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openssl

ca989269a2876bae79393bd54c3e72d49975fc75

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=ca989269a2876bae79393bd54c3e72d49975fc75

Use version in SSL_METHOD not SSL structure. When deciding whether to use TLS 1.2 PRF and record hash algorithms use the version number in the corresponding SSL_METHOD structure instead of the SSL structure. The SSL structure version is sometimes inaccurate. Note: OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later effectively do this already. (CVE-2013-6449)

long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s) { long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2; if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF)) return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256; return alg2; }

None

CVE-2013-6449

The ssl_get_algorithm2 function in ssl/s3_lib.c in OpenSSL before 1.0.2 obtains a certain version number from an incorrect data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via crafted traffic from a TLS 1.2 client.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6449

savannah

190cef6eed37d0e73a73c1e205eb31d45ab60a3c

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commitdiff;h=190cef6eed37d0e73a73c1e205eb31d45ab60a3c

None

gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session, void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size) { gnutls_datum_t psession; int ret; if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE) return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION; psession.data = session_data; ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession); if (ret < 0) { gnutls_assert (); return ret; } *session_data_size = psession.size; if (psession.size > *session_data_size) { ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER; goto error; } if (session_data != NULL) memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size); ret = 0; error: _gnutls_free_datum (&psession); return ret; }

None

CVE-2011-4128

Buffer overflow in the gnutls_session_get_data function in lib/gnutls_session.c in GnuTLS 2.12.x before 2.12.14 and 3.x before 3.0.7, when used on a client that performs nonstandard session resumption, allows remote TLS servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a large SessionTicket.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4128

savannah

e82ef4545e9e98cbcb032f55d7c750b81e3a0450

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commitdiff;h=e82ef4545e9e98cbcb032f55d7c750b81e3a0450

None

gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session, void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size) { gnutls_datum_t psession; int ret; if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE) return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION; psession.data = session_data; ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession); if (ret < 0) { gnutls_assert (); return ret; } if (psession.size > *session_data_size) { ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER; goto error; } if (session_data != NULL) memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size); ret = 0; error: _gnutls_free_datum (&psession); return ret; }

None

CVE-2011-4128

Buffer overflow in the gnutls_session_get_data function in lib/gnutls_session.c in GnuTLS 2.12.x before 2.12.14 and 3.x before 3.0.7, when used on a client that performs nonstandard session resumption, allows remote TLS servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a large SessionTicket.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4128

savannah

075d7556964f5a871a73c22ac4b69f5361295099

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=075d7556964f5a871a73c22ac4b69f5361295099

None

getftp (struct url *u, wgint passed_expected_bytes, wgint *qtyread, wgint restval, ccon *con, int count, wgint *last_expected_bytes, FILE *warc_tmp) { int csock, dtsock, local_sock, res; uerr_t err = RETROK; /* appease the compiler */ FILE *fp; char *respline, *tms; const char *user, *passwd, *tmrate; int cmd = con->cmd; bool pasv_mode_open = false; wgint expected_bytes = 0; bool got_expected_bytes = false; bool rest_failed = false; bool rest_failed = false; int flags; wgint rd_size, previous_rd_size = 0; char type_char; bool try_again; bool list_a_used = false; assert (con != NULL); assert (con->target != NULL); /* Debug-check of the sanity of the request by making sure that LIST and RETR are never both requested (since we can handle only one at a time. */ assert (!((cmd & DO_LIST) && (cmd & DO_RETR))); /* Make sure that at least *something* is requested. */ assert ((cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_CWD | DO_RETR | DO_LOGIN)) != 0); *qtyread = restval; user = u->user; passwd = u->passwd; search_netrc (u->host, (const char **)&user, (const char **)&passwd, 1); user = user ? user : (opt.ftp_user ? opt.ftp_user : opt.user); if (!user) user = "anonymous"; passwd = passwd ? passwd : (opt.ftp_passwd ? opt.ftp_passwd : opt.passwd); if (!passwd) passwd = "-wget@"; dtsock = -1; local_sock = -1; con->dltime = 0; if (!(cmd & DO_LOGIN)) csock = con->csock; else /* cmd & DO_LOGIN */ { char *host = con->proxy ? con->proxy->host : u->host; int port = con->proxy ? con->proxy->port : u->port; /* Login to the server: */ /* First: Establish the control connection. */ csock = connect_to_host (host, port); if (csock == E_HOST) return HOSTERR; else if (csock < 0) return (retryable_socket_connect_error (errno) ? CONERROR : CONIMPOSSIBLE); if (cmd & LEAVE_PENDING) con->csock = csock; else con->csock = -1; /* Second: Login with proper USER/PASS sequence. */ logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Logging in as %s ... "), quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, user)); if (opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_ALWAYS, "\n"); if (con->proxy) { /* If proxy is in use, log in as username@target-site. */ char *logname = concat_strings (user, "@", u->host, (char *) 0); err = ftp_login (csock, logname, passwd); xfree (logname); } else err = ftp_login (csock, user, passwd); /* FTPRERR, FTPSRVERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPLOGREFUSED, FTPLOGINC */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPSRVERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error in server greeting.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case WRITEFAILED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Write failed, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPLOGREFUSED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("The server refuses login.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return FTPLOGREFUSED; case FTPLOGINC: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Login incorrect.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return FTPLOGINC; case FTPOK: if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Logged in!\n")); break; default: abort (); } /* Third: Get the system type */ if (!opt.server_response) logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> SYST ... "); err = ftp_syst (csock, &con->rs, &con->rsu); /* FTPRERR */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPSRVERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Server error, can't determine system type.\n")); break; case FTPOK: /* Everything is OK. */ break; default: abort (); } if (!opt.server_response && err != FTPSRVERR) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. ")); /* 2013-10-17 Andrea Urbani (matfanjol) According to the system type I choose which list command will be used. If I don't know that system, I will try, the first time of each session, "LIST -a" and "LIST". (see __LIST_A_EXPLANATION__ below) */ switch (con->rs) { case ST_VMS: /* About ST_VMS there is an old note: 2008-01-29 SMS. For a VMS FTP server, where "LIST -a" may not fail, but will never do what is desired here, skip directly to the simple "LIST" command (assumed to be the last one in the list). */ DEBUGP (("\nVMS: I know it and I will use \"LIST\" as standard list command\n")); con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE; con->st |= AVOID_LIST_A; break; case ST_UNIX: if (con->rsu == UST_MULTINET) { DEBUGP (("\nUNIX MultiNet: I know it and I will use \"LIST\" " "as standard list command\n")); con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE; con->st |= AVOID_LIST_A; } else if (con->rsu == UST_TYPE_L8) { DEBUGP (("\nUNIX TYPE L8: I know it and I will use \"LIST -a\" " "as standard list command\n")); con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE; con->st |= AVOID_LIST; } break; default: break; } /* Fourth: Find the initial ftp directory */ if (!opt.server_response) logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> PWD ... "); err = ftp_pwd (csock, &con->id); /* FTPRERR */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPSRVERR : /* PWD unsupported -- assume "/". */ xfree (con->id); con->id = xstrdup ("/"); break; case FTPOK: /* Everything is OK. */ break; default: abort (); } #if 0 /* 2004-09-17 SMS. Don't help me out. Please. A reasonably recent VMS FTP server will cope just fine with UNIX file specifications. This code just spoils things. Discarding the device name, for example, is not a wise move. This code was disabled but left in as an example of what not to do. */ /* VMS will report something like "PUB$DEVICE:[INITIAL.FOLDER]". Convert it to "/INITIAL/FOLDER" */ if (con->rs == ST_VMS) { char *path = strchr (con->id, '['); char *pathend = path ? strchr (path + 1, ']') : NULL; if (!path || !pathend) DEBUGP (("Initial VMS directory not in the form [...]!\n")); else { char *idir = con->id; DEBUGP (("Preprocessing the initial VMS directory\n")); DEBUGP ((" old = '%s'\n", con->id)); /* We do the conversion in-place by copying the stuff between [ and ] to the beginning, and changing dots to slashes at the same time. */ *idir++ = '/'; for (++path; path < pathend; path++, idir++) *idir = *path == '.' ? '/' : *path; *idir = '\0'; DEBUGP ((" new = '%s'\n\n", con->id)); } } #endif /* 0 */ if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n")); /* Fifth: Set the FTP type. */ type_char = ftp_process_type (u->params); if (!opt.server_response) logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> TYPE %c ... ", type_char); err = ftp_type (csock, type_char); /* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPUNKNOWNTYPE */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case WRITEFAILED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Write failed, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPUNKNOWNTYPE: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unknown type `%c', closing control connection.\n"), type_char); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPOK: /* Everything is OK. */ break; default: abort (); } if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. ")); } /* do login */ if (cmd & DO_CWD) { if (!*u->dir) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("==> CWD not needed.\n")); else { const char *targ = NULL; int cwd_count; int cwd_end; int cwd_start; char *target = u->dir; DEBUGP (("changing working directory\n")); /* Change working directory. To change to a non-absolute Unix directory, we need to prepend initial directory (con->id) to it. Absolute directories "just work". A relative directory is one that does not begin with '/' and, on non-Unix OS'es, one that doesn't begin with "[a-z]:". This is not done for OS400, which doesn't use "/"-delimited directories, nor does it support directory hierarchies. "CWD foo" followed by "CWD bar" leaves us in "bar", not in "foo/bar", as would be customary elsewhere. */ /* 2004-09-20 SMS. Why is this wise even on UNIX? It certainly fouls VMS. See below for a more reliable, more universal method. */ /* 2008-04-22 MJC. I'm not crazy about it either. I'm informed it's useful for misconfigured servers that have some dirs in the path with +x but -r, but this method is not RFC-conformant. I understand the need to deal with crappy server configurations, but it's far better to use the canonical method first, and fall back to kludges second. */ if (target[0] != '/' && !(con->rs != ST_UNIX && c_isalpha (target[0]) && target[1] == ':') && (con->rs != ST_OS400) && (con->rs != ST_VMS)) { int idlen = strlen (con->id); char *ntarget, *p; /* Strip trailing slash(es) from con->id. */ while (idlen > 0 && con->id[idlen - 1] == '/') --idlen; p = ntarget = (char *)alloca (idlen + 1 + strlen (u->dir) + 1); memcpy (p, con->id, idlen); p += idlen; *p++ = '/'; strcpy (p, target); DEBUGP (("Prepended initial PWD to relative path:\n")); DEBUGP ((" pwd: '%s'\n old: '%s'\n new: '%s'\n", con->id, target, ntarget)); target = ntarget; } #if 0 /* 2004-09-17 SMS. Don't help me out. Please. A reasonably recent VMS FTP server will cope just fine with UNIX file specifications. This code just spoils things. Discarding the device name, for example, is not a wise move. This code was disabled but left in as an example of what not to do. */ /* If the FTP host runs VMS, we will have to convert the absolute directory path in UNIX notation to absolute directory path in VMS notation as VMS FTP servers do not like UNIX notation of absolute paths. "VMS notation" is [dir.subdir.subsubdir]. */ if (con->rs == ST_VMS) { char *tmpp; char *ntarget = (char *)alloca (strlen (target) + 2); /* We use a converted initial dir, so directories in TARGET will be separated with slashes, something like "/INITIAL/FOLDER/DIR/SUBDIR". Convert that to "[INITIAL.FOLDER.DIR.SUBDIR]". */ strcpy (ntarget, target); assert (*ntarget == '/'); *ntarget = '['; for (tmpp = ntarget + 1; *tmpp; tmpp++) if (*tmpp == '/') *tmpp = '.'; *tmpp++ = ']'; *tmpp = '\0'; DEBUGP (("Changed file name to VMS syntax:\n")); DEBUGP ((" Unix: '%s'\n VMS: '%s'\n", target, ntarget)); target = ntarget; } #endif /* 0 */ /* 2004-09-20 SMS. A relative directory is relative to the initial directory. Thus, what _is_ useful on VMS (and probably elsewhere) is to CWD to the initial directory (ideally, whatever the server reports, _exactly_, NOT badly UNIX-ixed), and then CWD to the (new) relative directory. This should probably be restructured as a function, called once or twice, but I'm lazy enough to take the badly indented loop short-cut for now. */ /* Decide on one pass (absolute) or two (relative). The VMS restriction may be relaxed when the squirrely code above is reformed. */ if ((con->rs == ST_VMS) && (target[0] != '/')) { cwd_start = 0; DEBUGP (("Using two-step CWD for relative path.\n")); } else { /* Go straight to the target. */ cwd_start = 1; } /* At least one VMS FTP server (TCPware V5.6-2) can switch to a UNIX emulation mode when given a UNIX-like directory specification (like "a/b/c"). If allowed to continue this way, LIST interpretation will be confused, because the system type (SYST response) will not be re-checked, and future UNIX-format directory listings (for multiple URLs or "-r") will be horribly misinterpreted. The cheap and nasty work-around is to do a "CWD []" after a UNIX-like directory specification is used. (A single-level directory is harmless.) This puts the TCPware server back into VMS mode, and does no harm on other servers. Unlike the rest of this block, this particular behavior _is_ VMS-specific, so it gets its own VMS test. */ if ((con->rs == ST_VMS) && (strchr( target, '/') != NULL)) { cwd_end = 3; DEBUGP (("Using extra \"CWD []\" step for VMS server.\n")); } else { cwd_end = 2; } /* 2004-09-20 SMS. */ /* Sorry about the deviant indenting. Laziness. */ for (cwd_count = cwd_start; cwd_count < cwd_end; cwd_count++) { switch (cwd_count) { case 0: /* Step one (optional): Go to the initial directory, exactly as reported by the server. */ targ = con->id; break; case 1: /* Step two: Go to the target directory. (Absolute or relative will work now.) */ targ = target; break; case 2: /* Step three (optional): "CWD []" to restore server VMS-ness. */ targ = "[]"; break; default: logprintf (LOG_ALWAYS, _("Logically impossible section reached in getftp()")); logprintf (LOG_ALWAYS, _("cwd_count: %d\ncwd_start: %d\ncwd_end: %d\n"), cwd_count, cwd_start, cwd_end); abort (); } if (!opt.server_response) logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> CWD (%d) %s ... ", cwd_count, quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, target)); err = ftp_cwd (csock, targ); /* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNSFOD */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case WRITEFAILED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Write failed, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPNSFOD: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such directory %s.\n\n"), quote (u->dir)); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPOK: break; default: abort (); } if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n")); } /* for */ /* 2004-09-20 SMS. */ } /* else */ } else /* do not CWD */ logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("==> CWD not required.\n")); if ((cmd & DO_RETR) && passed_expected_bytes == 0) { if (opt.verbose) { if (!opt.server_response) logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> SIZE %s ... ", quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, u->file)); } err = ftp_size (csock, u->file, &expected_bytes); /* FTPRERR */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: case FTPSRVERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPOK: got_expected_bytes = true; /* Everything is OK. */ break; default: abort (); } if (!opt.server_response) { logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%s\n", expected_bytes ? number_to_static_string (expected_bytes) : _("done.\n")); } } if (cmd & DO_RETR && restval > 0 && restval == expected_bytes) { /* Server confirms that file has length restval. We should stop now. Some servers (f.e. NcFTPd) return error when receive REST 0 */ logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("File has already been retrieved.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return RETRFINISHED; } do { try_again = false; /* If anything is to be retrieved, PORT (or PASV) must be sent. */ if (cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR)) { if (opt.ftp_pasv) { ip_address passive_addr; int passive_port; err = ftp_do_pasv (csock, &passive_addr, &passive_port); /* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNOPASV, FTPINVPASV */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case WRITEFAILED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Write failed, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; return err; case FTPNOPASV: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot initiate PASV transfer.\n")); break; case FTPINVPASV: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot parse PASV response.\n")); break; case FTPOK: break; default: abort (); } /* switch (err) */ if (err==FTPOK) { DEBUGP (("trying to connect to %s port %d\n", print_address (&passive_addr), passive_port)); dtsock = connect_to_ip (&passive_addr, passive_port, NULL); if (dtsock < 0) { int save_errno = errno; fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("couldn't connect to %s port %d: %s\n"), print_address (&passive_addr), passive_port, strerror (save_errno)); ? CONERROR : CONIMPOSSIBLE); } pasv_mode_open = true; /* Flag to avoid accept port */ if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. ")); } /* err==FTP_OK */ } if (!pasv_mode_open) /* Try to use a port command if PASV failed */ { err = ftp_do_port (csock, &local_sock); /* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, bindport (FTPSYSERR), HOSTERR, logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case WRITEFAILED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Write failed, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case CONSOCKERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "socket: %s\n", strerror (errno)); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case FTPSYSERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Bind error (%s).\n"), strerror (errno)); fd_close (dtsock); return err; case FTPPORTERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Invalid PORT.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case FTPOK: break; default: abort (); } /* port switch */ if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. ")); } /* dtsock == -1 */ } /* cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR) */ /* Restart if needed. */ if (restval && (cmd & DO_RETR)) { if (!opt.server_response) logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> REST %s ... ", number_to_static_string (restval)); err = ftp_rest (csock, restval); /* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPRESTFAIL */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case WRITEFAILED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Write failed, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case FTPRESTFAIL: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\nREST failed, starting from scratch.\n")); rest_failed = true; break; case FTPOK: break; default: abort (); } if (err != FTPRESTFAIL && !opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. ")); } /* restval && cmd & DO_RETR */ if (cmd & DO_RETR) { /* If we're in spider mode, don't really retrieve anything except the directory listing and verify whether the given "file" exists. */ if (opt.spider) { bool exists = false; struct fileinfo *f; uerr_t _res = ftp_get_listing (u, con, &f); /* Set the DO_RETR command flag again, because it gets unset when calling ftp_get_listing() and would otherwise cause an assertion failure earlier on when this function gets repeatedly called (e.g., when recursing). */ con->cmd |= DO_RETR; if (_res == RETROK) { while (f) { if (!strcmp (f->name, u->file)) { exists = true; break; } f = f->next; } if (exists) { logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("File %s exists.\n"), quote (u->file)); } else { logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file %s.\n"), quote (u->file)); } } fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return RETRFINISHED; } if (opt.verbose) { if (!opt.server_response) { if (restval) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> RETR %s ... ", quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, u->file)); } } err = ftp_retr (csock, u->file); /* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNSFOD */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case WRITEFAILED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Write failed, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case FTPNSFOD: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file %s.\n\n"), quote (u->file)); fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case FTPOK: break; default: abort (); } if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n")); if (! got_expected_bytes) expected_bytes = *last_expected_bytes; } /* do retrieve */ if (cmd & DO_LIST) { if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> LIST ... "); /* As Maciej W. Rozycki (macro@ds2.pg.gda.pl) says, `LIST' without arguments is better than `LIST .'; confirmed by RFC959. */ err = ftp_list (csock, NULL, con->st&AVOID_LIST_A, con->st&AVOID_LIST, &list_a_used); /* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED */ switch (err) { case FTPRERR: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ Error in server response, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case WRITEFAILED: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Write failed, closing control connection.\n")); fd_close (csock); con->csock = -1; fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case FTPNSFOD: logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n"); logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file or directory %s.\n\n"), quote (".")); fd_close (dtsock); fd_close (local_sock); return err; case FTPOK: break; default: abort (); } if (!opt.server_response) logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n")); if (! got_expected_bytes) expected_bytes = *last_expected_bytes; } /* cmd & DO_LIST */ if (!(cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR)) || (opt.spider && !(cmd & DO_LIST))) return RETRFINISHED; /* Some FTP servers return the total length of file after REST command, others just return the remaining size. */ if (passed_expected_bytes && restval && expected_bytes && (expected_bytes == passed_expected_bytes - restval)) { DEBUGP (("Lying FTP server found, adjusting.\n")); expected_bytes = passed_expected_bytes; } /* If no transmission was required, then everything is OK. */ if (!pasv_mode_open) /* we are not using pasive mode so we need to accept */ }

