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Service Lloyds then sought judicial review of the administrative appeal ruling, and Bestor obtained summary judgment in his favor and was awarded attorney's fees for that litigation. See HN1 [ ] TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.221(c) (providing for carrier's liability for claimant's attorney's fees if claimant prevails in carrier's action for judicial review). Service Lloyds did not appeal the summary judgment. | Party Submissions | 8.33303 | 8.472657 | 10.500998 |
Given the lack of clarity regarding the nature and extent of Claimants' voluntary production, Respondent asks the Tribunal to order production of all documents requested under this point, excluding the documents related to communications with Claimants' counsel in relation to the present arbitration or which were otherwise prepared for the purpose of providing or obtaining legal advice. TRIBUNAL’S Documents showing the exercise of Kalemegdan's management and control from 26 April 2012 until today, including in particular the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors of Kalemegdan during which the topic of Obnova was discussed or internal notes and communications between the shareholders concerning decisions related to Obnova. | Legal Decisions | 12.942987 | 11.511887 | 13.876815 |
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Expanded Standard Possession Order, if a weekend period of possession by L M O ends on or is immediately followed by a student holiday or a teacher in-service day that falls on a Monday during the regular school term, as determined by the school in which the child is enrolled, or a federal, state, or local holiday that falls on a Monday during the summer months when school is not in session, that weekend period of possession shall end at 6:00 p.m. on that Monday. | Party Submissions | 6.537339 | 5.891062 | 6.34196 |
N.W.2d 857, 860 (Minn.Ct.App.1987); Fleming v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 188 Kan. 571, 363 P.2d 432, 436 (1961). 18 Having concluded the Smith County court has exclusive jurisdiction, we necessarily reject application of the dominant jurisdiction doctrine because the Harris County court is not a proper forum. See Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 248. Further, the Harris and Smith County suits do not involve the same parties as required for dominant jurisdiction to apply; the carrier is a party to the Smith County suit, but not the Harris County suit. | Party Submissions | 5.645947 | 6.847706 | 7.262584 |
The Eastland court of appeals also followed the Cockerham rule in Reaves. Reaves v. Reaves, 2012 WL 3799668 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.). That case involved the transfer of an annuity owned by wife prior to marriage. In the process of financial planning, husband and the financial planner conspired to cause wife to transfer her separate property annuity to the names of husband and wife jointly. Id. at *3. The trial court allowed parol evidence as to the intent of the parties in the transfer transaction. Id. The trial court found that wife did not intend to make a gift to husband of her annuity. Id. The Texarkana court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on the Cockerham parol evidence rule. Id. at *5. | Party Submissions | 5.101884 | 5.471272 | 5.482365 |
To the Honorable Court: The Texas Municipal League (TML) is a non-profit association with a membership of over 1,170 Texas cities. TML provides legislative, legal, and educational services to its members. The Texas City Attorneys Association (TCAA), an affiliate of TML, is an organization of over 500 attorneys who represent Texas cities and city officials in the performance of their duties. Believing that the issue before this Court is of great significance to Texas cities, TML respectfully submits this letter of amici curiae in the above-referenced cause.1 Amici curiae urge the Court to grant the City of Dallas’ pending Motion for Rehearing for the following reasons. | Party Submissions | 4.297444 | 4.354427 | 4.537291 |
Here, the court of appeals found that this case alleged a departure from the accepted standards of professional or administrative services directly related to health care. | Party Submissions | 23.705563 | 25.955467 | 36.81634 |
This case is markedly different. The Amarillo Court first recognized specifically that it was required to consider the reports in their entirety. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *2. Next, the Court referred to both experts’ reports repeatedly; discussed both of their opinions; and even assumed “the reports sufficiently describe the occurrence of an asphyxia event[.]” Id. at *3-*4. In fact, the Court went through all alleged breaches of the standard of care by Dr. Castillo and discussed the lack of an adequate causation opinion for each. Id. at *4-*5. This case is, therefore, completely dissimilar to E.D. In fact, the Amarillo Court’s analysis specifically avoids the same pitfalls this Court criticized in E.D. | Party Submissions | 9.765836 | 10.320754 | 10.353567 |
These opinions are a far cry from a statement that various intrapartum factors “suggest[ed] the possibility” of stroke. (CR.794) As set out at length above, neither Dr. Tappan nor Dr. Null explained why or how the alleged stroke or asphyxia event occurred, much less tied it to conduct of the nurses. The lower court hardly engaged in weighing credibility – the problem in Abshire and Miller. Instead, the court applied an admittedly “lenient” review of the reports. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338, at *2. Even “pars[ing]” and “reorder[ing]” the reports could not save them as critical causation elements were simply lacking. Id. | Party Submissions | 16.789034 | 18.748302 | 18.70665 |
Considering the course of labor and delivery and H.W.’s condition at birth, Dr. Tappan concluded that H.W. suffered an in-utero asphyxia injury during the final hour to hour and half of labor. App. 7, CR 670-71. He believed Dr. Castillo was responsible for this result for two main reasons. App. 7, CR 670-71. | Party Submissions | 8.218005 | 10.716197 | 10.784431 |
In addition, documents post-dating the issuance of the Comptroller General’s 21 September 2020 report do not appear prima facie relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute. | Legal Decisions | 13.294591 | 15.189142 | 15.4426 |
R: Bueno, la medida impuesta corresponde a una medida de seguridad, es decir, es una medida que tiene por objeto evitar que se continúe generando un riesgo de daño al ambiente, los recursos naturales, derivados de las obras o actividades que se estén inspeccionando. | Party Submissions | 8.936325 | 13.292164 | 11.691511 |
For the foregoing reasons (and those provided in Respondent’s prior written and oral submissions), Respondent respectfully requests that the Tribunal dismiss all of Claimants’ claims for want of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, on the merits, and award Respondent the costs and fees, including attorneys’ fees, it has incurred in this arbitration, which, given the complexity of the issues under dispute, have been significant. | Legal Decisions | 5.180367 | 5.359992 | 5.17553 |
