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[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBonner’s entry of a not guilty plea and his attack on MeDay’s credibility also enhances the probity of the prior offense evidence by placing his intent and state of mind at issue. See Henthorn, 815 F.2d at 308 (finding probative value of extrinsic offense evidence outweighed possible prejudice where defendant pleaded not guilty and attacked the credibility of witnesses). Although the danger of prejudice associated with prior conviction evidence is often great, the district court in this case substantially reduced the possibility of prejudice to Bonner by carefully instructing the jury on how they could consider the evidence. See id. at 304 (finding that careful jury instructions minimized possibility of prejudice); see also United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1174 (5th Cir.1986) (holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBonner’s entry of a not guilty plea and his attack on MeDay’s credibility also enhances the probity of the prior offense evidence by placing his intent and state of mind at issue. See Henthorn, 815 F.2d at 308 (finding probative value of extrinsic offense evidence outweighed possible prejudice where defendant pleaded not guilty and attacked the credibility of witnesses). Although the danger of prejudice associated with prior conviction evidence is often great, the district court in this case substantially reduced the possibility of prejudice to Bonner by carefully instructing the jury on how they could consider the evidence. See id. at 304 (finding that careful jury instructions minimized possibility of prejudice); see also United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1174 (5th Cir.1986) (holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBonner’s entry of a not guilty plea and his attack on MeDay’s credibility also enhances the probity of the prior offense evidence by placing his intent and state of mind at issue. See Henthorn, 815 F.2d at 308 (finding probative value of extrinsic offense evidence outweighed possible prejudice where defendant pleaded not guilty and attacked the credibility of witnesses). Although the danger of prejudice associated with prior conviction evidence is often great, the district court in this case substantially reduced the possibility of prejudice to Bonner by carefully instructing the jury on how they could consider the evidence. See id. at 304 (finding that careful jury instructions minimized possibility of prejudice); see also United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1174 (5th Cir.1986) (recognizing that a limiting instruction has the potential to cure any prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBonner’s entry of a not guilty plea and his attack on MeDay’s credibility also enhances the probity of the prior offense evidence by placing his intent and state of mind at issue. See Henthorn, 815 F.2d at 308 (finding probative value of extrinsic offense evidence outweighed possible prejudice where defendant pleaded not guilty and attacked the credibility of witnesses). Although the danger of prejudice associated with prior conviction evidence is often great, the district court in this case substantially reduced the possibility of prejudice to Bonner by carefully instructing the jury on how they could consider the evidence. See id. at 304 (finding that careful jury instructions minimized possibility of prejudice); see also United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1174 (5th Cir.1986) (holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nBonner’s entry of a not guilty plea and his attack on MeDay’s credibility also enhances the probity of the prior offense evidence by placing his intent and state of mind at issue. See Henthorn, 815 F.2d at 308 (finding probative value of extrinsic offense evidence outweighed possible prejudice where defendant pleaded not guilty and attacked the credibility of witnesses). Although the danger of prejudice associated with prior conviction evidence is often great, the district court in this case substantially reduced the possibility of prejudice to Bonner by carefully instructing the jury on how they could consider the evidence. See id. at 304 (finding that careful jury instructions minimized possibility of prejudice); see also United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1174 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nGilmore, 372 U.S. at 44-45; see also Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d at 856. We recognize that, when appropriate, litigation costs must be apportioned between business and personal claims, and that business litigation costs are nondeductible to the extent that they constitute capital expenditures. See, e.g., Kurkjian v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 862 (1976) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 646-647 (1975) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to acquisition of intangible assets); Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); see also Boagni v. Commissioner, supra (recognizing the not insignificant costs involved in both establishing and operating as an llc", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nGilmore, 372 U.S. at 44-45; see also Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d at 856. We recognize that, when appropriate, litigation costs must be apportioned between business and personal claims, and that business litigation costs are nondeductible to the extent that they constitute capital expenditures. See, e.g., Kurkjian v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 862 (1976) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 646-647 (1975) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to acquisition of intangible assets); Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); see also Boagni v. Commissioner, supra (holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nGilmore, 372 U.S. at 44-45; see also Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d at 856. We recognize that, when appropriate, litigation costs must be apportioned between business and personal claims, and that business litigation costs are nondeductible to the extent that they constitute capital expenditures. See, e.g., Kurkjian v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 862 (1976) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 646-647 (1975) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to acquisition of intangible assets); Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); see also Boagni v. Commissioner, supra (holding defense applicable to both types of claims", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nGilmore, 372 U.S. at 44-45; see also Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d at 856. We recognize that, when appropriate, litigation costs must be apportioned between business and personal claims, and that business litigation costs are nondeductible to the extent that they constitute capital expenditures. See, e.g., Kurkjian v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 862 (1976) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 646-647 (1975) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to acquisition of intangible assets); Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); see also Boagni v. Commissioner, supra (holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nGilmore, 372 U.S. at 44-45; see also Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d at 856. We recognize that, when appropriate, litigation costs must be apportioned between business and personal claims, and that business litigation costs are nondeductible to the extent that they constitute capital expenditures. See, e.g., Kurkjian v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 862 (1976) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 646-647 (1975) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to acquisition of intangible assets); Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney’s fees attributable to personal matters); see also Boagni v. Commissioner, supra (recognizing that litigation costs can be characterized as both deductible and nondeductible when the litigation is rooted in situations giving rise to both types of expenditures" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(7)(f) or other discovery under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16, but the defendant is not under obligation to do so. The statute places the affirmative burden on the State to allege the prior offense upon which it relies for the imposition of the mandatory sentence. The State does not meet that burden by the penalty format it uses here. [¶ 13] In State v. Gielen, 54 N.D. 768, 210 N.W. 971, 975 (1926), the Court stated: It may be said that while the information in this case, under the circumstances presented by the ons which have reached what appears to be the opposite conclusion. But, we have not adopted a strict compliance standard. Rather, we have interpreted the statute as a notice requirement to which the harmless error analysis applies. Cf. State v. Anderson, 303 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.1981) (holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(7)(f) or other discovery under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16, but the defendant is not under obligation to do so. The statute places the affirmative burden on the State to allege the prior offense upon which it relies for the imposition of the mandatory sentence. The State does not meet that burden by the penalty format it uses here. [¶ 13] In State v. Gielen, 54 N.D. 768, 210 N.W. 971, 975 (1926), the Court stated: It may be said that while the information in this case, under the circumstances presented by the ons which have reached what appears to be the opposite conclusion. But, we have not adopted a strict compliance standard. Rather, we have interpreted the statute as a notice requirement to which the harmless error analysis applies. Cf. State v. Anderson, 303 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.1981) (holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(7)(f) or other discovery under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16, but the defendant is not under obligation to do so. The statute places the affirmative burden on the State to allege the prior offense upon which it relies for the imposition of the mandatory sentence. The State does not meet that burden by the penalty format it uses here. [¶ 13] In State v. Gielen, 54 N.D. 768, 210 N.W. 971, 975 (1926), the Court stated: It may be said that while the information in this case, under the circumstances presented by the ons which have reached what appears to be the opposite conclusion. But, we have not adopted a strict compliance standard. Rather, we have interpreted the statute as a notice requirement to which the harmless error analysis applies. Cf. State v. Anderson, 303 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.1981) (holding that due process does not require defendant to receive verbal notice of standard probation conditions because all persons have constructive notice of states criminal statutes", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(7)(f) or other discovery under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16, but the defendant is not under obligation to do so. The statute places the affirmative burden on the State to allege the prior offense upon which it relies for the imposition of the mandatory sentence. The State does not meet that burden by the penalty format it uses here. [¶ 13] In State v. Gielen, 54 N.D. 768, 210 N.W. 971, 975 (1926), the Court stated: It may be said that while the information in this case, under the circumstances presented by the ons which have reached what appears to be the opposite conclusion. But, we have not adopted a strict compliance standard. Rather, we have interpreted the statute as a notice requirement to which the harmless error analysis applies. Cf. State v. Anderson, 303 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.1981) (holding probationer who did not receive notice of specific offenses she was believed to have committed but had notice of probation terms states attorney believed were violated and of the facts constituting violation was not harmed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(7)(f) or other discovery under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16, but the defendant is not under obligation to do so. The statute places the affirmative burden on the State to allege the prior offense upon which it relies for the imposition of the mandatory sentence. The State does not meet that burden by the penalty format it uses here. [¶ 13] In State v. Gielen, 54 N.D. 768, 210 N.W. 971, 975 (1926), the Court stated: It may be said that while the information in this case, under the circumstances presented by the ons which have reached what appears to be the opposite conclusion. But, we have not adopted a strict compliance standard. Rather, we have interpreted the statute as a notice requirement to which the harmless error analysis applies. Cf. State v. Anderson, 303 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.1981) (holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclauses discussing venue in terms' of ’a state are commonly interpreted as creating either a'geographic or sovereignty limitation on venue. [Fjorum selection clauses that use the term ‘in [a state]’ express the parties’ intent as a.matter of geography, permitting jurisdiction in both, the state-and federal courts, of the named state, whereas forum selection clauses that use the term ‘of [a state]’ connote sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute to the state courts of the named state.. FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys.. Env’t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Dixon v. TSE Int'l Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (recognizing the same rule in texas courts", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclauses discussing venue in terms' of ’a state are commonly interpreted as creating either a'geographic or sovereignty limitation on venue. [Fjorum selection clauses that use the term ‘in [a state]’ express the parties’ intent as a.matter of geography, permitting jurisdiction in both, the state-and federal courts, of the named state, whereas forum selection clauses that use the term ‘of [a state]’ connote sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute to the state courts of the named state.. FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys.. Env’t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Dixon v. TSE Int'l Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclauses discussing venue in terms' of ’a state are commonly interpreted as creating either a'geographic or sovereignty limitation on venue. [Fjorum selection clauses that use the term ‘in [a state]’ express the parties’ intent as a.matter of geography, permitting jurisdiction in both, the state-and federal courts, of the named state, whereas forum selection clauses that use the term ‘of [a state]’ connote sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute to the state courts of the named state.. FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys.. Env’t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Dixon v. TSE Int'l Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that a texas court had personal jurisdiction over a kansas resident who after objecting to the texas courts jurisdiction filed a motion for attorneys fees", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclauses discussing venue in terms' of ’a state are commonly interpreted as creating either a'geographic or sovereignty limitation on venue. [Fjorum selection clauses that use the term ‘in [a state]’ express the parties’ intent as a.matter of geography, permitting jurisdiction in both, the state-and federal courts, of the named state, whereas forum selection clauses that use the term ‘of [a state]’ connote sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute to the state courts of the named state.. FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys.. Env’t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Dixon v. TSE Int'l Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that the contract language the courts of texas usa shall have jurisdiction precluded federal jurisdiction by explaining that flederal district courts may be in texas but they are not of texas emphasis in original", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclauses discussing venue in terms' of ’a state are commonly interpreted as creating either a'geographic or sovereignty limitation on venue. [Fjorum selection clauses that use the term ‘in [a state]’ express the parties’ intent as a.matter of geography, permitting jurisdiction in both, the state-and federal courts, of the named state, whereas forum selection clauses that use the term ‘of [a state]’ connote sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute to the state courts of the named state.. FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys.. Env’t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Dixon v. TSE Int'l Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law not arizona law should be applied" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“virtually every significant class action case would need to be litigated in California”). However, it has a characteristic that all of these Costco management districts except the Southern District of California lack: it is the most appropriate forum for litigating the claims of at least one named plaintiff. Furthermore, it is a forum for which there has been no showing of inconvenience for Costco, due to defendant’s strong contacts here and the agreement of the parties to travel to witnesses’ own locales for purposes of discovery. The Northern District is the plaintiffs chosen forum, and as such it is entitled to some deference. In class actions, this deference is reduced where a plaintiff lacks contacts with the chosen district. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“virtually every significant class action case would need to be litigated in California”). However, it has a characteristic that all of these Costco management districts except the Southern District of California lack: it is the most appropriate forum for litigating the claims of at least one named plaintiff. Furthermore, it is a forum for which there has been no showing of inconvenience for Costco, due to defendant’s strong contacts here and the agreement of the parties to travel to witnesses’ own locales for purposes of discovery. The Northern District is the plaintiffs chosen forum, and as such it is entitled to some deference. In class actions, this deference is reduced where a plaintiff lacks contacts with the chosen district. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.1987) (holding individual defendants subject to suit", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“virtually every significant class action case would need to be litigated in California”). However, it has a characteristic that all of these Costco management districts except the Southern District of California lack: it is the most appropriate forum for litigating the claims of at least one named plaintiff. Furthermore, it is a forum for which there has been no showing of inconvenience for Costco, due to defendant’s strong contacts here and the agreement of the parties to travel to witnesses’ own locales for purposes of discovery. The Northern District is the plaintiffs chosen forum, and as such it is entitled to some deference. In class actions, this deference is reduced where a plaintiff lacks contacts with the chosen district. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that when an individual brings a derivative suit or represents a class the named plaintiffs chosen forum is given less weight", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“virtually every significant class action case would need to be litigated in California”). However, it has a characteristic that all of these Costco management districts except the Southern District of California lack: it is the most appropriate forum for litigating the claims of at least one named plaintiff. Furthermore, it is a forum for which there has been no showing of inconvenience for Costco, due to defendant’s strong contacts here and the agreement of the parties to travel to witnesses’ own locales for purposes of discovery. The Northern District is the plaintiffs chosen forum, and as such it is entitled to some deference. In class actions, this deference is reduced where a plaintiff lacks contacts with the chosen district. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“virtually every significant class action case would need to be litigated in California”). However, it has a characteristic that all of these Costco management districts except the Southern District of California lack: it is the most appropriate forum for litigating the claims of at least one named plaintiff. Furthermore, it is a forum for which there has been no showing of inconvenience for Costco, due to defendant’s strong contacts here and the agreement of the parties to travel to witnesses’ own locales for purposes of discovery. The Northern District is the plaintiffs chosen forum, and as such it is entitled to some deference. In class actions, this deference is reduced where a plaintiff lacks contacts with the chosen district. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfacial neutrality.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. We must look beyond the text of the ordinance and examine whether the Borough enforces it on a religion-neutral basis, as “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally applicable on its face, if the Borough had enforced it uniformly, Smith would control and the plaintiffs’ claim would accordingly fail. The Borough insists it has done so, but the record shows otherwise. Indeed, the Borough has tacitly or expressly granted exemptions from the ordinance's unyielding language for various secular and religious-though never Orthodox Jewish-purposes. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) (recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfacial neutrality.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. We must look beyond the text of the ordinance and examine whether the Borough enforces it on a religion-neutral basis, as “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally applicable on its face, if the Borough had enforced it uniformly, Smith would control and the plaintiffs’ claim would accordingly fail. The Borough insists it has done so, but the record shows otherwise. Indeed, the Borough has tacitly or expressly granted exemptions from the ordinance's unyielding language for various secular and religious-though never Orthodox Jewish-purposes. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) (holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered religious exercise", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfacial neutrality.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. We must look beyond the text of the ordinance and examine whether the Borough enforces it on a religion-neutral basis, as “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally applicable on its face, if the Borough had enforced it uniformly, Smith would control and the plaintiffs’ claim would accordingly fail. The Borough insists it has done so, but the record shows otherwise. Indeed, the Borough has tacitly or expressly granted exemptions from the ordinance's unyielding language for various secular and religious-though never Orthodox Jewish-purposes. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) (holding that limitations placed upon the religious activities of two prison groups found to be religious organizations were reasonable under the circumstances", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfacial neutrality.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. We must look beyond the text of the ordinance and examine whether the Borough enforces it on a religion-neutral basis, as “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally applicable on its face, if the Borough had enforced it uniformly, Smith would control and the plaintiffs’ claim would accordingly fail. The Borough insists it has done so, but the record shows otherwise. Indeed, the Borough has tacitly or expressly granted exemptions from the ordinance's unyielding language for various secular and religious-though never Orthodox Jewish-purposes. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) (holding that exclusion of religious groups from universitys open forum policy violated the first amendment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfacial neutrality.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. We must look beyond the text of the ordinance and examine whether the Borough enforces it on a religion-neutral basis, as “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally applicable on its face, if the Borough had enforced it uniformly, Smith would control and the plaintiffs’ claim would accordingly fail. The Borough insists it has done so, but the record shows otherwise. Indeed, the Borough has tacitly or expressly granted exemptions from the ordinance's unyielding language for various secular and religious-though never Orthodox Jewish-purposes. