Datasets:

aidos-lab

/

mich-embeddings-int8-mixed-bread-large

like 0

Follow

aidos-lab 4

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 10, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 4, 2019 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

By order of January 24, 2018, the application for leave to appeal the June 22, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in People v. Kavanaugh (Docket No. 156408). On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been denied in People v. Kavanaugh , on December 27, 2018, 503 Mich. 933, 920 N.W.2d 612 (2018), the application is again considered. The appellant's motion to incorporate by reference the amicus curiae brief filed by the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan in People v. Kavanaugh is GRANTED. The application is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 23, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 21, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of People v. Washington (Docket No. 156648) is pending on appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Attorney General to share five minutes of the plaintiff-appellee's allotted time for oral argument is GRANTED. On further order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Michigan District Judges Association for five minutes of argument time separate from that of the parties is GRANTED.

On order of the Court, the motion to file supplemental brief is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the May 11, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 20, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 20, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Wayne Circuit Court's May 7, 2018 opinion and order denying relief from judgment, and we REMAND this case to that court to address whether the defendant has met his burden under MCR 6.508(D) of establishing (1) good cause for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue raised in his motion for relief from judgment, and (2) actual prejudice. The court shall address whether the defendant's appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See People v. Reed , 449 Mich. 375, 535 N.W.2d 496 (1995). We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Chief Justice, the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties agreeing to the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal is considered, and the application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs to either party.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 3, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion to extend time to file a response is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the November 15, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to remand is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 25, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 14, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is GRANTED as to this case only.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 9, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The motion to remand is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 25, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 10, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 13, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of People v. Turner (Docket No. 158068) is pending on appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's October 30, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).

By order of October 2, 2018, the application for leave to appeal the December 21, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Henderson v. Civil Serv. Comm. (Docket No. 156270). On order of the Court, the case having been decided on March 15, 2019, --- Mich. ---- (2019), the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 30, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 4, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 19, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 3, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 29, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 4, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission for further clarification of the details of the sanctions that it has imposed on the plaintiff. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 11, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 11, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 29, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 14, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the complaint for superintending control is considered, and relief is DENIED, because the Court is not persuaded that it should grant the requested relief. CAVANAGH, J ., did not participate due to her prior service as a member of the Attorney Grievance Commission.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 20, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to remand and the motion for stay of proceedings are DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 23, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 27, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 28, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 12, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 25, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 21, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 29, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.

Murray, C.J. In this child custody action brought pursuant to the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq ., plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's case on the basis that she lacked standing to seek custody. But, after a remand from this Court, the trial court held that the definition of "parent" contained within MCL 722.22(i) was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. Nonetheless, the court concluded that its ruling would not be applied retroactively, so the court maintained its ruling that plaintiff could not pursue this custody action. We hold that MCL 722.22(i) is not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff, and we affirm the trial court's dismissal of her complaint. I. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS This case arises from plaintiff and defendant's former romantic relationship. During their relationship, defendant entered into a contract (the agreement) with plaintiff and a sperm donor, who agreed to assist defendant with becoming pregnant. In the agreement, the donor promised that he would not "try to become a legal parent of any child born from [the] inseminations, or ask for custody or visitation rights at any time." The agreement also contained a statement that plaintiff and defendant "intend[ed] to be legal parents of any child born as a result of [the] inseminations" and that "they will file a petition for [plaintiff] to adopt the child as soon as possible after its birth." Ultimately, defendant's child, MEG, was born as a result of this agreement. Plaintiff and defendant's romantic relationship continued for some time after MEG's birth. However, plaintiff and defendant never married, nor did plaintiff seek to adopt MEG. Ultimately, plaintiff and defendant's relationship ended no later than February 2014. In 2016 plaintiff filed a complaint in the trial court to initiate a child custody dispute concerning MEG, wherein plaintiff requested custody of, and parenting time with, MEG on the grounds that it was in MEG's best interests as she had acted as his parent for a number of years. Defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint and subsequently moved for summary disposition. The trial court ultimately granted defendant's motion on the basis, as noted earlier, that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the action. On appeal, plaintiff argued that she should be considered a parent under the agreement and, therefore, had standing to maintain the custody action. In that regard, she argued that the fundamental right to parent recognized in Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), was violated by the court's refusal to allow her to seek custody of MEG. After oral argument before this Court, a majority entered an order remanding this case "for consideration of whether MCL 722.22(i) is constitutional as applied to the facts of this case, in light of Obergefell v. Hodges , [576] U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), and Pavan v. Smith , [582] U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2075, 198 L.Ed.2d 636 (2017)." Sheardown v. Guastella , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 14, 2017 (Docket No. 338089). As it was required to do, on remand, the trial court issued an opinion and order addressing what the majority asked of it, whether MCL 722.22(i) is constitutional as applied to the facts of this case, in light of Obergefell and Pavan . The trial court held that it was unconstitutional, but that this determination did not affect the ultimate disposition because the court could not go back in time and determine whether the parties would have married had it not been for the state law precluding them from doing so. II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MCL 722.22(i) AS APPLIED TO PLAINTIFF Generally, this Court reviews de novo questions of constitutional law. Detroit Mayor v. Arms Technology, Inc. , 258 Mich. App. 48, 57, 669 N.W.2d 845 (2003), citing People v. LeBlanc , 465 Mich. 575, 579, 640 N.W.2d 246 (2002). We embrace the presumption that statutes are constitutional, and the party challenging the constitutional validity of a statute bears a heavy burden. Phillips v. Mirac, Inc. , 470 Mich. 415, 422-423, 685 N.W.2d 174 (2004). This as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of MCL 722.22(i) must be considered in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the complaint's filing. See generally Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 481 Mich. 601, 606, 751 N.W.2d 463 (2008), and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). Plaintiff's complaint was filed on October 7, 2016, more than a year after the Obergefell Court struck down Michigan's constitutional and statutory prohibitions on same-sex marriage. Thus, when considering the constitutionality of MCL 722.22(i) as applied to these parties, it must be recognized that at the time the case was filed, (1) Michigan was required to recognize same-sex marriages, (2) our Court had already held that the definition of "parent" under MCL 722.22(i) did not run afoul of Obergefell because "that definition applies equally to same-sex and opposite-sex married couples," (3) the parties never availed themselves of the marriage laws of other states that recognized same-sex marriages, and (4) the parties' relationship had, at a minimum, ended some two-and-a-half years before, and approximately a year and a half prior to the issuance of Obergefell . In light of these undisputed factual and legal propositions, and when applying the governing law under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal Constitution, it is apparent that there is no constitutional infirmity to MCL 722.22(i). In Barrow v. Detroit Election Comm. , 301 Mich. App. 404, 419-420, 836 N.W.2d 498 (2013), our Court set forth the standards governing the equal-protection inquiry: In undertaking constitutional analysis, we are mindful-as was the circuit court-that legislation challenged on equal protection grounds is presumed constitutional and the challenger has the burden to rebut that presumption. Boulton v. Fenton Twp. , 272 Mich. App. 456, 467, 726 N.W.2d 733 (2006). Courts examine three factors when determining whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause: "the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification." Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). When evaluating an equal protection challenge to a provision, courts apply one of three traditional levels of review. Heidelberg Bldg., L.L.C. v. Dep't of Treasury , 270 Mich. App. 12, 18, 714 N.W.2d 664 (2006). Traditionally, the rational basis test applies where no suspect factors are present or where no fundamental right is implicated. Kyser v. Kasson Twp. , 486 Mich. 514, 522 n 2, 786 N.W.2d 543 (2010). Under this test, a statute is constitutional if it furthers a legitimate governmental interest and if the challenged statute is rationally related to achieving that interest. Boulton , 272 Mich. App. at 467, 726 N.W.2d 733. Thus, restrictions are set aside only if they are based on reasons unrelated to the state's goals and no grounds can be conceived to justify them. The most heightened review, strict scrutiny, applies when the provision interferes with a fundamental right or classifies based on factors that are suspect, such as race, national origin, or ethnicity. Rose v. Stokely , 258 Mich. App. 283, 300, 673 N.W.2d 413 (2003). Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government may not infringe upon a fundamental liberty interest unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In re B & J , 279 Mich. App. 12, 22, 756 N.W.2d 234 (2008). There are two reasons why plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal Constitution. First, Obergefell and its limited progeny do not have any impact on plaintiff as she was never married, and she is not asking the courts to create a marriage post hoc. Second, under an equal-protection analysis, plaintiff is simply not subject to dissimilar treatment under the statute compared to a heterosexual unmarried individual. A. OBERGEFELL'S PRINCIPLES DO NOT APPLY As noted above, the parties were never married and the plaintiff has disavowed any interest (as has the dissent) in going back in time in an attempt to determine whether the parties would have been married had they had the legal option to do so prior to Obergefell . This is important because Obergefell addressed only the fundamental right to marry protected by the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause, and the many state laws that did not recognize that right relative to same-sex couples. And, as Pavan , 582 U.S. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 2078, recognized, the overarching principle from Obergefell requires states to afford the same marriage -related benefits to same-sex married couples that are afforded to heterosexual married couples. See also McLaughlin v. Jones , 243 Ariz. 29, 34, 401 P.3d 492 (2017) (reasoning that "the benefits attendant to marriage were expressly part of the [ Obergefell ] Court's rationale for concluding that the Constitution does not permit states to bar same-sex couples from marriage 'on the same terms' "), quoting Obergefell , 579 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2607 (emphasis added); In re Carter Estate , 159 A.3d 970, 977 2017 PA Super 104 (2017) (holding that Obergefell was limited to recognizing the constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry under state law and not to be subsequently denied the same state law privileges afforded opposite-sex married couples). In other words, Obergefell requires states to recognize a legal marriage between individuals of the same sex and, as Pavan held, once the state recognizes these marriages it cannot deny government benefits that are offered to heterosexual married couples. And that is why our Court, with respect to this very statute, concluded that MCL 722.22(i) applies equally to same-sex and heterosexual married couples. Stankevich v. Milliron (On Remand) , 313 Mich. App. 233, 238 n. 2, 882 N.W.2d 194 (2015). But the parties were never married. They had the option to marry in several different states while they were in a relationship, but for whatever reason (and they offer conflicting ones), they did not. Nor did plaintiff ever seek to adopt MEG, even though that legal right existed after Obergefell was decided, see Mabry v. Mabry , 499 Mich. 997, 998-999, 882 N.W.2d 539 (2016) ( MCCORMACK , J., dissenting), most likely because the parties' relationship had ended years earlier. Consequently, plaintiff is not in a position to argue that she was denied a benefit granted to a heterosexual married person, because she was never married to defendant. As a result, the liberty interest in the right to marry that was extended to same-sex couples in Obergefell simply does not come into play. B. WITHOUT DISSIMILAR TREATMENT, NO EQUAL-PROTECTION VIOLATION EXISTS As noted, the Equal Protection Clause generally prohibits the government from treating similarly situated persons differently without a valid reason to do so. See In re Parole of Hill , 298 Mich. App. 404, 420-422, 827 N.W.2d 407 (2012) (recognizing the compelling-state-interest and rational-basis tests). If possible, we must construe a statute in a constitutional manner. See In re Rood , 483 Mich. 73, 121, 763 N.W.2d 587 (2009) (opinion by CORRIGAN , J.); People v. Wilson , 230 Mich. App. 590, 593-594, 585 N.W.2d 24 (1998). What is dispositive of this constitutional argument is that a male in an opposite-sex relationship could also meet the same fate as plaintiff, and thus receive the same treatment as plaintiff under the statute. For example, suppose the female in an opposite-sex relationship becomes pregnant with a third party's child, but once born, the male in the relationship treats the child as his own. Once the relationship ends, the male would be in the same position as plaintiff relative to the statutory definition of "parent," i.e., he would have no biological or legal link to the child born during the relationship. Because the foregoing shows that the statute can be applied equally to someone in plaintiff's position, but not in a same-sex relationship, MCL 722.22(i) is constitutional. The Virginia Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion regarding its common-law definition of "parentage," which is the same as our statutory definition of "parent." In Hawkins v. Grese , 68 Va. App. 462, 475, 809 S.E.2d 441 (2018), the court held that there was no dissimilar treatment under that state's biological/legal definition of "parentage," since it applied equally to all: Further, this definition of parentage does not discriminate between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. If the couple is not married, the non-biological/non-adoptive partner is not a parent irrespective of gender or sexual orientation. It is true that when Hawkins and Grese began their relationship, the law of the Commonwealth barred Hawkins and Grese from marrying, but the record does not indicate this was the sole reason they remained unmarried. While those laws previously banning same-sex marriage were discriminatory, the Commonwealth's definition of parent is not as it applies equally regardless of an unmarried couple's gender or sexual orientation. Because MCL 722.22(i) can apply equally to same-sex and opposite-sex unmarried couples, there is no equal-protection violation. We also conclude that even if dissimilar treatment did occur to plaintiff, it was not unconstitutional treatment under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause. Nothing within MCL 722.22(i) distinguishes between same-sex and opposite-sex married couples, a proposition we recognized in Stankevich , 313 Mich. App. at 238 n. 2, 882 N.W.2d 194. Instead, MCL 722.22(i) distinguishes only between those who have a biological or legal link to the child and those who do not. Such a distinction, particularly when applied to plaintiff, a unmarried person, does not run afoul of the constitutional principles declared in Obergefell . Nor does it suggest unlawful unequal treatment. Again, the Hawkins court used the same rationale in upholding Virginia's definition of parentage: In sum, the entire basis of the holding of Obergefell is the significance and importance of marriage as an institution that should not be withheld from same-sex couples. Barring procreation or adoption, pre- Obergefell , different-sex marriages did not automatically result in the spouses becoming legal parents of each other's children and the analysis of the Obergefell majority opinion does not compel a different conclusion with respect to same-sex marriages, far less unmarried couples of any sexual orientation. [ Hawkins , 68 Va. App. at 476-477, 809 S.E.2d 441.] We agree with this proposition, which satisfies the deferential rational-basis review applicable to this challenge. Lake v. Putnam , 316 Mich. App. 247, 254-256, 894 N.W.2d 62 (2016). There are several significant differences between our opinion and that of the dissent. First off, the dissent fails to recognize that Obergefell did not grant same-sex couples anything more than the right to have states recognize their marriage (not an insignificant right, no doubt) and to treat those marriages the same as ones between heterosexuals. As we have explained, Pavan made this point clear when it held that the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision "denied married same-sex couples access to the 'constellation of benefits that the Stat[e] ha[s] linked to marriage.' " Pavan , 582 U.S. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 2078, quoting Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2601 (alterations in original). Plaintiff can simply reap no benefit from either Obergefell or Pavan because she was never married, nor was she ever engaged to be married. And that brings us to our second point. Our reference to plaintiff's not having married-either before or after Obergefell -was not to "fault" her, or to raise any socioeconomic issues. Indeed, we know nothing of the parties' economic situations. Rather, our point was that in each case decided post- Obergefell , including Pavan , Stankevich , McLaughlin , and In re Carter Estate , the parties had been married (either in their state or another) and were seeking to obtain a benefit of marriage that was granted to heterosexual married couples. But when a party who comes before the court is not a part of a marital relationship, as in this case and Hawkins , he or she is not entitled to the "constellation of benefits" referred to in Obergefell . Thus, plaintiff's marital status is highly relevant to the legal issues presented, and not to any other social or economic matter. Additionally, we are unclear how MCL 722.22(i) makes a classification based on sexual orientation. Nothing in the words of the statute does, and our Court has already stated that this statute applies equally to same-sex and opposite-sex marriages. Stankevich , 313 Mich. App. at 238 n. 2, 882 N.W.2d 194. Nor can we allow any perceived inequities for a particular party to control our duty to objectively apply the law. Progressive Mich. Ins. Co. v. Smith , 490 Mich. 977, 978-979, 806 N.W.2d 494 ( YOUNG , C.J., concurring). For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's holding that MCL 722.22(i) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff, but affirm the trial court's ultimate order dismissing plaintiff's complaint for custody. Affirmed. No costs, a question of public importance being involved. MCR 7.219(A). Gleicher, J., concurred with Murray, C.J. Dissenting Opinion by Fort Hood, J. I respectfully dissent. At the heart of this case lies the well-being of a minor child who, without reason or justification aside from the fact that his parents were in a same-sex relationship and were not legally permitted to marry, has been denied the opportunity to continue a relationship with one of his parents, as well as his biological sibling. The foundation of the majority's conclusion permitting this action, that MCL 722.22(i) is constitutional on equal-protection and due-process grounds as applied to plaintiff, is grounded in its correct recognition that plaintiff and defendant were not legally married. However, the pivotal and very unfortunate fact not in dispute in this case is that plaintiff and defendant were legally forbidden by the state of Michigan from entering into a legally recognized marriage (1) before MEG was born, (2) on the date of his birth, July 26, 2011, and (3) in the time thereafter, before the breakdown of their romantic relationship. It was not until June 26, 2015, when the United States Supreme Court recognized that no person should be denied the fundamental right to marry, that members of same-sex relationships were afforded the basic human right to join in marriage, and all its attendant benefits, rights that all other Americans enjoyed before this date. As a result of the injustice that existed before Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), and which the Obergefell Court sought to remedy, plaintiff was legally foreclosed from taking the necessary steps to protect her relationship with MEG. The one who bears the bitter consequence of his parents' legal inability to marry is young MEG, and the end result of this case in this Court is that plaintiff will play no part in MEG's life and MEG will have no further relationship with his biological sibling. I cannot countenance such a result, particularly in light of the controlling United States Supreme Court precedent recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry and to avail themselves of the concomitant benefits, and for the reasons set forth below, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. MCL 722.22(i) The Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq ., governs custody, parenting time, and child support issues for minor children in Michigan. MCL 722.24(1). As this Court has observed, the CCA "is the exclusive means of pursuing child custody rights...." Aichele v. Hodge , 259 Mich. App. 146, 153, 673 N.W.2d 452 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Legislature has also directed that the CCA, legislation that is "equitable in nature," should be "liberally construed...." MCL 722.26(1). MCL 722.22(i) defines ''parent'' in the following terms: "Parent" means the natural or adoptive parent of a child. If plaintiff is not a biological parent or a legal parent, she is considered a third person under the CCA. Van v. Zahorik , 460 Mich. 320, 328, 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). The parties do not dispute that plaintiff does not meet the definition of a third person as contemplated by MCL 722.26c. Plaintiff also does not have standing under the CCA as a guardian or limited guardian. See MCL 722.26b. Therefore, this Court must decide whether, under the circumstances of this case, the definition of ''parent'' in MCL 722.22(i) violates plaintiff's equal-protection and substantive-due-process-rights because it excludes from its ambit plaintiff, a member of a same-sex partnership that bore a child, who was legally prohibited from marrying her same-sex partner and adopting MEG before the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Obergefell. I answer this question in the affirmative and would hold that MCL 722.22(i) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT In Obergefell , the petitioners argued that the respondent state officials violated the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing laws denying them the right to marry in their home state, or to have marriages validly performed in another state recognized in their home state. Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2593. The Obergefell Court ultimately held, in pertinent part, as follows: [T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them. Baker v. Nelson, [409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct. 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65 (1972) ] must be and now is overruled, and the State laws challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. [ Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2604-2605.] Importantly, and as relevant to this case, in Obergefell the Court recognized a "constellation of benefits ... linked to marriage" that same-sex couples were historically and unconstitutionally deprived of as a result of being denied the right to marry. Id . at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2601. These included, according to the Obergefell Court, the following: taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights ; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers' compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules . [ Id . at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2601 (emphasis added).] Following Obergefell , the United States Supreme Court decided Pavan v. Smith , 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2075, 198 L.Ed.2d 636 (2017), in which two married same-sex couples in Arkansas, having conceived their children through anonymous sperm donation, challenged an Arkansas state statute setting forth who could appear as parents on a child's state-issued birth certificate. The state law "generally require[d] the name of the mother's male spouse to appear on the child's birth certificate-regardless of his biological relationship to the child," and the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that this rule would not extend to same-sex couples. Id . at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 2077. The United States Supreme Court held that such ''differential treatment infringes Obergefellt's commitment to provide same-sex couples 'the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage' " and reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court. Id . at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 2077, quoting Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2601. The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision, we conclude, denied married same-sex couples access to the "constellation of benefits that the Stat[e] ha[s] linked to marriage." Obergefell , [576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2601]. As already explained, when a married woman in Arkansas conceives a child by means of artificial insemination, the State will-indeed, must-list the name of her male spouse on the child's birth certificate. See [Ark. Code Ann.] § 20-18-401(f)(1) ; see also § 9-10-201; supra , at 2077. And yet state law, as interpreted by the court below, allows Arkansas officials in those very same circumstances to omit a married woman's female spouse from her child's birth certificate. See [Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, 11-12, 505 S.W.3d 169 (2016) ]. As a result, same-sex parents in Arkansas lack the same right as opposite-sex parents to be listed on a child's birth certificate, a document often used for important transactions like making medical decisions for a child or enrolling a child in school. See [Petition for Certiorari, pp.] 5-7 (listing situations in which a parent might be required to present a child's birth certificate). Obergefell proscribes such disparate treatment. As we explained there, a State may not "exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples." [ Obergefill , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S. Ct. at 2605 ]. Indeed, in listing those terms and conditions-the "rights, benefits, and responsibilities" to which same-sex couples, no less than opposite-sex couples, must have access-we expressly identified "birth and death certificates." [ Id . at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2601 ]. That was no accident: Several of the plaintiffs in Obergefell challenged a State's refusal to recognize their same-sex spouses on their children's birth certificates. See DeBoer v. Snyder , 772 F.3d 388, 398-399 (C.A.6, 2014). In considering those challenges, we held the relevant state laws unconstitutional to the extent they treated same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples. See [ Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2605 ]. That holding applies with equal force to [Ark. Code Ann.] § 20-18-401. [ Pavan , 582 U.S. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 2078 (emphasis added).] III. EQUAL PROTECTION In determining whether MCL 722.22(i) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff on equal-protection and due-process grounds, I start with the foundational principle that a statute will be presumed to be constitutional "unless the unconstitutionality is clearly apparent." DeRose v. DeRose , 469 Mich. 320, 326, 666 N.W.2d 636 (2003). In Shepherd Montessori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp. , 486 Mich. 311, 318-319, 783 N.W.2d 695 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Court enunciated the applicable legal principles governing an equal protection challenge: The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law. This Court has held that Michigan's equal protection provision is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law. When reviewing the validity of state legislation or other official action that is challenged as denying equal protection, the threshold inquiry is whether plaintiff was treated differently from a similarly situated entity . The general rule is that legislation that treats similarly situated groups disparately is presumed valid and will be sustained if it passes the rational basis standard of review: that is, the classification drawn by the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Under this deferential standard, the burden of showing a statute to be unconstitutional is on the challenging party, not on the party defending the statute[.] [Quotation marks and citations; emphasis added.] As a preliminary matter, plaintiff, on the basis of her sexual orientation, and as a former member of a same-sex partnership who was not permitted to marry her same-sex partner or adopt MEG following his birth, is receiving disparate treatment from that of an individual who does not share her sexual orientation, because under the CCA she cannot seek custody of and parenting time with MEG. Conversely, a former member of an opposite-sex relationship that produced a child, even after the relationship ended, would be able to proceed under the CCA to seek custody of and parenting time with the child at issue if that individual had a biological link to the child. The majority asserts that plaintiff has not suffered a violation of her right to equal protection under MCL 722.22(i), claiming that a male in an opposite-sex relationship who does not have a biological link with a child his female partner carried "could also meet the same fate as plaintiff[.]" '' 'To be considered similarly situated [for purposes of an equal-protection analysis], the challenger and his comparators must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects or directly comparable ... in all material respects.' " Demski v. Petlick , 309 Mich. App. 404, 464, 873 N.W.2d 596 (2015), quoting Lima Twp. v. Bateson , 302 Mich. App. 483, 503, 838 N.W.2d 898 (2013). In my view, the majority's conclusion that the male in an opposite-sex relationship is similarly situated to plaintiff overlooks the key fact that, unlike the heterosexual male whom the majority compares plaintiff to, plaintiff was in fact legally precluded from marrying her partner. Conversely, the heterosexual male subject of the majority's comparison, if he and his female partner deemed it appropriate, could not only have legally married, but the male individual could have in turn adopted the child. Plaintiff, before Obergefell , enjoyed no such privileges, and therefore the majority's claim that she and the male in an opposite-sex relationship such as given in the majority's example are similarly situated is, in my view, not an appropriate analogy. Further, even employing the most deferential of standards, the rational-basis standard of review, the classification that MCL 722.22(i) makes on the basis of sexual orientation must be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Shepherd Montessori Ctr. Milan , 486 Mich. at 318-319, 783 N.W.2d 695. In general, the CCA serves an important purpose for our state, in that it "standardiz[es] the criteria for resolving child custody disputes by requiring the circuit court to evaluate [several] factors in making its determination of the best interests of a child." Bowie v. Arder , 441 Mich. 23, 52, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992). Put another way, "[i]t is clear that the act was intended to provide a framework for the resolution of disputes with regard to the custody of a child." Id . (emphasis omitted). Specifically turning to MCL 722.22(i), by limiting the definition of parent, Subdivision (i) presumably intends to ensure that those who seek to adjudicate matters of child custody and parenting time have a legal, valid, and continuing relationship with the minor child at issue. However, I cannot conclude that the means employed, which involves specifically and unjustifiably excluding some individuals from the definition of parent on the basis of their sexual orientation, is rationally related to the state's interest, particularly in light of Obergefell and Pavan , in which the United States Supreme Court has directed that benefits traditionally associated with marriage, such as child custody, parenting time, and adoption, should no longer be unconstitutionally withheld from married same-sex couples. Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2604-2605 ; Pavan , 582 U.S. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 2076-2077. Accordingly, I agree with plaintiff that by limiting the definition of ''parent'' in MCL 722.22(i) to a natural or adoptive parent, the legislation at issue violates plaintiff's right to equal protection under the law given that she was legally prohibited from marrying her same-sex partner. IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS In AFT Mich. v. Michigan , 497 Mich. 197, 244, 866 N.W.2d 782 (2015), the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he Michigan and United States Constitutions forbid the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Due process not only provides an individual with procedural protections, but also includes a "substantive" element by which an individual will be protected against "the arbitrary exercise of governmental power." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). When a challenged law does not violate a "fundamental right[ ]," to succeed on a substantive-due-process claim, the plaintiff must establish that the law at issue is "not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Michigan Supreme Court has cautioned, the initial inquiry in determining whether legislation violates an individual's substantive-due-process rights is "whether the interest allegedly infringed by the challenged government action ... comes within the definition of 'life, liberty or property.' " Bonner v. Brighton , 495 Mich. 209, 225, 848 N.W.2d 380 (2014). In Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997), the United States Supreme Court highlighted some of the individual rights encompassed by the '' 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause...." According to the Glucksberg Court, these rights include the right to marry, to have children, and "to direct the education and upbringing of one's children...." Id . (citations omitted). Later, in Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), the United States Supreme Court canvassed the history of what it characterized as one of ''the oldest ... fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the United States Supreme Court]," the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their child: The liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer [v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923) ], we held that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children" and "to control the education of their own." Two years later, in Pierce [v. Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925) ], we again held that the "liberty of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." We explained in Pierce that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id ., at 535, 45 S.Ct. 571. We returned to the subject in Prince [v. Massachusetts , 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944) ], and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id ., at 166, 64 S.Ct. 438. While the cases protecting parent's fundamental liberty interests in the care and management of their own children have traditionally done so when the rights of natural parents are at issue, in Obergefell and Pavan , the United States Supreme Court expressly held that same-sex married couples should not be denied, either on equal-protection or due-process grounds, the right to marry, as well as concomitant benefits, including adoption, custody, and parenting time. Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2604-2605 ; Pavan , 582 U.S. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 2076-2077. While the Michigan Supreme Court has observed that ''there has 'always been reluctan[ce] to expand the concept of substantive due process' " and that '' 'judicial self-restraint must be undertaken when the parties ask that new ground be broken in this field,' " Bonner , 495 Mich. at 227, 848 N.W.2d 380, the ground has already been broken wide open by the United States Supreme Court. Specifically, in Obergefell , the United States Supreme Court discussed ''four principles and traditions ... [that] demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples." Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2599. One such basis, the Court opined, ''for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education." Id . at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2600. The majority opinion makes much of the fact that plaintiff did not legally marry defendant. This is correct, and therefore, to her detriment, and in a particularly cruel evolution of our nation's law, according to the majority, the protections afforded by Obergefell simply pass plaintiff by. As noted earlier, plaintiff did not legally marry defendant because she was not permitted to do so before Obergefell was decided on June 26, 2015, although the parties agreed in a written contract that plaintiff would seek adoption of MEG, which was also unlawful for plaintiff pre- Obergefell . The majority essentially faults plaintiff for the failure to marry defendant, impliedly questioning why she did not travel to another state to legally marry defendant. I am aware that not all Americans are of financial means, and traveling to another state, while juggling the demands of parenthood and working outside the home, might not have been possible. Additionally, what motivation did plaintiff and defendant have to make such an out-of-state excursion to legally marry in a state that recognized same-sex marriage before Obergefell , when Michigan would have refused to recognize the union? Under these circumstances, consistent with Obergefell and Pavan , I conclude that plaintiff has a fundamental liberty interest in parenting MEG and that the limitation of the definition of ''parent'' in MCL 722.22(i) to a natural or adoptive parent post- Obergefell amounts to an arbitrary exercise of governmental power infringing that right. AFT Mich. , 497 Mich. at 245, 866 N.W.2d 782. Accordingly, I agree with plaintiff that MCL 722.22(i) also violates her right to substantive due process. V. CONCLUSION In my opinion, MCL 722.22(i) is unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Obergefell and Pavan because it violates plaintiff's rights to equal-protection under the law and substantive due process. I would reverse the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant and remand for further proceedings to allow (1) plaintiff to commence adoption proceedings and (2) the trial court to determine matters related to custody and parenting time as set forth in MCL 722.23, MCL 722.25, MCL 722.27, and MCL 722.27b. Plaintiff and defendant, who were a same-sex couple, ended their relationship more than a year prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Presiding Judge Murray dissented from the sua sponte remand, arguing that the constitutional issue ordered to be addressed by the trial court was injected into the case by the Court, not the parties. See Sheardown v. Guastella , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 14, 2017 (Docket No. 338089) ( Murray , P.J., dissenting). At oral argument before this Court, plaintiff's counsel conceded that the courts should not attempt to reconstruct whether the parties would have married prior to their breakup in 2012 had they had the right to do so. The trial court erred when it concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because "the Child Custody Act does not afford Plaintiff substantive rights to Defendant's child or Defendant substantive rights to Plaintiff's child." The trial court's analysis, while germane to considering whether plaintiff had standing to initiate a child custody dispute under the Child Custody Act, did not address whether the trial court itself lacked the right to exercise jurisdiction over child custody disputes. There is no dispute that a circuit court has the right to exercise jurisdiction over child custody, as the Child Custody Act expressly contemplates that "a child custody dispute" may be "submitted to the circuit court as an original action under this act...." MCL 722.27(1). Stankevich v. Milliron (On Remand) , 313 Mich. App. 233, 238 n. 2, 882 N.W.2d 194 (2015). See U.S. Const, Am XIV. With respect to the dissent's conclusion that unlawful dissimilar treatment exists under the statute, the dissent bases its conclusion on the rationale that plaintiff could not be a "parent" because she has no biological link to the child born to defendant and could not adopt the child when he was born, while a heterosexual individual who has a biological link to the child would be a "parent" under MCL 722.22(i). A true statement, but, as we noted above, that is not the end of the inquiry, as the proper question is whether the statute can be applied constitutionally, and it can. The rational-basis test is applied to an equal-protection challenge based on alleged dissimilar treatment between heterosexual and homosexual persons. See Bostic v. Schaefer , 760 F.3d 352, 397 (C.A. 4, 2014) ( Niemeyer , J., dissenting), and cases cited therein. The Obergefell Court did not specify what standard of review it was using for equal-protection purposes. As explained by this Court in Lake , 316 Mich. App. at 256, 894 N.W.2d 62, the equitable-parent doctrine is inapplicable to all unmarried couples, and thus the doctrine does not run afoul of either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause. Lake is binding on this Court, MCR 7.215(J)(1), and the Supreme Court has declined to address the issue any further, see Mabry , 499 Mich. 997, 882 N.W.2d 539 (2016) ( McCormack , J., dissenting). During their romantic relationship, defendant entered into a November 13, 2010 agreement (the donor agreement) with plaintiff and a sperm donor (the donor) who agreed to assist defendant with becoming pregnant. The donor agreement contained a statement that plaintiff and defendant "intend[ed] to be legal parents of any child born as a result of [the] inseminations" and that "they will file a petition for [plaintiff] to adopt the child as soon as possible after its birth." During their romantic relationship plaintiff gave birth to MEG's half-sister, also conceived through artificial insemination, who is biologically related to MEG. This Court is bound to follow Obergefell , and as the majority points out, Michigan now recognizes the validity of same-sex marriage. Stankevich v. Milliron (On Remand ), 313 Mich. App. 233, 237, 240, 882 N.W.2d 194 (2015). However, in Stankevich , this Court was not presented with the issue that we are in this case, that being whether a provision of the CCA is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff on due-process and equal-protection grounds in light of the fact that plaintiff was not able to enter into a legal same-sex marriage before Obergefell . In Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620, 623, 631-632, 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996), the United States Supreme Court employed the rational-basis standard of review when considering an equal-protection challenge to an amendment to Colorado's state constitution that "prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect" gays and lesbians, id . at 624, 116 S.Ct. 1620. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Obergefell , the right to " 'marry, establish a home and bring up children' is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Obergefell , 576 U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2600, quoting Zablocki v. Redhail , 434 U.S. 374, 384, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 26, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 14, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for extension of time to file brief is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the July 18, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 30, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 19, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