Arbitration Rule 21 2.1. The Tribunal was constituted on September 6, 2023, in accordance with the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. The Parties confirmed that the Tribunal was properly constituted and that no Party has any objection to the appointment of any Member of the Tribunal. | Legal Decisions | 4.496398 | 5.264604 | 5.057827 |
In article XVII, the parties to the Hooks/Bordages Leases adopted an entirely different framework for “Time, Method and Manner” of payment under the leases. The introductory paragraph waived Texas Natural Resources Code Sections 91.401 through 91.406 and stated they “shall not be applicable.” The parties also spelled out that it would apply to “all royalty payments” and “in lieu of” those statutory provisions. Does it make sense that they went to such lengths just to replicate a simple interest regime already provided by the Natural Resources Code? | Party Submissions | 15.916157 | 15.666642 | 15.705405 |
Finally, even if Yellowfin’s suit is not barred by any statute of limitations, it has waived its right to collect Santos’s debt. | Party Submissions | 14.242337 | 22.842646 | 26.078861 |
Jurisdiction lies with this Court under section 22.001(a)(6) of the Texas Government Code, and sections 109.002 and 263.405 of the Texas Family Code. | Party Submissions | 5.585038 | 6.724801 | 7.313515 |
Specifically, World Car proved that HMA required 100% sales efficiency by demanding that standard and using it to impose real consequences. | Party Submissions | 123.73143 | 127.39901 | 156.94206 |
Although Gal ovelho’s property was never deprived completely of its economic value, we conclude that the second Penn Central factor weighs in Gal ovelho’s favor, i.e., in favor of finding a taking. See id. Galovelho’s primary investment-backed expectation for the property was to operate a full-service dine-in restaurant at its full capacity. According to Galovelho’s pleading, that expectation complied with its lease, its certificate of occupancy, and its history of operation. We do not question that the Emergency Orders interfered temporarily with Gal ovelho’s expectations for its business. See id. | Party Submissions | 10.283108 | 12.691557 | 12.875985 |
Convention Article 43(a); Arbitration Rule 38 18.1. Witness statements and expert reports shall be filed together with the Parties’ pleadings. | Legal Decisions | 14.584942 | 14.041458 | 17.169813 |
The requested documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they address the property rights of Obnova which Claimants claim were expropriated by the adoption of the 2013 DRP. As Claimants are Obnova's shareholders, the requested documents are in their possession, custody or control. | Legal Decisions | 11.655353 | 13.408414 | 13.89507 |
After [**2] its reimbursement claim was denied under the TWCA, Sonic sought judicial review of that decision. The trial court rendered judgment in Sonic's favor, and TMI appeals the trial court's judgment (the "judicial review case") in Cause No. 14-05-00111-CV. Sonic's contract claims against TMI have remained abated since October 2003 and, in Cause No. 14-05-0770-CV, Sonic seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to lift abatement. We have consolidated the cases for purposes of this opinion. | Party Submissions | 6.032519 | 6.789475 | 6.894207 |
The United States objects to Request No. 1.f for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a. | Legal Decisions | 8.477822 | 13.354382 | 14.446341 |
The resulting opinion conflicts with this Court ’ s jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the other intermediate appellate courts, and Chapter 74’s plain text. Review is needed to ensure the faithful application of the TMLA and this Court’s precedent. | Party Submissions | 12.256976 | 15.064078 | 15.09685 |
The course and scope issue also became the subject of a workers' compensation proceeding. After Tyler paid Reynaldo's funeral expenses, it sought reimbursement from its workers' compensation carrier. The carrier contested the compensability of Reynaldo's death asserting it did not occur in the course and scope of his employment. After the parties were unable to resolve their dispute at a benefit review conference, a contested case hearing was held. The hearing officer ruled that Reynaldo sustained a compensable injury and awarded death benefits to the Gaonas and burial benefits to Tyler. The carrier appealed that decision to an appeals panel. In what the appeals panel called an unusual turn of events, the Gaonas also contested the decision. 3 The appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer's decision. | Party Submissions | 6.229193 | 5.924054 | 6.493434 |
Dr. Tappan’s lack of qualifications and proposed opinions are no different than those in three similar cases where the appellate courts rejected obstetricians’ opinions about neurological injuries because they failed to establish their expertise to do so. In Tenet v. De La Riva, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that an obstetrician could not offer an opinion about the cause of an infant’s neurological injuries because the physician’s report and curriculum vitae were silent about his qualifications in pediatric neurology. Tenet, 351 S.W.3d at 407 (“if [the expert] had some experience in practicing pediatric neurology, he would qualify as an expert in this regard, but neither his report nor curriculum vitae demonstrate any recent experience in perinatology.”). Likewise, here, nothing in Dr. Tappan’s report or CV suggests he has knowledge, training, or experience as a pediatric neurologist. | Party Submissions | 6.198731 | 5.941319 | 7.075626 |
Dr. Castillo disagrees with the Walkers’ Statement of Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error, and this case does not raise any question of law that is important to the jurisprudence of this State. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001(a). | Party Submissions | 7.414938 | 7.847247 | 7.955081 |
For these reasons, we find that the plain language of the termination clause, containing an all-embracing termination of any and all of Backes’s obligations under the guaranty, shows the parties’ cle ar intent that completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco building would bring an end to Backes’ s obligations under the guaranty, including those that had matured. See Transcor Astra Grp. S.A. v. Petrobras Am. Inc., No. 20-0932, 2022 WL 1275238, at *7 (Tex. Apr. 29, 2022); Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2008). Because we find that the termination clause was not ambiguous, we also find that the trial court erred to the extent that it considered extraneous evidence, other than extrinsic evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the bridge loan document, to determine t he parties’ intent. See Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d 480, 483 –84. Nevertheless, since the trial court’s construction of the termination clause was correct, any such error was harmless. See id. at 480. | Party Submissions | 6.334241 | 6.102119 | 6.732246 |