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) (holding that city violated free exercise clause by enforcing ordinance banning meetings in park against jehovahs witnesses but exempting other religious groups" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequires courts to analyze whether convenient and suitable access exists between the public roadway and the private parcel, or between some commercially useful location within the property and the point on the perimeter connecting the property to the public roadway. Whether there is reasonably convenient and suitable access to a parcel does not depend on whether the landowner prefers a different point of access. Grossman, 571 N.W.2d at 51. It is generally true that we consider the commercial use the complaining property owner wishes to make of the parcel when evaluating whether reasonably convenient and suitable access exists. See, e.g., Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607. (considering the commercial use of a bus company); County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Minn.App.1993) (holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequires courts to analyze whether convenient and suitable access exists between the public roadway and the private parcel, or between some commercially useful location within the property and the point on the perimeter connecting the property to the public roadway. Whether there is reasonably convenient and suitable access to a parcel does not depend on whether the landowner prefers a different point of access. Grossman, 571 N.W.2d at 51. It is generally true that we consider the commercial use the complaining property owner wishes to make of the parcel when evaluating whether reasonably convenient and suitable access exists. See, e.g., Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607. (considering the commercial use of a bus company); County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Minn.App.1993) (holding the district court erred when it did not consider the disruption of business caused by a roadway modification that may have interfered with large vehicles accessing the property", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequires courts to analyze whether convenient and suitable access exists between the public roadway and the private parcel, or between some commercially useful location within the property and the point on the perimeter connecting the property to the public roadway. Whether there is reasonably convenient and suitable access to a parcel does not depend on whether the landowner prefers a different point of access. Grossman, 571 N.W.2d at 51. It is generally true that we consider the commercial use the complaining property owner wishes to make of the parcel when evaluating whether reasonably convenient and suitable access exists. See, e.g., Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607. (considering the commercial use of a bus company); County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Minn.App.1993) (holding that the district court erred when it relied on the governments representation that the property sought by the defendant had been destroyed because the government did not submit any evidence of the propertys destruction", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequires courts to analyze whether convenient and suitable access exists between the public roadway and the private parcel, or between some commercially useful location within the property and the point on the perimeter connecting the property to the public roadway. Whether there is reasonably convenient and suitable access to a parcel does not depend on whether the landowner prefers a different point of access. Grossman, 571 N.W.2d at 51. It is generally true that we consider the commercial use the complaining property owner wishes to make of the parcel when evaluating whether reasonably convenient and suitable access exists. See, e.g., Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607. (considering the commercial use of a bus company); County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Minn.App.1993) (holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequires courts to analyze whether convenient and suitable access exists between the public roadway and the private parcel, or between some commercially useful location within the property and the point on the perimeter connecting the property to the public roadway. Whether there is reasonably convenient and suitable access to a parcel does not depend on whether the landowner prefers a different point of access. Grossman, 571 N.W.2d at 51. It is generally true that we consider the commercial use the complaining property owner wishes to make of the parcel when evaluating whether reasonably convenient and suitable access exists. See, e.g., Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607. (considering the commercial use of a bus company); County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Minn.App.1993) (holding circuit courts injunction interfered with the general operations of the agency" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nover. The parties have agreed that any remainder will go, after distribution of treble damages to class members, to cancer or patient-related charities. Although unusually timed, the cy pres fund in this case, contrary to Howe’s argument, is not taking damages away from the class members. The settlement per mits all plaintiffs to claim and be paid their damages — indeed treble their damages— before any money is paid to charity through cy pres. This process is like other, routinely approved cy pres distributions. See, e.g., Powell, 119 F.3d at 705-06 (refusing, after money in a settlement fund remained, to distribute the rest to class members because “neither party ha[d] a legal right” to the unclaimed funds); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that when counsel denied the petitioner the right to appeal neither the strickland prejudice prong nor the harmlesserror test is appropriate", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nover. The parties have agreed that any remainder will go, after distribution of treble damages to class members, to cancer or patient-related charities. Although unusually timed, the cy pres fund in this case, contrary to Howe’s argument, is not taking damages away from the class members. The settlement per mits all plaintiffs to claim and be paid their damages — indeed treble their damages— before any money is paid to charity through cy pres. This process is like other, routinely approved cy pres distributions. See, e.g., Powell, 119 F.3d at 705-06 (refusing, after money in a settlement fund remained, to distribute the rest to class members because “neither party ha[d] a legal right” to the unclaimed funds); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that the defendants contention was waived because it was supported neither by cogent argument nor citation to authority", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nover. The parties have agreed that any remainder will go, after distribution of treble damages to class members, to cancer or patient-related charities. Although unusually timed, the cy pres fund in this case, contrary to Howe’s argument, is not taking damages away from the class members. The settlement per mits all plaintiffs to claim and be paid their damages — indeed treble their damages— before any money is paid to charity through cy pres. This process is like other, routinely approved cy pres distributions. See, e.g., Powell, 119 F.3d at 705-06 (refusing, after money in a settlement fund remained, to distribute the rest to class members because “neither party ha[d] a legal right” to the unclaimed funds); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that when plaintiff sought arbitration and neither the award nor the arbitration agreement mentioned interest the plaintiff was not entitled to preaward interest", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nover. The parties have agreed that any remainder will go, after distribution of treble damages to class members, to cancer or patient-related charities. Although unusually timed, the cy pres fund in this case, contrary to Howe’s argument, is not taking damages away from the class members. The settlement per mits all plaintiffs to claim and be paid their damages — indeed treble their damages— before any money is paid to charity through cy pres. This process is like other, routinely approved cy pres distributions. See, e.g., Powell, 119 F.3d at 705-06 (refusing, after money in a settlement fund remained, to distribute the rest to class members because “neither party ha[d] a legal right” to the unclaimed funds); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1984) (holding a cy pres distribution was appropriate when 6 million remained in a fund created to pay costs and extra claims in a settlement because neither the plaintiff class nor the settling defendants had any right to the money", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nover. The parties have agreed that any remainder will go, after distribution of treble damages to class members, to cancer or patient-related charities. Although unusually timed, the cy pres fund in this case, contrary to Howe’s argument, is not taking damages away from the class members. The settlement per mits all plaintiffs to claim and be paid their damages — indeed treble their damages— before any money is paid to charity through cy pres. This process is like other, routinely approved cy pres distributions. See, e.g., Powell, 119 F.3d at 705-06 (refusing, after money in a settlement fund remained, to distribute the rest to class members because “neither party ha[d] a legal right” to the unclaimed funds); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on a defendants jurydemand where the defendant had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to make such a demand" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to show that other alleged false statements were actually false. As to the allegations that the “compare to” language impliedly communicated that the products had been tested against each other, PBM’s marketing director testified that the products have, in fact, been tested against each other. Id. at *5. In addition, Mead Johnson alleged that PBM’s label stated its gentle formula contains “partially broken down whey protein” but presented no evidence to suggest otherwise. As a result, the alleged implied message could not be proven false. In any event, even if PBM’s “compare to” messages were false, the district court correctly concluded that Mead Johnson cannot prove that the “compare to” language caused any damages. See Xoom v. Imageline, 323 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir.2003) (holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to show that other alleged false statements were actually false. As to the allegations that the “compare to” language impliedly communicated that the products had been tested against each other, PBM’s marketing director testified that the products have, in fact, been tested against each other. Id. at *5. In addition, Mead Johnson alleged that PBM’s label stated its gentle formula contains “partially broken down whey protein” but presented no evidence to suggest otherwise. As a result, the alleged implied message could not be proven false. In any event, even if PBM’s “compare to” messages were false, the district court correctly concluded that Mead Johnson cannot prove that the “compare to” language caused any damages. See Xoom v. Imageline, 323 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir.2003) (holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to show that other alleged false statements were actually false. As to the allegations that the “compare to” language impliedly communicated that the products had been tested against each other, PBM’s marketing director testified that the products have, in fact, been tested against each other. Id. at *5. In addition, Mead Johnson alleged that PBM’s label stated its gentle formula contains “partially broken down whey protein” but presented no evidence to suggest otherwise. As a result, the alleged implied message could not be proven false. In any event, even if PBM’s “compare to” messages were false, the district court correctly concluded that Mead Johnson cannot prove that the “compare to” language caused any damages. See Xoom v. Imageline, 323 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir.2003) (holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to show that other alleged false statements were actually false. As to the allegations that the “compare to” language impliedly communicated that the products had been tested against each other, PBM’s marketing director testified that the products have, in fact, been tested against each other. Id. at *5. In addition, Mead Johnson alleged that PBM’s label stated its gentle formula contains “partially broken down whey protein” but presented no evidence to suggest otherwise. As a result, the alleged implied message could not be proven false. In any event, even if PBM’s “compare to” messages were false, the district court correctly concluded that Mead Johnson cannot prove that the “compare to” language caused any damages. See Xoom v. Imageline, 323 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir.2003) (holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to show that other alleged false statements were actually false. As to the allegations that the “compare to” language impliedly communicated that the products had been tested against each other, PBM’s marketing director testified that the products have, in fact, been tested against each other. Id. at *5. In addition, Mead Johnson alleged that PBM’s label stated its gentle formula contains “partially broken down whey protein” but presented no evidence to suggest otherwise. As a result, the alleged implied message could not be proven false. In any event, even if PBM’s “compare to” messages were false, the district court correctly concluded that Mead Johnson cannot prove that the “compare to” language caused any damages. See Xoom v. Imageline, 323 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir.2003) (holding that in order to recover damages under the lanham act plaintiff must prove that there was a violation that plaintiff has been damaged and that there is a causal connection between the violation and those damages" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n524, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (concluding that summary judgment is proper where ADA plaintiff fails to show that he is \"regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs”)). 13 . See also Olivieri v. Abbot Laboratories, Civil No. 05-1244(ADC), 2008 WL 747082 (D.P.R. March 19, 2008) (evidence that employer was aware of plaintiffs condition, viewed her as unable to meet certain essential requirements of her job and even offered accommodations is insufficient to establish claim that defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled under ADA, inasmuch as the record is void of any evidence that defendant viewed plaintiff as unfit to perform a broad range of jobs). 14 . The EEOC guidelines have defined the term “qualified individual with a disability” as “an indiv 8, 1279-80 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that attendance is a minimum function of any job", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n524, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (concluding that summary judgment is proper where ADA plaintiff fails to show that he is \"regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs”)). 13 . See also Olivieri v. Abbot Laboratories, Civil No. 05-1244(ADC), 2008 WL 747082 (D.P.R. March 19, 2008) (evidence that employer was aware of plaintiffs condition, viewed her as unable to meet certain essential requirements of her job and even offered accommodations is insufficient to establish claim that defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled under ADA, inasmuch as the record is void of any evidence that defendant viewed plaintiff as unfit to perform a broad range of jobs). 14 . The EEOC guidelines have defined the term “qualified individual with a disability” as “an indiv 8, 1279-80 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n524, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (concluding that summary judgment is proper where ADA plaintiff fails to show that he is \"regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs”)). 13 . See also Olivieri v. Abbot Laboratories, Civil No. 05-1244(ADC), 2008 WL 747082 (D.P.R. March 19, 2008) (evidence that employer was aware of plaintiffs condition, viewed her as unable to meet certain essential requirements of her job and even offered accommodations is insufficient to establish claim that defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled under ADA, inasmuch as the record is void of any evidence that defendant viewed plaintiff as unfit to perform a broad range of jobs). 14 . The EEOC guidelines have defined the term “qualified individual with a disability” as “an indiv 8, 1279-80 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n524, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (concluding that summary judgment is proper where ADA plaintiff fails to show that he is \"regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs”)). 13 . See also Olivieri v. Abbot Laboratories, Civil No. 05-1244(ADC), 2008 WL 747082 (D.P.R. March 19, 2008) (evidence that employer was aware of plaintiffs condition, viewed her as unable to meet certain essential requirements of her job and even offered accommodations is insufficient to establish claim that defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled under ADA, inasmuch as the record is void of any evidence that defendant viewed plaintiff as unfit to perform a broad range of jobs). 14 . The EEOC guidelines have defined the term “qualified individual with a disability” as “an indiv 8, 1279-80 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that inability to maintain regular and reliable level of attendance defeated plaintiffs qualification for the job", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n524, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (concluding that summary judgment is proper where ADA plaintiff fails to show that he is \"regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs”)). 13 . See also Olivieri v. Abbot Laboratories, Civil No. 05-1244(ADC), 2008 WL 747082 (D.P.R. March 19, 2008) (evidence that employer was aware of plaintiffs condition, viewed her as unable to meet certain essential requirements of her job and even offered accommodations is insufficient to establish claim that defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled under ADA, inasmuch as the record is void of any evidence that defendant viewed plaintiff as unfit to perform a broad range of jobs). 14 . The EEOC guidelines have defined the term “qualified individual with a disability” as “an indiv 8, 1279-80 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that attendance can be an essential function of a position and that excessive absenteeism rendered an employee unqualified for such a position" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNo. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A (1962). 29 . Id. at 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218. See also n. 23 supra. 30 . 370 U.S. 139, 143-44, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962). See also People v. Von Villas, Cal.App.2d Dist., 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 133 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 838, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993) (recognizing that Lanza’s holding that confidential relationships would \"continue to receive unceasing protection despite the jailhouse setting”); In re Joseph A., supra at n. 22. Cf., e.g., U.S. v. Geller, supra n. 27 (intercepted wire communications between spouses suppressed since such communications were made in confidence and were privileged). 31 . D.R.E. 504. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 (holding that on march 13 2004 it was clearly established that the fourth amendment protects people from medical procedures induced by lawenforcement officers", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNo. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A (1962). 29 . Id. at 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218. See also n. 23 supra. 30 . 370 U.S. 139, 143-44, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962). See also People v. Von Villas, Cal.App.2d Dist., 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 133 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 838, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993) (recognizing that Lanza’s holding that confidential relationships would \"continue to receive unceasing protection despite the jailhouse setting”); In re Joseph A., supra at n. 22. Cf., e.g., U.S. v. Geller, supra n. 27 (intercepted wire communications between spouses suppressed since such communications were made in confidence and were privileged). 31 . D.R.E. 504. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 (holding that to decide whether or not a given area viewed in the abstract is constitutionally protected deflects attention from the problem presented because the fourth amendment protects people not places", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNo. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A (1962). 29 . Id. at 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218. See also n. 23 supra. 30 . 370 U.S. 139, 143-44, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962). See also People v. Von Villas, Cal.App.2d Dist., 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 133 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 838, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993) (recognizing that Lanza’s holding that confidential relationships would \"continue to receive unceasing protection despite the jailhouse setting”); In re Joseph A., supra at n. 22. Cf., e.g., U.S. v. Geller, supra n. 27 (intercepted wire communications between spouses suppressed since such communications were made in confidence and were privileged). 31 . D.R.E. 504. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 (holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNo. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A (1962). 29 . Id. at 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218. See also n. 23 supra. 30 . 370 U.S. 139, 143-44, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962). See also People v. Von Villas, Cal.App.2d Dist., 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 133 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 838, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993) (recognizing that Lanza’s holding that confidential relationships would \"continue to receive unceasing protection despite the jailhouse setting”); In re Joseph A., supra at n. 22. Cf., e.g., U.S. v. Geller, supra n. 27 (intercepted wire communications between spouses suppressed since such communications were made in confidence and were privileged). 31 . D.R.E. 504. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 (holding that the fourth amendment protects people not places", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNo. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A (1962). 29 . Id. at 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218. See also n. 23 supra. 30 . 370 U.S. 139, 143-44, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962). See also People v. Von Villas, Cal.App.2d Dist., 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 133 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 838, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993) (recognizing that Lanza’s holding that confidential relationships would \"continue to receive unceasing protection despite the jailhouse setting”); In re Joseph A., supra at n. 22. Cf., e.g., U.S. v. Geller, supra n. 27 (intercepted wire communications between spouses suppressed since such communications were made in confidence and were privileged). 31 . D.R.E. 504. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 (holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlitigation. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 928 (“Those contractual provisions ... specify that ‘any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to’ [an entity’s] participation in Lloyd’s be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the British courts .... ” (quoting underlying -contract)); Rice, 240 F.Supp.2d at 528 (“The form contract used ... contained a choice of forum clause, stating that ‘any litigation arising hereunder shall be filed only in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia or the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and you hereby consent to the jurisdiction of such courts.’ ” (quoting underlying contract)); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-89, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991) (holding that a forum selection clause encompassing any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this agreement included all causes of action arising directly or indirectly from the business relationship evidenced by the contract", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlitigation. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 928 (“Those contractual provisions ... specify that ‘any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to’ [an entity’s] participation in Lloyd’s be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the British courts .... ” (quoting underlying -contract)); Rice, 240 F.Supp.2d at 528 (“The form contract used ... contained a choice of forum clause, stating that ‘any litigation arising hereunder shall be filed only in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia or the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and you hereby consent to the jurisdiction of such courts.’ ” (quoting underlying contract)); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-89, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991) (holding that forum selection clause providing that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the borough of manhattan new york city new york shall have exclusive jurisdiction was not dispositive but merely one factor to consider in transfer analysis quoting underlying contract", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlitigation. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 928 (“Those contractual provisions ... specify that ‘any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to’ [an entity’s] participation in Lloyd’s be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the British courts .... ” (quoting underlying -contract)); Rice, 240 F.Supp.2d at 528 (“The form contract used ... contained a choice of forum clause, stating that ‘any litigation arising hereunder shall be filed only in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia or the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and you hereby consent to the jurisdiction of such courts.’ ” (quoting underlying contract)); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-89, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991) (holding that plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim was subject to mandatory forum selection clause requiring litigation in florida of any claims or disputes arising from employment agreement", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlitigation. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 928 (“Those contractual provisions ... specify that ‘any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to’ [an entity’s] participation in Lloyd’s be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the British courts .... ” (quoting underlying -contract)); Rice, 240 F.Supp.2d at 528 (“The form contract used ... contained a choice of forum clause, stating that ‘any litigation arising hereunder shall be filed only in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia or the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and you hereby consent to the jurisdiction of such courts.’ ” (quoting underlying contract)); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-89, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991) (holding that contract promise to litigate any dispute arising from the contract in the english courts was prima facie valid quoting underlying contract", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlitigation. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 928 (“Those contractual provisions ... specify that ‘any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to’ [an entity’s] participation in Lloyd’s be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the British courts .... ” (quoting underlying -contract)); Rice, 240 F.Supp.2d at 528 (“The form contract used ... contained a choice of forum clause, stating that ‘any litigation arising hereunder shall be filed only in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia or the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and you hereby consent to the jurisdiction of such courts.’ ” (quoting underlying contract)); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-89, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991) (holding valid forum selection clause providing that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under in connection with or incident to this contract shall be litigated if at all in and before a court located in the state of florida quoting underlying contract" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nExch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988) (applying both Illinois and Indiana law). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, however, disagree. Both courts denied the corporation in bankruptcy the right to bring alter ego claims on behalf of its creditors. See Spartan Tube and Steel, Inc. v. Himmelspach (In re RCS Engineered Prods. Co.), 102 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.1996) (applying Michigan law); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) (applying Arkansas law), cert. denied sub. nom., Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). 18 . To ascertain the property ownership of a foreign bankruptcy estate, the law of the jurisdiction where the section 304 proceeding is p (holding appellate courts cannot reverse judgment on grounds not raised on appeal", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nExch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988) (applying both Illinois and Indiana law). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, however, disagree. Both courts denied the corporation in bankruptcy the right to bring alter ego claims on behalf of its creditors. See Spartan Tube and Steel, Inc. v. Himmelspach (In re RCS Engineered Prods. Co.), 102 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.1996) (applying Michigan law); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) (applying Arkansas law), cert. denied sub. nom., Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). 18 . To ascertain the property ownership of a foreign bankruptcy estate, the law of the jurisdiction where the section 304 proceeding is p (holding that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nExch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988) (applying both Illinois and Indiana law). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, however, disagree. Both courts denied the corporation in bankruptcy the right to bring alter ego claims on behalf of its creditors. See Spartan Tube and Steel, Inc. v. Himmelspach (In re RCS Engineered Prods. Co.), 102 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.1996) (applying Michigan law); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) (applying Arkansas law), cert. denied sub. nom., Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). 18 . To ascertain the property ownership of a foreign bankruptcy estate, the law of the jurisdiction where the section 304 proceeding is p (recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nExch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988) (applying both Illinois and Indiana law). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, however, disagree. Both courts denied the corporation in bankruptcy the right to bring alter ego claims on behalf of its creditors. See Spartan Tube and Steel, Inc. v. Himmelspach (In re RCS Engineered Prods. Co.), 102 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.1996) (applying Michigan law); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) (applying Arkansas law), cert. denied sub. nom., Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). 18 . To ascertain the property ownership of a foreign bankruptcy estate, the law of the jurisdiction where the section 304 proceeding is p (recognizing reverse piercing ordinarily in oneman corporations", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nExch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988) (applying both Illinois and Indiana law). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, however, disagree. Both courts denied the corporation in bankruptcy the right to bring alter ego claims on behalf of its creditors. See Spartan Tube and Steel, Inc. v. Himmelspach (In re RCS Engineered Prods. Co.), 102 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.1996) (applying Michigan law); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) (applying Arkansas law), cert. denied sub. nom., Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). 18 . To ascertain the property ownership of a foreign bankruptcy estate, the law of the jurisdiction where the section 304 proceeding is p (recognizing appellate court may not reverse a summary judgment on a basis not raised by the appellant on appeal" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\narise: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. See LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 (1997). As plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship or that Ford made any representations about its ignition locks, only the second and third of the above-referenced circumstances are implicated here, and, as set forth above, both require a finding of “materiality.” See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 970-71 (N.D.Cal.2008), (holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\narise: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. See LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 (1997). As plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship or that Ford made any representations about its ignition locks, only the second and third of the above-referenced circumstances are implicated here, and, as set forth above, both require a finding of “materiality.” See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 970-71 (N.D.Cal.2008), (holding that section 636b1c does not require any review at all by the district court of an issue that is not objected to", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\narise: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. See LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 (1997). As plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship or that Ford made any representations about its ignition locks, only the second and third of the above-referenced circumstances are implicated here, and, as set forth above, both require a finding of “materiality.” See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 970-71 (N.D.Cal.2008), (recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\narise: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. See LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 (1997). As plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship or that Ford made any representations about its ignition locks, only the second and third of the above-referenced circumstances are implicated here, and, as set forth above, both require a finding of “materiality.” See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 970-71 (N.D.Cal.2008), (holding that section 636b1c does not require any review at all of any issue that is not the subject of an objection", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\narise: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. See LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 (1997). As plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship or that Ford made any representations about its ignition locks, only the second and third of the above-referenced circumstances are implicated here, and, as set forth above, both require a finding of “materiality.” See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 970-71 (N.D.Cal.2008), (holding the first condition is not at issue here all of the other situations require materiality" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncould not state that proposition. Alabama law is not permitted by the FAA to treat arbitratio his case. That fact is uncontested. In addition, it is uncontested that the contract to which Stiles assented may be changed by AGFC. A contract incorporating such a clause is valid under the laws of both Utah and Alabama. See discussion below. Stiles has, therefore, assented to an arbitration clause, even absent his signature. Cf. Clayton v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 981 F.Supp. 1447 (M.D.Ala.1997) (compelling arbitration where arbitration clause was included in constitution of fraternal benefit society, which was incorporated by reference into insurance contract); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. den., — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 47, 139 L.Ed.2d 13 (1997) (holding corporation vicariously liable for assault on customer by assistant manager as customer was engaged in trying to settle a controversy concerning a portion of defendants business", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncould not state that proposition. Alabama law is not permitted by the FAA to treat arbitratio his case. That fact is uncontested. In addition, it is uncontested that the contract to which Stiles assented may be changed by AGFC. A contract incorporating such a clause is valid under the laws of both Utah and Alabama. See discussion below. Stiles has, therefore, assented to an arbitration clause, even absent his signature. Cf. Clayton v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 981 F.Supp. 1447 (M.D.Ala.1997) (compelling arbitration where arbitration clause was included in constitution of fraternal benefit society, which was incorporated by reference into insurance contract); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. den., — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 47, 139 L.Ed.2d 13 (1997) (holding former employee could properly use recollection of customer information where he did not otherwise misappropriate an actual customer list", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncould not state that proposition. Alabama law is not permitted by the FAA to treat arbitratio his case. That fact is uncontested. In addition, it is uncontested that the contract to which Stiles assented may be changed by AGFC. A contract incorporating such a clause is valid under the laws of both Utah and Alabama. See discussion below. Stiles has, therefore, assented to an arbitration clause, even absent his signature. Cf. Clayton v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 981 F.Supp. 1447 (M.D.Ala.1997) (compelling arbitration where arbitration clause was included in constitution of fraternal benefit society, which was incorporated by reference into insurance contract); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. den., — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 47, 139 L.Ed.2d 13 (1997) (holding that arbitration clause which was included with product mailed to customer and with proviso that customer could return product within 30 days was binding on customer who did not return computer", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncould not state that proposition. Alabama law is not permitted by the FAA to treat arbitratio his case. That fact is uncontested. In addition, it is uncontested that the contract to which Stiles assented may be changed by AGFC. A contract incorporating such a clause is valid under the laws of both Utah and Alabama. See discussion below. Stiles has, therefore, assented to an arbitration clause, even absent his signature. Cf. Clayton v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 981 F.Supp. 1447 (M.D.Ala.1997) (compelling arbitration where arbitration clause was included in constitution of fraternal benefit society, which was incorporated by reference into insurance contract); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. den., — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 47, 139 L.Ed.2d 13 (1997) (holding that a bank customer was not bound to arbitrate where the signature card that was signed referenced a collateral document which contained an arbitration clause but the bank never sent the customer a copy of the collateral document", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncould not state that proposition. Alabama law is not permitted by the FAA to treat arbitratio his case. That fact is uncontested. In addition, it is uncontested that the contract to which Stiles assented may be changed by AGFC. A contract incorporating such a clause is valid under the laws of both Utah and Alabama. See discussion below. Stiles has, therefore, assented to an arbitration clause, even absent his signature. Cf. Clayton v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 981 F.Supp. 1447 (M.D.Ala.1997) (compelling arbitration where arbitration clause was included in constitution of fraternal benefit society, which was incorporated by reference into insurance contract); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. den., — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 47, 139 L.Ed.2d 13 (1997) (holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ntrial court to have granted a 30-day grace period, in light of the fact that Schorp’s attorney failed to file an expert report in compliance with the statute’s requirements, would have undermined the statute’s intent. For that reason, appellant’s fourth issue cannot be sustained. Therefore, we overrule appellant's fourth issue. 4 . Bell and Baptist assert relevant questions which a jury would have to consider and would necessitate an expert's opinion: for example, (1) whether the decision to use an arterial line was within the appropriate standard of care; (2)what are the appropriate procedures for an arterial line insertion; (3) what other possible medical causes could exist; (4) what should have been the appropriate medical treatment or intervention? See Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 953 (holding that affidavit of merit is not required in common knowledge cases", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ntrial court to have granted a 30-day grace period, in light of the fact that Schorp’s attorney failed to file an expert report in compliance with the statute’s requirements, would have undermined the statute’s intent. For that reason, appellant’s fourth issue cannot be sustained. Therefore, we overrule appellant's fourth issue. 4 . Bell and Baptist assert relevant questions which a jury would have to consider and would necessitate an expert's opinion: for example, (1) whether the decision to use an arterial line was within the appropriate standard of care; (2)what are the appropriate procedures for an arterial line insertion; (3) what other possible medical causes could exist; (4) what should have been the appropriate medical treatment or intervention? See Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 953 (recognizing common knowledge exception", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ntrial court to have granted a 30-day grace period, in light of the fact that Schorp’s attorney failed to file an expert report in compliance with the statute’s requirements, would have undermined the statute’s intent. For that reason, appellant’s fourth issue cannot be sustained. Therefore, we overrule appellant's fourth issue. 4 . Bell and Baptist assert relevant questions which a jury would have to consider and would necessitate an expert's opinion: for example, (1) whether the decision to use an arterial line was within the appropriate standard of care; (2)what are the appropriate procedures for an arterial line insertion; (3) what other possible medical causes could exist; (4) what should have been the appropriate medical treatment or intervention? See Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 953 (recognizing a common knowledge exception", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ntrial court to have granted a 30-day grace period, in light of the fact that Schorp’s attorney failed to file an expert report in compliance with the statute’s requirements, would have undermined the statute’s intent. For that reason, appellant’s fourth issue cannot be sustained. Therefore, we overrule appellant's fourth issue. 4 . Bell and Baptist assert relevant questions which a jury would have to consider and would necessitate an expert's opinion: for example, (1) whether the decision to use an arterial line was within the appropriate standard of care; (2)what are the appropriate procedures for an arterial line insertion; (3) what other possible medical causes could exist; (4) what should have been the appropriate medical treatment or intervention? See Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 953 (holding that administering of a hypodermic needle for the purpose of anesthesia was not within laymans common knowledge", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ntrial court to have granted a 30-day grace period, in light of the fact that Schorp’s attorney failed to file an expert report in compliance with the statute’s requirements, would have undermined the statute’s intent. For that reason, appellant’s fourth issue cannot be sustained. Therefore, we overrule appellant's fourth issue. 4 . Bell and Baptist assert relevant questions which a jury would have to consider and would necessitate an expert's opinion: for example, (1) whether the decision to use an arterial line was within the appropriate standard of care; (2)what are the appropriate procedures for an arterial line insertion; (3) what other possible medical causes could exist; (4) what should have been the appropriate medical treatment or intervention? See Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 953 (holding that a reason to combine may come from the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art the nature of the problem to be solved or common knowledge and common sense" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nphysical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a), or uses inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a)(4). “Corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in” specified or similar injuries such as sprains, fractures, brain damage, asphyxiation, burns, cuts, disfigurement, or significant bruises or welts. Id. Here, the evidence showed merely that the mother threw an empty plastic jug at the oldest child on one occasion and physically disciplined her on another occasion. There was no suggestion that the child required medical attention or that her physical, mental, or emotional health was significantly impaired. See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nphysical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a), or uses inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a)(4). “Corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in” specified or similar injuries such as sprains, fractures, brain damage, asphyxiation, burns, cuts, disfigurement, or significant bruises or welts. Id. Here, the evidence showed merely that the mother threw an empty plastic jug at the oldest child on one occasion and physically disciplined her on another occasion. There was no suggestion that the child required medical attention or that her physical, mental, or emotional health was significantly impaired. See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that physical abuse to support dependency adjudication was not shown by evidence that mother pulled childs hair and father slapped childs face leaving a mark that did not require medical attention", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nphysical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a), or uses inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a)(4). “Corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in” specified or similar injuries such as sprains, fractures, brain damage, asphyxiation, burns, cuts, disfigurement, or significant bruises or welts. Id. Here, the evidence showed merely that the mother threw an empty plastic jug at the oldest child on one occasion and physically disciplined her on another occasion. There was no suggestion that the child required medical attention or that her physical, mental, or emotional health was significantly impaired. See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that trial court improperly awarded custody of child to the childs stepmother and grandparents where no pleading in the case was directed at such relief and the childs mother had no notice that the issue would be considered", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nphysical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a), or uses inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a)(4). “Corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in” specified or similar injuries such as sprains, fractures, brain damage, asphyxiation, burns, cuts, disfigurement, or significant bruises or welts. Id. Here, the evidence showed merely that the mother threw an empty plastic jug at the oldest child on one occasion and physically disciplined her on another occasion. There was no suggestion that the child required medical attention or that her physical, mental, or emotional health was significantly impaired. See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nphysical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a), or uses inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a)(4). “Corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in” specified or similar injuries such as sprains, fractures, brain damage, asphyxiation, burns, cuts, disfigurement, or significant bruises or welts. Id. Here, the evidence showed merely that the mother threw an empty plastic jug at the oldest child on one occasion and physically disciplined her on another occasion. There was no suggestion that the child required medical attention or that her physical, mental, or emotional health was significantly impaired. See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother endangered childs physical and emotional wellbeing by leaving child alone overnight with known cocaine abusers" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontrary to the public interest. A preliminary injunction in the instant case would not be contrary to the public interest because the courts should strive to enforce contractual agreements. To begin, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2336-37, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) noted that the Arbitration Act established a federal policy supporting arbitration which obligates the courts to enforce arbitration agreements rigorously. Recognizing this important policy, this Court stated in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (M.D.Fla.1991) that parties should not be allowed to circumvent the terms of arbitration agreements by utilizing the AMEX Window. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontrary to the public interest. A preliminary injunction in the instant case would not be contrary to the public interest because the courts should strive to enforce contractual agreements. To begin, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2336-37, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) noted that the Arbitration Act established a federal policy supporting arbitration which obligates the courts to enforce arbitration agreements rigorously. Recognizing this important policy, this Court stated in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (M.D.Fla.1991) that parties should not be allowed to circumvent the terms of arbitration agreements by utilizing the AMEX Window. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that should is a preferential rather than mandatory word and that contract provision stating that parties should settle disputes in a particular forum was not a mandatory selection clause", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontrary to the public interest. A preliminary injunction in the instant case would not be contrary to the public interest because the courts should strive to enforce contractual agreements. To begin, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2336-37, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) noted that the Arbitration Act established a federal policy supporting arbitration which obligates the courts to enforce arbitration agreements rigorously. Recognizing this important policy, this Court stated in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (M.D.Fla.1991) that parties should not be allowed to circumvent the terms of arbitration agreements by utilizing the AMEX Window. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontrary to the public interest. A preliminary injunction in the instant case would not be contrary to the public interest because the courts should strive to enforce contractual agreements. To begin, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2336-37, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) noted that the Arbitration Act established a federal policy supporting arbitration which obligates the courts to enforce arbitration agreements rigorously. Recognizing this important policy, this Court stated in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (M.D.Fla.1991) that parties should not be allowed to circumvent the terms of arbitration agreements by utilizing the AMEX Window. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that under ordinary contract principles the parties should be bound by an arbitration provision requiring that disputes be arbitrated only before particular fora", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontrary to the public interest. A preliminary injunction in the instant case would not be contrary to the public interest because the courts should strive to enforce contractual agreements. To begin, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2336-37, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) noted that the Arbitration Act established a federal policy supporting arbitration which obligates the courts to enforce arbitration agreements rigorously. Recognizing this important policy, this Court stated in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (M.D.Fla.1991) that parties should not be allowed to circumvent the terms of arbitration agreements by utilizing the AMEX Window. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napplies, with caution, a balancing test in which consideration is to be given in part to “the magnitude of the burden of guarding against [injury] and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {29} Further, under the circumstances in this case, we determine that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of termination by Haar of the physician-patient relationship. The once-existing special relationship and ability to control Haar’s treatment disintegrated as a result of Haar’s failure after March 8, 2000, to seek Defendant’s assistance in any regard and Haar’s having chosen other mental health providers to handle his treatment and medication. See Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1972) (holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napplies, with caution, a balancing test in which consideration is to be given in part to “the magnitude of the burden of guarding against [injury] and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {29} Further, under the circumstances in this case, we determine that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of termination by Haar of the physician-patient relationship. The once-existing special relationship and ability to control Haar’s treatment disintegrated as a result of Haar’s failure after March 8, 2000, to seek Defendant’s assistance in any regard and Haar’s having chosen other mental health providers to handle his treatment and medication. See Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1972) (recognizing that a caregiver and patient relationship may be confidential", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napplies, with caution, a balancing test in which consideration is to be given in part to “the magnitude of the burden of guarding against [injury] and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {29} Further, under the circumstances in this case, we determine that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of termination by Haar of the physician-patient relationship. The once-existing special relationship and ability to control Haar’s treatment disintegrated as a result of Haar’s failure after March 8, 2000, to seek Defendant’s assistance in any regard and Haar’s having chosen other mental health providers to handle his treatment and medication. See Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1972) (holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napplies, with caution, a balancing test in which consideration is to be given in part to “the magnitude of the burden of guarding against [injury] and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {29} Further, under the circumstances in this case, we determine that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of termination by Haar of the physician-patient relationship. The once-existing special relationship and ability to control Haar’s treatment disintegrated as a result of Haar’s failure after March 8, 2000, to seek Defendant’s assistance in any regard and Haar’s having chosen other mental health providers to handle his treatment and medication. See Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1972) (holding that the physicianpatient relationship terminated when the patient missed a scheduled appointment and did not see the physician again and that the relationship did not continue despite the fact the patient later secured a refill of a prescription that was prescribed during the relationship", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\napplies, with caution, a balancing test in which consideration is to be given in part to “the magnitude of the burden of guarding against [injury] and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {29} Further, under the circumstances in this case, we determine that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of termination by Haar of the physician-patient relationship. The once-existing special relationship and ability to control Haar’s treatment disintegrated as a result of Haar’s failure after March 8, 2000, to seek Defendant’s assistance in any regard and Haar’s having chosen other mental health providers to handle his treatment and medication. See Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1972) (holding that no physicianpatient relationship between doctor who gave informal opinion over telephone at request of treating physician and minor patient whose case was discussed and thus doctor did not owe duty of care to patient" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin admitting that he was a “responsible person” within the meaning of Section 6672 and that Debtor, after receiving the IRS’s demand in May 1998 for full payment of the past due taxes, cooperated fully and openly with the IRS revenue officer, never attempting to “pull the wool” over Appellant’s eyes. Appellant argues that Debtor’s subsequent cooperation in assisting Appellant in collecting the past due taxes is irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. This Court agrees. Willfulness requires only the commission of a “voluntary, conscious, and intentional act.” Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1154. A responsible person acts “willfully” within the meaning of Section 6672 when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS knqwing that withholding taxes are due. Id. See also Smith, 894 F.2d at 1554 (holding that in a proceeding to recover taxes from a nonbankrupt taxpayer the taxpayer has the burden of proving that his taxes complied with the internal revenue code", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin admitting that he was a “responsible person” within the meaning of Section 6672 and that Debtor, after receiving the IRS’s demand in May 1998 for full payment of the past due taxes, cooperated fully and openly with the IRS revenue officer, never attempting to “pull the wool” over Appellant’s eyes. Appellant argues that Debtor’s subsequent cooperation in assisting Appellant in collecting the past due taxes is irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. This Court agrees. Willfulness requires only the commission of a “voluntary, conscious, and intentional act.” Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1154. A responsible person acts “willfully” within the meaning of Section 6672 when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS knqwing that withholding taxes are due. Id. See also Smith, 894 F.2d at 1554 (holding that even where taxpayer did not have the financial means to pay all of the taxes owed the taxpayer still willfully evaded tax obligation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin admitting that he was a “responsible person” within the meaning of Section 6672 and that Debtor, after receiving the IRS’s demand in May 1998 for full payment of the past due taxes, cooperated fully and openly with the IRS revenue officer, never attempting to “pull the wool” over Appellant’s eyes. Appellant argues that Debtor’s subsequent cooperation in assisting Appellant in collecting the past due taxes is irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. This Court agrees. Willfulness requires only the commission of a “voluntary, conscious, and intentional act.” Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1154. A responsible person acts “willfully” within the meaning of Section 6672 when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS knqwing that withholding taxes are due. Id. See also Smith, 894 F.2d at 1554 (holding that a plaintiff cannot assert a statutory claim for wages under the labor law if he has no enforceable contractual right to those wages", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin admitting that he was a “responsible person” within the meaning of Section 6672 and that Debtor, after receiving the IRS’s demand in May 1998 for full payment of the past due taxes, cooperated fully and openly with the IRS revenue officer, never attempting to “pull the wool” over Appellant’s eyes. Appellant argues that Debtor’s subsequent cooperation in assisting Appellant in collecting the past due taxes is irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. This Court agrees. Willfulness requires only the commission of a “voluntary, conscious, and intentional act.” Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1154. A responsible person acts “willfully” within the meaning of Section 6672 when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS knqwing that withholding taxes are due. Id. See also Smith, 894 F.2d at 1554 (holding that taxpayer did not disprove willfulness where there was evidence he paid employees their net wages despite his knowledge that taxes were due", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin admitting that he was a “responsible person” within the meaning of Section 6672 and that Debtor, after receiving the IRS’s demand in May 1998 for full payment of the past due taxes, cooperated fully and openly with the IRS revenue officer, never attempting to “pull the wool” over Appellant’s eyes. Appellant argues that Debtor’s subsequent cooperation in assisting Appellant in collecting the past due taxes is irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. This Court agrees. Willfulness requires only the commission of a “voluntary, conscious, and intentional act.” Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1154. A responsible person acts “willfully” within the meaning of Section 6672 when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS knqwing that withholding taxes are due. Id. See also Smith, 894 F.2d at 1554 (holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand safety during the 2007 China summer program trip. Every public school shares this common-sense duty to protect the health and safety of students in its care, Connecticut General Statutes § 10-220, but this duty may be heightened for boarding schools, institutions that accept responsibility for students’ well being. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); cf. Loomis Inst. v. Town of Windsor, 234 Conn. 169, 172, 661 A.2d 1001 (1995) (reasoning that on-campus “faculty members, unlike off campus faculty members, act in loco par-entis to boarding students and must be available on a twenty-four hour basis to take care of any problems that may occur at the school.”); accord Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 282, 141 A.2d 639 (1958) (holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand safety during the 2007 China summer program trip. Every public school shares this common-sense duty to protect the health and safety of students in its care, Connecticut General Statutes § 10-220, but this duty may be heightened for boarding schools, institutions that accept responsibility for students’ well being. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); cf. Loomis Inst. v. Town of Windsor, 234 Conn. 169, 172, 661 A.2d 1001 (1995) (reasoning that on-campus “faculty members, unlike off campus faculty members, act in loco par-entis to boarding students and must be available on a twenty-four hour basis to take care of any problems that may occur at the school.”); accord Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 282, 141 A.2d 639 (1958) (recognizing that teachers are not merely instructors in sciences and letters they are authority figures role models behavioral examples surrogate parents after a fashion teachers stand in loco parentis children learn much more from their teachers than the quadratic equation and the proper spelling of dirndl they learn important values and morals one of the most important values children learn from their teachers is respect for the law", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand safety during the 2007 China summer program trip. Every public school shares this common-sense duty to protect the health and safety of students in its care, Connecticut General Statutes § 10-220, but this duty may be heightened for boarding schools, institutions that accept responsibility for students’ well being. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); cf. Loomis Inst. v. Town of Windsor, 234 Conn. 169, 172, 661 A.2d 1001 (1995) (reasoning that on-campus “faculty members, unlike off campus faculty members, act in loco par-entis to boarding students and must be available on a twenty-four hour basis to take care of any problems that may occur at the school.”); accord Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 282, 141 A.2d 639 (1958) (holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand safety during the 2007 China summer program trip. Every public school shares this common-sense duty to protect the health and safety of students in its care, Connecticut General Statutes § 10-220, but this duty may be heightened for boarding schools, institutions that accept responsibility for students’ well being. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); cf. Loomis Inst. v. Town of Windsor, 234 Conn. 169, 172, 661 A.2d 1001 (1995) (reasoning that on-campus “faculty members, unlike off campus faculty members, act in loco par-entis to boarding students and must be available on a twenty-four hour basis to take care of any problems that may occur at the school.”); accord Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 282, 141 A.2d 639 (1958) (holding that teachers stand in loco parentis toward a pupil in matters of discipline and security", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand safety during the 2007 China summer program trip. Every public school shares this common-sense duty to protect the health and safety of students in its care, Connecticut General Statutes § 10-220, but this duty may be heightened for boarding schools, institutions that accept responsibility for students’ well being. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); cf. Loomis Inst. v. Town of Windsor, 234 Conn. 169, 172, 661 A.2d 1001 (1995) (reasoning that on-campus “faculty members, unlike off campus faculty members, act in loco par-entis to boarding students and must be available on a twenty-four hour basis to take care of any problems that may occur at the school.”); accord Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 282, 141 A.2d 639 (1958) (holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe reasonable probability of a valid claim to warrant a VA examination. The RO did not respond to Mr. Hayre’s argument regarding the failure to obtain the requested psychiatric SMRs. In July 1993, Mr. Hayre’s accredited representative filed an appeal to the Board and stated that the issue was “[wjhether the rating of [November 6, 1972] was clearly erroneous in the decision to deny the claimed nervous condition.” The representative claimed that the 1972 rating action was erroneous because the RO had failed properly to assist Mr. Hayre in developing his claim. The Board found that Mr. Hayre’s claim of CUE was not well-grounded because a breach of the duty to assist under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) cannot, as a matter of law, be CUE. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 377, 382-383 (1994) (holding that a state agencys breach of its statutory duty to assist individuals in reestablishing their business was a tort within the meaning of the otca", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe reasonable probability of a valid claim to warrant a VA examination. The RO did not respond to Mr. Hayre’s argument regarding the failure to obtain the requested psychiatric SMRs. In July 1993, Mr. Hayre’s accredited representative filed an appeal to the Board and stated that the issue was “[wjhether the rating of [November 6, 1972] was clearly erroneous in the decision to deny the claimed nervous condition.” The representative claimed that the 1972 rating action was erroneous because the RO had failed properly to assist Mr. Hayre in developing his claim. The Board found that Mr. Hayre’s claim of CUE was not well-grounded because a breach of the duty to assist under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) cannot, as a matter of law, be CUE. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 377, 382-383 (1994) (holding that a breach of the duty to assist cannot constitute cue because claimants cannot show that fulfillment of the duty to assist would have manifestly changed the outcome of the prior decision", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe reasonable probability of a valid claim to warrant a VA examination. The RO did not respond to Mr. Hayre’s argument regarding the failure to obtain the requested psychiatric SMRs. In July 1993, Mr. Hayre’s accredited representative filed an appeal to the Board and stated that the issue was “[wjhether the rating of [November 6, 1972] was clearly erroneous in the decision to deny the claimed nervous condition.” The representative claimed that the 1972 rating action was erroneous because the RO had failed properly to assist Mr. Hayre in developing his claim. The Board found that Mr. Hayre’s claim of CUE was not well-grounded because a breach of the duty to assist under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) cannot, as a matter of law, be CUE. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 377, 382-383 (1994) (holding that cue motion is not claim for benefits and that vcaa definition of claimant cannot encompass person seeking revision of final decision based on cue", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe reasonable probability of a valid claim to warrant a VA examination. The RO did not respond to Mr. Hayre’s argument regarding the failure to obtain the requested psychiatric SMRs. In July 1993, Mr. Hayre’s accredited representative filed an appeal to the Board and stated that the issue was “[wjhether the rating of [November 6, 1972] was clearly erroneous in the decision to deny the claimed nervous condition.” The representative claimed that the 1972 rating action was erroneous because the RO had failed properly to assist Mr. Hayre in developing his claim. The Board found that Mr. Hayre’s claim of CUE was not well-grounded because a breach of the duty to assist under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) cannot, as a matter of law, be CUE. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 377, 382-383 (1994) (holding that where employee cannot establish unions breach of duty of fair representation in failing to process grievance he must abide the outcome of the contractual remedies", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe reasonable probability of a valid claim to warrant a VA examination. The RO did not respond to Mr. Hayre’s argument regarding the failure to obtain the requested psychiatric SMRs. In July 1993, Mr. Hayre’s accredited representative filed an appeal to the Board and stated that the issue was “[wjhether the rating of [November 6, 1972] was clearly erroneous in the decision to deny the claimed nervous condition.” The representative claimed that the 1972 rating action was erroneous because the RO had failed properly to assist Mr. Hayre in developing his claim. The Board found that Mr. Hayre’s claim of CUE was not well-grounded because a breach of the duty to assist under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) cannot, as a matter of law, be CUE. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 377, 382-383 (1994) (holding that missouri law applied to the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim because it is corporate law that defines the contours of that duty" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na separate taxable entity to receive income, however, as the creation alone will not guarantee that the entity is deemed to have earned the income in question. [¶ 11] The general principle mandating that corporations be recognized as separate, taxable entities from their owners creates some tension with the requirement that income be taxed to the party who earns it. Recognizing that tension, in 1982 the United States Tax Court noted that, in the corporate context, simply identifying who earned the income may be inadequate to allow a determination of how the income should be taxed because corporations can act, and thus earn income, only through their agents. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 890-91; see also Haag v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 604, 611 (1987); cf. State v. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Me.1977) (holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na separate taxable entity to receive income, however, as the creation alone will not guarantee that the entity is deemed to have earned the income in question. [¶ 11] The general principle mandating that corporations be recognized as separate, taxable entities from their owners creates some tension with the requirement that income be taxed to the party who earns it. Recognizing that tension, in 1982 the United States Tax Court noted that, in the corporate context, simply identifying who earned the income may be inadequate to allow a determination of how the income should be taxed because corporations can act, and thus earn income, only through their agents. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 890-91; see also Haag v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 604, 611 (1987); cf. State v. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Me.1977) (recognizing as a matter of federal law that an action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na separate taxable entity to receive income, however, as the creation alone will not guarantee that the entity is deemed to have earned the income in question. [¶ 11] The general principle mandating that corporations be recognized as separate, taxable entities from their owners creates some tension with the requirement that income be taxed to the party who earns it. Recognizing that tension, in 1982 the United States Tax Court noted that, in the corporate context, simply identifying who earned the income may be inadequate to allow a determination of how the income should be taxed because corporations can act, and thus earn income, only through their agents. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 890-91; see also Haag v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 604, 611 (1987); cf. State v. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Me.1977) (holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na separate taxable entity to receive income, however, as the creation alone will not guarantee that the entity is deemed to have earned the income in question. [¶ 11] The general principle mandating that corporations be recognized as separate, taxable entities from their owners creates some tension with the requirement that income be taxed to the party who earns it. Recognizing that tension, in 1982 the United States Tax Court noted that, in the corporate context, simply identifying who earned the income may be inadequate to allow a determination of how the income should be taxed because corporations can act, and thus earn income, only through their agents. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 890-91; see also Haag v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 604, 611 (1987); cf. State v. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Me.1977) (holding that a corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agents corporate powers strictly construed but which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually authorized and in such eases there need be no written authority under seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the act", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na separate taxable entity to receive income, however, as the creation alone will not guarantee that the entity is deemed to have earned the income in question. [¶ 11] The general principle mandating that corporations be recognized as separate, taxable entities from their owners creates some tension with the requirement that income be taxed to the party who earns it. Recognizing that tension, in 1982 the United States Tax Court noted that, in the corporate context, simply identifying who earned the income may be inadequate to allow a determination of how the income should be taxed because corporations can act, and thus earn income, only through their agents. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 890-91; see also Haag v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 604, 611 (1987); cf. State v. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Me.1977) (recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStated differently, identification procedures are not per se unduly suggestive, but must be shown to be so under the circumstances unique to each case. Cothran argues that the identification procedures used in this case were unduly suggestive because both Harper and Cooper identified him: (1) while he was handcuffed; (2) after they saw officers take him out of a paddy wagon; and (3) after the police had told them that someone was in custody and had asked them to determine if that person was the robber. However, it is not enough that Cothran was identified under these circumstances. Police “show-ups,” like the ones used in this case, are not generally unduly suggestive. State v. Williams, 717 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo.App.E.D.1986); State v. Moore, 925 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.1996) (holding that the friend of an eyewitness to a robbery who called the witness to view the defendant as he was being arrested by police was not acting as an agent of the state but rather a private citizen and therefore the protections of the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule for improper identification procedures did not apply to the eyewitnesss identification at the showup", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStated differently, identification procedures are not per se unduly suggestive, but must be shown to be so under the circumstances unique to each case. Cothran argues that the identification procedures used in this case were unduly suggestive because both Harper and Cooper identified him: (1) while he was handcuffed; (2) after they saw officers take him out of a paddy wagon; and (3) after the police had told them that someone was in custody and had asked them to determine if that person was the robber. However, it is not enough that Cothran was identified under these circumstances. Police “show-ups,” like the ones used in this case, are not generally unduly suggestive. State v. Williams, 717 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo.App.E.D.1986); State v. Moore, 925 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.1996) (holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view even though appellant was handcuffed and under the control of the officers was lawful because there were other occupants in the house who were not handcuffed and who would have had access to the weapon", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStated differently, identification procedures are not per se unduly suggestive, but must be shown to be so under the circumstances unique to each case. Cothran argues that the identification procedures used in this case were unduly suggestive because both Harper and Cooper identified him: (1) while he was handcuffed; (2) after they saw officers take him out of a paddy wagon; and (3) after the police had told them that someone was in custody and had asked them to determine if that person was the robber. However, it is not enough that Cothran was identified under these circumstances. Police “show-ups,” like the ones used in this case, are not generally unduly suggestive. State v. Williams, 717 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo.App.E.D.1986); State v. Moore, 925 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.1996) (holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStated differently, identification procedures are not per se unduly suggestive, but must be shown to be so under the circumstances unique to each case. Cothran argues that the identification procedures used in this case were unduly suggestive because both Harper and Cooper identified him: (1) while he was handcuffed; (2) after they saw officers take him out of a paddy wagon; and (3) after the police had told them that someone was in custody and had asked them to determine if that person was the robber. However, it is not enough that Cothran was identified under these circumstances. Police “show-ups,” like the ones used in this case, are not generally unduly suggestive. State v. Williams, 717 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo.App.E.D.1986); State v. Moore, 925 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.1996) (holding that a showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive where it took place immediately after the unlawful conduct and was necessary to avoid arresting the wrong person", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStated differently, identification procedures are not per se unduly suggestive, but must be shown to be so under the circumstances unique to each case. Cothran argues that the identification procedures used in this case were unduly suggestive because both Harper and Cooper identified him: (1) while he was handcuffed; (2) after they saw officers take him out of a paddy wagon; and (3) after the police had told them that someone was in custody and had asked them to determine if that person was the robber. However, it is not enough that Cothran was identified under these circumstances. Police “show-ups,” like the ones used in this case, are not generally unduly suggestive. State v. Williams, 717 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo.App.E.D.1986); State v. Moore, 925 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.1996) (holding that a showup identification was valid even though the suspect was handcuffed" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwith respect to civil proceedings. The D.C. Circuit has neither recognized nor rejected that the First Amendment affords the public a right of access to civil proceedings. The government interprets the D.C. Circuit’s silence as a denial of the right. Quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the government argues that the D.C. Circuit has never “indicated that it would apply the [First Amendment right-of-public-aceess] test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.” 