None

CVE-2015-7665

Tails before 1.7 includes the wget program but does not prevent automatic fallback from passive FTP to active FTP, which allows remote FTP servers to discover the Tor client IP address by reading a (1) PORT or (2) EPRT command. NOTE: within wget itself, the automatic fallback is not considered a vulnerability by CVE.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7665

ghostscript

83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607

None

void fz_init_cached_color_converter(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, fz_colorspace *is, fz_colorspace *ds, fz_colorspace *ss, const fz_color_params *params) { int n = ss->n; fz_cached_color_converter *cached = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, fz_cached_color_converter); cc->opaque = cached; cc->convert = fz_cached_color_convert; cc->ds = ds ? ds : fz_device_gray(ctx); cc->ss = ss; cc->is = is; fz_try(ctx) { fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base, is, cc->ds, ss, params); cached->hash = fz_new_hash_table(ctx, 256, n * sizeof(float), -1, fz_free); } fz_catch(ctx) { fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base); fz_drop_hash_table(ctx, cached->hash); fz_free(ctx, cached); fz_rethrow(ctx); } }

colorspace.c

CVE-2018-1000040

In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple use of uninitialized value bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (crash) or influence program flow via a crafted file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000040

ghostscript

f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607;hp=093fc3b098dc5fadef5d8ad4b225db9fb124758b

None

add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many) { int current; cmap_splay *tree; if (low > high) { fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name); return; } tree = cmap->tree; if (cmap->tlen) { unsigned int move = cmap->ttop; unsigned int gt = EMPTY; unsigned int lt = EMPTY; if (check_for_overlap) { /* Check for collision with the current node */ do { current = move; /* Cases we might meet: * tree[i]: <-----> * case 0: <-> * case 1: <-------> * case 2: <-------------> * case 3: <-> * case 4: <-------> * case 5: <-> */ if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high) { /* case 1, reduces to case 0 */ /* or case 2, deleting the node */ tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low; tree[current].low = high + 1; if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high) { move = delete_node(cmap, current); current = EMPTY; continue; } } else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high) { /* case 4, reduces to case 5 */ tree[current].high = low - 1; assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high); } else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high) { /* case 3, reduces to case 5 */ int new_high = tree[current].high; tree[current].high = low-1; add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, tree[current].many); } /* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */ if (tree[current].low > high) { gt = current; } else { move = tree[current].right; lt = current; } } while (move != EMPTY); } else { do { current = move; if (tree[current].low > high) { move = tree[current].left; gt = current; } else { move = tree[current].right; lt = current; } } while (move != EMPTY); } /* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */ /* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */ /* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */ if (!many) { /* Check for the 'merge' cases. */ if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low) { tree[lt].high = high; if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low) { tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high; delete_node(cmap, gt); } goto exit; } if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low) { tree[gt].low = low; tree[gt].out = out; goto exit; } } } else current = EMPTY; if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap) { int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256; tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree); cmap->tcap = new_cap; } tree[cmap->tlen].low = low; tree[cmap->tlen].high = high; tree[cmap->tlen].out = out; tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current; tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY; tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY; tree[cmap->tlen].many = many; cmap->tlen++; if (current == EMPTY) cmap->ttop = 0; else if (tree[current].low > high) tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1; else { assert(tree[current].high < low); tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1; } move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1); cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1; exit: {} #ifdef CHECK_SPLAY check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0); #endif #ifdef DUMP_SPLAY dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, ""); #endif }

