, payable in five annual instalments ; and M\u2019Donald accordingly restored to him the property sold, discharged his judgment, and assigned to him the securities against his son and Boyce. John Neilson, jun., and Boyce are both proved then to have been, and still to be insolvent."], "id": "e42539c5-016a-44de-80bb-95b24c51c412", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner recovered a judgment in the amount of $16,009.38 against R & S Mehlman, Inc. (Mehlman) the judgment debtor which judgment remains wholly unsatisfied. It is uncontroverted that respondent Anchor Computers, Inc. (Anchor) has in its possession at the present time five magnetic computer tapes on which are encoded Mehlman\u2019s mailing list, i.e., a list of thousands of names and addresses, which has commercial value and use in connection with customer <mask> through use of the mails. Mehlman delivered said tapes to Anchor to enable Anchor to perform certain computer services. These services consisted of data manipulation, modifi*453cation and assembly so as to create computer tapes which are capable of providing the names and addresses of purchasers of books; the subject matters thereof purchased, the date of last purchase, the amount of each purchase, the sex of the purchasers, the frequency of purchases, the customer sources, customer geography factors, including by State, by section centers, by zip code and so on. By reason of this work, labor and services, Anchor claims an artisan\u2019s lien pursuant to section 180 of the Lien Law."], "id": "93ca319e-60bf-44f2-92f6-155fa8cb030b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["There are sound policy reasons why an indictment for both charges should be permitted. Any line drawn between <mask> and the attempted compulsion with which defendant is charged is bound to be perilously thin. Indeed, every solicitation would seem to imply some amount of coercion. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v Hall (536d 313, 321): \u201c[i]t cannot be said that in a bribery case there is never an aspect of coercion on the part of the bribee.\u201d At least one other court has specifically held that solicitation of a bribe can be an attempted extortion. (State v Begyn, 34 NJ 35; see, also, United States v Phillips, 577d 495, 503, cert den 439 US 831; United States v Furey, 491 F Supp 1048,1057, cert den 451 US 913; Finley v State, 84 Okla Crim 309.)"], "id": "c07a63d5-7ce2-4fbf-a6bf-7dccbeb959d6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["JACKSON, Circuit Judge: By statute, certain federal employers are required to engage in collective bargaining with their employees\u2019 representatives whenever there is a management-initiated change to the \u201cconditions of employment affecting such employees.\u201d Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7103(a)(12); see also id. \u00a7\u00a7 7102(2), 7103(a)(14). Congress has defined \u201cconditions of employment\u201d to include \u201cpersonnel policies, practices, and matters . . . affecting working conditions,\u201d with certain enumerated exceptions. Id. \u00a7 7103(a)(14). And from the mid-1980s until the policy statement challenged here, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (\u201cFLRA\u201d) interpreted these statutory provisions to require collective bargaining over any workplace changes that have more than a de minimis effect on such working conditions. In September of 2020, the FLRA adopted a new threshold for when collective bargaining is required. Under the agency\u2019s new standard, the duty to bargain is triggered only if a workplace change has \u201ca substantial impact on a condition of employment.\u201d U.S. Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. 968, 971 (2020). The petitioners are public-sector labor unions that challenge the FLRA\u2019s decision to alter the bargaining threshold; they maintain that the FLRA\u2019s new standard is both inconsistent with the governing statute and insufficiently explained, and is therefore arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. In the opinion that follows, we hold that the FLRA\u2019s decision to abandon its de minimis exception in favor of a substantial-impact threshold was not sufficiently reasoned, and thus is arbitrary and capricious in violation of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)(A). We therefore grant the unions\u2019 petitions for review and vacate the FLRA\u2019s policy statement. BACKGROUND Before the fall of 2020, it was the longstanding view of the FLRA that, despite certain federal employers\u2019 clear statutory duty to engage in collective bargaining over \u201cconditions of employment,\u201d 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7103(a)(12), some public-sector management decisions were not subject to bargaining if they had only a \u201cde minimis impact\u201d on such conditions. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin., 24 F.L.R.A. 403, 407 (1986); see also Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin. Reg. V, 19 F.L.R.A. 827, 834 (1985) (McGinnis, concurring); Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin. Chi. Region, 15 F.L.R.A. 922, 924 (1984). The de minimis impact exception, the FLRA explained, \u201cderive[s] from the Latin phrase \u2018De minimis non curat lex,\u2019 which . . . mean[s] that the law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters[.]\u201d Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin, 24 F.L.R.A. at 407 & n.2 (quoting De Minimis Non Curat Lex, BLACK\u2019S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)). In other words, the FLRA read 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7103(a)(12) and (14) to imply a narrow exception to the statute\u2019s collective bargaining requirement; one that pertained to management decisions that had only a trivial effect on conditions of employment. In October of 2019, the United States Departments of Education and Agriculture jointly requested that the FLRA issue a general statement of policy changing the impact threshold at which collective bargaining becomes mandatory. See 5 C.F.R. \u00a7 2427.2 (providing for general statements of policy or guidance). The Departments alleged several problems with the longstanding de minimis standard. For instance, they asserted that the de minimis policy was insufficiently concrete to permit consistent application, causing unnecessary litigation. They also asserted that \u201ceffective and efficient government would be promoted by the establishment\u201d of a clearer standard, and they maintained that the ideal standard would be one under which only a \u201csubstantial change\u201d\u2014or, rather, a change having a \u201csubstantial impact\u201d on conditions of employment\u2014triggers the duty to bargain. Request for General Statement of Policy or Guidance at 3\u20134, J.A. 3\u20134. On September 30, 2020, the FLRA adopted the Departments\u2019 proposed standard over a dissent and without soliciting public comment. In a four-page policy statement, the FLRA announced that \u201can agency will not be required to bargain over a change to a condition of employment unless the change is determined to have a substantial impact on a condition of employment.\u201d Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 971. The FLRA stated that the \u201cmore than de minimis\u201d test for determining when the duty to bargain is triggered is \u201cnot the appropriate standard,\u201d id., in part because that test had resulted in bargaining \u201cwhenever management has made any decision, no matter how small or trivial\u201d and is also \u201cunpredictable,\u201d id. at 969. The FLRA further faulted the initial agency decision to adopt the de minimis standard on the grounds that it was insufficiently explained. Id. at 970. With respect to the substantial-impact test, the FLRA suggested that this new standard would create \u201ca line that [was] meaningful and determinative[,]\u201d and noted that substantial impact is the governing bargaining threshold in the private sector. Id. The FLRA\u2019s dissenting member argued that the agency\u2019s adoption of a new bargaining threshold was an unjustifiable departure from past precedent and that there was a clear legal basis for the agency\u2019s prior adoption of the de minimis standard. See id. at 972 (DuBester, dissenting). The dissent also maintained that the substantial-impact test was contrary to the governing statute, id. at 973, and that the FLRA\u2019s policy change was not sufficiently reasoned or explained, id. at 973\u2013 76. The petitioners in these consolidated cases\u2014the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, the National Treasury Employees Union, and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO\u2014are labor unions that represent employees of government agencies that the FLRA\u2019s policy change covers. Each filed a timely petition for review of the FLRA\u2019s policy statement, and we consolidated the petitions. The unions have standing as employee representatives whose \u201cbargaining position\u201d would be \u201cfundamentally diminished\u201d under the FLRA\u2019s new interpretation, see Nat\u2019l Treasury Emps. Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and we have jurisdiction over their petitions for review, see 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7123(a). The unions challenge the FLRA\u2019s policy statement on two grounds, both of which implicate APA standards. First, they argue that the new substantial-impact threshold rests on an impermissible reading of 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 7103(a)(12) and (a)(14); they contend, in particular, that removing management- initiated changes whose effects are more than de minimis but less than substantial from the scope of collective bargaining is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of these statutory provisions. Second, the unions assail the FLRA\u2019s policy statement adopting the substantial-impact standard as arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)(A). In this regard, according to the unions, the FLRA\u2019s explanation for dispensing with its old policy and adopting the new one was insufficient to support the policy change. DISCUSSION Our analysis begins with the petitioners\u2019 arbitrary and capricious challenge. The petitioners also challenge the substantial-impact exception as contrary to the statute and unsupported by any canon that would justify its treatment as \u201cinherent in most statutory schemes by implication.\u201d See Ass\u2019n of Admin. Law Judges v. FLRA (AALJ), 397 F.3d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Env\u2019t Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Because we hold that the policy is unreasoned, we need not and do not reach the statutory claim. Cf. Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (declining to assess a claim about the meaning of a statutory provision where the failure of the challenged action under the arbitrary and capricious standard offered a sufficient basis for decision). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, \u201cwe must ensure that the [FLRA] \u2018examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.\u2019\u201d AFGE v. FLRA (AFGE 2020), 961 F.3d 452, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 865 F.3d 630, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). The key question is, at its core, whether the FLRA \u201cengage[d] in reasoned decisionmaking.\u201d Fred Meyer, 865 F.3d at 638 (internal citations omitted); see also FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). And while the FLRA certainly \u201cmay depart from its precedent,\u201d in so doing, it \u201cmust supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed.\u201d AFGE 2020, 961 F.3d at 457 (quoting Nat\u2019l Fed\u2019n of Fed. Emps. v. FLRA, 369 F.3d 548, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). The agency must also show that \u201cthe new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better\u201d than the previous policy. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (emphasis omitted). With these standards in mind and for the reasons explained below, we conclude that the FLRA\u2019s decision to abandon its longstanding precedents and adopt the substantial-impact standard was not sufficiently reasoned in several critical respects. A The first problem with the FLRA\u2019s reasoning is that its policy statement falls short on explaining the purported flaws of the de minimis standard. To start, the policy statement\u2019s description of the problem it seeks to solve is inconsistent. At the beginning of its substantive discussion, the FLRA laments that \u201c[it] has effectively extended the bargaining obligation under the de minimis test to . . . trigger[] an agency\u2019s duty to bargain whenever management has made any decision, no matter how small or trivial.\u201d Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 969. The policy statement explains that this purportedly ubiquitous misapplication of the de minimis standard to require bargaining in any and all circumstances has \u201cdrained\u201d that standard \u201cof any determinative meaning[.]\u201d Id. In the preceding paragraphs, however, the policy statement\u2019s background section highlights its concern that the de minimis standard is \u201cunpredictable\u201d and \u201chas created uncertainty,\u201d citing several examples of cases in which the FLRA concluded that a workplace change was de minimis and thus beyond the scope of bargaining. Id. at 969 & n.14; see also id. at 970 n.18 (explaining that the FLRA forewent <mask> of public comments \u201cbecause we are well aware of the confusion sown by nearly thirty-five years of our caselaw\u201d). It is not at all clear how the de minimis standard could both lead inexorably to the conclusion that all management decisions \u201cno matter how small or trivial\u201d must be subject to bargaining and at the same time yield unpredictable results, including, by the FLRA\u2019s own telling, many instances in which the duty to bargain was not triggered. See id. at 969 & n.14. Yet that is how the FLRA\u2019s policy statement reads: the existing standard both purportedly subjects every minor decision to review and is unworkable because it is impossible to predict. Even looking past this apparent contradiction, the FLRA\u2019s claim that the de minimis standard\u2019s unpredictability has \u201ccreated uncertainty that has negatively impacted labor- management relations\u201d is unconvincing on its own terms. Id. at 969 (internal quotation marks omitted). As evidence of the \u201cvast differences of opinion among arbitrators, judges, and the [FLRA itself] as to what matters affect conditions of employment sufficiently to require bargaining,\u201d the FLRA cites four pairs of decisions that involve purportedly similar facts in which the FLRA found certain management-initiated changes to be more than de minimis (and thus subject to bargaining) and others to be de minimis (and thus not). Id. at 969 & n.14. But closer inspection reveals that these divergent results are readily explained by distinguishable contexts. See id. at 973 (DuBester, dissenting) (\u201c[T]he cases cited by the majority simply reflect the inherently fact-dependent nature of the de minimis exception.\u201d). Take, for instance, the policy statement\u2019s citation to two decisions about office and seating arrangements that the agency now claims were contradictory. In Social Security Administration, Baltimore, Maryland, the FLRA concluded that \u201cchanges in seating assignments . . . including the movement of four employees (one-fourth of all [bargaining] unit employees) and one employee[\u2019]s[] loss of access to a window\u201d when considered together were \u201csufficient to support the . . . conclusion that the changes in seating arrangements were more than de minimis.\u201d U.S. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., Soc. Sec. Admin., Balt., Md., 36 F.L.R.A. 655, 668, 688 (1990)). In GSA, Region 9, on the other hand, the FLRA determined that an employer\u2019s decision to temporarily move a single employee to another building\u2014after her union suggested that such a temporary move would benefit the employee\u2014had, in light of \u201cequitable considerations,\u201d only a de minimis impact on her working conditions. 52 F.L.R.A. 1107, 1108\u201309, 1111\u201312 (1997). To describe these decisions is to distinguish them. And the latter decision, GSA, Region 9, indeed expressly distinguished the former as being about a \u201cpermanent relocation[] of employees that w[as] instituted by agency management for operational reasons,\u201d rather than a temporary move at the employee\u2019s union\u2019s suggestion. See id. at 1112 (citing U.S. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., Soc. Sec. Admin., Balt., Md., 36 F.L.R.A. at 655). The FLRA\u2019s summary assertion that these decisions were irreconcilable and thus evidence of the de minimis exception\u2019s unpredictability thus lacks merit. The FLRA\u2019s other examples are more of the same. For instance, the agency speciously summarizes one of its decisions as holding that \u201c[r]equiring [an] employee to give up a \u2018second\u2019 office while keeping [his] primary office\u201d was \u201cmore than de minimis\u201d and another as determining that \u201cmoving an employee permanently to a vacant office [was] held not to be more than de minimis.\u201d Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. 969 n.14 (first citing U.S. Dep\u2019t of the Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Space & Missile Sys. Ctr., Detachment 12, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., 64 F.L.R.A. 166, 173\u201374 (2009); and then citing Nat\u2019l Treasury Emps.\u2019 Union, Chapter 26, 66 F.L.R.A. 650, 653 (2012)). But these decisions too are readily distinguishable on their facts. U.S. Department of the Airforce concerned an employer\u2019s decision to downsize the workspace of a trainer who was a member of the relevant collective bargaining unit. 64 F.L.R.A. at 173\u201374. In that case, the FLRA held that the employer\u2019s decision to downsize the trainer\u2019s primary office at the same time it took away a second workspace that he had used to conduct certain face-to-face training and store equipment\u2014 changes made on short notice and without relocation assistance\u2014when viewed alongside problems with the new workspace, constituted a more-than-de minimis change. See id. In stark contrast, National Treasury Employees\u2019 Union, Chapter 26, was not about the reassignment of a union employee at all; instead, it concerned a union\u2019s challenge to an employer\u2019s decision to assign an employee outside the bargaining unit to a vacant workstation in the same office as employees in the bargaining unit. 66 F.L.R.A. at 652\u201353. Unsurprisingly, the FLRA held that the mere presence of an employee outside the bargaining unit in the same office as unit members had only a de minimis effect on the union employees\u2019 conditions of employment. Id. at 653. Once again, the FLRA\u2019s evidence of an irretrievably broken standard falls flat. As this court observed once before, \u201cthere is little indication that the de minimis exception\u201d has created the sort of \u201cconfusion\u201d the FLRA now claims. AALJ, 397 F.3d at 963. Rather than demonstrate such confusion, the examples that the FLRA cites to frame the problem it seeks to address seem to us to demonstrate rigorous application by the FLRA of a fact- intensive standard to varying factual contexts. Put another way, far from demonstrating the de minimis standard is unworkable, the FLRA\u2019s policy statement simply appears to demonstrate how it works. B The FLRA\u2019s condemnation of the de minimis test also fails to grapple with the agency\u2019s own past policy choices and this court\u2019s decisions upholding them. In the policy statement under review, the FLRA insists that the agency\u2019s initial adoption of the de minimis threshold back in 1985 was insufficiently explained and reasons that this initial failure supports the 2020 policy change. In this regard, the FLRA explains that the agency had used a substantial-impact standard for a few years before it adopted the de minimis threshold in 1985. And it calls the decision to discard the substantial-impact standard in favor of the de minimis threshold \u201cspecious\u201d for failing to \u201cprovide any rationale as to why the substantial impact standard was incorrect.\u201d Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 970 n.24. The FLRA further suggests that if a rigorous statutory analysis had been done in 1985, the agency would have discovered that \u201cthe de minimis standard is inconsistent with the purposes of the Statute.\u201d Id. at 971. Thus, the FLRA seeks to cast its policy change as merely correcting thirty-five-year-old procedural and interpretive errors. That rationale cannot withstand scrutiny. It is true that before it adopted the de minimis exception in 1985 the FLRA had applied a substantial-impact standard like the one at issue here, apparently as a carryover from the executive-order regime that governed public-sector labor relations before the enactment of the Labor-Management Relations Statute in 1978. But the mere fact that the FLRA briefly used a substantial- impact standard soon after the agency\u2019s creation does not provide inherent support for the present decision to discard thirty-five years of intervening precedent and return to that past policy. Indeed, Executive Order 11491, which governed before the Labor-Management Relations Statute, did not require bargaining at all. Instead, it directed agencies to \u201cmeet . . . and confer in good faith with respect to personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions, so far as may be appropriate,\u201d Exec. Order No. 11,491 \u00a7 11(a), 3 C.F.R. (1966-1970), which is in marked contrast to the Labor-Management Relations Statute\u2019s requirement that agencies bargain over \u201cany condition of employment,\u201d 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7114(b)(2); see also Nat\u2019l Fed\u2019n of Fed. Emps. v. FLRA, 369 F.3d 548, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (\u201cCongress passed the Federal Labor Relations Act to encourage collective bargaining between federal employees and their employers.\u201d). And the FLRA has itself recognized that the Labor-Management Relations Statute is more protective of collective bargaining than was the Executive Order and practice thereunder. See Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 974 & nn. 42\u201344 (DuBester, dissenting). Furthermore, the FLRA\u2019s characterization of its earlier decisions as lacking explanation for its adoption of the de minimis exception is misleading. In fact, as the dissenting Commissioner points out, id. at 974\u201375 (DuBester, dissenting), those earlier decisions expressly considered the question, and in light of Congress\u2019s clear purpose of expanding public-sector bargaining rights, the mid-1980s FLRA specifically \u201crejected the \u2018substantial impact\u2019 test\u201d in favor of the de minimis exception, Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin. Chi. Region, 15 F.L.R.A. at 924. What is more, the agency explained back then that it was rejecting the substantial-impact threshold both because the de minimis test struck the correct balance between government efficiency interests and labor rights, see Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin. Reg. V, 19 F.L.R.A. at 834 (McGinnis, concurring), and because \u201c[t]he limited scope of Federal sector bargaining caused by external laws, rules, and regulations also demands that the [FLRA] not impose further limitations unless they are based on clear statutory authority and are buttressed by sound policy considerations,\u201d Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin., 24 F.L.R.A. at 406\u201307. And the FLRA has since reiterated the view that the de minimis standard is \u201cthe appropriate threshold\u201d under the relevant statutory provisions. Soc. Sec. Admin. Off. of Hearings & Appeals, 59 F.L.R.A. 646, 653 (2004), aff\u2019d, AALJ, 397 F.3d at 964. To be sure, the FLRA\u2019s reasons for replacing the substantial-impact standard with the de minimis exception back in the mid-1980s were not tidily arranged in a single decision. But the FLRA\u2019s present assertion that the agency had offered no \u201cexplanation or rationale to support the change\u201d from the substantial-impact test to the de minimis standard, Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 970, is simply incorrect. Notably, even if the FLRA had failed to provide an adequate explanation for its adoption of the de minimis standard more than thirty-five years ago, any such failure would not absolve the agency of its present-day responsibility to explain its decision to jettison the precedents that apply the de minimis threshold. The FLRA cannot point to a latent and unchallenged purported defect in the original adoption of its prior policy and offer that as an independent basis for adopting a new one. Rather, the decision to adopt a new policy must be sufficiently explained on its own terms, because \u201c[i]n administrative law, as elsewhere, two wrongs do not make a right.\u201d Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign v. Perdue, 873 F.3d 914, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2017). We have long held that \u201cwe cannot condone the \u2018correction\u2019 of one error by the commitment of another,\u201d id. (quoting Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 663 (1987)), and we decline to do so here. Finally, to the extent that the FLRA now asserts that the de minimis standard must go because it is categorically \u201cinconsistent with the purposes of the [Labor-Management Relations] Statute,\u201d Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 971, that contention is plainly contrary to this court\u2019s past interpretation of the statute. In AALJ, for instance, a union challenged the FLRA\u2019s application of the de minimis exception to a new category of management decisions. The agency argued the exception was inherent in the statute, and thus urged us to hold that collective bargaining was not required for a de minimis change to conditions of employment. We agreed, concluding that an exception for de minimis effects on conditions of employment is \u201cinherent in\u201d the statute and thus \u201cneither contrary to the text nor unreasonable in light of\u201d the Labor-Management Relations Statute\u2019s purpose. AALJ, 397 F.3d at 959, 962. Our holding in AALJ is a clear recognition of the appropriateness of a de minimis exception to the duty to bargain, as a matter of law. Thus, when the FLRA nevertheless reached the conclusion that the de minimis test is not \u201cappropriate\u201d for determining whether the duty to bargain is triggered, Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 971, it not only ignored its own decisions outlining the reasons for its adoption of the de minimis exception in the first place, but also \u201cdeparted from precedent\u201d that had expressly decided that the de minimis exception is consistent with the Labor-Management Relations Statute, AFGE 2020, 961 F.3d at 459. For this reason, too, we conclude the need for the policy change \u201cis not sensibly explained.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). C Up to this point, we have focused on the deficiencies in the FLRA\u2019s reasons for its conclusion that the de minimis standard was so problematic that it needed to be changed. Beyond the various ill-defined reasons that the FLRA offers for departing from the de minimis threshold, the policy statement under review also undertakes to explain why the FLRA now prefers the substantial-impact standard. The FLRA points to two principal reasons for this decision. And, once again, neither is sufficiently explained. The FLRA first heralds the substantial-impact standard\u2019s bona fides by suggesting that it draws \u201ca line that is meaningful and determinative\u201d for agencies and their employees seeking to navigate labor negotiations. Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 970. And in its brief the FLRA further contends that its finding that the new standard will be more predictable and administrable is \u201cprecisely the sort of predictive judgment\u201d to which this court must defer. FLRA Br. 63. But neither the FLRA\u2019s challenged decision nor its brief on review analyzes the relative administrability of the substantial-impact and de minimis standards. This is a critical \u201cgap in [the FLRA\u2019s] reasoning[.]\u201d AFGE 2020, 961 F.3d at 459. And the FLRA simply ignores the guidance and elaboration provided in its own opinions. See, e.g., Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin. Region V, 19 F.L.R.A. at 834\u201335 (McGinnis, concurring) (identifying five factors informing application of the de minimis standard). It is especially striking that the FLRA does not provide a comparative analysis of the two standards or in its policy statement even argue that the substantial-impact standard used by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in the private- sector context has in fact led to more predictable results, since, as noted above, the FLRA frames inconsistent application as the principal problem the new standard is designed to fix. There is no obvious reason to expect that labor unions and employers will disagree less frequently about whether any given management decision has a \u201csubstantial impact\u201d on conditions of employment than they previously did over whether such a decision had a more than de minimis effect. But see Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 971. Indeed, these two standards share many characteristics that might lead one to expect just as much disagreement\u2014and, for that matter, just as many \u201cdifferences of opinion among arbitrators, judges, and the [FLRA] as to what matters affect conditions of employment sufficiently to require bargaining[,]\u201d id. at 969 (internal quotation marks omitted)\u2014when the substantial-impact threshold is applied. See also id. at 973\u201374 (DuBester, dissenting) (\u201cThe majority fails to explain how adoption of its new standard will produce decisions that are any less fact- dependent than those applying the current standard.\u201d). Thus, the new standard that the FLRA has adopted is not the sort of \u201ccommon sense\u201d measure for \u201cadvanc[ing the decision\u2019s stated] goals\u201d\u2014here, predictability and streamlined administration\u2014that we have found adequate to withstand arbitrary and capricious review. Free Access & Broad. Telemedia, LLC v. FCC, 865 F.3d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 2017). To address this obvious shortcoming, the FLRA argues for the first time in its brief that the new substantial-impact standard will have more predictable results because the FLRA will be able to draw on fifty years of NLRB decisions applying the substantial-impact test. The FLRA does not explain in its brief or otherwise why the NLRB\u2019s substantial-impact decisions would be easier to apply than the FLRA\u2019s own thirty- five years of precedents using the de minimis test. But, regardless, this argument is forfeit because it was not raised \u201cwhere it counts\u201d\u2014i.e., in the challenged decision itself. AFGE 2020, 961 F.3d at 457; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass\u2019n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (\u201c[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel\u2019s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.\u201d). What remains is the FLRA\u2019s bald assertion that its own \u201cdetermination that the substantial impact test would draw a line that is [more] meaningful and determinative is precisely the sort of predictive judgment to which this [c]ourt accords heightened deference.\u201d FLRA Br. 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). We fully recognize that we must defer to expert agencies\u2019 \u201creasoned predictions about technical issues[.]\u201d BNSF Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 526 F.3d 770, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But there is nothing technical about the predictability assessment that the FLRA makes here, and we are not bound by the FLRA\u2019s conclusory and counterintuitive assertions about the consistency with which its new standard is likely to be applied in subsequent adjudications, especially when the record contains no factual basis for making such a forecast. With respect to its consistency concern, the FLRA must at least explain why and how it has concluded that the substantial- impact threshold is \u201cbetter\u201d than the standard it was relinquishing. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515. It has failed to do so. The FLRA\u2019s final tack is to invoke the NLRB\u2019s longstanding use of a substantial-impact standard in the private-sector context, as an independent reason for the FLRA\u2019s adoption of the same collective bargaining threshold. The FLRA\u2019s policy statement asserts that, because \u201ccollective bargaining in the public sector\u201d under the Labor-Management Relations Statute \u201cmust be narrower\u201d than in the private sector, \u201c[i]t is incongruous . . . [to apply] a standard more lenient than the test applied by the [NLRB] . . . to determine whether a change requires bargaining.\u201d Dep\u2019t of Educ., 71 F.L.R.A. at 970. In its brief, the FLRA adds that it is not just permitted but indeed required to consider NLRB precedents when it administers parallel provisions of its statute; in this regard, it points to our instruction that \u201cwhen the [FLRA] departs from a familiar principle rooted in private sector precedent, it should either identify \u2018practical distinctions between private and governmental needs\u2019 that justify the departure, or offer some evidence in the language, history, or structure of the statute suggesting that Congress intended a different result.\u201d AFGE v. FLRA (AFGE 1988), 853 F.2d 986, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). But NLRB precedent cannot save the FLRA\u2019s unreasoned and unreasonable determination to import the substantial- impact standard. To start, the FLRA flips the controlling question on its head. Unlike in AFGE 1988, we are not being called upon to review a decision to part ways with NLRB precedent in the first instance. Instead, we are evaluating the FLRA\u2019s recent departure from its own longstanding precedents that since the 1980s have struck a balance that is different from the NLRB\u2019s decisions. In other words, the baseline for our review is the FLRA\u2019s longstanding and repeatedly reaffirmed decision to diverge from NLRB policy, which makes AFGE 1988\u2019s explanation of what the FLRA must do to rationalize a new departure from NLRB precedent inapposite. The FLRA\u2019s decision to adopt the NLRB\u2019s substantial- impact test also fails to account for the agency\u2019s own past assessments of how the differences between the public-sector and private-sector bargaining contexts inform the appropriate bargaining threshold. We have previously cautioned that the FLRA must \u201cbe careful to appreciate fully those distinctions between the private and public sectors that might necessitate a different legal analysis and conclusion\u201d with respect to collective bargaining, since \u201cthe bargaining status of any given subject is determined by different statutory provisions and by different policy considerations.\u201d Library of Cong. v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The FLRA apparently took those distinctions into account in its 1986 decision in Department of Health & Human Services Social Security Administration, when it acknowledged the NLRB\u2019s substantial-impact standard was \u201csimilar[]\u201d to the FLRA\u2019s de minimis exception, 24 F.L.R.A. at 406 n.1, but nevertheless opted to apply the de minimis standard. Critically, that decision highlighted \u201c[t]he limited scope of Federal sector bargaining caused by external laws, rules, and regulations[,]\u201d and observed that this context \u201cdemands that the [FLRA] not impose further limitations unless they are based on clear statutory authority and are buttressed by sound policy considerations.\u201d Id. at 406\u201307 (emphasis added); cf. Library of Cong., 699 F.2d at 1287 & n.33 (explaining that \u201c[t]he scope of collective bargaining is far broader in the private sector,\u201d in terms of the categories of conditions subject to bargaining, since the Labor-Management Relations Statute \u201cexclu[des] from the scope of federal sector bargaining [] matters provided for by federal statute, such as the pay rate or hours of employment\u201d). Thus, the FLRA has held in the past that the relative substantive narrowness of the public-sector bargaining mandated under the Labor-Management Relations Statute in fact supports the de minimis standard notwithstanding the NLRB\u2019s more stringent bargaining threshold. See Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs. Soc. Sec. Admin, 24 F.L.R.A. at 407. That conclusion is precisely the opposite of the one that the FLRA reached here. The agency now ignores its earlier balancing of the factors unique to public-sector bargaining and fails to address the reasons that it previously found persuasive when it decided to select a test that differs from the one that pertains to private-sector bargaining. We conclude that, whatever the virtues of the FLRA\u2019s present analysis concerning the statutory scheme for public- sector bargaining relative to its private-sector counterpart (which we do not here decide), the FLRA must acknowledge that in the past it reached the opposite conclusion about the need for congruity between the public- and private-sector bargaining thresholds. Thus, \u201c[i]t is not enough\u201d for the agency to now rest on abstract invocations of the \u201cnarrowness\u201d of public-sector bargaining or \u201crely vaguely on [it]s general duty to interpret the statute with government efficiency in mind.\u201d AFGE 1988, 853 F.2d at 993. Rather, the FLRA\u2019s adoption of the substantial-impact threshold after it previously and specifically rejected that standard must be built on a more \u201csolid foundation,\u201d id., including an explanation of the agency\u2019s view of why the new approach better comports with all of the provisions that Congress enacted to govern collective bargaining in the public sector. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7101(a)(1)(B) (finding that collective bargaining \u201ccontributes to the effective conduct of public business\u201d). The FLRA\u2019s failure to address its previous balancing of the Labor-Management Relations Statute\u2019s priorities\u2014a balancing that led it to adopt a different policy than that of the NLRB\u2014is yet another indication that the FLRA has not, in fact, \u201cengage[d] in reasoned decisionmaking.\u201d Fred Meyer, 865 F.3d at 638; see 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)(A). CONCLUSION The cursory policy statement that the FLRA issued to justify its choice to abandon thirty-five years of precedent promoting and applying the de minimis standard and to adopt the previously rejected substantial-impact test is arbitrary and capricious for the reasons explained above. Consequently, the unions\u2019 petitions for review are granted and the FLRA\u2019s September 30, 2020 general statement of policy is vacated. So ordered."], "id": "2f70080c-4541-4d62-8143-37d8661d6357", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["(a) A person may be convicted under a law of this state of an offense committed by his or her own or another person's conduct for which he or she is legally accountable if: (1) Either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs within this state; (2) Conduct occurring outside this state constitutes an attempt to commit an offense within this state; (3) Conduct occurring outside this state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within this state and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within this state; (4) Conduct occurring within this state establishes complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, <mask>, or conspiracy to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction that is also an offense under the law of this state; (5) The offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by *463a law of this state based on domicile, residence, or a relationship to a person, thing, or transaction in the state; or (6) The offense is defined by a statute of this state that expressly prohibits conduct outside the state and the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this state and the person knows or should know that his or her conduct is likely to affect that legitimate interest of this state. (b) When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the physical contact causing death constitutes a \"result\" within the meaning of subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Torres concedes that the State had jurisdiction to try him for murder pursuant to subsection (b) because the death occurred in Arkansas. However, Torres contends that the statute is void of language that would authorize a rape prosecution. The plain language of subsection (a)(1) provides that a person may be convicted under Arkansas law of an offense committed by his own conduct for which he is legally accountable if either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs within this state. In other words, based on the plain language of the statute, to establish jurisdiction over the predicate felony of rape, there are two options:"], "id": "f1e76127-5529-4f67-b289-c6a11dd48d05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In short, section 12.0 does not prohibit the use of public streets to tow cars nor does it prohibit all <mask> of towing work. What it does prohibit is unregulated solicitation that interferes with the free choice by the damaged car owner who is in a poor position or condition at that moment to properly protect himself, the racing to the scene of an accident by tow car operators to first solicit and garner the towing contract with the resultant interference with the rights of other motorists and traffic in general, and the interference with the proper police investigation and other necessary police work at the scene of the accident. \u25a0"], "id": "e129fc0c-7029-40e9-8027-f0e62ad022d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The respondent\u2019s counsel contends that there was no evidence that Johnson was the agent or servant of Smith or in any manner under his control, or subject to his order, or identified with him in business or purpose, and he cites, among other cases, Robinson v. New York Central and Hudson Riverr Railroad Company (66 N. Y., 11) and Dyer v. Erie Railway Company (71 N. Y., 228.) Those cases are distinguishable from the one before us. In the first, the plaintiff had accepted an invitation to take a ride with a person every way competent and fit to manage a horse. In the second ease, the plaintiff traveled in a vehicle over which he had no control, voluntarily and gratuitously, at the invitation of the owner and driver, who was competent to control and manage the team, and was traveling entirely on business of his own. In this case, the *36owner of tbe horse and vehicle was conveying the plaintiff at the request and <mask> of the latter, upon the latter\u2019s own business, and there was evidence tending to show that at the time, the owner and driver was, to the knowledge of the'plaintiff, not in a fit condition to control his horse at so dangerous a place as the railroad crossing in question, and that he managed his horse in a careless and reckless manner. Notwithstanding the owner was not the agent of the plaintiff or employed by him for hire, yet he was acting at the plaintiff\u2019s solicitation and in furtherance of the plaintiff\u2019s business. In view of the circumstances, we think it was the duty of the plaintiff, in the exercise of proper care, to have remonstrated with him and to have used all proper effort and influence on his part, to effect a safe crossing of the defendant\u2019s track. In the case of Robinson (supra), Chief Justice Chuboh, delivering the opinion of the court, remarked: \u201c It is not claimed but that Conlon (the driver) was an able-bodied, competent person to manage the establishment, nor that he was intoxicated, or in any way unfit to have charge of it.\u201d From this it is to be implied that, in the view of the court, if the circumstances in this case respecting the competency and condition of the driver had existed in that, the court might have held the negligence of the driver imputable to the plaintiff."], "id": "1663d795-f376-427d-9c46-4af8c3f8cd90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In view of the defendant, subdivision 12 of section 63 of the Executive Law has no application to litigation arising from a typical consumer complaint, i.e., questions concerning the performance or durability of the product. Rather, defendant contends, subdivision 12 of section 63 was intended to regulate only such activities as pyramid sales, bait and switch sales and such statutory violations as misleading advertising (General Business Law, \u00a7 349) or violations of the Home <mask> Sales Act (Personal Property Law, art 10-A). While the Executive Law clearly applies to such activities, the language of subdivision 12 of section 63 does not require the restrictive interpretation urged by the defendant. Although the suit of the Attorney-General arises from the factual context of a consumer product complaint, the essence of the suit is not the quality of the product per se, but the knowledge of the defect and *374the attempt by GM to limit its liability by means of concealment and limited warranties for the defective product."], "id": "6aeb55aa-7e80-40a4-ae3c-9a477a821fec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Mr. Cloutier has acknowledged that none of the three recipients in State\u2019s Office of Acquisition Management to whom the plaintiff emailed its proposal \u201cread, replied to, or forwarded the emails, or opened the attachments.\u201d (AR 2674.) According to Mr. Cloutier, \u201cMr. Elsasser and Ms. Sutliff did not recognize the <mask> number, and as branch chief for the local guard branch Ms. Bellevue is routinely copied on proposal submissions sent to the cognizant contracting officers in her branch.\u201d (Id.) Although Ms. Sutliff failed to recognize the solicitation number, the subject line of the plaintiff\u2019s emails correctly provided 19AQMM21R0036 as the solicitation number. (See AR 841-54.)"], "id": "eddeffce-a669-4d2f-9a1d-9483dad99763", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This memorandum also reviews \u201cbest and final\u201d offers solicited for site C. (Id.) Despite Dairyland\u2019s prior ultimatum, Dairy-land declined to respond to this <mask>. Dairyland\u2019s unresponsiveness may have indicated that its expressed immediate need for expansion space in the public market area was not so pressing or that its threat to move precipitously out of New York City was not entirely genuine. Moreover, Dairyland \u201cput forward a very low, uncompetitive offer\u201d for 155 Food Center Drive, indicating that Dairyland just assumed its ultimatum would garner this site or, instead, was \u201calready half way out the door to New Jersey.\u201d (Exhibit 12 at 1.) In any event, EDC had an 11.8-acre alternative site to both 155 Food Center Drive and site C to offer Dairyland."], "id": "3756eafb-29db-43cf-ad4f-be4c20d5f89e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["the facts demonstrating contacts between the parties are explained as follows. From 2012 to 2015, Simmons printed and distributed catalogs in the State of Arkansas, and purchased newspaper advertising in Arkansas newspapers, as well as television advertisements. Importantly, Simmons hosted a contest that targeted Arkansas residents for the largest deer harvested in Arkansas. Simmons circulated a total of 483,700 print advertisements and a total of 1,696,704 copies of the catalog. However, the relation of the cause of action to the contacts is weak. This cause of action arises out of a premises-liability suit that occurred in Louisiana; it is not directly connected to Simmons's advertisements. As discussed above, however, the proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect, but whether the defendant's conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way. Walden [v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) ]. Moreover, Arkansas does have a strong interest in providing a forum for its residents, particularly for those residents who act in response to <mask> from outside states. Lastly, Simmons is located roughly thirty miles *193away from the forum, so the argument regarding an inconvenient forum is weak. Id. at 7, 511 S.W.3d at 887-88 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we held that even though the relationship between Simmons's contacts with Arkansas and the cause of action was weak, the other four factors weighed in favor of exercising specific jurisdiction over Simmons."], "id": "4ddc1c76-039c-47b8-b54e-b7993dd77577", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court\u2019s determination of credibility and weight of the evidence are supported by the record (see Jones v Hart, 233 AD2d 297 [1996]). The major credibility dispute in this action was the propriety of <mask> of the agreement and the authenticity of the contract documents. The court was entitled to credit Gilbert\u2019s testimony that the agreement was solicited within legal hours and that he complied with the written and oral cancellation notice requirements. The Marengas themselves testified that NACO had performed services pursuant to the contract. Furthermore, on the basis of Gilbert\u2019s testimony to an extensive search of his office\u2019s files and premises, the court properly admitted a disputed copy of the contract into evidence (see Schozer v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 84 NY2d 639 *39[1994]). It then properly determined, on the basis of its credibility determinations and the weight of the credible evidence (id. at 646), that the contract was valid."], "id": "a11520f7-4194-44cf-a9e7-697bb443f13e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Fred Avery was also convicted of a violation of the same ordinance in that he was accused of soliciting contributions for the Patrolman\u2019s Benevolent Association, Inc., of Long Beach, L. I., in that defendant did cause one Edward G. Charleton to solicit contributions from one Robert H. Delafield in premises 61 Broadway, Manhattan, for the aforesaid Patrolman\u2019s Benevolent Association, Inc., of Long Beach, L. I., without having a license. The facts alleged in this complaint have been amply proven but the court *571feels that the violation of this ordinance occurred not in the county of New York but in the county of Kings where the appellant Avery had his office and from which his <mask> for funds emanated. The court, therefore, reverses this judgment for lack of jurisdiction with the suggestion that proceedings be brought against the appellants in the county of Kings."], "id": "1a547aa9-7a60-47aa-a0b2-9150770eb82f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff, M Co., which had obtained a judgment in California against the defendants, J and G, sought to enforce that judgment in Connecticut and to recover damages in connection with a home staging services and lease agreement between the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, M Co., a California corporation, was to provide design and decorating services, including the delivery and installation of rental furniture and de\u0301cor, for the purpose of making the defendants\u2019 Connecticut residence more attractive to potential buyers. J was the sole signatory to the agreement, but M Co. negotiated the agreement exclusively with G. The lease required an initial payment and had an initial term of four months. If the residence was not sold within that term, the lease would continue on a month-to-month basis at a monthly rate. One provision of the agreement contained both a choice of law clause, providing that Califor- nia law governed the agreement, and a forum selection clause, which vested courts in Los Angeles, California, with jurisdiction over disputes arising under the agreement and provided that the parties consented to the jurisdiction of that court. Beneath that provision, G amended the choice of law clause, writing in that, \u2018\u2018[s]ince this is a contract for an agreement taking place in the state of Connecticut, Connecticut laws will [supersede] those of California.\u2019\u2019 Additionally, although G did not sign the agreement, he signed an addendum to the agreement authorizing M Co. to charge his credit card for the initial payment. G made the initial payment to M Co., which then delivered and installed the rental furniture and de\u0301cor. Thereafter, the defendants defaulted on their pay- ment obligations. The defendants denied M Co. access to the premises when it attempted to repossess its furniture and de\u0301cor, which ultimately remained in the residence for approximately three years. M Co. filed an action in California Superior Court, which rendered a default judgment against the defendants after they failed to appear. When the default judgment remained unsatisfied, M Co. filed the present action, seeking enforcement of the California judgment and alleging breach of contract and quantum meruit. As to the claim seeking enforcement of the Califor- nia judgment, the trial court concluded that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over J, but not over G, and that the California court\u2019s judgment was entitled to full faith and credit as to G. As to the breach of contract claim, the court found that J had breached the home staging services agreement. In doing so, it rejected J\u2019s special defense that the agreement was unenforceable because it failed to comply with certain provisions of the Home <mask> Sales Act (\u00a7 42-134a et seq.) (HSSA). The court specifically determined that a home staging agree- ment, which involves the use of goods and services to facilitate the sale or rental or real property, was excluded from the purview of the HSSA, which exempts transactions \u2018\u2018pertaining to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019 from its requirements. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for M Co. and against G in connection with the enforcement of the California judgment and awarded M Co. the full amount of that judgment. In connection with the breach of contract claim, the court rendered judgment for M Co. and against J, and awarded M Co. damages for the conversion of M Co.\u2019s furniture and de\u0301cor, as well as for the associated rental loss of that inventory. Having done so, the court declined to address M Co.\u2019s quantum meruit claim as to J. Thereafter, M Co. withdrew the breach of contract and quantum meruit claims as to G, and the defendants appealed. Held: 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the California court had personal jurisdiction over G, G having consented to jurisdiction in California by virtue of the agreement\u2019s forum selection clause, and, accordingly, the trial court properly found that the California judgment was enforceable against G: although a nonsignatory to a contract generally is not bound by a forum selection clause contained therein, under the \u2018\u2018closely related\u2019\u2019 doctrine, a nonsignatory may be bound by that clause if he was so intimately involved in the negotiation, formation, execution, or ratifica- tion of the contract that it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be bound by it, considering factors such as the nonsignatory\u2019s relation- ship to the signatory and whether the nonsignatory received a direct benefit from the agreement; in the present case, the defendants did not dispute that the forum selection clause in the agreement was valid and enforceable, and G was so closely related to the agreement that he was bound by its forum selection clause, especially when G was married to J and lived in the residence she owned, in which they wrongfully used M Co.\u2019s inventory for three years; moreover, in addition to receiving a direct benefit under the agreement, only G, and not J, participated in the negotiations, he made a substantive change to the agreement prior to its execution, notably amending the choice of law clause while leaving the forum selection clause in that same provision untouched, and he executed an addendum to the agreement, pursuant to which he author- ized the sole payment made to M Co. that prompted M Co.\u2019s full perfor- mance of its contractual obligations. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the home staging services agreement was unenforceable due to M Co.\u2019s noncompliance with certain provisions of the HSSA, as the trial court correctly con- cluded that the transaction between the parties was not a \u2018\u2018home solicita- tion sale,\u2019\u2019 as defined therein, and, therefore, was outside the purview of the HSSA: the provisions of the HSSA apply only to \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale[s],\u2019\u2019 the statutory (\u00a7 42-134a (a) (5)) definition of which excludes any transaction \u2018\u2018pertaining to the sale or rental of real property\u2019\u2019; moreover, although a narrow construction of that language that applied only to contracts for the sale or rental of real property was inconsistent with the dictionary definitions of the phrase \u2018\u2018pertaining to,\u2019\u2019 this court none- theless concluded that it would yield absurd results to construe the real property exception as applying to all transactions for goods and services that relate to, or are an adjunct or accessory to, the sale or rental of real property; accordingly, this court turned to extratextual sources, including legislative history, the federal regulations on which the real property exception was based, and sister state precedent, and, consistent with the liberal construction afforded to remedial statutes such as the HSSA, concluded that a \u2018\u2018home solicitation sale\u2019\u2019 is not strictly limited to the sale or rental of real property but, instead, includes a limited category of consumer goods and services that may be excluded under the real property exception; in the present case, the sale of the residence was the stated purpose of the agreement, the duration of the agreement was defined by how long it took for the property to sell, and the sale of the property delimited the agreement\u2019s various terms by, for example, allowing M Co. to remove the furniture and de\u0301cor if the defendants\u2019 residence was not listed for sale within a prescribed period of time, such that the terms of the agreement were so intertwined with the sale of the defendants\u2019 property that the agreement was inextricably related to, or an integral adjunct or accessory to, the sale of the home. 3. There was no merit to the defendants\u2019 claim that the award of damages was improper insofar as the trial court awarded M Co. double damages by rendering judgment against both G and J for the same loss and included the conversion value of the furniture and de\u0301cor in the amount of damages for which J was liable in connection with the breach of contract claim; although a party may recover just damages for the same loss only once, it was undisputed that M Co.\u2019s loss was wholly unsatisfied when the trial court rendered judgment in its favor on the claim against G concerning the enforceability of the California judgment and on the breach of contract claim against J, and the trial court was not foreclosed from rendering judgment in favor of M Co. against both defendants, jointly or separately, for injuries for which each is liable; moreover, the trial court\u2019s award of damages for the conversion value of the furniture and de\u0301cor was not clearly erroneous in light of the fact that J caused M Co.\u2019s total loss of that inventory by keeping and using it in her personal residence for three years, as M Co.\u2019s loss of the furniture and de\u0301cor was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of J\u2019s breach of the home staging services agreement. (Two justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in one opinion) Argued September 8, 2020\u2014officially released September 22, 2021* Procedural History"], "id": "db27ad2e-2a0a-4a78-9f8f-22c7682ec22c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, prostitution is said to offend public sensibilities. Individual members of the public may indeed be offended by the public conduct associated with prostitution: they may be solicited on the street by prostitutes, embarrassed by the advances of streetwalkers, or find their path on the sidewalks or thoroughfares blocked.27 Such conduct may, indeed, be a harm legitimately of interest to the State should it constitute public disorder. This court will not decide the question of who has a right to be on the public streets. However, the court will point out that this public conduct is not caused in fact by the act of engaging in sexual relations for a fee. This harm, if any, is caused by the <mask> aspect of prostitution. The public aspect of prostitution, solicitation, must be distinguished from its private aspect, the performance of consensual sexual relations for a fee in private. Street solicitation is a method of advertising the business of commercial sex. It is separable from the underlying activity. In Nevada and Great Britain, for example, prostitution has been legalized, but street solicitation is proscribed by public order, breach of the peace \u2014 type statutes. Advertising is unoffensively and effectively accomplished through the use of discreet newspaper advertisements. (See Atlantic Monthly, supra.)"], "id": "24aaeed6-07e0-49d3-8391-26b61721de5b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*278Again, tlie order, as a whole, is res adjud\u00edcala in this court. The same questions have been argued and decided. In hostility to the Erie and at the <mask> of the Lackawanna, we have held the report and order to be just and proper. It is true, the power bf the commissioners to make certain conditions was not directly passed upon, but we have no doubt of its existence. (Matter of Lockport and Buffalo R. R. Co., 19 Hun, 38.) Such power seems to be a necessary incident to the duty of providing for a crossing. However, if the question is not res adjudicata in this court, and if the commissioners had no power or authority to make the requirements inserted in their report and confirmed by the order, the Lackawanna company can make such objections by answer and upon trial in-the action for a specific performance."], "id": "f5b59f71-fd98-4b94-9512-e73b14ab499b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Here, the loss of a customer was the likely harm to result from a breach of the noncompete, nondisclosure, and non<mask> provisions. Soliciting a customer would naturally mean Capps (or anyone on whose behalf he made the solicitation) stood to directly take away a customer from Cybertron. Similarly, if Capps violated the noncompete agreement, it was also reasonably likely Cybertron could lose one or more customers. Capps had been employed by Cybertron; therefore, he knew, or very likely would have known, among other things: (1) The identity of Cybertron's customers; (2) Cybertron's service, pricing, and business models; and (3) the types of products and services Cybertron provided to its various customers and their individual business needs. Armed with this information, Capps could easily enable a competitor to take away one or more of Cybertron's customers."], "id": "276829c0-b86d-47e3-9aff-170fbe7ca593", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["A reasonable construction of these words taken with their context and with a view to according them a meaning that will carry out the general purposes of the law is to regulate the conduct of those engaged in the sale of tickets on or near the highway. The primary purpose is to compel them to stay off the streets and to prevent the <mask> of their business in such a manner as not to annoy or offend pedestrians. Boisterous calling and invitation even from private premises is a violation; but a sign painted on a show window of a store or attached to the outside of the same window, provided it does not interfere with the rights of the public in going to and fro surely is not, in my opinion, that sort of \u201c other means \u201d as is made criminal. Ticket agencies openly advertise, as to the theatre proprietors, the sale of admission tickets and the prices therefor. If the defendant were to be held responsible under the Criminal Law, cardboard signs and advertisements in windows, railroad cars, and even in the daily newspapers might be the subject of successful criminal prosecution. Such a construction would be manifestly unjust and strained; and, instead of furthering the objects of this law it would surely *99defeat the very worthy purpose of the law. Advertisements, printed announcements, signs and placards are permissible provided that they do not violate the ordinances with respect to the placing and maintenance of signs, etc., in the City of New York."], "id": "1cc3292c-2b37-4d01-b089-bece2fb72122", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although as a general rule an employer may bar nonemployee union organizers from his property as trespassers, a union may gain a right of access if it can show either that it has no other reasonable means of communicating its organizational message to the employees or that the employer\u2019s access rules discriminate against union <mask>. (Sears, Roebuck, 436 US at 205; see also Lechmere, Inc. v National Labor Relations Bd., 502 US 527 [1992]; National Labor Relations Bd. v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 US 105 [1956].) It has been held that an employer\u2019s no-solicitation policy is discriminatory where it allows pro-employer information to be disseminated in the workplace while prohibiting comparable distribution of pro-union information. (See Cleveland Real Estate Partners v National Labor Relations Bd., 95d 457, 465 [6th Cir 1996]; but cf. Sandusky Mall Co. v National Labor Relations Bd., 242d 682, 689-692 [6th Cir 2001].)"], "id": "ecf89300-d309-4691-8e3e-5c37de15c58a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The campaign resulted in subscriptions aggregating approximately $400,000 including the $50,000 paid by decedent. However, no funds were solicited from other persons for the chapel and no other funds were allocated to the cost of erecting the chapel. But funds were solicited and obtained from persons other than the decedent for furnishing the chapel. Originally, the <mask> was by the Vestry of Holy Trinity until the incorporation of the claimant."], "id": "00b49108-e960-43ac-9082-fb871a77ec26", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff initiated this action on November 4, 2010, and filed its first amended verified complaint on January 14, 2011. On March 1, 2012, plaintiff filed its second amended verified complaint alleging various causes of action for breach of contract for \u201cillegal termination,\u201d \u201cillegal use of confidential information,\u201d breach of the non-<mask> provision, breach of fiduciary duties, \u201ctortious interference with plaintiff-customer relations,\u201d and misappropriation of trade secrets against defendants Conti and Kobakhidze individually. Against B&S, plaintiff asserts causes of action for unjust enrichment, misappropriation of trade secrets, and \u201ctortious interference with plaintiff-customer relations.\u201d By notice of motion dated April 24, 2013, defendants Conti and B&S moved for partial summary judgment declaring the agreements void, and by notice of motion dated May 24, 2013, defendant Kobakhidze moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the contracts are illegal."], "id": "eccdfb76-cf12-45d9-800d-a2378350aab3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In Bedford-Stuyvesant Real Estate Bd. v. Lomenzo (39 A D 2d 742) a special proceeding to enjoin the Secretary of State from issuing blanket non<mask> orders \u201c prohibiting solicitation by licensed real estate brokers and their salesmen, for listing of homes for sale in two certain areas in Brooklyn, New York\u201d (supra p. 742) the court pointedly said, when affirming the judgment of the court below dismissing the petition on the ground of lack of standing to sue: \u201c We have not reached the merits, but had we done so, we would have affirmed \u201d (supra, p. 742)."], "id": "c1838063-992b-48d2-8e10-734b679af175", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["While it is true that mere <mask> of business for out-of-State concerns is not enough to constitute doing business in this State (Miller v. Surf Properties, 4 N Y 2d 475), and there must be additional activities to render the corporation subject to jurisdiction (Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259), the court cannot from the conflicting affidavits submitted determine whether the third-party defendant is actually doing business within the State to be amenable to service of a summons upon it nor can it be determined, assuming that the defendant is doing business within the State, whether the person served falls within the provisions of section 229 of the Civil Practice Act."], "id": "54521c91-69e9-4f05-a431-1ae2645c7645", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["To be sure, the employment agreements toll the duration of the twelve-month-long non-compete and employee non-<mask> covenants for as long as \u201cthe [e]mployee is found to have been in violation of such restriction[s].\u201d But it is undisputed that the men were terminated from Elegance on October 12, 2020. And Vital concedes that \u201cthe record does not establish whether [the men have] been employed in violation of [their] restrictive covenant[s] since that date.\u201d On the current record, then, the twelve-month pe- riod of the non-compete and employee non-solicitation covenants in Alfieri\u2019s and LaRocca\u2019s agreements came to an end no later than October 2021. Because \u201cthe effective time period of the injunction has passed,\u201d the appeal of the partial denial of preliminary relief is moot. Brooks, 59 F.3d at 1119. Vital argues that the cross-appeal \u201cis not moot, because [Vi- tal] is entitled to the benefit of its contractual agreement.\u201d That is, if Vital succeeded on its cross-appeal, \u201cthe one-year restrictive pe- riod\u201d in Alfieri\u2019s and LaRocca\u2019s agreements \u201cshould begin after the Court issues its decision.\u201d In support, Vital relies on the holding of a Florida court that, \u201c[w]here there has been a delay in the entry of a non-compete injunction . . . , the party seeking to enforce the non-compete clause is entitled to receive the benefit of its bargain, which is the enforcement of the full non-compete period specified in the agreement between the parties.\u201d Anakarli Boutique, Inc. v. Ortiz, 152 So. 3d 107, 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). We rejected the same argument in Tropicana Products Sales, Inc. v. Phillips Brokerage Co., another appeal involving the USCA11 Case: 20-14217 Date Filed: 01/20/2022 Page: 13 of 34"], "id": "6ed161e1-0107-4e12-8291-ca712a4ac0ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As noted above, the exception set forth under Transportation Law \u00a7 151 authorizes a municipality with a population under 1,000,000 to adopt its own ordinance relating to registration and licensing of taxis or liveries, pursuant to General Municipal Law \u00a7 181 (1). That statute states, in pertinent part, that municipal officers in cities may adopt ordinances regulating the registration and licensing of taxicabs and may limit the number of taxicabs to be licensed (see also People v Cassese, 43 Misc 2d 869 [1964]). Counsel for defendant Bobnick argues that Vehicle and Traffic Law \u00a7 498 (1) restricts local regulation of taxis and liveries to cities where the population is 1,000,000 or more. However, as clearly set forth in Transportation Law \u00a7 151 (11) and General Municipal Law \u00a7 181 (1), home rule as to regulations regarding taxis and liveries is available to smaller cities such as Ithaca. In fact, it is considered to be well-settled law that a municipality may regulate and license a taxicab business for the purpose of maintaining order, enforcing laws, protecting property, and caring for the safety, health, comfort, and general welfare of the inhabitants and visitors to the city (People v Chimino, 39 Misc 2d 555 [1963]; see also 17 NY Jur 2d, Carriers \u00a7 32). At the same time, courts have made distinctions between statutory regulation of taxicabs or \u201chacks\u201d on the one hand, and livery or coaches on the other. In one such case, the court held that a livery is a vehicle hired by personal contract and without <mask> on public streets (see People v Sullivan, 199 Misc 524 [1951]). Similarly, in the case of People v Ethridge (29 Misc 2d 215 [1961]), the court held that a vehicle not plying for hire but rather operating solely in response to previous engagements, need not be licensed (see also 17 NY Jur 2d, Carriers \u00a7 101). However, the Village Court of the Village of Westbury upheld a village code provision that required a license for the mere picking up of a passenger within the village, regardless of the passenger\u2019s destination (People v Jabaar, 163 Misc 2d 1045 [1994]). The court in Jabaar distinguished the holding in Ethridge on the grounds that the law in the Ethridge case required a taxicab license for a driver transporting passengers *861through the village. The rule sought to be applied in Ithaca is not as restrictive as that in Jabaar; rather, it resembles the ordinance for the city of Yonkers set forth in People v Cassese (43 Misc 2d 869 [1964]). The Yonkers ordinance defined taxicab as a vehicle in the business of carrying persons for hire, whether operated by radio/telephone or electronic equipment of any type, \u201cfor the purpose of receiving and relaying designated proposed passenger information, whether the same is operated from a street stand or . . . subject to call from a garage, office or other place of business\u201d (at 871). As indicated above, the court in Cassese held that a private limousine service that did not cruise the streets of the city soliciting business or obtained requests for service by telephone was not subject to the statute. In the case at bar, it does not appear to be disputed that the vehicles referred to by the defendants as livery vehicles were dispatched from an office or garage to pick up fares within the city of Ithaca for delivery at another location within the city. It is even possible that in one or more instances, a vehicle was stopped by someone on a city street, requesting transportation to another location within the city. There is no evidence that any of the vehicles in question transported their passengers pursuant to any private contract."], "id": "05940592-3549-410d-be98-3c718e6177f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["That the decedent complained of his treatment by his wife is abundantly shown by all the proofs, after he left his home in December; but so far as I can discover, his dissatisfaction related chiefly if not entirely to her want of attention, and coolness\u2014that he was not allowed a Are in his room, and the house was too crowded. The reasonable answer to these charges was, that he had been living in the same house, with his brother-in-law, nearly five years; that his mother-in-law, with whom he had spent two summers, at Fishkill, without paying any board, was spending the winter with him, at his own <mask> ; that he was not allowed fire in his sleeping room by the express directions of his physician; and that, in the language of the Doctor, \u201c he was very well attended to and cared for, and very pleasantly situated at home.\u201d His wife was delicate, and had the charge of a young babe, but his mother-in-law assisted in attending him; and she testifies *494that she herself dressed the abscess in his back \u201c twice a day nearly for a year.\u201d As to the state of feeling between him and his wife, a number of witnesses show, so far as such a point can be established, that it was harmonious, tender, and affectionate, I mean externally. Mrs. Boyce says, \u201c He never had any difficulty with the other members of his family, that I know. He never had any serious difficulty with his wife. Their intercourse was apparently as affectionate as in other cases of man and wife. The greatest fault he had with her was that she was too economical.\u201d Mr. Morgan, who was about the same age as-the decedent, and was on intimate terms with him, states, that towards the 1st of December Mr. Darley, in a conversation at his house in Macdougal-street, said, \u201c that he had a great deal to be thankful for; he had a comfortable home; that his wife was very attentive, did everything for him that he wished, and she had no time to do anything else but wait on him. She did everything for him, and what she could not do, her sister did.\u201d \u201c Previous to this, I had often heard him speak of his wife in terms of the highest commendation. I.never heard him speak otherwise of her, until after he went to Brooklyn.\u201d The witness mentions several circumstances tending to corroborate his opinion of the affectionate character of their relations. Mr. Martin was intimate with Mr. Darley, and heard him, during his sickness, say how well he had been treated. Mr. Shook testified that the decedent frequently spoke to him before he went to Brooklyn \u201c in the highest terms of his family, and of his wife in particular,\u201d and he \u201c never heard him speak otherwise than in commendation of her.\u201d Mrs. Clearwater, who was well acquainted with the decedent and his wife, and visited at their house, characterizes their intercourse as harmonious, and says, \u201che always spoke of her with perfect kindness; I repeatedly heard him say that the family treated him too well; they had done too much for him; he never could repay them for it\u2014they were always ready to wait upon him.\u201d Mr. Clearwater testifies that he heard the decedent say \u201c his wife was not in very good health, and the *495family, together with her and Mrs. Boyce, had done too much for him; they were always ready to run for him at any time. The intercourse between him and his wife was perfect harmony ; he always spoke of her in the highest terms to me.\u201d The Bev. Mr. Shaw visited in the family, but never heard any complaint from the decedent until he visited him in Brooklyn. Catharine Dreger, who had charge of Mr. Darley\u2019s youngest child, says, \u201c he never complained about not having fire; almost all of them waited upon him; he never complained that he was not well waited upon,\u201d and she \u201c never heard of any trouble between him and his wife, while he was there. . . The abscess in his back was dressed twice a day,\u201d by his wife and his mother-in-law, Mrs. Boyce. Dr. Green thought \u201c he was very well attended to and cared for, and very pleasantly situated.\u201d He \u201c never knew of his being neglectednor heard any complaint of his wife \u201c previous to his going to Brooklyn, and they were not very definite then,\u201d but \u201c all fancy,\u201d in his opinion."], "id": "17efac0f-5405-417f-bae9-0866d398edec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "solicitation", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Under New York City Charter \u00a7 363, the provision which governs the award of City franchises, the initial determination of need for a particular type of franchise is made by the head of the City agency responsible for the particular activity, in this instance the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (see, NY City Charter \u00a7 363 [b] [DoITT]). Once such a determination is made, the agency (with the advice of, inter alia, the Corporation Counsel) must prepare a proposed authorizing resolution which is then submitted to the Mayor (NY City Charter \u00a7 363 [b]). The proposed authorizing resolution is required to set forth the nature of the franchise, the public service to be provided, the terms and provisions of the franchise, the method by which proposals shall, be solicited, and, the criteria to be used in evaluating the proposals submitted in response to a <mask> (see, NY City Charter \u00a7 363 [b]). The Mayor may thereafter submit the proposed authoriz*233ing resolution to the Council which may approve, modify or disapprove it (see, NY City Charter \u00a7 363 [c]). The Mayor may veto any modification or disapproval of the authorizing resolution, but the Council may vote to override the veto (see, NY City Charter \u00a7 363 [c]). Once an authorizing resolution has been adopted, it is referred to the responsible agency (again, in this instance, DoITT) which may issue requests for proposals (see, NY City Charter \u00a7 363 [e]). The selection of a franchisee is subject to the review and approval of the City Franchise and Concession Review Committee (FCRC) (see, NY City Charter \u00a7 363 [f]). After local governmental approval, the franchise agreements are required to be submitted to the PSC for review (see, 9 NYCRR 591.3). New York City Charter \u00a7 363 (d) contains the following provision: \u201cNo authorizing resolution or other action of the council may provide for any involvement by the council or any member of the council in the selection of a franchise pursuant to such resolution.\u201d"], "id": "93fd5dfe-2be0-44af-a5b0-28e00ac90c5d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. McCauley , 528 S.W.3d 421, 423 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). The State charged Armstrong with two counts of attempted first-degree <mask>, in violation of Sections 566.032 RSMo (2000)1 and 564.011; seven counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, in violation of Section 566.062; six counts of attempted first-degree statutory sodomy, in violation of Sections 566.062 and 564.011; and six counts of first-degree child molestation, in violation of Section 566.067. The case proceeded to a jury trial."], "id": "0f5c595c-1549-4e62-a1e4-3a7f2e0c2466", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["An examination of the cases urged by each of the parties in support of their mutually exclusive positions demonstrates the continuing viability of the teaching of Morissette (supra) that there is no precise delineation or a fixed formulation of \"comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law on the subject is neither settled nor static.\u201d (Supra, at 260.) This amorphous state of the law leads to incongruous results that are not easily reconciled. For example, in People v Dozier (72 AD2d 478) the crime of <mask>, a class E felony, was held to be a strict liability offense insofar as knowledge by the male defendant that the female was under 17 was not an element. In contrast, in People v Cooper (24 NY2d 877) an Administrative Code of the City of New York provision making it a misdemeanor to fail to file a city sales tax return was held to contain a scienter element that the failure to file was willful, rather than merely an innocent failure to file."], "id": "87a57e64-027e-43c8-afba-7eef459a41d2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["That being said, we may enter a conviction for first-degree child molestation.6 \"A person commits the crime of child molestation in the first degree if he or she subjects another person who is less than fourteen years of age to sexual contact.\" \u00a7 566.067.1. \"Sexual contact\" means \"any touching of another person with the genitals or any touching of the genitals ... of another person ... for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person.\" \u00a7 566.010(3). \"A person cannot engage in 'sexual intercourse' ... with another person without one of those persons engaging in 'sexual contact' because the former act[ ] involve[s] the 'touching of another person with the genitals' and 'touching of the genitals ... of another person....' \" State v. Miller , 372 S.W.3d 455, 470 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting \u00a7 566.010(3)). Accordingly, first-degree child molestation is a lesser-included offense of first-degree <mask>.7"], "id": "2afa9c00-8122-4681-8aad-8e51e0beb94a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Like the victim in the hypothetical referenced in the Celis-Garcia footnote, B.W. and N.G. testified to repeated, identical sexual acts committed at the same location during a particular time span, and they were unable to testify to specific acts on specific dates. Consequently, the verdict directors for B.W. and for N.G. focused on a single month, and any evidentiary fact that could possibly distinguish one incident of rape from another for each victim was included in the verdict directors. The factual findings required by each verdict director rendered it impossible for the jurors to differentiate between the repeated, identical acts of <mask> that fell within each of the verdict directors. For example, the verdict director for the statutory rape count involving B.W. required the jury to find that Walker had sexual intercourse with B.W. in \"May 2014\" in \"defendant's bedroom in Burlington Junction.\"1 With the factual restrictions contained in this verdict director, there was no further basis upon which the jurors could possibly distinguish one act of statutory rape from another. Because the jurors had no evidentiary basis upon which to differentiate between these repeated acts, Walker's right to a unanimous verdict was not at risk of being violated. Cf. State v. Carlton , 527 S.W.3d 865 (Mo. App. 2017) (holding that the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict was violated when the court submitted identical verdict directors on two counts of statutory sodomy, because the record contained evidence that would have allowed the jury to differentiate between the multiple, repeated acts of sodomy allegedly committed during the charged time period)."], "id": "fdae6919-5973-45aa-885f-47fbfbf1ff5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v Bouton (50 NY2d 130), defendant was convicted of sodomy and sexual abuse. During the course of their deliberations the jury viewed exhibits not admitted in evidence including \u201ctwo versions of defendant\u2019s confessions from which reference to uncharged sexual activity had not been redacted * * * hearsay laden psychiatric medical records of the <mask> complainant and welfare records of her mother.\u201d (Supra, p 137.) In view of the prejudicial nature of this material, the court held that the error could not be excused as harmless and a new trial was ordered."], "id": "8801aa76-2fe6-4d60-9820-99282b922e14", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["While this court may be reluctant to depart from the law laid down in prior decisions of our courts which are directly in point in favor of a later ruling which can be arrived at only by implication, we think the implications of the later decisions to be so irresistible that they become self-evident. If, therefore, there may be incest arising from proof of a <mask> with a relative within the prescribed line of consanguinity, there may be incest arising from proof of first degree rape with such a relative. There is consent in neither. There is force, either actual or implied in law in both. The jury was, therefore, justified in returning a verdict of guilt as to both rape and incest and the charge was proper;"], "id": "5ebd6432-e80c-4d3e-92f2-773b052d578b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Here, Balbirnie choked Victim while engaging in sexual intercourse with her. It is reasonably foreseeable that choking a person could cause that person's death. And, by Balbirnie's own words and theory on appeal-supported by the medical examiner's testimony at trial, his act of choking Victim was the likely cause of Victim's death. In other words, had Balbirnie not engaged in sexual intercourse with Victim, he would not have had occasion to choke her, and she would not have died as a result. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that Victim died \"as a result of the perpetration\" of second-degree <mask>."], "id": "ab5389fb-95e3-48f6-97da-f6fddf1febbb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["See State v. Walker , 549 S.W.3d 7 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (holding there was no unanimous verdict violation when the verdict directors identified an act of <mask> occurring in a specific location over a period of time -- \"on or about May 2014 ... the defendant knowingly had sexual intercourse with [victim] in defendant's bedroom in [town] every time her Mom went to Wal-Mart ,\" -- and evidence was offered of repeated, identical sexual acts committed at the same location during that particular time span, because the factual restrictions contained in the verdict director proscribed jurors from relying on evidence that would differentiate between the repeated acts.); State v. Armstrong , ED 105771, 560 S.W.3d 563, 2018 WL 3977548 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (holding that there was no unanimous jury verdict violation)."], "id": "66d2dbad-3b84-4004-ba08-503142302b02", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our decision in Kennedy v. State , 411 S.W.3d 873 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013), controls the resolution of this appeal. In Kennedy , the trial court granted Kennedy's petition to have his name removed from Missouri's sexual offender registry in connection with two convictions for <mask> in the second degree under section 589.400.3(4) and .7. Id. at 874-75. Although not specifically addressed in the opinion, it appears that Kennedy's requirement to register under federal law for these two convictions had expired. Id. at 878 n.6 (\"Both parties concede that Kennedy was required to register as a sex offender under federal law for his convictions of second-degree statutory rape.... In fact, Kennedy specifically acknowledged 'since [he] was previously required to register as a sex offender under federal law for his convictions of statutory rape in the second degree, he is required to register as a sex offender [under section] 589.400.1(7).' \"). In reversing the trial court, we stated:"], "id": "bbe02311-5563-4221-9b7f-6beb02224bd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Treta contends that his convictions and sentences for two counts each of <mask> and forcible rape for two single acts should be vacated because his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the convictions and sentences were duplicative in violation of his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. Specifically, Treta asserts that \"there was no indication of legislative intent an accused can be convicted on both forcible/non-consensual and statutory sex crimes arising from a single act, since statutory sex crimes are a specific type of forcible sex crimes, and, thus, convictions and sentences for both forcible/non-consensual and statutory sex crimes arising from a single act are prohibited, \u00a7 556.041(3)[.]\""], "id": "619487c7-d1e9-4414-8b7e-fb9502d4ba49", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Lutes was charged in this case with two counts of child molestation in the first degree for touching the vagina of his six-year-old granddaughter with his hand, and for forcing the victim to touch his penis with her hand. The First Amended Information alleged that the acts occurred \"on or about February 12, 2014.\" Over Lutes' objections, the State was permitted to introduce evidence at trial of three prior felony convictions Lutes had (each resulting from a guilty plea): (1) a 2004 conviction for <mask> in the second degree, for having sexual intercourse in 2001 with a female victim who was less than seventeen years old; (2) a 1994 conviction for two counts of sexual assault in the first degree for having sexual intercourse with a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old victim; and (3) a 1993 conviction for sexual assault in the first degree for having sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old victim.1"], "id": "7c9b716f-41bc-4356-9b20-5ca37329809f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our presumption is that the legislature does not intend to perform a useless *412act in enacting statutes or in amending statutes, but rather it intends such act to have some effect or accomplish some legislative purpose. Walker , 352 S.W.3d at 391. By making the changes it did in 1994, separating forcible rape into a separate statutory section from <mask> and creating separate punishment provisions for each, the legislature intended that forcible rape and statutory rape be separate and distinct crimes with separate punishments. Id. We perceive no reason to accept the notion rejected by the Walker court \"that the legislature changed the statutory scheme in such a manner, yet intended that there be only one offense for which an offender could be convicted for a single act.\" Id. at 391-92. To do so would render the legislature's acts meaningless. Id. at 392. \"The statutes protect against separate and distinct evils: (1) the use of force to compel sexual intercourse; and (2) the exploitation of children.\" Id. In raping the young victim here, Treta violated two different prohibitions that the legislature codified as separate criminal offenses: \"[h]e forced his victim to engage in sex against her will, and he chose a victim to whom the legislature afforded additional protection because of her age.\" Id."], "id": "99c43082-64c2-4aac-b13a-8832281ee908", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["counsel had a reasonable basis for not presenting the witnesses\u2019 testimony to establish [Van Horn]\u2019s character. During the PCRA hearing, Attorney Minotti testified that he did not call character witnesses because he believed that they would be cross-examined concerning [Van Horn]\u2019s prior convictions for burglary and <mask>. We conclude that this was a reasonable trial strategy, and counsel was not ineffective on this basis."], "id": "b7305ee7-e9a9-4584-a3ca-d2c04e742b38", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our decision in Kennedy v. State , 411 S.W.3d 873 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013), controls the resolution of this appeal. In Kennedy , the trial court granted Kennedy's petition to have his name removed from Missouri's sexual offender registry in connection with two convictions for <mask> in the second degree under section 589.400.3(4) and .7. Id. at 874-75. Although not specifically addressed in the opinion, it appears that Kennedy's requirement to register under federal law for these two convictions had expired. Id. at 878 n.6 (\"Both parties concede that Kennedy was required to register as a sex offender under federal law for his convictions of second-degree statutory rape.... In fact, Kennedy specifically acknowledged 'since [he] was previously required to register as a sex offender under federal law for his convictions of statutory rape in the second degree, he is required to register as a sex offender [under section] 589.400.1(7).' \"). In reversing the trial court, we stated:"], "id": "588a9f92-bf60-4ed3-abfa-ee477f277e19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*1086Traditional English practice permitted the introduction of a child into evidence for the jury to determine whether it resembled the putative father. It was an affirmation of the validity of the physiological principle that a child will resemble his parent. (See 1769 Lord Mansfield, C.J., in the Douglas Peerage Case \u2014 2 Hargr Collect Jurid 402 [1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), \u00a7 166].) Some United States jurisdictions permit this practice (see, e.g., State v Johnson, 361 Mo 214 [<mask> prosecution]). Wigmore cautions that the better rule would be to prohibit the introduction of this evidence, however presented (i.e., whether in the form of testimony or by presentation to the jury), unless the child has, in the opinion of the trial court \u201csettled features.\u201d (Flores v State, 72 Fla 302 [exhibition of child not yet three months old on an issue of paternity was erroneous].)"], "id": "582971a8-f176-431a-bc3e-4cb1ea1185f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> as defined by the Penal Law of the State of New York prior to April 1, 1950 provided: \u201c a person who perpetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, under the age of eighteen years, under circumstances not amounting to rape in the first degree, is guilty of rape in the second degree \u201d."], "id": "ae21f294-867e-4661-9aa7-a65eb46b1fa9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["For this court to perpetuate the holding in People v. Harriden (supra), requires the formulation of a ruling that the cases recognizing <mask> as a predicate for an incest conviction are a mere exception to the principle there enunciated. It would seem that if the Court of Appeals intended a mere exception it would have said so. Instead, the effect of its ruling is quite to the contrary of People v. Harriden (1 Parker Cr. Rep. 344, supra), in that not only did it recognize the validity of an incest conviction where mutual consent to intercourse was lacking but it parted absolutely with the principle that a conviction for incest is improper where the crime proved is also rape."], "id": "eb7c9fe5-ac88-4b93-b6af-8625060fadcf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". An act of sexual intercourse with a minor 14 years old or less is classified as <mask> in Texas (Texas Penal Code \u00a7 22.011). The plaintiffs behavior is consistent with that of a victim of predatory or abusive sexual relationships, who often displays promiscuity, depression, self-harm and susceptibility to revictimization (Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 Buff L Rev 703, 729-730 [2000]). The same author commented that, by discounting the importance of the statutory age limits, \u201cmodern criminal law has turned girls from \u2018jail bait\u2019 into \u2018fair game\u2019 without considering the nature and meaning of consensual sexual activity\u201d (Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J Grim L & Criminology 15, 21-22 [1994])."], "id": "794d8c6d-f83e-4d77-bb1b-e832a017b872", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Here, Balbirnie choked Victim while engaging in sexual intercourse with her. It is reasonably foreseeable that choking a person could cause that person's death. And, by Balbirnie's own words and theory on appeal-supported by the medical examiner's testimony at trial, his act of choking Victim was the likely cause of Victim's death. In other words, had Balbirnie not engaged in sexual intercourse with Victim, he would not have had occasion to choke her, and she would not have died as a result. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that Victim died \"as a result of the perpetration\" of second-degree <mask>."], "id": "84a74a13-9bdc-44ed-b899-c1d254f64b7c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"A person commits the crime of <mask> in the first degree if he has sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years old.\" \u00a7 566.032.1. \"Sexual intercourse\" is defined as \"any penetration, however slight, of the female sex organ by the male sex organ, whether or not an emission results.\" \u00a7 566.010(4). \"The female sexual organs include a woman's vulva and external genitals.\" State v. Dunn , 7 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)."], "id": "08c736b1-e3df-455f-aa54-94e1934c2d95", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Movant appeals to this Court for the fourth time based on his conviction for second-degree <mask> and incest arising from an evening in February 2007 where Movant had non-consensual sex with his then 16-year-old daughter. The three prior appeals include: (1) a direct appeal in which we affirmed Movant's convictions via an unpublished opinion, State v. Mercer , SD29114 (per curiam ); (2) an unsuccessful appeal of the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion, Mercer v. State , 330 S.W.3d 843 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) ; and (3) an appeal from the denial of a previous \u00a7 547.035 motion in which this Court dismissed his appeal due to the lack of a final judgment. Mercer v. State , SD33779, 2015 WL 9481403 (Mo. App. Dec. 29, 2015). That dismissal was transferred by a dissenting judge via Rule 83.03 to our supreme court, where it held that the denial of a \u00a7 547.035 motion was not subject to Rule 74.01(a)'s denomination requirement. Mercer v. State , 512 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Mo. banc 2017). Accordingly, our supreme court held that the docket entry denying Movant's \u00a7 547.035 motion was an appealable order, but reversed and remanded the cause \"due to the circuit court's failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by section 547.035.8.\" Id. at 754."], "id": "6b16c44c-19b0-4ffc-b073-b557bba2c6d0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 2014, McClure was charged with first-degree statutory sodomy, child molestation, and attempted <mask>, pursuant to Sections 566.062.1, 566.067, and 566.032, respectively.1 At trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence the 2007 CAC interview. McClure objected to the exhibit, arguing there was potentially a lack of foundation, materials subject to motions in limine, and improper bolstering. The objection was overruled, and the jury found McClure guilty on the sodomy and molestation charges but acquitted him of the attempted statutory rape charge. The court ordered McClure to serve two consecutive life sentences."], "id": "0041deb8-84ee-4660-a79d-02218d5ea759", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the conclusion of trial, the trial court instructed the jury on the twenty-one counts charged. Armstrong did not object to the instructions as offered at trial. Nor did Armstrong raise instructional error in his motion for new trial. The jury found Armstrong guilty on all counts. Armstrong was sentenced to fifteen years for each count, with the sentences for the counts of attempted <mask>, statutory sodomy, and attempted statutory sodomy to run consecutively, for a total of two hundred and twenty-five years' imprisonment. This appeal follows.2"], "id": "c1106dfd-80b3-46ce-8ab5-f7e00737cd70", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Let us analyze the implications of this holding in the light of the situation presented by this case. The theory of the law creating a <mask> is that any act of intercourse with a female under the age limit, however accomplished, is without her consent and against her will. In other words, it is declared rape to have intercourse with a female under eighteen years of age whether such intercourse be voluntary on her part or not (Colly v. Thomas, 99 Misc. 158; Penal Law, \u00a7 2010). The law \u2018 \u2018 offers resistance for them. It deals with the case as rape, not as a mere statutory offense \u201d (People v. Gibson, 232 N. Y. 458, 461)."], "id": "c18d20ed-fe98-452a-a99d-9bd0066489a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["We find no error, plain or otherwise, in the use of Victim's date of birth as the proper means for calculating her age under the statutes for statutory sodomy and <mask> here. Both statutes require the State to prove that the victim was \"less than seventeen years of age.\" Section 566.034, RSMo. (Supp. 2016) (statutory rape); Section 566.064, RSMo. (Supp. 2016) (statutory sodomy). The incident here took place on March 19, 2016. Victim testified her date of birth was June 1, 1999, and that she was 16 years old on March 19, 2016. Defendant does not dispute the accuracy of either date."], "id": "a866f0ee-f633-4aa5-a94a-c6d26bf91abc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Nor was this rule limited to prior criminal acts between the defendant and the victim. See, e.g., State v. Jenks , 126 Kan. 493, 268 P. 850, 851 (1928) (explaining evidence of a <mask> committed upon another girl would be admissible to prove the defendant's \"lustful disposition\" to commit the offense with which he was charged) (citation omitted); Bracey v. United States , 142 F.2d 85, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (observing the \"better reasoned cases in other jurisdictions\" allowed admission of evidence of other sexual offenses committed against other minors to prove defendant's \"emotional predisposition or passion\" to commit the offense with which he was charged); 1 George E. Dix, et al., McCormick on Evidence \u00a7 190 (K.S. Broun & R.P. Mosteller eds., 7th ed. 2013 & Supp. 2016) (\"[M]any jurisdictions now admit proof of other sex offenses with other persons, at least as to offenses involving sexual aberrations.\") (footnotes omitted)."], "id": "540a690f-f51d-4701-8a69-487afeb7b319", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Nor was this rule limited to prior criminal acts between the defendant and the victim. See, e.g., State v. Jenks , 126 Kan. 493, 268 P. 850, 851 (1928) (explaining evidence of a <mask> committed upon another girl would be admissible to prove the defendant's \"lustful disposition\" to commit the offense with which he was charged) (citation omitted); Bracey v. United States , 142 F.2d 85, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (observing the \"better reasoned cases in other jurisdictions\" allowed admission of evidence of other sexual offenses committed against other minors to prove defendant's \"emotional predisposition or passion\" to commit the offense with which he was charged); 1 George E. Dix, et al., McCormick on Evidence \u00a7 190 (K.S. Broun & R.P. Mosteller eds., 7th ed. 2013 & Supp. 2016) (\"[M]any jurisdictions now admit proof of other sex offenses with other persons, at least as to offenses involving sexual aberrations.\") (footnotes omitted)."], "id": "a7cc5022-3c82-45c5-ac0b-7afd86da1ceb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It can do so by a specific declaration that certain participants in a crime are not accomplices. Thus, section 1308-a. of the Penal Law declares that the thief is not an accomplice to the receiver. It can do so by specific language of a penal statute. Thus by the specific wording of the abortion statute (Penal Law, \u00a7 80) the woman upon whose body the abortion is performed cannot be guilty of aiding and abetting, even if a willing participant. She may only be guilty of a violation of section 81 of the Penal Law. (People v. Blank, 283 N. Y. 526.) And, in the <mask> section (Penal Law, \u00a7 2010), the Legislature has declared that a female under the age of 18 is incapable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse. Such a female cannot be an accomplice to the crime of statutory rape. (By analogy, the Court of Appeals has held that a female under the age of 18 is incapable of consenting to the crime of incest. People v. Gibson, 301 N. Y. 244.) By statutory declaration, she is made a \u201c victim \u201d and not an \u201c accomplice \u201d."], "id": "1d7ddb84-c560-47f3-9300-cf523c72f239", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In his colloquy with the plea court, Treta admitted that on January 29, 2013, he knowingly exposed his genitals to Victim for the purpose of gratifying his sexual desire, and further admitted that on the same day, he had sexual intercourse with Victim by the use of forcible compulsion and that Victim was less than twelve years old. Treta also admitted that on the same day, he committed the crime of <mask> by having sexual intercourse with Victim who was less than twelve years old. Treta admitted that on January 19, 2013, he had sexual intercourse with Victim by the use of forcible compulsion and that Victim was less than twelve years old. Finally, Treta admitted that on the same day, he committed the crime of statutory rape by having sexual intercourse with Victim who was less than twelve years old."], "id": "57c1d2ec-016f-48e0-a551-3841582fcf4c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["the felonies of rape in the first degree, forcible rape, rape, <mask> in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, forcible sodomy, sodomy, statutory sodomy in the first degree, or an attempt to commit any of the preceding crimes, or child molestation in the first, second, third, or fourth degree, sexual abuse, sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the second degree, sexual assault, sexual assault in the first degree, sodomy in the second degree, deviate sexual assault, deviate sexual assault in the first degree, or the act of abuse of a child involving either sexual contact, a prohibited sexual act, sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation of a minor, or any felony offense that contains elements substantially similar to the offenses listed above. Section 632.480(4) (emphasis added)."], "id": "e0f8cd62-41fe-4e95-938d-95928a50bc23", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Movant appeals to this Court for the fourth time based on his conviction for second-degree <mask> and incest arising from an evening in February 2007 where Movant had non-consensual sex with his then 16-year-old daughter. The three prior appeals include: (1) a direct appeal in which we affirmed Movant's convictions via an unpublished opinion, State v. Mercer , SD29114 (per curiam ); (2) an unsuccessful appeal of the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion, Mercer v. State , 330 S.W.3d 843 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) ; and (3) an appeal from the denial of a previous \u00a7 547.035 motion in which this Court dismissed his appeal due to the lack of a final judgment. Mercer v. State , SD33779, 2015 WL 9481403 (Mo. App. Dec. 29, 2015). That dismissal was transferred by a dissenting judge via Rule 83.03 to our supreme court, where it held that the denial of a \u00a7 547.035 motion was not subject to Rule 74.01(a)'s denomination requirement. Mercer v. State , 512 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Mo. banc 2017). Accordingly, our supreme court held that the docket entry denying Movant's \u00a7 547.035 motion was an appealable order, but reversed and remanded the cause \"due to the circuit court's failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by section 547.035.8.\" Id. at 754."], "id": "75ea4f6c-eb68-4824-a510-fd1196bda4f3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Like the victim in the hypothetical referenced in the Celis-Garcia footnote, B.W. and N.G. testified to repeated, identical sexual acts committed at the same location during a particular time span, and they were unable to testify to specific acts on specific dates. Consequently, the verdict directors for B.W. and for N.G. focused on a single month, and any evidentiary fact that could possibly distinguish one incident of rape from another for each victim was included in the verdict directors. The factual findings required by each verdict director rendered it impossible for the jurors to differentiate between the repeated, identical acts of <mask> that fell within each of the verdict directors. For example, the verdict director for the statutory rape count involving B.W. required the jury to find that Walker had sexual intercourse with B.W. in \"May 2014\" in \"defendant's bedroom in Burlington Junction.\"1 With the factual restrictions contained in this verdict director, there was no further basis upon which the jurors could possibly distinguish one act of statutory rape from another. Because the jurors had no evidentiary basis upon which to differentiate between these repeated acts, Walker's right to a unanimous verdict was not at risk of being violated. Cf. State v. Carlton , 527 S.W.3d 865 (Mo. App. 2017) (holding that the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict was violated when the court submitted identical verdict directors on two counts of statutory sodomy, because the record contained evidence that would have allowed the jury to differentiate between the multiple, repeated acts of sodomy allegedly committed during the charged time period)."], "id": "203c6372-269e-4d89-9f09-5ae2df81c733", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In March 2013, the State charged McIntosh with first-degree statutory sodomy *421and first-degree <mask> based on allegations that he had licked his nine-year-old cousin's vagina and anus. McIntosh waived his right to a jury trial in exchange for the State's agreement that he would not be sentenced to more than twenty years' incarceration if found guilty. The case proceeded to a bench trial in January 2016. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,2 the evidence at trial showed the following:"], "id": "6d598acb-40a0-4f06-a114-9f983a6d3b7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The jury convicted Defendant of one count of <mask>, two counts of statutory sodomy, and one count of incest. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a persistent misdemeanor offender to seven years on each of the first three counts, two of them to run concurrently and both consecutively to the third, and then the four-year sentence to run consecutively to the other counts, for a total of 18 years. This appeal follows."], "id": "6fa87245-8fb0-463d-be3d-37e76412d1c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". Former Florida Statutes \u00a7 800.04 (3) (1984 Fla Laws, ch 84-86, \u00a7 5; 1990 Fla Laws, ch 90-120, \u00a7 1), provided that any person who \u201c[c]ommits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011 (l)(h) upon any child under the age of 16 years . . . commits a felony of the second degree.\u201d Florida Statutes \u00a7 794.011 (1) (h) states that \u201c \u2018[slexual battery\u2019 means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.\u201d Accordingly, the Florida crime is akin to a <mask> charge."], "id": "b1c16a86-0061-4c73-93f8-febbac0b3b7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In State v. Noltie, 116 Wn.2d 831 (1991), the jury convicted Frederic Noltie of one count of <mask> and one count of indecent liberties. On appeal, Noltie complained about the information, not jury instructions. Noltie criticized the information as charging him with two counts of statutory rape without sufficiently distinguishing the two alleged criminal acts. The Supreme Court rejected the argument because the information, instructions, testimony, and jury argument established that the State charged Noltie with two different instances of statutory rape and did not seek to impose multiple punishments for the same offense. The court cited the principles that, when reviewing allegations of double jeopardy, an appellate court may review the entire trial record. The count emphasized that the trial court gave separate \u201c\u2018to convict\u2019\u201d instructions relating to the two counts of statutory rape. The instruction for the second count read, in part, that the jury must find that Noltie engaged in sexual intercourse in an incident separate from and in addition to any incident that the State may have proved in court one. During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney recognized the jury instructions provided only the \u201cbare bones\u201d of the elements of each count. State v. Noltie, 116 Wn.2d at 849 (1991). Nevertheless, the State\u2019s attorney stressed that the jury must find that Noltie engaged in sex with the child twice to convict on the second charge."], "id": "c1fbbda9-2d26-43f4-95da-0b66c26cd746", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["James Braddy was found guilty of one count of first-degree <mask> under *908section 566.032, RSMo Supp. 2006.1 The circuit court found him to be a persistent sexual offender under section 558.018, RSMo Supp. 2006,2 and sentenced him to seven years in prison. He successfully completed the Missouri Sex Offender Program, and the department of probation and parole recommended him for early release.3"], "id": "c4912151-c1ce-432d-a1c6-19f42b107873", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This cas\u00e9 arises from an August 12, 2000 sexual encounter between the then 15-year-old plaintiff and defendant Barsky. Barsky had been plaintiffs social studies teacher at a New York City public school during the preceding school year. Although Barsky and plaintiff met frequently in school outside of class, there is no evidence of any inappropriate contact prior to the subject encounter. Plaintiff spent the 2000 summer vacation at her grandmother\u2019s home in upstate New York. Barsky, who was supposedly planning to see his mother in Massachusetts, detoured to visit plaintiff. Plaintiff and Barsky arranged to meet, but plaintiff did not tell her grandmother about her plans. Plaintiff and Barsky met, drove around for a while, and then went to a hotel, where they had sexual intercourse. Although plaintiff acknowledges that the tryst was \u201cconsensual,\u201d she was legally incapable of consent. Barsky was charged with <mask>, and eventually pleaded guilty. He is no longer a teacher."], "id": "058cc06e-d588-4031-a4e8-4b67222f7619", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In State v. Cannafax , 344 S.W.3d 279, 291 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011), the Southern District held that \"a modification to the definition of 'dangerous felony' that limits [an inmate's] opportunity for early release may lawfully be applied to him [regardless of] whether ... sufficient evidence showed the offenses were committed after the 2003 amendment.\" In that case, the defendant argued that his crimes of first-degree <mask> and first-degree statutory sodomy were not part of the definition of \"dangerous felony\" at the time of his offenses and, because they were not added until the 2003 amendment, the 85% rule could not be applied to him. Id. at 290-91. In State v. Tivis , 933 S.W.2d 843, 848 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996), however, this court held that \"the amended definition of 'dangerous felony' which occurred after [commission of] the underlying offense [may not be used] for the purpose of determining whether or not [an inmate] is subject to sentencing enhancement.\" Here, we need not decide whether the current definition of \"dangerous felony\" applies to Hill's sentences, as we have concluded, in accordance with the holding in Mann v. McSwain , 526 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017), that his offenses constituted dangerous felonies as defined at the time of their commission."], "id": "12fa9c16-548b-4bba-9f08-1a7f6227e5c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["We find no error, plain or otherwise, in the use of Victim's date of birth as the proper means for calculating her age under the statutes for statutory sodomy and <mask> here. Both statutes require the State to prove that the victim was \"less than seventeen years of age.\" Section 566.034, RSMo. (Supp. 2016) (statutory rape); Section 566.064, RSMo. (Supp. 2016) (statutory sodomy). The incident here took place on March 19, 2016. Victim testified her date of birth was June 1, 1999, and that she was 16 years old on March 19, 2016. Defendant does not dispute the accuracy of either date."], "id": "f6e507be-b948-4763-aa36-fca2a3204d69", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to the CANRA violation, Doe asserts Arnold knew Doe was under 18 at the time she became pregnant and was informed that the father was her boyfriend, who was over 18. As a result, she was required to report the <mask>. Even if Arnold was required to report the incident, there is no evidence the failure to report was a proximate cause of Doe's injury as the injury had already occurred by the time she asserts it should have been reported. Indeed, Doe fails to identify what injury resulted from the failure to report, except to state that she \"was left to deal with her adult pursuer for an additional three and a half weeks.\" Beyond this statement, however, Doe does not assert, much less cite to evidence, that Dwayne continued to pursue her during those three and a half weeks, or that she even had contact with him during that time. Again, there is insufficient *76evidence of causation to allow a jury to find in her favor on her claims against the County."], "id": "10c362c3-1934-4fb6-9c14-24eaffb17585", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Balbirnie raises two points on appeal. In his first point, Balbirnie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his felony murder conviction, arguing that Victim's death did not come about \"as a result of the perpetration\" of second-degree statutory rape-the underlying felony. In his second point, Balbirnie argues that the State bore the burden and failed to prove that Balbirnie knew Victim was under the *708age of 17, as required to support his conviction for second-degree <mask>."], "id": "228d0335-9732-4b13-9926-33d5501a8535", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Balbirnie reads the phrase \"another person is killed as a result of the perpetration ... of such felony\" to mean that the death must result from one of the elements of the underlying felony. He notes that the elements of second-degree <mask> are: (1) a person age twenty-one or older; (2) having sexual intercourse; (3) with a person who is less than seventeen years old. See \u00a7 566.034.1. He then reasons that neither of the participants' ages can cause death, so, for him to be guilty of felony murder, Victim's death must have resulted from the second element-sexual intercourse. And, here, because there was no evidence that Victim's death was caused by the penetration of her vagina by Balbirnie's penis, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree."], "id": "f1b313f3-d2db-4585-8cbc-13eece067947", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Movant was charged with one count of first-degree <mask>, one count of second-degree statutory rape, three counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, and two counts of second-degree statutory sodomy. The charges all related to allegations that Movant engaged in multiple acts of sexual conduct at his home with a child under the age of fourteen between August and October of 2011. Following a jury trial, Movant was found not guilty of first-degree statutory rape, and guilty of all other charges. The court sentenced Movant to a total of twenty-five years in prison."], "id": "88234fe1-ee1f-4ffb-8749-ae63862fc1ff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [" Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order classifying him as a level two sex offender stemming from his 1996 conviction in Virginia for the <mask> of a 14-year-old female \"without the use of force.\" Defendant was 18 years old at the time of the offense, which the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders characterized as an \"isolated incident.\" Defendant successfully completed both sex offender treatment and substance abuse treatment, and he has not been convicted of any other sex crime. Under these circumstances, we agree with defendant, in the exercise of our own discretion, that his presumptive level two classification overestimates his \"dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism\" (People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841, 861 [2014]; see People v Carter, 138 AD3d 706, 707-708 [2d Dept 2016]). We therefore modify the order by determining that defendant is a level one risk (see People v George, 141 AD3d 1177, 1178 [4th Dept 2016]; see also People v Brocato, 188 AD3d 728, 728-729 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Fisher, 177 AD3d 615, 615-616 [2d Dept 2019]). Defendant's remaining contention is academic in light of our determination."], "id": "e6701a66-f40e-4ff4-8617-5215b6c66cd6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["That being said, we may enter a conviction for first-degree child molestation.6 \"A person commits the crime of child molestation in the first degree if he or she subjects another person who is less than fourteen years of age to sexual contact.\" \u00a7 566.067.1. \"Sexual contact\" means \"any touching of another person with the genitals or any touching of the genitals ... of another person ... for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person.\" \u00a7 566.010(3). \"A person cannot engage in 'sexual intercourse' ... with another person without one of those persons engaging in 'sexual contact' because the former act[ ] involve[s] the 'touching of another person with the genitals' and 'touching of the genitals ... of another person....' \" State v. Miller , 372 S.W.3d 455, 470 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting \u00a7 566.010(3)). Accordingly, first-degree child molestation is a lesser-included offense of first-degree <mask>.7"], "id": "f8b88295-37d6-4959-947f-3ac165e786b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The girl now seeks the return of her child, and prays that her instrument of surrender be set aside. After a plenary hearing, the following facts emerge: During her confinement in the foundling hospital her family rarely visited or comforted her. Her mother, who was most sensitive to the girl\u2019s predicament, came infrequently and displayed nothing but recrimination towards her daughter. In fact, the mother\u2019s implacable hostility towards the natural father of the infant in question resulted in his arrest for <mask> and completely cut off any possibility of a marriage between him and the girl. It seems that this mother, married for many years to an invalid, and having been forced to work in order to preserve her household, had unfortunately become embittered in many of her *964relationships, particularly with reference to her youngest daughter, the petitioner herein. Yet, she was and is a good woman, iron-willed and well intentioned."], "id": "9a0e992b-8235-498c-9344-e69c15a681b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Shortly after its decision in Tucker (supra), the Court once more returned to the issue of use of prior void convictions. In Loper v Beto (405 US 473 [1972]), upon taking the stand in his own defense, the defendant\u2019s general credibility was impeached with his prior convictions. Loper was charged with the <mask> of his eight-year-old stepdaughter who was the sole witness against him. The defendant, conversely, was the only witness for the defense. The Court set forth the question presented in Loper as follows: \u201cDoes the use of prior, void convic*205tions for impeachment purposes deprive a criminal defendant of due process of law where their use might well have influenced the outcome of the case?\u201d (Id., at 480.)"], "id": "8b041184-4320-495e-afe7-97f4af437164", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["While the evidence for each victim in Celis-Garcia showed that multiple acts of sodomy occurred at different, specified locations over an extended time period, the evidence for each victim in this case showed that multiple acts of <mask> occurred in an identical manner in the same location approximately every other day over a period of time. Id. at 11-12. The Western District likened its case to the hypothetical referenced in the Celis-Garcia footnote, as the victims testified to \"repeated, identical sexual acts committed at the same location during a particular time span, and they were unable to testify to specific acts on specific dates.\" Id. at 12. As such, the verdict directors focused on a single month, and any evidentiary fact that could distinguish one incident of rape from another was included in the verdict directors.9 The Court concluded that \"[t]he factual findings required by each verdict director rendered it impossible for the jurors to differentiate between the repeated, identical acts of statutory rape that fell within each of the verdict directors.\" Id. Accordingly, the defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated because the jurors had no evidentiary basis upon which to differentiate between the repeated acts. Id. Notably, as to the first count, the Court concluded the fact that sexual acts on different dates within the month of May \"could theoretically have been relied on by the jurors in finding [the defendant] guilty cannot demonstrate a violation of the right to a unanimous verdict when the record contains no evidentiary basis for the jurors to distinguish between those acts.\" Id."], "id": "000f18cd-97ed-4099-b495-eeecace48fe3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["What constitutes prejudice to the defendant? In People v Bouton (50 NY2d 130), the defendant was convicted of sodomy and sexual abuse. During the course of their delib*1087erations, the jury viewed \u201ctwo versions of defendant\u2019s confessions from which reference to uncharged sexual activity had not been redacted * * * hearsay laden psychiatric medical records of the <mask> complainant and welfare records of her mother\u201d (p 137). The Court of Appeals in Bouton (supra) found this material prejudicial and a new trial was ordered."], "id": "34ac8a0b-84d9-4e10-82a6-69649a603782", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Hamber did not object to these statements in the PSIR. As part of the factual basis during the plea hearing, Hamber admitted that he purchased the firearm in North Little Rock in October 2018 for approximately $130. During the sentencing hearing, Hamber backtracked from his previous admissions and claimed that he purchased the gun in September 2019. Hamber was indicted by the grand jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm and eventually entered an open plea of guilty to the charge. Before sentencing, the government filed a motion seeking an upward variance to 72 months on the grounds that Hamber\u2019s rape conviction was more aggravated than simple <mask>, that Hamber admitted he obtained a firearm days after he was released from state custody, and that his long history of violence posed a risk to the community. At sentencing, the district court calculated the advisory guideline range and advised Hamber that he faced a 10-year statutory maximum term of imprisonment. Hamber sought a sentence within the advisory range of 12 to 18 months."], "id": "6df620c2-f30e-4431-9e2e-5796ad9284b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The People assert that Meloon v Helgemoe is bad law, poorly reasoned and unconvincing; that it has been specifically rejected in at least two very recent State decisions: State v Brothers (384 A2d 402 [Del]) and People v McKellar (81 Cal App 3d \u2014, 146 Cal Rptr 327). Defendant argues that the proof of the unconstitutionality of the New Hampshire statute is that New Hampshire changed its sex law in 1975, to make it sexually neutral. The court in People v Davoli (95 Misc 2d 402, 405 [Onondaga County, Cunningham, J.]) makes an interesting comment: \"Finally, the over-all impression given by the Meloon decision is that it was tailor-made to deal with an ill conceived and particularly heavy-handed statute. That is, the New Hampshire <mask> offense was designated a class A felony, and this extreme penalty could be enacted even 'in the scenario of an adolescent love tryst of a 16 year old boy and a 14 year old girl\u2019 (Meloon, supra, p 608).\u201d"], "id": "c8fcfc9d-0081-427f-8702-7bde6fd13da3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The practice of polygamy, in particular, often coincides with crimes targeting women and children. Crimes not unusually attendant to the practice of polygamy include incest, sexual assault, <mask>, and failure to pay child support. See Richard A. Vasquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence , 5 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 225, 239-45 (2001). Moreover, the closed nature of polygamous communities makes obtaining evidence of and prosecuting these crimes challenging. See Id. at 243 (\"Given the highly private nature of sexual abuse and the self-imposed isolation of polygamous communities, prosecution may well prove impossible. This wall of silence may present a compelling justification for criminalizing the act of polygamy, prosecuting offenders, and effectively breaking down the wall that provides a favorable environment in which crimes of physical and sexual abuse can thrive.\").28 *710This alone provides a rational basis for drawing the distinction between married and unmarried offenders within the sexual assault statute. Indeed, without such a legislative classification, the statute would not be effective at its intended purpose of punishing more severely an individual who commits sexual assault pursuant to a bigamous or polygamous relationship.29 When dealing with the offenses of bigamy or polygamy, drawing a line between married and unmarried offenders is inevitable."], "id": "c852301f-acaa-49cd-a0bf-7853f5db2540", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In applying the pregnancy prevention rationale to sustain the constitutionality of a California <mask> provision (age limit 18), under the Reed standard, the court in People v MCKellar (81 Cal App 3d \u2014, \u2014, supra, 146 Cal Rptr 327, 331) stated: \"most of the problems encountered by the female when pregnant do not accrue to the male, minor or adult, who engages in sexual intercourse. The sexes are not similarly situated; therefore, the argument of appellant, ante, that males receive unconstitutional unequal treatment for the reason stated lacks merit. * * * Today\u2019s newspapers, almost daily, contain stories of the problems to society caused by the many pregnant unmarried minor females. The selection of the female age factor is clearly for the Legislature. [Citation omitted.] We conclude [the statute] represents a proper exercise of the Legislature\u2019s police power and the classification is reasonable and bears a genuine and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation.\u201d"], "id": "bafcfcc5-69ab-404d-a648-ba555da42cfa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The People assert that Meloon v Helgemoe is bad law, poorly reasoned and unconvincing; that it has been specifically rejected in at least two very recent State decisions: State v Brothers (384 A2d 402 [Del]) and People v McKellar (81 Cal App 3d \u2014, 146 Cal Rptr 327). Defendant argues that the proof of the unconstitutionality of the New Hampshire statute is that New Hampshire changed its sex law in 1975, to make it sexually neutral. The court in People v Davoli (95 Misc 2d 402, 405 [Onondaga County, Cunningham, J.]) makes an interesting comment: \"Finally, the over-all impression given by the Meloon decision is that it was tailor-made to deal with an ill conceived and particularly heavy-handed statute. That is, the New Hampshire <mask> offense was designated a class A felony, and this extreme penalty could be enacted even 'in the scenario of an adolescent love tryst of a 16 year old boy and a 14 year old girl\u2019 (Meloon, supra, p 608).\u201d"], "id": "c36de224-ac02-4a93-a7f5-aa972b5fd978", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["While the evidence for each victim in Celis-Garcia showed that multiple acts of sodomy occurred at different, specified locations over an extended time period, the evidence for each victim in this case showed that multiple acts of <mask> occurred in an identical manner in the same location approximately every other day over a period of time. Id. at 11-12. The Western District likened its case to the hypothetical referenced in the Celis-Garcia footnote, as the victims testified to \"repeated, identical sexual acts committed at the same location during a particular time span, and they were unable to testify to specific acts on specific dates.\" Id. at 12. As such, the verdict directors focused on a single month, and any evidentiary fact that could distinguish one incident of rape from another was included in the verdict directors.9 The Court concluded that \"[t]he factual findings required by each verdict director rendered it impossible for the jurors to differentiate between the repeated, identical acts of statutory rape that fell within each of the verdict directors.\" Id. Accordingly, the defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated because the jurors had no evidentiary basis upon which to differentiate between the repeated acts. Id. Notably, as to the first count, the Court concluded the fact that sexual acts on different dates within the month of May \"could theoretically have been relied on by the jurors in finding [the defendant] guilty cannot demonstrate a violation of the right to a unanimous verdict when the record contains no evidentiary basis for the jurors to distinguish between those acts.