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C.Cir.2003). In Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, however, the third party was not seeking access to judicial records in civil proceedings; rather, it sought Department of Justice investigation information on individuals detained for immigration violations. 331 F.3d at 934-35 (holding that the first amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwith respect to civil proceedings. The D.C. Circuit has neither recognized nor rejected that the First Amendment affords the public a right of access to civil proceedings. The government interprets the D.C. Circuit’s silence as a denial of the right. Quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the government argues that the D.C. Circuit has never “indicated that it would apply the [First Amendment right-of-public-aceess] test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.” 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C.Cir.2003). In Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, however, the third party was not seeking access to judicial records in civil proceedings; rather, it sought Department of Justice investigation information on individuals detained for immigration violations. 331 F.3d at 934-35 (recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwith respect to civil proceedings. The D.C. Circuit has neither recognized nor rejected that the First Amendment affords the public a right of access to civil proceedings. The government interprets the D.C. Circuit’s silence as a denial of the right. Quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the government argues that the D.C. Circuit has never “indicated that it would apply the [First Amendment right-of-public-aceess] test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.” 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C.Cir.2003). In Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, however, the third party was not seeking access to judicial records in civil proceedings; rather, it sought Department of Justice investigation information on individuals detained for immigration violations. 331 F.3d at 934-35 (recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwith respect to civil proceedings. The D.C. Circuit has neither recognized nor rejected that the First Amendment affords the public a right of access to civil proceedings. The government interprets the D.C. Circuit’s silence as a denial of the right. Quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the government argues that the D.C. Circuit has never “indicated that it would apply the [First Amendment right-of-public-aceess] test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.” 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C.Cir.2003). In Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, however, the third party was not seeking access to judicial records in civil proceedings; rather, it sought Department of Justice investigation information on individuals detained for immigration violations. 331 F.3d at 934-35 (holding that the first amendment right of public access does not extend to nonjudicial documents compiled during an executive branch investigation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwith respect to civil proceedings. The D.C. Circuit has neither recognized nor rejected that the First Amendment affords the public a right of access to civil proceedings. The government interprets the D.C. Circuit’s silence as a denial of the right. Quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the government argues that the D.C. Circuit has never “indicated that it would apply the [First Amendment right-of-public-aceess] test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.” 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C.Cir.2003). In Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, however, the third party was not seeking access to judicial records in civil proceedings; rather, it sought Department of Justice investigation information on individuals detained for immigration violations. 331 F.3d at 934-35 (holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith prejudice.”); LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C.1985) (“In the exercise of its discretion under Rule 41(b), the trial court 'should first resort to the wide range of lesser sanctions which it may impose.’ ”) (quoting Garces v. Bradley, 299 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C.1973)). 58 . Techniarts Video, 572 A.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). 59 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Granville v. Hunt, 566 A.2d 65, 66 (D.C.1989). 60 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173. 61 . See id. (\"When the conduct calling for sanctions consists of delay, ... relevant factors include the length of the delay and the resulting prejudice, if any, to the defendant.\"). 62 . 680 A.2d at 438. 63 . Id. 64 . See Lofton v. Kator & Scott, 802 A.2d 955, 957-58 (D.C.2002) (holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith prejudice.”); LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C.1985) (“In the exercise of its discretion under Rule 41(b), the trial court 'should first resort to the wide range of lesser sanctions which it may impose.’ ”) (quoting Garces v. Bradley, 299 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C.1973)). 58 . Techniarts Video, 572 A.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). 59 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Granville v. Hunt, 566 A.2d 65, 66 (D.C.1989). 60 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173. 61 . See id. (\"When the conduct calling for sanctions consists of delay, ... relevant factors include the length of the delay and the resulting prejudice, if any, to the defendant.\"). 62 . 680 A.2d at 438. 63 . Id. 64 . See Lofton v. Kator & Scott, 802 A.2d 955, 957-58 (D.C.2002) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a case after the parties allowed it to lay dormant for at least fourteenandahalfmonths", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith prejudice.”); LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C.1985) (“In the exercise of its discretion under Rule 41(b), the trial court 'should first resort to the wide range of lesser sanctions which it may impose.’ ”) (quoting Garces v. Bradley, 299 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C.1973)). 58 . Techniarts Video, 572 A.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). 59 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Granville v. Hunt, 566 A.2d 65, 66 (D.C.1989). 60 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173. 61 . See id. (\"When the conduct calling for sanctions consists of delay, ... relevant factors include the length of the delay and the resulting prejudice, if any, to the defendant.\"). 62 . 680 A.2d at 438. 63 . Id. 64 . See Lofton v. Kator & Scott, 802 A.2d 955, 957-58 (D.C.2002) (holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith prejudice.”); LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C.1985) (“In the exercise of its discretion under Rule 41(b), the trial court 'should first resort to the wide range of lesser sanctions which it may impose.’ ”) (quoting Garces v. Bradley, 299 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C.1973)). 58 . Techniarts Video, 572 A.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). 59 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Granville v. Hunt, 566 A.2d 65, 66 (D.C.1989). 60 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173. 61 . See id. (\"When the conduct calling for sanctions consists of delay, ... relevant factors include the length of the delay and the resulting prejudice, if any, to the defendant.\"). 62 . 680 A.2d at 438. 63 . Id. 64 . See Lofton v. Kator & Scott, 802 A.2d 955, 957-58 (D.C.2002) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith prejudice.”); LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C.1985) (“In the exercise of its discretion under Rule 41(b), the trial court 'should first resort to the wide range of lesser sanctions which it may impose.’ ”) (quoting Garces v. Bradley, 299 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C.1973)). 58 . Techniarts Video, 572 A.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). 59 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Granville v. Hunt, 566 A.2d 65, 66 (D.C.1989). 60 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173. 61 . See id. (\"When the conduct calling for sanctions consists of delay, ... relevant factors include the length of the delay and the resulting prejudice, if any, to the defendant.\"). 62 . 680 A.2d at 438. 63 . Id. 64 . See Lofton v. Kator & Scott, 802 A.2d 955, 957-58 (D.C.2002) (holding that the decision whether to apply the exhaustion requirement in an erisa case is committed to the district courts sound discretion but that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\napply to his invasion of privacy claim. DOC argues the two-year statute of limitations applies for two reasons: first, because “[i]n-vasion of privacy by intrusion is an intentional act” and “[i]ntentional torts are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under RCW 4.16.100; and second, “invasion of privacy claims are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986). Br. of Resp’t at 38. We disagree with DOC and apply the three-year statute of limitations. ¶44 As noted, Emeson asserts an invasion of privacy by publication claim, not an invasion of privacy by intrusion. The tort invasion of privacy by publication does not include intent as an essential element. See Fisher, 125 Wn. App. at 879-80 (holding that invasion of an identifiable customers account is not a necessary element proof under the statute", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\napply to his invasion of privacy claim. DOC argues the two-year statute of limitations applies for two reasons: first, because “[i]n-vasion of privacy by intrusion is an intentional act” and “[i]ntentional torts are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under RCW 4.16.100; and second, “invasion of privacy claims are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986). Br. of Resp’t at 38. We disagree with DOC and apply the three-year statute of limitations. ¶44 As noted, Emeson asserts an invasion of privacy by publication claim, not an invasion of privacy by intrusion. The tort invasion of privacy by publication does not include intent as an essential element. See Fisher, 125 Wn. App. at 879-80 (holding under section 1902a1 specific intent required as an element of section 1501 is the intent to cause the death of an individual", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\napply to his invasion of privacy claim. DOC argues the two-year statute of limitations applies for two reasons: first, because “[i]n-vasion of privacy by intrusion is an intentional act” and “[i]ntentional torts are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under RCW 4.16.100; and second, “invasion of privacy claims are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986). Br. of Resp’t at 38. We disagree with DOC and apply the three-year statute of limitations. ¶44 As noted, Emeson asserts an invasion of privacy by publication claim, not an invasion of privacy by intrusion. The tort invasion of privacy by publication does not include intent as an essential element. See Fisher, 125 Wn. App. at 879-80 (holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\napply to his invasion of privacy claim. DOC argues the two-year statute of limitations applies for two reasons: first, because “[i]n-vasion of privacy by intrusion is an intentional act” and “[i]ntentional torts are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under RCW 4.16.100; and second, “invasion of privacy claims are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986). Br. of Resp’t at 38. We disagree with DOC and apply the three-year statute of limitations. ¶44 As noted, Emeson asserts an invasion of privacy by publication claim, not an invasion of privacy by intrusion. The tort invasion of privacy by publication does not include intent as an essential element. See Fisher, 125 Wn. App. at 879-80 (holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\napply to his invasion of privacy claim. DOC argues the two-year statute of limitations applies for two reasons: first, because “[i]n-vasion of privacy by intrusion is an intentional act” and “[i]ntentional torts are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under RCW 4.16.100; and second, “invasion of privacy claims are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations” under Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986). Br. of Resp’t at 38. We disagree with DOC and apply the three-year statute of limitations. ¶44 As noted, Emeson asserts an invasion of privacy by publication claim, not an invasion of privacy by intrusion. The tort invasion of privacy by publication does not include intent as an essential element. See Fisher, 125 Wn. App. at 879-80 (holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncommittee notes (1972) (describing rationale underlying exception as “[t]he element of unusual reliability ... said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation”) (citation omit ted). Thus, the motivation of a record’s author is relevant to admissibility. Id. Not every item of business correspondence constitutes a business record. See, e.g., Breeden v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 754 (10th Cir.1997) (sustaining exclusion of letter from chiropractor proffered as “medical business record”); Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that court erred in admitting letter as business record where testimony was not adequate to establish that the letter was compiled as a matter of regular practice as opposed to one prepared in anticipation of litigation", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncommittee notes (1972) (describing rationale underlying exception as “[t]he element of unusual reliability ... said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation”) (citation omit ted). Thus, the motivation of a record’s author is relevant to admissibility. Id. Not every item of business correspondence constitutes a business record. See, e.g., Breeden v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 754 (10th Cir.1997) (sustaining exclusion of letter from chiropractor proffered as “medical business record”); Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that letters addressing dispute that was subject of litigation and that were written in anticipation of litigation did not fall under business record exception under rule 8036 of the federal rules of evidence and noting that it is wellestablished that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of business", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncommittee notes (1972) (describing rationale underlying exception as “[t]he element of unusual reliability ... said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation”) (citation omit ted). Thus, the motivation of a record’s author is relevant to admissibility. Id. Not every item of business correspondence constitutes a business record. See, e.g., Breeden v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 754 (10th Cir.1997) (sustaining exclusion of letter from chiropractor proffered as “medical business record”); Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncommittee notes (1972) (describing rationale underlying exception as “[t]he element of unusual reliability ... said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation”) (citation omit ted). Thus, the motivation of a record’s author is relevant to admissibility. Id. Not every item of business correspondence constitutes a business record. See, e.g., Breeden v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 754 (10th Cir.1997) (sustaining exclusion of letter from chiropractor proffered as “medical business record”); Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that court erred in admitting letters written in anticipation of litigation as business records", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncommittee notes (1972) (describing rationale underlying exception as “[t]he element of unusual reliability ... said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation”) (citation omit ted). Thus, the motivation of a record’s author is relevant to admissibility. Id. Not every item of business correspondence constitutes a business record. See, e.g., Breeden v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 754 (10th Cir.1997) (sustaining exclusion of letter from chiropractor proffered as “medical business record”); Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that a rule 90211 certification of medical records was not testimonial noting that the court did not find as controlling the fact that a certification of authenticity under 90211 is made in anticipation of litigation what is compelling is that crawford expressly identified business records as nontestimonial evidence" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto those under the comparator statutes — There are very important substantive differences between the Veterans’ Benefits Act and the Social Security Act ... especially between the service-connected disability ' compensation ... and the available benefits under the comparator acts. These differences render the Veterans’ Benefits Act, as a matter of statu tory construction, dissimilar to the Social Security Act.... Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 226, 233-34 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 285, 187 L.Ed.2d 152 (2013). “Congress has created a paternalistic veterans’ benefits system to care for those who served their country in uniform”. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2009); Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (holding that a plantshutdown benefit is not an optional form of benefit", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto those under the comparator statutes — There are very important substantive differences between the Veterans’ Benefits Act and the Social Security Act ... especially between the service-connected disability ' compensation ... and the available benefits under the comparator acts. These differences render the Veterans’ Benefits Act, as a matter of statu tory construction, dissimilar to the Social Security Act.... Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 226, 233-34 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 285, 187 L.Ed.2d 152 (2013). “Congress has created a paternalistic veterans’ benefits system to care for those who served their country in uniform”. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2009); Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the veterans benefit system is uniquely proclaimant", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto those under the comparator statutes — There are very important substantive differences between the Veterans’ Benefits Act and the Social Security Act ... especially between the service-connected disability ' compensation ... and the available benefits under the comparator acts. These differences render the Veterans’ Benefits Act, as a matter of statu tory construction, dissimilar to the Social Security Act.... Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 226, 233-34 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 285, 187 L.Ed.2d 152 (2013). “Congress has created a paternalistic veterans’ benefits system to care for those who served their country in uniform”. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2009); Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto those under the comparator statutes — There are very important substantive differences between the Veterans’ Benefits Act and the Social Security Act ... especially between the service-connected disability ' compensation ... and the available benefits under the comparator acts. These differences render the Veterans’ Benefits Act, as a matter of statu tory construction, dissimilar to the Social Security Act.... Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 226, 233-34 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 285, 187 L.Ed.2d 152 (2013). “Congress has created a paternalistic veterans’ benefits system to care for those who served their country in uniform”. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2009); Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (recognizing nonadversarial and proclaimant character of veterans benefits adjudication", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto those under the comparator statutes — There are very important substantive differences between the Veterans’ Benefits Act and the Social Security Act ... especially between the service-connected disability ' compensation ... and the available benefits under the comparator acts. These differences render the Veterans’ Benefits Act, as a matter of statu tory construction, dissimilar to the Social Security Act.... Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 226, 233-34 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 285, 187 L.Ed.2d 152 (2013). “Congress has created a paternalistic veterans’ benefits system to care for those who served their country in uniform”. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2009); Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (holding that the interpretation of a veterans filings is a factual inquiry" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nit pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). If a movant properly supports a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in her complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (holding that mere speculation does not satisfy the nonmoving partys burden of establishing a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nit pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). If a movant properly supports a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in her complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nit pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). If a movant properly supports a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in her complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nit pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). If a movant properly supports a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in her complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nit pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). If a movant properly supports a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in her complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\napplicable here, and supports our conclusion that the language of the ballot title and summary do not constitute political or emotional rhetoric. Moreover, the common definition of the term “protect” is “to maintain the status or integrity of.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 938 (10th ed.1998). This common definition, when read in context and conjunction with the rest of the language contained in the ballot title and summary accurately portrays the chief purpose of the amendment — preserving the current concept of marriage in Florida as the legal union of one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot summary and title in the instant proposal are not impermissibly misleading, nor are they “clearly and conclusively defective.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 154 (holding that language in a citizen initiative must be clearly and conclusively defective to justify removal of the measure from the ballot", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\napplicable here, and supports our conclusion that the language of the ballot title and summary do not constitute political or emotional rhetoric. Moreover, the common definition of the term “protect” is “to maintain the status or integrity of.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 938 (10th ed.1998). This common definition, when read in context and conjunction with the rest of the language contained in the ballot title and summary accurately portrays the chief purpose of the amendment — preserving the current concept of marriage in Florida as the legal union of one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot summary and title in the instant proposal are not impermissibly misleading, nor are they “clearly and conclusively defective.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 154 (holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\napplicable here, and supports our conclusion that the language of the ballot title and summary do not constitute political or emotional rhetoric. Moreover, the common definition of the term “protect” is “to maintain the status or integrity of.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 938 (10th ed.1998). This common definition, when read in context and conjunction with the rest of the language contained in the ballot title and summary accurately portrays the chief purpose of the amendment — preserving the current concept of marriage in Florida as the legal union of one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot summary and title in the instant proposal are not impermissibly misleading, nor are they “clearly and conclusively defective.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 154 (holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\napplicable here, and supports our conclusion that the language of the ballot title and summary do not constitute political or emotional rhetoric. Moreover, the common definition of the term “protect” is “to maintain the status or integrity of.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 938 (10th ed.1998). This common definition, when read in context and conjunction with the rest of the language contained in the ballot title and summary accurately portrays the chief purpose of the amendment — preserving the current concept of marriage in Florida as the legal union of one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot summary and title in the instant proposal are not impermissibly misleading, nor are they “clearly and conclusively defective.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 154 (holding that notice of removal was defective on its face because it failed to contain a copy of the process as required by the removal statute", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\napplicable here, and supports our conclusion that the language of the ballot title and summary do not constitute political or emotional rhetoric. Moreover, the common definition of the term “protect” is “to maintain the status or integrity of.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 938 (10th ed.1998). This common definition, when read in context and conjunction with the rest of the language contained in the ballot title and summary accurately portrays the chief purpose of the amendment — preserving the current concept of marriage in Florida as the legal union of one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot summary and title in the instant proposal are not impermissibly misleading, nor are they “clearly and conclusively defective.