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قد استحسن أهل الدربة بالحرب أنه إذا أراد بيات العدو، وهجمت فرقة من العسكر قاصدة وسط العدو، ويحيط الباقون بهم، ثم تصبح الفرقة التى قصدت إلى وسط العدو، فإنهم إذا صاحوا فى وسطهم على حين غفلة أخذتهم الدهشة والذعر | Men, practiced in war, have deemed it advisable, should one desire to raid the enemy by night, to have a group of the army attack by aiming at the middle of the enemy’s [formation], while the remainder [of the army] covers them. Then the group which had aimed at the middle of the enemy should shout; for, if they shout in their midst at a time [when the enemy is] unaware [of the raiders’ presence], confusion and ruin will overtake the enemy. |
فإذا طلبوا أطراف عسكرهم وجدوا باقى العسكر الذى بينهم قد أحاط بهم، ويأخذ الذين هم خارج العسكر فى الرمى عليهم بالنشاب من الخارج؛ فإن لذلك فى الليل والظلمة أثر عظيم فى المحاربة. | And should the latter seek to use the extremities of their army, they will find that the remainder of the [attacking] army between them [and their middle components] have surrounded them and taken those who are outside [the regular formation] by shooting arrows at them from beyond [the formation]; for, this action, carried out in the night and in great darkness, has a great effect on the combatants. |
وإن استطاعوا أن يعقروا دواب عسكر العدو ويجرحوها بالرماح بعد أن يقطعوا أرسانها وشكلها فعلوا ذلك؛ فإنها إذا أطلقت من الشكل والأرسان وأصابها الحديد جالت فى العسكر لما نالها من الألم، مع ما يحصل لها من هول الأصوات وإزعاجها. | And if they (i.e., the raiding party) are able to hamstring the beasts of the enemy’s army and wound them with spears, having [already] cut their halters and shackles, they should do this; for, if their halters and shackles are cut, and steel [weapons] smite them, they will run amok about [the enemy’s] army, because of the pain visited upon them, besides being terrified and startled by the loud voices. |
مما يستحسن فى ذلك أن القوم الذين يبيتون العدو إذا خالطوهم لا يثبتون فى مكان واحد، بل يكثرون الجولان فيه؛ فإنه أشد إرعاباً وأعظم نكاية، وأوهن للعدو. ومن اللازم أن يجعل لهم علامة فيما بينهم يتنادون بها مثل فرج الله أو نصر الله، وما شاكل ذلك [ليمتازوا] [عن العدو بذلك]. | It is advised in this matter that the group which is attacking the enemy by night, when they fall upon the enemy, should not confine themselves to a single place but should increase their movements within [the enemy formation]; for [such movements] magnify the terror, greatly increase the injuries and the [consequent] weakening of the enemy. Further, it is necessary that they be given a battle cry which they shout to one another, such as “May God gladden”, or “May God grant victory”, or similar cries, in order that they may be distinguished from the enemy. |
البابُ الرابع عشر: فى اختيار موضع المصاف للقتال وزمانه. وفيه فصلان. | BOOK FOURTEEN: about the selection of positions of the battle- rankings and the time [to carry this out]. In it are two chapters. |
الفصل الأول: فى اختيار موضع المصاف. | Chapter One: about the selection of position of the rankings. |
قد استحسنوا أن يكون موضع المصاف للقتال بحيث يسند أهل العسكر ظهورهم فى مصاف القتال إلى جبل [أو نهر أو تل]، بحيث يأمنوا هجوم العدو عليهم من ظهورهم، وخروج الكمين من ورائهم [كما تقدم فى النزول فى الطريق] على ما تقدم بيانه فى الباب العاشر. | [The experts] have preferred that the position of the battle-rankings be such that the men of the army, ranked for battle, will have their backs against a mountain or river or hill; so that, with respect to their backs they will be secure from an attack by the enemy against them, and [from] the springing of an ambush behind them; [rankings] similar to those which preceded about the [army’s] camping while en route [to battle] according to the explanation which was given in Book Ten. |
فإن لم يتيهأ له شئ من ذلك احتفر الخنادق، واستظهر بأكمان الكمائن من خلف عسكره، لتخرج الكمائن على العدو إن قصد ظهر عسكره. وعليه أن يحرص أن يكون موضع قلب العسكر على جبل أو شرف مرتفع صلب ليس فيه غبار | Should nothing like this be available, [the commander of the army] digs trenches and fortifies himself by setting up ambushes to spring against the enemy, should he be moving against the rear of the army. [The commander of the army] should see to it that the position of the center of the army is on a mountain or on a solid, raised place in which there is no dust. |
وصاحب العسكر فى وسطهم ليشرف على العسكرين، ويعاين ما يدبره فى أصحابه وعدوه من انتهاز فرصة، وسد خلل، وغير ذلك. | The commander of the army should be in the middle of them (i.e., the center group of the army), in order to be raised above the two armies and to see what takes place in his cohorts and the enemy’s by way of lucky opportunities and the plugging of gaps and such matters. |
فإن لم يجد إلا منخفضاً من الأرض لا يرى منه العسكرين، ولم يكن من اللقاء بد، فعليه أن يخلف فى القلب نائباً من أهل الدربة فى الحرب والثبات وحسن التدبير، ويمضى فى حماية إلى الميمنة مما يلى جناح القلب. | If he finds nothing but a depressed area in which he cannot see the two armies. and if the engagement is unavoidable, he should leave behind in the center formation as deputy one experienced in war, resolute, and skilled in the management [of troops], while he passes on, under protection to the right flank which is adjacent to the center wing. |
فإن وجد هناك مستشرفاً أشرف منه، وإن لم يجد هناك [مستشرفاً وطلبه] فى ناحية الميسرة. فإن لم يجد وأمكن أن ينصب له فى القلب شئ يعلو عليه ليشرف منه على العسكرين فعل. | Should he find there a raised place, he should ascend it; if he does not find one there, he seeks it on the left flank. If he cannot find one [anywhere], he should, if possible, erect in the center something upon which he can stand, so that he can overlook the two armies from [its height]. |
الفصل الثانى: فى اختيار وقت المصاف. | Chapter Two: about the choice of the time for [battle] ranking. |
يجب على صاحب العسكر أن يجتهد أن يكون مصافه فى وقت يكون الشمس أو الريح فيه من وراء ظهر عسكره. أما استدبار الشمس فلأنه إذا استقبلها وقع شعاعها على السلاح المصقول من السيوف والخوذ وغيرها | The commander of the army should strive to effect the ranking at a time when the sun and wind are coming from behind the rear of his army. As for having the sun come from behind: this is done because, if it comes from in front, its rays fall upon the burnished blades of the swords and [upon] the helmets and other [metallic paraphernalia of battle]. |
