Removing more dash issues?

question_data.json

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
 		"generation_colbert":"The relevant principles for answering the legal question derive from understanding which federal officers fall under the protection of Article III, which guarantees life tenure and protection from salary diminution for judges. Article III judges are appointed for life, have protections against removal unless for cause, and receive undiminished compensation during their tenure in office. Passage 4 specifies that Article I judges, such as civilian judges on the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) and administrative positions, do not benefit from these same constitutional protections as Article III judges. These judges can be removed for cause and do not have the same salary protection. Additionally, the historical context provided by court precedents (e.g., Morrison v. Olson) helps differentiate between principal and inferior officers but still underscores the lack of Article III protections for positions not explicitly created under Article III. Passages 8 and 9 indicate that review of administrative actions, or actions by military boards, can be conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but this review doesn't alter the classification of the officer under Article III. Lastly, no passages suggest that roles like Hobson's within a tribunal, established under a congressional act, enjoy the specific constitutional protections reserved for Article III judges.",
 		"top10_e5":[
 			"Article I Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time: and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.",
-			"The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution reads as follows: \"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\" U.S. Const., Art. II, \u00ac\u00df 2, cl. 2. 5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \"etiquette or protocol\"; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128\u201a\u00c4\u00ec131, 96 S.Ct., at 686\u201a\u00c4\u00ec688; Weiss, supra, at 183\u201a\u00c4\u00ec185, 114 S.Ct., at 763\u201a\u00c4\u00ec765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 904, and n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2652, and n. 4, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring). This disposition was also designed to assure a higher quality of appointments: The Framers anticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collective body. \"The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation.\" The Federalist No. 76, p. 387 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton); accord, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 374\u201a\u00c4\u00ec375 (1833). The President's power to select principal officers of the United States was not left unguarded, however, as Article II further requires the \"Advice and Consent of the Senate.\" This serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power, see 3 Story, supra, at 376\u201a\u00c4\u00ec377, and \"to promote a judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union,\" The Federalist No. 76, at 386\u201a\u00c4\u00ec387. *660 By requiring the joint participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one. Hamilton observed: \"The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive for nominating, and the senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.\" Id., No. 77, at 392. See also 3 Story, supra, at 375 (\"If [the President] should ... surrender the public patronage into the hands of profligate men, or low adventurers, it will be impossible for him long to retain public favour\"). The prescribed manner of appointment for principal officers is also the default manner of appointment for inferior officers. \"[B]ut,\" the Appointments Clause continues, \"the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\" This provision, sometimes referred to as the \"Excepting Clause,\" was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand Convention, with little discussion. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 627\u201a\u00c4\u00ec628 (1911 ed.). As one of our early opinions suggests, its obvious purpose is administrative convenience, see United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 25 L.Ed. 482 (1879)—but that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure only with respect to the appointment of \"inferior Officers.\" Section 323(a), which confers appointment power upon the Secretary of Transportation, can constitutionally be *661 applied to the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges only if those judges are \"inferior Officers.\" Our cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes. Among the offices that we have found to be inferior are that of a district court clerk, Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 229, 10 L.Ed. 136 (1839), an election supervisor, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397\u201a\u00c4\u00ec398, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880), a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the consul, United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343, 18 S.Ct. 374, 379, 42 L.Ed. 767 (1898), and a \"United States commissioner\" in district court proceedings, Go\u201a\u00c4\u00ecBart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352\u201a\u00c4\u00ec354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156\u201a\u00c4\u00ec157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. \u00ac\u00df\u00ac\u00df 591\u201a\u00c4\u00ec599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671\u201a\u00c4\u00ec672, 108 S.Ct., at 2608\u201a\u00c4\u00ec2609.",