None

CVE-2018-1000039

In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000039

ghostscript

4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05;hp=8ec561d1bccc46e9db40a9f61310cd8b3763914e

None

begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save) { pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop; pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask; fz_rect mask_bbox; fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm; fz_matrix mask_matrix; fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace; save->softmask = softmask; if (softmask == NULL) return gstate; save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources; save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm; save_ctm = gstate->ctm; pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox); pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix); pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save); if (gstate->luminosity) mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect; else { fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix); fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm); } gstate->softmask = NULL; gstate->softmask_resources = NULL; gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm; mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask); if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace) mask_colorspace = fz_device_gray(ctx); fz_try(ctx) { fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params); pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1); } fz_always(ctx) fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace); fz_catch(ctx) { fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER); /* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from * here the clip stack would be messed up. */ /* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */ } fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev); pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save); gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop; gstate->ctm = save_ctm; return gstate; }

pdf-op-run.c

CVE-2018-1000039

In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000039

ghostscript

71ceebcf56e682504da22c4035b39a2d451e8ffd

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=71ceebcf56e682504da22c4035b39a2d451e8ffd;hp=7f82c01523505052615492f8e220f4348ba46995

None

add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many) { int current; cmap_splay *tree; if (low > high) { fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name); return; } tree = cmap->tree; if (cmap->tlen) { unsigned int move = cmap->ttop; unsigned int gt = EMPTY; unsigned int lt = EMPTY; if (check_for_overlap) { /* Check for collision with the current node */ do { current = move; /* Cases we might meet: * tree[i]: <-----> * case 0: <-> * case 1: <-------> * case 2: <-------------> * case 3: <-> * case 4: <-------> * case 5: <-> */ if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high) { /* case 1, reduces to case 0 */ /* or case 2, deleting the node */ tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low; tree[current].low = high + 1; if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high) { move = delete_node(cmap, current); current = EMPTY; continue; } } else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high) { /* case 4, reduces to case 5 */ tree[current].high = low - 1; assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high); } else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high) { /* case 3, reduces to case 5 */ int new_high = tree[current].high; tree[current].high = low-1; add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, many); } /* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */ if (tree[current].low > high) { move = tree[current].left; gt = current; } else { move = tree[current].right; lt = current; } } while (move != EMPTY); } else { do { current = move; if (tree[current].low > high) { move = tree[current].left; gt = current; } else { move = tree[current].right; lt = current; } } while (move != EMPTY); } /* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */ /* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */ /* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */ if (!many) { /* Check for the 'merge' cases. */ if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low) { tree[lt].high = high; if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low) { tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high; delete_node(cmap, gt); } goto exit; } if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low) { tree[gt].low = low; tree[gt].out = out; goto exit; } } } else current = EMPTY; if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap) { int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256; tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree); cmap->tcap = new_cap; } tree[cmap->tlen].low = low; tree[cmap->tlen].high = high; tree[cmap->tlen].out = out; tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current; tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY; tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY; tree[cmap->tlen].many = many; cmap->tlen++; if (current == EMPTY) cmap->ttop = 0; else if (tree[current].low > high) tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1; else { assert(tree[current].high < low); tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1; } move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1); cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1; exit: {} #ifdef CHECK_SPLAY check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0); #endif #ifdef DUMP_SPLAY dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, ""); #endif }

pdf-cmap.c

CVE-2018-1000039

In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000039

ghostscript

b2e7d38e845c7d4922d05e6e41f3a2dc1bc1b14a

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=b2e7d38e845c7d4922d05e6e41f3a2dc1bc1b14a;hp=f51836b9732c38d945b87fda0770009a77ba680c

None

pdf_show_image(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, fz_image *image) { pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop; fz_matrix image_ctm; fz_rect bbox; softmask_save softmask = { NULL }; if (pr->super.hidden) return; break; case PDF_MAT_SHADE: if (gstate->fill.shade) { fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox); bbox = fz_unit_rect; fz_transform_rect(&bbox, &image_ctm); if (image->mask) { /* apply blend group even though we skip the soft mask */ if (gstate->blendmode) fz_begin_group(ctx, pr->dev, &bbox, NULL, 0, 0, gstate->blendmode, 1); fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image->mask, &image_ctm, &bbox); } else gstate = pdf_begin_group(ctx, pr, &bbox, &softmask); if (!image->colorspace) { switch (gstate->fill.kind) { case PDF_MAT_NONE: break; case PDF_MAT_COLOR: fz_fill_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, gstate->fill.colorspace, gstate->fill.v, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params); break; case PDF_MAT_PATTERN: if (gstate->fill.pattern) { fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox); pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->fill.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_FILL); fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev); } break; case PDF_MAT_SHADE: if (gstate->fill.shade) { fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox); fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->fill.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params); fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev); } break; } } else { fz_fill_image(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params); } if (image->mask) { fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev); if (gstate->blendmode) fz_end_group(ctx, pr->dev); } else pdf_end_group(ctx, pr, &softmask); } static void if (pr->clip) { gstate->clip_depth++; fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, pr->clip_even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox); pr->clip = 0; } if (pr->super.hidden) dostroke = dofill = 0; if (dofill || dostroke) gstate = pdf_begin_group(ctx, pr, &bbox, &softmask); if (dofill && dostroke) { /* We may need to push a knockout group */ if (gstate->stroke.alpha == 0) { /* No need for group, as stroke won't do anything */ } else if (gstate->stroke.alpha == 1.0f && gstate->blendmode == FZ_BLEND_NORMAL) { /* No need for group, as stroke won't show up */ } else { knockout_group = 1; fz_begin_group(ctx, pr->dev, &bbox, NULL, 0, 1, FZ_BLEND_NORMAL, 1); } } if (dofill) { switch (gstate->fill.kind) { case PDF_MAT_NONE: break; case PDF_MAT_COLOR: fz_fill_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm, gstate->fill.colorspace, gstate->fill.v, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params); break; case PDF_MAT_PATTERN: if (gstate->fill.pattern) { fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox); pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->fill.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_FILL); fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev); } break; case PDF_MAT_SHADE: if (gstate->fill.shade) { fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox); /* The cluster and page 2 of patterns.pdf shows that fz_fill_shade should NOT be called with gstate->ctm. */ fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->fill.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params); fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev); } break; } } if (dostroke) { switch (gstate->stroke.kind) { case PDF_MAT_NONE: break; case PDF_MAT_COLOR: fz_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm, gstate->stroke.colorspace, gstate->stroke.v, gstate->stroke.alpha, &gstate->stroke.color_params); break; case PDF_MAT_PATTERN: if (gstate->stroke.pattern) { fz_clip_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm, &bbox); pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->stroke.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->stroke.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_STROKE); fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev); } break; case PDF_MAT_SHADE: if (gstate->stroke.shade) { fz_clip_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm, &bbox); fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->stroke.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->stroke.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->stroke.alpha, &gstate->stroke.color_params); fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev); } break; } } if (knockout_group) fz_end_group(ctx, pr->dev); if (dofill || dostroke) pdf_end_group(ctx, pr, &softmask); }

None

CVE-2018-1000037

In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple reachable assertions in the PDF parser allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (assert crash) via a crafted file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000037

savannah

c15c42ccd1e2377945fd0414eca1a49294bff454

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/commit/?id=c15c42ccd1e2377945fd0414eca1a49294bff454

None

sparse_dump_region (struct tar_sparse_file *file, size_t i) { union block *blk; off_t bytes_left = file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes; if (!lseek_or_error (file, file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset)) return false; while (bytes_left > 0) { size_t bufsize = (bytes_left > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : bytes_left; size_t bytes_read; blk = find_next_block (); bytes_read = safe_read (file->fd, blk->buffer, bufsize); if (bytes_read == SAFE_READ_ERROR) { read_diag_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name, (file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset + file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes - bytes_left), bufsize); return false; } memset (blk->buffer + bytes_read, 0, BLOCKSIZE - bytes_read); bytes_left -= bytes_read; { size_t count; size_t wrbytes = (write_size > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : write_size; union block *blk = find_next_block (); if (!blk) { ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive"))); return false; } set_next_block_after (blk); count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes); write_size -= count; file->dumped_size += count; mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size); file->offset += count; if (count != wrbytes) { write_error_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name, count, wrbytes); return false; } } return true; }  /* Interface functions */ enum dump_status sparse_dump_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st) { return false; } set_next_block_after (blk); count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes); write_size -= count; file->dumped_size += count; mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size); file->offset += count; if (count != wrbytes) rc = sparse_scan_file (&file); if (rc && file.optab->dump_region) { tar_sparse_dump_header (&file); if (fd >= 0) { size_t i; mv_begin_write (file.stat_info->file_name, file.stat_info->stat.st_size, file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size); for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++) rc = tar_sparse_dump_region (&file, i); } } pad_archive (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size); return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short; }

None

CVE-2018-20482

GNU Tar through 1.30, when --sparse is used, mishandles file shrinkage during read access, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite read loop in sparse_dump_region in sparse.c) by modifying a file that is supposed to be archived by a different user's process (e.g., a system backup running as root).

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20482

haproxy

58df5aea0a0c926b2238f65908f5e9f83d1cca25

https://github.com/haproxy/haproxy

https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy.git;a=commit;h=58df5aea0a0c926b2238f65908f5e9f83d1cca25

BUG: dns: Prevent stack-exhaustion via recursion loop in dns_read_name When a compressed pointer is encountered, dns_read_name() will call itself with the pointed-to offset in the packet. With a specially crafted packet, it was possible to trigger an infinite-loop recursion by making the pointer points to itself. While it would be possible to handle that particular case differently by making sure that the target is different from the current offset, it would still be possible to craft a packet with a very long chain of valid pointers, always pointing backwards. To prevent a stack exhaustion in that case, this patch restricts the number of recursive calls to 100, which should be more than enough. To be backported to 1.8, probably also 1.7.

int dns_read_name(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *bufend, unsigned char *name, char *destination, int dest_len, int *offset) { int nb_bytes = 0, n = 0; int label_len; unsigned char *reader = name; char *dest = destination; while (1) { /* Name compression is in use */ if ((*reader & 0xc0) == 0xc0) { /* Must point BEFORE current position */ if ((buffer + reader[1]) > reader) goto err; n = dns_read_name(buffer, bufend, buffer + reader[1], dest, dest_len - nb_bytes, offset); if (n == 0) goto err; } label_len = *reader; if (label_len == 0) goto out; /* Check if: * - we won't read outside the buffer * - there is enough place in the destination */ if ((reader + label_len >= bufend) || (nb_bytes + label_len >= dest_len)) goto err; /* +1 to take label len + label string */ label_len++; memcpy(dest, reader, label_len); dest += label_len; nb_bytes += label_len; reader += label_len; } out: /* offset computation: * parse from <name> until finding either NULL or a pointer "c0xx" */ reader = name; *offset = 0; while (reader < bufend) { if ((reader[0] & 0xc0) == 0xc0) { *offset += 2; break; } else if (*reader == 0) { *offset += 1; break; } *offset += 1; ++reader; } return nb_bytes; err: return 0; }

None

CVE-2018-20103

An issue was discovered in dns.c in HAProxy through 1.8.14. In the case of a compressed pointer, a crafted packet can trigger infinite recursion by making the pointer point to itself, or create a long chain of valid pointers resulting in stack exhaustion.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20103

poppler

284a92899602daa4a7f429e61849e794569310b5

https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=284a92899602daa4a7f429e61849e794569310b5