\" Id."], "id": "4fb67f21-c7d3-4efc-a1e2-7f53ebe7df12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It can do so by a specific declaration that certain participants in a crime are not accomplices. Thus, section 1308-a. of the Penal Law declares that the thief is not an accomplice to the receiver. It can do so by specific language of a penal statute. Thus by the specific wording of the abortion statute (Penal Law, \u00a7 80) the woman upon whose body the abortion is performed cannot be guilty of aiding and abetting, even if a willing participant. She may only be guilty of a violation of section 81 of the Penal Law. (People v. Blank, 283 N. Y. 526.) And, in the <mask> section (Penal Law, \u00a7 2010), the Legislature has declared that a female under the age of 18 is incapable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse. Such a female cannot be an accomplice to the crime of statutory rape. (By analogy, the Court of Appeals has held that a female under the age of 18 is incapable of consenting to the crime of incest. People v. Gibson, 301 N. Y. 244.) By statutory declaration, she is made a \u201c victim \u201d and not an \u201c accomplice \u201d."], "id": "0af2c204-bea2-4b0a-a7a7-adfdff467f2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*781The Attorney General claims that Juror 11's statements \"resemble\" those used by a defense attorney in People v. Williams, supra, 25 Cal.4th 441, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209. We are not persuaded. In Williams , the defendant was charged with multiple crimes, including unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor as lesser included offenses to the charges of rape. Defense counsel argued in closing about the misdemeanor \"statutory rape\" charges: \"Law as you know is not uniformly applied.... Mores, custom[s] change. Times change. And the law must be applied fairly. So if the law is not being applied fairly, that's why you need fair jurors.\" ( Id . at p. 445, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209.) Defense counsel then purported to quote from a U.S. Supreme Court case (but actually quoting the dissent) that \" ' \"a jury may, at times, afford a higher justice by refusing to enforce harsh laws.\" Please understand.' \" ( Id. at p. 446, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209.) On the first day of deliberation, the foreperson sent a message to the trial court that a juror refused to adhere to the trial court's instruction on <mask> because he believed the law is \"wrong.\" The juror in question then told the trial court that he was not willing to follow the judge's instruction on this charge because he did not believe statutory rape should be a crime (although he would follow the other instructions for the rest of the charges) and that he was not willing to follow his oath as a juror. Not surprisingly, this juror was discharged. In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the \"basic rule\" that a juror must determine facts and render a verdict in accordance with the trial court's instructions, and failure to do so constitutes failure to perform one's duty as a juror under Penal Code section 1089. ( Id . at p. 463, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209.) But Williams is not this case. Juror 11 said he was following and would follow *378the trial court's instructions. He did not express a view that any of the charges against defendant here should not be a crime, and there was not substantial evidence in this record to suggest otherwise."], "id": "d8e27582-3ff2-44c8-8bf5-9d6e30cf62d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Nor was this rule limited to prior criminal acts between the defendant and the victim. See, e.g., State v. Jenks , 126 Kan. 493, 268 P. 850, 851 (1928) (explaining evidence of a <mask> committed upon another girl would be admissible to prove the defendant's \"lustful disposition\" to commit the offense with which he was charged) (citation omitted); Bracey v. United States , 142 F.2d 85, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (observing the \"better reasoned cases in other jurisdictions\" allowed admission of evidence of other sexual offenses committed against other minors to prove defendant's \"emotional predisposition or passion\" to commit the offense with which he was charged); 1 George E. Dix, et al., McCormick on Evidence \u00a7 190 (K.S. Broun & R.P. Mosteller eds., 7th ed. 2013 & Supp. 2016) (\"[M]any jurisdictions now admit proof of other sex offenses with other persons, at least as to offenses involving sexual aberrations.\") (footnotes omitted)."], "id": "f41e9bbd-cf78-423e-8756-2a6876b094d2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to Count 2, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that on or about January 2011, in the County of Nodaway, State of Missouri, the defendant knowingly had sexual intercourse with N.G. in defendant's bedroom in Burlington Junction every time her Mom went to Wal-Mart, and Second, that at that time N.G. was a child less than twelve years old, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count 2 of <mask> in the first degree. However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable *11doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense. The issue of jury unanimity may be implicated in cases such as this, which are commonly referred to as \"multiple acts\" cases. Id. \"A multiple acts case arises when there is evidence of multiple, distinct criminal acts, each of which could serve as the basis for a criminal charge, but the defendant is charged with those acts in a single count.\" Id. at 155-56. The evidence in this case was that Walker had sexual intercourse with B.W. and N.G. in the same manner and same location approximately every other day over a period of time, yet he was charged with only one count of statutory rape for each victim. The count for each victim specified the month in which the act of statutory rape occurred but did not specify a particular act of statutory rape on a particular date. Walker argues that, by not specifying a particular act of statutory rape in each count, the verdict directors ran afoul of the Supreme Court's opinion in Celis-Garcia , 344 S.W.3d 150."], "id": "524a3fc8-2ddd-4404-ad31-07e1a895e915", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although the United States Supreme Court has never spoken with respect to the level of analysis to be applied to statutes of the type which New York presently has concerning <mask>, it is clear that a higher level of scrutiny is appropriate than the traditional rational basis equal protection test when dealing with gender-based classifications. In Craig v Boren (supra, p 197) the court applied the standard of the court in Reed v Reed (404 US 71) and subsequent cases: \"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) In Me-loon v Helgemoe (564d 602, 604, supra) the United States Court of Appeals noted the heightened level of scrutiny which is appropriate to gender-based classifications: \"The statute at issue in this case is a classification based on sex. As such it requires more heightened scrutiny than would be applied to completely non-suspect legislation, but less stringent scrutiny than is typically applied to racial classifications, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Frontiero v. *500Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). Moreover, since a criminal statute is involved, the standards governing gender classification must be applied with special sensitivity.\u201d"], "id": "efe1006f-9b5f-4532-8f4c-f6338166b861", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Walker also contends the verdict directors violated his right to be free from double jeopardy because \"there is no way of knowing exactly what act of <mask> the jury used for its verdict of guilt\" and, therefore, the State could later charge him with another act of statutory rape during the charged time period. Walker did not object to the verdict directors on this basis at trial and did not include this argument in his motion for new trial. Therefore, review, if any, is for plain error. Plain error will be found only where the alleged error \"demonstrates on its face substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has occurred.\" State v. Biggs , 170 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Mo. App. 2005). Walker's allegation of error does not meet this standard. Because it was impossible to distinguish between each act of statutory rape during the charged time period, the verdict director for B.W. encompassed every act of statutory rape that Walker committed against her in his bedroom in May 2014, while the verdict director for N.G. encompassed every act of statutory rape that Walker committed against her every time her mother went to Walmart in January 2011. Walker cannot be successively prosecuted or punished for the acts of statutory rape encompassed by the verdict directors."], "id": "a09177e6-5cd2-4c75-ad0a-4b8b98767de9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant Taylor is also charged with 4 counts of forcible rape and all are alleged to have taken place during the period of December 1 to December 31, 1986. He is also charged with 4 counts of <mask> and the court has again assumed that these counts relate to the same incidents which form the basis for the forcible rape counts. The end result is that the indictment as it reads today charges each defendant with 4 counts of rape in the first degree."], "id": "988aa347-aed2-4fa2-8fde-a1b1f52a4ae0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The opinion of this court is that this decision is not binding upon us and that undue importance must not be attached to it. In State v Brothers (384 A2d 402, 406 [Del]) the Delaware Superior Court declined to follow Meloon v Helgemoe (supra) saying that that case \"placed an undue burden on the State of New Hampshire to justify the long-standing classification of offenses found in many statutes defining <mask>.\u201d"], "id": "f5cf784f-edb2-4afb-847d-0f0b88643812", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Shortly after its decision in Tucker (supra), the Court once more returned to the issue of use of prior void convictions. In Loper v Beto (405 US 473 [1972]), upon taking the stand in his own defense, the defendant\u2019s general credibility was impeached with his prior convictions. Loper was charged with the <mask> of his eight-year-old stepdaughter who was the sole witness against him. The defendant, conversely, was the only witness for the defense. The Court set forth the question presented in Loper as follows: \u201cDoes the use of prior, void convic*205tions for impeachment purposes deprive a criminal defendant of due process of law where their use might well have influenced the outcome of the case?\u201d (Id., at 480.)"], "id": "04834f05-33ee-4040-94e8-f91ed779a7aa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Thompson (212 N. Y. 249), the court held that in cases of adultery, seduction, <mask> and incest, even acts subsequent to the act charged in the indictment are relevant to show a continuity of the lascivious disposition. In People v. Thau (219 N. Y. 39, 42), evidence was received of the defendant\u2019s visit to the complaining witness on a prior occasion two weeks before the assault alleged in the indictment. His threatening manner and vicious conduct at that time were held relevant to establish motive, common scheme or plan and identity. There the court said: \u201c * * * where the evidence is relevant the trial court should not hesitate to receive it notwithstanding the fact that it tends to prove the defendant guilty of another offense. * * * \u2018 * * * A party cannot by multiplying his crimes diminish the volume of competent testimony against him.* * * \u2019\u201d."], "id": "62e48e1f-b537-4fef-8673-e51c1b9067e5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c While many of these duties are sanctioned by a more strict civil liability, lawmakers, whether wisely or not, have sought to make such regulations more effective by invoking criminal sanctions * * * Whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element * * * This has not, however, been without expressions of misgiving.\u201d (Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 254-256; Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes [7th ed.], \u00a7 5.10; Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, ch. 6, pp. 111-127 [citing the crimes of <mask> and bigamy as examples of strict liability offenses without mens rea]; People *431v. Nelson, 309 N. Y. 231; Tenement House Dept. v. McDevitt, 215 N. Y. 160; People v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487; People v. Polstein, 184 App. Div. 260, affd. 226 N. Y. 593; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277; and most recently again upheld by the Court of Appeals in People v. Transamerican Frgt. Lines, 24 N Y 2d 727, 731 [June, 1969].)"], "id": "a1c4ff6f-abbb-462b-b811-d188856b0f9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In State v Brothers (384 A2d 402, 405, supra), the court points out that rape and <mask> statutes have come under equal protection attack in many jurisdictions in recent years. Citing numerous case authority, the court says (p 405): \"It is apparent that in almost every instance the distinctions made in the statutes have been upheld\u201d. The Delaware Court also referred to the court in Meloon as applying the \"strict scrutiny\u201d test to the statute, and with respect to the pregnancy rationale of Meloon: \"It was almost as if the Court was requiring the legislature to build into its statutory scheme a definition of how far was too far and how much was enough\u201d. (State v Brothers, supra, p 406.)"], "id": "9044a412-bac4-4f95-b08b-e8d16bc82386", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["again. The district court denied a permanent injunction and granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff. After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the Sheriff\u2019s warning signs are compelled government speech, and their placement violates a homeowner\u2019s First Amendment rights. Thus, we vacate the district court\u2019s judgment in favor of the Sheriff and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. The Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Reginald Holden, Corey McClendon, and Christopher Reed are residents of Butts County and are required to register as sex offenders under O.C.G.A. \u00a7 42-1-12, et seq. The Georgia statute not only requires individuals with certain convictions to register as sex offenders, but also requires Georgia to classify registrants based on whether they pose an increased risk of recidivism. Id. \u00a7 42-1-14. None of the three plaintiffs have been classified as posing an increased risk of recidivism. In 2004, Holden was convicted of lewd and lascivious battery in Pinellas County, Florida. He has been a homeowner in Butts County since May 2017. He lives by himself and works as a warehouse coordinator. In 2001, McClendon was convicted of <mask> of a minor in Butts County. He lives with his daughter and his parents, USCA11 Case: 21-10092 Date Filed: 01/19/2022 Page: 4 of 21"], "id": "969ad022-3658-4473-9754-12815140c41e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["James Braddy was found guilty of one count of first-degree <mask> under *908section 566.032, RSMo Supp. 2006.1 The circuit court found him to be a persistent sexual offender under section 558.018, RSMo Supp. 2006,2 and sentenced him to seven years in prison. He successfully completed the Missouri Sex Offender Program, and the department of probation and parole recommended him for early release.3"], "id": "ddc56eff-4e1d-4d72-9d21-2dc0fe996e43", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Treta was charged by indictment with sexual misconduct involving a child, section 566.0833 (Count I);4 two counts of *409forcible rape, section 566.030 (Counts II and IV); and two counts of <mask> in the first degree, section 566.032 (Counts III and V). The charges arose from Treta's having sexual intercourse with Victim, a child under twelve years old, by the use of forcible compulsion on January 19, 2013, and January 29, 2013."], "id": "93767b58-8f64-4425-b484-4ea740c97e8e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The manifest purpose of the <mask> legislation is to *981protect the morals of young girls. (People v Marks, 146 App Div 11.) The State has an interest in protecting young girls even from their own immature indiscretions. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin (Flores v State, 69 Wis 2d 509, 510-511) in upholding a similar statutory rape statute wrote: \"One obvious, adequate justification for focusing upon sexual intercourse between males and minor females is the possibility of pregnancy. Moreover, the legislature could rationally have concluded that the danger of sexual exploitation by adult males of minor females and the resulting stigma and shame attendant on such activity in our society were so severe that this activity should be specially proscribed in a separate statute.\u201d"], "id": "952dd5f4-72f5-4ca4-a568-b5d3e0539a7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". Defendant may be sentenced for the most serious crime but not for ingredient-offenses committed in \u201csuccessive steps\u201d toward the major crime; contra, as to \u201cdistinct offenses\u201d not necessarily involved in the latter. Thus, since <mask> and bastardy are distinct crimes separate sentences may be imposed therefor but not on the fornication conviction on which the bastardy adjudication rests (Commonwealth ex rel. Roberts v. Keenan, 170 Pa. Super. 282). Acquittal of fornication will bar judgment on common-law rape, but not for assault, etc., with intent to ravish (Commonwealth v. Moss, 173 Pa. Super. 367); acquittal of adultery does not bar later prosecution for assault with intent to rape (Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555)."], "id": "4a2b7572-7a21-4883-8e60-ff273520cbeb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["An examination of the cases urged by each of the parties in support of their mutually exclusive positions demonstrates the continuing viability of the teaching of Morissette (supra) that there is no precise delineation or a fixed formulation of \"comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law on the subject is neither settled nor static.\u201d (Supra, at 260.) This amorphous state of the law leads to incongruous results that are not easily reconciled. For example, in People v Dozier (72 AD2d 478) the crime of <mask>, a class E felony, was held to be a strict liability offense insofar as knowledge by the male defendant that the female was under 17 was not an element. In contrast, in People v Cooper (24 NY2d 877) an Administrative Code of the City of New York provision making it a misdemeanor to fail to file a city sales tax return was held to contain a scienter element that the failure to file was willful, rather than merely an innocent failure to file."], "id": "b566d770-b01e-4faa-a71d-c02a7cff04f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Balbirnie raises two points on appeal. In his first point, Balbirnie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his felony murder conviction, arguing that Victim's death did not come about \"as a result of the perpetration\" of second-degree statutory rape-the underlying felony. In his second point, Balbirnie argues that the State bore the burden and failed to prove that Balbirnie knew Victim was under the *708age of 17, as required to support his conviction for second-degree <mask>."], "id": "6f477581-749e-4223-96ed-6fbe83bf6187", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the opinion of this court, the foregoing statute entails no shifting of the burden of proof on any element of the crime to the defendant, for in order to obtain a conviction under Penal Law \u00a7 263.16, the People are required to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant had a \u201cperformance\u201d in his possession or control; (2) that *256the performance included \u201csexual conduct\u201d; (3) that the defendant \u201ckn[ew]\u201d the \u201ccharacter and content\u201d of the performance; and (4) the child engaging in the sexual conduct was \u201cless than sixteen years of age\u201d. The \u201cage\u201d element as thus expressed imposes a significant burden upon the People, as the children who appear in these performances are likely to be anonymous and incapable of identification. This is in direct contrast to, e.g., a case of <mask>, where the People have a live witness with a verifiable date of birth. Moreover, once the People have met this significant burden of proving that the unknown child performer was less than 16 years of age, the defendant is given an opportunity to escape liability by showing his good-faith reasonable belief that the child depicted was 16 years of age or older. (Penal Law \u00a7 263.20 [1].) As with all affirmative defenses in New York, defendant\u2019s burden of proof in this area of the operation of his mind is by a preponderance of the evidence. (Penal Law \u00a7 25.00 [2].) The affirmative defense does not, therefore, dilute or water down or shift the People\u2019s burden of proving each and every element of the crime charged (including the age of the child) beyond a reasonable doubt, for if there is a reasonable doubt as to the age of the child, the defendant is not criminally liable."], "id": "1a47d880-1168-4413-9c79-f17759ef0813", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant Taylor is also charged with 4 counts of forcible rape and all are alleged to have taken place during the period of December 1 to December 31, 1986. He is also charged with 4 counts of <mask> and the court has again assumed that these counts relate to the same incidents which form the basis for the forcible rape counts. The end result is that the indictment as it reads today charges each defendant with 4 counts of rape in the first degree."], "id": "731fde9e-6778-4151-9a13-c3c29d036f8d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Movant appeals to this Court for the fourth time based on his conviction for second-degree <mask> and incest arising from an evening in February 2007 where Movant had non-consensual sex with his then 16-year-old daughter. The three prior appeals include: (1) a direct appeal in which we affirmed Movant's convictions via an unpublished opinion, State v. Mercer , SD29114 (per curiam ); (2) an unsuccessful appeal of the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion, Mercer v. State , 330 S.W.3d 843 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) ; and (3) an appeal from the denial of a previous \u00a7 547.035 motion in which this Court dismissed his appeal due to the lack of a final judgment. Mercer v. State , SD33779, 2015 WL 9481403 (Mo. App. Dec. 29, 2015). That dismissal was transferred by a dissenting judge via Rule 83.03 to our supreme court, where it held that the denial of a \u00a7 547.035 motion was not subject to Rule 74.01(a)'s denomination requirement. Mercer v. State , 512 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Mo. banc 2017). Accordingly, our supreme court held that the docket entry denying Movant's \u00a7 547.035 motion was an appealable order, but reversed and remanded the cause \"due to the circuit court's failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by section 547.035.8.\" Id. at 754."], "id": "be4777b0-8f2f-4d3b-8928-a76b03020216", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["People v. Flaherty, 162 N. Y. 538, is not an authority against this rule. There the act charged was <mask>. Evidence of several acts of intercourse was given, and the court said tliis was proper to show the disposition of the parties and as a circumstance of corroboration; hut it was not proper* to charge in the indictment any hut one act. The reason of this is plain, and that the act in itself constituted the crime, and, therefore, only one act could he charged. The case in principle is not parallel."], "id": "2cc55d34-56f5-4038-ba54-2b07b4b14fc2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to Count 1(a), if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that on or about May 2014, in the County of Nodaway, State of Missouri, the defendant knowingly had sexual intercourse with B.W. in defendant's bedroom in Burlington Junction, and Second, that at that time B.W. was a child less than fourteen years old, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count 1 of <mask> in the first degree. However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense. The verdict director for the first-degree statutory rape count involving N.G. was Instruction No. 9, and it read:"], "id": "6279ee76-abab-40d0-a4bd-708ca79cb00e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". Former Florida Statutes \u00a7 800.04 (3) (1984 Fla Laws, ch 84-86, \u00a7 5; 1990 Fla Laws, ch 90-120, \u00a7 1), provided that any person who \u201c[c]ommits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011 (l)(h) upon any child under the age of 16 years . . . commits a felony of the second degree.\u201d Florida Statutes \u00a7 794.011 (1) (h) states that \u201c \u2018[slexual battery\u2019 means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.\u201d Accordingly, the Florida crime is akin to a <mask> charge."], "id": "fc4b8416-6d8a-48e8-811b-faa42867089b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Another line of cases further buttresses this view. In People v Thompson (212 NY 249, 251, citing People v Molineux, supra) it was stated that evidence of criminal offenses other than that charged in the indictment4 is admissible where it *482has a \"natural tendency\u201d to establish the fact in controversy and \"to corroborate or supplement admitted direct evidence.\u201d The court held that in cases of <mask> upon one under the age of consent (and other selected cases not here relevant, except that the application of the rule was extended to statutory sodomy by People v Porcaro, 6 NY2d 248, 258, supra; see Richardson, Evidence [10th ed], \u00a7 182), evidence of other similar crimes both before and after the act charged in the indictment, by and between the same parties, was admissible, on the theory that it shows a course of lascivious conduct and predisposition to the commission of the act charged: \"In State v. Schueller (120 Minn. 26), a case of statutory rape, the reception of similar evidence was approved on the theory of disclosing the relationship between the parties, opportunity and inclination to commit the act complained of, and as corroborative of the specific charge. The reasoning and conclusion of such decisions have our approval.\u201d (People v Thompson, 212 NY 249, 252-253, supra.)"], "id": "b9721b32-dfaa-48be-8bd2-4c19c94c3159", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Treta contends that his convictions and sentences for two counts each of <mask> and forcible rape for two single acts should be vacated because his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the convictions and sentences were duplicative in violation of his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. Specifically, Treta asserts that \"there was no indication of legislative intent an accused can be convicted on both forcible/non-consensual and statutory sex crimes arising from a single act, since statutory sex crimes are a specific type of forcible sex crimes, and, thus, convictions and sentences for both forcible/non-consensual and statutory sex crimes arising from a single act are prohibited, \u00a7 556.041(3)[.]\""], "id": "f90defee-28c2-4cf8-a717-213cd19e67de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"Attempted <mask> in the first degree occurs where a subject, with the purpose of committing the [completed] offense, takes a substantial step towards having 'sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years old.' \" State v. Smith , 330 S.W.3d 548, 555 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (quoting \u00a7 566.032.1 and citing \u00a7 564.011.1). Here, it is unclear from the evidence what Barbee's purpose was in causing contact between his penis and Victim's genitals. In other words, he may have accomplished all the contact he sought at the time or he may have meant to do more but did not do so for unknown reasons. But even if we can reasonably infer that his purpose was to engage in sexual intercourse, the problem remains that the jury was never tasked with making such a finding. To convict a defendant of attempt, the jury must find that his conduct constituted a \"substantial step\" toward completion of the underlying crime. See Blair , 443 S.W.3d at 685. Because the jury was never tasked with making such a determination, we cannot enter a conviction for attempted first-degree statutory rape."], "id": "a82bd7f4-ccd4-4044-ba8e-6ad14b481e6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Doe asserts the County breached three mandatory duties as described in the Department of Social Services Manual of Regulations (DSSMR): 1) it failed to visit Doe at Sykes's foster home at least three times in the first 30 calendar days of her placement pursuant to DSSMR section 31-320; 2) it failed to conduct monthly visits with Sykes as required by DSSMR section 31-330.21;9 and 3) it failed to report Doe's <mask> despite knowing she was pregnant by an 18 year old as required under DSSMR section 31-501 and CANRA, Penal Code sections 11164 through 11174.3. Here, the evidence presented by Doe was insufficient to permit a jury to find the breach of these duties was a proximate cause of her injuries."], "id": "958a4dbd-4638-4ea3-895d-2f91f71b8046", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 2014, McClure was charged with first-degree statutory sodomy, child molestation, and attempted <mask>, pursuant to Sections 566.062.1, 566.067, and 566.032, respectively.1 At trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence the 2007 CAC interview. McClure objected to the exhibit, arguing there was potentially a lack of foundation, materials subject to motions in limine, and improper bolstering. The objection was overruled, and the jury found McClure guilty on the sodomy and molestation charges but acquitted him of the attempted statutory rape charge. The court ordered McClure to serve two consecutive life sentences."], "id": "ffbd5216-6524-4434-96ea-fae4b50c5966", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 2014, McClure was charged with first-degree statutory sodomy, child molestation, and attempted <mask>, pursuant to Sections 566.062.1, 566.067, and 566.032, respectively.1 At trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence the 2007 CAC interview. McClure objected to the exhibit, arguing there was potentially a lack of foundation, materials subject to motions in limine, and improper bolstering. The objection was overruled, and the jury found McClure guilty on the sodomy and molestation charges but acquitted him of the attempted statutory rape charge. The court ordered McClure to serve two consecutive life sentences."], "id": "b3b6a5a8-44b3-4596-b1be-8c207856be42", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The evidence here plainly satisfies the elements of first-degree child molestation insofar as Barbee subjected Victim, a person less than fourteen years of age, to sexual contact by touching his penis to her genitals. The evidence fully supports that his purpose in doing so was to \"arous[e] or *34gratify[ ] the sexual desire of any person.\" He had advised Victim that he wanted her to join his \"circle of sex\" and he specifically asked her, \"how do you feel?\" while engaging in sexual acts with Victim. Furthermore, the jury specifically found that Barbee had such a purpose when it convicted him of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy and one count of first-degree child molestation for incidents which occurred at the same time, or very close in time, to the <mask> offense that we are reversing. See Smith , 330 S.W.3d at 556 (noting that, in that case, \"all elements of the lesser offense, attempted statutory rape in the second degree, were explicitly found by the jury in finding Appellant guilty of Count I, enticement of a child, when coupled with their determination of guilt as to Count II, attempted statutory rape in the first degree.\"). The sodomy verdict-directors here required the jury to find that Barbee engaged in \"deviate sexual intercourse,\" which includes a finding that he engaged in the conduct \"for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person.\" \u00a7 566.010(1). And it also found him guilty of first-degree child molestation as a lesser-included of the third sodomy charge, which included its determination that he engaged in the conduct \"for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person.\" \u00a7 566.010(3). Hence, all three prongs of the test identified in Payne are satisfied with respect to first-degree child molestation and we may direct the trial court to enter a conviction on this lesser-included offense."], "id": "2d0094b8-d20e-43c5-ad0e-24ca5f5647ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["While the evidence for each victim in Celis-Garcia showed that multiple acts of sodomy occurred at different, specified locations over an extended time period, the evidence for each victim in this case showed that multiple acts of <mask> occurred in an identical manner in the same location approximately every other day over a period of time. Id. at 11-12. The Western District likened its case to the hypothetical referenced in the Celis-Garcia footnote, as the victims testified to \"repeated, identical sexual acts committed at the same location during a particular time span, and they were unable to testify to specific acts on specific dates.\" Id. at 12. As such, the verdict directors focused on a single month, and any evidentiary fact that could distinguish one incident of rape from another was included in the verdict directors.9 The Court concluded that \"[t]he factual findings required by each verdict director rendered it impossible for the jurors to differentiate between the repeated, identical acts of statutory rape that fell within each of the verdict directors.\" Id. Accordingly, the defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated because the jurors had no evidentiary basis upon which to differentiate between the repeated acts. Id. Notably, as to the first count, the Court concluded the fact that sexual acts on different dates within the month of May \"could theoretically have been relied on by the jurors in finding [the defendant] guilty cannot demonstrate a violation of the right to a unanimous verdict when the record contains no evidentiary basis for the jurors to distinguish between those acts.\" Id."], "id": "ad48b89c-64b5-4afb-94c5-4547ae5e39b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is important to note that the Court of Appeals emphasized that the reason for holding defendant\u2019s daughter not to he an accomplice did not rest upon the fact that she could not be indicted for the crime but rather upon the ground that she was incapable of consent. Here we have a clear determination that a <mask> may be the basis for a conviction of incest but that such conviction may be had as to the male participant only despite the statutory language rendering each punishable."], "id": "756d87b6-cbd6-450c-b400-dc217f1916bb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["As to Count 2, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that on or about January 2011, in the County of Nodaway, State of Missouri, the defendant knowingly had sexual intercourse with N.G. in defendant's bedroom in Burlington Junction every time her Mom went to Wal-Mart, and Second, that at that time N.G. was a child less than twelve years old, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count 2 of <mask> in the first degree. However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable *11doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense. The issue of jury unanimity may be implicated in cases such as this, which are commonly referred to as \"multiple acts\" cases. Id. \"A multiple acts case arises when there is evidence of multiple, distinct criminal acts, each of which could serve as the basis for a criminal charge, but the defendant is charged with those acts in a single count.\" Id. at 155-56. The evidence in this case was that Walker had sexual intercourse with B.W. and N.G. in the same manner and same location approximately every other day over a period of time, yet he was charged with only one count of statutory rape for each victim. The count for each victim specified the month in which the act of statutory rape occurred but did not specify a particular act of statutory rape on a particular date. Walker argues that, by not specifying a particular act of statutory rape in each count, the verdict directors ran afoul of the Supreme Court's opinion in Celis-Garcia , 344 S.W.3d 150."], "id": "90309cee-f1fd-4854-bc12-8d106bc2ca77", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The State charged Walker with one count of first-degree <mask> involving B.W., one count of first-degree statutory rape involving N.G., and one count of attempted first-degree statutory sodomy involving B.W. A jury trial was held. Walker testified at trial that he never sexually abused either B.W. or N.G. The jury found Walker guilty of both counts of first-degree statutory rape and not guilty of attempted first-degree statutory sodomy. The court later imposed the jury-recommended sentences of 25 years in prison on each of the statutory rape counts, to be served consecutively. Walker appeals."], "id": "b9884620-8bc9-46b3-b1c9-34823558cb16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In People v Bouton (50 NY2d 130), defendant was convicted of sodomy and sexual abuse. During the course of their deliberations the jury viewed exhibits not admitted in evidence including \u201ctwo versions of defendant\u2019s confessions from which reference to uncharged sexual activity had not been redacted * * * hearsay laden psychiatric medical records of the <mask> complainant and welfare records of her mother.\u201d (Supra, p 137.) In view of the prejudicial nature of this material, the court held that the error could not be excused as harmless and a new trial was ordered."], "id": "2431f326-2fda-4aa8-ae3a-59622c2f37d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Thus, \"forcible compulsion, by its very definition, does not encompass all instances of nonconsensual sex crimes.\" Thompson , 361 S.W.3d at 50 (emphasis added). Forcible sex crimes require an element of physical force or threat that is simply not required for a first-degree <mask> conviction, as the mere act of an individual engaging in sexual intercourse with someone under the age of fourteen, absent any physical force or threat, constitutes first-degree statutory rape. Id. at 51. Accordingly, circumstances constituting a first-degree statutory rape conviction do not automatically satisfy the necessary requirements for a forcible rape conviction. Id. Therefore, it does not follow that statutory sex crimes are specific instances of what Treta deems the more general crime of forcible rape. Id."], "id": "784b42e8-c948-4950-aec4-7ecf4ac88fee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It was never the intention of the Legislature to outlaw all actions in which sexual intercourse is an element. As a matter of fact, where consent could not be given or where it was coerced as in cases of <mask>, rape or where there was a fiduciary relationship between guardian and ward, there was always an action for damages on the case. (See Disler v McCauley, 66 App Div 42.) The Heart Balm Act was never intended to outlaw these nonconsensual causes of action."], "id": "a413a41f-9c2c-4fd7-93b4-97ce9fc83f7f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Balbirnie raises two points on appeal. In his first point, Balbirnie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his felony murder conviction, arguing that Victim's death did not come about \"as a result of the perpetration\" of second-degree statutory rape-the underlying felony. In his second point, Balbirnie argues that the State bore the burden and failed to prove that Balbirnie knew Victim was under the *708age of 17, as required to support his conviction for second-degree <mask>."], "id": "053d5a28-eb7d-46af-ad55-9c6fd2f19e41", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> as defined by the Penal Law of the State of New York prior to April 1, 1950 provided: \u201c a person who perpetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, under the age of eighteen years, under circumstances not amounting to rape in the first degree, is guilty of rape in the second degree \u201d."], "id": "51bb41e7-19da-4ca3-a9e6-3ea5d715ab43", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 2012, the State charged Wagner with four counts of first-degree rape, four counts of first-degree <mask>, one count of first-degree child molestation, two counts of first-degree sodomy, two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, and two counts of third-degree assault. The charges involved Wagner using force and other physical restraints to sexually violate his daughter's friends between 2010 and 2011. Wagner pleaded guilty to all charges. The circuit court sentenced Wagner as a dangerous offender to ten years in prison."], "id": "8126fc32-a3fe-4002-a2b9-514d773ca584", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This cas\u00e9 arises from an August 12, 2000 sexual encounter between the then 15-year-old plaintiff and defendant Barsky. Barsky had been plaintiffs social studies teacher at a New York City public school during the preceding school year. Although Barsky and plaintiff met frequently in school outside of class, there is no evidence of any inappropriate contact prior to the subject encounter. Plaintiff spent the 2000 summer vacation at her grandmother\u2019s home in upstate New York. Barsky, who was supposedly planning to see his mother in Massachusetts, detoured to visit plaintiff. Plaintiff and Barsky arranged to meet, but plaintiff did not tell her grandmother about her plans. Plaintiff and Barsky met, drove around for a while, and then went to a hotel, where they had sexual intercourse. Although plaintiff acknowledges that the tryst was \u201cconsensual,\u201d she was legally incapable of consent. Barsky was charged with <mask>, and eventually pleaded guilty. He is no longer a teacher."], "id": "0c64d32d-8892-43bf-8e47-350e8ded00b5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "statutory rape", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The girl now seeks the return of her child, and prays that her instrument of surrender be set aside. After a plenary hearing, the following facts emerge: During her confinement in the foundling hospital her family rarely visited or comforted her. Her mother, who was most sensitive to the girl\u2019s predicament, came infrequently and displayed nothing but recrimination towards her daughter. In fact, the mother\u2019s implacable hostility towards the natural father of the infant in question resulted in his arrest for <mask> and completely cut off any possibility of a marriage between him and the girl. It seems that this mother, married for many years to an invalid, and having been forced to work in order to preserve her household, had unfortunately become embittered in many of her *964relationships, particularly with reference to her youngest daughter, the petitioner herein. Yet, she was and is a good woman, iron-willed and well intentioned."], "id": "731fc493-fbf0-4a67-a21b-6e27e01697cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The final article by Seto, Hanson and Babchishin (the Seto article) examines prior contact offenses and re-offense rates for <mask> offenders through two meta-analyses. The *442recidivism study found that 4.6% of online child pornography offenders committed a new sexual offense during a 1.5- to six-year follow-up period. Two percent committed a contact offense and 3.4% committed a new child pornography offense. The meta-analysis included nine studies with 2,630 offenders. The authors caution that although recidivism rates for online offenders appear to be low, the time period measured in the studies was small and the statistics are subject to the caveat that sex crimes are typically underreported. The authors concluded, however, that \u201conline offenders rarely go on to commit detected contact sexual offenses\u201d and that the recidivism rates for this group were significantly lower than for other sex offenders. The study also indicated that \u201conline offenders who had no history of contact offenses almost never committed contact sexual offenses.\u201d (Seto article at 136-137.) Finally, the Position Statement notes as a departure consideration whether an offender has had previous \u201callegations regarding sexual contact with children.\u201d Prior sex offenses against children are already scored by the RAI. The Position Statement, however, apparently now provides that an \u201callegation\u201d regarding a child contact offense should also be used to inform departure determinations. It is not clear what degree of reliability such an allegation would be required to have in order to be considered relevant in making such a decision."], "id": "f9439148-6853-429b-8b4a-ee19d8911478", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["12. family was living in the Villa Avenue apartment building. That Karen saw defendant, while they were living in the Villa Avenue apartment building, naked inside Jane\u2019s room in the middle of the night touching Jane\u2019s arm was fully consistent with how, where, and when Jane described defendant\u2019s abuse occurring. Moreover, defendant\u2019s nudity on that occasion permitted a reasonable inference he harbored a lewd intent\u2014particularly given Jane\u2019s age and the circumstances. Defendant was not merely walking around his home naked at night, as he suggests; rather, he was naked inside the bedroom of his pre-teen stepdaughter. A trier of fact could reasonably infer that, absent some dire emergency that precluded the opportunity to don any kind of clothing (of which there was no evidence), there would be no reason for defendant to be inside Jane\u2019s bedroom naked and touching her arm other than for a lewd intent. The evidence of defendant\u2019s <mask> possession only strengthened the inference of lewd intent in the bedroom incident Karen witnessed, and it further corroborated Jane\u2019s allegations. Evidence of sexual misconduct admissible under Evidence Code section 1108 may be used to corroborate a victim\u2019s allegation and thereby satisfy section 803(f). (Ruiloba, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 682.) \u201c\u2018[T]he precise probative value to be accorded this evidence will depend on various considerations, such as the frequency of the [other] acts and their similarity and temporal proximity to the charged acts.\u2019\u201d (Ibid, quoting People v. Yovanov (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 392, 404.) Corroboration of the \u201cvictim\u2019s allegation\u201d under section 803(f) to toll the statute of limitations \u201ccan, and often does, consist of a description of multiple instances of abuse, often spread over years of time in the case of resident child molesters .\u2026 To the extent an uncharged act shows a defendant\u2019s propensity to commit sexual offenses against a child, that can corroborate all of the charged offenses even if it does not particularly corroborate any specific offense.\u201d (Ruiloba, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 683.) \u201cEvidence of a person\u2019s propensity to do what the victim has alleged corroborates the victim\u2019s allegation.\u201d (Ibid., citing People v. Mabini (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 654, 659.)"], "id": "304ff6a9-1705-4f91-a761-b8e247c4a978", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"[I]n regards to the motion to suppress pursuant to ... [s]ection 1538.5, ... it's clear that the Fourth Amendment at least does apply. However, ... because there is a civil commitment of [defendant]-and it's my understanding that was pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code [s]ection 6604-the Court finds that [defendant], because he was committed under that code section, it's a civil commitment and there is a significant reduction in any expectation of privacy. In regards to what that expectation of privacy would entail, it seems to me that there is [an] expectation of privacy regarding ... some aspects of his treatment. However, in regards to his living area, ... the Court has to take into consideration the type of facility.... [T]his is a maximum security state hospital. It's located within a state prison. A witness testified as to what is involved in gaining access to the facility, specifically the state hospital. The Court is taking that into consideration. The Court is also taking into consideration the notice or signs that have been posted or are posted ... within the facility and outside the facility. \"In regards to the search for cause, ... it doesn't appear that there are any cases that define what search for cause means, whether that's reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Even if the Court were to use the probable cause standard which is higher than reasonable suspicion, in this case, given the strong security interest of the institution in regards to contraband, ... in this case the <mask> and attempts to keep that outside of the facility, those outweigh any issues regarding the officer's ability then to search for those items. And in this case, they had that probable cause based on the statements of Mr. Rudd, the evidence that was observed by staff, and the prompt action by the state police to then go and obtain whatever evidence they were able to locate based on that information, and that information *910pointed to [defendant]. And so the officers did have probable cause to then seize those items. And then subsequently, ... the officers did obtain a search warrant to actually view the items that were found in [defendant]'s possession. \"So in light of the significant reduced expectation of privacy that [defendant] would have, the Court at this time finds no violation of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Court will deny the defense motion to suppress the evidence that was initially seized and then the evidence that was obtained as a result of any subsequent search warrant as to the actual items and images that were depicted on any media device.\" b. Standard of review."], "id": "41b9212b-7ec7-4f40-873b-de57f6ed8ca1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["characters that, when plugged into the Internet, could lead to questionable content.\u201d Def.\u2019s Sentencing Mem. 2. The district court did not rely upon URLs or hyperlinks in determining Hennings\u2019s offense level, however. The government submitted an affidavit of the case agent who had personally reviewed the contents of the Dropbox account. The affidavit explained that the account stored \u201capproximately 136 Gigabytes of content,\u201d including thousands of images and videos of <mask>, which \u201cwere not \u2018URLs\u2019, but actual files.\u201d The district court thus did not clearly err in finding that Hennings\u2019s Dropbox account stored \u201cactual images and videos,\u201d not just URLs or hyperlinks.2"], "id": "ff37a219-5dbb-430e-89db-493ebab676a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u2013 11 \u2013 2719 \u201cmotive, intent and absence of mistake or accident\u201d in a prosecution related to the possession of <mask>. On appeal, Lee does not challenge the trial court\u2019s finding that the charges were \u201cof the same or similar character.\u201d However, he does challenge the court\u2019s finding of cross-admissibility. According to Lee, the trial court\u2019s Rule 404(b)(1) ruling was erroneous and the suggested reasons for admissibility were a guise to admit prohibited propensity evidence. Lee also argues that the trial court erred in listing multiple grounds for admissibility without specifying which ones actually applied and why they applied. We agree with Lee that the trial court\u2019s ruling could have been clearer. As we have stated in the context of Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), simply reciting one or more of the purposes contained in the rule does not fulfill the trial court\u2019s duty to ensure that evidence is actually relevant and admissible for the proposed purpose.26 Instead, the trial court must closely evaluate each of the proposed purposes in their technical sense to ensure that the evidence has a case-specific, non-propensity relevance.27 We disagree with Lee, however, that all of the stated grounds for admissibility were erroneous. One of the stated grounds for cross-admissibility was to prove \u201cabsence of mistake or accident.\u201d On appeal, Lee points out that, at trial, he did not defend against either of the charges by claiming mistake or accident. But Lee ignores the context in which the trial court made its pretrial ruling on Lee\u2019s motion to sever. Lee filed his motion to sever early in the case, almost three years before trial occurred. At the time the trial court ruled on the motion, the parties agreed that the trial court could base its ruling on the complaint and charging documents before it."], "id": "e7158c0e-fb54-4751-aa2f-bd2c55499357", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["See United States v. Emmert , 825 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2016) (in child-pornography prosecution, affirming admission of evidence of defendant's prior sexual abuse of two minor females; \"Emmert's sexual abuse and <mask> victims were similar in age, and Emmert performed or possessed images depicting similar explicit acts on each victim.\"); United States v. Rodriguez , 581 F.3d 775, 796 (8th Cir. 2009) (\"In both cases, Rodriguez approached a young woman by herself, forced her into a vehicle under threat of violence, and sexually assaulted her. Here, the government alleged Rodriguez approached Sjodin while alone in a parking lot, abducted her at knife point, forced her into a car, and sexually assaulted her before murdering her.\"); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1997) (\"the stepdaughters' testimony suggests a similar pattern of sexual abuse of female minor relatives made possible by exploitation of familial authority\"); State v. George A. , 308 Conn. 274, 63 A.3d 918, 933 (2013) (despite age difference between victims of charged and uncharged offenses, affirming admission of evidence of uncharged offense because \"the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion based on the fact that the record revealed that both E and the victim were females, residing in the defendant's household, whom he had directed to engage in [fetishistic sexual activity involving animal cruelty] that are so sexually unique as to constitute a virtual 'signature' of his propensity to engage therein.\"); State v. Most , 815 N.W.2d 560, 566 \u00b6 21 (S.D. 2012) (finding sufficient similarity between uncharged and charged offenses where defendant \"was always much older than his victims,\" did not live with any of his victims but had a paternal or grandparental relationship with them, and the defendant \"gave all three victims gifts and money following the abuse; he abused all three victims in bedrooms or cars; and he abused his victims when they were about four years old to eleven years old\"); State v. Antonaras , 137 Conn.App. 703, 49 A.3d 783, 794 (2012) (affirming admission of evidence of prior sexual offenses where \"the defendant engaged in a similar grooming process\" in both the charged and uncharged offenses; \"[t]he defendant also engaged in similar initial sexual overtures\" in each case; \"the defendant's relationship with [the current victim] closely resembled his relationships with\" prior victims; and \"[a]ll three boys were similar in age when they first met the defendant\"); State v. Armstrong , 793 N.W.2d 6, 13 \u00b6 18 (S.D. 2010) (\"Because Armstrong's victims were similar ages when the offenses occurred, the requisite degree of similarity existed in this case.\"); State v. McGuire , 135 Idaho 535, 20 P.3d 719, 723 (Idaho App. 2001) (\"Each of McGuire's victims testified about foot rubbing sessions, and three of the four indicated that this conduct had escalated into sexual abuse. Three of the four victims testified that McGuire kissed them on the neck during these encounters and manually fondled and touched them in the vaginal area. All of these incidents of misconduct were committed by McGuire against his own female children while living as minors in his household.\"); Smith v. State , 745 So.2d 284, 289-90 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (\"With regard to the alleged dissimilarity of the offenses, the testimony established that Burnum Gilbert Smith engaged in sexual intercourse with his two natural daughters, sexual intercourse with his older stepdaughter, sodomy with his stepson, and simulated intercourse with his infant stepdaughter. These acts clearly are similar, particularly in light of the victims' age at the time of the offenses. All of the acts occurred in the Smiths' home, while the children were living with him; the children's mothers were aware of his actions; and the mothers also were present during most of the incidents.\")."], "id": "84010325-771a-4490-b1e3-6a39ea0375d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The County Court\u2019s designation of the defendant as a level two sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (hereinafter SORA) was supported by clear and convincing evidence (see Correction Law \u00a7 168-n [3]; People v Pettigrew, 14 NY3d 406, 408 [2010]; People v Mingo, 12 NY3d 563, 571 [2009]; People v Atkinson, 65 AD3d 1112 [2009]; People v Bright, 63 AD3d 1133 [2009]). Contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, in scoring the defendant pursuant to the SORA risk assessment instrument, the court adequately set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and properly assessed 30 and 20 points under risk factors 3 and 7, respectively (see Correction Law \u00a7 168-n [3]; People v Johnson, 11 NY3d 416, 419-420 [2008]; People v Poole, 90 AD3d 1550 [2011]; People v Harding, 87 AD3d 627 [2011]; People v Bretan, 84 AD3d 906 [2011]; People v Stella, 71 AD3d 970 [2010]; People v Perahia, 57 AD3d 865 [2008]; see also Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 10, 12 [2006]). Contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, the position statement issued by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders in June 2012 does not depart from the holding in People v Johnson (11 NY3d 416 [2008]), that offenders convicted of possession of <mask> are properly scored under risk factors 3 and 7."], "id": "07254531-5937-4439-a9fe-1b2b8d6f05e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant possessed <mask>. Unlike many cases involving the possession of child pornography, this defendant progressed into touching and abusing real children. His conduct was predatory in nature. He used his authority as a counselor to set up situations where he could isolate his victims to sexually abuse them. He preyed upon one of the most vulnerable groups in our society, young female children."], "id": "efea83ae-f6a2-4f97-9205-5a3e032d0e0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["second video, victim 2 is standing in the shower and Stewart pulls the shower curtain back, exposing her. In the third, victim 2 is laying in the bathtub, and the video focuses on her genitalia. In an interview with law enforcement, Stewart admitted that he learned in October 2017 that Edwards had been sexually abusing her son, victim 1, since he was eight years old. After Stewart learned about this, Edwards offered to \u201cset Stewart up\u201d with her daughter, victim 2. Stewart further admitted that he made videos of Edwards performing oral sex on victim 1, and those videos were for his and Edwards\u2019s personal gratification. Stewart also admitted that he gave verbal direction to Edwards and victim 1 in one of the sexually explicit videos and that he had shown victim 2 his penis on multiple occasions. B. Indictment and Guilty Plea An indictment charged Stewart with two counts of production of <mask>, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2251(a), (e) (Counts 1 and 2), and one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) (Count 3). Count 1 corresponded to the videos of victim 1, and Count 2 corresponded to the videos of victim 2. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Stewart pled guilty to Count 1, and the government agreed to move to dismiss the remaining counts at sentencing. The district court found that Stewart was competent to enter a plea and that his guilty plea was knowing USCA11 Case: 21-11411 Date Filed: 02/04/2022 Page: 5 of 11"], "id": "03e82e01-1ee9-4afa-b3c6-fcb569125468", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["results\u201d because criminal liability would be \u201csubject to the whims and aggressiveness of a particular police officer or the inherent randomness of the software search tool used\u201d and would potentially allow \u201ctwo defendants who engage in the identical conduct . . . [to] face different levels of criminal liability depending upon how many times a particular file was downloaded.\u201d Again, we disagree. Declining to find that appellant committed multiple violations of distributing <mask> would run counter to the purpose of the obscenity statutes: to prevent the abuse and sexual exploitation of children and extinguish the market for child pornography. (See Cochran, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 402.) As the Attorney General explains, each time a file containing distinct pornographic material is downloaded both adds to the child pornography market and perpetuates the abuse of the victim. This is particularly true in the context of peer-to-peer sharing of torrent files on a protocol such as BitTorrent, which allows for the widespread dissemination of child pornography. As Sergeant Servat testified, the technology allows users to share massive amounts of illicit data, and it incentives users to share files. Simply put, \u201cthe software . . . wouldn\u2019t work without sharing.\u201d The evidence established that appellant spent 16 hours a day on his computer, seven days a week, and actively used BitTorrent to amass child pornography. The jury was told that the BitTorrent display on a user\u2019s computer shows when a file is downloaded, and could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that appellant saw when a download of his obscene files was underway and consciously allowed it to happen. On this record, we find that each download of a torrent file which contained new or different obscene matter of minors performing or simulating sex acts was a completed distribution that supports"], "id": "74263089-53f6-4689-8602-dbda994cbd70", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u2013 13 \u2013 2719 We begin our analysis by noting that the risk of unfair prejudice in these situations is very real. Introducing evidence of <mask> to show a defendant\u2019s sexual interest in young children is conceptually not that different from introducing evidence of a defendant\u2019s propensity to commit sex crimes against children.29 The evidence also has the potential to be highly inflammatory and may be used improperly by the jury as evidence of the defendant\u2019s bad character.30 We therefore caution trial"], "id": "b7483973-9024-4116-bfb6-0bffb6b18b50", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["the pornographic image is created, not when it is disseminated. (Cochran, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 404.) Here, in contrast, \u201cconsideration\u201d has a common dictionary definition that means \u201cpayment [or] recompense\u201d (Webster\u2019s 10th New Collegiate Dict. (1999) p. 246). Unlike the producers of <mask>, section 311.2, subdivision (b) requires that we look to a distributor\u2019s intent at the time the obscene matter is distributed, exhibited, or exchanged for commercial consideration. As discussed above, a practical understanding of the phrase \u201ccommercial consideration\u201d is that the defendant was engaged in a commercial or profitmaking enterprise when he or she received recompense for the dissemination of obscene matter involving sexual conduct by minors. Finally, for the reasons discussed at length, an interpretation of commercial consideration that signifies an intent to trade obscene material with others would render words and phrases in section 311.2, subdivision (b) superfluous to one another, and make the conduct criminalized in this felony provision indistinguishable from the conduct proscribed in the wobbler statute, section 311.1, subdivision (a). We must give independent meaning and effect to the various words and statutes that govern the criminal act of distributing obscene matter showing sexual conduct by children. B. Instructional Error Having concluded that the element of commercial consideration cannot simply mean an intent to trade or induce others to trade in pornographic material over the Internet, we must determine whether the trial court\u2019s jury instruction of section 311.2, subdivision (b) amounted to reversible error.5"], "id": "d7460c33-d5eb-49ad-b7ea-b6cb8bbd4f8e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The motion court denied all of Goodwater's claims. In this case the judge who presided over the trial was the same judge who heard the motion in this matter. The *53motion court found that the record did not indicate that the trial court enhanced Goodwater's sentence based on his decision to exercise his constitutional right to a trial. The motion court found the sentence was justified by other reasons and there was no direct connection between any comments related to the viewing of the pornographic evidence at trial and the court's ultimate sentence. Regarding claims 8/9(c) and 8/9(d), the court found its statements were merely responding to statements Goodwater's trial counsel had made and Goodwater's sentence was not the maximum available and was less than recommended by the State. Regarding claims 8/9(e), the motion court found trial counsel had a sound strategy of not wanting to irritate the jury with too many objections during closing argument. Regarding claims 8/9(f) and 8/9(g), the motion court found that the current version of the <mask> statute makes it clear that \"[a] person who has committed the offense of possession of child pornography is subject to separate punishments for each item of child pornography or obscene material possessed by the person\"."], "id": "0f6af89f-974e-479e-b19e-5e916252701f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant has thus failed to establish that Officer Santilli\u2019s personal knowledge of the crimes alleged was limited to the viewing of the initial illicit image. Even if he had merely read a report from United Online and had never actually read the specific email messages, he would have learned from the report that the email account associated with defendant was an active site exchanging <mask>. Such information was valuable as a bridge in a trail of evidence reflecting continuing criminal activity and eliminating the possibility that the initial uploading was inadvertent."], "id": "0585a9ab-6b7d-432d-8c99-1969dcca255e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, in light of the large quantity of <mask> recovered from the defendant\u2019s possession and the nature of that material, which included, among other things, images and videos depicting the torture of children, the County Court properly determined that there were aggravating factors not adequately taken into account by the SORA guidelines (see People v DeDona, 102 AD3d 58, 68 [2012]; People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112, 121 [2011]; accord Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, Scoring of Child Pornography Cases Position Statement [June 1, 2012]). Upon making such a determination, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting the People\u2019s application for an upward departure from the presumptive sex offender risk level (see People v Voltaire, 112 AD3d 601 [2013]; cf. People v Gillotti, 104 AD3d 1155, 1155 [2013], lv granted 21 NY3d 858 [2013]; People v Poole, 90 AD3d 1550 [2011]; People v Bretan, 84 AD3d 906, 907 [2011])."], "id": "a60bd1bd-dbbf-41f6-8169-c76b92348527", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u20134\u2013 2719 grand jury indicted Lee on two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.3 A grand jury also indicted Lee on two counts of possessing <mask>, predicated on two images found respectively on each of Lee\u2019s computers.4 The State joined the counts together and presented the case at a single jury trial. The jury failed to reach a verdict on one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor for conduct involving D.A. but found Lee guilty of the remaining eighteen counts. At sentencing, the trial court ruled that Lee\u2019s previous military adjudication qualified as a prior felony conviction for presumptive sentencing purposes. As a second felony offender, Lee faced a minimum presumptive sentence of just over 75 years.5 The court sentenced Lee to a composite term of 115 years to serve with no time suspended. This appeal followed."], "id": "21f42131-2295-402a-aa7f-c96a88121892", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Although this Court has never addressed the meaning of \"lewd exhibition,\" several intermediate appellate courts in Texas have done so, and all of them have utilized the Dost factors to assist them in evaluating whether an image is a \"lewd exhibition\" for purposes of the <mask> laws. In Perkins v. State ,65 the First Court of Appeals held that videos of a teenage girl dressing and undressing in her bedroom were \"lewd\" because they reflected an \"invasion of personal privacy ... and the exploitation of an innocent child victim.\"66 The First Court of Appeals stated that \"jurors were permitted to rely on their common sense to conclude that these images of a teenage girl-who had *142undressed in the belief that she had privacy in the bathroom-were created and preserved to appeal to deviant and voyeuristic interest of the viewer, and thus the images were intended or designed to elicit a sexual response.\"67 Citing to the Dost factors, the First Court of Appeals held that,"], "id": "0a35f260-911e-4276-8595-9d082a661351", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["While the court concludes that the defendant\u2019s admission to sexual intercourse with at least five children alone warrants an upward departure, there are additional significant aggravating factors warranting such a departure.13 Indeed, as specifically outlined in the Board\u2019s position statement, the court finds that an upward departure is warranted based on the nature of the images possessed by the defendant, including a video clip showing the sadomasochistic abuse of a young girl, and evidence of the defendant\u2019s deviant sexual arousal towards children as demonstrated by his online conversations with an undercover detective, in which he invited the detective to masturbate together while watching <mask>."], "id": "9798e96c-52b3-4c3b-a45a-b58d647269a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u2013 22 \u2013 2719 purposes of presumptive sentencing is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.45 Here, as Lee concedes, both federal law and Alaska law criminalize the knowing possession of <mask>.46 Both federal and Alaska law also have a similar definition of what constitutes child pornography.47 Lee nevertheless argues that the statutes are dissimilar because (according to Lee) federal law does not require that the defendant know that the pornographic material involves a person under eighteen years of age and federal law also prohibits possession of computer-generated images that do not involve actual children. But, as the State points out, neither of these propositions is true. In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., the United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal child pornography statute to require proof that the defendant knew that the material in his possession \u201cinvolved the use of a minor.\u201d48 Likewise, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech"], "id": "e0b244c7-edcc-405c-8ed0-77f5353dd6b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Celis-Garcia is distinguishable here. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, this is not a multiple acts case, but rather, is a case concerning a proscribed course of conduct. \"A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and ... [s]uch person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony.\" Section 571.070.1(1). \"Crimes of *189possession are generally recognized in our criminal law as continuing offenses because '[t]he possession is a continuing offense, lasting as long as the act of possession does.' \" State v. Wright, 484 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW Sec. 6.1(e), n. 46 (2d ed. 2003) ). \"This is because possession [is] not terminated by a single act or circumstance but [is] committed as long as the proscribed conduct continues.\" Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted). As such, Missouri and federal courts have held that several crimes of possession are continuing course of conduct offenses. See ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1\">id. (\"[P]ossession of <mask> is a continuing offense because it does not cease when the defendant acquires the pornography, but rather when the possession terminates.\"); State v. Robinson, 710 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. App. W.D. 1986) (\"possession of the knife ... is a continuing charge\"); State v. Sampson, 408 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Mo. 1966) (\"possession of the amphetamine was a continuing offense\"); U.S. v. Fleischli, 305 F.3d 643, 658 (7th Cir. 2002) (\"Possession of a firearm is a continuing offense which ceases only when the possession stops.\") (superseded by statute on other grounds)."], "id": "0428b096-a777-47bd-af4e-68b9443b7f9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["First, a debilitating medical condition may support a downward departure as it tends to suggest that an individual is less likely to offend. (See People v Stevens, 55 AD3d 892 [2d Dept 2008]; People v Adams, 44 AD3d 1020 [2d Dept 2007].) Such is not necessarily the case in possession of <mask> cases, where no physical activity is required. (See People v Curthoys, 77 AD3d 1215 [3d Dept 2010].)16 So, too, while advanced age may support a downward departure, age alone is not dispositive. (See People v Burton, 71 AD3d 468 [1st Dept 2010]; People v Johnson, 44 AD3d 571 [1st Dept 2007]; People v Harrison, 74 AD3d 688 [1st Dept 2010]; People v Beyah, 76 AD3d 917 [1st Dept 2010].) Indeed, in the instant matter, the defendant committed the offenses at age 49. At the time of the hearing, he was 55 years old, hardly the \u201cadvanced age,\u201d he claims. Quite simply, in the context of this child pornography case, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that his age warrants a downward departure. (See People v Gajadhar, 103 AD3d 572 [1st Dept 2013]; People v Thomas, 105 AD3d 640 [1st Dept 2013]; People v Cabrera, 91 AD3d 479 [1st Dept 2012].)"], "id": "ef9fe7d4-98bf-4338-865f-e84712729a4b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["While in prison, Reddig completed the Missouri Sex Offender Program (\"MOSOP\"), and was released on parole in 2013. He was allowed to move to Kansas to live with his aunt and uncle. While in an outpatient sex offender treatment program, Reddig admitted to viewing and masturbating to pornography of children as young as four. His treatment was increased, but he continued looking at <mask> for children then as young as age two. Reddig was terminated from outpatient treatment due to concerns that he was going to reoffend."], "id": "7872b229-8253-4161-8250-de210ac3111a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It does, however, obviously have a relationship to the harm caused by these offenses. The more images an offender possesses, the more the offender has contributed to creating a market for the sexual abuse of children. The RAI, however, does not and was not designed to effectively measure the relative degrees of harm caused by <mask> offenders. It provides 20 points for two victims and 30 points for three or more victims. In the court\u2019s experience, however, child pornography offenders are not typically prosecuted for having one or two child pornography images. The usual case, rather, is one where there are large numbers of such images. Thus, in the majority of cases, offenders have been scored with 30 points. The score has functioned less as a measure of how harmful a child pornography offender\u2019s crimes are when compared to like offenders and more as an assessment that the demand created by such crimes generally promotes the sexual abuse of multiple children. Since New York\u2019s child pornography statute was enacted after the RAI was created, however, none of these impacts could possibly have been intended by the instrument\u2019s drafters."], "id": "cd41549e-3fc7-47cf-a6f4-809cbc0b206b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The text of section 13031(a) imposes a reporting duty on a covered professional \u201cwho, while engaged in a professional capacity or activity described in subsection (b) . . . , learns of facts that give reason to sus- pect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse.\u201d \u201c[C]hild abuse,\u201d in turn, is defined as \u201cthe physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or ex- ploitation, or negligent treatment of a child.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 13031(c)(1). The statute further provides that \u201cthe term \u2018sexual abuse\u2019 includes the employment [or] use . . . of a child to engage in . . . sexual exploitation of children,\u201d and that \u201cthe term \u2018exploitation\u2019 means <mask> or child prostitution.\u201d Id. \u00a7 13031(c)(4), (6). Under these definitions, cov- ered professionals must report suspected abuse if they learn of facts giving reason to suspect that a child \u201chas suffered an incident of [em- ployment or use to engage in child pornography],\u201d 7 or \u201chas suffered an incident of [child pornography].\u201d Although section 13031 does not define the term \u201cchild pornography,\u201d it is defined elsewhere in the U.S. Code as any visual depiction, . . . whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where\u2014"], "id": "3dd6d2c3-308e-49e2-9eff-5deb940614ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On 12/30/12 the above subject was confronted by his wife after she found naked pictures of her daughter on his iPad. Above subject admitted to hiding a web cam in her daughter's bedroom. The above subject then started to delete the pictures off the iPad and he destroyed the web cam. During the course of the investigation detective located <mask> that above subject was in possession of. Child pornography was several pictures that were on 3\u00bd\" floppy discs. Steele retained counsel and entered a not guilty plea."], "id": "a2e97f8c-cece-40b2-9826-19b48064646c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["and 10 videos of <mask> on one of appellant\u2019s computers, a Sony laptop. BitTorrent and encryption programs had been installed on appellant\u2019s other computer, a Hewlett-Packard (HP) laptop. A digital forensic examiner found evidence that torrent files containing child pornography had been downloaded to the HP laptop at some point, including the files that appellant had shared with Sergeant Servat. He also found a large encrypted file on the laptop approximately 100 gigabytes in size, capable of holding 50,000 images. Appellant\u2019s search history on the Google search engine was also admitted into evidence, and included terms such as \u201csad girls spanked TGP,\u201d \u201crape TGP,\u201d \u201ccruel TGP,\u201d \u201cmicrobikini preteen,\u201d \u201cmicrobikini child,\u201d \u201cmicrobikini baby,\u201d and \u201camateur preteens.\u201d Other child-pornography- related search terms had been bookmarked in a web browser. B. The Defense Case Appellant testified he had approximately 25 years of experience in computer programming. He spent about 16 hours a day, seven days a week, on his computer. Appellant was well versed in peer-to-peer networks. He admitted he used a BitTorrent network to download child pornography. When appellant installed BitTorrent on his computer, he was aware that in participating in a peer-to-peer network, \u201cwith the ability to download comes the ability to upload.\u201d He knew that his software client\u2019s settings defaulted to enable other users to access the contents of his shared folder, but claimed he did not intend to share any of the child pornography and forgot to turn off the default setting. Appellant admitted he had obtained hundreds of thousands of images of child pornography. But he claimed he had downloaded the material as part of a project to develop an algorithm that would determine if individuals"], "id": "2f0fe92c-c177-4440-8300-b3ddef87c13a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Detective Sean Pierce of the San Jos\u00e9 Police Department investigated <mask> on the Internet. Pierce identified an IP address (Internet Protocol address) used by a Comcast account sharing child pornography online. An IP address is an identifier assigned to a device on a network, such as a router, computer, or printer. The IP address allows the device to be identified and located by other devices. When a user connects to the Internet through a router, the user's Internet service provider (e.g., Comcast) assigns an IP address to the user's router."], "id": "69c5d2bc-ba93-4de1-a904-8dcc08d64150", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["There is ample information available to debunk the myth that those who view <mask> present no risk of personally engaging in such activity. The purpose of the Sex Offender Registration Act is to protect the community, especially its children, from sexual offenders. To hold that the children whose sexual abuse is recorded and disseminated to those who wish to view it are not victims flies in the face of the legislative purpose. Accordingly, the court finds that the children shown being sexually abused in the images possessed by Mr. Fitzpatrick are victims of his crime. The Sex Offender Registration Act risk assessment instrument will so reflect."], "id": "c0993721-1a83-4537-9e15-3a8dbfeab3a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA monetary penalty under the AVAA is separate and distinct from restitution.\u201d United States v. Madrid, 978 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 2020). Restitution requires identification of a victim and proof of losses. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2259(b)(2). However, a special assessment does not. Rather than going to individual victims, all assessments \u201ccollected under\u201d the AVAA \u201cshall be deposited into the <mask> Victims Reserve\u201d fund. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2259B(a)."], "id": "5d5f41af-aa5d-4598-a60a-c7f3558e814d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, defendant\u2019s attempt to liken this situation to the prewarrant confirmatory searches condemned in Murray v United States (487 US 533, 540 [1988]) is without merit. As stated above, when the police with Mulrooney opened up the \u201cxxx\u201d and \u201cMPG\u201d file folder directories on December 10th, they necessarily first encountered a table of contents page replete with *645image file titles expressly announcing the presence of <mask>. Because Mulrooney had already confirmed for the police the results of his private search on December 7th, i.e., that indeed the titles were accurate for the many image files he opened on that earlier date, defendant retained no expectation of privacy in the remaining images of child pornography in those two file folders under the Jacobsen-Walter-Adler rationale (see United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109 [1984]; Walter v United States, 447 US 649 [1980]; People v Adler, 50 NY2d 730 [1980]). Accordingly, the police were \u201clawfully present,\u201d for purposes of the plain view doctrine (1 Wayne R LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on The Fourth Amendment \u00a7 2.2, at 395, and n 1 [3d ed 1996]), or in other words \u201cthey had a right to be where they were when they saw\u201d (People v Brown, 96 NY2d at 88-89) the two file folder directory or table of contents pages. The case of Murray v United States (supra; see also, People v Burr, 70 NY2d 354, 362 [1987]) involves police acquisition of probable cause at a time when they had no right to be where they were, e.g., an illegal entry during which drugs are observed, a subsequent retreat from the premises to obtain a search warrant (leaving the contraband within), and a subsequent search pursuant to the warrant issued solely on the basis of observations made during the illegal entry. Murray and its progeny plainly have no application to an official search of items with respect to which defendant no longer enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy because of an earlier private search. Otherwise, the JacobsenWalter-Adler line of cases would be meaningless."], "id": "8549dd14-5c7f-41df-9ca5-4179dbd092ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In a March 22, 2012, interview with Garza and Sergeant Jerry Duvall, defendant stated he woke up on March 21, 2012, at approximately 8:30 p.m. and saw \"a small clear case containing two ... memory cards [i]n it.\" He \"took them out of the case to see what was on them,\" \"put them in his DVD player,\" and observed <mask>. At the same time, CSH police entered the dormitory. Defendant \"put [the memory cards] in a pocket because he didn't know what to do when the officers entered the room.\" On June 6, 2012, Duvall executed a search warrant, examined the memory cards, and found child pornography."], "id": "f12c0608-3eb9-4f46-8fc4-218b747ea8fa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA monetary penalty under the AVAA is separate and distinct from restitution.\u201d United States v. Madrid, 978 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 2020). Restitution requires identification of a victim and proof of losses. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2259(b)(2). However, a special assessment does not. Rather than going to individual victims, all assessments \u201ccollected under\u201d the AVAA \u201cshall be deposited into the <mask> Victims Reserve\u201d fund. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2259B(a)."], "id": "cf25bfcd-c670-4e75-b840-ae3a4968b755", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Pursuant to this court\u2019s decision in State v. Crawford (202 Conn. 443), the issuance of an arrest warrant within the time period prescribed by the applicable criminal statute of limitations commences a prosecution for purposes of satisfying that statute of limitations, so long as the warrant is executed without unreasonable delay. The state, on the granting of permission, appealed from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of an information charging the defendant with possession of <mask> in the first degree. In 2009, the police executed a search warrant at the defendant\u2019s residence and seized two of his com- puters. Thereafter, the defendant signed a sworn statement in which he admitted to possessing child pornography. The defendant was not arrested at that time but was informed by the police that he would be arrested as soon as a forensic examination of his computers was completed. In 2011, the defendant moved to California. In 2013, after the state forensic laboratory issued a report confirming the presence of child pornography on the computers, and after the police confirmed the defendant\u2019s address in California, an arrest warrant for the defendant was issued. Between 2009 and 2018, the police, despite having the defen- dant\u2019s cell phone number, never attempted to communicate with the defendant about the status of his case. In 2018, nearly five years after the warrant was issued and more than three years after the applicable statute of limitations ((Rev. to 2009) \u00a7 54-193 (b)) purportedly expired, the defendant was arrested and charged with possession of child pornog- raphy in the first degree. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information, claiming that the delay in the execution of the arrest warrant was unreasonable under Crawford and, therefore, that his prosecution was time barred. In response, the state argued that, because the defendant had moved to California in 2011, the tolling provision of \u00a7 54-193 (c), which extends the time within which an infor- mation may be brought with respect to a person who fled from and resided outside of the state after the commission of the offense, tolled the limitation period within which the warrant could be executed. In granting the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that the tolling provision was inapplicable because the arrest warrant was issued within the limitation period, the defendant had not fled the state within the meaning of the tolling provision, the defendant met his burden of demonstrating his availability for arrest, and the state failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the nearly five year delay in the warrant\u2019s execution was not unreasonable under Crawford. On appeal, the state, conceding that the five year delay in the execution of the arrest warrant was unreasonable, claimed that the trial court nevertheless incorrectly concluded that the tolling provision of \u00a7 54-193 (c) was inapplicable in light of the fact that the arrest warrant was issued within the limitation period. Held that the trial court correctly concluded that the tolling provision of \u00a7 54-193 (c) was inapplicable, as that provision tolls the limitation period solely with respect to the time within which a prosecution may be brought and does not purport to address prosecutions, such as the present one, that have already been brought, at which point there is no need for tolling because the statute of limitations has already been satisfied; moreover, contrary to the state\u2019s assertion that this court\u2019s interpretation of \u00a7 54-193 (c) penalizes it for obtaining an arrest warrant within the limitation period, this court\u2019s case law indicates that, so long as the warrant is executed without unreasonable delay, the state can continue to prosecute the defendant as soon as it is able to locate and arrest him. Argued April 29\u2014officially released October 1, 2021**"], "id": "8314f05d-d129-4e65-8446-ec55d4e5ba41", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*706The court has located a case which supports the People\u2019s position on the overbreadth issue, United States v Juarez (2013 WL 357570, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 11869 [ED NY, Jan. 29, 2013, No. 12-CR-59 (RRM), Mauskopf, J.]). In Juarez police seized the defendant\u2019s cell phone in an arrest for the crime of \u201cunlawful surveillance\u201d under New York law after he placed his cell phone camera under the skirts of women in Union Square Park and recorded them. The warrant to search the phone authorized the seizure of evidence of the unlawful surveillance crime \u201cin the vicinity of 4th Avenue and 14th Street\u201d in Manhattan and unspecified \u201crelated crimes, and conspiracy to commit those crimes\u201d which the court found under the warrant had to occur \u201cat a specific location in New York City\u201d (2013 WL 357570, *1, *4, 2013 US Dist Lexis 11869, *3, *12). <mask> was then discovered in the search of the phone."], "id": "91916acb-f635-468d-90b1-ad3faea11ef1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Regardless of the court\u2019s risk level assessment (whether the court finds the defendant a risk level one or two offender), the People request an upward departure, to risk level three, based upon: (1) defendant\u2019s compilation of numerous <mask> clips into a video that lasts just under three hours; (2) defendant\u2019s rationalization that he was merely addicted to pornography, thereby minimizing his personal responsibility; and (3) defendant\u2019s history of sexual dysfunction, which includes sexual relationships with two separate cousins."], "id": "9791c802-7ec2-4478-bc26-c54c3b690f2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This statute, which was enacted in 1996, is contained in article 263 of the Penal Law (sexual performance by a child). The definitions relevant to Penal Law \u00a7 263.16 have been in effect since 1977 when article 263 was enacted. \u201cSexual performance\u201d is defined as \u201cany performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age\u201d. (Penal Law \u00a7 263.00 [1].) \u201cSexual conduct\u201d is stated to mean \u201cactual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual beastiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals\u201d. (Penal Law \u00a7 263.00 [3].) The statutory definition of \u201cperformance\u201d includes a \u201cphotograph\u201d. (Penal Law \u00a7 263.00 [4].) The required element *252of scienter (\u201cknowing the character and content thereof\u2019) has been incorporated in the <mask> statutes of New York State since 1977. (See, Penal Law \u00a7 263.15.)"], "id": "ada0bcb3-fc95-40de-adaa-d6b6a1d3f1a0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was designated a level two sex offender based upon his conviction of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child and possessing an obscene sexual performance by a child. The defendant contends that he was improperly assessed 80 points by the court, five points more than the 75 points required for adjudicating him a level two sex offender, based upon the number of victims and the fact that children depicted on <mask> accessed by him were strangers to him. Contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, the assessment of those points was supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record (see People v Johnson, 11 NY3d 416, 422 [2008]; People v Brown, 116 AD3d 1017 [2014]; People v Bretan, 84 AD3d 906, 907 [2011])."], "id": "3163a6d4-c4ca-44a0-9621-031a06b68c9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Penal Law \u00a7 263.15 is directed against the exploitation of children \"as subjects in sexual performances\u201d. (L 1977, ch 910, \u00a7 1.) The United States Supreme Court holds that the State has a \" 'compelling\u2019 \u201d interest in \" 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor\u2019 \u201d. (New York v Ferber, 458 US 747, 756-757, supra, citing Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Ct, 457 US 596, 607 [1982].) Additionally, the court in Ferber found that \"[t]he distribution of photographs * * * depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways. First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the children\u2019s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the distribution network for <mask> must be closed if the production of material *594which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.\u201d (Supra, at 759.)"], "id": "3629fb37-03c3-4ed9-85ea-872624ca8e6f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court made several findings of fact supporting quashal. First, the court rejected the assertion that the rear structure was simply a garage: \"Had that been the case (i.e. the detached building was simply a garage) to search it would have been reasonable, and indeed compelled by the warrant. The officers, however, discovered that the detached building was plainly a separate residence before the recovery of any of the computers or other evidence containing the <mask> from defendant's detached residence.\" The court ruled that when police realized the rear structure was a separate residence, the law required them to halt their search and seek an additional warrant under Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (Garrison )."], "id": "5413da24-b2e5-47f6-a9a1-01fe225d4443", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["When compared to prior practice, the Position Statement likely will result in more accurate initial scoring determinations. The recidivism rates for <mask> offenders when compared to other sex offenders appear to be low. The Position Statement, however, in this court\u2019s view, continues to leave courts with no useful guidance in determining whether to depart from presumptive RAI scores in setting risk levels."], "id": "2c8a8c3e-fa95-4805-b5d3-4c8a9902e82a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["convict him of three counts: two counts for crimes against JF and one for producing <mask> with KM. Second, he asks for a new trial on the grounds that the district court should have sup- pressed the evidence from the New York and Kentucky searches. Third, he argues that the district court should have granted a mis- trial when it admitted, but then excluded, six images of the girls from the camera\u2019s unallocated space. We address each issue in turn."], "id": "ac598415-0340-40ed-93a4-f0ffe7f8749d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cA monetary penalty under the AVAA is separate and distinct from restitution.\u201d United States v. Madrid, 978 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 2020). Restitution requires identification of a victim and proof of losses. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2259(b)(2). However, a special assessment does not. Rather than going to individual victims, all assessments \u201ccollected under\u201d the AVAA \u201cshall be deposited into the <mask> Victims Reserve\u201d fund. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2259B(a)."], "id": "926e508e-602b-4e6b-a640-4b027c31b725", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["18. People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790; accord, People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75\u201376 (Panizzon).) Even if an appeal goes forward without a certificate of probable cause based upon claims that do not require one, the defendant may not raise additional claims that do require a certificate. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1104.) Nevertheless, there are two types of issues that may be raised on appeal following a guilty or nolo contendere plea without the need for a certificate: issues relating to the validity of a search and seizure, for which an appeal is provided under section 1538.5, subdivision (m), and issues regarding proceedings held subsequent to the plea for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed. (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 766; People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 780.) C. Analysis Despite his no contest plea, defendant claims he was improperly convicted on count 2 for <mask> possession under section 311.11(c)(1) because that subdivision does not state a substantive offense but is, rather, an alternate penalty provision. The People assert defendant\u2019s failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5 precludes him from presenting this argument on appeal. The certificate requirements of section 1237.5 are to \u201cbe applied in a strict manner.\u201d (People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1098.) To determine whether an appeal challenging a post-no contest plea sentence requires examining the substance of the claim on appeal: \u201cthe crucial issue is what the defendant is challenging, not the time or manner in which the challenge is made.\u201d (People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 63, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 656.) In other words, the question \u201cis whether a challenge to the sentence is in substance a challenge to the validity of the plea, thus rendering the appeal subject to the requirements of section 1237.5.\u201d (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 76.)"], "id": "2d1652f6-7619-4f23-8407-cb7c00bfa9fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Inspector Hayes began his investigation by entering the America Online \u201cPre-Teen Room\u201d which provided a forum for \u201cpicture trading\u201d. It is unclear whether the participants are meant to be preadolescents or whether the photographs are meant to depict preadolescents or both. (The Pre-Teen Room has since been deleted from the services currently available through America Online.) In his search for <mask>, Inspector Hayes would \u201clog-on\u201d during hours when children would be likely to use the computer: after 3:30 p.m. on weekdays and on weekends. As 13-year-old Tori, he received instant messages from hundreds of adult males from all over the country and the world. Enlisting the assistance of America Online to access subscriber information, he was able to obtain the geographical locations for the participants whose screen identities could well, like his own, be completely fictitious. By obtaining telephone numbers, usually from the computer user himself, prearranged calls were placed by female Detective Karen Gumbs to verify that the computer personality was actually an adult male. Detective Gumbs spoke with men in Washington, Oregon, Texas and New Jersey, as well as defendant in Connecticut. The telephone conversations were sexually explicit and, much like the cyberchats in evidence, included offers to \u201cteach\u201d the purported adolescent concerning sexual activities and to meet with the teen female for such purpose."], "id": "4739595d-f07b-4737-b575-a9483f69ad1e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["be incongruent for the Legislature to apply contract principles to a criminal provision where the object of the agreement and the consideration used to achieve it are both unlawful and preclude the formation of a contract. Furthermore, section 311.2 is part of a broader statutory scheme \u201caimed at extinguishing the market for sexually explicit materials featuring children.\u201d (People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 540.) It was adopted in its present form, along with section 311.4, as a \u201c \u2018double-barreled legislative attack which treats producers [of child pornography] as child abusers whether or not the material is obscene, and deals with distributors and retailers of obscene \u201cmaterials depicting minors under [F]irst [A]mendment analysis.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 402 (Cochran).) As the Legislature declared when enacting this urgency legislation: \u201cThe proliferation of <mask> and the use of minors as subjects in child pornography pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of a large number of minors in California which necessitates immediate redress.\u201d (Stats. 1977, ch. 1061, \u00a7 4, p. 3203.) The Legislature\u2019s purpose in seeking to eradicate the market for child pornography would not be served by limiting the reach of section 311.2, subdivision (b) to the distribution of obscene matter that is, as appellant contends, \u201cinduced or caused by promises made by the parties involved and resulting from a bargaining process.\u201d Commercial distributors of child pornography do not necessarily engage in quid pro quo agreements with their customers. For example, a website operator who exhibits child pornography free of charge and yet earns a profit through the Internet traffic generated on the website would not be a commercial distributor under appellant\u2019s construction of the statute. Even though the website operator is distributing or exhibiting child pornography as a commercial or profit-making enterprise,"], "id": "8c7396a5-65ae-4924-a376-f6383b26831b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Williams testified and admitted that he has sexually assaulted children and that he has a problem with seeking out <mask>. He testified that he has never intentionally looked for pornography involving prepubescent children. He stated that he is not still sexually attracted to children and that he has not been since around the time of his arrest. Williams also testified, without objection, that he has been granted parole in his state cases, but he has not been released from confinement. He testified that he is \"not at risk of offending,\" that he \"will not reoffend,\" and that he \"will never have another victim.\" He stated that, upon release, he plans to move to Arizona, where his mother lives, register as a sex offender, and try to get into a sex offender treatment program. He testified that he does not think that he would reoffend if he did not enter a sex offender treatment program, but he acknowledged that \"it's a benefit for [him] and for the public\" for him to enter such a program."], "id": "d8a2068e-e6a0-4b94-973d-696f0c09f814", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 960 (Kasky).) Commercial speech is \u201cspeech which does \u2018no more than propose a commercial transaction\u2019 \u201d (Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 762), and is generally associated with a profit motive. (See Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 962 [\u201ccommercial speech, being motivated by the desire for economic profit, is less likely than noncommercial speech to be chilled by proper regulation.\u201d], citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., supra, 425 U.S. at p. 772, fn. 24.) Accordingly, even if consideration signifies recompense or payment, such payment must be \u201ccommercial\u201d in nature, meaning payment associated with a commercial transaction such as the buying or selling of goods or services or a transaction motivated by economic profit. Read in context, \u201ccommercial consideration\u201d cannot reasonably be interpreted to extend to the simple act of trading obscene material with others, because such exchange does not necessarily involve engaging in commerce or a profitmaking enterprise. Trading in illicit material, even if unlawful, can be a noncommercial endeavor. While the Attorney General emphasizes that the <mask> here was traded over the Internet, we fail to see how using this platform to disseminate obscene matter automatically makes it commercial. And, as discussed above, equating commercial consideration with an intent to trade would erase any distinction between the wobbler and felony obscenity laws described above. To harmonize the various statutes governing the criminal distribution of child pornography and best effectuate the Legislature\u2019s intent, we conclude that the element of commercial consideration in section 311.2, subdivision (b) requires proof that the defendant received or intended to receive payment at the time he or she distributed, exhibited or exchanged obscene matter"], "id": "2cc3fc78-b591-4ac6-a77d-8f12a7647ea2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Williams testified and admitted that he has sexually assaulted children and that he has a problem with seeking out <mask>. He testified that he has never intentionally looked for pornography involving prepubescent children. He stated that he is not still sexually attracted to children and that he has not been since around the time of his arrest. Williams also testified, without objection, that he has been granted parole in his state cases, but he has not been released from confinement. He testified that he is \"not at risk of offending,\" that he \"will not reoffend,\" and that he \"will never have another victim.\" He stated that, upon release, he plans to move to Arizona, where his mother lives, register as a sex offender, and try to get into a sex offender treatment program. He testified that he does not think that he would reoffend if he did not enter a sex offender treatment program, but he acknowledged that \"it's a benefit for [him] and for the public\" for him to enter such a program."], "id": "484a30e3-6462-4f28-a8c0-ebeb29e7fb13", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["fines \u201cexploitation\u201d\u2014without any qualification\u2014to include \u201c<mask> or child prostitution,\u201d but defines \u201csexual abuse\u201d to include \u201crape, molestation, prostitution, or other form[s] of sexual exploitation of children.\u201d Compare 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 13031(c)(6) (definition of \u201cexploitation\u201d), with id. \u00a7 13031(c)(4) (definition of \u201csexual abuse\u201d). We do not think, however, that the statute intends to draw a strong distinction between \u201cexploita- tion\u201d and \u201csexual exploitation.\u201d The latter phrase is not a defined term. And the statute in other respects seems to treat the two terms as essentially interchangeable. In particular, the definition of \u201csexual abuse\u201d expressly provides that \u201cprostitution . . . of children\u201d is a form of \u201csexual exploitation of children,\u201d and the definition of \u201cexploitation\u201d similarly provides that \u201cchild prostitution\u201d is a form of \u201cexploitation.\u201d Id. \u00a7 13031(c)(4), (6)."], "id": "ea716cf5-d6cf-4d70-9c96-24f232e6d4e7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Near a television set in the living room, the detectives found more photographs depicting one of the children who had been present when the photographs obtained from the photo lab were taken.7 From a dresser found in the living room, Detective Heavey seized defendant\u2019s passport, Social Security card stub, and some letters. Several pieces of video and still camera equipment were seized from a closet in the living room area. Also, a cardboard box containing numerous pornographic magazines and nine additional \u201cmini-albums\u201d \u2014 none of which contained <mask> \u2014 was seized from the garage. Various items of clothing were also seized, including a knit *721pink shirt, four pairs of ladies\u2019 underpants, and a lavender nightgown; these articles of clothing were similar in appearance to the items of clothing worn by the child seen in the \u201cEric\u201d videotape. Also seized from the bedroom were a pair of \u201ccamouflage\u201d shorts similar to those worn by defendant in the \u201cEric\u201d videotape, as well as a tube of surgical lubricant. Defendant was seen to use the lubricant in the course of engaging in a sex act with the male child."], "id": "04afc632-b3f1-473e-a31a-46747034f058", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, to the extent that the defense suggests that the dicta provided by the Court of Appeals in People v Johnson (11 NY3d 416 [2008]) provides that all defendants who are scored as presumptive risk level two sex offenders under SORA following their conviction of crimes which consisted of their possession of pornographic images of children will uniformly and properly be granted downward departures to risk level one designations, there is absolutely no support for such a reading of the holding or dicta enunciated therein. Rather, insofar as relevant to this branch of the defendant\u2019s argument, the Johnson case simply stands for the proposition that a defendant who has been convicted of a crime involving the possession of child *810pornography may seek a downward departure from his or her presumptive risk level, while noting that the application of points under risk factor 7 to such a defendant \u201cproduces a seemingly anomalous result, one the authors of the Guidelines may not have intended or foreseen\u201d (People v Johnson, 11 NY3d at 421). Contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, the Johnson Court\u2019s holding does not stand for the proposition that a SORA defendant\u2019s application for a downward departure from a presumptive risk level two designation must be granted in all <mask> possession cases irrespective of the showing proffered by the particular defendant at his or her SORA hearing. Rather, it appears that the more well-reasoned approach adopted by SORA hearing courts which have applied the \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d standard enunciated in People v Wyatt (89 AD3d at 127-128) when granting a SORA defendant\u2019s application for a downward departure from the presumptive risk level designation in a child pornography possession case is to have relied upon a specific mitigating factor, such as the sex offender\u2019s participation in and response to sex offender treatment programming, before granting an application for a downward departure (People v Antoine, 37 Misc 3d 474 [2012]; People v Yen, 33 Misc 3d 1234[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52240[U] [2011])."], "id": "ec36c92f-18b8-4e2e-8cdf-f4fe0d8040b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The police may seize items not specified in the warrant if the warrant authorized the seizure of that type of property. (See, People v Dominique, 229 AD2d 719, 720 [3d Dept 1996] [warrant specifying \u201c \u2018tatooing [sic] equipment\u2019 \u201d authorized seizure of ink-stained bag and towel; warrant specifying \u201c \u2018red and green piggy banks with change\u2019 \u201d authorized seizure of coin wrappers].) Once the police saw that the videotape cassettes were surrounded by a plethora of sexually explicit still pictures of children, commingled in a closed metal container, they had reason to believe that the videotapes contained recordings of visual images depicting <mask>. Their suspicions were heightened by defendant\u2019s son\u2019s repeatedly expressed intense desire to obtain the box following his father\u2019s arrest, and by the fact that one of the tapes bore a person\u2019s name, and *726the other was inscribed with an \u201cX,\u201d perhaps alluding to the illicit subject matter contained therein. Also, Detective Heavey\u2019s expert opinion that pedophiles keep \u201cmementos\u201d of their illicit activities lent credence to the belief that the videotapes contained images of the type for which seizure was authorized."], "id": "dc976e1c-a4b3-441f-b357-3101c6b7ce3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["During the course of the instant risk assessment determination proceeding, the People submitted material for the court\u2019s consideration, including the risk assessment instrument prepared by Assistant District Attorney Laura Forbes which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 1, the RAI prepared by the Board which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 2a, the case summary which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 2b, the sex offender designation form which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 2c, a copy of the instant indictment which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 3, a copy of the defendant\u2019s presentence investigation report which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 4, the affidavit of Investigator Richard Corvinus which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 5, and an optical compact disc containing files depicting images of <mask>. In reliance upon their submission of the above-referenced materials and the oral argument they presented, the People submit that the defendant should be designated a risk level two sex offender based upon the allocation of 95 points to his total risk factor score. As proposed by the People, the recommended total risk factor score of 95 points would be derived from the allocation of 30 points pursuant to RAI risk factor 3 \u201cNumber of victims,\u201d 30 points pursuant to RAI risk factor 5 \u201cAge of victim,\u201d 20 points pursuant to RAI risk factor 7 \u201cRelationship with victim,\u201d and 15 points pursuant to RAI risk factor 14 \u201cSupervision.\u201d With respect to RAI risk factor 3, the People advance their argument that 30 points should be allocated to the defendant\u2019s total risk factor score thereunder in reliance upon People\u2019s exhibit 3 in evidence, as the grand jury returned the instant indictment upon findings that the defendant knowingly possessed more than three computer files depicting sexual conduct by more than three distinct children of less than 16 years of age. With respect to RAI risk factor 5, the People sup*802port their argument that 30 points should be allocated to the defendant\u2019s total risk factor score thereunder through their reliance upon People\u2019s exhibit 5 in evidence, which indicates that more than 50 of the image files located on the defendant\u2019s computer and hard disk drives contained images of children 10 years of age or less engaged in sexual performances. With respect to RAI risk factor 7, the People support their argument that 20 points should be allocated to the defendant\u2019s total risk factor score thereunder through their reliance upon People\u2019s exhibit 4 in evidence, which indicates that the defendant did not know any of the victims depicted in the pornographic images he possessed. With respect to RAI risk factor 14, the People support their argument that 15 points should be allocated to the defendant\u2019s total risk factor score thereunder through their reliance upon their recognition that the defendant will not be supervised upon his release from incarceration. The People do not seek an adjudication of the defendant as either a \u201csexually violent offender,\u201d a \u201cpredicate sex offender,\u201d or a \u201csexual predator,\u201d nor do they seek an upward departure from the defendant\u2019s presumptive risk level two designation."], "id": "aa1f01c4-3157-4ffb-b15a-84f29e6519b0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Minor A to engage in sexually explicit conduct that involved lascivious exhibition of Minor A\u2019s genitalia, for the purposes of having Minor A take a photograph of the sexually explicit conduct.\u201d At the change of plea hearing, the district court placed Merrill under oath and engaged in a thorough colloquy under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Merrill testi\ufb01ed that he had read the plea agreement, discussed it with defense counsel, and understood it. The government recited the factual basis as set forth in the plea agreement, including: \u201cAt defendant\u2019s direction Minor A took photographs of herself that involved the lascivious exhibition of her genitals . \u2026 And then she sent those photographs to the defendant via text message at his direction.\u201d When asked whether the government\u2019s facts were accurate, Merrill replied: \u201cYes I did do that. I just don\u2019t remember because it was so long ago. But \u2026 it says I did it because it was on my phone.\u201d Defense counsel interjected to explain that, based on his conversations with Merrill, \u201cit\u2019s not that he doesn\u2019t remember anything about the o\ufb00ense. It\u2019s that he doesn\u2019t remember certain details.\u201d The judge asked Merrill whether he remembered \u201csoliciting photographs and possessing the types of photographs that are set forth in the plea agreement.\u201d Merrill con\ufb01rmed that he did. Days before the scheduled sentencing hearing, new counsel appeared for Merrill. His new counsel moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. Merrill\u2019s motion and supplemental a\ufb03davit asserted that his two former attorneys, Pablo deCastro and Summer McKeivier, \u201cnever explained to him what it means to produce <mask> under the law\u201d and \u201cnever explained what the elements of the production 4 No. 21-1070"], "id": "ed096a53-b7af-45f0-a6d5-93018ca42dce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Because \u201cdistribute\u201d necessarily involves the transfer of materials to another person or location, a distribution within the meaning of the obscenity statutes occurs when a defendant\u2019s <mask> materials are actually transferred to or downloaded by another person. Although appellant concedes that \u201cthe downloading of a torrent file containing multiple pornographic images and videos by [Sergeant] Servat\u2019s program would complete an act of distribution,\u201d he nonetheless argues that counts two through four are \u201clegally unauthorized\u201d because Servat downloaded the \u201csame file with the same contents.\u201d Appellant\u2019s arguments are belied by the record. Sergeant Servat\u2019s testimony established that downloading the same torrent file does not necessarily mean that the same files with the same content are downloaded. He testified that on May 26, 2017, a torrent file was downloaded with approximately 244 pornographic files, stored in subfolders bearing names such as \u201cHawaiian Breeze\u201d and \u201cLS Studio.\u201d The same torrent file was downloaded the next day, also resulting in 244 files, but Servat testified that there were \u201cone or two\u201d more folders in the May 27 download. The May 27 download contained a folder named \u201cSpoilt bab\u201d and a subfolder named \u201cIssue 15, Spoilt Babies.\u201d According to Sergeant Servat, the download on May 27 contained \u201cmostly\u201d pornographic images, but also a 50- minute video depicting 9 and 10 year old girls orally copulating and digitally penetrating each other. On May 28, the same torrent file was downloaded again, this time resulting in 217 obscene files. The May 28 torrent download included a folder named \u201cHappy Birthday\u201d with a subfolder containing 12 obscene videos showing 7 and 8 year old girls in sexually provocative acts. Appellant complains that Sergeant Servat did not specify any differences in the folders or whether the folders contained different files, but"], "id": "c021d32c-dc97-4ab4-9448-a44d314e22bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Our conclusion that the trial court's order does not violate Article 39.15(c) does not end the inquiry. The trial court excluded State's Exhibit 3 and Hanner's testimony regarding his own observation of the images for two reasons: (1) the evidence is irrelevant because it was not in the format required by the trial court; and (2) the State refused to make copies of the <mask> images for admission into evidence."], "id": "21e1bbfe-ff91-4035-8d62-87b358339723", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["costly to release. Id. at 142\u201343 (explaining that the good faith ex- ception as a rule \u201creflect[s]\u201d and is \u201cjustified by\u201d weighing costs and deterrence benefits). Under Herring, therefore, when a court con- cludes that a constitutional violation was caused by a police of- ficer\u2019s good faith mistake, \u201crather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,\u201d id. at 147, the costs of suppressing the evidence necessarily outweigh the benefits. The in- verse is also true. And it is true whether the charged crime is mur- der or jaywalking or something in between. Finally, even if this evidence should have been suppressed, we believe any error would have been harmless beyond a reasona- ble doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Consti- tutional errors in a criminal trial \u201cdo not require reversal if they are harmless.\u201d United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1167 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc)). A constitu- tional error is harmless when the government proves \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\u201d Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22). \u201cTo say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury con- sidered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.\u201d Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991). Two pieces of evidence were found in the truck: (1) a cam- era with <mask> and (2) sex toys and similar parapher- nalia. Nicholson argues that the images found on the camera were USCA11 Case: 19-11669 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 23 of 25"], "id": "4c7ee59a-7545-4d29-a495-20ef170a8561", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court of appeals reversed Appellant's conviction on Count 1, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. As to the original full image of the child, the court of appeals decided that the full image is not <mask> because it does not depict a \"lewd exhibition of the genitals.\" Following that holding, the court of appeals then held that the cropped image could not support the conviction on Count 1 because, having been \"made\" in 2014 at the time of cropping, that image does not depict a person who was under the age of eighteen at the time the image was made, and thus could not be child pornography.11"], "id": "978754ee-943c-45c9-a5b3-cc9768d236c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Unlike Penal Law \u00a7 235.22, section 263.10 is unrelated to the age of the recipient of the proscribed communication. In enacting Penal Law article 263, the New York Legislature found \u201ca proliferation of exploitation of children as subjects in sexual performances\u201d, declaring that \u201c[t]he public policy of the state demands the protection of children from exploitation through sexual performances.\u201d (L 1977, ch 910, \u00a7 1.) Article 263 was thus enacted for the protection of the child performers who were necessarily exploited and abused in the process of creating the pornographic communication.19 (New York v Ferber, 458 US 747 [1982], supra; People v Keyes, 75 NY2d 343, 346 [1990]; People v Gaito, 199 AD2d 615, 616 [3d Dept 1993].) The statute was expressly intended to chill the market for this contraband by criminalizing its possession and thereby to eliminate the child abuse inherent in its production. (See, New York v Ferber, at 759-760; People v Keyes, at 348; see also, Osborne v Ohio, 495 US 103, 109-110 [1990], supra [wherein the *736prohibition against private possession of <mask> was found to be constitutional].) Child pornography, like obscenity, is not protected under the First Amendment. In upholding the constitutionality of New York\u2019s Penal Law \u00a7 263.15, which criminalizes the promotion of any sexual performance by a child under 16 regardless of whether it is \u201cobscene\u201d, the United States Supreme Court so held (New York v Ferber, at 750, 764). The Court took care to reject the application of the Miller obscenity standard to child pornography, finding the subject matter itself to be unprotected regardless of its effect upon the average person.20"], "id": "b74ac731-56f0-467d-a34b-7ecfc3f304dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["An upward departure is also warranted based on the nature of the <mask> possessed by the defendant. The defendant possessed not only still images, but multiple video recordings of children being brutally and repeatedly sexually assaulted, sometimes over the course of several years. Many of the videos are rather lengthy, and show the sexual abuse of multiple child victims. At least two of the videos are high-quality produc*337tians with an individual filming the abuse while the child victim is being sexually assaulted by an adult male. Moreover, at least one of the video recordings shows the sadomasochistic abuse of a child victim. In that particular video, the child victim, who is wearing a black mask, is bound around her neck, wrists, and ankles, with her ankles tied to the binding around her neck. An adult male forces a dildo, and later, his penis into her mouth, and holds her head while he repeatedly forces his penis into her mouth."], "id": "73fa4198-087e-45d3-8de0-8e83d2225641", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["It is also true that in one sentence of its opinion, the Kent majority appeared to dispense with the distinction between the intangibility of an image and its placement on a tangible medium. In that passage, the Court noted that some state authorities had held that a defendant\u2019s awareness that a child pornographic image was stored on a cache was not necessary to impose criminal liability. Those authorities, the Court continued, did \u201cnot rely on the tangibility of the image (i.e., its permanent placement on the defendant\u2019s hard drive and his ability to access it later)\u201d but upheld criminal liability merely for accessing and viewing <mask>. (Id. at 302 [citations omitted].) The connotation of this passage is that child pornographic computer images are themselves tangible. That one sentence read in isolation, however, in this court\u2019s view, is less an assessment that digital computer images are tangible than a minor imprecise turn of phrase on an issue which was not material to the Court\u2019s holding.24"], "id": "348a127d-d3b0-4e85-82e0-438e1c09bb34", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Minor A to engage in sexually explicit conduct that involved lascivious exhibition of Minor A\u2019s genitalia, for the purposes of having Minor A take a photograph of the sexually explicit conduct.\u201d At the change of plea hearing, the district court placed Merrill under oath and engaged in a thorough colloquy under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Merrill testi\ufb01ed that he had read the plea agreement, discussed it with defense counsel, and understood it. The government recited the factual basis as set forth in the plea agreement, including: \u201cAt defendant\u2019s direction Minor A took photographs of herself that involved the lascivious exhibition of her genitals . \u2026 And then she sent those photographs to the defendant via text message at his direction.\u201d When asked whether the government\u2019s facts were accurate, Merrill replied: \u201cYes I did do that. I just don\u2019t remember because it was so long ago. But \u2026 it says I did it because it was on my phone.\u201d Defense counsel interjected to explain that, based on his conversations with Merrill, \u201cit\u2019s not that he doesn\u2019t remember anything about the o\ufb00ense. It\u2019s that he doesn\u2019t remember certain details.\u201d The judge asked Merrill whether he remembered \u201csoliciting photographs and possessing the types of photographs that are set forth in the plea agreement.\u201d Merrill con\ufb01rmed that he did. Days before the scheduled sentencing hearing, new counsel appeared for Merrill. His new counsel moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. Merrill\u2019s motion and supplemental a\ufb03davit asserted that his two former attorneys, Pablo deCastro and Summer McKeivier, \u201cnever explained to him what it means to produce <mask> under the law\u201d and \u201cnever explained what the elements of the production 4 No. 21-1070"], "id": "5f2d5da0-4b8a-4f40-8f2c-1394b548f5b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Even if the language of the warrant could be interpreted to include a *132search of Nguyen's residence, the warrant and affidavit failed to establish probable cause for such a search. The Attorney General contends \"probable cause was established by the existence of an IP address assigned to an internet user at that property on the date and time the contraband images were transferred.\" He relies on the affidavit's statement that \"the person responsible for the trading of <mask> from this residence can be anyone with access to the internet signal associated with this residence.\" The phrase \"this residence\" in the affidavit referred to the front house-i.e., Reynolds' residence. The Attorney General asserts that \"[e]ven though it turned out that there were multiple domiciles on the property, there was probable cause to search all the residences because the entire premises were suspect.\""], "id": "b6f94107-4a87-402d-b025-2b029a01f79b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The 2009 amendment to Article 39.14 made it subject to the restrictions provided by Article 39.15. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2018). Article 39.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the trial court allow discovery of property or material that constitutes <mask>, as described by Section 43.26(a)(1) of the Penal Code, but it establishes the procedures which must be followed. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 39.15(a)(1), (c) (West 2018). Under Section 39.15(b), property or material described by subsection (a) must remain in the care, custody, or control of the court or the state as provided by Article 38.45. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 39.15(b)."], "id": "c400b8c8-8f52-4057-923d-6e8b2e3009b4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u2013 16 \u2013 2719 Instead, the defendant must show \u201cthat the jury\u2019s ability to fairly decide the individual charges [was] substantially impaired [because] the jury hear[d] evidence relating to other charges at the same time.\u201d32 Here, the evidence of Lee\u2019s sexual abuse of the children was strong, and the jury\u2019s decision to acquit on one of the charges demonstrates that they carefully reviewed the evidence and were not simply overcome by emotion. With the exception of the count on which the jury acquitted, the children\u2019s accounts supported the sexual abuse and assault charges. The court admitted the recorded interviews of S.A. and D.A. in their entirety, and, during these interviews, both S.A. and D.A. reported that Lee assaulted them on multiple occasions and threatened S.A. with a sword. They also testified at trial. Although D.A. could not recall the assaults that had occurred five years earlier when she was six, S.A. gave consistent testimony regarding what had occurred. S.A. recalled being threatened by Lee and detailed multiple incidents of sexual abuse, including Lee touching her vaginal area while they were watching a movie. She was adamant that she was not mixing up Lee\u2019s actions toward her with the actions of someone else. Given the strength of the evidence and the trial court\u2019s care in eliminating the most inflammatory <mask> images, we conclude that Lee has failed to show the particularized prejudice required to prevail on this claim. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s decision to deny Lee\u2019s motion to sever."], "id": "c3ab3c5f-a4d1-4eb1-b383-97e421532af1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["542 F. App\u2019x 724, 726\u201327 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that, after \u00a7 2252A(a)(5)(B) was amended in 2008, the government was not required \u201cto establish that the images themselves had crossed state lines\u201d); United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1350\u201351 (9th Cir. 2015) (interpreting the 2008 amendments of \u00a7\u00a7 2251(d)(1)(A) and 2252A(a)(1) to \u201cnot require evidence that the [child pornography] actually crossed state lines\u201d); United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 713 (8th Cir. 2016) (\u201c[The defendant\u2019s] use of the internet to access and download [child pornography] from [a website] is enough in this case to satisfy the interstate commerce nexus [of \u00a7 2252A(a)(5)(B)].\u201d); see also United States v. Grzybowicz, 747 F.3d 1296, 1306 (11th Cir. 2014) (\u201cThe interstate commerce element[s] for [\u00a7\u00a7 2251(a) and 2252A(a)(5)(B)] [are] satisfied by proof that the <mask> was transmitted using a facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including by computer . . . .\u201d). In this case, the government provided the jury with circumstantial evidence that Clark\u2019s child pornography moved from his computer through the internet to the government agent\u2019s computer. This is sufficient evidence of distribution using a means or facility of interstate commerce within the meaning of \u00a7 2252(a)(2)."], "id": "00ffbf83-6cf8-4b0a-a13c-e4d81d438484", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The Supreme Court extensively discussed the knowing possession requirement of KRS 531.335. The Court recognized that, \"[t]he crime requires only the knowing possessing of <mask>, regardless of the purpose. The mens rea requirements of [ KRS 531.335 ] are satisfied by showing that the defendant knew the videos were child pornography and that he knowingly possessed them.