No right or obligation under, or interest in, this Agreement shall be assigned without prior written consent of both TDCC and UCC; provided, however, that TDCC may assign any part of its interest in, or any of its rights or obligations under, this Agreement to any TDCC Affiliate at any time without prior written consent from UCC. | Contract | 5.148118 | 4.89811 | 6.796994 |
Awardee understands that the Company’s Confidential Information includes not only the individual categories of information identified in this Section, but also the compilation and/or aggregation of the Company’s information, which is and has been compiled/aggregated via significant effort and expense and which has value to the Company and to the Company’s employees as used in furtherance of the Company’s business. | Contract | 8.969471 | 8.739056 | 9.243515 |
null | Legislation | null | null | null |
The Motion also claims that the appellate court improperly deferred to the “trial court’s legal conclusions.” 5 However, because no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested, there were no legal conclusions upon which the appellate court could have deferred. Instead, the appellate court correctly applied the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s denial as a whole, relying upon “any appropriate legal theory urged,” an approach supported by a plethora of precedent. | Party Submissions | 7.311925 | 7.388522 | 8.696626 |
Such tentative earnings shall not be due or payable to Subcontractor or anyone else claiming in Subcontractor's place and stead, including but not limited to Subcontractor’s surety, a Trustee in bankruptcy, receiver or assignee of Subcontractor, and will be subject to offset, until and unless Subcontractor’s Work is fully and satisfactorily completed and any amounts under a, b, or c above are fully paid and satisfied. McCarthy may demand written evidence of Subcontractor's financial capability to perform and that Subcontractor has made such payments at any time. | Party Submissions | 10.318955 | 9.610429 | 10.551647 |
The first session of the Tribunal was held on Monday, 6 November 2023 at 6:00 a.m. (Washington, D.C.) / 11:00 a.m. (London) / 12:00 p.m. (Lagos and Paris) / 7:00 p.m. (Singapore) by video conference. | Legal Decisions | 3.184548 | 3.265991 | 3.238524 |
Una vez que el inversionista haya iniciado un procedimiento ante un tribunal competente de la Parte en cuyo territorio se hubiera admitido la inversión o haya notificado a la otra Parte su intención de iniciar cualquiera de los procedimientos arbitrales indicados en el Artículo 12.18 (5), la elección de uno u otro procedimiento será definitivo. | Legal Decisions | 6.142223 | 10.175448 | 8.113117 |
In short, HSMiller did not meet its burden of showing either prong of gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence, and there is legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s gross negligence verdict. The Court can and should render a take nothing judgment on the gross negligence claim against the Lawyers. See Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d at 141 & n.23. | Party Submissions | 7.716738 | 8.07513 | 8.874061 |
McCarthy its monthly Subcontractor’s Application for Payment by the date established by McCarthy, McCarthy may at its option include in its monthly pay application to the Owner for Work performed during the preceding month such amount as it may deem proper for the Work of Subcontractor for the preceding month and Subcontractor agrees to accept such approved portion thereof in lieu of monthly payment based upon Subcontractor's Application for Payment. | Party Submissions | 9.129399 | 9.366323 | 9.976537 |
The proportionate responsibility chapter, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch. 33, does not apply to an action to collect workers' compensation benefits under the workers' compensation law of the state of Texas (Subtitle A, Title 5, Labor Code). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.002(c)(1) (West 2020). | Party Submissions | 3.554324 | 3.975359 | 3.832328 |
Oncor contends that §1.111(e) agreements do not preclude section 25.25(c) motions, but only section 25.25(c-1) and (d) motions. The argument rests on the fact that section 25.25(c-1) and (d-1) prohibit corrections under sub-sections (c-1) and (d) when an agreement has been reached on value, but no such language exists regarding sub-section (c). | Party Submissions | 7.091734 | 7.560515 | 7.510281 |
I certify that the foregoing petition for review is in compliance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure because it contains 4,471 words and has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Georgia font for text and 12-point Georgia font for footnotes, which meets the typeface requirements. | Party Submissions | 5.185313 | 5.386461 | 6.875795 |
The illegal-assignment issue was fully briefed in the trial court and at the Fifth Court of Appeals in the first malpractice trial and appeal. That court’s opinion fully addressed the issue and held against the Lawyers. Henry S. Miller, 2016 WL 4821684 at *2ؘ–3. | Party Submissions | 14.840467 | 17.746212 | 17.181967 |
TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 2. Liberty shall continue to provide to Ames continuous and adequate sewer service that complies with TWC Chapter 26, TWC § 13.041(h)(1), and 30 TAC Chapters 35 and 291 of TCEQ's rules; 3. This Order shall expire in 120 days, unless extended; 4. Pursuant to TWC § 5.504, the Commission hereby sets a hearing to consider \Vhether to arm, modify or set aside this Emergency Order at its regular Agenda meeting on August 24, 2022, at 9:30 a.m., at TCEQ Park 35 Complex, 12100 Park 35 Circle, Building E, Room 201 S, Austin, Texas; 5. The provisions of this Order shall apply to and be binding upon Liberty and Ames. Liberty and Ames shall give notice of this Order to personnel ,vho maintain day-to-day control over the operations rerenced in this Order; 6. The Chief Clerk of the Commission shall mail a copy of this Order to all parties; and 7, If any provision, sentence, clause, or phrase of this Order is r any reason held to be invalid, the invalidity of any portion shall not aect the validity of the remaining portions of this Order. | Party Submissions | 6.705388 | 5.702079 | 6.441863 |
What is the amount, if any, by which the judgment actually rendered in the Underlying Lawsuit exceeded the judgment that would have been rendered but for the negligence you have found on the part of the Terry Defendants? | Party Submissions | 10.427486 | 13.890754 | 13.023688 |