Did a mistake in the gmalloc -> gmallocn commit, it's a 4 here not a 3

void SplashOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str, int width, int height, GfxImageColorMap *colorMap, int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg) { double *ctm; SplashCoord mat[6]; SplashOutImageData imgData; SplashColorMode srcMode; SplashImageSource src; GfxGray gray; GfxRGB rgb; #if SPLASH_CMYK GfxCMYK cmyk; #endif Guchar pix; int n, i; ctm = state->getCTM(); mat[0] = ctm[0]; mat[1] = ctm[1]; mat[2] = -ctm[2]; mat[3] = -ctm[3]; mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4]; mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5]; imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width, colorMap->getNumPixelComps(), colorMap->getBits()); imgData.imgStr->reset(); imgData.colorMap = colorMap; imgData.maskColors = maskColors; imgData.colorMode = colorMode; imgData.width = width; imgData.height = height; imgData.y = 0; imgData.lookup = NULL; if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) { n = 1 << colorMap->getBits(); switch (colorMode) { case splashModeMono1: case splashModeMono8: imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { pix = (Guchar)i; colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray); imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray); } break; case splashModeRGB8: case splashModeBGR8: imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { pix = (Guchar)i; colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb); imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r); imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g); imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b); } break; case splashModeXBGR8: imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { pix = (Guchar)i; colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb); imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r); imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g); imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b); imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255; } break; #if SPLASH_CMYK case splashModeCMYK8: imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { pix = (Guchar)i; colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk); imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c); imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m); imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y); imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k); } break; #endif break; } } if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) { srcMode = splashModeMono8; } else { srcMode = colorMode; } src = maskColors ? &alphaImageSrc : &imageSrc; splash->drawImage(src, &imgData, srcMode, maskColors ? gTrue : gFalse, width, height, mat); if (inlineImg) { while (imgData.y < height) { imgData.imgStr->getLine(); ++imgData.y; } } gfree(imgData.lookup); delete imgData.imgStr; str->close(); }

None

CVE-2009-3605

Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3605

poppler

7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a

https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a

Be paranoid, use gmallocn or gmallocn3 in all gmalloc with *

void ArthurOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str, int width, int height, GfxImageColorMap *colorMap, int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg) { unsigned char *buffer; unsigned int *dest; int x, y; ImageStream *imgStr; Guchar *pix; int i; double *ctm; QMatrix matrix; int is_identity_transform; buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4); /* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */ imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width, colorMap->getNumPixelComps(), colorMap->getBits()); imgStr->reset(); /* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction * so check its underlying color space as well */ is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB || (colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased && ((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB); if (maskColors) { for (y = 0; y < height; y++) { dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width); pix = imgStr->getLine(); colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width); for (x = 0; x < width; x++) { for (i = 0; i < colorMap->getNumPixelComps(); ++i) { if (pix[i] < maskColors[2*i] * 255|| pix[i] > maskColors[2*i+1] * 255) { *dest = *dest | 0xff000000; break; } } pix += colorMap->getNumPixelComps(); dest++; } } m_image = new QImage(buffer, width, height, QImage::Format_ARGB32); } else { for (y = 0; y < height; y++) { dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width); pix = imgStr->getLine(); colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width); } m_image = new QImage(buffer, width, height, QImage::Format_RGB32); } if (m_image == NULL || m_image->isNull()) { qDebug() << "Null image"; delete imgStr; return; } ctm = state->getCTM(); matrix.setMatrix(ctm[0] / width, ctm[1] / width, -ctm[2] / height, -ctm[3] / height, ctm[2] + ctm[4], ctm[3] + ctm[5]); m_painter->setMatrix(matrix, true); m_painter->drawImage( QPoint(0,0), *m_image ); delete m_image; m_image = 0; free (buffer); delete imgStr; }

ArthurOutputDev.cc

CVE-2009-3605

Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3605

shibboleth

b66cceb0e992c351ad5e2c665229ede82f261b16

https://git.shibboleth.net/view/?p=cpp-opensaml

https://git.shibboleth.net/view/?p=cpp-sp.git;a=commit;h=b66cceb0e992c351ad5e2c665229ede82f261b16

None

DynamicMetadataProvider::DynamicMetadataProvider(const DOMElement* e) : saml2md::DynamicMetadataProvider(e), m_verifyHost(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, true, verifyHost)), m_ignoreTransport(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, ignoreTransport)), m_encoded(true), m_trust(nullptr) { const DOMElement* child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Subst); if (child && child->hasChildNodes()) { auto_ptr_char s(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue()); if (s.get() && *s.get()) { m_subst = s.get(); m_encoded = XMLHelper::getAttrBool(child, true, encoded); m_hashed = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, hashed); } } if (m_subst.empty()) { child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Regex); if (child && child->hasChildNodes() && child->hasAttributeNS(nullptr, match)) { m_match = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, match); auto_ptr_char repl(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue()); if (repl.get() && *repl.get()) m_regex = repl.get(); } } if (!m_ignoreTransport) { child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, _TrustEngine); string t = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, _type); if (!t.empty()) { TrustEngine* trust = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().TrustEngineManager.newPlugin(t.c_str(), child); if (!dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust)) { delete trust; throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin."); } m_trust.reset(dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust)); m_dummyCR.reset(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().CredentialResolverManager.newPlugin(DUMMY_CREDENTIAL_RESOLVER, nullptr)); } if (!m_trust.get() || !m_dummyCR.get()) throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin unless ignoreTransport is true."); } }

None

CVE-2017-16852

shibsp/metadata/DynamicMetadataProvider.cpp in the Dynamic MetadataProvider plugin in Shibboleth Service Provider before 2.6.1 fails to properly configure itself with the MetadataFilter plugins and does not perform critical security checks such as signature verification, enforcement of validity periods, and other checks specific to deployments, aka SSPCPP-763.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16852

pengutronix

574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208

https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/fs/nfs.c?h=next&id=574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208

https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/fs/nfs.c?h=next&id=574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208

None

static int nfs_readlink_req(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct nfs_fh *fh, char **target) { uint32_t data[1024]; uint32_t *p; uint32_t len; struct packet *nfs_packet; /* * struct READLINK3args { * nfs_fh3 symlink; * }; * * struct READLINK3resok { * post_op_attr symlink_attributes; * nfspath3 data; * }; * * struct READLINK3resfail { * post_op_attr symlink_attributes; * } * * union READLINK3res switch (nfsstat3 status) { * case NFS3_OK: * READLINK3resok resok; * default: * READLINK3resfail resfail; * }; */ p = &(data[0]); p = rpc_add_credentials(p); p = nfs_add_fh3(p, fh); len = p - &(data[0]); nfs_packet = rpc_req(npriv, PROG_NFS, NFSPROC3_READLINK, data, len); if (IS_ERR(nfs_packet)) return PTR_ERR(nfs_packet); p = (void *)nfs_packet->data + sizeof(struct rpc_reply) + 4; p = nfs_read_post_op_attr(p, NULL); len = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p)); /* new path length */ p++; *target = xzalloc(len + 1); return 0; }

None

CVE-2019-15938

Pengutronix barebox through 2019.08.1 has a remote buffer overflow in nfs_readlink_req in fs/nfs.c because a length field is directly used for a memcpy.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15938

pengutronix

84986ca024462058574432b5483f4bf9136c538d

https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/fs/nfs.c?h=next&id=574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208

https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/net/nfs.c?h=next&id=84986ca024462058574432b5483f4bf9136c538d

None

static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len) { uint32_t *data; char *path; int rlen; int ret; ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1); if (ret) return ret; data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply)); data++; rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */ data++; path = (char *)data; } else { memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen); nfs_path[rlen] = 0; }

None

CVE-2019-15937

Pengutronix barebox through 2019.08.1 has a remote buffer overflow in nfs_readlink_reply in net/nfs.c because a length field is directly used for a memcpy.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15937

savannah

7a42b78be9a4108d98833069a88e6fddb9285008

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/quagga.git/commit/?id=7a42b78be9a4108d98833069a88e6fddb9285008

None

aspath_put (struct stream *s, struct aspath *as, int use32bit ) { struct assegment *seg = as->segments; size_t bytes = 0; if (!seg || seg->length == 0) return 0; if (seg) { /* * Hey, what do we do when we have > STREAM_WRITABLE(s) here? * At the moment, we would write out a partial aspath, and our peer * will complain and drop the session :-/ * * The general assumption here is that many things tested will * never happen. And, in real live, up to now, they have not. */ while (seg && (ASSEGMENT_LEN(seg, use32bit) <= STREAM_WRITEABLE(s))) { struct assegment *next = seg->next; int written = 0; int asns_packed = 0; size_t lenp; /* Overlength segments have to be split up */ while ( (seg->length - written) > AS_SEGMENT_MAX) { assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, AS_SEGMENT_MAX); assegment_data_put (s, seg->as, AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit); written += AS_SEGMENT_MAX; bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (written, use32bit); } /* write the final segment, probably is also the first */ lenp = assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, seg->length - written); assegment_data_put (s, (seg->as + written), seg->length - written, use32bit); /* Sequence-type segments can be 'packed' together * Case of a segment which was overlength and split up * will be missed here, but that doesn't matter. */ while (next && ASSEGMENTS_PACKABLE (seg, next)) { /* NB: We should never normally get here given we * normalise aspath data when parse them. However, better * safe than sorry. We potentially could call * assegment_normalise here instead, but it's cheaper and * easier to do it on the fly here rather than go through * the segment list twice every time we write out * aspath's. */ /* Next segment's data can fit in this one */ assegment_data_put (s, next->as, next->length, use32bit); /* update the length of the segment header */ stream_putc_at (s, lenp, seg->length - written + next->length); asns_packed += next->length; next = next->next; } bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (seg->length - written + asns_packed, use32bit); seg = next; } } return bytes; }

bgp_aspath.c

CVE-2017-16227

The aspath_put function in bgpd/bgp_aspath.c in Quagga before 1.2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (session drop) via BGP UPDATE messages, because AS_PATH size calculation for long paths counts certain bytes twice and consequently constructs an invalid message.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16227

samba

c252546ceeb0925eb8a4061315e3ff0a8c55b48b

https://github.com/samba-team/samba

https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=c252546ceeb0925eb8a4061315e3ff0a8c55b48b

None

void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len) { switch (cursum_type) { case CSUM_MD5: md5_update(&md, (uchar *)p, len); break; case CSUM_MD4: case CSUM_MD4_OLD: case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED: if (len + sumresidue < CSUM_CHUNK) { memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len); sumresidue += len; } if (sumresidue) { int32 i = CSUM_CHUNK - sumresidue; memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i); mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK); len -= i; p += i; } while (len >= CSUM_CHUNK) { mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK); len -= CSUM_CHUNK; p += CSUM_CHUNK; } sumresidue = len; if (sumresidue) memcpy(md.buffer, p, sumresidue); break; case CSUM_NONE: break; } }

None

CVE-2017-15994

rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15994

samba

9a480deec4d20277d8e20bc55515ef0640ca1e55

https://github.com/samba-team/samba

https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=9a480deec4d20277d8e20bc55515ef0640ca1e55

None

char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host, const char *addr, const char *leader) { char *users = lp_auth_users(module); char challenge[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2]; char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN]; char **auth_uid_groups = NULL; int auth_uid_groups_cnt = -1; const char *err = NULL; int group_match = -1; char *tok, *pass; char opt_ch = '\0'; /* if no auth list then allow anyone in! */ if (!users || !*users) if (!users || !*users) return ""; gen_challenge(addr, challenge); io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge); return NULL; }