M. J. Kelly, J. Plaintiff, Catherine Puetz, M.D., appeals by right the trial court order dismissing her complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm in part and reverse in part. I. BASIC FACTS In 1999, Puetz took a job with Emergency Care Specialists (ECS), a physicians' group representing about 150 physicians and about 70 physician's assistants. ECS exclusively staffs its physicians at hospitals run by defendant, Spectrum Health Hospitals (Spectrum). Through her relationship with ECS, Puetz had admission privileges in emergency services and observation medicine at Spectrum. In addition, Spectrum appointed Puetz to serve as the associate medical director of observation medicine, the associate medical director for emergency and cardiovascular medicine, and the clinical advisor for pediatrics. In connection with her role at Spectrum, Puetz developed certain observation protocols, which she admitted were created for Spectrum's use and placed on Spectrum's intranet. Because the observation program at Spectrum was considered a success, individuals and organizations outside of Spectrum and ECS were interested in it. As a result, in the summer of 2013, ECS and Puetz decided to prepare a pamphlet on observation medicine in an effort to start consulting on the subject. When Spectrum learned about the pamphlet, it instructed ECS that it had to work with Spectrum on any consulting or observation work. Further, a meeting was held on the pamphlet/consulting work in July 2013. At the meeting, Spectrum claimed ownership of the observation materials. A follow-up meeting was scheduled, but the meeting did not occur before Puetz was, essentially, prohibited from working at Spectrum in any capacity because of her comments on a Facebook page. The record reflects that on August 5, 2013, a Spectrum nurse posted on a public Facebook page a photograph of the backside of an overweight woman and the caption: "Don't judge me. I like what I like." In response to the post, 12 Spectrum employees and 3 ECS employees commented on the photograph on Facebook. Relevant to this appeal, Puetz was the sixth person to comment, and she stated, "OMG is that [patient's initials]? You are soo naughty." A Spectrum staff member saw the post on Facebook, was uncomfortable with the dialogue, and reported it to Spectrum. Defendant Kevin Splaine, Spectrum's president, testified that the decision was made to discipline those involved. Initially, Spectrum decided to remove Puetz from her administrative roles at the hospital. However, Splaine testified that as the investigation into the incident continued, he decided that additional discipline was warranted. According to Splaine, "anyone with whom we could prove was part of this dialogue knew that this was a patient, if they were an employee of Spectrum Health, they would be terminated. If they were contracting with Spectrum Health, the contract would be terminated. And if they were privileged at Spectrum Health, we would not allow them to practice at Spectrum Health Hospitals." The other individuals involved received a written reprimand. By August 19, 2013, Puetz was informed that she was being removed from both her "administrative leadership position and clinical" because of the Facebook incident. On August 21, 2013, after making that decision, Splaine spoke at an ECS meeting. Ostensibly, Splaine spoke at the meeting because there was "a lot of angst and concern" about the decision to remove Puetz, and ECS wanted to hear Spectrum's side of it. Splaine apparently did not refer to Puetz by name at the meeting; however, he allegedly told everyone at the meeting that Puetz's comments on Facebook violated HIPAA. In addition, Splaine sent ECS a letter demanding that Puetz and another employee of ECS not be scheduled at any hospital owned by Spectrum. In the letter, Splaine referred to the conduct of Puetz and the other employee as reprehensible, unprofessional, and disturbing. On March 14, 2014, Puetz filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan alleging defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, breach of contract, intellectual property ownership, and two counts of tortious interference with a business expectancy. Only Count IV, the intellectual-property-ownership claim, arguably fell within the federal court's original jurisdiction. After discovery closed, the federal district court sua sponte issued a show-cause order regarding subject-matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, the court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the intellectual-property claim and dismissed the entire complaint without prejudice. Within 30 days of her federal complaint being dismissed, Puetz filed a claim in the Kent County Circuit Court. In response, Spectrum moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) with regard to the defamation claim and for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) for the remaining claims. Puetz also moved for partial summary disposition on the defamation claim, asserting that Splaine's comments were defamation per se, and she asked the court to rule as a matter of law that her comments on Facebook did not constitute a violation of HIPAA. After oral argument, the trial court entered a written opinion and order dismissing the defamation claim under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and dismissing the remaining claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10). II. DISMISSAL UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(7) A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Puetz first argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her defamation claim under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Whether a trial court properly granted summary disposition on statute-of-limitations grounds is reviewed de novo. Barnard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gates Performance Engineering, Inc. , 285 Mich. App. 362, 369, 775 N.W.2d 618 (2009). "Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate when the undisputed facts establish that the plaintiff's claim is barred under the applicable statute of limitations." Kincaid v. Cardwell , 300 Mich. App. 513, 522, 834 N.W.2d 122 (2013). In addition, issues regarding the proper interpretation and application of statutes are reviewed de novo. Petersen v. Magna Corp. , 484 Mich. 300, 306, 773 N.W.2d 564 (2009) (opinion by KELLY , C.J.). B. ANALYSIS In Michigan, the period of limitations for a defamation claim is one year. MCL 600.5805(9). "A defamation claim accrues when 'the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.' " Mitan v. Campbell , 474 Mich. 21, 24, 706 N.W.2d 420 (2005), quoting MCL 600.5827. Here, the allegedly defamatory statements were made on August 21, 2013, and August 22, 2013. Puetz timely filed her complaint in federal court, but her federal complaint was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in June 2015. Puetz declined to appeal the dismissal from federal district court. Subsequently, on July 21, 2015, she filed suit in Michigan, again raising her defamation claim based on Splaine's August 21 and August 22, 2013 statements to ECS. Because her defamation claim was filed more than a year after her claim accrued, it is time-barred unless a tolling provision applies. In order to bring a state-law claim in federal court, a plaintiff must assert his or her claim under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 USC 1367. Section 1367(a) provides: Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. [Emphasis added.] Therefore, before a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim, two requirements must be met. First, there must be a civil action over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction. Second, the state-law claim must be "so related" to the federal claim that it forms "part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." Id. In this case, the federal district court concluded that Puetz's complaint failed to satisfy the first requirement, i.e., the federal district court lacked original jurisdiction over any of the claims raised in the complaint. Accordingly, because there was no claim over which the federal court had original jurisdiction, the court had no authority under § 1367(a) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Puetz's state-law claims. The supplemental jurisdiction statute does not contain a provision expressly addressing what happens when a state-law claim is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1367(a). Instead, "Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when the district court's original jurisdiction is based only on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction...." Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota , 534 U.S. 533, 540, 122 S.Ct. 999, 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002). "Subsection (c) allows district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain situations" that are not applicable under the facts in this case. Id . In addition, Subsection (d) appears to toll the limitations period for any claim asserted under Subsection (a) regardless of whether the plaintiff was successful in asserting that claim. See Raygor , 534 U.S. at 542, 122 S.Ct. 999. Section 1367(d) provides: The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period. It is an issue of first impression in Michigan whether 28 USC 1367(d) tolls a state-law claim filed in federal court that is later dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, and although there are a number of state courts and lower federal courts that have addressed the issue, those decisions are not binding on this Court. In the absence of binding authority interpreting 28 USC 1367(d), we first address the United States Supreme Court decision in Raygor . The Raygor Court addressed the narrow issue of whether it was constitutionally permissible to apply the tolling provision in § 1367(d) to state-law claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Raygor , 534 U.S. at 539, 544, 122 S.Ct. 999. In answering this question, the Raygor Court acknowledged that § 1367(d) applied on its face to any claim asserted under Subsection (a). Id . at 542, 122 S.Ct. 999. However, the Court stated that "reading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims against nonconsenting States are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds raises serious doubts about the constitutionality of the provision given principles of state sovereign immunity." Id . The Court considered it a constitutional question given that a limitations period may be a central condition of a state's decision to waive immunity and given that a state can "prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued ...." Id. at 542-543, 122 S.Ct. 999 (quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, the Raygor Court relied on the following principle of statutory construction: "When Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Id . at 543, 122 S.Ct. 999 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Turning to the statutory language, the Raygor Court noted that there was a lack of clarity on whether there was a clear intent to toll the limitations period for claims against nonconsenting state defendants that were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Id . at 544, 122 S.Ct. 999. As a result, although the language "any claim asserted" was broad enough to cover the situation in Raygor , it was "not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment" because it did not reflect any "specific or unequivocal intent to toll the statute of limitations for claims asserted against nonconsenting States ...." Id . at 544-545, 122 S.Ct. 999. Moreover, although the statute could be read to authorize tolling of claims dismissed against nonconsenting State defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds, in context, 28 U.S.C. 1367 only contemplates a few grounds for dismissal. Id . at 545, 122 S.Ct. 999. The Court stated: The requirements of § 1367(a) make clear that a claim will be subject to dismissal if it fails to "form part of the same case or controversy" as a claim within the district court's original jurisdiction. Likewise, § 1367(b) entails that certain claims will be subject to dismissal if exercising jurisdiction over them would be "inconsistent" with 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Finally, § 1367(c) (1994 ed.) lists four specific situations in which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a particular claim. Given that particular context, it is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to apply to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute, such as dismissals on Eleventh Amendment grounds. In sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, we are looking for a clear statement of what the rule includes , not a clear statement of what it excludes . Section 1367(d) fails this test. As such, we will not read § 1367(d) to apply to dismissal of claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. [ Id . at 545-546, 122 S.Ct. 999 (citations omitted).] Overall, Raygor contains language suggesting that § 1367(d) may apply only to dismissals contemplated by §§ 1367(a), (b), and (c), but it also contains language making clear that the interpretation of § 1367(d) was driven by constitutional concerns that are not relevant to the issue in the case sub judice. Relying on the Raygor decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that if a federal court dismissed a state-law claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction premised on a lack of original jurisdiction, the tolling provision in § 1367(d) does not apply to a plaintiff's claims when they are refiled in state court. Morris v. Giovan , 225 Ariz. 582, 585, 242 P.3d 181 (Ariz. App. 2010). The Morris court concluded that there was no real distinction between a claim dismissed against nonconsenting defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds and a claim dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id . at 584, 242 P.3d 181. Further, the court believed that holding otherwise would "affect the constitutional balance between the states and the federal government, and Congress has not expressed this intent in the language of the statute." Id . at 585, 242 P.3d 181, citing Raygor , 534 U.S. at 543, 122 S.Ct. 999. The trial court in this case found Morris persuasive and applied it to bar Puetz's defamation claim. We conclude, however, that the court's reliance on Morris was misplaced. The Morris court did not independently evaluate the statutory language. Instead, it relied on the Raygor Court's interpretation of § 1367(d), which was an interpretation of the statute in light of the dismissal of a claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds . Morris , 225 Ariz. at 584, 242 P.3d 181 ; Raygor , 534 U.S. at 542, 122 S.Ct. 999. Then, without citing legal authority, the Morris court presumed that the same constitutional concerns that existed in Raygor were present when a case is dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Morris , 225 Ariz. at 585, 242 P.3d 181. Finally, the Morris court did not acknowledge that in Jinks v. Richland Co. South Carolina , 538 U.S. 456, 466, 123 S.Ct. 1667, 155 L.Ed.2d 631 (2003), the United States Supreme Court declined to extend the holding in Raygor in the absence of Eleventh Amendment concerns. For these reasons, we do not find Morris persuasive. Instead, we turn to the language used in 28 USC 1367(d) and the rules of interpretation espoused by our own Supreme Court in Walters v. Nadell , 481 Mich. 377, 751 N.W.2d 431 (2008). In that case, our Supreme Court explained that [w]hen interpreting a federal statute, our task is to give effect to the will of Congress. To do so, we start, of course, with the statutory text, and unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete. [ Id . at 381-382, 751 N.W.2d 431 (quotation marks, brackets, ellipses and citations omitted).] 28 USC 1367(d) provides that its tolling provision applies to "any claim asserted under subsection (a)." The term " '[a]ny' means 'every; all.' " Nat'l Pride At Work, Inc. v. Governor , 481 Mich. 56, 77, 748 N.W.2d 524 (2008) (citation and brackets omitted). Therefore, applying the statute as written, because Puetz asserted a supplemental jurisdiction claim under § 1367(a), her claim was tolled under § 1367(d). Applying the statute as written is also in line with Congress's intent when enacting the statute. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Jinks , § 1367(d) was enacted "[t]o prevent the limitations period on [dismissed] claims from expiring while the plaintiff was fruitlessly pursuing them in federal court ...." The Jinks Court further stated: Prior to enactment of § 1367(d), [plaintiffs] had the following unattractive options: (1) They could file a single federal-court action, which would run the risk that the federal court would dismiss the state-law claims after the limitations period had expired; (2) they could file a single state-law action, which would abandon their right to a federal forum; (3) they could file separate, timely actions in federal and state court and ask that the state-court litigation be stayed pending resolution of the federal case, which would increase litigation costs with no guarantee that the state court would oblige. Section 1367(d) replaces this selection of inadequate choices with the assurance that state-law claims asserted under § 1367(a) will not become time barred while pending in federal court. [ Id . at 463-464, 123 S.Ct. 1667.] Similarly, the United States Supreme Court recently explained that the supplemental jurisdiction statute was enacted because "Congress sought to clarify the scope of federal courts' authority to hear claims within their supplemental jurisdiction, appreciating that supplemental jurisdiction has enabled federal courts and litigants to ... deal economically-in single rather than multiple litigation-with related matters." Artis v. District of Columbia , 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 594, 598, 199 L.Ed.2d 473 (2018) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Moreover, three purposes of statutes of limitations are (1) to afford security against fraudulent or stale claims that become difficult to defend because of the loss of evidence, (2) to relieve the courts from dealing with stale claims, and (3) to protect potential defendants from protracted fear of litigation. Moll v. Abbott Laboratories , 444 Mich. 1, 14, 506 N.W.2d 816 (1993). Here, because the case was filed in federal district court, the purpose of the statute of limitations was, in effect, satisfied insofar as no evidence was lost and Spectrum had notice of the claim against it. Furthermore, although we recognize that exceptions to statutes of limitations are generally strictly construed, Mair v. Consumers Power Co. , 419 Mich. 74, 80, 348 N.W.2d 256 (1984), that does not mean that they must be interpreted contrary to their plain meaning. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 28 USC 1367(d) tolled Puetz's defamation claim notwithstanding that her federal claim was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. III. DISMISSAL UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(10) A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Puetz also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her claims for false-light invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and tortious interference with a business expectancy. In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court considers "the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Greene v. A.P. Prod., Ltd. , 475 Mich. 502, 507, 717 N.W.2d 855 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The motion for summary disposition "tests the factual support for a claim and should be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." MEEMIC Ins. Co. v. DTE Energy Co. , 292 Mich. App. 278, 280, 807 N.W.2d 407 (2011). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establishes a matter in which reasonable minds could differ. Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., L.L.P. , 481 Mich. 419, 425, 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). Further, the court may not make factual findings on disputed factual issues during a motion for summary disposition and may not make credibility determinations. Burkhardt v. Bailey , 260 Mich. App. 636, 646-647, 680 N.W.2d 453 (2004). B. ANALYSIS 1. FALSE-LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY An invasion-of-privacy claim protects against four types of invasion of privacy: "(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Doe v. Mills , 212 Mich. App. 73, 80, 536 N.W.2d 824 (1995). In this case, Puetz's claim is based on the third type: false light. "In order to maintain an action for false-light invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show that the defendant broadcast to the public in general, or to a large number of people, information that was unreasonable and highly objectionable by attributing to the plaintiff characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that were false and placed the plaintiff in a false position." Duran v. Detroit News, Inc. , 200 Mich. App. 622, 631-632, 504 N.W.2d 715 (1993). Further, "the defendant must have known of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed." Detroit Free Press, Inc., v. Oakland Co. Sheriff , 164 Mich. App. 656, 666, 418 N.W.2d 124 (1987). See also Early Detection Ctr., P.C., v. New York Life Ins. Co. , 157 Mich. App. 618, 630, 403 N.W.2d 830 (1986). Puetz's complaint does not clearly identify the statements that she contends placed her in a false light. Her complaint provides: 77. The statements of Spectrum placed [Puetz] in a false light to her peers within the hospital, outside hospital as well as with other staff within Spectrum. 78. Spectrum set in motion communications to the media that a physician was fired for a HIPAA violation and encouraged invasion of her privacy. 79. This cause of action protects [Puetz's] right to be left alone and not have private facts shared about her to third parties who have no duty to know. 80. Statements by Spectrum that placed [Puetz] in a false light would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person. 81. [Puetz] was injured and suffered shame, embarrassment and humiliation by the actions of Spectrum. Her injuries are ongoing because the websites for the media are disseminated continuously on the Internet. 82. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Spectrum's conduct, [Puetz] has suffered loss of privacy, loss of reputation, emotional distress, embarrassment, ridicule and humiliation. Wholly missing from Puetz's pleading is an identification of who disseminated information about her, when that information was given, and what was actually said about her that placed her in a false light. It is likely that a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) would have been viable given the lack of detail in the complaint. However, the trial court reviewed this claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and permitted Puetz to clarify the factual basis for this claim at oral argument on the motion for summary disposition. We therefore address this claim in light of the clarification. Puetz contends that her false-light claim is based on statements that Splaine made to ECS on August 21, 2013, and on August 22, 2013. The trial court concluded that these statements were not actionable as a matter of law because any information Splaine provided at the meeting was not "publicized." A claim for false-light invasion of privacy requires that the plaintiff receive publicity. Derderian v. Genesys Health Care Sys. , 263 Mich. App. 364, 385, 689 N.W.2d 145 (2004). Publicity can be shown if the defendant "broadcast [the challenged information] to the public in general, or to a large number of people ...." Duran , 200 Mich. App. at 631-632, 504 N.W.2d 715. The term "broadcast" means "to make widely known." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). Therefore, summary disposition is appropriate when the communication is only published to a small or specific group of individuals. See Derderian , 263 Mich. App. at 387, 689 N.W.2d 145 ("Even construing Dr. Rogers's list of medical personnel as the 'public' to whom the information was broadcast, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a sufficient level of publicity ...."); Dzierwa v. Mich. Oil Co. , 152 Mich. App. 281, 288, 393 N.W.2d 610 (1986) (holding that the plaintiff's false-light claim failed because the communications "occurred only in the presence of other employees or, at most, a handful of office visitors"); Hall v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc. , 153 Mich. App. 609, 618, 396 N.W.2d 809 (1986) (stating that the plaintiff's false-light claim failed when the actionable communication consisted of one telephone call); Sawabini v. Desenberg , 143 Mich. App. 373, 380-381, 372 N.W.2d 559 (1985) (holding that a letter from a physician to a lawyer was not disseminated to the public in general or to a large number of people). With regard to the comments made by Splaine in the August 22, 2013 letter, Puetz has provided no evidence that the information in it was distributed to a large number of people or the public in general. The letter was addressed to ECS, "Attn: Kenneth S. Johnson, MD," and was copied to ECS's lawyer and three employees at Spectrum. Therefore, it appears that Spectrum "broadcast" the letter to only five people who were involved in the incident management. Like the plaintiff in Derderian , 263 Mich. App. at 387, 689 N.W.2d 145, Puetz simply has failed to demonstrate a sufficient level of publicity with regard to the letter. Instead, she merely speculates that the letter could have been widely disseminated because it was not marked "confidential." Without proof that it was disseminated further, however, the trial court did not err by dismissing her false-light claims based on the letter. The next component of the false-light claim is premised on Splaine's comments at the August 21, 2013 meeting. Puetz asserts that at the meeting, Splaine told ECS's members that she violated HIPAA and that Splaine called her conduct reprehensible, egregious, unprofessional, and lacking in integrity. Splaine allegedly disclosed false information about Puetz to a group of 50 to 60 people at the meeting. Despite the large size of the group, the trial court relied on Derderian for the proposition that disclosure to a "medical executive committee/team" does not satisfy the publicity element of a false-light claim. See id . at 388, 689 N.W.2d 145. In Derderian , however, unlike the present case, the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate factual support for their claim that any "publication was made to a sufficiently large group of people." Id. Here, given that there is factual support for Puetz's claim that the disclosure was made to 50 to 60 people, and given that a jury could reasonably infer that to be a large group of people so as to satisfy the publication requirement, we conclude that the trial court erred by finding there was no genuine issue of material fact on the publicity element of Puetz's false-light claim with regard to the statements made at the August 21, 2013 meeting. The second element of a false-light claim is that the comments must be "unreasonable and highly objectionable" because they attributed to the plaintiff "characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that were false and placed the plaintiff in a false position." See Duran , 200 Mich. App. at 632, 504 N.W.2d 715. The trial court did not reach this element because it granted summary disposition based on a lack of publicity. Puetz contends there is a factual dispute on this point because Splaine stated at the ECS meeting that she had violated HIPAA. Spectrum argues, however, that Splaine never referred to Puetz by name at the meeting, so Puetz cannot prove that Splaine attributed a HIPAA violation to her at the meeting. We disagree. The record reflects that the attendees of the ECS meeting were aware of the Facebook incident, those involved, and the discipline imposed; it is reasonable to infer that they knew Splaine was referring to Puetz when he spoke at the meeting. Consequently, we conclude that there are fact questions about whether Splaine told ECS that Puetz violated HIPAA. The next question is whether there is a fact question regarding whether the communication of that information, i.e., the attribution of a HIPAA violation to Puetz, was false and placed her in a false light. We note that whether Puetz's comments violated HIPAA could be determined as a matter of law. However, it is not necessary to take that step because in order to establish a false-light claim, a plaintiff must establish that when the defendant disseminated the information, it was done with actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the publicized matter. Detroit Free Press, Inc , 164 Mich. App. at 666, 418 N.W.2d 124. Here, the record reflects that before Splaine spoke at the ECS meeting, he had ongoing discussions with Spectrum's lawyers and others involved in the decision-making process about whether the Facebook incident was a violation of HIPAA. Further, he testified that based on his own compliance training, he was aware that identifying a patient by his or her initials is part of what constitutes a patient identifier for HIPAA purposes. In addition, several witnesses testified at length about the rationale behind the discipline imposed. Specifically, if the Facebook post demonstrated knowledge that the individual commenting knew the woman depicted was a patient, then the person making that comment was terminated or prohibited from practicing at Spectrum. Puetz has not directed this Court to any evidence showing that when Splaine made his comments, he either knew his comments were false or he recklessly disregarded the possibility that they were false. Stated differently, even if Puetz could establish that unreasonable and highly objectionable information was publicized to a large group of people, she cannot establish that when he spoke at the ECS meeting, Splaine "must have known of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed." Id . As a result, although the court's reasoning was flawed, the trial court did not err by dismissing Puetz's false-light claim to the extent that it was based on Splaine's comments at the August 21, 2013 meeting. Finally, Puetz argues that her false-light claim should be allowed to proceed because Spectrum, ECS, and "some doctors" knew who Puetz was and then, one day, she opened her door and a reporter was there asking if she was terminated for a Facebook comment. Puetz's lawyer represented to the trial court that this type of result did not come about "without that information being publicized," but when asked by the court to show "anything in the record that supports your supposition that anyone at Spectrum gave that information out," Puetz's lawyer candidly admitted that "we can't." In its opinion granting summary disposition on this claim, the trial court noted that "the record is bereft of evidence that Spectrum took any actions to notify the media of its disciplinary actions" and that the court could not "presume that Spectrum leaked any information to the press." In the absence of any evidence in support of this claim, we conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing this aspect of the false-light claim. In sum, Puetz's false-light claim was premised on three separate incidents: the letter to ECS, the statements made at the ECS meeting, and statements made to the media about Puetz. The letter, however, is not actionable because there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether it was publicized. The statements to the media are not actionable because there is, in fact, no evidence that Spectrum made any false statement to the media about Puetz. Finally, although the trial court erred by finding no genuine issue of fact with regard to whether the statements at the ECS meeting were publicized, Puetz cannot establish that Splaine made the statements with actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the publicized matter. Detroit Free Press, Inc , 164 Mich. App. at 666, 418 N.W.2d 124. Therefore, despite there being a fact question on some of the elements of the false-light claim, Puetz's failure to establish the final element is fatal to her claim, and the trial court did not err by dismissing it. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by dismissing this claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 2. BREACH OF CONTRACT The trial court also erred by dismissing Puetz's intellectual-property-ownership claim, which was based on a breach-of-contract theory. The trial court held that as a matter of law all the agreements Puetz signed bound her to follow Spectrum's policies and procedures, including Spectrum's intellectual-property policy. The court further found that under the broad language of the intellectual-property policy, Spectrum owned the disputed observation materials. On appeal, Puetz contends that the trial court erred by finding she was bound by the intellectual-property policy. "In Michigan, the essential elements of a valid contract are (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation." Thomas v. Leja , 187 Mich. App. 418, 422, 468 N.W.2d 58 (1991). Here, the trial court relied on three contracts: a 2008 clinical services agreement, a 2009 medical-director-services agreement, and a 2012 pediatric-clinical-services agreement. However, the language of the contracts makes it apparent that Puetz was not a party to the contracts and her signature on the agreements did not represent her intent to be bound by the terms set forth in them. Instead, the parties were Spectrum and ECS, who were named parties, signed as parties, and referred to as parties throughout the contracts. Because Puetz was not a party to the contracts and because there is no evidence before this Court that she separately agreed to be bound by the agreements, the trial court erred by concluding she was bound by the 2008, 2009, and 2012 provisions providing that she would conform with Spectrum's intellectual-property policy. We note that there are also several problems with the dates of the agreements. The 2008, 2009, and 2012 agreements refer to "this agreement," indicating that they apply to services performed under each respective contract. Puetz testified that she started developing her observation materials in 2003, which is about five years before she signed the 2008 agreement, about six years before the 2009 agreement, and about nine years before she signed the 2012 agreement. Given that the contracts purportedly binding her to the intellectual-property policy were not in place when she started developing the content, not all of the observation materials could have been developed under the 2008, 2009, and 2012 agreements. Moreover, a copy of the intellectual-property policy in effect in 2003 is not included in the lower-court record. Instead, the record indicates that the intellectual-property policy was put into effect in June 2006. It was revised in June 2010 and again in October 2012. Section 2.3.3.3 of the 2012 version of the intellectual-property policy provided that "[a]ny Intellectual Property developed by an Associate prior to his or her relationship with Spectrum Health shall not be owned by Spectrum Health, except to the extent a Derivative Work of such Intellectual Property is developed during the Associate's relationship with Spectrum Health and otherwise meets the qualifications for ownership by Spectrum Health set forth in Section 2.3. above." The 2010 version of the policy had a similar limitation. Accordingly, at a minimum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Puetz, it appears that there are factual questions about whether some of the materials were developed before the intellectual-property policy was in place and before Puetz signed any contract potentially binding her to conform to the policy. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred by dismissing this claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 3. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A BUSINESS EXPECTANCY To succeed on a claim of tortious interference with a business expectancy, a plaintiff must establish "the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the defendant, an intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy, and resulting damage to the plaintiff." Dalley v. Dykema Gossett PLLC , 287 Mich. App. 296, 323, 788 N.W.2d 679 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, to satisfy the third element, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant "acted both intentionally and either improperly or without justification." Id . If the defendant's act was motivated by legitimate business reasons, then the act does not "constitute improper motive or interference." Id . at 324, 788 N.W.2d 679. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant "did something illegal, unethical, or fraudulent." Id . The record reflects that multiple individuals who commented on the Facebook post were disciplined. In addition, although not everyone who posted on the Facebook page was terminated or prohibited from working at Spectrum, the record reflects that Puetz and three or four others were either terminated or prohibited from working at Spectrum Hospitals. Thus, although Puetz can establish that Spectrum intentionally interfered with her relationship with ECS by instructing ECS not to schedule her at any Spectrum facility, she cannot establish that Spectrum acted improperly or without justification, given that Spectrum also terminated or disciplined others involved in the Facebook incident. Further, given the impropriety of Puetz's comments on Facebook, there is nothing to suggest that Spectrum was acting illegally, unethically, or fraudulently when it sought to prevent her from being employed in its hospitals. Moreover, although Puetz speculates that Spectrum had an improper motive when it interfered with her relationship with ECS, she cannot direct this Court to anything other than her own suspicions. Splaine testified that he did not know about Puetz's intellectual-property dispute before he reached the decision to prohibit her from working at Spectrum. Puetz offered no evidence to counter that testimony, other than speculation that his direct supervisor probably knew about the dispute and may have influenced him. Further, Puetz has offered no evidence to contradict Splaine's testimony that the rationale behind the discipline imposed was based on whether or not the individual who commented on the Facebook post was aware or unaware that the woman depicted was a patient. Consequently, Puetz has failed to support this claim, and the trial court did not err by dismissing it under MCR 2.116(C)(10). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, we reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss Puetz's defamation claim because under the language in 28 USC 1367(d) the limitations period was tolled. We also reverse the court's decision to dismiss Puetz's breach-of-contract claim because there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Puetz agreed to be bound by Spectrum's IP policy. However, we affirm the court's decision to dismiss Puetz's claim for false light and her claim for tortious interference with a business expectancy. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs, neither party having prevailed in full. MCR 7.219(A). MARKEY, P.J., and CAMERON, J., concurred with M. J. KELLY, J. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 USC 1320d et seq . The parties argue that unless the tolling provision in 28 USC 1367(d) applies to Puetz's defamation claim, that claim is time-barred by the one-year period of limitations in MCL 600.5805(9). However, our general tolling statute, MCL 600.5856(a), would also toll Puetz's claim. See Badon v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 188 Mich. App. 430, 436, 470 N.W.2d 436 (1991) (holding that if the plaintiff timely files a complaint in federal court, then-under MCL 600.5856 -"[t]he statutory period of limitation was then tolled until the federal action was no longer pending"). Puetz contends that Count IV of her federal complaint was a claim over which the federal district court had original jurisdiction. And she argues that the trial court should have reviewed anew the issue of whether the federal court had original jurisdiction over her federal complaint despite the fact that she did not appeal the dismissal in federal court. Puetz, however, cites no authority in support of that novel proposition, so we conclude that this issue was abandoned on appeal. See Mitcham v. Detroit , 355 Mich. 182, 203, 94 N.W.2d 388 (1959). See Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 603, 606, 677 N.W.2d 325 (2004) (stating that when construing federal statutes, state courts must follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, but the decisions of lower federal courts are merely persuasive), and K & K Constr, Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental Quality , 267 Mich. App. 523, 559 n. 38, 705 N.W.2d 365 (2005) (stating that although not binding, the decisions of courts from other states may be considered as persuasive authority). Other courts have applied the plain language of the statute to conclude that a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction does not bar application of the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. 1367(d). See Krause v. Textron Fin. Corp. , 59 So.3d 1085, 1090 (Fla. 2011) (holding that the mere fact that a dismissal in federal court was based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction does not change the plain and unambiguous language of the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) ); Stevens v. ARCO Mgt. of Washington DC, Inc. , 751 A.2d 995, 998 (D.C., 2000) (holding that 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) does not limit its application to conditional dismissals under § 1367(c) and instead applies to any claim asserted under § 1367(a) regardless of whether that assertion was successful or unsuccessful). Spectrum argues that even if summary disposition was improper under MCR 2.116(C)(7), there was no genuine question of material fact on the merits of the claim, so summary disposition would have been proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10). However, because the trial court did not rule on that argument, we will not address it on appeal. An official letter explaining Spectrum's position was not unwarranted. It is also reasonable to conclude that as the president of ECS, Johnson needed to receive the letter and that it should have been copied to ECS's lawyer. Further, Kathy Van Rhee, one of the Spectrum employees who received the letter, was the head of nursing in the emergency room and worked with Puetz. She was one of the individuals involved. Thus, at best, the letter was copied to two individuals who had no apparent reason to be copied. Sending the letter to two people who (arguably) should not have received it does not establish a sufficient level of publicity. According to Puetz's copyright registration forms, she completed work on part of the materials in 2011 and on another part of the materials in 2012. Accordingly, when she completed the materials, the intellectual-property policy was clearly in place, as were at least some of the contracts Puetz signed.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 15, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 28, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 24, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 8, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the July 30, 2014 amended judgment of sentence, and we REMAND this case to the Oakland Circuit Court to reinstate the June 16, 2014 judgment of sentence. Because the June 16, 2014 judgment of sentence was valid under People v. Williams , 294 Mich. App. 461, 811 N.W.2d 88 (2011), the Oakland Circuit Court lacked the authority to correct the sentence. MCR 6.429(A) ("[T]he court may not modify a valid sentence after it has been imposed except as provided by law.")