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 154 (holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto reward appellant for his past commendable service, while at the same time, adding incentive for appellant to remain with the company in order to exercise such options. Yet, in the unfortunate circumstance of appellant’s death, the option period would have remained open to appellant’s estate for one year. Similarly, if appellant became disabled, such options would then vest. Notwithstanding the lack of value, such options that were gained prior to the filing of the dissolution petition do represent assets that were accumulated during the marriage and are, thhs, subject to equitable distribution. We also find support for our holding in the majority of other state courts that have addressed this issue. In Fisher v. Fisher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing both .Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto reward appellant for his past commendable service, while at the same time, adding incentive for appellant to remain with the company in order to exercise such options. Yet, in the unfortunate circumstance of appellant’s death, the option period would have remained open to appellant’s estate for one year. Similarly, if appellant became disabled, such options would then vest. Notwithstanding the lack of value, such options that were gained prior to the filing of the dissolution petition do represent assets that were accumulated during the marriage and are, thhs, subject to equitable distribution. We also find support for our holding in the majority of other state courts that have addressed this issue. In Fisher v. Fisher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing both .Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husbands unvested stock options as marital property", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto reward appellant for his past commendable service, while at the same time, adding incentive for appellant to remain with the company in order to exercise such options. Yet, in the unfortunate circumstance of appellant’s death, the option period would have remained open to appellant’s estate for one year. Similarly, if appellant became disabled, such options would then vest. Notwithstanding the lack of value, such options that were gained prior to the filing of the dissolution petition do represent assets that were accumulated during the marriage and are, thhs, subject to equitable distribution. We also find support for our holding in the majority of other state courts that have addressed this issue. In Fisher v. Fisher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing both .Ct.App.1987) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto reward appellant for his past commendable service, while at the same time, adding incentive for appellant to remain with the company in order to exercise such options. Yet, in the unfortunate circumstance of appellant’s death, the option period would have remained open to appellant’s estate for one year. Similarly, if appellant became disabled, such options would then vest. Notwithstanding the lack of value, such options that were gained prior to the filing of the dissolution petition do represent assets that were accumulated during the marriage and are, thhs, subject to equitable distribution. We also find support for our holding in the majority of other state courts that have addressed this issue. In Fisher v. Fisher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing both .Ct.App.1987) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto reward appellant for his past commendable service, while at the same time, adding incentive for appellant to remain with the company in order to exercise such options. Yet, in the unfortunate circumstance of appellant’s death, the option period would have remained open to appellant’s estate for one year. Similarly, if appellant became disabled, such options would then vest. Notwithstanding the lack of value, such options that were gained prior to the filing of the dissolution petition do represent assets that were accumulated during the marriage and are, thhs, subject to equitable distribution. We also find support for our holding in the majority of other state courts that have addressed this issue. In Fisher v. Fisher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing both .Ct.App.1987) (holding that unvested stock options subject to the contingency of debtors future employment are property of the bankruptcy estate" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the insured consciously desires the result of his or her act and the term ‘expect’ requires that the insured knows with substantial certainty that l 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An injury is expected if the insured was consciously aware that the injury was practically certain to occur.”); James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (“The ‘expected or intended’ exception is inapplicable unless the insured specifically and subjectively intends the injury giving rise to the claim.”); Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (noting that “[t]he subjective intent of the insured . . . will determine whether an act is intentional”); Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 1998 ME 197, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 938 (holding that the policy language expected or intended by an insured person is unambiguous and requires a subjective intent on behalf of the insured", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the insured consciously desires the result of his or her act and the term ‘expect’ requires that the insured knows with substantial certainty that l 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An injury is expected if the insured was consciously aware that the injury was practically certain to occur.”); James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (“The ‘expected or intended’ exception is inapplicable unless the insured specifically and subjectively intends the injury giving rise to the claim.”); Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (noting that “[t]he subjective intent of the insured . . . will determine whether an act is intentional”); Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 1998 ME 197, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 938 (holding that the exclusion is triggered when the insured subjectively expects or intends that bodily injury will occur", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the insured consciously desires the result of his or her act and the term ‘expect’ requires that the insured knows with substantial certainty that l 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An injury is expected if the insured was consciously aware that the injury was practically certain to occur.”); James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (“The ‘expected or intended’ exception is inapplicable unless the insured specifically and subjectively intends the injury giving rise to the claim.”); Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (noting that “[t]he subjective intent of the insured . . . will determine whether an act is intentional”); Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 1998 ME 197, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 938 (holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the insured consciously desires the result of his or her act and the term ‘expect’ requires that the insured knows with substantial certainty that l 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An injury is expected if the insured was consciously aware that the injury was practically certain to occur.”); James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (“The ‘expected or intended’ exception is inapplicable unless the insured specifically and subjectively intends the injury giving rise to the claim.”); Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (noting that “[t]he subjective intent of the insured . . . will determine whether an act is intentional”); Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 1998 ME 197, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 938 (holding that the inclusion of the phrase by the insured indicates that its application is triggered when the insured subjectively expects or intends that bodily injury will occur and not merely when an ordinary reasonable person would be able to foresee injury occurring as a result of his acts", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the insured consciously desires the result of his or her act and the term ‘expect’ requires that the insured knows with substantial certainty that l 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An injury is expected if the insured was consciously aware that the injury was practically certain to occur.”); James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (“The ‘expected or intended’ exception is inapplicable unless the insured specifically and subjectively intends the injury giving rise to the claim.”); Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (noting that “[t]he subjective intent of the insured . . . will determine whether an act is intentional”); Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 1998 ME 197, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 938 (holding that the standard policy exclusion of injuries expected or intended by the insured refers only to bodily injury that the insured in fact subjectively wanted intended to be a result of his conduct or in fact subjectively foresaw as practically certain expected to be a result of his conduct" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nabuse of discretion. VI. Finally, the failure to give eyewitness identification instructions was not harmless. To reiterate, the State lacked any evidence directly connecting Cabinatan to the charged offenses. The testimony of Kincaid was in some respects inconsistent with the police report she filled out before viewing Cabina-tan. Also, her identification was the result of the inherently suggestive environment of a police showup. Cabinatan presented alibi evidence that indicated that he was not present when the thefts occurred. Hence, there was a reasonable possibility that the absence of eyewitness instructions caused the jury to place undue weight on Kincaid’s testimony; thus contributing to Cabinatan’s conviction. See State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 356, 378, 60 P.3d 306, 328 (2002) (holding that error is considered harmless if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nabuse of discretion. VI. Finally, the failure to give eyewitness identification instructions was not harmless. To reiterate, the State lacked any evidence directly connecting Cabinatan to the charged offenses. The testimony of Kincaid was in some respects inconsistent with the police report she filled out before viewing Cabina-tan. Also, her identification was the result of the inherently suggestive environment of a police showup. Cabinatan presented alibi evidence that indicated that he was not present when the thefts occurred. Hence, there was a reasonable possibility that the absence of eyewitness instructions caused the jury to place undue weight on Kincaid’s testimony; thus contributing to Cabinatan’s conviction. See State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 356, 378, 60 P.3d 306, 328 (2002) (holding that the harmless error test places a burden on the state to prove that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nabuse of discretion. VI. Finally, the failure to give eyewitness identification instructions was not harmless. To reiterate, the State lacked any evidence directly connecting Cabinatan to the charged offenses. The testimony of Kincaid was in some respects inconsistent with the police report she filled out before viewing Cabina-tan. Also, her identification was the result of the inherently suggestive environment of a police showup. Cabinatan presented alibi evidence that indicated that he was not present when the thefts occurred. Hence, there was a reasonable possibility that the absence of eyewitness instructions caused the jury to place undue weight on Kincaid’s testimony; thus contributing to Cabinatan’s conviction. See State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 356, 378, 60 P.3d 306, 328 (2002) (holding that under the harmless error standard an appellate court must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nabuse of discretion. VI. Finally, the failure to give eyewitness identification instructions was not harmless. To reiterate, the State lacked any evidence directly connecting Cabinatan to the charged offenses. The testimony of Kincaid was in some respects inconsistent with the police report she filled out before viewing Cabina-tan. Also, her identification was the result of the inherently suggestive environment of a police showup. Cabinatan presented alibi evidence that indicated that he was not present when the thefts occurred. Hence, there was a reasonable possibility that the absence of eyewitness instructions caused the jury to place undue weight on Kincaid’s testimony; thus contributing to Cabinatan’s conviction. See State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 356, 378, 60 P.3d 306, 328 (2002) (holding that harmless error test is satisfied when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nabuse of discretion. VI. Finally, the failure to give eyewitness identification instructions was not harmless. To reiterate, the State lacked any evidence directly connecting Cabinatan to the charged offenses. The testimony of Kincaid was in some respects inconsistent with the police report she filled out before viewing Cabina-tan. Also, her identification was the result of the inherently suggestive environment of a police showup. Cabinatan presented alibi evidence that indicated that he was not present when the thefts occurred. Hence, there was a reasonable possibility that the absence of eyewitness instructions caused the jury to place undue weight on Kincaid’s testimony; thus contributing to Cabinatan’s conviction. See State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 356, 378, 60 P.3d 306, 328 (2002) (holding that an error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe meaning of the Restrictions, and the Restrictions specifically preclude the construction or retention of any structure other than a single-family home. It was an abuse of discretion to ignore the language contained in the Restrictions, or to interpret the term “structure” to exclude the proposed roadway. Holding otherwise would render meaningless “[t]he sanctity of written contracts, [which] defin[e] the rights and duties of the contracting parties,” Apolito v. Johnson, 3 Ariz.App. 358, 360, 414 P.2d 442, 444 (1966), and would violate the clear intent of the Restrictions as a contract among the property owners. ¶ 20 Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Highland Meadow Estates at Castle Peak Ranch, Inc. v. Buick, 994 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Colo.Ct.App.1999) (holding that a covenant stating that all lots shall be used exclusively for singlefamily dwellings was both a structural and a use restriction that prohibited the building of roads not used in connection with a residence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe meaning of the Restrictions, and the Restrictions specifically preclude the construction or retention of any structure other than a single-family home. It was an abuse of discretion to ignore the language contained in the Restrictions, or to interpret the term “structure” to exclude the proposed roadway. Holding otherwise would render meaningless “[t]he sanctity of written contracts, [which] defin[e] the rights and duties of the contracting parties,” Apolito v. Johnson, 3 Ariz.App. 358, 360, 414 P.2d 442, 444 (1966), and would violate the clear intent of the Restrictions as a contract among the property owners. ¶ 20 Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Highland Meadow Estates at Castle Peak Ranch, Inc. v. Buick, 994 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Colo.Ct.App.1999) (holding that a pasture leased by the policyholder was not used in connection with the residence premises of the policyholder", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe meaning of the Restrictions, and the Restrictions specifically preclude the construction or retention of any structure other than a single-family home. It was an abuse of discretion to ignore the language contained in the Restrictions, or to interpret the term “structure” to exclude the proposed roadway. Holding otherwise would render meaningless “[t]he sanctity of written contracts, [which] defin[e] the rights and duties of the contracting parties,” Apolito v. Johnson, 3 Ariz.App. 358, 360, 414 P.2d 442, 444 (1966), and would violate the clear intent of the Restrictions as a contract among the property owners. ¶ 20 Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Highland Meadow Estates at Castle Peak Ranch, Inc. v. Buick, 994 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Colo.Ct.App.1999) (holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe meaning of the Restrictions, and the Restrictions specifically preclude the construction or retention of any structure other than a single-family home. It was an abuse of discretion to ignore the language contained in the Restrictions, or to interpret the term “structure” to exclude the proposed roadway. Holding otherwise would render meaningless “[t]he sanctity of written contracts, [which] defin[e] the rights and duties of the contracting parties,” Apolito v. Johnson, 3 Ariz.App. 358, 360, 414 P.2d 442, 444 (1966), and would violate the clear intent of the Restrictions as a contract among the property owners. ¶ 20 Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Highland Meadow Estates at Castle Peak Ranch, Inc. v. Buick, 994 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Colo.Ct.App.1999) (holding that an unpaved public street a short distance from the policyholders home was not part of the insured premises because it was not used in connection with the residence premises", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe meaning of the Restrictions, and the Restrictions specifically preclude the construction or retention of any structure other than a single-family home. It was an abuse of discretion to ignore the language contained in the Restrictions, or to interpret the term “structure” to exclude the proposed roadway. Holding otherwise would render meaningless “[t]he sanctity of written contracts, [which] defin[e] the rights and duties of the contracting parties,” Apolito v. Johnson, 3 Ariz.App. 358, 360, 414 P.2d 442, 444 (1966), and would violate the clear intent of the Restrictions as a contract among the property owners. ¶ 20 Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Highland Meadow Estates at Castle Peak Ranch, Inc. v. Buick, 994 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Colo.Ct.App.1999) (holding that homeowners short term rental of home violated deed restriction that home could be used only for singlefamily residence purposes" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1373, 84 L.Ed.2d 392 (1985). The Court agrees and finds that, as a class, gay men and lesbians are a minority and have relatively limited political power to attract the favorable attention of lawmakers. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Although this factor is not an absolute prerequisite for heightened scrutiny, the Court finds the evidence and the law support the conclusion that gay men and lesbians remain a politically vulnerable minority. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321, 96 S.Ct. 2562. Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is heightened scrutiny. See also In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 931 (holding that disability is not a suspect or quasisuspect classification that requires heightened scrutiny", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1373, 84 L.Ed.2d 392 (1985). The Court agrees and finds that, as a class, gay men and lesbians are a minority and have relatively limited political power to attract the favorable attention of lawmakers. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Although this factor is not an absolute prerequisite for heightened scrutiny, the Court finds the evidence and the law support the conclusion that gay men and lesbians remain a politically vulnerable minority. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321, 96 S.Ct. 2562. Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is heightened scrutiny. See also In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 931 (recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to facial discrimination against a suspect class", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1373, 84 L.Ed.2d 392 (1985). The Court agrees and finds that, as a class, gay men and lesbians are a minority and have relatively limited political power to attract the favorable attention of lawmakers. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Although this factor is not an absolute prerequisite for heightened scrutiny, the Court finds the evidence and the law support the conclusion that gay men and lesbians remain a politically vulnerable minority. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321, 96 S.Ct. 2562. Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is heightened scrutiny. See also In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 931 (holding that strict scrutiny applies", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1373, 84 L.Ed.2d 392 (1985). The Court agrees and finds that, as a class, gay men and lesbians are a minority and have relatively limited political power to attract the favorable attention of lawmakers. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Although this factor is not an absolute prerequisite for heightened scrutiny, the Court finds the evidence and the law support the conclusion that gay men and lesbians remain a politically vulnerable minority. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321, 96 S.Ct. 2562. Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is heightened scrutiny. See also In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 931 (holding that some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1373, 84 L.Ed.2d 392 (1985). The Court agrees and finds that, as a class, gay men and lesbians are a minority and have relatively limited political power to attract the favorable attention of lawmakers. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Although this factor is not an absolute prerequisite for heightened scrutiny, the Court finds the evidence and the law support the conclusion that gay men and lesbians remain a politically vulnerable minority. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321, 96 S.Ct. 2562. Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is heightened scrutiny. See also In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 931 (recognizing scrutiny on statutory grounds stated in 10a and scrutiny for whether the award evinces a manifest disregard of applicable law" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the suit in which he is appointed, and the receiver is not appointed for the benefit of any party_”) 16 . RCW § 7.60.040 provides: \"[t]he receiver shall have power, under control of the court, to bring and defend actions, to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, and generally to do such acts respecting the property, as the court may authorize.” 17 . RCW § 7.60.030 provides: Before entering upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and with one or more sureties, approved by the court, execute a bond to such person as the court may direct, conditioned that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action, and obey the orders of the court therein. 18 . See also, Bennett v. Williams, 892 F.2d at 824 (holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the suit in which he is appointed, and the receiver is not appointed for the benefit of any party_”) 16 . RCW § 7.60.040 provides: \"[t]he receiver shall have power, under control of the court, to bring and defend actions, to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, and generally to do such acts respecting the property, as the court may authorize.” 17 . RCW § 7.60.030 provides: Before entering upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and with one or more sureties, approved by the court, execute a bond to such person as the court may direct, conditioned that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action, and obey the orders of the court therein. 18 . See also, Bennett v. Williams, 892 F.2d at 824 (holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under 1983", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the suit in which he is appointed, and the receiver is not appointed for the benefit of any party_”) 16 . RCW § 7.60.040 provides: \"[t]he receiver shall have power, under control of the court, to bring and defend actions, to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, and generally to do such acts respecting the property, as the court may authorize.” 17 . RCW § 7.60.030 provides: Before entering upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and with one or more sureties, approved by the court, execute a bond to such person as the court may direct, conditioned that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action, and obey the orders of the court therein. 18 . See also, Bennett v. Williams, 892 F.2d at 824 (holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the suit in which he is appointed, and the receiver is not appointed for the benefit of any party_”) 16 . RCW § 7.60.040 provides: \"[t]he receiver shall have power, under control of the court, to bring and defend actions, to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, and generally to do such acts respecting the property, as the court may authorize.” 17 . RCW § 7.60.030 provides: Before entering upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and with one or more sureties, approved by the court, execute a bond to such person as the court may direct, conditioned that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action, and obey the orders of the court therein. 18 . See also, Bennett v. Williams, 892 F.2d at 824 (holding that bankruptcy trustees shall not be held liable for mistakes within reasonable business judgment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the suit in which he is appointed, and the receiver is not appointed for the benefit of any party_”) 16 . RCW § 7.60.040 provides: \"[t]he receiver shall have power, under control of the court, to bring and defend actions, to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, and generally to do such acts respecting the property, as the court may authorize.” 17 . RCW § 7.60.030 provides: Before entering upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and with one or more sureties, approved by the court, execute a bond to such person as the court may direct, conditioned that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action, and obey the orders of the court therein. 