Terry designated Defterios, HSMiller and Diamond State as RTPs in both malpractice trials. (CR275, 885; 11RR191-99, 214-24) Before the first malpractice trial, Diamond State settled with HSMiller. (CR337) The jury was asked to determine the percentage of responsibility of all three in the first trial. (CR885) In the retrial, however, the trial court rejected Terry’s submissions that the proportionate responsibility of all three be included in the charge. (9SCR8405-08; 20RR658-61; CR541-52) 50 While a trial court’s decision to submit or refuse a jury question or instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012), a trial court is required to submit a properly requested question raised by the pleadings and evidence and necessary for the jury to render a proper verdict. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278. The failure to submit a proper responsible third party “skew[s] the proceedings,” In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding), and “probably cause[s] the rendition of an improper judgment” and “probably prevent[s] the petitioner from properly presenting the case to the appellate courts.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1. As this Court recently reiterated in Gregory v. Chohan, “litigants have a significant and substantive right to allow the fact finder to determine the proportionate responsibility of all responsible parties.” 670 S.W.3d 548, 568 (Tex. 2023) (quoting In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d at 509) (internal punctuations omitted). The failure to submit responsible third parties and settling defendants under Chapter 33 is reversible error resulting in a new trial. See id. | Party Submissions | 6.470018 | 6.548461 | 6.964569 |
This Court ultimately held that despite the presence of a fee-splitting provision in In re Poly-America agreement, the claimant did not “demonstrate[] that the ability to pursue his claim in the arbitral forum hinge[d] upon his payment of the estimated costs; to the contrary, depending upon the circumstances, [the claimant] may not have [] bear[ed] any cost at all.” Id. at 356. | Party Submissions | 13.576959 | 14.033831 | 14.828512 |
Galovelho argues that this Bruen test now applies to any government regulation of a constitutional right. Because the Texas constitution purportedly protects against the type of conduct he challenges, Galovelho contends that appellees “ must demonstrate there is a valid, constitutional, and historical basis for their actions. ” We reject Galovelho’s argument that the Bruen test is applicable in any context other than the Second Amendment. But regardless, appellees have in fact established that they had a valid constitutional and historical basis for the Emergency Orders. See, e.g., Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 (“ Uncompensated destruction of property has been occasionally justified by reason of war, riot, pestilence or other great public calamity. ”). | Party Submissions | 9.927121 | 10.096356 | 10.794103 |
Claimant’s contingency fee arrangement already since June 2022. The Respondent has failed to discharge its burden of proof regarding urgency. | Legal Decisions | 22.709139 | 17.851622 | 24.053434 |
The Tribunal concurs with their view that the applicable law is to be found in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and Article IX of the BIT, the provisions of which are to be interpreted in accordance with the rules of international law respecting treaty interpretation. Those rules are generally considered to have been codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. While the Vienna Convention is not in force between Latvia and Norway, the rules and principles of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 to 33 are generally regarded as declaratory of customary international law and will therefore be applied as such. | Legal Decisions | 5.019921 | 4.778441 | 5.262315 |
Finally, the Walkers complain that the Court of Appeals also erred in requiring that the experts should have explained why one of the allegedly negligent acts was not “too attenuated” to H.W.’s harm. (Pet. Br. at 27). The problem with the Walkers’ argument is that both Dr. Tappan and Dr. Null claim H.W. sustained an in-utero asphyxia injury, and that the seminal events of his birth occurred an hour to an hour and a half before he was born. (CR.671, 709). Yet Dr. Tappan also criticized Dr. Castillo’s and Baptist’s care beginning six hours earlier. | Party Submissions | 11.328181 | 11.99171 | 12.764037 |
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 1.a and no decision is therefore made. | Legal Decisions | 25.8679 | 30.320728 | 37.255703 |
In the event that a judgment is obtained and recovered through the bankruptcy court against the settling defendant, then this Court has held that recovery would be applied as a credit against the plaintiff’s judgment against the separate, jointly-liable tortfeasor. Quinney Elec., Inc. v. Kondos Entm’t, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1999) (“Instead, the trial court properly foreclosed Quinney’s double recovery of contract damages by crediting Quinney’s judgment against Kondos and Snyder with the amount Quinney received from the bankruptcy court judgment.”). And if the trustee clawed back the settlement through a preference and then later settled the claim in the bankruptcy court, the separate tortfeasor could also claim a credit. See Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 108 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied), overruled on other grounds by Duffey v. Sleep Ctr. of Longview, 598 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (applying settlement credit after Texas Capital “filed a motion with the state trial court asking it to reduce Texas Capital’s liability for the judgment by the amount of Ballow’s bankruptcy settlement with Sandefer.”). | Party Submissions | 6.063376 | 5.996099 | 6.239491 |
The United States objects to Request No. 3.i for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a. | Legal Decisions | 9.046106 | 13.500893 | 16.311207 |
As noted below, the fact of third-party funding from external funders is not prohibited, whether via a contingency agreement or funding by a funder.56 In the past, contingency arrangements did not require disclosure, so there are no cases of disclosure of such otherwise privileged arrangements. The existence of a contingency agreement does not indicate that this claim is frivolous or without merit – just the opposite. It means that experienced, qualified counsel believes that the case is so worthy that counsel is willing to risk their time in the expectation of a significant award. Neither would the situation be any different if Riverside received other forms of Third-Party Funding from an outside funder for the same reason. | Party Submissions | 13.836111 | 13.364781 | 14.702453 |