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 21, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we VACATE the second-degree arson sentence of the Wayne Circuit Court, and we REMAND this case to the trial court for resentencing on that count. The trial court erred by finding that it did not have the authority to review the defendant's sentence for second-degree arson. When the defendant was originally sentenced, the probation department calculated her guidelines only for the higher crime class offense of placing explosives on or near property, MCL 750.207(2)(b), and not for second-degree arson, MCL 750.73(1). The trial court sentenced the defendant to 15 years for both crimes, which was a departure sentence for the arson offense, but it had no practical effect in light of the sentence for placing explosives on or near property. The trial court acknowledged this by stating that the arson sentence was "really based on" the higher class sentence. After the defendant was resentenced in 2016 and her sentence for placing explosives on or near property was reduced, the departure sentence for arson was no longer inconsequential. The arson sentence, being based on a higher class crime offense sentence that had been significantly reduced, was invalid because it was based on inaccurate information, and the trial court had the authority to resentence the defendant on that count. People v. Francisco , 474 Mich. 82, 88, 711 N.W.2d 44 (2006) ; MCR 6.429(A). Wilder, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel at an earlier stage of the proceedings.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 24, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is GRANTED. The parties shall address whether the defendants violated either the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., Am. V, or the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2, or both, by retaining proceeds from the sale of tax foreclosed property that exceeded the amount of the tax delinquency in accordance with MCL 211.78m(8)(h). The time allowed for oral argument shall be 20 minutes for each side. MCR 7.314(B)(1). Persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the trial court clearly erred in finding a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer, and we REMAND this case to that court for consideration of whether Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012), should be applied retroactively to this case, in which the defendant's convictions became final in 2005. The Court of Appeals found clear error in the trial court's memorandum opinion and in its statements during oral argument at a subsequent hearing. However, in its review of the record, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that, at the end of that hearing, the trial court quoted the applicable standard from Lafler and unequivocally found that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer. This finding - made by the trial judge who presided over the trial and the evidentiary hearing - is supported by the record, and we are not "left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake." People v. Armstrong , 490 Mich. 281, 289, 806 N.W.2d 676 (2011).

By order of April 4, 2018, the prosecuting attorney was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the July 6, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is again considered, and we direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on the application. MCR 7.305(H)(1). We further ORDER the Saginaw Circuit Court, in accordance with Administrative Order 2003-03, to determine whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, to appoint attorney Christine DuBois, if feasible, to represent the defendant in this Court. If this appointment is not feasible, the trial court shall, within the same time frame, appoint other counsel to represent the defendant in this Court. The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of the order appointing counsel, addressing whether (1) the show-up identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, see People v. Kurylczyk , 443 Mich. 289, 303-306, 505 N.W.2d 528 (1993) ; (2) if so, whether the identification was nonetheless sufficiently reliable so that it was properly admitted, Perry v. New Hampshire , 565 U.S. 228, 238-239, 132 S.Ct. 716, 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012) ; and (3) if improperly admitted, whether it is more probable than not that the erroneous admission of the identification through the detective's testimony affected the outcome of the trial. People v. Lukity , 460 Mich. 484, 496, 596 N.W.2d 607 (1999). In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellant's brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellant. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellant within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted, and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we REVERSE the April 11, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals. The circuit court correctly concluded that equitable estoppel did not bar the defendant from denying coverage for the December 2013 water leak in the plaintiffs' Portage house. "[T]he maxim that 'one who comes into equity must come with clean hands' is 'the expression of one of the elementary and fundamental conceptions of equity jurisprudence.' " Rose v. Nat'l Auction Group , 466 Mich 453, 462, 646 N.W.2d 455 (2002), quoting 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, ch. I, § 397, p 90, and § 398, p. 92 (1941). The plaintiffs by their own admission never told the defendant they had moved out of the Portage house when they put that house up for sale in 2013. They also told the defendant that they "were moving" in February 2013 rather than that they "had moved," and they never asked for a seasonal policy for a non-primary residence. The defendant relied on those misrepresentations and omissions to conclude the plaintiffs still resided in the Portage house when it renewed the homeowner's policy on the house in November 2013. The Court of Appeals therefore erred by holding that the defendant was equitably estopped from denying coverage under the facts of this case. We REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the remaining issue raised by the parties but not addressed by that court in its initial review of the case.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of People v. Sharpe , 502 Mich. 313, 918 N.W.2d 504 (2018). We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 1, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

By order of April 26, 2018, the prosecuting attorney was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the September 15, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 24, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

Gadola, J. Plaintiffs, Robert F. and Kimberly Broz, appeal as of right the order of the trial court granting summary disposition to defendant, Plante & Moran, PLLC, under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). We affirm. I. FACTS This case involves alleged accounting malpractice. When this case was previously before this Court in Broz v. Plante & Moran, PLLC , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 17, 2016 (Docket No. 325884) 2016 WL 2908341, we summarized the underlying facts as follows: Robert Broz operated several businesses that provide cellular telephone services, including RFB Cellular and Alpine PCS. He organized the businesses as S Corporations, which provided for pass through taxation. The IRS audited the [Brozes'] tax returns and issued a notice of deficiency, or 90-day letter, to them. The IRS listed various deficiencies in the [Brozes'] tax payments for tax years 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. Plante Moran prepared the [Brozes'] tax returns for each of those years. The parties' professional relationship ended in February 2006. After the end of the relationship, but before the IRS issued the notice of deficiency, the [Brozes] filed amended tax returns for years 1998-2001, each one designated as a "protective filing" and showing a decrease in adjusted gross income of $ 35,675,453. Having claimed a large net operating loss for tax year 2002, they filed the amended returns in hopes of taking advantage of the 2002 enactment of the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act, P.L. 107-147, § 102(a); 116 Stat. 21, which allowed taxpayers to carry back net operating losses incurred in tax years 2001 and 2002 for five years instead of the normal two. The [Brozes] then sued the IRS in the United States Tax Court and disputed the deficiencies; they alleged in relevant part that all but a nominal amount of any tax deficiency assessed as a result of the audit would be eliminated by their 2002 net operating loss carryback. Despite raising the 2002 carryback as an issue in their petition to the Tax Court, the [Brozes] chose not to press that matter as part of their case before that tribunal. Their trial lawyer explained at deposition that this was done for strategic reasons and with the knowledge and approval of Robert Broz. The [Brozes] sued Plante Moran for malpractice in 2008, but the parties entered into a series of tolling agreements pending the resolution of the case in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court issued a decision in favor of the IRS on the deficiencies on September 1, 2011, Broz v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , 137 T.C. 46 (US Tax Ct., 2011). The [Brozes] then filed this action on January 19, 2012. They also appealed the decision of the Tax Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. While that appeal was pending, the [Brozes'] lawyer attempted to fight collection efforts by the IRS by asserting that the judgment could be reduced either by a favorable ruling from the Sixth Circuit, or by application of the [Brozes'] 2002 net operating loss carryback, which they were still pursuing with the IRS. The federal appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court in August 2013. See Broz v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , 727 F.3d 621 (C.A. 6, 2013). On September 16, 2014, the IRS sent the [Brozes] a letter disallowing the [Brozes'] carryback claims. The [Brozes'] lawyer responded with a letter stating their disagreement and requesting an appeals conference. Plante Moran moved for summary disposition of this case on November 5, 2014. It argued that the case must be dismissed because it was not yet ripe; specifically, it stated that the IRS's review process could yet determine that no damages existed. It also argued that, by failing to assert the carryback argument in the United States Tax Court, the [Brozes] caused their own losses. The trial court agreed that the cause of action was not ripe. Although the [Brozes] had been assessed a tax liability, the court explained, they had not suffered any present injury because it was possible that that liability would be offset if they prevailed in their pending action with the IRS. On that basis, the trial court granted Plante Moran's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and dismissed the case without prejudice. [ Broz , unpub. op. at 1-2.] On appeal in this Court, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendant on ripeness grounds. This Court agreed, reversing the decision of the trial court and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id . at 4. On remand, the parties engaged in additional discovery, and defendant again sought summary disposition of plaintiffs' amended complaint, which alleged breach of contract, professional negligence (malpractice), negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and "estoppel to mitigate and indemnity." The trial court granted defendant's motion, dismissing plaintiffs' claim for professional negligence (malpractice) under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and dismissing all other counts of plaintiffs' complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Plaintiffs again appeal in this Court. II. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition of their claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny summary disposition. Lowrey v. LMPS & LMPJ, Inc. , 500 Mich. 1, 5-6, 890 N.W.2d 344 (2016). In so doing, we review the entire record to determine whether the moving party was entitled to summary disposition. Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). We also review de novo issues of statutory construction. Trentadue v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co. , 479 Mich. 378, 386, 738 N.W.2d 664 (2007). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8)"tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant." Maiden , 461 Mich. at 119, 597 N.W.2d 817. A motion for summary disposition under this section is properly granted when, considering only the pleadings, the alleged claims are clearly unenforceable as a matter of law and no factual development could justify recovery. Id . at 119-120. By contrast, when reviewing an order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers all documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Dawoud v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 317 Mich. App. 517, 520, 895 N.W.2d 188 (2016). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is warranted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id . When a motion is made and supported under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show, by affidavits or other documentary evidence, that there is a genuine issue of material fact. MCR 2.116(G)(4) ; Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co. , 451 Mich. 358, 362, 547 N.W.2d 314 (1996). If the nonmoving party does not make such a showing, summary disposition is properly granted. Quinto , 451 Mich. at 363, 547 N.W.2d 314. A. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (MALPRACTICE) Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred by granting defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) of plaintiffs' claim of accounting malpractice. We disagree. 1. STANDARD OF CARE Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erroneously imposed on them a duty to establish the standard of care and whether defendant met that standard of care, which plaintiffs argue is a burden that is not properly imposed on a plaintiff bringing a claim of accounting malpractice. Plaintiffs are incorrect in this assertion. Professional malpractice arises from the "breach of a duty owed by one rendering professional services to a person who has contracted for such services." Saur v. Probes , 190 Mich. App. 636, 638, 476 N.W.2d 496 (1991). A professional malpractice claim is a tort claim predicated on the failure of the defendant to exercise the requisite professional skill. Stewart v. Rudner , 349 Mich. 459, 468, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957). Accounting is a profession traditionally subject to common-law malpractice liability. Local 1064, RWDSU AFL-CIO v. Ernst & Young , 449 Mich. 322, 333, 535 N.W.2d 187 (1995). Members of a state-licensed profession, such as accountants, are subject to liability for malpractice under the rules of the common law as articulated by MCL 600.2912, which provides: (1) A civil action for malpractice may be maintained against any person professing or holding himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession. The rules of the common law applicable to actions against members of a state licensed profession, for malpractice, are applicable against any person who holds himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession. (2) Malpractice may be given in evidence in defense to any action for services rendered by the member of a state licensed profession, or person holding himself out to be member of a state licensed profession. Section 2962 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.2962, sets forth limitations on liability for accounting malpractice. At all times relevant to this action, § 2962 provided: This section applies to an action for professional malpractice against a certified public accountant. A certified public accountant is liable for civil damages in connection with public accounting services performed by the certified public accountant only in 1 of the following situations : (a) A negligent act, omission, decision, or other conduct of the certified public accountant if the claimant is the certified public accountant's client. (b) An act, omission, decision, or conduct of the certified public accountant that constitutes fraud or an intentional misrepresentation. (c) A negligent act, omission, decision, or other conduct of the certified public accountant if the certified public accountant was informed in writing by the client at the time of engagement that a primary intent of the client was for the professional public accounting services to benefit or influence the person bringing the action for civil damages. For the purposes of this subdivision, the certified public accountant shall identify in writing to the client each person, generic group, or class description that the certified public accountant intends to have rely on the services. The certified public accountant may be held liable only to each identified person, generic group, or class description. The certified public accountant's written identification shall include each person, generic group, or class description identified by the client as being benefited or influenced. [Emphasis added.] Generally, to state a claim for malpractice, a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of a professional relationship, (2) negligence in the performance of the duties within that relationship, (3) proximate cause, and (4) the fact and extent of the client's injury. See Simko v. Blake , 448 Mich. 648, 655, 532 N.W.2d 842 (1995) (defining legal malpractice). This Court has also stated that "[a] malpractice claim requires proof of simple negligence based on a breach of a professional standard of care." Phillips v. Mazda Motor Mfg. (USA) Corp. , 204 Mich. App. 401, 409, 516 N.W.2d 502 (1994), abrogated on other grounds Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc. , 471 Mich. 45, 684 N.W.2d 320 (2004) ; see also MCL 600.2912a. The standard of care refers to what a professional must or must not do. See Moning v. Alfono , 400 Mich. 425, 437-438, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977). In that regard, MCL 600.2912a provides: (1) Subject to subsection (2), in an action alleging malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that in light of the state of the art existing at the time of the alleged malpractice: (a) The defendant, if a general practitioner, failed to provide the plaintiff the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community, and that as a proximate result of the defendant failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury. (b) The defendant, if a specialist, failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities reasonably available under the circumstances, and as a proximate result of the defendant failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury. (2) In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants. In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%. The plaintiff is usually required to introduce expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care and to establish that the professional breached the standard of care, but such testimony is not necessary when the lack of professional care is so obvious as to be within the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary layman. Elher v. Misra , 499 Mich. 11, 21, 878 N.W.2d 790 (2016). When a plaintiff fails to present expert testimony regarding the standard of care, the malpractice claim is subject to dismissal. See Locke v. Pachtman , 446 Mich. 216, 225-226, 521 N.W.2d 786 (1994) (discussing medical malpractice). In this case, the trial court found that plaintiffs had failed to present proof of the standard of care and whether defendant had breached that standard of care. Specifically, the trial court found that plaintiffs' expert, Peter Oettinger, did not directly testify or report regarding the standard of care, and on that basis, the court concluded that defendant was entitled to summary disposition of plaintiffs' claim of accounting malpractice. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by requiring them to present proof of the standard of care, contending that accounting-malpractice claims are governed exclusively by MCL 600.2962, which, plaintiffs argue, does not require a plaintiff alleging accounting-malpractice to present proof of the standard of care. Plaintiffs further argue that MCL 600.2912a does not apply to accounting malpractice claims. When construing a statute, this Court's primary task is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Coldwater v. Consumers Energy Co. , 500 Mich. 158, 167, 895 N.W.2d 154 (2017). This Court begins this task by examining the language of the statute as the most reliable evidence of the intent of the Legislature, id ., giving the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning, Tomra of North America, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 325 Mich. App. 289, 300, 291-91, 926 N.W.2d 261-62, 2018 WL 3443084, *2-3 (2018). If the language is unambiguous, this Court will conclude that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed and will enforce the statute as written. Coldwater , 500 Mich. at 167, 895 N.W.2d 154, citing Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward , 460 Mich. 230, 236, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). MCL 600.2912a(1) does not specifically state that it applies to accounting malpractice. Rather, the statute provides that "in an action alleging malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving" that the defendant "failed to provide the plaintiff the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care." Id . Giving this language its plain and ordinary meaning, the statute indicates that the Legislature meant it to apply to "an action alleging malpractice" without exception. MCL 600.2912a therefore imposes on plaintiffs, who in this case are alleging malpractice, the burden of establishing the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care and of establishing that defendant failed to meet this standard in providing professional services to plaintiffs. To summarize, MCL 600.2912(1) acknowledges a malpractice cause of action against state-licensed professionals, such as accountants, under the rules of the common law. MCL 600.2962 sets forth limitations on a cause of action for accounting malpractice. MCL 600.2912a articulates the burden on a plaintiff in a malpractice case to demonstrate the standard of care and a breach of that standard by the defendant, which applies to malpractice actions without exception. We therefore conclude that MCL 600.2912a imposes on plaintiffs in this case the burden of proving that defendant failed to provide plaintiffs with the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care, which is consistent with the burden under the common law on a plaintiff alleging malpractice. The trial court therefore did not err by determining that plaintiffs had the burden of presenting proof regarding the standard of care and whether defendant had breached that standard. The trial court also did not by concluding that expert testimony was required in this case to meet that burden. As noted, to establish the standard of care in a malpractice action and, further, to establish that the defendant breached that standard of care, the plaintiff is required to introduce expert testimony except when the lack of professional care is so obvious as to be within the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary layman. Elher , 499 Mich. at 21, 878 N.W.2d 790. In this case, the report of plaintiff's expert details the complex accounting transactions that led the IRS to find that plaintiffs had tax liability, which plaintiffs argue resulted from defendant's actions. The complexity of the accounting issues involved supports the trial court's conclusion that expert testimony was needed to establish both the standard of care and any alleged breach of that standard in this case. Having concluded that plaintiffs were required to present the opinion of an expert to establish the standard of care and whether defendant breached that standard of care, we consider whether the trial court erred by finding that plaintiffs in this case failed to do so. Oettinger prepared an extensive report detailing the structure of plaintiffs' businesses and how that structure, established by defendant, resulted in plaintiffs incurring tax obligations. Oettinger's report also discussed how the businesses could have been structured differently to avoid the tax liability imposed on plaintiffs. Oettinger's report, however, does not specify the standard of care, nor does the report specifically state that defendant breached that standard when it recommended the business structures plaintiffs used. Rather, the report suggests that other approaches might have been successful, but it does not conclude that defendant's conduct rose to the level of malpractice. Oettinger was thereafter deposed by defendant and testified that he had applied the standard of care issued by the AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) in preparing his report. In determining whether Oettinger's report and deposition testimony adequately established the standard of care, the trial court looked to our Supreme Court's decision in Locke , 446 Mich. at 225-226, 521 N.W.2d 786, for guidance. In Locke , a case involving alleged medical malpractice, our Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination that the plaintiff's expert witness had failed to establish a standard of care and that the plaintiff had therefore failed to establish a prima facie case of malpractice. Our Supreme Court stated: As the lower courts found, it is indeed questionable whether Dr. Couch's latter testimony on this point was sufficient to establish a standard of care with regard to "incorrect technique." Dr. Couch, while presenting one way in which needles break, never went so far as to relate that discussion to a standard of care. In effect, she never explained what a reasonably prudent surgeon would do, in keeping with the standards of professional practice, that might not have been done by Dr. Pachtman. Accordingly, the jury would have had no standard against which to measure Dr. Pachtman's conduct. This factor, coupled with the conflicting nature of Dr. Couch's testimony, leads us to believe that the standard of care was not sufficiently established. [ Id . at 225, 521 N.W.2d 786.] In this case, the trial court determined that because plaintiffs' expert had failed to state an opinion regarding the standard of care and whether defendant had breached that standard, plaintiffs had failed to create an issue of fact regarding their claim of malpractice. Relying on Locke , the trial court reasoned: Mr. Oettinger's report does state what "typically" occurs, arguably setting some basis for what other accountants might have done that the Defendant did not. Further, Mr. Oettinger characterizes the Defendant's actions as "highly questionable". However, like the Locke case, these statements do not rise to the level of clearly identifying a standard of care. It is true that Mr. Oettinger stated what typically is done in a timing sense of accounting actions, but he failed to specifically identify what is standard practice or whether the actions and advice the Defendant gave actually breached those professional standards.... It is clear from Mr. Oettinger's report that because of Defendant's advice the tax returns resulted in expensive deficiencies. According to Mr. Oettinger the business structure was overly complex and could have been more simple. However, pointing to damages resulting from Defendant's advice does not specifically show the Defendant committed malpractice. Advice from attorneys, doctors, and accountants can be unsatisfactory in that it does not produce the desired results, yet still be within the standard of care. Regardless of Mr. Oettinger's lack of specific language detailing negligence or malpractice, his report does not clearly identify what exactly Defendant should have done based on accounting standards of care or how the Defendant's advice breached the standard. We agree that Oettinger's report does not state the standard of care; although he explained what defendant did wrong and suggests what could have been done instead, he did not specifically identify the standard of care nor did he specifically state that defendant violated the standard of care. And although Oettinger stated in his deposition that he had applied the standard of care articulated by the AICPA in preparing his report, he did not state what that standard is or whether defendant breached that standard of care. 2. OETTINGER'S AFFIDAVIT After defendant moved for summary disposition, plaintiffs submitted to the trial court an affidavit entitled "Declaration of Peter Oettinger, CPA," attempting to clarify Oettinger's testimony regarding the standard of care. In the affidavit, Oettinger states, in pertinent part: 5. This declaration is made in response to Defendant's suggestion that Defendant has not violated "a duty or standard of care." That statement is false. Defendant has clearly violated their duty to Plaintiffs and did provide bad accounting advice. 6. The tax planning and tax advice provided by Defendant to the [Brozes] and their companies were wrong. Their bad advice directly resulted in the IRS disallowing millions of dollars of deductions that the [Brozes] took on their personal returns. * * * 12. To be crystal clear, my report and my testimony is that Defendant committed accounting malpractice and violated its duties to the [Brozes]. Whether or not my report used some particular "buzzword,1" the net effect is the same. Plante & Moran clearly and unequivocally violated its duty of care to Robert and Kimberly Broz. 1 Notwithstanding Defendant's suggestion to the contrary, my report indicates that I used the standard of care as issued by the AICPA. Subsequent research confirms that Michigan has adopted the AICPA standard. (Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Accountant Rule 338.5102 which states[, "](1) The following standards are adopted by reference: (a) The standards issued by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA), 220 Leigh Farm Road, Durham, North Carolina, 27707, set forth in the publication 'AICPA Professional Standards'[...."] ) The trial court declined to consider the affidavit, finding it a contradiction of Oettinger's earlier testimony. Plaintiffs contend that Oettinger's affidavit was sufficient to clarify his testimony on the standard of care and that the trial court erred by declining to consider the affidavit. "[A] witness is bound by his or her deposition testimony, and that testimony cannot be contradicted by affidavit in an attempt to defeat a motion for summary disposition." Casey v. Auto. Owners Ins. Co. , 273 Mich. App. 388, 396, 729 N.W.2d 277 (2007). See also Mitan v. Neiman Marcus , 240 Mich. App. 679, 683, 613 N.W.2d 415 (2000) (stating that a party may not contrive a factual issue by asserting the contrary in an affidavit after a deposition). But although a witness is bound by his or her deposition testimony, an affidavit that clarifies or expands on previous testimony is not prohibited from consideration. See Wallad v. Access BIDCO, Inc. , 236 Mich. App. 303, 312-313, 600 N.W.2d 664 (1999). In this case, the record does not support the trial court's finding that Oettinger's affidavit contradicts his earlier report or deposition testimony. A review of Oettinger's report and deposition testimony demonstrates that the affidavit is consistent with his testimony, and in fact, the trial court noted in its opinion that the affidavit clarified Oettinger's position that defendants violated their duty to plaintiffs by providing bad advice and by structuring the businesses in a manner that resulted in tax liability to plaintiffs. Because an affidavit that clarifies or expands on previous testimony is not prohibited from consideration, see id ., the trial court was obligated to consider the affidavit. MCR 2.116(G)(5). We therefore next consider whether the affidavit adequately supplies the missing information regarding the standard of care. In his deposition, Oettinger testified that in writing his report he had applied the standard of care adopted by the AICPA. In his affidavit, he notes that Michigan has adopted the AICPA standards for accountant malpractice and also explicitly states that defendant violated its duty of care to plaintiffs. But Oettinger's affidavit does not explicitly state the standard of care, nor does it identify what actions by defendant breached that standard. It is not enough to say that defendant violated its duty to plaintiffs or provided bad accounting advice because a professional's bad advice, even combined with a bad result, is not necessarily malpractice. Rather, the expert testimony must establish what the professional's duty is by identifying the relevant standard of care and then specifying what the defendant did or failed to do that violated that standard of care. Accordingly, although all documentary evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the nonmoving party, Dawoud , 317 Mich. App. at 520, 895 N.W.2d 188, here, plaintiffs failed to establish a question of material fact regarding whether defendant breached the standard of care because they failed to present expert testimony on the standard of care and whether defendant breached that standard. The trial court therefore did not err by granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiffs' claim for accounting malpractice. B. DISMISSAL OF REMAINING CLAIMS Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's remaining claims for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and "estoppel to mitigate and indemnity." We disagree. 1. BREACH OF CONTRACT A plaintiff may allege both breach of contract and malpractice in the same action. See Stewart , 349 Mich. at 468, 84 N.W.2d 816. A contract obligates the parties to do certain acts or provide certain services, and it encompasses the duty to perform those acts or services with due care. Malpractice can arise from the breach of that duty of care owed under the contract. Saur , 190 Mich. App. at 638, 476 N.W.2d 496 ; Malik v. William Beaumont Hosp. , 168 Mich. App. 159, 168, 423 N.W.2d 920 (1988). But the duty to meet the standard of care is distinct from the contractual duty to provide services and, as a result, a plaintiff can raise both tort and breach-of-contract claims in one action. A tort claim and contract claim thus may arise from the same transaction, but the two causes of action are separate, with different theories and different proofs. Stewart , 349 Mich. at 468, 84 N.W.2d 816. In addition, although a malpractice claim is a tort claim grounded in an allegation of failure to exercise the requisite professional skill, when there is a failure to perform a specific contracted-for action, the cause of action may be one of breach of contract. Id ., 84 N.W.2d 816. In the context of legal malpractice, this Court has concluded that an attorney may be held liable under a contract theory if the attorney breached a "special agreement" rather than a general agreement to provide requisite skill or adequate legal services. Brownell v. Garber , 199 Mich. App. 519, 524-525, 503 N.W.2d 81 (1993). A special agreement is a contract to perform a specific act. Barnard v. Dilley , 134 Mich. App. 375, 378, 350 N.W.2d 887 (1984). When a plaintiff successfully pleads a nontort cause of action, such as breach of contract, the claim will not be barred simply because the underlying facts may also establish a tort cause of action. In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. 367, 386, 835 N.W.2d 545 (2013). In determining whether a claim is based in contract or tort, courts are not bound by the label assigned to the claim by the plaintiff. Stephens v. Worden Ins. Agency, LLC , 307 Mich. App. 220, 229, 859 N.W.2d 723 (2014). Rather, a court is required to consider the gravamen of the suit based on the complaint as a whole. Id ., citing Buhalis v. Trinity Continuing Care Servs. , 296 Mich. App. 685, 691-692, 822 N.W.2d 254 (2012). Generally, "a tort requires a wrong independent of a contract...." In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. at 383, 835 N.W.2d 545 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he distinguishing feature of a tort is that it consists in the violation of a right given or neglect of a duty imposed by law, and not by contract." Id . (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). In this case, the trial court correctly noted that a plaintiff may bring a claim for both malpractice and breach of contract in the same action but nonetheless dismissed plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim, reasoning that the allegations of the complaint asserting malpractice and asserting breach of contract were essentially the same. The trial court reasoned: Here, Plaintiffs' complaint is not alleging that the Defendant failed to perform a specific task such as the promise to watch an employee as in Banker[ & Brisebois Co. v. Maddox , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 29, 2014 (Docket No. 310993) [2014 WL 1720285].] As reflected in Barnard , 350 NW2d 887 (1984) and Aldred [v. O'Hara-Bruce , 184 Mich. App. 488, 458 N.W.2d 671 (1990) ], Plaintiffs['] claim here is in essence an allegation that the Defendant's accounting services were inadequate. Labels aside, Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract is in substance another way of stating their claims for malpractice. Because the Plaintiffs have failed to plead or establish facts that would support a separate claim for breach of contract, the Defendant is entitled to summary disposition on that claim. The trial court's conclusion is supported by the record. Plaintiffs assert that defendant breached their contract by failing to adequately render the contracted-for professional services, such as setting up their business structure in a tax-advantageous manner. Although a claim for breach of contract will not be barred simply because the underlying facts also establish a tort cause of action, In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. at 386, 835 N.W.2d 545, defendant's alleged failure to properly conduct the work that plaintiffs hired defendant to do is not sufficient to establish a breach-of-contract claim separate from the malpractice claim. The trial court therefore did not err by granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim. 2. REMAINING CLAIMS The trial court similarly granted defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) of plaintiffs' remaining claims for negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and "estoppel to mitigate and indemnity." Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in doing so because these causes of action differ from malpractice. While it is true that these causes of action differ from malpractice, plaintiffs' allegations are virtually the same for these claims as for their claim of malpractice, and we discuss them here together. Regarding negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty, a professional may be liable for ordinary negligence as well as for malpractice. See MacDonald v. Barbarotto , 161 Mich. App. 542, 549, 411 N.W.2d 747 (1987). However, a claim arising out of the fiduciary relationship between a professional and the professional's client alleging that the professional failed to adequately provide professional services sounds in malpractice, regardless of the label given to the claim. See Aldred , 184 Mich. App. at 490, 458 N.W.2d 671 (1990). This Court has held that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not necessarily duplicative of a claim for legal malpractice, but "[t]he conduct required to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty requires a more culpable state of mind than the negligence required for malpractice. Damages may be obtained for a breach of fiduciary duty when a position of influence has been acquired and abused, or when confidence has been reposed and betrayed." Prentis Family Foundation, Inc. v. Karmanos Cancer Institute , 266 Mich. App. 39, 47, 698 N.W.2d 900 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Regarding plaintiffs' equitable claim entitled "estoppel to mitigate and indemnity," plaintiffs appear to request equitable relief from the trial court, asserting that their damages could have been mitigated if defendant had paid plaintiffs' tax liability when it was assessed against plaintiffs. Again, these allegations have as their basis the contention that defendant poorly performed its professional duties to plaintiffs, causing plaintiffs to incur tax liability. The trial court dismissed these remaining claims (negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and estoppel) as redundant, concluding that although these claims had various labels, each claim was essentially the same as the claim of malpractice. We agree. Viewing these claims within the context of the entire complaint, each of the claims has as its gravamen the same actions that make up defendant's alleged malpractice. In each count of plaintiffs' amended complaint, the action complained of is, essentially, that defendant gave plaintiffs bad advice. Defendant advised plaintiffs that the business structure they were providing for plaintiffs' businesses would result in favorable tax treatment. Defendant was wrong. The IRS disagreed with defendant, resulting in damages and years of litigation for plaintiffs. But because the gravamen of each of these claims is duplicative of the claim for malpractice, the trial court did not err by granting defendant summary disposition of these remaining claims. Affirmed. Boonstra, P.J., and Jansen, J., concurred with Gadola, J. Our Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of this statute is to ensure that the impostor and the state-licensed professional are both held to the same standard of care. See Sam v. Balardo , 411 Mich. 405, 425-426, 308 N.W.2d 142 (1981) ("[L]iability for malpractice of members of state-licensed professions is to be determined by resort to the common law. Accordingly, the provisions of the [Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.101 et seq . ] do not purport to create or limit the cause of action of malpractice to something other than what was recognized at common law.") MCL 600.2962 has since been amended by 2012 P.A. 268, effective July 3, 2012. The malpractice alleged in this case occurred not later than 2006. We note that this Court previously has determined that MCL 600.2912a applies to a claim alleging accounting malpractice, albeit in unpublished opinions, which are not precedentially binding, MCR 7.215(C)(1), but may be considered instructive or persuasive, Sau-Tuk Indus., Inc. v. Allegan Co. , 316 Mich. App. 122, 137, 892 N.W.2d 33 (2016). Thus, it is not MCL 600.2962 that is the fountainhead of accounting malpractice, as plaintiffs suggest, but rather MCL 600.2912(1), with its basis in the common law, that provides the foundation for the cause of action, with MCL 600.2962 providing certain limitations. Furthermore, the existence of MCL 600.2962 does not abrogate a plaintiff's obligation under MCL 600.2912a to establish the applicable standard of care and the defendant's obligation to meet that standard.