None

CVE-2017-15994

rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15994

busybox

0402cb32df015d9372578e3db27db47b33d5c7b0

http://git.busybox.net/busybox

https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=0402cb32df015d9372578e3db27db47b33d5c7b0

bunzip2: fix runCnt overflow from bug 10431 This particular corrupted file can be dealth with by using "unsigned". If there will be cases where it genuinely overflows, there is a disabled code to deal with that too. function old new delta get_next_block 1678 1667 -11 Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>

static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd) { struct group_data *hufGroup; int dbufCount, dbufSize, groupCount, *base, *limit, selector, i, j, runPos, symCount, symTotal, nSelectors, byteCount[256]; int runCnt = runCnt; /* for compiler */ uint8_t uc, symToByte[256], mtfSymbol[256], *selectors; uint32_t *dbuf; unsigned origPtr, t; dbuf = bd->dbuf; dbufSize = bd->dbufSize; selectors = bd->selectors; /* In bbox, we are ok with aborting through setjmp which is set up in start_bunzip */ #if 0 /* Reset longjmp I/O error handling */ i = setjmp(bd->jmpbuf); if (i) return i; #endif /* Read in header signature and CRC, then validate signature. (last block signature means CRC is for whole file, return now) */ i = get_bits(bd, 24); j = get_bits(bd, 24); bd->headerCRC = get_bits(bd, 32); if ((i == 0x177245) && (j == 0x385090)) return RETVAL_LAST_BLOCK; if ((i != 0x314159) || (j != 0x265359)) return RETVAL_NOT_BZIP_DATA; /* We can add support for blockRandomised if anybody complains. There was some code for this in busybox 1.0.0-pre3, but nobody ever noticed that it didn't actually work. */ if (get_bits(bd, 1)) return RETVAL_OBSOLETE_INPUT; origPtr = get_bits(bd, 24); if ((int)origPtr > dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; /* mapping table: if some byte values are never used (encoding things like ascii text), the compression code removes the gaps to have fewer symbols to deal with, and writes a sparse bitfield indicating which values were present. We make a translation table to convert the symbols back to the corresponding bytes. */ symTotal = 0; i = 0; t = get_bits(bd, 16); do { if (t & (1 << 15)) { unsigned inner_map = get_bits(bd, 16); do { if (inner_map & (1 << 15)) symToByte[symTotal++] = i; inner_map <<= 1; i++; } while (i & 15); i -= 16; } t <<= 1; i += 16; } while (i < 256); /* How many different Huffman coding groups does this block use? */ groupCount = get_bits(bd, 3); if (groupCount < 2 || groupCount > MAX_GROUPS) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; /* nSelectors: Every GROUP_SIZE many symbols we select a new Huffman coding group. Read in the group selector list, which is stored as MTF encoded bit runs. (MTF=Move To Front, as each value is used it's moved to the start of the list.) */ for (i = 0; i < groupCount; i++) mtfSymbol[i] = i; nSelectors = get_bits(bd, 15); if (!nSelectors) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; for (i = 0; i < nSelectors; i++) { uint8_t tmp_byte; /* Get next value */ int n = 0; while (get_bits(bd, 1)) { if (n >= groupCount) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; n++; } /* Decode MTF to get the next selector */ tmp_byte = mtfSymbol[n]; while (--n >= 0) mtfSymbol[n + 1] = mtfSymbol[n]; mtfSymbol[0] = selectors[i] = tmp_byte; } /* Read the Huffman coding tables for each group, which code for symTotal literal symbols, plus two run symbols (RUNA, RUNB) */ symCount = symTotal + 2; for (j = 0; j < groupCount; j++) { uint8_t length[MAX_SYMBOLS]; /* 8 bits is ALMOST enough for temp[], see below */ unsigned temp[MAX_HUFCODE_BITS+1]; int minLen, maxLen, pp, len_m1; /* Read Huffman code lengths for each symbol. They're stored in a way similar to mtf; record a starting value for the first symbol, and an offset from the previous value for every symbol after that. (Subtracting 1 before the loop and then adding it back at the end is an optimization that makes the test inside the loop simpler: symbol length 0 becomes negative, so an unsigned inequality catches it.) */ len_m1 = get_bits(bd, 5) - 1; for (i = 0; i < symCount; i++) { for (;;) { int two_bits; if ((unsigned)len_m1 > (MAX_HUFCODE_BITS-1)) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; /* If first bit is 0, stop. Else second bit indicates whether to increment or decrement the value. Optimization: grab 2 bits and unget the second if the first was 0. */ two_bits = get_bits(bd, 2); if (two_bits < 2) { bd->inbufBitCount++; break; } /* Add one if second bit 1, else subtract 1. Avoids if/else */ len_m1 += (((two_bits+1) & 2) - 1); } /* Correct for the initial -1, to get the final symbol length */ length[i] = len_m1 + 1; } /* Find largest and smallest lengths in this group */ minLen = maxLen = length[0]; for (i = 1; i < symCount; i++) { if (length[i] > maxLen) maxLen = length[i]; else if (length[i] < minLen) minLen = length[i]; } /* Calculate permute[], base[], and limit[] tables from length[]. * * permute[] is the lookup table for converting Huffman coded symbols * into decoded symbols. base[] is the amount to subtract from the * value of a Huffman symbol of a given length when using permute[]. * * limit[] indicates the largest numerical value a symbol with a given * number of bits can have. This is how the Huffman codes can vary in * length: each code with a value>limit[length] needs another bit. */ hufGroup = bd->groups + j; hufGroup->minLen = minLen; hufGroup->maxLen = maxLen; /* Note that minLen can't be smaller than 1, so we adjust the base and limit array pointers so we're not always wasting the first entry. We do this again when using them (during symbol decoding). */ base = hufGroup->base - 1; limit = hufGroup->limit - 1; /* Calculate permute[]. Concurrently, initialize temp[] and limit[]. */ pp = 0; for (i = minLen; i <= maxLen; i++) { int k; temp[i] = limit[i] = 0; for (k = 0; k < symCount; k++) if (length[k] == i) hufGroup->permute[pp++] = k; } /* Count symbols coded for at each bit length */ /* NB: in pathological cases, temp[8] can end ip being 256. * That's why uint8_t is too small for temp[]. */ for (i = 0; i < symCount; i++) temp[length[i]]++; /* Calculate limit[] (the largest symbol-coding value at each bit * length, which is (previous limit<<1)+symbols at this level), and * base[] (number of symbols to ignore at each bit length, which is * limit minus the cumulative count of symbols coded for already). */ pp = t = 0; for (i = minLen; i < maxLen;) { unsigned temp_i = temp[i]; pp += temp_i; /* We read the largest possible symbol size and then unget bits after determining how many we need, and those extra bits could be set to anything. (They're noise from future symbols.) At each level we're really only interested in the first few bits, so here we set all the trailing to-be-ignored bits to 1 so they don't affect the value>limit[length] comparison. */ limit[i] = (pp << (maxLen - i)) - 1; pp <<= 1; t += temp_i; base[++i] = pp - t; } limit[maxLen] = pp + temp[maxLen] - 1; limit[maxLen+1] = INT_MAX; /* Sentinel value for reading next sym. */ base[minLen] = 0; } /* We've finished reading and digesting the block header. Now read this block's Huffman coded symbols from the file and undo the Huffman coding and run length encoding, saving the result into dbuf[dbufCount++] = uc */ /* Initialize symbol occurrence counters and symbol Move To Front table */ /*memset(byteCount, 0, sizeof(byteCount)); - smaller, but slower */ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { byteCount[i] = 0; mtfSymbol[i] = (uint8_t)i; } /* Loop through compressed symbols. */ runPos = dbufCount = selector = 0; for (;;) { int nextSym; /* Fetch next Huffman coding group from list. */ symCount = GROUP_SIZE - 1; if (selector >= nSelectors) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; hufGroup = bd->groups + selectors[selector++]; base = hufGroup->base - 1; limit = hufGroup->limit - 1; continue_this_group: /* Read next Huffman-coded symbol. */ /* Note: It is far cheaper to read maxLen bits and back up than it is to read minLen bits and then add additional bit at a time, testing as we go. Because there is a trailing last block (with file CRC), there is no danger of the overread causing an unexpected EOF for a valid compressed file. */ if (1) { /* As a further optimization, we do the read inline (falling back to a call to get_bits if the buffer runs dry). */ int new_cnt; while ((new_cnt = bd->inbufBitCount - hufGroup->maxLen) < 0) { /* bd->inbufBitCount < hufGroup->maxLen */ if (bd->inbufPos == bd->inbufCount) { nextSym = get_bits(bd, hufGroup->maxLen); goto got_huff_bits; } bd->inbufBits = (bd->inbufBits << 8) | bd->inbuf[bd->inbufPos++]; bd->inbufBitCount += 8; }; bd->inbufBitCount = new_cnt; /* "bd->inbufBitCount -= hufGroup->maxLen;" */ nextSym = (bd->inbufBits >> new_cnt) & ((1 << hufGroup->maxLen) - 1); got_huff_bits: ; } else { /* unoptimized equivalent */ nextSym = get_bits(bd, hufGroup->maxLen); } /* Figure how many bits are in next symbol and unget extras */ i = hufGroup->minLen; while (nextSym > limit[i]) ++i; j = hufGroup->maxLen - i; if (j < 0) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; bd->inbufBitCount += j; /* Huffman decode value to get nextSym (with bounds checking) */ nextSym = (nextSym >> j) - base[i]; if ((unsigned)nextSym >= MAX_SYMBOLS) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; nextSym = hufGroup->permute[nextSym]; /* We have now decoded the symbol, which indicates either a new literal byte, or a repeated run of the most recent literal byte. First, check if nextSym indicates a repeated run, and if so loop collecting how many times to repeat the last literal. */ if ((unsigned)nextSym <= SYMBOL_RUNB) { /* RUNA or RUNB */ /* If this is the start of a new run, zero out counter */ if (runPos == 0) { runPos = 1; runCnt = 0; } /* Neat trick that saves 1 symbol: instead of or-ing 0 or 1 at each bit position, add 1 or 2 instead. For example, 1011 is 1<<0 + 1<<1 + 2<<2. 1010 is 2<<0 + 2<<1 + 1<<2. You can make any bit pattern that way using 1 less symbol than the basic or 0/1 method (except all bits 0, which would use no symbols, but a run of length 0 doesn't mean anything in this context). Thus space is saved. */ runCnt += (runPos << nextSym); /* +runPos if RUNA; +2*runPos if RUNB */ if (runPos < dbufSize) runPos <<= 1; ////The 32-bit overflow of runCnt wasn't yet seen, but probably can happen. ////This would be the fix (catches too large count way before it can overflow): //// if (runCnt > bd->dbufSize) { //// dbg("runCnt:%u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR", //// runCnt, bd->dbufSize); //// return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; //// } goto end_of_huffman_loop; } dbg("dbufCount:%d+runCnt:%d %d > dbufSize:%d RETVAL_DATA_ERROR", dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, dbufSize); return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; literal used is the one at the head of the mtfSymbol array.) */ if (runPos != 0) { uint8_t tmp_byte; if (dbufCount + runCnt > dbufSize) { dbg("dbufCount:%d+runCnt:%d %d > dbufSize:%d RETVAL_DATA_ERROR", dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, dbufSize); return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; } tmp_byte = symToByte[mtfSymbol[0]]; byteCount[tmp_byte] += runCnt; while (--runCnt >= 0) dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)tmp_byte; runPos = 0; } as part of a run above. Therefore 1 unused mtf position minus 2 non-literal nextSym values equals -1.) */ if (dbufCount >= dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; i = nextSym - 1; uc = mtfSymbol[i]; /* Adjust the MTF array. Since we typically expect to move only a first symbol in the mtf array, position 0, would have been handled as part of a run above. Therefore 1 unused mtf position minus 2 non-literal nextSym values equals -1.) */ if (dbufCount >= dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; i = nextSym - 1; uc = mtfSymbol[i]; uc = symToByte[uc]; /* We have our literal byte. Save it into dbuf. */ byteCount[uc]++; dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)uc; /* Skip group initialization if we're not done with this group. Done * this way to avoid compiler warning. */ end_of_huffman_loop: if (--symCount >= 0) goto continue_this_group; } /* At this point, we've read all the Huffman-coded symbols (and repeated runs) for this block from the input stream, and decoded them into the intermediate buffer. There are dbufCount many decoded bytes in dbuf[]. Now undo the Burrows-Wheeler transform on dbuf. See http://dogma.net/markn/articles/bwt/bwt.htm */ /* Turn byteCount into cumulative occurrence counts of 0 to n-1. */ j = 0; for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { int tmp_count = j + byteCount[i]; byteCount[i] = j; j = tmp_count; } /* Figure out what order dbuf would be in if we sorted it. */ for (i = 0; i < dbufCount; i++) { uint8_t tmp_byte = (uint8_t)dbuf[i]; int tmp_count = byteCount[tmp_byte]; dbuf[tmp_count] |= (i << 8); byteCount[tmp_byte] = tmp_count + 1; } /* Decode first byte by hand to initialize "previous" byte. Note that it doesn't get output, and if the first three characters are identical it doesn't qualify as a run (hence writeRunCountdown=5). */ if (dbufCount) { uint32_t tmp; if ((int)origPtr >= dbufCount) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR; tmp = dbuf[origPtr]; bd->writeCurrent = (uint8_t)tmp; bd->writePos = (tmp >> 8); bd->writeRunCountdown = 5; } bd->writeCount = dbufCount; return RETVAL_OK; }