فيلحق شعاعها الأعين، فتكل الأبصار عن النظر، وربما أثر فى بعضها ذهاب البصر بالكلية. وأما استدبار الريح ليسلم مما يلقيه الريح فى العيون من التراب والرمل، فإنه متى سفت الريح التراب والرمل فى الأعين دعى ذلك إلى إطباق الجفون مما يصيبها من ذلك. | And [too] its rays reach the eyes ,dimming the sight; causing, perhaps, the total deprivation of sight of some of [the men]. As for having the wind come from behind: it is so that the [warrior] will be protected from what the wind throws in the eyes of dust and sand; for, when the wind raises the dust and sand to the eyes, this induces the lowering of the eyelids against what threatens [the eyes]. |
وقد نهى عن إطباق الجفون فى الحرب عند اللقاء، ولو أنه يرى السلاح يكاد يدخل فى عينه، لأن بإطباق الجفون يصير المقاتل كأنه أعمى، والأعمى لا نفع له فى الحرب. فإن لم يمكنه استدبار الريح جعل مجراها فى طرف ميمنة إلى ميسرة عدوه | It has been deemed foolhardy to lower the eyelids in war, [particularly] while engaged in battle, even though one were to see the sword almost enter one’s eye; because, by lowering the eyelids, the warrior would become [comparable] to one who is blinded, and the blind man is useless in war. If it is not possible to have the wind come from the rear, its approach should be such that it sweeps in from the end of one’s right flank towards the left flank of the enemy. |
ليقع [اشتراك عسكر العدو] مع عسكره فى ضررها فيناله مثل ما ينال أهل عسكره، فإن يمكنه ذلك حرض على انحرافها ما استطاع ليأخذ العدو منها بنصيبه. فإن لم يمكنه ذلك، وألح العدو فى طلب القتال فى ذلك الوقت | thereby occasioning the sharing by the enemy’s army with one’s own of the [wind’s] detriment. Thus he sustains [of disadvantage] the like of that which is sustained by the men of one’s own army. If it prove possible, [the commander of the army] should so maneuver that the wind will come from a direction such that the enemy takes [of the wind’s disadvantageous direction] his full share. If it is not possible and the enemy persists in seeking battle at this time. |
أو تغيرت الريح وهو فى المصاف، أما الفرسان بالنزول عن خيلهم وقتالهم رجالة متزاحمين كأنهم رجل واحد؛ فإن إصابة الريح للفرسان أشد من إصابتها للرجالة لارتفاع الفارس عن الأرض وانخفاض الراجل بوقوفه عليها. | or if the wind changes while he is in formation, the commander, apropos of the rankings, should order the cavalry to dismount from their horses, and fight as infantry, crowded together as though they were one man; for the wind’s pressure against the cavalry is stronger than its pressure against the infantry, because of the cavalryman’s eminence about the ground, and the infantryman’s lowness” through standing upon it. |
البابُ الخامِسُ عشر: فى بيان إكمان الكمائن وتدبير أمورها. وفيه فصلان. | BOOK FIFTEEN, about the explanation of the setting up of ambushers and the management of their affairs. In it are two chapters. |
الفصل الأول: فى ذكر صفة رجال الكمين وخيله والمكان الذى يكمنون فيه. | Chapter One: about the account of the qualities of the men of the ambush, and of the horses for it, and the place in which to spring the ambush. |
أما الرجالة فينبغى [أن يكونوا أشجع] فرسان العسكر، وأدربهم بالحرب، وأعرفهم بالتجارب؛ فإنهم ينفردون عن العسكر، ويكونون فى مكان ليس له فيه من يعينهم ولا ينجدهم من أهل العسكر لبعدهم [عنهم. ويتعين] مع ذلك أن يكون عليه مقدماً عارفاً بأمور الحرب، درباً بمحاربها | As for the men of it: it is necessary that they be among the most courageous of the cavalrymen of the army, the most experienced in war, the most adept in exploits; for they will be isolated from the army and will be in a place in which none of the men of the army can help them, or relieve them, because of their distance from them. Besides this, [the commander of the army] must place over them an officer who is knowledgeable of the affairs of wars, experienced in their battles. |
عالماً بأحوال الأماكن الصالحة للاختفاء، ليكون ذلك أعون لحصول الغرض من أمر الكمين فى اختفائه حيث يجب الاختفاء، وظهوره حيث يقتضى الظهور. وأما خيلهم فيتعين أن تكون ثابتة الحوافر، سالمة الظهور، عرية عن الحرن والجماع، على ما تقدم فى خيل الطلائع | expert about the proper places for concealment; for this will be more helpful in the accomplishment of the aim of the ambush relative to its concealment, when concealment is called for, and its springing forth when this is ordained. As for its horses: it is necessary that they be firm-footed, sound of back, free of stubborness and sexual restiveness, according to what has preceded about the horses for the scouting party. |
وأن لا يكون فيها من الخلق ما يستدل به عليهم حال أكمانهم من الصهيل ونحوه. [وينبغى أن تكون] خيولهم كلها ذكوراً أو كلها إناثاً؛ فإن اجتماع ذكور الخيول وإناثها ربما أوجب إثارة جلبة من صهيل الخيل أو صياحها | And there should not be in their temperament anything by which they can be recognized during the time of ambush, such as neighing or the like. It is imperative that their horses be all stallions or all mares; for, if stallions and mares are grouped together in the same party, it may prove a clear evidence [of the party’s presence] by their neighing or snorting. |
فيؤدى ذلك إلى العلم بالكمين، وربما جر إلى حصول الضرر بجميع العساكر. وبالجملة فكل أمر يظهر به ما يروم صاحب الكمين ستره فإنه يتعين تركه. | thus giving [the enemy] knowledge of the ambush, and perhaps this will lead to the visiting of injury upon all of the army. In general, the commander of the ambush should remove anything which would reveal that which he wants to conceal. |
وأما الموضع الذى يكمنون فيه فإنه يجب أن يكون خفياً مستتراً، وأن يكون مما يحتمل الإقامة فيه إذا دعت الحاجة إلى طول الإقامة، بأن يكون فيه الماء والمرعى وسائر ما يحتاج إليه أهل الكمين بحسب الإمكان. | As for the place in which to conceal the ambushers: it is necessary that it be secret, hidden and that establishment in it be bearable if the need calls for long standing; and that there be in it water and pasturage and the rest of what the men of the ambushing party need, as far as possible. |
الفصل الثانى: فى تدبير أمور الكمائن. | Chapter Two: about the management of the affairs of the ambushers. |
أول ما يتعين على أهل الكمين أنهم يقيمون لهم ديدبانا يطلع على أخبار العدو ومتجددات أمور العسكر، ويعرفهم بذلك. ويجب أن يكون ذلك الديدبان ممن يوثق به ويتحقق نصيحته؛ فإنه إذا كان بخلاف ذلك ربما مال إلى العدو، فدل على الكمين، فأخذوا بدلالته. | The first thing incumbent upon the men of the ambushing party is that they establish for themselves a watchman, dayduban, to scout for news of the enemy and the latest [situation] in the affairs of the army and acquaint them about them. It is necessary that this watchman be one of those who are trustworthy and whose counsel has been proven. For, if he were of the opposite stripe, he might incline towards the enemy and reveal the ambush and they would be taken at his indication [of the place]. |