\" Crabtree , 455 S.W.3d at 402."], "id": "8007e2dd-aea7-400a-8df8-696547f31419", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["There is a well-established body of constitutional law which holds that the court may limit that \"speech\u201d which is made available to children by persons other than their parents. \"[T]he power of the State to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults\u201d (Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 170; Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 638; cf., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale U 877, 939 [\"regulations of communication addressed to (children) need not conform to the requirements of the first amendment in the same way as those applicable to adults\u201d]). Thus, for example, <mask> is not constitutionally protected speech (Osborn v Ohio, 495 US 103; R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 US \u2014, 112 S Ct 2538; see, People v Sprowal, 49 Misc 2d 806 [App Term, 1st Dept])."], "id": "d66be5eb-532e-4779-a0fc-b857f207abbb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["During the course of the instant risk assessment determination proceeding, the People submitted material for the court\u2019s consideration, including the risk assessment instrument prepared by Assistant District Attorney Laura Forbes which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 1, the RAI prepared by the Board which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 2a, the case summary which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 2b, the sex offender designation form which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 2c, a copy of the instant indictment which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 3, a copy of the defendant\u2019s presentence investigation report which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 4, the affidavit of Investigator Richard Corvinus which was admitted into evidence as People\u2019s exhibit 5, and an optical compact disc containing files depicting images of <mask>. In reliance upon their submission of the above-referenced materials and the oral argument they presented, the People submit that the defendant should be designated a risk level two sex offender based upon the allocation of 95 points to his total risk factor score. As proposed by the People, the recommended total risk factor score of 95 points would be derived from the allocation of 30 points pursuant to RAI risk factor 3 \u201cNumber of victims,\u201d 30 points pursuant to RAI risk factor 5 \u201cAge of victim,\u201d 20 points pursuant to RAI risk factor 7 \u201cRelationship with victim,\u201d and 15 points pursuant to RAI risk factor 14 \u201cSupervision.\u201d With respect to RAI risk factor 3, the People advance their argument that 30 points should be allocated to the defendant\u2019s total risk factor score thereunder in reliance upon People\u2019s exhibit 3 in evidence, as the grand jury returned the instant indictment upon findings that the defendant knowingly possessed more than three computer files depicting sexual conduct by more than three distinct children of less than 16 years of age. With respect to RAI risk factor 5, the People sup*802port their argument that 30 points should be allocated to the defendant\u2019s total risk factor score thereunder through their reliance upon People\u2019s exhibit 5 in evidence, which indicates that more than 50 of the image files located on the defendant\u2019s computer and hard disk drives contained images of children 10 years of age or less engaged in sexual performances. With respect to RAI risk factor 7, the People support their argument that 20 points should be allocated to the defendant\u2019s total risk factor score thereunder through their reliance upon People\u2019s exhibit 4 in evidence, which indicates that the defendant did not know any of the victims depicted in the pornographic images he possessed. With respect to RAI risk factor 14, the People support their argument that 15 points should be allocated to the defendant\u2019s total risk factor score thereunder through their reliance upon their recognition that the defendant will not be supervised upon his release from incarceration. The People do not seek an adjudication of the defendant as either a \u201csexually violent offender,\u201d a \u201cpredicate sex offender,\u201d or a \u201csexual predator,\u201d nor do they seek an upward departure from the defendant\u2019s presumptive risk level two designation."], "id": "aedddc14-6864-4911-8bfb-14dbbc76bcf1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["On February 1, 2013, defendant filed a suppression motion pursuant to section 1538.5, alleging the warrantless search on March 21, 2012, violated the Fourth Amendment. On March 12 and 13, 2013, the superior court heard the motion in conjunction with the preliminary hearing. At the hearing, CSH police testified CSH is a maximum-security psychiatric hospital with a patient *909population of 1,100, between 80 to 85 percent of whom are sexually violent predators. Because CSH is located on the grounds of Pleasant Valley State Prison, a visitor cannot access the hospital unless he or she first passes an inspection by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Various signs throughout CSH advise that all persons, vehicles, and items are subject to search and/or list prohibited items. Officers conduct random searches of patients and their dormitories for contraband daily to maintain institutional security. However, patients often dispose of items in the trash or in the toilet once they realize officers are conducting a search. A *493major problem is the sale of <mask>. According to Sergeant Duvall, CSH is \"possibly becoming a distribution hub.\" In addition, there have been assaults on (1) those \"coming forward\" to report child pornography; and (2) those who possess the child pornography by fellow patients who \"don't like the persons having materials like that.\""], "id": "1c25cb9b-59ac-4702-9cd5-198eecb9b894", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["After a bench trial, the district court convicted John Kuhnel of receipt and possession of <mask>. On appeal, Kuhnel challenges the search of his vehicle by his supervising probation officer and the sufficiency of the evidence for the receipt convictions. Kuhnel raises additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief, including that his possession convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.1 We affirm in part and remand with instructions."], "id": "db7e29ac-d643-45e1-a88e-b2c2d1a60591", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cThe Board remains concerned about <mask> offenders, and in the majority of cases, believes that they have a sexually deviant interest in children which poses a significant risk to public safety; however, recognizes that each person convicted of a child pornography offense poses risks that are unique to that individual. These images are in essence crime scene photos of children being sexually abused, and the increased demand for these images results in further sexual victimization of children.\u201d (State of New York Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, June 1, 2012.)"], "id": "40014aeb-7824-4d77-a7dc-dd300019c0b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["sel, Department of Defense (Feb. 26, 2010, 5:02 PM). The Department of State \u201cdoes not have a formal position or policy addressing whether the reporting requirement is triggered when a covered professional learns that someone has viewed <mask>, but the professional does not know the identity of the child or children depicted and has no reason to believe that the viewer knows their identities.\u201d E-mail for Jeannie S. Rhee, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, from Robert Choo, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State (July 21, 2010, 2:35 PM). It recognizes, however, that this situation \u201cmay trigger other actions including the enforcement of child pornography laws, if applicable, or internal discipline.\u201d Id. 7 The substitution in the text is not completely straightforward, in that the statute de-"], "id": "59bd7940-7f6e-45c2-bdcf-b4d95143d6e3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, Dr. Kline concluded that Derby was more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. Dr. Kline explained that predatory acts are those directed towards individuals, including family members, for the primary purpose of victimization. Dr. Kline noted that children portrayed in <mask> are also victimized. Dr. Kline explained that Derby's past offense against his nephew was a predatory, sexual act and that Derby's purpose in molesting his nephew was victimization. Dr. Kline opined that future acts by Derby were similarly more likely than not to be of a predatory, sexually violent nature involving some victimization."], "id": "72abc2dc-3e9b-46e6-b1ae-cc58607d508f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The government responds that Kuhnel\u2019s conviction under \u00a7 2252A(a)(5)(B) involved additional proof of a digitally \u201cmorphed\u201d image. \u201cChild pornography\u201d for purposes of \u00a7 2252A(a)(5)(B) more broadly includes visual depictions \u201ccreated, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2256(8)(C). Like \u00a7 2252(a)(4)(B), however, the definition also encompasses visual depictions of real minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2256(8)(A). Although the digitally altered picture of Victim G would not have fallen within the narrower language of \u00a7 2252(a)(4)(B), all the images and videos charged in the possession counts met the definition of <mask> applicable to \u00a7 2252A(a)(5)(B). The two possession statutes therefore do not require mutually exclusive proof of different types of child pornography."], "id": "bc68974e-54ea-4b5b-950c-ed694f7c0ec4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In March 2012, the subpoenaed company identified Defendant as the \"account holder/subscriber\" for the IP address. Detective Phelps compared files that had been offered via Peer-to-Peer from the IP address with files in a law enforcement library of known images of <mask>, and he determined that 15 files offered from the IP address contained child pornography. Detective Phelps executed an affidavit for a search warrant (\"the Phelps affidavit\") that included, inter alia , specific descriptions of the content of the images in the 15 identified files available from the IP address."], "id": "aaed722a-b50a-477f-8cc9-0ba8ffc0e309", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Later, upon examination, law enforcement authorities determined that the iPhone contained information showing that it had been utilized for purposes of connecting to the internet to view and upload <mask>. Upon a later questioning, Appellee, when confronted with this information, made certain potentially incriminating statements. Appellee was subsequently charged with thirty (30) counts of distribution, possession, or viewing of matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child. In a pre-trial motion, Appellee sought to suppress the evidence found on the iPhone and his subsequent incriminating statements. The trial court in deciding to suppress the evidence, framed the question for this interlocutory appeal rather nicely. Quoting from the pre-trial order suppressing evidence:"], "id": "347a882c-8e61-4d9f-80f2-aed7eeb61b92", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Child Pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 2008, Congress amended the jurisdictional provisions of several child-pornography laws, including \u00a7 2252(a)(2), to add the phrase \u201cusing any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce.\u201d Effective <mask> Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110\u2013 358, \u00a7 103, 122 Stat. 4001 (2008) (amending \u00a7\u00a7 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2252A to include that phrase). Previously, \u00a7 2252(a)(2) required that the child pornography had been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.5 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2252(a)(2) (2006). We agree with other circuit courts that have interpreted this amendment as an \u201cexpan[sion]\u201d of the statute\u2019s \u201cjurisdictional coverage.\u201d United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 216 (1st Cir. 2009); see United States v. Crain, 877 F.3d 637, 646 & n.32 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that the \u201cjurisdictional element\u201d of 2252(a) was \u201cexpanded\u201d by the 2008 amendment); United States v. Wasson,"], "id": "e8dae1b9-9e70-4586-988c-71f42596e90e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*644This argument does not support reexamination of the court\u2019s denial of the motion to suppress. First, defendant\u2019s motion papers made no allegation that the police ventured outside \u201cxxx\u201d and \u201cMPG\u201d file folders. Second, the critical point is that defendant\u2019s motion to suppress only targeted for a suppression order the 43 child pornographic images which are the subject of the indictment. Nothing additional was sought to be suppressed. The motion to suppress, framed as it was in these terms, did not require examination into whether the December 10th search went beyond the \u201cxxx\u201d and \u201cMPG\u201d file folders, or included two files in the \u201cxxx\u201d file folder not containing <mask>. Even if it had, the remedy would be, as I pointed out in my original decision, suppression of \u201conly the information attributable to that additional \u2018search,\u2019 \u201d not suppression of the results of the entire search. (United States v $557,937.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287d 66, 87-88 [2d Cir 2002] [emphasis in original], quoted in n 3 of the original decision.) There is no precedent supporting suppression of those items a valid plain view search turns up simply because the police seize other items not in plain view which the People do not intend to use at trial. (United States v Rouse, 148d 1040, 1041 [8th Cir 1998] [suppression ordered only of those items with respect to which the defendant did not \u201calready ha(ve) his expectation of privacy frustrated\u201d]; cf., in the context of severing an invalid portion of a search warrant, People v Brown, 96 NY2d at 86-87.) Inasmuch as the motion to suppress targeted only the child pornography images, and they were lawfully seized and searched in plain view, the motion for reargument is denied. Defendant\u2019s remedy, if any, would be a motion for a return of those items improperly seized. (Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 44 n 3 [1984]; Andresen v Maryland, 427 US 463, 482 n 11 [1976].) For the same reasons, the fact that two image files in the \u201cxxx\u201d and \u201cMPG\u201d folders had titles not suggesting child pornography does not require reexamination of the original decision denying the motion to suppress, because defendant did not in his original motion papers seek suppression of those two image files. In any event, the People have expressed no intent to use them at trial."], "id": "77fc095c-73bf-4e16-ac5c-a41fd454ae83", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The supporting affidavit identified Jennie Reynolds as the subscriber to the Comcast account with the suspect IP address. The affidavit stated that \"the person responsible for the trading of <mask> from this residence can be anyone with access to the internet signal associated with this residence.\" Neither the warrant nor the affidavit mentioned Nguyen. Pierce testified that at the time he sought the warrant he did not know Nguyen lived in the rear residence, and he had no information *128on the relationship between Nguyen, Reynolds, and Blankenship. *579The day before police executed the search warrant, they notified the Mountain View Police Department of the impending search of Nguyen's residence. On the day of the search, San Jos\u00e9 police officers surreptitiously followed Nguyen driving from the property at 309 South 23rd Street to the Mountain View Police Department. When Nguyen arrived at work to report for duty, two Mountain View police officers took him aside, informed him of the search, and told him to wait with them until the search was complete."], "id": "55e98bd3-96a3-452e-b49c-ee6d1bfa6596", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\u2013 15 \u2013 2719 But these comments did not relate to the images introduced at trial; rather, they referred to Lee\u2019s <mask> collection as a whole. Noting that many of the images were \u201cextraordinarily disturbing and inflammatory when we\u2019re talking about sexual abuse of a minor of a six-year-old and an eleven-year-old,\u201d the court proceeded to rule that the vast majority of the images were inadmissible, and that only a few images that appeared similar to \u201cthe ages of the victims in the case and the conduct that is alleged to have occurred\u201d could be shown to the jury. Ultimately, only eight images, including the two images for which Lee was indicted, survived the trial court\u2019s review. Thus, due to the care the trial court took to whittle down the number of images presented to the jury \u2014 and to exclude the most prejudicial of those images \u2014 the potential for undue prejudice was greatly diminished. Moreover, as we previously noted, Lee\u2019s statements \u2014 particularly his statement about not being interested in sex \u2014 provided a case-specific relevancy for these images. Ultimately, even when charges are improperly joined, the error requires reversal \u201conly if the defendant makes a particularized showing of prejudice.\u201d As we have previously stated: It is not enough for the defendant to show that evidence of the various charges was not cross-admissible, nor is it enough for the defendant to assert in general terms that the trial of several charges at once might suggest to the jurors that the defendant has a criminal disposition.[31]"], "id": "bde1ce53-614e-4cd2-b676-a35f5b5577a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["847 F. App\u2019x 523, 525\u201326 (10th Cir. 2021) (emphasizing that Congress \u201creduce[d] the government\u2019s burden on the interstate commerce element\u201d when it amended a materially identical offense to include the words \u201cusing any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce\u201d) (interpreting \u00a7 2252A). That is to say, the interstate-commerce element of \u00a7 2252(a)(2) is satisfied when a defendant uses the internet to distribute <mask>, regardless of whether there is evidence that the data travelled interstate."], "id": "2eb2b3dd-a224-4223-a830-d0b03788ba24", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, Dr. Kline concluded that Derby was more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. Dr. Kline explained that predatory acts are those directed towards individuals, including family members, for the primary purpose of victimization. Dr. Kline noted that children portrayed in <mask> are also victimized. Dr. Kline explained that Derby's past offense against his nephew was a predatory, sexual act and that Derby's purpose in molesting his nephew was victimization. Dr. Kline opined that future acts by Derby were similarly more likely than not to be of a predatory, sexually violent nature involving some victimization."], "id": "5a506ebe-afa8-4334-b1c4-953a934ddcca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["template that the statute applies in a situation where the patient merely blurts out that he has an addiction to <mask>.\u201d Instead, under its policy, reporting would be required in contexts where the patient \u201cis drawn to a particular child,\u201d \u201cknows the identity or whereabouts of a child depicted in the pornography,\u201d \u201chelp[s] to produce the pornogra- phy,\u201d or in other contexts where \u201cthere is an identifiable child or identifiable children that could be the subject of action by the child protective agency.\u201d E-mail for Jeannie S. Rhee, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, from John Casciotti, Office of General Coun-"], "id": "edaa08fb-e1a0-4b87-8d19-c2f914352283", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Resolution of the issue presented requires us to consider the interplay of several statutes. In 2009, the Legislature amended Article 39.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and added Articles 39.15 and 38.45. Act 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 276, \u00a7\u00a7 1-3, 2009 TEX.GEN.LAWS 732-33. The stated purpose of these legislative changes was to remove the ability of defendants charged with possession or promotion of <mask> to retain copies of the evidence against them, including child pornography. Texas Bill Analysis, 81st Leg., R.S., S.B. 595 (September 17, 2009)."], "id": "4ca28b97-a7aa-449f-9906-bf51aac4e10f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["10. On appeal, defendant argues Karen\u2019s testimony and the subsequent <mask> possession evidence was insufficient to clearly and convincingly corroborate Jane\u2019s allegations; the statute of limitations, therefore, could not be tolled under section 803(f), and counts 3, 4, 5 and 9 must be reversed as time barred. B. Corroboration Requirement Supported by Substantial Evidence 1. Section 803 If a pleading is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the prosecution must allege facts that toll the limitation period. (People v. Crosby (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 724.) Pursuant to section 803(f), an expired statute of limitations period may be tolled under particular circumstances. A criminal complaint may be filed within one year of a police report for certain sexual offenses, such as violations of section 288, 261, and 289, which are at issue here, that were committed against victims when they were less than 18 years old. (\u00a7 803, subd. (f)(1).) For tolling to apply under these circumstances, the following criteria must be established: (1) the limitations period specified in sections 800, 801, or 801.1, whichever is later, has expired (\u00a7 803, subd. (f)(2)(A)); (2) the crime involved substantial sexual conduct as described in section 1203.066, subdivision (b), excluding masturbation that is not mutual (\u00a7 803, subd. (f)(2)(B)); and (3) there is independent evidence that corroborates the victim\u2019s allegations (\u00a7 803(f)(2)(C)). If the victim is 21 years of age or older at the time of the report, section 803(f)(2)(C) states that \u201cthe independent evidence shall clearly and convincingly corroborate the victim\u2019s allegation.\u201d Further, \u201c[e]vidence shall not be used to corroborate the victim\u2019s allegation if that evidence would otherwise be inadmissible during trial\u201d (\u00a7 803, subd. (f)(3)), and \u201c[i]ndependent evidence excludes the opinions of mental health professionals\u201d (ibid.)."], "id": "9bbd6863-d85d-4343-ac7b-7fddee911b1d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the days and weeks that followed, the wife began cleaning up the cluttered basement where many of Steele's possessions remained. During one of her cleaning sessions, the wife found a purple box that had fallen behind a desk. This box contained several floppy disks. She informed her son, and they used a device belonging to her mother to determine what was on the disks. Based on the file names, they turned the disks over to Detective Horn, who determined that seven disks held <mask> and four held photos of nude adult celebrities. Detective Horn had also determined that the iPad contained photos of nude celebrities, non-celebrity nude photos, clothed women, and nature. Detective Horn never visited the apartment, and he took the wife at her word as to where the floppy disks were found. Steele did not present any witnesses, but the Commonwealth played his recorded police statement without objection, in which he characterized the voyeurism as a mistake and denied possessing any child pornography."], "id": "007b1c1f-cb03-427f-a040-d5a5a8acfe4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["abuse, regardless of where the suspected victim is cared for or resides. We recognize that the scope of some of the statutory language may be ambig- uous, and that narrower readings of the reporting requirement find some support in certain of the statute\u2019s provisions. But we believe that section 13031, read as a whole and in light of its purpose, is best interpreted broadly. Second, you have inquired whether the VCAA\u2019s reporting obligation is triggered when a person covered by section 13031 learns that a patient under his or her care has viewed <mask>, even if the person does not know, and has no reason to believe the patient knows, the identi- ty of the child or children depicted in the pornography. We conclude that the fact that a patient has viewed child pornography may be a \u201cfact[] . . . giv[ing] reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse\u201d under section 13031, and that the statute does not require a cov- ered professional to possess knowledge of the identity of an affected child in order for the reporting duty to apply. We have concluded that the interpretive questions you have raised can be resolved using ordinary tools of statutory construction, so we have not applied the rule of lenity even though the VCAA provides for criminal penalties. We note, however, that a person who fails to make a report required by section 13031 will not necessarily be subject to criminal penalties under the statute. The criminal penalty provision contains no explicit mens rea requirement, and thus one would almost certainly be inferred. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994). While we need not decide what mens rea would apply, a court construing section 13031 might well require a defendant to have known that a report was legally required before imposing criminal liability for a failure to report. Such a reading would, among other things, address any concern about imposing criminal liability on persons who lacked clear notice that the failure to report in their particular circumstances was unlawful."], "id": "0057ad46-e397-4f38-ba7a-d0ce0cdb6ff1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["\"Determining whether an expectation of privacy is 'legitimate' or 'reasonable' necessarily entails a balancing of interests.\" ( Hudson , supra , 468 U.S. at p. 527, 104 S.Ct. 3194.) Here, the competing interests are defendant's interest in privacy within his area of the CSH dormitory and society's interests in both the security and order of a maximum-security psychiatric hospital and the treatment and rehabilitation of SVP's. \"Virtually the only place [patients] can conceal ... contraband [such as child pornography] is in their [dormitories].\" ( Ibid. ) A recognition of privacy rights for SVP's in their dormitories would hamper CSH staff from accessing the dormitories and ferreting out <mask>, the possession of which has become widespread, has incited violence among the patients, and clearly undermines the rehabilitation objective. Searches of the over 800 SVP's and their dormitories, even if done at random, \" 'are valid and necessary to ensure the security of the institution and the safety of [patients]' \" ( id. at p. 529, 104 S.Ct. 3194 ) as well as promote the rehabilitation objective, giving CSH staff \" 'flexibility' \" and preventing patients \" 'from anticipating, and thereby thwarting, a search for contraband' \" ( ibid. ), a key concern at CSH. We also point out the record establishes a CSH dormitory \" 'shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home' \" ( id. at p. 527, 104 S.Ct. 3194 ): the dormitory itself *496accommodates multiple patients, officers conduct random searches on a daily basis, and various signs throughout the facility warn patients they are subject to such searches."], "id": "84ed0088-38b6-42ca-8336-4246e296b360", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Lewis Bart Stone, J. Bernard Millan pleaded guilty on May 12, 1999, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, to an indictment charging a violation of 18 USC \u00a7 2252 (a) (2), a federal class C felony, carrying a potential punishment of more than one-year imprisonment. The indictment charged that \u201cMillan attempted to purchase videotapes depicting <mask>.\u201d The underlying facts indicate that Millan, using a computer, ordered tapes which depicted sex acts involving children ages 5, 6 and 14 years old.1"], "id": "f169549f-8e58-4551-97ff-be9aba6b2c4d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This is a different situation than that encountered in the context of simple obscenity, as opposed to <mask>. If *643we were only dealing with materials alleged to be obscene, the labeling, on the computer file folder table of contents page, of files as \u201csexually explicit\u201d would not be enough to suggest that, in addition, the file images contained therein were obscene, because an additional finding beyond sexual explicitness, which could only occur by a viewing of the files, would have to be made. In that situation, a warrant would have to be obtained to open the individual files labeled as sexually explicit, on an additional showing beyond the labeling that obscenity may probably be present. That is the point of Walter v United States (447 US 649, 657 [1980] [from the labeling alone, \u201cone could only draw inferences about what was on the films\u201d]), and also the point of United States v Carey (172d at 1273-1276)."], "id": "2c96fd9e-8596-4392-b5ff-cf519988a3c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Keone Jason Lee was convicted, following a jury trial, of five counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, nine counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, two counts of third-degree assault, and two counts of possession of <mask>.1 The sexual abuse charges related to acts of penetration and sexual contact with two young girls \u2014 eleven-year-old S.A. and her sister, six-year-old D.A. Lee raises four claims on appeal. First, he argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for possession of child pornography. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support these convictions. Second, Lee argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Lee\u2019s motion to sever the possession of child pornography charges from the sexual abuse charges. For the reasons explained here, we find no abuse of discretion. Third, Lee argues that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated when the court allowed the State to play a video recording of an interview of D.A. made at a child advocacy center. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that D.A. was available for cross-examination, and admission of the recorded interview therefore did not violate Lee\u2019s right to confrontation. Fourth, Lee argues that the trial court erred in concluding that his prior military adjudication for possession of child pornography qualified as a prior felony for presumptive sentencing purposes. Lee raises two separate issues with regard to this claim of error. Lee first asserts that the federal crime for possessing child pornography is not similar to the Alaska crime for possessing child pornography and therefore cannot qualify as a prior felony conviction under Alaska law. We find no merit to this contention. Lee also argues that military adjudications should not count as prior felony convictions for purposes of Alaska presumptive sentencing law because defendants in military tribunals are not entitled to a unanimous verdict by a jury of their peers. For the"], "id": "89a6df5e-f5f6-4c93-a5d1-ce502b445bd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["These factors have been adopted by many state courts for analyzing analogous issues arising under state <mask> laws, including courts in Texas which have treated the term \"lascivious\" as used in the federal statute as synonymous with \"lewd\" as used in the Texas statute.... We agree with the other Texas courts of appeals which have applied the Dost factors as a framework for analyzing whether images could be considered \"lewd\" for purposes of the child pornography laws.68 In Tovar v. State ,69 the Fourth Court of Appeals followed the Dost factors, as paraphrased by the Fifth Court of Appeals in Alexander v. State :"], "id": "c97bbfbe-4724-41d8-ac98-bc1efbc77dfe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*431Mr. Marrero is 33 years old and has had no other contacts with the criminal justice system. He has suffered from severe problems with depression and social anxiety arising from prior physical abuse by his father. Psychiatric evaluations indicated that he posed little risk of committing a contact sex offense. His prospects for committing another <mask> crime, however, were less certain. Mr. Marrero\u2019s counsel argued that the defendant did not view the child pornographic images on his computer for sexual pleasure but rather because he identified with the pain and abuse the children in the videos had suffered. In the court\u2019s view, however, the evidence indicated that the defendant also may well have been motivated at least in part by sexual desire. The evidence indicated that although Mr. Marrero could not be diagnosed with pedophilia, such a diagnosis could also not be ruled out. Mr. Marrero has expressed remorse for his crime. He currently lives and cares for his ailing mother in public housing but would apparently have to move out of his mother\u2019s apartment if he were designated as anything other than a level one offender. He has been complying with the requirements of his supervision."], "id": "eee04dd9-3e21-44bd-a792-6ca968369f20", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["13. Defendant claims the <mask> possession offenses are too temporally attenuated and substantively different from the molestation offenses to constitute clear and convincing independent corroboration. Defendant points out the sex offenses occurred more than 20 years before the child pornography offenses, and he argues child pornography possession is not sufficiently similar to the child molestation offenses to show any type of propensity or corroborative link. Child pornography is defined broadly under section 311.11(a) as any type of information, data or image that depicts a person under the age of 18 years old engaging in or simulating \u201csexual conduct\u201d as that term is defined in section 311.4, subdivision (d). (\u00a7 311.11(a).) Material covered under that umbrella would include images or video of two 17-year-old teenagers engaged in intercourse to toddlers engaged in sexual intercourse with adults. All child pornography uniformly victimizes the minor or minors involved\u2014and often does so repeatedly, given vast proliferation of such materials via the internet. Yet, not all child pornography encompassed by section 311.11(a)\u2019s definition involves an adult male lewdly and sexually touching, penetrating and orally copulating (or being copulated by) a female child under the age of 15 years\u2014which is much of the child pornography defendant possessed. It was not just the fact of defendant\u2019s conviction for child pornography possession the factfinder had available to consider as corroborating evidence\u2013there was significant evidence of the amount and nature of the child pornography defendant possessed. The child pornography defendant possessed mirrored the types of offenses Jane alleged defendant committed against her. Defendant possessed child pornography that exclusively depicted female children under the age of 15 years, and many of the admitted images and videos depicted female children ages six to nine years old, either being vaginally penetrated by an adult male penis or the female child was orally copulating an adult male penis. Jane described instances of defendant placing his fingers inside her vagina, rubbing his penis on her vagina and inserting it, and orally copulating her, all"], "id": "4044edad-e8b9-4ca6-854b-cae72636de71", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Pursuant to this court\u2019s decision in State v. Crawford (202 Conn. 443), the issuance of an arrest warrant within the time period prescribed by the applicable criminal statute of limitations commences a prosecution for purposes of satisfying that statute of limitations, so long as the warrant is executed without unreasonable delay. The state, on the granting of permission, appealed from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of an information charging the defendant with possession of <mask> in the first degree. In 2009, the police executed a search warrant at the defendant\u2019s residence and seized two of his com- puters. Thereafter, the defendant signed a sworn statement in which he admitted to possessing child pornography. The defendant was not arrested at that time but was informed by the police that he would be arrested as soon as a forensic examination of his computers was completed. In 2011, the defendant moved to California. In 2013, after the state forensic laboratory issued a report confirming the presence of child pornography on the computers, and after the police confirmed the defendant\u2019s address in California, an arrest warrant for the defendant was issued. Between 2009 and 2018, the police, despite having the defen- dant\u2019s cell phone number, never attempted to communicate with the defendant about the status of his case. In 2018, nearly five years after the warrant was issued and more than three years after the applicable statute of limitations ((Rev. to 2009) \u00a7 54-193 (b)) purportedly expired, the defendant was arrested and charged with possession of child pornog- raphy in the first degree. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information, claiming that the delay in the execution of the arrest warrant was unreasonable under Crawford and, therefore, that his prosecution was time barred. In response, the state argued that, because the defendant had moved to California in 2011, the tolling provision of \u00a7 54-193 (c), which extends the time within which an infor- mation may be brought with respect to a person who fled from and resided outside of the state after the commission of the offense, tolled the limitation period within which the warrant could be executed. In granting the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that the tolling provision was inapplicable because the arrest warrant was issued within the limitation period, the defendant had not fled the state within the meaning of the tolling provision, the defendant met his burden of demonstrating his availability for arrest, and the state failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the nearly five year delay in the warrant\u2019s execution was not unreasonable under Crawford. On appeal, the state, conceding that the five year delay in the execution of the arrest warrant was unreasonable, claimed that the trial court nevertheless incorrectly concluded that the tolling provision of \u00a7 54-193 (c) was inapplicable in light of the fact that the arrest warrant was issued within the limitation period. Held that the trial court correctly concluded that the tolling provision of \u00a7 54-193 (c) was inapplicable, as that provision tolls the limitation period solely with respect to the time within which a prosecution may be brought and does not purport to address prosecutions, such as the present one, that have already been brought, at which point there is no need for tolling because the statute of limitations has already been satisfied; moreover, contrary to the state\u2019s assertion that this court\u2019s interpretation of \u00a7 54-193 (c) penalizes it for obtaining an arrest warrant within the limitation period, this court\u2019s case law indicates that, so long as the warrant is executed without unreasonable delay, the state can continue to prosecute the defendant as soon as it is able to locate and arrest him. Argued April 29\u2014officially released October 1, 2021**"], "id": "5fc5da65-bcdc-43ee-a0c1-97274bd3aec3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["While in prison, Reddig completed the Missouri Sex Offender Program (\"MOSOP\"), and was released on parole in 2013. He was allowed to move to Kansas to live with his aunt and uncle. While in an outpatient sex offender treatment program, Reddig admitted to viewing and masturbating to pornography of children as young as four. His treatment was increased, but he continued looking at <mask> for children then as young as age two. Reddig was terminated from outpatient treatment due to concerns that he was going to reoffend."], "id": "4ecf4df1-a924-4452-8b99-70bd538edce4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["According to Dr. Proctor, it was more accurate to place Williams in the \"moderate\" range for reoffending. He stated that Williams has an \"ingrained history of sexual interest in children, including prepubescent children,\" and that the Static-99R did not account for his long history of offending before his nine convictions of sexual-related offenses. Dr. Proctor considered the existence of unreported victims, including Williams' cousin, a situation in which Williams invited children to view pornography with him while he lived with his sister, the fact that he was fired from his student job at the University of Houston for printing a pornographic picture which may have been of a child, and his strong interest in viewing <mask>. Dr. Proctor stated that, considering the \"whole picture,\" he \"fe[lt] like there's a level of risk here that isn't fully captured by the Static.\""], "id": "da187c83-c8d5-4aa8-bd25-89af9cb37035", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["[Defense counsel]: I believe they're about to try to get in the images right now. Right? I don't think they should be on a disk like this. Right? Because they need to be able to be published to the jury via the Elmo like we had the last time and that way- ... [Defense counsel]: -and that way in case they need to be recalled by the jury or referenced in later examinations that way we don't have to bring it up on a computer when the whole worry about attaching this to a computer is that it would be attached to the Internet. [The prosecutor]: May I respond? Your Honor, I brought the computer where we view the <mask> images that has no Internet connection. I have already prepared it and set it up to the Elmo for us to publish it there and when we are done with the trial, I would leave the [sic] it with the bailiff so that he could provide it to the jury if they want to review images again- [The trial court]: But he wants the printed out images for the jury. [Emphasis added]. Following a break, the parties and the trial court continued to discuss the issue. [The trial court]: We're back on the record outside the presence of the jury at 8:50. I asked the state to go ahead and print out copies. It is now 25 minutes later and the state wants to make a record, but I expect and I hope that the copies are printed. Go ahead. [The prosecutor]: Okay. Your Honor, just to clarify on the record. What was happening during this trial of aggravated sexual assault, I was in the process of showing State's Exhibit Number 3 to the witness, Detective Hanner. State's Exhibit Number 3 contains 10 images of child pornography that are relevant to this case. Defense counsel then asked to approach the bench and in approaching the bench, defense counsel stated that they needed to have a copy-the pictures printed out so that they could refer to during the trial and- [The trial court]: Okay. [The prosecutor]: -have access- [The trial court]: Okay. Well, I want to clarify that. [The prosecutor]: -from what I recall. [The trial court]: Well, I want to clarify- [The prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor. [The trial court]: -that they were not saying they had to have it. They were making that as a suggestion. The record will show what it shows. But it was me, not the defense, who ordered the copies and I didn't clarify that it was in response to defense's request, but it's the way that I want to handle the trial. So continue. [The prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor. And in doing so after that request-or after that suggestion was made by defense counsel, the state did object to the court's telling the state-requesting the state to print out the images of the child pornography. Section 39.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure titled discovery of evidence depicting or describing abuse of a minor or sexual conduct by a child or a minor under section C states that a court shall deny any request by a defendant to copy, photo-photograph, duplicate or otherwise reproduce any property or material described by subsection A provided that the state makes the property *63and material reasonably available to the defendant. Under subsection A, Your Honor, the article states that in any manner provided by this article, the court shall allow discovery under article 39.14 of property or material that constitutes child pornography as described by section 43.26. And then also it refers to section 38.071. If I may just refer to that. ... [The prosecutor]: 38.071 talks about testimony of a child who is a victim of the offense. This is the part that talks about any type of evidence that depicts a child talking about sexual assault. One of the offenses listed in that section is aggravated sexual assault of a child so it refers to that one. Your Honor, under 39.15 the state is-we're not able to duplicate the evidence of child pornography. The-if I may suggest what could happen, the disk itself, State's Exhibit Number 3, is supposed to remain in the state's possession or in the court's possession. If the court would like to take possession of State's Exhibit 3 and would like to print out the pictures, then that is something that the state would be in agreement with. But as far as us printing them out or duplicating them as far as 39.15, under that particular law, we cannot duplicate, Your Honor, these images. [The trial court]: Okay. Then you can't put this evidence in this trial. Okay? I've followed your argument and the discovery statute doesn't apply to trial. And 38.071 says this article applies only to a hearing or proceeding in which the court determines that a child younger than 13 would be unavailable to testify. So everything you've given to me, you either reduce it to the format that I require or proceed on the case. It's not coming in. Are you ready? [The prosecutor]: No, Your Honor. We actually need a moment to do that. The State asked the trial court to sign an order that he was requiring the State to print out the images, but the trial court refused. The State also asked the trial court to reconsider the ruling because the only means of viewing the restored digital images was on a computer and the images could not be printed. The trial court summarily dismissed this concern and stated that the digital images could be reproduced by taking a photograph of each digital image and printing it. The State also argued that reproducing the images might violate Section 43.26 of the Texas Penal Code. The trial court recalled that the digital images were viewed in court on the screen during the first trial, but the court was requiring in this trial that they \"come off the CD.\" Without any objection from the defense to the admission of State's Exhibit 3, the trial court ruled that the exhibit and its contents were not relevant because they were not in the format required by the court.2 Further, the trial court prohibited the State from eliciting testimony from Detective Hanner about his observations of the digital images."], "id": "3532b476-5181-4300-b66b-7c07ef0f78e6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "child pornography", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["We again find Gray instructive. There, a doctor who specialized in psychiatry was charged with multiple criminal counts, including possession of controlled substances ( Health & Saf. Code, \u00a7\u00a7 11153, subd. (a), 11350, subd. (a), 11375, subd. (b)(2) ) and <mask> ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 311.11 ), as well as sexually exploiting a patient or former patient ( Bus. & Prof. Code, \u00a7 729 ). ( Gray , supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 635, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50.) The Attorney General appeared at the arraignment without notice and \"asked that 'as a condition of release on bail that Dr. Gray's [medical] license be suspended so that he will not be able to prescribe drugs or have access to any kind of patients at all.' \" ( Id. at pp. 635-636, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50.) The trial court agreed and ordered, as a condition of O.R. bail release, that the defendant not practice medicine. ( Id. at p. 636, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50.)"], "id": "57f0abae-a60f-4ddf-87b6-fd04b6d79bab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the instant case, the obvious legislative intent for the application of section 245.00 of the Penal Law was to proscribe <mask> of a public nature or like or similar public-type *410of acts. Whatever the exact scope of application, it cannot be reasonably argued that this section is to apply to performances inside a building which cannot as here, be observed by anyone outside of said building."], "id": "add5ac38-c331-4e0f-b7f6-8f5c077a4afa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["A cogent observation by a California court has direct application in this case: \u2018 \u2018 Our ruling in this case rests on the simple proposition that a dance performed before an audience for entertainment cannot be held to violate the statutory prohibitions of <mask> and lewd or desolate conduct in the absence of proof that the dance, tested in the context of contemporary community standards, appealed to the prurient interest of the audience and affronted standards of decency generally accepted in the community * \u00b0 * We shall point out that the performance of such a dance, like other forms of expression or communication, prima facie enjoys protection under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; it loses such protection upon a showing of its obscenity. To show such obscenity, however, the prosecution must introduce evidence that, applying contemporary standards, the questioned dance appealed to the prurient interest of the audience and affronted the standards of decency accepted in the community.\u201d (Matter of Qianmni, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 564 \u2014 65, 567; emphasis supplied)."], "id": "fad49b9d-e774-4ddd-9c81-cb2f4e07cee8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court\u2019s attention has been directed to the broad, penetrating pronouncement of the Supreme Court of California in Matter of Lynch (8 Cal. 3d 410). The court there, in declaring cruel and unusual a mandatory life term for a second offense of <mask>, isolated severe tests to be employed in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. They are: (1) whether the punishment fits the offense and the offender, keeping in mind the danger to society and the penological purpose of rehabilitation; (2) comparison of the challenged,punishment with punishment prescribed in the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses; and (3) comparison of the challenged punishment with that prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. The court notes that similar tests were applied in Hart v. Coiner (483 F. 2d 136) holding a mandatory life sentence under the recidivism statute for a bad check offense to be unconstitutional as cruel and unusual."], "id": "604f79f8-83c4-43be-8f76-7db471b8da6a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Upon examination of the cases referred to by the prosecution, this court is still unable to reach a similar conclusion on the issue of sufficiency. The accusatory instruments in the cited cases differ from the case at bar. The dismissed accusatory instrument in People v McNamara (78 NY2d 626 [1991]) alleged that the <mask> took place in the rear seat of a vehicle parked on a street; the other accusatory instruments in McNamara alleged that the sexual acts were committed on a public residential street and were likewise dismissed. The Court\u2019s basis for affirming these dismissals is that these accusatory instruments failed to allege facts supporting the conclusion that the acts complained of occurred in public places. (Id. at 630.) So while the prosecution argues that the location here, as described in their papers, meets the legal standard, the Court in McNamara requires the accusatory instrument to include more information for sufficiency purposes: the accusatory instrument and the accompanying supporting deposition must include the facts that exist to establish the statutory element that the acts were committed in a \u201cpublic place\u201d (id.), or private premises under circumstances in which he may readily be observed from either a public place or from other private premises, and with intent that he be so observed. (Penal Law \u00a7 245.00 [b].)"], "id": "dbfb272d-0469-4b25-afb3-f7f1a55abd22", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["This prosecution of the defendant for the crime of <mask> pursuant to section 1140 of the Penal Law had its inception on March 12, 1965, at approximately 9:30 p.m., when Detectives George F. Burlison and James Clark arrived at the defendant\u2019s home in Wantagh, Long Island, New York. They testified in substance that the defendant\u2019s wife Wilma J. Frank answered the door \u2014 that they identified themselves as detectives from the Seventh Squad and asked if they could speak to the defendant alone. They further testified that they advised the defendant that they were investigating a complaint of indecent exposure, and that the defendant accompanied them to the Seventh Precinct located at Merrick Boad and Neptune Boulevard, Seaford, where they arrived with him at about 10 :00 p.m. At the precinct they advised the defendant that they had been given a license plate number by two girls relative to an exposure inci*562dent near Jerusalem Avenue Junior High School, which checked out to his name and address. Detective Burlison testified that the defendant then admitted that he was the one who did it and the detective then asked the defendant if he wanted an attorney hut that the defendant said \u201c No \u201d. The defendant then telephoned his wife after which in response to Detective Burlison\u2019s questions he gave a statement, of which Detective Burlison typed approximately 80% with the remainder being typed by Detective Arthur Holder \u2014 this latter part being the incriminating portion of said statement (People\u2019s Exh. I). Detective Clark did not participate in the taking of the defendant\u2019s statement having\u2019 left the defendant in Detective Burlison\u2019s custody after their arrival at the precinct. Defendant\u2019s statement of approximately one and one-quarter pages in length was signed by the defendant and witnessed by Detectives Burlison and Holder."], "id": "93d1e815-6737-427c-bfe7-e2fbc43f0d0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Topless appearances are a form of expression explicitly excluded from the broad protection of the First Amendment. (Matter of J.B.H. Rest. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 28 A D 2d 521, affd. 21 N Y 2d 846.) \u201cPetitioner\u2019s reliance on the constitutional privilege of free expression * * * is without substance.\u201d The court opined that the undeclared purpose of featuring topless waitresses had nothing to do with self-expression, but was a \u2018 \u2018 bald attempt to profit on <mask> and drink.\u201d"], "id": "d82895a3-7744-4d06-921e-ca2791dcc815", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*119In 1983, the Legislature considered, and passed, a totally revised version of the <mask> laws. Insofar as possible, it made the statute gender-neutral, i.e., applicable to both men and women, and banned public nudity by persons of either sex. But the new statute retained the sexually based discrimination in respect to breasts, and continued, in the very same language, to forbid only women from exposing their breasts in public.4"], "id": "ab57325c-c6ea-4523-ad58-754677c043c2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Since Griswold v Connecticut (381 US 479 [1965]), funda*122mental rights of privacy and liberty which individuals have claimed to \"emanate\u201d from the Constitution have expanded significantly. In 1986, Robert Hollman, who had appeared nude on Jacob Riis Beach in Queens, and who had been convicted of a violation of the present <mask> law (Penal Law \u00a7 245.01), tried to persuade thfe New York Court of Appeals that he held a fundamental constitutional right to appear nude in public. Hollman\u2019s arguments to that court at the time are virtually identical to the defendants\u2019 argument to this court now: to wit, that nudism promotes physical and psychological health, heightened awareness of human potentials, and freedom from the repressions of Puritanism and the constraints of clothing."], "id": "9a4ba77e-8dff-4e87-8b90-7702614a1a74", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": [". The court acknowledges here that, notwithstanding the disclaimers in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Hollman case (68 NY2d 202), the purpose of the <mask> law is not only to provide general public access to recreational areas, but it is also to set a standard of morally decent behavior. It is because public nudity is not morally decent and acceptable that families stayed away from Jacob Riis Beach. Reestablishment of the moral standards on public nudity, in effect, returned the beach to the general public, and specifically, to family use. Therefore, there is no question that the indecent exposure laws enact moral judgments which serve to benefit the common good. Law and morality are not so separate when the public order must be served. Moreover, it is clear that under the New York Constitution, an advocate of public nudism cannot be a law unto himself."], "id": "5e48d781-d02d-42c6-a4b0-c7910376b75a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["During the course of the trial the theory of plaintiff\u2019s libel cause of action shifted from an emphasis upon the alleged <mask> of her likeness in these sketches to the claim that they were obscene and suggestive in their surroundings and not fair representations of the character she portrayed in the motion picture. The original complaint included both claims, but the \u2018 \u2018 indecent exposure \u2019 \u2019 count was dropped when it developed that in several of plaintiff\u2019s former pictures as well as in a poster photograph taken at the conclusion of this picture for the express purpose of advertising it she had exposed her chest in equal or greater degree."], "id": "e45a2c24-8183-4aa7-922b-1c48f93c64cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["14. when she was between the ages of 10 and 15 years old. The child pornography defendant possessed was highly consistent with the sex offenses against Jane in terms of the age and gender of the victims, the age (adult) and gender of the perpetrators (male), and the types of acts committed\u2014vaginal penetration and oral copulation. Due to these significant parallels, the child pornography possession offenses had strong corroborative value with respect to Jane\u2019s allegations. Defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372 does not persuade us differently. There, the court concluded a misdemeanor <mask> charge could not rationally support an inference the defendant had a propensity to commit a subsequent sexual assault. (Id. at pp. 396\u2013400.) The court reasoned the two sex acts were different, and the \u201cpropensity to commit one kind of act cannot be supposed, without further evidentiary foundation, to demonstrate a propensity to commit a different act.\u201d (Id. at p. 399.) Unlike the differences between indecent exposure and sexual assault at issue in People v. Earle, there is a recognized nexus between pedophilia and child pornography. (See People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 864\u2013865 [possession of child pornography evidence of the defendant\u2019s intent to molest young boys], overruled on a different ground in People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 181, fn. 2; see also United States v. Brand (2d Cir. 2006) 467 F.3d 179, 201 [\u201cBoth Congress and at least one other court have concluded that possession of child pornography signals the abnormal sexual attraction to children underlying a person\u2019s motivation to commit sexual crimes against children.\u201d], abrogated on another ground by United States v. Cabrera (2021) 13 F.4th 140, 147.) Beyond defendant\u2019s admission to police officers, the child pornography affirmed defendant\u2019s sexual interest in children. (See, e.g., United States v. Bentley (N.D.Iowa 2007) 475 F.Supp.2d 852, 858 [difference between prior sexual assaults of children and current prosecution for possessing child pornography \u201care not as great as they might seem at first glance\u201d because \u201c[t]he child pornographer, like the child rapist, displays a sexual interest in children\u201d].) That fact is relevant to the allegation that he sexually"], "id": "71780055-d34a-46a3-ac7b-d9e9397eef14", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The alleged <mask> by defendant, committed in the presence of complainant\u2019s mother hours before the acts here *108complained. of happened, and which defendant denies, was improperly received. This testimony is no part of the res gestae; and if it is developed as a specific wrong by the defendant to show his bad character, such evidence is inadmissible. (People v. Richardson, 222 N. Y. 103.) It is error that is prejudicial and harmful. We cannot disregard it (see section 542, Code Criminal Procedure) ; and it calls for a reversal and new trial."], "id": "bbfa9a30-9266-4a26-8b95-c15777698f82", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Lonnie J. Arnold was convicted following a jury trial of aggravated <mask>, MCL 750.335a(2)(b), and indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, MCL 750.335a(2)(c). He was sentenced by the Monroe Circuit Court, Michael A. Weipert, J., as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 25 to 70 years in prison for indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person; his sentence for aggravated indecent exposure was later set aside. At sentencing, Arnold argued that MCL 750.335a(2)(c) required a sentence of \u201c1 day to life\u201d as provided in the statute, but the trial court stated that it was prohibited from imposing a sentence with a minimum penalty of a term of years and a maximum penalty of life. The court\u2019s minimum sentence of 25 years was calculated to fit within the sentencing guidelines range. Arnold appealed his sentence. The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, which held that the \u201c1 day to life\u201d sentence for indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person in MCL 750.335a(2)(c) was an alternative to the other sentences provided in MCL 750.335a and was not modifiable. People v Arnold, 502 Mich 438 (2018) (Arnold I). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to resolve the effect of the sentencing guidelines on the sentencing scheme for sexually delinquent persons in MCL 750.335a(2)(c). On remand, the Court of Appeals, GLEICHER, P.J., MURRAY, C.J., and CAVANAGH, J., concluded that the sentencing guidelines provide another sentencing alternative for persons convicted of indecent exposure as sexual delinquents. Accordingly, a sentencing court can sentence such defendants to either \u201c1 day to life\u201d or to a sentence premised on the guidelines. Because the trial court was not aware of this range of sentencing options, the Court of Appeals vacated Arnold\u2019s sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. 328 Mich App 592 (2019). Arnold sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Court granted his application for leave to appeal. 505 Mich 1001 (2020)."], "id": "ad9c3b9d-afde-440e-9a1b-b7d32b375f0c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["MCL 750.335a prohibits <mask> and aggravated indecent exposure, establishes penalties for those offenses, and establishes an alternative sentence that is available when a defendant commits one of those offenses while being a sexually delinquent person. In Arnold I, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to allow a defendant convicted of an indecent-exposure offense as a sexually delinquent person to be sentenced to either a nonmodifiable sentence of \u201c1 day to life\u201d under MCL 750.335a(2)(c) or to the appropriate penalty in MCL 750.335a(2)(a) or (b). Under MCL 777.16q of the sentencing guidelines, MCL 750.335a(2)(c) is a Class A felony punishable by a statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The guidelines grid for Class A felonies at MCL 777.62 lays out a range of possible minimum sentences for term-of-years sentences, depending on how the guidelines are scored, in contrast to the \u201c1 day to life\u201d sentence in MCL 750.335a(2)(c). MCL 777.16q and MCL 777.62 thus appear to allow for sentences that clash with the \u201c1 day to life\u201d sentence in MCL 750.335a(2)(c). This apparent conflict required a determination of whether the guidelines create a substantive-penalty provision for MCL 750.335a(2)(c) that authorizes the courts to impose that penalty to the exclusion of the penalty in MCL 750.335a(2)(c). The guidelines do not purport to trump the substantive penalties in the statutes that establish the criminal offense; rather, in MCL 769.34(2)(a), the Legislature has subordinated the guidelines to the applicable penalty provisions in the substantive criminal statutes. Accordingly, because MCL 750.335a(2)(c) establishes a mandatory minimum sentence of one day and makes no allowance for variances, the court must impose the sentence in MCL 750.335a(2)(c) or the applicable alternative in MCL 750.335a(2)(a) or (b). The only possible textual basis for a term-of-years sentence for MCL 750.335a(2)(c) is a reference in MCL 777.16q to \u201cLife\u201d as the statutory maximum sentence for that offense. But nothing in the text indicates that the term \u201cLife\u201d can encompass any term of years, such as the 70-year maximum sentence imposed by the trial court in this case. Interpreting \u201clife\u201d to mean \u201clife or any term of years\u201d would cut against the meaning of life imprisonment as well as caselaw treating life sentences and term-of- years sentences as mutually exclusive. Further, while \u201clife\u201d might be the only possible maximum sentence, it is hard to see how MCL 777.16q imposes this sentence. Such an interpretation would require a determination that the statute implicitly referred to in MCL 777.16q in the \u201cStat Max\u201d (statutory maximum sentence) column is MCL 777.16q itself, rather than the substantive criminal statute. This conclusion is belied by the fact that all of the other offenses in the relevant sentencing grids in the guidelines indicate that the statute referred to in the \u201cStat Max\u201d column is the relevant Penal Code statute listed in the grid. Thus, the most natural reading of MCL 777.16q confirms that MCL 750.335a(2)(c) establishes the substantive penalty for indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person. Further, the guidelines are part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq. The term \u201cprocedure\u201d is usually used in contradistinction to \u201csubstantive\u201d; the substantive criminal law generally encompasses the definitions of crimes and the penalties for the crimes. \u201cProcedure,\u201d by contrast, is the law governing the series of procedures through which the substantive criminal law is enforced. The titles of the Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et seq., and the Code of Criminal Procedure support these observations. The Penal Code\u2019s title states that the act\u2019s purpose is \u201cto define crimes and prescribe the penalties therefor . . . ,\u201d while the title of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that its purpose is to \u201ccodify the laws relating to criminal procedure.\u201d The contents of the Code bear this out, as none of its provisions involves the direct creation of crimes or the imposition of core penalties. Therefore, neither MCL 777.16q or MCL 777.62 mandates a particular sentence or range of sentences, nor do they establish discrete penalties or supplant the penalties specified in the substantive criminal statute. For these reasons, MCL 777.16q and MCL 777.62 cannot be read to authorize sentence ranges that are an alternative to the penalty in MCL 750.335a(2)(c). Therefore, the reference in MCL 777.16q to MCL 750.335a(2)(c) is nugatory, and MCL 777.62 does not apply to individuals convicted under MCL 750.335a(2)(c). Although the general rule when interpreting a statute is to give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute nugatory, this principle is not absolute, and in this case must give way to the unmistakable meanings of the statutes. The only way to harmonize the statutes is to interpret the guidelines as an alternative penalty provision, but this interpretation is not supported by the text. Because the guidelines do not apply, Arnold I controls the sentencing of individuals convicted of an indecent- exposure offense as a sexually delinquent person under MCL 750.335a(2)(c). A court may impose the applicable penalty provision in MCL 750.335a(2)(a) or (b), along with any applicable sentencing enhancements, or the \u201c1 day to life\u201d sentence in MCL 750.335a(2)(c). Arnold was not sentenced to either of these options because his sentence reflects the application of the sentencing guidelines. Because the guidelines are not applicable, he was entitled to resentencing."], "id": "4248bcf7-8a59-4ce3-8ad4-f8c663b9f784", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Justice CLEMENT, joined by Chief Justice MCCORMACK and Justice CAVANAGH, concurring in the judgment, agreed that the trial court\u2019s sentence of 25 to 70 years was invalid because Arnold had to be sentenced either to a term of years under MCL 750.335a(2)(b) (as potentially enhanced by being a fourth-offense habitual offender) or to a \u201c1 day to life\u201d sentence under MCL 750.335a(2)(c). Although the trial court had complied with the sentencing guidelines, the guidelines could not authorize Arnold\u2019s sentence because to do so would indirectly amend MCL 750.335a in violation of Const 1963, art 4, \u00a7 25. Rather than address the constitutional issue, the majority instead tried to uncover the ordinary meaning of the sentencing guidelines. MCL 750.335a(2)(c) provided a \u201c1 day to life\u201d sentence, while the term-of-years sentence option in MCL 750.335a(2)(b) allowed the trial court to sentence Arnold as a fourth-offense habitual offender to up to a 15-year maximum sentence. By contrast, under MCL 777.16q and MCL 777.62 of the guidelines, Arnold\u2019s recommended minimum sentence range as a fourth-offense habitual offender was between 135 and 450 months, and the trial court sentenced him to a minimum sentence of 25 years. The likely reason for these disparate outcomes was a mistake due to the failure of the Legislature\u2019s institutional memory between the enactment of MCL 750.335a in 1952 and the enactment of the guidelines in 1998. When enacting the guidelines, the Legislature seemingly concluded that the \u201c1 day to life\u201d language in MCL 750.335a was equivalent to \u201clife or any term of years\u201d and therefore listed <mask> by a sexually delinquent person as a Class A felony under the guidelines. The majority concludes that the ordinary meaning of MCL 777.16q is that it does not mean what it says, because interpreting the statute\u2019s reference to \u201cLife\u201d as \u201clife or any term of years\u201d requires a series of inferences. However, such inferences are commonplace throughout the guidelines. Rather, the Court had to negate the expression of legislative intent because Michigan constitutional law prevents the adoption of a provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure (i.e., MCL 777.16q) from indirectly amending a provision of the Penal Code (i.e., MCL 750.335a(2)(c)). Under the Reenact-Publish Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 4, \u00a7 25, changes to the law must be in the form of redline edits, i.e., in order to change the law, the Legislature must edit the text rather than enact some inconsistent provision. Therefore, the instructions in the Code of Criminal Procedure for how to sentence someone convicted of an indecent-exposure offense cannot indirectly change the sentencing options in the Penal Code. Justice CLEMENT agreed however with the majority\u2019s conclusion that Arnold was entitled to resentencing to either a term-of-years sentence that complied with MCL 750.335a(2)(b) or to a \u201c1 day to life\u201d sentence under MCL 750.335a(2)(c). Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Chief Justice: Justices:"], "id": "7f219dbf-7d2d-4173-b9a4-1515218d8484", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Arnold I, 502 Mich at 446. The Court of Appeals set aside defendant\u2019s sentence for aggravated <mask> for reasons that are not relevant to the present appeal. Id. at 446 n 3. Id. at 449 (\u201cThe sentencing guidelines list indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person as a Class A felony, MCL 777.16q, and the proposed scoring of defendant\u2019s guidelines variables placed him in cell F-III of the Class A grid, which provides for a minimum sentence of 135 to 225 months, MCL 777.62, the high end of which was then doubled to 450 months because defendant was a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 777.21(3)(c).\u201d). Id. at 482-483. Id. Id. at 479-480, citing 2005 PA 300. Arnold I, 502 Mich at 469-471."], "id": "f2b4bc0b-7d00-4de4-9c9e-5c2bd61708a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The majority insists that I am \u201csimply incorrect\u201d to question whether \u201cthe basis for [its] holding\u201d was in our grant order. We granted leave on \u201cwhether <mask> by a sexually delinquent person is a distinct felony \u2018enumerated\u2019 in the Michigan Penal Code and subject to the sentencing guidelines, or whether the offense is subject to the sentencing guidelines regardless because it is set forth in MCL 777.16q as a listed felony.\u201d People v Arnold, 505 Mich 1001, 1001 (2020). The majority\u2019s conclusion that MCL 777.16q does not purport to express a legislative intention of a substantive punishment for this offense is not, in my view, responsive to that question, and even if a very broad interpretation of our grant order encompassed the majority\u2019s reasoning, nothing like that reasoning can be found anywhere in the parties\u2019 briefing. I do not believe we are obliged to confine ourselves to the parties\u2019 briefs where neither party has presented the Court with arguments the Court believes are correct\u2014we ought not allow poor party presentation to compel us to make bad law\u2014but where the parties\u2019 presentation of the case presents a legally proper solution, I think it is preferable for us to address the case as it has been presented."], "id": "066dc0f5-8a35-44b0-8d86-a977e6f21c2d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In the present case, both victims were approximately the same age at the time of the events, and both were in a father-daughter relationship with defendant. The evidence supports a finding that the charged and the uncharged acts were part of defendant\u2019s common plan or system to act out sexually with preteen girls living in the same household, over whom he had parental authority. As in Sabin, there were also some differences between the acts. The prior bad acts against LL involved incidents of <mask>, whereas the charged acts in this case involved intercourse and sexual contact. There was no evidence that LL was warned not to disclose the acts, whereas the victim in this case was told not to say anything. It appears that others persons were present in the home during two of the three indecent exposure incidents with LL, whereas defendant was alone with the victim during the charged acts. However, these differences do not compel the conclusion that the charged and the uncharged acts were so dissimilar that they precluded admission for purposes of showing a common plan or system. As in Sabin, reasonable persons could disagree concerning whether the charged acts and the prior bad acts were sufficiently similar to show (by probability) the existence of a scheme, plan, or system that tends to prove (by probability) that the charged acts were committed. Because the evidentiary issue was a close one, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of defendant\u2019s prior acts of indecent exposure. [Smith, 282 Mich App at 196-197.]"], "id": "90471dcb-b1c0-4ba3-a669-529160c9776b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The court received, without objection, a Presentence Investigation Report (\u201cPSIR\u201d) that recounts Hamber\u2019s criminal history as well as over 200 disciplinary violations while he was incarcerated. Hamber has convictions for raping a 12-year- old, residential burglary, commercial burglary, in-custody battery on two separate occasions, and also first-degree assault and terroristic threatening regarding an incident where he threw urine on a deputy and threatened the deputy\u2019s family. Included among Hamber\u2019s disciplinary violations while in state custody are: 29 instances of making verbal or written threats, 5 instances of attempted assault or threatening jail staff, 2 instances of battery as to an inmate, 4 instances of battery as to jail staff, 9 instances of battery resulting in injury as to jail staff and/or possession/introduction of a firearm or weapon, an aggravated battery, 15 instances of <mask>, 9 instances of throwing or ejecting fluids or excrement, another instance of striking a person with bodily fluid, 8 instances of destruction of state property, 7 instances of tampering with or blocking a lock, and breaking into another\u2019s room. Hamber was released from prison on October 29, 2018."], "id": "81e5e4a0-e721-43bd-8a7d-26eeb4e1a5ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["time of the prior evaluation. He had similar delusions and was religiously preoccupied, but his symptoms were toned down. He still did not have appropriate insight into his mental illness and did not acknowledge positive aspects of adhering to medication management. He adamantly asserted, \u201c \u2018I don\u2019t need psychiatric medication. It\u2019s breaking and killing me.\u2019 \u201d Fekadu has been prescribed several different medications for his schizophrenia with varying degrees of success. He has a history of medication noncompliance and intermittently asks to be taken off his medications, including those for his medical conditions. Dr. Kodzic noted that Fekadu\u2019s refusal to take medication for high blood pressure and diabetes is concerning because these conditions can lead to significant medical complications. Dr. Kodzic stated that Fekadu works against his treatment team and is not forthcoming about his symptoms. For example, Fekadu told a staff member in 2018 that he was hearing the voice of an evil woman, but he did not want to tell his doctors because he thought they would increase his medications. He previously assaulted a psychiatrist, which resulted in his transfer to his current facility. The recent letter to his psychiatrist was threatening in that it said that God would punish the psychiatrist. Dr. Kodzic indicated that Fekadu\u2019s belief that he is the hand of God raises the concern that Fekadu would act aggressively in the future, particularly if he heard a voice that he believed to be God\u2019s. Fekadu engaged in violent acts in 1995, 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2017. He also behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner toward his psychologist and had a few <mask> incidents in 2015. Dr. Kodzic took these"], "id": "19437c4e-2bbc-49b7-a981-75bb8b32cc08", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["they are challenging a particular recall or dismissal of sentence, dismissal and sealing, or redesignation. The prosecution shall inform the court when they are not challenging a particular recall or dismissal of sentence, dismissal and sealing, or redesignation. [\u00b6] . . . [\u00b6] (d) If the prosecution does not challenge the recall or dismissal of sentence, dismissal and sealing, or redesignation by July 1, 2020, the court shall reduce or dismiss the conviction pursuant to Section 11361.8.\u201d DOJ identified defendant as potentially eligible for redesignation of his sentence to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 11361.8. On June 29, 2020, the People filed a challenge to the redesignation, arguing defendant has a prior conviction of a designated felony requiring registration, namely Penal Code section 314, <mask>, and is therefore ineligible for redesignation. But the People mistakenly filed the challenge in another of defendant\u2019s criminal cases, NCR93900, instead of the correct case, NCR73171.2 The other case did not involve a marijuana-related conviction. The People served both defendant and his counsel of record at their last known addresses. On July 29, 2020, the People filed an amended challenge to redesignation, reasserting the argument that defendant is ineligible for redesignation, and again serving both defendant and his counsel of record at their last known addresses. The trial court accepted the People\u2019s challenge as timely and after receiving briefing on the issue, denied the redesignation. The trial court found that defendant received actual notice of the People\u2019s challenge, albeit for the wrong case, and the People\u2019s error did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. DISCUSSION Defendant argues the July 1, 2020 deadline under section 11361.9 established a statute of limitations before which the People were required to file a challenge in the"], "id": "a2bb0fe6-d040-4cae-a7c0-3fdc8c65ef91", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Indecent Exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant is charged in Count II of the information with the crime of <mask> to a Minor, a violation, on or about a period of time between January 1, 2017, and April 30, 2018. In order to find the Defendant guilty, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a specific act or acts constituting the crime within the period alleged. Also, in order to find the Defendant guilty, you rnust unanimously agree upon the commission of the same specific act or acts constituting the crime within the period alleged. It is not necessary that the particular act or acts committed so agreed upon be stated in the verdict."], "id": "42c39bdf-b310-41bd-9c47-7f68f3e0f9ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["[2.] Did not the court err by imposing separate sentences of guilt with no further penalty for the charges of theft by unlawful taking, unlawful restraint, <mask>, terroristic threats, indecent assault[,] and corruption of minors where, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] \u00a7 3502(d), a defendant sentenced for a burglary conviction may not be separately sentenced for offenses \u201cwhich it was his intent to commit after the burglarious entry?\u201d"], "id": "954cceb5-321c-4d08-ba9d-42ad0a5c7c10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-110(a)(2)(A), a person commits the offense of sexual indecency with a child if, \"[w]ith the purpose to arouse or gratify a sexual desire of himself or herself or a sexual desire of another person, the person purposely exposes his or her sex organs to another person who is less than fifteen (15) years of age.\" Krol raises two arguments challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion for directed verdict.2 He argues that the circuit court applied an incorrect interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-110(a)(2)(A) when it denied his motion and urges us to adopt an interpretation of the statute that requires proof that the child victim consciously observed the exposure of the defendant's genitals. We decline to do so because the plain language of the statute does not contain any explicit requirement that the child observe the act. This is in contrast to other criminal statutes that contain an awareness element, such as Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-112(a)(2), which states that \"[a] person commits <mask> if, with the purpose to arouse or gratify a sexual desire of himself or herself or of any other person, the person exposes his or her sex organs ... [u]nder circumstances in which the person knows the conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.\" We have repeatedly rejected reading additional requirements into a statute that were not placed there by the legislature. Heape v. State , 87 Ark. App. 370, 374-77, 192 S.W.3d 281, 284-86 (2004) (rejecting, based on the plain meaning of the word \"solicit\" in subsection (a)(1), Heape's argument that the victim must be shown to have believed the sexual solicitation was genuine and not a mere \"rhetorical question\"); Renderos v. State , 92 Ark. App. 293, 293-95, 213 S.W.3d 37, 38-39 (2005) (rejecting Renderos's argument \"that the statute should be read ... as to require that inducement be expressed verbally where there is evidence of unambiguous nonverbal inducement\")."], "id": "2868d765-4606-4ffd-babe-6f43e11e088f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The affidavit also included DHS's history with the family beginning in March 2011 with a true finding for environmental neglect; May 2011 true findings of EP and another sibling having been victims of sexual contact and <mask> by a man who was not their parent; February 2012 true finding that AP and EP were victims of sexual contact and sexual penetration by two men who were not their fathers; true finding of sexual contact and sexual penetration in January 2016 listing AP as the alleged victim and the offender as a man who is not her father; current investigation open for inadequate supervision listing CP as the alleged victim and an unknown offender; open investigation for AP, EP, and CP as the alleged victims and appellants as the offenders; and several unsubstantiated reports of environmental and/or educational neglect beginning in 2008."], "id": "ff03a3ad-f04a-4744-b5be-1e83651387d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Horton further testified that there were true findings against Charity of striking a child with her fist, striking a child on the head or face, sexual contact, sexual exposure, pornography and exposure to live sex acts, and <mask>. She also said that Charity had not followed the recommendations of the psychological evaluation and that she did not successfully complete her individual counseling. No documentation of criminal charges or a psychological evaluation were accepted as evidence. On cross-examination, Horton could not say the dates of the true findings other than they were in November 2017."], "id": "36f12ba3-5f5c-4454-9003-2fabaa207b27", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Lynch describes three \"techniques\" to determine whether a sentence is so disproportionate to the crime as to constitute cruel or unusual punishment. ( Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 425, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921.) We first consider \"the nature of the offense and/or offender, with particular regard to the degree *443of danger both present to society.\" ( Ibid. ) Next, we compare the sentence to \"punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different offenses which, by the same test, must be deemed more serious.\" ( Id. at p. 426, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921.) Finally, we compare the sentence \"with the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions having an identical or similar constitutional provision.\" ( Id. at p. 427, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921.) The weight afforded to each prong may vary by case. (See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 [relying heavily on first prong] ( Dillon ).) \"Disproportionality need not be established in all three areas.\" ( People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 230, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 652.) *724Applying this test, the California Supreme Court has found unconstitutional a life sentence for a second offense of <mask> ( Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 413, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 ); lewd and lascivious touching of \"a child's private parts\" in violation of section 288 ( Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 654-656, 122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384 ); and felony-murder by a 17-year-old defendant ( Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 482, 489, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 )."], "id": "4e520e13-60a6-4608-bfd2-cc93ce440d5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The San Mateo District Attorney charged Dawkins with multiple crimes as a result of these incidents. Based on the incident involving E., Dawkins was charged with a felony count of stalking, a felony count of making criminal threats, two felony counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child, and one *703misdemeanor count of false imprisonment.1 Based on the incident involving A., Dawkins was charged with a felony count of <mask>.2 Dawkins was also alleged to have four prior strike convictions-one in 1987 for burglary, one in 1991 for robbery, and two in 1995 for rape-and to have served four prior prison terms, three for the strike convictions and one for an October 2013 indecent-exposure conviction.3 At trial, the parties stipulated that, in addition to the October 2013 conviction, Dawkins had also been convicted of indecent exposure around April 2008 and around December 2008."], "id": "da12a487-e175-4d88-b4a9-41e4f5fc8449", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The jury found Dawkins guilty on all counts, and the trial court found true the prior-conviction allegations. The court then granted Dawkins's Romero motion in part, striking the burglary and robbery convictions and one of the rape convictions. Dawkins was sentenced as a second-strike offender to a total term of 25 years in prison, composed of a six-year term for the count of making criminal threats, three consecutive 16-month terms for the two counts of lewd acts and the count of <mask>, and three consecutive five-year terms for the prior strikes. Terms for the remaining counts and enhancements were imposed and stayed, except that the prior-prison-term findings were also stricken."], "id": "f8c4849c-d2e3-4bf0-973a-fa21784ebbe6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Here, the plain language of section 783 provides for venue in San Mateo County. At the preliminary hearing, two BART police officers testified that trains on the Pittsburg-Bay Point line generally originate in San Mateo County. Although the officers acknowledged the possibility that a train could be replaced somewhere along the line due to a mechanical issue or some other problem, their testimony about the normal origin point of Pittsburg-Bay Point trains constituted sufficient evidence that the train on which Dawkins committed <mask> \"passe[d]\" \"through, on, or over\" San Mateo County \"in the course of its voyage or trip.\"4 ( \u00a7 783.) Thus, contrary to Dawkins's suggestion otherwise, there is no need to construe the statute's reference to trips \"terminat[ing]\" in a superior court's jurisdiction to include trips originating there. ( Ibid. )"], "id": "55aab726-30d7-41ae-a970-46516595a006", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Framing the question as whether the Ventura County offenses could \"be said to have occurred 'on a ... motor vehicle' within the meaning of section 783,\" the Supreme Court agreed with the People that venue did not lie in Los Angeles County because \"the offenses were committed outside the vehicle at *706an identifiable spot along the highway.\" ( Bradford, supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 15, 130 Cal.Rptr. 129, 549 P.2d 1225, italics added.) Construing section 783\"[i]n light of the federal constitutional right to a trial by a jury drawn from the vicinage in which the crime occurred,\"5 the Court determined that \" section 783 must be held inapplicable where, as here, the location of the crime is readily identifiable.\" ( Bradford , at p. 17, 130 Cal.Rptr. 129, 549 P.2d 1225.) *373Dawkins seizes on this broadly worded holding, contending that under Bradford section 783 does not apply because it is clear he committed <mask> somewhere in Contra Costa County. But in Bradford the offenses occurred outside the car, and thus section 783 did not apply by its terms. ( Bradford, supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 15, 130 Cal.Rptr. 129, 549 P.2d 1225.) In contrast, the offense here took place on a train that passed through San Mateo County on its trip. Although in Bradford the fact that the offenses occurred in a \"readily identifiable\" location also supported the result, the holding was consistent with section 783 's language. ( Bradford , at pp. 15, 17, 130 Cal.Rptr. 129, 549 P.2d 1225.) In other words, the Supreme Court did not have to interpret section 783 in a manner that contradicted its plain meaning, as Dawkins would have us do here."], "id": "48b7f7e7-f889-4ae7-8c77-6fc5f7cc03df", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In 2013, appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine ( Health & Saf. Code, \u00a7 11377, subd. (a) ) and was sentenced to 32 months in state prison. He was scheduled to be released on parole in November 2017. While serving his sentence in San Diego County, he was charged in a January 2014 rules violation report (RVR) with violating prison rules by committing *752the offense of felony <mask> (\u00a7 314, subd. (1)).3 The matter *347was referred to the San Diego County District Attorney for possible investigation and prosecution ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, \u00a7 3316, subd. (a) ). Pursuant to appellant's request, his RVR disciplinary hearing was postponed pending the outcome of the referral for criminal prosecution. (Id. , subd. (c).)"], "id": "1d53257d-4b8e-466d-8b06-cf23b7ec985c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In November 2014, appellant was convicted in San Diego County Superior Court of felony <mask> and was sentenced to an additional and consecutive 32-month prison term. In April 2015, following his RVR disciplinary hearing, he was found guilty of violating prison rules by committing the felony indecent exposure offense. He was scheduled to be released on parole in November 2017."], "id": "964509a5-ad45-45cf-a503-75f815d49833", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["To prove that appellant's commitment offense of felony <mask> qualified him for MDO treatment, the People offered copies of his CLETS4 report and the RVR regarding the offense.5 The CLETS report includes *753appellant's 2014 conviction of the current offense, and his prior convictions in 2003 on one misdemeanor count of indecent exposure (\u00a7 314) and two counts of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (\u00a7 288, subd. (a))."], "id": "ccdb2b5e-d2b0-4876-9e2f-b55fb67f668e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["At the MDO hearing, the trial court asked the prosecutor to explain his theory that appellant's offense of felony <mask> was a qualifying offense under the MDO law. The prosecutor offered that \"[t]he actions of the patient [sic ] were obviously very threatening to [Officer M.M.]\" as reflected in the RVR. The court responded, \"Standing there naked and masturbating.\" The prosecutor replied, \"It sounds kind of threatening to me, your Honor. She indicates her fear in that, your Honor, too.\""], "id": "112b4656-916a-42fa-bbd1-720deb562cf2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["*350To commit appellant for MDO treatment as a condition of his parole, the trial court had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense for which he was sentenced to prison-felony indecent exposure-is a qualifying *756offense. ( \u00a7 2962, subd. (e).) As relevant here, a person is guilty of misdemeanor <mask> if he \"willfully and lewdly ... [\u00b6] 1. Exposes his person, or the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby ....\" (\u00a7 314.) The crime becomes a felony where, as here, the defendant has a prior conviction for indecent exposure under subdivision (1) of section 314, or a prior conviction for committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 in violation of section 288. (Ibid. )"], "id": "c6894af7-2e0e-4d63-b7fb-a14a7046b76a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court found that appellant's felony <mask> offense qualified him for MDO treatment because it was \"[a] crime in which the perpetrator expressly or impliedly threatened another with the use of force or violence likely to produce substantial physical harm in such a manner that a reasonable person would believe and expect that the force or violence would be used.\" ( \u00a7 2962, subd. (e)(2)(Q).) In making this finding, the court primarily relied on Officer M.M.'s statements that \"I fear for my safety with [appellant] on the yard, due to his stalking behavior\" and that \"[h]is progression from stalking to masturbating directly at me leads me to fear he may take it further.\""], "id": "51198735-5543-4468-b203-285e45f4a90f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant's conviction of felony <mask>, however, does not encompass the alleged \"stalking behavior\" he exhibited prior to his commission of the offense. As we have previously recognized, \"other crimes the prisoner may have committed in perpetrating the commitment offense are irrelevant to the determination whether that offense meets the criteria for MDO treatment.\" ( People v. Kortesmaki (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 922, 926-927, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 706, citing People v. Green (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 907, 913, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 464.)"], "id": "f4bed493-878c-425c-9b42-e2358d05d02f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["In any event, the evidence is insufficient to prove that appellant's felony <mask> offense involved a threat to use force or violence likely to produce substantial physical harm. Appellant walked out of his cell naked and masturbated while looking at a female correctional officer who stood a substantial distance away from him in a secure location. Earlier that morning, he was twice seen briefly staring at the same officer. On each occasion, he was ordered to cease his offensive behavior and he immediately complied. Moreover, there is no evidence that appellant ever attempted to make physical contact with Officer M.M. or that he exhibited aggressive, forceful, or violent behavior toward her or anyone else."], "id": "5a4072af-9145-477d-9399-7452d3b120da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court nevertheless reasoned that appellant intended to convey such a threat to Officer M.M. because men who expose themselves in the manner he did \"are showing the woman ... what organ you are going to use on her.\" The court also acknowledged, however, that men who commit such acts may \"just [be] pleasuring [themselves] because there's a female in the vicinity.\" As our Supreme Court has recognized, the crime of <mask> \"invariably entails no physical aggression or even contact ....\" ( In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 430, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921.) Moreover, \" '[i]t is generally agreed that the exhibitionist does not seek further contact with the victim; on the contrary, he is afraid of it. There is usually some appreciable distance which separates the exhibitionist and the object and rarely does it occur when the parties are in close proximity.' [Citation.]\" ( Ibid. ) This is such a case."], "id": "7d86aa58-28e1-43ea-8912-16cadbe4e6f6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["An RVR is issued to document serious inmate misconduct that is a violation of law or is not minor in nature. (In re Gray (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 389, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 724.) An RVR triggers certain procedural protections and can result in various forms of discipline for the offending inmate. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 3313 -3316.) The offense of felony <mask> constitutes a serious violation of the rule that inmates shall not engage in illegal sexual acts. (Id., \u00a7 3007.)"], "id": "9d46b562-2967-4a7c-bc74-2b0726f21089", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Not every interpretation of every item of evidence discussed in Judge Goetz's description of her findings is necessarily binding under the doctrine of issue preclusion. Only findings on issues that are \"not '... unnecessary' \" to the court's decision are binding. ( Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 342, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223 [fact that the prosecution failed to prove <mask> as a basis for a probation violation was \" 'necessarily decided' \" even though a probation violation was established through other, admitted conduct].)"], "id": "13d364d3-2afd-4145-b548-4809a568cf10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["After reviewing the additional information, Dr. Jeko revised her evaluation to conclude Morrison is an SVP. The complete record revealed Morrison had close to 30 separate 115 Rule violations dating from 2002 to September 2016. These included repeated episodes of <mask> and/or masturbation in front of female nurses, physicians, and psychologists. For example, Morrison confronted a female psychologist in her office and exposed himself, masturbated during a session with a female physician, and masturbated and exposed himself through his cell door to another female psychologist. At least one female psychologist felt \"very uncomfortable and quite threatened\" by Morrison's misconduct. Morrison told a psychologist he had uncontrollable urges and, if released, he would rape again. Dr. Jeko diagnosed Morrison with Unspecified Paraphilia Disorder, Exhibitionist Disorder, and Antisocial Personality Disorder. Dr. Jeko's initial report was based on a significantly smaller and less detailed list of 115 Rule violations and did not reflect the extent and depth of Morrison's misconduct in prison."], "id": "316904c9-d886-4022-ae83-02cade92c7b7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant's strike priors are two 1992 residential burglaries and a 1996 robbery. The two burglaries were committed within minutes of each other. In the first burglary, defendant stole jewelry. In the second burglary, he was interrupted by the victim. The robbery involved \"entering a residence, brandishing knives and demanding *767money from the victim.\" Defendant also suffered three other felony convictions and 13 misdemeanor convictions prior to his current conviction. One of his misdemeanor convictions was a 1996 *228<mask> (\u00a7 314, subd. (1)) conviction.2 A number of defendant's convictions were for narcotics offenses."], "id": "1df737a4-b972-4a2b-8208-3acaf0e27037", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["The defense submitted a report by Richard Subia, a former California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) division director and warden. Subia had *768interviewed defendant and reviewed defendant's prison record, and defendant had told Subia that he was defending himself in most of the fights in which he was involved in prison. Defendant told Subia that he was targeted because of his \" 'R' \" designation (due to his <mask> conviction) and \"his size.\" Subia's opinion was that defendant did not currently pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety."], "id": "ffce00cc-3d80-43e2-967b-cdc69fb1c04c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Meanwhile, the State sought review of the court of appeals's decision reversing the judgment of civil commitment. See Bohannan II , 388 S.W.3d at 302. On August 31, 2012, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. Id. at 307. Nevertheless, a couple of months later in October of 2012, the State indicted Appellant of violating the civil commitment order. Bohannan III , 2014 WL 5490936, at *1. The mandate of reversal was issued on January 18, 2013. Id. , at *3. Still, the State proceeded with the prosecution, and on February 12, 2013, Appellant was convicted by a jury of violating the civil commitment order. Id. , at *1. Finding enhancement paragraphs alleging the rape convictions and the South Carolina <mask> conviction to be true, the jury assessed a sentence of life in prison. Id."], "id": "8904dc02-f315-4a71-bcf3-d93602e0bde3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["After the trial court denied defendant Ronald Kay Mason\u2019s motion to suppress his confession that he masturbated in his car and exposed himself to the victim, which he gave after being detained during a traffic stop, a jury found him guilty on two counts of <mask> with a prior sex offense. Defendant appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the admission at trial of his confession violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because he made the incriminating statement during a custodial interrogation without first being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694] (Miranda)."], "id": "2c418247-82ee-44e3-b02a-8eaee3a550c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "indecent exposure", "legal_topic": "Sex-related", "masked_sentences": ["Paula pulled out of her parking spot and stopped behind some nearby cars to write down the truck\u2019s license plate number and call 911.2 The truck drove off, and Paula followed it, relaying to the 911 dispatcher a description of the truck, its license plate number, and its location. While following the truck, Paula was able to observe the driver\u2019s face.3 Officer Devin Ketel responded to the 911 call and located a white truck that matched the description and license plate number Paula provided. He stopped the truck on the Highway 44 westbound onramp; defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the truck. Officer Ketel questioned defendant outside his truck, and he initially denied being in the Walmart parking lot earlier that day. Defendant eventually admitted that he had seen a woman with red hair in the parking lot, and had masturbated in his truck and exposed himself to her for excitement. During an in-field showup, Paula positively identified defendant. Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of <mask> with a prior conviction under Penal Code section 288, subdivision4 (\u00a7 314, subd. 1, count 1 [July 3 incident] & count 2 [July 5 incident]). As to both counts, it was alleged that he had a prior strike conviction for a sexual offense. (\u00a7 1170.12.) Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude his confession from trial. He contended that Officer Ketel violated his Fifth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a custodial interrogation during the traffic stop without first giving him Miranda warnings."], "id": "af56ce8e-02ea-442d-bdb9-5b5167623f2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The relevant statutory language at the time of the court's July 2018 hearing stated, \"Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated <mask> against the other party seeking custody of the child or against the child or the child's siblings within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child, pursuant to Section 3011. This presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.\" (Former Fam. Code, \u00a7 3044, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2003, ch. 243, \u00a7 1, p. 2329.) \"The requirement of a finding by the court shall also be satisfied if a court, whether that court hears or has heard the child custody proceedings or not, has made a finding pursuant to subdivision (a) based on conduct occurring within the previous five years.\" (Former Fam. Code, \u00a7 3044, subd. (d)(2), as amended by Stats. 2003, ch. 243, \u00a7 1, p. 2330.) The statutory language was later amended, but the amendments do not have a material impact on our analysis. (Stats. 2018, ch. 941, \u00a7 3, pp. 6217-6218.)"], "id": "f2d82807-2a70-4cb2-912e-e44b1e27065a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["while the criminal justice system incarcerated Father from January 2019 to June 2019. Mother repeatedly told DCFS she did not want to rekindle her relationship with Father, all the while secretly getting together with him and ultimately permitting him to reside with the family by December 2019. DCFS recommended removal of the children from Mother: \u201cDue to mother\u2019s history of deceiving DCFS, coaching the children to deceive DCFS (evidenced by the twins saying mother would not let them disclose abuse), repeatedly returning to father through at least three years of abuse, knowing father used methamphetamine and still allowing father unlimited access to herself and the children, disregarding CPO and Family Law order[s] [without] taking responsibility of her actions, DCFS does not believe the children are safe with mother at this time. Mother displays a history of poor judgment that places the children in danger. [\u00b6] . . . [\u00b6] When asked how <mask> impacted the children, mother said there was no impact and they were stronger and more mature due to what they went through.\u201d DCFS noted that since the children had been detained from their parents, Victoria had improved in school and no longer struggled with anxiety attacks and eating disorders, C.L. was now \u201c \u2018goofy\u2019 and funny, and \u2018more himself\u2019 \u201d and the children \u201cfeel safe other than having fear of father manipulating their thoughts and emotions once again.\u201d DCFS also noted Father had taken no responsibility for any of his actions and continued to deny any violence toward Mother, his girlfriend, or his children. At the hearing on October 28, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered the children removed from both parents. In doing so, the juvenile court addressed Mother: \u201cLet me put it to you this way, Mom, to say that this is a tough"], "id": "0c7e85e0-1c03-4790-834e-57b4e17e645d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["With these legal principles in mind, we examine the evidence presented in this case. GL was brought into emergency DHS custody shortly after her birth in January 2016, based on allegations that Tara was acting erratically, exhibiting dramatic mood swings, and making statements about hurting GL. Tara had tested positive for amphetamines, and hospital staff thought she was in psychosis. GL tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Tara admitted that she was essentially homeless, having lived in a tent city and various people's homes prior to giving birth to GL. She identified two men as possibly being GL's father, one of whom she accused of <mask>."], "id": "09f6b2f3-d34f-4d3b-a376-c912a238d415", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\"(1) Whether the perpetrator of <mask> has demonstrated that giving sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to the perpetrator is in the best interest of the child. In determining the best interest of the child, the preference for frequent and continuing contact with both parents, as set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 3020, or with the noncustodial parent, as set forth in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 3040, may not be used to rebut the presumption, in whole or in part."], "id": "7129c390-4471-4737-a74b-714ae5bb3c4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["And Rehaif fails to help Leija because the statutes at issue do not have similar wording. In Rehaif, the federal statute stated: \"Whoever knowingly violates subsection . . . (g), . . . of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.\" (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(a)(2); 139 S. Ct. at 2195 (noting that the adverb \"knowingly\" modifies the verb \"violates\"). Violating \u00a7 922 requires more than just possessing a firearm. The Rehaif Court's task was to discern what the statute required a defendant to know in order to violate the law. But K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6301(a)(18) prohibits a person convicted of a <mask> misdemeanor from \"knowingly . . . possessing\" a firearm. The fact that the adverb \"knowingly\" directly modifies the verb \"possessing\" makes the Kansas statute differ from the federal statute at issue in Rehaif so that Rehaif has little value in analyzing Leija's issue."], "id": "0af20d01-482a-4c74-9262-5f3b53b043f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Minor argues the juvenile court erred in finding Minor did not satisfy her burden of proof under section 364(c) because \"Mother did not complete the <mask> program ordered by the court and that was prima facie evidence that conditions which would justify the initial assumption of jurisdiction still existed and continued supervision was necessary.\" Minor further argues the court erred in terminating jurisdiction because Mother had failed to make Minor available \"for home visits,\" as also required by her case plan. We find these arguments unavailing for a variety of reasons, including our conclusion it misstates the record evidence."], "id": "9f3b18bc-8e5a-41b6-b2e5-7570061b7737", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["4 The small claims form lists the date of the recording as September 28, 2018. This appears to be a typographical error. served Kovtun with the complaint. The commissioner transferred the case to superior court, where the court consolidated the actions on its own motion. E. The First Anti-SLAPP Motion On November 16, 2018, Kovtun filed an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., \u00a7 425.16). She argued (1) the cross-complaint was not compulsory and was therefore subject to the anti-SLAPP statute; and (2) the conduct giving rise to the causes of action in which she was named were all subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because they arose from a meeting to prepare a custody agreement to file with the court. She also argued (3) the transcript and audio recording of the meeting were inadmissible evidence, and (4) Jennifer had no probability of success on the merits because Kovtun\u2019s conduct was protected by the litigation privilege.5 While the motion was pending, Jennifer filed a first amended verified complaint (FAVC). The FAVC modified one fact, who initially phoned Jennifer to invite her to the meeting. The FAVC alleged nine causes of action against Kovtun: a Ralph Act violation, negligence, professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, witness intimidation, and abuse of process. In the causes of action for negligence, professional negligence, and intentional misrepresentation, the FAVC referenced Kovtun as \u201cAttorney Kovtun\u201d and an \u201cofficer of the court,\u201d and it alleged Kovtun had violated \u201caffirmative duty\u201d she had as an officer of the court. The court denied Kovtun\u2019s anti-SLAPP motion. It ruled the transcript and recording were admissible because a <mask> victim can record conversations with the restrained party. It also concluded the meeting was"], "id": "bbdf0901-c57f-4fbc-b8b0-9976d14623f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["S.Y. relies on the following two comments out of the 35 pages of material of which she requested judicial notice: (1) Section 3044\"require[s] the perpetrator to show that he or she has undertaken specific actions to deal with the situation before custody is awarded to the parent.\" (Assem. Republican Caucus, analysis of Assembly Bill No. 840 (1999 - 2000 Reg. Sess.), p. 2 [Arguments in Support of the Bill, No. 3].); and (2) Section 3044 requires \"proof of rehabilitation\" to overcome the presumption against joint custody in order to \"increase the probability that a <mask> perpetrator will be a safe custodial parent.\" (Enrolled Bill Report dated September 1, 1999 from the Health and Human Services Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 840 (1999 - 2000 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 1, 1999, p. 1 [Recommendation and Supporting Arguments].)"], "id": "edcd8942-a6ec-41e6-896e-3db4a9836753", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court has reviewed the undisputed facts in light of the new statute\u2019s broad prohibition and narrow exceptions. Mr. R. was convicted of second degree murder of his son\u2019s mother. Michael, only three years old, is too young to agree to visits. Michael\u2019s maternal grandmother, who has legal custody, opposes visitation. There is no claim that petitioner was himself the victim of <mask> inflicted by the deceased."], "id": "1caf2d40-1357-4dab-a7a4-a4102fbc93c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, there was <mask> between K.K. and E.S. in C.M.'s presence. C.M. was clearly impacted by the significant and escalating violence in the home, including the use of bleach, which has the capacity to permanently maim and injure a person. K.K. used a knife during the confrontation. E.S. minimized his use of a weapon. The court was concerned because K.K. had completed a 52-week domestic violence treatment program and was still engaging in violent activity."], "id": "8e85cbde-7ac2-4819-9832-ddf71be89b7b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Mother testified at the February 16, 2018 hearing that she had not been given an opportunity to provide information to the Tribe regarding her progress with her services. She explained that she wanted the Tribe to know that she had completed <mask> classes and therapy, and that she had healed. She also testified that she opposed the tribal customary adoption because she wanted to raise her children herself. She told the court that she was living on her own and maintained that she had learned \"red flags\" and other warning signs from participating in therapy and *30completing domestic violence classes. She testified that she had left four messages for the Tribe after she received the tribal customary adoption proposal, but had not been *142contacted by anyone from the Tribe. On cross-examination, Mother denied that she had spoken about A.S. and E.S. with the tribal social worker in October 2017. The court concluded that testimony about visitation, Mother's progress in services, and her bond with the children was not relevant to the issues to be determined at the hearing."], "id": "47263453-4c06-4641-832c-9ac784e3fa6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["12. The record, read in its totality, demonstrates the children were removed from mother\u2019s care not simply for \u201cdrug use,\u201d as she suggests, but for longstanding substance abuse which put the children at risk of physical harm. The record also demonstrates several other reasons for removal, including mental health issues, <mask> issues, home safety issues, as well as a general disregard for the children\u2019s safety as evidenced in part by her failure to secure the children in car seats and subsequent ambivalence about the failure. Mother\u2019s assertion she was denied reunification services only because she was incarcerated is similarly not entirely accurate. Mother\u2019s incarceration simply triggered the court\u2019s consideration of whether services would be detrimental to the children. The court ultimately denied services to mother based on its finding the services would be detrimental to them, a finding mother notably did not challenge on appeal for sufficiency of the evidence. This is all to say mother\u2019s allegations that she had been methamphetamine free for a period of eight months and had been released from custody were not compelling reasons that the proposed order was in the children\u2019s best interests. Mother\u2019s allegation she had been sober for a period of eight months, several of which she was in custody, carried little weight in light of her long history of substance abuse and multiple periods of sobriety and relapse. Mother had reported using methamphetamine since she was 17 years old. At the time the dependency proceedings were initiated, she was 39 years old, which indicates she has struggled for over half of her life and the entirety of her adulthood with her addiction. Her relapses had a demonstrable negative effect on her children, as evidenced by her history of child welfare referrals, the facts leading to the present case, and M.B.\u2019s comments at the section 388 hearing that she did not want to go through \u201canother relapse\u201d with mother and she and Matthew did not want to get hurt \u201cagain.\u201d Further, as the agency points out, mother made no allegations as to whether she had begun to or was willing to address her mental health issues or demonstrated disregard for the children\u2019s physical safety."], "id": "3a1b8c68-fb89-49c1-83f0-26a94cb34648", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, respondents\u2019 decision to terminate petitioner\u2019s employment, their failure to provide her the reasonable accom*801modations she requested (despite abundant notice of her status as a victim of domestic violence), their failure to follow their own Directive on <mask> victims (see respondents\u2019 exhibit 21) and failure to engage in any \u201cinteractive process,\u201d was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and made in bad faith. Significantly, respondents do not argue that it would have caused undue hardship in the conduct of their business to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable petitioner, who is a victim of domestic violence, to satisfy the essential requisites of her job. Respondents have also failed to show the unavailability of any safe and reasonable accommodation for petitioner\u2019s status as a victim of domestic violence, but instead denied petitioner\u2019s multiple requests, based on the legally insufficient reason that petitioner was a \u201cprobationary employee.\u201d As indicated, probationary employees are also covered by the New York City Human Rights Law. (See Quick v Horn, 21 Misc 3d 1116[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52078[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2008]; Matter of Reynolds v Fraser, 5 Misc 3d 758 [Sup Ct, NY County 2004].) Consequently, respondents have utterly failed to meet their burden to prove that any proposed accommodation would place an undue hardship on their business. (See Administrative Code \u00a7 8-102 [18]; Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824 [2014]; Romanello v Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 NY3d 881 [2013].) Such failure by respondents buttresses petitioner\u2019s claim of bad faith."], "id": "7a08b99d-b1e2-4ced-88b5-d73de8287851", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Following a review hearing in August 2020, the juvenile court ordered Tina to cooperate fully with DHHS and the caseworker, maintain reasonable contact with her case manager and providers, maintain a suitable residence, seek and maintain gainful employment, and participate in \u201cindividual/family counseling programs.\u201d The court further ordered that all medical information and physician appointments regarding the children be provided to Tina and her counsel. Following a review hearing in November, the matter was continued for further review hearings \u201cunder the terms and conditions previously ordered.\u201d On November 24, 2020, the State filed a motion to terminate Tina\u2019s parental rights to Angel and Vivian pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 43-292(7) (Reissue 2016). The State alleged that the children had been in an out-of-home placement for 15 or more months of the most recent 22 months, Tina remained unfit to provide parental care for them, and that termination of Tina\u2019s parental rights was in the children\u2019s best interests. TERMINATION HEARING The hearing on the motion to terminate Tina\u2019s parental rights was held in May 2021, and an interpreter was present. The State called five witnesses to testify. Tina testified in her own behalf. Several exhibits were also received into evidence. A summary of the relevant evidence follows. Certified copies of this family\u2019s two previous juvenile court cases were received into evidence. In March 2008, a juvenile petition was filed in Sarpy County Juvenile Court Docket JV 08-206, alleging that Thu and Angel fell within \u00a7 43-247(3)(a) because they lacked proper parental care insofar as their mother, Tina, was concerned; Vivian was not yet born. The petition alleged, as later amended: <mask> has been occurring in the home since on or before December 2003, and [Tina] has failed to seek services for herself or her husband. The mother, who works evenings from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. sometimes goes to the casino after work. Currently, there are marital issues causing stress and discord in the family."], "id": "338c7985-0575-4013-a626-98d5f8b27e25", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The parties filed cross petitions for custody of K.B. Jr. Petitioner filed a petition for custody on July 19, 2007. Respondent filed a cross petition for custody on August 6, 2007. Respondent stated in her cross petition that it would be in the best interest of the child if custody of the child was awarded to her since petitioner is actually a woman. In respondent\u2019s affirmation it is alleged that petitioner committed acts of <mask> against her while they lived together and that she feared for the safety of the child. In respondent\u2019s custody petition she stated that the petitioner was \u201cactually a woman\u201d and therefore the marriage was \u201cinvalid.\u201d (Cross petition of J.R., Aug. 6, 2007.)"], "id": "ba874514-cf68-4d84-89ad-34741dd65fa9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Mother's counsel again cited the section 3044 presumption. The court responded, \"I will look at [section] 3044 right now.\" The court stated its ruling that Father was more suitable and stable than Mother. The court acknowledged it issued a <mask> restraining order but observed \"the standard is not a very high standard.\" The court remarked it had issued the order to address \"relations between Mother and Father.\" \"And we have many situations *215where the parents just, you know, there are issues. There is a need to keep one parent away from the other and where they crossed over a line justifying the issuance of a DVRO [domestic violence restraining order].\""], "id": "9dc35f81-946b-4bdf-baeb-dc1ca9553b2f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The relevant statutory language at the time of the court's July 2018 hearing stated, \"Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated <mask> against the other party seeking custody of the child or against the child or the child's siblings within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child, pursuant to Section 3011. This presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.\" (Former Fam. Code, \u00a7 3044, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2003, ch. 243, \u00a7 1, p. 2329.) \"The requirement of a finding by the court shall also be satisfied if a court, whether that court hears or has heard the child custody proceedings or not, has made a finding pursuant to subdivision (a) based on conduct occurring within the previous five years.\" (Former Fam. Code, \u00a7 3044, subd. (d)(2), as amended by Stats. 2003, ch. 243, \u00a7 1, p. 2330.) The statutory language was later amended, but the amendments do not have a material impact on our analysis. (Stats. 2018, ch. 941, \u00a7 3, pp. 6217-6218.)"], "id": "5f4ba3e0-5045-4cc9-b0c4-331bcba9bf53", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively for the purposes of this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a child or that parent from sexual assault or <mask> by the child\u2019s other parent. [MCL 722.23(j).]"], "id": "d40ee74a-7ac5-4971-808f-26c5ce8d7363", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c<mask> has three phases that comprise the \u2018cycle of violence\u2019: (1) the tension building phase, (2) the violence phase and (3) the honeymoon phase. During the first two phases the victim is reduced to a state of fear and anxiety due to impending or actual violence. In the honeymoon phase, the abuser acts with contrition, begs for forgiveness and makes declarations of love. During the honeymoon phase, the victim is seduced into believing that the abuse will cease and that the family will remain intact. This cycle repeats itself over many years . . . \u201c[D]uring the honeymoon phase, victims of domestic abuse often recant their reports of abuse and refuse to testify. During this phase, the batterer has, often in violation of an order of protection, repeatedly contacted the victim, professing apologies and declarations of love to trick the victim into believing that the violence will end. During this \u2018reconciliation\u2019 the batterer is able to convince the victim that recantation would solve their problems\u201d {id. at 270). For all the foregoing reasons, this aspect of defendant\u2019s motion is denied."], "id": "8f212104-6816-47da-a93e-241ad892c92c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As related in his 2017 Comprehensive Risk Assessment, petitioner grew up with a mother who was verbally abusive and a stepfather who was both physically and emotionally abusive toward the entire family, and until age 15 or 16 felt \"invisible, insecure and unworthy.\" His older brothers ran away and were then placed in foster care when petitioner was seven or eight years old, leaving him feeling abandoned. Though a friendship with his stepfather's nephew, petitioner had begun to engage in criminal activity, and by 16 he was selling cocaine. At age 16 he intervened in an incident of <mask> between his stepfather and his mother, striking his stepfather in the head with the leg of a chair, and he began to feel \"untouchable and invincible.\" His criminal behavior escalated as he hung around with antisocial and criminal peers, sold narcotics and carried weapons. His mother moved to Minnesota, leaving petitioner to live with his brother and contributing to petitioner's *970feeling of abandonment. Petitioner then moved into a house with a group of older people who were selling drugs. Petitioner had dropped out of school after failing tenth grade. He enrolled in Job Corps., where he obtained a GED, but was expelled for fighting. He was fired from or left jobs due to his criminality."], "id": "1b499507-c021-4447-90cb-f9d21137df6f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The parties filed cross petitions for custody of K.B. Jr. Petitioner filed a petition for custody on July 19, 2007. Respondent filed a cross petition for custody on August 6, 2007. Respondent stated in her cross petition that it would be in the best interest of the child if custody of the child was awarded to her since petitioner is actually a woman. In respondent\u2019s affirmation it is alleged that petitioner committed acts of <mask> against her while they lived together and that she feared for the safety of the child. In respondent\u2019s custody petition she stated that the petitioner was \u201cactually a woman\u201d and therefore the marriage was \u201cinvalid.\u201d (Cross petition of J.R., Aug. 6, 2007.)"], "id": "7854a432-f91e-4572-9b68-e2a25ceb0775", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*764\u201c[ejmployers are required to maintain employee confidentiality for leave taken under the law, and employees may use vacation, personal leave or compensatory time off that is otherwise available to them. However, the law does not create employee rights to take unpaid leave in excess of the time allowed under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993\u201d (California Prohibits Adverse Employment Action Against Sexual Assault Victims, Private Educ L Rep [Dec. 2002]). Rhode Island (RI Gen Laws \u00a7 12-28-10 [a]) bars employment discrimination by employers, employment agencies and licensing agencies against those who seek or refuse to seek a protective order under Rhode Island General Laws, title 15, chapter 15 or title 8, chapter 8.1. In 2001, Tennessee\u2019s General Assembly introduced bills which would (1) make it discriminatory for an employer to fire or not hire victims of <mask>; (2) prohibit denying unemployment benefits because of circumstances stemming from domestic abuse, and require that unemployment compensation be provided when an employee loses a job due to domestic abuse; and (3) allow employers of domestic violence victims threatened at the workplace to seek a TRO and injunction protecting workplace and the domestic violence victim while at the workplace."], "id": "60d4b20d-755c-4bad-a5de-23e7b104940f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Although Kerley was not in custody, he presented no danger to Dever in the police station. Officer Harper conducted a standard post-incident interview of a <mask> victim in order to establish and document what had happened at the house. Although the timing and duration of the interview are not clear from the record, Dever was at the police station for approximately two hours. Viewing all of the circumstances objectively, it is clear the *552primary purpose of the police station interview was to gather evidence of past events for possible use in a criminal prosecution. This interview is indistinguishable from the police interviews in Crawford , Hammon, and Cage ."], "id": "b5889cf6-5c2d-4fda-95b8-5e16505b705d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over L.K., the child of L.M. (mother)1 and M.K. (father), under Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). It found L.K. was at risk of harm due to father\u2019s physical abuse of L.K., violent conduct toward mother, and alcohol abuse, as well as mother\u2019s failure to protect L.K. from father\u2019s conduct. Subsequently, the court removed L.K. from father under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) and placed her with mother under the supervision of the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department). It ordered father to participate in enhancement services and granted him monitored visits in a therapeutic setting. On appeal, father contends: (1) the jurisdictional findings regarding his physical abuse of L.K., his infliction of <mask> on mother, and his alcohol abuse are unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) removal was unwarranted because reasonable alternatives to removal were available to protect L.K. if she were returned to father; (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion by including certain services in his court-ordered case plan; and (4) the court improperly delegated its authority to determine the frequency of his visits with L.K. to her therapist. As discussed below, we conclude father\u2019s first three arguments are without merit. We further conclude father"], "id": "7e6d949f-2766-45d6-b486-f46802ba0c9f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["5 The purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of <mask> from those who perpetuate such abuse, with the primary goal being the prevention of physical and sexual abuse. Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d. 1260, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also 23 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 6108 (enumerating forms of relief availing under the Act). \u201cA PFA order may be justified if the trial court finds that it is supported by a preponderance of evidence.\u201d K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d.123, 128 (Pa. Super. 2019). The trial court\u2019s exclusive role as the finder of fact is to assess the demeanor and credibility of witness testimony. See C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 1276-77 (Pa. Super. 2019). When reviewing the propriety of a PFA order, an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard and must defer to the trial court\u2019s credibility determinations. Id. All record evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party for whom a PFA order was granted. Id."], "id": "42e5791f-45a5-426d-a9c2-1ab534c2ae09", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["David's petition was brought pursuant to the Act, which as amended in 2014 provides that its purpose is \"to prevent acts of <mask>, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the cause of the violence.