The very purpose of a front-end jurisdictional inquiry is to avoid subjecting an entity with immunity, such as Midland, from the process and expenses of litigation when there are no facts that give rise to jurisdiction. Following Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction in which Midland provided evidence establishing that it had never permitted the alleged disposals to discharge into Midland’s wastewater collection system, the burden shifted to Weatherford to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Tex. 2004); (CR 54, 348, 359); Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. City of Midland, 652 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2022, pet. filed). Absent Weatherford presenting such a fact issue, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction, and the claim is dismissed. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 234. Weatherford’s only attempt to offer any “facts” in response to Midland’s Plea was the Ramboll Report, a report prepared by Weatherford’s environmental consultants, that referenced unidentified alleged third party disposers of contaminants and hypothesized that such disposals then leaked out of Midland’s sewage system. (CR 165–66.) The report further referenced purported interviews with an unidentified former employee of the alleged dischargers. Such multi-layered hearsay was properly excluded from the record,5 and Weatherford never presented or attempted to present any other evidence. (CR 385–86); Weatherford Int’l, 652 S.W.3d at 915. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Weatherford failed to meet its jurisdictional burden, and it was unnecessary to analyze the underlying SWDA statute when “pursuant to the statute’s unambiguous terms, the SWDA’s cost-recovery provision does not apply to the allegations and subject matter—i.e., a domestic wastewater collection system—that form the factual basis of the claims that Weatherford has asserted. .. .” Id. | Party Submissions | 6.165427 | 6.287509 | 6.43152 |
The characterization of property as either community or separate is determined by the inception of title to the property. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2004, no pet). Inception of title occurs “when aparty rst has aright of claim to the property by virtue ofwhich title is nally vested.” Id. The-major cOnsideration in determining the characterization of property as community or separate is the intention of the spouses by the circumstances surrounding the inception of title. Id. | Party Submissions | 8.411721 | 9.523512 | 8.715241 |
But the Section 29(7) exception to collateral estoppel is not appropriate because (1) any non-party exception does not apply, in light of what Samson did to sever this Bordages case from Hooks and the subsequent intertwined history of the cases (with one lease in both cases) and (2) the policy purposes of the Restatement do not warrant exempting this case from ordinary rules of issue preclusion. | Party Submissions | 22.877714 | 21.766636 | 26.504068 |
The jury erred when it terminated A.S.’s parental rights to R.W. based upon grounds (D), (E), (F), (N) and (O) of subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. Likewise, termination of A.S. ’s parental rights was not within the best interest of R.W. | Party Submissions | 6.033988 | 6.369354 | 6.09618 |
Business Day or, in the case of investment allocations received after a time specified by the Committee, the next Business Day, and shall be applied prospectively. | Contract | 15.85 | 20.73515 | 37.00025 |
Dr. Donald Null, a neonatologist who has managed hundreds of patients with findings similar to H.W.’s, reviewed Dr. Tappan’s report and agreed with his conclusions. App. 9, CR 709. In Dr. Null’s opinion, H.W.’s normal fetal heart rate early in labor and his condition post-delivery (his need for resuscitation, assisted ventilation, and cooling therapy, as well as his coagulopathy and severe acidosis) were consistent with an antenatal asphyxia event that occurred late during labor. App. 9, CR 709. Dr. Null also noted that there was no evidence that Mrs. Walker’s pregnancy complications harmed H.W. or that infection, brain malformation, or an old injury could explain H.W.’s condition at birth. App. 9, CR 709. Dr. Null believed that had H.W. been delivered only an hour to an hour and a half earlier, he would more likely than not avoided the degree of brain injury from which he suffers. App. 9, CR 709. | Party Submissions | 6.022232 | 6.380126 | 6.590268 |
And E.D., like this case, involved birth-injury claims brought against both a physician and a hospital. 644 S.W.3d at 667. Like the intermediate court in Abshire, the court of appeals in E.D. found the claimants’ expert reports deficient for failing, at least in the court’s view, to explain why any inferences drawn from the medical records were “medically preferable.” Tex. Health Care, P.L.L.C. v. E.D. by & Through B.O., No. 02-18-00300-CV, 2020 WL 1057332, at *9 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020), rev’d, 644 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2022) (“The report must explain why the inferences drawn are medically preferable to competing inferences that are equally consistent with the known facts.”). This Court disagreed that Chapter 74 required such a showing, confirming again that the “fair summary benchmark” is not evidentiary. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 667 (quoting Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 226). | Party Submissions | 4.82908 | 5.009592 | 5.142212 |
The Lawyers say there is no collateral attack because they were not parties to the bankruptcy court proceedings. Lawyers’ Brief at 45. | Party Submissions | 15.030692 | 17.778233 | 23.001675 |
In the instant case, Intervenor questioned A.S. about being stopped by law enforcement and being arrested for a misdemeanor drug possession charge while pregnant. See 3 RR 41. A video, without an appropriate sponsoring witness, was admitted before the jury of A.S.’s arrest. See 3 RR 45-46. As well, the jury heard testimony that A.S. was positive for methamphetamines during the time she was pregnant with R.W. | Party Submissions | 10.015285 | 9.111267 | 11.272531 |
Documents showing the exercise of Coropi's management and control from 26 April 2012 until today, including in particular minutes of the meetings of the board of directors of Coropi during which the topic of Obnova was discussed or internal notes and communications between the shareholders and/or Coropi's directors concerning decisions related to Obnova. | Legal Decisions | 13.363918 | 10.682851 | 14.688361 |
The Respondent understands that this Request has been withdrawn. The Respondent reserves the right to object to any further request for these documents in due course. | Legal Decisions | 12.391204 | 10.437552 | 13.697888 |
El Sr. Chodorow reconoció abiertamente este hecho durante su contrainterrogatorio: Q. Okay. There is no information on file about the availability of the type of transportation facilities or means available at each of VMC's production facilities and distribution yards in the U.S.; correct? A. (Mr. Chodorow) That's correct. Q. Okay. And there is no information on file about production capacity and costs of each of VMC's production facilities in the U.S.; correct? A. (Mr. Chodorow) That's correct.234 198. Aunque el Sr. Chodorow reconoció que contar con esa información “sería útil” para un análisis de mitigación, no estuvo de acuerdo en que fuese necesaria.235 Para la Demandada es bastante obvio que sí lo es. | Party Submissions | 7.035422 | 9.459542 | 8.602191 |
Any and all documents relied upon to estimate implementation costs of the 2013 DRP presented in the Concept of the 2013 DRP prepared in 2010 (submitted as exhibit C-330). | Legal Decisions | 17.240494 | 17.373022 | 18.682201 |