18 . See also, Bennett v. Williams, 892 F.2d at 824 (holding that employer may be held liable under 1981 for discrimination by supervisory employee" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncustody of his mother when she was naturalized, the legal custody condition would be met if he could show that his parents were legally separated at that time. The critical question, therefore, is whether, at the time of his mother’s naturalization, “there ha[d] been a legal separation of the parents.” INA § 321(a)(3). The meaning of the term “legal separation” as contained in former INA § 321(a)(3) is a question of federal statutory interpretation. See Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2004); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir.2000). Yet, the INA does not define the term and the only case from our circuit to discuss it merely holds that a legal separation must be preceded by a legal marriage. See Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that a petitioner did not enjoy derivative citizenship under the first clause of 321a3 because his natural parents never married and thus could not legally separate emphasis in original", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncustody of his mother when she was naturalized, the legal custody condition would be met if he could show that his parents were legally separated at that time. The critical question, therefore, is whether, at the time of his mother’s naturalization, “there ha[d] been a legal separation of the parents.” INA § 321(a)(3). The meaning of the term “legal separation” as contained in former INA § 321(a)(3) is a question of federal statutory interpretation. See Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2004); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir.2000). Yet, the INA does not define the term and the only case from our circuit to discuss it merely holds that a legal separation must be preceded by a legal marriage. See Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that a childs interest supercedes that of its natural parents", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncustody of his mother when she was naturalized, the legal custody condition would be met if he could show that his parents were legally separated at that time. The critical question, therefore, is whether, at the time of his mother’s naturalization, “there ha[d] been a legal separation of the parents.” INA § 321(a)(3). The meaning of the term “legal separation” as contained in former INA § 321(a)(3) is a question of federal statutory interpretation. See Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2004); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir.2000). Yet, the INA does not define the term and the only case from our circuit to discuss it merely holds that a legal separation must be preceded by a legal marriage. See Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2003) (holding the foster parents responsible for support where the childs natural parents are unknown and noting that an earlier new york case held that an agreement to adopt did not terminate the natural parents duty of support but that in that earlier case the natural parent was alive and capable of providing for the child", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncustody of his mother when she was naturalized, the legal custody condition would be met if he could show that his parents were legally separated at that time. The critical question, therefore, is whether, at the time of his mother’s naturalization, “there ha[d] been a legal separation of the parents.” INA § 321(a)(3). The meaning of the term “legal separation” as contained in former INA § 321(a)(3) is a question of federal statutory interpretation. See Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2004); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir.2000). Yet, the INA does not define the term and the only case from our circuit to discuss it merely holds that a legal separation must be preceded by a legal marriage. See Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2003) (holding evidence legally sufficient", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncustody of his mother when she was naturalized, the legal custody condition would be met if he could show that his parents were legally separated at that time. The critical question, therefore, is whether, at the time of his mother’s naturalization, “there ha[d] been a legal separation of the parents.” INA § 321(a)(3). The meaning of the term “legal separation” as contained in former INA § 321(a)(3) is a question of federal statutory interpretation. See Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2004); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir.2000). Yet, the INA does not define the term and the only case from our circuit to discuss it merely holds that a legal separation must be preceded by a legal marriage. See Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that once a state posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married his mother" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe use must be necessary to the use of the dominant estate); Koonce v. J.E. Brite Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.1984) (stating one of the required elements to establish an easement by necessity is that “access must be a necessity and not a mere convenience”). Because necessity is the common, and dispositive element for the purpose of this appeal, we further narrow our review to whether the Saenzes carried their burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact on the element of necessity, and we do not consider whether they met their burden on the remaining elements of their theories of recovery. There is no dispute the Saenzes must cross property owned by another in order to access their acreage. “[A]n easement by necessity is not defeated n Antonio 1996, writ denied) (holding same as to an implied easement appurtenant", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe use must be necessary to the use of the dominant estate); Koonce v. J.E. Brite Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.1984) (stating one of the required elements to establish an easement by necessity is that “access must be a necessity and not a mere convenience”). Because necessity is the common, and dispositive element for the purpose of this appeal, we further narrow our review to whether the Saenzes carried their burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact on the element of necessity, and we do not consider whether they met their burden on the remaining elements of their theories of recovery. There is no dispute the Saenzes must cross property owned by another in order to access their acreage. “[A]n easement by necessity is not defeated n Antonio 1996, writ denied) (holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe use must be necessary to the use of the dominant estate); Koonce v. J.E. Brite Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.1984) (stating one of the required elements to establish an easement by necessity is that “access must be a necessity and not a mere convenience”). Because necessity is the common, and dispositive element for the purpose of this appeal, we further narrow our review to whether the Saenzes carried their burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact on the element of necessity, and we do not consider whether they met their burden on the remaining elements of their theories of recovery. There is no dispute the Saenzes must cross property owned by another in order to access their acreage. “[A]n easement by necessity is not defeated n Antonio 1996, writ denied) (holding same as to an easement by implication", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe use must be necessary to the use of the dominant estate); Koonce v. J.E. Brite Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.1984) (stating one of the required elements to establish an easement by necessity is that “access must be a necessity and not a mere convenience”). Because necessity is the common, and dispositive element for the purpose of this appeal, we further narrow our review to whether the Saenzes carried their burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact on the element of necessity, and we do not consider whether they met their burden on the remaining elements of their theories of recovery. There is no dispute the Saenzes must cross property owned by another in order to access their acreage. “[A]n easement by necessity is not defeated n Antonio 1996, writ denied) (recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe use must be necessary to the use of the dominant estate); Koonce v. J.E. Brite Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.1984) (stating one of the required elements to establish an easement by necessity is that “access must be a necessity and not a mere convenience”). Because necessity is the common, and dispositive element for the purpose of this appeal, we further narrow our review to whether the Saenzes carried their burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact on the element of necessity, and we do not consider whether they met their burden on the remaining elements of their theories of recovery. There is no dispute the Saenzes must cross property owned by another in order to access their acreage. “[A]n easement by necessity is not defeated n Antonio 1996, writ denied) (holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the best position to discern the impression conveyed by the witness, and because the IJ’s finding of non-responsiveness was supported by the record, the IJ reasonably found that Li’s demeanor undermined her credibility. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. Similarly, the record supports the IJ’s finding that Li was “hesitant and vague” when asked to describe her mother’s practice of Falun Gong. The record reflects that Li’s testimony on this topic was “spare” and that the IJ attempted to “probe for incidental details.” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003). Because the IJ’s finding also included her perception of Li’s demeanor, it serves as an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the best position to discern the impression conveyed by the witness, and because the IJ’s finding of non-responsiveness was supported by the record, the IJ reasonably found that Li’s demeanor undermined her credibility. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. Similarly, the record supports the IJ’s finding that Li was “hesitant and vague” when asked to describe her mother’s practice of Falun Gong. The record reflects that Li’s testimony on this topic was “spare” and that the IJ attempted to “probe for incidental details.” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003). Because the IJ’s finding also included her perception of Li’s demeanor, it serves as an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the best position to discern the impression conveyed by the witness, and because the IJ’s finding of non-responsiveness was supported by the record, the IJ reasonably found that Li’s demeanor undermined her credibility. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. Similarly, the record supports the IJ’s finding that Li was “hesitant and vague” when asked to describe her mother’s practice of Falun Gong. The record reflects that Li’s testimony on this topic was “spare” and that the IJ attempted to “probe for incidental details.” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003). Because the IJ’s finding also included her perception of Li’s demeanor, it serves as an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the record did not support the agencys adverse credibility finding in the absence of additional probing", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the best position to discern the impression conveyed by the witness, and because the IJ’s finding of non-responsiveness was supported by the record, the IJ reasonably found that Li’s demeanor undermined her credibility. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. Similarly, the record supports the IJ’s finding that Li was “hesitant and vague” when asked to describe her mother’s practice of Falun Gong. The record reflects that Li’s testimony on this topic was “spare” and that the IJ attempted to “probe for incidental details.” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003). Because the IJ’s finding also included her perception of Li’s demeanor, it serves as an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the best position to discern the impression conveyed by the witness, and because the IJ’s finding of non-responsiveness was supported by the record, the IJ reasonably found that Li’s demeanor undermined her credibility. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. Similarly, the record supports the IJ’s finding that Li was “hesitant and vague” when asked to describe her mother’s practice of Falun Gong. The record reflects that Li’s testimony on this topic was “spare” and that the IJ attempted to “probe for incidental details.” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003). Because the IJ’s finding also included her perception of Li’s demeanor, it serves as an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that inconsistencies adequately support the administrative law judges alj adverse credibility finding" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nomitted). Accord, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1014 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1982) (‘Voluntary” means not caused by police misconduct); United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.1977) (evidence left in police car after illegal arrest held inadmissible because discovery of the evidence was a direct result of the unconstitutional seizure of defendant’s person); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993, 995 (10th Cir.1974) (drugs left behind as a result of illegal search of rear compartment of camper held inadmissible). Of course, if the abandonment is truly voluntary — i.e., not caused by police misconduct — evidence found is admissible even if there was a prior or subsequent illegal search or seizure. E.g., United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that trial court properly left the door open for defendant to prove its defenses to the fed complaint", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nomitted). Accord, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1014 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1982) (‘Voluntary” means not caused by police misconduct); United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.1977) (evidence left in police car after illegal arrest held inadmissible because discovery of the evidence was a direct result of the unconstitutional seizure of defendant’s person); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993, 995 (10th Cir.1974) (drugs left behind as a result of illegal search of rear compartment of camper held inadmissible). Of course, if the abandonment is truly voluntary — i.e., not caused by police misconduct — evidence found is admissible even if there was a prior or subsequent illegal search or seizure. E.g., United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that when a police officer observes something from an area where the officer is lawfully entitled to be anything that is in open view may be observed without having to obtain a search warrant because making such open view observations does not constitute a search in the constitutional sense", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nomitted). Accord, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1014 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1982) (‘Voluntary” means not caused by police misconduct); United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.1977) (evidence left in police car after illegal arrest held inadmissible because discovery of the evidence was a direct result of the unconstitutional seizure of defendant’s person); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993, 995 (10th Cir.1974) (drugs left behind as a result of illegal search of rear compartment of camper held inadmissible). Of course, if the abandonment is truly voluntary — i.e., not caused by police misconduct — evidence found is admissible even if there was a prior or subsequent illegal search or seizure. E.g., United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.1982) (holding tacit consent to search of person was insufficient to prove consent to search bags where bags were not in defendants actual possession defendant merely pointed out bags at officers request and officer never specifically asked for consent to search bags", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nomitted). Accord, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1014 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1982) (‘Voluntary” means not caused by police misconduct); United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.1977) (evidence left in police car after illegal arrest held inadmissible because discovery of the evidence was a direct result of the unconstitutional seizure of defendant’s person); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993, 995 (10th Cir.1974) (drugs left behind as a result of illegal search of rear compartment of camper held inadmissible). Of course, if the abandonment is truly voluntary — i.e., not caused by police misconduct — evidence found is admissible even if there was a prior or subsequent illegal search or seizure. E.g., United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that abandonment was not caused by police misconduct where defendant left bags in open view before officers had knocked on door to gain admission because officers had not yet done anything illegal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nomitted). Accord, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1014 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1982) (‘Voluntary” means not caused by police misconduct); United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.1977) (evidence left in police car after illegal arrest held inadmissible because discovery of the evidence was a direct result of the unconstitutional seizure of defendant’s person); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993, 995 (10th Cir.1974) (drugs left behind as a result of illegal search of rear compartment of camper held inadmissible). Of course, if the abandonment is truly voluntary — i.e., not caused by police misconduct — evidence found is admissible even if there was a prior or subsequent illegal search or seizure. E.g., United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... to trigger the [IAD], and that he did request, as he was required to do, a trial within the time period.” Subsequently, the judge denied the State’s motion for reconsideration. The State appeals, contending that the motion judge erred in dismissing the indictment and that the IAD was not applicable. Under the IAD, a person who is imprisoned in one state, who has, pending in another state which is a party to the agreement, an “untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against” him, must “be brought to trial within 180 days after he [has] caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a fin ) (holding that a defendant is not entitled to dismissal of an indictment under the iad as no detainer had been lodged against him", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... to trigger the [IAD], and that he did request, as he was required to do, a trial within the time period.” Subsequently, the judge denied the State’s motion for reconsideration. The State appeals, contending that the motion judge erred in dismissing the indictment and that the IAD was not applicable. Under the IAD, a person who is imprisoned in one state, who has, pending in another state which is a party to the agreement, an “untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against” him, must “be brought to trial within 180 days after he [has] caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a fin ) (holding that indictment sufficiently informed defendant of the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare a defense and thus there is no claim that he was surprised at trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... to trigger the [IAD], and that he did request, as he was required to do, a trial within the time period.” Subsequently, the judge denied the State’s motion for reconsideration. The State appeals, contending that the motion judge erred in dismissing the indictment and that the IAD was not applicable. Under the IAD, a person who is imprisoned in one state, who has, pending in another state which is a party to the agreement, an “untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against” him, must “be brought to trial within 180 days after he [has] caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a fin ) (holding that if the time limits of the iad have been violated the charges underlying the detainer must be dismissed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... to trigger the [IAD], and that he did request, as he was required to do, a trial within the time period.” Subsequently, the judge denied the State’s motion for reconsideration. The State appeals, contending that the motion judge erred in dismissing the indictment and that the IAD was not applicable. Under the IAD, a person who is imprisoned in one state, who has, pending in another state which is a party to the agreement, an “untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against” him, must “be brought to trial within 180 days after he [has] caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a fin ) (holding that the 180day time period in article 111a of the iad does not commence until the prisoners request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... to trigger the [IAD], and that he did request, as he was required to do, a trial within the time period.” Subsequently, the judge denied the State’s motion for reconsideration. The State appeals, contending that the motion judge erred in dismissing the indictment and that the IAD was not applicable. Under the IAD, a person who is imprisoned in one state, who has, pending in another state which is a party to the agreement, an “untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against” him, must “be brought to trial within 180 days after he [has] caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a fin ) (recognizing that under fex prisoners request for final disposition requires actual delivery to court and prosecuting officer of jurisdiction that lodged detainer against him" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nessentially assumes a trustee’s role of deciding what information is relevant or material, and thus undercuts the central principles of chapter 7”); Klutchko, 338 B.R. at 568 (\"Generally ... it is not for the debtor to determine which assets should be disclosed to creditors.... The debtor’s duty is merely to answer truthfully. It is left to the creditors or parties-in-interest to judge whether that information will aid them or prejudice them.”); Fokkena v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 356 B.R. 468, 478 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2006) (stating that debtors have an absolute duty to report whatever interests they hold in property, even if they believe their assets are worthless) (citing Kas-den v. Kasden (In re Kasden), 209 B.R. 239, 243-44 (8th Cir. BAP 1997)). 39 .See Bressler, 387 B.R. at 461-62 (holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nessentially assumes a trustee’s role of deciding what information is relevant or material, and thus undercuts the central principles of chapter 7”); Klutchko, 338 B.R. at 568 (\"Generally ... it is not for the debtor to determine which assets should be disclosed to creditors.... The debtor’s duty is merely to answer truthfully. It is left to the creditors or parties-in-interest to judge whether that information will aid them or prejudice them.”); Fokkena v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 356 B.R. 468, 478 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2006) (stating that debtors have an absolute duty to report whatever interests they hold in property, even if they believe their assets are worthless) (citing Kas-den v. Kasden (In re Kasden), 209 B.R. 239, 243-44 (8th Cir. BAP 1997)). 39 .See Bressler, 387 B.R. at 461-62 (holding that a retainer agreements general payorwewill quit language was not specific enough to comply with a local rule that required bankruptcy attorneys to represent debtors in adversary proceedings unless the debtors expressly agreed otherwise", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nessentially assumes a trustee’s role of deciding what information is relevant or material, and thus undercuts the central principles of chapter 7”); Klutchko, 338 B.R. at 568 (\"Generally ... it is not for the debtor to determine which assets should be disclosed to creditors.... The debtor’s duty is merely to answer truthfully. It is left to the creditors or parties-in-interest to judge whether that information will aid them or prejudice them.”); Fokkena v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 356 B.R. 468, 478 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2006) (stating that debtors have an absolute duty to report whatever interests they hold in property, even if they believe their assets are worthless) (citing Kas-den v. Kasden (In re Kasden), 209 B.R. 239, 243-44 (8th Cir. BAP 1997)). 39 .See Bressler, 387 B.R. at 461-62 (holding that otherwise immaterial falsehoods or omissions can aggregate into a critical mass substantial enough to bar a debtors discharge", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nessentially assumes a trustee’s role of deciding what information is relevant or material, and thus undercuts the central principles of chapter 7”); Klutchko, 338 B.R. at 568 (\"Generally ... it is not for the debtor to determine which assets should be disclosed to creditors.... The debtor’s duty is merely to answer truthfully. It is left to the creditors or parties-in-interest to judge whether that information will aid them or prejudice them.”); Fokkena v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 356 B.R. 468, 478 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2006) (stating that debtors have an absolute duty to report whatever interests they hold in property, even if they believe their assets are worthless) (citing Kas-den v. Kasden (In re Kasden), 209 B.R. 239, 243-44 (8th Cir. BAP 1997)). 39 .See Bressler, 387 B.R. at 461-62 (holding that a cause of action exists under 523a15 by which a debtors own former divorce attorneys might except from discharge the debtors contractual obligation to them", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nessentially assumes a trustee’s role of deciding what information is relevant or material, and thus undercuts the central principles of chapter 7”); Klutchko, 338 B.R. at 568 (\"Generally ... it is not for the debtor to determine which assets should be disclosed to creditors.... The debtor’s duty is merely to answer truthfully. It is left to the creditors or parties-in-interest to judge whether that information will aid them or prejudice them.”); Fokkena v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 356 B.R. 468, 478 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2006) (stating that debtors have an absolute duty to report whatever interests they hold in property, even if they believe their assets are worthless) (citing Kas-den v. Kasden (In re Kasden), 209 B.R. 239, 243-44 (8th Cir. BAP 1997)). 