\" (\u00a7 6220.)12"], "id": "107c0c31-ce94-4417-b9ee-bc6c5088345f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["second, he broke away from a supervisor while being disciplined, hopped over a barrier, and started fighting with another ward. The jury heard evidence of <mask> Newborn committed against several partners. Arguing with Tanchell Anderson shortly after their relationship ended in 1991, name- calling escalated to an exchange of blows. Anderson told police Newborn had knocked her to the ground and punched her in the face about 30 times. When Newborn was dating Aneadra Keaton in 1992, he once broke into a house she was visiting and assaulted her, pushed her down a stairway, and forced her to leave. Another time, Newborn hit Keaton several times during an argument. Detrick Bright was driving a car in August 1992 when Newborn kicked in her car window, injuring her with broken glass. In 1993, he took her pager and hit her several times. When police arrived, Newborn resisted and had to be subdued with mace. Later that year, Newborn sprayed the then-pregnant Bright in the face with household cleaners. In November 1992, Rochelle Douglas had been dating Newborn for over three years and was eight-and-a-half months pregnant with his child. One day they argued, and Newborn asserted the child was not his. He told her not to \u201cput the baby in his name\u201d when it was born or he would hurt her. He then hit her several times in the face. Two other incidents were introduced. In 1992, Newborn threatened Louise Jernigan with a gun during an argument. In May 1993, he resisted arrest. Officers responding to reports of an armed man asked to search Newborn and directed him to place his hands on his head. He refused to comply, yelling curses and attempting to incite a nearby crowd."], "id": "d3d7049d-6878-43af-aa78-67bfd88c983c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court stated that it wanted S.Y. to have primary physical custody and that S.Y. should have four days with A. and Omar should have three days. This was actually a de facto joint custody order. ( Celia S. v. Hugo H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655, 663, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 756 ( Celia S .) [50/50 time split between parents was de facto joint physical custody even though court said it was giving sole legal and physical custody to mother and characterized father's time as visitation].) \" 'Joint physical custody' means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody.\" (\u00a7 3004.) In Celia S ., the order awarding de facto joint physical custody was reversed because there was simply no evidence rebutting the <mask> presumption. ( Celia S ., at pp. 663, 664, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 756.) The case was remanded for the court to restore sole custody to the mother but noted that the father could move to modify custody, subject to the section 3044 presumption. ( Id . at pp. 664-665, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 756.) The appellate court did not find de facto joint physical custody erroneous in all cases, but that it required rebuttal of the section 3044 presumption. ( Ibid . )"], "id": "718a02d7-e8d4-4c74-946f-3bfb27f28be4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Kim about section 278.7. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the question was beyond the scope of the direct examination. The objection was sustained. Moments later, the prosecutor asked Kim how she would counsel someone who was concealing a child to protect them from <mask>. Kim responded that she would advise the person to file a \"good-faith report\" with the district attorney's office and commence a custody action. When the prosecutor attempted to follow up, defense counsel objected that the follow up questions were beyond the scope of the direct examination. This time, the trial court overruled the objection, stating, \"You qualified her as an expert witness in the use of the family law procedure and domestic violence in general, so at this point it's fair game.\" The prosecutor then asked Kim a series of questions regarding section 278.7's reporting requirements. As we shall discuss, there was no evidence that defendant complied with these requirements."], "id": "ca235a87-c65d-4b28-b5a9-fb7cd3c530dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\"[THE TRIAL COURT]: I completely agree with the People on this. You can't raise the issue of threat of <mask> as you have done and then just leave it out there. This is the only way a person can take advantage of the defense of I had to leave because I was afraid of violence to me or my child."], "id": "99ed1c28-38c7-4598-9379-1929ba1bda76", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) initiated contact with appellants on December 3, 2015, after receiving a hotline report of environmental neglect, drug use, <mask>, the children being \"filthy[,]\" and lack of food. Family services worker (FSW) Katie Wells made contact on the same date; she found adequate food and observed no health or safety concerns. Appellants denied drug use, domestic violence, and a lack of food. Unsuccessful attempts to visit appellants were made on January 4 and 6, 2016, but a successful attempt was made on January 11, 2016. Again, there was adequate food and no health or safety concerns were found; however, appellants both refused drug screens. Because the hotline report could not be substantiated, the case was closed on January 13, 2016."], "id": "dbf79e16-0f01-4774-9e1e-40f0fcb01f6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court has reviewed the undisputed facts in light of the new statute\u2019s broad prohibition and narrow exceptions. Mr. R. was convicted of second degree murder of his son\u2019s mother. Michael, only three years old, is too young to agree to visits. Michael\u2019s maternal grandmother, who has legal custody, opposes visitation. There is no claim that petitioner was himself the victim of <mask> inflicted by the deceased."], "id": "2fc5f458-4c3a-49e2-911b-a14b960cf6ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Soon thereafter, the juvenile court scheduled a hearing in the dependency proceedings \"for status of Parentage.\" Prior to the hearing, Michael, Joel, and Donald all filed requests to be declared the minor's father. Michael also sought an order of visitation. In support of his request for presumed parent status, Donald submitted a declaration describing his relationship with the minor and stating that although he was required by a <mask> restraining order to live apart from Mother and the minor, he intended to reunite with them when permitted to do so and to \"remain[ ] [the minor's] father for the rest of his life.\""], "id": "2ca074ef-5c54-4e71-8d26-39bcc4bb9f6b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["At the end of the trial on custody, the court stated the reasons for its ruling and issued an interim order granting joint legal custody and de facto joint physical custody to S.Y. and Omar. The court found that Omar perpetrated <mask> on S.Y. on August 29, 2016, giving rise to the section 3044 presumption, but that a grant of custody to Omar would not be detrimental to A.'s best interests. It found that Omar did not pose a risk to A.'s safety, given the presence of family members, and that Omar rebutted the presumption of detriment."], "id": "e366de76-ce1e-471f-9d12-c7bd25bee59d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Michael Lee Johnson was indicted for unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate <mask>, witness tampering, and assault, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 13, 113(a)(8), 113(a)(4), 2261(a), and 1512(b). A jury found Johnson guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 864 months\u2019 imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. Johnson now challenges his conviction and sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE and REMAND."], "id": "a5355c45-df53-4f66-b313-abd8135e7e0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["8 The temporary restraining order did not include (and Mother did not reached the same decision after considering Mother\u2019s claim that Father\u2019s actions violated the temporary restraining order and disturbed her peace. (S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 672 [mother\u2019s testimony regarding father\u2019s alleged history of <mask>, \u201cas well as her testimony that [f]ather violated the 2019 temporary restraining order by parking near her driveway\u201d was not \u201c \u2018 \u201cof such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support\u201d \u2019 the requisite finding\u2014 namely, that a permanent restraining order was necessary to protect [m]other\u2019s safety.\u201d].) We therefore reject Mother\u2019s contention that the court misapplied the law in evaluating her claims. Although the majority of the evidence presented to the trial court involved the parties\u2019 custody dispute, Mother also testified briefly about two prior incidents of alleged abuse during the parties\u2019 marriage. As set forth ante, Mother contended in her first supplemental declaration that Father \u201cwas verbally abusive\u201d during their marriage and \u201cused his physicality to intimidate [her].\u201d At the evidentiary hearing, Mother briefly described these two alleged incidents. During the first incident, Mother alleged that Father was unsatisfied with her responses to his questions and he apparently"], "id": "f91e538a-ba51-4a90-883d-54c8726c2ae6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On October 8, David and Joannie stipulated to a temporary timeshare arrangement for their children. They agreed to split custody evenly, but David insisted on continuing to pursue his request for a child custody evaluation. David also required a provision that specifically \"reserves his right\" to seek a custody modification \"at any time\" pursuant to Family Code section 3044, which creates \"a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated <mask> is detrimental to the best interest of the child.\""], "id": "724db39f-7869-419b-80e5-4c3794fd7342", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In this first place the decision herein clearly does not pertain to the issue which was the subject of the Turza and Trabazo cases \u2014 the creation of the integrated <mask> parts. The issue therein is a grant of ancillary jurisdiction over related matters involving matrimonial law, family law and criminal law within the Supreme Court. The need to consolidate all matters involving the same or similar parties in one forum is arguably well within the power of the Chief Administrative Judge. (People v Gutierrez, 2001 NY Slip Op 40290[U] [2001].)"], "id": "10341263-afc1-46ce-9d0f-a908c73b9d6c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["There have been no reported cases interpreting this statutory provision. However, in this court\u2019s view, the storage of the firearms by the defendant\u2019s father within the home inside a locked *779glass display case does not satisfy the underlying aim of the statute to require that firearms possessed by one who resides with an individual who such person knows, or has reason to know, is prohibited from possessing such firearm be secured in a \u201csafe storage depository\u201d within the meaning of Penal Law \u00a7 265.45. In order to comport with the statute\u2019s purpose to enhance protections for victims of <mask>, secure storage of firearms within a household where a defendant convicted of domestic violence offenses resides is necessary. Securing such firearms within a glass case, even if locked, does not meet the minimum requirements for safe storage."], "id": "02b435be-5fb6-4db1-8612-8c6761067867", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The case social worker assessed the children for physical, sexual, and emotional abuse in the home, but found none. All four family members denied any <mask> occurred in the home, stating the children's electronics were usually taken away as punishment. The parents reported the children were current with their immunizations, went to the doctor if they were sick, and did not have any medical conditions. Alexzander told the case social worker he was in eighth grade and received A's and B's in school. He also reported he has perfect attendance and is never late. Catrina reported she is in fifth grade and gets good grades."], "id": "a8a4b777-b971-451f-ab77-2bbddda10487", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Michael Lee Johnson was indicted for unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate <mask>, witness tampering, and assault, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 13, 113(a)(8), 113(a)(4), 2261(a), and 1512(b). A jury found Johnson guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 864 months\u2019 imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. Johnson now challenges his conviction and sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE and REMAND."], "id": "cd595ec1-7061-4070-aaf3-0ddab03b9b8e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Whether the visitation provisions in the judgment of divorce now before this court meet the jurisdictional standards of article 5-A of the Domestic Relations Law, when there is no evidence that the wife ever signed any document evincing her agreement to those explicit provisions, requires further analysis. The UCCJEA defines \u201cchild custody determination\u201d as an order of a court providing for visitation with respect to a child (Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 75-a [3]). The Singapore interim judgment is a \u201cchild custody determination\u201d within the meaning of the UCCJEA. There is no claim by the wife that the Singapore court improperly applied the laws of Singapore in adding the language which spelled out the husband\u2019s visitation rights. The core of the wife\u2019s complaint before this court is twofold: (1) that the interim judgment of divorce, which contains the specific description of the husband\u2019s \u201cliberal\u201d access rights, was modified without either the wife\u2019s consent or the findings of a court after a hearing7 and (2) she claims the divorce was procured, in part, as a result of <mask> against her."], "id": "508e6e59-1291-4cc1-b80d-e65493ed27ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The financial stress also affected Mother's ability to control her temper. When she abused the children, she usually used her hands, a belt, or some other instrument. A social worked contacted Mother about <mask> in 2007. Mother admitted having hit J.N. with a belt, leaving a bruise. The social worker suggested therapy, and Mother took some domestic violence classes. Mother said the counseling helped and she did not hit the children as much thereafter. J.N.'s older sister had additional counseling because she was depressed, suicidal, and cut herself."], "id": "b224743b-2973-465f-bb4d-5d345d86836c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Deborah A. Haendiges, J. On January 18, 2011 the defendant was arraigned in Buffalo City Court on one count of harassment in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 240.26 (1) alleging an act of <mask> by the defendant against the complainant. Thereafter, on January 26, 2011 the People declared their readiness for trial and defendant served motions on the Erie County District Attorney on February 1, 2011. While this Buffalo City Court action was pending, three petitions were simultaneously pending in Erie County Family Court between the defendant, complainant and a third family member concerning the custody of the defendant\u2019s and complainant\u2019s child. The pendency of these simultaneous criminal and Family Court matters with the underlying issue of domestic violence prompted a screening by this court, the Supreme Court Integrated Domestic Violence (hereinafter IDV) Part, located in Erie County."], "id": "3a924a90-d53d-4aed-8488-7f700f0510a9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["complex was unlocked and cracked open and that Candice\u2019s apartment door was open. Housh stated that during previous visits, she was unable to enter the apartment complex because the front door was always locked. Candice informed Housh that she had been assaulted four times, and Housh observed that Candice had stitches on her left eyebrow and bruising on her eyes and face. During the meeting, Candice stated that she feared disclosing the assaults to Housh because she had been previously told that she needed to make real changes and participate in all services. Candice denied using any alcohol. After further discussion, Candice reported to Housh that she had been at a <mask> support center which offered her crisis services, emergency shelter, and transitional housing. Housh testified that during her meeting with Candice, Candice received a call from the center asking when Candice would be returning to the center. During the meeting, Housh informed Candice of the pending motion to terminate Candice\u2019s parental rights and the scheduled hearing thereon. Housh testified that this information caused Candice to become visibly upset, raise her voice, use profanity, and present with \u201caggressive\u201d body language. Housh indicated Candice was eventually able to calm down and continue the discussion, telling Housh that she had called her children \u201ca few times\u201d from the center, she provided Christmas gifts for her children, and stated several times that she was \u201cthe best mom and that she ha[d] always been there for her children.\u201d Housh admitted that Candice and the children share a strong bond and love each other and that when Candice was sober, the visits went well. However, when Candice was not sober during visits, [t]he children did not want to continue the visits and would usually ask the visitation worker if they could leave the visit. During the visit, what would upset the girls . . . would be [Candice\u2019s] falling asleep on the couch, her questioning the girls about different things that either didn\u2019t make sense or that the girls didn\u2019t know - 609 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 30 Nebraska Appellate Reports IN RE INTEREST OF SERENITY A. & CANJERRICA D. Cite as 30 Neb. App. 602"], "id": "8e2a690f-f3ce-40dc-8a31-d1822ed34db3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["harm to the minors. Moreover, the <mask> allegations were too dated to show evidence of a current risk. We disagree. The social services agency must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor comes within the juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction. (\u00a7 355, subd. (a); In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128, 137 (Isabella F.).) As relevant here, section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes dependency jurisdiction when \u201c[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child\u2019s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent\u2019s . . . mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.\u201d Juvenile dependency proceedings are intended to protect not only children who are currently being abused or neglected, but also \u201cto ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.\u201d (\u00a7 300.2; In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) \u201c \u2018The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.\u2019 \u201d (In re T.V., at p. 133.) \u201cWe review the jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We consider the entire record, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court\u2019s findings and affirming the order even if other evidence supports a different finding. [Citation.] We do not consider the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Substantial evidence does not mean \u2018any evidence,\u2019 however, and we ultimately consider whether a reasonable trier of fact would make the challenged ruling in light of the entire record.\u201d (Isabella F., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 137-138.) Here, the juvenile court carefully considered how mother\u2019s various conditions affected the minors and their physical and mental well-being. As to mother\u2019s mental illness, the court reviewed evidence that, while mother had previously been diagnosed and medicated for multiple mental illnesses, she was no longer taking medication and did"], "id": "39acd7ae-e50b-4d1e-baf5-d8decd005682", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In stating the bases for rebuttal of the presumption, the trial court said that Omar was more fluent in English than S.Y. and found his greater fluency to be an advantage for \"navigation through the American medical and educational system.\" It was error to use language fluency to rebut the presumption of detriment arising from <mask> as it has no relation to A.'s safety or the impact of prior domestic violence on him. The error does not require reversal or remand, however, because there was sufficient other evidence supporting the court's finding that Omar had rebutted the presumption of detriment with respect to both legal and physical custody."], "id": "cac4a666-4358-4220-906a-16da16afc221", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In People v Greenlee (70 AD3d 966 [2d Dept 2010], Iv denied 14 NY3d 888 [2010]), the Court held admissible medical records containing a statement by a victim that she was attacked by friends of her former boyfriend who were trying to stop her from testifying against him in a <mask> proceeding. The Court found that the statement was admissible because it was relevant to treatment in that it could be used to develop a discharge plan that would provide for the victim\u2019s safety."], "id": "46acc169-1740-4aea-8c79-04b579162e6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The general purpose of a trial, or a hearing, is to address and determine issues of fact. (See generally Matter of Lagani v Li, 131 AD3d 1246 [2d Dept 2015].) As the defendant has openly admitted to all of the pertinent facts, a reopening of the trial would be unnecessary, and would only serve to cause delay and additional legal fees for both parties. (See 1319 Third Ave. Realty Corp. v Chateaubriant Rest. Dev. Co., LLC, 57 AD3d 340 [1st Dept 2008].) If the court were to reopen the trial for the limited purpose of taking testimony regarding the issue of contempt, the testimony would be identical to the admissions made by the defendant on the record of September 15, 2016. Accordingly, plaintiff\u2019s application to reopen the trial is hereby denied as unnecessary. Moreover, to reopen this trial would necessarily require the court to revisit issues of <mask>, counsel fees, equitable distribution, and maintenance in light of the defendant\u2019s contemptuous actions, while serving to provide nothing relevant to the contempt issue currently before the court."], "id": "0a05a57f-2a8c-400c-a7eb-e2eda8fb9a1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Matthew J. D\u2019Emic, J. *1135In this <mask> prosecution the People concede that defendant\u2019s statement that she cut her husband as he was beating her during a fight over child support was made in violation of her constitutional rights (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). Nevertheless, the People requested a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the statement since they seek to impeach the defendant with her words if she testifies at trial."], "id": "b173c0f0-5930-4200-98b4-55745f0dda16", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["This case more closely resembles Brumley v. Arkansas Department of Human Services , 2015 Ark. 356, 2015 WL 5895440. In that case, our supreme court held that termination was appropriate despite the child's being placed with an aunt because Brumley, who was incarcerated, lacked essential components of the case plan, including stable housing and employment. Here, Covin had abandoned the children for most of the case, and any progress she made was late in the case plan, as far as twelve months after the filing of the original petition. Covin did not acknowledge either the seriousness of the <mask> she experienced or the physical danger she had placed her children in during her violent outbursts, and she admitted that she had not made an effort to comply with the case plan for the first year of the case."], "id": "0186c20d-2bad-4de0-908d-dd7bd9df13be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["defendant\u2019s brother\u2019s running shoes. Counsel asserted that presenting evidence on these matters would be distracting, consume undue time, and be prejudicial. Counsel also asserted that the prior acts were insufficiently similar to the charged offenses. In additional oral argument the following day, the prosecutor asserted that the prior acts contextualized what was going on with the family and with defendant being a family member subject to a restraining order. The prosecutor asserted that there would be sufficient evidence to prove the prior acts, regardless of whether defendant was charged for them, and that they were sufficiently similar. Addressing similarity, the prosecutor again asserted that \u201cit starts with the fact that it\u2019s the same location for all these incidences, which is . . . the family home . . . ,\u201d and the same victims. Additionally, defendant entered using the same side garage door. And a restraining order was violated in all of the prior incidents; in all but one of incidents the same restraining order was violated as defendant violated during the charged offenses. Further, defendant left the scene before the police arrived. Defense counsel asserted that prior thefts should not be admissible under section 1109, because that provision addresses prior acts of <mask>. Acknowledging that the Family Code contains a more expansive definition of abuse, counsel argued the trial court still has discretion to preclude the evidence under section 352. Counsel argued the evidence was potentially prejudicial, lacked probative value to prove defendant\u2019s intent when he entered the house, and would consume undue time and confuse the jury. Regarding section 1101, subdivision (b), defense counsel asserted that the similarity of the prior acts was insufficient to warrant admission of the evidence. Counsel further maintained that defendant\u2019s violations of prior restraining orders were not relevant to the issue of knowledge because \u201cthe issue isn\u2019t whether he has knowledge of how restraining orders work, it\u2019s whether he had knowledge of this particular restraining order\u201d which counsel stated was issued March 2017."], "id": "50cac9e9-b56e-4c46-90d7-64971f52cb10", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On April 7, 2017, defendant filed a motion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor and for termination of her probation. Defendant alleged she had completed a 52-week <mask> program, had been on probation for approximately 15 months with no probation violations, and had no outstanding balance owed to the court. The People opposed the motion. At the hearing on the motion, the court indicated it would \"give everybody my tentative. I think [defense counsel] knows what's coming. Based on the short length of probation, and because I believe [section] 1203.097 requires three years of probation, I don't believe the Court has jurisdiction to terminate probation early when the statute prescribes a minimum length of probation. [\u00b6] I've invited anybody to brief me on this issue, but I don't think you are going to find cases because I could not find one stating one way or the other.\""], "id": "ccdb526b-c94f-48d3-b6f6-fd8c18685785", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["At the detention hearing, the court found a prima facie case for jurisdiction over the children under section 300. The court ordered the children removed from both parents and released to mother. The court also ordered monitored visitation for father. II. Jurisdiction/disposition Report DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on January 29, 2021. When DCFS spoke with mother on January 15, 2021, she confirmed that there had been <mask> with father. Mother stated: \u201cHe beat me when I was pregnant, he beat me in front of the kids.\u201d Mother also stated that she tried to prevent father from hitting the children, but he then hit her. She stated that father hit her in the face, knocked her down, and choked her. When asked how often the abuse occurred, she stated it occurred \u201crandomly\u201d and with increasing frequency. Mother told the DCFS investigator (DI) that she separated from father in 2019, but let father visit the children in her home, where he \u201ckept being abusive.\u201d Regarding marijuana use, mother stated that she and father used to smoke when they were together, but never did so in front of the children. She reported that the previous day, father was video chatting with the children and visibly smoking marijuana during the chat. Mother sent the DI a video showing father smoking a joint while on video chat with the children. When the DI spoke with father, he admitted to \u201ca partial factor\u201d regarding the allegations of domestic violence, stating that he never hit mother, but he had pushed her and they would verbally argue. When asked about the pushing, father stated, \u201cevery time I ever touched her it was defense, I would never just attack her.\u201d He claimed that the children were not present for"], "id": "b2214fd8-4f07-4cb0-b6b4-7e2e8bf8a11f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Dawn Tish, investigator for the Missouri Department of Social Services, Children's Division, testified regarding a March 10, 2017, investigation into an allegation Sibling was being abused in Father's home.6 Tish interviewed Father who denied Sibling was being abused in his home. Father admitted to <mask> with Child's Mother, however, and alleged Child's Mother was the aggressor. Father confirmed that on one occasion Child's Mother hit him in the face with a frying pan, breaking his nose. He confirmed Sibling *614and Child were present when domestic violence occurred within his home; Father would try to lead Child's Mother to another part of the home in these instances. Father admitted to one incident wherein he was deemed the aggressor. He reported that during an argument he became frustrated and threw a cup. The cup bounced off of a mattress and hit Child's Mother in the face; Father was arrested. Father told Tish that the argument started because he thought Child's Mother too strictly disciplined the children.7 Tish testified that Child's Mother \"may have had some bruising on her face when I saw her.\" Father also admitted to marijuana use."], "id": "511e7cb3-9dba-4109-b6b0-a5cbea199d0b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*394Mr. Blue\u2019s history of <mask> which occurred during the period of time he resided with Ms. Jones presents further extraordinary circumstances. In addition to the 1991 convictions arising out of his assault upon Ms. Jones and his violation of the temporary order of protection, there is evidence that Mr. Blue often assaulted his wife, resulting in physical injury to her. While Mr. Blue has sought to minimize the severity of these incidents, he has not denied that they occurred."], "id": "90784a73-4a2d-41d1-a04f-0ac9e9071215", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Domestic Violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": [". See, Walker, The Battered Woman (1979); but see, Digirolamo, Myths and Misconceptions About <mask>, 16 Pace L Rev 41 (1995), and Toffel, Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and Evil Children: Confronting the Myths About Battered People Who Kill Their Abusers, and the Argument for Extending Battered Syndrome Self-Defenses to All Victims of Domestic Violence, 70 S Cal L Rev 337 (1996)."], "id": "cd76c220-eaa9-42c6-b9c6-68a0fd4c3db6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["the social worker that he had a parenting class enrollment appointment the following day. On December 3, 2020, father informed the social worker that he was enrolling in a parenting class that day after work. Father alleged mother is vindictive and made false claims about him because she is unhappy that he was awarded unsupervised, weekend visits. When asked about his criminal arrests and allegations of <mask> and drug use, father stated he is a different person. He acknowledged his prior use of cocaine and his past DUI but denied the domestic violence allegations. Father\u2019s criminal history consists of arrests for various crimes and a DUI conviction."], "id": "555ab5ac-fadc-4ac1-83bb-275e2a409310", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["9. a substantial probability C.P. could be placed in his home by the 12-month review hearing. Consequently, he failed to raise a claim of reversible error. Therefore, his petition does not comply with rules 8.450\u22128.452 and is inadequate for appellate review. Even if we were to independently review the record for possible error, we would affirm the juvenile court\u2019s rulings. C.P. was removed from the parents mainly because of their unresolved methamphetamine abuse. They had recently failed to reunify with C.P.\u2019s sibling because of their drug use. In addition, mother had already lost custody of another child to a legal guardianship because of her drug use. Nevertheless, the juvenile court gave the parents an opportunity to reunify with C.P. by providing them drug treatment as well as services to address their <mask>. However, they continued to use methamphetamine and made minimal overall progress in completing their case plan requirements. On that evidence, the juvenile court properly found C.P. could not be returned to the parents\u2019 custody without subjecting her to a substantial risk of detriment. Further given the parents\u2019 lack of progress up to that point, there was no reason for the juvenile court to believe they could safely parent C.P. in the time remaining before the juvenile court would conduct a 12-month review hearing. Our calculation that the 12-month period would fall on March 23 rather than February 25, 2022 (see fn. 4), does not change our opinion. We conclude father failed to comply with rules 8.450\u22128.452 and for that reason dismiss his writ petition. We also deny his request for a stay of the section 366.26 hearing."], "id": "561d4127-2c4c-472c-9607-6c8cb3324189", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court rejects petitioner\u2019s arguments that the new statute is \u201cpunitive\u201d or an ex post facto measure creating a new sanction for petitioner\u2019s criminal act. As stated earlier, visitation with his son is not solely Mr. R\u2019s \u201cright\u201d. Visitation is a right jointly shared by parent and child, intended to benefit both. Nevertheless, it is the child\u2019s interest that is paramount and it is the child\u2019s interest that the new legislation addresses. The Legislature has twice demonstrated its concern for the impact on children of acts of <mask> inflicted by one parent against the other, first in the 1996 amendments, and now in chapter 150. These laws reflect a public policy determination that children are to be protected from exposure to domestic violence, and as such they may be considered remedial in nature."], "id": "f7a97744-79fd-4cc9-bded-0bbf8dcfe1a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Similarly, father points to the two sentences C.Q. spends distinguishing B.S. to support the proposition that evidence of physical abuse is required to sustain a restraining order under section 213.5. (See C.Q. , supra , 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 365, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 719, distinguishing B.S. , supra , 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 194, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 810.) We do not read B.S. so narrowly. Though the infant in B.S. was indeed *642in physical jeopardy, that case was premised on father's general inability to *999control himself during violent outbursts-of which throwing the mother onto the child was but one example. ( B.S. , at p. 194, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 810.) The court also emphasized that father had committed repeated acts of <mask>, and that \"[d]uring previous incidents, he had torn a door off its hinges and knocked a hole in the wall.\" ( Ibid . ) The court explicitly held that physical harm, though sufficient, was not required. ( Id. at p. 193, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 810.)"], "id": "28eb11a5-ac2b-4c09-bd8b-7a6947deeeb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Under the within undisputed facts and circumstances, the penalty imposed by respondents of dismissal of petitioner, a victim of <mask> (of which respondents were notified on numerous occasions) and a caregiver of five children (some of whom suffer from special needs) and, given that respondents based their penalty of termination, in part, on absences attributed to her status as a domestic violence victim (including Family Court appearance on an order of protection) and on absences prior to the disclosure of her domestic violence status, which indisputably were attributed to a documented temporary disability, such actions are indeed so disproportionate to the alleged misconduct, the harm to the agency, or the general public welfare, such that a lesser penalty, other than termination, is warranted. Further, such penalty is especially shocking in that respondents were obligated to affirmatively assist their employees who were being abused, in accordance with their own policy and procedures outlined in their Direc*805tive, which was clearly not followed. (Respondents\u2019 exhibit 21.) To the extent that respondents have alleged any unexplained absences, or violations of rules by petitioner, respondents have not maintained that termination would nonetheless have been the appropriate penalty, absent respondents\u2019 inappropriate and discriminatory placement of petitioner in the \u201cchronic absence\u201d category, based on her temporary disability, or their discriminatory conduct based on petitioner\u2019s domestic violence status. In any event, the extreme penalty of termination would be shockingly disproportionate to any remaining alleged infractions, even if substantiated, given respondents\u2019 bad faith and petitioner\u2019s personal situation. (See Matter of Diefenthaler v Klein, 27 AD3d 347 [1st Dept 2006]; Matter of Lagala v New York City Police Dept., 286 AD2d 205 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 605 [2001]; Matter of Mauro v Walcott, 115 AD3d 547 [1st Dept 2014]; Matter of Brito v Walcott, 115 AD3d 544 [1st Dept 2014] .)28"], "id": "180d1740-95ba-482a-9b75-0f2f62fe7255", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Applying these rules in a <mask> protective order context, Fregoso held that the court will affirm unless \" ' \"the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.\" ' \" ( Fregoso, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 702, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 884, citing Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 317.) And it went on, \" ' \"When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced *624from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court,\" ' \" but instead must \"accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court's findings, resolving every conflict in the evidence in favor of the judgment.\" ( Ibid. , citing Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 664.)"], "id": "1cd9c610-66c1-4806-9ea7-e96022b883ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As discussed above, on January 7, 1996, Officer Cross was dispatched to the Kerley residence on a call of <mask>. She arrived approximately 14 minutes after the call went out and found that Dever had been placed in one patrol car and Kerley in another. Officer Cross interviewed both. When asked to describe Dever's demeanor, Officer Cross testified that Dever's makeup was smeared and it looked like she had been crying. Her eyes showed some blackening and her right wrist and ankle were turning red or beginning to swell. Dever told Officer Cross that Kerley had stomped on her right hand and foot and kicked her in the eye. When Dever tried to call 911, Kerley said he would kill Dever if anyone from the police department came to the house."], "id": "666c701e-09b8-4ebd-8088-9cd81de713a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["advance report that a burglary suspect was armed and they were not apparently, much less actually, threatened with a weapon. Id. at 602\u201303. Without provocation, those officers shot a non-danger- ous suspect. Id. The district court reasoned that what the Lundgren officers encountered was different from what happened here, where officers responded at night to a shots-fired <mask> call and were confronted with an armed man facing them and raising a pistol. And, the court explained, this case is materially different from Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016), where an officer shot a man who was subdued, unarmed, and not resisting arrest. Id. at 1222. After concluding there was no relevant decisional law clearly establishing that Snook violated David Powell\u2019s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, the district court considered whether Snook\u2019s conduct \u201cwas so obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that any officer would know the conduct was illegal.\u201d In concluding that it was not, the court reasoned that the \u201cdecisive factor\u201d was that David Powell \u201ccarried a gun in his right hand and began raising that gun in front of a police officer\u201d and while facing \u201cin the direction of the officer.\u201d The court granted summary judgment on qualified im- munity grounds because it was not clearly established that the use of deadly force in these specific circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. USCA11 Case: 19-13340 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 12 of 23"], "id": "eecacfa8-5e58-4332-a829-d3fb843632ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Davila and her children are protected persons under the DVPA. (\u00a7 6211, subds. (a) [a spouse], (e) [a child of a party].) The trial court may issue a DVRO to prevent <mask> based upon reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse. (\u00a7 6300; Nevarez, supra , 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 782, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 219.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Mejia committed prior acts of domestic abuse against both Davila and her children. Mejia, by holding a gun to Davila's head and threatening to kill her, committed domestic abuse by placing Davila \"in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury.\" (\u00a7 6203, subd. (a)(3).) Mejia's conduct toward Davila's children, including on November 2, 2016 jumping over the gate to the family home, knocking on the windows and doors, and threatening physically to abuse the children if they did not open the door, similarly constituted *229domestic abuse. (See \u00a7\u00a7 6203, subd. (a)(3) & (4), 6320, subd. (a) [abuse includes engaging in stalking, threatening, or harassing conduct].)"], "id": "fb0b3182-676a-4886-9cec-68693f7f8855", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Domestic Violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Government entities at all levels are finally beginning to address the problem. There is now a National <mask> Hotline (800-799-SAFE). The Social Security Administration, recognizing that a victim must sometimes even change identity to attain a safe environment, has established a procedure to issue new Social Security numbers to victims of domestic violence and mounted a public awareness campaign stressing the importance of victims developing safety plans. At the state and municipal levels, various legislation has been enacted to protect domestic abuse victims and ease their transition to safety."], "id": "1181b97f-f587-4647-a8f5-acc8a1d06d0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that this evidence was properly admitted. The court noted that \u201c[i]n cases of do*854mestic violence, prior incidents of abuse against family members or sexual partners are more generally permitted because there is a logical connection between violent acts against two different persons with whom the accused had a similar emotional or intimate attachment\u201d (supra, 232 Ga App, at 294, 501 SE2d, at 527). Stated otherwise, a prior act of <mask> can show the defendant\u2019s actual course of conduct in reacting to anger in such a relationship."], "id": "b1417409-faf4-4d3e-99a1-4b77d8a8e106", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*724In March 2014, DPSS received a referral alleging the grandparents were neglecting D.H. According to the referral, \"drug activity takes place in the garage of the home,\" where father and his girlfriend reportedly resided. The referral also reported father had a history of drug-related arrests and <mask>. When the social worker interviewed the grandparents, they said father had been living in their garage \"off and on.\" The social worker asked the grandparents to drug test. Grandfather tested negative. Grandmother could not produce enough saliva to test, and ultimately admitted she had taken methamphetamine the night before. She said father's girlfriend had given it to her and it was the first time she had ever taken the drug. The social worker asked grandfather if he knew about grandmother's drug use and he replied, \"I plead the fifth on that.\""], "id": "3708513a-175a-4cc7-8f8d-72b0360d1234", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Both Ivers and Cranford are distinguishable from the instant case. Here, JP, NP, and JH had been diagnosed with PTSD from the <mask> they were exposed to and from the severe neglect they experienced in their parents' custody. Neither the father in Ivers nor the parents in Cranford had ever subjected the children to an abusive or traumatic household, whereas the Hopfners had exposed the children to domestic abuse a \"drug lifestyle,\" and \"a living hell.\" Moreover, sufficient evidence supports the circuit court's potential-harm finding. The children's counselors, the CASA volunteer, the Department, and both Robin and Philip testified at the hearing that none of the children were ready to be returned to the Hopfners' custody because of the lingering anxiety-related issues stemming from the trauma they suffered while in their parents' care. The CASA volunteer and the children's counselors also noted that the three children were bonded to each other. Philip characterizes the circuit court's acknowledgment of this strong, meaningful bond between the siblings and its reliance on this bond as support for the potential-harm finding as erroneously viewing the children as an \"amorphous group.\" In fact, the court relied on testimony from several witnesses that the children were extremely bonded due to the trauma they had suffered, and to separate them would be detrimental to their emotional health."], "id": "a7bd8bd5-b271-4659-8b80-9ebc434de1c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The home environment assessment and the permanency assessment involve the collection and review of a comprehensive amount of personal information. A family home environment assessment includes a criminal record clearance for each applicant and all adults residing in or regularly present in the home (denizen), consideration of any substantiated child abuse allegation against the applicant and any denizens, and a home and grounds evaluation. (\u00a7 16519.5, subd. (d)(2).) A permanency assessment includes a psychosocial assessment of an applicant and the results of a risk assessment. The risk assessment includes, but is not limited to, the applicant's physical and mental health, alcohol and other substance abuse, family and <mask>, and the applicant's understanding of children's needs and development, particularly children who have been victims of child abuse and neglect, and the capacity to meet those needs. A successful applicant must also demonstrate the ability to ensure the stability and financial security of the family. (Id. , subds. (c)(1) & (d)(3).)"], "id": "8e7c07ac-5c5d-4bf2-a94c-13b02c65f215", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Moreover, even if we were to agree that Megown's acts toward Maria did not constitute <mask> within the meaning of section 1109 and that this evidence was also inadmissible as to the counts pertaining to Maria under section 1101(b), we would not reverse. Error in admitting evidence of a defendant's prior acts of domestic violence under sections 1109 or 1101 is subject to the standard of prejudice set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 ( Watson ). (See People v. Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 913 [any error in admitting uncharged act of domestic violence was harmless under Watson ]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 750, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754 [admission of evidence prohibited by \u00a7 1101 is reviewed under the Watson harmless error standard].) Under the Watson test, the trial court's judgment may be overturned on appeal only if the defendant shows \"it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.\" ( Watson , at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243.)"], "id": "f755a529-78b8-413d-a083-8553f6b331c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We do not suggest minor's counsel should routinely review RFA information in all cases. Here, the Agency's inability to place Charlotte in the home of relatives who had previously been approved to care for her would have raised sufficient concerns to require further inquiry and investigation by minor's counsel even if information about the relative's past methamphetamine use and <mask> had not inadvertently been disclosed."], "id": "9e5e7c90-4b65-4a36-b60f-b3467089736b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["section 300.3 Three of these allegations involved father\u2019s conduct.4 Count a-1 alleged that mother and father\u2019s history of <mask> placed Katherine at risk of physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by her parents. Count b-2 repeated the domestic violence allegations, contending that such violence posed a substantial risk that Katherine would be harmed as a result of her parents\u2019 failure to adequately protect her. Finally, count b-3 alleged that father\u2019s substance abuse issues rendered him unable to care for Katherine, placing her at risk of serious physical harm. Father initially denied that he ever fought with or attacked mother in Katherine\u2019s presence. He also denied ever using substances in Katherine\u2019s presence. On July 27, 2016, however, at the jurisdictional hearing, both parents pled no contest to the (amended) petition. Accordingly, the juvenile court sustained counts a-1 and b-3, as well as another count related to mother\u2019s substance abuse. Father received reunification services and monitored weekly visitation. C. Father\u2019s Resumption of Custody On September 21, 2017, the juvenile court found that father had made substantial progress and granted him unmonitored visitation."], "id": "e59e3057-3735-489f-95a8-7cef46c6c9b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Tish testified that, although many of the <mask> incidents between the couple were unreported, the Independence Police Department had been called to the home on four occasions. When asked if Tish had concerns regarding Father's ability to protect his children, she testified: \"He was very reluctant to be the enforcer.... He stated that he was afraid that [Child's Mother] would retaliate causing damage to either himself or his property.\" Tish was most concerned with Father's ability to protect Child because Sibling was only at Father's home on limited weekends; Child was at Father's home all of the time."], "id": "cddda1b3-7d4e-41ee-a519-cbd0f84dcbf5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["understanding of the case . . . .\u2019 \u201d (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 845-846, quoting People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1219.) \u201c \u2018We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the independent or de novo standard of review. [Citation.] Review of the adequacy of instructions is based on whether the trial court \u201cfully and fairly instructed on the applicable law.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (People v. Turner (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 882, 887.) \u201cWe consider the instructions as a whole as well as the entire record of trial, including the arguments of counsel. [Citation.] If reasonably possible, instructions are interpreted to support the judgment rather than defeat it.\u201d (People v. McPheeters (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 124, 132.) D. Analysis We have concluded that section 1109 incorporates the Family Code definition of abuse. Thus, the trial court did not err in including the legally correct and applicable Family Code definition of abuse in its modified CALCRIM No. 852A instruction. Defendant asserts that CALCRIM No. 852A, as given, was erroneous because it allowed the jury to infer from prior acts of <mask> his propensity to commit burglary on an intent to steal theory, which, according to defendant, is not an act of domestic violence. However, as we have pointed out, breaking into the victims\u2019 home to steal property can result in a disturbance of the victims\u2019 peace. Disturbing the peace was included in the court\u2019s modified CALCRIM No. 852A instruction. We conclude the instruction was not erroneous. 15 E. Due Process Violation"], "id": "41e8e1cd-8978-4677-8f9a-2b69b0753a1f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Here the commissioner interjected that petitioner did not have a history of violence -an observation impossible to reconcile with the history that petitioner related and was documented in his records, as was later confirmed when the deputy commissioner asked petitioner about \"all this raising hell in jail ... [a]ssaulting police officers ... the records saturated with it, right?\" Petitioner acknowledged he had not been sent to jail for violence prior to the life crime, but explained again that this was what he learned from the <mask> he grew up with and, later, from his older criminal associates telling him, \"if you pull a gun out, you gotta use it. If you fight with somebody, you gotta make sure you win.\" Asked what he proved by shooting Ellingsen, petitioner replied that he proved to Grant that \"I can do what you did too,\" that \"I can get everybody up out of this situation\" and that *977\"it was nothing for me to ... shoot into somebody car and then later on when everybody find out that I murdered somebody, hey, I murdered ... this is me. I did that.\""], "id": "2f653b51-846e-4feb-936c-e65b64eca19a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Charlotte argues the juvenile court violated her due process rights by limiting her ability to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence. She contends the court erred by securing a public defender for Uncle and allowing him to plead the Fifth Amendment; excluding the <mask> restraining order and/or attached documentation on hearsay grounds; sustaining objections to questions concerning the incident of domestic violence between Uncle and his father and whether Uncle participated in domestic violence treatment or substance abuse testing; and by excluding testimony of RFA social workers concerning information they obtained during the relatives' RFA process, their opinion about Uncle's suitability to care for Charlotte, and whether there was any current *119risk to Charlotte in Aunt and Uncle's home."], "id": "343dbf05-136b-4c2b-8360-54d854d8921f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As an initial matter, we conclude that the trial court erred to the extent it based termination on respondent\u2019s involvement in <mask> because the record fails to establish that respondent was a perpetrator. The fact that respondent was or is a victim of domestic violence may not be relied upon as a basis for terminating parental rights. In re Plump, 294 Mich App 270, 273; 817 NW2d 119 (2011). This is not to say that being a victim of domestic violence necessarily precludes termination of parental rights. To the extent such a victim is also a perpetrator, the commission of domestic violence is an appropriate concern. Similarly, termination may be"], "id": "5e32f3ba-4f04-49b1-a87e-e13a4aa6d023", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Petitioner also maintains that respondents admit in their verified answer that they based the decision to terminate unlawfully, in part, on petitioner\u2019s past disability-related absences for which she had several surgeries, and from which she ultimately fully recovered. Petitioner claims that such admission by respondents, in addition to petitioner\u2019s status as a victim of <mask>, were the true motivating factors for petitioner\u2019s unlawful termination, and thus were discriminatory and violative of both Administrative Code \u00a7\u00a7 8-107 (1) (a) (barring disability discrimination) and 8-107.1 (2) (barring discrimination against a domestic violence victim).11"], "id": "536c42ce-2d8c-47b3-a485-89e95fc0d315", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The statements Dever yelled to Officer McCoy as she jumped onto him and held on for dear life-\" 'Help me, help me, save me, save me, he did this' \"-were non-testimonial. Again, the officers were called to a home on a report of <mask>. They had no idea what to expect. When Officer McCoy knocked on the door, Dever opened the door. Kerley was in the house behind her. Dever had two black eyes and was crying and shaking uncontrollably. Before the officers could ask any questions, Dever jumped onto Officer McCoy, wrapping her arms and legs around him. Officer McCoy could not pry her free, so he had to walk with her latched onto him to a patrol car in front of the house before he could release her."], "id": "50c414a6-1a67-4564-b127-18d34a8bbb7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["3. school on time. Ahmed admitted being arrested twice for <mask> against Alisha, but there was never a trial; in the past five years, police came to their home several other times because he and Alisha were physically fighting. Ahmed produced an exchange of text messages between himself and Alisha from November 9, 2019, when Alisha lived in Stanislaus County and had custody of the children and H. 3 In the text messages, Alisha asked Ahmed for support because H. was threatening her; Alisha stated H. told her to watch her back and she should not sleep. Alisha texted Ahmed that H. yelled at her and pushed her hard twice, and a few months before, H. threw Alisha\u2019s medicines away and told Alisha she wanted her to die. Alisha also texted that H. was standing in Alisha\u2019s bedroom doorway, staring at her with clenched fists, and H. yelled that Alisha should hit her so Alisha would go to jail. During this, Alisha laid on her bed with the lights off. Alisha stated H. threatened to kill her four times that night, and H. needed to either go to a mental institution or be arrested. Ahmed questioned Alisha about this incident. She testified that H. was going through a suicidal moment, and she contacted Ahmed for help because she needed a babysitter for the younger children. Alisha said H. threatened to kill her if she sought Ahmed\u2019s help. While Alisha twice sought Ahmed\u2019s help in dealing with H., she claimed H. was doing better. Ahmed also testified about the incident. He was concerned about H. being around the children because she \u201cgoes through stages, especially when she\u2019s not taking her treatment where she exhibits very concerning behavior and language in front of the children that would harm them.\u201d During a break in testimony, when the family court was reviewing the exhibits offered by both parties, the family court asked Alisha\u2019s attorney to review the text"], "id": "19dce4e1-910b-4233-b041-2c8f21b019ba", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["From before the minor's birth, the relationship between Mother and Michael was characterized by oppressive <mask>. In January 2013, prior to the minor's first birthday, a criminal protective order issued to protect Mother from Michael. He was arrested for a separate act of domestic violence against her two months later and eventually suffered a misdemeanor conviction. A year later, in April 2014, another restraining order was granted in favor of Mother against Michael. She remained fearful of him long after."], "id": "db544789-cf54-47ea-bdd8-159aafbe6b3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["would have obtained a more favorable result if a supplemental report had been prepared. (Dobbins, supra, at p. 182.) 1. The Presentence Report Considering the \u201ccriteria affecting probation,\u201d under rule 4.414, the probation officer observed that \u201c[t]he nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the crime as compared to other instances of the same crime appear significantly elevated in seriousness given the large number of violations of the Court\u2019s orders in addition to the sustained and pervasive harassment.\u201d The probation officer \u201calso noted that during these events, [defendant] utilized the Rio Vista Police in March 2019 to escalate the harassment of the victim.\u201d Additionally, the presentence report concluded that defendant \u201cinflicted significant emotional injury upon the victim.\u201d In considering circumstances in aggravation under rule 4.421(b), the probation officer stated that \u201cdefendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.\u201d The presentence report continued: \u201cThe defendant\u2019s behavior throughout this series of events associated with the instant offense is egregious and indicative of a substantial public safety concern. Though he has a limited history of criminal conduct, it is noted that his one prior was for <mask>, demonstrating a pattern of family violence related behavior that has apparently gone undetected and/or unreported.\u201d6 Further, \u201c[w]hen confronted about his behavior, [defendant] largely minimized his role in the events leading up to his arrest and maintained his narrative that the victim pulled a gun on him in Rio Vista.\u201d"], "id": "bb750c2c-f9cd-4977-b398-a182d27dc4f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We must agree with the grandparents that the June 6, 2017, order was not final or appealable as it did not finally establish the rights of the parties. As the grandparents argued, the family court's order recognized that the father had not complied with the requirements put in place when the 2015 disposition order was entered. These requirements, which included substance abuse, parenting, and <mask> assessments and services, stable income and housing for six months, and consistent supervised visitation, were all to be accomplished when the father was released from jail. Rather than completing these tasks upon his release as he was ordered to do, the father instead sought a new placement for the child or expanded visitation. Recognizing this, the family court declined to grant any further access to the child until the father had fully complied with its order. The court certainly did not preclude the father from seeking similar or even expanded relief in the future. We are not persuaded that this order is anything other than interlocutory by the father's citation to J.C. v. Commonwealth , 2013 WL 5046582 (No. 2012-CA-001731-ME) (Ky. App. Sept. 13, 2013)."], "id": "7753bb0a-62e8-47bd-9d25-e079f7c56b2d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As noted, for nonstrike felony <mask>, the \"term otherwise provided as punishment,\" within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(1), is two, three, or four years. ( \u00a7 273.5, subd. (a).) Thus, if no exception or *484disqualifying factor applies, defendant was required to be sentenced to a maximum of eight years (twice the upper term of four years) on his domestic violence conviction. (\u00a7\u00a7 667, subd. (e)(1), (e)(2)(C), 273.5, subd. (a).) But if an exception applies, the court was required to *656sentence defendant, as it did, to \"an indeterminate term of life imprisonment ....\" (\u00a7 667, subd. (e)(2)(A).) The minimum term of defendant's indeterminate term was 25 years."], "id": "c19de409-355d-4e78-ade2-fb4ea501d5b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["After considering the parties\u2019 arguments, the trial court made the following ruling: \u201cI have considered the arguments of the parties with respect to this other-acts type of evidence. I\u2019ve read the offers of proof that are contained within the People\u2019s in limine motions and statement of facts. I\u2019ve looked at the way in which it has been delineated and described for purposes of each particular count and the reasons, therefore, and I balanced all of this under Evidence Code Section 352 balancing the probative value of the evidence to be offered for the various purposes with the concerns of substantial prejudice, undue consumption of time, confusion of the issues, et cetera. [\u00b6] I do find that the People should be entitled to introduce this evidence under the various theories for which they have proffered it . . . .\u201d 2. Constitutionality of Evidence Code Sections 1108 and 1109 Simmons argues that Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1109 are unconstitutional and violate principles of due process. We review this claim de novo. (Scott, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1271-1272.) And as we explain, we find that it is without merit. \u201cCharacter evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a propensity or disposition to engage in a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person\u2019s conduct on a specified occasion.\u201d (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159; Evid. Code, \u00a7 1101, subd. (a).) However, the Legislature has created certain exceptions to the prohibition against admitting propensity evidence in cases involving sexual offenses (Evid. Code, \u00a7 1108, subd. (a)) and <mask> (id., \u00a7 1109, subd. (a)(1)). Simmons acknowledges that the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that Evidence Code section 1108 violates a defendant\u2019s right to due process in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 (Falsetta).12 Falsetta held that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s discretion to exclude propensity evidence under [Evidence Code] section 352 saves [Evidence"], "id": "7cecdfdc-906d-4794-bbd4-a05e6e0ac647", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In May 2015, Austin was charged with several offenses arising out of a <mask> incident involving his girlfriend Lisa H. and an assault on Lisa's adult son Brent M. the following day. He pleaded guilty to a single count, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury as to Brent ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 245, subd. (a)(4) ), and admitted a prior serious felony conviction.1 All remaining counts and allegations were dismissed."], "id": "0c4fa823-d0fb-4d5f-82fd-940268757465", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On the day of the hearing when defendant changed his plea, the People filed a 23-page boilerplate memorandum of points and authorities, accompanied by a 12-page declaration from a Sacramento County *184Sheriff's deputy assigned to the Sacramento Valley Hi-Tech Crimes Task Force, in support of the imposition of a probation condition requiring defendant to submit his electronic storage devices, including but not limited to cell phones and computers, to warrantless search and seizure. The boilerplate memorandum explained that the superior court had \"developed new language describing search and seizure terms and conditions accompanying grants of probation for certain cases.\" Essentially, the new language added \"electronic storage devices\" to the standard condition permitting warrantless probation searches, which already permitted searches of a probationer's \"person, place, property, automobile, ... and any object under [the probationer's] control.\"2 According to the memorandum, the probation department was \"recommending the imposition of this new language in cases, such as this, where there is a nexus between the grant of probation and the defendant's use of an electronic device.\" Being a boilerplate document, however, the memorandum did not provide any details relating to this specific case. Instead, the memorandum asserted in a footnote that the new search condition \"should be imposed in cases where there has been a demonstrated connection between the type of criminal conduct involved and the use of electronic devices and/or [where the condition] bears a reasonable relation to future criminality, such as the following: drug sales/transportation; fraud, identity theft, financial crimes; sex offenses; human trafficking, pimping and pandering; <mask> ; weapons-related offenses; gang enhancements and gang membership; and any other case where a defendant used an electronic device during the current offense or in a previous crime.\" (Italics added.)"], "id": "e0ffd74c-460c-48b0-b33d-a0228946f1a4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["[O]n September 2, 2015, in Spencer County, Kentucky, ... [the child] was exposed to a <mask> altercation between his father ... and great uncle ... and PGF [paternal grandfather].... PGF filed an EPO and the police were contacted and [the father] was arrested for assault 4th degree. PGF reports in the EPO and the police report in the JC-3 that [the father] was under the influence of drugs at the time of the altercation. PGF requested that the EPO be dismissed but [the father] was found guilty of the assault charge. [The father] admitted there was an altercation but minimized the incident. [The child] shared with DCBS that the altercation scared him and that his father scared him with what he had done to PGF and great uncle. [The father] was in a caretaker role of [the child] at the time of the altercation. The family court held a temporary removal hearing on September 15, 2015, during which the father stipulated to reasonable grounds for the child's removal, and the court placed the child with the mother. The court ordered both parents to comply with several terms. The mother was to obtain counseling for the child, cooperate with the Department of Community Based Services (DCBS) and case planning, send the child to school, and have the child present for all supervised visitations. The *157father's terms were more extensive. He was to undergo drug testing as requested, obtain a drug assessment and follow all recommendations, attend drug/chemical dependency counseling, obtain a perpetrator anger management assessment and follow all recommendations, cooperate with DCBS and case planning, and have supervised visitation with an adult approved by DCBS. The court continued the matter for further proceedings."], "id": "5712a9ea-8cd9-4d24-919e-16ba476fcd64", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Domestic Violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": [". See, Walker, The Battered Woman (1979); but see, Digirolamo, Myths and Misconceptions About <mask>, 16 Pace L Rev 41 (1995), and Toffel, Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and Evil Children: Confronting the Myths About Battered People Who Kill Their Abusers, and the Argument for Extending Battered Syndrome Self-Defenses to All Victims of Domestic Violence, 70 S Cal L Rev 337 (1996)."], "id": "16c49257-b093-4271-b4b5-22f4cf5b7eab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 252 gives very little substantive law and guidance for the procedural devices to be utilized when a party\u2019s motion for a temporary order of protection is contested in a pending divorce proceeding. Subdivision (4) of Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 252 states that a temporary order of protection may be issued upon the court\u2019s own motion or, where a motion for such relief is made to the court, for good cause shown. This portion of the statute seems to contemplate the issuance of a temporary order of protection upon an ex parte motion since it precludes the provisions of subdivision (4) of Domestic Relations Law \u00a7 252, applicable to orders of protection, requiring a court finding on the record. However, the court can find guidance under the statutory provisions of article 8 of the Family Court Act relating to temporary orders of protection involving allegations of <mask>, which are far more extensive and instructive regarding the court procedures and substantive law for the issuance of temporary orders of protection (Scheinkman, Practice Commentary, McKinney\u2019s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C240:30; see, Roofeh v Roofeh, 138 Misc 2d 889; Matter of Arlyn T. v Harold T., 107 Misc 2d 672)."], "id": "166f2c5d-1bf7-43d0-8c4b-5f21f912edbe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In early 2018, mother filed a section 388 petition seeking to have C.M. returned to her custody. The Department filed a response, acknowledging mother's participation in anger management classes and individual counseling. The <mask> program mother completed was only a 10-week domestic violence awareness course, not a 52-week domestic violence batterer's course as ordered by the court. The Department had not yet received mother's psychological evaluation report. According to the Department's report, Mother stated she was bonded to the children and that, before detention, C.M. had no contact with father. Mother expressed concern about stability and consistency, noting she took the children to church weekly. The Department expressed concern about whether mother was able to take responsibility for her actions, noting she had not acknowledged fault for the detention of her children, and was quick to blame others. Mother was unable to tell the social worker what she had learned or what had changed since the children were detained. Mother also discussed case issues with C.M. during visits, telling him he *394would be living with mother and would not see father, reportedly causing C.M. to feel sad and scared. Based on the lack of evidence that mother had resolved the issues leading to the dependency case, along with her failure to complete a 52-week domestic violence batterer's program and her pending psychological evaluation, the Department recommended that the court deny mother's section 388 petition."], "id": "8b17b805-5d22-4895-941b-f4545da09e7d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On April 3, 2017, Appellant filed an ex parte request for a restraining order against Ex-Husband in her pending dissolution action. In her declaration in support of the request, Appellant described abuse by Ex-Husband, including physical beatings *499(documented with photographs), verbal threats of violence, and personal insults. Appellant testified that Ex-Husband owned a firearm and had a previous conviction for <mask>."], "id": "8ec92f1c-6313-46e4-bfc6-16074526c351", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["While the record supports that respondent and AN were bonded, the record also supports that the bond was not healthy for AN. Indeed, in the six months before termination, AN began to bite and pinch other children and her \u201ccaregivers,\u201d and AN engaged in attention-seeking behaviors after parenting time visitations. AN\u2019s hair also began to thin, and AN was \u201cclingy,\u201d \u201cmore agitated, [and] more easily upset\u201d after visitations. Respondent was never permitted to have unsupervised parenting time with AN, who had been out of her care for nearly two years at the time of termination. This was based in part on respondent being criminally charged with <mask> against AN\u2019s father and entering into a relationship with a man who was on the Central Registry. Thus, although respondent shared a bond with AN at the time of termination, the record supports that the bond was not healthy for AN. See In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 196-197; 646 NW2d 506 (2002), overruled on other grounds by In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 (2014) (holding that the fact that there was a \u201cserious dispute\u201d on the record concerning whether the respondent"], "id": "b9721c5e-c739-4299-ba2c-90658ad5fa85", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Even New York\u2019s judiciary has also joined the bandwagon. Formerly, the plight of victims of domestic abuse was generally addressed by the courts of this state in three disjointed contexts: Family Court proceedings, criminal actions and matrimoni\u00e1is. In a recent initiative, the Chief Judge of this state established special integrated <mask> courts, manned by specially trained personnel, with the explicit mission \u201cto promote justice and protect the rights of all litigants while providing a comprehensive approach to case resolution, increasing offender accountability, ensuring victim safety, integrating the delivery of social services, and eliminating inconsistent and conflicting judicial orders\u201d (Integrated Domestic Violence Courts, Mission Statement, cached at <http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/ webdocs/Integrated_Domestic_Violence_Courts.htm>). Following the example set by our Chief Judge, New York State courts are in general becoming more aware and sensitive to domestic violence issues. Indeed, the Court of Appeals removed a town and village justice from office because of his insensitivity to victims of domestic violence (Matter of Romano, 93 NY2d 161 [1999])."], "id": "2b16dd8f-ece5-4bd3-b9f2-9296c92a4363", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, Kerley argues that, even if the diary entries were admissible for impeachment purposes, they were unduly prejudicial because of the danger that the jury would use the diary entries to conclude that Dever's death resulted from the type of acts that Mandee wrote about, and that the jury would use the entries to corroborate the uncharged acts of <mask>. We disagree. As discussed above, the jury was twice instructed not to consider the diary entries for the truth of the matters stated therein and to use them only for the purpose of evaluating Mandee's testimony. We presume that the jury followed these instructions and did not consider the diary entries for any impermissible purpose. (See People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041 [\"We of course presume 'that jurors understand and follow the court's instructions' \"].)"], "id": "a588c5fb-1115-404f-a015-09b8761286ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*821We may not conclude, on the information before us, that the Dominican court knew about or considered the <mask> in this family at the time the custody determination was made. Nor does it appear that the Dominican court is now in a strong position to protect the respondent and the children from domestic violence or abuse in the future."], "id": "1d452e75-827d-48b7-9c21-13b5d7a2c87c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Matthew J. D\u2019Emic, J. *1135In this <mask> prosecution the People concede that defendant\u2019s statement that she cut her husband as he was beating her during a fight over child support was made in violation of her constitutional rights (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). Nevertheless, the People requested a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the statement since they seek to impeach the defendant with her words if she testifies at trial."], "id": "830723ca-3dcb-495f-937b-5dec7a6c482e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "domestic violence", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": [". E.g., Price v Viking Penguin, 881d 1426, 1438 (8th Cir 1989), cert denied 493 US 1036 (1990) (statement that embodies \"a qualitative judgment [of a law enforcement] agency\u2019s motivation, effort and effectiveness * * * is unverifiable\u201d and therefore protected as opinion); Janklow v Newsweek, Inc., 788d 1300 (8th Cir) (en banc), cert denied 479 US 883 (1986) (Janklow II) (statement that plaintiff, Governor of South Dakota, had, while Attorney General, been prosecuting Dennis Banks because Banks had brought assault charges against plaintiff, held not actionable); King v Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass 705, 716, 512 NE2d 241, 248 (1987), cert denied 485 US 940 (1988) (assertion that plaintiff Governor\u2019s position on racetrack legislation was motivated by personal loyalty held not actionable; \"the First Amendment protects as opinion discussion about the motives of public officials\u201d); Disen v Hessburg, 455 NW2d 446 (Minn 1990), cert denied 498 US 1119 (1991) (statements questioning County Attorney\u2019s commitment to prosecuting <mask> cases held not actionable opinion despite allegedly false factual implications); Okun v Superior Ct., 29 Cal 3d 442, 451, 175 Cal Rptr 157, 162, 629 P2d 1369, 1374, cert denied sub nom. Maple Props. v Superior Ct., 454 US 1099 (1981) (\"A statement regarding (1) a public official\u2019s business, social, or political affiliations, and (2) how those affiliations seem reflected in decision-making\u201d is not actionable; \"[a] contrary ruling would inhibit a significant segment of the discourse vital in a democracy\u201d); Gregory v McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal 3d 596, 604, 131 Cal Rptr 641, 646, 552 P2d 425, 430 (1976) (\"[publications otherwise protected under the First Amendment do not lose their protection because they contain statements which attribute improper motives\u201d to a public official or union official); Grillo v Smith, 144 Cal App 3d 868, 875, 193 Cal Rptr 414, 419 (1983) (statement that \"judge * * * 'changed his mind under pressure from his peers\u2019 * * * merely express the [newspaper\u2019s] opinion of what his actions and motivations were. As such they constitute nothing 'more than a constitutionally protected expression of severe disapproval of noncriminal conduct\u2019 \u201d); Marchiondo v New Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 NM 282, 648 P2d 321 (1981) (statement that gubernatorial candidate was likely or inclined to appoint cronies held actionable opinion)."], "id": "a123cbbb-cacf-4508-9ea6-e29a75683b3e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, the court notes the substantial prejudice which would inure to the defendant should this plea be vacated, notwithstanding the People\u2019s new offer that defendant plea to the crime of attempted <mask> in the second degree under this indictment. Unlike the crime to which defendant pleaded, attempted burglary in the second degree is a violent felony offense as per Penal Law \u00a7 70.02. The stigma that attaches to a violent crime and the potential future sentencing ramifications under Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 70.04 and 70.08 are far greater when dealing with \"violent felonies\u201d as opposed to nonviolent *896ones such as the one to which defendant pleaded under the SCI. (See, Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103.)"], "id": "2a45645e-39ab-45cd-9e49-c2e19b488201", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In this regard, we note Smith's statement in Johns's presence meets even the stricter standard adopted by the dissenters in Grimes. In implicating Mitchell in Kelley's death, Smith necessarily placed herself at the scene of the <mask> and homicide and, consequently, implicated herself in the murder as well. Thus, unlike the circumstances discussed in Grimes , here there is no credible basis upon which to argue that Smith's statements were in any sense collateral. Rather, as in Gordon , Wilson and Greenberger , those portions of Smith's statements that implicated her in the murder were inextricably intertwined with the portions that implicated Mitchell. There was simply no way in which her statements about being at the scene of the burglary, robbery and murder in which she was a relatively lesser participant would make any sense without reference to the major actors and, in particular, her boyfriend."], "id": "1b3510ea-2d7d-4a67-9b3f-eff2bfcc3696", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On January 15, 1976, at the end of a Christmas visit, Johnson was arrested for attempted first degree robbery. On March 8, 1976 he was arrested for first degree robbery and less than one week later (on March 14) for attempted robbery, possession of drugs and assault on a police officer. On June 14, 1976 he was arrested for third degree <mask>, petit larceny, criminal trespass, possession of stolen property, criminal mischief and attempted burglary. On September 27, 1976, Johnson did not return from a visit and he was declared AWOL, thereby calling forth a warrant for his arrest."], "id": "ec246463-84b4-40ef-9148-4b040106583e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As an initial matter, we address the State's contention that Collins's Rule 37.1 petition was untimely filed. In February 2013, a jury convicted Collins of one count of commercial <mask>, one count of theft of property over $2,500, one count of Class Y felony arson, and two counts of Class C felony arson. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed three of Collins's convictions but reversed the conviction for Class Y felony arson. Collins v. State , 2014 Ark. App. 551, 444 S.W.3d 889. This court denied the parties' cross-motions for review, and the mandate was issued on January 22, 2015. Accordingly, Collins was resentenced and a second amended sentencing order was entered by the trial court on February 20, 2015. Thereafter, Collins filed a timely pro se Rule 37.1 petition on May 13, 2015. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c)(iv) (2013) (stating in pertinent part that if no appeal is taken from a resentencing order the petition must be filed within ninety days of the entry of the judgment). Here, no appeal was taken from the resentencing order filed on February 20, 2015, and Collins's Rule 37.1 petition was due on May 21, 2015. Therefore, his petition filed on May 13, 2015, was timely."], "id": "57ca625d-dde1-4caf-b77c-45b58181d9fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The new shoplifting statute directs that \"[n]o person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with <mask> or theft of the same property.\" (\u00a7 459.5, subd. (b).) As the Supreme Court held, \"the phrase 'the same property' confirms that multiple burglary charges may not be based on entry with intent to commit different forms of theft offenses if the property intended to be stolen is the same property at issue in the shoplifting charge.\" ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) Robbery is a \"theft offense[ ],\" as the Supreme Court used that term in Gonzales. (See People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 692, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887 [\" 'robbery was the only available theft offense' \"];"], "id": "d210adc9-5619-4d39-9ee1-c00abab7bde3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant has at least two prior convictions for felonies which would classify him as a predicate felon (Penal Law, \u00a7 70.06). They are a 1972 charge of criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced on May 1, 1973 to five years\u2019 probation and sent to an institution under the control of the Narcotic\u2019s Addict Control Commission and a 1970 charge of <mask> in the third degree for which he was sentenced for attempted burglary in the third degree on October 9, 1970 and sent to Suffolk County Jail for a period of one year. Other *168convictions include five other burglaries, a robbery, possession of a dangerous weapon and another drug charge."], "id": "1af21144-b588-48ab-8ad5-bee3162b74c3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Sometime during January 21, a call was received by Patrolman B of the Fourth Squad Detectives from defendant\u2019s mother seeking help for him. Defendant had, at this point, been taken to Brookhaven Memorial Hospital along with Patricia V after an automobile accident which occurred while they were en route to a motel. It should be noted that defendant had become B\u2019s informant after B had arrested defendant on December 8,1980, as the result of a <mask> complaint made by the girlfriend\u2019s husband. After this earlier arrest, defendant had been advised by B to get a lawyer, but defendant insisted it was \u201call bullshit. * * * going to Family Court.\u201d B, learning that homicide was interested in Lucarano, called Me C and informed him that defendant wanted to talk to B about pressing charges against his girlfriend, because she had forced Valium on the defendant. It was ultimately agreed by Me C and B that they would go to the hospital to talk to defendant. Prior to leaving, Me C encountered Assistant District Attorney S, Chief of the Major Offense Bureau, who was at homicide on an unrelated matter. S, after learning from Me C or B that defendant had several prior pending charges, instructed Me C to inquire if defendant had an attorney, and that if defendant did not, it would be permissible to talk to him."], "id": "9ce401ed-f4fd-42e4-9174-8481cfb16e54", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A person commits the crime of <mask> in the first degree when he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, that person or an accomplice in the crime is armed with a deadly weapon or assaults any person."], "id": "3d7ed6ad-8844-4993-a15b-82eb86ff0b77", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["For the State, the record reveals that on June 13, 2017, Investigator Amy Groethe of the Victoria Police Department submitted a sworn affidavit seeking an arrest *727warrant for Cardenas on charges of capital murder, aggravated sexual assault, <mask> of a habitation with intent to commit other felony, and felony theft/unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. That affidavit, of which the court took judicial notice, stated that on June 12, 2017, the Victoria Police Department received a 911 call that a female was unconscious and not breathing and that \"there was blood everywhere.\" The affidavit continued:"], "id": "78f9ebe6-ecfd-4fef-b208-f747499145b6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As to the remaining point made by defendant: This is hardly an \u201c unexplained shortage.\u201d If the. defendant were to prevail in its contention to that effect.(that this is an unexplained shortage because no one actually saw the jewelry stolen from the display case), theft policies of this kind would be generally useless. A theft must usually be proven by' circumstantial evidence. The thief seldom steals in the presence of witnesses. This is not a policy protecting the insured only against loss resulting from <mask> or taking by violence. In any event, there is at the very least a triable issue concerning the explanation for the loss, and any inferences of fact must be drawn by the trier of the facts."], "id": "456d655d-cd29-4341-b779-bc0bc4129fff", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["For instance, if one engaged in the commission of a <mask> should lull another, even without design to effect death, the crime would undoubtedly come under this subdivision and would be murder in the first degree. So if the prisoner, while engaged in the commission of this rape, had strangled some person other than the girl in order to prevent that person\u2019s interference, and had thus killed such person without design to effect death, the crime would have come within this same subdivision."], "id": "0781b4be-47d1-408a-abf2-1cb3fb404035", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant herein was indicted by a Queens County Grand Jury on May 29, 1974 and charged with the crimes of robbery in the first degree, <mask> in the second degree and assault in the second degree. He now alleges that he has been convicted of the following crimes between July, 1968 and August, 1972: (1) a conviction in July, 1968 for attempted possession of a hypodermic instrument; (2) a conviction in 1969 for possession *815of dangerous drugs; (3) a conviction in April, 1970 for attempted criminal possession of stolen property; (4) a conviction in June, 1971 for possession of drugs; and (5) a conviction in August, 1972 for possession of weapons as a misdemeanor."], "id": "7f7efe06-d04d-43f8-9727-36a81251f244", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["- 10 - special concurrence below, defendant claims that, because the latent print was found on such an easily moveable object and there was no evidence that his print was found elsewhere in the apartment or that he possessed any of the items taken, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the print was left at the time of the <mask>."], "id": "f56a5838-fff8-4c14-9266-11e93b321e24", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A person commits residential <mask> if he enters or remains unlawfully in a residential occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the residential occupiable structure any offense punishable by imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-39-201(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). Nelson relies on Lindsey v. State , 68 Ark. App. 70, 3 S.W.3d 346 (1999), to support his argument. There, we held that sufficient evidence did not support appellant's theft-by-receiving conviction of a utility van when the circumstantial evidence simply demonstrated that appellant was near the location where the theft had occurred. Id. We held that utility vans are not unique, so the possibility that appellant could be present in a utility van like the stolen van that was discovered nearby hours later was not unreasonable. Id."], "id": "3f165a41-30ed-4aa4-98f7-1d4410d7e29d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant's trial counsel then moved for a continuance of three days to investigate the call, speak with the witness and defendant, and research case law. The trial court denied the motion.3 The recording was admitted as State's Exhibit 82 in the State's punishment case-in-chief the same day (October 27, 2016). Evidence of appellant's other extraneous offenses, including possession of marijuana, <mask>, injury to a child, and trespass, was also presented. At the conclusion of the punishment phase of trial, the jury sentenced appellant to life imprisonment with a $10,000 fine."], "id": "6c67338e-c873-4f97-ba2a-76692fe8161a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*805The indictment in question charges the defendant with first, <mask> in the first degree committed on June 28, 1961 (breaking and entering the house of the victim); second, grand larceny in the first degree committed at the same time in the same premises (stealing money of more than $500 in amount); and third, felonious possession of a loaded firearm on the same occasion. The indictment also alleges that \u2014 \u201c All of the acts and transactions alleged in each of the several counts of this indictment are connected together.\u201d"], "id": "e983360e-fb96-4aaf-999f-da73e208e70a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The commitment order for the rape conviction states that the sentence is to run consecutively with the <mask> sentence, and the commitment order *1297for the burglary conviction states that the sentence is to run consecutively with the rape sentence. The commitment orders for the assault and sexual abuse convictions simply state that those sentences are to run concurrently, without stating what other sentence or sentences they run concurrently with. Our decision deciding petitioner\u2019s appeal from his judgment of conviction clarifies \u2014 based on a record that also included the sentencing minutes \u2014 that County Court imposed the assault and sexual abuse sentences to run concurrently with the rape sentence (People v Bush, 266 AD2d at 643)."], "id": "30f0ab87-91ac-4884-9ee8-a7908e95930a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant, Ramon Rivera (Rivera), was arrested on August 10,1983. He was subsequently indicted by a Grand Jury for two counts of grand larceny in the third degree. The People fied a predicate felony information alleging two prior convictions: a <mask> conviction obtained after trial in Passaic County, New Jersey, in 1981 (the New Jersey conviction) and a burglary and larceny conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea in Superior Court, Erie County, in 1971 (the Erie County conviction). On March 7, 1984, the defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment while moving to contest sentencing as a second felony offender pursuant to CPL 400.21."], "id": "d5242d39-0c95-4c38-a769-2d8cfbc0d5f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Counsel gave several different reasons for challenging the second prospective juror. Initially, he indicated that the challenge was based on consultation with his client. After the court pointed out that neither a defendant nor defense counsel is entitled to exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of race, counsel stated, \u201cit\u2019s not so much as racially motivated as it is based upon [the prospective juror\u2019s] contacts with neighborhoods in Brooklyn. He does live in Brooklyn Heights. In that manner, it worries the Defense that he may not have\u2014 Could I have a moment, your Honor?\u201d After a pause and a comment by the prosecutor, defense counsel then offered as an explanation the fact that this second prospective juror had also been the victim of a <mask>."], "id": "eb3d3c08-987f-40ec-9536-02d20c447594", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Hallam rejected the Attorney General's argument a \"room within the business where the buying and selling of goods or services does not occur\" could not be part of the \"commercial establishment.\" ( Hallam, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 912, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 812.) \"Turning to the words of the statute here, we find no indication that shoplifting can occur only in specific areas of a commercial establishment. Nor does there appear any requirement that the business's commercial activity must be taking place in the area from which the theft occurs in order to qualify the offense as shoplifting. The trial court thus added an element to the offense that is absent from the plain language of the statute itself when it determined that appellant's theft would qualify as shoplifting only if it occurred in an area of the commercial establishment open to the public where merchandise is sold. Based on its impermissible revision of the definition of shoplifting, the court concluded that the crime was <mask> rather than shoplifting because appellant entered the store through the back and stole an item from the employee restroom rather than an area of the store that was 'open for business.' \" ( Id. at p. 912, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 812.)"], "id": "75bd6892-36d8-4b50-b59b-2178b20c5ba1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In Ol'outher\u2019s case, 1 Cro. Eliz. 654, it was held that an indictment would lie against a constable by reason of Ms failure \u201cto raise hue and cry\u201d at night immediately upon receiving notice of a <mask> just committed. So it was held during the *36reign of Queen Anne that \u201cif a man be made an officer by act of Parliament and misbehave in his office he is indictable for it at common law, and any public officer is indictable for misben havior in his office.\u201d Anon., 6 Mod. R. 96."], "id": "3f8ab747-5215-4bbe-9763-dd062902b5e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Via an omnibus motion, defense counsel seeks an inspection of the Grand Jury minutes which resulted in the indictment of defendant for rape in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 130.35), sodomy in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 130.50), aggravated sexual abuse (Penal Law, \u00a7 130.70), <mask> in the first degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 140.30), attempted burglary in the second degree (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 110, 140.25), criminal mischief in the fourth degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 145.00), and resisting arrest. Further, defendant *734seeks dismissal of the various counts of the indictment \u201con the grounds that the said indictment is not founded on sufficient legal and competent evidence *** [and because] the Grand Jury did not receive proper instructions on the law.\u201d"], "id": "c2a8b9ee-bd86-4e25-a19a-7e84906ea080", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Mario Pittoni, J. Petitioner requests a judgment prohibiting the enforcement of an order of respondent, a District Court Judge, dated June 20, 1978, which rescinded respondent\u2019s earlier order dated December 5, 1977, granting an application pursuant to CPL 180.50, to reduce the charge of <mask> in the second degree in the Nassau County District Court to criminal trespass in the second degree."], "id": "b6a45e12-0835-4828-9cdc-09c4cd624c4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On March 23 and March 24, 2006, the People presented evidence to a grand jury in the above-captioned case. The evidence consisted of testimony from the complaining witness, a detective and the defendant. After the People presented all of their evidence and charged the grand jury on the applicable law, the grand jury was directed to consider a single charge, <mask> in the second degree. The grand jury deliberated on the matter and then informed the prosecutor, through its foreperson, that it was taking \u201cNo Action.\u201d The following colloquy then took place:"], "id": "ae21c845-4356-48fb-b766-cbaf6a4bb486", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["I assume, because of the fact no maximum was placed or indicated in either of these sections of the Penal Law, that it would be technically legal to sentence a man for a term of not less than fifteen years and the maximum of which could be his natural *565life. I cannot get myself to think that the Legislature ever intended a man should receive a life sentence for the commission of the crime of robbery in the first degree or <mask> in the first degree, unless the crime were accompanied by extremely cruel circumstances as well as serious injury to person; and I cannot escape this reaction to this law, because in 1928 murder in the second degree was as follows: \u201c Section 1046. Such killing of a human being is murder in the second degree, when committed with a design to effect the death of the person killed, or of another, but without deliberation and premeditation.\u201d (Italics supplied.) Here the Legislature definitely indicated its attitude towards offenses accompanied by serious bodily violence and definitely indicated it was aware of the extreme penalty that might be inflicted, because in that connection the punishment for murder in the second degree as pronounced in section 1048 reads: \u201c Murder in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence, the minimum of which shall be not less than twenty years and the maximum of which shall be for the offender\u2019s natural life; * *"], "id": "fc683a14-41f0-420b-88e2-01acd1effd77", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["It is fair to assume that the proportion of injuries occurring on premises through negligence of building owners is much greater for firefighters than for police officers. If police officers\u2019 rights to recover damages were to be limited to the same circumstances applicable to firefighters, it might be said that the \"same\u201d protection results. There would however not be parity of protection. On the other hand if the scope of General *1092Municipal Law \u00a7 205-e is unlimited, police officers would enjoy greater protection than firefighters. One might argue, for example, that it would be unfair to allow a police officer to recover for injuries sustained in a vehicle collision en route to a <mask> but deny such recovery by a firefighter injured in a vehicle collision en route to a fire."], "id": "a2e9bd35-6307-4d1d-b2bc-c7a34aba0138", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon her plea of guilty of attempted <mask> in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 140.30 [2]). Defendant failed to preserve for our review her contention that the guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered inasmuch as she failed to move to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Zulian, 68 AD3d 1731, 1732 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 894 [2010]). In any event, defendant\u2019s contention that she was not competent to enter both her guilty plea and the waiver of the right to appeal are without merit. Defendant stated during the plea colloquy that she was taking prescription medication for anxiety and depression, but \u201c[t]here was not the slightest indication that defendant was uninformed, confused or incompetent\u201d at the time she entered the plea and the waiver of the right to appeal (People v Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 486 [2002]; see People v Sonberg, 61 AD3d 1350, 1351 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 800 [2009]). In response to County Court\u2019s inquiry, \u201cdefendant advised the court that [s]he was thinking clearly and understood the proceedings\u201d (Zulian, 68 AD3d at 1732). The valid waiver of the right to appeal encompasses defendant\u2019s challenge to the severity of the sentence (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 255-256 [2006]; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998])."], "id": "018aa103-9d2c-41d9-b7cb-e937ed1222f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Where the evidence would support a finding that the defendant was justified in using deadly physical force either to resist the imminent use of deadly force (Penal Law \u00a7 35.15 [2] [a]), or to terminate an attempted <mask> (Penal Law \u00a7 35.20 [3]), a trial court must instruct the jury on both theories of justification. (Cf., People v Chung-Li Wang, 164 Misc 2d 707.) The distinction between the two may be critical, since the defendant may legally use deadly physical force to terminate a burglary attempt even though the victim has threatened or used only physical force, and not deadly physical force, to enter the premises or to commit the crime therein. The failure to provide this instruction to the Grand Jury renders the proceedings defective at least where the evidence indicates that, had the instruction been given, there is a reasonable possibility no indictment would have been returned. (People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36, supra.) Under the evidence presented here, the court finds that the defendant\u2019s statements to the Grand Jury presented a basis for finding justification upon either theory. The defendant not only testified that he believed the complainant might kill him, he also testified that he cut him trying to get him out of the apartment after the complainant broke in to assault him. Penal Law \u00a7 35.20 (3) therefore had to be charged."], "id": "f10ec35f-914c-4028-a575-c4672c6c7173", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cAfter a careful review of [the record] and [Mr. Wallace\u2019s] interview, it is the determination of this panel that if released at this time there is a reasonable probability that [he] would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and [his] release at this time is incompatible with the welfare and safety of the community. This decision is based on the following factors: the instant offense <mask> 3rd (two counts) involved ... a series of burglaries of buildings. [He was] on parole supervision at the time of the instant offense for robbery 3rd and murder 2nd which involved the robbery of a restaurant wherein an employee was shot and killed. [His] institutional programming and positive disciplinary record have been noted and considered. [His] continued participation in unlawful activity despite previous legal intervention leads this panel to determine that . . . release at this time is unwarranted.\u201d (Petition, exhibit A.) The parole denial determination was made in Columbia County. (Cross affirmation K 6.)"], "id": "c16db983-3a74-4b9f-a7d8-8d60f01d3410", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In response to the foregoing information which was forwarded by OCA, the Committee searched for respondent and ascertained that he had been arrested in Bridgeport, Connecticut, for felony <mask>. The criminal complainant, who was an acquaintance of respondent, asserted in her statement to the police that respondent was a \"crack addict\u201d, that he did not have authority or permission to enter her home, and that he stole $120 from her after gaining entry by smashing a window. Respondent failed to return to court in Connecticut on the appointed day and, as of March 21, 1994, an arrest warrant was issued and respondent has also been charged with bail jumping."], "id": "69ca1bd1-b12a-4624-943e-b332837a63f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, the court notes the substantial prejudice which would inure to the defendant should this plea be vacated, notwithstanding the People\u2019s new offer that defendant plea to the crime of attempted <mask> in the second degree under this indictment. Unlike the crime to which defendant pleaded, attempted burglary in the second degree is a violent felony offense as per Penal Law \u00a7 70.02. The stigma that attaches to a violent crime and the potential future sentencing ramifications under Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 70.04 and 70.08 are far greater when dealing with \"violent felonies\u201d as opposed to nonviolent *896ones such as the one to which defendant pleaded under the SCI. (See, Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103.)"], "id": "66b86b61-104e-4266-a155-83e1a67fb751", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff thereafter pleaded guilty to issuing a bad check (Penal Law, \u00a7 190.05), a Class B misdemeanor, reduced from grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 155.05,155.30), a Class E felony. The plea came as the result of the incident in early March, 1971, which culminated in the news stories libelously linking him with Nichols as part of a <mask> ring. The headlines referred to \u201c two geneses men accused op thepts \u201d and 11 GENESEE PAIR HELD IN THEPTS \u201d."], "id": "c94d2071-b985-4719-9ca0-115e18628cf8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Since all of the procedural requisites for a valid waiver of immunity were satisfied, defendant effectively waived immunity prior to commencing his testimony.1 As noted above, defendant argues that the limited grant of immunity, pertaining to unlicensed motor vehicle operation at times other than the date of the <mask> in question, (1) had the effect of \"vitiating\u201d his original waiver, so as to confer transactional immunity, and (2) caused him to \"misunderstand\u201d the scope of immunity conferred and thus violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The court finds these arguments to be without merit."], "id": "d5cf14f5-1fda-45a6-ad4f-c6941f41c014", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["This court\u2019s treatment of the witness Isaac, ruling that as a matter of law he was not an accomplice to intentional murder or manslaughter, even though he could be an accomplice as a matter of fact for felony murder, is consistent with rulings in pertinent, although not identical, situations. There are appellate holdings that a witness who took part in a serious crime *713that was closely connected to the crime charged was not an accomplice to the crime charged, despite the connection between the two crimes and the witness\u2019s implication of himself in a felony; this was so even though the two crimes had a common element, as they do in this case (causing the death). These cases confirm that Isaac\u2019s status as a potential accomplice to the related attempted <mask> or attempted larceny at the victim\u2019s store, and thereby to the felony murder, does not entail his status as a potential accomplice to the intentional shooting of the victim. (See, People v McAuliffe, 36 NY2d 820 [accomplice to bribery is not an accomplice to the defendant\u2019s perjury about that bribery]; People v Brooks, 34 NY2d 475 [receiver of stolen property is not an accomplice to the theft]; People v Greenberger, 96 AD2d 910 [vendors who paid kickbacks to the defendant, a hospital administrator, were not accomplices to the defendant\u2019s attempt to evade payment of income taxes by failing to report those kickbacks as income]; People v Maldonado, 123 AD2d 788 [witness was not accomplice to manslaughter in the first degree alleged to have been committed when the defendant shot the deceased after a brawl, merely because during the brawl the witness tried to pass the defendant a large knife].)"], "id": "204d31db-a254-482e-a261-4074e73efdf5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["alleged that the county was negligent in its handling of a series of calls to the 911 emergency dispatch service, which led to a delay in responding, and was therefore liable. We rejected that assertion, noting that no matter how the negligence claim was restated, it arose out of the underlying assault and fell within the intentional tort exception of the PSTCA. In Britton v. City of Crawford, 10 a <mask> suspect was shot and killed during a standoff with police. The suspect\u2019s personal representative filed a claim against the city, alleging that law enforcement was negligent in its tactics. We concluded that the claim was barred by the intentional tort exception. We reasoned that the exception not only bars claims for assault and battery, but bars claims arising out of an assault and battery. For his claim, Williams\u2019 complaint alleges that the State neg- ligently failed to separate Williams from Armendariz and his supporters. But the injury and damages Williams alleges plainly arose from Williams\u2019 preemptive assault on Armendariz, from the retaliatory assault on Williams, and from Williams\u2019 fear of a potential assault on him by Armendariz. We therefore con- clude that Williams\u2019 negligence claim against the State is one which arose from an assault, is barred by the intentional tort exception to the State\u2019s waiver of sovereign immunity under the STCA, and was properly dismissed by the district court. Leave to Amend. Williams next argues that although his claim for negligence was dismissed, the district court erred when it denied him leave to amend his complaint to allege, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress as a separate theory of recov- ery. Although Williams did not offer a proposed amendment to the district court, the parties discussed emotional damages at the hearing. Williams suggested he would make his complaint more specific and offer additional facts. However, the district court found that any such amendment would be futile because it would also arise out of \u201cmultiple layers of assault/battery\u201d Britton v. City of Crawford, 282 Neb. 374, 803 N.W.2d 508 (2011). - 596 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports WILLIAMS v. STATE Cite as 310 Neb. 588"], "id": "0499943f-c8d6-4dca-b0c0-e2defadfe080", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Of note, the Wiesner majority observed that \u201c[w]hile Dean Feerick was unfamiliar with the nature of petitioner\u2019s offenses . . . upon being so informed, [he] expounded on the importance of redemption in adhering to his recommendation that petitioner\u2019s application be approved\u201d (Wiesner at 176). Here, a former New York State Supreme Court Justice, after being told of the death of the woman during the <mask>, similarly expressed his view that \u201cpunishments \u2014 all punishments \u2014 must some day come to an end.\u201d When a subcommittee member advised the former Justice that petitioner took full responsibility for his actions in his current application and had explained why he was unable to do so in his earlier ones, the witness opined that petitioner\u2019s prior lack of candor was understandable and that he is now forthcoming, he should be admitted."], "id": "d84afa39-5100-4e5e-84e1-060a0a2019ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Palmer was raised primarily by his mother, with only sporadic contact with his father. At some point, his family moved from a low income area to one with \"predominantly wealthier kids\"; Palmer related that his self-esteem suffered and he committed crimes and used drugs in order to be accepted by his peers, \"have the things that they had\" and \"do the things they were doing.\" He admitted his first offense, driving without a license, in July 1985. In February 1986, he admitted a violation of Penal Code section 288a, a felony, for his conduct with three minors.2 He was placed on probation, which he then violated with two charges of robbery, <mask>, and attempted burglary."], "id": "f95408fa-5139-4502-a88a-d2a2030f7e43", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We find support for our reasoning in People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083 ( Davis ), in which the Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant could be convicted of <mask> under section 459 on the basis that he placed a forged check in a chute in a walk-up window of a check-cashing business. ( Davis , at p. 714, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083.) Although burglary \"can be committed by using an instrument to enter a building,\" not just by entering *94with one's body, the Court concluded that passing a forged check into a building did not qualify as burglary. ( Id. at pp. 714, 716, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083.) It explained, \"It is important to establish reasonable limits as to what constitutes an entry by means of an instrument for purposes of the burglary statute. Otherwise the scope of the burglary statute could be expanded to absurd proportions,\" so that even mailing a forged check to a bank could constitute burglary. ( Id. at p. 719, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083.) Observing that \"the 'underlying basis for the criminal sanction' of burglary is ' \"the danger caused by the unauthorized entry itself,\" ' \" the Court determined that the insertion of a forged check into a chute in a walk-up window did not qualify as entry by instrument because it did not \"violate [ ] the occupant's possessory interest in the building.\" ( Id. at p. 722, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083.)"], "id": "621bbef5-7e54-440b-8c15-4c932c546eed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Similarly, in People v Plevy (67 AD2d 591, supra), a defendant was indicted in Kings County on a murder charge and in Nassau County for <mask> and petit larceny. Incriminating physical evidence linking him to all of these charges was found by the police by means of search war-ants that had been issued in the respective counties as a result of information concerning observations made of the contents of the defendant\u2019s room by a Nassau County detective. In the Kings County prosecution the defendant moved for the suppression of the evidence upon the ground that the Nassau County detective had not been given permission by the defendant to accompany him to his room where he had observed the incriminating evidence and therefore the search warrant was the tainted product of an illegal police trespass. The Kings County suppression court denied the defendant\u2019s motion on the ground that he had expressly consented to the detective\u2019s request to accompany him to his room. The defendant was then tried and convicted of the murder charge. Subsequently, the defendant was prosecuted on the Nassau County indictment. He moved for the suppression of the physical evidence on the identical ground he had asserted and that had been decided against him in the Kings County proceeding. The suppression motion was denied on the ground that the defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue that had been decided against him in Kings County. The defendant was thereupon tried and convicted of the Nassau charges. The defendant\u2019s conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Second Judicial Department. The court held that collateral estoppel had properly been invoked against the defendant, as the following three essential criteria had been met (p 595) : \u201c(1) that there is an identity of issues in both proceedings; (2) that the issue was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding; and (3) that the party against whom the prior ruling is sought to be invoked has had a full and fair opportunity to contest that issue.\u201d (Citing Schwartz v Pub*405lic Administrator of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 71, supra.) The Appellate Division thus held the issue of the collateral estoppel effect of suppression decisions to be governed by the same criteria controlling the application of the doctrine in civil cases. An identity of parties requirement was rejected in favor of the more flexible criterion that the party against whom estoppel is sought has had a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in the prior proceeding.4"], "id": "dae8aa06-14aa-486a-83ed-44c596c0e6fd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["alleged that the county was negligent in its handling of a series of calls to the 911 emergency dispatch service, which led to a delay in responding, and was therefore liable. We rejected that assertion, noting that no matter how the negligence claim was restated, it arose out of the underlying assault and fell within the intentional tort exception of the PSTCA. In Britton v. City of Crawford, 10 a <mask> suspect was shot and killed during a standoff with police. The suspect\u2019s personal representative filed a claim against the city, alleging that law enforcement was negligent in its tactics. We concluded that the claim was barred by the intentional tort exception. We reasoned that the exception not only bars claims for assault and battery, but bars claims arising out of an assault and battery. For his claim, Williams\u2019 complaint alleges that the State neg- ligently failed to separate Williams from Armendariz and his supporters. But the injury and damages Williams alleges plainly arose from Williams\u2019 preemptive assault on Armendariz, from the retaliatory assault on Williams, and from Williams\u2019 fear of a potential assault on him by Armendariz. We therefore con- clude that Williams\u2019 negligence claim against the State is one which arose from an assault, is barred by the intentional tort exception to the State\u2019s waiver of sovereign immunity under the STCA, and was properly dismissed by the district court. Leave to Amend. Williams next argues that although his claim for negligence was dismissed, the district court erred when it denied him leave to amend his complaint to allege, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress as a separate theory of recov- ery. Although Williams did not offer a proposed amendment to the district court, the parties discussed emotional damages at the hearing. Williams suggested he would make his complaint more specific and offer additional facts. However, the district court found that any such amendment would be futile because it would also arise out of \u201cmultiple layers of assault/battery\u201d Britton v. City of Crawford, 282 Neb. 374, 803 N.W.2d 508 (2011). - 596 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports WILLIAMS v. STATE Cite as 310 Neb. 588"], "id": "b389a660-4dea-4c68-b2d4-cba44e63d881", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["By the minutes of the grand jury, of August 13, 1873, it appears that an indictment was found, on that day, on the evidence of George H. Tafft, against Alfred E. Lagrave, and' James D. Otis, for <mask> in the third degree. Mr. Townsend testifies in this matter, that it is very possible he did draw the original affidavit of George H. Tafit\u2014 that he did draw the affidavit of one person and delivered it to the district, attorney; cannot say whether it was Tafft\u2019s or Bassett\u2019s. The district attorney remembers Townsend spoke to him about the case, but cannot say whether before or after the indictment. He says there was a conversation with Townsend, which must have been after the *339indictment, about claiming Lagrave from the French government under the treaty. A letter was prepared by his clerk, or by Townsend, to the secretary of state."], "id": "5182b1d2-e224-4dee-a0d5-6d8bcded6aa7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In contrast, \"[i]n enacting the shoplifting statute as part of Proposition 47, the electorate signaled that these interests do not apply in the same way when a person intends to steal property in a place where he or she has been invited to peruse the goods and services that are on offer. Store owners and employees do not, of course, consent to the theft of property. But the core of the crime of <mask> is not theft but physical intrusion , and owners and employees have every reason to expect that members of the public will enter where they have been invited.\" ( Colbert, supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 607, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 665, 433 P.3d 536, second italics added.)"], "id": "5dfd95d3-ddd6-4d58-87f4-f2185d44e441", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["This appeal pertains to an amended petition to revoke Anderson's SIS, which the State filed on July 26, 2017. The petition alleged that since his previous revocation, Anderson had committed the new offenses of residential <mask>, aggravated assault, and third-degree domestic battering, and that he had failed to pay his restitution, court costs, and public-defender fee.2 At *285the conclusion of the August 24, 2017 hearing on the amended petition, the circuit court found that Anderson had violated the terms and conditions of his SIS based on testimony that he had kicked in the door of a residence and pointed a gun at the man who lived there. The circuit court also found that he had failed to make his court-ordered payments as directed. The circuit court revoked Anderson's SIS and sentenced him to a term of fifteen years in the ADC, with another nine years suspended. Anderson now appeals."], "id": "eadfb57b-bc71-4fb7-aa5e-78e9bda01c5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Addressing the facts regarding defendant's conviction, the court noted that defendant pled no contest to <mask>, and that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was that defendant broke into the victim's storage locker and stole tools. It observed that the elements of the crime of shoplifting, a new misdemeanor offense under Proposition 47, include entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny of property valued at $950 or less. Citing a decision from Division Five of this District that had been published a few weeks earlier- In re J.L. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1108, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 482 -that discussed the meaning of \"commercial establishment\" and shoplifting ( id. at pp. 1114, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 482 [\"a commercial establishment is one that is primarily engaged in commerce, that is, the buying and selling of goods or services\"], 1115 [\"Shoplifting is commonly understood as theft of merchandise from a store or business that sells goods to the public\"] ), the court concluded that the crime to which defendant pled did not qualify as shoplifting because the victim's storage locker was not a business engaged in commerce. Therefore, the court issued an order to show cause why the *700November 12, 2015 order granting his Proposition 47 petition \"should [not] be set aside as unauthorized by Proposition 47 and his felony conviction and sentence reinstated.\""], "id": "9fe59e44-8999-445e-b696-c819d230b07f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The term \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 10.00 (12) means \u201cany loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged\u201d. In order to establish that the instant gun was a deadly weapon, as required for the <mask> first charge, the prosecution needed to present evidence that it was both operable and loaded with live ammunition (People v Shaffer, 66 NY2d 663, 664). There was no evidence presented to the Grand Jury that a qualified firearms\u2019 expert performed testing on the subject firearm to determine its operability. Although a certified laboratory report would have sufficed, none was presented. (See, CPL 190.30 [2].) The testimony elicited from the owner that the weapon was kept loaded and was operational the last he knew is not sufficient to show that the firearm was operational on the day in question."], "id": "c605c346-c1cd-4c8c-aafd-ca90c7db0ba6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A person commits residential <mask> if he or she enters, or remains unlawfully inside, a residential occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing (inside the structure) any offense punishable by imprisonment. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-39-201(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). The offense intended must be identified and is an element of the charge of burglary. Oliver v. State , 286 Ark. 198, 691 S.W.2d 842 (1985)."], "id": "ef385cdf-bf6f-47f6-af4c-4dd4c30be74c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Many authorities hold that unlicensed persons may not sue for breach of contract or seek a recovery based on quantum meruit even though their services were completely and satisfactorily performed. Statutes that require, for instance, that home improvement contractors have licenses are intended to protect the public against the financial and even physical dangers that unscrupulous or incompetent contractors represent. (See, Chosen Constr. Corp. v Syz, 138 AD2d 284 [1st Dept 1988]; Millington v Rapoport, 98 AD2d 765 [2d Dept 1983].) Two cases decided prior to the 1986 amendment held that public adjusters were barred from recovery for services performed with respect to <mask> losses. (Gross v Reliance Ins. Co., 119 Misc 2d 270 [Sup Ct 1983]; Zarrell v Gutenplan Assocs., 111 Misc 2d 340 [Sup Ct 1981]; see also, Abrams Adjusters v Lewis, NYLJ, June 17, 1980, at 10, col 6 [Sup Ct, Alexander, J.].)"], "id": "c2a234b0-11e3-47fd-8148-5dd485d06a2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The jury rendered a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, as charged in the indictment. And as one count charged the prisoner with that crime, because he took the life of his victim while committing a <mask>, the second while committing a robbery, and the third with deliberation and premeditation, the verdict is objected to as an inconsistent and improper one. But as it was neither impossible nor improbable, that the prisoner ivas committing both burglary and robbery when he inflicted the mortal blow, and at that time was actuated by a deliberate and premeditated purpose to take life, the verdict cannot be held to be necessarily inconsistent with the indictment. The prisoner may very well have been guilty of all the charges contained in these three counts, when he inflicted the mortal wound upon the deceased \\ *505for he may have been engaged in both burglary and robbery, with a deliberate and premeditated design to take the life of the person resisting him in the execution of those felonies. The law requires no particular period for, or amount of deliberation to constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, even when the nature of the offense depends wholly upon the existence of that circumstance. It is sufficient that the fact of deliberation existed in the case, combined with the intent to take life, and that the mortal blow or wound was given in consequence of that intention and deliberation, and for the purpose of executing such intention. What the law has required is, that both deliberation and premeditation shall precede the act of taking life, and that the act shall execute the purpose so formed. And that may very well have been the nature of the prisoner\u2019s act, while he was at the same time engaged in the commission of the burglary and robbery, charged in the indictment, for the purpose of making out the existence of the offense under the other provision of the statute."], "id": "c50f8893-6058-496b-a5a5-a8926f49a35c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Viewed in the light most favorable to verdict, the evidence shows T.S. and Stewart agreed he would move out of the residence. Consistent with that agreement, Stewart stayed away from the residence and surrounding property, returning only at night to sleep in the camper. Stewart testified he and T.S. \"were not living together on January 23, 2015.\" Under these circumstances, a reasonable juror could find T.S. was in sole possession of the residence and Stewart relinquished his license or privilege to remain there. Further, a reasonable juror could find Stewart exceeded the scope of any limited license and privilege to remain in the residence when, after delivering firewood to the basement, he went upstairs, twice ignored T.S.'s demands that he leave and, instead, fired a gun and threatened to kill her. Stewart's assertion he was licensed or privileged to remain in the residence because he continued to use the residence fails because it is based on evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Stewart committed a <mask> by knowingly remaining unlawfully in the residence for the purpose of assaulting T.S.8 The circuit court did not err in overruling Stewart's motion for judgment of acquittal on his conviction for burglary."], "id": "ffd77ba4-ecc5-42a4-b421-532d990a0d0d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Recently, another appellate court reached a different conclusion in People v. Gonzales (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 35, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 856. In Gonzales, the defendant twice entered a bank and cashed a check made out to him for $125 purportedly signed by his grandmother. His grandmother denied she signed the checks or gave the defendant permission to use her checks. The defendant pleaded guilty to felony commercial <mask> and subsequently requested reduction to a misdemeanor under the Act. The trial court denied the petition, reasoning the offense did not qualify as shoplifting under section 459.5 because there was no larceny. (Id. at pp. 37-38, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 856.) In affirming, the appellate court looked to robbery cases, in particular People v. Williams (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 305 P.3d 1241. (Gonzales, at p. 39, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 856.) Williams discussed the meaning of common law larceny, which requires a felonious taking, in the context of robbery, which also requires a felonious taking. (Williams, at pp. 786-787, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 305 P.3d 1241.) Common law larceny, unlike other forms of theft, requires both asportation and a taking without the owner's consent. (Id. at pp. 787-788, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 305 P.3d 1241.) In Gonzales, the court found the defendant did not commit larceny because the taking was consensual. (Gonzales, at p. 39, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 856.)"], "id": "ba483352-75cb-4159-ab17-51b9912a46f5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff was convicted after a trial by a jury of the crimes of <mask> in the third degree and grand larceny, second degree. Upon being sentenced for said crimes, the District Attorney filed an information against him charging him with being a multiple offender. Plaintiff was represented by counsel who, after hearing the information, stated \u201c We do not admit that the other two alleged felony convictions read by the district attorney are really felonies as provided in the statutes of the State of New York \u201d. Plaintiff was thereupon sentenced as a third felony offender. He appealed his case to the Appellate Division, Third Department and was successful in obtaining a reversal of the jury verdict and a new trial. The question of whether or not the plaintiff was a multiple offender was not raised or decided in the Appellate Division."], "id": "60c78b94-eaeb-4b99-abd2-8b314730dd1c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The Kansas City police department conducted a search of the residence that evening.2 No one was home. The police seized a laptop and laptop case, a red purse containing various small items, a Coach purse, and a bracelet. M.G. confirmed all the property seized from the residence had been stolen from her apartment. Mr. Douglass and Ms. Gaulter were arrested and subsequently charged by indictment with <mask> in the second degree, section 569.170,3 and felony stealing, section 570.030, RSMo Supp. 2013.4"], "id": "c3354aae-6ba7-4b8d-89b3-a122730f489a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["counsel had a reasonable basis for not presenting the witnesses\u2019 testimony to establish [Van Horn]\u2019s character. During the PCRA hearing, Attorney Minotti testified that he did not call character witnesses because he believed that they would be cross-examined concerning [Van Horn]\u2019s prior convictions for <mask> and statutory rape. We conclude that this was a reasonable trial strategy, and counsel was not ineffective on this basis."], "id": "d8ebcab5-3de1-4005-a02f-a8353111c268", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court places no credence in defendant\u2019s assertions that, despite efforts by the defendant, Mr. Shalleck failed to appear for, or consult with him after the plea because he was irritated after hearing that the defendant had pleaded guilty. His assertions of abandonment by Mr. Shalleck cannot be reconciled with the fact that the very next time this defendant came into conflict with the law, in 1929, at which time he was indicted for <mask> again, he went to trial with the firm of Shalleck & Shalleck as his retained counsel. Moreover, apart from the defendant\u2019s extensive criminal record to date, this court is convinced, after listening to and observing him, that his testimony is not to be believed."], "id": "0c58461c-2188-415c-b2f4-d8f0755fee05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Here too, the question remains that if petitioner, age 66, is not admitted now, then when. Although petitioner\u2019s testimony that he removed the gag during the 1975 <mask> may be questioned, the subcommittee did not find the testimony to be a fabrication. Petitioner may sincerely believe that he did remove the gag. Yet the majority is in effect adopting the position that this Court criticized in Wiesner, holding that petitioner must testify that he never went back to remove the gag if he is ever to be admitted to the New York bar. This is not just. Our analysis of petitioner should be in accord with this Court\u2019s recent precedent for substantially analogous applicants and petitioner is entitled to the same treatment as Wiesner. Even if petitioner *98may be deemed to have exhibited a defensive posture as to certain aspects of his crimes, he has acknowledged his responsibility for them, for which he spent five years in prison and over 30 years atoning. As the majority concedes, since his release on parole petitioner\u2019s \u201cpersonal history took a commendable term for the better,\u201d and he has led a \u201cseemingly unblemished personal life.