None

CVE-2017-15873

The get_next_block function in archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c in BusyBox 1.27.2 has an Integer Overflow that may lead to a write access violation.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15873

libxfont

d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0

None

BufCompressedFill (BufFilePtr f) { CompressedFile *file; register char_type *stackp, *de_stack; register char_type finchar; register code_int code, oldcode, incode; BufChar *buf, *bufend; file = (CompressedFile *) f->private; buf = f->buffer; bufend = buf + BUFFILESIZE; stackp = file->stackp; de_stack = file->de_stack; finchar = file->finchar; oldcode = file->oldcode; while (buf < bufend) { while (stackp > de_stack && buf < bufend) *buf++ = *--stackp; if (buf == bufend) break; if (oldcode == -1) break; code = getcode (file); if (code == -1) break; if ( (code == CLEAR) && file->block_compress ) { for ( code = 255; code >= 0; code-- ) file->tab_prefix[code] = 0; file->clear_flg = 1; file->free_ent = FIRST - 1; if ( (code = getcode (file)) == -1 ) /* O, untimely death! */ break; } incode = code; /* * Special case for KwKwK string. */ if ( code >= file->free_ent ) { *stackp++ = finchar; code = oldcode; } /* * Generate output characters in reverse order */ while ( code >= 256 ) { *stackp++ = file->tab_suffix[code]; code = file->tab_prefix[code]; } /* * Generate the new entry. */ if ( (code=file->free_ent) < file->maxmaxcode ) { file->tab_prefix[code] = (unsigned short)oldcode; file->tab_suffix[code] = finchar; file->free_ent = code+1; } /* * Remember previous code. */ oldcode = incode; } file->oldcode = oldcode; file->stackp = stackp; file->finchar = finchar; if (buf == f->buffer) { f->left = 0; return BUFFILEEOF; } f->bufp = f->buffer + 1; f->left = (buf - f->buffer) - 1; return f->buffer[0]; }

None

CVE-2011-2895

The LZW decompressor in (1) the BufCompressedFill function in fontfile/decompress.c in X.Org libXfont before 1.4.4 and (2) compress/compress.c in 4.3BSD, as used in zopen.c in OpenBSD before 3.8, FreeBSD, NetBSD 4.0.x and 5.0.x before 5.0.3 and 5.1.x before 5.1.1, FreeType 2.1.9, and other products, does not properly handle code words that are absent from the decompression table when encountered, which allows context-dependent attackers to trigger an infinite loop or a heap-based buffer overflow, and possibly execute arbitrary code, via a crafted compressed stream, a related issue to CVE-2006-1168 and CVE-2011-2896.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2895

musl

45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395

https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395

https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395

None

static int dns_parse_callback(void *c, int rr, const void *data, int len, const void *packet) { char tmp[256]; struct dpc_ctx *ctx = c; switch (rr) { case RR_A: if (len != 4) return -1; ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0; memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 4); break; case RR_AAAA: if (len != 16) return -1; ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].family = AF_INET6; ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0; memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 16); break; case RR_CNAME: if (__dn_expand(packet, (const unsigned char *)packet + 512, data, tmp, sizeof tmp) > 0 && is_valid_hostname(tmp)) strcpy(ctx->canon, tmp); break; } return 0; }

None

CVE-2017-15650

musl libc before 1.1.17 has a buffer overflow via crafted DNS replies because dns_parse_callback in network/lookup_name.c does not restrict the number of addresses, and thus an attacker can provide an unexpected number by sending A records in a reply to an AAAA query.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15650

poppler

61f79b8447c3ac8ab5a26e79e0c28053ffdccf75

https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=61f79b8447c3ac8ab5a26e79e0c28053ffdccf75

Allow only one %d in the filename Fixes crashes if you had %s and similar in the filename Inspired from patch by Pedro Ribeiro <pedrib@gmail.com> Bug #69434

bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) { char pathName[4096]; GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName); PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (!doc->isOk()) { error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName); return false; } if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) { firstPage = 1; lastPage = doc->getNumPages(); } if (lastPage == 0) lastPage = doc->getNumPages(); if (firstPage == 0) if (firstPage == 0) firstPage = 1; if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) { error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName); return false; } for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) { snprintf (pathName, sizeof (pathName) - 1, destFileName, pageNo); GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName); { printUsage ("pdfseparate", "<PDF-sourcefile> <PDF-pattern-destfile>", argDesc); } if (printVersion || printHelp) exitCode = 0; goto err0; } globalParams = new GlobalParams(); ok = extractPages (argv[1], argv[2]); if (ok) { exitCode = 0; } delete globalParams; err0: return exitCode; }

None

CVE-2013-4474

Format string vulnerability in the extractPages function in utils/pdfseparate.cc in poppler before 0.24.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via format string specifiers in a destination filename.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4474

poppler

b8682d868ddf7f741e93b791588af0932893f95c

https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/utils/pdfseparate.cc?id=b8682d868ddf7f741e93b

pdfseparate: improve the path building Make use of snprintf to limit the output to the pathName buffer; while I'm there, expand its size to 4096 (might help longer paths), although a better fix would be dynamically allocate its length (and/or using GooString, maybe).

bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) { char pathName[1024]; GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName); PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (!doc->isOk()) { error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName); return false; } if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) { firstPage = 1; lastPage = doc->getNumPages(); } if (lastPage == 0) lastPage = doc->getNumPages(); if (firstPage == 0) firstPage = 1; if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) { error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName); return false; } for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) { sprintf (pathName, destFileName, pageNo); GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName); int errCode = doc->savePageAs(gpageName, pageNo); if ( errCode != errNone) { delete gpageName; delete gfileName; return false; } delete gpageName; } delete gfileName; return true; }

pdfseparate.cc

CVE-2013-4473

Stack-based buffer overflow in the extractPages function in utils/pdfseparate.cc in poppler before 0.24.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a source filename.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4473

ghostscript

97096297d409ec6f206298444ba00719607e8ba8

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commit;h=97096297d409ec6f206298444ba00719607e8ba8

None

walk_string(fz_context *ctx, int uni, int remove, editable_str *str) { int rune; if (str->utf8 == NULL) return; do { char *s = &str->utf8[str->pos]; size_t len; int n = fz_chartorune(&rune, s); if (rune == uni) { /* Match. Skip over that one. */ str->pos += n; } else if (uni == 32) { /* We don't care if we're given whitespace * and it doesn't match the string. Don't * skip forward. Nothing to remove. */ break; } else if (rune == 32) { /* The string has a whitespace, and we * don't match it; that's forgivable as * PDF often misses out spaces. Remove this * if we are removing stuff. */ } else { /* Mismatch. No point in tracking through any more. */ str->pos = -1; break; } if (remove) { len = strlen(s+n); memmove(s, s+n, len+1); str->edited = 1; } } while (rune != uni); }

None

CVE-2019-14975

Artifex MuPDF before 1.16.0 has a heap-based buffer over-read in fz_chartorune in fitz/string.c because pdf/pdf-op-filter.c does not check for a missing string.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-14975

spice

53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d

https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/spice/spice

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d

Use RING_FOREACH_SAFE in red_channel.c functions which are missing it Currently, both red_channel_pipes_add_type() and red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg() use plaing RING_FOREACH() which is not safe versus removals from the ring within the loop body. Although it's rare, such a removal can occur in both cases. In the case of red_channel_pipes_add_type() we have: red_channel_pipes_add_type() -> red_channel_client_pipe_add_type() -> red_channel_client_push() And in the case of red_channel_client_pipes_add_empty_msg() we have: red_channel_client_pipes_add_empty_msg() -> red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg() -> red_channel_client_push() But red_channel_client_push() can cause a removal from the clients ring if a network error occurs: red_channel_client_push() -> red_channel_client_send() -> red_peer_handle_outgoing() -> handler->cb->on_error callback = red_channel_client_default_peer_on_error() -> red_channel_client_disconnect() -> red_channel_remove_client() -> ring_remove() When this error path does occur, the assertion in RING_FOREACH()'s ring_next() trips, and the process containing the spice server is aborted. i.e. your whole VM dies, as a result of an unfortunately timed network error on the spice channel. Please apply. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <dgibson@redhat.com>

void red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg(RedChannel *channel, int msg_type) { RingItem *link; RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) { red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg( SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link), msg_type); } }

red_channel.c

CVE-2013-4130

The (1) red_channel_pipes_add_type and (2) red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg functions in server/red_channel.c in SPICE before 0.12.4 do not properly perform ring loops, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (reachable assertion and server exit) by triggering a network error.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4130

spice

53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d

https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/spice/spice

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d

Use RING_FOREACH_SAFE in red_channel.c functions which are missing it Currently, both red_channel_pipes_add_type() and red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg() use plaing RING_FOREACH() which is not safe versus removals from the ring within the loop body. Although it's rare, such a removal can occur in both cases. In the case of red_channel_pipes_add_type() we have: red_channel_pipes_add_type() -> red_channel_client_pipe_add_type() -> red_channel_client_push() And in the case of red_channel_client_pipes_add_empty_msg() we have: red_channel_client_pipes_add_empty_msg() -> red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg() -> red_channel_client_push() But red_channel_client_push() can cause a removal from the clients ring if a network error occurs: red_channel_client_push() -> red_channel_client_send() -> red_peer_handle_outgoing() -> handler->cb->on_error callback = red_channel_client_default_peer_on_error() -> red_channel_client_disconnect() -> red_channel_remove_client() -> ring_remove() When this error path does occur, the assertion in RING_FOREACH()'s ring_next() trips, and the process containing the spice server is aborted. i.e. your whole VM dies, as a result of an unfortunately timed network error on the spice channel. Please apply. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <dgibson@redhat.com>

void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type) { RingItem *link; RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) { red_channel_client_pipe_add_type( SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link), pipe_item_type); } }

red_channel.c

CVE-2013-4130

The (1) red_channel_pipes_add_type and (2) red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg functions in server/red_channel.c in SPICE before 0.12.4 do not properly perform ring loops, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (reachable assertion and server exit) by triggering a network error.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4130

mindrot

1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d

https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh

https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?h=V_6_9&id=1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d