Gadola, J. Appellant, Brenda M. Moore, appeals as of right the determination of the Board of State Canvassers (the Board) that the petition for recall submitted by appellee, Jeremy Hooker, complied with the requirements of MCL 168.951a(1)(c). Because we conclude that the petition for recall met the requirements of that statutory section, we affirm. I. FACTS Appellant has been serving as the Muskegon County drain commissioner since November 2013. She asserts that in her capacity as drain commissioner she has overseen 18 petitions for drainage projects. According to appellant, with regard to each project she complied with the applicable laws by referring each project to engineers to determine the most cost-effective option, then submitted each project for bids and accepted the lowest bid for each project. On March 16, 2018, appellee submitted a petition for the recall of appellant to the Secretary of State. The petition stated the following reason for the proposed recall: "Muskegon County Drain Commissioner, Brenda Moore, elected to undertake the broadest scopes of work and most expensive options proposed by her engineers for each project assessed during her current term in office, when less expensive alternatives were proposed to her." The Department of State, Bureau of Elections, notified appellant of the recall petition by letter, indicating that the Board would meet to conduct a "Clarity-Factual Hearing" on April 5, 2018. The parties do not dispute that the Board did not hold the planned hearing on April 5, 2018, and that the Board's failure to conduct the hearing constituted "a determination that each reason for the recall stated in the petition is factual and of sufficient clarity to enable the officer whose recall is being sought and the electors to identify the course of conduct that is the basis for the recall." MCL 168.951a(3). Appellant thereafter appealed the determination of the Board in this Court. See MCL 168.951a(6). II. ANALYSIS Appellant challenges the Board's determination that the reason stated in the recall petition met the statutory requirements that the reason be factual and of sufficient clarity. MCL 168.951a(1)(c). Initially, we note that an elected officer whose recall is sought may appeal a determination by the Board in this Court for a determination concerning whether the reasons stated in the petition are factual and of sufficient clarity. See MCL 168.951a(6). Resolution of this appeal involves a question of statutory construction, which this Court reviews de novo. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grange Ins. Co. of Mich. , 319 Mich. App. 579, 583, 903 N.W.2d 400 (2017). The right to recall an elected official is reserved to the voters of this state by our state Constitution. See Const. 1963, art. 2, § 8. In that regard, our Legislature enacted MCL 168.951a, which applies to the attempted recall of a county official other than a county commissioner. See MCL 168.951a(1) and MCL 168.959. At the times relevant to the appeal, MCL 168.951a(1) provided: (1) A petition for the recall of an officer listed in [ MCL 168.959 ] shall meet all of the following requirements: (a) Comply with [ MCL 168.544c(1) and (2) ]. (b) Be printed. (c) State factually and clearly each reason for the recall. Each reason for the recall shall be based upon the officer's conduct during his or her current term of office. The reason for the recall may be typewritten. If any reason for the recall is based on the officer's conduct in connection with specific legislation, the reason for the recall shall not misrepresent the content of the specific legislation. (d) Contain a certificate of the circulator. The certificate of the circulator may be printed on the reverse side of the petition. (e) Be in a form prescribed by the secretary of state. Before a petition for recall may be circulated, the petition must be submitted to the Board. MCL 168.951a(2). The Board must then meet and "determine ... whether each reason for the recall stated in the petition is factual and of sufficient clarity to enable the officer whose recall is sought and the electors to identify the course of conduct that is the basis for the recall." MCL 168.951a(3). If the Board determines that "any reason for the recall is not factual or of sufficient clarity," it must reject the entire petition. MCL 168.951a(3). In this case, the Board did not meet on the date scheduled to consider whether appellee's petition met the statutory criteria. The Board's failure to meet therefore constituted "a determination" by the Board "that each reason for the recall stated in the petition is factual and of sufficient clarity to enable the officer whose recall is being sought and the electors to identify the course of conduct that is the basis for the recall." MCL 168.951a(3). Appellant challenges whether the petition meets the requirements of MCL 168.951a(1)(c) that the petition "[s]tate factually and clearly each reason for the recall." Specifically, she argues that appellee's stated ground for recall is not factual because he misstates her record and that the term "factual" as used in the statute must be understood to require that the petition be truthful. In response, appellee contends that the reason stated in the recall petition is factually accurate. We have previously held that Const. 1963, art. 2, § 8, which reserves to the voters the right to recall an elected official, "was intended to preclude judicial or administrative review of the substantive merit of the reasons alleged in a recall petition" while recognizing the statutory requirement that a recall petition must clearly state the reason for the recall attempt, which is subject to judicial review. In re Wayne Co. Election Comm. , 150 Mich. App. 427, 437, 388 N.W.2d 707 (1986). Before the enactment of 2012 P.A. 417, which added MCL 168.951a and amended MCL 168.952, this Court was tasked with determining the "clarity" of recall petitions, and we noted that our review was limited in scope: The standard of review for clarity of recall petitions has been described as both "lenient," and "very lenient." "Thus, recall review by the courts should be very, very limited." A meticulous and detailed statement of the charges against an officeholder is not required. It is sufficient if an officeholder is apprised of the course of conduct in office that is the basis of the recall drive, so that a defense can be mounted regarding that conduct. "Where the clarity of the reasons stated in the petition is a close question, doubt should be resolved in favor of the individual formulating the petition." [ Dimas v. Macomb Co. Election Comm. , 248 Mich. App. 624, 627-628, 639 N.W.2d 850 (2001) (citations omitted).] We held that under the version of MCL 168.952 then in effect that whether the statements in a petition are true is not a proper consideration for rejecting the petition on grounds of clarity because such a determination is a political question that must be left to the electors under Const. 1963, art. 2, § 8. Donigan v. Oakland Co. Election Comm. , 279 Mich. App. 80, 83-84, 755 N.W.2d 209 (2008) (discussing MCL 168.952 before the enactment of 2012 P.A. 417). Our Legislature has since enacted 2012 P.A. 417, adding MCL 168.951a, which requires a recall petition to state "factually and clearly each reason for the recall." MCL 168.951a(1)(c). If the Board determines that "any reason for the recall is not factual or of sufficient clarity," it must reject the entire petition. MCL 168.951a(3). Upon appeal in this Court, this Court is charged with determining "whether each reason [stated in the recall petition] is factual and of sufficient clarity...." MCL 168.951a(6). Accordingly, we now consider whether the addition of the terms "factually" and "factual" to the requirement of clarity altered the scope of the determination by this Court to include a determination of "truthfulness." When construing a statute, our primary task is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Coldwater v. Consumers Energy Co. , 500 Mich. 158, 167, 895 N.W.2d 154 (2017). We begin by examining the language of the statute as the most reliable evidence of the intent of the Legislature, and we give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning. TOMRA of North America, Inc v. Dep't of Treasury , 325 Mich. App. 289, 295-297, 926 N.W.2d 259 (2018). If the language is unambiguous, we will conclude that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed and will enforce the statute as written. Coldwater , 500 Mich. at 167, 895 N.W.2d 154, citing Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward , 460 Mich. 230, 236, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). In ordinary usage, the word "factual" can mean "restricted to or based on fact," while the word "fact" can be understood to mean "an actual occurrence" and "a piece of information presented as having objective reality[.]" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). When read in the context of the statute as a whole, the plainest construction is that the Legislature included the terms "factual" and "factually" in MCL 168.951a to ensure that the grounds set forth in a recall petition are stated in terms of a factual occurrence. That is, the ground for recall must be stated in the form of a factual assertion about the official's conduct that the proponent believes warrants the recall. The language of MCL 168.951a does not specify, however, that the reason for the recall stated in the petition must be truthful. Our state Constitution provides that "[t]he sufficiency of any statement of reasons or grounds procedurally required shall be a political rather than a judicial question." Const. 1963, art. 2, § 8. An assessment of the accuracy or truthfulness of a factual assertion is an inquiry into the sufficiency of the reason stated in support of recall; our Constitution plainly reserves that assessment to the electors, and the Legislature could not in any event remove that right from them. Donigan , 279 Mich. App. at 84, 755 N.W.2d 209, citing Meyers v. Patchkowski , 216 Mich. App. 513, 518, 549 N.W.2d 602 (1996). We therefore conclude that the terms "factually" and "factual" as used in MCL 168.951a require the reason stated in the recall petition to be in the form of a factual assertion but do not confer upon the Board or upon this Court the task of determining the truthfulness of the statement. See Const. 1963, art. 2, § 8 ; Donigan , 279 Mich. App. at 84, 755 N.W.2d 209. In his petition, appellee stated that appellant "elected to undertake the broadest scopes of work and most expensive options proposed by her engineers for each project assessed during her current term in office, when less expensive alternatives were proposed to her." Regardless of whether this is true or false, this is a clearly stated factual assertion. Because the statement is factually and clearly stated, the petition meets the requirements of MCL 168.951a(1)(c). If the petition garners the requisite support, it will be for the electorate to determine whether the assertion is actually true and warrants recall. See Donigan , 279 Mich. App. at 84-85, 755 N.W.2d 209. Affirmed. Boonstra, P.J., and Jansen, J., concurrred with Gadola, J. MCL 168.951a was amended by 2018 P.A. 190, effective June 20, 2018. Appellant also asserts, in conclusory fashion and without citation of supporting legal authority, that this Court must interpret MCL 168.951a(1)(c) to require truthful statements because to do otherwise would constitute an unconstitutional taking of her property right to continue in office. It is well settled that political officers have no property rights in their offices. See Detroit v. Div. 26 of the Amalgamated Ass'n. , 332 Mich. 237, 251, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952). It is equally well settled that when a party merely announces his or her position and fails to cite any supporting legal authority, the issue is deemed abandoned. Southfield Ed. Ass'n v. Bd. of Ed. of Southfield Pub. Sch. , 320 Mich. App. 353, 379, 909 N.W.2d 1 (2017). Left as an open question by our ruling in this case is whether the statutory requirement that the stated reason or reasons for recall be "factual" is an unconstitutional limitation on the people's right to recall elected officials. This is a question worth pondering in light of the requirement of Const. 1963, art. 2, § 8, that the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds stated in a recall petition be a political rather than a judicial question. As appellee fails to raise this issue, we decline to address it.

Murray, C.J. Defendant was convicted of jury tampering, MCL 750.120a(1), a misdemeanor, for attempting to influence jurors when he stood in front of a courthouse and distributed pamphlets to those he knew to be potential jurors in a case set for trial that day. The circuit court affirmed his conviction, rejecting defendant's statutory and First Amendment arguments. We granted leave to appeal, and we now affirm. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This matter arose out of defendant's interest in a criminal case involving Andrew Yoder, who had been charged with "a [Department of Environmental Quality] violation" for "illegally draining wetlands." After hearing of the case, defendant decided to attend the pretrial hearing on November 4, 2015, because despite not actually knowing Yoder, the case "piqu[ed] [his] interest." At the pretrial hearing, the court scheduled Yoder's trial for November 24, 2015. Defendant returned to the courthouse on the day set for trial and stood outside the front entrance to pass out pamphlets entitled, "Your Jury Rights: True or False?" that he had obtained from the Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA) website. The pamphlet explains that jurors may vote according to their conscience. It further advises readers to be aware "when it's your turn to serve" that "[y]ou may, and should, vote your conscience," that "[y]ou cannot be forced to obey a 'juror's oath,' " and that "[y]ou have the right to 'hang' the jury with your vote if you cannot agree with other jurors!" Although defendant handed or attempted to hand the pamphlet to a number of people that day, his charge for jury tampering resulted from his distribution of the pamphlet to Jennifer Johnson and Theresa DeVries, two people summoned to the court for jury selection. Johnson testified that she arrived at the courthouse unsure of where to go and that she approached defendant, thinking he was out front to "direct traffic." Although she could not remember who broached the subject, it was established between them that she was there for jury duty. Defendant proceeded to hand her a pamphlet "and sort of pointed at the door." DeVries, on the other hand, testified that as she approached the courthouse, defendant specifically asked if she was there for jury selection. When she confirmed that she was, he handed her a pamphlet and said, " 'Do you know what your rights are for being a jury [sic] on jury duty?' " Defendant was ultimately arrested and charged with obstruction of justice, MCL 750.505, and jury tampering. Yoder's case, however, never went to trial because the parties reached a plea agreement. Before trial in his own case, defendant moved the district court to dismiss both charges. The district court granted the motion with respect to obstruction of justice but declined to dismiss the jury-tampering charge. In so doing, the court rejected defendant's argument that the charge should be dismissed because the term "juror," as used in MCL 750.120a(1), does not encompass individuals like Thompson and DeVries who were summoned for jury duty, but who were never actually selected or sworn, and took defendant's First Amendment argument under advisement. The circuit court affirmed the district court's decision, and defendant was denied leave to appeal by this Court, People v. Wood , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 2, 2016 (Docket No. 334410), as well as by the Michigan Supreme Court, People v. Wood , 500 Mich. 963, 891 N.W.2d 495 (2017). Defendant's two-day jury trial was held in district court. When asked why he had decided to distribute the pamphlets, defendant testified that he learned a really interesting fact that 95 percent of all criminal cases in the United States, they are pled out before they go to trial. And so there was a-there was a very high likelihood that the Yoder case was not going to go to trial, but then I also believed that there were going to be a lot of people around the courthouse and it was going to give me a really good opportunity to educate as many people to hand out the pamphlets and get this information to their hands. He further stated that he did not know "who was summoned as a potential juror" and that he just handed the pamphlet "[t]o anybody that would receive one." After the prosecution rested, defendant renewed his motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds, but the district court rejected the argument, reasoning that defendant "was targeting jurors that were coming in that day" and that there was "a compelling interest in making sure for both the Prosecutor and the defense that there is a fair and impartial jury being chosen and that it is also very clear to me that [defendant] was very interested in that case and knew that the case was set for trial that day." Further, the court found it to be irrelevant that a trial never occurred in Yoder's case. At the close of trial, the district court provided the following instructions to the jury regarding the elements of jury tampering: First, that Jennifer Johnson and/or Theresa DeVries was a juror/were jurors in the case of People v. Yoder . Second, that the defendant willfully attempted to influence that juror by the use of argument or persuasion. Third, that the defendant's conduct took place outside of proceedings in open court in the trial of the case. A person acts willfully when he or she acts knowingly and purposefully. The word "juror" includes a person who has been summoned to appear in court to decide the facts in a specific trial. An "argument or persuasion" can be oral or written. Defendant was ultimately convicted and then sentenced on July 21, 2017. On appeal in the circuit court, defendant argued that: (1) "the State" violated his First Amendment rights when he was "arrested and charged because of the content his pamphlet contained," and such conduct would fail a strict-scrutiny analysis, (2) he was denied his right to due process because MCL 750.120a(1) is unconstitutionally vague, (3) the district court erred by defining the term "juror" to include persons summoned for jury duty, and (4) even if the district court's interpretation was correct, he should not have been convicted under MCL 750.120a(1) because Yoder's case never proceeded to trial. The circuit court issued its opinion and order on February 2, 2018, affirming defendant's conviction. In so doing, the court first rejected defendant's First Amendment argument, reasoning that the content of the pamphlet was not at issue because "[t]he statute relates solely to when a person attempts to 'influence' a juror's decision, not to 'influence' them as to any topic whatsoever," and defendant willfully attempted to influence people he believed to be jurors. Secondly, the court concluded that because Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.) defines "juror" to include those selected for jury duty, the juror-tampering statute applied. And lastly, the court ruled that no evidence existed to support defendant's argument that he was denied a fair trial. II. DID DEFENDANT TAMPER WITH A "JUROR?" Defendant first argues that both trial courts erroneously defined "juror," as used in MCL 750.120a(1), to include those summoned for jury duty. Specifically, he asserts that he could not have tampered with "a juror in any case" under MCL 750.120a(1), because the term "juror" only encompasses those selected and sworn for jury duty, and no jurors were ever selected in Yoder's case. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. PNC Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury , 285 Mich. App. 504, 505, 778 N.W.2d 282 (2009). When interpreting statutory provisions, the overriding goal is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. People v. Flick , 487 Mich. 1, 10, 790 N.W.2d 295 (2010). The words in the statute are, of course, the best evidence of what was intended by the Legislature in passing the statute. People v. Smith , 496 Mich. 133, 138, 852 N.W.2d 127 (2014) ("The words of a statute are the most reliable indicator of the Legislature's intent and should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning and the context within which they are used in the statute."). "If the statute is unambiguous on its face, the Legislature will be presumed to have intended the meaning expressed, and judicial construction is neither required nor permissible." People v. Likine , 492 Mich. 367, 387, 823 N.W.2d 50 (2012). MCL 750.120a(1) provides: A person who willfully attempts to influence the decision of a juror in any case by argument or persuasion, other than as part of the proceedings in open court in the trial of the case, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both. The term "juror" is not defined in the statute itself or in the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et seq . As a result, we may consult a lay dictionary to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of "juror" if the term lacks "a unique legal meaning," People v. Thompson , 477 Mich. 146, 151-152, 730 N.W.2d 708 (2007), or a legal dictionary if the word is a legal term of art, People v. Jones , 467 Mich. 301, 304, 651 N.W.2d 906 (2002). See also MCL 8.3a. However, because the definitions of the term "juror" "are the same in both a lay dictionary and legal dictionary, it is unnecessary to determine whether the phrase is a term of art, and it does not matter to which type of dictionary this Court resorts." Hecht v. Nat'l Heritage Academies, Inc. , 499 Mich. 586, 621 n. 62, 886 N.W.2d 135 (2016). Defendant maintains that the rules of statutory construction require a court to consult dictionaries in publication at the time a statute was enacted-1955 in this case-to determine the meaning of an undefined term. The Michigan Supreme Court has recognized the importance of defining a statutory term according to its original meaning. Cain v. Waste Mgt., Inc. (After Remand) , 472 Mich. 236, 247, 697 N.W.2d 130 (2005) (reasoning that because the statute at issue did not define the term "loss," the Court was required to "ascertain the original meaning the word 'loss' had when the statute was enacted in 1912"). See also Perrin v. United States , 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) ("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."). The definition of "juror" found in both lay and legal dictionaries in publication at the time the statute was enacted supports the trial courts' determination that the term, as used in MCL 750.120a(1), includes those summoned for jury duty, even if never selected nor sworn to serve on a jury. In deciding defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss, the district court relied in part on Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th ed.), published in 1968, which defines "juror" as "[o]ne member of a jury," and includes a usage note which states, "The term is not inflexible, and besides a person who has been accepted and sworn to try a cause 'juror' may also mean a person selected for jury service." The same definition and usage note appears in Black's Law Dictionary (Deluxe 4th ed.), published in 1951 and cited by defendant in support of his argument. Moreover, the usage note is consistent with the definition of "juror" in a lay dictionary from 1955. Webster's New International Dictionary (1955), provides that a juror is [o]ne of a number of men sworn to deliver a verdict as a body; specif., Law , a member of a jury, or one designated and summoned to serve on a jury. "Juror " is uniformly used by the jurists most familiar with the subject as including persons designated or ordered to be summoned as jurors . For stronger reasons, it would include them after they are summoned and have appeared in court. Similar definitions for "juror" also appear in more current legal and lay dictionaries. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) defines "juror" as both "a member of a jury" and "a person summoned to serve on a jury[.]" And in Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001), "juror" is defined as "a member of a jury," "a member of the panel from which a jury is selected," or "a person who has taken an oath or sworn allegiance." Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.) states that a "juror" is "[a] member of a jury; a person serving on a jury panel." The definition of "jury panel" directs the reader to "VENIRE," which is defined as "[a] panel of persons selected for jury duty and from among whom the jurors are to be chosen." Id . Consequently, given the dictionary definitions from 1955 and today, a "juror" under MCL 750.120a(1) includes a person summoned for jury duty. Defendant's assertions that MCL 750.120, M. Crim. JI 1.1, and MCR 6.412(B) support his argument regarding the definition of "juror" also fail. MCL 750.120, which punishes jurors who accept bribes, provides as follows: Any person summoned as a juror or chosen or appointed as an appraiser, receiver, trustee, administrator, executor, commissioner, auditor, arbitrator or referee who shall corruptly take anything to give his verdict, award, or report, or who shall corruptly receive any gift or gratuity whatever, from a party to any suit, cause, or proceeding, for the trial or decision of which such juror shall have been summoned, or for the hearing or determination of which such appraiser, receiver, trustee, administrator, executor, commissioner, auditor, arbitrator, or referee shall have been chosen or appointed, shall be guilty of a felony. Defendant highlights the language "[a]ny person summoned as a juror" to assert that "[i]f the legislature truly intended for jury tampering to include every person who has been summoned, it would have used the same language from the immediately preceding statute." But "the specific rules of statutory construction are merely aids to interpretation." People v. Armstrong , 212 Mich. App. 121, 128, 536 N.W.2d 789 (1995). Looking at MCL 750.120 in its entirety, and considering the context in which the phrase is used, it is obvious to us that the Legislature simply used the phrase "[a]ny person summoned" to describe the act of being called for jury duty, just as it used a descriptive phrase for the rest of the positions listed in the statute, i.e., "[a]ny person ... chosen or appointed as[.]" No comparable language was necessary or appropriate in MCL 750.120a(1), as it applies only to jurors. Further, statutory language should be read in harmony with the entire legislative scheme, York Charter Twp. v. Miller , 322 Mich. App. 648, 662, 915 N.W.2d 373 (2018), and under the doctrine of in pari materia , "statutes that relate to the same subject or that share a common purpose should, if possible, be read together to create a harmonious body of law," People v. Mazur , 497 Mich. 302, 313, 872 N.W.2d 201 (2015). Both MCL 750.120 and MCL 750.120a aim to preserve the integrity and impartiality of juries. It would be inconsistent with this shared purpose to read one as applicable to anyone summoned for jury duty and the other as applicable only to those chosen from the pool of summoned jurors and sworn to serve on a jury. We likewise reject defendant's position that MCR 6.412(B) and M. Crim. JI 1.1 support his argument because they each use the term "prospective jurors" with regard to preliminary instructions given before the jury-selection process. Neither the court rules nor jury instructions are created by the Legislature, so their use of the term "prospective jurors" has no bearing on what the Legislature meant when it used the term "juror" in a statute. Additionally, neither People v. Cain , 498 Mich. 108, 869 N.W.2d 829 (2015), nor Jochen v. Saginaw Co. , 363 Mich. 648, 110 N.W.2d 780 (1961), supports defendant's argument. Neither case interpreted the term "juror," as used in MCL 750.120a(1), and we fail to understand how opinions involving the correct juror's oath, see Cain , 498 Mich. at 112, 869 N.W.2d 829, or whether a person injured while reporting for jury duty should be considered a county employee under the workmen's compensation act, see Jochen , 363 Mich. at 649, 110 N.W.2d 780, are at all applicable to the separate statutory question before us. Defendant also argues that the district court misapplied the elements of jury tampering, citing § 2:22(1) of the Michigan Nonstandard Jury Instructions Criminal (August 2016 Update) which recommend the following instruction for the first element of the crime: "That [name juror involved] was a juror in the case of [name case in which juror sat][.]" He asserts that "[e]ven the proposed jury instruction acknowledged that the juror must have 'sat' in the case." But this is simply a different way of arguing that the term "juror" does not include those summoned for jury duty, which we have rejected. As stated above, jury instructions are not created by the Legislature, and they therefore have no bearing on the interpretation of statutory terms. Further, the district court did not err by refusing to allow defendant to argue that there were no jurors in Yoder's case because no trial ever occurred. MCL 750.120a(1) only requires that someone attempt to influence "a juror in any case." A trial is not required, and there is no indication that the Legislature sought to exclude from prosecution under MCL 750.120a(1) a person who attempts to influence a juror's decision in a case that is ultimately disposed of before trial. III. DID DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT? A. AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE Having concluded that Johnson and DeVries were "jurors" for purposes of the jury-tampering statute, we now must address defendant's alternative argument that MCL 750.120a(1), as applied to his circumstances, violated his First Amendment right to free speech. We review constitutional questions de novo. People v. Pennington , 240 Mich. App. 188, 191, 610 N.W.2d 608 (2000). "A constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute can be brought in one of two ways: by either a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge." In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali & Contents , 316 Mich. App. 562, 569, 892 N.W.2d 388 (2016). "When faced with a claim that application of a statute renders it unconstitutional, the Court must analyze the statute 'as applied' to the particular case." Crego v. Coleman , 463 Mich. 248, 269, 615 N.W.2d 218 (2000). In other words, "[a]n as-applied challenge contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant's particular speech activity, even though the law may be capable of valid application to others." Foti v. Menlo Park , 146 F.3d 629, 635 (C.A. 9, 1998). See also Bonner v. Brighton , 495 Mich. 209, 223 n. 27, 848 N.W.2d 380 (2014) ("An as-applied challenge, to be distinguished from a facial challenge, alleges 'a present infringement or denial of a specific right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution' of government action.") (citation omitted). The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," U.S. Const., Am I, and the amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, McDonald v. Grand Traverse Co. Election Comm. , 255 Mich. App. 674, 681, 662 N.W.2d 804 (2003). "Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a traditional public forum." Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York , 519 U.S. 357, 377, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). Defendant's as-applied challenge is based upon his assertion that his conduct involved pure speech, the restriction of which should be subject to strict scrutiny, and that the state has no compelling interest in preventing a person from distributing educational pamphlets to potential jurors in a public space. In addressing this as-applied challenge, our focus is exclusively on the specific facts at issue-namely, the jury's finding that defendant distributed pamphlets at the courthouse to influence the decision of people he knew to be potential jurors for a case in which he had taken an interest. In fact, as discussed below, the conduct defendant engaged in is precisely the type of speech states have a compelling interest in regulating through validly enacted statutes. "[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U.S. 568, 571, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Although speech is given great protections by the First Amendment, the states nonetheless have the right to punish certain limited speech so long as there is a compelling reason to do so and the limitation is accomplished in the narrowest fashion. See Speet v. Schuette , 726 F.3d 867, 880 (C.A. 6, 2013). And, when it comes to the prevention of jury tampering, it has long been held that states may punish or regulate speech intended to interfere with court proceedings or with the right of an accused to have his case decided by an impartial jury. See Turney v. State , 936 P.2d 533, 541 (Alaska 1997) (holding that a narrowly drawn jury-tampering statute did not implicate protected speech under the First Amendment); Dawkins v. State , 208 So.2d 119, 122 (Fla. App., 1968) ("Efforts to influence a grand jury in its deliberations respecting specific matters under investigation by it are not shielded by the constitutional right of free speech."); Pennekamp v. Florida , 328 U.S. 331, 366, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In securing freedom of speech, the Constitution hardly meant to create the right to influence judges or juries."). See also Cox v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 559, 562-564, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (upholding a statute that prohibited picketing near a courthouse on the basis that "[a] State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence," and that a statute like that at issue did not infringe the right of free speech because "[t]he conduct which is the subject of [the] statute ... is subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and association"). Thus, because defendant concedes that MCL 750.120a(1) is facially valid and a jury found that he willfully attempted to influence a juror's decision in Yoder's case, his as-applied constitutional challenge necessarily fails. The foregoing is a more direct way of stating that when applying strict scrutiny to the government's actions as defendant urges us to do (and argues the trial courts erred by failing to do), his First Amendment challenge fails because the state has a compelling interest in protecting the sanctity of the jury. "The First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. , 564 U.S. 552, 566, 131 S.Ct. 2653, 180 L.Ed.2d 544 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed." Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona , 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015). "Content-based laws-those that target speech based on its communicative content-are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests." Id . at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2226. Applying strict scrutiny, we hold that application of the statute to defendant's conduct was a narrowly tailored means of furthering the state's compelling interest in preserving the impartiality and integrity of jurors. Defendant concedes that the government has a compelling interest in preventing jury tampering but states that he "does not concede ... that the State has a compelling interest to criminalize [his] distribution of a juror rights pamphlet on a public sidewalk." Yet this argument is based on the premise, rejected outright by the jury, that defendant only intended to educate the general public with his pamphlet. The jury, in fact, determined the opposite, as it found that defendant had distributed the pamphlets in an attempt to willfully influence the decision of jurors in a particular case. We cannot overemphasize the importance of the jury's finding that defendant intended to influence two jurors summoned for Yoder's case. It is that specific level of intent that takes defendant's case out of the general pamphletting activities protected by the First Amendment. Further, we reject defendant's argument that the government does not have a compelling interest in preventing tampering with "potential jurors ." First, as we have already concluded, Johnson and DeVries were "jurors" for purposes of MCL 750.120a(1), not "potential jurors." Second, there is no basis in the law that would allow us to recognize the government's interest in protecting the impartiality of jurors only after they have been selected and sworn, as juries are chosen from the pool of people summoned for jury duty. Jurors summoned for duty that are tampered with do not lose that taint if they end up on the jury. See State v. Tucker , 170 So.3d 394, 406, 49, 822-KA and 49, 950-KA(La. App., 2d Cir., 7/8/15) ("Because any threat or attempt to influence a person summoned for jury duty (i.e., a 'prospective juror') in a pending trial impairs the administration of justice in exactly the same way that justice is impaired by a threat or influence of an impaneled 'juror,' we conclude that the term 'juror' in the statute includes a 'prospective juror' within its reach."). Defendant's additional argument that "[e]ven if the government had a compelling interest in ensuring potential jurors are not informed of the powers they rightfully and lawfully possess ..., the government failed to use the least restrictive means available to accomplish that interest," fares no better. A content-based restriction on speech "must be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest." McCullen v. Coakley , 573 U.S. 464, 478, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2530, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (2014). Defendant asserts specifically that the government exercised the most extreme option available in response to his conduct by arresting and prosecuting him and that the government could have instead employed valid time, place, and manner restrictions to regulate his distribution of pamphlets. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, the argument is based entirely on the rejected premise that defendant's distribution of the pamphlet was an attempt to educate the public rather than a willful attempt to influence the decision of jurors in Yoder's case. Second, although at the time defendant was arrested and charged it appears that certain government actors did not know of defendant's interest in the Yoder case and disapproved of the pamphlet's contents, the jury ultimately found defendant guilty of violating MCL 750.120a(1), which requires a specific intent to influence jurors. And the evidence presented at trial supported these findings. The law defendant was convicted under does not address the random distribution of pamphlets to the general public outside a courthouse. Instead, the Legislature was concerned with an individual's purposeful attempt to tamper with jurors, which is a compelling state interest. The statute also touches upon only a narrowly defined class of people and speech, i.e., those who purposefully communicate with specific jurors summoned to serve on a case with the intent to influence the decision of a juror. Defendant cannot rely on less restrictive means relating to an entirely hypothetical governmental interest not present in this case, and the government clearly has no obligation, through statute, regulation, or rule, to designate places and times during which an individual may engage in criminal behavior, speech-related or not. B. OVERBROAD CHALLENGE Defendant also argues that MCL 750.120a(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad because "[w]hen the lower courts redefined the word 'juror' to mean more than a person actually selected, empaneled, and sworn in a case, it vastly expanded the range and scope of the jury-tampering statute to reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech." Although defendant characterizes his argument as an as-applied challenge, it is more appropriately considered a facial challenge to the statute itself, given that we have held that the lower courts accurately interpreted the term "juror" in MCL 750.120a(1). "An overbroad statute prohibits protected conduct, primarily conduct protected by the First Amendment." People v. Lueth , 253 Mich. App. 670, 676, 660 N.W.2d 322 (2002). "Under the doctrine of First Amendment overbreadth, a litigant may mount a facial attack on a statute that restricts protected speech even if the litigant's own speech is unprotected." Turney , 400 F.3d at 1200, citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). "In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). "Criminal statutes must be scrutinized with particular care; those that make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate application." City of Houston, Texas v. Hill , 482 U.S. 451, 459, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (citation omitted). Defendant asserts that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because "a person could be criminally liable for merely speaking with, giving information to, or communicating in any way with a potential juror." For example, he contends, if he "had started handing out pamphlets to the summoned potential jurors after the Court released them on the day in question, under the lower courts' redefinition, he could still be charged with jury tampering because they were still summoned for that month." However, defendant's assertions ignore the requirement in MCL 750.120a(1) that to be convicted of jury tampering, a person must possess the willful intent to influence the decision of a juror in a particular case. That requirement serves as a constitutional safeguard. As the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Turney , 400 F.3d at 1204, "innocent" conversations with jurors will rarely violate a jury-tampering statute because such communications will usually lack "the requisite intent." If a person is not attempting to influence a juror's decision in a case, that person can freely communicate with the juror without violating MCL 750.120a(1). In its amicus brief, the American Civil Liberties Union contends that "[t]he state's interpretation of the jury tampering statute criminalizes a great variety of First Amendment protected expression," and provides it the following hypotheticals: Consider whether a citizen committed to decriminalizing possession of controlled substances, passing out material regarding the issue outside a courthouse, would be charged with jury tampering if a prospective juror received the material. Would a group advocating for tort reform be prevented from protesting outside the court on days when products liability cases were being tried? Can the court prevent a women's rights organization from holding a rally when sex discrimination cases are on the docket? Similarly, in its amicus brief, the Cato Institute posed hypotheticals involving op-ed writers, radio personalities, protesters with signs urging conviction, and a wife reminding her husband who has been selected for jury duty that he should not assume government witnesses are more credible than other witnesses. Despite these concerns, the simple fact is that the conduct prosecuted in this case has no relationship to the eye-grabbing hypotheticals posed, all of which ignore the intent element of MCL 750.120a(1). For instance, an op-ed writer or radio personality expressing an opinion about a particular case or types of cases would likely not possess the intent necessary to be convicted of jury tampering under MCL 750.120a(1). There is a significant distinction between an individual targeting jurors for a particular case and providing them with information calculated to influence how they conduct their duties as jurors, and an op-ed writer or protester who opines about the general propriety of a prosecution or civil matter, with no intent to influence a particular juror. Moreover, "[t]he overbreadth doctrine is not ... 'casually employed,' even in a case involving a First Amendment challenge." In re Chmura , 461 Mich. 517, 531, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000) (citation omitted). "[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). There is nothing to show that the statute would be applied to anyone or any set of facts that go beyond the intent required by the statute. With regard to the political-demonstration examples, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cox , provides guidance. In that case, the defendant led a group of people outside a courthouse in protest against the arrest of students the day before, and the defendant was arrested and convicted of intending to influence a juror or to obstruct or impede the administration of justice. Cox , 379 U.S. at 560, 564-565, 85 S.Ct. 476. The Court explained that "[t]he conduct which is the subject of this statute-picketing and parading-is subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and association." Id . at 563, 85 S.Ct. 476. The Court ultimately concluded that the statute at issue was facially valid because "the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection." Id . at 564, 85 S.Ct. 476. Accordingly, to the extent that MCL 750.120a(1) may preclude certain limited courthouse demonstrations, the United States Supreme Court has countenanced that result given the government's strong interest in the impartial administration of justice. Defendant's First Amendment argument fails. IV. DUE PROCESS A. VAGUENESS Defendant next argues that MCL 750.120a, as interpreted and applied by the trial courts, is void for vagueness because it: (1) fails to provide proper notice to citizens "that the distribution of a pamphlet of general information on a public sidewalk to a person who was merely summoned for potential jury duty is a criminal act," (2) is susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and (3) as erroneously interpreted and applied, impinged on his First Amendment rights. We review de novo "challenges to the constitutionality of a statute under the void-for-vagueness doctrine." People v. Lawhorn , 320 Mich. App. 194, 197 n. 1, 907 N.W.2d 832 (2017). "The 'void for vagueness' doctrine is derived from the constitutional guarantee that the state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." State Treasurer v. Wilson (On Remand) , 150 Mich. App. 78, 80, 388 N.W.2d 312 (1986). "A penal statute may be unconstitutionally vague if it (1) fails to provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed, (2) permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, or (3) is overbroad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms." People v. Sands , 261 Mich. App. 158, 161, 680 N.W.2d 500 (2004). "A vagueness challenge must be considered in light of the facts at issue." Id ."When presented with a vagueness challenge, we examine the entire text of the statute and give the words of the statute their ordinary meanings." People v. Morey , 230 Mich. App. 152, 163, 583 N.W.2d 907 (1998), aff'd 461 Mich. 325, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). "To afford proper notice of the conduct proscribed, a statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." People v. Roberts , 292 Mich. App. 492, 497, 808 N.W.2d 290 (2011). "A statute cannot use terms that require persons of ordinary intelligence to speculate regarding its meaning and differ about its application." Sands , 261 Mich. App. at 161, 680 N.W.2d 500. "For a statute to be sufficiently definite, its meaning must be fairly ascertainable by reference to judicial interpretations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises, or the commonly accepted meanings of words." Id . Defendant first asserts that if the trial courts' interpretation of MCL 750.120a(1) is correct, then the law is unconstitutionally vague because "[n]o statute, case, or any other Michigan authority exists which would [have] given notice to the citizenry that the word 'juror' included anyone who had simply received a summons in the mail." However, a person of ordinary intelligence does not have to speculate as to the word's meaning. Rather, the definition of "juror" is readily ascertainable to anyone with access to a dictionary. See Sands , 261 Mich. App. at 161, 680 N.W.2d 500. Further, defendant's assertion that a person of ordinary intelligence comparing MCL 750.120 and MCL 750.120a(1) would look at the statutes and naturally conclude that one covers a person summoned for jury duty while the other does not, lacks merit for the reasons already stated. Defendant also suggests that MCL 750.120a(1) is susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, asserting that his own arrest and prosecution were based on the government's "animus towards the content of his pamphlet." Even if the decision to arrest and charge defendant was primarily based on the content of the pamphlet, the pamphlet provided evidence of his intent to influence a juror and was relevant to his prosecution. Additionally, although a statute may be misapplied by officials, our primary focus is on whether the statute permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, not whether an isolated official happens to arbitrarily enforce it. See Allison v. Southfield , 172 Mich. App. 592, 596, 432 N.W.2d 369 (1988) ("Even if one of the evils sought to be prevented by the vagueness doctrine is the vesting of unstructured discretion and the resultant arbitrary and [discriminatory] enforcement of the law, the doctrine is not triggered unless the wording of the promulgation is itself vague.") (citation omitted). Defendant has not shown that MCL 750.120a(1) is unconstitutionally vague. People v. Vandenberg , 307 Mich. App. 57, 62, 859 N.W.2d 229 (2014). B. FAIR TRIAL Lastly, defendant argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the district court precluded him from arguing the elements of MCL 750.120a(1) and because he was not permitted to cross-examine 77th District Court Magistrate Thomas G. Lyons regarding purported bias against him. We review de novo whether a defendant received a fair trial. People v. Stevens , 498 Mich. 162, 168, 869 N.W.2d 233 (2015). With regard to the elements of jury tampering, defendant asserts he should have been allowed to argue that the absence of an actual trial in Yoder's case precluded his conviction under MCL 750.120a(1). However, the statute contains no requirement that a trial take place, and the argument is duplicative of his underlying position, rejected in this opinion, that only those selected and sworn for jury service may be considered jurors under the statute. With regard to Magistrate Lyons's purported bias, "[a] primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause [ U.S. Const., Am. VI ] is the right of cross-examination." People v. Gaines , 306 Mich. App. 289, 315, 856 N.W.2d 222 (2014). "Neither the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause nor due process confers on a defendant an unlimited right to cross-examine on any subject." People v. Canter , 197 Mich. App. 550, 564, 496 N.W.2d 336 (1992). "Rather, the Confrontation Clause protects the defendant's right for a reasonable opportunity to test the truthfulness of a witness' testimony." People v. Ho , 231 Mich. App. 178, 190, 585 N.W.2d 357 (1998). However, "[a] limitation on cross-examination that prevents a defendant from placing before the jury facts from which bias, prejudice, or lack of credibility of a prosecution witness might be inferred constitutes denial of the constitutional right of confrontation." People v. Kelly , 231 Mich. App. 627, 644, 588 N.W.2d 480 (1998). Defendant contends specifically that he wished to examine Magistrate Lyons regarding conduct at the arraignment, when Magistrate Lyons allegedly "set an unconstitutionally high bond of $150,000.00 (10%)" and "refused to appoint [him] an attorney," and that the district court erred by denying him the opportunity to do so. Defendant identifies caselaw suggesting that a defendant has a constitutional right to examine a witness's bias, see id . at 644, 588 N.W.2d 480 ; Hayes v. Coleman , 338 Mich. 371, 380-381, 61 N.W.2d 634 (1953), and the matters identified by defendant arguably show that Magistrate Lyons was biased against him. However, even if the district court erred by precluding cross-examination, the error would be harmless. [V]iolations of the right to adequate cross-examination are subject to a harmless-error analysis. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends on a host of factors, including the importance of the witness' testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case. [ Kelly , 231 Mich. App. at 644-645, 588 N.W.2d 480.] Magistrate Lyons's testimony merely provided context for the events of the day. He testified about when he learned of the pamphlets, his interaction with defendant, and his subsequent conversation with 77th District Court Judge Peter M. Jaklevic. Further, he testified that Yoder's case was the only case scheduled for trial on the day in question. This testimony was cumulative to that of other witnesses, namely 77th District Court Judge Peter M. Jaklevic, and had little bearing on whether defendant actually violated MCL 750.120a(1). Moreover, we see nothing to suggest that the jury would have reached a different result had it concluded that Magistrate Lyons was biased against defendant and not credible. As a result, we cannot hold that defendant was denied a fair trial on this basis. Affirmed. Cameron, J., concurred with Murray, C.J. People v. Wood , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 22, 2018 (Docket No. 342424). See 1955 P.A. 88. MCL 750.120 was enacted in 1931. 1931 P.A. 328. MCL 600.1334 and MCL 600.1344, which govern juror excusal from attendance in court and juror compensation, support our conclusion that the term "juror," as used in MCL 750.120a(1), includes those summoned for jury duty, but never selected to actually serve on a jury. Both use the term broadly. For instance, MCL 600.1334(1) states, in part, "The chief judge may postpone the service of a juror to a later term of court if the juror has not been called for voir dire examination in any action." And MCL 600.1344 provides that jurors must be compensated for each day of actual attendance at sessions of the court. Although "juror" is undefined, the statutes clearly apply to those persons summoned for jury duty but not necessarily selected and sworn. "This Court reviews jury instructions as a whole to determine whether there is error requiring reversal." People v. Bartlett , 231 Mich. App. 139, 143, 585 N.W.2d 341 (1998). Our dissenting colleague opines that MCL 750.120a(1) is only implicated "after the trial process has commenced." But the language referring to a trial is in the exception to the rule, allowing arguments and persuasion of jurors once trial has commenced. That language adds nothing to when a person becomes a juror under this statute. Evidence at trial supported the jury's findings. Defendant testified that he took an interest in Yoder's case, and he attended the pretrial hearing when the trial date was announced. He then returned to the courthouse on the day set for trial and distributed the FIJA pamphlets to several people, including Johnson and DeVries, who both testified that defendant knew they were at the courthouse because they had been summoned for jury duty. The Ninth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to a similar jury-tampering statute in Turney v. Pugh , 400 F.3d 1197 (C.A. 9, 2005). There, the petitioner (who was also the petitioner in Turney , 936 P.2d 533) challenged the Alaska statute as overbroad, and as part of its decision, the court reasoned: [T]he First Amendment, while generally quite protective of speech concerning judicial proceedings, does not shield the narrow but significant category of communications to jurors made outside of the auspices of the official proceeding and aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of a particular case. What Alaska's jury tampering statute covers in the main, then, is speech that is not protected by the First Amendment." [Turney, 400 F.3d at 1203.] Defendant's attempt to distinguish Turney on the basis that the Alaska statute expressly defined "juror" to include those summoned for jury duty is misguided because the term "juror," as used in MCL 750.120a(1), also includes those summoned for jury duty. Defendant does not argue that MCL 750.120a(1) is, on its face, a content-based regulation. Rather, he maintains that the government regulated his "speech in a content-based way" given that "[i]t is clear that the government actors in this case arrested and charged [him] because of the content of his pamphlet." We apply strict scrutiny here because although the statute is not a purely content-based restriction, to convict under the statute it must be proved that defendant intended to influence a juror, and that can only be done by reviewing the words communicated to the juror. For example, if defendant were passing out to jurors a newspaper circular with commercial advertisements, he would not have been prosecuted for or convicted of jury tampering. Defendant appears to misunderstand the concept of time, place, and manner restrictions. Time, place, and manner restrictions may be used to regulate speech otherwise protected under the First Amendment , if such restrictions are content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence , 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984).