39 .See Bressler, 387 B.R. at 461-62 (holding that a debt that was the result of debtors fraud could be exempted from discharge under 523a4 when the parties had later entered into a settlement agreement" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbut only as evidence of the property’s willing-seller/willing-buyer value on the date of the foreclosure sale; By permitting the court to consider evidence that is not typically relevant to a fair-market-value analysis, the statute simply reflects the nature of foreclosure sales, not a new meaning of “fair market value,” The statute expressly requires that the court determine “the fair market value of the real property as of the date of the foreclosure sale,” and the evidence regarding the discounted future sales price is permissible only to “arrive at a current fair market value” on that date. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(b)(5). C. “Discounting” the Future Sales Price Although the statute refers to a “future sales price,” it does so using terms that necessarily tie that p mm’n App.1931) (holding that in computing the present worth of such future payments same should have been discounted to their present worth at the date of judgment at 6 per cent interest per annum", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbut only as evidence of the property’s willing-seller/willing-buyer value on the date of the foreclosure sale; By permitting the court to consider evidence that is not typically relevant to a fair-market-value analysis, the statute simply reflects the nature of foreclosure sales, not a new meaning of “fair market value,” The statute expressly requires that the court determine “the fair market value of the real property as of the date of the foreclosure sale,” and the evidence regarding the discounted future sales price is permissible only to “arrive at a current fair market value” on that date. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(b)(5). C. “Discounting” the Future Sales Price Although the statute refers to a “future sales price,” it does so using terms that necessarily tie that p mm’n App.1931) (holding that courts may not find a per se sixth amendment violation where the defendant was unable to present relevant evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbut only as evidence of the property’s willing-seller/willing-buyer value on the date of the foreclosure sale; By permitting the court to consider evidence that is not typically relevant to a fair-market-value analysis, the statute simply reflects the nature of foreclosure sales, not a new meaning of “fair market value,” The statute expressly requires that the court determine “the fair market value of the real property as of the date of the foreclosure sale,” and the evidence regarding the discounted future sales price is permissible only to “arrive at a current fair market value” on that date. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(b)(5). C. “Discounting” the Future Sales Price Although the statute refers to a “future sales price,” it does so using terms that necessarily tie that p mm’n App.1931) (holding that an award of future salary payments should have been discounted to its present value at the legal rate of interest", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbut only as evidence of the property’s willing-seller/willing-buyer value on the date of the foreclosure sale; By permitting the court to consider evidence that is not typically relevant to a fair-market-value analysis, the statute simply reflects the nature of foreclosure sales, not a new meaning of “fair market value,” The statute expressly requires that the court determine “the fair market value of the real property as of the date of the foreclosure sale,” and the evidence regarding the discounted future sales price is permissible only to “arrive at a current fair market value” on that date. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(b)(5). C. “Discounting” the Future Sales Price Although the statute refers to a “future sales price,” it does so using terms that necessarily tie that p mm’n App.1931) (holding that plaintiff must present such evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbut only as evidence of the property’s willing-seller/willing-buyer value on the date of the foreclosure sale; By permitting the court to consider evidence that is not typically relevant to a fair-market-value analysis, the statute simply reflects the nature of foreclosure sales, not a new meaning of “fair market value,” The statute expressly requires that the court determine “the fair market value of the real property as of the date of the foreclosure sale,” and the evidence regarding the discounted future sales price is permissible only to “arrive at a current fair market value” on that date. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(b)(5). C. “Discounting” the Future Sales Price Although the statute refers to a “future sales price,” it does so using terms that necessarily tie that p mm’n App.1931) (holding that bonds that bore interest at one percent per annum plus on supplemental coupons up to 212 additional interest per annum to the extent net revenues are available were not negotiable instruments because the supplemental coupons indefinite interest rate failed to state a sum certain under section 3106" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n106-11 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of the variable annuities were “in connection with” the security); Korsinsky, 2002 WL 27775, at *5 (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of a stock were “in connection with” the stock); Hardy, 189 F.Supp.2d at 18 (same). In contrast, courts have found that the “in connection with” element was not met when the plaintiff did not allege that the fraud concerned the value of the security or the consideration received in return. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the authority to extend credit did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received); Spielman, 2001 WL 1182927, at *5 (holding that the same must pertain to the value of the security and where the facts indicated they did not", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n106-11 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of the variable annuities were “in connection with” the security); Korsinsky, 2002 WL 27775, at *5 (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of a stock were “in connection with” the stock); Hardy, 189 F.Supp.2d at 18 (same). In contrast, courts have found that the “in connection with” element was not met when the plaintiff did not allege that the fraud concerned the value of the security or the consideration received in return. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the authority to extend credit did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received); Spielman, 2001 WL 1182927, at *5 (holding that a plaintiff satisfied rule 9b by pleading which machines were the subject of alleged fraudulent transactions and the nature and subject of the alleged misrepresentations", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n106-11 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of the variable annuities were “in connection with” the security); Korsinsky, 2002 WL 27775, at *5 (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of a stock were “in connection with” the stock); Hardy, 189 F.Supp.2d at 18 (same). In contrast, courts have found that the “in connection with” element was not met when the plaintiff did not allege that the fraud concerned the value of the security or the consideration received in return. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the authority to extend credit did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received); Spielman, 2001 WL 1182927, at *5 (holding that the alleged misrepresentations concerning the transaction fees charged by a broker did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n106-11 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of the variable annuities were “in connection with” the security); Korsinsky, 2002 WL 27775, at *5 (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of a stock were “in connection with” the stock); Hardy, 189 F.Supp.2d at 18 (same). In contrast, courts have found that the “in connection with” element was not met when the plaintiff did not allege that the fraud concerned the value of the security or the consideration received in return. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the authority to extend credit did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received); Spielman, 2001 WL 1182927, at *5 (holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n106-11 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of the variable annuities were “in connection with” the security); Korsinsky, 2002 WL 27775, at *5 (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of a stock were “in connection with” the stock); Hardy, 189 F.Supp.2d at 18 (same). In contrast, courts have found that the “in connection with” element was not met when the plaintiff did not allege that the fraud concerned the value of the security or the consideration received in return. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the authority to extend credit did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received); Spielman, 2001 WL 1182927, at *5 (holding that plaintiff was entitled to sue under rule 10b5 for the difference between the price and the value received from the sale of the security where as here the evil is not the price at which plaintiff bought but the fact of being induced to buy" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the purpose and intent behind the Act as follows: “Congress enacted EMTALA in response to its concern that hospitals were ‘dumping’ patients (who were) unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or transferring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized. Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993). Through EMTALA, Congress sought ‘to provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis for all patients,’ Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (daily ed. October 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Dole)); see also, Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that hospital did not violate emtala by failing to follow a thrombolysis protocol because by its very terms the protocol was not expressly applicable to patients in the er", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the purpose and intent behind the Act as follows: “Congress enacted EMTALA in response to its concern that hospitals were ‘dumping’ patients (who were) unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or transferring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized. Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993). Through EMTALA, Congress sought ‘to provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis for all patients,’ Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (daily ed. October 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Dole)); see also, Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that emtala applies to any and all patients", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the purpose and intent behind the Act as follows: “Congress enacted EMTALA in response to its concern that hospitals were ‘dumping’ patients (who were) unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or transferring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized. Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993). Through EMTALA, Congress sought ‘to provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis for all patients,’ Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (daily ed. October 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Dole)); see also, Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a company providing administrative purchasing and financial services to a hospital was not a hospital and thus could not be held directly liable under emtala", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the purpose and intent behind the Act as follows: “Congress enacted EMTALA in response to its concern that hospitals were ‘dumping’ patients (who were) unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or transferring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized. Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993). Through EMTALA, Congress sought ‘to provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis for all patients,’ Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (daily ed. October 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Dole)); see also, Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the purpose and intent behind the Act as follows: “Congress enacted EMTALA in response to its concern that hospitals were ‘dumping’ patients (who were) unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or transferring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized. Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993). Through EMTALA, Congress sought ‘to provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis for all patients,’ Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (daily ed. October 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Dole)); see also, Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that doctors do not have to accept patients" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS. Kreindler et al., 15 N.Y. Practice Series, N.Y. Law of Torts § 12:38 (2013) (“A restaurant owner, as a landowner, has a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for persons on the property. Accordingly, a restaurant owner must take appropriate measures to protect persons on the premises from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons.”). Evidence of prior criminal acts sufficiently similar to the instant act can demonstrate foreseeability. See, e.g., Maysonet v. KFC, Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 906 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir.1990); Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163, 614 N.E.2d 723 (1993). Here, Gray adduced evidence that she was physically assaulted by a group of loud and profane customers whom she asked to be quiet 584 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (1st Dep’t 1992) (holding that no seizure occurred where officers boarded bus and began questioning passengers gave passengers no reason to believe that they required an answer and tjhere was no application of force no intimidating movement no overwhelming show of force no brandishing of weapons no blocking of exits no threat no command not even an authoritative tone of voice", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS. Kreindler et al., 15 N.Y. Practice Series, N.Y. Law of Torts § 12:38 (2013) (“A restaurant owner, as a landowner, has a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for persons on the property. Accordingly, a restaurant owner must take appropriate measures to protect persons on the premises from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons.”). Evidence of prior criminal acts sufficiently similar to the instant act can demonstrate foreseeability. See, e.g., Maysonet v. KFC, Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 906 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir.1990); Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163, 614 N.E.2d 723 (1993). Here, Gray adduced evidence that she was physically assaulted by a group of loud and profane customers whom she asked to be quiet 584 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (1st Dep’t 1992) (holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS. Kreindler et al., 15 N.Y. Practice Series, N.Y. Law of Torts § 12:38 (2013) (“A restaurant owner, as a landowner, has a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for persons on the property. Accordingly, a restaurant owner must take appropriate measures to protect persons on the premises from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons.”). Evidence of prior criminal acts sufficiently similar to the instant act can demonstrate foreseeability. See, e.g., Maysonet v. KFC, Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 906 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir.1990); Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163, 614 N.E.2d 723 (1993). Here, Gray adduced evidence that she was physically assaulted by a group of loud and profane customers whom she asked to be quiet 584 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (1st Dep’t 1992) (holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS. Kreindler et al., 15 N.Y. Practice Series, N.Y. Law of Torts § 12:38 (2013) (“A restaurant owner, as a landowner, has a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for persons on the property. Accordingly, a restaurant owner must take appropriate measures to protect persons on the premises from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons.”). Evidence of prior criminal acts sufficiently similar to the instant act can demonstrate foreseeability. See, e.g., Maysonet v. KFC, Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 906 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir.1990); Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163, 614 N.E.2d 723 (1993). Here, Gray adduced evidence that she was physically assaulted by a group of loud and profane customers whom she asked to be quiet 584 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (1st Dep’t 1992) (holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nS. Kreindler et al., 15 N.Y. Practice Series, N.Y. Law of Torts § 12:38 (2013) (“A restaurant owner, as a landowner, has a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for persons on the property. Accordingly, a restaurant owner must take appropriate measures to protect persons on the premises from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons.”). Evidence of prior criminal acts sufficiently similar to the instant act can demonstrate foreseeability. See, e.g., Maysonet v. KFC, Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 906 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir.1990); Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163, 614 N.E.2d 723 (1993). Here, Gray adduced evidence that she was physically assaulted by a group of loud and profane customers whom she asked to be quiet 584 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (1st Dep’t 1992) (holding that defendant had no duty where tjhere was no evidence of a pattern of criminal activity or of even one similar incident involving different patrons" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case which supports it.” Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 519, 750 A.2d 10 (2000); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80, 506 A.2d 646 (1986); Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979); Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 13, 320 A.2d 258 (1974). 6 . Our holding is consistent with other cases that have considered this issue. See Vieregger v. Robertson, 9 Neb.App. 193, 609 N.W.2d 409, 414 (2000)(where instruction to jury imposed burden of proof that doctor had to be the cause and not a cause of the injury to be considered a proximate cause, court ruled that “an instruction that the burden of proof is to show that a doctor's negligence was a cause is what is required.’'[(emphasis added); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999)(holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case which supports it.” Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 519, 750 A.2d 10 (2000); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80, 506 A.2d 646 (1986); Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979); Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 13, 320 A.2d 258 (1974). 6 . Our holding is consistent with other cases that have considered this issue. See Vieregger v. Robertson, 9 Neb.App. 193, 609 N.W.2d 409, 414 (2000)(where instruction to jury imposed burden of proof that doctor had to be the cause and not a cause of the injury to be considered a proximate cause, court ruled that “an instruction that the burden of proof is to show that a doctor's negligence was a cause is what is required.’'[(emphasis added); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999)(holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case which supports it.” Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 519, 750 A.2d 10 (2000); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80, 506 A.2d 646 (1986); Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979); Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 13, 320 A.2d 258 (1974). 6 . Our holding is consistent with other cases that have considered this issue. See Vieregger v. Robertson, 9 Neb.App. 193, 609 N.W.2d 409, 414 (2000)(where instruction to jury imposed burden of proof that doctor had to be the cause and not a cause of the injury to be considered a proximate cause, court ruled that “an instruction that the burden of proof is to show that a doctor's negligence was a cause is what is required.’'[(emphasis added); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999)(holding that whether the negligent acts of parties combined to become the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case which supports it.” Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 519, 750 A.2d 10 (2000); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80, 506 A.2d 646 (1986); Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979); Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 13, 320 A.2d 258 (1974). 6 . Our holding is consistent with other cases that have considered this issue. See Vieregger v. Robertson, 9 Neb.App. 193, 609 N.W.2d 409, 414 (2000)(where instruction to jury imposed burden of proof that doctor had to be the cause and not a cause of the injury to be considered a proximate cause, court ruled that “an instruction that the burden of proof is to show that a doctor's negligence was a cause is what is required.’'[(emphasis added); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999)(holding proximate cause required for claim of breach of special duty", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case which supports it.” Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 519, 750 A.2d 10 (2000); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80, 506 A.2d 646 (1986); Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979); Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 13, 320 A.2d 258 (1974). 6 . Our holding is consistent with other cases that have considered this issue. See Vieregger v. Robertson, 9 Neb.App. 193, 609 N.W.2d 409, 414 (2000)(where instruction to jury imposed burden of proof that doctor had to be the cause and not a cause of the injury to be considered a proximate cause, court ruled that “an instruction that the burden of proof is to show that a doctor's negligence was a cause is what is required.’'[(emphasis added); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999)(holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nclass members nationwide would predominate over common ones, given the lack of a national market or a nationwide conspiracy. Appellants contend that they should not have been required to prove national market or nationwide conspiracy at the class certification stage because these are not required elements of their antitrust claims. Recovery under § 4 of the Clayton Act, however, requires proof of antitrust impact, which in turn requires proof of the relevant market. Ala. v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir.1978) (“we do not understand how the plaintiffs can make this proof [of anti-trust impact] without examining the relevant school bus market where each individual plaintiff is located”); see Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Comms., 435 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that market participant socal edison is in privity with the california power exchange corporation not with other market participants", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nclass members nationwide would predominate over common ones, given the lack of a national market or a nationwide conspiracy. Appellants contend that they should not have been required to prove national market or nationwide conspiracy at the class certification stage because these are not required elements of their antitrust claims. Recovery under § 4 of the Clayton Act, however, requires proof of antitrust impact, which in turn requires proof of the relevant market. Ala. v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir.1978) (“we do not understand how the plaintiffs can make this proof [of anti-trust impact] without examining the relevant school bus market where each individual plaintiff is located”); see Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Comms., 435 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that proof of relevant market is essential under 2", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nclass members nationwide would predominate over common ones, given the lack of a national market or a nationwide conspiracy. Appellants contend that they should not have been required to prove national market or nationwide conspiracy at the class certification stage because these are not required elements of their antitrust claims. Recovery under § 4 of the Clayton Act, however, requires proof of antitrust impact, which in turn requires proof of the relevant market. Ala. v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir.1978) (“we do not understand how the plaintiffs can make this proof [of anti-trust impact] without examining the relevant school bus market where each individual plaintiff is located”); see Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Comms., 435 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir.2006) (recognizing implied duty to market", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nclass members nationwide would predominate over common ones, given the lack of a national market or a nationwide conspiracy. Appellants contend that they should not have been required to prove national market or nationwide conspiracy at the class certification stage because these are not required elements of their antitrust claims. Recovery under § 4 of the Clayton Act, however, requires proof of antitrust impact, which in turn requires proof of the relevant market. Ala. v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir.1978) (“we do not understand how the plaintiffs can make this proof [of anti-trust impact] without examining the relevant school bus market where each individual plaintiff is located”); see Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Comms., 435 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that a plaintiff claiming monopolization is obligated to establish the relevant market because the power to control prices or exclude competition only makes sense with reference to a particular market", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nclass members nationwide would predominate over common ones, given the lack of a national market or a nationwide conspiracy. Appellants contend that they should not have been required to prove national market or nationwide conspiracy at the class certification stage because these are not required elements of their antitrust claims. Recovery under § 4 of the Clayton Act, however, requires proof of antitrust impact, which in turn requires proof of the relevant market. Ala. v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir.1978) (“we do not understand how the plaintiffs can make this proof [of anti-trust impact] without examining the relevant school bus market where each individual plaintiff is located”); see Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Comms., 435 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that to pose a threat to monopolization one firm alone must have the power to control market output and exclude competition" ]