وعلى أهل الكمين أن يتجنبوا التعرض للصيد من الطير والوحش مما حولهم؛ فإن ذلك مما يوجب نفار الطير والوحش، وربما رأى أحد من أهل البصيرة بالحرب نفار الصيد فاستدل به على أنه إنما نفر من منفر له، فىتوصل بذلك [إلى العلم بالكمين] فيؤخذ. | The ambushers should avoid hunting birds or wild beasts from the surrounding area; for, this induces the flight of the birds and beasts and, perhaps, one of the people of the shrewdness about war sees the flight of the hunted [bird or beast] and concludes that it was frightened by a frightener, and he connects this [fact] to his knowledge about ambushes, and [the ambushing party] would be captured. |
ويتعين بأن يكون وقت ظهور الكمين فى حال غفلة العدو، وبأن يكون ذلك غدوة النهار، أو عند حط العدو عن دوابهم وإراحتها، بأن يكون ذلك فى أخر ساعة فى أيام الصيف أو أبرد ساعة فى أيام الشتاء. | It is required that the time of the springing of the ambush be at a time of inattention [on the part] of the enemy, this being the period of the oncoming morning (between dawn and sunrise); or while the enemy alights from their beasts and sets them to rest, during the hottest hour [of the daylight] in summer or the coldest hour of the day in winter. |
وينبغى أن يكون خروجهم من الكمين على العدو كراديس كراديس متقطعة من غير أن يبعد بعضهم من بعض، وأن يسرعوا الرجعة إلى مكمنهم إذا لم يظفروا بحاجتهم، وإن حصل ملاقاتهم العدو [بصدورهم للقتال] وأظهر كل واحد منهم ما عنده من القوة والبسالة. | Further, their going out from the ambush against the enemy must be in separate squadron formations, kurdusah, pl. karadis, not far distant from one another; and they should hasten their return to their place of ambush if they do not accomplish their objective. If they should meet the enemy, then they should engage him and each one of them should exhibit what he possesses of strength and valor. |
البابُ السَادس عشر: فى بيان كيفية تعبئة العساكر عند المصاف للقتال. وفيه ثلاثة فصول. | BOOK SIXTEEN: about the description of the method of arraying the soldiers when they are mobilized for battle. In it are three chapters. |
الفصل الأول: فيما إذا كان العدو المتصدى للحرب قليلا، ويختلف ذلك باختلاف حاله فى القلة. | Chapter One: about that which [should obtain] if the opposing army [arrayed for battle] were small and this is related to a difference of degree of smallness [of numbers on both sides]. |
فإن كان المتصدى للحرب واحداً واجه خصمه بالقتال، ولا عمل له غير ذلك؛ فإن اجتمع على واحد اثنان أخذ عنهما جانباً، وأخذ [فى دفع كل منهما عنه] وإن كان المتصدى للحرب ثلاثة نفر فيكون واحد منهم قلباً، وواحد ميمنة، وواحد ميسرة. | Should there be but one person girding for war, one engages his adversary [face to face] in battle, and no other action but this is possible for him. If two combine against one, he draws to one side and tries to defend himself against each of them. If the opponent [girded] for war be three, one of them will be in the center, one of them on the left flank and one of them on the right flank. |
ومنهم من ذهب إلى أنه إذا اجتمع ثلاثة لا يترتبون على هذا الوجه، ولكن يتحفظ كل رجل منهم ظهر صاحبه وهو باب عظيم فى الحرب، وعليه عمل كثير من أهل الدربة بالحروب. وإن كان المتصدى للحرب تسعة نفر جعل القلب ثلاثة نفر، والميسرة ثلاثة نفر، والميمنة ثلاثة نفر. | Some maintain [however] that when there are three gathered [to fight],they are not arranged in this manner, but rather each of them protects the back of his companion. This is a great chapter in war; [only] those experienced in wars have practiced it. If the persons girded for war be nine, three are in the center, three on the right flank, and three on the left flank. |
وإن كان المتصدى للحرب اثنين جعل كل واحد منهم ظهره لظهر صاحبه إن تفرق العدو عليها، وإلا واجهاه إن كان من جهة واحدة. وإن كان المتصدى للحرب أربعة ترتب ثلاثة منهم قلباً وميمنة وميسرة على ما تقدم | If there be but two readied for battle, the back of each is placed to that of his companion [if] the enemy separates to strike against them. Otherwise they can face him if he comes from one direction. If there are four poised for battle, three array themselves as center, right flank and left flank as has been explained. |
واعتزل واحد منهم ناحية إن لاحت له فرصة من العدو وانتهزها، وإن احتاج أصحابه إلى معاضدة عاضدهم، وهو أنفع من اختلاطه بهم، إلا أن يحملوا كردوساً واحداً فتكون الأربعة مجتمعين. | and one of them retires to the side, so that if an opportunity [to attack] the enemy appears, he can seize it; or if his companions need help, he can assist them. This is preferable to mixing with them, except when they are mounted as a cavalry squadron, [in which case] the four should attack en masse. |
وإن كان العدو ستة ترتبوا على ما تقدم: فى القلب اثنين، وفى الميمنة اثنين، وفى الميسرة اثنين. وإن كان العدو ثمانية فالأحسن أن يترتب ستة على ما تقدم، ويجعل الاثنان الباقيان كمينا؛ لأن لخروج الكمين عند وقوع القتال بغتة روعة عظيمة. | If there are six poised for battle, they should be arrayed according to what has preceded: two in the center, two on the right flank and two on the left flank. If there are eight, it is best to arrange six in the manner described above, and employ the remaining two in ambush, because springing unexpectedly from concealment while the battle is taking place can cause a great tumult. |
وذهب بعض أهل الحرب إلى أن العدو المتصدى للحرب إذا كان قليلا فى [الجملة أنهم] لا يترتبون، وإنما يحملون على العدو كردوساً واحداً؛ فإن الاجتماع أعون لهم. وبالجملة، فالأمر فى ذلك راجع إلى اجتهاد المقاتل بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال. | Some warriors hold the opinion that, if the opposing enemy’s battle strength be generally small, the army should not array themselves [as has been described], but rather should attack the enemy as a single cavalry division. Massing is better for them. In general, the procedure for this is dependent upon the diligence of the combatant to the degree that the situation demands. |
الفصل الثانى: فيما إذا كان العدو المتصدى للحرب كثيراً. | Chapter Two: about that which [should be done] if the [numerical strength] of the enemy, poised for battle, were great. |
وقد اصطلحوا على أنه إذا كان العدو كثيراً كالعسكر الكبير جعل العسكر خمسة أحياز: الحيز الأول فى مقدمة العسكر، وهو الذى عليه العمدة، فيجب أن يكون من فيه من الفرسان فى غاية القوة والشجاعة والاستظهار والدربة بالحرب. | [The experts] have judged it proper, if the [numerical strength] of the enemy were great, such as that of the great army, to put the army in five lines. The first line will be the vanguard of the army and [much] depends upon it. It is necessary that the cavalrymen in it be outstanding for strength and courage and conquering spirit and experience in war. |
فإنهم الذين فى نحر العدو، وعليهم اعتماد من وراءهم من الأحياز. وقد اصطلحوا على تقسيم المقدمة إلى ثلاثة أجزاء: القلب، والميمنة والميسرة؛ فالقلب هو الذى فى الوسط، ويعنون به قلب العسكر | for they will be at the throat of the enemy, and those behind them of the [other] lines depend upon them. [The experts] judged it proper to divide the vanguard into three parts: a center, a right flank and a left flank. The center is the one which is in the middle and they mean by it the center of the [entire] army. |