Murray, C.J. Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company appeals by leave granted the May 2, 2017 Wayne Circuit Court order embodying the trial court's ruling that defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company was excluded from the order of priority for first-party no-fault benefits in the current lawsuit filed by plaintiff, Malek Hmeidan, and that Progressive is the highest-priority insurer for plaintiff's claim for no-fault benefits. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND FACTS This lawsuit arises from a collision between a motorcycle and motor vehicle. Plaintiff claims that he was "test-driving" a motorcycle for sale by "an associate." While plaintiff was operating the motorcycle, a car failed to stop at a stop sign and turned in front of him. Once plaintiff applied the brakes, the motorcycle began to skid and collided with the back of the car. The operator of the car immediately fled the scene. Progressive insured the motor vehicles of the wife of the owner of the motorcycle involved in the accident. At the time of the accident, plaintiff lived at his mother's house in Detroit, but he sometimes stayed at his brother's house in Melvindale. Plaintiff did not own a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, although his mother, Aida Hmeidan, owned two motor vehicles that were insured by State Farm. The State Farm policy booklet contains language stating that the policy provided personal protection insurance (PIP) coverage for the insured "or any resident relative ." The policy booklet pertinently defines "resident relative" to mean "a person , other than you , domiciled in the same household with the first person shown as a named insured on the Declarations Page and who is: 1. related to that named insured or his or her spouse by blood, marriage, or adoption...." (Paragraph structure omitted.) A. THE 2013 LAWSUIT In March 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking no-fault and uninsured motorist benefits against Farmers Insurance Exchange as the assigned carrier and against State Farm based on the insurance policy issued to his mother. According to Progressive, on March 19, 2014, State Farm moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that plaintiff was not a "resident relative" of Aida (its insured) at the time of the accident because plaintiff and Aida "were primarily living at different locations," which precluded plaintiff from resident-relative status. State Farm relied on plaintiff's deposition testimony that he primarily lived at the Detroit residence and that he occasionally stayed at his brother's home in Melvindale, as well as the deposition testimony of plaintiff's mother and brother that prior to the accident, Aida was living at her son's home in Melvindale during the week and only stayed at her residence in Detroit for two days each week. According to Progressive, the trial court denied State Farm's motion, "finding a question of fact existed on the issue of whether plaintiff was a resident relative, i.e., domiciled with Aida on the date of the underlying accident." Farmers subsequently filed a cross-claim against State Farm, and third-party claims against Allstate Insurance Co. and Progressive, seeking a declaratory judgment that one of the entities was the highest in the order of priority to pay PIP benefits and seeking reimbursement of the benefits it had already paid to plaintiff. Eventually, Farmers moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the grounds that State Farm, Allstate, or Progressive was the highest-priority insurer. Progressive responded and sought summary disposition in its favor on the ground that plaintiff was covered under the State Farm policy. The trial court denied Farmers' motion for summary disposition and adjourned Progressive's motion for summary disposition to allow supplemental briefs. In its supplemental brief, State Farm asserted that the trial court had previously ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff's residence and that, therefore, this finding must be applied to Progressive's motion. Following a settlement conference, the parties agreed to dismiss plaintiff's claims against Farmers. Plaintiff's action against Farmers, and Farmers' action against State Farm and Progressive, were dismissed with prejudice; plaintiff's claims and those of the intervening medical providers were dismissed without prejudice, and Progressive and State Farm agreed to waive the one-year back rule under MCL 500.3145 if plaintiff refiled the action. B. THE CURRENT LAWSUIT On June 3, 2015, plaintiff filed the current action against State Farm and Progressive, claiming that he was entitled to first-party and uninsured motorist benefits. The case was assigned to the same judge who presided over the 2013 lawsuit. During the course of the proceedings, the parties filed several motions for summary disposition, one of which the trial court granted, dismissing plaintiff's claims for uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist benefits against Progressive. Progressive filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that MCL 500.3114(5) sets forth the order-of-priority rule for individuals who sustain accidental bodily injury while operating a motorcycle that is involved in a motor vehicle accident and that State Farm is the highest-priority insurer for PIP benefits because his mother maintained a policy of insurance with State Farm and plaintiff and his mother were domiciled in the same household at the time of the accident. Therefore, Progressive argued, State Farm is "[t]he motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle involved in the accident." MCL 500.3114(5)(c). In response, State Farm asserted that the trial court had previously denied Farmers' summary disposition motion (in the 2013 lawsuit) on the issue of domicile and had ruled that the domicile of plaintiff was a question to be decided by the fact-finder. The register of actions indicates that the trial court denied Progressive's motion. Leading up to the scheduled trial date of April 10, 2017, State Farm and Progressive filed several motions, including one to bifurcate the trial on plaintiff's claims for PIP benefits and for uninsured motorist benefits. The trial court entered an order granting the motions, stating that the trial would be initially limited to the issues of (1) whether plaintiff should have known that the motorcycle was stolen and is therefore precluded from receiving PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a), and (2) whether plaintiff was domiciled with his mother on the date of the accident. Trial began on April 10, 2017, and voir dire continued the following day. When the parties appeared on April 17, 2017, the trial court initiated a discussion about the interpretation of the priority statute, MCL 500.3114(5), questioning why the resident-relative issue was pertinent. Counsel for both Progressive and State Farm explained that if plaintiff was not domiciled with his mother, then State Farm is not the insurer of the operator of the motorcycle. The trial court repeatedly questioned whether there could be a "motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle" under MCL 500.3114(5)(c) when plaintiff did not have an insurance policy himself and did not own a vehicle. Progressive, plaintiff, and the intervening plaintiffs maintained that if a person was entitled to no-fault coverage as a resident relative of a named insured, that insurer was the "motor vehicle insurer of the operator." Counsel for Progressive also noted that if the trial court's logic were applied to similar language in MCL 500.3114(5)(d), then Progressive was not liable because Guillermo Flores, Jr. (the registered owner of the stolen motorcycle) was not a named insured. The trial court ultimately concluded that State Farm could not be liable under MCL 500.3114(5)(c) and that Progressive could be liable as the motor vehicle insurer of the owner of the motorcycle, even though Flores was not named on his wife's policy. The trial court reasoned: Let's go back to [ MCL 500.3114(5)(c) ]. [It] states that the motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle. Okay. The motor vehicle insurer doesn't exist because [plaintiff] did not own a vehicle and ... as a result [he] did not did not have insurance on that vehicle. How could he if he didn't own one? [ MCL 500.3114(5)(d) ] indicates a motor vehicle insurer of the owner ... of the motorcycle, assuming [Flores] owns a Chevy and the insurer of that Chevy would be responsible. When plaintiff's counsel asserted that if Progressive were determined to be not liable under MCL 500.3114(5)(d), then State Farm could potentially be liable under MCL 500.3114(1) (resident relative), the trial court responded that State Farm could not be liable because Progressive was higher in the order of priority. Having concluded that Progressive was the highest-priority carrier, the trial court ordered the case back for case evaluation. In the uninsured-motorist portion of the case, the trial court indicated that it would schedule a hearing on whether plaintiff's mother had made a material misrepresentation about her residency that would make the policy void. As a result, the trial court entered an order stating that State Farm was excluded from the order of priority pursuant to MCL 500.3114(5)(c) and that Progressive was the highest-priority insurer pursuant to MCL 500.3114(5)(d). Progressive moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court committed palpable error when it held that State Farm was not plaintiff's motor vehicle insurer under MCL 500.3114(5)(c). Progressive primarily relied upon Prishtina v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 10, 2015 (Docket No. 318912), 2015 WL 1069405. The trial court addressed Progressive's motion at a hearing, noting that Prishtina was unpublished and that this case involved a different issue. For those reasons, the trial court denied Progressive's motion for reconsideration. II. ANALYSIS For the reasons explained below, we hold that the trial court erroneously interpreted and applied MCL 500.3114(5)(c), and that the court erred when it concluded that State Farm could not possibly be the highest-priority insurer for plaintiff's PIP claim. "The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Rogers v. Wcisel , 312 Mich. App. 79, 86, 877 N.W.2d 169 (2015). As with many of the no-fault cases that have flooded Michigan courts in the last decade or so, the dispositive issue in this case revolves around the priority provisions of the act. In particular, we must decide whether State Farm was properly determined to not have priority. "Generally, under MCL 500.3101(1) and MCL 500.3114(1), an individual must seek no-fault benefits from his own insurer unless one of the exceptions enumerated in MCL 500.3114(2), (3), or (5) applies." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Mich. , 272 Mich. App. 106, 111, 724 N.W.2d 485 (2006). "The exception at issue here, MCL 500.3114(5), establishes the priority in which a motorcycle rider accidentally injured by a motor vehicle must claim no-fault benefits." Id . MCL 500.3114(5) provides: (5) A person suffering accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident that shows evidence of the involvement of a motor vehicle while an operator or passenger of a motorcycle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of priority: (a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. (b) The insurer of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. (c) The motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle involved in the accident. (d) The motor vehicle insurer of the owner or registrant of the motorcycle involved in the accident. A motorcycle is not a "motor vehicle" under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq . Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hoadley , 201 Mich. App. 555, 558-559, 506 N.W.2d 595 (1993). The term "vehicle" is a broader category that encompasses both motorcycles and motor vehicles; the term "motor vehicle" is a narrower category of vehicles that excludes motorcycles. Id . at 559, 506 N.W.2d 595. "Thus, while both motorcycles and motor vehicles are vehicles, a motorcycle is not a motor vehicle." Id . All parties agree that MCL 500.3114(5)(a) and (b) cannot apply because the driver of the motor vehicle involved in the accident fled the scene and was not found. Consequently, neither the owner nor the operator of the motor vehicle that struck plaintiff is a known party. Rather, this case concerns the MCL 500.3114(c) and (d). State Farm insures a motor vehicle owned by plaintiff's mother, Aida, and its policy extends coverage to family members who reside in Aida's household. According to Progressive, State Farm's policy covers plaintiff as a resident relative of Aida's household and therefore State Farm is the highest-priority insurer under MCL 500.3114(5)(c). In the trial court, State Farm disputed whether plaintiff resided with Aida and contended that Progressive was the highest-priority insurer under MCL 500.3114(5)(d) because Progressive insured the owner of the motorcycle. The overall goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Garfield Mart, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 320 Mich. App. 628, 643, 907 N.W.2d 880 (2017). "The best indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary language used." Id ."In construing a statute, the Court must read the language as a whole, giving meaning to each word in the context of the statute." Id ."If the language is unambiguous, then the language must be applied as written." Id . This Court must avoid any construction of a statute that renders any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. Apsey v. Mem. Hosp. , 477 Mich. 120, 127, 730 N.W.2d 695 (2007). It must also be remembered that the purpose of the no-fault act is to "keep[ ] insurance premiums at affordable rates while providing victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses." Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 491 Mich. 200, 217-218, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). Because the act is remedial, it must be construed liberally in favor of those who are the intended beneficiaries of the act. Frierson v. West American Ins. Co. , 261 Mich. App. 732, 734, 683 N.W.2d 695 (2004). Specific terms of the no-fault act are read in the context of the entire act. Id ."[C]ourts should not abandon common sense when construing a statute." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Our decision turns on the meaning of the phrase "motor vehicle insurer" in the context of MCL 500.3114(5). Progressive contends that the phrase "motor vehicle" does not restrict coverage under MCL 500.3114(5)(c) or (d) to instances in which the motorcyclist owns and insures a separate motor vehicle. Rather, the phrase identifies the general category of insurer; it distinguishes an insurer providing coverage to a motor vehicle as opposed to an insurer providing a different type of coverage. To understand MCL 500.3114(5), one must consider the context in which it comes into play: an accident involving both a motorcycle and a motor vehicle. Owners of motor vehicles are required by the no-fault act to carry PIP coverage, while owners of motorcycles are not. MCL 500.3101(1) ; Perkins v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 301 Mich. App. 658, 665-666, 837 N.W.2d 32 (2013). Pursuant to MCL 500.3103(2), motorcycle insurers are required to offer medical-benefits coverage to owners of motorcycles seeking a motorcycle insurance policy. But those benefits are not required, and they are much more limited than the PIP benefits that must be provided in motor vehicle policies. Under MCL 500.3103(2), motorcyclists must be offered "security for the payment of first-party medical benefits only, in increments of $ 5,000.00, payable in the event the owner or registrant is involved in a motorcycle accident." In contrast, motor vehicle policies are required to include coverage for "all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation," MCL 500.3107(1)(a), work-loss benefits, MCL 500.3107(1)(b), and replacement services of up to $ 20 each day for the first three years after the accident, MCL 500.3107(1)(c). Yet despite not requiring motorcyclists to obtain PIP coverage, our Legislature has extended PIP coverage to motorcyclists by statute, at least in instances in which a motor vehicle is involved in an accident with a motorcyclist. Perkins , 301 Mich. App. at 665, 837 N.W.2d 32, citing MCL 500.3114(5). In other words, our Legislature has made a policy choice to provide motorcyclists with the more expansive PIP coverage whenever they are injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle, rather than being limited to the optional medical-benefits coverage motorcyclists may also choose to purchase. With that in mind, it is quite clear that by using the phrase "motor vehicle insurer," the Legislature was simply delineating between the injured party's motorcycle policy and any applicable motor vehicle policies. Under MCL 500.3114(5), the highest-priority insurer is "[t]he insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in the accident." MCL 500.3114(5)(a). The second-in-priority insurer is "[t]he insurer of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident." MCL 500.3114(5)(b). Because these order-of-priority provisions refer to the insurers of those owning or operating a motor vehicle, there was no need for the Legislature to include the additional description of "motor vehicle" before the word "insurer" in either MCL 500.3114(5)(a) or (b) ; that was the only type of insurer that could be at issue. But MCL 500.3114(5)(c) and (d) both focus on insurers of the operators or owners of motorcycles. MCL 500.3114(5)(c) makes the third-in-priority insurer the "motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle," while MCL 500.3114(5)(d) makes the fourth-in-priority insurer the "motor vehicle insurer of the owner or registrant of the motorcycle...." (Emphasis added.) The reason the Legislature included the phrase "motor vehicle" before the word "insurer" in each of these subsections is very apparent. Our Legislature was making clear that it was speaking of any motor vehicle policies that covered the motorcycle rider, which would be required to provide PIP coverage, not the separate motorcycle-insurance policy, which would not include PIP coverage at all. This is consistent with how we interpreted MCL 500.3114(5) in Perkins , 301 Mich. App. at 666, 837 N.W.2d 32, in which this Court explained that "[u]nder MCL 500.3114(5), the motorcycle insurance policy is never the source of the payment of PIP benefits." State Farm contends that it should be plainly obvious that MCL 500.3114(5)(c), and presumably MCL 500.3114(5)(d), refer to motor vehicle insurers, and that there was therefore no need for the Legislature to include the additional descriptor of "motor vehicle" in Subdivisions (c) and (d) unless it intended for the phrase to have some additional meaning. According to State Farm, this additional meaning is what the trial court gave the statute: that MCL 500.3114(5)(c) only speaks to policies that specifically name the injured party as an insured. This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, even assuming that it should be obvious that MCL 500.3114(5)(c) is speaking to motor vehicle policies and not motorcycle policies, a somewhat dubious assumption, this does not mean that the Legislature's choice of language is rendered nugatory by giving it that obvious meaning. Stated otherwise, that the Legislature chose to make the obvious clear does not mean that the clarifying language is meaningless. Second, had the Legislature wished to limit MCL 500.3114(5)(c) in the way State Farm suggests, it could have done so. For example, and as Progressive suggests, the Legislature could have written MCL 500.3114(5)(c) as stating, "The motor vehicle insurer of the named insured who operated the motorcycle involved in the accident." Alternatively, if the Legislature wished to prohibit motorcyclists from recovering no-fault benefits through a motor vehicle policy that names only a resident relative as the insured, it could have said as much. Ultimately, State Farm's position asks this Court to place a restriction in the statute that simply is not there. That goes beyond our judicial power. Faircloth v. Family Independence Agency , 232 Mich. App. 391, 409-410, 591 N.W.2d 314 (1998). When the Legislature spoke of a "motor vehicle insurer" in MCL 500.3114(5)(c) and (d), it was speaking of just that-a motor vehicle insurer. State Farm insures Aida's motor vehicle and, as such, is a motor vehicle insurer. What is left for the jury to decide is whether State Farm insures "the operator of the motorcycle"-plaintiff. In this regard, it is undisputed that State Farm's policy extends coverage to relatives of Aida residing in her household. Clearly, plaintiff is a relative of his mother. But it must be determined whether he is a resident of her household. Therefore, before it may be determined whether State Farm is the highest-priority insurer, the matter must be remanded to the trial court for a jury to answer the question that the parties intended to have answered through trial: whether plaintiff resided with Aida. The trial court's order is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No costs to either side, the trial court having raised the issue on its own. MCR 7.219(A). Meter and Gleicher, JJ., concurred with Murray, C.J. Hmeidan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 17, 2017 (Docket No. 338707). There is significant evidence that the motorcycle was stolen, but that concern is not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Apparently, plaintiff filed a claim with the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, which assigned Farmers to handle the claim. Farmers paid some benefits to plaintiff but, at some point, stopped doing so. State Farm also asserted in the response that it had filed a motion for summary disposition "against" plaintiff on the issue of domicile, which the trial court denied. Two medical providers that are not involved in this appeal. Progressive contends that this Court should "strike" State Farm's arguments regarding MCL 500.3114(5)(c) because State Farm did not raise these arguments in the trial court. Progressive's argument lacks merit. The issue was raised below, albeit by the trial court, and it is therefore preserved for this Court's review. See Peterman v. Dep't of Natural Resources , 446 Mich. 177, 182-183, 521 N.W.2d 499 (1994). To be clear, the trial court must also obtain an answer to another question relevant to whether plaintiff may obtain benefits that was raised below: whether plaintiff is precluded from receiving PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a) because he knew the motorcycle was stolen at the time of the accident.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to exceed the page limitation for his application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The 66-page application submitted on June 6, 2019, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellee to extend the time for filing its answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer submitted on June 3, 2019, is accepted as timely filed.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 7, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on the application. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether the Tuscola Circuit Court had jurisdiction to extend the defendant's probationary term in September 2015; and (2) whether the extension of the probationary term without notice or a hearing violated the defendant's due process rights. Compare People v. Marks , 340 Mich. 495, 65 N.W.2d 698 (1954), with Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellant's brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellant. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellant within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we REVERSE the February 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held that petitioners' appeal was moot because of an order of filiation in a related paternity case, Brown v. Ross (Docket No. 157997). We also VACATE the Oakland Circuit Court's determination that the putative father was a "do something" father under Section 39(2) of the Michigan Adoption Code, MCL 710.21 et seq. , and we REMAND this case to the Family Division of the Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners' appeal of the September 14, 2017 order was moot because of the subsequently entered order of filiation in the related paternity case, Brown v. Ross (Docket No. 157997). MGR was born on June 5, 2016. On June 9, 2016, petitioners filed the petition for adoption. Respondent-father filed the paternity action on July 15, 2016. "All proceedings under [the Michigan Adoption Code] shall be considered to have the highest priority and shall be advanced on the court docket so as to provide for their earliest practicable disposition." MCL 710.25(1). "Although proceedings under the Adoption Code should, in general, take precedence over proceedings under the Paternity Act, adoption proceedings may be stayed upon a showing of good cause, as determined by the trial court on a case-by-case basis." In re MKK , 286 Mich. App. 546, 555, 781 N.W.2d 132 (2009), citing MCL 710.25(2). Respondent-father did not request that the trial court stay the adoption proceedings in favor of the paternity proceedings pursuant to MCL 710.25(2), and the facts did not justify a stay in any event. Instead, over petitioners' objection that there was no good cause, the trial court, sua sponte , entered an order on April 17, 2017 staying the adoption proceedings until the paternity action was resolved. The Court of Appeals, in orders entered on May 31, 2017 and July 25, 2017, directed the trial court to commence and conclude the Section 39 hearing, see MCL 710.39. Respondent-father did not seek further appellate review of either order. The trial court held the Section 39 hearing on August 7 and 8, 2017 but did not issue a decision. On August 29, 2017, the Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to issue a decision with respect to the Section 39 hearing. Respondent-father did not seek further appellate review of the Court of Appeals order. The trial court issued its Section 39 opinion on September 14, 2017. Respondent-father never requested the court to stay the adoption proceedings under MCL 710.25(2) for good cause relating to his separate paternity proceeding, and the facts did not justify a stay in any event. The trial court entered an order of filiation on October 4, 2017-after it had issued its Section 39 determination and after petitioners had appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. The birth mother, on the other hand, twice asked the trial court to stay the paternity action. On June 7, 2017, the birth mother moved for stay, and the circuit court denied it on June 14, 2017. Following petitioners' appeal of the trial court's Section 39 determination, the birth mother again moved to stay the paternity action pending that appeal. On October 4, 2017, the trial court denied the motion and entered the order of filiation the same day. The trial court's denial of the birth mother's motions was an abuse of discretion given the unique circumstances of this case. The trial court had the authority to stay the paternity action in favor of the adoption proceedings: absent good cause, adoption proceedings should be given priority. MCL 710.21a and MCL 710.25(2). And a trial court has the inherent authority to control the progress of a case. See MCR 1.105 ; MCR 2.401 ; see also MCR 3.217(A) ("Procedure in actions under the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq. , is governed by the rules applicable to other civil actions except as otherwise provided by this rule and the act."). Because petitioners had a right to appeal the Section 39 determination and because good cause to delay those proceedings had not been alleged, the trial court should have stayed the paternity proceedings pursuant to MCR 7.209(E)(2)(b) so that the appellate court could review that decision. The order of filiation was therefore erroneously entered on October 4, 2017 and is vacated in our June 6, 2019 order in Brown v. Ross (Docket No. 157997). Accordingly, the order of filiation did not moot appellate review of the trial court's September 14, 2017 Section 39 decision. Further, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the putative father was a "do something" father under Section 39(2) of the Michigan Adoption Code, MCL 710.39(2). To qualify as a "do something" father, a putative father must demonstrate that he has either (1) established a custodial relationship with the child or (2) provided "substantial and regular support or care in accordance with [his] ability to provide support or care for the mother during her pregnancy or for either mother or child after the child's birth during the 90 days before notice of the hearing was served upon him[.]" MCL 710.39(2). Respondent-father failed to satisfy either condition. After the birth mother discovered she was pregnant in October 2015, she and respondent-father lived for a matter of weeks with respondent-father's grandmother. In November 2015, the pair rented an apartment together, paying their $ 700 security deposit with funds from the birth mother's sister. The birth mother lived in the apartment from November 2015 until February 2016. Until the month before the birth mother moved out of the apartment-in her fourth month of pregnancy-the parties shared household responsibilities and expenses for rent, food, and utilities. Respondent-father provided financial assistance one time in the amount of $ 200 to partially repay his share of the security deposit. Respondent-father was employed full-time until the time of the child's birth, when he voluntarily terminated his employment. Respondent-father took the birth mother to Planned Parenthood once for a pregnancy test, but did not otherwise pay for or participate in her prenatal, delivery, or postnatal medical care. After the child was born on June 5, 2016, respondent-father received notice of the hearing to determine his rights as a putative father on July 27, 2016, making the relevant statutory 90-day time period April 28, 2016 to July 27, 2016. MCL 710.39(2). Respondent-father testified that he set up a crowdfunding webpage in October or November 2016, to pay for his legal fees and expenses, outside of the statutory 90-day window. But he never paid any of the money raised to the child or the child's caretakers. Respondent-father also claimed he purchased several items for the child, including diapers and clothing, using money from odd jobs or Christmas gifts, but he never attempted to get those items to the child through either the adoption agency or the birth mother. The facts did not establish that respondent-father provided substantial and regular support or care either to the birth mother during her pregnancy or to the birth mother or the child after the child's birth during the relevant 90-day period. Respondent-father's support was insubstantial and irregular. Further, this is not a case in which respondent-father lacked the ability to support the birth mother or the child; the record shows that respondent-father was employed throughout the birth mother's pregnancy and had the means to provide financial support. The trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that respondent-father was entitled to the protections of MCL 710.39(2) because the record does not support a finding that he provided substantial and regular support or care for the birth mother during her pregnancy or the birth mother or child during the 90 days before he received service of the notice of the hearing, despite having the ability to do so. We therefore VACATE the trial court's September 14, 2017 order, and we REMAND this case to the Family Division of the Oakland Circuit Court to conduct an analysis under Section 39(1) of the Michigan Adoption Code, MCL 710.39(1). In light of our resolution of these issues, we decline to reach petitioners' remaining issue. We do not retain jurisdiction. We agree with Justice Viviano that "In re MKK represents an admirable effort by the Court of Appeals to balance the competing rights, interests and responsibilities of the parties when determining whether to proceed with proceedings under the Adoption Code or a case filed under the Paternity Act." And we also agree that the Legislature's input on this question would be helpful. But we respectfully disagree that this order creates any per se rule; our decision today is based in the very specific facts of this case alone.