Contractors Pollution Liability coverage is written on a Claims Made basis, the Certificate of Insurance will clearly so state. In addition to the coverage specifications listed above, such policy shall provide, and the Certificate of Insurance will list, that the retroactive date coincides with or precedes Subcontractors commencement of work under this Agreement. If insurance is terminated for any reason, Subcontractor shall purchase an extended reporting provision of at least five (5) years to report claims in connection with this Agreement. | Party Submissions | 9.925921 | 7.356621 | 10.722415 |
Time of Election. The date on which a modification election is submitted to the Committee must be at least twelve (12) months prior to the date on which payment is scheduled to commence under the Payment Schedule in effect prior to the modification. | Contract | 6.588235 | 7.912857 | 9.855241 |
The Martinez Family contends that the district court could lift the abatement because the DWC order is void for want of jurisdiction in absence of a pending claim. We have already rejected the Martinez Family's jurisdictional theory rooted in a distinction between potential claims and pending claims. The Martinez Family also argues that—to whatever extent DWC might otherwise have jurisdiction over the contested issue here—DWC lost that jurisdiction when the claim was rendered moot, which the Martinez Family believes occurred on July 26, 2020, when the [*20] statute of limitations had allegedly run on any claim the Martinez Family might file. We reject this argument, as well. | Party Submissions | 8.422646 | 9.016046 | 8.943125 |
There are four very different versions of what Mann was doing on morning of his accident. One version is that he was crossing Up River Road on his way back to his personal vehicle, for personal reasons. 17 The second version is that he was on the side of the road gathering drinks for the other workers that he supervised. 18 The third version was that he was going to a safety meeting. 19 And a fourth was that he was *6 going to inspect an excavation site for his crew. 20 However, this “statement” was obtained by Bay's worker's compensation coordinator, Pamela McShann, after Mann informed her that he had counsel and is therefore inadmissible. 21 There are no conclusive facts establishing that Mann was in the course and scope of his employment. | Party Submissions | 11.849041 | 12.422646 | 13.334682 |
Annotations This Section cited in 28 TAC § 42.105, (relating to Medical Fee Guideline); 28 TAC § 133.304, (relating to Notice of Medical Payment Dispute); 28 TAC § 134.1000, (relating to Mental Health Treatment Guideline). | Party Submissions | 7.058867 | 7.332791 | 7.0092 |
As to the second through fourth Dow factors, Midland affirmatively proved that it did not have the authority, obligation, or control over the disposal of the Contaminants. Carl Craigo, Midland’s Director of Utilities, is the person responsible for the permitting and files regarding past and present permits or authorizations. Craigo is the only person who would have known about Midland’s pretreatment licenses and any disposals Midland would have authorized of such pollutants. Craigo affirmatively showed, after a thorough search through Midland’s files, that no such permit or authorization from the City of Midland ever existed for either Hy-Bon or EndDevices. (CR 54.) As such, any alleged disposal would have occurred (if it occurred at all) without Midland’s consent, and further, would have been in direct violation of Midland’s ordinances. | Party Submissions | 13.341414 | 14.63446 | 14.873656 |
Bay has cited numerous cases in its reply brief holding that the “passive receipt” doctrine survived Heldenfels, or have at least recited the “passive receipt” standard as the law. Bay Reply BOM at 11-12 & n.1. This Court should take the opportunity to define “undue advantage,” officially adopt the passive receipt doctrine, and find that the charge is not erroneous. Alternatively, to the extent the Court finds the charge was erroneous, the Court should remand for a new trial under a proper jury charge. VII. What does the Restatement say about the passive receipts theory At oral argument, Justice Busby asked what the Restatement says about the passive receipts theory of unjust enrichment. There is not a single Restatement section that synthesizes the various unjust enrichment theories similar to the Court’s decision in Heldenfels. Rather, there are numerous provisions in the Restatement that deal with passive receipts of benefits in different contexts, and they all support recovery by Bay, Ltd. in this case. | Party Submissions | 9.501493 | 9.722243 | 10.355762 |
SuppCR14, 21. Samson argued severance would “promote judicial economy and efficiency” (SuppCR7). Samson identified issues common to the cases, including what it called Claim 6: “Most Favored Nations Claim/Late Charges (‘Tract 4/14 Lease’).” Samson pressed for severance of those identical claims, assuring the court that there was no risk of inconsistent adjudications because the Hooks case would resolve Late Charges and other common issues in what became this Bordages case: Those claims [] made under the “Tract 4/14 Leases” are absolutely unique to that lease form...Therefore, if the Hooks’ claim is severed, its resolution in the first case as to claims 6, 7 and 8 – whether by trial or motion for summary judgment – is very likely to resolve many of the same issues that are common, and unique, to all of the “Tract 4/14 Lease” Plaintiffs in the second case . | Party Submissions | 16.257599 | 18.352087 | 18.775034 |
TMI contends the cases relied on by Sonic are inapposite because a workers' compensation claim is at issue in this case. Relying primarily on American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 122 (Tex. 2001), and In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., 107 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding), TMI argues that claims involving bad faith and negligence must be abated [**29] pending a final resolution of prerequisite or related workers' compensation claims. | Party Submissions | 5.819627 | 6.067388 | 6.368601 |
Claimants also allege that Coropi exercised control over and directed the business decisions of Kalemegdan, and indirectly Obnova. In particular, Claimants refer to the so-called letter of instruction dated 26 April 2012 and the two trust deeds dated 26 April 2012 and 12 August 2012, which purport to give Coropi control over Mr Djura Obradović's shares in Kalemegdan (and by extension, Kalemegdan's shares in Obnova). | Legal Decisions | 7.736303 | 7.930536 | 8.550344 |
In adecree of divorce or annulment, the court shall determine the rights of both spouses in apension, retirement plan, annuity, and bonus, among other things. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §7.003. Generally, personal earnings are community pr0perty if earned during marriage. See Williams v. Williams, 246' S.W.3d 207, 21 5 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). | Party Submissions | 6.494929 | 6.809237 | 7.204551 |