والميمنة ما على بين القلب؛ والميسرة ما على يساره [ولكل من الثلاثة حكم يخصّه] وقد يسمون الميمنة والميسرة المجنبتين، وتسمى الميمنة والميسرة الجناحين، فيقال جناح الميمنة، وجناح الميسرة [وربما يسمى كل من الميمنة والميسرة جناحاً]. | The right flank is that which is to the right of the center and the left flank is that which is to its left. And to each of the three is a role special to it. They call the right and left flanks al-mujannabatain, “the two advanced guards”, and the right and left flanks are [also] called al-janahain, “the two wings”. Thus one says “the wing of the right flank” and “the wing of the left flank”. Perhaps each [part] of the right flank and of the left flank is called janah, “wing”. |
وقد ينقسم كل من القلب والميمنة والميسرة إلى ثلاثة أجزاء على ما تقدم، فيجعل للقلب قلب وميمنة وميسرة، وللميمنة كذلك، وللميسرة كذلك. ويجعل على كل جزء من هذه الأجزاء مقدما، فتصير فى مقدمة العسكر تسعة مقدمين، ليكون أقرب لتدبير أمرهم | All of the center and of the right flank and of the left flank arc divided into three parts according to what has preceded. Thus one arranges the center [of this vanguard] as a center, a right flank and a left flank. The same is done to the [vanguard’s] right and left flanks. Over each of these sections one places a general, al-muqaddam, making nine such in the vanguard of the army, so that there will be close supervision of their (i.e., the sections’) activity. |
فإن كثرة المقدمين على الفرسان فى أجزاء العسكر مما يزيدها قوة، ويديم ثبوتها، لا سيما إذا كان مع كل مقدم جزء من الجيش. قالوا: ينبغى أن يجعل ما بين جناحى القلب الميمنة الميسرة طريقاً، ويوسع بينهما لتمر فيه الخيل وأرباب المبارزة. | Verily, the great number of the generals of the cavalry in the sections of the army is among that which strengthens the sections and prolongs their steadfastness, especially if with each general there is a section of the army [under his direct command]. [Experts] say it is necessary to place between the [various] wings of the center and of the right and left flanks a clear path, sufficiently wide between [any] two of them to permit the easy passage of the horses and officers [bound] for single combat (al-mubarazih). |
الحيز الثانى وراء الحيز الأول، ويكون فى الترتيب على ثلاثة أجزاء: قلب وميمنة وميسرة على نظير الصف الأول: القلب خلف القلب، والميمنة خلف الميمنة، والميسرة خلف الميسرة. | The second line will be behind the first, and will be arranged in three parts: a center, a right flank and a left flank, corresponding to the ranking of the first: center behind center, right flank behind right flank and left flank behind left flank. |
وقد شرطوا فى هذا الحيز أن تكون فيه مشاهير الفرسان من يكفى فى مثل ذلك ممن عرف بتدبير الحرب، والقيام بمهماتها، والصبر على وقائعها، وصحة الرأي عند ورود المستصعبات فيها. | [The experts] have stipulated that this line should contain celebrated cavaliers, sufficiently comparable to those who are cognizant of the management of war and the execution of its important affairs, patient about its events and clear-headed when its difficulties are manifested. |
الحيز الثالث وراء الحيز الثانى، وهو الموضوع لحفظ الأثقال. وقد علم أنه لا مقام للعسكر إلا بثقله؛ فيجب أن يكون الثقل محفوفاً بمن [يخاف معرة الفرار أكثر مما] يخاف الموت [لأنه لا قوام للعسكر إلا بثقله]. | The third line will be behind the second and it is placed for the protection of the baggage. It has been explained that there can be no operation of the army without its baggage. The baggage must be encompassed by those who fear the stain of running away more than they fear death, for there is no sustenance possible for the army without its baggage. |
الحيز الرابع وراء الثالث، وحكمه أن يكون حافظاً من خلف الأثقال. وقد شرطوا فى هذا الحيز أن يكون فرسانه خفافاً أنجاداً من أهل التجارب فى المعارك. الحيز الخامس وراء الحيز الرابع، وهو الساقة. | The fourth line will be behind the third, and its role is to protect the rear of the baggage. It has been stipulated that the horsemen of this line be light troops, khifaf anjdd, from among the people of exploits on battle fields, [who are capable of quick support]. The fifth line will be behind the fourth line, and it constitutes the rear guard of the army. |
وقد شرطوا [فى هذا الحيز] أن يكون فيه [ذوو] النجدة والبأس ممن يوثق بكفايته مما يندب إليه. وعلى هذا الحيز والحيز الرابع حفظ مؤخر العسكر، والاحتراز من الغارة على مؤخر العسكر حسب الاستطاعة؛ فإن العدو يطمع فى أطراف العسكر. | [The experts] have stipulated that this line should have men of boldness and intrepidity, upon whose sufficiency [the commander] can rely, should he need them. Upon this line and the fourth depends the protection of the rear section of the army and the prevention of predatory incursions against the rear of the army insofar as they are able, for the enemy will be emboldened [to strike] against the extremities of the army. |
الفصل الثالث: فى بيان أشكال الصفوف فى العدو الكثير. | Chapter Three: about the description of the forms of the rankings [should] the enemy be of great numerical strength. |
وقد اختلفوا فى ذلك، فذهب أكثر العارفين بأمور الحرب أن أحسن الصفوف الصف المستوى المنضم بعضه إلى بعض. ويذكر أن ذلك هو مصطلح الفرس قديماً. وقد مدح الله هذه الصفة فى كتابه العزيز، فقال جلت قدرته: “إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ يُحِبُّ ٱلَّذِينَ يُقَٰتِلُونَ فِى سَبِيلِهِ صَفًّا كَأَنَّهُم بُنْيَٰنٌ مَّرْصُوصٌ”. | [Experts] have differed about this. Most of those versed in military affairs hold that the best ranking is that of the straight line, whose parts are joined to each other. It is reported that this was the conventional [method] of the Persians in ancient times. God had commended this method in His Honored Book [when] He said, exalted be His power, God loves those who fight in His way in ranks, as though they were a building well-compacted.” |
وقد استحسن بعض من له دربة بالحرب أن يكون الصف خارجاً من جناحيه، داخلا من صدره، وهو أقوى لقلب الصف وأضعف لجناحيه، [قد كان من] يفعل ذلك يعد لكل طرف من الجناحين كردوساً من الخيل المقومة عوضاً عما هو داخل من صدره. | Some of those experienced in war prefer the ranks to curve out from the wings and in towards the center; thus strengthening the center of the rankings and weakening the wings. He who does this will delegate for each of the wings a squadron of supporting cavalry as compensation for the bending in towards the center. |
وكرهوا أن يكون الصف خارج الصدر، داخل الجناحين؛ فإن فيه ضعفاً للقلب، وإن كان فيه قوة للجناحين. ولذلك كان من يصف صفة كذلك يجعل أهل البأس والنجدة ميمنة وميسرة ليكون أشد للقلب. | They disapprove the curving out of the rankings from the center and in towards the wings, for this weakens the center and strengthens the wings. Thus he who arranges his ranks like this, will station people of bravery and valor on the right and left flanks so as to strengthen the center. |