\u201d Petitioner has demonstrated a \u201ccommendable work ethic,\u201d and there is \u201cno basis to doubt the sincerity of [petitioners] regrets\u201d over the elderly woman\u2019s death or to \u201csuspect that [petitioner] will re-offend.\u201d Thus, contrary to the majority\u2019s ultimate finding, we are dealing with far more than the mere passage of time and \u201cthe extraordinary results for rehabilitation that was found in Wiesner\u201d undeniably exist here."], "id": "9b0d1332-3b83-4d8e-8372-ebf444ba5995", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, defendant asserts that exculpatory clauses contained in the contracts bar all of plaintiffs\u2019 claims, including the fraud claim. According to defendant, the contracts expressly provide that Slomin\u2019s is not liable for losses sustained in a <mask> resulting from the cutting of telephone lines. Defendant cites the disclaimer provisions quoted above and several other *935clauses which, essentially, provide that Slomin\u2019s shall not be responsible for damage or loss resulting from telephone line failure, interruption of telephone service or causes beyond Slomin\u2019s control."], "id": "5c46620e-068d-45d6-91bb-b9d75674a20c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As used in the Arkansas Insurance Code, unless the context otherwise requires, \"property insurance\" is insurance on real or personal property of every kind and of every interest therein, whether on land, water, or in the air, against loss or damage from any and all hazard or cause and against loss consequential upon the loss or damage, other than noncontracted legal liability for the loss or damage. Several types of insurance are considered casualty insurance according to Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-62-105 : (1) vehicle insurance, (2) liability insurance, (3) workers' compensation and employer's liability, (4) <mask> and theft, (5) personal property floater, (6) glass, (7) boiler and machinery, (8) leakage and fire extinguishing equipment, (9) credit, (10) malpractice, (11) livestock, (12) entertainment, (13) elevator, *436(14) abstractor's professional liability, (15) mortgage lien protection, and (16) miscellaneous. Personal property floater is defined as \"insurance upon personal effects against loss or damage from any cause under a personal property floater.\" Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-62-105(5)."], "id": "fa20fb4b-9ff9-4aed-a1e4-7c032c1c422b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Perhaps the best and clearest language on this issue is found in a trial court decision, People v Crowell (122 Misc 2d 133 [Oswego County Ct 1983]). In that case, the defendant was *242given permission to enter the premises for the purpose of painting it. The court found that the privilege to be within the premises is not negated by the formulation of a criminal intent or even the undertaking of a criminal action therein. The court went on to state that \u201cthe doctrine remains that a licensed or privileged entry or remaining is not transformed into an unlawful one upon the occurrence of criminal conduct on the part of the licensee. * * * A rule to the contrary would mean that an intoxicated house guest who loses his temper and intentionally smashes a vase becomes a burglar. Innumerable like examples can be imagined. Such is not the intent of the Legislature in creating the <mask> statutes, all of which have trespassorial conduct as one essential element.\u201d (Id. at 134-135 [citations omitted].)"], "id": "86105882-c32f-426b-9a6b-c464e06ff4cb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["There is no reasonable possibility that the defendant would have received a more favorable decision on his suppression motion if the statements attributed to the parole officers had been turned over. As explained by this court in its decision and order dated July 20, 1995, when the parole officers received in*224formation that their parolee was in possession of some of the fruit of a recent <mask>, they had a duty to investigate."], "id": "4c4e78e1-a3aa-410b-be58-1632206e6846", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b6 19 On appeal, defendant asserted that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of residential <mask>. Defendant argued that the only evidence tying him to the offense consisted of a single, partial fingerprint on a portable object. Additionally, the State did not offer evidence that Dennewitz followed the accepted methodology for identifying latent fingerprints by verifying his results with another examiner. The appellate court agreed and reversed his conviction. 2020 IL App (1st) 172631, \u00b6\u00b6 28-29."], "id": "0f7c7c7f-021b-4606-a1f7-7c757064f233", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["There is practically no dispute about any of the facts in the case, and the question is, therefore, one of law. The defendant contends that it cannot be held liable, except upon proof by the plaintiff of some negligence on its part; and it contends that none has been proven. I do not think the defendant\u2019s contention can prevail; and it seems to me that it is incumbent upon it, if it wishes to excuse itself for the loss of the goods, to show what has become of them. There is no evidence in the case from which it can be even inferred when or where or how the coat disappeared, and we are unable to decide whether it was lost in transit or after it reached its destination at its terminal. It is true McArdle testified as above quoted; but, keeping in mind that the coat was in a box, the cover of which had 'been nailed down, it does not appear that he made an examination more than to look at the outside of the box. Bor the purposes of the case, however, we will assume, giving the appellant the benefit of the doubt; that the box and its contents were duly delivered by it to its terminal, and were there suffered to remain for such a time that, as a matter of law, the status of the defendant as a common carrier was changed to simply that of a *350warehouseman; and we will consider the case on that basis. \u25a0Appellant quotes the case of Ballston Refrigerating Storage Co. v. Eastern States Refrigerating Co., 142 App. Div. 135, . in support of its contention; but I do not see that the law, \u25a0as there stated, is of assistance to him. I will quote from page 139 of the opinion: The gravamen of an action such as this is negligence. The burden of- proof rests on plaintiff throughout the entire trial to establish such negligence by a preponderance of evidence. The contract of the bailee is to return the property in proper condition, and when a plaintiff establishes a failure to do so a prima facie case of negligence is made out which places the defendant under the necessity of offering an explanation of the loss or damaged condition of the property in order to meet such prima facie case.\u201d Further on on the same page the court quotes with approval the following language: \u201cAs a general rule, when a bailee fails on demand 'to deliver to the bailor property to which the latter is entitled, the-presumption of liability arises, and if the goods cannot be found it furnishes the imputation of negligence as the cause. But such prima facie case may be overcome when it is made to appear that the loss was occasioned by some misfortune or accident not within the control of the bailee.\u201d It is true that case holds, as do others, that the basis of the action is negligence, and that the affirmative of the issue is not shifted to the defendant, but remains through the trial with the plaintiff; but, from the language above quoted, it is apparent that there is. a prima facie ease of negligence made out when a bailee proves delivery to a warehouseman, demand of return and\" failure of the warehouseman to produce the goods. The most instructive case which I have found oh this subject, and the one most closely in point, is that of Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260. In that case a warehouseman had been sued for failing to return the bailee\u2019s goods, and it appeared that the warehouse had been 'burglarized. The court said: \u201c Upon its appearing that the goods were lost by a <mask> committed upon the defendants\u2019 warehouse, it was for the plaintiffs to establish affirmatively that such burglary was occasioned or was -not prevented by reason of some negligence or omission of due *351care on the part of the warehouseman.\u201d And continues: \u201c The cases agree that where a bailee of goods, although liable to their owner for their loss in case of negligence, fails, nevertheless, upon their being demanded, to deliver them or account for such non-delivery, or, to use the language of .Sutherland, J., in S'chmidt v. Blood, where there is a total default in delivering or accounting for the goods,\u2019 this is to be treated as prima facie evidence -of negligence.\u201d The court says that this rule arises from the necessity of the case, it being presumed that the bailee has exclusive knowledge of the facts, and that he is- able to give the reason for his nondelivery, if any exists, other than his own act or fault, or from a presumption that he actually retains the goods, and by his refusal converts them."], "id": "623f1ab8-b23b-4680-97ca-10102fcaaa6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c The Grand Jury of the County of Jefferson, by this indictment, accuse william seymour, of the crime of <mask> in the Third Degree, committed on or about the 23rd day of February, 1953, at the City of Watertown, in said County of Jefferson and State of New York, \u201c SECOND COUNT \u2018 \u2018 And the Grand Jury aforesaid, by a second count in this indictment further accuse the said william seymour of the crime of Petit Larceny, committed on or about the 23rd day of February, 1953, in the City of Watertown, County of Jefferson and State of New York.\u201d The indictment appears to conform with the requirements of the statutes relating to a simplified indictment and is not *227insufficient or defective. It is not necessary to allege all of the elements of the crime where this type of indictment is the basis of the charge. Neither was it necessary for the District Attorney to set forth the particular subdivision defining the crime of burglary in the third degree, with which the defendant was charged. (People v. Rosen, 251 App. Div. 584, affd. 275 N. Y. 627.)"], "id": "256a9d3a-2ebb-4e91-9830-b0aaa82f8a87", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": [". Compare, former Penal Law \u00a7 1044 \"The killing of a human being * * * is murder in the first degree, when committed * * * by a person engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise\u201d (emphasis added), with Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 (3): \"A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when * * * [a]cting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, <mask>, kidnapping, arson, rape * * *, sodomy * * *, sexual abuse * * *, or escape * * * and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant * * * causes the death of a person other than one of the participants\u201d (emphasis added)."], "id": "300ad24c-c4e0-4be6-8d56-41ff6b8aa465", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In turn, the New York Court of Appeals in People v Chappie (38 NY2d 112, 115) acknowledged that: \u201cWarnings, to be effective under the combined holdings in Miranda and Westover, must precede the subjection of a defendant to questioning. Later is too late, unless there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning.\u201d The officer in the Chappie case admitted that he stopped the defendant, who was walking on a public roadway, ordered him into the police car, questioned him about several burglaries in the area and drove him to the site of the most recent one. Not until the defendant had admitted that <mask> and showed where he had broken into the building, did the officer give him his Miranda warnings and continue the interrogation which elicited admissions of other burglaries. The court held (supra, p 115) that: \u201cUnlike theories which require examination of a defendant\u2019s testimony as to his state of mind and, thus, an assessment of his credibility, the Westover approach may be based on an assessment of external events. We find that the testimony of Officer Luck himself, in the case before us, supplies ample basis for the conclusion that Chappie was subjected to such a continuous interrogation that the Miranda warnings administered at the site of the burglary were insufficient to protect his rights. Given that insufficiency, his later confessions must be suppressed.\u201d"], "id": "5db29e10-ff9c-41cf-8c76-00fc856a8a46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On April 16, 2014, the district attorney filed an information charging defendant with unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, having been previously convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle (\u00a7 666.5(a) ; count 1);4 receiving a stolen vehicle (\u00a7 496d(a); count 2); unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, \u00a7 10851(a) ; count 3); receiving stolen property (\u00a7 496, subd. (a) (hereafter \u00a7 496(a)); count 4); possessing a <mask> tool (\u00a7 466; count 5, a misdemeanor); and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, \u00a7 14601.2, subd. (a) ; count 6, a misdemeanor). The information also alleged in connection with counts 1 through 4 that defendant had served a prior prison term (\u00a7 667.5, subd. (b)) for a 2005 conviction under section 496d(a)."], "id": "22988254-90b2-4459-a20b-e4759a93b87f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The facts of the Fowlkes case bear a striking resemblance to the situation in the case at bar. There, Mr. Fowlkes was accused of having broken into the apartment of a woman conceded to be his wife and of stabbing her. He was indicted on two counts of assault and counts of <mask> and possession of a dangerous weapon. Fowlkes pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the second degree, a felony, and was sentenced to State prison."], "id": "afabb2cf-b84c-44dc-ae69-bd1f7ab77c46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In United States v Thomas (444d 919, 921), the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that a <mask> indictment which alleged that it was \"with intent to commit any criminal offense therein\u201d was defective on its face and *497could not be cured by a bill of particulars. In line with its opinion, it also could not be cured by a motion to amend. Said the court (pp 921-922) \"An indictment drawn simply in the language of the District\u2019s burglary statute thus does not allege with sufficient particularity, the offense with which appellant was charged. As so drawn, it describes the offense only in impermissibly broad and categorical terms. In order to achieve the requisite degree of precision, we hold, in accordance with the great weight of authority [citing cases], that the indictment must state the particular offense the accused intended to commit upon entry into the dwelling\u201d."], "id": "c312e53e-e53b-49f8-8064-bd1dd59a1907", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["When appellant committed residential <mask> in March 2016, he was on notice that residential burglary was then listed as a felony involving violence that would subject him to a more severe penalty than the previous residential-burglary statute. The 2015 amendment that added residential burglary to the list of felonies involving violence did not affect his sentences for his previous residential burglaries but did enhance the sentence he could receive when he was convicted of residential burglary in 2016. As in Sims , Garrett , and Laymon , we hold that there was no ex post facto violation here, and the circuit court properly denied appellant's objection."], "id": "05aed693-00f9-4516-a441-d28b3effb13b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The officer\u2019s question, \"How did you get in there?\u201d or words to that effect, was a reasonable response to the defendant\u2019s plea to the officer to free him from the lockup and arrest him for a minor offense. By then, Officer Muzek had realized that the defendant had been locked in from the outside, and it was appropriate to ask how he had got in, to facilitate his release. Muzek did not have to go through a Miranda litany before asking for that on-the-scene clarification of the situation. (See, People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29, 34 [\" 'What are you doing back here?\u2019 \u201d]; People v Johnson, 86 AD2d 165, 168, affd 59 NY2d 1014 [\" 'What are you doing here?\u2019 \u201d]; People v Luna, 164 AD2d 870, lv denied 76 NY2d 941 [police officer subduing <mask> suspect asked what a bulge in his pocket was]; People v Deresky, 134 AD2d 512 [officer\u2019s question to murder suspect, who had just been arrested upon getting off an airplane, whether he had any luggage, \"was not intended or designed to elicit an incriminating response\u201d, so it \"did not constitute custodial interrogation\u201d].)"], "id": "d12f500a-7e51-4df8-b237-a41d3a74cc73", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["John M. Leventhal, J. *1025The defendant Steven Sommerville stands charged in a nine-count indictment with the crimes, inter alia, of <mask> in the first degree, assault in the second degree, criminal contempt in the second degree, and intimidating a witness in the third degree. A Mapp hearing was held before this court on October 23, 1996. Oral argument was held and memoranda of law were submitted by both sides. The issue to be determined is whether the reading of specific entries in the defendant\u2019s \"weekly appointment calendar\u201d constitutes a proper police precinct inventory search of items secured from defendant\u2019s knapsack upon his earlier arrest. Based upon the credible evidence of record, the court makes the following findings:"], "id": "b9e8d9a3-2b89-4286-bc8c-7028c5be4d95", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In appeal No. 2, defendant contends that County Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss count one of the indictment, charging <mask> in the second degree, because the People failed to allege an essential element of the crime, namely, that he had entered the dwelling \u201cunlawfully\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 140.25 [2]). We reject that contention. That count of the indictment specifically referred to Penal Law \u00a7 140.25 (2) and, thus, the People\u2019s failure to allege that defendant entered the dwelling \u201cunlawfully\u201d does not constitute a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal of that count (see People v Wright, 67 NY2d 749, 750 [1986]; People v Shanley, 15 AD3d 921, 922 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 856 [2005])."], "id": "265d3595-238f-4fe7-91a9-4ab4c00934e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["John Austin, J. The respondent, who was initially charged with having committed certain acts which, if committed by an adult, would consist of the crimes of <mask> in the first degree and attempt to commit rape in the first degree, admitted the crime of burglary in the third degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 140.20) in full satisfaction of the petition pending against him. Subsequent to his admission, the respondent was adjudged to be a juvenile delinquent by the Warren County Family Court and was placed on probation for a period of two years with certain terms and conditions."], "id": "e50e78e0-0bfe-4897-8372-c01422166afe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c On plea of former acquittal or conviction, the accused must show that he was acquitted or convicted of the same accusation against him in a former trial; not of an entirely different offense growing out of the same state of facts or transaction. The proper test is: Was the matter set out in a second indictment admissible as evidence under the first indictment, and could a conviction have been properly maintained upon such evidence? *19If the answer is yes, then the plea is sufficient; otherwise, it is not. Acquittal on a charge of crime is a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense under a different name, in all those cases where the accused might have been found guilty and sentenced on the offense charged in the later indictment under the former prosecution. Conviction or acquittal in one offense is a bar to a prosecution in another, in all those case where the later offense charged is a necessary element in, and constitutes an essential part of, the former. Thus, a plea of former conviction of <mask> is sufficient in an indictment for robbery based on the same offense, when the record shows that, in order to prove the felonious intent in the former prosecution, the circumstances of the stealing were proved, and thus the same transaction, the robbery, was involved in both cases.\u201d (Emphasis added.)"], "id": "ea054288-8882-42dd-97a4-edd5cb0006e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was originally sentenced by the Honorable Angelo Ingrassia, Judge of the County Court (on June 19, 1981), to the following periods of incarceration: 25 years to life on each of 3 counts of murder in the second degree; SVs to 25 years on each of 2 counts of robbery in the first degree; SVs to 25 years on each of 3 counts of <mask> in the first degree; 2V3 to 7 years on the single count of assault in the second degree; 1 to 4 years on the single count of grand larceny in the third degree; 1 year each on the misdemeanor charges of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (2 counts), petit larceny (1 count), and criminal mischief in the fourth degree (1 count)."], "id": "209730b1-c844-4704-a6cf-bc7d2a37d5a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant admits keeping a dog in her apartment contrary to the Rules and Regulations but her husband in her behalf asserts that her purchase of the dog was necessitated by circumstances that have arisen since the execution of the agreement in June, 1968, which make it necessary for her to have a dog in her apartment. He refers to a series of seven burglaries in the building in as many months, plus an assault, and an attempted <mask> which was frustrated. He also asserts that the owner has permitted other occupants to keep cats as well as dogs in their apartment."], "id": "84f57a02-1111-4a91-9465-fa708328608e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. contends the trial court abused its sentencing discretion and requests remand for resentencing. Although Criado\u2019s original briefing in this appeal argued the trial court erred under Senate Bill 136, both parties agree that resentencing is required pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), which was enacted after the original briefing had been completed. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731.) We concur and will remand for resentencing on this basis. In light of this conclusion, we need not address Criado\u2019s other claims of error. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 Criado robbed a gas station in Big Sur and threatened a store clerk at the station with a knife. When officers arrested Criado, he had the knife \u201c \u2018clipped on [his] side.\u2019 \u201d Following a two-day trial, a jury found Criado guilty of robbery (\u00a7 211) and misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, \u00a7 11377, subd. (a)). The jury also found Criado had personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of the robbery. (\u00a7 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Criado waived his right to a jury trial on the remaining enhancements, and the trial court found true the allegations that Criado had served two prior prison commitments. (\u00a7 667.5(b).) One of the prison priors was for check fraud (\u00a7 476) and <mask> (\u00a7 459), and the other was for assault with a deadly weapon (\u00a7 245). The probation report prepared for Criado\u2019s original sentencing identified the following five possible factors in aggravation: The crime involved the threat of great bodily harm to the victim as he was performing his job duties (Cal. Rules of Court, rule"], "id": "3b5c58b2-1f81-4af9-a9d1-a0d029518101", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendants claim there is no procedural authority for this motion. The prosecutor refers to CPL 210.20 (1) and People v Dykes (86 AD2d 191) as the foundations for granting leave to re-present. These citations, of course, deal with vastly different circumstances. CPL 210.20 (1), insofar as remotely applicable to the argument raised by the People, deals with dismissals of indictments as defective or as unsupported by legally sufficient evidence. (CPL 210.20 [1] [a], [b].) It is subdivision (4) that the prosecutor intends to invoke in such a *72situation: \"Upon dismissing an indictment or a count thereof upon any of the grounds specified in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (i) of subdivision one * * * the court may, upon application of the people, in its discretion authorize the people to submit the charge * * * to the same or another grand jury.\u201d This familiar procedure has been in the Criminal Procedure Law since its inception in 1971. It is inapplicable at bar for two reasons. First, a motion to inspect and dismiss must fail if the Grand Jury minutes support the charge or any lesser included offense. (CPL 210.20 [1] [b].) And, as already mentioned, this court found that the Grand Jury minutes supported criminal trespass, third degree, manifestly a lesser included offense of <mask>, third degree. Secondly, this court did not dismiss after its inspection of the minutes. It simply reduced the charge."], "id": "c22bc11f-7b7a-4a07-82af-349f2eb9eec7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["At some hour between 4:30 p.m. on December 20, 1974 and 7:30 a.m. on December 23, 1974, the premises of the Dutch Masters Paint & Chemical Co., Ltd., were burglarized. As said premises had been broken into on numerous prior occasions, a special police unit had been assigned to investigate the prior burglaries. In the course of the investigation, following the <mask> in question, latent fingerprints were found on two objects inside the premises."], "id": "f2e32671-0c1f-44ae-991f-178ea45b44c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": [" Defendant was charged with <mask> in the third degree stemming from an incident where items owned by the victim \u2014 specifically, a chainsaw and a gas can \u2014 were stolen from the victim's garage. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged. County Court sentenced defendant, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 3\u00bd to 7 years. Defendant appeals. We affirm."], "id": "0109e91b-7e99-4d5a-8124-32cef7267951", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The relator was taken into custody in this jurisdiction on or about May 17, 1968, on charges which ultimately resulted in an indictment by the Grand Jury of Westchester County for <mask> in the third degree, possession of burglar\u2019s tools, assault in the second degree and resisting arrest. On September 18, 1968, he pled guilty to two misdemeanors in full satisfaction of the indictment and was sentenced on October 11,1968, to concurrent terms of one year. Relator remained in custody under these sentences until the completion in March, 1969. On November 6, 1967, a bench warrant was issued from Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, charging the relator with a violation of parole. This warrant was received by the Sheriff of Westchester County on January '27, 1968, and on March 13, 1969, the relator was arraigned on the fugitive information, refused to waive extradition and bail was set at $1,000. On April 11, 1969, relator was informed that there was also an outstanding charge from the State of Pennsylvania of \u00a3\u00a3 Assault with Intent to Ravish a fifteen-year old juvenile \u201d. On April 22, 1969, relator was arraigned on the warrant of the Governor of the State of New Ydrk dated April 10, 1969, for his extradition to the State of Pennsylvania."], "id": "4425c6f1-967d-4c9a-98c8-57b0c7eca602", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Assuming arguendo, the defendant did commit the crime in the nighttime, it would still constitute a felony in this State even under article 1389 of the Texas Penal Code. The latter statute states in part: 11 entering a house by force, threats or fraud, at night \u2019 \u2019 and these acts would constitute a <mask> in this State. Section 400 of the Penal Law defines the word \u201c break \u201d: \u201c3. Obtaining an entrance into such a building or apartment, by any threat or artifice used for that purpose, or by collusion with any person therein.\u201d"], "id": "8e68fe70-aec4-4ac0-81ca-c5f13f4d79b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The evidence at the trial, however, established that it was one room, described by Greenidge at trial as a mainte*11nance room, about 10 by 12 or 8 by 12 feet in size, containing tools and materials used in his maintenance of 1036 Bedford Avenue. The complainant described the building 1036 Bedford Avenue as a three-family dwelling house with a store on the first floor. On the second floor across the hall from the locked door in question was an occupied apartment. Greenidge testified that he did not know the defendant or give him permission to enter 1036 Bedford Avenue or the maintenance room, or to damage the door and lock to that room. No doubt, if the Grand Jury had been aware of the facts, the indictment would have alleged <mask> in the second degree for entering the \u201cdwelling\u201d 1036 Bedford Avenue with intent to commit a crime (see Quinn v People, 71 NY 561), or burglary in the third degree, for entering the \u201cbuilding\u201d 1036 Bedford Avenue with intent to commit a crime, instead of attempted burglary in the second degree, for attempting to enter the \u201cdwelling\u201d on the second floor of the house. But the trial court was not empowered to change the conceded theory of the indictment by substituting the entire building for the maintenance room as the subject to the alleged attempted burglary, or by substituting a completed crime for the attempt. The nature of the subject premises and the defendant\u2019s conduct as an attempt to enter it are elements of the crime, and once charged by the Grand Jury may not be changed by the trial court. (People v Spann, 56 NY2d 469.)"], "id": "4f5035fd-34ca-45a4-8fda-38e67470c2b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": [" The court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant's mistrial motion, made after the prosecutor elicited testimony on cross-examination of defendant that indirectly referenced an uncharged crime, consisting of an earlier entry by defendant into the store in question on the day of one of the charged crimes. That brief testimony caused little or no prejudice in the context of the case, and the court's curative instructions directing the jury to disregard the testimony rectified any possible prejudice (see People v Santiago, 52 NY2d 865 [1981]). Defendant claims that this testimony, and the prosecutor's failure to disclose that there were two entries on the day of the first <mask> (rather than one entry with an apparent discrepancy as to the time), prejudiced his defense. However, we find that the court's instruction, which the jury is presumed to have followed (see People v Davis, 58 NY2d 1102, 1104 [1983]), to disregard the"], "id": "c14f0836-fd85-4e47-84d4-3a946657ebd1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The California Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to when \"the same act or course of conduct\" is involved in multiple offenses for purposes of section 654 's preclusion of successive prosecutions. Kellett involved a defendant arrested for the single act of standing on the sidewalk with a pistol in his hand. He was charged with and pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner, and later separately prosecuted for felony possession of a concealable weapon. The Supreme Court held that the felony prosecution was barred by section 654, notwithstanding the possibility the defendant had possessed the firearm for some time before he was observed brandishing it. (See Kellett , supra , 63 Cal.2d at pp. 824-825, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206.) The offenses were too \"interrelated,\" in other words, to permit separate prosecutions. (See id . at p. 827, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206.) Kellett also gave as an example that \"[a] conviction and sentence for petty theft would therefore bar a subsequent prosecution for <mask> of premises entered with intent to commit that theft, since only a single act within the meaning of section 654 would be involved.\" ( Id . at p. 828, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206.)"], "id": "2260fc53-9d6c-4218-96b5-f06b7602cf36", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Seth L. Marvin, J. By an indictment filed on November 9, 2007, the defendant Frank Bennet was charged with <mask> in the second and third degrees, criminal trespass in the second degree, criminal impersonation in the first degree and false personation. On May 27, 2009, on motion of the People, the count charging second-degree burglary was dismissed. Then defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary and first-degree criminal impersonation. On November 10, 2009, defendant was sentenced, as a second felony offender, as promised, to two consecutive terms of imprisonment of from 3V2 to 7 years for the burglary count and IV2 to 3 years for the criminal impersonation count. Defendant waived his right to appeal as part of the plea bargain."], "id": "8577224e-d630-4f4a-8cfe-07a1bcb22bf7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["After the release of our initial opinion in this matter, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Colbert , which presented the following question concerning the line separating shoplifting from <mask>: \"If a person enters a store during regular business hours but then proceeds to a private back office *996with intent to steal therefrom, which crime has he or she committed?\" ( Colbert, supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 598, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 665, 433 P.3d 536.) In rejecting Colbert's claim that he was guilty only of misdemeanor shoplifting, the court concluded that \"entering an interior room that is objectively identifiable as off-limits to the public with intent to steal therefrom is not shoplifting, but instead remains punishable as burglary.\" ( Ibid. )"], "id": "fde2f492-553a-4b6f-bfd4-c77bfde46aeb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*27Prior offense Conviction Sentence Release Rulings Rulings date date on on Prop. 47 motions petitions to strike (1) First degree 5/25/90 2 years' 6/30/91 Denied <mask> (former prison (Romero) \u00a7 460.1) (2) Failure to 4/28/92 3 years' Not indicated appear upon probation; release (\u00a7 1320, 378 days' subd. (b)) jail (3) Felon in 12/3/92 4 years' 12/28/94 possession of prison firearm (former \u00a7 12021, subd. (a)) (4) Felon in 10/6/95 32 months' 09/18/97 possession of prison firearm (former \u00a7 12021, subd. (a)) *895(5) Failure to 12/16/99 6 years' 5/15/04 appear for prison felony charge (\u00a7 1320.5) (6) Attempted 3/23/05 16 7/12/05 vandalism months' (\u00a7\u00a7 664, 1320.5) prison (7) Receiving 6/26/06 44 Not Granted stolen property months' indicated (\u00a7 496) prison (8) Attempted 12/15/09 16 11/06/10 granted unlawful months' possession of prison controlled substance (Pen. Code, \u00a7 664; Health & Saf. Code, \u00a7 11350) (9) Second 10/12/12 4 years' 5/24/14 degree burglary prison (\u00a7 460, subd. (b)) At the trial on the prior prison enhancements, defense counsel noted that convictions 7 and 8 above had previously been reduced to misdemeanors under Proposition 47 and, without those convictions, more than five years passed from the ninth felony conviction and the six earlier felony convictions, and Kelly should not be subject to enhancements for the six earlier felony convictions due to the washout rule."], "id": "70a03b59-1776-4e8c-b31a-0b5023da2eae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b6 17 At the posttrial hearing, Carroll testified that prior to trial he reviewed the discovery provided by the State and developed a defense strategy. It was twofold. First, he sought to convince the court that Dennewitz assumed \u201cthe other part of the fingerprint belonged to [defendant]\u201d and, thus, had not made a \u201cpositive identification.\u201d To achieve that goal, he asked Dennewitz whether he had simply assumed the missing part of the print belonged to defendant. Second, Carroll testified that he attempted to show the State failed to prove defendant was not a guest of Slowinski\u2019s friend the week prior to the <mask> and that it was thus impossible to determine when defendant\u2019s fingerprint appeared on the headphone case."], "id": "eba6ba40-c13f-4d8e-a28f-c0e812c5e753", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff was convicted after a trial by a jury of the crimes of <mask> in the third degree and grand larceny, second degree. Upon being sentenced for said crimes, the District Attorney filed an information against him charging him with being a multiple offender. Plaintiff was represented by counsel who, after hearing the information, stated \u201c We do not admit that the other two alleged felony convictions read by the district attorney are really felonies as provided in the statutes of the State of New York \u201d. Plaintiff was thereupon sentenced as a third felony offender. He appealed his case to the Appellate Division, Third Department and was successful in obtaining a reversal of the jury verdict and a new trial. The question of whether or not the plaintiff was a multiple offender was not raised or decided in the Appellate Division."], "id": "a355a379-a024-4cc3-8515-3b21a0f10a24", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In October 1996, the People charged Berg with murder (\u00a7 187) (count 1), and alleged the special circumstance that Berg committed the murder in the course of a robbery (\u00a7 190.2, subd. (a)(17) ), and during the commission of a <mask> (\u00a7 190.2, subd. (a)(17) ). The People also alleged that Berg personally used a knife during the murder (\u00a7 12022, subd. (b)(1) ). In addition, the People charged Berg with conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary (\u00a7 182, subd. (a)(1) ) (count 2), robbery (\u00a7 211) (count 3), and burglary ( \u00a7 459 ) (count 4) and alleged a knife use allegation with respect to each count (\u00a7 12022, subd. (b)(1) ). Counts 1 through 4 were all related to the Hancock murder."], "id": "0c176256-07e4-407c-99d1-680f8bb00ca3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["_______________________________ SUMMARY We reverse the trial court\u2019s summary denial of a recommendation of the secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to recall the sentence of and resentence defendant Victor Guadalupe Ladd. We remand for reconsideration in accordance with statutory changes that went into effect on January 1, 2022. FACTS In October 2020, the secretary of the CDCR recommended a recall of sentence and resentencing for defendant under then- effective Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). (All statutory references are to the Penal Code.) That statute authorized a court, at any time after receiving a recommendation from the secretary, to recall an inmate\u2019s sentence and resentence that inmate to a lesser sentence. Defendant was convicted, under a plea agreement, of second degree robbery, enhanced for the use of a firearm, and two counts of second degree <mask>. He was sentenced to 14 years four months, and his earliest possible release date is February 11, 2026. The secretary pointed out that courts are now empowered with discretion to strike or dismiss a personal use firearm enhancement at sentencing or resentencing, in the interest of justice, and recommended resentencing. In November 2020, the trial court summarily \u201cread, considered and denied\u201d the request. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in declining to follow the CDCR\u2019s recommendation, and asserted the trial court\u2019s summary denial violated due process and equal protection principles. While defendant\u2019s appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed Assembly Bill No. 1540 (AB 1540; 2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). Among other things, AB 1540"], "id": "2e5f4157-9ff5-4517-8890-20cde49933b9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b6 19 On appeal, defendant asserted that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of residential <mask>. Defendant argued that the only evidence tying him to the offense consisted of a single, partial fingerprint on a portable object. Additionally, the State did not offer evidence that Dennewitz followed the accepted methodology for identifying latent fingerprints by verifying his results with another examiner. The appellate court agreed and reversed his conviction. 2020 IL App (1st) 172631, \u00b6\u00b6 28-29."], "id": "8e1ef58f-9b21-4b3f-9995-05b556b9661c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Kevin Jennings was the People\u2019s main witness at the Sirois hearing. Mr. Jennings is currently incarcerated on a <mask> *542charge for criminally impersonating a cable employee in order to gain access to the victim\u2019s home. Mr. Jennings also is being held for violating the terms of his parole on a prior gun conviction and concedes he has been convicted on several occasions for \"sucking tokens\u201d out of Transit Authority turnstiles. Defendant admits having a number of prior bench warrants and manipulating the legal system to obtain a \"package deal\u201d upon a subsequent arrest and the execution of the outstanding bench warrant."], "id": "8c9c0db2-9bd4-41b5-a1d8-d170fc25becc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Amack's sentencing challenge\u2014whether his earlier aggravated-<mask> conviction was properly classified as a person felony\u2014requires us to interpret the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines. See State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 571, 357 P.3d 251 (2015). Appellate courts interpret statutes de novo. Wetrich, 307 Kan. at 555. \"The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.\" Keel, 302 Kan. at 572. If statutory language is plain and unambiguous, using the words' ordinary meanings, then the plain text controls. 302 Kan. at 572. If a statute is ambiguous, courts may resort to other considerations such as canons of construction or legislative history to determine legislative intent. 302 Kan. at 572. Courts construe statutes to avoid unreasonable results and should assume the legislature enacted statutory provisions for a reason. 302 Kan. 560, Syl. \u00b6 7."], "id": "237c8fcd-174e-4b3a-9c7f-e0c7d52e1b67", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*567Plaintiff had carried this, or similar <mask> insurance with defendant for five years or more before the loss. Defendant does not attack the claim of burglary. It does not question the honesty of the officer. It does not charge fraud. It does not say that the officer testified falsely. It does not say that plaintiff failed to follow its instructions for keeping records. Hone of these elements are present in this case. Instead, having accepted premiums without audit or instructions for over five years, and a loss having finally occurred, defendant seeks to hang its hat on naked technicalities to avoid its side of the bargain. On this record it has not established its right to do so."], "id": "beaa1f02-dea7-4326-9408-1126f8e6ad78", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Mulvey contacted defendant, who at first denied any knowledge of the <mask>, but explained that Brink owed him some money and offered to buy some merchandise for him at the mall as repayment. He said that Brink made the purchases but did not tell defendant that the card was stolen. On June 23, 1992 Mulvey spoke with Brink, who admitted that defendant had driven him around Conklin in search of a place to burglarize. Brink said that defendant dropped him off on Powers Road and he then burglarized the Bailey residence. Brink said that defendant drove him to the mall where they made purchases with the stolen credit card. Brink also involved defendant in other burglaries."], "id": "f446ece6-46d2-448b-927b-3b98a12aae5a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The possessory offenses, to which defendant Fletcher pleaded guilty, and the charge of third degree <mask> were joinable under CPL 40.40 (subd 1); the defendant\u2019s guilty plea does not bar prosecution for the burglary because of an exception to the joinder doctrine provided in CPL 40.40 (subd 2). That exception permits a subsequent prosecution of the uncharged offense if, at the time of disposition (by plea or trial) under the first accusatory instrument, the People did not possess evidence legally sufficient to support a conviction of the uncharged offense. As previously discussed, the record supports the District Attorney\u2019s contention. The People\u2019s proceeding with the burglary charge is clearly not the product of harassment or overzealous prosecution. It is simply the culmination of a diligent investigatory process where evidence essential to prove the more serious charge was only adduced subsequent to the defendant\u2019s plea of guilty on the misdemeanor complaint. Therefore, in the instant case, neither the letter nor intent of CPL 40.40 is contravened by prosecution of defendant Fletcher under the burglary count of the indictment."], "id": "df3adb14-61e8-4b1e-84e8-0a8a6c109631", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 1999, defendant pleaded guilty to all charges in a pending indictment, consisting of attempted <mask> in the first degree, attempted assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. He was sentenced as a second felony offender to, among other things, 12 years in prison on the attempted burglary conviction. His conviction was subsequently affirmed on appeal (278 AD2d 662 [2000]). Defendant thereafter sought to set aside his sentence pursuant to CPL 440.20 on the ground that he had not been advised that his sentence included a mandatory period of postrelease supervision. This application was denied, and the denial was upheld upon appeal (4 AD3d 627 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 803 [2004]). In 2009, defendant was resentenced on the attempted burglary conviction to the original prison term of 12 years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision (see Correction Law \u00a7 601-d). Defendant appeals from the judgment resentencing him."], "id": "67711011-fe53-4832-93f6-0c55aff3c57b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Prior to trial, on November 30, 2015, the prosecutor filed an in limine motion seeking to impeach defendant with (1) the fact of his two felony convictions for first degree <mask> \"should [defendant] elect to testify at trial\" and (2) the underlying facts of the felonies and of a misdemeanor conviction \"with evidence that he is known to regularly carry knives\" in the event defendant were to \" 'open the door' \" during his testimony. The prosecutor professed not to seek to use these convictions for Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) purposes, as the district attorney conceded \"their probative value is likely substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect given the issues in this case.\" He reiterated that position at a hearing on the in limine motions held the same day. However, the prosecutor said he \"would seek to explore those areas were the defendant to testify, were he to open the door about weapons, violence, et cetera.\" The court reserved ruling on the matter until such time as \"we're able to determine if the defendant testifies. And then prior to his testimony, you can make your offer of proof at that point.\""], "id": "6e8926be-a924-429c-a8cf-2be767d47a3e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "burglary", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The juvenile court also denied E.P.'s motion to dismiss because it concluded that although the ice rink is a commercial establishment, the rink's locker room was not part of the commercial establishment. In Colbert , supra , our Supreme Court addressed whether the nonpublic areas of a business structure form part of the \" 'commercial establishment' \" covered by the shoplifting statute. ( Colbert, supra , 6 Cal.5th at pp. 600-601, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 665, 433 P.3d 536.) There, the defendant entered the private offices of a convenience store and a gas station and stole about $ 300 on two separate occasions. ( Id. at p. 598-599, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 665, 433 P.3d 536.) The defendant petitioned to redesignate the two <mask> convictions as shoplifting misdemeanors, but the trial court denied the petition. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the defendant's petition on the ground that the private offices were not part a \" 'commercial establishment' \" covered by section 459.5. ( Id. at pp. 600-601, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 665, 433 P.3d 536.)"], "id": "253ce316-8ada-4378-9cbd-5689bd39af3f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. Defendant was convicted of one count of <mask> for sexual purposes (\u00a7 209, subd. (b)(1)); one count of kidnapping during a carjacking (\u00a7 209.5, subd. (a)); one count of carjacking (\u00a7 215, subd. (a)); one count of second degree robbery (\u00a7\u00a7 211, 212.5, subd. (c)); active participation in the criminal conduct of a criminal street gang (\u00a7 186.22, subd. (a)); two counts of forcible sexual penetration (\u00a7 289); two counts of forcible sodomy in concert (\u00a7 286, subd. (d)(1)); two counts of forcible rape in concert (\u00a7 264.1, subd. (a)); and four counts of forcible oral copulation in concert (\u00a7 288a, subd. (d)(1))."], "id": "7b857ffd-1309-4cda-9928-d7076a26d8db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["At the conclusion of a court trial, Jeremiah Charlie Brewer (defendant) was convicted of sexual penetration by force ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 289, subd. (a)(1)(A) ; count 1), assault with intent to commit rape or forcible sexual penetration during the commission of first degree burglary (id ., \u00a7 220, subd. (b); count 2), and <mask> to commit rape or forcible sexual penetration (id ., \u00a7 209, subd. (b)(1); count 3). The court found true allegations in count 1 that defendant substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim inherent in the offense by kidnapping her (id ., \u00a7 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(2)), committed the offense during the commission of first degree burglary with the intent of committing sexual penetration by force (id ., \u00a7 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(4)), and kidnapped the victim to accomplish the offense (id ., \u00a7 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to an unstayed term of 25 years to life in prison."], "id": "b9073859-c88d-44c7-88aa-42faf4b989e0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Aside from being unnecessary to our analysis ( Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 487, fn. 38, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 ), an interstate comparison is also the least useful means of assessing proportionality in the present case because it is so difficult to determine what sentence a like crime-considering all circumstances related to the offense and offender-would receive in other jurisdictions. The fact that-as will be discussed-many states authorize punishment of up to life in prison for a <mask> in facially similar circumstances (i.e., for the purpose of robbery, with use of a firearm and without injury to the victim) is *727of limited significance without knowing whether and how such states would account for matters such as the facts that the firearm was not loaded and appellant was 17 years old. In general, reliance upon an interstate comparison may be subject to the criticism leveled by respondent here, that even if California imposes the harshest penalty for a given offense, this does not necessarily demonstrate the penalty is constitutionally excessive. ( People v. Martinez , supra , 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 638.) Nevertheless, a few points are worth making."], "id": "70378dfb-950f-4ffd-a7c3-d0101384399c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Turning again to plain error, where, after a conviction following a jury trial, the trial judge imposed an incorrect sentence, we have found plain error and ordered the trial court to correct the sentence. See State v. Thorpe, 280 Neb. 11, 26, 783 N.W.2d 749, 762 (2010) (remanding with directions to resentence to life imprisonment because \u201clife imprisonment without parole\u201d was not a valid sen- tence for first degree murder). In this instance, the incor- rect sentence constituted plain error, and we remand for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. Betancourt I, 295 Neb. at 192, 887 N.W.2d at 313. Despite this direction, the district court on January 27, 2017, resentenced Betancourt to a term of \u201clife imprisonment without parole.\u201d We agree with Betancourt and the State that counsel was deficient by failing to object to an improper sentence for count III, conspiracy to commit <mask>. Because this is a post\u00ad conviction proceeding brought under the provisions of \u00a7 29-3001 et seq., rather than vacating this sentence, this court is required to remand the cause to the trial court for a hearing. See State v. Rolling, 218 Neb. 51, 352 N.W.2d 175 (1984)."], "id": "b6f8f268-b504-4688-a3e5-99d4a5845aeb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. Defendant was convicted of one count of <mask> for sexual purposes (\u00a7 209, subd. (b)(1)); one count of kidnapping during a carjacking (\u00a7 209.5, subd. (a)); one count of carjacking (\u00a7 215, subd. (a)); one count of second degree robbery (\u00a7\u00a7 211, 212.5, subd. (c)); active participation in the criminal conduct of a criminal street gang (\u00a7 186.22, subd. (a)); two counts of forcible sexual penetration (\u00a7 289); two counts of forcible sodomy in concert (\u00a7 286, subd. (d)(1)); two counts of forcible rape in concert (\u00a7 264.1, subd. (a)); and four counts of forcible oral copulation in concert (\u00a7 288a, subd. (d)(1))."], "id": "f5a57f09-78e1-481b-b1b1-6e02a100eb4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c) defines 23 criminal violations, or categories of crimes, as violent felonies-including murder, voluntary manslaughter, any robbery, <mask>, various specified sex crimes, and other offenses. Being a felon in possession of a firearm and evading a police officer while driving recklessly-Edwards' crimes triggering his Three Strikes sentence-are not among the violent crimes listed in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)."], "id": "f6426547-2123-424f-9198-6dd9665303a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Jeffrey S. Brown, J. An indictment has been filed against the defendant Raymond Klinger accusing him of the class B felony of rape in the first degree, class B felony of <mask> in the second degree, *575class B felony of aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, class A misdemeanor of sexual abuse in the second degree, class B felony of assault in the first degree, class D felony of assault in the second degree (two counts) and the class D felony of reckless endangerment in the first degree. The indictment also accuses both defendants, Michael Klinger and Raymond Klinger, individually and aiding and abetting and being aided and abetted by each other of the class E felony of tampering with physical evidence and the class E felony of hindering prosecution in the second degree."], "id": "452c6d75-946a-4636-b09a-e51d178b1204", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The threat Montellano claimed defendant made cannot be heard on the video; the camera recorded no audio at all. That means that on the key issue of whether Montellano was unlawfully moved by fear, her testimony-impeachable for the reasons identified by the majority ante at pages 913 to 914-was largely if not entirely uncorroborated. Under the circumstances, and with the other points I have already discussed in mind, I cannot hold harmless the admission of the incriminating statements the detectives obtained in violation of Miranda . In my view, a new trial is required on both the murder charge and the <mask> charge."], "id": "e1cdcf94-df3c-403f-9fdb-12f7bbd7b1cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["But the question here is not whether a life sentence for the offense of <mask> for robbery is proportionate in the abstract. \"[A] punishment which is not disproportionate in the abstract is nevertheless constitutionally impermissible if it is disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability.\" ( Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 480, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697.) In Rodriguez , the California Supreme Court found that a potential life sentence for a conviction of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child was not constitutionally excessive because of the wide range of conduct within the ambit of the statute. ( Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 647-648, 122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384.) The court recognized, however, that \"the offense described in section 288 encompasses conduct for which life might be a permissible punishment in some cases but excessive in others\" and found that the 22 years served by the defendant in that case was constitutionally excessive. ( Id. at pp. 647, 653, 122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384.) Rodriguez explained: \"The offense committed here is by no means 'trivial,' but the method of its commission involved no violence and caused no physical harm to the victim. The episode lasted only a few minutes. No weapon was involved and petitioner attempted none of the dangerous offenses sometimes associated with violations of section 288.\" ( Id. at pp. 654-655, 122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384.)"], "id": "9a4f8294-ce23-4196-94c1-cfea760f9f38", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant's argument on appeal is that his belief he had killed Kerr when he strangled her meant he did not commit a <mask> for purposes of the special circumstance allegation because a movement of the victim is a required element of kidnapping, and the victim must be alive to be kidnapped. The asserted mistaken belief here is analogous to that at issue in Mayberry : If the victim is dead, she cannot give or withhold her consent to the movement. In People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 499, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754, this court held that, like the crime of rape, kidnapping requires a live victim. For this proposition Hillhouse cited People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 524, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385, which explained *397that the crime of rape requires a live victim because rape is an act of intercourse against a person's will and a dead body cannot consent to, or protest against, the intercourse."], "id": "20ffb712-3d13-4a60-a817-3c4b8101b2c0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Dominic R. Massaro, J. *351Defendant, Pedro Soto, was convicted by a jury on May 25, 1993 of acting in concert with others in committing the crimes of murder in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 [1]), three counts of <mask> in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 135.25 [2] [a], [c]; [3]), conspiracy in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 105.15), and criminal impersonation in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 190.26). He was thereafter sentenced on July 2, 1993 to concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment of from 20 years to life for the murder count, 15 years to life for each of the kidnapping counts, 6 to 12 years for the conspiracy count, and IV2 to 3 years for the criminal impersonation count. Defendant now moves, for a second time, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law \u00a7 440.10, to vacate his judgment of conviction. The motion is denied."], "id": "1d54e16f-15fd-439f-a62a-bccb0bc7bf94", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Stuart Namm, J. Defendant Ferdinand Valero is charged in indictment number 1318-83 with the commission of two counts of *540<mask> in the first degree in violation of section 135.25 (subd 2, pars [a], [b]) of the Penal Law. The defendant moves to dismiss the indictment upon several grounds. Some of the arguments made by the defendant are novel and appear to raise questions of first impression. His application is decided as follows:"], "id": "8c0b04e7-eee0-4e64-bab5-dab0371cbea6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*854Treating <mask> and unlawful imprisonment of a minor as sex offenses subject to registration and notification is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objectives underlying the adoption of JWA and SOBA. Petitioners have failed to meet their burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that SOBA is unconstitutional as applied to them. Petitioners\u2019 applications to be exempted from the registration requirements of SOBA accordingly are denied.15"], "id": "672a05d4-767a-41b8-869c-5c60f0ddb9a8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*619The information alleged two circumstances, gun use and <mask>, and the gun-use circumstance was specifically pleaded. After a jury convicted the defendant of multiple violent sex offenses against two different victims, and despite the fact that \"[n]either the original nor amended information ever alleged a multiple victim circumstance\" under section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5), the trial court imposed the enhancement. ( Mancebo , at pp. 740, 743, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556.) The defendant appealed and asserted the One Strike law's pleading provision required the multiple victim circumstance to be \"specially alleged in the information and proved\" before the People could use that circumstance in support of a One Strike sentence. ( Id . at pp. 740-741, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556.) The Court of Appeal agreed and ordered the enhancements stricken. ( Id. at p. 741, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556.) The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding \"the trial court erred at sentencing when it purported to substitute the unpled multiple victim circumstances for the properly pleaded and proved gun-use enhancements in support of the One Strike terms.\" ( Id. at p. 754, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556.)"], "id": "9d5fdb0a-2861-4600-853a-a69918737d6d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A fourth potentially harmful condition the court found was Mother's failure to adequately appreciate and understand the concerns that brought Son under the court's jurisdiction and prevented him from returning to her care, which the court believed pose a future safety risk because her behavior and actions are likely to continue. Specifically, the court noted that Mother testified that she believes this was a case of medical <mask> done by the Division for financial gain and that the reason Son had not been returned to her care was because the case worker wanted *338Son to be adopted. Mother testified that, if Son were released to her custody, she would not continue with any individual or family therapy, or any other services, unless they were court ordered. She said that she would need help only with babysitting and would take care of Son's needs, which are extensive, by herself. Yet, Mother admitted that she had never inquired as to potential daycare services for Son and had never inquired as to whether Son could obtain the special services he is currently receiving if he moved into her school district. She was unable to articulate any specific plan for ensuring that Son continued to receive the services he needs."], "id": "85017b81-75cd-475e-a646-1d3678220ad5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected defendant\u2019s claim that the second degree <mask> charge merged with the first degree assault charge, since, (1) as to both Dogan and the child, defendant was charged only with kidnapping, not assault and, thus, there was no charge into which kidnapping could merge and, (2) as to Ms. Onar, the kidnapping and the assault were two separate and distinct crimes, unrelated to each other. The assault was not part of the kidnapping and was brought on by Ms. Onar\u2019s attempt to escape."], "id": "8c732231-da31-4dd6-bd41-9a032c801e21", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In a powerful concurrence, Judge Kleinfeld outlined the problems with reading the statute too broadly: \u201c<mask>, punishable by life imprisonment, is not committed whenever someone is held against their will, as when one person grabs another to do harm, and the victim says \u2018Let me go.\u2019\u201d Id. at 428 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). Otherwise, prosecutors would have \u201cunfettered discretion to charge the same 10 UNITED STATES V. JACKSON"], "id": "ca5587f7-8df3-4f90-a691-661a4c029c67", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["KELLER, J. In this certified appeal,1 the defendant, Jamaal Coltherst, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court, which resentenced him for crimes he committed in 1999, when he was seventeen years old. In his original brief to this court, the defendant claimed that the Appel- late Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court followed the statutory requirements of General Statutes \u00a7 54-91g in resentencing him to eighty years of incarcer- ation.2 He argued that the statute created a presumption against the imposition of an effective life sentence, which can be overcome only upon the court\u2019s finding that the defendant is incorrigible. Because we conclude, as we explain in this opinion, that \u00a7 54-91g does not apply to the defendant, we do not reach the issue of whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court followed the statutory requirements of \u00a7 54-91g in resentencing the defendant to a term of eighty years of incarceration. Following oral argument, this court ordered the par- ties to file supplemental briefs addressing two issues: First, \u2018\u2018[d]oes [\u00a7] 54-91g apply in cases where, as here, the defendant was not charged as a child and trans- ferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regu- lar criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to [General Statutes \u00a7] 46b-127 but, rather, [was] charged as an adult under the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court?\u2019\u2019 Second, \u2018\u2018[i]s the defendant eligible for parole when he received two distinct total effective sentences of 85 years and 80 years, respectively, to run consecutively, and, if so, when is he eligible for parole on each case?\u2019\u2019 As to the second issue, we conclude, consistent with an affidavit submitted by Richard Spar- aco, the executive director of the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles (board), that the defendant will be eligible for parole after serving 30 years of the 165 year aggregate term of the two distinct total effective sentences that he is currently serving. As to the first issue, we conclude that \u00a7 54-91g does not apply to the defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. The following facts and procedural background are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. This case arose from the October 15, 1999 carjacking, <mask>, and murder of the victim, Kyle Holden, by the defendant and Carl Johnson. See State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478, 485\u201386, 820 A.2d 1024 (2003). On the day that the defendant was released from juvenile detention, where he had been incarcerated for violating probation after having been convicted on charges of assault in the third degree, the defendant and Johnson planned to commit a carjacking. Id., 483\u201384. They scouted out various loca- tions and potential targets before settling on the victim, whose car was parked outside an exotic dance club in East Hartford. Id., 484\u201385. When the victim exited the club, Johnson held a gun to his head, and Johnson and the defendant forced the victim into his car. Id., 485. Johnson then drove the car to an automated teller machine (ATM), while the defendant, who held the gun, sat with the victim in the backseat. Id. They used the victim\u2019s bank card to withdraw money from the ATM and then brought the victim to a nearby entrance ramp to Interstate 84, where Johnson shot the victim in the head, killing him almost instantly. Id., 485\u201386. Over the next eight days, the defendant and Johnson continued to use the victim\u2019s car and made withdrawals from his bank account using his bank card. Id., 486. Thereafter, they were arrested by the police, who had been on the lookout for the victim\u2019s car after the victim was reported missing. See id., 486\u201387. Because the defendant was seventeen years old at the time he committed these crimes, he was tried as an adult under the then applicable law. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7 46b-120 (1) (limiting, as general rule, for purposes of delinquency, definition of \u2018\u2018child\u2019\u2019 to persons under sixteen years of age at time of offense). \u2018\u2018After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of capi- tal felony, murder, felony murder, kidnapping in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, larceny in the first degree, conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree, and larceny in the fourth degree. The trial court merged the convic- tions of capital felony, murder, felony murder and kid- napping in the first degree and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release on the capital felony count, twenty years imprisonment on the count of robbery in the first degree, ten years imprisonment on the count of robbery in the second degree, twenty years imprisonment on the count of larceny in the first degree, twenty years imprisonment on the count of conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree, and one year imprisonment on the count of larceny in the fourth degree, all to be served consecutively to the sentence of life imprisonment, for a total effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release followed by seventy-one years [of] imprisonment.\u2019\u2019 State v. Coltherst, supra, 263 Conn. 487\u201388. Subsequent to the defendant\u2019s original sentencing, significant changes in juvenile sentencing law prompted the resentencing proceedings that are the subject of this appeal. We recently summarized the effect of those changes: \u2018\u2018Under the federal constitution\u2019s prohibition [against] cruel and unusual punishments, a juvenile offender cannot serve a sentence of imprisonment for life, or its functional equivalent, without the possibility of parole, unless his age and the hallmarks of adoles- cence have been considered as mitigating factors. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476\u201377, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012); Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 60\u201361, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016); State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016).\u2019\u2019 State v. Williams-Bey, 333 Conn. 468, 470, 215 A.3d 711 (2019). The United States Supreme Court has held that Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). The court clarified, however, that \u2018\u2018[g]iving Miller retroactive effect . . . does not require [s]tates to relitigate sen- tences, let alone convictions, in every case [in which] a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole. A [s]tate may remedy a Miller violation by per- mitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.\u2019\u2019 Id., 212. To comply with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Miller, as well as this court\u2019s deci- sions in Riley and Casiano, the legislature enacted No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84). Section 1 of P.A. 15-84, codified at General Statutes \u00a7 54-125a (f) (1), ensures parole eligibility for all persons convicted of crimes committed when they were under eighteen years of age who received a sentence of ten years or more.3 Section 2 of P.A. 15-84, codified at \u00a7 54-91g, requires a sentencing court to consider, inter alia, the \u2018\u2018the hallmark features of adolescence\u2019\u2019 and the differ- ences between the brain development of a child and an adult when sentencing a child who has been con- victed of a class A or B felony following transfer of the child\u2019s case from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. The defendant became eligible for resentencing pur- suant to \u00a7 6 of P.A. 15-84, which repealed General Stat- utes \u00a7 53a-46a, the capital felony provision, pursuant to which the defendant had been sentenced. The substi- tute provision, codified at General Statutes (Supp. 2016) \u00a7 53a-46a, made persons who committed a capital fel- ony when they were under eighteen years of age ineligi- ble for the death penalty.4 The passage of P.A. 15-84, therefore, rendered the defendant\u2019s capital felony con- viction invalid.5 Relying on that change in the law, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. He sought to have his conviction of capital felony vacated and argued that, upon resentencing, \u00a7 54-91g (a) (1) required the trial court to consider his age at the time of the offense, the hallmark features of adoles- cence, and any scientific and psychological evidence showing the developmental differences between child and adult brains. He also argued that \u00a7 54-91g (a) (2) required the court, if it proposed to sentence him to a lengthy sentence under which he would be likely to die while incarcerated, to consider how the factors listed in subsection (a) (1) counseled against such a sentence. At the hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion, neither the state nor the trial court questioned the defendant\u2019s reliance on \u00a7 54-91g. In resentencing the defendant, the court considered the mitigating factors of youth but also took into account the horrific nature of the crimes, the defendant\u2019s level of involvement in them, his crimi- nal history, his attempts to deflect blame for his crimes, and his disciplinary record in prison. The court dis- missed the counts of capital felony and felony murder, and sentenced him to a total effective sentence of eighty years of imprisonment on the remaining counts.6 The court further ordered the defendant\u2019s total effective sentence in the present case to run consecutively to the sentence of eighty-five years of imprisonment the defendant is serving for a conviction involving his shoot- ing of another victim four days after he and Johnson killed the victim in the present case. See State v. Col- therst, 87 Conn. App. 93, 95\u201398, 864 A.2d 869, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 919, 871 A.2d 371 (2005). The court noted that the defendant would be eligible for parole. In his appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly failed, pursuant to \u00a7 54-91g, \u2018\u2018to account adequately for the defendant\u2019s youth at the time he committed the underly- ing crimes . . . .\u2019\u20197 State v. Coltherst, 192 Conn. App. 738, 740, 218 A.3d 696 (2019). The Appellate Court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that \u00a7 54-91g creates a presumption against the imposition of an effective sentence of life imprisonment\u2014in the present case, eighty years\u2014for defendants who were minors at the time they committed their crimes. Id., 752\u201353. The court grounded its decision on the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; see id., 751; which requires that the sentencing court \u2018\u2018[c]onsider\u2019\u2019 how the scientific and psychological evidence showing the differences between a child\u2019s brain development and an adult\u2019s brain devel- opment counsels against the imposition of a lengthy sentence under which it is likely that the child will die while incarcerated. General Statutes \u00a7 54-91g (a) (1) and (2); see also State v. Riley, 190 Conn. App. 1, 26\u201328, 209 A.3d 646 (rejecting, on basis of plain language of \u00a7 54-91g, defendant\u2019s argument that language and legis- lative history of P.A. 15-84 created \u2018\u2018a presumption against the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile defen- dant,8 and such exceedingly rare sentences can only be imposed after a specific finding that the juvenile being sentenced is permanently incorrigible, irreparably cor- rupt, or irretrievably depraved\u2019\u2019 (footnote added; inter- nal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 923, 217 A.3d 993 (2019).9 This certified appeal followed. I We first address the question of whether and when the defendant, who has received two distinct total effec- tive sentences of eighty-five years of imprisonment and eighty years of imprisonment, respectively, to run con- secutively, will be eligible for parole. On the basis of the parties\u2019 submissions, we conclude that the defen- dant will be eligible for parole after serving thirty years of the aggregate term of the two definite sentences of imprisonment that he is currently serving. The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this issue. Four days after the defendant and Johnson killed the victim in the present case, they, along with a third person, Rashad Smith, accosted Michael Clark in the parking lot of an insurance firm in Wethersfield where Clark worked. State v. Coltherst, supra, 87 Conn. App. 96. They took Clark\u2019s laptop and credit card, and were in the process of forcing him into his car when he broke free and ran, but Johnson tackled him. Id., 97. The defendant and Clark then struggled, and the defendant shot Clark in the head. Id. Grievously injured, Clark nonetheless survived the shooting. See id., 98. In connection with this incident, the defendant was convicted of numerous offenses (Wethersfield assault conviction) and received a total effective sen- tence of eighty-five years of imprisonment. Id., 95. In the present case, when the trial court resentenced the defendant, it ordered the total effective sentence of eighty years in the present case to run consecutively to the total effective sentence of eighty-five years that the defendant received as a result of the Wethersfield assault conviction. Under the facts of these two cases, the defendant\u2019s parole eligibility is governed by General Statutes \u00a7 53a- 38 (b) (2), read in conjunction with \u00a7 54-125a (f) (1). The question of how the defendant\u2019s parole eligibility date is calculated under those two statutes presents a question of statutory interpretation subject to plenary review. See, e.g., Commissioner of Emergency Ser- vices & Public Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission, 330 Conn. 372, 380, 194 A.3d 759 (2018); Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 792, 849 A.2d 839 (2004). In construing the relevant statutes, \u2018\u2018[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291, 308, 943 A.2d 1075 (2008). We begin with the language of the statutes. Section 53a-38 (b) provides: \u2018\u2018A definite sentence of imprison- ment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.\u2019\u2019 Pursuant to \u00a7 53a-38 (b) (2), therefore, the defen- dant\u2019s aggregate term is 165 years and the two consecu- tive, definite sentences are satisfied by the discharge of the 165 year aggregate term. Section 54-125a (f) (1), which is set forth in full in footnote 3 of this opinion, does not expressly provide that the aggregate term is used for purposes of calculating eligibility for parole when an incarcerated person is serving more than one definite sentence. It refers only to a \u2018\u2018definite sentence\u2019\u2019 and provides that, if a person who falls within the ambit of the statute \u2018\u2018is serving a sentence of more than fifty years, such person shall be eligible for parole after serving thirty years.\u2019\u2019 General Statutes \u00a7 54-125a (f) (1) (B). The plain language of \u00a7\u00a7 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1), accordingly, does not resolve whether the parole eligibility date of a prisoner serving more than one definite sentence should be calculated on the basis of the aggregate term or each definite sentence. Interpreting \u00a7\u00a7 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1) to require that parole eligibility be calculated on the basis of the defendant\u2019s definite sentences rather than the aggregate term, however, would be contrary to the legis- lative intent underlying \u00a7 54-125a (f) (1). As we have explained in this opinion, the legislative intent behind the parole eligibility guarantee in \u00a7 54-125a (f) (1) is to comply with the constitutional standards enunciated in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Miller and Montgomery, as well as in this court\u2019s deci- sions in Riley and Casiano. See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 479 (holding that \u2018\u2018the [e]ighth [a]mend- ment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders\u2019\u2019); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, 577 U.S. 212 (holding that \u2018\u2018[a] [s]tate may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offend- ers to be considered for parole, rather than by resen- tencing them\u2019\u2019); Casiano v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, supra, 317 Conn. 54, 69 (holding that Miller announced watershed rule of criminal procedure, appli- cable retroactively); State v. Riley, supra, 315 Conn. 659\u201361 (applying Miller to state\u2019s sentencing scheme and holding that defendant\u2019s 100 year sentence violated Miller because sentencing court did not consider miti- gating factors of youth in sentencing defendant, who was under eighteen years of age at time of offense, to functional equivalent of life). Treating each definite sentence separately for pur- poses of parole eligibility would yield the result that the defendant\u2019s only opportunity for parole would be 30 years after he began serving the 80 year sentence in the present case, 115 years after he began serving the sentence for the Wethersfield assault conviction. He would die long before becoming eligible for parole, rendering the intended remedy of parole eligibility meaningless\u2014his sentence would effectively be one without the opportunity for parole. That interpretation would flout every recent juvenile sentencing decision of both this court and the United States Supreme Court and, therefore, would also be inconsistent with the intent of the legislature in \u00a7 54-125a (f) (1). Accordingly, consistent with the legislative intent underlying \u00a7 54- 125a (f) (1), we conclude that, when a defendant is serving more than one definite sentence, his parole eligibility date for purposes of \u00a7 54-125a (f) (1) is calcu- lated on the basis of the aggregate term of the definite sentences. Our conclusion is consistent with the board\u2019s inter- pretation of and current practice in applying \u00a7\u00a7 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1). In an affidavit procured by the state in response to the second issue in this court\u2019s order for supplemental briefing regarding the defen- dant\u2019s parole eligibility, Sparaco, the executive director of the board, stated that, in circumstances such as those in the defendant\u2019s case, pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1), the board uses the aggregate term to calculate a parole eligibility date. Accordingly, Sparaco stated that, because the defendant\u2019s 165 year aggregate sentence is more than 50 years, he will be eligible for parole after serving 30 years. On the basis of our inter- pretation of \u00a7\u00a7 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1), we agree with Sparaco\u2019s conclusion that the defendant will be eligible for parole after serving 30 years of the 165 year aggregate term of the two definite sentences. II We next address the question of whether \u00a7 54-91g applies to the defendant. The defendant, whose case was not transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court but, rather, was charged under the then applicable law as an adult under the regular criminal docket; see Gen- eral Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7 46b-120; claims that the provisions of \u00a7 54-91g nonetheless apply to him. We conclude that the plain language of the statute, which restricts its application to children whose cases are transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, makes clear that the statute does not apply to the defendant. The applicability of \u00a7 54-91g to the defendant pre- sents a question of statutory interpretation, subject to plenary review. See State v. Ruiz-Pacheco, 336 Conn. 219, 232, 244 A.3d 908 (2020). \u2018\u2018When construing a stat- ute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned man- ner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seek- ing to determine that meaning, General Statutes \u00a7 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the mean- ing of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.\u2019\u2019 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trin- ity Christian School v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 329 Conn. 684, 694, 189 A.3d 79 (2018). We begin with the language of the statute. Section 54-91g (a) provides: \u2018\u2018If the case of a child, as defined in section 46b-120, is transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to section 46b- 127 and the child is convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant to such transfer, at the time of sentencing, the court shall: (1) Consider, in addition to any other information relevant to sentencing, the defendant\u2019s age at the time of the offense, the hallmark features of adolescence, and any scientific and psychological evi- dence showing the differences between a child\u2019s brain development and an adult\u2019s brain development; and (2) Consider, if the court proposes to sentence the child to a lengthy sentence under which it is likely that the child will die while incarcerated, how the scientific and psychological evidence described in subdivision (1) of this subsection counsels against such a sentence.\u2019\u2019 Subsection (a) of \u00a7 54-91g sets forth two conditions that trigger the required sentencing considerations in subdivisions (1) and (2) of that subsection. First, the case of a child, as defined in General Statutes \u00a7 46b- 120, must be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to \u00a7 46b-127. Second, the child must be convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant to the transfer. Under the facts of the present case, neither of these two conditions has been met. Because the defendant was over the age of sixteen at the time that he committed his crimes, he was not a \u2018\u2018child\u2019\u2019 under the then applicable law. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7 46b-120 (1). In 1999, when the defendant committed his crimes, General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7 46b-120 (1) defined a delinquent \u2018\u2018child\u2019\u201910 as \u2018\u2018any person (A) under sixteen years of age . . . .\u2019\u201911 The defendant, who was seven- teen at the time he committed the crimes, was treated as an adult criminal. Accordingly, the defendant\u2019s case was never initiated as a juvenile matter in the docket of the Superior Court for juvenile matters. Instead, the defendant was charged as an adult, and the state\u2019s case against him was filed in the regular criminal docket. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7 46b-127 (a). Of course, because the defendant\u2019s case was not trans- ferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regu- lar criminal docket, the defendant was not convicted pursuant to any such transfer. See General Statutes \u00a7 54-91g (a). Thus, neither of the two conditions that would make \u00a7 54-91g (a) applicable was met. This court\u2019s previous interpretation of \u00a7 54-91g con- firms that the legislature did not intend the statute to apply retroactively to defendants who, although under the age of eighteen when they committed their offenses, were initially charged and tried as adults. Specifically, in State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 151 A.3d 345 (2016), although the defendant did not expressly claim that \u00a7 54-91g applied to him retroactively, we considered and rejected that interpretation of the statute as part of our analysis of his claim that he was entitled to be resentenced. See id., 814. We explained: \u2018\u2018There are ten sections in P.A. 15-84, four of which specify that they are \u2018[e]ffective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date.\u2019 . . . P.A. 15-84, \u00a7\u00a7 6 through 9. In contrast, P.A. 15-84, \u00a7 2, provides [that] it is \u2018[e]ffective October 1, 2015,\u2019 indicat- ing that the legislature did not intend for this section to apply retroactively. Moreover, there is nothing in the text of . . . \u00a7 54-91g or the legislative history of P.A. 15-84 to suggest that the legislature intended that all [persons] convicted of a class A or B felony [committed when they were under the age of eighteen] who were sentenced without consideration of the age related miti- gating factors identified in Miller would be resentenced. In sum, even if the defendant had alleged that his sen- tence was imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court failed to adhere to the requirements of [\u00a7 54- 91g], he would not be able to demonstrate that that [statute] applies to him.\u2019\u2019 State v. Delgado, supra, 814. We added: \u2018\u2018Although the text of [\u00a7 54-91g] seems clear insofar as the retroactivity issue is concerned, to the extent that there is any ambiguity in the applicable statutory language, the pertinent legislative history clar- ifies that the legislature did not intend for this [statute] to apply retroactively. The limited discussion on this topic occurred before the Judiciary Committee. Attor- ney Robert Farr, a member of the working group of the Connecticut Sentencing Commission, which helped craft the proposed legislative language, discussed how the legislation would affect previously sentenced indi- viduals. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 2015 Sess., pp. 949, 955\u201356. He first mentioned this court\u2019s decision in Riley, in which the defendant in that case had been sentenced to 100 years in prison and then resentenced, and noted that, under the proposed legislation, \u2018instead of having to worry about resentencing what would have happened is in 30 years, 21 years from now there will be a parole hearing and then that parole hearing would decide whether [the defendant in Riley] was going to be\u2014get another parole hearing . . . . So it gave some resolution to this which was consistent we believe with the federal\u2014with the [United States] Supreme Court cases.\u2019 Id., p. 956, remarks of Attorney Farr.\u2019\u2019 State v. Delgado, supra, 814 n.9.12 Relying on both the statutory language and its legisla- tive history, we concluded in Delgado that, even if the defendant in that case had claimed that the trial court had failed to adhere to the requirements of \u00a7 54-91g, his claim would fail because the statute\u2019s provisions did not apply to him. Id., 814. Our conclusion in Delgado that \u00a7 54-91g does not apply retroactively is consistent with the plain language of the statute, which, as we have explained, limits its application, effective October 1, 2015, to children convicted of a class A or B felony following transfer from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, and supports our conclusion that \u00a7 54-91g does not apply to the defendant.13 Accordingly, because the trial court incorrectly applied \u00a7 54-91g in considering adolescent mitigating factors in resentencing the defendant, he received more consideration than was required, resulting in a much reduced sentence with the possibility of parole after he serves thirty years. The state recognizes that the defendant received more consideration than that to which he was statutorily entitled but does not request that the defendant\u2019s case be remanded for resentencing and requests that this court affirm the Appellate Court\u2019s judgment. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. * October 13, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. This court granted the defendant\u2019s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: \u2018\u2018Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court had followed the statutory requirements under General Statutes \u00a7 54-91g in resentencing the defendant to eighty years of incarcera- tion?\u2019\u2019 State v. Coltherst, 333 Conn. 946, 219 A.3d 377 (2019). General Statutes \u00a7 54-91g provides in relevant part: \u2018\u2018(a) If the case of a child, as defined in section 46b-120, is transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to section 46b-127 and the child is convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant to such transfer, at the time of sentencing, the court shall: \u2018\u2018(1) Consider, in addition to any other information relevant to sentencing, the defendant\u2019s age at the time of the offense, the hallmark features of adolescence, and any scientific and psychological evidence showing the differences between a child\u2019s brain development and an adult\u2019s brain devel- opment; and \u2018\u2018(2) Consider, if the court proposes to sentence the child to a lengthy sentence under which it is likely that the child will die while incarcerated, how the scientific and psychological evidence described in subdivision (1) of this subsection counsels against such a sentence. *** \u2018\u2018(c) Whenever a child is sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the court shall indicate the maximum period of incarceration that may apply to the child and whether the child may be eligible to apply for release on parole pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (f) of section 54-125a. . . .\u2019\u2019 General Statutes \u00a7 54-125a (f) (1) provides: \u2018\u2018Notwithstanding the provi- sions of subsections (a) to (e), inclusive, of this section, a person convicted of one or more crimes committed while such person was under eighteen years of age, who is incarcerated on or after October 1, 2015, and who received a definite sentence or total effective sentence of more than ten years for such crime or crimes prior to, on or after October 1, 2015, may be allowed to go at large on parole in the discretion of the panel of the Board of Pardons and Paroles for the institution in which such person is confined, provided (A) if such person is serving a sentence of fifty years or less, such person shall be eligible for parole after serving sixty per cent of the sentence or twelve years, whichever is greater, or (B) if such person is serving a sentence of more than fifty years, such person shall be eligible for parole after serving thirty years. Nothing in this subsection shall limit a person\u2019s eligibility for parole release under the provisions of subsections (a) to (e), inclusive, of this section if such person would be eligible for parole release at an earlier date under any of such provisions.\u2019\u2019 This court has since held that, regardless of a defendant\u2019s age at the time of the commission of a crime, the death penalty violates article first, \u00a7\u00a7 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. See State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 119, 122 A.3d 1 (2015). Because the passage of \u00a7 6 of P.A. 15-84 rendered \u00a7 53a-46a, the provision under which the defendant had been sentenced, invalid, this case is distin- guishable from State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019), and State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 151 A.3d 345 (2016). In each of those cases, this court concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant\u2019s motion to correct an illegal sentence. See State v. McCleese, supra, 387; State v. Delgado, supra, 813. In those cases, the sole defect relied on by the defendants in seeking resentencing was the failure of the trial court, in the original sentencing, to consider the mitigating factors of youth in sentencing each of them to a sentence without eligibility for parole. See State v. McCleese, supra, 385; State v. Delgado, supra, 803\u2013804. Because the passage of \u00a71 of P.A. 15-84, codified at \u00a7 54-125a, made those defendants eligible for parole, we explained, their sentences were no longer invalid. See State v. McCleese, supra, 387; State v. Delgado, supra, 812. By contrast, in the present case, although the defendant is now eligible for parole, it is indisputable that his capitol felony conviction and sentence were rendered invalid by the passage of \u00a7 6 of P.A. 15-84. Thus, not only did the trial court retain jurisdiction to modify his sentence, but, because the sentence had been rendered invalid, the court was required to resentence him. See Practice Book \u00a7 43-22 (\u2018\u2018[t]he judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner\u2019\u2019). The court sentenced the defendant as follows: on count two, for murder in violation of General Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 53a-8 and 53a-54a (a), forty years; on count four, for kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 53a-8 and 53a-92 (a) (2) (B), twenty years; on count five, for robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \u00a7 53a-134 (a) (2), ten years; on count six, for robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7 53a-135 (a) (1), five years; on count seven, for larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7\u00a7 53a-8 and 53a-122 (a) (3), ten years; on count eight, for conspiracy to commit kidnap- ping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 53a-48 and 53a- 92 (a) (2) (B), ten years; and, on count nine, for larceny in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7 53a-125 (a), one year. Counts two, four, five, and eight run consecutively. Counts six, seven, and nine run concurrently to counts two, four, five, and eight. The defendant also claimed that the trial court improperly allowed him to provide additional remarks to the court at the time of resentencing, in violation of his rights to counsel, due process, and allocution. State v. Coltherst, 192 Conn. App. 738, 740\u201341, 218 A.3d 696 (2019). The Appellate Court\u2019s rejection of that claim is not before us in this appeal. Although the defendant in the present case often refers to himself as a \u2018\u2018juvenile\u2019\u2019 because he was a minor when he committed the crimes, we emphasize that, in 1999, the law did not afford him juvenile status for purposes of delinquency proceedings. Seventeen year olds were not afforded juvenile status until 2012. See generally Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2007, No. 07-4, \u00a7\u00a7 73 through 78; Public Acts, Spec. Sess., September, 2009, No. 09-7, \u00a7\u00a7 69 through 89. The United States Supreme Court recently held that Miller does not require a sentencing court, prior to imposing a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on defendants convicted of a homicide committed when they were under the age of eighteen, to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility. See Jones v. Mississippi, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1318\u201319, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021). By contrast, under the current statute, a delinquent \u2018\u2018child\u2019\u2019 includes \u2018\u2018any person . . . who is . . . under eighteen years of age and has not been legally emancipated . . . .\u2019\u2019 General Statutes \u00a7 46b-120 (1) (A) (i) (I). General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) \u00a7 46b-120 (1) (B) provides that the term \u2018\u2018child\u2019\u2019 applies to a person over sixteen years of age only if that person, \u2018\u2018prior to attaining sixteen years of age, has violated any federal or state law or municipal or local ordinance, other than an ordinance regulating behavior of a child in a family with service needs, and, subsequent to attaining sixteen years of age, violates any order of the Superior Court or any condition of probation ordered by the Superior Court with respect to such delinquency proceeding . . . .\u2019\u2019 A child under sixteen years old charged as a delinquent in 1999 and made subject to a court order in that delinquency proceeding by the Superior Court for juvenile matters could, at any time after he turned sixteen or older, be subject to a juvenile prosecution for violating the court\u2019s order. Neither of the parties addressed in their supplemental briefs the import of our conclusion in Delgado that \u00a7 54-91g does not apply retroactively. We observe, however, that, in light of that conclusion, even if the defendant had been transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to \u00a7 46b-127, \u00a7 54-91g would not apply to him. We disagree with the defendant\u2019s conclusory statement in his supple- mental brief that this construction renders \u00a7 54-91g unconstitutional because it violates his right to equal protection. Even if we agreed with the defendant\u2019s statement that he is similarly situated to a child sentenced after October 1, 2015, who is convicted of a class A or B felony following transfer to the regular criminal docket\u2014which we do not\u2014the differing treatment survives rational basis review. That is, the legislature rationally could provide one remedy for persons in the defendant\u2019s class and a different remedy to persons who meet the conditions under which the provisions of \u00a7 54-91g apply. This is the sole constitutional argument that the defendant raises in this appeal."], "id": "50416c5d-6376-4a16-8bf9-7990284f3a7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Josie Anderson : A friend of Carty's. Josie saw that Carty had purchased a baby car seat, a diaper bag with baby items, and items from the medical supply store-a stethoscope, nurse's scrubs, and a pair of surgical scissors. Carty told Josie that she had planned a \"lick\" (a robbery where you kick in the door) of an apartment where there was a pregnant lady and her husband. Josie and Carty recruited Josie's boyfriend, Christopher Robinson, and his friend Marvin \"Junebug\" Caston to participate in the \"lick.\" Carty told the group that she wanted the woman's baby and was going to cut it out of the lady. Josie thought that Carty \"was crazy\" and decided not to participate in either the home invasion or the <mask>. Marvin Caston: (Also known as \"Junebug\"). The group helping Carty with the \"lick\" did not believe they were going to do anything to Rodriguez or to the baby. A couple of days before the kidnapping, Carty picked up Caston and was \"really, really talking about the baby thing.\" Carty told Caston that \"she just wanted that specific baby because she was saying that her husband was having an affair with the woman.\" Caston testified that Carty said she \"wanted to cut the baby out because she is not knowing that the baby was already born.\" Carty was living in a hotel because she had moved out of her apartment. Caston carried a baby bag into the hotel room for Carty. When Josie and Carty showed up at Caston's mother's house where Caston was staying, he had his mother tell them he wasn't home. Caston did not participate in the \"lick.\" Chris Robinson : He testified at trial that he had not been promised anything or threatened with anything. He said that the first time he met Carty was on Mother's Day (May 13, 2001) when she was with Josie and \"Junebug\" (Caston). Carty was organizing a \"lick.\" She told them about Rodriguez (\"the lady\") and the baby. Carty told them to kill everyone and take the pregnant lady so she could cut the baby out of the lady. He said the plan was for him (Robinson) and Twin (Williams) to kick in the door. Baby G (Anderson) was with them. Anderson and Twin brought the lady out and Carty had the baby. Anderson put the lady in the trunk, then they drove to a storage unit, and Anderson put the lady in Carty's trunk. Then they all met again at the Van Zandt house and Carty had the baby. The three men were mad at Carty because they felt that she used them. There was no marijuana at the apartment. They were there just to kidnap the lady and the baby. Robinson said that Carty was the one who instructed them to tape up the lady and close her in the trunk. They talked about shooting Carty and letting the lady go, but then the men left the house. When Robinson returned he saw Carty doing something in the trunk. When he got closer he saw that Carty had put a *155bag over the lady's head. Robinson tried to rip it off but the lady was already dead. Robinson then took Carty to her hotel and it was full of baby clothes and baby things. He ended up taking the baby back to the Van Zandt house and leaving him in his car seat in the air conditioned car. Zebediah Comb : He was Robinson's half-brother and lived with their grandmother at the Van Zandt house where Rodriguez's body was found in Carty's rental car. Comb was on electronic monitoring house-arrest for the federal offense of bank robbery and could not leave the Van Zandt Street address where he lived. Before the incident, the group that was preparing for the \"lick\" came to the Van Zandt address to pick up Robinson. Comb testified that Carty \"had a job\" for them to do involving a drug deal, and \"for the drug deal she wanted a favor in return.\" The favor was to \"bring the lady to her,\" and Carty was \"going to handle it from there.\" Comb testified that he was present for conversations about the lick on May 13, 2001, that he helped recruit Carliss \"Twin\" Williams on May 15, 2001. Comb said he was also present when Rodriguez was brought to the Van Zandt house late that night, after the kidnapping. He testified that Carty said \"I got my baby.\" Comb said that he saw Rodriguez in the trunk of Carty's Pontiac and refused her request to put Rodriguez in another car parked in the yard. Comb testified that the men were angry at Carty because there was no money or drugs in the house. Comb told Carty and the men that they needed to get in their cars and leave, but Carty refused to drive her car with the woman in the trunk. Comb testified that when he awoke the next morning Robinson was there, and Carty arrived about twenty minutes later driving a black Chevrolet with a baby in the car. He also said that Rodriguez's body was in the Pontiac's trunk and she was bound with tape with a torn bag over her head. Comb also testified that Carty was talking about disposing of the body by burning it. Carty then left again and returned one to two hours later with the baby. Comb said he saw Robinson, Carty, and Anderson putting together packets of fake and real money to use in ripping off a dope dealer. Then Carty, Robinson, and the baby left in the Chevrolet and Anderson and another man left in a different car. Robinson returned with the baby about three hours later, and he left the baby in the Chevrolet with the air conditioner running. Comb said that Robinson then used Lysol to wipe down the cars. Neither Gerald \"Baby G\" Anderson nor Carliss \"Twin\" Williams testified at Carty's trial.4 The non-accomplice witness testimony at trial showed that Carty's stories about being pregnant and having a baby coincided with the kidnapping of baby Ray. At trial, the following non-accomplice witnesses testified:"], "id": "d747602c-da7b-42e6-8763-0fa05829f48f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appeal from the District Court for Madison County: Mark A. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded with direction. Brad J. Montag, of Egley, Fullner, Montag, Morland & Easland, P.C., for appellant. Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph for appellee. Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Papik, JJ., and Harder and Masteller, District Judges. Miller-Lerman, J. I. NATURE OF CASE Rosario Betancourt-Garcia (Betancourt), who is serving sentences of imprisonment for his convictions for kidnap- ping, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and conspiracy to commit <mask>, filed a petition for postconviction relief. The district court for Madison County granted an evidentiary hearing on three of Betancourt\u2019s claims and denied the bal- ance of Betancourt\u2019s petition without an evidentiary hearing. Betancourt appeals. He claims on appeal that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing generally concerning several layered claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, related to, - 443 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BETANCOURT-GARCIA Cite as 310 Neb. 440"], "id": "ae77bb3d-a1d8-47ae-9cf3-a986649047d1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Lucy Billings, J. Petitioner has been on parole since May 3, 2012, following his conviction January 22, 1982, and subsequent incarceration for <mask> in the first degree. When he was convicted in 1982, kidnapping in the first degree was not classified as a sex offense. Even now, kidnapping in the first degree is classified as a sex offense only if the victim is under 17 years old, which petitioner\u2019s victim was not. (Correction Law \u00a7 168-a [2] [a] [i]; People v Howard, 27 NY3d 337, 339-340 [2016]; People v Knox, 12 NY3d 60, 65 [2009].) As part of the conditions of his parole, however, respondent New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) Division of Parole and Parole Officers in November 2013 assigned him to a unit for sex offenders and in February 2015 required him to participate in a sex offender treatment program. Petitioner seeks reassignment out of the sex offenders\u2019 unit and removal of the condition that he participate in sex offender treatment, on the grounds that these conditions are arbitrary, not rationally based on the facts or law, and an abuse of discretion. (CPLR 7803 [3].)"], "id": "c7afd446-778d-489f-9ec2-398255a6b443", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 1938, murder in the first degree, <mask> and treason were capital crimes. The first degree murder statute encompassed \"deliberate and. premeditated\u201d killings, \"depraved mind\u201d and felony murders and intentional homicides committed in the course of arsons or train wrecks (former Penal Law \u00a7 1044 [l]-[4]). The capital punishment provisions of the kidnapping statute and the depraved mind and felony murder variations of first degree murder were discretionary. Specifically, regarding depraved and felony murder \"[a] jury * * * may, as a part of its verdict, recommend that the defendant be imprisoned for the term of his natural life.\u201d (L 1937, ch 67, \u00a7 2, former Penal Law \u00a7 1045-a.) All other forms of first degree murder as well as treason carried a mandatory death sentence."], "id": "a8460774-3046-49d2-9f1d-317f3cfc816d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["4.1 \u2022 ',was (quoting Clem v. State, 104 Nev. 351, 354, 760 P.2d 103, 105 (1988))), holding modified on other grounds by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 275- 76, 130 P.3d 176, 181 (2006). Also, the statute does not provide any demarcation for the length or degree of detainment. See NRS 200.310(1). The crime is complete when the actor commits the actus reus with the requisite mental state, regardless of whether the victim thereafter leaves on his or her own volition. See id. Accordingly, perpetual restraint of the victim does not constitute a necessary condition to the charge of first-degree <mask>. NRS 200.310(1) can encompass conduct that also constitutes a separate offense depending on the circumstances. Wright, 94 Nev. at 417, 581 P.2d at 443 (explaining that \"[1]iterally applied, [the statute] . . encompass[es] . . . ordinary robbery,\" which carries a lighter sentence). Thus, when a defendant faces separate charges of kidnapping and an enumerated offense, as here, we require that the State rely on a movement not \"incidentar to the underlying offense. Id. at 417-18, 581 P.2d at 443-44. A movement is not incidental where it (1) \"serves to substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in an associated offense,\" (2) \"substantially exceeds that required to complete the associated crime charged,\" or (3) \"stands alone with independent significance from the underlying charge.\" Mendoza, 122 Nev. at 274-75, 130 P.3d at 180-81. While B.W. testified that she left Boyd's presence on several occasions, mostly to visit her family, and thus, Boyd never physically restrained her, the evidence supports a theory that her movements did not reflect her free will because she felt compelled to return to Boyd out of fear for the harm that he would inflict on her and her family. B.W. testified that"], "id": "863a4060-9625-4c2a-a335-b1efc648e7c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["4.1 \u2022 ',was (quoting Clem v. State, 104 Nev. 351, 354, 760 P.2d 103, 105 (1988))), holding modified on other grounds by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 275- 76, 130 P.3d 176, 181 (2006). Also, the statute does not provide any demarcation for the length or degree of detainment. See NRS 200.310(1). The crime is complete when the actor commits the actus reus with the requisite mental state, regardless of whether the victim thereafter leaves on his or her own volition. See id. Accordingly, perpetual restraint of the victim does not constitute a necessary condition to the charge of first-degree <mask>. NRS 200.310(1) can encompass conduct that also constitutes a separate offense depending on the circumstances. Wright, 94 Nev. at 417, 581 P.2d at 443 (explaining that \"[1]iterally applied, [the statute] . . encompass[es] . . . ordinary robbery,\" which carries a lighter sentence). Thus, when a defendant faces separate charges of kidnapping and an enumerated offense, as here, we require that the State rely on a movement not \"incidentar to the underlying offense. Id. at 417-18, 581 P.2d at 443-44. A movement is not incidental where it (1) \"serves to substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in an associated offense,\" (2) \"substantially exceeds that required to complete the associated crime charged,\" or (3) \"stands alone with independent significance from the underlying charge.\" Mendoza, 122 Nev. at 274-75, 130 P.3d at 180-81. While B.W. testified that she left Boyd's presence on several occasions, mostly to visit her family, and thus, Boyd never physically restrained her, the evidence supports a theory that her movements did not reflect her free will because she felt compelled to return to Boyd out of fear for the harm that he would inflict on her and her family. B.W. testified that"], "id": "ea9aed25-bade-49b4-8230-8ec661b3f52a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The first prong is subjective; it requires a determination of whether the defendant had the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary to avert death, serious bodily injury, <mask>, rape, or forcible sodomy. The factfinder is required to place itself in the shoes of the defendant, determine the point of view which the defendant had at the time of the incident, and \"view the conduct of the [victim] with all its pertinent sidelights as the [defendant] was warranted in viewing it.\" State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 238, 850 P.2d 495, 504 (1993) (quoting State v. Tribett, 74 Wash. 125, 130, 132 P. 875 (1913)). Evaluating the evidence from a subjective point of view ensures that the factfinder \"fully understands the totality of the defendant's actions from the defendant's own perspective.\" Id. at 239, 850 P.2d at 505."], "id": "7b23796e-e24a-4559-9a73-eb4000b38044", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The courts have time and again refused to interfere with prosecuting attorneys who in the exercise of discretion have determined not to institute prosecutions or determined that they would prosecute for one crime and not another. Thus in People v. Florio (301 N. Y. 46), the court said (p. 53): \u201c However, the District Attorney may possibly have avoided asking the Grand Jury to indict the defendants for abduction in addition to <mask>, * * *. * * * In any event, the District Attorney of a county, familiar with the conditions there and responsible to the People of the county, has the duty of recommending to the Grand Jury indictment for the crime or crimes which the protection of the community requires and we are not here to determine that for him.\u201d (Italics ours.)"], "id": "f8c5c8f4-abaa-40e9-86ae-043d9c8efdab", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In People v Gonzalez (80 NY2d 146) the Court of Appeals held the merger doctrine inapplicable to the facts of that case. The victim, four months pregnant, was taken by automobile for about two hours, during which time she was terrorized. She was verbally and physically abused, which included punching and hitting about the face and head, both with fists and with a gun. When the vehicle stopped at a vacant lot, she was taken out of the automobile, whereupon defendant punched and kicked her and, while she was on the ground, told her he was going to rape her. Complainant lost consciousness and was unable to say if she actually had been sexually assaulted, although she did conclude that she had been raped. Her legs, stomach and vagina felt sore and her legs were \"sticky.\u201d She found her clothing strewn about the lot. Defendant was acquitted of attempted rape but was convicted of <mask> in the second degree. The Appellate Division concluded that the kidnapping conviction should be merged in the attempted rape acquittal and dismissed that charge. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, under the facts of that case, that merger did not preclude a kidnapping conviction since the kidnapping had already been completed when the sexual attack took place: \"The abduction constituted the discrete crime of second degree kidnapping which was already completed, in all its elements, before the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted. The restraint was not a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to another crime, nor was it simultaneous and inseparable from another crime. It was a crime in itself\u2019 (supra, 80 NY2d, at 153)."], "id": "af3520a6-5930-454d-a9e0-3c6536424f3f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Section 667.61 subdivision (a) provides that an accused under specified circumstances can be subject to an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to *511life.2 (See People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 534, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 298 P.3d 835 ; People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 102, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 77, 211 P.3d 584.) Section 667.61, subdivision (c) identifies the offenses which can result in an indeterminate term if a specified qualifying circumstance is present. Two of the offenses which can result in an indeterminate term when accompanied by a qualifying circumstance are present in this case: rape and oral copulation in concert. (\u00a7\u00a7 667.61, subds. (c)(3) and (7).) The qualifying circumstances are found in section 667.61, subdivisions (d) and (e). One of the qualifying circumstances which can result in an indeterminate 25-years-to-life sentence is specified in section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) which states, \"The defendant kidnapped the victim of the present offense and the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense in subdivision (c).\" (See People v. Byrd (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 88, 100-101, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 ; People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 712-716, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506.) In our case, the jury convicted defendant of rape and forcible oral copulation in concert and found the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) <mask> qualifying circumstance allegation true. Both defendants were sentenced on count 4 to indeterminate life terms for kidnapping to commit rape and oral copulation in violation of section 209, subdivision (b). The count 4 indeterminate sentences carry specified minimum parole eligibility dates."], "id": "1cc57a57-fd3b-4ba4-8053-e3f0b42bcbb3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Applying those factors, the panel concluded that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a <mask> occurred. The first factor, the duration of the holding, weighs against kidnapping, as a seven-minute holding would be quite brief on the spectrum of possible kidnappings. The second and third factors\u2014the presence of a separate offense and the degree to which the holding was inherent in the other offense\u2014strongly indicate that there"], "id": "15881aaa-2556-448b-b0a8-05611581969b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As explained below, defendant's contention that his confession followed an invocation of his Miranda right to remain silent is forfeited due to the absence of a timely and specific objection, as well as defense counsel's subsequent withdrawal of all objections to the prosecution evidence. Defendant's secondary position-that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to make an objection to preserve the Miranda invocation issue for appeal-is meritorious. Defendant has established prejudice and reversal is required of the conviction for first degree murder. Defendant has not, however, established prejudice as to his *909conviction of <mask> in count 3, which we affirm."], "id": "5cb92ee0-4430-4c13-8a9c-f8dec16b0d5d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["An information charged Johnson with (1) <mask> to commit another crime (\u00a7 209, subd. (b)(1)) (count one), (2) forcible rape ( \u00a7 261, subd. (a)(2) ) (count two), and (3) rape of an intoxicated person ( \u00a7 261, subd. (a)(3) ) (count three). As to count two, the information included special allegations that Johnson kidnapped the rape victim (\u00a7 667.61, subd. (e)(1)) and that the kidnapping substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim beyond the level inherent in the underlying rape (\u00a7 667.61, subd. (d)(2)).2"], "id": "e9fdcab7-81d5-4cd9-bbd1-1b940aeedc75", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Furthermore, a reading of the minutes by the court discloses there were sufficient facts before the District Attorney and Grand Jury to indicate that the complainant required an interpreter and that she had some difficulty in expressing herself on previous occasions, and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the indictment charging <mask>. Motion denied, submit order."], "id": "a91bde0d-e29c-42c6-938d-250316f9610a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Next, however, we review the trial court\u2019s finding that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Per the indictment and the proof at trial, all three offenses with which the defendant was charged took place after the defendant and the victim bought drugs and returned to the victim\u2019s apartment. The <mask> charge, on which the defendant was acquitted, was based on the defendant\u2019s alleged refusal to allow the victim to leave the apartment or summon for help while in the apartment. The remaining charges on which the defendant was convicted, aggravated assault by strangulation and domestic assault, also took place while the defendant and the victim were in the apartment. While there was testimony that the defendant produced a box cutter when he was initially in the car with the victim prior to buying drugs, there is no proof in the record alleging that the defendant possessed the box cutter during the offenses that took place in the apartment. Per the statute, the enhancement factor is applicable when a defendant possesses the deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 40-35-114 (9) (emphasis added). The proof at trial only establishes that the defendant possessed the weapon some five plus hours prior to the commission of the offense not during the commission of the offenses charged or on which the defendant was convicted. Thus, this factor is not applicable to the defendant\u2019s case and should not have been relied on by the trial court."], "id": "2b8bfca2-ad2d-482b-9828-cd19f8012f44", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant's current convictions for <mask> with intent to commit a sexual offense and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in counts 1 and 2 were serious and/or violent felonies. (\u00a7 667.5, subd. (c)(14) & (15); \u00a7 1192.7, subd. (c)(10), (20) & (29).) Consecutive sentences are required on those counts pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(7). Appellant's conviction for failing to register as a sex offender was not a serious or violent felony, but because the serious/violent felonies had to be consecutive \"to the sentence for any other conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced,\" sentence on that count must also be consecutive. (\u00a7 1170.12, subd. (a)(7).) On remand the court should impose sentence accordingly."], "id": "8e7c0366-54f1-4724-9589-1a5559bba3c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["For over 20 years it has been the law of the State of New York \u2014 by judicial fiat rather than through the legislative process \u2014 that, as a general principle,1 offenders may not stand convicted for <mask> when that charge is combined with another (usually rape, robbery, or assault) which actually provides the flavor for the criminal enterprise more so than the incidental technical kidnapping.2"], "id": "9a84ccb0-f706-4388-9e95-0fe3ecc4a32f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2007, a jury found Daniel Hargrove guilty of <mask>, family violence aggravated battery, and two counts of family violence aggravated assault. On direct appeal, we reversed his kidnapping conviction, but otherwise affirmed, Hargrove v. State, 299 Ga. App. 27 (681 SE2d 707) (2009), and the trial court resentenced Hargrove on remand. In 2021, Hargrove filed a pro se motion to vacate a void sentence. The trial court denied Hargrove\u2019s motion on December 2, 2021, and Hargrove filed this appeal on January 7, 2022. We lack jurisdiction. To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. See OCGA \u00a7 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Pretermitting whether Hargrove is entitled to a direct appeal from the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to vacate a void sentence, his notice of appeal is untimely, as it was filed 36 days after entry of the order he seeks to appeal. Consequently, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk\u2019s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 01/31/2022 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written."], "id": "805deee9-902b-4488-952f-2984a19b4031", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On February 27, 2017, Stephanie was arrested on charges of <mask>, endangering the welfare of a minor, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance. Gregory was arrested on charges of criminal mischief, resisting arrest, endangering the welfare of a minor, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, and driving on a suspended license.1 Their arrests came after they had removed a relative's child from the hospital because they feared the child would be taken by the Department under \"Garrett's law.\" In order to escape with the child, Stephanie punched a nurse in the face. Stephanie subsequently admitted being under the influence of methamphetamine and K2 at the time of her arrest. Because two-year-old I.M. was with them at the time of their arrest, I.M. was taken into custody on a seventy-two-hour hold. The Department subsequently learned that a relative had been caring for I.M. for over two months before Stephanie's arrest and that Stephanie had never cared for I.M. long term."], "id": "58ab4632-255d-4947-ba70-011693d1e49e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The jury was instructed as to the elements of rape (count 2) and forcible oral copulation (count 3) in concert pursuant to CALCRIM Nos. 1000, 1001, 1015 and 1016. In addition, the jurors were instructed concerning the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) <mask> qualifying circumstance in compliance with CALCRIM No. 3179 : \"If you find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 2 and/or 3, you must then decide whether, for each crime, the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant kidnapped Diane [ ]. You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime. [\u00b6] To decide whether the defendant kidnapped Diane [ ] please refer to the separate instructions that I have given you on kidnapping. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this additional allegation. [\u00b6] The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.\""], "id": "71f0efd3-53ed-4a7e-888b-fea5e210a170", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The gist of defendant\u2019s cruel and unusual punishment claim is that the penalty which has been legislatively imposed and must be judicially imposed, if there is a conviction, is too harsh for the alleged crimes. He contends that when, in 1973, the Legisla*747ture, in an effort to come to grips with the threat which the drug problem admittedly poses to society, incorporated such \u201c nonviolent \u201d sale and possession offenses, involving, as at bar, narcotic drugs in any quantity, regardless of the amount or value thereof, within the Class A felony scheme, and ranked them, insofar as mandatory maximum life imprisonment is concerned, with the most serious crimes known under New York Law, i.e., murder, attempted murder of a police officer, first degree <mask>, and arson in the first degree, it exceeded its constitutional limitations and imposed a punishment which is excessive and disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenses to which it applies."], "id": "371e83af-6239-4d5d-8340-206b9f20e472", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Age is one of the variables recognized as bearing on whether punishment is proportional to an offender's individual culpability. ( People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697.) Moreover, one of the virtues of age as a measure of proportionality is its objectivity. As pointed out by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, proportionality review should be informed by \" 'objective factors to the maximum possible extent.' \" ( Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1000, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (plurality opn.), quoting Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 274-275, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382.) Age is among the Board's regulatory factors tending to show suitability for release, but only inasmuch as \"the prisoner's present age reduces the probability of recidivism\" (Regs., \u00a7\u00a7 2281, subd. (d)(7), 2402, subd. (d)(7), italics added); the Board's regulations relating to suitability do not consider a prisoner's age at the time of the commitment offense a factor tending to show suitability. The legislative directive to accord \"great weight\" to the \"diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults\" makes clear, as did the United States Supreme Court in Miller , Graham , and Roper , that the imposition of more lenient punishment on youth offenders than on adult offenders serves the proportionality principle inherent in the cruel and/or unusual punishment provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. The circumstances of Palmer's life offense exemplify the \" 'hallmark features' \" of youth-\" 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences' \" ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 283, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053, quoting Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455 )-that diminish youth offenders' culpability. As a 17-year-old high school dropout, Palmer made an impulsive \"spur of the moment\" decision to turn an attempted robbery with an unloaded gun into a <mask> for robbery, during the course of which Palmer was shot by the victim. That Palmer had no idea of the consequences of *75his conduct is demonstrated by his question to the police officer who waited with him at the emergency room: \"What will I get for doing this, six months or a year in custody?\""], "id": "f484f434-a0fb-45c8-80ea-fc2f10f42aca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["No doubt, the jurors impliedly found that the movement of Diane increased the risk of harm to her. As noted, the jurors were instructed on the charge of <mask> for the purpose of rape or oral copulation pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1203. The jurors were instructed, \"The movement must have increased the risk of physical or psychological harm to that person beyond that necessarily present in the rape or oral copulation.