None

x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) { u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(b) < 12) return 0; debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", ucp[0]); return -1; }

None

CVE-2015-5352

The x11_open_helper function in channels.c in ssh in OpenSSH before 6.9, when ForwardX11Trusted mode is not used, lacks a check of the refusal deadline for X connections, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a connection outside of the permitted time window.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5352

samba

538d305de91e34a2938f5f219f18bf0e1918763f

https://github.com/samba-team/samba

https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=538d305de91e34a2938f5f219f18bf0e1918763f

CVE-2015-5330: next_codepoint_handle_ext: don't short-circuit UTF16 low bytes UTF16 contains zero bytes when it is encoding ASCII (for example), so we can't assume the absense of the 0x80 bit means a one byte encoding. No current callers use UTF16. Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599 Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz> Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>

_PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext( struct smb_iconv_handle *ic, const char *str, size_t len, charset_t src_charset, size_t *bytes_consumed) { /* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */ uint8_t buf[4]; smb_iconv_t descriptor; size_t ilen_orig; size_t ilen; size_t olen; char *outbuf; if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) { *bytes_consumed = 1; return (codepoint_t)str[0]; } * This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000) */ ilen_orig = MIN(len, 5); ilen = ilen_orig; descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16); if (descriptor == (smb_iconv_t)-1) { *bytes_consumed = 1; return INVALID_CODEPOINT; } /* * this looks a little strange, but it is needed to cope with * codepoints above 64k (U+1000) which are encoded as per RFC2781. */ olen = 2; outbuf = (char *)buf; smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen); if (olen == 2) { olen = 4; outbuf = (char *)buf; smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen); if (olen == 4) { /* we didn't convert any bytes */ *bytes_consumed = 1; return INVALID_CODEPOINT; } olen = 4 - olen; } else { olen = 2 - olen; } *bytes_consumed = ilen_orig - ilen; if (olen == 2) { return (codepoint_t)SVAL(buf, 0); } if (olen == 4) { /* decode a 4 byte UTF16 character manually */ return (codepoint_t)0x10000 + (buf[2] | ((buf[3] & 0x3)<<8) | (buf[0]<<10) | ((buf[1] & 0x3)<<18)); } /* no other length is valid */ return INVALID_CODEPOINT; }

None

CVE-2015-5330

ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5330

samba

7f51ec8c4ed9ba1f53d722e44fb6fb3cde933b72

https://github.com/samba-team/samba

https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=7f51ec8c4ed9ba1f53d722e44fb6fb3cde933b72

CVE-2015-5330: ldb_dn: simplify and fix ldb_dn_escape_internal() Previously we relied on NUL terminated strings and jumped back and forth between copying escaped bytes and memcpy()ing un-escaped chunks. This simple version is easier to reason about and works with unterminated strings. It may also be faster as it avoids reading the string twice (first with strcspn, then with memcpy). Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599 Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz> Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>

static int ldb_dn_escape_internal(char *dst, const char *src, int len) { const char *p, *s; char *d; size_t l; p = s = src; d = dst; while (p - src < len) { p += strcspn(p, ",=\n\r+<>#;\\\" "); if (p - src == len) /* found no escapable chars */ break; /* copy the part of the string before the stop */ memcpy(d, s, p - s); d += (p - s); /* move to current position */ switch (*p) { case ' ': if (p == src || (p-src)==(len-1)) { /* if at the beginning or end * of the string then escape */ *d++ = '\\'; *d++ = *p++; } else { /* otherwise don't escape */ *d++ = *p++; } break; /* if at the beginning or end * of the string then escape */ *d++ = '\\'; *d++ = *p++; } else { /* otherwise don't escape */ *d++ = *p++; } break; case '?': /* these must be escaped using \c form */ *d++ = '\\'; *d++ = *p++; break; default: { /* any others get \XX form */ unsigned char v; const char *hexbytes = "0123456789ABCDEF"; v = *(const unsigned char *)p; *d++ = '\\'; *d++ = hexbytes[v>>4]; *d++ = hexbytes[v&0xF]; p++; break; } } s = p; /* move forward */ }

None

CVE-2015-5330

ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5330

samba

a118d4220ed85749c07fb43c1229d9e2fecbea6b

https://github.com/samba-team/samba

https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=a118d4220ed85749c07fb43c1229d9e2fecbea6b

CVE-2015-5330: strupper_talloc_n_handle(): properly count characters When a codepoint eats more than one byte we really want to know, especially if the string is not NUL terminated. Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599 Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz> Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>

_PUBLIC_ char *strupper_talloc_n_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *iconv_handle, TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *src, size_t n) { size_t size=0; char *dest; if (!src) { return NULL; } /* this takes advantage of the fact that upper/lower can't change the length of a character by more than 1 byte */ dest = talloc_array(ctx, char, 2*(n+1)); if (dest == NULL) { return NULL; } while (n-- && *src) { size_t c_size; codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle_ext(iconv_handle, src, n, CH_UNIX, &c_size); src += c_size; c = toupper_m(c); if (c_size == -1) { talloc_free(dest); return NULL; } size += c_size; } dest[size] = 0; /* trim it so talloc_append_string() works */ dest = talloc_realloc(ctx, dest, char, size+1); talloc_set_name_const(dest, dest); return dest; }

None

CVE-2015-5330

ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5330

samba

f36cb71c330a52106e36028b3029d952257baf15

https://github.com/samba-team/samba

https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=f36cb71c330a52106e36028b3029d952257baf15

CVE-2015-5330: ldb_dn_explode: copy strings by length, not terminators That is, memdup(), not strdup(). The terminators might not be there. But, we have to make sure we put the terminator on, because we tend to assume the terminator is there in other places. Use talloc_set_name_const() on the resulting chunk so talloc_report() remains unchanged. Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599 Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz> Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz> Pair-programmed-with: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Pair-programmed-with: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>

static bool ldb_dn_explode(struct ldb_dn *dn) { char *p, *ex_name = NULL, *ex_value = NULL, *data, *d, *dt, *t; bool trim = true; bool in_extended = true; bool in_ex_name = false; bool in_ex_value = false; bool in_attr = false; bool in_value = false; bool in_quote = false; bool is_oid = false; bool escape = false; unsigned int x; size_t l = 0; int ret; char *parse_dn; bool is_index; if ( ! dn || dn->invalid) return false; if (dn->components) { return true; } if (dn->ext_linearized) { parse_dn = dn->ext_linearized; } else { parse_dn = dn->linearized; } if ( ! parse_dn ) { return false; } is_index = (strncmp(parse_dn, "DN=@INDEX:", 10) == 0); /* Empty DNs */ if (parse_dn[0] == '\0') { return true; } /* Special DNs case */ if (dn->special) { return true; } /* make sure we free this if allocated previously before replacing */ LDB_FREE(dn->components); dn->comp_num = 0; LDB_FREE(dn->ext_components); dn->ext_comp_num = 0; /* in the common case we have 3 or more components */ /* make sure all components are zeroed, other functions depend on it */ dn->components = talloc_zero_array(dn, struct ldb_dn_component, 3); if ( ! dn->components) { return false; } /* Components data space is allocated here once */ data = talloc_array(dn->components, char, strlen(parse_dn) + 1); if (!data) { return false; } p = parse_dn; t = NULL; d = dt = data; while (*p) { if (in_extended) { if (!in_ex_name && !in_ex_value) { if (p[0] == '<') { p++; ex_name = d; in_ex_name = true; continue; } else if (p[0] == '\0') { p++; continue; } else { in_extended = false; in_attr = true; dt = d; continue; } } if (in_ex_name && *p == '=') { *d++ = '\0'; p++; ex_value = d; in_ex_name = false; in_ex_value = true; continue; } if (in_ex_value && *p == '>') { const struct ldb_dn_extended_syntax *ext_syntax; struct ldb_val ex_val = { .data = (uint8_t *)ex_value, .length = d - ex_value }; *d++ = '\0'; p++; in_ex_value = false; /* Process name and ex_value */ dn->ext_components = talloc_realloc(dn, dn->ext_components, struct ldb_dn_ext_component, dn->ext_comp_num + 1); if ( ! dn->ext_components) { /* ouch ! */ goto failed; } ext_syntax = ldb_dn_extended_syntax_by_name(dn->ldb, ex_name); if (!ext_syntax) { /* We don't know about this type of extended DN */ goto failed; } dn->ext_components[dn->ext_comp_num].name = talloc_strdup(dn->ext_components, ex_name); if (!dn->ext_components[dn->ext_comp_num].name) { /* ouch */ goto failed; } ret = ext_syntax->read_fn(dn->ldb, dn->ext_components, &ex_val, &dn->ext_components[dn->ext_comp_num].value); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } dn->ext_comp_num++; if (*p == '\0') { /* We have reached the end (extended component only)! */ talloc_free(data); return true; } else if (*p == ';') { p++; continue; } else { ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } } *d++ = *p++; continue; } if (in_attr) { if (trim) { if (*p == ' ') { p++; continue; } /* first char */ trim = false; if (!isascii(*p)) { /* attr names must be ascii only */ ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } if (isdigit(*p)) { is_oid = true; } else if ( ! isalpha(*p)) { /* not a digit nor an alpha, * invalid attribute name */ ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } /* Copy this character across from parse_dn, * now we have trimmed out spaces */ *d++ = *p++; continue; } if (*p == ' ') { p++; /* valid only if we are at the end */ trim = true; continue; } if (trim && (*p != '=')) { /* spaces/tabs are not allowed */ ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } if (*p == '=') { /* attribute terminated */ in_attr = false; in_value = true; trim = true; l = 0; /* Terminate this string in d * (which is a copy of parse_dn * with spaces trimmed) */ *d++ = '\0'; dn->components[dn->comp_num].name = talloc_strdup(dn->components, dt); if ( ! dn->components[dn->comp_num].name) { /* ouch */ goto failed; } dt = d; p++; continue; } if (!isascii(*p)) { /* attr names must be ascii only */ ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } if (is_oid && ( ! (isdigit(*p) || (*p == '.')))) { /* not a digit nor a dot, * invalid attribute oid */ ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } else if ( ! (isalpha(*p) || isdigit(*p) || (*p == '-'))) { /* not ALPHA, DIGIT or HYPHEN */ ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } *d++ = *p++; continue; } if (in_value) { if (in_quote) { if (*p == '\"') { if (p[-1] != '\\') { p++; in_quote = false; continue; } } *d++ = *p++; l++; continue; } if (trim) { if (*p == ' ') { p++; continue; } /* first char */ trim = false; if (*p == '\"') { in_quote = true; p++; continue; } } switch (*p) { /* TODO: support ber encoded values case '#': */ case ',': if (escape) { *d++ = *p++; l++; escape = false; continue; } /* ok found value terminator */ if ( t ) { /* trim back */ d -= (p - t); l -= (p - t); } in_attr = true; in_value = false; trim = true; p++; *d++ = '\0'; dn->components[dn->comp_num].value.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_strdup(dn->components, dt); dn->components[dn->comp_num].value.length = l; if ( ! dn->components[dn->comp_num].value.data) { /* ouch ! */ goto failed; } dt = d; dn->components, struct ldb_dn_component, dn->comp_num + 1); if ( ! dn->components) { /* ouch ! */ goto failed; } /* make sure all components are zeroed, other functions depend on this */ memset(&dn->components[dn->comp_num], '\0', sizeof(struct ldb_dn_component)); } continue; case '+': case '=': /* to main compatibility with earlier versions of ldb indexing, we have to accept the base64 encoded binary index values, which contain a '+' or '=' which should normally be escaped */ if (is_index) { if ( t ) t = NULL; *d++ = *p++; l++; break; } /* fall through */ case '\"': case '<': case '>': case ';': /* a string with not escaped specials is invalid (tested) */ if ( ! escape) { ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } escape = false; *d++ = *p++; l++; if ( t ) t = NULL; break; case '\\': if ( ! escape) { escape = true; p++; continue; } escape = false; *d++ = *p++; l++; if ( t ) t = NULL; break; default: if (escape) { if (isxdigit(p[0]) && isxdigit(p[1])) { if (sscanf(p, "%02x", &x) != 1) { /* invalid escaping sequence */ ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn); goto failed; } p += 2; *d++ = (unsigned char)x; } else { *d++ = *p++; } escape = false; l++; if ( t ) t = NULL; break; } if (*p == ' ') { if ( ! t) t = p; } else { if ( t ) t = NULL; } *d++ = *p++; l++; break; } } }