والمغل من الترك معتادون أن يكون القوم كردوساً واحداً ليتدافعوا على العدو، ويمتنع على كل واحد منهم الهزيمة والرجوع، ولهم بذلك الدربة العظيمة التى ليست لغيرهم. | The Mongols from among the Turkish people accustomed their people [to fight as] a single squadron of cavalry, so that they struggled together against the enemy. Retiring [from the battle] and returning [to it] was denied to each of them. They gained from this great experience which was not [duplicated] by others. |
البابُ السَابع عشر: فيما يجب فعله عند لقاء العدو وقتاله. وفيه ثلاثة فصول. | BOOK SEVENTEEN: about what should be done while encountering the enemy and fighting him. In it are three chapters. |
الفصل الأول: فيما إذا زحف العسكر على العدو [قبل زحف العدو]. | Chapter One: about [what should be done] when the army marches out against the enemy before the enemy marches out. |
وإذا زحفت العساكر على العدو ابتدأ فينبغى أن يكون زحفهم عليه من مكان عال مرتفع عن الأرض، ليكون العسكر أعلى من العدو، ويكون زحفهم إليه بالتثبت والتحفظ والتؤدة. | If the soldiers take the initiative in marching out against the enemy, their march should be from a high place, elevated above the ground so that the army will be higher than the enemy. Their going forth should be steady and cautious and slow. |
ويكون أمام الخيالة من الرجالة من يدب عنها ويحمى الفرسان من رجاله العدو؛ فإن رجالة العسكر متى هزموا رجالة العدو ربما تبعهم فرسان العسكر فى الانهزام. وإذا هزمت رجالة العدو رجعت على فرسانهم دعا ذلك خيلهم إلى الجفل، وربما دام طلب رجالة العسكر لهم | There should be in front of the cavalry those of the infantry who will defend it and protect it from the infantry of the enemy. When the infantry of the army have put the enemy’s infantry to flight, it may happen that the cavalry of the army will follow upon them in the work of routing. If the infantry of the enemy is routed, and falls back upon their cavalry, it causes their horses to panic and their pursuit by the infantry of the army might be continued. |
فيكون ذلك سبباً لكسر العدو وانهزامه. وإن احتاج القلب إلى الزحف على العدو، وسار أهله الهوينا قليلا قليلا، بلا ركض ولا عجلة، فإنه إذا حدثت عجلة فى الحركة إلى العدو ربما خطر لمن خلف الصف أنهم صاروا إلى العدو ليكونوا معه، فانزعجوا لذلك وتأثروا له. | This will be the cause of the break-up of the enemy and his rout. If the center is required to march out against the enemy, its men should proceed slowly, little by little, without rushing or haste. If haste in movement towards the enemy occurs, perhaps those behind the [center’s] ranking will think that they have arrived at the enemy’s [position] and that they will be [engaged] with him. They will become disturbed because of this and will be affected by it. |
وإذا حملت طائفة من العسكر على العدو، ثم اضطروا إلى الرجوع إلى مواقفهم، فعليهم أن يتجنبوا قبح الرجعة والسرعة فيها، لما فى ذلك من الدلالة على الخوف والهلع. بل يكون رجوعهم على أتم الهيئات والثبات فى الرجوع | If a troop of men attack the enemy and then are required to retire to their [original] station, they should avoid anything unseemly or hurried in their retreat, for such would indicate fear and anxiety. Rather their retreat should be the most ordered and steadiest of retreats. |
فإن سوء رجعته قد يؤدى إلى طمع العدو فيه، فيتبعه العدو، فتصير هزيمة. وإن كان [الذى حمل على العدو وهم] أهل القلب بأجمعهم واحتاجوا إلى الرجوع رجعوا القهقرى إلى وراء ظهورهم انحرافاً وازورارا بالنظر، وميل بعض المناكب والروس. | The unseemliness of their retreat could enhance the covetousness of the enemy towards [the army]. He will pursue it, and rout will ensue. If the men who attacked the enemy were those of the center in their totality and they are compelled to retreat, they should retreat to a place behind their backs, swerving and looking sideways, some inclining shoulders and heads. |
وتكون الصدور مواجهة لصدور العدو، ولا تنحرف عنها حتى يصلوا إلى مواقفهم. وهم فى ذلك مظهرون للقوة، داعين بالظفر وطلب الثبات والنصر، بحيث يسمعون أصحابهم ذلك؛ فإن ذلك مما يشعر بحضور القلب وقوته فى مثل هذه الحالة التى تضعف فيها القلوب. | and [with] chests in the direction of the chests of the enemy. They should not cease doing this until they reach their [original] positions. While doing this, they [must] display power [by] calling for victory, exhorting steadiness and conquest, so that their companions hear [this call]. This gives notice of the presence of the center and of its power in such cases where the hearts grow faint. |
وإذا حمل أحد من القلب، وانتهز الفرصة من العدو ثم رجع، انعطف متياسراً إلى الميسرة، أو إلى ما بين جناح القلب والميسرة. وإن كان الذين حملوا هم من أهل الميمنة رجعوا القهقرى إلى مواقفهم | If one of the men of the center attacks and takes advantage of an opportunity against the enemy (i.e.. for individual combat) and then has to retire, he should incline leftwards and towards the left flank or towards what is between the wings of the center and left flank. If those who attack are men of the right flank, they should retire, [if forced to], by walking backwards to their [original] positions. |
وإن حمل أحد منهم وانتهز فرصة ثم أراد الرجوع عطف متياسراً إلى القلب أو إلى ما بين جناح القلب والميمنة؛ فإن ذلك أسهل له فى رجوعه من أن يرجع إلى الميسرة وما يقرب منها. | Should one of the men of the right flank attack and take advantage of an opportunity [against] the enemy and [then] wishes to retire, he should incline leftwards towards the center or towards what is between the center wing and right flank. This latter method is easier in retreating than retiring towards the left flank and its vicinity would be. |
وإن كان الذى حمل جميع الميسرة رجعوا القهقرى إلى مواقفهم كما تقدم فى الميمنة، وإن حمل أحد من الميسرة ثم رجع عطف متياسراً، فإن عطف الأيسر من الميسرة [بعد الحملة] إلى نحو القلب أيسر منه إلى الأيمن. | If all of the left flank attacks, they should retire [by] moving backwards to their positions, as has been noted for the right flank. And if one of the left flank attacks, then retires, he should incline [in retreating towards] the left. If the warrior of the left flank, after the attack, moves towards the area of the center, it [will be] easier for him than [a motion] towards the right flank. |
ومما ينبغى التنبيه إليه أن يعلم أن رجوع الفارس بعد الحملة إلى موضعه الذى خرج منه أولى إن أمكنه ذلك، ليكون فى مكانه المقرر له. فإن لم يمكنه ذلك وقف على القرب منه، ولا مشاحة فى ذلك، لأن القصد إنما هو قيامه فى صفه لا ذلك المكان بعينه. | And among that which attentiveness demands is the knowledge that the return of the horseman after the engagement to his station, from which he sallied forth, is most salutary, if it be possible; so that he will be in the position established for him, [making him easier to find later on]. If it isn’t possible, he should stand in its vicinity. There should be no altercation about this, because the object is simply that he remain in his [proper] ranking and not [necessarily] in that particular place. |