\" As instructed, in order to convict defendant of aggravated kidnapping within the meaning of section 209, subdivision (b)(1), the jurors were required to find the movement increased the risk of harm to Diane. As we have noted, after January 1, 1998, an increase in the risk of harm was an essential element of section 209 subdivision (b)(1) aggravated kidnapping. Thus, the jury impliedly found that there was an increase in the risk of harm because of the lengthy asportation that occurred in our case. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 438, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388 [\"[A] trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not prejudicial if, as here, the jury necessarily resolved the factual question adversely to the defendant under other instructions.\"]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 99, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23 [\"By finding the firearm-use allegation to be true, the jury impliedly found that defendant was a direct participant, or, at a minimum, that he aided the robbery with the requisite intent.\"].) Thus, the sole prejudicial error issue that remains relates to the \"substantial\" increase in the risk of harm element in section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2). While deciding the aggravated kidnapping charge in count 4, the jurors impliedly found that there had been an increase in risk of harm during the lengthy asportation."], "id": "04af9a2e-ae60-4ad1-b05f-884bf26c801d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cDue to increasing population mobility, cases involving simultaneous and conflicting jurisdiction over guardianship are increasing. Adult guardianship jurisdiction issues commonly arise in situations involving snowbirds, transferred/long-distance care giving arrangements, interstate health markets, wandering, and even the occasional incidence of elderly <mask>. The process of appointing a guardian is handled in state courts. Often, jurisdiction in adult guardianship cases is complicated because multiple states, each with its own adult guardianship system, may have an interest in the case. Consequently, it may be unclear which state court has jurisdiction to decide the guardianship issue.\u201d (Sponsor\u2019s Mem, 2013 NY Assembly Bill A857; see also Sponsor\u2019s Mem, 2013 NY Senate Bill S2534.) Mental Hygiene Law \u00a7 83.33 specifically outlines a procedure for a New York State court to accept a guardianship proceeding transferred from another state."], "id": "3d75c557-e148-49ba-85ea-e3d1eda91774", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["- B.W.'s assertions to police thus gave investigators reason to believe that Boyd's phone, not B.W.'s phone, contained the probative information. Thus, B.W.'s phone did not \"so obvious[ly]\" contain exculpatory evidence, particularly in the form of photos, such that the failure to collect the photo evidence amounted to gross negligence. Cf. Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 988, 36 P.3d 424, 435 (2001) (concluding \"that the potential evidentiary significance of blood evidence \"was [not] so obvioue as to constitute gross negligence by investigators' failure \"to impound and tese it). We have also said that the selective collection of evidence does not prove even negligence, much less gross negligence. See Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 167-68, 17 P.3d 1008, 1018 (2001). Boyd also failed to show that it was possible for police to collect the data given the limitations of extraction tools. Randolph, 117 Nev. at 988, 36 P.3d at 435. Because Boyd failed to show materiality and gross negligence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the evidence-collection instructions. Sufficiency of the evidence Boyd argues that B.W.'s testimony demonstrates that she moved freely during the four-month period the State alleged the <mask> occurred such that the evidence does not support his first-degree kidnapping conviction.4 He contends that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove that any kidnapping was not incidental to any extortion because \"[n]one of the facte relied on by the State to establish first-degree kidnapping \"go beyond what is required to prove [the predicate offense of]"], "id": "3bf54840-2838-42f4-806e-628ef95532f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Dan Lamont, J. This case presents an issue which arguably remains unresolved by the Court of Appeals decision in People v Dodt (61 NY2d 408 [1984]), to wit: If a defendant restrains another *730person by \u201cthreatening to use deadly physical force,\u201d but the handgun actually threatened to be used was in fact a starter pistol, can such defendant be convicted of <mask> in the second degree? This issue was first confronted by the undersigned as the Trial Judge when the case was to be submitted to the jury (see, CPL 300.30 [1])."], "id": "25579a4f-a596-4c36-9a86-a1353c3f3667", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant argues that the trial court's instruction explaining the elements of the special circumstance allegation that defendant murdered the victim while engaged in <mask> stated an incorrect definition of the asportation requirement. We agree with defendant that the court erred by instructing the jury with a definition of asportation that was not in effect at the time of the crimes in question. We conclude, however, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore does not require that either the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding or the death sentence be set aside, as explained below."], "id": "4030442b-bbc7-4747-a09e-0d6e1bfa2432", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On March 25, 1980 a felony complaint and warrant of arrest were issued by the Police Court of the City of Albany charging defendant of the violation of section 135.20 of the Penal Law, <mask>, second degree, a class B felony, for the alleged abduction of the one-year-old daughter of the affiant (and apparently defendant). A teletype advising of the \u201cactiv\u00e9 warrant kidnapping second degree\u201d was teletyped to and received at Peekskill Headquarters that day. That evening Sergeant Hayes and Police Officer *834Coons saw defendant\u2019s sister-in-law at her home in Peeks-kill and advised her of the Albany warrant outstanding against defendant. Defendant, who was apparently advised of the officers\u2019 visit, called his attorney in Albany later that evening; arrangements were then made for defendant to surrender himself to Albany at approximately 9:00 A.M. t\u00a3le following morning (March 26) in the presence of his attorney. This procedure was followed and between 9:15 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on March 26, 1980 defendant was booked, the original charge was reduced by Judge Keegan of the Police Court of the City of Albany to the misdemeanor of unlawful imprisonment, second degree (Penal Law, \u00a7 135.05), defendant was released on his own recognizance and the case was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal to October 17, 1980. The warrant of arrest which had been issued the previous day was vacated. Two detectives in Albany stated they would have the warrant canceled. However, the Peekskill Police Department was not notified of the vacatur of the arrest warrant. Defendant returned to Peekskill."], "id": "93d7357c-2420-48e5-9ee8-fa35c07481b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": [" Defendant was convicted in November 2016 upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, <mask> in the second degree, burglary in the second degree (two counts) and attempted burglary in the second degree and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment (158 AD3d 1299 [2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1014 [2018]). The sentencing court denied defendant's request for youthful offender treatment and, upon appeal, the Fourth Department declined to adjudicate defendant a youthful offender in the interest of justice (id. at 1300). In June 2017, defendant \u2014 then 17 years old \u2014 was indicted and charged with one count of promoting prison contraband in the first degree. The charge stemmed from defendant's possession of a metal razor blade. Defendant pleaded guilty to that crime with the understanding that he would be sentenced to a prison term of 2 to 4 years. The plea agreement also required defendant to waive his right to appeal. County Court summarily denied defendant's request for youthful offender treatment and sentenced defendant as a predicate felon to the contemplated term of imprisonment. This appeal ensued."], "id": "d6fef96b-cc10-4384-a4d9-ba8e86decebe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*836In response to their son\u2019s <mask>, Jacob\u2019s parents formed the Jacob Wetterling Foundation, an advocacy group for children\u2019s safety. The Foundation\u2019s mission, stated on its Web site,5 is to protect children from sexual exploitation and abduction. In 1994, the Wetterlings, along with other interested individuals and groups, successfully lobbied Congress to pass what is commonly known as \u201cthe Jacob Wetterling Act\u201d (hereinafter referred to as JWA).6"], "id": "ff74b358-bf98-48ea-b62d-2d27debbe894", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant's argument focuses on the element of <mask> relating to deadly force. The element is contained in the definition of the term \"abduct,\" which, as noted, means \"to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by: (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found; or (B) using or threatening to use deadly force.\" TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7 20.01(2). The phrase \"using or threatening to use deadly force\" does not describe a conduct element. Rather, it describes one of the \"two alternative components of the specific intent element.\" Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 475-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ; see Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 521 ; State Bar of Tex., TEXAS CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY CHARGES: CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS & PROPERTY : PJC 81.8, 81.9 (2016). As the court explained in Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 521, the term \"abduct\" thus includes two elements. \"First, the defendant must have restrained another, which is the actus reus requirement. Second, the defendant must have had the specific intent *835to prevent liberation, which is the mens rea requirement.\" Id. (citations omitted). The use or threat of use of deadly force is a component of the mens rea requirement of the offense, not the actus reus. Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 476.5 Accordingly, to prove appellant committed the offense, the State was required to prove appellant moved Hooser from one place to another with the intent to prevent his liberation by using or threatening to use deadly force. Examining the record for evidence appellant possessed such an intent, we find ample evidence."], "id": "9be004a1-defa-4e53-a1a9-4999bab300fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["An indictment was filed on February 15, 1979 by a Queens County Grand Jury charging defendant with the crime of <mask> in the second degree. On March 20, 1979, defendant was ordered to be examined for the purpose of determining if she is still an incapacitated person as defined in CPL article 730 and the case was adjourned until April 20, 1979; and at that time the court found defendant sane and fit to proceed to trial."], "id": "48cc5951-ce8b-4ddf-a2ba-e93f6aa4f07e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Mosley alleges that the State did not disclose prior to trial that the victim had denied that an accident had occurred to the vehicle that he was driving when he and the victim traveled to the place where the two engaged in intercourse. He contends that \"Mosley's vehicle is the DNA that proves Mosley innocent\" and that the \"vehicle in Mosley's case disproves the underlying <mask>.\" Mosley contended at trial, and on direct appeal, that the State failed to prove that the sex was not consensual. Mosley asserts that, if he could have shown that his car was dented, it would have discredited the victim's testimony, presumably about other matters. It appears that Mosley is contending that the victim did not mention the accident in her testimony until after she learned that the car had been dented and thus her testimony was shown to be unreliable. While Mosley alleges that the victim in a pretrial statement had denied that the accident happened, he does not say when he learned that the State had concealed the statement or otherwise provide any factual substantiation for the claim that it did so."], "id": "b6a41119-517d-454f-a923-18bab94d61ce", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*853The holdings in Bell and Moi were based on the court\u2019s determination that there is no rational connection between the challenged offenses and the purposes of SORA where no sexual component is alleged. That conclusion, however, fails to take into account that it is for the Legislature, not the judiciary, to determine whether making <mask> and unlawful imprisonment of a minor subject to SORA serves the public interest."], "id": "fb77fdf8-e5bb-482c-94f4-435b72794220", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*521Pursuant to section 209, subdivision (d), defendants could not be punished for the same act that violated both *559sections 209, subdivision (b)and 667.61. The act prohibited by section 209, subdivision (b), as applicable here, is <mask> to commit rape or oral copulation. The section 667.61 conduct is the section 667.61, subdivisions (c)(3) and (7) rape or oral copulation in concert violations under the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) qualifying circumstances. Section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) requires a kidnapping occur. The violations of section 209, subdivision (b) and 667.61 subdivisions (c)(3) and (7) under the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) qualifying circumstances have two common elements. In our context, the section 209 subdivision (b) violation requires the commission of a kidnapping with the intent to commit one of the enumerated sex offenses. (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1151, fn. 6, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 140 P.3d 866 ; People v. Bell (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 435, fn. 2, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 300.) The 667.61 subdivisions (c)(3) and (7) violations under the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) qualifying circumstances involve both the kidnapping and commission of a section 209, subdivision (b) enumerated sex offense."], "id": "6a652330-7838-4d20-81cf-df21cd17729a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On appeal, Ledesma asserts his conviction must be reversed because both the crime of aggravated <mask> and the One Strike Law sentence enhancement for aggravated kidnapping are constitutionally defective. Specifically, he argues that under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States (2015) 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 ( Johnson ) these statutes violated his due process rights because they are impermissibly vague. Ledesma also asserts, and the Attorney General concedes, that the abstract of judgment should be modified to remove the inaccurate reference to a true finding of personal use of a firearm. We reject Ledesma's constitutional vagueness challenge and affirm the judgment as modified to accurately reflect the sentence imposed by the trial court."], "id": "47ce413b-aaa6-42fe-81e5-7f27e698cd14", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Although we conclude that Jones's convictions must be reversed because of the lack of a valid waiver of her right to a jury trial, we also must consider the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether she may be tried again on the charges. ( People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 613, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 170 P.3d 129 [\"Although we have concluded that the <mask> conviction must be reversed because it was presented to the jury on both a legally adequate and a legally inadequate theory, we must nonetheless assess the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether defendant may again be tried for the kidnapping offense.\"]; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376 [\"Although we have concluded *241that the robbery conviction must be reversed for instructional error, we must nonetheless assess the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether defendant may again be tried for this offense.\"]; see People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1295, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 709, 204 P.3d 306 [\" 'an appellate ruling of legal insufficiency is functionally equivalent to an acquittal and precludes a retrial' \"].)"], "id": "4960b4c2-4afc-4f5f-a727-9cf26ee1f49b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We recognized the wisdom of this warning in Etsitty. See 130 F.3d at 427. There, the defendant lassoed the victim around the neck, dragged her on the ground for twenty feet, repeatedly attempted to tie her up and gag her, knocked her unconscious, and then tried to take her away on his horse. Id. at 423. Under these facts, we concluded that the government proved a violation of \u00a7 1201(a)(2), as \u201ca reasonable trier of fact\u201d could find that the defendant seized the victim \u201cfor a substantial period of time.\u201d Id. at 427. But we repeated Chatwin\u2019s warning about the danger of broadening <mask> \u201cinto a secondary charge wherever there is a detention accompanying another crime.\u201d Id."], "id": "24572d2e-34d5-4199-9152-b2ea6969db3c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Applying those factors, the panel concluded that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a <mask> occurred. The first factor, the duration of the holding, weighs against kidnapping, as a seven-minute holding would be quite brief on the spectrum of possible kidnappings. The second and third factors\u2014the presence of a separate offense and the degree to which the holding was inherent in the other offense\u2014strongly indicate that there"], "id": "084f90a4-ece7-4ded-8a00-934e32c7bbf8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The People admit that the proof of the overt acts alleged in the Federal indictment are the facts which the evidence possessed by the People will establish, and will sustain the charge of <mask>. They assert, however, that to convict under the Federal indictment proof of additional facts was necessary, and that such additional facts are not essential in the State prosecution. But proof of the overt acts as to the kidnapping and confinement of Wendel was essential to a conviction in the Federal court. Judge Clark\u2019s charge is conclusive on that question. If the People\u2019s contention should prevail, then section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could rarely be successfully invoked. It would seem to be an inexcusably narrow construction to hold that every fact essential to secure a conviction under the Federal statute must be established in the proof required on trial of the State indictment before the bar of section 139 can be invoked. It appeals to me as a more reasonable construction that if it be imperative that an essential act be established to secure a conviction under both statutes, it is sufficient to raise the bar."], "id": "6f1dbbe6-9c83-4010-a4a1-afa80ce7b59a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We are not persuaded that such a contradiction affecting substantial rights occurred here. In Hillhouse , the challenged instruction told the jury that motive was not an element of the various crimes charged (murder, robbery, and <mask> for robbery) and need not be shown. ( *350Hillhouse , supra , 27 Cal.4th at p. 503, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) The defendant argued on appeal that motive was an element of those crimes. The Supreme Court reasoned that if the defendant had been correct (though he was not), the instruction \"would have contradicted other instructions regarding the elements of the crimes.\" ( Ibid . ) Because \"[i]nstructions regarding the elements of the crime affect the substantial rights of the defendant,\" no objection was required for appellate review. ( Ibid . ) The court distinguished this type of elemental error from the general premise that \"[a] party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed clarification, without first requesting such clarification at trial.\" ( Ibid . ; People v . Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 622, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.)"], "id": "345141e7-7809-4ef0-a1da-cf95d206a8f7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["(n) Jury Instruction on Lesser-Included Offense of First Degree False Imprisonment Betancourt claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the district court\u2019s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of first degree false impris- onment. He claims that such an instruction would have allowed the jury to determine whether Betancourt intended to commit <mask> or the crime of first degree false imprisonment. The lesser-included offense instruction was not warranted by the evidence. This claim is affirmatively refuted by the record. We have stated: \u201cWhere the prosecution has offered uncontroverted evi- dence on an element necessary for a conviction of the greater crime but not necessary for the lesser offense, a duty rests on the defendant to offer at least some - 462 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BETANCOURT-GARCIA Cite as 310 Neb. 440"], "id": "bebf5a14-47e1-462d-a040-eb29a730c440", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Although the sexual assault victims named in this appeal are not minors, we identify the victims by initials because appellant did so in his brief. See Act of May 28, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 426, art. 2, \u00a7 1, sec. 19.03(a)(2), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1123 (capital murder defined, in part, as intentionally committing murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit <mask>, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, or arson); Act of May 29, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 977, \u00a7 6, sec. 19.03(a)(2), 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5311, 5317 (amending \u201caggravated rape\u201d to \u201caggravated sexual assault\u201d; version in effect at time of offense) (amended 1993, 2003) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7 19.03(a)(2)). 2018. As required by law, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for"], "id": "f0684ec5-c0ad-4595-9d21-cd0f3599a637", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Aside from being unnecessary to our analysis ( Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 487, fn. 38, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 ), an interstate comparison is also the least useful means of assessing proportionality in the present case because it is so difficult to determine what sentence a like crime-considering all circumstances related to the offense and offender-would receive in other jurisdictions. The fact that-as will be discussed-many states authorize punishment of up to life in prison for a <mask> in facially similar circumstances (i.e., for the purpose of robbery, with use of a firearm and without injury to the victim) is *727of limited significance without knowing whether and how such states would account for matters such as the facts that the firearm was not loaded and appellant was 17 years old. In general, reliance upon an interstate comparison may be subject to the criticism leveled by respondent here, that even if California imposes the harshest penalty for a given offense, this does not necessarily demonstrate the penalty is constitutionally excessive. ( People v. Martinez , supra , 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 638.) Nevertheless, a few points are worth making."], "id": "2ec5e5fe-7b25-4e63-9a7b-58ef86b56424", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We conclude that the court in this case had a duty to instruct on the independent felonious purpose rule because there was evidence from which the jury could have inferred that defendant placed Kerr in the back of her car and drove off for the sole purpose of killing her. Significantly, there was evidence suggesting that defendant killed Kerr by setting her and her car on fire, without ever having moved her from the position in the car in which defendant had originally placed her, or done anything else to her. That defendant kidnapped Kerr by placing her in her car and then killed her in that vehicle raised a reasonable inference that his sole purpose in placing her in the car and driving off was to transport her to the location where he would set the fatal fire. The evidence showed furthermore that defendant had stated to his plumbing assistant shortly before the murder that he wanted to get Kerr \"off his mind\" by blowing up her car or setting it on fire. This evidence likewise created an inference that defendant kidnapped Kerr solely to carry out that plan, and that his act of setting her car on fire was not an afterthought following the <mask>."], "id": "af4740bf-70cd-4dc5-9858-aa2b6e9a3194", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u201cIn short, the Levy-Lombardi rule was designed to prevent gross distortion of lesser crimes into a much more serious crime by excess of prosecutional zeal. It was not designed to merge \u2018true\u2019 kidnappings into other crimes merely because the kidnappings were used to accomplish ultimate crimes of lesser or equal or greater gravity. Moreover, it is the rare <mask> that is an end in itself; *29almost invariably there is another ultimate crime.\u201d (People v Miles, 23 NY2d 527, 539-540.)"], "id": "7f64c956-f95e-4c15-9009-e8c796677ec0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Conaway's position-that the \"merely incidental\" test should apply to <mask> for the purpose of shielding-would be unworkable. For example, in this case, in addition to kidnapping, Conaway was charged with endangering the welfare of the Victim, and with resisting a lawful detention. Conaway's briefing acknowledges that it is unclear which of those other counts should be considered the \"underlying offense\" for purposes of determining if the kidnapping charge involved \"merely incidental\" conduct. Conaway's confusion on this point is understandable: the fact is, the kidnapping charge in this case has no underlying offense-it is a *384\"stand-alone,\" independent criminal charge."], "id": "b8521ecf-1b13-4156-80f0-0864b5844d6e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The merger doctrine does not apply to the case at bar since \"the rule has no purpose of ignoring as independent crimes alternative or optional means used in committing another crime which, by the gravity and even horrendousness of the means used, constitute and should constitute a separately cognizable offense.\u201d (People v Miles, 23 NY2d 527, at p 539.) The facts of the instant case clearly fall into this exception. The crimes of <mask> and robbery were certainly not incidental to the crime of intentional murder, but were independent crimes which, due to the particular fact pattern here, should clearly constitute separate offenses from that of intentional murder, as well as felony murder. In fact, consecutive sentences for the intentional murder and the robbery are permitted by case law (People v Tanner, 30 NY2d 102, 108)."], "id": "1549d33b-6f1a-4c5e-9067-fc1526d1df82", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The Washington State Court of Appeals had occasion to examine a substantially similar statute in the context of a case involving rape and <mask>. In State v Tuitasi (46 Wash App 206, 729 P2d 75 [1986]), the defendant had threatened to kidnap his own daughter unless his estranged wife consented to have sexual relations with him. The mother submitted to his demand, and the court found that this constituted \"forcible compulsion\u201d from fear of the threatened kidnapping. This is prohibited by Washington Criminal Code, title 9A, \u00a7 44.010 (5), which concerns sexual offenses. The Washington kidnapping statutes are included in Washington Criminal Code, title 9A, \u00a7\u00a7 40.020-40.030."], "id": "b3918cc2-ca62-4619-9fbe-62e97cd1e677", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b619 In contrast, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he \u201cintentionally or knowingly impedes the normal breathing or circulation of blood of another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck or by obstructing the nose and mouth\u201d in the context of a domestic violence assault. A.R.S. \u00a7 13-1204(B). The State presented evidence, separate from the <mask>, that Jones covered Megan\u2019s nose and mouth until she lost consciousness. Sufficient evidence supports each of Jones\u2019s convictions for the kidnapping and aggravated assault of Megan."], "id": "bae9035b-f25b-4177-a9bf-94ac7fbc7fb8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Given the record before us, we cannot say with fair assurance that the erroneous admission of the surveillance video did not affect appellant's substantial rights. The surveillance video was a central piece of evidence in the case. Other than information provided by complainants, admitted con artists, the video was the only strong evidence showing appellant's involvement in the offenses. Although the State presented other compelling evidence of the scene on the highway and of complainant's injuries, none of this evidence showed appellant's involvement in the aggravated robbery and aggravated <mask> of complainants. The State relied primarily on the video in making its closing arguments. In addition, the trial court explicitly stated that the video evidence impacted appellant's sentencing. Under these circumstances, we must reverse the convictions."], "id": "18274bff-f92d-4c6f-988a-0509170db615", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Essential to the commission of the crime of <mask> is the requirement that it occur against the will, or at least *542without the consent, of the victim. (Marks and Paperno, Criminal Law in NY [2d ed], \u00a7 233, p 285.) This requirement is reflected in the Penal Law which provides that the movement or confinement of a person \u201cwithout consent\u201d may be accomplished by physical force, intimidation or deception. Thus, asportation of the victim, which is a necessary element of kidnapping (People v Levy, 15 NY2d 159, 164), may be accomplished by trick or device, and in the first instance, there need not be a resort to physical force or intimidation."], "id": "1e496da2-eb30-4919-a542-56228b96fb44", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*421On May 9, 2005, after a jury trial conducted before this court, defendant was found guilty of two counts of sodomy in the first degree, a class B violent felony, one count of <mask> in the second degree, a class B violent felony, two counts of assault in the second degree, a class D violent felony, and one count of endangering the welfare of a child, a class A misdemeanor."], "id": "fc1cc141-ce0a-4b6b-9653-b359d886d34d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["took place. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a7 12.1(b)(2) (3d ed. 2018). Instruction No. 13 was an accurate statement of the law as to count I, <mask>, and count II, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and we conclude that although erroneous as applied to the conspiracy charge, any such error was harmless. See State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55, 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012). The undis- puted evidence was that all three alleged crimes physically took place in Madison County, and as such, instruction No. 13 would not have confused the jury. A hearing on this claim was not warranted. (l) Right Not to Testify Betancourt claims that appellate counsel did not raise that trial counsel did not adequately advise him about his right not to testify and that if he decided not to testify, that fact could not be considered an admission of guilt and must not influence the verdict in any way. Regardless of whether trial counsel advised Betancourt he had a right not to testify, the record shows that he was so advised by the court. At his arraignment, Betancourt was advised of his right not to testify, as well as advised that if he chose not to testify, that fact could not be used against him. Thus, even if trial counsel failed to advise Betancourt in this regard, he was not prejudiced thereby and appellate counsel was not ineffective in not pursuing this argument. A hearing on this claim was not warranted. (m) Sentence for Count III, Conspiracy Betancourt claims that appellate counsel, while serving as trial counsel upon remand for resentencing on the conspiracy conviction, was ineffective for not objecting to the district court\u2019s imposition of a sentence of \u201clife imprisonment without parole.\u201d The State concedes that Betancourt\u2019s conspiracy sen- tence of \u201clife imprisonment without parole\u201d is not authorized. In Betancourt I, the direct appeal, we remanded the cause for resentencing on the conspiracy conviction with directions to impose a life sentence. We said: - 461 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BETANCOURT-GARCIA Cite as 310 Neb. 440"], "id": "83acfe58-6a21-4a4a-a3ae-d8d7ba42c65b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Third, the prosecutor's argument to the jury as to the <mask> charge made no mention of defendant's confession to the murder. Instead, the prosecutor relied on Montellano's testimony, which was corroborated by \"a videotape of the commission of the crime\" of kidnapping. (See People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280, citing Cahill , supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 503, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037 [a video recording of a crime could support a finding that erroneous admission of a confession is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a higher standard than applicable to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel].) The prosecutor played the video recording for the jury during argument, highlighting how it corroborated Montellano's testimony."], "id": "5fc39daf-35b5-4604-80bf-9d2cee72bb30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["KB\u2019s behavior, including her submissions in this court and others, demonstrated her lack of capacity to protect her interests. There were, for example, her persistent, unsupported charges that \u201cExecutioner\u201d Anne had murdered their mother, *552who had died in a nursing facility while in Seattle to be near Anne. Even after an autopsy by the Seattle Medical Examiner had resulted in a finding of death from natural causes, KB continued to report to this court that the death was the subject of an ongoing homicide investigation in Seattle. There were, as further example, the intemperate language of her document demands under SCPA 1404 and the haranguing and threatening nature of her examination of the witness at SCPA 1404 depositions despite the presence of a member of the Law Department. There was the barrage of motions in which KB sought referrals by this court to Federal, State and local authorities concerning the collection of charges that she leveled at others who were involved in this proceeding. Indeed, to the list of persons whom KB accused of crimes ranging from <mask>, perjury, and larceny to \u201ccriminal indifference to civil obligations\u201d, KB eventually added (as a \u201ccoconspirator\u201d) the name of May Glazer, the attorney this court had appointed court evaluator in the proceeding brought by KB\u2019s sister Elinor in July 1996 under article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law to determine whether KB required the appointment of a guardian of her person or property."], "id": "9385b3ba-0b79-45b2-8275-7f16ac8c9bc8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2007, a jury found Daniel Hargrove guilty of <mask>, family violence aggravated battery, and two counts of family violence aggravated assault. On direct appeal, we reversed his kidnapping conviction, but otherwise affirmed, Hargrove v. State, 299 Ga. App. 27 (681 SE2d 707) (2009), and the trial court resentenced Hargrove on remand. In 2021, Hargrove filed a pro se motion to vacate a void sentence. The trial court denied Hargrove\u2019s motion on December 2, 2021, and Hargrove filed this appeal on January 7, 2022. We lack jurisdiction. To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. See OCGA \u00a7 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Pretermitting whether Hargrove is entitled to a direct appeal from the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to vacate a void sentence, his notice of appeal is untimely, as it was filed 36 days after entry of the order he seeks to appeal. Consequently, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk\u2019s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 01/31/2022 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written."], "id": "26482556-6d70-47bb-bd2d-6f6a87e6ea49", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> may be accomplished without the use of physical force,; inveiglement is sufficient. (People v. De Leon, 109 N.Y. 226, 229.) The very essence of inveiglement is deceit. It may be that every deceptive practice does not constitute an inveiglement, but here,- as in the De Leon Case (supra), a distinct, affirmative wrong was done the plaintiff. He was induced to go far from'his home, into an unknown country, where the climate and sanitary conditions were, as the event proved, practically unbearable, by representations that he was to be given employment at a village near New York\u2014only a few miles away, five hours\u2019sail on the -steamer \u2014 where the railroad fare back to New York was only ninety cents. (See People v. Fitzpatrick, 57 Hun, 459, 461.)"], "id": "9a3dd7bc-5edc-47d7-9481-a6eb2cf120d8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Because we agree, we need not reach Romero's other claims on appeal which challenge his convictions for the attempted <mask> of Brittney as well his section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), conviction. We do note, however, that sufficient evidence supported both convictions. Further, although all agree that the abstract of judgment incorrectly states Romero was convicted of dissuading a witness from testifying-rather than dissuading a witness from reporting a crime-our reversal renders that error moot."], "id": "115ccc40-0170-45ed-ae39-a91ec7a1bc70", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The contention of the defendant is that the underlying facts of both indictments, proof of which is essential to establish either offense, is the alleged <mask> of Paul H. Wendel; that the Federal indictment charges a conspiracy to transport in interstate commerce a kidnapped person; that the kidnapped person in each instance was Paul H. Wendel; that upon that fact depended the guilt of those charged with conspiracy in the Federal court; that while there is no such crime as kidnapping under the Federal statutes, yet there must be proof of facts which constitute the crime of kidnapping under the laws of New York, before a crime of conspiracy to transport in interstate commerce can be established under the Federal law. The argument is advanced that there need not be absolute identity of all the facts essential to give jurisdiction to both sovereignties; it is sufficient if offenses under both jurisdictions necessitate proof of some identical facts essential to establish violations."], "id": "e3d4878d-79f3-4d9c-9d84-3a47cc1b36da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Section 667.61 subdivision (a) provides that an accused under specified circumstances can be subject to an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life.5 (See *11People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 534, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 298 P.3d 835 ; People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 102, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 77, 211 P.3d 584.) Section 667.61, subdivision (c) identifies the offenses which can result in an indeterminate term if a specified qualifying circumstance is present. Two of the offenses which can result in an indeterminate term when accompanied by a qualifying circumstance are present in this case: rape and oral copulation in concert. ( \u00a7 667.61, subds. (c)(3) and (7).) The qualifying circumstances are found in section 667.61, subdivisions (d) and (e). One of the qualifying circumstances which can result in an indeterminate 25-years-to-life sentence is specified in section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) which states, \"The defendant kidnapped the victim of the present offense and the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense in subdivision (c).\" (See People v. Byrd (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 88, 100-101, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 ; People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 712-716, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506.) In our case, the jury convicted defendant of rape and forcible oral copulation in concert and found the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) <mask> qualifying circumstance allegation true. Both defendants were sentenced on count 4 to indeterminate life terms for kidnapping to commit rape and oral copulation in violation of section 209, subdivision (b). The count 4 indeterminate sentences carry specified minimum parole eligibility dates."], "id": "fdd73dff-a9be-4cb2-83f7-0c77897610ca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Willbanks was 17 years old when he was charged with <mask>, first-degree assault, two counts of first-degree robbery, and three counts of armed criminal action. He was convicted and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the kidnapping count, life for the assault count, 20 years for each of the two robbery counts, and 100 years for each of the three armed criminal action counts. Id. at 239. Willbanks asserted that \"his sentences, in the aggregate, will result in the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence.\" Id. at 239. He went on to point out that \"[t]he Supreme Court held [in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010),] that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile nonhomicide offenders from being sentenced to life without parole.\" 522 S.W.3d at 242."], "id": "c9b87a0b-0d6a-48a8-aa76-4a774b9c6ebd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["took place. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a7 12.1(b)(2) (3d ed. 2018). Instruction No. 13 was an accurate statement of the law as to count I, <mask>, and count II, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and we conclude that although erroneous as applied to the conspiracy charge, any such error was harmless. See State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55, 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012). The undis- puted evidence was that all three alleged crimes physically took place in Madison County, and as such, instruction No. 13 would not have confused the jury. A hearing on this claim was not warranted. (l) Right Not to Testify Betancourt claims that appellate counsel did not raise that trial counsel did not adequately advise him about his right not to testify and that if he decided not to testify, that fact could not be considered an admission of guilt and must not influence the verdict in any way. Regardless of whether trial counsel advised Betancourt he had a right not to testify, the record shows that he was so advised by the court. At his arraignment, Betancourt was advised of his right not to testify, as well as advised that if he chose not to testify, that fact could not be used against him. Thus, even if trial counsel failed to advise Betancourt in this regard, he was not prejudiced thereby and appellate counsel was not ineffective in not pursuing this argument. A hearing on this claim was not warranted. (m) Sentence for Count III, Conspiracy Betancourt claims that appellate counsel, while serving as trial counsel upon remand for resentencing on the conspiracy conviction, was ineffective for not objecting to the district court\u2019s imposition of a sentence of \u201clife imprisonment without parole.\u201d The State concedes that Betancourt\u2019s conspiracy sen- tence of \u201clife imprisonment without parole\u201d is not authorized. In Betancourt I, the direct appeal, we remanded the cause for resentencing on the conspiracy conviction with directions to impose a life sentence. We said: - 461 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BETANCOURT-GARCIA Cite as 310 Neb. 440"], "id": "bed9c764-2f01-4100-b2b2-fab6be766530", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Other double punishment cases in this State and in California decide substantially the same issue. (People v. Florio, 301 N. Y. 46; People v. Oliver, 4 A D 2d 28, affd. 3 N Y 2d 684.) In Florio, the <mask> preceded the rape, and although \u201c separate \u201d crimes, were held singly punishable. In Oliver, it was held that the assault and the burglary were ordinarily separate crimes but since the assault was a \u2018 \u2018 necessary ingredient \u2019 \u2019 of the breaking and entry and committed to effect such entry, the crimes could not be doubly punished."], "id": "2e51772f-d928-4b25-8a92-5e7a153a17cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The People, however, assert that the indictment herein contains a count charging the defendant with the crime of assault in the second degree, which in no way is involved in the charge in the Federal indictment. The second count is as follows: \u201c The defendants from February 14, 1938, to February 24, 1936, inclusive, in the County of Kings, assaulted Paul H. Wendel, with intent to commit upon him the crime of <mask>.\u201d"], "id": "7ae6afea-063b-4b3e-864b-af967b9b0b25", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On May 16, 2014, the jury returned its verdicts. As to count 2, Mr. Adams was convicted of forcible rape while acting in concert and the following special allegations were found to be true: he personally used a firearm within the meaning of *554sections 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (e) and 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e) ; he kidnapped the victim within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d) ; and the sexual assault was committed for the benefit of a street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). As to count 3, Mr. Adams was convicted of oral copulation by acting in concert and the jury found two special allegations to be true. The jury found Mr. Adams kidnapped the victim within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d). In addition, the jury found the offense was committed for the benefit of a street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). However, the jury found the firearm *515use allegation within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (e) was not true. As to count 4, the jury convicted Mr. Adams of <mask> to commit another crime in violation of section 209, subdivision (b)(1). The jury found the gang and firearm use allegations to be true. (\u00a7\u00a7 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C); 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e).)"], "id": "7ff71d96-7899-4da4-9967-975935927594", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*117As previously explained in this opinion ( *431ante , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 386-388, 396 P.3d at pp. 526-527), at the time of defendant's crimes in March 1999, a felony-murder special circumstance could apply only when it was shown \"that the defendant had an independent purpose for the commission of the felony, that is, the commission of the felony was not merely incidental to an intended murder.\" (People v. Mendoza, supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 182, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150 ; People v. Green , supra , 27 Cal.3d at p. 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) With regard to a kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation specifically, a defendant had to have a \"purpose for the <mask> apart from murder.\" (People v. Raley, supra , 2 Cal.4th at p. 902, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712 ; accord People v. Brents, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 609, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 267 P.3d 1135.)"], "id": "5904ddad-8da0-415e-a4ca-7734e704212d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant does not claim the conduct described in the State's instructions were not included within the scope of the original charging document. Rather, he claims the original charging document was ambiguous as to whether the attempted <mask> was premised on removal or confinement. This is an important distinction, because to the extent Appellant is correct the charge was ambiguous as to whether the State would opt for removal or confinement, the charging document encompassed either, or both, methods of effecting kidnapping."], "id": "1e60b09f-2be9-47b1-8628-007eed168abc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment based upon legal insufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury. The charges in the indictment are based upon the defendant sending five separate letters to the victim, Michelle Moon, between April 13, 2001 and October 30, 2001. There were two separate court orders of protection forbidding any contact. Specifically, defendant claims there was no evidence showing his intent to harass, annoy or alarm Michelle Moon and insufficient evidence of any course of conduct by the defendant likely to cause Michelle Moon to reasonably fear physical injury or serious physical injury, the commission of a sex offense against, or the <mask>, unlawful imprisonment or death of herself. In support of his argument the defendant stresses the fact that he was incarcerated at Albany County Jail on the dates the letters were sent. Therefore, the defendant argues, it was not reasonable for Michelle Moon to reasonably fear any of the aforementioned consequences set forth in the statute. Defendant also argues that any fear must go to an imminent or reasonably imminent act and since the defendant was incarcerated any fear of Michelle Moon was not within the scope of the statute. The defendant further argues that the court should apply the reasonableness standard set forth in the justification defense of article 35 of the Penal Law in relation to any fear of the victim. Reasonably believes as contained in article 35 of the Penal Law involves both a subjective and objective test (see, People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96)."], "id": "11e71828-5c92-4298-8873-ee025ad03876", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant was charged with attempted <mask> under Sections 564.011 and 565.110. \"[T]he crime of attempt has two elements: (1) the purpose to commit the underlying offense, and (2) the doing of an act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.\" State v. Bonich, 289 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Kidnapping may be effectuated via two alternative methods: either confining or removing a person, in addition to being for one of the unlawful purposes stipulated by the statute. Section 565.100; State v. Porter, 241 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007). In contrast, false imprisonment cannot be effectuated by removal, only by confinement (or, as the statute phrases it, \"restrain[t]\"). Section 565.130. The statute does not require that an individual do so in furtherance of an unlawful purpose. Id."], "id": "e2b2e095-b28d-4731-8322-fc8278784cb8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 1203, modified at the prosecutor's request, because the modified *614version allowed the jury to convict him of <mask> to commit robbery on a theory not supported by the evidence. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in modifying CALCRIM No. 1203 to specify that the intent to commit robbery includes the intent to aid in the escape from the robbery. Defendant asserts that there was no evidence to support a theory that the asportation of S.A. occurred in order to effectuate defendant and codefendant's escape."], "id": "f37d5e33-c8e5-4047-99ff-c44d839d2777", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Lead counsel testified that in his first meeting with the petitioner, the petitioner \u201cwas in real distress, and he was extremely psychotic\u201d and \u201cstruggling mightily.\u201d He said that the petitioner \u201cwas clearly hearing things\u201d and \u201cwas obviously physically The record does not indicate a further disposition on the petitioner\u2019s especially aggravated <mask> charges. trying to resist whatever it was he was being told to do.\u201d Lead counsel said that he had \u201c[n]o doubt\u201d that the petitioner was suffering from a mental illness. He said that he hired Doctor Keith Caruso to evaluate the petitioner in an unrelated case in which lead counsel was also representing the petitioner and that both Doctor Caruso and the State\u2019s expert determined that the petitioner \u201ccould rely on the defense of insanity\u201d in that case. The trial court gave lead counsel 60 days in which to submit a report from Doctor Caruso in this case, which deadline Doctor Caruso said that he could not meet. Lead counsel received a draft report from Doctor Caruso \u201csometime in the middle of May of [20]09,\u201d which report lead counsel reviewed, annotated, and discussed with Doctor Caruso. Lead counsel\u2019s annotated copy of the May 2009 report is included in the record."], "id": "1ac02237-55ca-4293-9d46-be3b766f80b1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appeal from the District Court for Madison County: Mark A. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded with direction. Brad J. Montag, of Egley, Fullner, Montag, Morland & Easland, P.C., for appellant. Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph for appellee. Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Papik, JJ., and Harder and Masteller, District Judges. Miller-Lerman, J. I. NATURE OF CASE Rosario Betancourt-Garcia (Betancourt), who is serving sentences of imprisonment for his convictions for kidnap- ping, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and conspiracy to commit <mask>, filed a petition for postconviction relief. The district court for Madison County granted an evidentiary hearing on three of Betancourt\u2019s claims and denied the bal- ance of Betancourt\u2019s petition without an evidentiary hearing. Betancourt appeals. He claims on appeal that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing generally concerning several layered claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, related to, - 443 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BETANCOURT-GARCIA Cite as 310 Neb. 440"], "id": "8b9284eb-6eb4-4dfa-920d-4f5fe2c37574", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Before concluding, it is noted that one of the merger doctrine\u2019s initial concerns was to avoid elevating less serious offenses into more serious crimes by liberal application of the <mask> statute\u2019s language. The disparity between the two crimes involved herein, particularly the sentences which may be imposed, cannot be ignored. Attempted escape in the first degree is a class E felony offense (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 110.05, 205.15), whereas kidnapping in the second degree is a class B violent felony offense (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 135.20, 70.02). If, as it appears, the defendant has been subjected to one or more predicate violent felony *30convictions, the mandatory sentence he faces is clearly not insignificant. (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 70.04, 70.08, 70.25.)"], "id": "b1e5d095-64c4-4ce2-889a-e8b0847e5fde", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["I respectfully dissent, however, from the holding that the admission of the incriminating statements obtained in violation of Miranda did not prejudice the jury's finding that defendant kidnapped his girlfriend Guadalupe Montellano. I will summarize several reasons why; they involve my disagreement with the majority about the relationship between the murder and <mask> charges, the mediocre quality of the video footage introduced at trial, and the fact that the video does not, and cannot, corroborate the key element of fear that Montellano emphasized as the reason why, according to her, she got in the car with defendant against her will."], "id": "fd6d3eb5-d089-41c1-b2ab-cc75093c7509", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of first-degree <mask>, sex trafficking, extortion, and three counts of sexual assault. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Carolyn Ellsworth, Judge. A jury found appellant Keair Jamal Boyd guilty of the above- referenced crimes, after which the district court sentenced Boyd to an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 256 months. On appeal, Boyd challenges several evidentiary decisions, jury instructions. and the sufficiency of evidence to support the first-degree kidnapping conviction. We address each of his arguments in turn. Evidentiary rulings Expert testimony Boyd argues that the district court erred by allowing Sergeant Richard Leung to testify as an expert about the pimp-prostitute relationship because the subject matter fell within the jury's knowledge and Leung's testimony \"unfairly bolstered\" the victim-B.W.'s credibility. Boyd also contends that the testimony's prejudicial effect \"far outweighecr its"], "id": "d83f8ba7-5e03-44a9-8462-0b82f94ef76f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Carter told Special Agent Graham that at approximately 12:50 Saturday morning on October 27, 1979, he had received a telephone call from Dennis Simpson. The defendant, Dennis Simpson, told Jonathan Carter in the telephone conversation that he was involved in the <mask> and wore a stocking hat and that the kidnapped car was dropped downtown. Dennis Simpson stated on the telephone that he had seen a red car go by his home in Portchester and suspected that it was driven by the police."], "id": "2f367350-8ffa-469c-8811-7f69e34a1a7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The threat Montellano claimed defendant made cannot be heard on the video; the camera recorded no audio at all. That means that on the key issue of whether Montellano was unlawfully moved by fear, her testimony-impeachable for the reasons identified by the majority ante at pages 913 to 914-was largely if not entirely uncorroborated. Under the circumstances, and with the other points I have already discussed in mind, I cannot hold harmless the admission of the incriminating statements the detectives obtained in violation of Miranda . In my view, a new trial is required on both the murder charge and the <mask> charge."], "id": "37b0a9b9-f04a-46b2-960c-f9dd864c5497", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society requires prosecution in the criminal division of circuit court. The circuit court noted Parks was charged with four Class Y felonies, the most serious classification of offenses other than capital murder. The circuit court specifically found the offenses \"could hardly be more serious\" and \"[d]ue to the seriousness of the offenses and this defendant's level of participation in them, the Court *185is of the opinion the issue of societal protection weighs in favor of the State.\" (2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner. The circuit court found the offenses were committed in an aggressive, premeditated, and willful manner. (3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted. The circuit court found the offenses were committed against not one, but two people, and resulted in the death of Kaleb Watson. (4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and participation in the alleged offense. The circuit court was of the opinion Parks had \"significant\" culpability in the commission of the offenses, specifically noting Parks not only was present at the planning of the robbery and <mask>, which ultimately resulted in a homicide, but \"it is fair to say the homicide would not have occurred but for his involvement.\" The circuit court found Parks \"provided the target and the motivation for the robbery by advising the other defendants of valuables within the victim's residence\"; provided a bag to be used in the robbery and the shoelace used to restrain Watson; and actively participated in the plan he helped concoct by creating a diversion at Watson's front door to allow the Sharps to enter the residence through the back door. (5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence. The circuit court noted Parks had been adjudicated a juvenile offender on five occasions, although none were offenses against persons or felonies. Nevertheless, evidence of antisocial and violent behavior at school was presented, including shoving other students, fighting, and making threats against his peers at school. (6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated as an adult. The circuit court found Parks was neither sophisticated nor mature, and he suffered from low intellectual functioning. (7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the judge of the juvenile division of circuit court that are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile before the expiration of the juvenile's twenty-first birthday. While there were facilities and programs available, the circuit court found there was insufficient evidence from which it could determine the likelihood of rehabilitation. Concerns set forth by the circuit court were the lack of reliable statistics regarding recidivism, the uncertainty of housing options, recurring escapes from the facilities, and the fact that Parks's prior involvement with other juvenile resources, although not the same facilities or programs, had failed to rehabilitate him in the past. The circuit court was concerned Parks's limited intelligence would be a hindrance to successful rehabilitation in a juvenile facility. (8) Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission of the alleged offense. It was undisputed Parks and the Sharp brothers acted as a group during the commission of the offenses. *186(9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile's mental, physical, educational, and social history. The circuit court noted Parks had \"significant challenges\" in his educational history; however, the records did not indicate those challenges impaired his ability to comport himself according to law. (10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the judge. The circuit court noted Parks's age at the time of the offenses; he was three days away from turning sixteen. It also considered that Parks's early cooperation with the police played a \"vital role\" in solving the crimes. However, in contrast, the circuit court found it was noteworthy Parks betrayed Watson, who had befriended and welcomed Parks into his home, and Parks repaid such overtures of friendship with actions that, at the very least, Parks knew would lead to terror and loss of property. Parks addresses each factor separately, but his arguments can be grouped together. As for factors one, two, three, and four, while conceding the offenses are serious felonies, Parks argues he was the least culpable of the three defendants because he was not the person who employed violence against Watson, he did not want to commit the crime, and he ran back to his house after knocking on Watson's front door. This argument is not persuasive. A juvenile may be tried as an adult solely because of the serious and violent nature of the offense. C.B. v. State , 2012 Ark. 220, 406 S.W.3d 796. Furthermore, it is of no moment Parks did not personally employ the gun used during the crimes; his association with the use of weapons in the course of the crimes satisfies the fact the crimes were committed in a violent manner. Neal v. State , 2010 Ark. App. 744, 379 S.W.3d 634."], "id": "aac2eecb-61be-4136-94ec-74858d5a1e8d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Here, Johnson argues that the district court erred in calculating his Guidelines range by determining that his offense of unlawful imprisonment under Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 750.349b was analogous to U.S.S.G. \u00a72A4.1 for <mask>, abduction, and unlawful restraint. Johnson failed to object to the application of \u00a72A4.1 below and thus we review it for plain error. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)."], "id": "93e3d3e0-cc5e-4611-9e08-8dd3e5d6603a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Finally, we decline to exercise our discretion to reduce the maximum sentences imposed on the murder and first degree <mask> since the People\u2019s evidence demonstrated that defendant was a significant member of a gang which mercilessly abducted and crushed the victim. In addition, defendant was required to raise the claim that he was improperly adjudicated a second felony offender at sentencing in order to preserve his claim for appellate review as a matter of law (People v Butler, 203 AD2d 35), and we decline to review in the interest of justice. Concur\u2014Murphy, P. J., Rosenberger, Ross, Rubin and Williams, JJ."], "id": "020e85e7-0c1a-4955-8a28-2e7ee92eb424", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "kidnapping", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["a motion to quash count I, <mask>, and count II, use of a firearm to commit a felony. The district court did not adjudi- cate this allegation in its order. However, the claim is affirma- tively refuted by the record as we determined in Betancourt I, wherein we concluded that counts I and II were filed within the statute of limitations. Further, Betancourt\u2019s counsel filed a motion to quash the State\u2019s amended information based on the statute of limitations and specifically sought dismissal on count III, conspiracy. The record showed that on November 17, 2003, the State timely filed an initial information charging counts I and II and obtained an arrest warrant 2 days after the crimes were com- mitted. The State filed an amended information on May 21, 2014. The district court conducted a hearing on Betancourt\u2019s motion to quash count III. The court heard evidence on whether Betancourt fled from justice for purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 29-110(7) (Reissue 2008), which provides that the time limitation for filing charges \u201cshall not extend to any person fleeing from justice.\u201d That evidence showed the events involv- ing Betancourt\u2019s ultimate arrest in Texas to where Betancourt had fled and subsequent extradition to Nebraska. Given the undisputed evidence that Betancourt had fled Nebraska and by application of \u00a7 29-110(7), the district court overruled Betancourt\u2019s motion to quash count III. A motion to quash on counts I and II would have been similarly unsuccessful under \u00a7 29-110(7). Betancourt I, supra. A hearing on this claim was not warranted."], "id": "a0a2d027-9ea5-49d5-88f9-68046b125805", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Section 1106 limits the evidence the defendant may use to support this assertion. It provides that \"[i]n any civil action alleging conduct which constitutes sexual harassment, sexual assault, or sexual <mask>, opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the plaintiff's sexual conduct, or any of that evidence, is not admissible by the defendant in order to prove consent by the plaintiff or the absence of injury to the plaintiff ....\" (\u00a7 1106, subd. (a).) This general rule is, however, subject to the exception that it \"does not apply to evidence of the plaintiff's sexual conduct with the alleged perpetrator.\" (\u00a7 1106, subd. (b).) The term \"sexual conduct\" within the meaning of section 1106 has been broadly construed to include \"all active or passive behavior (whether statements or actions) that either directly or through reasonable inference establishes a plaintiff's willingness to engage in sexual activity,\" including \"racy banter, sexual horseplay, and statements concerning prior, proposed, or planned sexual exploits.\" ( Rieger , supra , 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 462, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 295.)"], "id": "2702a80f-61f5-456c-aeb0-8d90ec05400d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Sergeant Kessler testified that a \"Generation 3\" ankle monitor was placed on defendant when he was released on EMP. There were no problems with those devices aside from having to charge the <mask>. The device would indicate if the charger was working. The inmates are instructed to notify their supervising deputy if they have problems with the ankle monitor or the charger."], "id": "3cd274f6-7266-4c85-beda-9a7b81a30e58", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In his amended motion, Appellant asserts the facts that he claims to have provided trial counsel would have supported a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Specifically, he points to the heated argument he and Victim had immediately preceding their fight, and the fact that Victim instigated the physical confrontation by throwing a punch at Appellant. These facts, if offered at trial, may well form the basis of voluntary manslaughter. Several Missouri cases indicate that a heated argument, culminating in the victim assaulting the defendant, may constitute evidence of sudden passion upon adequate cause, necessitating a voluntary manslaughter instruction. See State v. Redmond, 937 S.W.2d 205, 208-09 (Mo. banc 1996) ; see also State v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Mo. banc 1991) ; State v. Arnel, 846 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (\"A manslaughter instruction is typically justified when the victim perpetrates <mask> upon the defendant.\")."], "id": "7afe7f93-054b-459c-9b03-2b573265aaec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["a question of subject matter jurisdiction, we address it as a threshold issue. 5 [5,6] Through the STCA, the Nebraska Legislature has enacted a limited waiver of the State\u2019s sovereign immunity with respect to some, but not all, types of tort claims. 6 The STCA contains specific exceptions to the waiver of sover- eign immunity. As relevant here, the intentional tort excep- tion in \u00a7 81-8,219(4) provides that sovereign immunity is not waived for \u201c[a]ny claim arising out of assault, <mask>, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, or interference with contract rights . . . .\u201d Because the language of this exception is nearly identical under both Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 13-910(7) (Cum. Supp. 2020) of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) and \u00a7 81-8,219(4) of the STCA, we have applied cases construing the exception under the PSTCA to cases under the STCA, and vice versa. 7 Our cases construing and applying the intentional tort excep- tion have consistently barred claims like the one alleged by Williams. In Moser v. State, 8 we applied the intentional tort exception to bar a negligence claim brought by the estate of a man who was fatally assaulted by a cellmate. We concluded that the claim that prison officials had negligently double- bunked the two inmates arose out of the assault and thus fell within the STCA\u2019s exception in \u00a7 81-8,219(4) for \u201c[a]ny claim arising out of assault.\u201d In Edwards v. Douglas County, 9 we applied that same excep- tion to bar a claim brought by a woman who was held hostage and sexually assaulted by a former boyfriend. The woman See Lambert v. Lincoln Public Schools, 306 Neb. 192, 945 N.W.2d 84 (2020). See Moser v. State, supra note 2. Edwards v. Douglas County, 308 Neb. 259, 953 N.W.2d 744 (2021). Moser v. State, supra note 2. Edwards v. Douglas County, supra note 7. - 595 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports WILLIAMS v. STATE Cite as 310 Neb. 588"], "id": "007f78f4-19ef-410d-9d9f-36cf332d0e7e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In summary, the plaintiff\u2019s causes of action to recover for false arrest/false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress may proceed insofar as asserted against Detective O\u2019Rourke and Lieutenant Hearle. The plaintiff\u2019s causes of action to recover for assault and <mask> may proceed as against Lieutenant Hearle only. The causes of action for assault, battery, and false arrest/false imprisonment may also proceed against the City under a theory of respondeat superior."], "id": "c113c135-9670-4455-9177-5e4fdb11bf2a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["During the first phase of the trial, Harris only submitted the <mask> claim to the jury, abandoning the assault claim. The jury found in favor of Harris, assessed compensatory damages at $750,000, and found that Jungerman was liable for punitive damages. During the second phase of the trial, the jury awarded Harris $5 million in punitive damages. The trial court accepted the verdicts and entered judgment accordingly. This appeal by Jungerman followed."], "id": "5a5fbf4d-a4d8-478e-8b43-15102a1b6694", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Drivers approaching a signalized intersection in the dark when the traffic signals are not working are supposed to treat the intersection as a four-way stop and proceed only when it is safe. ( Veh. Code, \u00a7 21800, subd. (d)(1).) As in many aspects of daily life, however, \"common experience shows they do not always do so.\" ( Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 775, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170.) It is foreseeable motorists and pedestrians entering an intersection when the traffic signals are not operating due to a power outage, particularly at night, may become confused and suffer harm if the <mask> backup unit is not operational. The foreseeability factor does *731not support an absence of duty as a matter of law."], "id": "5ae996bc-04d7-4512-961d-da1ca563e9af", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The true explanation of the words, \u201c that fart of the city usually called the <mask> \u201d\u2014although I believe it is not given in any of the depositions\u2014is not difficult to be stated. It is found in the deed given by the corporation in 1815, to the purchasers of the lots on the Bowling Green and on State-street. The covenant in that deed describes the lands, to which it relates, as \u201c vacant grounds belonging to the corporation in the vicinity of the premises granted, and commonly called the Battery.\u201d I see no reason to doubt that the words, \u201c usually called the Battery,\u201d have the same meaning in the act of 1821, and ought therefore to be construed as applying exclusively to grounds then vacant, and then belonging to the corporation. Assuredly the word \u201c Battery \u201d had not a different meaning in 1821, from that which it is known to have borne in 1815. As it then excluded the lands ceded to the United States, it continued to exclude them."], "id": "94fe34e8-3952-475b-a8b2-0d48f097fdda", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["II. BACKGROUND On December 2, 2019, Gnanaprakasam was arrested and the State filed a complaint against him in the county court, charging him with one count of third degree domestic assault, a Class I misdemeanor. The State later amended the com- plaint to charge him with assault and <mask> under the Omaha Municipal Code. Following a 1-week delay resulting from withdrawal of his counsel, the case was rescheduled for a bench trial on April 17, 2020. However, on April 7, 2020, the court continued Gnanaprakasam\u2019s trial to June 16 for good cause under \u00a7 29-1207(4)(f). The court cited this court\u2019s and the Douglas County Health Department\u2019s administrative orders regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 16, 2020, Gnanaprakasam filed a motion for abso- lute discharge, asserting that the State failed to bring him to trial within 6 months. At a hearing on his motion, the State called no witnesses and offered no exhibits, but requested the court to take judicial notice of its continuation order, which the court did. Gnanaprakasam introduced an audio record- ing of the hearing regarding the withdrawal of his counsel, the cited administrative orders, and the Nebraska Pandemic Bench Book. The county court overruled Gnanaprakasam\u2019s motion for discharge, citing this court\u2019s and the Douglas County Board of Health\u2019s administrative orders regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. The court found that 197 days had elapsed between See, State v. Brown, ante p. 224, 964 N.W.2d 682 (2021); State v. Chase, ante p. 160, 964 N.W.2d 254 (2021). - 522 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM Cite as 310 Neb. 519"], "id": "e535ec2a-e789-4c4c-9f12-55521b265d93", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Nassau argues for the application of the above-quoted definition of the insured to the assault and <mask> clause and, further, that the insured, in the exception, includes the driver employee Knight, an omnibus insured. At the outset, this court does not agree with those opinions (e.g., American Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v Allstate Ins. Co., 212 Va 302) construing this form of assault and battery clause as referring only to the named insured and not to an omnibus insured. The rationale' of such a constrained interpretation is the belief that assault *459could never be an accident; and so if the clause was construed as proposed by the insurer. This belief, however, is ill founded. Notwithstanding the fact that coverage may, in the end, be withheld from the named insured or an omnibus insured actually responsible for the commission of the assault or directing it to be committed, a view indicated by the discussion to follow, it is illogical to indiscriminately exclude from coverage all insureds whenever an assault is committed, without distinguishing the responsibility, if any, of the particular insured for that specific assault. Without allowing gross distortion of the term \"the insured\u201d, a pattern unfortunately followed in some jurisdictions, this court reaches the conclusion that Knight is an \"insured\u201d under the omnibus clause of the policy. Moreover, this assault and battery clause can preserve its intended effect so as to give equitable and fair treatment to the insurer, the named insured, and the omnibus insured."], "id": "02f63db1-8fe6-481e-ae00-76f1d01b5fe9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On balance, consideration of the factors in Court of Claims Act \u00a7 10 (6) weigh in favor of granting the motion with respect to the causes of action for false arrest, assault, <mask> and negligent hiring, training and supervision. Claimant is to serve and file a proposed claim containing those causes of action in the manner required by Court of Claims Act \u00a7 11 within 30 days of service upon him of a file-stamped copy of this order. Permission to file claims for libel, slander, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of rights under New York State Constitution, article I, \u00a7\u00a7 6, 11 and 12 is denied."], "id": "59b44f05-671f-480a-9520-f16993bf8cad", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["If this be so, then the affidavit purporting to be sworn to before a master in chancery, not being legal proof according to the principle laid down in 9th John. 75, and 11th Id. 175, *324left the ease withotit any proof of publication in New-York. The statute has provided before whom affidavits, to be used before an officer, under the act which authorizes a discharge to be granted, should be sworn to; and a master in chancery is not one of these officers. But the next section does provide when an affidavit may be made before a master in chancery. (2 R. S. 284, \u00a7\u00a7 49, 50. See 9 Wend. 340.) The oath taken before the master in chancery was of no force or validity whatever. No perjury could be assigned on such an affidavit. It \u25a0was not legal proof. It was no proof at all, any more than if the affidavit had been sworn to before a sheriff or constable. There was therefore no proof that the order to show cause had been published, or that the creditors had been notified, as the statute requires, of the time and place of showing cause; and of course the proceeding founded on it was void. It is said, however, that the question of jurisdiction here, was one which was directly passed on by the officer, and of course could not be reviewed except by a direct proceeding in error; and we are referred to Cowen & Hill's Notes, 1016,1017,1020; 17 Wend. 407, and 20 John. 209, for the authority on which the argument is founded. There is such a principle as that relied on by the defendant\u2019s counsel, but it has no application here. Every justice of the peace who holds a court, and entertains an action for assault and <mask>, or malicious prosecution, or slander; and every such magistrate who issues a warrant or attachment without sufficient proof, might be protected under this principle, if it had any application; but it has not. We are therefore compelled to say that the discharge granted in this case is void, and forms no bar to the action."], "id": "78e2bd3d-b710-4da3-85ba-87f28f743f02", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["And he makes the further distinction, that section 6 of the Revised Statutes provided for a separate class of actions, as assaults, &c., whereas the Code in less general terms provides for cases in which title to lands comes in question, and then by the word \u201c but\u201d introduces an exception that in cases of assault, &c., no more costs than damages shall be recovered in cases like the present where less than fifty dollars is recovered, and insists that now though the title to lands comes in question, if. the action is for assault and <mask>, the plaintiff *499recovering less than fifty dollars recovers no more costs than damages."], "id": "6696f780-51dc-4307-aa8c-5402cb295757", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["This case originated when the police were called to investigate a domestic disturbance on June 16, 2017, involving appellant and A.S. Springdale police officer Jacob Enos testified that A.S.'s physical appearance concerned him because she had a large swelling on her nose and under her eye. He spoke with A.S. about what happened and felt her story was credible. Officer Enos testified that during the investigation, appellant was arrested on the charge of third-degree domestic <mask> involving A.S. Later, he saw appellant at the jail, and although he did not speak to her, he testified that she appeared to be very intoxicated based on his observation."], "id": "31db9c37-db2e-4a82-8e5a-640476c41453", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In the unpublished portions of this opinion, we conclude there is substantial evidence Charley committed sexual <mask>, and that his challenge to the electronics search condition of probation has been forfeited. In the published portion, however, we agree with Charley and hold that the condition of probation forbidding him from using, owning or possessing depictions of nudity is unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore we will order the condition stricken. As so modified, the court's disposition order will be affirmed."], "id": "e2b9fc42-27a4-49a1-9495-d4e2a4064cf6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A.A. appeals a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the juvenile court ( Welf. & Inst. Code, \u00a7 602 ) and placing him on probation after the trial court sustained a petition for <mask> with serious bodily injury. ( Pen. Code, \u00a7 243, subd. (d).) Appellant contends that a probation condition prohibiting him from discussing his case on social media is overbroad and violates his First Amendment rights. We affirm."], "id": "dbf3541b-98d0-4d6d-ae62-fc929de1cf46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["4. she was participating in services or no longer using methamphetamine. Father had not been cooperative with the department and had not participated in a drug test. In addition to his recent assault charges, father had a history of assaulting mother in Oklahoma. In March 2020, he was arrested for domestic assault and <mask> by strangulation, and domestic assault and battery in the presence of a minor. Mother told the police officer father choked her and threatened to kill her. Mother sustained facial bruising, a cut on the bridge of her nose, bruising on the inside of both forearms and scratches on her back. The dispositional hearing, originally set for January 19, 2021, was continued and conducted as a contested hearing on March 2, 2021. Father appeared in custody and informed the juvenile court he was taking classes in jail and expected to be released on March 9, 2021. The juvenile court ordered father to complete programs in parenting, domestic violence and outpatient substance abuse treatment, and participate in random drug testing. The court ordered county counsel and father\u2019s attorney to contact the court in Oklahoma regarding the restraining order and set a hearing on March 16, 2021, to review the status of the restraining order and for September 2, 2021, as a six-month review of services. On March 16, 2021, the juvenile court ordered father to provide his attorney certificates of completion for the classes he attended and granted the department discretion to arrange supervised visits for father. In its report for the six-month review hearing, the department recommended the juvenile court terminate father\u2019s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. He regularly visited S.B. but had not completed any of his court-ordered services and was not cooperative with the department. He told his probation officer he did not \u201c \u2018want anything to do with CPS and [would] do it all himself.\u2019 \u201d There were maternal relatives in Oklahoma who were interested in providing S.B. a permanent home and had been approved for placement."], "id": "55843351-c031-4ee4-9647-653c97826674", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*564In addition to this meta-analysis, Dr. Thornton also examined the files of 33 convicted rapists confined in the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, all of whom had been subjected to PPG testing using three sets of stimuli: consensual sex, a rape scenario and a third, more brutal rape scenario involving physical <mask> or even murder which corresponds with the DSM-5 diagnosis for sexual sadism (Thornton tr at 258-259). According to Dr. Thornton, fifty percent of the participants showed a preference for consensual sex, twenty percent for coercion and twenty percent for brutality (Thornton tr at 259; David Thornton, Evidence Regarding the Need for a Diagnostic Category for a Coercive Paraphilia, 39 Arch Sex Behav 411 [2009])."], "id": "0a09d272-152f-49da-8131-32db31c18efa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The offer of the plaintiff to amend, was not broad enough to remove the objection to the pleading. If the allegations relating to the assault and <mask>, slander, abuse and maltreatment had been stricken out of the complaint, it would have presented enough to give the court jurisdiction, although it would have presented at the same time the melancholy relic of a complaint so defectively drawn as to require severe mutilation."], "id": "c5d6df08-3dd7-489a-9977-55f0f322ebbc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court held an evidentiary hearing in April. Based on the evidence presented, which included a police video of Cooper's wife shortly after the alleged aggravated <mask>, the court found Cooper violated all the conditions contained in the January warrant and some of the no-contact conditions from the March warrant. Based primarily on the fact that Cooper committed multiple new crimes, the court revoked probation and imposed the underlying jail sentence. Cooper appeals that decision."], "id": "7da2cd35-be19-4f29-a790-f209c2dab200", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The same principles were expressed by Mr. Justice Edgcomb in Bolivar v. Monnat (232 App. Div. 33, 38), wherein the court stated: \u201c It is not necessary to define the nature of the action with meticulous accuracy. The element of negligence may be wanting because the act was done deliberately rather than carelessly. Under the authority of the Stratton and McGue cases (supra [Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303 ; McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168]) we would be warranted in calling it an action for assault and <mask>. But it matters not what it is named, whether negligence, assault and battery, or an action *98on the case, the fact remains that the complaint alleges a violation of a right or duty growing out of the relations existing between the parties, and this gives plaintiff a right of action against defendant for the damages sustained. The novelty of the action, or the want of an exact precedent does not deprive the plaintiff of a remedy for defendant\u2019s unlawful act.\u201d Exemplifications of these precepts, although factually dissimilar from the instant case, are the holdings in Mitran v. Williamson (21 Misc 2d 106) and Halio v. Lurie (15 A D 2d 62), which hold that the intentional infliction of emotional harm by words or deeds is actionable. (See, also, Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N Y 2d 560, 569.)"], "id": "dc52ef24-e11e-4382-b767-289f58d89744", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-516(f), the trial court merged the convictions for aggravated sexual <mask> and rape of a child into the conviction for continuous sexual abuse of child and sentenced Defendant only as to that count to sixty years as a Range III offender to be served at 100%, by operation of law, in the Department of Correction. It is from these judgments that Defendant now appeals."], "id": "bb715e72-7812-4a5a-92b1-d2982b1ff2fa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["EV charging stations are facilities that use specialized equipment, such as a specific cord and vehicle connector, to provide the service of charging a <mask> in an electric vehicle. The battery is the sole source of power to make the vehicle's wheels turn, the heater and air conditioner operate, and the headlights shine light. The charging service is the product being sold, not the electricity used to power the charging system. By analogy, a laundromat uses electricity to provide clothes drying services, but that does not mean the laundromat's dryers are electric plant, or that the laundromat should be regulated by the Commission. EV charging stations are not \"electric plant\" and, therefore, the Commission lacks statutory authority to regulate their operation. To rule otherwise would conceivably assert jurisdiction over other similar battery-charging services. Some examples would be smart phone charging stations or kiosks, RV parks that allow vehicles to connect to the park's electricity supply, or airports that connect planes to a hangar's electricity supply while parked, which the Missouri General Assembly could not have intended. The Commission stated that the conclusion that electric vehicle charging stations are not \"electric plant\" was \"further buttressed\" by additional considerations. The Commission reasoned that Missouri's public service statutes were enacted to avoid \"destructive competition\" and \"unnecessary duplication of service\" in industries in which natural monopoly conditions exist, but that Commission regulation was inappropriate in \"situations in which competition could serve a useful public purpose.\" The Commission concluded that including KCP&L's electric vehicle charging stations in rate base would not serve the public interest, but would distort what would otherwise be a competitive market:"], "id": "d8e2d7c8-f074-45cd-b2bb-574295a9c64c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["At the conclusion of the State\u2019s proof, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the eighty-one counts of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual <mask>, and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The trial court partially granted the motion finding that the State had introduced proof of penetration for only one count of rape of a child. The trial court further modified eighty of the rape of a child counts to the lesser- included offense of aggravated sexual battery. The motion as to the other counts was denied."], "id": "26554b22-8e12-43d2-9695-90565a021c30", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The record only reflects Meeks's counsel's oral motion to dismiss the sexual <mask> claim as to Fajardo, while reserving Meeks's \"appellate rights as to AutoZone.\" The parties and the court seem to have been operating on the mistaken belief that AutoZone had previously been granted summary adjudication on the sexual battery claim. The jury was not instructed on sexual battery, or asked to return a verdict on such a claim with respect to any party, and Meeks has asserted no claims of error with respect to her sexual battery claim on appeal. The sexual battery claim therefore has been forfeited, to the extent it was not voluntarily dismissed."], "id": "0edfe8fb-a6dd-4c21-b518-b50c6ab1dc68", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["When Glekiah and Merchant testified, they admitted they had been running a *229scam on appellant. Merchant admitted that he and Glekiah were using the scam to steal $100,000 from appellant. Merchant admitted that he had run the same scam on a previous occasion. Glekiah and Merchant admitted they were not entirely honest with the police during the investigation. Glekiah testified that he had previously pled guilty to pandering and was under indictment for another offense in Georgia. Merchant testified that he had previously been convicted of family-violence <mask> in Georgia. During their testimony about the events that took place in Dreams Auto Customs, the video was played both to corroborate their testimony and also to show what was missing from the video."], "id": "935489a0-bdd2-4763-8837-f10759175008", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Wade v. Kalbfleisch (58 N. Y., 282) is in harmony with this view. That was an action for breach of promise of marriage. It was not based on. injury to any right of the plaintiff which had a pecunicvry val/ue. It was based solely on injury to the plaintiff\u2019s feelings; as an action of assault and <mask> would have been based on injury to the jilaintiff\u2019s body. The only difficulty in that case was that the form of the action was on contract. And therefore, it was necessary to show that, in fast, it was not an action based on \u201c wrong done to' the property, rights or interests of another.\u201d (2 R. S., 447, \u00a7 1.)"], "id": "a7c1cdee-a15a-4503-b03b-dd11b79e99f9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant, Christopher Nichol Cox, was convicted by a jury of eighty-one counts of aggravated sexual <mask>, one count of rape of a child, and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The trial court merged the convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child into the conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child and imposed a sixty-year sentence as a Range III offender to be served at 100%, by operation of law, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that: the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance; the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify with the aid of a therapy dog without a hearing to determine the animal\u2019s training or necessity to the victim\u2019s testimony; the trial court improperly bolstered the victim\u2019s testimony by allowing the victim\u2019s entire forensic interview to be played to the jury; the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial when a witness testified that Defendant had other cases and that there were other victims; the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child and thirty of the counts of aggravated sexual battery; the jurors did not make a unanimous decision as to which acts of sexual abuse it relied on to support his continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction; the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence by relying on an enhancement factor that is an essential element of the offense; and the cumulative effect of repeated constitutional errors denied him a fair trial. After hearing oral arguments and following our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of aggravated sexual battery in counts sixteen through twenty-seven, counts forty-eight through fifty-four, and counts sixty-five through eighty-one and accordingly dismiss those counts and remand for entry of amended judgments. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court."], "id": "126e900b-5ab2-4210-a2be-5ef99c270ade", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The case upon which the respondent relies for defeating this application \u2014 McCarthy v. MV AIC (16 A D 2d 35, affd. 12 N Y 2d 922) \u2014 is inapposite and factually distinguishable. The court found in that case that the plaintiff\u2019s brother-in-law, Branch, deliberately drove his car into that owned by her when she was assisting her sister, his wife, a passenger in plaintiff\u2019s car, in getting away from him. For this he was convicted of the crime of assault upon his plea of guilty to the above-described act. After plaintiff recovered a default judgment against Branch, she was unsuccessful in recovering the amount of that judgment from his insurance carrier and brought an action against MVAIC bottomed on the New York automobile accident indemnification indorsement attached to the standard automobile liability policy covering her automobile. The Third Department, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, held that MVAIC was not liable under the uninsured motorist indorsement* for plaintiff\u2019s injuries caused, as they were, by an assault and <mask>."], "id": "1f85d905-3db9-4e0b-aaee-229e2f5ad785", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*240This is an action to recover for property damage sustained when the plaintiffs recreational vehicle caught on fire on April 22, 1986, while plaintiff was driving it on U. S. Route 117, approximately one mile south of Faison, North Carolina. General Motors manufactured the chassis upon which codefendant Heritage Recreational Vehicles, Ltd., assembled the motor home. The vehicle was sold to the plaintiff by the codefendant American Camper Sales, Inc. The theory of liability asserted against General Motors is that the fire was caused because there was a metal clamp attaching the positive <mask> terminal cable to the metal frame of the radiator which eventually caused the insulation material oh the cable to wear out, resulting in an electrical short which caused a fire in the motor compartment."], "id": "29a30224-5bd5-469d-a3a4-b811aafd4bd9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Where the statutory language is clear, \" ' \" 'courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.' \" ' \" ( Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 434 P.3d 564.) Following the plain meaning of section 1203.4a would not lead to absurd results. It is no secret that persons in custody can, and often do, commit crimes or violate institutional rules. (See, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 243.1 [<mask> against custodial officer], 4573.6 [possession of controlled substance in jail].) It is not absurd to encourage their compliance with the law and institutional rules pending their release."], "id": "eee32050-22ef-422e-9600-18bc6a211cd6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In view of this testimony, it is evident that there could be no recovery against the movant on either the express or the implied warranty theories. The Court of Appeals long ago laid down the requirement of privity of contract between the parties for an action for breach of warranty, in Turner v. Edison Stor. <mask> Co. (248 N. Y. 73), which it very recently reiterated in Greenberg v. Lorenz (9 N Y 2d 195, 198), stating:11 There can be no warranty, express or implied, without privity of contract.\u201d In the Greenberg case the court recognized the harshness of the rule which limited actions for breach of warranty arising from the purchase of unwholesome food to the member of the family actually making the purchase and, to extend the right of action to any other member injured as the result thereof, laid down the rule that \u201c [a]t least as to food and household goods, the presumption should be that the purchase was made for all the members of the household\u201d (p. 200). It did not however indicate any intention to vary the privity requirement \u2014 so clearly stated \u2014 in circumstances other than those there presented. Until the Court of Appeals sees fit to change the rule in other than food cases, this court is bound to hold that, in actions like the present one, without privity of contract between the parties there can be no action on an express or implied warranty."], "id": "5fb4ce53-5f1b-4a7f-8179-1ea297d924c8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant's claim of correctable error is based on Taylor. In Taylor , the jury convicted the defendant of <mask> with SBI, assault by means of force *478likely to produce GBI, and willful infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (\u00a7 273.5, subd. (a) ), but found not true the GBI allegations as to each of the three charged crimes. ( Taylor, supra , 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 17-18, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693.) Notwithstanding the not true finding on the GBI allegations, the trial court found that Taylor's current offense was a serious felony. ( Id. at p. 22, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693.) Faced with an express jury finding that Taylor had not inflicted GBI, the Taylor court held that the imposition of the enhancement violated his statutory and constitutional right to a jury trial. ( Id . at pp. 20, 30, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693.)"], "id": "7ba48058-4204-46c5-ab00-650eccba5da2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In May 1994, a rent receiver was appointed to enter the premises and collect the rents. The second-captioned action was commenced in January 1995, seeking termination of the leasehold estates of all tenants of the premises. Defendants Cruz, <mask>, Kendall, Albertini, Beck and Access (collectively, the Answering Defendants) claim that from the inception of their tenancies, Amerasian knew that they were planning to use the premises for residential purposes and encouraged them to perform renovations incident to such use. Collectively, defendants claim to have spent about $375,000 on renovations. They claim that they are now rent-stabilized tenants and that Dime\u2019s interest in the premises is subject to their rights under rent stabilization. Jonathan Hollander and Jacqueline Christy, who are, respectively, the presidents of Battery and Access, maintain that they have used the \"corporate\u201d space for their own residences. Dime claims that it did not learn of the Answering Defendants\u2019 alleged residential use until some time *394after the appointment of the receiver. Dime does not at this point seek summary judgment with respect to the rent stabilization coverage issue (although it mentions that the premises are not legally zoned for residential use). However, Dime asserts that even if the Answering Defendants are assumed to be rent-stabilized tenants, Dime (or a prospective foreclosure purchaser) is not liable for rent overcharges collected by the mortgagor, Amerasian. In other words, Dime contends that a mortgagee who has never collected rents or had any relationship with the tenants is not responsible for any rent overcharges.*"], "id": "e8004217-c0c3-4af8-9920-0d0abdbf38eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Do the words then embrace that part of the <mask> which the corporation had before granted to the United States? The necessary reply to this question, it seems to me, is the same as to the former\u2014certainly not. An authority to extend the Bat*8tery six hundred feet implies, that no such extension had then heen made; but such an extension of that part of the Battery which belonged to the United States was no longer possible, to the extent of five hundred feet, with the exception of the small space of water covered by the Bridge\u2014it had already been made. Moreover, the corporation could have no power to extend a part of the Battery not belonging to themselves, nor in their possession. Nor can we be justified in saying that the legislature meant to invade the rights of the United States, by granting such an authority; for it is to be observed, that it is a present and absolute, not a future and contingent authority, that the act of 1821 plainly confers. It is an authority that, if exercised at all, might be exercised at once. Its exercise was not meant to be suspended until the United States should cease to be the owners of the lands, that had been ceded to them. r \u2022#"], "id": "2ed23ec4-0cea-4370-ae14-8ad34a7ee66b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The two pending applications present a third category of cases, namely, those that do not meet the evidentiary tests but appear to have a ring of truth. In the case of Sneha Anne Philip, M.D., the application is supported by affidavits from her husband, Ronald Lieberman, M.D., and her mother, Ansa Philip, as well as a report by a private investigator hired by the family. The documents establish that Dr. Philip lived in <mask> Park City, located near the Twin Towers, and that, on the evening of September 10, 2001, she used her credit card to purchase various items from a store located directly across from the World Trade Center. No trace of such items was found in the Battery Park City apartment and it is conceded that she did not sleep there that night. Despite a diligent search, Dr. Philip has not been seen or heard from since such time."], "id": "c26026c6-cacb-4f1e-bba6-5d7ef5ccb6bd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The jury found Valdez guilty of <mask> by gassing. At the conclusion of a priors trial, the jury also found Valdez's strike prior and prison priors to be true. The trial court sentenced Valdez to 11 years in the state prison, consisting of the upper term of four years, doubled because of the strike prior, plus three one-year prison priors."], "id": "76c09f83-ff55-4a0b-b9fd-0dafb4ca3b23", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["According to the probation department, Cooper pled to reckless driving in August 2002 in a case initially filed as a DUI. Less than a month later, she again was charged with a DUI. Less than two months later, Cooper was arrested again for DUI, convicted, and ordered to complete an 18-month alcohol education program. Less than six months later, Cooper was arrested and charged with DUI as well as criminal threats, <mask> on a peace officer, and gassing. In November 2004, she was arrested for driving with a suspended license. In October 2006, Cooper again committed a DUI. In July 2007 she committed a hit-and-run; she also was charged with driving while her license was suspended for failure to comply with DUI conditions. In July 2009, Cooper was charged with felony DUI causing injury and hit-and-run with injury committed in November 2007. Cooper also was convicted of theft and drug crimes between 1989 and 2008."], "id": "4d106728-ac62-485a-aaa8-036aeb9bedcb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["really frightened\u201d7 and that he then left her telling her to stay on the roof until he got down or he would kill her8. From this evidence the jury could have found and, by reference to the instruction given them on the assault count9 it is implicit in the guilty verdict that they did find, that the assault with intent to rape was committed antecedently, inside the door to the roof, by the defendant\u2019s mute offer \u2014 through the display of the knife coupled with obviously present ability to exercise unlawful physical violence upon the person of his victim if she did not obey him (People v. Wood, 10 A D 2d 231, 234-237; see, also, Hays v. People, 1 Hill 351; Mulligan v. People, 5 Park. Crim. 105, 111-112; 6 C. J. S., Assault and <mask>, \u00a7 57, p. 913) and that such assault was committed for the purpose of preventing her resistance and with the intent to rape her10."], "id": "b4c55e68-da75-40be-9082-bb9375fddf5f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["I do not perceive either the propriety nor the soundness of this view of the subject, though I am aware that it has been *488by some regarded as the correct one. If the whole question of damages were open to the jury, as in actions of tort generally, if it were proper to instruct the jury to give such damages as all the circumstances of the case seemed to require, with the same latitude given in actions for slander, assault and <mask>, fraud, deceit, &c., then, indeed, they should not be instructed to add interest as further damages. But such is not the case here. The plaintiff is confined by a rigid limitation of the extent of recovery to a prescribed rule of computation, which the jury may not exceed; and I can conceive of no more reason for submitting the question of allowing interest to their discretion, than for leaving to them the question whether the plaintiffs\u2019 recovery shall be computed according to the market value, on the day fixed. This doctrine has some foundation in the anonymous case found in 1 Johns. R. 315, and is sought to be implied also from Dox v. Dey, 3 Wend. 356."], "id": "e9706c6e-8622-4ab7-9cc9-3424457685d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant is charged with the crime of Felonious Assault, that would be Mr. Leffew, and felonious assault is just another name for assault with a dangerous weapon. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the defendant either attempted to commit a <mask> on Michael Porter or did an act that would cause a reasonable person to fear or apprehend an immediate battery. A battery is a forceful or violent touching of the person or something closely connected with the person. Second, that the defendant intended either to injure Michael Porter, or to make Michael Porter reasonably fear an immediate battery. Third, that at the time, the defendant had the ability to commit a battery, appeared to have the ability, or thought he had the ability. Fourth, that the defendant committed an assault with a knife."], "id": "cdefcd3e-d992-42a0-b805-cfb41bd441f4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The transfer of the cause from the Superior Court to the-Marine Court was ordered pursuant to the Marine Court Act of 1872 (L. 1872, ch. 629, \u00a7 3, sub. 12), which reads as follows: \u201c Any other court of record in the city and county of New York shall have power, by an order to be entered by its direction on its minutes, to send any action of libel, slander, assault, <mask>, criminal- conversation, seduction, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment, pending, or that may hereafter be brought in said courts of record, after issue has been joined therein, to-the said Marine Court for trial, and a certified copy of such order shall be delivered to and filed with the clerk of the said Marine Court, and entered by him in its minutes, and thereupon the said Marine Court of the city of New York shall have immediate and exclusive jurisdiction of such action, and the said jurisdiction of the said court, as to the amount of the recovery in such action, costs and additional allowances therein, shall, for the purposes of said action, be the same, and as full and comprehensive as that of the court from whence the same proceeds.\u201d"], "id": "b590f00d-1769-43de-9561-b61fca6737a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Although there is one case (see, Henry v Bronx Lebanon Med. Ctr., 53 AD2d 476 [1st Dept 1976]) relied upon by defendants in their reply papers which supports the proposition that even if Dr. Morgenstern did perform the procedure, such act cannot give rise to a lack of informed consent claim much less to a <mask> claim, that case involved the presentation of competent evidence establishing a practice at Lenox Hill Hospital by attending physicians to allow residents to do a particular procedure. On this record the defendants, who have the burden of establishing their entitlement to summary judgment (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]) have failed to submit any competent evidence that there was such a practice with respect to the procedure performed here. I further note that this ground was only raised in the defen*317dants\u2019 reply papers, which is improper. (See, Dannasch v Bifulco, 184 AD2d 415 [1st Dept 1992].) Similarly, the defendants\u2019 claim that the battery claim should be dismissed because the plaintiff actually consented to Dr. Morgenstern\u2019s performance of the procedure by signing the aforementioned consent form was also raised for the first time in defendants\u2019 reply. In any event, in light of the allegations contained in the verified complaint, the consent form only raises a factual issue as to whether there was consensual contact by Dr. Morgenstern."], "id": "448f7812-1e6d-40a4-ba0d-2a50655df566", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["With respect to the plaintiff\u2019s claims that his conduct amounted to negligence, the law is clear that there is no cause of action in New York for a negligent assault (Salimbene, 217 AD2d at 994). Even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff swung the bat twice to get Sciortino away from him, it is clear that such an \u201cact was done with the intention of inflicting an offensive bodily contact upon [Sciortino] or putting him in apprehension of such contact and thus, an assault was committed regardless of whether there was actual intent to inflict injury\u201d (id., quoting Trott v Merit Dept. Store, 106 AD2d 158, 160 [1st Dept 1985]). \u201cNew York has adopted the prevailing modern view that, once intentional offensive contact has been established, the actor is liable for assault and not negligence, even when the physical injuries may have been inflicted inadvertently\u201d (id., quoting Mazzaferro v Albany Motel Enters., 127 AD2d 374, 376 [3d Dept 1987]). Even if the theory was that the plaintiff used more force than was reasonably necessary to defend himself, the resulting legal liability would be for assault and <mask>, and not negligence (Figueroa v Kirmayer, 32 AD2d 923, 924 [2d Dept 1969]). The allegations in the underlying complaint, and the trial and deposition testimony of the plaintiff demonstrate that the injuries occurred as a result of an assault, and not negligence."], "id": "4e613a2b-bff2-4d86-9dc6-e08d70159742", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, although plaintiff has not presented the court with expert submissions to the contrary, the court is not persuaded that, in the end, any \u201cevidence created\u201d through the structured and unstructured interviews and <mask> of tests sought to be administered will be conclusive on issues of causation and/or damages. Among other things, admittedly, inquiry should not begin and end with the parents since \u201cthe involvement of numerous children and families in generating the allegations adds another potential dimension of social influence and distortion to the parent-child dynamic . . . [T]he pattern of communications between families as well as within the family warrants exploration\u201d (affirmation of Dr. Bursztajn, \u00b6 8). Seemingly, there is no logical or definitive end to the inquiry."], "id": "2804e7e5-16a8-4f04-9107-cd449b57d09f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["By the wrongful act of defendant\u2019s testator, the plaintiff lost, for a time, the services of his daughter,' which were of pecuniary value to him. I think he should recover, although the wrongdoer is dead. It would be a strange doctrine that, if a robber forcibly and violently took from one\u2019s pocket a large sum of money, the robber\u2019s executors would not be liable to an action for the amount thus taken, for the reason that the action of assault and <mask> did not survive."], "id": "65f4fdd4-f096-410d-85dc-459a91ea97d7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\"[A] frisk for weapons is not justified unless the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, considered in conjunction with rational inferences to be drawn therefrom, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.\" ( People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 176-177, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 546.) A claim of \"harassing\" customers of a business, with no reports of violence, <mask>, assault, threats or weapons does not reasonably suggest the presence of weapons. Nor did defendant's conduct, or wearing a jacket and sweatshirt on a \"pretty warm\" day provide reasonable grounds to believe he was armed and/or dangerous and might gain immediate control of a weapon. ( People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 927, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785.) Thus, there was not reasonable *97suspicion to patsearch defendant once he was detained."], "id": "2774ddca-4106-4220-82fa-b4c1fefe023e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["While Fogal (41 A D 2d 468, supra) did not involve the issue of the Statute of Limitations, it is this court\u2019s belief that the Appellate Division\u2019s reliance upon Canterbury v. Spence (464 F. 2d 772, supra) indicates that it would also approve the Federal court\u2019s holding that the ithree-year Statute of Limitations governing negligence actions rather than the one-year Statute of Limitations governing assault and <mask> actions is applicable (see, also, Wilkenson v. Vesey, 110 R. I. 606)."], "id": "eb010926-3614-4973-a025-527aa1676eed", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Such being the condition of the premises when the act of 1821 was passed, let us now give our attention to the words of the act. The first sentence of the first section declares, that <c it shall be lawful for the mayor, aldermen, &c., of the city of New-York, to extend that part of the said city usually called the <mask> into the bay, and into the North and East rivers such distance as they may deem proper, not exceeding six hundred feetand the next sentence then vests in the corporation, for the^purposes already mentioned, all the title of the people of the state to all the lands that the proposed extension was meant to cover."], "id": "5682a781-eedb-4c09-a96c-07e2929734fe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment was based upon a statute of that State which in pertinent part defines aggravated assault and <mask> as follows: \u2018 \u2018 Whoever unlawfully and maliciously inflicts upon another person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, any grievous bodily harm * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor \u201d. (18 Purdon\u2019s Penna. Stats., \u00a7 4709 [Penal Code of 1939].)"], "id": "c412ebd5-d95c-4b8a-96a6-1fcc4e760f39", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The same principles were expressed by Mr. Justice Edgcomb in Bolivar v. Monnat (232 App. Div. 33, 38), wherein the court stated: \u201c It is not necessary to define the nature of the action with meticulous accuracy. The element of negligence may be wanting because the act was done deliberately rather than carelessly. Under the authority of the Stratton and McGue cases (supra [Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303 ; McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168]) we would be warranted in calling it an action for assault and <mask>. But it matters not what it is named, whether negligence, assault and battery, or an action *98on the case, the fact remains that the complaint alleges a violation of a right or duty growing out of the relations existing between the parties, and this gives plaintiff a right of action against defendant for the damages sustained. The novelty of the action, or the want of an exact precedent does not deprive the plaintiff of a remedy for defendant\u2019s unlawful act.\u201d Exemplifications of these precepts, although factually dissimilar from the instant case, are the holdings in Mitran v. Williamson (21 Misc 2d 106) and Halio v. Lurie (15 A D 2d 62), which hold that the intentional infliction of emotional harm by words or deeds is actionable. (See, also, Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N Y 2d 560, 569.)"], "id": "fc6edf5b-213a-4211-8393-62a0db5a1d62", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Judge BRONSON\u2019S views in this case were repudiated by Justice Parker in Darry v. The People (10 N. Y., 161), but were approved in The People v. Butler (3 Parker, 385). In Darry\u2019s Case (10 N. Y., 120) the killing was charged by the indictment to have been done by the prisoner with malice aforethought, according to the common law form, and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, under the statute, *490by striking and beating the deceased person with a chair, and with his hands and foot. The jury were charged that the prisoner might be found guilty under the second subdivision of the statute, which was excepted to. The prisoner was convicted of murder and the case was reviewed in the Court of Appeals upon this \u2022exception. Upon the first argument the judges were equally divided in opinion (2 Parker, 606), but upon the second hearing the conviction was reversed, upon the ground that when the violence was aimed at a particuliar person, the case did not fall within the second subdivision. Justice Parker, in his opinion, discusses the sixth section of title 2, defining manslaughter in the first degree, and says that unintentional killing, while intending and committing an assault and <mask> upon the person killed, falls within this section, and that unintentional killing while intending and committing a mayhem or other felony, upon the person lrilled, is murder, (pp. 160-161.) This question not being in the case, Judge Selden expressly refused to pass upon it (p. 149), and Judge Denio was silent upon the subject."], "id": "9a640a8f-e331-4365-8179-894eee04979e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["No such error is present. The district court correctly determined that, of the nine robbery counts, the greatest offense level among them (Count 6) was 30. To arrive at this level, the court began with a base offense level of 20, U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2B3.1(a), then added a 6-level enhancement for use of a firearm, U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2B3.1(b)(2)(B), and a further 2- level enhancement for bodily injury to a victim, U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2B3.1(b)(3)(A). The court then properly added 5 more levels for committing multiple related offenses, U.S.S.G. \u00a7 3D1.4, and subtracted 3 levels because White accepted responsibility, U.S.S.G. \u00a7 3E1.1(a), (b). For criminal history, the court accurately calculated White\u2019s category of IV based on 7 points (1 for <mask>, 2 for carrying a handgun without a license, 2 for robbery, and 2 for committing the instant offenses while under sentence for robbery). Based on these calculations, the court properly determined that White\u2019s guidelines range for the robberies was 135 to 168 months in prison. The court also properly determined that the Guidelines called for 228 months in prison for White\u2019s three weapons counts, which is the minimum required by statute (one count required 60 months; two counts required 84 months minimum due to brandishing a firearm). See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A)(i)\u2013(ii); U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2K2.4(b)."], "id": "4eee401b-7684-4937-9b9b-35bbf8d17bdd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["It is well settled that the intent to do harm is not a necessary element of a <mask>. (See, Oates v New York Hosp., supra, at 370; Masters v Becker, 22 AD2d 118, 119-120 [2d Dept 1964]; Villanueva v Comparetto, 180 AD2d 627 [2d Dept 1992]; Maines v Cronomer Val. Fire Dept., 50 NY2d 535, 545546 [1980]; PJI 3:3 [1995 Supp].) A claim for battery is stated if one alleges bodily contact which is offensive and is made with intent. (PJI 3:3; 2 NY PJI 18 [1995 Supp].) The necessary intent is the intent to make contact, not to do injury. (2 NY PJI, op. cik, at 19; Villanueva v Comparetto, supra, at 629.) What is welcome and inoffensive contact by one person can easily amount to offensive contact by another."], "id": "4e250d8e-c62f-4c08-8b8f-fa2c750ed72e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["I am, therefore, constrained to hold that article 4 of the Debtor and Creditor Law was properly construed in Matter of Berman (supra) and does not extend to a judgment debtor against whom the judgment arose out of tort for assault and <mask>. As the petitioner in this case cannot, therefore, be exempted from arrest under such a judgment, it follows that the objection of the objecting creditor on that ground is good, and that the motion to strike out the same must be denied. As to that objecting creditor, therefore, the petition is not good, because it seeks relief which as against him cannot be given. The motion to dismiss the petition as to that objecting creditor, therefore, must be granted."], "id": "6da76015-1f16-4cd8-8b86-ce1a22b3afe3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Although the conduct of Mast, Miller and Calle alleged in the complaints was wholly inappropriate, it is not so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree as to be utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Thus, plaintiff has not properly alleged causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (see, Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135, 143-144; Burlew v American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 NY2d 412, 418-418; Fischer v Maloney, 43 NY2d 553, 557; Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 AD2d 169; Marshall v Nelson Elec., supra; Roster v Chase Manhattan Bank, supra). Therefore, we modify the order on appeal by granting the motions of Mast, Miller and Calle to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We further modify the order by limiting plaintiff\u2019s causes of action for slander and <mask> to conduct that occurred after February 23, 1992. (Appeals from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Calvaruso, J.\u2014Dismiss Causes of Action.) Present\u2014Fallon, J. P., Wesley, Doerr, Balio and Boehm, JJ."], "id": "7b7c0ffd-8d76-4186-9921-08da9ca368e7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant Jungerman's actions manifest reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff. Defendant Jungerman knew or should have had information from [sic] which he in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that the alleged negligent conduct created a high degree of probability of injury and thereby showed complete [sic] indifference or conscious disregard for Plaintiff's safety. While the second sentence of the punitive damages allegation related to the negligence claim, the first sentence was applicable to the intentional tort claims. Liberally granting Harris all favorable inferences from his pleading, the petition sufficiently asserted that the wrongful acts alleged in the <mask> claim were done with a reckless indifference to the rights of Harris. The petition gave Jungerman fair notice of the nature of the demand for punitive damages and the grounds upon which it rested. Harris's petition sufficiently alleged a cause of action for punitive damages for battery. The point is denied."], "id": "e2af2133-c894-4ef9-bfbe-87fae635aa84", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Even were we to analyze the 2008 findings challenged here, which we do not, and conclude that the sentencing court erred in 2008 when it classified the assault and <mask> convictions as serious felonies and imposed five-year terms for the corresponding section 667, subdivision (a) allegations accordingly, that claim could not be presented to the trial court in 2015, as it correctly ruled. The sentencing court's 2008 findings were not appealed and are *380now final; the fact that defendant's crimes were found to be serious felonies rendered him ineligible for relief under section 1170.126."], "id": "5b9f708d-3ddd-49b2-95b8-8238d9347639", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Upon defendants\u2019 demand, Williams filed a verified complaint dated March 22, 2012 (petition, exhibit A). The complaint alleged that on the day in question, \u201cwithout justification\u201d defendants delivered multiple kicks and punches to Williams\u2019 head and body, slammed him against a wall, threw him down the stairs and shouted racial epithets at him (id. \u00b6\u00b6 11-14). The complaint also stated that the defendants submitted false reports about the incident, which resulted in disciplinary charges being filed against Williams, and sanctions imposed on him (id. If 16-20). Williams\u2019 pleading set forth causes of action under 42 USC \u00a7 1983, and for <mask> and intentional infliction of emotional distress."], "id": "5a4c62e1-0e8e-4ac8-9dd9-78a044c7b8da", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["5. In this situation the act of the 27th of March, 1821, was passed. The.corporation was authorized to extend that part of the city usually called the <mask> into the river six hundred feet, and all the title of the people of the State, in and to the land, and land under water, in front of and adjoining to the said Battery for that distance, was vested in the mayor and commonalty, \u201c to remain for the purpose of extending such Battery for a public walk, and for erecting public buildings and works of defence thereon; hut without any power to dispose of the same for any other use or purpose whatsoever, and without any power of selling it, or any part of it.\u201d Under this act, the reversionary right of the State to the land under water on which the castle stands, and to most of that over which the bridge ran, thus passed to the corporation upon the tenure expressed."], "id": "030bb9b9-3137-485a-9ffe-0f8d0157b89f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["William G. Mulligan, Jr., a creditor, has filed objections \u2014 one of which is that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief demanded in his petition as against the objecting creditor by reason of the fact that such creditor is a judgment creditor holding a judgment against the petitioner which was a judgment in tort arising out of an assault and <mask>."], "id": "593a6355-290c-45cd-b897-19b473bc51b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["(a) plaintiff Avena will receive from Ford either repair of the engine block of his 1977 vehicle or reimbursement of his out-of-pocket expenses for repair of his vehicle\u2019s cracked engine block. Inspection has revealed that a new engine including <mask> is required. Credit for $181 will be given to Mr. Avena; (b) plaintiff Silverman will receive from Ford an inspection of his 1977 Ford LTD vehicle at a mutually convenient time and place, such inspection to determine whether his vehicle has exhibited any of the known symptoms of the cracked engine block problem. If a crack is detected, it will be corrected; (c) both plaintiffs Avena and Silverman will execute and deliver several releases to Ford acknowledging re*446ceipt of consideration in connection with the compromise and releasing Ford from all liability relating to the cracked engine block problem of their vehicles; (d) Ford will pay to the attorneys for the plaintiffs reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses in the amount of $6,000; (e) as a condition of the compromise of their claims, plaintiffs will seek and obtain an order of discontinuance which shall dismiss with prejudice all individual claims asserted by the named plaintiffs and discontinue without prejudice any claims purportedly asserted on behalf of the putative members of the alleged but uncertified class; (f) as a condition of the compromise, Ford requires that the proposed order of discontinuance contain no notice to putative members of the alleged but uncertified class and that if the court determines that such notice is necessary, then Ford shall withdraw from this settlement agreement. An affidavit of plaintiffs\u2019 attorney is submitted in which he states that he has advised his clients that the settlement is fair, equitable and in the best interests of the parties. He states that they advised him that they agree to the terms."], "id": "6361ac87-d6dd-4fc7-9d7f-7ce747b69ea6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendants\u2019 contention is that the quoted allegations are based upon an assumed right to sue for damages resulting from fright, that there is no such cause of action in this State (Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107; O\u2019Brien v. Moss, 220 App. Div. 464; Adams v. Harry T. Mangurian, Inc., 204 Misc. 890), and hence that said allegations should be stricken from the complaint. The rule relied upon by the defendants is limited to cases where there has been no contact or <mask> of the plaintiff whatever (Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231; Sawyer v. Dougherty, 286 App. Div. 1061, motion for leave to appeal denied 309 N. Y. 1032). It was laid down as a matter of policy because of \u20181 the practical consideration that where there has been no physical contact there is danger that fictitious claims may be fabricated.