On January 14, 2021, the Oklahoma court denied McCarthy’s motion to dismiss and ordered McCarthy to answer the lawsuit; McCarthy answered the Oklahoma case and asserted counterclaims against MVP on January 29, 2021. | Party Submissions | 6.576544 | 6.711597 | 7.339524 |
The treatment referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall as a minimum not be less favourable than that which is granted with regard to investments by investors of any third state. | Legal Decisions | 9.915648 | 8.274026 | 11.942193 |
Here, the evidence shows that Husband owned his home before the current marriage as a result of prior divorce proceedings. (6RR D 754– 760). The house was titled solely in Husband’s name and under the inception of title doctrine was unquestionably Husband’s separate property. (5RR 38:14–21). During the marriage, the parties elected to refinance the house mortgage. (5RR 39:1–11, 40:1–23). Wife took charge of the process and interfaced with the lender and title company. The deed executed by the parties as part of the refinance indicates both Husband and Wife as grantors, and Husband and Wife as grantees. (5RR 40:15– 23, 41:12–25, 43:3–25, 44:1-4; 3RR 141:18–25, 142:1–24; 6RR B 584–589). Husband testified that it was “strange” that the deed referred to Wife as grantor because she had no ownership interest to grant and he thought the title company got confused. | Party Submissions | 5.942967 | 6.029873 | 6.601528 |
S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 841 (Tex. 2010). | Party Submissions | 3.507008 | 4.200554 | 5.048914 |
The decision on review shall set forth: (i) the specific reason or reasons for the denial; (ii) specific references to the pertinent Plan provisions on which the denial is based; (iii) a statement that the Claimant is entitled to receive, upon request and free of charge, reasonable access to and copies of all documents, records, or other information relevant (as defined above) to the Claimant’s claim; and (iv) a statement describing any voluntary appeal procedures offered by the plan and a statement of the Claimant’s right to bring an action under Section 502(a) of ERISA. | Contract | 2.407232 | 2.86634 | 3.264966 |
Claimant s’ Memorial on the Merits Friday, 1 March 2024 Respondent’s Identification of Preliminary Objections and Request for Bifurcation Friday, 12 April 2024 Claimants’ Response to the Request for Bifurcation Friday, 24 May 2024 Tribunal’s Decision on Bifurcation Friday, 21 June 2024 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction Friday, 27 September 2024 Claimant s’ Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction Friday, 3 January 2025 Parties to identify witnesses and experts for cross-examination, if any Friday, 31 January 2025 Pre-hearing CMC Friday, 14 February 2025 Hearing on Jurisdiction (by video-conference) 10-11 March 2025 (12 March 2025 in reserve) If the Tribunal upholds its jurisdiction, a new calendar will be set for the merits phase. | Legal Decisions | 3.798389 | 3.776756 | 3.939097 |
The court of appeals also committed an error of law by holding Petitioners cannot bring a premises defect claim where there is no physical defect, which is an issue of such importance to the state’s jurisprudence that it should be corrected. See TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1(a)(5). Finally, this Court has not yet decided whether Texas recognizes a common law duty for owners and operators of public pools to provide lifeguards and make the premises safe, and this Court should address an important question of state law that was decided by the court of appeals. | Party Submissions | 7.094857 | 8.546744 | 7.806476 |
These documents were co ntained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden. | Legal Decisions | 13.390581 | 13.452183 | 14.155488 |
The number of Restricted Stock Units, vesting schedule of the Restricted Stock Units, and Award Date with respect to this Award, all of which are accessible to you through your brokerage account with the Company’s designated brokerage firm (“the Designated Broker”), are hereby incorporated into this Agreement by reference if not set forth above. | Contract | 8.267981 | 7.665128 | 8.474465 |
Synopsis Employee brought action against employer alleging bad faith denial of reasonable and timely workers' compensation benefits. The 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, John J. Specia, Jr., J., granted summary judgment to employer. Employee appealed. The San Antonio Court of Appeals, Green, J., 21 S.W.3d 414, affirmed. Employee petitioned for review. The Supreme Court held that it would grant employee's petition for review and remand for appropriate action. | Party Submissions | 5.496981 | 5.400754 | 5.488665 |
But while the facts here stem from the sanctions case, as explained in more detail below, this case is different, cleaner, less complicated, and deserving of another look. This case raises important statutory and common law questions of first impression unrelated to the sanctions case. | Party Submissions | 15.217662 | 17.701347 | 18.466635 |
Before this Court stayed all proceedings below during the pendency of the petition for review, the parties—including Rafiei—were participating in discovery in the trial court.1 The Court knows that because Rafiei argued that he wanted to continue with discovery. Rafiei’s Response to Appellant’s Motion to Stay Trial Court Proceedings (July 10, 2023), p. 4. | Party Submissions | 9.018791 | 11.572508 | 11.314844 |
Possession 1. The fact of having or holding property in one's power; the exercise of dominion over property. 2. The right under which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object. 3. Civil law. The detention or use of a physical thing with the intent to hold it as one's own. 4. (usu. pl.) Something that a person owns or controls. | Party Submissions | 7.233634 | 7.851753 | 7.349293 |
First : MVP’s argument hinges on the hope that this Court does not review the record. While MVP’s brief trumpets “waiver” on almost every page, the record does not support this argument—or the court of appeals’ waiver holding. Unlike the cases relied on by MVP (discussed below), RLB never once conceded that the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law clause and waiver language applied to RLB and its claims. To the contrary, RLB repeatedly disagreed with the assertion that these MCC provisions applied to it through the Subcontract. R.0335 (MCC is only “ostensibly incorporated into the Subcontract”), R.0343 (MCC is only “allegedly” incorporated into the Subcontract), R.0684-85 (“RLB has not waived its rights regarding the forum selection clause or the choice of law clause in the [MCC] that MVP considers RLB as not having any rights under”). RLB also repeatedly sought to hold MVP to its burden of proof and raised numerous arguments to dispute the relief MVP sought in the trial court: abatement. R.0340, 0348-49, 0682. | Party Submissions | 8.655294 | 8.358414 | 9.045674 |
Mexico’s obligations toward First Majestic, the Tribunal does not need to deal with the Claimant’s procedural arguments referred to in para. 48 above. | Legal Decisions | 18.761887 | 25.710333 | 28.003521 |