وينبغى للحامل على العدو أن لا يستغرق جهده فى جرى فرسه، وأن لا يتبع خصمه إلى أكثر من الثلث مما بينه وبين العدو، فيكون بينه وبين العسكر الثلث من المسافة، وبينه وبين العدو الثلثان منها؛ فإن فى الزيادة على ذلك تغرير، (وما المغر بمحمود ولو سلما). | It is required of the warrior [charging] against the enemy that he does not exhaust himself in rushing his horse and that he does not pursue his adversary beyond a third of the distance between him and the enemy. Thus there would be between him and the army a third of the distance, and between him and the enemy two-thirds. To go beyond this is heedlessness. For the heedless, no praise.. E’en though he come through safe.” |
ولا يأمن عن انهزام عدوه أمامه أن يكون ذلك لمكيدة من خروج كمين ونحوه، اللهم إلا أن يظهر فشل العدو وخذلانه؛ فيجب اتباعه، لكنه لا يسرع فى الدخول فى عسكر العدو، وإن ظهر فشله، وتأخرت خيله | [Though] the enemy be put to rout before him, the attacker should not feel secure, because this [rout] might be like a stratagem such as [to enable] the springing of an ambush and the like; unless, of course, the failure of the enemy and his defeat are apparent. In the latter case pursuing the enemy is necessary, but the warrior should not hasten to thrust [too] deeply into the army of the enemy, even if the latter’s failure is apparent and his horses are delayed [in retreat]. |
حتى يتلاحق من عسكره أهل الشجاعة والصبر، وتتزاحف فرسان الحرب. وإن استطرد العدو فأرهجوا فلا تقع الحملة عليهم حتى يسكن الرهج، ويتبين أمرهم حذرا من الكمين. | until the men of bravery and patience from his own army join him and the battle cavalry have come together once more. If the enemy simulates flight and raises dust, the attack against him should not occur until this dust has settled, for fear of an ambush. |
وإذا ولى العدو وتحققت هزيمته فلا يتبعه كل العسكر، بل يكون بعض العسكر خلفه [وبعض العسكر للغنيمة]. وبعضهم الحفظ؛ فإن اتباعهم بالجمع مذموم. وإن ثبت العدو بعد انهزامه تقدم صاحب اللواء قليلا، وتحمل الخيل التى قد انتخبت لذلك وأعدت له. | If the enemy turns his back and his rout is certain, the entire army should not follow him, rather some of the army should pursue him while others plunder, and the remainder are employed to cover these operations. For the army, as a whole, to pursue [the enemy] is judged blameworthy. Should the enemy remain standing after his [apparent] defeat, the standard bearer (or flag commander), sahib al-Hwa’, should advance a little distance, while the cavalry, who are chosen and prepared for that [eventuality], attacks. |
وينبغى فى هذه الحالة أن يسند العسكر فى وجوههم من كل ناحية، ويتحرك صاحب الجيش مع البند الأعظم، وتحميه الخيل كلها وتحدق به؛ فإن فى ذلك روعة وإرهاباً للعدو، لا سيما إذا ذاقوا حد الحديد. ومتى تأخر العدو حينئذ فهو ابتداء الظفر إنشاء الله تعالى. | In this circumstance, it is incumbent upon the army to make every effort to surround them from every side. The commander of the army should set out [towards the enemy] with the largest standard, al-band al-a‘zam, and all of the cavalry should surround and protect him. Verily, in all this there is dread and fright brought upon the enemy, especially if they have [already] tasted the edge of iron. When the enemy dallies at this point, it is the onset of victory, God willing. |
وإذا بارز مبارز من العسكر فليكن موقفه على الثلث مما بين أصحابه وبين العدو، وإن استطرد فإلى الثلثين، ولا يجاوز ذلك. ومنهم من قال: لا يجاوز الثلث بينه وبين أصحابه بكل حال. | If a combatant from the army rides out for single combat, his position should be at a point one third of the distance between his comrades and the enemy. Should the latter simulate flight, he [can proceed] to two-thirds of the distance, but he must not go beyond that. Indeed some have said that he should not exceed a third of the distance between his comrades and the enemy under any circumstances. |
[ الفصل الثانى]: [ فيما إذا زحف العدو على العسكر قبل زحف العسكر]. | Chapter Two: about what [should be done] when the enemy marches out against the army before the army takes the field. |
قال أهل التجربة فى الحروب: إذا حمل العدو على العسكر قبل حملته أو استحكام ترتيبه وتعبئته، فالطريق فى ذلك أن يجثو اهل العسكر على الركب، ويشرعوا الأسنة فى نحورهم، ويتستروا بالدرق والطوارق، ويكونون صفاً واحداً متعاضدين، على أن يندفع العدو أو يتهيأ الركوب واللقاء. | Men of exploits in wars hold that if the enemy attacks the army before it can attack the enemy or before its organization and mobilization for battle can be carried out thoroughly, the men of the army should kneel on one knee and point their spears from the upper part of the chest, concealing themselves behind leather shields and cuirasses, arrayed in a single ranking, assisting one another until the enemy is repelled or until [the cavalry’s] mounting and engagement have been effected. |
قال أهل التجربة للحرب: وهى ساعة فيها شدة على من لم يعتد مثلها. وإن كانت حملة العدو على العسكر بعد استحكام تعبية العساكر، فالطريق فى ذلك أن يتلقاهم رجالة العسكر، ويشرعوا الأسنة فى نحورهم، ويلزموا مواقفهم | Those experienced in war say that [this] is the hour of adversity for he who is not accustomed to its like. Should the attack of the enemy occur after the tightening of the battle array of the soldiers, the infantry of the army should engage them and point their spears from the upper part of the chest and remain fixed in their places. |
ويعضدهم رماة العسكر بالرمى فى وجوههم، فإن لم تقف الرجالة فى ذلك أجابت الخيل حينئذ. ومن أنفع ما يعتمد فى هذه الحالة الصبر؛ فإنه لا يثبت لذلك إلا أهل القوة [والبسالة ومن له عادة باللقاء. والحذر أن يتضعضع العسكر عند أول حملة القوم] فى أول وهلة | and the archers of the army should assist them by shooting [arrows] at the faces [of the enemy]. If the infantry is unable to stand [the attack] in this manner, the cavalry will then respond. Patience is most beneficial at this time. None but the people of strength and valor and he who has the practice of battle engagement is firm in this [quality of] patience. [Beneficial, too,] is cautiousness against the army’s crumbling during the first attack of the enemy in the first moment [of battle]. |
فتنحرف الجبناء عن مواقفهم، فيكون ذلك سبباً للكسرة. فإن اتفق أن يقع لهم ذلك فالطريق أن يؤمر بضبطهم، يجعل معهم من رجال الحرب من يثبت معهم ليثبتوا بثبوتهم، ويقووا ما خار من قلوبهم. | The cowards will vacate their positions, and this will be a reason for the break-up [of the army’s formation]. Should this happen, the correct procedure is to order their control by placing with them experienced warriors who will stand firmly with them, so that they will be made constant by their constancy, strengthening that which had softened their hearts. |