\u201d (Comstock v. Wilson, supra, p. 239.) In the case at bar, reading the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff, it is alleged that one or both of defendants\u2019 automobiles struck plaintiff\u2019s testator, and that he was rendered unconscious upon the highway, so that he was later struck again by a third automobile, whose owner is not a party hereto. Since it is alleged that plaintiff\u2019s testator was injured by at least one of the defendants\u2019 automobiles and that both drivers negligently caused the testator to be struck, there is involved merely a matter of causation. The allegations that plaintiff\u2019s testator was frightened and disoriented by the negligent manner in which defendants operated their automobiles are made to establish causal relation between defendants\u2019 conduct and plaintiff\u2019s testator\u2019s injury. Although the allegations may not be in the most artistic form they are sufficient for the purpose and sufficient to withstand this motion (LaRue v. Tiernan, 285 N. Y. 550, affg. 260 App. Div. 337; Mullaney v. Blasso, 264 N. Y. 577; Quelch v. Miller, 261 N. Y. 600; Hancock v. Steber, 208 App. Div. 455)."], "id": "cad11eb0-a688-47ea-95a1-6d590e4e662b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["This question was objected to by Graham and Van Wyck, as it would be improper to go into the occurrences of the whole day, and as they should be confined to the assault and <mask>. The court said they had better go on and confine themselves as much as possible to the assault and battery. (Witnessproceeds.) vV'ent with Cassidy to the Orange party, who were carrying a flag\u2014(they were John Moore, Henry Bush, Mullen, and Lowry)\u2014Asked Moore if that was the Orange colours he was carrying\u2014-Moore *90took hold of the pole with both his hands, and struck him; Witness was struck by the four defendants\u2014felt the blows for several days\u2014was in danger of his life\u2014the pole was from eight to twelve feet long, and from three to four inches square. Witness had no weapon\u2014he had a debate\u2014that is, he defended himself. The Orangemen were armed\u2014one of them had a carpenter\u2019s hammer. Witness made no attempt to strike until he was struck. There were between twelve and twenty Orangemen. Their head quarters were at Green\u2019s, McDonald\u2019s, McKeever\u2019s and Burges\u2019. Witness was very much astonished and frightened at seeing \u00a1the Orange flag. They marched along and cried out, \u201c come forward you damned croppies\u201d\u2014they meant republicans. Witness told them they had better go to the British consul, and he would send them home. Witness had been forced to leave his country on account of Orangemen. Went to the police when he saw it\u2014he could not make them understand it. They called out for croppies and papists. Croppy is a person not belonging to the Orange party\u2014one who does not join in their society. They paraded in the morning about five o\u2019clock, and he heard guns. When they knocked witness down, he saved his life by saying, \u201c don\u2019t strike me, I am one of your side\u201d\u2014he said so to make his escape. It was about six o\u2019clock in the afternoon when he was struck. All the defendants took part in the aggression. Witness is a catholic. They called him papist, and he said they did not know what he professed. Witness does think they were in earnest. Cautioned them to leave off, and they appeared to be angry."], "id": "71719227-ba95-4318-b8cc-da0b8419c42d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part as follows: The trial court's grant of summary adjudication in favor of AutoZone on Meeks's retaliation claim is affirmed. The judgment in favor of defendants is affirmed with respect to Meeks's sexual <mask> claim. The judgment is reversed with *880respect to Meeks's other claims, and the matter is remanded for a new trial and any other necessary proceedings. Meeks is awarded her costs on appeal."], "id": "28d0c584-b9be-4b83-8937-1d88f616963b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The underlying facts are largely undisputed. By an April 1998 information, the State of Florida charged that, on October 1, 1997, petitioner, who was 18 at the time, violated former Florida Statutes \u00a7 800.04 (3) by committing an act of sexual <mask> *1030as defined in Florida Statutes \u00a7 794.011 (1) (h)1 upon a child under the age of 16.2 On June 4, 1999, petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge for which the court withheld adjudication, and the court entered an \u201corder of supervision\u201d placing petitioner on \u201csexual offender probation\u201d for four years. In March 2001, the Florida court granted a defense motion to terminate petitioner\u2019s probation and petitioner was thereafter required to register as a sex offender under Florida Statutes \u00a7 943.0435, Florida\u2019s version of SORA."], "id": "16eac674-ad54-42fb-9609-596546f8c375", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["(a) A person commits domestic battering in the first degree if: (1) With the purpose of causing serious physical injury to a family or household member, the person causes serious physical injury to a family or household member by means of a deadly weapon; (2) With the purpose of seriously and permanently disfiguring a family or household member or of destroying, amputating, or permanently disabling a member or organ of a family or household member's body, the person causes such an injury to a family or household member; (3) The person causes serious physical injury to a family or household member under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; (4) The person knowingly causes serious physical injury to a family or household member he or she knows to be sixty (60) years of age or older or twelve (12) years of age or younger; (5) The person: (A) Commits any act of domestic battering as defined in \u00a7 5-26-304 or \u00a7 5-26-305; and (B) For conduct that occurred within the ten (10) years preceding the commission of the current offense, the person has on two (2) previous occasions been convicted of any act of <mask> against a family or household member as defined by the laws of this state or by the equivalent laws of any other state or foreign jurisdiction; or (6) With the purpose of causing physical injury to a family or household member, the person causes physical injury to a family or household member by means of a firearm. (b)(1) Domestic battering in the first degree is a Class B felony. (2) However, domestic battering in the first degree is a Class A felony upon a conviction under subsection (a) of this section if: (A) Committed against a woman the person knew or should have known was pregnant; or (B) The person committed one (1) or more of the following offenses within five (5) years of the offense of domestic battering in the first degree: (i) Domestic battering in the first degree; (ii) Domestic battering in the second degree, \u00a7 5-26-304; (iii) Domestic battering in the third degree, \u00a7 5-26-305; or (iv) A violation of an equivalent penal law of this state or of another state or foreign jurisdiction. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-26-303."], "id": "59bf2e15-6c33-490e-9670-067b6f6ea456", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The contention for a diverse result based on the allegation that at the time of the settlement of the account of the executor, a similar diversion was permitted to pass unchallenged, if seriously *779advanced, which may well be doubted, possesses no possible merit. The fact that an individual may condone an assault and <mask> upon his person or property on one occasion, will not furnish any legal justification for a repetition of the offense at a future time. It may be noted further that at the time of the former judicial settlement this objector was an infant."], "id": "4e492945-0ccb-42ce-ad06-d3dcb7a1fadf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*796796 INDEX. \u201c that what one might call for would be the same as if both should order it.\u201d Held, that the defendant's account for liquors, &c., furnished to each, created a joint obligation against both, and constituted a valid counter claim to the plaintiffs demand. Hartung v. Siccardi, 660 36. An administrator, by indorsing a promissory note and delivering it before maturity for a debt contracted by the intestate\u2019s widow for necessaries furnished to her after the decease, renders himself personally liable, although in making the indorsement he adds to his name the title of administrator. Sieehnan v. Allen, 661 See Appeal, 20. Assignment, 13, 14, 16. Auctioneers, 1. Broker, 1 to 3. Evidence, 60, 61. Injunction, 1 to 4. Married Women, 3. Mechanics\u2019 Lien Law, 12 to 17, 19, 37, 38, 91 to 98. Principal and Agent, 6, 7. Sheriff\u2019s Sale, 1 to 7. SEAL. . See Principal and Agent, 8. SEAMEN\u2019S WAGES. 1. In an action for wages as a seaman, proof that the plaintiff worked on board a sloop and -that the defendant was the owner thereof, is prim\u00e9 facie sufficient to sustain a recovery. Dougherty v. Gallagher, 670 2. But where the master testified, that he and the defendant were jointly interested in the business wherein the sloop was employed\u2014that by arrangement between them, the defendant was to pay half the dockage and the witness to pay the hands\u2014that the witness engaged the plaintiff and then told him of the arrangement and that he was to look to the witness for his wages; held, that this testimony being uncontradicted, established a special agreement between the witness and the plaintiff, and formed a bar to the action against the defendant. Id. See Ships and Shipping, 1 to 4. SECURITY. See Appeal, 27, 28. Costs, 2 to 4. SELF DEFENCE. See Assault- and <mask>, 4. SET OFF. See Evidence, 93. Judgment, 17. Landlord and Tenant, 16. Practice, Counter Claim,, 32. Practice, Set Off, 128 to 136. SEVERAL PROMISORS. 1. Under the present system of practice in this state, several promisors can be proceeded against in one action, and a joint judgment recovered. It seems, therefore, that, where the defendants are declared against as joint promisors, and the evidence shows that the promise was not made jointly, but by each defendant separately, the variance between the pleading and proof would be disregarded or cured by allowing an amendment, where their liabilities, as between themselves, would not be altered by this form of recovery against them\u00bb Downing v. Mann, 36 See Sales, 35. SHERIFFS. 1. The sheriff, as an officer of the court, is bound to execute the judgments and decrees thereof. He cannot go behind any direction contained therein, and refuse obedience, because in his opinion such direction is erroneous. Smith v. Corey, 642 2. So held, where the sheriff refused to deliver a deed to a purchaser at a sale"], "id": "b4104e86-e01d-4700-84fd-d4d901ce6062", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Paragraph 2 of the claim (pleading) summarizes the four causes of action as follows: \u201c2. That this is a claim for damages sustained by the claimant by reason of the false imprisonment and illegal detention of claimant at Matteawan State Hospital from May 19, 1947 to September 8, 1961, set forth in the 1st Cause of Action; by reason of the negligence of State of New York doctors and others in failing to use ordinary care and prudence in giving the claimant psychiatric examinations, and in other respects, as set forth in the 2nd Cause of Action; by reason of the negligence on the part of the defendant\u2019s Attorney General and Assistant Attorneys General in failing to use ordinary care and prudence, as set forth in the 3rd Cause of Action; and for damages for personal injuries sustained by the claimant as the result of the assault and <mask> committed on the claimant by defendant\u2019s employees and patients in the Matteawan State Hospital, as set forth in the 4th Cause of Action. \u2019 \u2019"], "id": "c0287e9c-cc43-4c2d-9148-713d40891701", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The plaintiff, as noted above, claims that the defendants negligently engaged in a course of action that created a risk of injury, and that she was injured thereby. Negligence, however, is an odd label for this action. The defendants\u2019 conduct could plausibly be depicted as intentional and directed to*232wards a tortious end: an assault if not a <mask> upon Beaker. This purpose can hardly be considered negligent. The only other possible interpretation of the plaintiffs claim is that the defendants conducted themselves negligently while carrying out a scheme to confront Beaker. This, too, is difficult to understand; to find joint (as opposed to individual) responsibility for the negligent carrying out of some concerted plan one would have to find that the defendants agreed as to means as well as to ends. It is easy to see circumstances which would support an intentional conduct claim \u2014 if, for example, the plaintiff could show an agreement to menace the partygoers in order to find out where Beaker was hiding; but there can hardly be a conspiracy to commit negligence."], "id": "ea3b4a67-815d-4d68-9bf5-568dbcd4c590", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The language of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6811(c)(3)(A) is clear, unambiguous, and specific. Under this statute\u2014which applies when the current crime of conviction is aggravated <mask> while DUI\u2014the first prior adult conviction for \"[a]ny act described\" in the DUI statutes \"shall count as one nonperson felony for criminal history purposes.\" (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6811(c)(3)(A). Under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21- 6811(c)(3)(B), however, \"each second or subsequent prior adult conviction\" for \"[a]ny act described\" in the DUI statutes \"shall count as one person felony for criminal history purposes.\" (Emphasis added.) Applying this statute to the facts of this case, Obiero's prior DUI convictions were properly included and classified for criminal history scoring purposes."], "id": "05535811-009b-4138-b31d-6b313f96fa36", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["United States Supreme Court decisions after Crawford have attempted to explain what types of statements are \"testimonial\" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, since Crawford \"did not offer an exhaustive definition of 'testimonial' statements.\" (Clark , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2179.) For example, in Davis v. Washington (Davis) and Hammon v. Indiana (Hammon) (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, which were decided together, the Court considered statements given to law enforcement officers. The victim in Davis made statements to a 911 emergency operator during and immediately after an attack. (Id. at pp. 817-819, 126 S.Ct. 2266.) In Hammon , after the victim was isolated from her abusive husband, she made statements to police that were memorialized in something called a \" '<mask> affidavit.' \" (Id. at pp. 819-820, 126 S.Ct. 2266.) The United States Supreme Court held that the statements at issue in Hammon were testimonial, but that the statements at issue in Davis were not. The court offered the following test for determining whether a statement is testimonial: \"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation *909under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.\" (Id. at p. 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266.) However, because both Hammon and Davis involved statements made to law enforcement officers, the Court reserved the question whether similar statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers would raise issues under the Confrontation Clause. (Id. at p. 823, fn. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2266.) *787In 2011, the United States Supreme Court further elucidated the \"primary purpose\" test, explaining that a court must consider \"all of the relevant circumstances.\" (Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344, 369, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93.) Specifically, \"there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.\" (Id. at p. 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143.) \"[T]he existence vel non of an ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry.\" (Id. at p. 374, 131 S.Ct. 1143, first italics in original, second italics added.) Instead, \"whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor ... that informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the 'primary purpose' of an interrogation.\" (Id. at p. 366, 131 S.Ct. 1143.) Another factor a court is to consider is \"the informality of the situation and the interrogation.\" (Id. at p. 377, 131 S.Ct. 1143.) \"A 'formal station-house interrogation,' like the questioning in Crawford , is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the accused.\" (Clark , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2180.) Another factor a court is to consider is to whom the statements were made. Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to adopt a categorical rule excluding statements made to individuals who are not law enforcement officers from the Sixth Amendment's reach, the Court has noted that \"such statements are much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers.\" (Id. at p. 2181.)"], "id": "7889dc66-98df-48ea-8ac6-8b6c06ec2b04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child because there was no evidence of penetration and his conviction for thirty of the counts of aggravated sexual <mask> because the victim did not offer any testimony as to those counts. In a related issue, Defendant also contends that the jury\u2019s verdict was improper because the jury failed to specify which acts of sexual abuse on which it relied for his continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction. The State asserts that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that continuous sexual abuse of a child statute does not require the jury to specifically identify the three acts on which it relied for the conviction as long as the jury unanimously agrees that Defendant committed three or more acts of sexual abuse."], "id": "b1394fdc-fbd1-44ce-9d5f-ef4232e93a2c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["term. He has also filed a motion for a peremptory writ and a motion for recovery of damages under R.C. 2731.11. We deny the writ and deny Shie\u2019s motions. I. Factual and Procedural Background {\u00b6 2} Shie was released from prison in August 2020 after serving a 16-year sentence for convictions for sexual <mask>. Upon his release, Shie was subject to mandatory postrelease control for five years. Shie\u2019s conditions of postrelease control forbade him from (1) unsupervised contact with minors, (2) accessing \u201csocial networking sites\u201d frequented by minors, (3) contacting minors via the Internet, and (4) possessing pornography or other sexually explicit material. {\u00b6 3} In March 2021, Shie was charged with violating the conditions of his postrelease control. It was alleged that in February 2021, Shie solicited or attempted to solicit a person he believed to be a 15-year-old girl named \u201cGabby\u201d to engage in sexual activity. \u201cGabby\u201d was, in fact, an undercover law-enforcement officer. When Shie attempted to meet \u201cGabby\u201d in person, he was arrested for violating the terms of his postrelease control. Further investigation into Shie\u2019s activity on social media revealed that he was active on Snapchat and had engaged in numerous conversations with girls who appeared to be under the age of 18 on that social-media platform. A search of Shie\u2019s phone also revealed that he possessed numerous pornographic images and videos. {\u00b6 4} Following his arrest, Shie was charged with four postrelease-control violations: (1) attempted solicitation of \u201cGabby\u201d for sexual activity, (2) possession of pornography or sexually explicit material, (3) accessing \u201csocial media sites\u201d frequented by minors, and (4) unsupervised contact with a minor without the approval of the APA. Shie admitted the counts related to pornography and accessing \u201csocial media sites\u201d; he admitted \u201cwith mitigation\u201d the counts related to his attempted solicitation of \u201cGabby\u201d and unsupervised contact with minors. {\u00b6 5} A hearing on Shie\u2019s alleged violations was held on March 25. Shie waived his right to appear at the hearing, his right to counsel, his right to call witnesses and present evidence, and his right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Based on Shie\u2019s admissions and the information presented by the APA, a hearing officer found that Shie committed"], "id": "df83430d-83bf-4d1b-b695-15d8d6d128f1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In November 2017, the month after the court terminated its jurisdiction, and while C.W. was still living in the residential treatment program, Louisiana child protective services removed Rusty's other two children from his custody due to physical abuse, and he was ordered to have no *481contact with them. Then, in December 2017, Rusty was arrested for two counts of sexual <mask> involving his wife's nine-year-old daughter. He was released from jail on bond the following month, in mid-January 2018, on the condition he not return to his home, and after his release from jail he removed C.W. from the residential treatment facility."], "id": "06f44e0d-e9ee-4d46-89a4-10f8097667a1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["It seems to us that the present action is plainly one for injury to the person. Assault, <mask>, and false imprisonment are provided for in section 93. The injury meant in section 94, subdivision 2, must therefore, be one which does not come within the definition of those mentioned in section 93; that is an injury caused indirectly, such as were formerly sued upon by action on the case."], "id": "484ef3f2-31c5-43e3-8f13-8879fa66bfca", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*1004On August 2, 1993, plaintiff commenced a second action against Mast, Miller and Calle, alleging causes of action against all three defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress, against Miller for slander, and against Calle for <mask>. On November 5, 1993, plaintiff amended her complaint in the first action to include the causes of action alleged in the second action. Mast, Miller and Calle moved to dismiss both actions on the ground that the intentional tort causes of action were time barred pursuant to CPLR 215 (3). They further asserted that the conduct that occurred within one year of the commencement of the first action was insufficient to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court denied their motions. That was error."], "id": "031b631b-d991-4369-aa56-e00b57dd5077", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["This is a wrongful death action brought by plaintiff Alphonso Lewis, as administrator of the estate (and guardian for the children) of Kenneth Thomas, deceased, who was allegedly wrongfully run over by a tractor-trailer during the West Indian American Day Parade conducted in Brooklyn on September 2, 1996. A cause of action for loss of services on behalf of plaintiff Vermaneta Lewis, the alleged wife of Kenneth Thomas, deceased, was discontinued with prejudice. The complaint alleges causes of action for negligence, recklessness, assault, <mask> and civil rights violations allegedly committed by the defendants."], "id": "71c65e67-407a-422a-af67-33b07ac3831d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The injustice of the old doctrine was set forth as early as 1823 by Judge Stout of the Circuit Court of\" the United States. In a situation similar to the one at hand, involving a passenger on a ship, he stated, \u201c It is intimated that all these acts, though wrong in morals, are yet acts which the law does not punish; that if the person is untouched, if the acts do not amount to an assault and <mask>, they are not to be redressed. The law looks upon them as unworthy of its cognizance. The master is at liberty to inflict the most severe mental sufferings, in the most tyrannical manner, and yet if he withholds a blow, the victim may be crushed by his unkindness. He commits nothing within the reach of civil jurisprudence. My opinion is, that the law involves no such absurdity. It is rational and just. It gives compensation for mental suffering occasioned by acts of wanton injustice, equally whether they operate by way of direct, or of consequential injuries. In each case, the contract of the passengers for the voyage is in substance violated; and the wrong is to be redressed as a cause of damage.\u201d (Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mas. 242, 246-247.)"], "id": "2af07945-685d-466b-a785-2bc0d8779155", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2007, a jury found Daniel Hargrove guilty of kidnapping, family violence aggravated <mask>, and two counts of family violence aggravated assault. On direct appeal, we reversed his kidnapping conviction, but otherwise affirmed, Hargrove v. State, 299 Ga. App. 27 (681 SE2d 707) (2009), and the trial court resentenced Hargrove on remand. In 2021, Hargrove filed a pro se motion to vacate a void sentence. The trial court denied Hargrove\u2019s motion on December 2, 2021, and Hargrove filed this appeal on January 7, 2022. We lack jurisdiction. To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. See OCGA \u00a7 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Pretermitting whether Hargrove is entitled to a direct appeal from the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to vacate a void sentence, his notice of appeal is untimely, as it was filed 36 days after entry of the order he seeks to appeal. Consequently, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk\u2019s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 01/31/2022 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written."], "id": "3882a66c-32f5-4b0e-b294-caa0b51cf317", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Between March 6, 2004 and June 24, 2004, SRP ran up more than $56,000 in legal fees in the course of performing tasks, such as: (a) evaluating the case, (b) negotiating with the Company, (c) preparing and filing a <mask> complaint, and (d) preparing and filing an EEOC complaint. According to petitioner, a substantial portion of SRP\u2019s billings relate to litigation work. Of the $56,000 amount that petitioner has been billed, she has paid $28,000. She has refused to pay the balance of approximately $29,000 on the ground that she was poorly advised and over-billed."], "id": "6a95b3d2-4b62-4108-be65-969283c3c33e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["BACKGROUND Maxell, Ltd. and Maxell Holdings, Ltd. (collectively, \u201cMaxell\u201d)1 own the patents-at-issue in this case. Effective March 26, 2020, Maxell entered into a non-disclosure agreement with ATL for purposes of discussing a license to Maxell\u2019s lithium-ion <mask> patent portfolio. Relevant here, that agreement included a \u201clitigation standstill\u201d clause, in which the parties agreed not to initiate any legal actions against each other for one year. Just as the one-year period was ending with no agree- ment having been reached, Maxell sent a letter to ATL, stating that it remained \u201cwilling to resolve this matter am- icably and to grant ATL a license\u201d but if \u201cMaxell and ATL are not able to enter into a licensing agreement by Friday, April 9, 2021, Maxell will be left with no choice but to pur- sue litigation.\u201d Appx0002. After discussions between Max- ell\u2019s and ATL\u2019s counsel, Maxell wrote to ATL on April 5, 2021 by email that it was open to having another meeting and requested that ATL \u201cprovide the materials ATL planned to present.\u201d Appx0003. The evening of the next day, April 6, 2021, ATL sent an email to Maxell, stating that it would \u201cbe in touch as soon as [it] can get the materials.\u201d Id. A few hours later on the same day, ATL brought the present action in the District of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment of nonin- fringement of Maxell\u2019s patents. Two days later, on April 8, 2021, Maxell sued ATL in the Western District of Texas, accusing the same products identified in the declaratory judgment complaint of infringing the same patents. Maxell moved the New Jersey court either to decline jurisdiction over ATL\u2019s declaratory judgment action or to transfer ATL\u2019s action to the Western District of Texas"], "id": "73b3f49f-e3fe-44df-a305-20f62fe5cc27", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Now, this is the contention of the defendant in this regard: that this was simply a trial of athletic skill, lawful in itself, and ordinarily not tending to harm. It is fairly to be inferred from their contention (what is a matter of common knowledge) that in any athletic contest, exhibiting powers of skill, there is necessarily involved an element of danger. Now, gentlemen, if you should find that this was not a contention or fight, within the meaning of the statute, yon are next to consider, assuming, as I have suggested before, that you find that the homicide was caused by the act of the defendant, whether the defendant was engaged in the commission, or attempted commission, of a <mask> upon the person of Rioirdan. An assault in the third degree is a sort of general description of other assaults not included in what I called assaults in the first and second degrees; which, in brief, defines those serious assaults which threaten or attempt the taking of human life, but unsuccessfully, or which attempt doing to the person assaulted grievous bodily harm. It is what is known in ordinary parlance as an assault and battery. Now, gentlemen, if you find this homicide is *401traceable directly and fairly to the act of the defendant, and you find at that time, within the definition which I have laid down to you, that he was engaged in the commission of an injury, or an assault in the third degree, it will be your duty to find Mm guilty. Now, gentlemen, this depends largely upon the fact of the element of consent. It may be assumed at this point that Eiordan and Fitzsimmons mutually agreed to engage with each -other in these contests. Now, gentlemen, consent is sometimes an excuse for crime; at other times it is not. It is an excuse for larceny, unless your property is obtained by trick; and then it is a -serious question whether you consent. In other words, a prisoner cannot be convicted -of larceny if you consent that he should fake your property. It is a necessary element in the crime of rape, unless perpetrated upon the person of one so young that she cannot, in the eyes of the law, consent; because the moment that you-have the consent of the female it ceases to be rape. But there are other crimes to which the parties cannot consent to their commission; and, in considering this question, gentlemen, as applied to this oa-se, you are to consider\u2014First, whether, in fact, Eiordan did consent to receive such a blow, if one was given; and, second, whether he had the legal right to so consent if, in fact, he did. Did Eiordan consent to receive whatever was in store for him in this game, if it was a game? Did he take his chances, whatever might be the consequences, or did he only consent to such treatment, to such consequences, to sudh acts, on the part -of defendant, as would ordinarily be the result of that contention or game? Was it the contention -of Fitzsimmons, at the time this blow was struck, if you should find that it was struck, to strike upon the person of Eiordan a disabling blow, -one intended for the -purpose of doing him injury beyond what he reasonably expected or consented to when engaged in the contest? Now, gentlemen, assuming that you should' find this fact with the defendant, did Eiordan have the right to consent to have his life taken, or to have this injury or receive this blow? The public is a party to all these transactions, and it has an interest which the parties to the transaction cannot eliminate."], "id": "1d22c292-7fc4-4c33-a3c3-86f14e68d13b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, counsel correctly notes that the only adverse rulings were the court's denial of Richard's directed-verdict motion and the revocation of Richard's probation. Counsel provides sound analysis establishing that the circuit court was correct in its ruling that there was sufficient evidence to find that Richard had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. We agree-the circuit court heard sufficient evidence to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Richard had violated his probation by committing a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment and failing to report as ordered. Specifically, Charnell Houff, Richard's supervising officer, testified that on July 6, 2017, Richard was arrested for domestic <mask> and was convicted on December 21, 2017. Houff further testified that Richard had failed to report to her as directed from July 2017 through September 2017."], "id": "317266d0-8c2e-4ceb-8e2a-22337ed8e943", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Simberg\u2019s estate filed suit against Trezza and Relia in September, 1982. The complaint alleged that Trezza and Relia \u201cwithout just cause or provocation did viciously, maliciously, intentionally and wantonly assault and batter the decedent, striking him on various portions of his body,\u201d causing him to fall to the ground, strike his head on the pavement, and later die. Three causes of action were asserted: the first alleged intentional <mask> of the decedent causing him serious personal injuries; the second alleged wrongful death resulting from \u201cthe aforesaid severe, serious and painful injuries;\u201d the third stated a claim by Simberg\u2019s wife for loss of services.2"], "id": "d13ce7d8-5ae9-4de4-8ecd-42e355a65660", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Where the statutory language is clear, \" ' \" 'courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.' \" ' \" ( Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 434 P.3d 564.) Following the plain meaning of section 1203.4a would not lead to absurd results. It is no secret that persons in custody can, and often do, commit crimes or violate institutional rules. (See, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 243.1 [<mask> against custodial officer], 4573.6 [possession of controlled substance in jail].) It is not absurd to encourage their compliance with the law and institutional rules pending their release."], "id": "3289f47f-7085-4542-bdd3-0ead7b196c37", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The instant case involved not an assault alone but an assault and <mask>. \u201c In a battery, * * * the only intent that is required at common law is a general criminal intent, that is a voluntary infliction of the bodily injury, no specific intent, or premeditation or malice being necessary.\u201d (2 Burdick on Law of Crime, \u00a7 353, p. 21.) In the opinion of this court, the statute (Penal Law, \u00a7 244) requires no more."], "id": "60409b88-279e-42ca-92e8-4a528665406f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["However, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion by refusing to permit the plaintiff to amend the complaint to plead causes of action against Ramon Sambade for damages for the intentional torts of assault and <mask>. These causes of action are an additional theory of recovery based on the same facts alleged in the original complaint and during discovery. The record unequivocally demonstrates that Ramon Sambade was familiar with the facts underlying these causes of action from the outset of the litigation. Moreover, he failed to demonstrate, or even allege, that any prejudice or surprise would result from the proposed amendment (see, *657CPLR 3025 [b]; Warrensburg Bd. & Paper Corp. v Adirondack Hydro Dev. Corp., 186 AD2d 305; Trusthouse Forte [Garden City] Mgt. v Garden City Hotel, 106 AD2d 271; Wyso v City of New York, 91 AD2d 661; Carlisle v County of Nassau, 75 AD2d 593). Ramon Sambade\u2019s belated claims of prejudice, asserted for the first time on appeal, are not properly before this Court (see, Orellano v Samples Tire Equip. & Supply Corp., 110 AD2d 757), and, in any event, are unpersuasive under the circumstances of this case. Ritter, J. P., Pizzuto, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur."], "id": "bcfb74f8-aca3-4567-81b1-b61d1ea0ea15", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As was said in Wagner Trading Co. v. <mask> Park Nat. Bank (228 N. Y. 37), at page 45: \u201c The courts are careful to guard the interests of commerce and to protect and strengthen its great medium, commercial paper, but they are also careful to defeat titles taken in bad faith or with knowledge actual or imputed which amounts to bad faith.\u201d"], "id": "78fa2d73-8738-4c00-9d66-147265879e01", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Decedent\u2019s wife (personally and as administratrix) and father now sue the State of New York for wrongful death and personal injuries. Claimants allege \"gross and wanton dereliction of duty, breach of contract, assault and <mask>, conspiracy, fraud and negligence of the Commission * * * its officers, agents, servants and/or employees\u201d. The essence of this claim is that the Commission\u2019s representatives at the Garden on the night of the fight either conspired with Resto and Lewis or, alternatively, failed in their duty to detect the eviscerated gloves."], "id": "c1f16ba8-a5cf-4607-86fc-3dda13e63eb4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["State's exhibit no. 2 shows that on 27 January 1998, Radford pleaded guilty to five felonies: (1) second-degree murder, (2) burglary, (3) second-degree <mask>, (4) theft, and (5) first-degree criminal mischief. Felonies six and seven occurred in 2008, when Radford pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree sexual assault. The eighth one appeared when Radford pleaded guilty to residential burglary in 2014. Radford neither objected to how the sentencing phase was conducted overall, nor to the specific issue of the number of felonies the jury should have been allowed to consider under the habitual-offender statute."], "id": "ce73323d-bb34-482d-9356-4bb3eec7ff27", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In Gilbert v. Rounds (14 How. Pr. 46), which was an action for an assault and <mask>, it is said by Balcom, J., that where a party allows an - inquest to be taken against Rim at a circuit, there is authority for saying that he thereby loses the right to produce testimony and examine witnesses on his part; and is restricted to the right of cross-examining plaintiff\u2019s witnesses ; but that he was unable to find any authority, that the defendant\u2019s rights were so restricted on the assessment of damages, either at the circuit, or before a sheriff\u2019s jury, when judgment goes against him for not answering the complaint. This distinction may be entirely true, so far as it is applied to the assessment of damages in an action for assault and battery; for in such an action, if the plaintiff, upon the defendant\u2019s failure to answer, gives no proof of the nature of the injury which he suffered, but relies simply upon the defendant\u2019s admission of :an assault and battery, the plaintiff can recover only nominal damages (Bates v. Loomis, 5 Wend. 134) ; for unless the circumstances of the assault and battery are proved, the jury have no means of judging what damages beyond nominal damages they ought to give."], "id": "a4e24b6c-df04-4f66-a2e2-7bb6d00145a0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["No authority need be cited for the rule that we, not the parties, decide the standard of review. In any event, for the reasons that follow, he cannot show error in the court\u2019s application of that Guideline; therefore, his claim fails regardless of whether the issue was preserved. See United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008) (pretermitting resolution of standard of review because challenge failed under any standard). If a prison term results from an offense that is treated as relevant conduct to the instant offense, the Guidelines dictate: the sentence for the instant offense shall run concurrently with the remainder of the undischarged prison term; and the court should adjust the sentence for time served on the undischarged term if it determines that that time would not be credited by the Bureau of Prisons. Guideline \u00a7 5G1.3(b). As the district court and both parties recognized, a straightforward application of \u00a7 5G1.3(b) was complicated by the fact that, at the time of Kimbrough\u2019s federal sentencing, he was also serving an undischarged four-year sentence for the unrelated state <mask> offense. \u201cSubsection (b) does not apply in cases in which the"], "id": "6acdf95f-f100-4a2d-aba2-649708398514", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["It appears from the motion papers that a <mask> and not an assault is being claimed. (See Prosser, Torts [4th ed], \u00a7\u00a7 9, 10; PJI 3:2.) This being so, the pleading is further deficient in that it fails to allege any wrongful bodily contact, another of the material aspects of a cause of action in battery. (Masters v Becker, supra; PJI 3:3.)"], "id": "0cc0eb71-7d2a-4332-9b37-1c290b8c26f6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Although he was appointed counsel, Lowery proceeded to file several pro se motions, including a motion of dismissal, a motion to reduce charges, a motion for a change of venue, a motion to impeach, a motion for work release, a motion to request a hearing, and a motion requesting discovery. Lowery also sent the court letters about his case. At his preliminary hearing Lowery attempted to raise these motions, and he specifically attempted to raise the defense of intoxication. The court informed him that the issue could not be addressed at that point. The court also denied Lowery's pro se motion to dismiss and proceeded with the hearing. After hearing the testimony of the officer who suffered a small laceration from Lowery's bite, the court found probable cause to support the felony <mask> on a law enforcement officer charge and bound Lowery over for trial."], "id": "6e810452-e4ba-435f-a491-f0cf6f4d7ced", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff is entitled to be protected from any future menace, as occurs in cases of trade-mark confusion or purchaser deception (Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F. 2d 517, 520; Gannert v. Rupert, 127 F. 962; Cecile Gagnon Co. v. Bourjois, Inc., 223 F. 2d 731, 733). A restraining order will prevent confusion and will give plaintiff the protection to which it is entitled (Philadelphia Stor. <mask> Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 56; Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, 147 Misc. 679, affd. 237 App. Div. *63801, affd. 262 N. Y. 482; Martha Washington Candies Co. v. Martha Washington Ice Cream Co., 280 App. Div. 256, appeal dismissed 304 N. Y. 974; Santa\u2019s Workshop v. Sterling, 282 App. Div. 328, 329-330; 2 A D 2d 262, affd. 3 N Y 2d 757)."], "id": "762c3f40-5b62-47d0-a4aa-cd05f13d4cfd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["[W]e turn to the facts of Ward's case. At the time of his 1997 sentencing, Ward must have made the threshold showing that his sanity at the time of the offense would be a significant issue and an error occurred in this court's review that requires us to recall the mandate in Ward III. The record demonstrates that on February 14, 1997, Ward filed a motion for appropriation of funds for expert assistance pursuant to Ake . In Ward's motion, he stated in pertinent part: *550Mr. Ward requests an ex parte hearing on this motion under the authority of Ake v. Oklahoma , 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). This request is made because defense counsel does not wish to unnecessarily disclose the defense mitigation case. The reasons in support of this motion are set out in the accompanying memorandum. .... Counsel for Mr. Ward represents to the Court that she has probable cause to suspect that the utilization of these particular experts will produce mitigating evidence. It is the professional judgment of defense counsel that this information is necessary in order to adequately represent Mr. Ward and that these steps would most certainly be undertaken in the course of representation provided to a similarly situated client in a retained counsel case. On February 27, 1997, the circuit court denied the Ake motion. At the pretrial hearing, Ward stated several times that he was not interested in resentencing and wanted to be released from prison or reinstate the death penalty. Additionally, Ward refused to cooperate in 1996 with the state hospital for a mental evaluation. On October 7, 1997, pursuant to both parties' request, the circuit court ordered Ward to undergo an Act III evaluation. On October 17, 1997, Michael Simon, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist, attempted to conduct an evaluation of Ward and submitted a report to the circuit court on that same date. The evaluation stated in pertinent part: On 10/17/97, a forensic evaluation team consisting of Wendell Hall, MD., Michael I. Simon, PhD., and Maria Gergely, L.C.S.W. made an attempt to evaluate Mr. Ward. He was brought to a conference room to meet with the evaluation team at the Arkansas State Hospital. He was neatly dressed in an, orange jumpsuit. He began the interview by stating, \"I cannot comply with the evaluation,\" He did say his attorneys filed a motion for evaluation and he tried to remove their motion. The court denied them and ordered him to appear for evaluation. He politely informed us \"I am competent\" ... \"I have a right to remain silent,\" ... \"I am not going to submit to evaluation.\" At this point the evaluation was terminated. Thus, in summary, the evaluation could not be completed due to Mr. Ward's unwillingness to participate. There was no evidence to indicate that this unwillingness was due to mental disease or defect. During our brief interview with Mr. Ward, he interacted in a logical, coherent manner and exhibited no signs of psychosis. Thus, in summary, Mr. Ward refused to cooperate with this evaluation and there was no indication that this uncooperativeness was due to any Axis I mental disorder. At Ward's 1997 resentencing trial, Ward presented several witnesses through video-taped statements. Ward presented testimony of three educators from the Erie, Pennsylvania school system where he attended school. Thomas Ritter, a teacher and guidance counselor, testified that he taught Ward in 1965 and 1966 and was also his guidance counselor in the 1970s. Ritter testified that Ward did not have success in school and that Ward was disruptive, and without provocation was aggressive toward other students, but when Ritter spoke to Ward about this behavior he had a \"blank stare ... there was no comprehension that he did anything wrong.\" Ritter further testified that he knew something \"was basically wrong\" with Ward but that he did not refer him to a psychologist *551because at that time the school system had very limited access to psychologists and based on Ward's testing he had the ability to learn. Ritter also testified that Ward exhibited \"hostile behavior ... bizarre behavior.\" L. Catherine Fayenmeyer, a guidance counselor in Wattsburg, Pennsylvania from 1965 to 1975, testified that she met with Ward ten to twelve times over a five-year period and knew Ward well. She testified that Ward came to see her mainly for disciplinary problems. She further testified that Ward did not put forth effort in school and was disruptive in class. Fayenmeyer testified that Ward was very bright but had very few friends and did not engage in any activities at school. She testified that Ward was \"exceptional\" because he did not need classes for \"dull students,\" but she opined that the opportunity to work one on one with a teacher would have made a significant difference for him. C.J. Wortham, an education specialist in the City of Erie, Pennsylvania in the 1960s and 1970s and who was also part of the Civil Air Patrol Program, worked with Ward for approximately a year and a half when Ward was a cadet in the program. Wortham testified that Ward did well in the structured Civil Air Patrol program and was good with outdoor work and compassing. He also testified that Ward was good with adults, but had emotional problems dealing with his peers and life in general. Wortham testified that he recommended to Ward's family that they seek psychiatric help for Ward. He also testified that Ward got \"into trouble\" when alcohol was present. Next, the deposition of Dr. Anthony Cillufo, a psychologist, was read into the record as part of Ward's 1997 sentencing. Dr. Cillufo testified that on April 22, 1977, he conducted a three-hour interview of Ward at the Erie County jail. He testified that he conducted a <mask> of tests and an extensive clinical interview with Ward, including talking with Ward about his life history, family relationships, and sexual history. Dr. Cillufo diagnosed Ward as an anxious, shy, alienated man of average intelligence, with a propensity for acting violently as part of a mixed personality disorder. He further testified that Ward had features of social personality or explosive personality as well as passive/aggressive and paranoid disorders, and a secondary diagnosis of alcoholism. Further, Dr. Cillufo testified that Ward could possibly have had some early history of minimal brain dysfunction and a slight possibility of neurological damage as Ward had reported fainting spells or blackouts. Dr. Cillufo testified that his main diagnosis was mixed personality disorder. Ward also presented testimony from Tom Devine, an attorney at the Pulaski County Public Defender's Office. Devine testified that he had known Ward for twelve and a half years and Ward made paintings and drawings for him. Gary Wayne Brossett had testified at Ward's first trial, and his testimony was also read into the record during Ward's 1997 sentencing. Brossett testified that he was a nursing student at Arkansas Children's Hospital in 1989 and was working at Joubert's, a local tavern. Brossett testified that Ward was at Joubert's on the night of Doss's murder and that Ward drank a few beers and played some pool and left the tavern around midnight. Having reviewed Ward's presentation of evidence at the 1997 sentencing, we turn to Ward's argument in his motion to recall the mandate regarding an alleged Ake violation. In asserting that this court should recall the mandate on *552this point, Ward relies primarily on a report from Dr. William Logan, a forensic psychiatrist. Logan's forty-one-page report regarding Ward's 1997 sentencing can be summarized as follows. Logan diagnosed Ward with \"schizophrenia, paranoid type, as evidenced by a preoccupation with persecutory and grandiose delusional ideas, and occasional hallucinations and disorganized thinking.\" Dr. Logan examined Ward on October 22, 2008. Dr. Logan completed a three-hour examination on Ward at the Varner Supermax Unit. According to his report, Dr. Logan reviewed IQ evaluations performed on Ward in 1972, a presentence report performed in 1977, several documents compiled in connection with Ward's prior arrest in Pennsylvania in 1977, Ward's military records, a questionnaire completed by Ward's mother in 1977, Ward's medical history compiled after his 1989 arrest in Arkansas, evaluations performed by Dr. Simon, affidavits from Ward's prior counsel describing his behavior during his 1990 trial and two resentencing hearings, Ward's competency hearing, and various filings and pleadings made by both the State and Ward during his trial and sentencing hearings. In his report, Dr. Logan described Ward as a heavyset man with poor grooming. He described Ward as having \"fair thought organization when giving information about his family and childhood,\" but noted that \"[a]s he began to discuss his legal situation his thought processes deteriorated markedly.\" Dr. Logan described Ward's \"persistent and grandiose delusions\" that he \"was the target of a conspiracy between officials in Pennsylvania, someone he knew in Canton, Texas and various Arkansas government entities including the governor's office and the State and Federal Public Defenders.\" According to Dr. Logan, Ward's delusions \"do not compromise his intellectual capacity in terms of his intelligence and orientation,\" but that his understanding of his conviction and sentence are \"irrational and delusional.\" For example, Dr. Logan stated that Ward expressed his belief that \"he will never be executed, but rather be exonerated and leave prison a free man to achieve great success.\" According to Dr. Logan, Ward attributes this belief to \"revelations from God.\" Dr. Logan's report also described delusions reported by Ward, including his belief that Joe Biden \"got Nick Trenticosta (a former attorney of Mr. Ward's) on his case and also has a connection to his current attorney.\" Ward also reported that he \"can see the future including future disasters and future events.\" He also believes his father is part of the Illuminati and that the Illuminati are trying to help him. According to Dr. Logan's report, Ward described visions of a large black dog that jumps into people and possesses them and that Ward reported hearing his deceased father's voice from a chair. Ward also described his belief that others are jealous of him because of his talent and power and that some of the other prisoners are demons under a spell from the State because they do not complain. Ward stated that he \"also has been the victim of a laxative curse.\" During the interview, Ward reported that the \"unholy Alliance in Pennsylvania told him to give up his powers or suffer the consequences.\" Dr. Logan diagnosed Ward as having schizophrenia, paranoid type. Dr. Logan gave his opinion that Ward was not competent to be executed. Dr. Logan's specific report regarding the 1997 sentencing was as follows: *553Competency to Stand Trial in the 1997 Penalty Phase Hearing Mr. Ward adamantly opposed any attempt by his then attorney, Ms. Tammy Harris to present mitigation testimony that might result in a life sentence. He resisted an effort to assess his competency. Mr. Ward's decisional competency was never addressed. He wanted an outright dismissal of the charges and compensation. Despite his bizarre behavior, the case was allowed to proceed. Subsequently, it has been revealed Mr. Ward's actions were the direct consequences of delusional beliefs that resulted from his Paranoid Schizophrenia, a mental disease. Consequently, it is my opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that at the 1997 Penalty Phase proceeding, Mr. Ward suffered from Paranoid Schizophrenia. It is my further opinion that the delusions characteristic of this mental disease prevented him from having an ability to understand rationally the proceedings against him and from having the ability to assist effectively in his own defense. In reviewing Dr. Logan's report, we note that Dr. Logan's evaluation was performed in 2008 and was not part of the record in Ward's 1997 sentencing. Further, Dr. Logan's report discrediting years of data and evaluation is based on his one visit with Ward in 2008. In any event, Dr. Logan's report is of limited support for Ward's argument that a fundamental breakdown in the appellate process occurred in Ward's 1997 sentencing regarding Ward's Ake argument because it was not part of the record reviewed by this court. Next, the record demonstrates that on October 17, 1997, Ward was afforded the opportunity to have his \"competency and criminal responsibility\" evaluated by psychologists at the state hospital. Although Ward was unwilling to participate, Dr. Simon reported that \"there was no evidence to indicate that this unwillingness was due to mental disease or defect.\" Ward asserts that this evaluation is unreliable and he should be afforded an independent evaluation. However, we have recognized that a defendant's rights are adequately protected by an examination at the state hospital, an institution that has no part in the prosecution of criminals. Branscomb v. State , 299 Ark. 482, 774 S.W.2d 426 (1989) ; Dunn v. State , 291 Ark. 131, 722 S.W.2d 595 (1987) ; Wall v. State , 289 Ark. 570, 715 S.W.2d 208 (1986). In other words, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to search for a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own but is entitled to access to a competent psychiatrist and the examination afforded to Ward satisfied that right. Although Ward requests that we overrule our precedent holding that a competency evaluation at the Arkansas State Hospital satisfies Ake , we decline to overrule this precedent. In sum, we do not find merit in Ward's assertions. Whether Ward contends that he was not competent to stand trial at the 1997 sentencing or that his sanity at the time of the offense was at issue, based on the record before us, we do not find that there was a breakdown in the appellate process in Ward III. Ward was afforded his constitutionally guaranteed evaluation pursuant to Ake , and the record does not support Ward's contention that any breakdown occurred. Ward simply failed to make a threshold showing that his sanity at the time of the offense or his competence to stand trial were significant factors. *554While the record demonstrates that Ward filed the Ake motion, Ward did not make an argument that the state hospital evaluation was inadequate or present any evidence that would support his argument that there was a breakdown in the appellate process. Likewise, we reject Ward's contention that the circuit court's failure to provide an independent psychiatrist to develop mitigating evidence during sentencing, and this court's subsequent failure to discover and reverse that decision, resulted in a breakdown of the appellate process. Accordingly, we deny Ward's request that we recall the mandate on his first point. Ward V , 2015 Ark. 61 at 7-15, 455 S.W.3d at 823-27."], "id": "346fa5f7-5fe0-4946-a3c5-3130bc1fcb69", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["a suspended or revoked license and driving without proof of insurance in case number OBL04059 were dismissed in connection with Simpson\u2019s July 29, 2020 no contest plea to simple <mask> in case number OBL04328. Simpson admitted to a probation violation based on the battery conviction. 3As set forth above, Simpson\u2019s first payment on his fines and fees in this case was not due until November 22, 2020, more than a month after this probation violation hearing."], "id": "4f09d638-671c-49f0-a83e-18a016bd74b8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "battery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As to the <mask> claim, it is true \"that medical treatment beyond the scope of patient\u2019s consent should not be considered\u201d as a battery (Dries v Gregor, 72 AD2d 231, 235 [4th Dept 1980]). Thus for example, where a physician tells a patient prior to surgery that the physician is only going to perform a biopsy and then proceeds to perform somewhat more extensive surgery, a claim for lack of informed consent is stated. (See, Dries v Gregor, supra.) That scenario is not applicable here since there is no claim that there was medical treatment beyond that consented to. In addition, when a physician tells a *316patient that he is going to perform a specified surgery but neglects to tell the patient the risks of the surgery to be performed by that physician, again a claim for lack of informed consent, rather than for battery, is stated. (Oates v New York Hosp., 131 AD2d 368, 369 [1st Dept 1987]; Murriello v Crapotta, 51 AD2d 381 [2d Dept 1976]; Rigie v Goldman, 148 AD2d 23, 28-29 [2d Dept 1989]; Spinosa v Weinstein, 168 AD2d 32, 41 [2d Dept 1991].)"], "id": "b06b491c-aecf-4d8a-9a6b-a6d3532db90d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The element of the crime of <mask> here involved is that, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, the defendant displayed what appeared to be a firearm. The prima facie test for this element are: did the defendant display something and, if so, what did it appear to the complainant to be? Accordingly, the principal focus of the instant inquiry must be the legislative intent in the use of the word \u201cdisplays\u201d. No definition is provided by the statutes."], "id": "be157887-4129-48a2-8587-ea4e9c8c3c63", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*1217Maston reviewed the constitutionality of the penalty for kidnap for <mask> with injury in the abstract; the court noted that the defendants \"d[id] not claim disproportionate punishment in relationship to their individual offense,\" and that such a claim was \"unavailable\" to them on the facts-\"[b]eyond abducting their victim, raping and robbing her they forcibly transported her for many miles and severely beat her.\" ( Maston , supra , 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 565, 109 Cal.Rptr. 164.) Maston acknowledged that the aggravated kidnapping statute \"is part of an anomalous substructure of California penal law\" under which \"[p]remeditated kidnapping which injures but does *725not kill elicits a heavier penalty than premeditated murder\" and a \"robber who kills but does not kidnap retains hope of eventual parole\" while one \"who abducts and merely injures is deprived of that hope.\" ( Id. at p. 564, 109 Cal.Rptr. 164.) The court noted that these anomalies \"acutely need legislative attention.\" ( Id. at p. 565, 109 Cal.Rptr. 164.) More importantly, for our purposes, Maston expressly commented that it was addressing the \"maximum statutory punishment, not its fitness as applied to the individual offense and offender,\" and that \"[u]nusual twists of fact occur where, for lack of a sentencing alternative, the offender's punishment is grossly disproportionate to the circumstances.\" ( Ibid. )"], "id": "e2c540b0-9ee5-44d3-941a-975c87eea9d5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Had the text messages not been admitted into evidence, overwhelming evidence of Farmer's guilt remained. Fisher testified that Farmer kicked in her door while armed with a gun, beat her with his fists, held a knife to her cheek, threatened to disfigure and kill her, and attempted to steal her gun and television. Fisher's testimony was corroborated by that of her neighbor and the police officers, as well as photographs of her injuries. Further, both Farmer's mother and his ex-wife testified that he had admitted to them that he had beaten Fisher. Had the text messages been struck after Fisher admitted on cross-examination that she had deleted some messages, the same evidence recounted above would still have existed to overwhelmingly prove Farmer's guilt as to aggravated <mask>, aggravated residential burglary, terroristic threatening, and domestic battery in the third degree.3 Furthermore, any risk of prejudice resulting from admitting or failing to strike the exhibit was slight. Farmer contends that we should conclude that \"Fisher's perjury and altered messages could have affected the jury's judgment,\" but we are not left to speculate on this point. Farmer successfully impeached Fisher's credibility by exposing her false testimony to the jury. The inaccuracy of State's exhibit 20 was brought to light by the defense, and the jury was provided with the missing messages contained in the defense exhibit. Unlike the cases from other jurisdictions relied on by Farmer, the false testimony here was revealed to the jury at trial."], "id": "5de649ff-3a02-4b2b-a5ba-729d5937ba86", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by allowing the two notes into evidence. More specifically, appellant contends that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the notes, that the notes were not relevant, that the probative value of the notes outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice to appellant, and that the notes constituted inadmissible hearsay. Grant testified that appellant asked him and his wife to keep appellant's daughter and take care of her. Grant stated that he had in his possession a computer bag that belonged to appellant. He said that he found two notes dealing with bank robberies inside the bag and immediately turned them over to the police. Appellant objected to the introduction of the notes. The State argued, and the court agreed, that the foundation was laid when Grant testified to finding the notes inside a computer bag that belonged to appellant and that they were not impermissible hearsay because they were not offered for the proof of the matter asserted. The court also agreed *326with the State that the notes were relevant because they dealt with how to commit a <mask>. Appellant further argued that the probative value of the notes was outweighed by the unfair prejudice, because the notes dealt with research about bank robberies, and there was no evidence that appellant committed any bank robberies. Appellant now contends that the probative effect was outweighed by the prejudicial effect because the notes showed the jury that appellant had future plans to rob a bank. This argument is not the same as the one presented to the trial court, and it is not preserved for our review.26 We hold that the State laid a proper foundation for the introduction of the letters and that the letters were relevant to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.27 The court properly admitted the evidence and we affirm this point. However, even if the evidence had been erroneously admitted, we would still affirm, because any error would have been harmless under the facts of this case."], "id": "4d2215ae-0390-4d63-a400-091dd0091683", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Here, this was undoubtedly a close case in which no forensic or photographic evidence linked Miles to the crime scene. The prosecution's case, at least as to Miles, turned entirely on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Patlan and Gomez. While those witnesses were confident in their in-court identifications of Miles, the jury had also heard evidence regarding the difficulties in eyewitness identifications, including cross-racial identifications. On the other hand, the defense evidence stood in sharp conflict to the prosecution's case and put Miles in Las Vegas on the day of the <mask>. Indeed, the jurors deliberated for five days and on the third day they had asked for clarification as to when a jury is considered a \"hung jury.\" Although this information concerning the jury's deliberations is not conclusive, it does indicate that the jury may have been closely divided on the question of Miles' identity as Accomplice Two."], "id": "9dc4b85f-d000-440c-9e7b-2982d105d361", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c Having fixed the penalty for burglary and <mask> committed when armed with a dangerous weapon, it may be said that the Legislature did not intend to increase the penalty by reason of this element. But that we think is just what the Legislature intended to do. (People v. Paradiso, 248 N. Y. 123.) Burglary and robbery in the first degree may be committed in four or five different ways, but when committed while being armed with a dangerous weapon, the defendant must receive the additional punishment stated in section 1944. So if in the act of committing any felony the defendant be armed with a dangerous weapon, his punishment is increased. Not the user necessarily, but the having of such an instrument, is the determining factor.\u201d"], "id": "0eab883c-127f-483e-bdae-e37ee874cf8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Alain M. Bourgeois, J. On February 6,1985, the defendant, following the denial of a motion to suppress identification testimony, entered a plea of guilty to <mask> in the first degree in satisfaction of all counts of the indictment herein. With the consent of the Assistant District Attorney, the defendant was promised that if he were found not to be a predicate felon, he would receive a sentence of two to six years in State prison. Alternatively, he was promised that were he determined to be a second felony offender he would be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty to robbery in the first degree and substitute therefor a plea to robbery in the second degree, on which he would be sentenced to a term of from three to six years\u2019 incarceration."], "id": "d0950504-1c81-42a3-b4cc-8e5a69197df5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The testimony of Catherine Poillion Smith may be joined with that of her sister, Charlotte A. Poillion, because their testimony is substantially to the same effect, to wit, that on or about the 18th day of July, 1931, she and her sister were confined in a cell in the Harlem Woman\u2019s Prison upon a charge of defrauding a hotel-keeper; that while there, the witness Gladys Clayton, upon whose testimony the People mainly relied in connection with other evidence to establish the guilt of this defendant, told them that she had identified a man who was concerned in a <mask> during which a police officer was killed, although, in fact, she was unable to make an identification; that she identified the defendant because of police compulsion; that she believed, because she was a prostitute, it was to her advantage to do so; that when it was called to her attention that she might send an innocent man to the electric chair she said, \u201c He was only to get 20 years, and it didn\u2019t matter.\u201d"], "id": "9f581d30-e0cb-4544-baf1-b51881b5aafd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On April 22, 1992, undercover police officers observed the defendant running towards them. He looked over his shoulders, ducked into a doorway, crouched down, and began rummaging through a wallet. The police officers approached the defendant and asked him for his name. The defendant\u2019s name did not match the name on the driver\u2019s license that the defendant had discarded. The officers then received a radio transmission of a description of a <mask> suspect who had fled in the direction from which the defendant had been running. The defendant was detained for several minutes until a showup identification was completed."], "id": "2a8d1c37-7dc2-47b0-ba1d-7ed87786a140", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["However, when the court in 1961 vacated the defendant\u2019s 1932 conviction it destroyed the underlying predicate for the application of section 219 of the Correction Law since the defendant could not be a parole violator on the homicide charge at the time of the commission of the <mask> in 1953 since he was not validly convicted of the homicide charge until May 9, 1962."], "id": "8d45b9b3-f883-4502-bfea-8453d0964aac", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["After the hearing, this court ruled that the personal attendance of the witness was precluded, whereupon a properly authenticated transcript of the criminal court hearing testimony was admitted over objection. The People rested without calling other witnesses. Decision on defendant\u2019s motion for a trial order of dismissal on grounds of legal insufficiency was reserved until after the verdict in view of People v Brown (40 NY2d 381, cert den 433 US 913). Defendant\u2019s case at trial consisted of placing in evidence the complainant\u2019s alleged prior inconsistent statement about a knife as recorded in the UF 61 complaint report. The jury found the defendant guilty of <mask> in the second degree. The motion to dismiss is now before the court."], "id": "6689dd3e-ab78-4fe0-a6a6-85708f6d050b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Accordingly, to convict Defendant of attempted second-degree <mask> under a theory of accomplice liability in Count V, the State must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that, in accordance with the above statutes and case law, (1) Defendant or another person committed an act; (2) such conduct was a substantial step toward the commission of the offense of second-degree robbery; (3) Defendant or another person engaged in such conduct for the purpose of committing such second-degree robbery; and (4) with the purpose of promoting the commission of second-degree robbery, Defendant acted with another person or persons in committing the offense. See id. ; sections 569.030.1, 569.010(1), and 564.011.1; see also Hosier , 454 S.W.3d at 898 ; Voss , 488 S.W.3d at 108-10 ; Kusgen , 178 S.W.3d at 601 ; MAI-CR3d 304.06 (effective July 1, 2013); MAI-CR3d 304.04 (effective Sept. 1, 2003)."], "id": "6da13ad7-269b-4a50-b2ee-9dfc6830ee64", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Notwithstanding the language in People v Pellot (supra), that merger applies only to kidnapping in the second degree, in People v Addison (151 AD2d 372, lv denied 74 NY2d 946), the Appellate Division, First Department, under the facts of that case, held that the merger principle would not preclude a conviction for kidnapping in the first degree, since the <mask> had been fully consummated before the abduction and the kidnapping was \"a separate and discrete crime neither incidental to nor inseparable from the robbery\u201d (151 AD2d, at 373)."], "id": "de72a33c-03ca-449a-b7ae-6e0a1d9ee30f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court explained that in Tison , \"[t]he United States Supreme Court granted Ricky's and Raymond's petitions to consider the application of Enmund to these facts. The court began by discussing at length and endorsing Enmund 's holding *619that the Eighth Amendment limits the ability of states to impose death for 'felony murder simpliciter .' [Citation.] Specifically, Tison described the range of felony-murder participants as a spectrum. At one extreme were people like 'Enmund himself: the minor actor in an armed <mask>, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.' [Citation.] At the other extreme were actual killers and those who attempted or intended to kill. [Citation.] Under Enmund , Tison held, death was disproportional and impermissible for those at the former pole, but permissible for those at the latter. [Citation.] The Supreme Court then addressed the gray area in between, the proportionality of capital punishment for felony-murder participants who, like the two surviving Tison brothers, fell 'into neither of these neat categories.' [Citation.] Here, the court announced, 'major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.' [Citation.]\" ( Banks, supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 800, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330.) Therefore, the culpability of nonkiller felony murderers falls on a continuum, and only knowingly creating a \" 'grave risk of death' \" satisfies the constitutional minimum for death penalty eligibility and felony-murder special circumstances. ( Id. at p. 811, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330 ; Tison, supra , 481 U.S. at p. 157, 107 S.Ct. 1676.)4"], "id": "19d5a2e2-dd4c-41c6-bcaa-756a4ec0fd9d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A Nassau County detective who was investigating a series of robberies learned of a <mask> in Suffolk County that fit the same pattern. The license plate number of the vehicle used in the Suffolk County robbery was traced to the defendant\u2019s Cadillac. Upon discovering that the defendant was on parole for a robbery conviction, the detective obtained his photograph for a photographic array. One of the Nassau County robbery victims positively identified the defendant in the array, and another victim made a tentative identification of the defendant. Two days later, the police stopped the defendant while he was driving the Cadillac and arrested him."], "id": "cb446ff7-2363-4378-a967-4b3276a75b62", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["According to the records, the cell phone towers used for the calls were consistent with the testimony of Thompson, Moore, and Jacari about their activities on September 24 and 25, as well as Rendon and Thompson\u2019s drive to the Quad Cities on September 26. The district court denied Rendon\u2019s motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury found Rendon guilty of first-degree burglary and nine counts of first-degree <mask>. Rendon was sentenced to a total of seventy-five years in prison."], "id": "4f2e59c2-8ba3-40a7-bca8-ea8e528a20f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["1) that the trial court erred by failing to give the \"no duty to retreat\" instruction; 2) that the trial court erred during the penalty phase of the trial by permitting the Commonwealth to present evidence of Appellant's juvenile court adjudication for <mask>; and *6193) that although KRS 532.055(2)(a) 6 authorized the admission of his juvenile court record, the trial court erred by doing so because the statute is an unconstitutional encroachment upon the prerogatives of the judiciary. Id."], "id": "6f52069b-db59-4d77-9a09-4369f33c79ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The law is clear that where a defendant is arrested on the basis of a loitering statute which is unconstitutional, any search incident to such arrest is improper and any items seized as a result must be suppressed (People v Peterkin, 48 AD2d 843; People v Beltrand, 63 Misc 2d 1041, affd 67 Misc 2d 324). In Peterkin, the defendant was arrested for loitering in violation of Penal Law \u00a7 240.35 (6) and a search uncovered money stolen during a <mask>. That loitering section was subsequently found to be unconstitutional in People v Berck (32 NY2d 567, cert denied 414 US 1093) and as a consequence the search which was incident to the arrest was illegal. The fact pattern in Beltrand was almost identical to that in Peterkin and the result was the same."], "id": "ea6ac03f-0f0c-4a09-b00d-ed8ab1febf8d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On November 30, 2005, at about 5:00 p.m., Officer Santiago, an anticrime officer in the 73rd Precinct, interviewed the complaining witness at the precinct. The complaining witness indicated that he had been robbed that day at about 4:00 p.m. He told the officer that he had been robbed in front of his home at gunpoint by three black men who took his jewelry. The *708complaining witness stated that, after the <mask>, the men had jumped into a new model Dodge Charger, possibly maroon or orange, with custom wheels the same color as the car.2"], "id": "05a3215f-9cb2-4cd7-8a1f-9551d3aca471", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The evidence presented to the Grand Jury was that a man entered a pharmacy here in the Bronx wearing what the witness described as a \u201cbandana\u201d over the lower part of his face and a baseball hat, displayed and \u201cclicked\u201d what looked like a \u201cgun\u201d to the store clerk, and demanded that he fill a bag with money. The clerk complied and the robber fled from the store with the money. Six days later, the clerk identified defendant in a police-arranged lineup. The People also presented the arresting detective to the Grand Jury. That witness, Detective Houlihan, testified to a statement made by defendant after his arrest in which defendant admitted that he had entered the pharmacy on the date of the crime wearing a handkerchief *712over his face. Defendant further stated that he showed a gun to the clerk behind the counter, clicked it and demanded money. Defendant stated that after receiving the money in a bag he fled. With respect to the gun, defendant stated it was \u201ca small 380, black in color. There were no bullets in the gun.\u201d The People instructed the Grand Jury on the elements of the crime of <mask> in the first degree, Penal Law \u00a7 160.15 (4) (displayed what appeared to be a pistol, revolver or other firearm), robbery in the second degree, Penal Law \u00a7 160.10 (2) (b) (displayed what appeared to be a pistol, revolver or other firearm), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, Penal Law \u00a7 265.01 (2), and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, Penal Law \u00a7 165.40. The prosecutor\u2019s charge included a reading of that portion of the statute defining robbery in the first degree that sets forth an affirmative defense to that degree of robbery, that the weapon displayed was either unloaded or inoperable. The filed indictment contains each of the submitted crimes, including both robbery in the first and second degrees."], "id": "730c252d-a2b2-449c-b955-6cfe6a425eec", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Viewing the evidence, in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The complainant\u2019s story as to the happening of the <mask> was consistent. Minor inconsistencies between his statement to the police and his trial testimony do not make his testimony incredible as a matter of law (see, People v Senior, 203 AD2d 308; People v Stackhouse, 201 AD2d 686; People v White, 192 AD2d 736)."], "id": "173eab11-07cf-4118-a8f8-5960f0d903e8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Here, one of the People\u2019s two witnesses, an employee of the fast-food restaurant where the <mask> occurred, testified that Detective Delpino conducted a 15-minute interview at the restaurant on either the date of the robbery or the next day. According to the People\u2019s witness, during this interview, he provided Detective Delpino with a description of the perpetrators and answered other questions concerning the circumstances of the robbery. The witness further testified that Detective Delpino wrote down his responses on a piece of paper. Significantly, the prosecutor maintained that a certain DD-5 report, which had been compiled by telephone by Detective Delpino, is the only Rosario material pertaining to this witness. Faced with this discrepancy, the court afforded the defendant an opportunity to question Detective Delpino and thereby determine whether the alleged Rosario material existed. The defendant specifically declined the court\u2019s offer, opting instead to seek an adverse inference charge based upon the record as it was. The Supreme Court correctly declined to give the requested charge, because the record was incomplete. Now, on appeal, the defendant argues that the court erred in failing to conduct the hearing. However, having failed to avail himself of the opportunity presented by the Supreme Court, the defendant may not now claim to have been deprived of a full and fair hearing on this issue (see generally, People v Poole, supra, at 150)."], "id": "93129f15-986a-40e7-a563-5e8e6da98a90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Part of that problem is caused by the failure of the courts to notice that some crimes have a tangible injury (which can be isolated as a corpus delicti) while others an intangible corpus or none at all. The corpus delicti (not to be confused with proof of death in homicide, Penal Law, \u00a7 1041) is tangible in all violent crimes, homicide, assault, <mask>. It is also often tangible in property crimes, arson, burglary, larceny, receiving, etc. It is intangible in perjury, bribery, corruption, tax eva*369sion, etc. (Proof of the corpus in intangible crimes often involves necessarily proof of the defendant\u2019s complicity \u2014 see Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147, 153, 154, supra.) This latter distinction is mentioned because it has resulted in some rather general language in cases having an intangible corpus which might indicate that the \u201cadditional proof\u201d need only serve to corroborate the truth of the confession (cf. People v. Jaehne [a bribery prosecution], 103 N. Y. 182, 199, \u201c are strongly corroborative of its truth \u201d). But the law is clear that \u201c additional proof \u201d which serves only to corroborate the truth of the confession and does not corroborate the corpus delicti is insufficient. (People v. Clark, 228 App. Div. 670; People v. Di Gregario, 205 App. Div. 629; People v. Cuozzo, 292 N. Y. 85; People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, supra; cf. State v. Johnson, 31 N. J. 489; State v. Lucas, 30 N. J. 37.)"], "id": "e4df7512-ae3e-403e-b843-02ba4c30adcf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant, John Doe, proceeded to deny having committed the <mask>. He also asserted a justification defense, alleging that complainant was the initial aggressor, had attempted to strike the defendant with a golf club after breaking into the defendant\u2019s home, and that codefendant, Richard Doe, shot the complainant during the incident. In an effort to substantiate his statements, the defendant was permitted to introduce photographs and a street map which had been procured by his attorney. (The foregoing was introduced only after a heated discussion between the prosecutor and defense counsel, which had occurred outside the Grand Jury room, but which had been overheard by one of the grand jurors.) Following his statement, the defendant was vigorously cross-examined by the prosecutor."], "id": "61a42410-435d-4aee-a62d-1d8f26f1ca65", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Gittens is currently serving a 7-to-14-year sentence at Sullivan Correctional Facility for two counts of armed <mask> in the second degree. From the record, it is both clear and uncontroverted that the prisoner in question suffers from chronic, severe psychiatric disorders, including chronic paranoid schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Since the inception of his incarceration in 1981, Gittens has been committed to the Central New York Psychiatric Center 17 times. He apparently is, and has been, receiving various forms of psychotherapy and antipsychotic medications. The record also indicates that Sullivan Correctional Facility was aware of Gittens\u2019 mental condition, and on at least three occasions, his condition was taken into account in the disposition of prison disciplinary proceedings. Gittens had 10 additional disciplinary proceedings held against him between 1983 and 1988, in which a total of 11V2 months of good behavior allowances (good time) were recommended to be taken from him as punishment upon determinations of guilt as to various charged acts of misbehavior. There is no indication that Gittens\u2019 mental condition was considered in any way at these hearings."], "id": "fd4f0a66-b03b-4b25-bb5e-c7fb732387a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Despite the stated purpose of its sponsors (the Baumes\u2019 Commission, supra noted), the simplified form of indictment may not be used where the District Attorney is uncertain of the nature of the crime to be charged and the factual allegations to be included in the indictment. It may be used where indeed it is least necessary, i.e., where the evidence presented to the Grand Jury leaves no doubt of the crime charged and the facts upon which that charge is based. It is suitable in eases of homicide, <mask> and burglary and not by any means in all such cases. But the long form of indictment can be used with equal facility in such cases. Where a statute defines a crime which may be charged in several different ways and the evidence presented before the Grand Jury can support more than one of the charges, the simplified form should not be used."], "id": "893ed165-435f-4457-98bf-2dead6fc7aa7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Parks also explained to Parkinson that he had contact with appellant on Facebook Messenger after the incident. In the messages, Parks told appellant that Watson was dead. Appellant told Parks not to snitch and described how they had disposed of the gun and that no one had seen their faces. Parks also told Parkinson that, during their discussions before the <mask>, Shakur said that if Watson resisted, he would shoot him in the leg."], "id": "372f7d9d-66cf-45a2-8fd9-e411a604b6b2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In the course of the recorded conversation, it is evident that Schwimmer was hoping to enlist two new and more reliable recruits than the fumbling trio who had botched up the West 4th Street subway <mask>. With undiminished confidence in his basic criminal scheme, Schwimmer proposed to teach them how to lurk outside the Customs House, how to spot potential couriers of large diamond shipments, and how to rob them in fast and daring daylight street assaults. In the course of the meeting, some boasting as to criminal prowess took place. Unfortunately for Schwimmer, his part of this interchange included explicit reference to his full participation in the West *9824th Street subway robbery, and his smug possession of over two thirds of the unrecovered loot. Understandably, this taped conversation enabled a Grand Jury on November 10, 1977 to indict Schwimmer with the crimes of robbery in the second degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree. It is this taped conversation which Schwimmer now moves to suppress as illegally obtained."], "id": "846f50fa-f763-46ee-b9fc-c22d024aac0b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["However, in its order, the circuit court explained that this exchange was solely an inquiry regarding the requested jury instruction for the lesser-included offense of simple <mask> and that trial counsel did present a defense of general denial. Matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, fall within the realm of counsel's professional judgment and are not grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Anderson v. State , 2015 Ark. 18, at 8, 454 S.W.3d 212, 218. While a better strategy may seem apparent to Mercouri now, judicial review of trial counsel's performance is highly deferential, and Mercouri fails to offer evidence that counsel's approach was objectively unreasonable. Moreover, his contention that \"counsel basically did nothing\" fails because, as the circuit court explained in its order,"], "id": "02e230f0-b304-43db-aaaa-4655f478845f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As noted, subdivision (a)(1)(D) of section 781 contains the following limitation on eligibility for record sealing under that section: \"Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall not order the person's records sealed in any case in which the person has been found by the juvenile court to have committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 when he or she had attained 14 years of age or older.\" <mask> is one of the offenses listed in section 707, subdivision (b). (See \u00a7 707, subd. (b)(3).)"], "id": "79029972-02e8-48ba-abc9-c0a410f8f580", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As to Teamer, Steward, and Miles, the referee concluded that they were either not \"inherently\" or \"compellingly credible.\" For instance, as to Steward, the referee stated that: \"While his recent testimony concerning the <mask> that resulted in [Miles'] conviction could be true, the referee cannot conclude that Mr. Steward has any inherent credibility.\" (Italics added.) In his final report, the referee concluded: \"[T]he referee believes that, based on all of the testimony he has heard and all of the evidence that he has reviewed, [Miles] 'could in fact be innocent of the robbery at Fidelity Financial Services on June 29, 1998.' Likewise, based on all of the testimony he has heard and the evidence he has reviewed, the referee believes that the inculpatory eyewitness identifications that resulted in [Miles'] conviction could be honest and accurate. If that is the case, then [Miles] is guilty of that robbery.\""], "id": "a5ca1f83-8c1f-4aa3-aeed-81177c3bb172", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In addition, whereas the evidence in McKay showed the alternative perpetrator committed a similar crime in the immediate vicinity just eight days after the occurrence of the <mask>, in this case the gas-station armed robberies and the crimes at the Drury Inn were different, occurred much further apart in time, and were committed in three different locations in the St. Louis area. As previously stated, the crimes involving the Bulls Hat Bandit were all robberies committed at gas stations with no injuries being reported, whereas the crimes in this case involved a robbery and a murder at a hotel with the Victim being killed by the suspect. Furthermore, the only evidence regarding the timing of the three gas-station armed robberies is that the last one occurred around the time of May 10, 2015, which was approximately four months after the Drury Inn crimes."], "id": "93872802-8ddb-4dca-b132-95129e199539", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["This novel question \u2014 for which there is no apparent case law in this State \u2014 arose during the course of a lengthy pretrial hearing at which the defendant sought to suppress certain property seized and statements made in connection with his arrest for <mask>, first degree and second degree, burglary, first degree, conspiracy, fourth degree, criminal impersonation, first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and, by separate indictment, for murder, second degree."], "id": "4c0978be-bc08-442e-ac21-1ea2a295f1fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant acknowledges that no \"felony complaint\u201d was filed, but argues that the prosecutor had no choice but to charge him as a felon, since he has been previously convicted of DWI. The defendant urges the court to accept this argument since otherwise the system would be unfair in that a person charged with rape or <mask>, for example, would be entitled to notice of the District Attorney\u2019s intent to present the matter to a Grand Jury, whereas a person facing felony charges of DWI would not have the same rights."], "id": "fc1d66ad-09fa-4e51-882e-e2f127d409ef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Contrary to the defendant\u2019s contention, the hearing court properly declined to suppress the in-court identification of the defendant by a witness to the <mask>. The testimony adduced at the Wade hearing establishes that the witness observed the defendant at close range, under good lighting conditions, for approximately two minutes, and that the witness gave a detailed description of the defendant to the police the day after the robbery. Thus, although the hearing court found that the lineup conducted by the police was impermissibly sugges*398tive, there was an independent source for the witness\u2019s in-court identification of the defendant (see, Manson v Braithwaite, 432 US 98; People v Reid, 175 AD2d 815; People v Greer, 173 AD2d 557; People v Tomilin, 131 AD2d 897; People v Owens, 131 AD2d 602; Matter of Michael J., 117 AD2d 602)."], "id": "72c3bdb6-5205-4ca8-9186-58368a7e569f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On appeal, Fleming claims his trial counsel was ineffective for requesting an erroneous jury instruction. More specifically, Fleming resurrects the argument he made in his direct appeal about the alleged instructional error, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for requesting the standard pattern instruction (PIK) for aggravated <mask> instead of requesting an instruction that specified that Fleming took Dean's cell phone and wallet. He argues that the overly broad jury instruction prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Fleming had raised other grounds for relief in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that he does not address on appeal. Issues not briefed are deemed waived or abandoned. State v. Arnett, 307 Kan. 648, 650, 413 P.3d 787 (2018)."], "id": "799bc13c-3f0d-4e1c-928c-8ff11dcf2c88", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\"In sum, [petitioner] testified that he did not know what happened to the guns found in the sock and he did not fire them, he was not involved in the purchase of ammunition, no one discussed or displayed any firearms on the evening of the murder, he was not asked to participate in a <mask>, he did not know what Candido or Josh were going to do at Skeeko's Bar, and he did not go there with the intent to commit any crime.\" (People v. Ramirez , supra ,, fns. omitted.)"], "id": "35dc5391-bdd5-4eca-a2ad-76230b4ff233", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": [". Mr. Smith\u2019s legal history is characterized only by violent criminal behavior: Dec. 5,1988, convicted of the crime of <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 160.10); May 25, 1989, convicted of the crime of attempted robbery in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 160.10); Jan. 18, 1995, convicted of the crime of attempted rape in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 130.35); June 6, 1996, convicted of the crime of assault in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 120.05 [7])."], "id": "4ccaeace-80ce-4e35-aea6-30cc5abc995d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["One of the cases relied upon by the defendant involved the element of an escape where, by means of a gun, a sheriff was assaulted and the jail keys were taken from his person. In that case, the defendants were indicted for <mask> and assault *991in the first degree, and were given consecutive sentences, which was held improper by the Appellate Division because the assault in the first degree and the robbery were considered inclusive crimes. Apparently, the defendants were not indicted for escape, and consequently, that case may be distinguished from the present one. (People v. Wells, 246 App. Div. 853.)"], "id": "9845ac7d-7ff6-4b09-9ae0-0ee4982f9bc2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On cross-examination, Dye stated that he remembered speaking to Officer Chris Gravely and that he \"supposed\" he told Gravely that the suspect was \"6'3 and had a slender build,\" but that \"he wasn't skinny at the time.\" He admitted that before being presented with the photo lineup, he had already described the suspect as being \"an older gentleman, in his 40's.\" He testified that the suspect pulled the taser out of his pocket with his left hand and that the suspect's right hand never touched the taser. He said that although he watched the suspect leave after the <mask>, he did not see the suspect get into a truck."], "id": "dfb1ab46-6d20-4f9b-bf31-9dedc90341eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of <mask> in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 160.15 [3]). We reject defendant\u2019s contention that County Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea without a hearing (see People v Merritt, 115 AD3d 1250, 1250-1251 [2014]; see generally People v Mitchell, 21 NY3d 964, 966 [2013]). Defendant\u2019s belated and unsupported claims of innocence and coercion were insufficient to justify a hearing (see *1498People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). We reject defendant\u2019s further contention that his plea was jurisdictionally defective. Defendant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the indictment (cf. People v Castillo, 8 NY3d 959, 960-961 [2007]) and, by his guilty plea, defendant forfeited any challenge to the alleged amendment of the indictment (see People v Martinez, 52 AD3d 68, 71 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 791 [2008]). Defendant\u2019s valid waiver of the right to appeal precludes review of the factual sufficiency of the plea allocution and forecloses defendant\u2019s challenge to the severity of his sentence (see People v Talley, 112 AD3d 1347, 1347 [2013]; People v Nash, 38 AD3d 684, 684 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 848 [2007]). While defendant\u2019s contention that his plea was not voluntary survives the waiver of the right to appeal and was preserved by his motion to withdraw his plea, we conclude that the contention is without merit inasmuch as it is belied by the record (see Merritt, 115 AD3d at 1251)."], "id": "c16d3038-c201-403d-b50a-2349ccd51d73", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["At the point where the respondent herein took out the gun from the bag which was on the bench next to Ralph, a <mask> was occurring; the complainant, Anthony and the other two assailants were still aggressors in the robbery. When the respondent pulled out the gun, stood up and said \"I\u2019ve got a gun, I\u2019m going to kill you!\u201d, two of the assailants fled behind the sliding door which separated one subway car from another."], "id": "77dfda29-2dff-4797-be3b-fe5b50522d0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We have seen that the difference between an \u201c included \u201d crime and a \u201c separate \u201d crime is entirely a matter of legislative definition. Thus in California where one kind of kidnapping is defined as detention for the purpose of <mask>, robbery is an included crime with kidnapping. There can be no kidnapping under the definition without a robbery. Also in this State prior to the Penal Code burglary was defined as breaking and entering and stealing. Larceny was an \u201c included \u201d crime with burglary and it was held that a person convicted of larceny could not be tried for burglary. (People v. Smith, 57 Barb. 46.) But the Legislature in adopting the Penal Code redefined burglary as breaking and entering with the intent to steal. Thus larceny was made a \u201c separate \u201d crime from burglary. To clarify the legislative intent section 506 of the Penal Code, now 406 of the Penal Law, specifically provided that each crime could be separately punished. The Legislature by redefinition can do the same with any crime. It could define robbery as assault with intent to steal thus making larceny a \u201c separate \u201d crime from robbery."], "id": "3a782aa7-9005-4b30-be28-289f1065c014", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["with a third party was offered not for the truth of what the third party told him, but to explain the course of his investigation. Commonwealth v. Rega, [593 Pa. 659], 933 A.2d 997, 1017 (2007)\u2026.\u201c[I]t is a longstanding rule of jurisprudence that an out- of-court statement offered to explain a course of conduct is not hearsay.\u201d Commonwealth v. Dargan, 897 A.2d 496, [500] (Pa.Super. 2006) [(quotation marks and quotations omitted)]. Here, Mr. Wilkinson was asked by the prosecutor about the timing of his initial identification of Appellant, which happened almost a week after the <mask>. [Appellant\u2019s trial counsel objected to the initial question, and the trial court overruled the objection.] [Mr. Wilkinson then] explained why he returned to the police and when he learned of Appellant\u2019s name. The fact that he learned of Appellant\u2019s name through a third party [was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted]. Because this testimony only elaborated on how he identified Appellant to the police, it was admissible to explain his course of conduct during the investigation. Thereafter, on cross-examination, [Appellant\u2019s co- defendant\u2019s] counsel was attempting to get the witness to commit to the point in time when he either knew or didn\u2019t know of Appellant\u2019s identity, and he specifically instructed the witness not to tell him who may have given him Appellant\u2019s name or how it was said to him. Clearly, this line of questioning [on cross- examination] was relevant to explain why the witness waited for close to a week after the robbery to identify Appellant. Appellant\u2019s counsel had already objected to this line of questioning on direct examination, and although his objection to the mere explanation of learning Appellant\u2019s name through a third party was initially overruled, [the trial court] sustained when Mr. Wilkinson was about to repeat the third party\u2019s actual statement. (N.T., 6/24/15, pgs. 33-34). The cross-examination questions posed by [Appellant\u2019s co-defendant\u2019s] counsel stayed within the same parameters; namely, an explanation of the timing of Mr. Wilkinson\u2019s eventual identification of Appellant as the shooter. Inasmuch as Appellant\u2019s trial counsel would have had no basis for lodging an objection at the aforesaid point in cross- examination by [Appellant\u2019s co-defendant\u2019s] counsel, he cannot be found ineffective for failing to do so. Further, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a limiting jury instruction concerning Mr. Wilkinson\u2019s mention of a \u201csomebody\u201d who told him Appellant\u2019s name."], "id": "1ea1ad2c-a390-4a00-9f94-3f9210034afe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Heretofore on August 14, 1981, this court directed John Crawford, who was in detention on an unrelated charge to appear in a lineup in connection with a <mask> investigation. Relying on Matter of Alphonso C. (50 AD2d 97), Matter of District Attorney v Angelo G. (48 AD2d 576), and Matter of Burke v Sullivan (52 AD2d 536), probable cause was determined as a condition precedent for the issuance of that order. In addition it was also determined that proper notice had been given to counsel for the defendant, who in fact, appeared and argued in opposition to its issuance. Those two salient requirements were satisfied and therefore the dictates of due process were met (see, also, Matter of Merola v Fico, 81 Misc 2d 206)."], "id": "d2565945-9869-4911-ab23-bd9312393662", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Testimony from other witnesses at the revocation hearing was consistent with Shaw's version of the events. And police officer Raymond Stanley testified that when Collins gave a statement subsequent to his arrest, he denied knowing about or participating in the physical altercation and the <mask> in his SUV but admitted having been the driver during the robbery and having smoked the stolen marijuana afterward."], "id": "9e759114-e975-473b-8b73-30c818300c3f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Nor does Mullaney (supra) encompass the further claim of defendant, that the prosecution must establish the facts which distinguish between the degrees of <mask> \"by display * * * [of] what appears to be a [firearm].\u201d While manslaughter and murder were genetically different offenses at common law, as focused upon in Mullaney (supra), no such dichotomy there existed between differing forms of robbery. Those were, of *248course, days of simpler weapons and modest firepower. Precise definitions of the offense differ among jurisdictions, but New York\u2019s use of the term \"forcible stealing\u201d (Penal Law, \u00a7 160.00) in defining robbery differs little semantically and none in application from the generally accepted definition of robbery as \"larceny from the person by violence or intimidation.\u201d (Perkins, Criminal Law [2d ed], p 279.)"], "id": "9483e238-faad-42ab-bcad-49f0cfb3fdd6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Johnson (supra) would thus seem to preclude a plea to any crime which is not within the embrace of CPL 1.20 (37) or 220.20 (1) (a)-(k). This, of course, would render the plea in the instant case defective since attempted <mask> in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of the first degree robbery charged here (Penal Law \u00a7 160.15 [3]) under CPL 1.20 (37) or 220.20 (1) (a)-(k). In my view analysis of Johnson in conjunction with its antecedents shows that the plea in the instant case was permissible."], "id": "cc5def49-0763-418d-a3a8-8773320d863f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Shirley R. Levittan, J. On August 11, 1982, defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted <mask> in the second degree (Penal Law, \u00a7\u00a7 110.00, 160.10), a class D felony. The People have now filed a statement, pursuant to CPL 400.21, indicating defendant be sentenced as a second felony offender (Penal Law, \u00a7 70.06). Defendant challenges the use of his prior felony conviction as a predicate, alleging his plea of guilty was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution (CPL 400.21, subd 7, par [b]). Defendant contends that the court, on his prior conviction, neglected to advise him of his rights outlined in Boykin v Alabama (395 US 238). Specifically, defendant argues that the failure to inform him of his right to a trial by jury voids the use of this conviction for the purposes of section 70.06 of the Penal Law."], "id": "d337069f-2d4c-4b90-a263-08248f1bff35", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, however, the court did not find that no other person was present when Mann committed the <mask>. It found codefendants Mack and Ferguson had not been proved to have been present, but both Watford, the complaining witness, and Mann, the defendant, testified there was someone else present. Mann said it was one Alonzo Walker, Watford thought it was Ferguson (though not with sufficient certainty to satisfy the court), but even if it was not proved to have been Ferguson or Mack, someone besides Mann was there to help pin down Watford, remove his pants, and help relieve him of his possessions. There is nothing either conceplually or factually implausible in the identity and complicity of one person accused of acting with an accomplice being readily established, while the identity of his accomplice has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. \u201c The question of the one defendant\u2019s guilt cannot turn upon the establishment of the other\u2019s guilt; it is an independent issue to be tried out alone.\u201d (People v. Kief, 126 N. Y. 661, 663. See, also, People ex rel. Guido v. Calkins, 9 N Y 2d 77, 81.) Even though the crime charged is one that must have been committed in the presence of another, it need not be a, person named in the indictment so long as the evidence shows and the trier of the facts is convinced that someone besides the convicted defendant was present as an accomplice. (People v. Eichner, 168 App. Div. 200.)"], "id": "9e6c4256-914b-405c-907b-1b0096e5996a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Plaintiff-petitioner is presently incarcerated at the Federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. He was convicted on April 19, 1971 for bank <mask>. On December 8, 1976, plaintiff-petitioner requested in writing from the New York State Police, pursuant to the freedom of information article of the Public Officers Law of the State of New York (art 6), copies of all files and/or other information in possession of defendant-respondent with reference to plaintiff-petitioner. The request was denied on the grounds that the records requested are a part of investigative files compiled for law *530enforcement purposes and as such are specifically exempt from disclosure under section 88 (subd 7, par d) of the Public Officers Law."], "id": "ed40319b-e38c-408d-b19e-8d29c5f10ae1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["At trial, the People called Rivers as a witness. After he invoked, outside the presence of the jury, his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify, the portion of the allocution summarized above with Woods\u2019 and Hopkins\u2019 names redacted to \u201cA\u201d and \u201cB,\u201d respectively, was read to the jury. The trial concluded with defendant Woods being convicted of assault in the third degree and defendant Hopkins of <mask> in the second degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree. This opinion is being issued to supplement and further explain the court\u2019s trial rulings with respect to the admission and use of the allocution."], "id": "4864d852-eb39-4e81-a60a-919dee5d971f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The witness was also permitted to tell the Grand Jury that while Hanley and \"Billy\u201d were in the store, the defendants remained outside \"looking up and down the block for the police.\u201d The record offers no basis for his conclusions and opinions that the defendants were waiting for Hanley and \"Billy\u201d or that they were watching out for the police. Again, this testimony does not consist of observable events or circum*273stances, but rather of unsupported inferences that go directly to the ultimate factual issues, inferences which are the exclusive province of the Grand Jury. This testimony is critical because if the grand jurors were to have lawfully concluded that the defendants were, in fact, lookouts, an indictment for the crimes of murder and <mask> could lawfully have been returned. (See, e.g., People v Bradley, 150 AD2d 592 [2d Dept 1989].) Save for the testimony that the defendants were in the company of two perpetrators, one of whom signalled the intention to commit the crime, that they were in proximity to the crime site and that they ran after the shooting, the evidence connecting the defendants to the criminal enterprise consists of the inadmissible opinion testimony of the eyewitness. In essence, the witness clothed the defendants in perpetrators\u2019 garb by his conclusory allegations. The error was heavily underscored and compounded when, despite the significant instances of incompetent and inadmissible testimony, the prosecutor failed to provide any sort of limiting instruction or explanation as to how the Grand Jury should evaluate such evidence."], "id": "bd2c24fb-36d4-4993-a204-03169705584e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant was accused of robbing two banks and attempting to rob a third bank. Charged with multiple felony counts, the defendant was to plead guilty to attempted <mask> in the second degree, in full satisfaction of the indictment, with the understanding that he would receive a certain sentence. After a plea allocution, the Supreme Court stated that the plea was acceptable to the court, but the prosecutor, in effect, objected to the allocution. After making further inquiry of the defendant, the court stated that the plea was acceptable to the court if it was acceptable to the People. The prosecutor, in effect, objected again, stating his belief that the allocution was not legally sufficient. The matters then proceeded to a jury trial, after which the defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, two counts of robbery in the third degree, and attempted robbery in the third degree."], "id": "b0e7471e-ff8b-4ed9-9f52-854465243f96", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["the people and take it. They were close to the car at this time. Bivert then threatened defendant. \u2018Before we went down there, he said, if he started shooting, that I better start shooting or that he was going to blow my head off, or he was going to do the same to me as he did to the rest, or something to that effect.\u2019 \u201cDefendant testified that he believed Bivert would kill him if he did not start shooting when Bivert did. Defendant \u2018wondered\u2019 whether he would, but the thought that Bivert might not shoot him \u2018passed real quick.\u2019 They then walked from the car toward the Rogerses. Defendant did not walk away because he was panicked and thought he would be shot in the back; he did not shoot Bivert because he was less experienced with handguns than Bivert; and he did not try to warn the Rogerses due to panic. They walked by the car without checking to see if it could be hot-wired. After they reached the Rogerses and Bivert fired several times, he looked at defendant and said, \u2018you better get to shooting.\u2019 Defendant then pulled out the .38-caliber revolver, closed his eyes and started shooting. He fired five of his six rounds with his eyes closed. He made no conscious effort to either aim at the Rogerses or away from them. \u201cDefendant did not try to get away from Bivert over the next three days because he was scared. They eventually went to the house of defendant\u2019s friend Shane Brumble in Oregon. Defendant told Brumble that they had shot two people in self-defense because he thought Shane would turn them in. Defendant thought it would be better to get caught than for anybody else to be killed or for him to be killed. \u201cDefendant testified that he could not remember Bivert ever threatening him until he was standing on the levee where the Rogerses were fishing. Bivert did not threaten him after shooting Patton. Even though he was afraid of Bivert, he did not know for sure if his death was imminent.\u201d (People v. King, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 294-295, fns. omitted.) \u201cThe jury returned verdicts of guilty on all murder and <mask> counts and their special findings. Not guilty verdicts were returned on both counts of grand theft-firearm."], "id": "a01f3530-6130-4f66-bc60-27d4b190f5c4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["To conform to the usages of merchants and the necessities of commerce, this otherwise substantially inflexible rule was, during the passage of time, to some extent relaxed by the aid of statutes and judicial decisions in respect to bills of exchange and promissory notes and these \u201c came to have distinct attributes and qualities not pertaining to any other form of contract. They were not only made transferable by delivery and suable in the name of the transferee, but, contrary to the general rule of the common law, \u2018 honest acquisition \u2019 for value was held to give to the transferee a new and original title, wholly independent of that of the prior holder and subject to no infirmity which affected the paper in his hands. The real owner, who had been despoiled of the paper by <mask> or theft, or who had lost it without negligence, was concluded from re-claiming it, and the maker, although he had been defrauded in executing it, could not be heard to allege the fraud as a defense against a bona fide holder. And the transferee, although he may have been negligent in talcing it, and omitted precautions which a prudent man would have taken, nevertheless, unless he acted mala fide, his title, according to the doctrine now settled, will prevail. These familiar but arbitrary principles applicable to commercial paper, originating in commercial policy, the encouragement of *746trade, the convenience of having some representative of money readily convertible and commanding confidence, while they operate in many cases with great severity upon the rights of innocent persons, have contributed greatly to stimulate commerce and advance the prosperity of States. The principles applicable to negotiable paper have been extended to embrace public debentures payable to bearer, and bonds of corporations, and some of the incidents of negotiability have either by custom or statute been applied to instruments not strictly negotiable. Certificates of stock, in business corporations, are embraced in \u25a0 the class last mentioned. They are not negotiable in form, they represent no debt and are not securities for money. But the courts of this country, in view of the extensive dealings in certificates of shares in corporate enterprises, and the interest both of the public and of the corporation which issues them, in making them readily transferable and convertible, have given to them some of the elements of negotiability.\u201d (Knox v. Eden Musee Co., Ltd., 148 N. Y. 441, 453, 454.)"], "id": "488056bc-1a5f-4805-8a99-3752eb304b05", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant was indicted for the crimes of burglary in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the second degree, <mask> in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree and kidnapping in the second degree. *855Following plea negotiations, defendant entered guilty pleas to burglary in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 140.25 [2]), as a lesser included offense of the first count of the indictment charging burglary in the first degree, and reckless endangerment in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 2 to 6 years on each charge to run concurrently in accordance with County Court\u2019s promise."], "id": "d06bcf54-0f3b-4144-b1be-356c330a668b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Nor does petitioner's conduct demonstrate reckless indifference to human life. There is no evidence from which it reasonably can be inferred petitioner harbored a willingness to kill, or to assist his confederates in killing, to *406achieve the goal of robbing someone, or that he anticipated the potential for loss of human life beyond that usually accompanying an armed <mask>. This is not reckless enough to support a special-circumstance finding. (See Clark , supra , 63 Cal.4th at pp. 617-618, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811.) Considering all the evidence, \"there appears to be nothing in the plan that one can point to that elevated the risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in any armed robbery.\" ( Id . at p. 623, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811 ; see In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 975-977, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 ( Miller ).) *769Considering all the circumstances, we conclude no reasonable juror could have found defendant aided and abetted the attempted robbery \"with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant\" ( \u00a7 190.2, subd. (d) ), as those terms are set out in Tison and explicated by Banks and Clark . (Compare In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1019-1021, 1023-1027, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 ( Bennett ) with In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 49-54, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 671 ( Loza ) & People v. Medina (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 778, 791-793, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 133.) Because the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's true finding on count 1's special circumstance, that finding must be vacated. Retrial of the special-circumstance allegation is barred. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 509, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947, disapproved on another ground in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 918-920, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 363, 320 P.3d 800 ; People v. Perez (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 863, 882, 196 Cal.Rptr.3d 871.)"], "id": "5b47127b-b6e7-424e-8cef-3a1de9e1bca8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The facts of the current offense and prior <mask> are not relevant to this appeal. The facts of the prior murder, as revealed in the record of conviction, are that defendant killed the victim by stabbing him with a knife and hitting him on the head with a blunt object, conduct that was found by a Texas jury to be \"clearly dangerous to human life\" and done with the \"inten[t] to cause serious bodily injury.\""], "id": "552db7b4-fcd7-458c-98be-d492494a684b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["For over 20 years it has been the law of the State of New York \u2014 by judicial fiat rather than through the legislative process \u2014 that, as a general principle,1 offenders may not stand convicted for kidnapping when that charge is combined with another (usually rape, <mask>, or assault) which actually provides the flavor for the criminal enterprise more so than the incidental technical kidnapping.2"], "id": "ca9e7205-887b-4175-accc-e420cb7bc398", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security served Pas- cal with an I-261, charging that he was removable under INA \u00a7 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the United States for a time longer than permitted. The I-261 also charged Pas- cal as removable under INA \u00a7 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for being convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, and under INA \u00a7 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for being convicted of an aggravated felony relat- ing to a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year. Pascal, represented by counsel, appeared at a master calen- dar hearing, and conceded that he was removable as charged with regard to his status as a nonimmigrant who remained longer than permitted. The immigration judge marked his previous convic- tions into evidence without objection from Pascal\u2019s attorney. Then, the immigration judge sustained the charges of removability against Pascal based on his two crimes involving moral turpitude (<mask> and burglary) and his aggravated felony conviction (rob- bery). Pascal applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief asserting persecution on account of political opinion. At the merits hearing, Pascal testified that he came to the United States in 2002 and had not returned to Haiti. He testified that he was mar- ried with one son who was five years old at the time. He further testified that his life would be in danger if he returned to Haiti. USCA11 Case: 20-13993 Date Filed: 02/03/2022 Page: 5 of 10"], "id": "f8db060b-94fc-4283-8082-35ee6a6c6f90", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant was subsequently charged in El Dorado County with <mask> and second degree burglary with three strikes (\u00a7 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and five prior prison term allegations (\u00a7 667.5, subd. (b)). He pleaded guilty to grand theft and admitted three strikes. On December 24, 2003, he was sentenced to 25 years to life consecutive to the prior term, for a total term of 193 years to life."], "id": "b3af5b28-0d78-491b-b1b1-12b2badbce22", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On April 17, 1997, the court filed a written decision on defendant\u2019s omnibus motion. However, as defendant failed to appear, the bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Approximately two years and four months later, on August 24, 1999, defendant was involuntarily returned on the warrant after being extradited from New Jersey where defendant had been continuously incarcerated, under the same name, since June 10, 1997. Defendant\u2019s incarceration in New Jersey stemmed from an arrest for <mask>, burglary and related charges. Defendant pleaded guilty in the New Jersey matter to robbery in the second degree on July 15, 1997, and was sentenced on September 25, 1997 to a five-year term of imprisonment."], "id": "2e835735-6dec-4b7a-8c70-5ad8a9f5be78", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A. Kirke Bartley, J. The defendant was convicted by plea of <mask> in the second degree. On October 25, 2000, she was sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment of seven years. Justice Harold Beeler presided over the plea and sentence, and failed to sentence the defendant to any period of postrelease supervision (PRS). Nor is there any indication on the sentencing papers that a period of PRS was added to the seven-year sentence. Moreover, at no time during the plea or the sentence did Justice Beeler ever indicate that the defendant would be subject to a period of PRS after she was discharged from prison (see minutes of plea and sentence, attached to defendant\u2019s motion papers as exhibits A, B). Nevertheless, as she approached her discharge date, the defendant was informed by the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) that she was required to serve five years\u2019 PRS. She was discharged from prison on December 1, 2006, and reached the maximum expiration date of her seven-year sentence on January 1, 2007 (see DOCS inmate information sheet, attached to defendant\u2019s motion papers as exhibit E)."], "id": "e29b3e5b-6b38-453f-9f47-acc41f85cb26", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant\u2019s motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 which was to set aside so much of his sentence as imposed consecutive terms of imprisonment upon his convictions of murder in the second degree (see Penal Law \u00a7 125.25 [3]) and <mask> in the first degree (see Penal Law \u00a7 160.15 [2]). The statutory sentencing scheme requires the imposition of concurrent sentences \u201c[w]hen more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 70.25 [2]), but allows for judicial discretion to impose consecutive sentences where the \u201cacts or omissions committed by defendant were separate and distinct acts\u201d (People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640, 643 [1996] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Frazier, 16 NY3d 36, 41 [2010]; People v Brown, 80 NY2d 361, 364 [1992]; People v Holmes, 92 AD3d 957 [2012])."], "id": "42717838-6d63-4ab0-8de3-10da1612deef", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["For his first point on appeal from the guilt/innocence phase of his trial, Reams argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of evidence of his other crimes. Reams asserts that references to his involvement in crimes unrelated to the capital-murder charge-the burglary of the dry cleaners, the <mask> of a bus station, and the robbery at an ATM-were featured prominently throughout the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. Reams argues that the jury should never have heard any of this prejudicial, other-crimes evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. To support his position, Reams argues that this court has made clear that, under Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence,4 other-crimes evidence can be admitted only if it is \"independently relevant to the main issue, in that it tends to prove some material point rather than merely proving that the defendant is a criminal.\" Lockhart v. State , 2010 Ark. 278, at 9, 367 S.W.3d 530, 536."], "id": "50ecca90-1149-492c-95c8-a33ab441442c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The trial court found true allegations that Jackson had two prior serious-felony convictions, one in 1989 for <mask> and one in 1997 for assault with a deadly weapon.3 After granting his Romero4 motion as to the strike findings under section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), the court sentenced him to 12 years in prison, composed of a term of two years for the robbery, a concurrent term of two years for the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, and two consecutive five-year terms under section 667, subdivision (a) for the prior convictions."], "id": "9599e5f4-3ae5-4960-b860-44a2955019a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Having determined that, the issue remains whether defendant\u2019s actions constituted force within the meaning of the <mask> statute. New York courts have generally followed the majority rule in most jurisdictions which have dealt with these types of cases, that \"a snatching unaccompanied by any resistance is not sufficient to constitute a robbery\u201d (People v Santiago, 62 AD2d 572, 575 [2d Dept], affd 48 NY2d 1023), and have declined to follow the minority view, led by the Kentucky courts, that \"a snatching of property from the victim is sufficient to constitute a robbery regardless of the victim\u2019s resistance or lack thereof\u2019 (People v Santiago, supra, at 578, citing Jones v Commonwealth, 112 Ky 689, 66 SW 633). Nevertheless, various State courts have determined that the force applied in the taking of a purse while looped over the victim\u2019s arm, shoulder or hand was sufficient to constitute a robbery (see, e.g., Commonwealth v Brown, 2 Mass App 883, 318 NE2d 486; Commonwealth v Jones, 362 Mass 83, 283 NE2d 840; State v Scoby, 719 SW2d 916 [Mo App]; but see, State v Sein, 124 NJ 209, 590 A2d 665; People v Gary, 80 Ill App 3d 817, 400 NE2d 473). Similarly, and more precisely, State courts have determined that where a purse was snatched with a great degree of force or where the strap or handle broke, the taking was accomplished with sufficient physical force to constitute a robbery (see, People v Roberts, 57 *510Cal App 3d 782, 129 Cal Rptr 529, overruled on other grounds in People v Rollo, 20 Cal 3d 109, 569 P2d 771; Raiford v State, 52 Md App 163, 447 A2d 496, affd in part and revd in part on other grounds 296 Md 289, 462 A2d 1192 [handbag \"ripped\u201d from the complainant]; Annotation, Purse Snatching as Robbery or Theft, 42 ALR3d 1381-1391)."], "id": "b3680fff-3e03-4aaa-a4eb-991af23f53d3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On September 17, 1997, prior to resuming jury selection, Justice Fisher rendered his decision on the Molineux application. The court ruled that the testimony regarding the uncharged <mask> would be allowed on the People\u2019s direct case as to codefendant Maxwell on the count of the indictment for which Mr. Jamal was not charged. As a result of that determination, defendant Jamal moved for a severance and mistrial on the grounds that he would be prejudiced by the jury hearing evidence that he was involved in a prior robbery. The application was granted by the court. Further, defendant Maxwell asked for a mistrial which also was granted by the court. The jury was disbanded, and the People proceeded with defendant Maxwell\u2019s case before a new jury."], "id": "1a1e361b-2a43-4ab5-b9a5-a4f91442b320", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The minutes of the Clerk of the court indicate that after a jury had been drawn and the case partially tried, defendant-petitioner through his counsel, withdrew his former plea of not guilty and, with the consent of the District Attorney pleaded guilty to *532<mask> in the second degree. He was thereafter sentenced to a term of not less than 5 years nor more than 10 years in Attica State Prison."], "id": "a923fd5b-9387-481b-ad38-248dde431d31", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The similarity of the tactics used by Scott support that joinder was proper as a matter of law. Several other cases support this conclusion. See State v. Vinson , 834 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992) (finding it proper to join two offenses when both offenses involved the <mask> of a service station/food mart in St. Charles within a two-month period where defendant drew a resolver on the cashier, walked behind the counter, removed the case drawer, and fled from the store to a waiting vehicle); State v. Forister , 823 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992) (finding joinder proper where all four robberies were committed in St. Louis County within a three-week period and in each instance defendant drove a red 1963 Chrysler as a getaway car for the same accomplice who displayed a gun and demanded money); State v. White , 755 S.W.2d 363, 367-68 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988) (concluding joinder of two separate robberies was proper where in both robberies the robber was a thin, black male, who displayed a handgun and announced a robbery; ordered the victims to put their things onto the table; herded the victims into the bathroom(s) at gunpoint; and ordered one victim to hand over his automobile keys before fleeing in the that vehicle); State v. Sims , 764 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988) (finding joinder of twenty counts arising out of ten separate criminal episodes proper where the crimes all occurred in south St. Louis within a three week period and in each incident a man entered a business, drew a handgun, produced a bag from his waist area and demanded the employee fill the bag with money)."], "id": "c6ab3b79-4fe4-4b88-8b83-174ddf97fde3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\"The fear mentioned in Section 211 may be either: [\u00b6] 1. The fear of an unlawful injury to the person or property of the person robbed, or of any relative of his or member of his family; or, [\u00b6] 2. The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the <mask>.\" (\u00a7 212.)"], "id": "45ca560d-872b-4d6e-a59f-7bd06b9620b3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The facts fully warrant the conclusion that there was a breaking into the plaintiff\u2019s place of business, but the question is whether this breaking in and the extraction of the certain sum of money from the filing cabinet in the plaintiff\u2019s store, if we believe the plaintiff\u2019s claim, was a burglary or a <mask> within the terms of the policy."], "id": "e204d5d2-16e4-4e52-a993-0565b2f1600c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, <mask> is deemed by statute to be first degree murder. (Former \u00a7 189, now \u00a7 189, subd. (a).)4 Subdivision (a)(17) of section 190.2 provides for a penalty of death or LWOP for a defendant found guilty of first degree murder committed \"while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, ...: [\u00b6] (A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 ....\" ( \u00a7 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i), now subd. (a)(17)(A).)"], "id": "f6f83d62-7db4-4816-9849-3c034aaf4478", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["These are the unambiguous, incriminating, raw facts known to the officers who, immediately after the shooting, were in pursuit of the two fleeing felons: (1) the police knew the names and descriptions of the two unapprehended and armed bank robbers; (2) they knew that the three conspirators had carefully planned the <mask> in defendant\u2019s apartment the night before; (3) they knew the location of defendant\u2019s apartment: it was less than a mile from the victimized bank; (4) they had the keys to defendant\u2019s apartment and the front entrance door of his building; (5) within one hour after the shooting they observed an unusual garment discarded in a garbage can adjacent defendant\u2019s home; this unique garment was strikingly similar to one worn a short time before and a short *391distance away by one of the bandits. It was reasonable for Ulsamer to infer that the fugitives might be in defendant\u2019s apartment. (In fact, as developed at trial, they fled to a friend\u2019s apartment adjacent defendant\u2019s building.)"], "id": "0b478da4-bef1-498c-9f43-d4ccf82eac46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\"Here, [the gang expert] based his opinion that appellant committed the <mask> to further the interests of the Norte\u00f1o gang on the premise that it was a violent crime, and gangs commit violent crimes in order to gain respect and to intimidate others in their community. But, nothing in the record indicates that appellant or his companions did anything while in the supermarket to identify themselves with any gang, other than wearing clothing with red on it. No gang signs or words were used, and there was no evidence that [the assistant manager of the supermarket] or any of the other persons who witnessed the crime knew that gang members or affiliates were involved. Therefore, the crime could not have enhanced respect for the gang members or intimidated others in their community, as suggested by [the gang expert.]