Per Curiam. Plaintiff, the Meisner Law Group, PC, brought this action for attorney fees in circuit court, asserting that "[t]he amount in controversy exceeds $25,000." Plaintiff alleged three theories for relief: (1) quantum meruit or unjust enrichment under an unexecuted, proposed contingent-fee agreement, (2) breach of an existing written retainer contract, and (3) that defendant misrepresented that it would fairly compensate plaintiff for the work plaintiff would perform. The circuit court entered an order on February 24, 2016, granting defendant Weston Downs Condominium Association's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). The court found that neither plaintiff's complaint nor the evidence that plaintiff submitted created a question of fact that plaintiff's claims might exceed $25,000. The circuit court also determined that plaintiff's claims were frivolous, ruling that it would award defendant its attorney fees in an amount to be determined at a later hearing. The circuit court entered an order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff now appeals by right. We affirm. I. SUMMARY OF UNDERLYING FACTS On May 24, 2013, plaintiff and defendant entered into a general retention agreement (GRA), whereby defendant retained plaintiff as legal counsel to provide legal services within an hourly rate range for attorneys and within a lesser hourly rate range for the law firm's other employees. The GRA provided that plaintiff would send defendant statements containing "[a]n itemized description of services rendered" and that defendant would pay the statements within 15 days of receiving them. The GRA further provided that defendant would be given 15 days of notice regarding any change in the hourly rates stated in the agreement and that "[e]xcept for the change in the hourly rates and flat fees, the terms and conditions of this retention agreement shall remain in effect, unless superseded by another fee agreement." The GRA contemplated that a separate agreement regarding fees might be required for work on a "major claim," providing: The rates quoted in this letter are with respect to general work performed on behalf of the Association. Should a major claim in behalf of or against the Association arise, a separate fee agreement would be established. On May 13, 2015, defendant sought plaintiff's counsel regarding its concerns that the developer of the condominiums, Mondrian Properties Weston Downs, LLC, had sold or transferred the last three remaining condominium units to its three principal members, who intended to use the units as rental properties. Defendant sought to amend the association's bylaws and other documents to limit or prevent rentals and to review potential claims defendant may have against the developer regarding ownership of the units and liability for association fees. Plaintiff provided advice regarding potential legal claims against the developer and drafted the necessary documents to amend the association's bylaws. Defendant paid plaintiff's invoices for these services under the GRA in the amount of $5,667. Believing that the matters regarding the developer concerned a "major claim," plaintiff, through Robert Meisner, wrote an e-mail to defendant's president on May 15, 2015, "enclosing a proposed fee agreement for consideration by the Board of Directors exclusively in regard to the Developer suit." This transmittal letter asked defendant's board to review the proposal "at your earliest convenience and presuming it is satisfactory, please have it signed and return it to me together with the initial retainer so that we can begin obtaining experts and otherwise preparing the claim." A second letter of the same date that contained the proposed retainer agreement began by stating that "[t]his letter will serve to set forth this firm's fee arrangement and proposal in connection with our representation of Weston Downs Condominium Association regarding the prosecution of a claim and/or commencement of a lawsuit against those persons or entities responsible...." The proposed retainer agreement specified hourly rates that were slightly less than those in the GRA and, in addition to the hourly rates, provided: "the Association shall pay the following contingency fee with respect to the litigation: fifteen (15%) percent of the value of all ... benefits of any kind realized, paid to, and/or received by the Association ... whether by way of settlement, agreement, case evaluation award, arbitration award, judgment, alternative dispute resolution, or otherwise .... The proposed retainer agreement also stated that "[i]f the contents of this Agreement are satisfactory to the Board of Directors, please have two (2) representatives authorized by the Board of Directors date and sign the Agreement on behalf of the Association in the spaces provided below as well as the representative claimant ...." The next paragraph of the proposed retainer agreement stated, "The effective date of this Agreement shall be upon a receipt of this signed agreement by the Board of Directors of the Association, and receipt of a retainer in the amount of $5,000." It is undisputed that defendant's board never authorized the proposed agreement, authorized board members never signed the proposed agreement, and defendant never paid plaintiff the required $5,000 retainer. In an e-mail exchange between defendant's board member, Rick Bonus, and one of plaintiff's attorneys, Dan Feinberg, on June 1, 2015, defendant posed nine additional legal questions concerning potential claims the Association may have against the developer. Feinberg responded with answers to the questions posed in an e-mail of June 4, 2015. It is undisputed that although defendant's representatives repeatedly invited plaintiff to invoice defendant for these services so that they could be paid, plaintiff never did so. It is also undisputed that the work to prepare the June 4, 2015 e-mail was the last legal service plaintiff performed for defendant. Through June and July 2015, representatives of plaintiff queried defendant's representatives concerning the status of defendant's intent regarding potential claims against the developer. Defendant's representatives responded that the Board was still considering its options. Plaintiff responded in a letter of June 11, 2015 by its principal, Robert Meisner, stating that defendant had taken plaintiff's valuable advice and proceeded on its own. Meisner noted that although defendant had not signed the proposed retainer agreement, plaintiff expected that it would be compensated for the "fair value" of its services. Meisner wrote an e-mail on August 7, 2015, to one of defendant's board members requesting clarification of defendant's position. Meisner stated that if he received no response within 7 days, he would assume that defendant no longer desired plaintiff's services, and that plaintiff would "notify the developer that we retain an attorney's lien on any [recovery and] ... we are entitled to the fair value of our services." Defendant's Board responded to the August 7, 2015 e-mail of Meisner an August 11, 2015 letter signed by all three Board members, which stated, in pertinent part: "[P]lease be advised that the Board of Directors is not contemplating any legal action at this time against the developer and therefore no longer wishes your firm to provide any future services. Furthermore, as you note in your email, the Association has no[t] signed [the] engagement letter with your firm with respect to any such litigation." Plaintiff responded in an August 18, 2015, letter by Meisner to the Board's president, Rose Ann Schmitt. Meisner expressed his shock at defendant's "lack of good faith" and accused defendant's Board of "using our work-product without our knowledge or consent to obtain substantial benefits for the Association." Meisner also "advised that unless you provide this firm with full disclosure as to what has transpired between the Association and the Developer since our email to the Board of June 4, 2015, we will have no choice but to not only file an attorney's lien, but to institute litigation to seek the information through the discovery process...." Meisner also threatened that plaintiff would "consider proceeding against [Schmitt] personally for what I consider to be a fraud on this firm." On September 18, 2015, plaintiff filed its three-count complaint against defendant in the Oakland Circuit Court. As noted, plaintiff's complaint alleged (1) quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, (2) breach of the GRA, and (3) misrepresentation that defendant would compensate plaintiff for the "fair value" of its work. The essence of plaintiff's unjust-enrichment claim is stated in Paragraph 16, "The Board accepted the benefits of the [plaintiff's] advice, and, on information and belief, used this special advice and information to leverage a settlement with the developer." Plaintiff never produced any evidence of a "settlement" between defendant and the developer. Defendant responded to plaintiff's original complaint on October 19, 2015 with a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (8), and (10), and for sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.114(E) and (F), MCR 2.625(A)(2), and MCL 600.2591. Thereafter, plaintiff filed, on November 2, 2015, a first amended complaint with minor editorial changes from the original complaint. Defendant filed a response to the amended complaint, noting that nothing in the amended complaint "remedied the misdeeds that warrant the imposition of sanctions against [plaintiff] pursuant to MCR 2.114(E) and (F), MCR 2.625(A)(2), and MCL 600.2591," so defendant stood on its previously filed motion for summary disposition. That motion, with respect MCR 2.116(C)(4), asserted that plaintiff "has not produced and cannot produce any evidence to support its vacant claim that the 'amount in controversy exceeds $25,000.' " The hearing on defendant's motion for summary disposition occurred on February 24, 2016. At the hearing, defendant was permitted to file an affidavit by Joseph Maniaci, a manager of the developer. Maniaci averred that no litigation had ever existed between defendant and the developer and that defendant had asserted no claims against the developer since May 24, 2013. Otherwise, both parties stood on their written submissions. The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice on the basis that plaintiff's claim could not exceed $25,000. The court ruled that neither plaintiff's complaint nor any evidence that plaintiff had submitted created a question of fact that plaintiff's claims might exceed $25,000. The circuit court also determined that plaintiff's claims were frivolous and ruled that it would determine an award of attorney fees at a later hearing. No further hearings were held in the circuit court. Plaintiff appeals by right. II. AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY A. PRESERVATION Plaintiff preserved this issue for appellate review by presenting it to the circuit court, which addressed and decided the issue. Walters v. Nadell , 481 Mich. 377, 387-388, 751 N.W.2d 431 (2008). B. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo "a trial court's decision to grant or deny summary disposition." Cairns v. East Lansing , 275 Mich.App. 102, 107, 738 N.W.2d 246 (2007). "Jurisdictional questions under MCR 2.116(C)(4) are questions of law that are also reviewed de novo." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co. , 465 Mich. 185, 205, 631 N.W.2d 733 (2001). Similarly, issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo on appeal. Yee v. Shiawassee Co. Bd. of Comm'rs , 251 Mich.App. 379, 393, 651 N.W.2d 756 (2002). A trial court is duty-bound to recognize the limits of its subject-matter jurisdiction, and it must dismiss an action when subject-matter jurisdiction is not present. Id . at 399, 651 N.W.2d 756. See also Cairns , 275 Mich.App. at 107, 738 N.W.2d 246. MCR 2.116(C)(4) permits a trial court to dismiss a complaint when "[t]he court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter." A motion under Subrule (C)(4) may be supported or opposed by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(2). When affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence are submitted with a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), they "must be considered by the court." MCR 2.116(G)(5). So, when reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(4) that asserts the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Summer v. Southfield Bd. of Ed. , 310 Mich.App. 660, 668, 874 N.W.2d 150 (2015) ; Manning v. Amerman , 229 Mich.App. 608, 610, 582 N.W.2d 539 (1998). C. ANALYSIS In this civil action which the undisputed facts show that the amount in controversy could not exceed $25,000, the circuit court properly granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, which lay exclusively with the district court. MCL 600.605 ; MCL 600.8301(1) ; Clohset v. No Name Corp. (On Remand) , 302 Mich.App. 550, 560, 840 N.W.2d 375 (2013) ("District courts in Michigan have exclusive jurisdiction over civil matters where the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000."); Bowie v. Arder , 441 Mich. 23, 50, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992) (explaining that "circuit courts do not have jurisdiction in matters in which jurisdiction is given exclusively by constitutional provision or by statute to another court"). Consequently, we affirm the circuit court. Michigan's Constitution provides in pertinent part, that "judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, ... and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish...." Const. 1963, art. 6, § 1. Under this authority, the Legislature enacted MCL 600.605 and MCL 600.8301(1) that plainly combine, when no other jurisdictional statute applies, to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction over civil actions "when the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00." MCL 600.8301(1). Our Supreme Court explained, "Although circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, with original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, circuit courts do not have jurisdiction in matters in which jurisdiction is given exclusively by constitutional provision or by statute to another court." Bowie , 441 Mich. at 50, 490 N.W.2d 568. But Michigan's judiciary have long held that the circuit court is not deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction when a plaintiff claims damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount but the judge or jury returns a verdict of an amount less than the jurisdictional limit. See, e.g., Fox v. Martin , 287 Mich. 147, 151, 283 N.W. 9 (1938) ("Jurisdiction does not depend upon the facts, but upon the allegations."); Zimmerman v. Miller , 206 Mich. 599, 604-605, 173 N.W. 364 (1919) (stating that the "jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount demanded in the plaintiff's pleadings, not by the sum actually recoverable or that found by the judge or jury on the trial."); Inkster v. Carver , 16 Mich. 484, 487 (1868) (stating that the only practical rule is "that the damages claimed in the declaration or process, and not the amount found by the court or jury upon trial, must be the test of jurisdiction."); Strong v. Daniels , 3 Mich. 466, 471 (1855) (holding "that jurisdiction must be determined from the record, and, where it depends on amount, by the sum claimed in the declaration or writ."). In Hodge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 499 Mich. 211, 884 N.W.2d 238 (2016), our Supreme Court considered the reverse scenario of the present case: a plaintiff filed a complaint in district court, seeking damages " 'not in excess of $25,000' " but discovery and proofs at trial revealed actual damages were far in excess of $25,000. Id . at 214, 884 N.W.2d 238. The district court permitted the case to go to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff of $85,000. The district court entered a remitted judgment of $25,000, plus interest. The circuit court reversed that order, finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and this Court affirmed. Id . at 214-215, 884 N.W.2d 238, citing Moody v. Home Owners Ins. Co. , 304 Mich. App. 415, 430, ,849 N.W.2d 31 (2014). Our Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction because "in its subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry, a district court determines the amount in controversy using the prayer for relief set forth in the plaintiff's pleadings, calculated exclusive of fees, costs, and interest." Hodge , 499 Mich. at 223-224, 884 N.W.2d 238. The Court reasoned that the court below had made "no findings ... of bad faith in the pleadings," so "[e]ven though [the plaintiff's] proofs exceeded [the district court's jurisdictional limit], the prayer for relief controls when determining the amount in controversy and the limit of awardable damages." Id . Therefore, "the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim." Does the Hodge rule-courts determine the "amount in controversy" solely by the prayer for relief in the plaintiff's pleadings-apply to this case, in which plaintiff pleaded that the "amount in controversy exceeds $25,000" but the circuit court determined, on the basis of the documentary evidence that the parties submitted on defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), that the undisputed facts showed the amount in controversy could not exceed $25,000? Stated otherwise, the first question is whether "the amount in controversy" of a civil action filed in the circuit court is determined, for purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction, solely on the basis of the amount claimed in the complaint? According to the authority set forth in the "Standard of Review section of this opinion," the answer is no. The Michigan Court Rules of 1985 require a circuit court, when its jurisdiction is challenged with a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(4), to consider the "affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence" that the parties may submit "to support or oppose the grounds asserted in the motion." MCR 2.116(G)(2). See also MCR 2.116(G)(5) ; Moody , 304 Mich.App. at 437, 849 N.W.2d 31. So, when reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4) that asserts the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the circuit court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning provable damages. See Summer , 310 Mich.App. at 668, 874 N.W.2d 150. Additionally, as already noted, the Hodge rule does not apply when a party's pleadings are made in bad faith. Hodge , 499 Mich. at 221-224, 884 N.W.2d 238. The majority in Hodge did not expand on what constitutes "bad faith," but it did note that "a court will not retain subject-matter jurisdiction over a case 'when ... fraud upon the court is apparent' from allegations pleaded in bad faith." Id . at 222 n. 31, 884 N.W.2d 238, quoting Fix v. Sissung , 83 Mich. 561, 563, 47 N.W. 340 (1890). "In Fix , this Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit as being brought in bad faith because the amount claimed was 'unjustifiable' and could not be proved." Hodge , 499 Mich. at 222 n. 31, 884 N.W.2d 238, discussing Fix , 83 Mich. at 563, 47 N.W. 340. Accordingly, "bad faith" is not a plaintiff's subjective ill will. Instead, bad faith exists when a plaintiff's claim to damages in the pleadings are "unjustifiable" because they "could not be proved." Hodge , 499 Mich. at 222 n. 31, 884 N.W.2d 238. The "bad faith" found in Fix and endorsed in Hodge mirrors the requirements of MCR 2.116(C)(4), (G)(2), and (G)(5). Although a plaintiff may claim damages in excess of $25,000, when the documentary evidence submitted to the circuit court shows by undisputed facts that the plaintiff's claim to damages exceeding the jurisdictional amount cannot be proved, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) is proper. See Packowski v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951 , 289 Mich.App. 132, 138-139, 796 N.W.2d 94 (2010) ; Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing , 279 Mich.App. 150, 176, 756 N.W.2d 483 (2008) ; MCR 2.116(I)(1) ("If the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if the affidavits or other proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court shall render judgment without delay."). Hodge is further distinguished from the present case because it addressed the limited jurisdiction of the district court, in which damages may not be obtained in excess of its limited jurisdiction of $25,000. Hodge , 499 Mich. at 216 & n. 13, 884 N.W.2d 238. "The district court, therefore, may not award damages in excess of that amount." Id . at 216-217, 884 N.W.2d 238. In other words, a plaintiff pleading a case of damages for $25,000 or less who proves and obtains a verdict for more than $25,000, would still be limited to awardable damages of not more than the district court's jurisdictional limit of $25,000. Id . at 224, 884 N.W.2d 238. The Hodge Court suggested this result "should deter fully-informed plaintiffs from too-readily seeking to litigate a more valuable claim in district court." Id . at 223, 884 N.W.2d 238. But the Court also declined to address "whether a fully-informed plaintiff acts in bad faith by filing a claim in district court, thereby limiting his own recovery to $25,000." Id . at 223 n. 31, 884 N.W.2d 238. Thus, Hodge permits a fully informed plaintiff as a matter of tactical advantage to limit recovery of a claim worth more than $25,000 by filing it in the district court. Although the Hodge Court premised its decision by applying longstanding common-law practice to the Legislative phrase "amount in controversy," id . at 221, 884 N.W.2d 238, it plainly only decided when a district court has jurisdiction under MCL 600.8301(1). The circuit court's jurisdiction on a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4) must be determined in accordance with the Michigan Court Rules and longstanding caselaw. When there is a complaint that asserts damages in excess of $25,000 but the "affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence," MCR 2.116(G)(2), show without dispute that that amount "could not be proved," Hodge , 499 Mich. at 222 n. 31, 884 N.W.2d 238, the complaint would essentially be one pleaded in bad faith. In this case, the circuit court correctly ruled on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted that plaintiff could not prove, or more accurately could not create a question of fact, that its claim for compensation for legal services under any of the theories advanced could exceed the $25,000 jurisdictional limit of the circuit court. The undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff had performed legal research and answered certain questions posed by defendant's representative. The questions were posed on June 1, 2015 in an e-mail and answered by one of plaintiff's attorneys in an e-mail on June 4, 2015. It is undisputed that when these legal services were rendered, there was a written agreement (the GRA) between plaintiff and defendant providing for a top hourly attorney rate of $325. Although defendant requested that plaintiff send an invoice for these services so that defendant could pay plaintiff for the work performed, plaintiff never did. Looking at these facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we note that if these legal services required 32 hours of attorney time at $325 per hour, the total amount due would be $10,400. If this amount were increased by 50% for any support staff services and for winding up plaintiff's legal representation of defendant, the total expense would still be under $16,000. In sum, the undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal services under any theory "could not be proved" to exceed $25,000. Hodge , 499 Mich. at 222 n. 31, 884 N.W.2d 238. Plaintiff argues that its claim for the "fair value" for its services would be in excess of $25,000 by relying on a proposed "major claims" retainer agreement that contained both hourly rates less than the GRA and a contingent fee based on any judgment or settlement that defendant might obtain. It is undisputed the proposed hybrid retainer agreement with the contingent fee clause never became effective because no authorized representatives of defendant's governing board ever signed it, nor did defendant pay a required retainer fee. Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the unexecuted contingent-fee agreement would be an appropriate measure of the value of its services under both plaintiff's quantum meruit or unjust enrichment theory and its claim that defendant misrepresented that it would fairly compensate plaintiff. These theories contemplate that plaintiff be compensated for the benefit plaintiff's legal work conferred on defendant. "The essential elements of [an unjust enrichment] claim are (1) receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff, and (2) which benefit it is inequitable that the defendant retain." B & M Die Co. v. Ford Motor Co. , 167 Mich.App. 176, 181, 421 N.W.2d 620 (1988). "Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine that prevents a client's unjust enrichment while compensating an attorney for only those benefits actually generated by the attorney's work." Island Lake Arbors Condo. Ass'n v. Meisner & Assoc., PC , 301 Mich.App. 384, 399, 837 N.W.2d 439 (2013). The undisputed facts do not support plaintiff's claim that defendant received a valuable settlement on the basis of plaintiff's advice, i.e., that defendant received a benefit that it would be unjust to retain. The contingent-fee agreement was proposed to pursue claims against the condominium developer and would have been invoked if litigation had been initiated or a claim made and a judgment, award, or settlement entered. But the undisputed facts show that none of these events occurred. Defendant's August 11, 2015 letter to plaintiff informed plaintiff that defendant did not intend to pursue legal action against the developer. The affidavit of the developer's manager averred that no litigation had ever existed between defendant and the developer and that defendant had asserted no claims against the developer since the GRA was executed. Accordingly, there was no evidence to support a claim that defendant unjustly or fraudulently received a benefit on the basis of legal services plaintiff provided. So the undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal services under a theory of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment or fraudulent misrepresentation "could not be proved" to exceed 25,000. Hodge , 499 Mich. at 222 n. 31, 884 N.W.2d 238. Instead of producing evidence of a settlement between defendant and the developer, plaintiff only presents speculation that one occurred based on plaintiff's characterization that defendant was being "astonishingly secretive and unresponsive" to plaintiff's several requests for information during June and July 2015. From this speculation, plaintiff inferred that defendant had entered into a valuable settlement with the developer that was procured on the basis of the legal advice plaintiff had provided. But "[a] party opposing a motion for summary disposition must present more than conjecture and speculation to meet its burden of providing evidentiary proof establishing a genuine issue of material fact." Cloverleaf Car Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 213 Mich.App. 186, 192-193, 540 N.W.2d 297 (1995). Plaintiff offers only speculation that defendant used its legal advice to "leverage a settlement" with the developer, and that conjecture is insufficient to create a question of disputed fact sufficient to survive a motion for summary disposition. See Yoost v. Caspari , 295 Mich. App. 209, 227-228, 813 N.W.2d 783 (2012) (holding that speculation was insufficient to demonstrate facts necessary to establish limited personal jurisdiction); Central Transp., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp. , 139 Mich. App. 536, 546, 362 N.W.2d 823 (1984) ("Calculation of lost profits cannot be based solely on conjecture and speculation"). The mere possibility that a claim might be supported by evidence at trial is insufficient. Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 121, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). Plaintiff also argues that he did not have a chance to prove his claim because summary disposition was granted before discovery occurred. In general, summary disposition is premature if granted before discovery on a disputed issue is complete. Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v. Bloomfield Hills Country Club , 283 Mich. App. 264, 292, 769 N.W.2d 234 (2009). But a party must show that further discovery presents a fair likelihood of uncovering factual support for the party's position. Liparoto Constr. Co., Inc. v. Gen. Shale Brick , Inc. , 284 Mich.App. 25, 33-34, 772 N.W.2d 801 (2009). Indeed, a party claiming that summary disposition is premature must "identify[ ] a disputed issue and support[ ] that issue with independent evidence." Froling Trust , 283 Mich.App. at 292, 769 N.W.2d 234, citing Bellows v. Delaware McDonald's Corp. , 206 Mich.App. 555, 561, 522 N.W.2d 707 (1994). In this case, both of the participants of the alleged settlement assert that litigation was not initiated; a claim was not made, and no settlement exists. Plaintiff offers no independent evidence that further discovery would uncover evidence to contradict that submitted by defendant. Froling Trust , 283 Mich.App. at 292, 769 N.W.2d 234. Consequently, plaintiff has not shown a fair likelihood that further discovery could enable plaintiff to establish a question of fact concerning a settlement to which it believes it is entitled to a portion of as "fair compensation" for its legal work. Liparoto Constr. Co. , 284 Mich.App. at 33-34, 772 N.W.2d 801. The circuit court did not prematurely grant summary disposition. Plaintiff also argues that its claim is supported because this instance is the second time that defendant had sought and obtained significant legal advice regarding major claims against the developer and afterward become "uncommunicative." Although plaintiff alleged a similar incident occurred in 2013-2014, plaintiff presented no evidence to support the claim. A circuit court's review is limited to the evidence that is presented to the court at the time the motion was decided. See Innovative Adult Foster Care , Inc. v. Ragin , 285 Mich.App. 466, 476, 776 N.W.2d 398 (2009). Similarly, a party may not expand the record on appeal, Detroit Leasing Co. v. Detroit , 269 Mich.App. 233, 237, 713 N.W.2d 269 (2005), and this Court's review is limited to the trial court record, Sherman v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc. , 251 Mich.App. 41, 56, 649 N.W.2d 783 (2002). In summary, the undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal services under any theory "could not be proved" to exceed $25,000. Hodge , 499 Mich. at 222 n. 31, 884 N.W.2d 238. The circuit court properly granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, which lay exclusively with the district court. MCL 600.605 ; MCL 600.8301(1) ; Bowie , 441 Mich. at 50, 490 N.W.2d 568 ; Clohset , 302 Mich.App. at 560, 840 N.W.2d 375. III. EQUITABLE IN NATURE Plaintiff also argues that regardless of the amount in controversy, the circuit court had jurisdiction of its complaint because its claims were equitable in nature. Plaintiff argues that under MCL 600.8302 and MCL 600.8315, the district court did not have jurisdiction; therefore, jurisdiction lay in the circuit court as the court of general jurisdiction that has jurisdiction in equitable matters except as limited by Michigan's Constitution or by statute. See MCL 600.601(1)(b) ; MCL 600.605 ; Bowie , 441 Mich. at 37-38, 490 N.W.2d 568. We disagree. A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Plaintiff did not preserve this issue for appellate review by presenting it to and obtaining a ruling from the circuit court. Walters , 481 Mich. at 387-388, 751 N.W.2d 431. Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Teddy 23, LLC v. Mich. Film Office , 313 Mich.App. 557, 564, 884 N.W.2d 799 (2015). Questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Id . B. ANALYSIS This issue is one of first impression. Must a claim of quantum meruit be brought in circuit court because it is "equitable in nature"? See MCL 600.8315. We conclude that because plaintiff sought only legal relief-money damages-the district court "has exclusive jurisdiction" of this civil action where "the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00." MCL 600.8301(1) ; MCL 600.605. Plaintiff argues that its quantum meruit claim is "equitable in nature" and therefore must be brought in the circuit court because the district court lacks general equitable jurisdiction. This Court has opined that "while a claim for contract damages is legal in nature, a claim of quantum meruit is equitable in nature." Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc. , 273 Mich.App. 187, 199, 729 N.W.2d 898 (2006). The Court also noted that when a contract for labor is breached, the aggrieved party may sue for damages on the contract or ignore the contract and assert unjust enrichment as the proper remedy. Id . For quantum meruit or unjust enrichment to apply, there must not be an express contract between the parties covering the same subject matter. Id . at 194, 729 N.W.2d 898. Equitable principles apply because "the law will imply a contract to prevent unjust enrichment only if the defendant has been unjustly or inequitably enriched at the plaintiff's expense." Id . at 195, 729 N.W.2d 898. Although plaintiff's theory of recovery rests on equitable principles of unjust enrichment, plaintiff's complaint sought only legal relief of money damages. In other contexts, the relief sought by a plaintiff determines its procedural rights. See, e.g., Anzaldua v. Band , 457 Mich. 530, 539 n. 6, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998), and B & M Die Co. , 167 Mich.App. 176, 184, 421 N.W.2d 620, which both held that a party seeking only equitable relief has no right to a trial by a jury except when coupled with a claim for legal relief in the form of money damages. Plaintiff first argues that under MCL 600.8302, the district court does not have equitable jurisdiction of its quantum meruit claim. Plaintiff contends that MCL 600.8302 limits the district court's equitable jurisdiction to cases brought under Chapter 84 (small claims), MCL 600.8401 et seq. ; Chapter 57 (summary proceedings), MCL 600.5701 et seq. ; Chapter 31 (foreclosures of land contracts), MCL 600.3101 et seq. ; Chapter 33 (partition of lands), MCL 600.3301 et seq. ; or Chapter 38 (public nuisances), MCL 600.3801 et seq. Because none of these grants of equitable jurisdiction applies to plaintiff's unjust-enrichment claim, plaintiff reasons that, its equitable unjust-enrichment claim must come within the circuit court's general jurisdiction under MCL 600.605, which includes "all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court ...." This conclusion, plaintiff contends, is supported by MCL 600.8302, which provides that district courts only have equitable jurisdiction to the limited extent permitted in that section. Defendant correctly argues that plaintiff misreads MCL 600.8302(1). The statute provides, in pertinent part, "In addition to the civil jurisdiction provided in sections 5704 and 8301, the district court has equitable jurisdiction and authority concurrent with that of the circuit court in the matters and to the extent provided by this section." Id . (emphasis added). By its plain terms, § 8302 is a grant of additional jurisdiction to the district court that is concurrent with that of the circuit court. The statute specifically delineates this grant-"the extent provided by this section"-but nowhere limits the grant of jurisdiction provided by other statutory provisions, including § 8301. If a claim specified in § 8302 is brought in the district court, this Court has held that the district court has jurisdiction even when the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional "amount in controversy" limitation of § 8301. See Clohset , 302 Mich.App. at 560-563, 840 N.W.2d 375 (holding that the specific jurisdictional grant in MCL 600.8302(1) and (3) takes precedence over the more general jurisdictional grant found in MCL 600.8301(1) ); see also Bruwer v. Oaks (On Remand) , 218 Mich.App. 392, 395-396, 554 N.W.2d 345 (1996). Contrary to plaintiff's argument, MCL 600.8302 does not provide, that equitable matters not listed in the statute may not be brought in the district court and that therefore the circuit court must have jurisdiction. Rather, civil actions not within the ambit of § 8302 are controlled, when no other jurisdiction statute or constitutional provision applies, by the jurisdictional amount stated in MCL 600.8301(1). Plaintiff's other argument, raised for the first time in its reply brief, is more problematic. Plaintiff cites MCL 600.8315, which provides, in pertinent part, "The district court shall not have jurisdiction in actions for injunctions, divorce or actions which are historically equitable in nature, except as otherwise provided by law." Plaintiff argues that because its claim is "equitable in nature," plaintiff was prohibited by § 8315 from filing its quantum meruit claim in the district court; therefore, it was required to file it in the circuit court. Plaintiff cites Paley v. Coca Cola Co. , 389 Mich. 583, 209 N.W.2d 232 (1973), in support of its argument. Paley was a split decision by an evenly divided Court that affirmed this Court's holding permitting a class-action lawsuit to proceed in circuit court, although none of the individual plaintiffs had satisfied the jurisdictional limitation of that court. In the lead opinion, Justice WILLIAMS reasoned that because class actions are historically equitable in nature, the § 8315 exclusion of "actions which are historically equitable in nature" from the jurisdiction of the district court meant that the Legislature intended class actions to be brought in the circuit court. Paley , 389 Mich. at 590-592, 209 N.W.2d 232 (opinion by WILLIAMS , J.). Justice WILLIAMS also approvingly quoted from this Court's opinion: " '[I]rrespective of the amount in controversy, a cause sounding primarily in equity must be brought in the circuit court.' " Id . at 594, 209 N.W.2d 232, quoting Paley v. Coca Cola Co. , 39 Mich.App. 379, 383, 197 N.W.2d 478 (1972), aff'd 389 Mich. 583, 209 N.W.2d 232 (1973). Justice WILLIAMS 's lead opinion, however, is not binding precedent because it did not represent a majority opinion of the Court. See Negri v. Slotkin , 397 Mich. 105, 109, 244 N.W.2d 98 (1976) ("[D]ecisions in which no majority of the justices participating agree as to the reasoning are not an authoritative interpretation binding ... under the doctrine of Stare decisis."). Moreover, plaintiff's complaint sounds primarily in contract and seeks legal relief in the form of a money judgment. Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to money damages under equitable principles related to unjust enrichment but does not seek equitable relief. So plaintiff's complaint does not sound primarily in equity or seek equitable relief; instead, the complaint is primarily a legal claim, and the phrase "equitable in nature" should not take precedence over the phrase "otherwise provided by law" in MCL 600.8315. As to the latter, the district court has "exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000." MCL 600.8301(1). As discussed, plaintiff's complaint comes within this exclusive jurisdiction. In sum, because plaintiff sought only legal relief-money damages-the district court "has exclusive jurisdiction" of plaintiff's civil action involving contract and quasi-contract claims because the undisputed evidence shows that "the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00." MCL 600.8301(1) ; MCL 600.605. The circuit court properly granted defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). IV. FRIVOLOUS CLAIM A. STANDARD OF REVIEW "A trial court's findings with regard to whether a claim or defense was frivolous, and whether sanctions may be imposed, will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous." 1300 Lafayette East Coop., Inc. v. Savoy , 284 Mich.App. 522, 533, 773 N.W.2d 57 (2009). "A decision is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Kitchen v. Kitchen , 465 Mich. 654, 661-662, 641 N.W.2d 245 (2002). B. ANALYSIS Plaintiff's first argument-that the circuit could take no action other than to dismiss the complaint after finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction-is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See Fix , 83 Mich. at 563, 47 N.W. 340 (affirming the circuit court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and holding that the circuit court "was right in dismissing the case, with costs"). Further, MCR 2.114(E), MCR 2.625(A)(2), and MCL 600.2591(1), not only authorize but require a court to sanction an attorney or party that files a frivolous action or defense. Additionally, a circuit court has inherent authority to impose sanctions on litigants appearing before it regardless of whether the court also rules that it lacks jurisdiction over a complaint. See Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co. , 476 Mich. 372, 375-376, 719 N.W.2d 809 (2006) ; Baynesan v. Wayne State Univ. , 316 Mich.App. 643, 651, 655, 894 N.W.2d 102 (2016). "An exercise of the court's 'inherent power' may be disturbed only upon a finding that there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Brenner v. Kolk , 226 Mich.App. 149, 160, 573 N.W.2d 65 (1997). "Whether a claim is frivolous within the meaning of MCR 2.114(F) and MCL 600.2591 depends on the facts of the case." Kitchen , 465 Mich. at 662, 641 N.W.2d 245. MCL 600.2591(3)(a) defines the term "frivolous" as follows: (i ) The party's primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the defense was to harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing party. (ii ) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party's legal position were in fact true. (iii ) The party's legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit. The frivolous-claim-or-defense provisions of the Michigan Court Rules and MCL 600.2591"impose an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal viability of a pleading before it is signed." Attorney General v. Harkins , 257 Mich.App. 564, 576, 669 N.W.2d 296 (2003). The reasonableness of the attorney's inquiry is determined by an objective standard, not the attorney's subjective good faith. Id . The purpose of imposing sanctions for asserting a frivolous action or defense is to deter parties and their attorneys from filing documents or asserting claims or defenses that have not been sufficiently investigated and researched or that are intended to serve an improper purpose. BJ's & Sons Constr. Co., Inc. v. Van Sickle , 266 Mich.App. 400, 405, 700 N.W.2d 432 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A court must determine whether a claim or defense is frivolous on the basis of the circumstances at the time it was asserted. Robert A. Hansen Family Trust v. FGH Indus., LLC , 279 Mich.App. 468, 486, 760 N.W.2d 526 (2008). In ruling that plaintiff's action was frivolous, the circuit court did not specify under which MCL 600.2591(3)(a) subparagraph it based this finding. The circuit court ruled: [T]he matter is before the Court on a request for sanctions and whether-for filing a frivolous complaint. In this case plaintiff filed a case based on an unsigned agreement. The Court reviewed the file. There was a letter from the Association saying they didn't wish to proceed. Then this case was brought, a very serious case requesting fees with no amount and no billing ever having been made. And, there's been no proof, in fact there's an affidavit to the contrary that there was never any litigation that began to which the plaintiff even under-if they-the agreement had been signed a fee would have been earned. While the circuit court did not specify which MCL 600.2591(3)(a) subparagraph it found applicable, it is clear from the court's comments that it made no specific mention that plaintiff acted with an improper purpose under § 2591(3)(a)(i ). Rather, the circuit court explicitly and implicitly found that plaintiff "had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party's legal position were in fact true." MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii ). This finding, in turn, implicates § 2591(3)(a)(iii ), which applies when "[t]he party's legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit." " 'A claim is devoid of arguable legal merit if it is not sufficiently grounded in law or fact[.]' " Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury , 313 Mich.App. 572, 589, 884 N.W.2d 587 (2015) (alteration in original), quoting Adamo Demolition Co. v. Dep't of Treasury , 303 Mich.App. 356, 369, 844 N.W.2d 143 (2013). The circuit court did not clearly err in its findings because they have sufficient evidentiary support; this Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Kitchen , 465 Mich. at 661-662, 641 N.W.2d 245. The evidence supports that plaintiff based its claims on an unexecuted retainer agreement, which the undisputed facts showed would not have yielded a contingent fee even if effective because defendant did not initiate litigation or a claim against the developer. Defendant advised plaintiff by letter before this lawsuit was filed that it did not intend on pursuing claims against the developer. While the developer's affidavit stating that plaintiff had not initiated a claim or litigation against it was made after the lawsuit was filed, the facts averred could have been confirmed by contacting the clerk of the pertinent court or making direct inquiry of the developer. Accordingly, there was no basis in fact to support plaintiff's speculative belief that defendant had benefited unjustly from plaintiff's legal advice and reached a valuable settlement with the developer, which was the foundation of plaintiff's claims of quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent misrepresentation. And plaintiff's last claim-based on an assertion that defendant sought legal advice for which it never intended to pay-is totally unsupported by the facts in that defendant repeatedly requested a bill for services rendered in June 2015 so that it could pay for those services, but plaintiff refused to send defendant an invoice for the services it had performed. This evidence supports the conclusion that plaintiff did not sufficiently investigate and research the factual bases of its claims. BJ's & Sons Constr. , 266 Mich.App. at 405, 700 N.W.2d 432. And even if plaintiff's principal had a subjective good-faith belief in the viability of the claims, an objective assessment of the facts known and reasonably knowable, Harkins , 257 Mich. App. at 576, 669 N.W.2d 296, shows that plaintiff "had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party's legal position were in fact true," MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii ). The circuit court did not clearly err by finding that plaintiff's claims were frivolous and awarding defendant its attorney fees, subject to a reasonableness hearing. Kitchen , 465 Mich. at 661-662, 641 N.W.2d 245 ; Ford Motor , 313 Mich.App. at 589-590, 884 N.W.2d 587. We therefore affirm the circuit court's finding that plaintiff's claims were frivolous and remand the case for a hearing regarding a reasonable attorney fees award. See Vittiglio v. Vittiglio , 297 Mich.App. 391, 408-410, 824 N.W.2d 591 (2012) ; John J. Fannon Co. v. Fannon Products, LLC , 269 Mich.App. 162, 171-172, 712 N.W.2d 731 (2005). V. CONCLUSION The undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal services under any theory "could not be proved" to exceed $25,000. So the circuit court properly granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction which lay exclusively with the district court. MCL 600.605 ; MCL 600.8301(1). Plaintiff's complaint does not sound primarily in equity or seek equitable relief; the complaint is primarily a legal claim and the phrase "equitable in nature" should not take precedence over the phrase "otherwise provided by law" in MCL 600.8315. Because plaintiff sought only legal relief-money damages-the district court "has exclusive jurisdiction" of plaintiff's civil action involving its contract and quasi-contract theories because the undisputed evidence showed that "the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00." MCL 600.8301(1) ; MCL 600.605. The circuit court properly granted defendant summary disposition. MCR 2.116(C)(4). We affirm the circuit court's finding that plaintiff's claims were frivolous and remand the case for a hearing regarding a reasonable attorney fees award. We affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendant, as the prevailing party, may tax its costs under MCR 7.219(F). Beckering, P.J., and Markey and Riordan, JJ., concurred. Defendant filed statements regarding attorney fees from two law firms in the amount of $16,615.50 and $5,945.00, to which plaintiff filed objections. The circuit court has not yet conducted a hearing to determine the amount of the attorney-fee sanction. May 24, 2013, is the date on which defendant signed the GRA with plaintiff. Although the circuit court did not address defendant's arguments for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), defendant presents them as alternative grounds to affirm the circuit court. An appellee, like defendant, without filing a cross-appeal, may "urge an alternative ground for affirmance, even if the alternative ground was considered and rejected by the lower court or tribunal." Boardman v. Dep't of State Police , 243 Mich.App. 351, 358, 622 N.W.2d 97 (2000), citing Middlebrooks v. Wayne Co. , 446 Mich. 151, 166 n. 41, 521 N.W.2d 774 (1994). But while alternative grounds to affirm may be considered, affirming the circuit court on the alternative grounds asserted would grant defendant more relief than defendant obtained in the circuit court. See Barrow v. Detroit Election Comm. , 305 Mich. App. 649, 683, 854 N.W.2d 489 (2014) ("An appellee may urge an alternative ground for affirmance without filing a cross-appeal, but an appellee may not obtain a decision more favorable than that rendered below without filing a cross-appeal."). For that reason, we decline to address defendant's alternative arguments. "Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state." "The district court has exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00." The Court in Strong , 3 Mich. at 472-473, opined: "It is well settled in actions commenced before a justice of the peace, that the test of jurisdiction is the sum demanded in the writ or declaration, and the justice will not be ousted of his jurisdiction by the jury returning a verdict, or by proof of damages beyond his jurisdiction. In such case the excess may be remitted, and judgment rendered for the balance." In Island Lake, id . at 386, 837 N.W.2d 439, a similar hybrid compensation agreement was entered, and plaintiff represented a client in litigation for 18 months before being discharged; the litigation was eventually settled. The plaintiff brought a declaratory action, contesting Meisner's charging lien. Id . This Court held, on the basis of the unambiguous contract language, that "Meisner is entitled to a contingent share of Island Lake's recovery ... by applying quantum meruit principles and cannot exceed 12 percent of the total recovery ...." Id . at 387, 837 N.W.2d 439. Island Lake is inapposite here because the undisputed documentary evidence shows that the contingent-fee contract never became effective, no claim or litigation was initiated, and there is no evidence a settlement was ever entered between defendant and the developer. The chapters discussed by plaintiff are contained within the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.101 et seq . This Court subsequently held that individual plaintiffs may not aggregate their claims to satisfy the jurisdictional minimum of the circuit court. Boyd v. Nelson Credit Ctrs. , 132 Mich.App. 774, 780-781, 348 N.W.2d 25 (1984).