فإن قدر أن يولى أحد من أهل العسكر عند خوفه الحرب أو عند ألم الجراح فلا يعترضه أحد من أهل العسكر بالوقوف فى طريقه، أو رده إلى الموقف من العسكر، ولكن يرفق به، ويؤخذ بالمداراة حتى يخرج إلى خلف الصفوف. | If it happen that one of the men of the army should retire because of his fear of battle or the suffering of wounds, no other person of the army should obstruct him by standing in his way or should send him back to [his] position among the warriors; but rather he should be treated gently and be placated until he attains the rear of the battle rankings. |
وإن كثر العدو على العسكر، وعجزوا عن دفع صولته، رجعوا إلى عسكرهم على حميتهم حتى يلموا أطرافهم، ويعرضوا خيولهم ورجالهم، ويتقوا بالسلاح، ويبعثوا بطلب المدد والتعجيل به؛ فإذا اجتمعت لهم أطرافهم ووفاهم مددهم استأنفوا الحرب بحسب ما يقتضيه الحال. | If the enemy overwhelms [a group] of the army and they fail to repulse his assault, they should return to the [main ranks] of the army, maintaining their zeal until they close ranks, and regroup their cavalry and their infantry and protect themselves with [their] weapons and send to seek assistance and the hastening of it. If ranks arc closed and the assistance they sought comes to them, they can join battle again to the degree that the situation demands. |
وإن زحف العدو إلى العسكر إلى خنادقهم استعدوا لهم بأتم حالة، وحملوا عليه حملة واحدة، ناظرين مواطئ اقدام العدو دون وجوههم؛ فإن ثبت العدو لملاقاتهم حينئذ فليس لهم إلا النزول إليهم بالسيوف والدبابيس المحرقة والأطبار. | If the enemy gives battle to the army right up to the trenches, the men should be prepared for this in the completest manner possible, and they should attack the enemy in a single foray, observing the footsteps of the enemy rather than their faces. Should the enemy hold forth to meet them at this time, nothing remains for them but to descend upon [the enemy] with swords and pointed maces, al-dababis al-muharrafah and battle axes. |
ومتى أخذ العسكر من عرضة الحرب قدر رمح من العدو، وتوالى ذلك، فقد عده أهل التجربة من مبادئ الظفر. وعلى أهل العسكر أن يلزموا مواقفهم مع إحكام الصفوف حيث قصدهم العدو، ولا يتركوا إشراع الأسنة فى صدورهم، والرمى عليهم من كل ناحية. | And when the army has taken of the battle-field a distance from that held by the enemy equal to the length of [the hurl of] a spear, and this happens again and again, the men of exploits count it among the beginnings of victory. It is necessary that the men of the army hold to their positions with solid rankings [within the area] where the enemy had aimed at them and that they do not cease pointing their spears from their chests or to shoot [arrows] at them from every side. |
وإن طاول العدو وصابر فلا يأخذ أهل العسكر ضجر ولا قلق، فإن الألم مشترك بين الفريقين. وقد نبه الله تعالى على ذلك بقوله: “إِن تَكُونُواْ تَأْلَمُونَ فَإِنَّهُمْ يَأْلَمُونَ كَمَا تَأْلَمُونَ ۖ وَتَرْجُونَ مِنَ ٱللَّهِ مَا لَا يَرْجُونَ”. | Should the enemy protract [his efforts] and remain patient [under attack], the men of the army should not become disquieted or anxious, because the suffering [of the encounter] is shared by both factions. God pointed this out in His saying: “If you are suffering, they also are suffering as you are suffering, and you are hoping from God for that for which they cannot hope.” |
وإن دخلت ميمنة العدو إلى بقية العسكر فليس لأحد من أهل العسكر أن يخرج من العسكر، إلا أن يكون واثقاً بأنه يدرك قرنه قبل رجوعه إلى موقفه | Should the right flank of the enemy enter the other parts (reserves?) of the army, no one of the men of the army should leave the ranks unless he is confident that he can defeat his equal before returning to his battle position. |
لأن ضبط مكانه ودفع عدوه [وهو فيه] أولى من الانصراف، لأن المنفصل عن مكانه لا يدرى كيف يكون حاله إلا أن يعلم أن العدو الداخل عليه ليس بناج فيحسن طلبه حينئذ. | for holding fast in his place and repulsing the enemy [from there] is better than being diverted from it; for he who is cut off from his place cannot foresee what his situation will be, unless he knows that the enemy who is advancing on him cannot escape [defeat]. Then engaging him [elsewhere] is permitted at this time. |
الفصل الثالث: فيما يجب من الاحتراز فى حال لقاء العدو. | Chapter Three: about what is required of cautiousness at the time of meeting the enemy. |
قال أهل التجربة والدربة بالحروب: إذا [طرقت العسكر] من ظهره خيل من خيل العدو [فى حال المصاف]، أو خرج عليهم كمين، حينئذ فيجب على صاحب الجيش أن يقيم [خيلا يفردها] لذلك لدفعه عن العسكر | Those accustomed to and experienced in wars say if a group of enemy’s cavalry comes upon the army from the rear at the time of mobilization [for battle], or should spring an ambush upon them at that time, the commander of the army should establish a group of cavalry, which he sets aside for this purpose, to repel [the enemy] away from the army. |
فإن لم يكن انتخب من الميسرة فرساناً تدفعهم فى نحورهم وتصدهم عن ذلك. قالوا: ويجب على الخارجين لهم أن لا يرجعوا إلا بأذن صاحب الجيش، وأن لا يجاوزوا الموضع الذى حده لهم لأنه أعلم بما يوجههم فيه، وهو فى تلك الحالة كالطبيب للمريض. | If he has not done this, he should choose horsemen from the left flank to frustrate them and prevent them from [succeeding] in this action. [The experts] say that it is incumbent upon those who go out against the enemy that they do not retreat except at the command of the commander of the army, and that they do not proceed beyond the limit set by him for them, because he knows better what he is directing them toward. In these circumstances, he is like the physician for the sick. |
وإذا جن عليهم الليل، ولم ينصرف القتال، فينبغى لفرسان العسكر ورجالته أن لا يزولوا عن موقفهم حتى ينصرف عدوهم، ثم ينصرفوا بعد ذلك بصفوفهم على تعبئتهم الأول فالأول. وفى هذه الحالة يجب الحذر من هجوم العدو ودخول جواسيسه. | If night covers them and battle has not abated, it is necessary that the infantry and cavalry do not leave battle-stations until their enemy retires from the battle; after which they should retire [to their encampment] in their rankings according to their battle-array, one [ranking] after the other. In this circumstance, cautiousness against sudden attack by the enemy and the entrance of his spies is necessary. |
فإذا دخل الناس إلى مواضعهم انصرف أرباب الخيل إلى مراكزهم، وسدوا أبواب خنادقهم، ودار العسس والقواد مع رؤساء الأجياد بالحرس حتى يصبحوا. | When the men have entered their stations [in the camp], the cavalry officers retire to their posts. They close up the entranceways over the trenches. The night patrols and the [detailed] officers go round about with the corps commanders, ru’asa al-ajnad, [visiting those] on watch duty until morning arrives. |