\" ( In re Daniel C., supra , 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 337.)"], "id": "26bbe260-0295-446f-b4e9-44d6a0e025cc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["It is particularly important for prosecutors to move swiftly when a defendant has multiple indictments pending against him. As a general rule, within the bounds of fundamental fairness a prosecutor should have the right to choose which of several cases he should try first. However, once having tried one indictment with its attendant and inevitable lapses of *236time, it is essential that any untried indictments be moved expeditiously. In the instant case, for example, while \"only\u201d 18 months are chargeable to the People, the fact remains that the <mask> charge has been pending against the defendant for almost four years."], "id": "d715c7a3-b3ec-4cac-ab0e-b94aa76fd333", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As for the codefendant, Robert Chamberlin, in addition to *642his conviction with Tunstall on indictment No. 248/79, he had two other criminal matters pending against him in Richmond County, and his sentence was adjourned so that a disposition could be had as to all of his pending cases. Subsequently, Chamberlin pleaded guilty to attempted <mask> in the first degree under indictment No. S-287/79, with the understanding that the sentence to be imposed on that conviction would run concurrently with the sentence to be imposed on indictment No. 248/79, and on December 17, 1980, he was sentenced to indeterminate term of imprisonment on indictment No. 248/79. Thereafter, and on January 15, 1981, Chamberlin was sentenced as a second felony offender to a concurrent, indeterminate term of imprisonment on indictment No. S-287/ 79, and on February 26, 1981, he was sentenced to a further indeterminate term of imprisonment as a probation violator on indictment No. 100/77. However, that sentence was designated to run consecutively with the sentence imposed on indictment No. 248/79. A notice of appeal was subsequently filed on behalf of Chamberlin with regard to his conviction on indictment No. 248/79, but apparently nothing was done with respect to perfecting that appeal until after the Appellate Division reversed the conviction of the codefendant, Tunstall, on October 24, 1983. An appellate brief was thereafter filed on Chamberlin\u2019s behalf on March 15, 1984 and a respondent\u2019s brief was filed on or about August 8, 1984. The foregoing appeal was never calendared, however, for following the decision of the Court of Appeals in People v Tunstall (63 NY2d 1, supra), the People moved in the Appellate Division, inter alia, to remand the Chamberlin matter to the Supreme Court for a hearing on the effect, if any, of hypnosis on appellant\u2019s ability to meaningfully cross-examine the female victim at the trial on the underlying indictment. This motion was granted on or about October 10, 1984, whereupon Chamberlin\u2019s appeal was ordered held in abeyance and the matter remanded to the Supreme Court, Richmond County, for the above-mentioned hearing."], "id": "7922f3e5-7249-422a-9e4e-422b2afc2f97", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Section 70.02 of the Penal Law defines a violent felony offense as applicable to the instant case, to include <mask> in the first degree, a class B felony, and robbery in the second degree, a class C felony. The statute (Penal Law, \u00a7 70.08) defines a persistent violent felony offender as a person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense after having previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felony convictions. In section 70.04 (subd 1, par [b], cl [i]) it is stated: \u201cThe conviction must have been in this state of * * * a violent felony offense * * * or in any other jurisdiction of an offense which includes all of the essential elements of any such felony for which a sentence *861to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year * * * is authorized in this state\u201d."], "id": "ccbf2da7-0301-4982-bbdc-85c71d35c965", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["MY BELIEF IS BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING FACTS: D. Arnold (Affiant) was assigned to investigate Aggravated Assault and reviewed offense report #161435712D written by Officer A. Deleon. Affiant was dispatched to 10500 Northwest Freeway, Houston, Harris County, Texas. Affiant learned from Officer A. Deleon that Cindy Davis (Witness) reported that on December 24, 2012 she observed two men (Complainants) lying injured on the side of the roadway with their hands tied and mouths duct taped. Affiant learned from HPD Officer A. Deleon that Complainants had apparent gunshot wounds to their bodies and had been transported to Ben Taub Hospital for treatment. Affiant spoke to Diane Deyoung who witnessed Complainants coming out of a white van license plate AV5-0784 before the [sic] continued down the road without stopping. Affiant learned from hospital personnel that Moses Glekiah (Complainant Glekiah) was recovering from gunshot wounds and Richard Merchant (Complainant Merchant) was in critical condition for his gunshot injuries. Affiant spoke with Moses Glekiah (Complainant Glekiah) and learned he and his friend Richard Merchant (Complainant Merchant) had agreed to engage in [sic] business transaction at 2501-C #2 Central Parkway Houston, Harris County, Texas with a male known as \"Jerry.\" When Complainants arrived on December 24, 2012 at the business that they describe as an autoshop, they are grabbed by several males and held against their will. Complainant Glekiah reported that Suspects also stole their cash money $400 that Complainants had in their possession, wallets, cell phone and a suitcase/briefcase container belonging to Complainant Merchant. Suspect 1 poured gasoline on Complainants and held lighter near Complainants threatening to set them on fire. Suspect 1 then called two other Suspects who put Complainants in truck at gunpoint. Complainant Glekiah says that he felt in fear for their lives. Complainants jumped out of the van because they believed they were going to be killed. As Complainant [sic] leaped out of the vehicle they were shot by Suspects. Complainant Glekiah directed Affiant to autoshop where this Aggravated Assault and <mask> occurred at 2501-C *227#2 Central Parkway Houston, Harris County, Texas. Affiant researched the location and found the owner to be Charese Foreman. Affiant review computer databases and discovered that Charese Foreman is married to Nathan Ray Foreman. Affiant reviewed criminal history of Nathan Ray Foreman and found that he had been charged with autotheft, possession of prohibited weapon and delivery of cocaine. Affiant showed Complainant Glekiah a known photograph of Nathan Ray Foreman along with five other photos of similar looking males. Complainant Glekiah positively identified Nathan Ray Foreman as Suspect 1 who participated in punching Complainants, told other suspects what to do, poured the gasoline on Complainants and contacted 2 suspects to drive Complainant away from business. Affiant knows that gasoline and lighter are deadly weapons that can kill a person. Affiant believes that Complainants and Suspects DNA will be inside the Target Location along with property belonging to Complainant such as money, suitcase/briefcase, wallets, cell phone, identification cards. Also instrumentalities of the crime such as white van that transported Complainants, guns used to shoot Complainants, zip ties used to tie complainants may also be inside Target Location. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress."], "id": "2e08a9d9-1cc1-4867-8ea8-127083bc0fa4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u201c \u2018However, if the record, including the court\u2019s own documents, \u201ccontain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,\u201d then \u201cthe court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) \u201cAppellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part of the record of conviction.\u201d (Id. at p. 972.) \u201cIn reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in \u2018factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.\u2019 \u201d (Ibid.) \u201cIn sum, the parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under [section 1170.95], subdivision (c).\u201d (Ibid.) II Analysis The question of how courts should use pre-Banks and Clark special circumstances in reviewing resentencing petitions under section 1170.95 in evaluating any prima facies showing of eligibility is before our Supreme Court. Ultimately, our high court will provide direction to the courts. Until then, we will follow our decision in Arias, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th 987, review granted. There, we examined the same issues that are before us in this case. We concluded that a resentencing petition could not be denied at the prima facie stage of review based solely on a true finding on a pre-Banks and Clark <mask> murder special circumstance. We continue to believe the analysis of the issues in Arias is correct and will apply it here. On this record, the court could not find Alfredo, an aider and abettor, to be a major participant in the crime while acting with reckless disregard for human life without factfinding, which is not permitted at the prima facie review stage of a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 in light of"], "id": "2911dde3-2830-476f-9d47-57b7d8157c7a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Saddler discusses a number of prior cases in which such an instruction was held to be properly given, one of which, People v. Perez (1967) 65 Cal.2d 615, 55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597 ( Perez ), is instructive. In Perez , the defendant was charged with four counts of first degree <mask>. ( Id. at pp. 616-617, 55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597.) The prosecution presented evidence of the four robbery offenses as well as an uncharged prior robbery, admitted to establish a modus operandi bearing similarity to the charged crimes. ( Id. at pp. 618-619, 55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597.) In direct testimony, the defendant gave an alibi with respect to the robberies charged in counts 1 and 2 but was silent as to the robberies in counts 3 and 4. On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to ask about the other charged robberies, but an objection that the question exceeded the scope of direct examination was sustained. The prosecutor commented on the defendant's failure to explain or deny evidence as to counts 3 and 4 in closing argument, and the trial court gave an instruction *266permitting the jury to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to explain or deny facts within his knowledge. ( Id. at pp. 619-620, 55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597.) *609The Supreme Court found the instruction permissible. ( Perez , supra , 65 Cal.2d at p. 621, 55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597.) Noting that \" 'a defendant who takes the stand and testifies in his own behalf waives his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at least to the extent of the scope of relevant cross-examination' \" ( id. at p. 620, 55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597 ), the court determined that cross-examination as to the robberies charged in counts 3 and 4 as well as the collateral robbery would have been proper because they \"disclosed a plan, pattern, and modus operandi similar in many respects to those charged in counts 1 and 2\" ( id. at p. 621, 55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597 ). Because the defendant failed to explain or deny the evidence against him as to the charged robberies in counts 3 and 4, as well as the uncharged robbery-matters the prosecutor could have asked about on cross-examination-the instruction was proper. (See People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 610-611, 55 Cal.Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590 [concluding that the defendant's general denial of charged rape offenses on direct examination permitted cross-examination of other uncharged rape offenses as to which the defendant was silent; the defendant thus waived his state and federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the collateral rape offenses, and comment and instruction on his failure to deny them were not improper].)"], "id": "cce88eff-b660-445f-a78c-9c5b400c7e96", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In the earlier marine policies there was no specific coverage against losses by theft. Such losses came under a clause insuring against \"all fortuitous circumstances\u201d. (Atlantic Ins. Co. v Storrow, 1 Edw Ch 621, 5 Paige Ch 285 [1835].) Theft by piracy, <mask> or other violence was considered a fortuitous circumstance as distinguished from losses caused by failure to exercise ordinary diligence. (Spinetti v Atlas S. S. Co., 80 NY 71, 79 [1880]; see, Delay, op. cit, 4 Mar Law 277, 279 [1979].)"], "id": "329a891c-7e0b-4587-a3d6-67357a4922a0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Although a BB gun is not a firearm or pistol within the meaning of the statute (see People v Depaul, 101 AD3d 1735, 1735 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1097 [2013]; People v Wilson, 283 AD2d 339, 340 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 644 [2001]; see also Penal Law \u00a7 265.00 [3]; see generally People v Howard, 22 NY3d 388, 401 [2013]), the question is whether defendant displayed \u201cwhat appear[ed] to be,\u201d and whether Arroyo perceived that object as, \u201ca pistol, revolver ... or other firearm\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 160.10 [2] [b] [emphasis added]; see People v Depaul, 101 AD3d at 1735 [affirming conviction for menacing in the second degree where victim testified that \u201cthe BB gun appeared to be a real handgun and he feared for his life\u201d]). While Arroyo\u2019s testimony was somewhat inconsistent or unclear as to whether he believed that defendant had an actual firearm as opposed to a BB gun, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Toye, 107 AD3d at 1151), is legally sufficient to establish that defendant displayed what appeared to be a pistol or firearm while in immediate flight from the commission of a <mask>."], "id": "e32ee22e-5259-4a1d-8603-69ce6d15c08e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Willbanks was 17 years old when he was charged with kidnapping, first-degree assault, two counts of first-degree <mask>, and three counts of armed criminal action. He was convicted and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the kidnapping count, life for the assault count, 20 years for each of the two robbery counts, and 100 years for each of the three armed criminal action counts. Id. at 239. Willbanks asserted that \"his sentences, in the aggregate, will result in the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence.\" Id. at 239. He went on to point out that \"[t]he Supreme Court held [in Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010),] that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile nonhomicide offenders from being sentenced to life without parole.\" 522 S.W.3d at 242."], "id": "c041031a-36a9-4a1e-92be-93409787d0e9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Subdivision 3 of section 125.25 of the Penal Law provides that: \u201cA person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: * * * (3) [ajeting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit <mask>, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants\u201d."], "id": "b55a6aec-93bc-4c81-b161-f16c39b0deeb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In the case cited {supra) the court mentions that burglary and <mask> may be committed in four or five different ways. Section 240 defines how assault in the first degree (a felony) may be committed. Applying the principle in People v. Caruso (supra) it logically follows that it was clearly the intention of the Legislature to increase the punishment to be imposed upon a conviction of assault in the first degree (a felony) if a dangerous weapon was used. In this case the defendant was charged with the crime of assault in the first degree and in its perpetration he aimed and discharged a loaded pistol at the complainant with the intention of killing him. The jury so found and the court imposed the additional punishment as provided in section 1944."], "id": "fe2ff166-9cb4-4e1c-a0a9-f26a2b84f1c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The verdict was neither based on legally insufficient evidence nor against the weight of the evidence. Although defendant never explicitly admitted any advance knowledge of his cohorts\u2019 intent to commit a <mask>, defendant confessed to knowingly driving them, and their loot, away from the robbery scene, and a rational jury could readily have concluded from this confession, and defendant\u2019s pre- and post-robbery conduct, that defendant, at the very least, joined the robbery in progress with intent that it be successfully completed (see, People v Dordal, 55 NY2d 954; People v Jackson, 44 NY2d 935; People v Keitt, 42 NY2d 926)."], "id": "8375525d-552d-4ee0-b558-92cd7ffbd7ee", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Eugene J. Berkowitz, J. Defendants Batista, Jackson and Wilson were indicted for <mask> in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree. Prior to trial defendants made Sandoval motions as to their past criminal records, which were granted on a limited basis. The issue herein raised is whether the court can grant the People\u2019s motion to limit cross-examination as to the complaining witness\u2019 prior bad acts which resulted in an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) for a marihuana possession arrest."], "id": "bd98763e-25c0-4bae-ac7b-9a3eadc032fb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Nor is this case analogous to Loeser v Nathan Hale Gardens (73 AD2d 187), relied upon by plaintiff, where this Court found the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of liability for an assault perpetrated by unknown assailants in an outdoor parking lot behind an apartment building, both of which were owned and operated by the defendants. Liability was predicated upon the defendants\u2019 failure to restore to proper functioning two large fluorescent lights, installed in conformity with a statutory requirement, which normally illuminated the area. There was expert testimony that crimes of <mask> and assault are deterred by lighting in an outside environment."], "id": "53c7efa4-bceb-4f8b-ba07-40a5d8b84c12", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Further, the record is clear that the defendant testified with the understanding that the Sandoval ruling allowed but a single question as to whether or not he had been convicted of <mask>. The purpose of the Sandoval ruling, of course, is to let the defendant make an informed decision as to whether he will testify in his own behalf (see, e.g., People v Astado, 131 AD2d 684, 685). Plainly the purpose of the ruling in the present case was undone when the prosecutor with the court\u2019s acquiescence went beyond the limitation relied upon by the defendant when he took the witness stand. It was moreover not the defendant, but the prosecutor who \"opened the door\u201d, *191and the court\u2019s appropriate role at that juncture was not to open the door wider but to shut it in adherence to the ruling already made. Undoubtedly, the defendant\u2019s credibility was in issue and in that context particularly the court\u2019s error denied the defendant a fair trial."], "id": "a892dbe6-89e1-4b10-8db5-3c5d65e37648", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*18In addition to the jury's implied findings, the error was harmless because the substantial risk of harm issue was uncontested. The omission of an element during jury instruction may be harmless when the factual issue is uncontested by the defense. ( People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 410, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339, 266 P.3d 1030 [\"the omission of an element of a ... sentencing factor is harmless when 'the omitted element was uncontested and *192supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.' \"]; People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 761, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590 [same].) The substantial increase in risk element of section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) was uncontested by Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams called no witnesses and chose to rely on the state of the evidence. Mr. Adams's lawyer never argued that the asportation did not substantially increased the risk of harm and never mentioned the 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) qualifying circumstance instructions nor special finding. Mr. Moreland denied being present throughout the sexual assaults, kidnapping, attempted murder and other crimes committed against Diane. However, during jury argument, Mr. Moreland's counsel never discussed the substantially increased risk of harm element nor anything concerning the 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) qualifying circumstance issue. The substantial increase in the risk of harm entire issue was uncontested and, with good reason, because the lengthy asportation allowed defendants to leave the presence of Mr. Odhiambo. He testified that as soon as the <mask> was completed and Diane was removed forcibly from his car, defendants fled with her. During the movement, the jurors found that both defendants personally used a firearm. Further, it was during the lengthy asportation Diane was repeatedly sexually assaulted."], "id": "13004f83-914f-4905-bfea-247725711ea6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Davis was not a <mask> case. Our Supreme Court did not decide whether Davis could have been convicted of robbery for his larceny of a shirt had a scuffle ensued when he attempted to leave Mervyn's with a fraudulently obtained credit voucher (instead of a shirt). Consequently, without more Davis would theoretically support a jury's finding that Mireles's initial taking of the weed killer from the shelf was a larceny. But Davis cannot support any more than that proposition. The majority opinion extends Davis far beyond its natural or logical reach."], "id": "0ec0917a-af0b-4055-b446-03f59679f348", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Counts 1 through 5 of the information charged Hutchinson, Smith and Phillips with first degree residential <mask>, in violation of section 211. Counts 6 through 10 of the information charged Hutchinson, Smith and Phillips with home invasion robbery, in violation of section 211. As to counts 6 through 10, the information further alleged that Hutchinson, Smith and Phillips acted in concert and entered an inhabited dwelling house during the commission of the robbery, in violation of section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A)."], "id": "a80a3411-5290-4e62-9eab-6256226af068", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In view of all the circumstances, that is, the admission by this defendant to our Probation Department of the commission of the crimes for which he was indicted on September 25, 1961, and said admissions having been prior to the taking of a plea of guilty to <mask> in the third degree and prior to his judgment of conviction, and in view of the provisions of section 312-d of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the use of confessions or admissions given while being investigated for youthful offender treatment, this court hereby, on its own motion, under the authority given to it under section 671 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereby dismisses Indictments No. 1075-61 and No. 1289-61 against this defendent Robert Earl Gatlin. This court has reached this conclusion only after the use of extreme deliberation, as the honest labors of a Grand Jury and the District Attorney should not be set aside lightly. It would be a violation of the court\u2019s sense of fair play and justice, however, if it did not exercise this power, no matter how reluctantly."], "id": "ab6cc44a-10e7-4881-bd4f-4fd808edfe1e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Michael J. Obus, J. Late in the evening of October 18, 1988, Police Officer Michael Buczek was shot and killed as he and his partner tried to stop two men in the vicinity of Broadway and 161st Street in Manhattan. Unbeknownst to the officers, these two men were fleeing from a <mask>. On January 12, 1989, a grand jury commenced an investigation into Officer Buczek\u2019s death, at the outset of which the assistant district attorney asked the grand jurors to vote to extend their term for at least an additional four months. After hearing from 25 witnesses and receiving over 30 exhibits into evidence, which focused on the guilt of the defendant and Daniel Mirambeaux, both of whom had fled to the Dominican Republic immediately after the crimes, the *785prosecutor, on March 30, 1989, asked the grand jury to consider, as to Mirambeaux only, charges of murder in the first degree; attempted murder in the first degree; two counts of murder in the second degree, intentional and felony murder; and robbery in the first degree. The panel voted a true bill."], "id": "0bf0405f-763c-48d1-99fb-99c9f31f71bf", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We need not decide whether a greater showing of authenticity would be required to admit the videos as substantive evidence at trial, because the videos were relevant to the probable cause determination if they bore indicia of reliability (see Part I.D., post) , even if (for some unlikely reason) the videos did not actually depict the charged robberies. (Cf. Goldsmith, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 265-266, 271-272, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 637, 326 P.3d 239 [authentication of images from red light traffic camera at court trial on citation for running red light]; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1304, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 347, 324 P.3d 183 [authentication of photographs from surveillance video at murder and <mask> jury trial].) People v. Collins (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 988, 994, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, and People v. Romeo, supra , 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, upon which appellant Alexander relies, are also distinguishable. The searches in those cases were based upon a warrant ( Collins ) and a probation search condition ( Romeo ) , and the validity of the searches turned on evidence of the existence and scope of the warrant and search condition, rather than a probable cause determination based on the information possessed by the officer. (Collins , at p. 994, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 ; Romeo , at p. 952, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 96.)"], "id": "566d06c0-0c6f-4296-af59-10a9f089cb11", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As the Court held in Hamilton, \u201c[m]ere doubt as to the defendant\u2019s guilt, or a preponderance of conflicting evidence as to the defendant\u2019s guilt, is insufficient, since a convicted defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and in fact is presumed to be guilty.\u201d (People v Hamilton at 27.) Here, defendant has not met his burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he is actually innocent of the burglary and <mask> for which the trial jury found him guilty in 1998. Therefore, his motion to vacate his conviction for actual innocence is denied."], "id": "89c9daca-050c-4869-9227-9d915bce5a0f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The Appellate Division also has labeled as a Ventimiglia hearing those in which a prior crime of the defendant was involved (e.g., People v Gaston, 261 AD2d 782, lv denied 93 NY2d 1002 [attempted murder; prior drug trafficking]; also, People v Holmes, 260 AD2d 942, lv denied 93 NY2d 1020; People v Glass, 259 AD2d 989, lv denied 93 NY2d 924; People v Greene, 252 AD2d 746, lv denied 92 NY2d 925; People v McClain, 250 AD2d 871, lv denied 92 NY2d 901); as a Molineux hearing in the same situation (e.g., People v Vaughn, 209 AD2d 459, lv denied 84 NY2d 1040 [manslaughter; drug activity]; also, People v Burton, 186 AD2d 672, lv denied 81 NY2d 761; People v Young, 178 AD2d 571, lv denied 79 NY2d 955; People v Linton, 166 AD2d 670, lv denied 77 NY2d 879; People v Miller, 239 AD2d 787, affd 91 NY2d 3722); and to a Ventimiglia hearing where there was proof of a defendant\u2019s conduct, other than direct proof of his prior crime (e.g., People v Morris, 267 AD2d 1032 [<mask>; defendant\u2019s initial words were \u201c T just got out of jail. I\u2019m on parole\u2019 \u201d]; People v Thibodeau, 267 AD2d 952; People v Maxwell, 260 AD2d 653, lv denied 93 NY2d 1004)."], "id": "17ef6b44-4824-4d41-bef7-1e230b94d743", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "robbery", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*791But probably what is most corroborative of Steward's credibility in our evaluation is the way his statements came to light. At one of the habeas hearings, Rory Dungey testified that he met Steward in prison in 2003. According to Dungey, Steward had told him that he had committed a <mask> with Teamer and Bailey, and that Bailey had fled to Texas. Then, in 2007, apparently by coincidence, Dungey met Miles in a different prison. Miles told Dungey that he was wrongfully convicted and he thought that Teamer and Bailey had done the robbery with a third man whose identity he didn't know. It was then that Dungey told Miles about Steward and what Steward had told him years earlier. A meeting between Steward and Miles was then arranged by another person in prison, Prince. Prince had met Miles in prison and he thought Miles \"was like a weirdo because he was always telling people he was innocent.\" According to Prince, when he asked Steward about the robbery, Steward said, \"Yeah, that was me. I heard it was a guy who got locked up from [their] neighborhood that had nothing to do with it, but I don't know his name. I don't know him.\""], "id": "a1c29f4d-3604-4830-b8cc-7678a15e1613", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The entire incident, beginning with the traffic stop and culminating in [Peacock]\u2019s arrest, took place in the performance of the police officers\u2019 duties in the City of Philadelphia. [Peacock] caused bodily injury by repeatedly kicking, punching, and struggling with Officer Hynes. As a result of [Peacock]\u2019s conduct, the officer was transported to a hospital, underwent surgery to repair his injured wrist, and missed eight months of work. [This] evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to sustain the conviction for <mask> as well as simple assault against the police officer."], "id": "16854eab-be1b-4be9-8127-f060e027fcc7", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["I have found only one <mask> case where the everyday item held to have been used as a deadly weapon never made contact with the victim , and that case is easily distinguishable. In In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 186 Cal.Rptr. 898, the defendant stuck a metal pin inside an apple and gave it to his teacher, but fortunately another student warned the teacher before she could eat it. ( Id. at p. 274, 186 Cal.Rptr. 898.) At trial, a medical expert testified about the severe injuries and infections that could have resulted from ingesting that particular pin. She also opined ingestion could have been fatal. ( Id. at p. 276, 186 Cal.Rptr. 898.) Based on that evidence, the court held the defendant had used the pin as a deadly weapon because, had the teacher ingested it as planned, she would have suffered grave injury. ( Ibid. ) Here, in contrast, the record *941contains no testimony about what could have happened had Koback's swing landed. Unlike ingesting a metal pin, which is sharp enough to draw blood upon slight contact, the type of the injury, if any, that would result from being hit in the midsection with a key like the one Koback used depends entirely on the force behind the swing."], "id": "5745a8c5-b464-443a-9add-e14bfff68b04", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The State petitioned this Court to review the court of appeals' conclusion that, by failing to apply the law of self-defense to the lesser-included offense of <mask>, the trial court committed jury-charge error. We do not understand the State to object to the court of appeals's harm analysis, but only its ruling that the trial court \"erred\" at all.12"], "id": "0e3463f8-84f8-4009-b4b4-3d9fbb88825a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The indictment was based upon a statute of that State which in pertinent part defines <mask> and battery as follows: \u2018 \u2018 Whoever unlawfully and maliciously inflicts upon another person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, any grievous bodily harm * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor \u201d. (18 Purdon\u2019s Penna. Stats., \u00a7 4709 [Penal Code of 1939].)"], "id": "f0c9c119-19b5-41e8-84fc-0dce0ac482e2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2009, Appellant was convicted of <mask> with a deadly weapon. The jury assessed his punishment at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This court subsequently affirmed Appellant's conviction in an opinion and judgment issued in 2011. Dohnal v. State , No. 11-09-00236-CR, 2011 WL 319950 (Tex. App.-Eastland Jan. 27, 2011, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We recited the facts of the case as follows in our previous opinion:"], "id": "cac5a77b-31fa-4b2a-8481-8b1ef094c7c6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant\u2019s counsel in his opening statement claimed that the defendant had the right to refuse to stop for the bicycle police officer because the latter lacked probable cause, probably relying upon the cases of People v Spencer (84 NY2d 749, cert denied 516 US 905) and People v Hoffman (283 AD2d 928, lv denied 96 NY2d 919).1 The prosecutor objected that this was a question of law outside of the province of the jury (see People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750, 761-762; People v Conklin, 145 AD2d 20, 25, lv denied 74 NY2d 738), but this objection was overruled. The reasoning was that the defendant\u2019s state of mind might negative the required intent for the charge of <mask> on the first police officer (see People v Finger, 266 AD2d 561, affd 95 NY2d 894; People v Boyd, 256 AD2d 350; People v Leonardo, 89 AD2d 214, affd 60 NY2d 683). At this juncture the statement was appropriate (see People v Valentin, 211 AD2d 509, lv denied 85 NY2d 944), and depending upon the proof at trial, any misconception could be corrected in the final charge to the jury (see People v Vinogradov, 294 AD2d 708, 709-710; People v Levy, 202 AD2d 242, 245)."], "id": "42b408ff-d775-4f3f-b891-68c7ae1b8f9e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["What our case boils down to is a single swipe of a car key at a person's clothed torso from a few feet away with unknown force. No other court has upheld an <mask> conviction on such scant evidence. A survey of the published cases where everyday items were found to have been used in a manner likely to kill or severely injure is illustrative of what an aberration this case is. In People v. Russell (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 660, 139 P.2d 661, the defendant used a fingernail file to slash the *691victim's face, causing a large gash requiring 11 stitches. In People v. White (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 464, 28 Cal.Rptr. 67, the defendant bashed the victim's head with a rock, causing a two-inch gouge that penetrated \"through all layers of the scalp ... to the bone.\" ( Id. at p. 465, 28 Cal.Rptr. 67.) In People v. Helms (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 51 Cal.Rptr. 484, the defendant smothered the victim's face with a pillow \"for several minutes.\" ( Id. at p. 478, 51 Cal.Rptr. 484.) In People v. Richardson (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 238, 1 Cal.Rptr. 306, the defendant repeatedly slashed the victim's face and head with a razor blade, causing cuts that required 25 to 30 sutures. In People v. Lee (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 168, 72 P.2d 572, the defendant hit the victim \"several times over the head\" with a pipe. ( Id. at p. 169, 72 P.2d 572.)"], "id": "3239fa60-02d7-47a6-a735-a66407c33f0e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "AGGRAVATED ASSAULT", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["I, D. Arnold, a peace officer employed by Houston Police Department do solemnly swear that I have reason to believe and do believe that on the property of 2501-C #2 Central Parkway Houston, Harris County, Texas (Target Location), with the authority to search for and to seize any and all ITEMS CONSITUTING [sic] EVIDENCE CONSTITUTING <mask> AND ROBBERY that may be found therein including, but not limited to all DNA and items that may contain biological material; fingerprints; hair fiber(s); audio/video surveillance video and/or video equipment; instrumentalities of the crime including firearm(s) and ballistics evidence; gasoline container(s), lighter(s), tap, zip tie(s), van; fruits of the crime including wallet(s), suitcase, briefcase, money, documents establishing identity of Complainant(s) and/or Suspect(s) *226such as paper(s), license(s), cell phone(s). The affidavit also described the location:"], "id": "7ddedb9e-3a21-4399-8521-410c136de2c1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, to obtain a conviction for <mask>, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Venegas intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused serious bodily injury to Ramos by failing to maintain a reasonable speed or driving in a manner that disregarded the safety of other motorists on the roadway. See TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN . \u00a7\u00a7 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(1) (West 2011 & Supp. 2017). \"Bodily injury\" means \"physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.\" Id. \u00a7 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp. 2017). \"Serious bodily injury\" is \"bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.\" Id. \u00a7 1.07(a)(46)."], "id": "807969d7-6c91-4d1f-96d9-a65bacc12a2e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*419The defendant was first charged with the crimes of burglary in the first degree, assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and was released on bail. While these matters were pending on the Trial Calendar, the defendant was allegedly involved in a shoot-out with police officers. As a consequence of this incident, the defendant is now charged with the crimes of attempted <mask> upon a police officer, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree."], "id": "8eeb26df-0b6c-41a4-a078-dbd65e8b63d4", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["What our case boils down to is a single swipe of a car key at a person's clothed *873midsection from a few feet away with unknown force. No other court has upheld an <mask> conviction on such thin evidence. A survey of the published cases where everyday items were found to have been used in a manner likely to kill or severely injure is illustrative of what an aberration this case is. In People v. Russell (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 660, 139 P.2d 661, the defendant used a fingernail file to slash the victim's face, causing a large gash requiring 11 stitches. In People v. White (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 464, 28 Cal.Rptr. 67, the defendant bashed the victim's head with a rock, causing a two-inch gouge that penetrated \"through all layers of the scalp ... to the bone.\" ( Id. at p. 465, 28 Cal.Rptr. 67.) In People v. Helms (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 51 Cal.Rptr. 484, the defendant smothered the victim's face with a pillow \"for several minutes.\" ( Id. at p. 478, 51 Cal.Rptr. 484.) In People v. Richardson (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 238, 1 Cal.Rptr. 306, the defendant repeatedly slashed the victim's face and head with a razor blade, causing cuts that required 25 to 30 sutures. In People v. Lee (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 168, 72 P.2d 572, the defendant hit the victim \"several times over the head\" with a pipe. ( Id. at p. 169, 72 P.2d 572.)"], "id": "4efcd23e-6cbc-4c37-8984-c45ceebc0c8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["204 (Fruits) [evidence of prior threats the defendant made against his mother, and other prior acts of violence against her were similar to the charged offense involving his mother and thus highly probative]; People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1029 (Hoover) [\u00a7 1109 evidence relevant to domestic violence was admissible in view of the fact that the evidence involved the defendant\u2019s history of similar conduct against the same victim and the evidence was not unduly inflammatory].) Defendant emphasizes differences between the prior acts and the charged offenses such as the time of day and the fact that he previously only entered the attached garage and not the residence itself. He also asserts that, during the prior acts, he did not carry a weapon as alleged regarding the charged crimes. We conclude that these differences were insignificant compared to the fact that he victimized the same people, at the same place, employed a similar means of entry causing similar damage, repeatedly violated a restraining order and, with the exception of one incident, left the scene before the police arrived. In the context of this case, these similarities were substantial enough to have sufficient probative value. Regarding the charged burglary count, as stated ante, the prosecution proceeded on the theories that, when defendant entered the house, his intent was to commit <mask> or theft. The circumstantial evidence pointed to defendant as the person who stole items of property from the home on at least two prior occasions. Additionally, in another prior act, defendant went to the house and attempted to assault his brother with a motor vehicle. These prior acts were relevant to defendant\u2019s intent when he entered into the house on March 29, 2018. 7"], "id": "b194b7b1-3091-4abc-bc41-37015345d2bd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant was originally indicted for <mask> on a family member with a deadly weapon. The indictment alleged that Appellant caused serious bodily injury to Rene Caso. Testimony would later reveal that Caso lost his right eye as a result of the assault. The original indictment identified the deadly weapon as either a vase, a tissue box, or Appellant's hand. The State later struck the deadly weapon language from the indictment. But the State also enhanced the punishment range by claiming that Appellant had previously been convicted of another felony offense some seven years before the date of the aggravated assault."], "id": "ba7218c7-903b-4a34-90b3-c83ded7737a5", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On July 28, 2020, the Appellant was charged by information with two counts of <mask> with a deadly weapon. That same day, he pled guilty to the offenses. Pursuant to the plea agreement,the Appellant was to receive concurrent six-year sentences as a Range I, standard offender with the trial court to consider his application for judicial diversion and the manner of service ofthe sentences."], "id": "32eb93ec-ffe5-4dc6-b69a-60d3203c2ea0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The Petitioner, Brian C. Frelix, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court\u2019s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for four counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of <mask>, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, for which he is serving an effective thirty- eight-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the post-conviction court erred in not continuing the hearing until the Petitioner could appear in person following the Petitioner\u2019s positive COVID-19 test and (2) the court erred in denying his post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a hearing at which the Petitioner is present."], "id": "f5da813a-1cf1-4beb-8c6e-efbbc8bf9e8f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["I realize that using the term \"one continuous assaultive transaction\" may be viewed as an attempt to resurrect a form of the carving doctrine, which this Court abandoned in favor of the Blockburger double jeopardy test. See Ex parte McWilliams , 634 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on reh'g) (holding that the carving doctrine is unsound because its application has been erratic and it is not mandated by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of either the United States or Texas Constitutions); Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). However, under the facts of this case, I would hold that the continuous assaultive transaction rule applies just as it did in 1905 when this Court decided Paschal v. State , 49 Tex.Crim. 111, 90 S.W. 878 (1905). In Paschal , the evidence showed that Appellant, who was angry with his wife, went to find her at her friend's house. He was carrying a paper sack full of oranges, and threw one at his wife. It struck her between the eyes and she fell. \"He then hit her with his fist, knocked her down, and kicked her, and then threw a rock and hit a cow.\" Then, he \"stamped and choked his wife.\" She ran into the hogpen, and he followed and hit her again. She then ran to the house, and he caught her at the fence and cut her clothes. She then ran into the house and he jerked her to the floor and kicked her. He ran outside and grabbed a stick and came back into the house, but he did not hit her with the stick. The Court held that this was one <mask>. Although the \"continuous assaultive transaction\" test is disfavored because it has been \"randomly applied,\" see Ex parte McWilliams , 634 S.W.2d at 823, I would hold that it is not an extinct concept, it applies under these facts, and its application here is not inconsistent with Blockburger since double jeopardy is not an issue in this case."], "id": "5bb581b1-bd4d-4984-a132-bc34a063aac6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["While he pleaded to two separate counts in admitting his culpability, the defendant acknowledged through the allocution that what he did was one single act \u2014 bank robbery with a deadly weapon. It would be sophism to adopt any other conclusion. This is reinforced by reading the portion of the plea minutes (pp 3, 5) where the defendant admitted using a firearm to commit a felony, namely, the bank robbery. The court is entitled to evaluate this admission in the most logical light in reaching a just result. No court is ever required to distort the truth or use a strained application of facts in coming to a decision. The defendant should not be permitted to escape the enhanced punishment of the law as to the finding of guilty on the charge of <mask> on a police officer through a legal subterfuge."], "id": "c7ff2516-c784-4edc-a515-a65b5da1c433", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*548In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205 ( Cage ), our Supreme Court applied Crawford, Davis, and Hammon in a child abuse case. The defendant in Cage was convicted of <mask> for slashing her 15-year-old son across the face with a shard of glass while her mother held the child down. ( Id. at pp. 970, 972, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205.) The victim was taken to a hospital, where a surgeon asked him for purposes of treating him, \"what happened?\" The victim responded \" 'he had been held down by his grandmother and cut by his mother.' \" ( Id. at p. 972, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205.)"], "id": "470e1bb4-6a69-4048-9a42-dd00b01187cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In a prosecution for <mask>, the State need only prove the defendant harbored a culpable mental state as to the underlying assault. Accordingly, even if Rodriguez reasonably believed that his actions would cause only \"simple\" bodily injury, his mistake about the severity of Francisco's injuries did not negate any elemental mental state.58 A mistake-of-fact instruction on these grounds would have been contrary to Section 8.02(a). The court of appeals' judgment is reversed, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed."], "id": "81b3c368-e67f-4e4a-8efb-d841c33aa6eb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*385(a) A person commits an offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination or as a member of a criminal street gang, the person commits or conspires to commit one or more of the following: (1) murder, capital murder, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary, theft, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, <mask>, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, continuous sexual abuse of young child or children, solicitation of a minor, forgery, deadly conduct, assault punishable as a Class A misdemeanor, burglary of a motor vehicle, or unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; (2) any gambling offense punishable as a Class A misdemeanor; (3) promotion of prostitution, aggravated promotion of prostitution, or compelling prostitution; (4) unlawful manufacture, transportation, repair, or sale of firearms or prohibited weapons; (5) unlawful manufacture, delivery, dispensation, or distribution of a controlled substance or dangerous drug, or unlawful possession of a controlled substance or dangerous drug through forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, or deception; (5-a) causing the unlawful delivery, dispensation, or distribution of a controlled substance or dangerous drug in violation of Subtitle B, Title 3, Occupations Code; (6) any unlawful wholesale promotion or possession of any obscene material or obscene device with the intent to wholesale promote the same; (7) any offense under Subchapter B, Chapter 43,1 depicting or involving conduct by or directed toward a child younger than 18 years of age; (8) any felony offense under Chapter 32; (9) any offense under Chapter 36; (10) any offense under Chapter 34, 35, or 35A; (11) any offense under Section 37.11(a); (12) any offense under Chapter 20A; (13) any offense under Section 37.10; (14) any offense under Section 38.06, 38.07, 38.09, or 38.11; (15) any offense under Section 42.10; (16) any offense under Section 46.06(a)(1) or 46.14; (17) any offense under Section 20.05 or 20.06; or (18) any offense classified as a felony under the Tax Code.32 Additionally, Section 71.01(a) defines the term \"combination\" as follows"], "id": "ebf0bcae-8de3-408e-b441-32742329b26c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Darrious Mathis was charged in a seven-count indictment with crimes including kidnapping, false imprisonment, and <mask>. Count 7 of the indictment, charging Mathis with possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer, was severed from the other counts at trial. The jury rendered guilty verdicts on Counts 1 through 6, and the trial court sentenced Mathis on those counts. Count 7 was never presented to the jury. More than a year after sentencing, the trial court entered an order placing Count 7 on the court\u2019s Administrative Dead Docket, and the record before us shows no further proceedings as to that count. Subsequently, the trial court denied Mathis\u2019s amended motion for new trial. Mathis now seeks to appeal the order denying this motion. We lack jurisdiction. \u201c[W]hen a count is dead-docketed, it remains pending below even if it is not being actively litigated. And our precedent unequivocally holds that when a count is pending below, so is the case of which that count is a part.\u201d Seals v. State, 311 Ga. 739, 748 (3) (b) (860 SE2d 419) (2021). When a case remains pending below, it \u201ccannot be appealed as a final judgment.\u201d Id. at 739. Instead, it may be appealed only by obtaining a certificate of immediate review, and the failure to do so requires dismissal of the appeal. Id. at 739, 748 (3) (b); see also OCGA \u00a7 5- 6-34 (b). Here, because Count 7 remains pending below, the case is not final, and the order denying Mathis\u2019s amended motion for new trial is not a final judgment that is appealable under OCGA \u00a7 5-6-34 (a) (1). Because Mathis did not obtain a certificate of immediate review, his appeal must be dismissed. See Seals, 311 Ga. at 739, 748 (3) (b)."], "id": "c4d50635-8e1c-4e2f-a001-3da8cb5b8b0f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The court in Corrigan also relies on In re Jonathan R. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 963, 971, in which the Court of Appeal concluded section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and (4), created separate offenses of assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, respectively, because under Gonzalez each subdivision stated the elements of the offense. (Corrigan, supra , 34 Cal.App.5th at p. ----, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 756, 2019 WL 1513202, *5.) But the Court of Appeal in People v. Brunton (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1097, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 declined to follow In re Jonathan R. , noting the Supreme Court's holding in Vidana supported consideration of the legislative history, which the Brunton court concluded supported its holding the Legislature did not intend by its 2011 amendment to section 245 to create two separate offenses of <mask>. (Brunton , at pp. 1106-1107, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 686.) We likewise follow Vidana and conclude the legislative history and statutory scheme show the Legislature intended to create a single offense of simple arson."], "id": "2a27c922-9937-40b9-a068-f705456c3852", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In Crumpton , the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court properly entered a deadly weapon finding because the jury, in finding the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide, necessarily found that he used a vehicle as a deadly weapon. 301 S.W.3d at 664. The court reasoned: \"If a deadly weapon is anything that is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, and the indictment alleges that the defendant caused death or serious bodily injury [by striking the complainant's vehicle with her vehicle], and the jury finds the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, the verdict is necessarily a finding that a deadly weapon was used.\" Id. at 665 ; see also Blount v. State , 257 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that allegation of <mask> by causing serious bodily injury with weapon or instrument \"necessarily implies the use of a deadly weapon,\" which is anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing serious bodily injury)."], "id": "5acfbf3e-b614-49b6-a519-5bbfac43424b", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["during the charged event: intent to commit <mask> and intent to steal. Because section 1109 allows prior acts of domestic violence when a defendant is accused of \u201c \u2018an offense involving domestic violence,\u2019 \u201d the issue defendant raises is whether a burglary based on an intent to steal theory is an offense involving domestic violence. Defendant argues it is not, because such conduct does not constitute abuse under either the Penal Code or Family Code definitions. We disagree. The Attorney General relies on People v. James (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 478 (James), a case that supports only a determination that burglary based on entry with the intent to commit an aggravated assault or threat to cause injury is a crime \u201c \u2018involving domestic violence\u2019 \u201d within the meaning section 1109. There, the defendant broke into his former girlfriend\u2019s home and made threatening statements towards her, placing her in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury. (James, at p. 483.) Noting the Penal Code section 13700, subdivision (a) definition of abuse includes \u201c \u2018intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another,\u2019 \u201d the James court reasoned that, under the circumstances of that case, burglary was an act of domestic violence for purposes of Penal Code section 13700, subdivision (a). (James, at pp. 482-483.) In this regard, the court held: \u201cAlthough the crime of burglary is not a crime of domestic violence on its face, the trial court properly found that under the facts of the case, the burglary was a qualifying offense allowing the People to seek to present propensity evidence under section 1109.\u201d (James, at p. 484.) Here, defendant entered into the house his mother and brother shared in the middle of the night while they were in their beds. He was then seen running up the stairs holding a kitchen knife. For purposes of admissibility of the evidence, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendant\u2019s alleged actions would have placed his brother \u201cin reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or . . . another.\u201d (Pen. Code, \u00a7 13700, subd. (a).) Thus, under the reasoning of James, the"], "id": "89d50d78-6e58-420b-8c46-8f22a2240338", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The real party in interest, Angelica Hernandez, is charged by indictment in cause number 20130D02077 with three counts of <mask> of a child and one count of indecency with a child. The indictment alleged that Hernandez, acting in concert with Osvaldo Araiza, provided alcohol to her sixteen-year-old biological daughter, B.P., and to another child, and Araiza penetrated B.P.'s sexual organ with his finger and penis, contacted her sexual organ with his mouth, and touched her breast."], "id": "cb9f056c-c7b5-4b1a-a5bf-5d73042ebcd6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We conclude that deadly conduct, as a matter of law, is a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of <mask> by threat where it was alleged that appellant used or exhibited a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. Because the court of appeals held otherwise, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court for it to conduct the second step of the two-step lesser-included offense analysis."], "id": "8d739455-4df9-4357-86bf-6e7533d224a6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Robertson was arrested on November 18, 2016, and was subsequently charged with residential burglary and <mask>. He was on parole at the time of his arrest and was later found to have ultimately violated the terms of his parole, so he remained in the State's custody from the time of his arrest through his jury trial on March 27, 2018, 494 days."], "id": "c5944c85-ac41-4049-a9f1-4dff27fc9ea0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Aggravated Assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["caused the death of said Clarence Wayne Harris, by shooting a firearm at or near Clarence Wayne Harris or Amanda Harris and the defendant was in the course of intentionally or knowingly committing or attempting to commit a felony, namely, Stalking or <mask>, and the death of Clarence Wayne Harris was caused while the defendant and [sic] then you will find the defendant, SAYANTAN GHOSE, guilty of murder, as charged in the indictment. The charge also allowed the jury to find appellant not guilty of murder but to consider appellant\u2019s guilt regarding a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. The charge provided that \u201c[a] person commits aggravated assault if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.\u201d"], "id": "31abaafb-2885-4fc2-be0f-6fc2e2fe11f0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior acts under section 1101, subdivision (b). He asserts that this evidence was not relevant to prove he entered the home with the intent to steal property or commit an <mask>, or to prove he had knowledge of the restraining order in effect at the relevant time. This is so, according to defendant, because the prior incidents were insufficiently similar to be probative, and further that the prior acts of alleged theft were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. He also asserts that this evidence was inadmissible on section 352 grounds. Again, we disagree. 2. Analysis Section 1101, subdivision (a) generally prohibits evidence of character to prove conduct. Apart from the exception under section 1109, subdivision (b) of section 1101 provides that \u201cevidence of a prior uncharged act may also be admissible to prove a disputed material fact\u2014other than a criminal disposition\u2014such as motive, intent, knowledge, or the absence of mistake or accident.\u201d (People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1075.) Our high court has stated: \u201cThe least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. . . . In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant \u2018 \u201cprobably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402 (Ewoldt).) As our high court has explained, \u201cthe recurrence of a similar result tends to negate an innocent mental state and tends to establish the presence of the normal criminal intent.\u201d (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 371; see also Ewoldt, at p. 402.) \u201c[T]he similarities between the two events must be substantial enough to have probative value.\u201d (Winkler, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.) We conclude the prior acts were sufficiently similar for admissibility under section 1101, subdivision (b). (See generally People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 203-"], "id": "977cce34-f53e-44cf-b253-c72545cb6f8e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Specifically, the severed charges included counts: second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count eight); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon with a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 5(b)(1) (count nine); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (heroin), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count ten); third-degree possession of a CDS (heroin) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count eleven); second-degree possession of a weapon while committing certain CDS offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count twelve); and fourth-degree <mask>, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a) (count thirteen)."], "id": "365700f2-edf0-40f9-81d5-059e06cc675c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The United States Probation Office recommended classifying Lawson as a career offender because he had two prior state court convictions\u2014one for a crime of violence (a 2011 Florida conviction for <mask> of a law enforcement officer with a firearm) and another for a controlled substance offense (a 2004 Florida conviction for possession, sale, or delivery of cocaine within 1000 feet of a place of worship). See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.1(a). As USCA11 Case: 20-14776 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 4 of 17"], "id": "2db0a2c1-8924-4b7a-8bd2-c1b9eed28ff6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2017, Michael C. Wilkin pleaded guilty to four counts of <mask> and was sentenced to ten years to serve one. In 2021, Wilkin filed a petition seeking to be retroactively sentenced as a first offender, which the trial court denied. Wilkin filed this direct appeal, however, we lack jurisdiction. Under OCGA \u00a7 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, whichever is later. Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 (691 SE2d 247) (2010). Once this statutory period expires, as here, a trial court may modify only a void sentence. Id. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004). When a sentence falls within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void. See id. Moreover, an appeal does not lie from the denial of a motion to modify a sentence filed outside the statutory time period unless the motion raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void. Frazier, 302 Ga. App. at 348. Wilkin argues that he should have been sentenced as a first offender, but he does not contend that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. See OCGA \u00a7 16-5-21 (b) (providing that aggravated assault is punishable by imprisonment for one to twenty years). Thus, Wilkin has not set forth a colorable void-sentence claim. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED."], "id": "a2d5d74f-2798-4d8f-86e2-a442fbad9ffe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We note that the Sentencing Guidelines have been updated since Johnson. Today, the Sentencing Guidelines also contemplate certain enumerated offenses, including \u201c<mask>,\u201d can qualify as crimes of violence. U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.1(a)(2). We requested supplemental briefing in this case after Borden issued. Yet the parties have not addressed whether Texas assault on a public servant qualifies as aggravated assault, and thus a crime of violence, under the updated Sentencing Guidelines. Nor did the district court give that as an alternative reason for Bates having committed a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, we will not address the issue ourselves and express no opinion on its applicability on remand."], "id": "6a2301e4-b087-4eea-8a57-38da9cdc9ea8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["murder, <mask>, first-degree burglary, first-degree home invasion, conspiracy to commit robbery, armed robbery, false imprisonment, first-degree cruelty to children, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant was re-indicted for the same offenses in August 2015. In February 2016, Appellant was tried jointly with Stokes and Scott. Appellant was convicted of all counts except malice murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus a total of 50 consecutive years to serve. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial on March 1, 2016, which he amended through new counsel on July 2, 2018, and again on May 19, 2019. On February 5, 2020, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, and on March 3, 2020, the trial court denied Appellant\u2019s motion for new trial. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on March 10, 2020. The case was docketed to this Court\u2019s term beginning in August 2021 and orally argued on November 9, 2021. when she heard Schrier cry out, followed by booming sounds. Smith"], "id": "a9bfb008-0ef0-4fee-8ac4-9f512dcf9162", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Two Florida statutes were cited on Cobb's journal entry of judgment for his Florida battery conviction: Fla. Stat. \u00a7 741.28 and Fla. Stat. \u00a7 784.03. The first statute defines domestic violence under Florida law as: \"any assault, <mask>, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or household member.\" (Emphasis added.) Fla. Stat. \u00a7 741.28(2). The second statute defines battery under Florida law as (1) actually and intentionally touching or striking another person against their will, or (2) intentionally causing bodily harm to another person. Fla. Stat. \u00a7 784.03(1)(a). Because Cobb was convicted of domestic felony battery in Florida, the first alternate"], "id": "a288a663-7f22-430f-aef9-3d7468a358cd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> may be committed in only two ways: (1) by causing serious bodily injury; or (2) by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.02(a)(1),(2). Each of these necessarily involve the use of a deadly weapon. Blount v. State , 257 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). The first way of committing aggravated assault-causing serious bodily injury-necessarily implies the use of a deadly weapon, which is \"anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.\" Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 1.07(17)(B) (West Supp. 2016). The second *637way of committing aggravated assault expressly describes use or exhibition of a deadly weapon."], "id": "595b11d8-76c8-4298-8848-8a521c366c4f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["STEGNER, Justice. Mario Reyes appeals a jury verdict convicting him of domestic battery, attempted strangulation, and <mask>. Reyes appealed to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions. Reyes petitioned for review by this Court, which we granted. On appeal, Reyes requests that his convictions be vacated. Reyes first argues that several evidentiary issues, including the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, rendered his trial unfair. Reyes next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it found that the victim was unavailable to testify at trial under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5) and allowed her preliminary hearing testimony to be read into the record. Additionally, Reyes argues that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument impermissibly implied that the victim did not testify because she feared Reyes. Finally, Reyes argues that these errors, when taken together, deprived him of his right to due process and a fair trial. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate Reyes\u2019 convictions."], "id": "5a130a68-2efd-4109-a825-94f87444a5a2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The defendant\u2019s counsel in his opening statement claimed that the defendant had the right to refuse to stop for the bicycle police officer because the latter lacked probable cause, probably relying upon the cases of People v Spencer (84 NY2d 749, cert denied 516 US 905) and People v Hoffman (283 AD2d 928, lv denied 96 NY2d 919).1 The prosecutor objected that this was a question of law outside of the province of the jury (see People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750, 761-762; People v Conklin, 145 AD2d 20, 25, lv denied 74 NY2d 738), but this objection was overruled. The reasoning was that the defendant\u2019s state of mind might negative the required intent for the charge of <mask> on the first police officer (see People v Finger, 266 AD2d 561, affd 95 NY2d 894; People v Boyd, 256 AD2d 350; People v Leonardo, 89 AD2d 214, affd 60 NY2d 683). At this juncture the statement was appropriate (see People v Valentin, 211 AD2d 509, lv denied 85 NY2d 944), and depending upon the proof at trial, any misconception could be corrected in the final charge to the jury (see People v Vinogradov, 294 AD2d 708, 709-710; People v Levy, 202 AD2d 242, 245)."], "id": "454bc159-cec5-48bd-a242-c3c1227f1293", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["But this particular variance between the pleading and the proof should not be considered to be material in the sufficiency analysis because it would be patently immaterial under Johnson . 364 S.W.3d at 292. The variance regarding Appellant's use of his hands would be one describing only the manner and means by which the bodily injury was caused. Under Johnson , this would fall into the second category of variance, a \"non-statutory allegation that describes the offense in some way.\" Id. at 295. Such a variance is material only when it converts the offense proven at trial into a different offense than what was pled in the charging instrument, which could potentially subject a defendant to another prosecution for the same offense. Id. There is no such danger here, however, because the fact that Appellant caused Molien to suffer bodily injury with his hands not by striking her with them, but instead by choking her,5 does not make the <mask> that was proved at trial different than the aggravated assault that was pled in the indictment. What was pled and proved was that Appellant committed aggravated assault against Molien by causing her bodily injury and that he used water as a deadly weapon while doing so. The indictment did not specify the precise injury that would be shown by the evidence, and exactly how Appellant used his hands to cause the bodily injury is inconsequential to the legal sufficiency analysis."], "id": "b9fb1e91-bb78-4f87-9964-a1f4485d9828", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A debate arose at sentencing as to whether the firearm used in connection with another felony must be the same firearm that was the subject of the felon-in-possession charge. After a brief recess, Dexter\u2019s attorney conceded that the firearm need not be the same. Dexter appears to have forfeited that argument, but in any event, the district court concluded that the weapon used in connection with the <mask> was the same weapon subject to the felon- in-possession charge. Dexter does not argue that the alleged conduct\u2014firing a shotgun into Sesley\u2019s apartment\u2014would not be, if true, a felonious aggravated assault. We therefore assume that the conduct qualifies as a felony."], "id": "889f7ed8-695a-4e12-8771-eba289cfd5be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["As relevant to this case, a person commits capital murder if he intentionally causes the death of an individual in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. TEX. PENAL CODE \u00a7\u00a7 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2), 29.02 ; see Nickerson v. State , 478 S.W.3d 744, 755-56 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). A person commits assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE \u00a7 22.01(a)(1). Using or displaying a deadly weapon during the commission of an assault elevates the offense to <mask>. Id. \u00a7 22.02(a)(2). A firearm is a deadly weapon. See id. \u00a7 1.07(a)(17)."], "id": "36451731-6f9a-4de5-86b0-d9d6d556654f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["2 For example, in the domestic abuse situation that resulted in Appellant\u2019s <mask> conviction, Appellant may have lied to the victim to gain access to her and facilitate the aggravated assault. See Davis, 17 A.3d at 396 (\u201cif the crime is not inherently crimen falsi, this Court then inspects the underlying facts that led to the conviction to determine if dishonesty or false statement facilitated the commission of the crime\u201d)."], "id": "cc21ada7-92f6-457d-b9f2-29fa0cc0542f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["I realize that using the term \"one continuous assaultive transaction\" may be viewed as an attempt to resurrect a form of the carving doctrine, which this Court abandoned in favor of the Blockburger double jeopardy test. See Ex parte McWilliams , 634 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on reh'g) (holding that the carving doctrine is unsound because its application has been erratic and it is not mandated by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of either the United States or Texas Constitutions); Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). However, under the facts of this case, I would hold that the continuous assaultive transaction rule applies just as it did in 1905 when this Court decided Paschal v. State , 49 Tex.Crim. 111, 90 S.W. 878 (1905). In Paschal , the evidence showed that Appellant, who was angry with his wife, went to find her at her friend's house. He was carrying a paper sack full of oranges, and threw one at his wife. It struck her between the eyes and she fell. \"He then hit her with his fist, knocked her down, and kicked her, and then threw a rock and hit a cow.\" Then, he \"stamped and choked his wife.\" She ran into the hogpen, and he followed and hit her again. She then ran to the house, and he caught her at the fence and cut her clothes. She then ran into the house and he jerked her to the floor and kicked her. He ran outside and grabbed a stick and came back into the house, but he did not hit her with the stick. The Court held that this was one <mask>. Although the \"continuous assaultive transaction\" test is disfavored because it has been \"randomly applied,\" see Ex parte McWilliams , 634 S.W.2d at 823, I would hold that it is not an extinct concept, it applies under these facts, and its application here is not inconsistent with Blockburger since double jeopardy is not an issue in this case."], "id": "b334ae02-a43d-4325-a899-8a97b34a9ac0", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["(i)(a) That a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued to be out of the custody of the parent for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. .... (vii)(a) That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent's circumstances that prevent the placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent. .... (ix)(a) The parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, including the juvenile division of circuit court, to: (3)(A) Have subjected any juvenile to aggravated circumstances. (B) \"Aggravated circumstances\" means: (i) ... [A] determination has been made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family *599will result in successful reunification. At the termination hearing, it was established that Steven had been incarcerated for a total of nine or ten months during the fifteen months since emergency removal of the children. Most recently, Steven was in prison between December 14, 2016, and May 23, 2017, for violating the terms of his probation related to a 2012 conviction for <mask> committed against Kathy. For the probation violations, Steven was sentenced to three years in prison followed by a three-year suspended imposition of sentence. He was paroled on May 23, 2017. After his release, Steven moved into his father's house where he continued to reside as of the termination hearing held on July 10, 2017."], "id": "7db87a96-6b37-4bdf-9ba6-556612ee7207", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["1990), superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1995). Under Georgia law, a person commits <mask> when he (1) commits a simple assault, and (2) there is an aggravat- ing factor present (such as the intent to murder, rape, or rob; or the use of a deadly weapon). O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-21(a); see Smith v. Hardrick, 464 S.E.2d 198, 200 (Ga. 1995). A person commits simple assault under Georgia law when he either \u201c[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another\u201d or \u201c[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiv- ing a violent injury.\u201d O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-20(a). A criminal offense with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a \u201cviolent felony\u201d under ACCA\u2019s elements clause. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021). After Borden, we reinstated our opinion in United States v. Moss, 920 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2019), which had been vacated after a grant of rehearing en banc. United States v. Moss, 4 F.4th 1292, 1292 (11th Cir. 2021). In Moss, we held that a conviction for Georgia aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-21(a)(2) was a crime of recklessness where it was based on the \u201cplaces another in reasonable apprehension\u201d variety of simple assault. Moss, 920 F.3d at 759. Because a felony \u201cmust be predicated on the intentional use of physical force\u201d to qualify as a violent felony under ACCA\u2019s elements clause, we con- cluded that Georgia aggravated assault is not categorically a violent felony. Id. (citing United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010)). USCA11 Case: 21-10514 Date Filed: 01/27/2022 Page: 8 of 10"], "id": "3025243e-5743-42b1-8e18-f54bfb652b03", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The source of the majority's mistake in relying on Simons appears to be People v. Page (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 857 ( Page ). In *342that case, a different panel of our court concluded the defendant committed as-used <mask> when she held the sharpened tip of a pencil to the victim's neck during a robbery and told him not to involve the police because she \"knew where he lived.\" ( Id. at p. 1469, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 857.) Like the majority does here, the Page court cites the two-part Aguilar test, but then applies the Simons test. The court upheld the aggravated assault conviction on the ground a sharpened pencil could be dangerous and the defendant's use of the pencil while threatening the victim during a robbery demonstrated she intended to use it as a weapon if need be . ( Page , at p. 1473, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 857.)"], "id": "1819b14a-d86d-4465-ae8e-c537509eab46", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Mother initially denied knowing anyone named Ramone L. After admitting to knowing Ramone L., Mother denied being in a romantic relationship with Ramone L. and stated he was a friend. According to the records admitted at trial, Ramone L. is a man who was charged in December 2020 with <mask> after Mother was struck with a bullet from what police believed to be a .380 caliber gun. Mother described it as \u201ca whole misunderstanding.\u201d According to Mother, she was walking and a bullet bounced on her leg and Ramone L. and two other individuals had helped her. Ramone L. ultimately pled guilty to assault in January 2021, although Mother denied that she had a tumultuous relationship with him."], "id": "71ebf725-9a4f-4302-af12-a6982a84ffd8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In March 2017, the State filed petitions in Harris County juvenile court alleging that appellant C.R., at age 16, engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon,1 evading detention,2 capital murder,3 and <mask> with a deadly weapon.4 Pursuant to section 54.02(a) of the Family Code, the State later petitioned the juvenile court to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer appellant to the criminal court for further proceedings on each of the charges, excluding evading detention. The juvenile court ordered a certification examination, which was conducted prior to the certification hearing."], "id": "7d38e76a-1c58-48cd-a372-9f7166b56365", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2012, a jury found Willie Fletcher guilty of armed robbery, <mask>, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court placed the final charge against Fletcher, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, on the dead docket. Following entry of his sentence, Fletcher filed a motion for new trial. On April 5, 2021, the trial court denied Fletcher\u2019s motion for new trial, and Fletcher filed this appeal. We, however, lack jurisdiction. In Seals v. State, 311 Ga. 739, 741 (2) (860 SE2d 419) (2021), the Supreme Court determined that a criminal case in which charges have been dead-docketed is non-final for purposes of appeal. Accordingly, in order to appeal the denial of his motion for new trial, Fletcher was required to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedure and obtain a certificate of immediate review. Id.; OCGA \u00a7 5-6-34 (b). His failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED."], "id": "3f0b5a38-ca92-4546-abeb-9431087f738d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["1990), superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1995). Under Georgia law, a person commits <mask> when he (1) commits a simple assault, and (2) there is an aggravat- ing factor present (such as the intent to murder, rape, or rob; or the use of a deadly weapon). O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-21(a); see Smith v. Hardrick, 464 S.E.2d 198, 200 (Ga. 1995). A person commits simple assault under Georgia law when he either \u201c[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another\u201d or \u201c[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiv- ing a violent injury.\u201d O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-20(a). A criminal offense with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a \u201cviolent felony\u201d under ACCA\u2019s elements clause. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021). After Borden, we reinstated our opinion in United States v. Moss, 920 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2019), which had been vacated after a grant of rehearing en banc. United States v. Moss, 4 F.4th 1292, 1292 (11th Cir. 2021). In Moss, we held that a conviction for Georgia aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-5-21(a)(2) was a crime of recklessness where it was based on the \u201cplaces another in reasonable apprehension\u201d variety of simple assault. Moss, 920 F.3d at 759. Because a felony \u201cmust be predicated on the intentional use of physical force\u201d to qualify as a violent felony under ACCA\u2019s elements clause, we con- cluded that Georgia aggravated assault is not categorically a violent felony. Id. (citing United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010)). USCA11 Case: 21-10514 Date Filed: 01/27/2022 Page: 8 of 10"], "id": "c2aac136-8275-43e1-aaaa-ca369b128e73", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204 ( Aguilar ), the California Supreme Court explained why-\"except in those cases involving an inherently dangerous weapon\" ( id. at p. 1035, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204 )-the determination of whether an <mask> is committed under section 245(a)(1)'s deadly weapon clause or force-likely clause is \"functionally identical.\" ( Aguilar , at p. 1035, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204.) The Aguilar court reasoned a noninherently dangerous object becomes a deadly weapon (thereby satisfying section 245(a)(1)'s deadly weapon clause) only when it is used in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily injury (thereby also satisfying the force-*691likely clause). ( Aguilar , at p. 1029, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204.)4"], "id": "00fd76a3-2084-4614-9ca6-4ca2bb6399dc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The juvenile court found that appellant's \"record and previous history\" weighed in support of discretionary transfer. The court found that appellant had a \"lengthy history\" of referrals to the Harris County Juvenile Probation Department, which started when he was 12 years old. In support of its findings, the court described the circumstances leading to five prior referrals to the Juvenile Probation Department, including an assault on his mother, criminal mischief, assault and harassment of a public servant, and burglary of a habitation. The order also noted that appellant had been placed in the Harris County Youth Village, the Burnett-Bayland Rehabilitation Center, and the Harris County Leadership Academy. The court found that after the referral for burglary of a habitation, appellant violated his probation, and he was transferred to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. It noted that appellant was released in November 2016, and he was on parole when he allegedly committed capital murder and <mask>."], "id": "0d1a3a7e-d953-4e6a-aa7f-f01c39019811", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\"Now consider the motives the guards have for lying. Here's a prisoner who talked back, acted out, caused a big disruption. The guards can't have that. They have to make an example. They have to put the prisoner in his place, show him who's boss. If they beat him, well, there are cameras and there might be consequences. How to punish the prisoner and get away with it? Nothing easier. Check the video, see what you can plausibly claim consistent with it. Then go to the D.A. Exaggerate what happened within the limits of that plausibility. Was my client just having a freakout over the deaths of his family members? Say it was a deliberate attack instead. Did one officer bump his head? Say Mr. Rodriguez viciously slammed him on the head with chains-once, twice, whatever (though it's better when the officers get their stories straight). Make sure you describe an <mask>, because that's a serious felony, not just an assault, which is a misdemeanor. Lock him up for a long, long time beyond the sentence he's already serving. That'll send a powerful message to any other prisoner who might think about crossing us."], "id": "40618a22-9964-4f4a-bd7e-30c228783e36", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Aggravated Assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The facts in this case show that the defendant not only committed Aggravated Robbery, a class Y felony, he did so with extreme indifference to the value of human life as evidenced by the <mask> allegation and testimony supporting that allegation. As stated above, the use of the weapon against an elderly disabled woman could have resulted in death or more serious physical injury. The Court believes that the countervailing factors show by clear and convincing evidence that the case should be retained in the criminal division of the circuit court. For reversal, appellant alleges deficiencies in the circuit court's consideration of the factors. First, although appellant acknowledges the seriousness of the offense, he contends that \"there was no evidence to support a conclusion that society needed to be protected from Appellant beyond which Juvenile Court could handle.\" However, as set out in the order quoted above, the circuit court found that the allegations of the State and \"especially the callous nature of the crime\" required prosecution in the criminal division."], "id": "7e24c09c-b624-44f9-910f-a1d7b68377ea", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In Sanchez , the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defendant's trial counsel performed deficiently when he advised the defendant incorrectly that he would be eligible for community supervision from the judge if he pleaded no contest to <mask> with a deadly weapon. Id. at 287-88.9 The Court further noted that counsel did not advise the defendant regarding the availability of deferred adjudication and did not file a motion requesting deferred adjudication. Id. at 288."], "id": "d4619975-0700-4117-9e34-2347f627c188", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Aggravated Assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["' Attempted Murder, (18 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 901(a)); Conspiracy \u2014 Attempted Murder, (18 Pa. C.S.A. \u00a7 903); <mask>, (18 Pa.C.S.A, \u00a7 2702(a)); Possession of an Instrument of Crime, (18 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 907(a)); Possession of Firearm Prohibted, (18 Pa.C.S.A, \u00a7 6105(a)(1)); Firearm not to Be Carried, (18 Pa. C.S.A, \u00a7 6106(a)(1)); Carrying of Firearms in Public in Philadelphia, (18 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6108)), respectively. to the court\u2019s shutdown from the novel coronavirus,\u201d Appellant filed a responsive 1925(b)"], "id": "fb76c37e-846d-4b63-ab1e-bdf74bded755", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The First Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Radack, disagreed. \"[O]nce the trial court included self-defense in the abstract portion of the charge,\" the court said, self-defense became \"law applicable to the case.\"10 This meant that \"the trial court was required to apply that defensive issue properly\" to the entire case-including the lesser offense of <mask>.11 Analyzing a number of factors, the court went on to determine that the omission of a self-defense instruction on aggravated assault was egregiously harmful, and reversed Mendez's aggravated-assault conviction."], "id": "74ae1f8d-8b4a-416f-ba58-2da2e4392a4a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Appellant Sayantan Ghose appeals judgments of conviction for murder and <mask> with a deadly weapon. Appellant presents two identical issues in both appeals. First, he argues that the trial court erroneously omitted from the jury charge certain instructions limiting the right of a citizen to make an arrest, which appellant contends deprived him of the correct application of the self- defense statute. Because appellant concededly did not object to the jury charge on this basis, we hold the issue is waived. Second, appellant contends that legally insufficient evidence supports the jury\u2019s rejection of his self-defense theory. Concluding that the evidence is legally sufficient, we overrule this issue."], "id": "50c8b05e-02d9-4bb2-b3f6-6b0cec42d4db", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Based on our conclusion that the trial court misapplied enhancement factor (9) because no proof supported the factor, the trial court\u2019s failure to find and even consider the mitigation proof offered concerning the defendant\u2019s mental health, and the trial court\u2019s failure to properly review and analyze the fines imposed by the jury, we determine the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant. Because we have determined enhancement factor (9) is not applicable and the defendant is entitled to some mitigation based on his mental health issues, we reverse the defendant\u2019s sentence of fifteen years for <mask> and impose a sentence of thirteen years to be served concurrently with his sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Additionally, as noted, we remand the matter for review of the fines imposed by the jury."], "id": "e6453be1-1469-4b6d-b032-d411b0b1242f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["<mask> is generally a second degree felony that carries a punishment range of two to twenty years. Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.02(b) (aggravated assault is generally a second degree felony); id. at \u00a7 12.33(a)(range of punishment). An aggravated assault may become a first degree felony when the defendant uses a deadly weapon. Id. at \u00a7 22.02(b)(1). In that sense, a deadly weapon finding is significant to a defendant. But the State here did not need the deadly weapon finding to reach the first degree felony punishment range. Because it enhanced the conviction with a prior felony to which Appellant pled true, the punishment range was already the same as a first degree felony. Id. at. \u00a7 12.42(b) (second degree felony punished as first degree felony when defendant has a prior felony conviction).7 As we excerpt above, the trial court explained this to Appellant on the record, and he chose to proceed with the open plea. For that reason, we find no Strickland harm even if his counsel misunderstood the import of dropping the deadly weapon language from the indictment"], "id": "f3654dea-c05c-4db3-9b5a-824e5ca84886", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The legislative memorandum in support of the <mask> statute is consistent with this view and does not suggest that Federal officers were excluded from its terms. Penal Law \u00a7 120.11 was enacted in 1980 as part of a gun control legislation program whose purpose was to increase penalties for unlawful possession and use of firearms. It was prepared in response to the \"tragic deaths of those police *373officers who have fallen victim to armed felons\u201d and reflected a deepening concern for their safety. Moreover, the clear trend in law enforcement today is for Federal and State officers to work together on a regular, continuing basis. Joint task forces were created to deal with immediate, pressing concerns, such as the violation of narcotics laws, and for long-range investigations. Officers from both jurisdictions are assigned to each other\u2019s agencies. Cases and allegations of wrongdoing are routinely referred from prosecutors and officers in one jurisdiction to prosecutors and officers in another."], "id": "43fc79e9-5a8c-413c-ba27-9ae33885cb4e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["cause[d] bodily injury to Melanie Molien by striking [her] head or body with [his] hands, and [he] did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: water, during the commission of said assault. After trial, the jury convicted Appellant of non-aggravated sexual assault and of <mask> with a deadly weapon while acquitting him of assault/family violence. The jury assessed a seven year sentence for the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction and a ten year sentence, suspended to community supervision, for the sexual assault conviction."], "id": "ff6782a1-f0cd-4c56-87af-f6c903ac9e19", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In this case, the State indicted Appellant for <mask> both by causing serious bodily injury and by use a deadly weapon (here by using either a vase, a tissue box, or Appellant's hand). The State later deleted the express reference to a deadly weapon from the indictment. Appellant contends that his trial counsel erred in assuming, and presumably informing Appellant, that the deletion of the deadly weapon language carried some significance to the case. Appellant reasons that under Blount v. State , the mere allegation of a serious bodily injury carries with it an implicit allegation of use of a deadly weapon, so that the deadly weapon allegation never really went away."], "id": "64268d7f-ccb8-4e4f-be59-aa62c2438d45", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In May of 1988, the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health brought a recommitment application pursuant to CPL 330.20 (14). In support of the application, Dr. Maurice Masse stated that S. was not compliant with his treatment. During the pendency of that application, S. continued his substance-induced violent behavior. On June 4, 1988, he was arrested and charged in New Jersey for shoplifting and <mask> on a police officer. On July 27, 1988, he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Then, at around midnight on November 2, 1989, S. threatened a bartender and patrons at Canastel\u2019s restaurant, on the corner of 19th Street and Park Avenue South in Manhattan, with a 10-inch-long metal pipe wrapped in leather. Police Officer Daniel Pusateri encountered S. outside of the restaurant after he had been ejected but then tried to get back inside. Officer Pusateri asked S. to leave the area, but he refused and swung his arms around and yelled. As S. was being placed under arrest for disorderly conduct, he bit the officer on the hand. As a result, *9S. was charged with assault, resisting arrest, menacing and criminal possession of a weapon. On November 5, 1989 S. pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree and was sentenced to 30 days in jail."], "id": "0eb59286-6ffc-4b1e-b83a-26deface99fc", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["3 In addition to addressing the merits of Miller\u2019s argument, the State contends the aggravated-assault instruction is a moot issue. It notes that two of the felonious-assault charges (deadly weapon and serious physical harm) related to the stabbing, served as underlying predicates to murder, and merged into murder for purposes of sentencing. The State also points out that Miller does not allege ineffective assistance based on his attorney\u2019s failure to seek an involuntary-manslaughter instruction predicated on the lesser offense of <mask>. As for the third felonious-assault charge, the State notes that it related to the victim being struck by a car, which was a separate incident falling outside of any serious provocation producing sudden passion or a fit of rage. For each of these reasons, the State contends we need not address defense counsel\u2019s failure to seek an aggravated-assault instruction. Because we find Miller\u2019s ineffective-assistance argument unpersuasive on its merits, we express no opinion on the mootness issue."], "id": "6b968b91-7a1c-4c37-8cb4-5fd34107298c", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) took a seventy-two-hour hold on the children on June 30, 2016, after learning that appellant had threatened to \"shoot the whole place up\" while under the influence of drugs and, at one point, pointed a gun at S.S. Although the incident began as a domestic situation between Madison and appellant, Madison did not want a protection order. Therefore, the children were removed due to abuse, neglect, and parental unfitness. An arrest warrant was subsequently issued for appellant for <mask> on a family or household member and terroristic threatening. DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect on July 5, 2016. An ex parte order for emergency custody was filed the same day."], "id": "f8d6d898-16fc-4dbd-8b5b-2aabc7244af6", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["PER CURIAM: Davino Marquan Daniels timely appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions to withdraw his pleas and that provisions of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6801 et seq., violate his constitutional rights. Daniels pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and one count of <mask> in 19CR656 and one count of violating the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4901 et seq., in 19CR796. Prior to sentencing, Daniels moved to withdraw his guilty pleas in both cases. Upon our extensive review of the record, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion when"], "id": "da0cc30a-f8c8-482b-b87e-e453686f7c4d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On April 12, 2019, the Defendant was arrested and charged with <mask>, theft of property, evading arrest, resisting arrest, and violating an order of protection. The Defendant represented himself during two hearings in general sessions court and filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial, which he later withdrew. The Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and on July 17, 2019, a Bradley County grand jury indicted the Defendant for the offenses. On August 12, 2019, the trial court appointed counsel, and the Defendant pleaded guilty as charged on December 9, 2019."], "id": "0c2cd7ec-a5ee-4489-a0bf-7184c32dec1a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that, under the first step of the two-part lesser-included-offense analysis, as charged in this case, deadly conduct is a lesser-included offense of <mask>. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC . art 37.09(1) ; Hall , 225 S.W.3d at 536. Because, under the functional-equivalence concept, the elements of deadly conduct are functionally the same or less than those required for the offense of aggravated assault as alleged here, the court of appeals erred by concluding that deadly conduct was not a lesser-included offense as a matter of law. See McKithan , 324 S.W.3d at 588."], "id": "2242d256-77f5-451c-b4d2-b89b451803de", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["And after Ms. Perry through (sic) [the Petitioner\u2019s] drink all over his face and shirt, he overreacted. In a split second he did something careless, something he can never take back. He through (sic) the glass, whose contents had just been thrown all over him. And he is taking responsibility for that. He is acknowledging those actions. But it doesn\u2019t mean that he\u2019s guilty of <mask>."], "id": "b85c594c-6d96-4722-a345-9ff55d47d95a", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["But this particular variance between the pleading and the proof should not be considered to be material in the sufficiency analysis because it would be patently immaterial under Johnson . 364 S.W.3d at 292. The variance regarding Appellant's use of his hands would be one describing only the manner and means by which the bodily injury was caused. Under Johnson , this would fall into the second category of variance, a \"non-statutory allegation that describes the offense in some way.\" Id. at 295. Such a variance is material only when it converts the offense proven at trial into a different offense than what was pled in the charging instrument, which could potentially subject a defendant to another prosecution for the same offense. Id. There is no such danger here, however, because the fact that Appellant caused Molien to suffer bodily injury with his hands not by striking her with them, but instead by choking her,5 does not make the <mask> that was proved at trial different than the aggravated assault that was pled in the indictment. What was pled and proved was that Appellant committed aggravated assault against Molien by causing her bodily injury and that he used water as a deadly weapon while doing so. The indictment did not specify the precise injury that would be shown by the evidence, and exactly how Appellant used his hands to cause the bodily injury is inconsequential to the legal sufficiency analysis."], "id": "dc217edf-2201-4949-98a2-3081be20fdfa", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Cf. United States v. Hoxworth, 11 F.4th 693, 695\u201396 (8th Cir. 2021) (similarly holding that \u201cthere is no question\u201d after Borden that a conviction under the same Texas <mask> provisions is not a \u201cviolent felony\u201d under the Armed Career Criminal Act \u201c[g]iven that Texas\u2019s version of aggravated assault criminalizes \u2018recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury\u2019\u201d). See, e.g., United States v. Zapata-Camacho, 808 F. App\u2019x 272, 273\u201374 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Vega-Rivas, 774 F. App\u2019x 899, 900 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Gomez, 770 F. App\u2019x 194, 194 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Sanabia-Sanchez, 746 F. App\u2019x 425, 426 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 894 F.3d 1274, 1274 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc); United States v. Nunez-Medrano, 751 F. App\u2019x 494, 501 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Olivarez, 749 F. App\u2019x 277, 278 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Aspirlla, 738 F. App\u2019x 302, 303 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 748 F. App\u2019x 597, 598 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Carrillo-Hernandez, 749 F. App\u2019x 246, 247 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Canales-Bonilla, 735 F. App\u2019x 154, 155\u201356 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Valdez, 734 F. App\u2019x 291, 291\u201392 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Flores, 734 F. App\u2019x 277, 278 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Santos-Gabino, 732 F. App\u2019x 320, 321 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Bello, 731 F. App\u2019x 340, 340\u201341 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Montanez-Trejo, 708 F. App\u2019x 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Nunez, 680 F. App\u2019x 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2017) (Graves, J., dissenting); United States v. Ulloa, 668 F."], "id": "3c6bf8ef-219d-4300-b822-5629a1b4cd69", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Specifically, the severed charges included counts: second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count eight); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon with a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 5(b)(1) (count nine); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (heroin), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count ten); third-degree possession of a CDS (heroin) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count eleven); second-degree possession of a weapon while committing certain CDS offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) (count twelve); and fourth-degree <mask>, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a) (count thirteen)."], "id": "96af5397-a9dd-4e12-99e9-39d34bc82efe", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The record demonstrates that the court considered the totality of the circumstances and found that defendant did not deserve relief from his original sentence, only after the court balanced defendant\u2019s extensive criminal history, defendant\u2019s denial of any responsibility at trial and sentencing, and the circumstances of the underlying offenses, against the evidence of defendant\u2019s postincarceration rehabilitation. Defendant\u2019s extensive criminal record in New York and New Jersey, including five felonies, is replete with crimes of violence that were very serious, regardless of whether they would technically qualify as New York violent felonies. Among other crimes, defendant has been convicted of possession of a loaded handgun and ammunition, <mask> with a deadly weapon, and home invasion robbery and burglary of another drug dealer\u2019s home, during which defendant covered a 12-year-old boy\u2019s head in a pillow case. This last offense was committed after defendant absconded after being released on bail on drug charges in New York. Defendant also has prior convictions for possession of large quantities of drugs, including near a school, and drug selling paraphernalia. The instant crimes not only involved a large quantity of drugs, but also a reckless high-speed car chase that resulted in injuries to innocent persons, property damage, and the complete sealing off of the West Side Highway for hours."], "id": "f0b23485-5b3e-45e5-88dd-ecc931c7befd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Per Curiam. On December 15, 1994, the respondent was convicted, upon a jury verdict in the New Jersey Superior Court, of the crimes of <mask> in the second degree, in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated \u00a7 2C:12-1 (b) (1); simple assault, in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated \u00a7 2C:12-1 (a); and possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes in the third degree, in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated \u00a7 2C:39-4 (d)."], "id": "3d124ec4-2717-464d-825a-2293a814fb26", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Pursuant to Penal Law \u00a7 120.11, a person is guilty of <mask> on a police officer when \u201cwith intent to cause serious physical injury to a person whom he knows or reasonably should know to be a police officer . . . engaged in the course of performing his official duties, he causes such injury by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.\u201d In contrast, a person is guilty of assault on a police officer \u201cwhen, with intent to prevent a . . . police officer . . . from performing a lawful duty, he causes serious physical injury to such . . . police officer\u201d (Penal Law \u00a7 120.08). The element of intent with respect to the crime of aggravated assault upon a police officer relates to the causing of physical injury, while the element of intent with respect to the crime of attempted assault of a police officer \u201crelates not to the result proscribed by the statute \u2014 causing the injury \u2014 but to the circumstances which make that result one for which defendant is strictly liable\u201d (People v Campbell, 72 NY2d 602, 605 [1988]). Since \u201cthe lesser crime requires demonstration of an element or fact not required by the greater, the impossibility test has not been met\u201d (Green, 56 NY2d at 431, citing People v Graham, 44 NY2d 768 [1978])."], "id": "10d68c21-1bd0-45e0-8059-8b0f5a7f1dc9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["*586A few weeks after the retrial, Moon was indicted on the bail jumping and failure to appear charge in this case. Shortly before the trial of this case, Lori died of cancer. During the guilt/innocence stage of the trial of this case, over Moon's objection, the trial court admitted that portion of Lori's testimony from the <mask> trial set forth in footnote 3. Moon argues on appeal that the introduction of this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him."], "id": "359adcd9-cea9-437b-bcfe-ba1bebd730d9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Regarding the pint glass introduced at trial, co-counsel testified that he agreed to let it come in for a number of reasons. Specifically, co-counsel noted that because the Petitioner was charged with <mask> with a deadly weapon,3 whether the glass was a deadly weapon became a factual issue at trial. Accordingly, co-counsel believed it would be beneficial to the Petitioner to show the smaller pint glass as opposed to the \u201cgiant fishbowl glasses\u201d that Gerst Haus also used. When asked whether the Petitioner had asked co-counsel to locate Ms. Schaffer, co-counsel testified that he remembered discussing Ms. Shaffer but could not recall the contents or length of the discussions. Co-counsel agreed that Gerst Haus was no longer in business but that it was open at the time of the Petitioner\u2019s trial."], "id": "246a6097-a292-4af5-ad4f-4565b7abb4c9", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The more serious crime of <mask> in violation of Penal Code section 245 can be committed in a number of ways. Three types of aggravated assault are relevant here: (1) by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, (2) by means of an inherently deadly weapon, and (3) by means of an object not designed to be a weapon but alleged to be a deadly weapon as used . The first and third type require a *685showing of the amount of force the defendant used during the assault. \"[T]he jury's decisionmaking process in an aggravated assault case ... is functionally identical regardless of whether, in the particular case, the defendant employed a weapon alleged to be deadly as used or employed force likely to produce great bodily injury; in either instance, the decision turns on the nature of the force [the defendant] used .\" ( Aguilar , supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 1035, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204, italics added.) Only the second variety, assault with an inherently deadly weapon, requires no showing of force. Merely using the weapon to attempt an injury is enough."], "id": "083d09f8-3b19-43bb-9c79-4164571f5cc3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On January 27, 2017, while serving Lunsford with a warrant for <mask>, police officers found Lunsford in possession of a loaded pistol. The aggravated-assault charges were later dropped, but the felon-in-possession charge went forward. At the bench trial, Sheriff Jeffrey King testified about serving the warrant on Lunsford and finding the gun. The State then introduced evidence of Lunsford's 2002 felony conviction and rested. Lunsford moved to dismiss, arguing the evidence was insufficient; the motion was denied. Lunsford then introduced the 2005 order to seal his 2002 felony conviction and argued that the expungement of his felony conviction restored his right to possess a firearm. Lunsford again moved to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge. The circuit court denied that motion as well, and Lunsford now appeals."], "id": "7987b103-fda6-4560-87f2-4eab4431a9bb", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["On review before this Court, the majority has concluded that the court of appeals erred by failing to consider all of the evidence presented at trial that might have supported the <mask> offense alleged in the indictment when conducting its legal sufficiency analysis. Specifically, the court of appeals failed to consider the evidence supporting what the majority views as the second assaultive event-evidence showing that Appellant used one hand to choke Melanie while simultaneously using the other hand to pour water down her throat."], "id": "1a8a8b73-444f-4af6-b5aa-12fc4c72a119", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["\u00b61 Gabriel Bedonie appeals from his convictions and sentences for armed robbery and <mask>. Bedonie argues that allowing the State to amend the indictment during his motion for judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule) 20 violated Rule 13.5 and caused him prejudice. Bedonie also argues that the court\u2019s failure to follow Rule 26.10(a) at the sentencing hearing renders his sentence incomplete and invalid. Finding no prejudice in the court\u2019s decision to grant an amendment to the indictment and no error in the court\u2019s sentencing, we affirm."], "id": "b06dc3e4-c8f7-454b-8c07-826546d55405", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Patently, threatening another with imminent bodily injury is engaging in conduct. When that threat is accomplished by the use of a deadly weapon, by definition the victim is \"exposed\" to the deadly character of the weapon and the inherent risk of serious bodily injury. The danger of serious bodily injury is necessarily established when a deadly weapon is used in the commission of an offense. It follows, therefore, that proof of threatening another with imminent bodily injury by the use of a deadly weapon constitutes proof of engaging in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. Id. at 438-39 (emphasis original). Given this reasoning, we held that reckless conduct was a lesser-included offense of \"the offense charged\" because it could be established by proof of the same facts required to establish the commission of <mask> by the use of a deadly weapon. Id. at 439."], "id": "3f54ea82-b163-426c-b7ea-4267fa40e6dd", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, effective December 21, 2005, the New York State Legislature, in an extraordinary session, enacted the Crimes Against Police Act.2 The act (L 2005, ch 765, as amended) supplemented the Penal and Criminal Procedure Laws by establishing the crimes *427of menacing of a police officer (Penal Law \u00a7 120.18), <mask> upon a police officer (Penal Law \u00a7 120.11), aggravated criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law \u00a7 125.11), aggravated manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.22), aggravated manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law \u00a7 125.21) and aggravated murder (Penal Law \u00a7 125.26), and increased the minimum sentences of imprisonment for certain offenses involving the assault of police officers."], "id": "3d6309fc-2001-4e32-af01-0cdb1eb34c53", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The alleged irregularity is not specified in the notice of motion. (Rule 25.) The undertaking is valid, though signed by only one surety and not by the plaintiffs. (iSeld., 446.) The sufficiency of the surety is not questioned. The amount of bail cannot be reduced, as the opposing affidavits are explicit as to the fact of an <mask>, and on this motion it is impossible.to say that they are untrue, and that the affiants on the part of the plaintiffs testify truly. That question must be determined by a jury."], "id": "8d88b81d-4591-41c4-8c7a-63f4686237f3", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["204 (Fruits) [evidence of prior threats the defendant made against his mother, and other prior acts of violence against her were similar to the charged offense involving his mother and thus highly probative]; People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1029 (Hoover) [\u00a7 1109 evidence relevant to domestic violence was admissible in view of the fact that the evidence involved the defendant\u2019s history of similar conduct against the same victim and the evidence was not unduly inflammatory].) Defendant emphasizes differences between the prior acts and the charged offenses such as the time of day and the fact that he previously only entered the attached garage and not the residence itself. He also asserts that, during the prior acts, he did not carry a weapon as alleged regarding the charged crimes. We conclude that these differences were insignificant compared to the fact that he victimized the same people, at the same place, employed a similar means of entry causing similar damage, repeatedly violated a restraining order and, with the exception of one incident, left the scene before the police arrived. In the context of this case, these similarities were substantial enough to have sufficient probative value. Regarding the charged burglary count, as stated ante, the prosecution proceeded on the theories that, when defendant entered the house, his intent was to commit <mask> or theft. The circumstantial evidence pointed to defendant as the person who stole items of property from the home on at least two prior occasions. Additionally, in another prior act, defendant went to the house and attempted to assault his brother with a motor vehicle. These prior acts were relevant to defendant\u2019s intent when he entered into the house on March 29, 2018. 7"], "id": "aa5b0d72-af6b-4455-ab2a-8454b9756138", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The juvenile court found that appellant's \"record and previous history\" weighed in support of discretionary transfer. The court found that appellant had a \"lengthy history\" of referrals to the Harris County Juvenile Probation Department, which started when he was 12 years old. In support of its findings, the court described the circumstances leading to five prior referrals to the Juvenile Probation Department, including an assault on his mother, criminal mischief, assault and harassment of a public servant, and burglary of a habitation. The order also noted that appellant had been placed in the Harris County Youth Village, the Burnett-Bayland Rehabilitation Center, and the Harris County Leadership Academy. The court found that after the referral for burglary of a habitation, appellant violated his probation, and he was transferred to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. It noted that appellant was released in November 2016, and he was on parole when he allegedly committed capital murder and <mask>."], "id": "0fd5eaaa-a634-4986-b202-4663c0c07451", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["[\u00b61] Wayne Herbert Martinez appeals from a criminal judgment in which he was found guilty of <mask>. Martinez argues his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Martinez did not move to dismiss the criminal complaint. A defendant who fails to move to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation and submits to trial forfeits their claim asserting a violation of their right to a speedy trial. See State v. Jensen, 2021 ND 119, \u00b6\u00b6 14-17, 962 N.W.2d 393; State v. Hamre, 2019 ND 86, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 14-15, 924 N.W.2d 776; Koenig v. State, 2018 ND 59, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 14-24, 907 N.W.2d 344. After a review of the arguments properly presented on appeal, we summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7)."], "id": "dd5f8cc9-5eac-4e56-9068-154758c0306d", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["A grand jury indicted Gutierrez with three counts of <mask>, one count of assault on a public servant, and one count of harassment of a public servant. Gutierrez elected for a jury to determine his guilt. After the jury was sworn in, the State called its first witness, Officer Ruben Ramirez. At that time, one of the jurors informed the judge that he went to school with Ramirez. The judge excused the remainder of the jury, and the attorneys and judge questioned the juror.3 The juror stated that he could be fair and impartial even though he and Ramirez had mutual friends in high school and had seen each other every couple of years since graduating eighteen years before."], "id": "f6eb96b8-9447-42fe-900e-1e8b5cae24e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "Aggravated Assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["MY BELIEF IS BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING FACTS: D. Arnold (Affiant) was assigned to investigate <mask> and reviewed offense report #161435712D written by Officer A. Deleon. Affiant was dispatched to 10500 Northwest Freeway, Houston, Harris County, Texas. Affiant learned from Officer A. Deleon that Cindy Davis (Witness) reported that on December 24, 2012 she observed two men (Complainants) lying injured on the side of the roadway with their hands tied and mouths duct taped. Affiant learned from HPD Officer A. Deleon that Complainants had apparent gunshot wounds to their bodies and had been transported to Ben Taub Hospital for treatment. Affiant spoke to Diane Deyoung who witnessed Complainants coming out of a white van license plate AV5-0784 before the [sic] continued down the road without stopping. Affiant learned from hospital personnel that Moses Glekiah (Complainant Glekiah) was recovering from gunshot wounds and Richard Merchant (Complainant Merchant) was in critical condition for his gunshot injuries. Affiant spoke with Moses Glekiah (Complainant Glekiah) and learned he and his friend Richard Merchant (Complainant Merchant) had agreed to engage in [sic] business transaction at 2501-C #2 Central Parkway Houston, Harris County, Texas with a male known as \"Jerry.\" When Complainants arrived on December 24, 2012 at the business that they describe as an autoshop, they are grabbed by several males and held against their will. Complainant Glekiah reported that Suspects also stole their cash money $400 that Complainants had in their possession, wallets, cell phone and a suitcase/briefcase container belonging to Complainant Merchant. Suspect 1 poured gasoline on Complainants and held lighter near Complainants threatening to set them on fire. Suspect 1 then called two other Suspects who put Complainants in truck at gunpoint. Complainant Glekiah says that he felt in fear for their lives. Complainants jumped out of the van because they believed they were going to be killed. As Complainant [sic] leaped out of the vehicle they were shot by Suspects. Complainant Glekiah directed Affiant to autoshop where this Aggravated Assault and Robbery occurred at 2501-C *227#2 Central Parkway Houston, Harris County, Texas. Affiant researched the location and found the owner to be Charese Foreman. Affiant review computer databases and discovered that Charese Foreman is married to Nathan Ray Foreman. Affiant reviewed criminal history of Nathan Ray Foreman and found that he had been charged with autotheft, possession of prohibited weapon and delivery of cocaine. Affiant showed Complainant Glekiah a known photograph of Nathan Ray Foreman along with five other photos of similar looking males. Complainant Glekiah positively identified Nathan Ray Foreman as Suspect 1 who participated in punching Complainants, told other suspects what to do, poured the gasoline on Complainants and contacted 2 suspects to drive Complainant away from business. Affiant knows that gasoline and lighter are deadly weapons that can kill a person. Affiant believes that Complainants and Suspects DNA will be inside the Target Location along with property belonging to Complainant such as money, suitcase/briefcase, wallets, cell phone, identification cards. Also instrumentalities of the crime such as white van that transported Complainants, guns used to shoot Complainants, zip ties used to tie complainants may also be inside Target Location. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress."], "id": "4278e210-93c6-4687-96d4-d1b1ac009d08", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["We disagree with the court of appeals's reliance on the reasoning of the Seventh Court of Appeals in Miller v. State , which distinguished Bell based on the inclusion of \"use or exhibit\" language in the indictments. Safian , 2016 WL 828337, at *7-8 (citing Miller v. State , 86 S.W.3d 663, 666-67 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. ref'd) ). The court of appeals erred by finding that Bell 's holding does not apply under the instant circumstances in which the indictment alleges the use or exhibition of a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. For all of the reasons explained above, we agree that the exhibition of a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon implicates the same inherent danger of serious bodily injury that accompanies the use of a deadly weapon. This was the principle on which our holding in Bell relied. Because the exhibition of a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon during the course of an assault poses the same imminent danger of serious bodily injury as would using a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon, deadly conduct is a lesser-included offense of <mask> as alleged here. We conclude that Bell 's discussion that deadly conduct is, as a matter of law, a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon applies equally to the instant circumstances involving the alleged use or exhibition of a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon."], "id": "b35bb803-7ff6-40b4-8a3f-f4822208a12e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In Boorman v Deutsch, after a remand to reassess as excessive compensatory and punitive damages of $5,000,000 awarded upon default (152 AD2d 48, 55 [1st Dept 1989]), a second inquest or assessment of damages was held on August 13, 1990 in Supreme Court, New York County (index No. 29609/84), in iA Part 2, before Justice Eugene L. Nardelli. Justice Nardelli thereafter awarded $1,000,000 past compensatory damages; $750,000 future compensatory damages plus $1,000,000 punitive damages for sexual and <mask> over an evening and a night for which defendant was convicted of two felonies in New Jersey, following testimony by plaintiff and a psychologist. The plaintiff and defendant had renewed a prior social and sexual dating relationship which turned violent."], "id": "004d85a0-f14e-4c83-8032-53d6f4c4816f", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "AGGRAVATED ASSAULT", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["COUNT 1-A [AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT] [Hernandez] [d]id then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration of the female sexual organ of Melanie Molien by [his] finger, without the consent of Melanie Molien, and in the course of the same criminal episode the defendant attempted to cause the death of Melanie Molien by strangulation and waterboarding. COUNT 1-B & C [AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT] [Hernandez] [d]id then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration of the female sexual organ of Melanie Molien by [his] finger, without the consent of Melanie Molien, and [Hernandez] did then and there by acts or words threaten to cause, or place, Melanie Molien in fear that death or serious bodily injury would be imminently inflicted on Melanie Molien, and said acts or words occurred in the presence of Melanie Molien. COUNT 1-D [AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT] [Hernandez] [d]id then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration *326of the female sexual organ of Melanie Molien by [his] finger, without the consent of Melanie Molien, and in the course of the same criminal episode [Hernandez] used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: water. COUNT 2 [<mask> WITH A DEADLY WEAPON] [Hernandez] [d]id then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to Melanie Molien by striking the victim's head or body with [his] hands, and the defendant did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: water, during the commission of said assault. COUNT 3 [ASSAULT FAMILY VIOLENCE/STRANGULATION] [Hernandez] [d]id then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to Melanie Molien, a person with whom the defendant has or has had a dating relationship, by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of Melanie Molien by applying pressure to the throat or neck and blocking the nose or mouth of Melanie Molien. The jury found Hernandez guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon \"as alleged in the indictment\" and guilty of the lesser-included offense of sexual assault, but it acquitted him of family-violence assault by strangulation. The jury recommended that Hernandez be placed on community supervision for 10 years for the sexual-assault offense, but it sentenced him to seven years' confinement for the aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon offense."], "id": "b04aefdd-1984-46ff-aef1-3f68cd02fbb8", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In an amended petition, Baker pleaded a new cause of action for nuisance under Chapter 125 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. He alleged that LFMC Enterprises, Feng, and Chan \"maintained, aided and abetted, and otherwise permitted and facilitated the existence of a highly dangerous, unlicensed, and illegal nightclub.\" He also asserted that people habitually went to the nightclub for illegal purposes, such as publicly discharging a firearm, recklessly discharging a firearm, engaging in gang activity, <mask>, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, aggravated robbery, and unlawfully carrying a weapon. Though Baker did not allege that LFMC Enterprises, Feng, and Chan participated in these illegal activities, he did allege that they knew about and tolerated them without making reasonable attempts at abatement because they were profiting from the rental revenue. He further maintained that the illegal and dangerous activities were continuing on the premises and that, \"singularly and collectively,\" they constituted a nuisance under the statute. Baker sought damages and an injunction to prohibit the appellants from allowing an unlicensed nightclub to operate on their premises."], "id": "a407fddd-6416-49d7-9189-2af7e39fc7be", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Per Curiam. On December 15, 1994, the respondent was convicted, upon a jury verdict in the New Jersey Superior Court, of the crimes of <mask> in the second degree, in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated \u00a7 2C:12-1 (b) (1); simple assault, in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated \u00a7 2C:12-1 (a); and possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes in the third degree, in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated \u00a7 2C:39-4 (d)."], "id": "2b9c95b7-05d7-4ac3-84a8-421bdae5cc72", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["The United States Probation Office recommended classifying Lawson as a career offender because he had two prior state court convictions\u2014one for a crime of violence (a 2011 Florida conviction for <mask> of a law enforcement officer with a firearm) and another for a controlled substance offense (a 2004 Florida conviction for possession, sale, or delivery of cocaine within 1000 feet of a place of worship). See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.1(a). As USCA11 Case: 20-14776 Date Filed: 01/14/2022 Page: 4 of 17"], "id": "19812609-a3dc-4a28-865d-db6aaad09027", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2009, Appellant was convicted of <mask> with a deadly weapon. The jury assessed his punishment at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This court subsequently affirmed Appellant's conviction in an opinion and judgment issued in 2011. Dohnal v. State , No. 11-09-00236-CR, 2011 WL 319950 (Tex. App.-Eastland Jan. 27, 2011, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We recited the facts of the case as follows in our previous opinion:"], "id": "1b3fa221-d6c7-432d-bdeb-7d1ebe2d17ae", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["In 2009, Appellant was convicted of <mask> with a deadly weapon. The jury assessed his punishment at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This court subsequently affirmed Appellant's conviction in an opinion and judgment issued in 2011. Dohnal v. State , No. 11-09-00236-CR, 2011 WL 319950 (Tex. App.-Eastland Jan. 27, 2011, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We recited the facts of the case as follows in our previous opinion:"], "id": "c0d63943-fc8c-4204-8b4f-9bd44397c1f2", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Garcia appealed, contending, inter alia: the district court plainly erred in treating his prior Texas conviction for <mask> as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 16 (defining crime of violence) and, therefore, as an aggravated felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining aggravated felony as crime of violence) and \u00a7 1326(b)(2) (criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens). Because he did not preserve the aggravated-assault issue in district court, review was only for plain error. E.g., United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012). Garcia maintained his prior Texas conviction for aggravated assault\u2014in violation of Texas Penal Code \u00a7 22.02(a)\u2014did not constitute a crime of violence because the Texas conviction included reckless conduct, which does not involve \u201cthe use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force\u201d element required by \u00a7 16. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 16(a). Our court affirmed, based on our precedent providing that Garcia\u2019s violation of Texas Penal Code \u00a7 22.02(a) constituted a crime of violence. See United States v. Gracia-Cantu, 920 F.3d 252, 253\u201354 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (holding conviction under Texas Penal Code \u00a7 22.01(a)(1), which \u00a7 22.02(a) incorporates, is a crime of violence). (We also remanded in part for the limited purpose of the court\u2019s correcting the written judgment to conform to its oral pronouncement at sentencing. That issue is not before our court on remand.) United States v. Garcia, 838 Fed. App\u2019x 901 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has since held: the definition of \u201cviolent felony\u201d\u2014requiring \u201cuse of physical force against the person of another\u201d\u2014 does not include reckless behavior. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021) (plurality opinion)."], "id": "3ed94306-31f9-4b25-892e-a8b41f6b22e1", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}
+{"obj_label": "aggravated assault", "legal_topic": "Violence", "masked_sentences": ["Mother initially denied knowing anyone named Ramone L. After admitting to knowing Ramone L., Mother denied being in a romantic relationship with Ramone L. and stated he was a friend. According to the records admitted at trial, Ramone L. is a man who was charged in December 2020 with <mask> after Mother was struck with a bullet from what police believed to be a .380 caliber gun. Mother described it as \u201ca whole misunderstanding.\u201d According to Mother, she was walking and a bullet bounced on her leg and Ramone L. and two other individuals had helped her. Ramone L. ultimately pled guilty to assault in January 2021, although Mother denied that she had a tumultuous relationship with him."], "id": "4b2f1d4f-a3ec-4eea-b977-040d5ac06a5e", "sub_label": "US_Criminal_Offences"}