Per Curiam. Plaintiff, Fred Paquin, appeals as of right an order of the Mackinac Circuit Court denying his motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact, and moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law), declaring him ineligible to run for city council in defendant, the City of St. Ignace, and dismissing his complaint for declaratory relief with prejudice. We affirm. I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The pertinent facts are not in dispute. On January 19, 2010, the United States Attorney's Office filed an indictment against plaintiff and his daughter in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Northern Division. Among the 19 counts, plaintiff was charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States by dishonest means in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. The actions prompting the federal indictment occurred while plaintiff was serving as the chief of police for the Law Enforcement Department (the tribal police department) of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (the Tribe), a federally recognized Indian tribe, and serving as an elected member of the Tribe's Board of Directors, the Tribe's governing body. On July 22, 2010, plaintiff signed a plea agreement, in which he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by dishonest means. As the factual basis for his plea, plaintiff admitted to engaging in a conspiracy involving the misuse of federal funds granted to the tribal police department. On December 20, 2010, plaintiff was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day. After serving his prison sentence, plaintiff sought to run for a position on defendant's city council in the November 2013 general election. On August 15, 2013, the Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, "applies to a person convicted of a crime based on that person's conduct as a governmental employee or elected official of a federally recognized Indian Tribe." OAG, 2013-2014, No. 7273, p 30, at 30 (August 15, 2013). Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, provides: A person is ineligible for election or appointment to any state or local elective office of this state and ineligible to hold a position in public employment in this state that is policy-making or that has discretionary authority over public assets if, within the immediately preceding 20 years, the person was convicted of a felony involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or a breach of the public trust and the conviction was related to the person's official capacity while the person was holding any elective office or position of employment in local, state, or federal government. This requirement is in addition to any other qualification required under this constitution or by law. The legislature shall prescribe by law for the implementation of this section. The Attorney General concluded that Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, applies to convictions related to a person's elective office or position of employment in the Tribe's government. Accordingly, plaintiff was "ineligible for election or appointment to any state or local elective office of this State and ineligible to hold a position in public employment in this State that is policy-making or has discretionary authority over public assets." OAG, 2013-2014, No. 7273, at 36. Relying on the Attorney General's opinion, defendant's city manager informed plaintiff in 2013 and again in 2015 that he could not run for city council. On June 26, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory relief against defendant, seeking a determination regarding the applicability of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, to "a person convicted of a crime based on that person's conduct as an employee of a federally recognized Indian Tribe." Plaintiff asserted, in relevant part, that he was eligible to run for defendant's city council because he was not convicted while holding an elective office or a position of employment in a local, state, or federal government. Defendant filed an answer denying that plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief. Plaintiff moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that defendant admitted that the only authority it relied on in denying his eligibility was the Attorney General's opinion and that the opinion was flawed "not only in the authority cited within it but within its reasoning for the application of Article 11, Section 8 of the Michigan Constitution." In particular, plaintiff asserted that the Attorney General had cited "no legal authority for its determination that the plain language of local, state or federal government somehow includes a federally recognized sovereign Indian Tribe." The Attorney General moved to submit an amicus curiae brief and to participate in oral argument in support of defendant, and the trial court granted the motion. In the amicus curiae brief, the Attorney General argued that plaintiff's positions with the Tribe constituted elective or employment positions within local government. Following oral argument, the trial court took plaintiff's motion for summary disposition under advisement. In a three-page order entered July 29, 2016, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for summary disposition, declared him ineligible to run for city council, and dismissed his complaint with prejudice. In short, the trial court found persuasive the arguments and rationale proffered by the Attorney General that plaintiff fell under the prohibition of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, as a citizen of Michigan, regardless of his status as a member of the sovereign tribal nation. II. ANALYSIS The issue before this Court on appeal is whether plaintiff's employment with a federally recognized sovereign Indian tribe constituted employment in "local, state, or federal government" for purposes of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8. This is an issue of first impression involving the interpretation of a constitutional provision. A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW The proper interpretation of a constitutional provision is a question of law, which appellate courts review de novo. People v. Hall , 499 Mich. 446, 452, 884 N.W.2d 561 (2016). "[T]he primary objective of constitutional interpretation ... is to faithfully give meaning to the intent of those who enacted the law. This Court typically discerns the common understanding of constitutional text by applying each term's plain meaning at the time of ratification." Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor , 481 Mich. 56, 67-68, 748 N.W.2d 524 (2008). That is, this Court attempts to ascertain "the common understanding of the provision, that meaning which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it." People v. Nash , 418 Mich. 196, 209, 341 N.W.2d 439 (1983) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When constitutional terms are undefined, it is appropriate to consult dictionary definitions to determine meaning. See Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. , 481 Mich. at 69, 75-77, 748 N.W.2d 524. A trial court's summary disposition decision is also reviewed de novo. Goldstone v. Bloomfield Twp. Pub. Library , 479 Mich. 554, 558, 737 N.W.2d 476 (2007). Plaintiff moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [ Bank of America, NA v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. , 316 Mich.App. 480, 488, 892 N.W.2d 467 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] B. CONST. 1963, ART. 11, § 8 As previously stated, the text of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, renders a person ineligible for "election or appointment to any state or local elective office of this state" and ineligible to hold certain positions of public employment in this state if, within the immediately preceding 20 years, the person was convicted of a felony involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or a breach of the public trust and the conviction was related to the person's official capacity while the person was holding any elective office or position of employment in local, state, or federal government.[ ] In the present case, it is undisputed that plaintiff is or was seeking to run for a position on defendant's city council, i.e., a "local elective office of this state." It is also undisputed that plaintiff was convicted of a felony within the immediately preceding 20 years involving fraud; in 2010, he was convicted by guilty plea of conspiracy to defraud the United States by dishonest means, 18 U.S.C. 371. Finally, it is undisputed that plaintiff's conviction related to his official capacities as the police chief of the tribal police department and an elected member of the Tribe's board of directors, the Tribe's governing body. Plaintiff concedes these points on appeal. Therefore, the only question is whether plaintiff's position with the Tribe constituted an "elective office or position of employment in local, state, or federal government ," thereby disqualifying plaintiff from running for defendant's city council. Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8 (emphasis added). We agree with the Attorney General and the trial court that the Tribe qualifies as a "local government" under the plain meaning of the text of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8. Because the constitutional provision does not define the term "local government," it is appropriate to consult a dictionary definition to determine the plain meaning of the phrase at the time of ratification.[ ] See Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. , 481 Mich. at 69, 75-77, 748 N.W.2d 524. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (2007), p. 730, defines "local government" as: "1. the government of a specific local area constituting a major political unit (as a nation or a state); also : the body of persons constituting such a government." The word "local" means, in relevant part, "of, relating to, or characteristic of a particular place: not general or widespread." Id . The relevant definition of "government" is "the body of persons that constitutes the governing authority of a political unit or organization[.]" Id . at 541. It is beyond dispute that the Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians is a sovereign political community, or unit. Indian tribes are distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights in matters of local self-government . Although no longer possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, they remain a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations. They have power to make their own substantive law in internal matters and to enforce that law in their own forums. [ Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez , 436 U.S. 49, 55-56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (emphasis added; quotation marks and citations omitted).] Although "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess," id . at 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, "unless and until Congress acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority," Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community , 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2030, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The fact that the Tribe is subject to plenary control by Congress does not preclude the determination that the Tribe is a "domestic dependent nation[ ]" exercising "inherent sovereign authority." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, authority from a variety of contexts supports the proposition that Michigan clearly views Indian tribes as units of local government with authority to execute local governmental functions. See, for example, McDonald v. Means , 309 F.3d 530, 539 (C.A. 9, 2002) (noting that a federal regulation made clear that the administration and maintenance of Indian reservation roads and bridges are essentially functions of the local government, which was an Indian tribe with respect to the road at issue in McDonald ); OAG, 2003-2004, No. 7134, p. 44, at 46 (May 21, 2003) (quoting the above analysis in McDonald and stating that McDonald equated local government with tribal government); MCL 333.13704(1) (defining a "municipality" to include Indian tribes for the purpose of an environmental law); Executive Order No. 2002-5 (defining "local units of government" to include federally recognized Indian tribes in an executive order reorganizing the executive branch of Michigan); Mich. Admin. Code, R 29.2163(h) (defining "local government" to include Indian tribes with respect to the regulation of underground storage tanks). In addition, it is also undisputed in the present case that the Board of Directors is the governing body of the Tribe and that plaintiff served as an elected member of that board. Thus, to the extent that the Tribe is an "independent political communit[y], retaining [its] original natural rights in matters of local self-government," Santa Clara Pueblo , 436 U.S. at 55, 98 S.Ct. 1670, and plaintiff was an elected member of the Tribe's governing body, plaintiff served as an elected official in a local government. (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, has no language stating that the local governmental entity must be a political subdivision of the state of Michigan. Moreover, as chief of police in the tribal police department, plaintiff also held a position of employment in local government. Tomkiewicz v. Detroit News, Inc. , 246 Mich.App. 662, 671, 635 N.W.2d 36 (2001) (" 'It is indisputable that law enforcement is a primary function of local government ....' "), quoting Coursey v. Greater Niles Twp. Publishing Corp. , 40 Ill.2d 257, 265, 239 N.E.2d 837 (1968) ; see also Royal v. Ecorse Police & Fire Comm. , 345 Mich. 214, 219, 75 N.W.2d 841 (1956) (noting that the control of a police department was a function of a local governmental entity). In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Tribe constitutes a local government and that plaintiff's employment with the Tribe constituted employment in "local, state, or federal government" for purposes of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8. This holding does not diminish or undermine the Tribe's inherent sovereign authority. "[S]tate laws are generally not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has explicitly provided that state law shall apply." Huron Potawatomi, Inc. v. Stinger , 227 Mich.App. 127, 132, 574 N.W.2d 706 (1997). In the instant case, no one is seeking to prohibit plaintiff from running for a position in the Tribe or otherwise to interfere in the Tribe's regulation of its internal matters. Instead, Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, is being applied to prohibit plaintiff from running for a position on defendant's city council. In other words, the constitutional provision is being used to assess the qualification of a potential candidate for a position on the city council of a Michigan municipality, not a position in the Tribe. "The members of the various Indian tribes are citizens of the United States and citizens of the state within which they reside." Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony , 90 Mich.App. 99, 109, 280 N.W.2d 883 (1979) (citations omitted). In seeking to run for an elective position in a Michigan city, plaintiff was acting in his capacity as a Michigan citizen rather than a member of the Tribe. As a Michigan citizen, plaintiff is subject to the same laws as other Michigan citizens when seeking to run for an office in a Michigan municipality. See generally Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones , 411 U.S. 145, 148-149, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973) ("Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State."). III. CONCLUSION We conclude that plaintiff's position of employment with the Tribe constituted employment in "local, state, or federal government." Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint because the text of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, makes plaintiff ineligible to run for a position on defendant's city council. Affirmed. K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Beckering and Riordan, JJ., concurred. Although the Attorney General filed an amicus curiae brief in the trial court, the Attorney General has been granted the status of an intervening appellee by this Court. See Paquin v. City of St. Ignace , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 21, 2017 (Docket No. 334350). In this instance, plaintiff was employed by the Tribe as the chief of police and held an elective office as a member of the Tribe's board of directors. The analysis for either position is the same, and it is undisputed that his conviction related to his official capacity as both an employee and a governmental official. Plaintiff has waived any argument regarding the self-executing nature of § 8. In any event, we agree with the analysis of the Attorney General in OAG, 2013-2014, No. 7273, at 31-32, that the provision is self-executing because it "supplies a sufficient rule, by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced[.]" Thompson v. Secretary of State , 192 Mich. 512, 520, 159 N.W. 65 (1916) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Section 8 identifies the types of offices that are unavailable, the types of felonies and period within which convictions for these felonies will be considered, and the circumstances that will trigger application of the section. In addition, implementing legislation is generally unnecessary to give effect to a prohibition. See Beecher v. Baldy , 7 Mich. 488, 500 (1859). Section 8 expressly prohibits or disqualifies certain felons from holding elective or appointed office in Michigan. Therefore, its effectiveness does not depend on implementing legislation. Id . As noted by the Attorney General in its brief on appeal, § 8 was added to the Michigan Constitution pursuant to Article 12, § 1, which provides for constitutional amendments by legislative proposal and statewide vote. Const. 1963, art. 12, § 1. Section 8 became effective on December 18, 2010. Lower federal court opinions are not binding on this Court, but such opinions may be considered persuasive. See Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 603, 607, 677 N.W.2d 325 (2004). But see MCL 18.1115(5), a provision of The Management and Budget Act, MCL 18.1101 et seq., defining "unit of local government" to include only political subdivisions of the state of Michigan.

Gadola, J. This case requires us to reconcile provisions set forth by MCL 46.30a of the county boards of commissioners act (CBCA), MCL 46.1 et seq. , and MCL 35.402 of the veterans preference act (VPA), MCL 35.401 et seq . The issue on appeal is whether plaintiff, Charles Vayda, was entitled to notice and a hearing under the VPA before the termination of his employment with the Lake County Sheriff's Office after he became a member of the Lake County Board of Commissioners (the Board). We hold that the conclusion of plaintiff's employment as a sheriff's deputy did not trigger the notice and hearing requirements of the VPA because plaintiff made himself ineligible for continued employment with the sheriff's office by accepting a position on the Board. We therefore reverse the trial court's order granting plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and remand for entry of an order granting the motion for summary disposition filed by defendant, the County of Lake (the County). I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE Plaintiff is a military veteran who was employed by the County as a sheriff's deputy from 1991 until the circumstances giving rise to this case. After plaintiff was elected to the Board in November 2014, the Board filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory ruling regarding whether plaintiff could simultaneously hold both the position of county commissioner and the position of sheriff's deputy. The Board asked the court to enter a declaratory judgment stating that plaintiff "must resign either his position as a deputy in the Sheriff's Office or his position as a member of the Lake County Board of Commissioners" because holding both positions violated Michigan's incompatible public offices act (IPOA), MCL 15.181 et seq ., and MCL 46.30a of the CBCA. Plaintiff responded to the Board's request for a declaratory judgment, alleging that on January 2, 2015, the day he was sworn in as a county commissioner, Lake County Sheriff Robert Hilts met with him and asked him to resign from his position as a sheriff's deputy. Plaintiff refused to resign, and Sheriff Hilts placed him on unpaid administrative leave pending the outcome of the Board's lawsuit. The circuit court ruled that inherent conflicts of interest existed between the county commissioner and sheriff's deputy positions and that, under MCL 46.30a of the CBCA and MCL 15.182 and MCL 15.183 of the IPOA, plaintiff "[could not] hold both positions simultaneously." Plaintiff maintained, however, that the circuit court did not specify from which position he must resign. After the circuit court issued its opinion and order, Sheriff Hilts sent plaintiff a letter stating that his employment as a sheriff's deputy had been terminated. Plaintiff then filed his complaint in the instant action, alleging that the County violated his rights under MCL 35.402 of the VPA by failing to provide him with notice and a hearing before terminating his employment as a sheriff's deputy. Plaintiff asserted that the County should have allowed him to choose which position he would like to maintain because the circuit court did not direct his withdrawal from one position over the other. Plaintiff claimed that he informed Sheriff Hilts that he would step down from his role as a county commissioner because he wanted to remain a sheriff's deputy. Plaintiff alleged that, after the conclusion of his employment as a sheriff's deputy, he sent a letter to Lake County's prosecuting attorney, Craig R. Cooper, requesting a VPA hearing, but that the County refused his request. Plaintiff said he received a letter from Cooper, dated June 24, 2015, which stated that the "issues presented under the [VPA] have already been decided based on the doctrine of Res Judicata." Plaintiff argued, however, that res judicata did not apply because the circuit court did not address in its declaratory ruling which position plaintiff was required to give up. Plaintiff asked the court to issue an order of superintending control compelling the County to hold a VPA hearing. He also asked the court to issue an order to show cause regarding why the County denied plaintiff his rights under the VPA. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim), and the County filed a responding motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim barred by prior judgment), MCR 2.116(C)(8), and MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Following a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and denied the County's motion. In support of its decision, the court offered the following analysis: The Veteran's Preference Act requires that a qualifying veteran is entitled to a hearing pursuant to MCL § 35.402. Plaintiff is a qualifying veteran. The statute plainly requires a hearing prior to termination of employment. Plaintiff was not afforded a hearing even after he made a written request for a hearing. There is no authority presented to the Court by defendant which would authorize the Prosecuting Attorney to deny the hearing. In essence the decision was made by the Prosecuting Attorney without hearing all the facts. That decision violates the express terms of the VPA. The Court remands this issue to the Prosecuting Attorney as the entity required to hold the hearing. ... Defendant's Motion for Summary Disposition alleges that the claims by plaintiff are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel and constitute an impermissible collateral attack on this Court's prior judgment. Defendant argues that plaintiff's request for a VPA hearing was "fully and finally determined when this Court held that he could not serve simultaneously as a deputy sheriff and County Commissioner." The Court disagrees with this position. The legal opinion that plaintiff could not hold both positions is distinct from the facts and circumstances of his termination. Those facts are currently in dispute. That dispute could be heard at a VPA hearing. The relief requested in the prior lawsuit by the current defendant was a declaration that [plaintiff] could not hold both positions and that [plaintiff] then chose which position he would continue. The facts as alleged demonstrate there is a question of fact regarding whether he was given that opportunity. There is nothing in the prior opinion of this Court that says that [plaintiff] should have been terminated from the Sheriff's office. ... Consistent with the Court's prior ruling, it would have been appropriate for the County to give plaintiff a reasonable amount of time to decide which position he would continue. This was the specific relief requested by the County Board of Commissioners and granted in the prior case. Whether or not [plaintiff] was given an opportunity to chose [sic] is a factual question to be determined at a VPA hearing. This action does not constitute a collateral attack on the prior Order of the Court because the prior Order did not in any manner dictate that [plaintiff] should be terminated from the Sheriff's Department. However, if there is a question regarding clarification of the prior Order, that question should be raised in the prior case, not this one. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Johnson v. Recca , 492 Mich. 169, 173, 821 N.W.2d 520 (2012). Although the trial court did not specify under which subrule it granted plaintiff's motion, it appears that the court confined its analysis to information set forth by the parties in their pleadings alone, so we will treat the motion as having been granted under MCR 2.116(C)(9). MCR 2.116(G)(5). When deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(9), a trial court considers the pleadings alone, accepting as true all well-pleaded allegations, to assess the sufficiency of a defendant's defenses. Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 257 Mich.App. 513, 517, 669 N.W.2d 271 (2003). "Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) is proper when the defendant's pleadings are so clearly untenable that as a matter of law no factual development could possibly deny the plaintiff's right to recovery." Id. at 518, 669 N.W.2d 271 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This case also implicates questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Bukowski v. Detroit , 478 Mich. 268, 273, 732 N.W.2d 75 (2007). III. ANALYSIS "The VPA was enacted for the purpose of discharging, in a measure, the debt of gratitude the public owes to veterans who have served in the armed services in time of war, by granting them a preference in original employment and retention thereof in public service." Sherrod v. Detroit , 244 Mich.App. 516, 523, 625 N.W.2d 437 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The VPA "entitles a veteran to notice and a hearing before his employer may take any action against him with respect to his employment" and "converts at-will public employment positions into ones that are terminable only for just cause." Id. Because the conversion of at-will public employment into just-cause employment gives a veteran a property interest in continuing such employment once it is secured, failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the VPA may support a due-process claim. Id. Further, failing to provide notice and a hearing in violation of the VPA subjects the offender to criminal prosecution. Jackson v. Detroit Police Chief , 201 Mich.App. 173, 177, 506 N.W.2d 251 (1993) MCL 35.403. Also at issue in this case is MCL 46.30a of the CBCA, which states, in part, the following: (1) A member of the county board of commissioners of any county shall not be eligible to receive, or shall not receive, an appointment from, or be employed by an officer, board, committee, or other authority of that county except as otherwise provided by law. (2) In case of an appointment or employment made in violation of this section, both the person making the appointment or employment and the person appointed or employed shall be liable for moneys paid to the person as salary, wages, or compensation in connection with the appointment or employment. In case the appointment or employment is made by a committee or board, a member of the committee or board at the time the appointment was made or contract of employment entered into shall be liable. An action for the recovery of salary, wages, or compensation paid in connection with any appointment or employment made in contravention of this section, may be maintained by a taxpayer of the county. The moneys recovered in the action shall be deposited in the county treasury to the credit of the general fund. (3) The prosecuting attorney of the county, upon the request of the taxpayer, shall prosecute the action in the taxpayer's behalf. (4) A member of the county board of commissioners accepting an appointment or employment in violation of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $100.00 or imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or both. An officer or other official, or a member of a board or committee making an appointment or employment in violation of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both. The issue in this case is whether plaintiff was entitled to notice and a hearing under the VPA before the conclusion of his employment as a sheriff's deputy after he accepted a position on the Board. In the Board's previous lawsuit, the circuit court held that plaintiff could not hold both positions simultaneously without violating MCL 46.30a of the CBCA and MCL 15.182 and MCL 15.183 of the IPOA. Neither party has challenged this determination. In the instant action, plaintiff asserts that he was nonetheless entitled to notice and a hearing under the VPA before the conclusion of his employment as a sheriff's deputy and that the County should have given him an opportunity to choose which position he would vacate. In contrast, the County argues that plaintiff was not entitled to the protections of the VPA because he made himself ineligible for continued employment as a sheriff's deputy by accepting a position on the Board. MCL 46.30a(1) of the CBCA makes clear that a member of any county board of commissioners "shall not ... be employed by an ... authority of that county except as otherwise provided by law." MCL 46.30a(2) states that in the case of "employment made in violation of [ MCL 46.30a ], both the person making the ... employment and the person ... employed shall be liable for moneys paid to the person as salary, wages, or compensation in connection with the ... employment." More important is the fact that MCL 46.30a(4) states that "[a] member of the county board of commissioners accepting ... employment in violation of this section" and "[a]n officer or other official ... making an ... employment in violation of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both." In this case, then, MCL 46.30a(2) would make both plaintiff (as the employee) and Sheriff Hilts (as the county authority employing plaintiff), liable for any salary or compensation paid in connection with plaintiff's continued employment as a sheriff's deputy after he became a member of the Board. The circuit court's declaratory ruling in the Board's previous lawsuit was consistent with this application of MCL 46.30a(2) to the instant facts. In addition, MCL 46.30a(4) would make both plaintiff and Sheriff Hilts criminally culpable for any period that plaintiff remained a sheriff's deputy with the County in violation of the CBCA. In spite of this fact, plaintiff argues that he was entitled to notice and a hearing under the VPA before his employment as a sheriff's deputy ceased. The relevant statutory provision of the VPA, MCL 35.402, states, in pertinent part, the following: No veteran ... holding an office or employment in any public department or public works of the state or any county , city or township or village of the state, except heads of departments, members of commissions,[ ] and boards and heads of institutions appointed by the governor and officers appointed directly by the mayor of a city under the provisions of a charter, and first deputies of such heads of departments, heads of institutions and officers, shall be removed or suspended, or shall, without his consent, be transferred from such office or employment except for official misconduct, habitual, serious or willful neglect in the performance of duty, extortion, conviction of intoxication, conviction of felony, or incompetency; and such veteran shall not be removed , transferred or suspended for any cause above enumerated from any office or employment, except after a full hearing before the governor of the state if a state employee, or before the prosecuting attorney if a county employee .... As a condition precedent to removal, the statute further states that a veteran "shall be entitled to a notice in writing stating the cause or causes of removal ... at least 15 days prior to the hearing ...." MCL 35.402. In our opinion, whether the notice and hearing requirements of MCL 35.402 apply to plaintiff depends on whether plaintiff was "removed" from his employment as a sheriff's deputy. When the meaning of statutory language is clear, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted. Nastal v. Henderson & Assoc. Investigations, Inc. , 471 Mich. 712, 720, 691 N.W.2d 1 (2005). We give every word or phrase of a statute its plain and ordinary meaning unless a statutory term has a special, technical meaning or is defined by the statute itself. Casco Twp. v. Secretary of State , 472 Mich. 566, 593 & n. 44, 701 N.W.2d 102 (2005) ; MCL 8.3. Statutory provisions cannot be read in isolation, but must be read in context, giving meaning and effect to the act as a whole. Robinson v. Lansing , 486 Mich. 1, 15, 782 N.W.2d 171 (2010). The VPA does not define the word "removed," and in the absence of a statutory definition or a special, technical meaning, we may consult a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory term. See Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. , 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) contains several definitions of the word "remove," which include "to change the location, position, station, or residence of" "to get rid of: ELIMINATE ," Although the conclusion of plaintiff's employment as a sheriff's deputy could be said to constitute a change of his employment position, this change was effectuated by plaintiff's own voluntary conduct of running for, and ultimately accepting, a position on the Board. In our opinion, the notice and hearing requirements of MCL 35.402 were not triggered in this instance because plaintiff made himself ineligible for continued employment as a sheriff's deputy by accepting a position on the Board; his employer did not "remove" him from his employment. Indeed, plaintiff removed himself from employment by his voluntary action of assuming a position on the Board, particularly in the face of the trial court's prior ruling against him in the Board's declaratory action and the mandatory language of the CBCA. Admittedly, the verb "removed" as it is used in MCL 35.402 is written in the passive voice-the verb is not paired with a specific subject or actor who must do the removing. Consequently, the language of the statute does not indicate that any particular person must perform the specified action. See Perkovic v. Zurich American Ins. Co. , 500 Mich. 44, 53-56, 893 N.W.2d 322 (2017) (interpreting the notice provision of MCL 500.3145(1), as focusing on the content of the notice rather than on the person providing the notice); Fields v. Suburban Mobility Auth. , 311 Mich.App. 231, 243-244, 874 N.W.2d 715 (2015) ( SHAPIRO , J., concurring) ("The operative phrase requiring provision of the notice is written in the passive voice, i.e., it does not require that any particular person provide the written notice, only that it be provided within 60 days ...."). Considering the statutory term "removed" in context, however, make clear that the VPA was designed only to provide some protection to a qualifying veteran employed in the public sector whose employer has taken adverse action against the veteran; the VPA was designed not to impose arduous notice requirements and hearing procedures whenever a veteran makes a voluntary career move. See Sherrod , 244 Mich.App. at 523, 625 N.W.2d 437 (explaining that the VPA "entitles a veteran to notice and a hearing before his employer may take any action against him with respect to his employment") (emphasis added); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 542-543, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (explaining that once a state legislature confers a property interest in public employment, an employer may not deprive the employee of that interest absent appropriate procedural safeguards). The procedural safeguards of the VPA were not triggered in this case because the conclusion of plaintiff's employment as a sheriff's deputy was effectuated by his voluntary decision to accept an incompatible position on the Board, which made him ineligible for continued employment as a sheriff's deputy. See MCL 15.182. Sheriff Hilts had no need to terminate plaintiff's employment because plaintiff rendered himself ineligible for continued employment once he took the oath of office as a county commissioner. MCL 46.30a. The trial court therefore erred by concluding that plaintiff was entitled to a VPA hearing and by granting his motion for summary disposition. Further, to the extent plaintiff argues that he should have been given a reasonable amount of time after the circuit court issued its ruling on the Board's request for a declaratory judgment to decide which position he would keep and from which he would resign, we conclude that any such argument lacks merit. In light of the circuit court's declaratory ruling, plaintiff made himself ineligible for continued employment as a sheriff's deputy at the moment he became a member of the Board, and plaintiff would have rendered both himself and Sheriff Hilts criminally culpable if the employment had continued. See MCL 46.30a(4). The County was not obligated to subject itself to criminal liability for any period of time while plaintiff attempted to maintain his illegal and incompatible positions. IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiff was not entitled to the procedural protections of the VPA because the conclusion of his employment as a sheriff's deputy was effectuated by his voluntary acceptance of an incompatible position on the Board, which made him ineligible for continued employment as a sheriff's deputy. The trial court therefore erred by concluding that plaintiff was entitled to a VPA hearing and by granting his motion for summary disposition for that reason. Because plaintiff was not entitled to the protections provided by the VPA, the trial court should have granted the County's motion for summary disposition regarding plaintiff's claims. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of the County. We do not retain jurisdiction. Boonstra, P.J., and Meter, J., concurred with Gadola, J. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Sheriff Hilts sent the letter "on the same day," March 10, 2015, that the circuit court issued its ruling on the Board's request for a declaratory judgment. In its answer, the County alleged that "Sheriff Hilts terminated Plaintiff's employment on March 12, 2015 by letter," or two days after the circuit court issued its ruling. Plaintiff contends that he should have been given more time to decide which position he would like to keep, but according to the County, plaintiff had two days after the circuit court issued its ruling to make a decision before Sheriff Hilts took any action. In any event, as discussed in more detail in this opinion, once the circuit court issued its ruling, plaintiff became ineligible to hold both positions simultaneously and subjected both himself and Sheriff Hilts to criminal culpability for any period, whether two hours or two days, of continued employment as a sheriff's deputy. See MCL 46.30a(4). Therefore, if plaintiff had a preference to remain a sheriff's deputy and vacate his position as a county commissioner, he was obligated to make that election immediately upon the circuit court's ruling, which he failed to do. Plaintiff moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), but this subrule only entitles a movant to summary disposition if "[t]he opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted." As the defendant in the action, the County was not asserting any claim against plaintiff; rather, it is clear from plaintiff's motion that he was challenging the sufficiency of the defenses asserted by the County in its responsive pleadings. MCR 2.116(C) states that a movant must specify the grounds on which a motion for summary disposition is based, but "exact technical compliance ... is not required." Mollett v. City of Taylor , 197 Mich.App. 328, 332, 494 N.W.2d 832 (1992). Considering the substance of the County's responsive motion for summary disposition and its arguments at the hearing on the parties' motions, we are satisfied that plaintiff's motion and arguments were sufficiently clear to allow the County to understand and fully respond to the issues before the court. See Moy v. Detroit Receiving Hosp. , 169 Mich.App. 600, 605, 426 N.W.2d 722 (1988) (rejecting a challenge to an order granting summary disposition on the basis that the movants failed to identify the specific subrule under which they sought summary disposition). We note that this Court has previously stated that the "only veterans employed by state and local governments who are not protected by the VPA are department heads, members of commissions and boards, heads of institutions appointed by the governor, officers appointed by a city's mayor under the city's charter, and first deputies of such people." Jackson , 201 Mich.App. at 175, 506 N.W.2d 251. Neither party suggests that this exception could exclude plaintiff from protection under the VPA. Even assuming plaintiff is a member of a commission as contemplated by the exception in MCL 35.402, it is clear from reading the statute as a whole that the exception only applies when a veteran challenges his or her removal, suspension, or transfer "from such office or employment"-for example, if plaintiff, as a county commissioner, was hypothetically removed from the Board and challenged his removal. The exception is therefore inapplicable to this case in which plaintiff, a county commissioner, is challenging his termination from a separate public employment position with the County. It is apparent from the record that plaintiff's employment as a sheriff's deputy ended shortly after the circuit court issued its declaratory ruling in the Board's previous lawsuit. Therefore, plaintiff was clearly not "suspended" or "transferred" for purposes of MCL 35.402. The County raises numerous other arguments regarding why the trial court should have granted its motion for summary disposition. Although it is not essential that we address these alternative arguments, having concluded that summary disposition in favor of the County should have been granted for the reasons already stated in this opinion, we take a moment to do so. First, we disagree with the County that plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Whether the manner of plaintiff's termination from his employment as a sheriff's deputy violated the procedural requirements of the VPA was not litigated in the Board's previous lawsuit, nor could it have been, because plaintiff's employment did not end until after the circuit court issued its declaratory ruling in the case. See Adair v. Michigan , 470 Mich. 105, 121, 680 N.W.2d 386 (2004) (explaining that, among other things, res judicata requires that the matter in the second case was or could have been resolved in the first); Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 469 Mich. 679, 683, 677 N.W.2d 843 (2004) (explaining that application of collateral estoppel requires that "a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid final judgment" to preclude its relitigation)(quotation marks and citation omitted). We also disagree with the County that plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to a VPA hearing is moot because the only remedy available under the VPA is reinstatement to the prior employment and possible back pay, which is prohibited by the CBCA in this case. This Court has held that the immediate remedy for failure to hold a hearing when one was required under the VPA is the provision of the hearing to which the employee was entitled. Jackson , 201 Mich.App. at 177, 506 N.W.2d 251 ; Valentine v. Redford Twp. Supervisor , 371 Mich. 138, 147, 123 N.W.2d 227 (1963). We would agree, however, that plaintiff was not entitled to an order of superintending control. The distinction between actions for mandamus and for superintending control often goes unrecognized. Choe v. Flint Charter Twp. , 240 Mich.App. 662, 665-667, 615 N.W.2d 739 (2000). Although both serve as vehicles for compelling the performance of a clear legal duty, an order of superintending control is directed to lower courts or tribunals while a writ of mandamus is directed to public officials. MCR 3.302(A) ; MCR 3.305(A)(1). See also Jones v. Dep't of Corrections , 468 Mich. 646, 658, 664 N.W.2d 717 (2003). In this case, plaintiff's action is based on the theory that the Lake County prosecutor, not a lower court or tribunal, failed to perform a clear legal duty to afford him a hearing under the VPA. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate entitlement to such a hearing for the reasons already stated in this opinion, but regardless, the appropriate remedy would have been to seek a writ of mandamus, rather than an order of superintending control.