وإن صفت الصفوف وهجم الليل ولم يكن بد من المبيت فلينعطف [صف الميسرة] على صدر القلب، وينعطف طرف الميمنة حتى يصل إلى الميسرة، فيستدير العسكر، ويكون الإثقال حينئذ فى الوسط قد أحاط بها الفرسان، فإذا كان القلس الأكبر عادوا إلى مراكزهم. | If the rankings are arrayed for battle, and night descends and there is no escape from passing the night [in battle formation], the ranks of the left flank should bend towards the middle part of the center and the edge of the right flank should bend until it is linked to the left flank. The [entire] army will wheel about, the baggage being at this time in the middle [of the formation] and the cavalrymen will surround it. In the darkness before the dawn they [all] return to their regular positions. |
وينبغى أن يكون فى جوانب العسكر من رجال اليقظة من ينظر فى وجوه الناس ويتأملهم؛ فمن رآه مريباً أو تخيل فيه مخيلة قبض عليه واستعلم أمره؛ فإن المريب يظهر حاله من وجهه؛ ويعرفه أهل النباهة والفراسة. | There should be shrewd men on all sides of the army who can look upon the faces of people and scrutinize them. He who sees a suspicious person, or imagines one to be such, should seize him and inquire about his business. The nature of a suspicious person is apparent from his face, and the shrewd men, those skilled in physiognomy, will know him as such. |
وإذا أنكر حال شخص وأقدم على قبضه فليحذر منه حينئذ، فإنه ربما غلب على ظنه أنه يقتل فيبادر إلى قتل الذى قبض عليه لينجو بنفسه، أو يأخذ بثأر نفسه قبل قتله. وكذلك يجب حفظ المستأمنين والأسراء وإيثاقهم بعد التوفية بما وقع لهم من الالتزام. | If he doubts the outward appearance of a person, and moves to arrest him, he should be wary of him at this moment, for perhaps [the suspect] thinks himself able to kill and hastens towards killing the one who had seized him in order to save himself or to take vengeance before being slain [himself]. Similarly, it is necessary to control those who have sought safe-conduct, al-musta’minin, and [any] capitves and to bind them after the terms given them have been fulfilled. |
واعلم أن أحوال الحرب لا تجرى على نظام واحد، بل تختلف أحوالها وتتغير، وربما دبر صاحب الجيش أو بعض قواده أمراً فأتى الحال بخلافه، فيعمل حينئذ بما يقتضيه رأيه، ويؤدى إليه اجتهاده. | Know that the conditions of war do not run according to a single plan but vary and change, and perhaps the commander of the army or some of his deputies, having disposed of a matter [in a certain way,] find that circumstances call for another method. He must do at that time what his opinion thinks necessary and his judgment will lead him to it. |
وقد حكى أن أفروطة من مراكب الفرنج قصدت مدينة سبتة من بلاد المغرب، فخرجت المقاتلة، وجرى بينهم مصاف عظيم كانت النصرة فيه آخراً للمسلمين. [فرفعت النصارى] قلاع مراكبهم وأقلعت، فتأخر مركب كبير لعسر حركته | It has been related that a fleet of ships, ufrutah? min marakib, of the Franks sought [to capture] the city of Sabtah (Ceuta) in the lands of the Maghrib. An opposing force went out to engage it and a great battle ensued between them. Victory went finally to the Muslims. The Christians raised the sails of their ships and sailed away. But one large ship was delayed because of the difficulty in maneuvering it. |
فاجتمع رماة المسلمين عليه، فستروا عليه بالدرق والطوارق، فصاح شيخ من مشايخ المسلمين على الرماة: عليكم بحبل النصارى [فارموا عليه، فرموا عليه فاشتبك النشاب فيه] فتعذر جريانه فى البكر لاشتباك السهام فيه، فأدركه المسلمون فأخذوه. | The archers of the Muslims gathered to do battle against it. [The Franks] shielded it with leather shields and cuirasses. One of the Muslim shaykhs called out to the archers, “Look you to the rope of the Christians. Shoot at it.” They did and the arrows became entangled in it and its flow through the pulleys was stopped, because of the arrows entangled in it. The Muslims overtook [the ship] and captured it. |
البابُ الثامِنُ عشر: فيما يجب فعله عند انهزام العدو. وفيه فصلان. | BOOK EIGHTEEN: about what should be done while putting the enemy to rout. In it are two chapters. |
الفصل الأول: فيما يتعلق بتمام أمر الحرب عند انهزام العدو. | Chapter One: about that which is related to the completion of the battle when the enemy has been routed. |
قال المدبرون لأمر الحرب: إذا تحققت هزيمة العدو توليته فيجب حينئذ اتباعهم، فركوب أقفيتهم، والأخذ فى أمرهم بالجد والاجتهاد قبل التيام صفوفهم، والتحاق متفرق خيلهم، مع الحذر من الكمين والتيقظ له | The managers of the affairs of war said that when the rout of the enemy and his flight are certain, following them and riding in their footsteps, taking up this matter with haste and diligence, are mandatory before they (i.e., the enemy) are able to close their ranks and reassemble their divided cavalry. [It should be done] with caution against ambush and vigilance against its eventuality. |
فإنه ربما كانت الهزيمة من العدو خدعة ومكيدة كما تقدم، والهزيمة الصحيحة لا تكاد تخفى على متيقظ، وربما خفيت عليه لنفاد القدر. وإذا استحكمت الهزيمة فينبغى أن تختص الميمنة والميسرة بطلب العدو. | It may be that the apparent rout of the enemy is a stratagem or trick similar to that which has been discussed; whereas a real routing can hardly be concealed from the vigilant; yet it may be concealed even from [the vigilant] because of the running out of luck. Should it prove to be a thorough rout, [the commander] must detail the right flank and the left flank only to seek the enemy. |
ويكون صاحب الجيش فى القلب شاهر الألوية وأعلامه يسير على رسله قليلا قليلا، فإذا انتهى إلى الموضع الذى يستحق الوقوف فيه وقف من معه من القلب، وتبقى الميمنة والميسرة فى الطلب للعدو بحيث أنهم لم يغيبوا عن بصر صاحب الجيش. | The commander of the army and his banners should be in the center, the standards unfurled, going forward at a gentle pace, little by little. When he arrives at a place in which he prefers to halt, those with him of the center should halt, while the right and left flanks continue [further on] to seek the enemy, but only to the degree that they do not become hidden to the sight of the commander of the army. |
وإن استرسلت الخيل فى طلبهم فينبغى أن تحمل الرجالة على العدو، وليشغلوا رجاله العدو عن التعرض للخيل إن رأى صاحب الجيش ذلك. وإن خيفت كثرة العدو بعد انهزامه أمر صاحب القلب أهل الميمنة والميسرة أن يزحفوا إليه من غير أن يولوا ظهورهم | If the cavalry have to be dispatched to hunt them down, it is necessary to have the infantry attack the enemy so that they might divert the enemy’s infantry from hindering the [pursuing] cavalry. If the commander of the army sees this (i.e., the hindering of his cavalry), and if the numerical strength of the enemy after the rout is still feared, the commander of the center (obviously the commander of the army himself who is with the center group) orders the men of the right and left flanks to march (retreat) towards him but without exposing their backs. |