+			"The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution reads as follows: \"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\" U.S. Const., Art. II, \u00ac\u00df 2, cl. 2. 5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \"etiquette or protocol\"; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128-131, 96 S.Ct., at 686-688; Weiss, supra, at 183-185, 114 S.Ct., at 763-765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 904, and n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2652, and n. 4, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring). This disposition was also designed to assure a higher quality of appointments: The Framers anticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collective body. \"The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation.\" The Federalist No. 76, p. 387 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton); accord, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 374-375 (1833). The President's power to select principal officers of the United States was not left unguarded, however, as Article II further requires the \"Advice and Consent of the Senate.\" This serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power, see 3 Story, supra, at 376-377, and \"to promote a judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union,\" The Federalist No. 76, at 386-387. *660 By requiring the joint participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one. Hamilton observed: \"The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive for nominating, and the senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.\" Id., No. 77, at 392. See also 3 Story, supra, at 375 (\"If [the President] should ... surrender the public patronage into the hands of profligate men, or low adventurers, it will be impossible for him long to retain public favour\"). The prescribed manner of appointment for principal officers is also the default manner of appointment for inferior officers. \"[B]ut,\" the Appointments Clause continues, \"the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\" This provision, sometimes referred to as the \"Excepting Clause,\" was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand Convention, with little discussion. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 627-628 (1911 ed.). As one of our early opinions suggests, its obvious purpose is administrative convenience, see United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 25 L.Ed. 482 (1879)—but that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure only with respect to the appointment of \"inferior Officers.\" Section 323(a), which confers appointment power upon the Secretary of Transportation, can constitutionally be *661 applied to the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges only if those judges are \"inferior Officers.\" Our cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes. Among the offices that we have found to be inferior are that of a district court clerk, Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 229, 10 L.Ed. 136 (1839), an election supervisor, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-398, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880), a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the consul, United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343, 18 S.Ct. 374, 379, 42 L.Ed. 767 (1898), and a \"United States commissioner\" in district court proceedings, Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156-157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. \u00ac\u00df\u00ac\u00df 591-599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671-672, 108 S.Ct., at 2608-2609.",
 			"The majority relies for its contrary vision on Article II's Vesting Clause, see ante, at 2197, 2204 - 2205, but the provision can't carry all that weight. Or as Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote of a similar claim in Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), \"extrapolat[ing]\" an unrestricted removal power from such \"general constitutional language\"-which says only that \"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President\"-is \"more than the text will bear.\" Id., at 690, n. 29, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Dean John Manning has well explained why, even were it not obvious from the Clause's \"open-ended language.\" Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1971 (2011). The Necessary and Proper Clause, he writes, makes it impossible to \"establish a constitutional violation simply by showing that Congress has constrained the way '[t]he executive Power' is implemented\"; that is exactly what the Clause gives Congress the power to do. Id., at 1967. Only \"a specific historical understanding\" can bar Congress from enacting a given constraint. Id., at 2024. And nothing of that sort broadly prevents Congress from limiting the President's removal power. I'll turn soon to the Decision of 1789 and other evidence of Post-Convention thought. See infra , at 2228 - 2231. For now, note two points about practice before the Constitution's drafting. First, in that era, Parliament often restricted the King's power to remove royal officers-and the President, needless to say, wasn't supposed to be a king. See Birk, Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive, 73 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021). Second, many States at the time allowed limits on gubernatorial removal power even though their constitutions had similar vesting clauses. See Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 323, 334-344 (2016). Historical understandings thus belie the majority's \"general rule.\"",
 			"Article III Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.",
 			"Because the elimination of the solicited-fax rule applies to Safemark, we need not decide whether the district court violated the Hobbs Act when it refused to apply that rule. But I write separately to explain that our precedents have misconstrued the Act's grant of \"exclusive jurisdiction\" to the circuit courts \"to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of\" certain agency orders, 28 U.S.C. \u00ac\u00df 2342. Our precedents, Self v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc. , 700 F.3d 453 (11th Cir. 2012), and Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau , 768 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2014), interpret the Act to mean that an agency's interpretation of federal law in a final order is subject to only a single 60-day window for judicial review in a single circuit-court proceeding, outside of which no party to any proceeding in any court may question the agency's interpretation, no matter how wrong. Four justices of the Supreme Court have recently explained-with good reason and without any justice voicing a contrary interpretation-that the Act means no such thing and might well be unconstitutional if it did. See PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. , --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2057, 2062-66, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2056-57 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The Hobbs Act, correctly construed, does not require district courts adjudicating cases within their ordinary jurisdiction to treat agency orders that interpret federal statutes as binding precedent. Our precedents' interpretation of the Hobbs Act ignores the statutory context, generates absurd results, and raises serious constitutional doubts. In the earliest appropriate case, we should correct our mistake en banc.",