Ronayne Krause, J. Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted the trial court's order denying his postconviction motion for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.502. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2) ; being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f ; possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, second offense, MCL 750.227b ; and resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). On appeal, this Court affirmed. Defendant thereafter moved for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.502, contending that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by commenting on the admissibility of a statement he made to an arresting police officer and precluding further questioning of the circumstances surrounding the statement. This Court granted leave to appeal limited to that issue. We affirm. Defendant's convictions arose out of police officers discovering defendant engaged in an altercation with another person, both of whom had their hands on a semiautomatic rifle. Relevant to the instant appeal, officers on the scene testified that defendant told them, unprompted, that "I broke into [the] house but the guy had the gun." The trial court held a hearing and found the statement admissible. At trial, the trial court cut off redirect questioning of one of the officers by the prosecutor into, apparently, the circumstances of that statement and when the officer read Miranda rights, stating, "The Court already held a hearing on this matter and I have ruled that the defendant was properly advised of his rights and that the statements that have been introduced are admissible." Defense counsel objected, to which the trial court replied "Fine. Go ahead. It's true. Have a seat." On recross-examination, defense counsel asked the officer about the statement and mentioned the court's remark about its admissibility, to which the officer replied: "The Judge said it. I don't know if I appreciate it." The trial court then stated, "You know what, that doesn't matter either. So go ahead." The officer then confirmed that defendant had made statements to him and to other officers. Defendant contends that the trial court's remarks deprived him of a fair trial, especially because he denied having made the statement at all. Although trial judges enjoy great discretion and wide latitude in conducting trials, they must not intentionally or unintentionally deprive a criminal defendant of a fair trial. Wheeler v. Wallace , 53 Mich. 355, 357-358, 19 N.W. 33 (1884). Usually, although not always, objections are required to preserve issues for appeal. See People v. Grant , 445 Mich. 535, 546-547, 520 N.W.2d 123 (1994). Where objection would "[have] to be made to the trial judge himself concerning his own conduct," review without the benefit of an objection may be particularly appropriate. People v. Collier , 168 Mich.App. 687, 697, 425 N.W.2d 118 (1988). Trial counsel did object to the trial court's commentary to some extent, although no explication was given; the trial court's conduct, insofar as it is discernable from the transcript, suggests that any further efforts by counsel would have been futile or counterproductive. This Court reviews the issue to determine whether the appellant received a fair trial. Wheeler , 53 Mich. at 357-358, 19 N.W. 33. It has long been established that it is error for a trial court to inform a jury that it had already determined a defendant's confession to be voluntary, although such an error may or may not warrant reversal. See People v. Gilbert , 55 Mich.App. 168, 171-173, 222 N.W.2d 305 (1974), and People v. Williams , 46 Mich.App. 165, 169-170, 207 N.W.2d 480 (1973) ; which both relied on People v. Walker (On Rehearing) , 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965). Analogously, informing the jury that the trial court already determined a police officer's conduct to have been proper and lawful in the context of an allegedly coerced confession is, as a practical matter, the same error, albeit also not necessarily one mandating reversal. People v. Kincaid , 136 Mich.App. 209, 215-216, 356 N.W.2d 4 (1984). It is no particular stretch to further extrapolate that there is little substantive difference between advising the jury that a confession had previously been ruled voluntary after a hearing and advising the jury that the confession had previously been ruled admissible after a hearing. I decline to presume that lay jurors would appreciate the distinction. The practical effect of such a line of commentary is simply to impress upon the jury that the trial court had already engaged in some manner of extraordinary analysis of the propriety of the confession and arrived at a conclusion unfavorable to the defendant. It would be splitting semantic hairs for us to find otherwise. However, by the same extrapolation from established caselaw, such an error must be subject to review for harmlessness. Under the circumstances of this case, I find the statements erroneous but harmless. First, I think it likely that the officer's remark that he did not "appreciate" the trial court's statement blunted the latter's effect on the jury. Given that the trial court cut off the prosecutor's questioning, I doubt the jury would have unambiguously understood it to favor the prosecution or the defense. More importantly, the trial court properly instructed the jury that its rulings and comments were not evidence, that the jury must disregard any opinion it believed the judge might have, and that the jury was the sole judge of the facts. Juries are presumed to follow their instructions "unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant." People v. Dennis , 464 Mich. 567, 581, 628 N.W.2d 502 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As noted, I think the effect the trial court's statement might have had on the jury to be fairly mild. Significantly, ample other evidence was properly admitted establishing both the content of defendant's statement and the fact that he had not been advised of his Miranda rights when he allegedly made it. Finally, defendant's theory of the case, as reflected by closing argument to the jury, was that the other people ostensibly involved in the alleged crimes were unreliable or absent, and possibly that the police officers were incompetent. The overwhelming likelihood is that the trial court's erroneous remark, although clearly intemperate and unwise, had little to no effect on the outcome of the case. My conclusion in this regard is limited to the facts and circumstances before us, and I would expressly decline to craft a bright-line rule regarding reversal, or whether a similar error would be harmless or outcome-determinative in any other case. I hold only that in this case, defendant was not deprived of a fair trial on the basis of the erroneous commentary, and the trial court properly declined to grant him relief from judgment on that basis. I therefore do not consider any argument pertaining to the absence of this or any other issue from defendant's prior appeal. Affirmed. People v. Pierson , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 10, 2013 (Docket No. 309315), 2013 WL 6481167. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 15, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing its reply is GRANTED. The reply will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before May 23, 2018.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of amicus curiae Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan to file a response to the brief amicus curiae Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan is DENIED. The response submitted on April 10, 2018, is not accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 20, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

By order of Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellee/cross-appellant to file a cross application for leave to appeal that exceeds the page limitation is GRANTED. The cross application submitted on April 4, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 13, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties agreeing to the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal is considered, and the application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiffs-appellees to strike the brief of amici curiae is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 26, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. McCormack, J. (concurring ). I agree with the Court's order denying leave to appeal, which properly leaves it to the trial court to resolve several fact-intensive legal questions in the first instance. Among those questions are, as the Court of Appeals noted, whether the contracts between the parties and the in vitro fertilization clinic affect the proper disposition of this case. While I express no opinion on the correct resolution of that issue, it is possible those contracts alone could prove outcome-determinative. I write separately to note that the trial court should not avoid the question argued by the parties: whether frozen embryos are persons subject to a custody determination. The answer to that question could prove dispositive regarding whether the contracts resolve this dispute. See Harvey v. Harvey , 470 Mich. 186, 194, 680 N.W.2d 835 (2004) (stating that "parties cannot stipulate to circumvent the authority of the circuit court in determining the custody of children"). And if the trial court concludes that embryos are not subject to a custody determination, it is still bound to make a determination about the proper legal disposition of those embryos, if not under contract law or child custody law. Under Const. 1963, art. 6, § 1, it has an obligation to exercise the judicial power to decide the dispute before it. See also MCL 600.605 (circuit courts "have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state"). Should it become necessary to determine the disposition of the embryos outside contract law or child custody law, the trial court may wish to avail itself of the nonbinding authorities that have grappled with these difficult questions. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis , 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn., 1992) (applying a balancing-of-interests test to determine the disposition of frozen embryos); Flannery, "Rethinking" Embryo Disposition Upon Divorce , 29 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 233 (2013) (discussing three different approaches to the disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 15, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellants shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether the "authorized by law" scope of review under Const 1963, art 6, § 28 applied to the appellants' judicial review of the Civil Service Commission's final decision made without a hearing; (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals gave proper meaning to the "authorized by law" constitutional standard; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied that scope of review to the appellants' challenge. In addition to the brief, the appellants shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellees shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellants' brief. The appellees shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellants. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellants within 14 days of being served with the appellees' brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. Persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 1, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals judgment concluding that the plaintiff had abandoned her claims under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq . The plaintiff attached her complaint to her brief, cited the governing statute, MCL 445.901 et seq ., and provided a two-page discussion of her theory supporting her claims. Thus, the plaintiff did not simply announce her position and leave it to the court to rationalize her basis, nor did she require the court to search for authority either to sustain or reject her position in this statutory cause of action. Cf. Wilson v. Taylor , 457 Mich. 232, 243, 577 N.W.2d 100 (1998), quoting Mitcham v. Detroit , 355 Mich. 182, 203, 94 N.W.2d 388 (1959). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in declining to consider the plaintiff's MCPA claims. Therefore, we REMAND this case to that court for consideration of the trial court's grant of summary disposition on those claims. See Brownlow v. McCall Enterprises, Inc. , 315 Mich.App. 103, 888 N.W.2d 295 (2016). In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.

By order of Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing his supplemental brief is GRANTED. The supplemental brief will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before June 13, 2018.

On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted, and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we REVERSE the January 17, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals and we REINSTATE the September 21, 2015 summary disposition order of the Benzie Circuit Court. The circuit court correctly ruled that the recreational land use act (RUA), MCL 324.73301, applies to this case. That statute provides in relevant part that gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct by an owner, tenant, or lessee must be shown in order to bring a cause of action "for injuries to a person who is on the land of another without paying to the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land a valuable consideration for the purpose of fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use or trail use ...." MCL 324.73301(1). Plaintiff's next friend and daughter injured herself on defendant's beachfront property on Lake Michigan after stepping on hot coals that were the remnants of a beach fire. A witness testified that the girl had been at the beach with a friend, "building sand castles, throwing stones in the water, and splashing around." The issue in this case is whether these activities fall within the RUA's general category of "any other outdoor recreational use[.]" The Court of Appeals interpreted the RUA using the ejusdem generis canon, which provides that when specific words precede general words in a statute, " 'the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated.' " Sands Appliance Servs., Inc v. Wilson , 463 Mich 231, 242, 615 N.W.2d 241 (2000), quoting People v. Brown , 406 Mich 215, 221, 277 N.W.2d 155 (1979). The Court of Appeals then interpreted the RUA's enumerated list to involve activities that require a higher degree of risk and intensity than beach play, which it thus found to be outside the scope of the RUA's general category. Consequently, the Court held that the RUA did not apply and that plaintiff's negligence action could go forward. We disagree. The activities at issue here fall within the plain meaning of the general phrase "any other outdoor recreational use." They occurred outdoors and were done for refreshment or diversion, and consequently were recreational. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) (defining "recreation" as, among other things, "a means of refreshment or diversion"). We reject the Court of Appeals' limitations on the scope of the general category fashioned by using the ejusdem generis canon. We do not agree that all of the listed activities involve any particular heightened degree of physical intensity or inherent risk. And even if they did, beach play would be encompassed, as it is at least as intense and risky as "sightseeing" or "fishing," two of the listed activities. Nor do we find any need to define what limitations any other common characteristic of the RUA's enumerated items might impose on the general phrase, because the parties have identified no such characteristic that would limit the scope of the general category in a manner that would exclude beach play. Therefore, because the activities here fit the plain meaning of "any other outdoor recreational use" and are not excluded by any interpretation of the RUA's general provision under the ejusdem generis canon, we conclude that the RUA applies. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstate the Benzie Circuit Court's order. Wilder, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel. As noted above and by the Court of Appeals, the doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that " 'the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated.' " Sands Appliance Servs. , 463 Mich at 242, 615 N.W.2d 241, quoting Brown , 406 Mich at 221, 277 N.W.2d 155. This doctrine is often applied to avoid rendering the list of specific words superfluous. See 2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed), § 47:17 ("If the general words are given their full and natural abstract meaning, they would include the objects designated by the specific words, making the latter superfluous."). While the doctrine may have applicability to a statute, it is nonetheless unnecessary to define the outer parameters of the common class in a given case. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2012), p 208 (explaining that there are times when it is unnecessary "to identify the genus [i.e., the common class] with specificity in order to decide the case at hand"). Because this case involves beach play, which clearly falls within whatever the proper common class may be among the specifically enumerated land uses, it is unnecessary in this case to define the outer limits of the common class.

On January 11, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the August 18, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We understand the Court of Appeals as having decided the case on evidentiary grounds. MRE 804(a) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying." (Emphasis added). In finding error requiring a new trial, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court record established that the prosecutor's conduct procured the unavailability of the witness and could not be justified. But that is a factual determination that should first be decided by the trial court, and it fails to address the text of the rule. The plain language of the exception to "unavailability" under MRE 804(a) mandates that the court consider whether the conduct of the proponent of the statement was for the purpose of causing the declarant to be unavailable. The trial court found that the witness was unavailable because he felt threatened by the prosecutor, but did not consider whether the prosecutor intended to cause the declarant to refuse to testify when engaging in that conduct. We therefore REMAND this case to the Saginaw Circuit Court for a determination of whether the witness was unavailable due to the prosecutor's procurement or wrongdoing for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying, consistent with MRE 804(a). We express no opinion on any constitutional issues that the defendant may have argued. We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall pay to the Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $41.00; submit a copy of this order; and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $334.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

On November 8, 2017, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the December 27, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, there being no majority in favor of granting leave to appeal or taking other action. McCormack, J., (dissenting ). I respectfully dissent from this Court's order denying leave to appeal. I would grant leave and overrule In re Hatcher , 443 Mich. 426, 505 N.W.2d 834 (1993), or in the alternative, hold that the collateral bar rule must give way to due process. The respondent-mother's children were removed in May 2013 by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and an initial disposition hearing was held in August, at which the respondent admitted several allegations and pleaded no contest to several others. The parties do not dispute that her plea was defective, as the trial court did not inform her of her rights as required by MCR 3.971(B) : the respondent was not told she was giving up the right to conduct a trial, force the DHHS to prove its allegations, confront witnesses against her, and compel attendance of favorable witnesses. Nor-importantly here-was she told that her plea could be used against her in a later proceeding to terminate her parental rights. As a result of the defective plea, the court took jurisdiction over her children and adopted the DHHS's recommended service plan. Over the next two and a half years, the court held a series of review hearings to assess the respondent's progress. In 2016, DHHS sought to terminate the respondent's rights and the court did so. The respondent appealed. She argued that because her plea was defective, the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that she was precluded from complaining about her plea by the collateral bar rule, citing Hatcher . In re Hill, Minors , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 27, 2016 (Docket No. 332923), 2016 WL 7493894. We ordered arguments on the application and asked the parties to address whether Hatcher correctly held that the collateral bar rule could prevent a parent from challenging the court's initial exercise of jurisdiction after the court terminated her parental rights, if not what standard courts should apply in this context, and whether Hatcher was correctly decided. I would answer those questions now. A child protective action is started by a petition alleging parental abuse or neglect, and then proceeds in two phases: adjudication and disposition. In re Sanders , 495 Mich. 394, 404, 852 N.W.2d 524 (2014), citing In re Brock , 442 Mich. 101, 108, 499 N.W.2d 752 (1993). At the adjudicative phase, a parent can either enter a plea to the allegations in the petition, MCR 3.971, or demand a trial, MCR 3.972. If the court finds the allegations proven, whether by plea or trial, it assumes jurisdiction over the child. Sanders , 495 Mich. at 405, 852 N.W.2d 524. "Once the court has jurisdiction, it determines during the dispositional phase what course of action will ensure the child's safety and well-being." Id. at 404, 852 N.W.2d 524 ; see also MCR 3.973. During the dispositional phase the court monitors and assesses a parent's progress under the DHHS case service plan in review hearings. MCR 3.975. If the parent cannot make progress under the plan, DHHS may seek to terminate his or her parental rights. At the end of the process, the court may decide to reunify the family or terminate the parent's rights. MCR 3.976 ; MCR 3.977(H). It is then that the proceeding is completed. The collateral bar rule requires a litigant to challenge a trial court's erroneous decision in a direct appeal of that decision and forbids an attack in a different (collateral) proceeding. Hatcher first applied the collateral bar rule to child-protective proceedings but its application was novel. Hatcher effectively held that a child-protective action is really multiple actions with multiple final orders, each of which must be appealed immediately and separately. This view of a child-protective action misunderstands the processes and rules that govern it, and disserves children and families by that misunderstanding. Hatcher 's rule is that a parent who appeals a defect in the adjudicative phase at the end of the proceeding is "collaterally" attacking that very same proceeding. But as then Justice CORRIGAN has explained, "[a] child protective action is 'a single continuous proceeding.' " In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928, 935, 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) ( CORRIGAN, J. , concurring), quoting In re LaFlure , 48 Mich. App. 377, 391, 210 N.W.2d 482 (1973). Each proceeding starts with the filing of a petition, and ends with a determination of whether a parent's rights will be terminated. This understanding is reinforced by our Court Rules. To the extent that MCR 3.993 can be read as permitting a parent to appeal a nonfinal order at the adjudication phase, there is no rule requiring that a parent be advised of that fact, much less any rule advising that if the parent does not appeal they will be barred from doing so at the end of the proceeding. Nor is there a rule requiring appointment of counsel to pursue such an appeal, as there is when a parent's rights are terminated. MCR 3.977(J). As a result, Hatcher 'srequirement that a parent appeal immediately after a court issues a nonfinal order in the adjudication phase is not made plain to a parent until it is too late. These important differences set Hatcher apart from the precedent on which it relied. The Hatcher opinion cited Jackson City Bank & Trust Co. v. Fredrick , 271 Mich. 538, 260 N.W. 908 (1935), to justify applying the collateral bar rule within a child protective action. But Jackson City Bank presented a typical collateral bar question-a party challenging a final judgment from a previous case in a subsequent and separate case. In that case, the parties were granted a judgment of divorce and did not contest or appeal it. Id . at 545, 260 N.W. 908. In a new lawsuit, the plaintiffs-who were not parties to the divorce proceeding but the heirs of the wife's second husband-sought to challenge the validity of the divorce, and the Court barred their claims. Id. at 546, 260 N.W. 908. The same setup-a party using a subsequent lawsuit to attack a prior judgment-underlies the other cases cited in Hatcher . See Life Ins. Co. of Detroit v. Burton , 306 Mich. 81, 84-85, 10 N.W.2d 315 (1943) (defendant filed to set aside a sheriff's levy and sale several months after it occurred, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction); Edwards v. Meinberg , 334 Mich. 355, 54 N.W.2d 684 (1952) (defendant lost a jury trial and then attacked the court's jurisdiction in a separate and subsequent proceeding). Given the inapt application of the collateral bar rule to the direct appeal of a single child-protective proceeding, not surprisingly, we have already carved out many exceptions to the Hatcher rule. See, e.g., Sanders , 495 Mich. 394, 852 N.W.2d 524 (reversing a termination in which one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional); In re Mays , 490 Mich. 993, 807 N.W.2d 307 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason , 486 Mich. 142, 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination for failure to facilitate the parent's involvement during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928, 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (remanding where the trial court failed to advise the respondent that her plea could be used in a proceeding to terminate her parental rights); In re Mitchell , 485 Mich. 922, 773 N.W.2d 663 (2009) (same). Cf. In re Rood , 483 Mich. 73, 111, 763 N.W.2d 587 (2009) (opinion by CORRIGAN, J. ) (reversing a termination order because the trial court did not provide parent with proper notice of dispositional hearings). In each of these cases we did not view Hatcher as an impediment to each parent's challenge to an error from the adjudication phase after termination. And we have recently summarily reversed parental termination orders on due process grounds despite Hatcher . See, e.g., In re Jones , 499 Mich. 862, 874 N.W.2d 129 (2016) (reversing a parental termination order after the Court of Appeals held the respondent's claims were barred by Hatcher ); In re Wangler , 498 Mich. 911, 870 N.W.2d 923 (2015) (same). With all of these carve-outs, it is hard to say what is left of the Hatcher rule. Which makes sense, given the Hatcher rule's flimsy foundation; an intraproceeding collateral bar rule will be no match for the constitutional concerns at issue when a court terminates a parent's rights. The rule also undermines the first principle of the juvenile code, MCL 712A.1 et seq . to support children in their own homes. See MCL 712A.1(3) ("This chapter shall be literally construed so that each juvenile coming within the court's jurisdiction receives the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home, conducive to the juvenile's welfare and the best interest of the state."). Achieving finality for children in child-protective proceedings as soon as possible is a critical goal too. But the Hatcher rule disserves even that goal. Incentivizing parents to file interlocutory appeals for fear of waiving an issue instead of promoting a parent's timely cooperation with DHHS will only make coming to a final determination in a proceeding a longer process. A parent's right to raise his or her children is ancient, profound, and firmly established in our jurisprudence. "The right to parent one's children is essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men and is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests[.]" Sanders , 495 Mich. at 409, 852 N.W.2d 524, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 399-400, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) and Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (cleaned up). And the right "does not evaporate simply because" one has not been a model parent. Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). As a result, the termination of the right is "unique in the kind, the degree, and the severity of the deprivation [it] inflict[s]." In re Sanchez , 422 Mich. 758, 765, 375 N.W.2d 353 (1985) (quotation marks and citation omitted). And robust protection of parental rights furthers the best interests of children, because "[w]hen a child is parented by a fit parent, the state's interest in the child's welfare is perfectly aligned with the parent's liberty interest." Sanders , 495 Mich. at 416, 852 N.W.2d 524. A court-fashioned rule that prevents a parent from having a court consider a meritorious claim of a defect in the governmental process that permanently separates a parent from a child is one we should disavow affirmatively, rather than whittle away one case at a time. For all of these reasons, I believe Hatcher was wrongly decided and I would say so here. But short of that, I would hold that the Hatcher rule must yield to due process here, as we have held that it does in so many similar contexts. See Sanders , 495 Mich. 394, 852 N.W.2d 524 ; Hudson , 483 Mich. 928, 763 N.W.2d 618 ; Mitchell , 485 Mich. 922, 773 N.W.2d 663. Viviano and Bernstein, JJ., join the statement of McCormack, J. Clement, J., did not participate in the disposition of this matter because the Court considered it before she assumed office. This rule is longstanding and common across legal disciplines. See e.g. People v. Ingram , 439 Mich. 288, 291 n. 1, 484 N.W.2d 241 (1992) ("Collateral attacks encompass those challenges raised other than by initial appeal of the conviction in question."); People v. Howard , 212 Mich. App. 366, 369, 538 N.W.2d 44 (1995) ("[A] challenge brought in any subsequent proceeding or action is a collateral attack."); Workers' Compensation Agency Dir. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prod., Inc. (On Reconsideration) , 305 Mich. App. 460, 474, 853 N.W.2d 467 (2014) (describing a collateral attack as using "a second proceeding to attack a tribunal's decision in a previous proceeding").

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 6, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We DIRECT the Saginaw County Prosecuting Attorney to answer the application for leave to appeal within 28 days after the date of this order. The application for leave to appeal remains pending.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 25, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We DIRECT the Lenawee County Prosecutor to answer the application for leave to appeal within 28 days after the date of this order, addressing whether the trial court erred in assigning 10 points to Offense Variable 19 (interference with the administration of justice) on the basis of the defendant's relocation to Mississippi eight months after the offense and two months before the victim disclosed the offense to police. See People v. Hershey , 303 Mich. App. 330, 844 N.W.2d 127 (2013). The application for leave to appeal remains pending.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Michigan Association of Counties to participate as amicus curiae and to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 13, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On March 6, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the March 15, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that trial counsel provided constitutionally effective representation, we VACATE the defendant's convictions and sentences, and we REMAND this case to the Van Buren Circuit Court for a new trial. To establish that trial counsel was ineffective, defendant must first establish that counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Id . ; People v. LeBlanc , 465 Mich. 575, 578, 640 N.W.2d 246 (2002) ; People v. Effinger , 212 Mich. App. 67, 69, 536 N.W.2d 809 (1995). Once defendant has established that counsel's performance was deficient, he must establish that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; LeBlanc , 465 Mich. at 578, 640 N.W.2d 246. To do this, he must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id . This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious that they deprived defendant of a fair trial with a reliable result. Id . Here, defense counsel was provided in pretrial discovery a medical report prepared by a physician assistant who examined the complainant and who was listed on the prosecution's witness list. The report, while repeating the claims of the complainant, was generally favorable to the defense in that it did not document any tearing, bruising, bleeding, lacerations, DNA evidence, or evidence of any sexually transmitted disease found on the complainant. Defense counsel did not attempt to interview this critical witness before trial and did not reasonably prepare to cross-examine the trial testimony of the physician assistant by relying on the report to ask targeted questions to elicit the exculpatory evidence. Rather, defense counsel asked the witness during cross-examination the open-ended question whether there was "no medical evidence" to support the complainant's claim of assault. The witness responded that an adult speculum had easily been used to examine the 12-year-old complainant. Defense counsel testified at the Ginther hearing that he thought he had elicited evidence from the witness that she had not mentioned the speculum in her report. But review of the record finds no such impeachment. Further, instead of using the report to impeach the witness on the failure to document the adult speculum in the report, defense counsel aggravated this inadequacy when, in his own words, he "tried to be the expert" on female anatomy. That was not a reasonable trial strategy. Here, "[a]ny attorney acting reasonably" would have elicited the favorable exculpatory evidence from the report and then, if necessary, used the report to impeach the witness by presenting to the jury her failure to mention the speculum in her report documenting the complainant's examination. People v. Armstrong , 490 Mich. 281, 290, 806 N.W.2d 676 (2011). This is particularly true when, as here, attacking the witness's credibility "offered the most promising defense strategy." Id . at 291, 806 N.W.2d 676. Moreover, defense counsel's conduct was not only deficient, it also prejudiced defendant. This case was solely a credibility contest between defendant and the complainant, and the physician assistant's testimony that she used an adult speculum to examine the 12-year-old complainant was the only medical evidence admitted at trial. Because defense counsel not only allowed this testimony to stand unchecked but also highlighted the testimony, there exists a reasonable probability of a different result. People v. Ginther , 390 Mich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973). Defense counsel admitted this was "[n]ot my finest moment, as the jurors told me at the end that I know nothing about the female anatomy...."

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 15, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 23, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 22, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to add to the record is DENIED. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 1, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 14, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.