To require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on the impacts of seasonal and nonresident homeownership on data collected by the Bureau of the Census, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 5.408366 | 5.419417 | 5.205791 |
This renders Resolution No. 141 a “measure taken in wilful disregard of due process and proper procedure ”, which is another articulation of arbitrariness according to EDF v. Romania ’s definition. | Legal Decisions | 30.42705 | 35.08436 | 36.97436 |
Weatherford now asks the Court to bypass the jurisdictional and definitional deficiencies upon which the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Weatherford’s claims, and instead focus on statutory interpretation that is not ripe for analysis in the absence of underlying jurisdictional facts. There is no deviation from this Court’s precedent by the Trial Court and Court of Appeals, as neither forum needed to perform a SWDA substantive law analysis in the absence of requisite jurisdictional facts. The Court should therefore deny Weatherford’s Petition, as Weatherford has failed to invoke any waiver of Midland’s immunity to its SWDA contribution claims. | Party Submissions | 10.497941 | 10.664004 | 10.932384 |
This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results. | Party Submissions | 4.423625 | 3.996976 | 5.107457 |
Citing De La Riva and Alonzo, among others, the court held the pathologist was not qualified. Id. Although he was “undoubtedly an experienced pathologist, [] there is nothing in the report or curriculum vitae explicitly addressing whether, or how, his vast experience as a pathologist qualifies him to opine on whether appellants’ negligence caused [decedent’s] injuries” related to a fall from the patient’s bed. Id. | Party Submissions | 12.065375 | 11.562069 | 13.425122 |
Perú ,239 Abaclat c. Argentina240 y SGS c. Paraguay241 para concluir que la jurisprudencia internacional ha establecido elementos que ilustran el tipo de actuaciones soberanas por parte de órganos o entidades estatales, que van más allá de un rol puramente contractual respecto de los inversionistas y sus inversiones, y que efectivamente comprometen la responsabilidad 233 Contestación a Objeciones, ¶ 110. 234 Dúplica sobre Objeciones, ¶ 106, con referencia a la Contestación a Objeciones, ¶¶ 76-78. 235 Dúplica sobre Objeciones, ¶ 107, con referencia a la Contestación a Objeciones, ¶¶ 120-145. 236 Dúplica sobre Objeciones, ¶ 108, con referencia a Convial Callao S.A. y CCI -Compañía de Concesiones de Infraestructura S.A. c. República del Perú, Caso CIADI No. ARB/10/2, Laudo Final, 21 de mayo de 2013 (CL-143), ¶ 517. 237 Dúplica sobre Objeciones, ¶ 109. 238 Siemens A.G. c. República Argentina, Caso CIADI No. ARB/02/8, Laudo, 17 de enero de 2007 (CL-105), ¶ 254. 239 Convial Callao S.A. y CCI -Compañía de Concesiones de Infraestructura S.A. c. República del Perú, Caso CIADI No. ARB/10/2, Laudo Final, 21 de mayo de 2013 (CL-143), ¶ 513. 240 Abaclat y otros c. República Argentina, Caso CIADI No. ARB/07/5, Decisión sobre Jurisdicción y Admisibilidad, 4 de agosto de 2011 ( RL-14 ), ¶ 238. 241 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. c. República del Paraguay, Caso CIADI No. ARB/07/29, Laudo, 10 de febrero de 2012 ( CL-152 ), ¶ 73. | Legal Decisions | 3.004178 | 3.527649 | 3.118938 |
This conclusion of law contains both a conclusion of law that “a ny and all of Backes ’ s obligations as Guarantor under his Repayment Guaranty have terminated and been discharged pursuant to the Termination Clause ” and a finding of fact that “‘ construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco Building ’ was completed when THC approved the second Part C to the Texas application for State Tax Credits and thereafter the proceeds of the State Tax Credits were ready to be paid, which occurred on February 11, 2020.” Although Osprin challenges the conclusion of law, in the body of its brief, it does not challenge the fact-finding that the historic tax credit rehabilitation was completed when THC approved the second Part C and the state tax credits were ready to be paid. | Party Submissions | 11.476489 | 11.715564 | 12.039734 |
In public international law, the doctrine of estoppel protects legitimate expectations of States induced by the conduct of another State. The term stems from common and Anglo-American law, without being identical with the different forms found in domestic law. It is supported by the protection of good faith (bona fide) in the traditions of civil law. Despite varying perceptions and definitions in doctrine and practice, the following features and essential components of estoppel in public international law are generally accepted today, as stated by Judge Spender in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case, “the principle operates to prevent a State contesting before the Court a situation contrary to a clear and unequivocal representation previously made by it to another State, either expressly or impliedly, on which representation the other State was, in the circumstances, entitled to rely and in fact did rely, and as a result that other State has been prejudiced or the State making it has secured some benefit or advantage for itself.” (Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear [Cambodia v Thailand] [Merits] [Dissenting Opinion of Sir Percy Spender] 143–44).542 507. The Tribunal also subscribes to the position summarized in the Pope & Talbot v. | Legal Decisions | 8.169266 | 9.006425 | 8.453819 |
This dataset presents the data used in the paper "SaulLM-7B: Pioneering the first Legal Large Language Model" in "6.3 Perplexity Analysis" section. The dataset contains the perplexity scores of SaulLM-7B, Llama2-7B and Mistral-7B across a corpora of recent text.
We proceeded to standardize the data by removing any special characters using unicodedata normalization. We also filtered for text that have proper punctuation and a minimum length of 20 tokens. Additionally, we also filtered the text by using a Naive Bayes classifier that aims to classifiy if a given text is a consice piece of text or not.
The corpora consists of four distinct categories, each serving different purposes:
Party Submissions: This category includes documents submitted by parties involved in legal proceedings. These submissions were sourced exclusively from Texas briefs filed after October 1, 2023.
Legal Decisions: Documents in this category are legal judgments or rulings. They were obtained from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), specifically filtering for decisions made after October 2023.
Contracts: This category comprises contractual agreements. The contracts were sourced from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. Specifically, data from 2024 Q1 was focused on to ensure the exclusion of any data previously seen by the model.
Legislation: This category encompasses bills introduced in the United States Congress. It includes bills submitted to either the U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate after October 1, 2023.