None

CVE-2015-5330

ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5330

ghostscript

a6807394bd94b708be24758287b606154daaaed9

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=a6807394bd94

None

gs_call_interp(i_ctx_t **pi_ctx_p, ref * pref, int user_errors, int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object) { ref *epref = pref; ref doref; ref *perrordict; ref error_name; int code, ccode; ref saref; i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p; int *gc_signal = &imemory_system->gs_lib_ctx->gcsignal; *pexit_code = 0; *gc_signal = 0; ialloc_reset_requested(idmemory); again: /* Avoid a dangling error object that might get traced by a future GC. */ make_null(perror_object); o_stack.requested = e_stack.requested = d_stack.requested = 0; while (*gc_signal) { /* Some routine below triggered a GC. */ gs_gc_root_t epref_root; *gc_signal = 0; /* Make sure that doref will get relocated properly if */ /* a garbage collection happens with epref == &doref. */ gs_register_ref_root(imemory_system, &epref_root, (void **)&epref, "gs_call_interp(epref)"); code = interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, -1); i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p; gs_unregister_root(imemory_system, &epref_root, "gs_call_interp(epref)"); if (code < 0) return code; } code = interp(pi_ctx_p, epref, perror_object); i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p; if (!r_has_type(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid)) { *perror_object = i_ctx_p->error_object; make_t(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid); } /* Prevent a dangling reference to the GC signal in ticks_left */ /* in the frame of interp, but be prepared to do a GC if */ /* an allocation in this routine asks for it. */ *gc_signal = 0; set_gc_signal(i_ctx_p, 1); if (esp < esbot) /* popped guard entry */ esp = esbot; switch (code) { case gs_error_Fatal: *pexit_code = 255; return code; case gs_error_Quit: *perror_object = osp[-1]; *pexit_code = code = osp->value.intval; osp -= 2; return (code == 0 ? gs_error_Quit : code < 0 && code > -100 ? code : gs_error_Fatal); case gs_error_InterpreterExit: return 0; case gs_error_ExecStackUnderflow: /****** WRONG -- must keep mark blocks intact ******/ ref_stack_pop_block(&e_stack); doref = *perror_object; epref = &doref; goto again; case gs_error_VMreclaim: /* Do the GC and continue. */ /* We ignore the return value here, if it fails here * we'll call it again having jumped to the "again" label. * Where, assuming it fails again, we'll handle the error. */ (void)interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, (osp->value.intval == 2 ? avm_global : avm_local)); i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p; make_oper(&doref, 0, zpop); epref = &doref; goto again; case gs_error_NeedInput: case gs_error_interrupt: return code; } /* Adjust osp in case of operand stack underflow */ if (osp < osbot - 1) osp = osbot - 1; /* We have to handle stack over/underflow specially, because */ /* we might be able to recover by adding or removing a block. */ switch (code) { case gs_error_dictstackoverflow: /* We don't have to handle this specially: */ /* The only places that could generate it */ /* use check_dstack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */ /* so if` we get this error, it's a real one. */ if (osp >= ostop) { if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0) return ccode; } /* Skip system dictionaries for CET 20-02-02 */ ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, min_dstack_size, &saref); if (ccode < 0) return ccode; ref_stack_pop_to(&d_stack, min_dstack_size); dict_set_top(); *++osp = saref; break; case gs_error_dictstackunderflow: if (ref_stack_pop_block(&d_stack) >= 0) { dict_set_top(); doref = *perror_object; epref = &doref; goto again; } break; case gs_error_execstackoverflow: /* We don't have to handle this specially: */ /* The only places that could generate it */ /* use check_estack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */ /* so if we get this error, it's a real one. */ if (osp >= ostop) { if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0) return ccode; } ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, 0, &saref); if (ccode < 0) return ccode; { uint count = ref_stack_count(&e_stack); uint limit = ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack) - ES_HEADROOM; if (count > limit) { /* * If there is an e-stack mark within MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK of * the new top, cut the stack back to remove the mark. */ int skip = count - limit; int i; for (i = skip; i < skip + MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK; ++i) { const ref *ep = ref_stack_index(&e_stack, i); if (r_has_type_attrs(ep, t_null, a_executable)) { skip = i + 1; break; } } pop_estack(i_ctx_p, skip); } } *++osp = saref; break; case gs_error_stackoverflow: if (ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, o_stack.requested) >= 0) { /* We can't just re-execute the object, because */ /* it might be a procedure being pushed as a */ /* literal. We check for this case specially. */ doref = *perror_object; if (r_is_proc(&doref)) { *++osp = doref; make_null_proc(&doref); } epref = &doref; goto again; } ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, 0, &saref); if (ccode < 0) return ccode; ref_stack_clear(&o_stack); *++osp = saref; break; case gs_error_stackunderflow: if (ref_stack_pop_block(&o_stack) >= 0) { doref = *perror_object; epref = &doref; goto again; } break; } if (user_errors < 0) return code; if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) < 0) return code; /* out-of-range error code! */ /* We refer to gserrordict first, which is not accessible to Postcript jobs * If we're running with SAFERERRORS all the handlers are copied to gserrordict * so we'll always find the default one. If not SAFERERRORS, only gs specific * errors are in gserrordict. */ if (dict_find_string(systemdict, "gserrordict", &perrordict) <= 0 || (dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0 && (dict_find_string(systemdict, "errordict", &perrordict) <= 0 || dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0)) ) return code; /* error name not in errordict??? */ doref = *epref; epref = &doref; /* Push the error object on the operand stack if appropriate. */ if (!GS_ERROR_IS_INTERRUPT(code)) { /* Replace the error object if within an oparray or .errorexec. */ osp++; if (osp >= ostop) { } *osp = *perror_object; } *osp = *perror_object; errorexec_find(i_ctx_p, osp); /* If using SAFER, hand a name object to the error handler, rather than the executable * object/operator itself. */ if (i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions) { code = obj_cvs(imemory, osp, buf + 2, 256, &rlen, (const byte **)&bufptr); if (code < 0) { const char *unknownstr = "--unknown--"; rlen = strlen(unknownstr); memcpy(buf, unknownstr, rlen); } else { buf[0] = buf[1] = buf[rlen + 2] = buf[rlen + 3] = '-'; rlen += 4; } code = name_ref(imemory, buf, rlen, osp, 1); if (code < 0) make_null(osp); } }

None

CVE-2018-17961

Artifex Ghostscript 9.25 and earlier allows attackers to bypass a sandbox protection mechanism via vectors involving errorhandler setup. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-17183.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17961

samba

4278ef25f64d5fdbf432ff1534e275416ec9561e

https://github.com/samba-team/samba

https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=4278ef25f64d5fdbf432ff1534e275416ec9561e

CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file access outside the share). Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>

NTSTATUS check_reduced_name_with_privilege(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname, struct smb_request *smbreq) { NTSTATUS status; TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos(); const char *conn_rootdir; size_t rootdir_len; char *dir_name = NULL; const char *last_component = NULL; char *resolved_name = NULL; char *saved_dir = NULL; struct smb_filename *smb_fname_cwd = NULL; struct privilege_paths *priv_paths = NULL; int ret; DEBUG(3,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege [%s] [%s]\n", fname, priv_paths = talloc_zero(smbreq, struct privilege_paths); if (!priv_paths) { status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto err; } if (!parent_dirname(ctx, fname, &dir_name, &last_component)) { status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto err; } priv_paths->parent_name.base_name = talloc_strdup(priv_paths, dir_name); priv_paths->file_name.base_name = talloc_strdup(priv_paths, last_component); if (priv_paths->parent_name.base_name == NULL || priv_paths->file_name.base_name == NULL) { status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto err; } if (SMB_VFS_STAT(conn, &priv_paths->parent_name) != 0) { status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno); goto err; } /* Remember where we were. */ saved_dir = vfs_GetWd(ctx, conn); if (!saved_dir) { status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno); goto err; } /* Go to the parent directory to lock in memory. */ if (vfs_ChDir(conn, priv_paths->parent_name.base_name) == -1) { status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno); goto err; } /* Get the absolute path of the parent directory. */ resolved_name = SMB_VFS_REALPATH(conn,"."); if (!resolved_name) { status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno); goto err; } if (*resolved_name != '/') { DEBUG(0,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: realpath " "doesn't return absolute paths !\n")); status = NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID; goto err; } DEBUG(10,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: realpath [%s] -> [%s]\n", priv_paths->parent_name.base_name, resolved_name)); /* Now check the stat value is the same. */ smb_fname_cwd = synthetic_smb_fname(talloc_tos(), ".", NULL, NULL); if (smb_fname_cwd == NULL) { status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto err; } if (SMB_VFS_LSTAT(conn, smb_fname_cwd) != 0) { status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno); goto err; } /* Ensure we're pointing at the same place. */ if (!check_same_stat(&smb_fname_cwd->st, &priv_paths->parent_name.st)) { DEBUG(0,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: " "device/inode/uid/gid on directory %s changed. " "Denying access !\n", priv_paths->parent_name.base_name)); status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; goto err; } /* Ensure we're below the connect path. */ conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname); if (conn_rootdir == NULL) { DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: Could not get " "conn_rootdir\n")); status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; goto err; } }

None

CVE-2015-5252

vfs.c in smbd in Samba 3.x and 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, when share names with certain substring relationships exist, allows remote attackers to bypass intended file-access restrictions via a symlink that points outside of a share.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5252

savannah

dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a

None

plan_a (char const *filename) { char const *s; char const *lim; char const **ptr; char *buffer; lin iline; size_t size = instat.st_size; /* Fail if the file size doesn't fit in a size_t, or if storage isn't available. */ if (! (size == instat.st_size && (buffer = malloc (size ? size : (size_t) 1)))) return false; /* Read the input file, but don't bother reading it if it's empty. When creating files, the files do not actually exist. */ if (size) { if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode)) { int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0); size_t buffered = 0, n; if (ifd < 0) pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename)); /* Some non-POSIX hosts exaggerate st_size in text mode; or the file may have shrunk! */ size = buffered; break; } if (n == (size_t) -1) { /* Perhaps size is too large for this host. */ close (ifd); free (buffer); return false; } buffered += n; } if (close (ifd) != 0) read_fatal (); }

None

CVE-2019-13636

In GNU patch through 2.7.6, the following of symlinks is mishandled in certain cases other than input files. This affects inp.c and util.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13636

dbus

c3223ba6c401ba81df1305851312a47c485e6cd7

http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=dbus/dbus

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?h=dbus-1.4&id=c3223ba6c401ba81df1305851312a47c485e6cd7

_dbus_header_byteswap: change the first byte of the message, not just the struct member This has been wrong approximately forever, for instance see: http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/dbus/2007-March/007357.html Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38120 Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=629938 Reviewed-by: Will Thompson <will.thompson@collabora.co.uk>

_dbus_header_byteswap (DBusHeader *header, int new_order) { if (header->byte_order == new_order) return; _dbus_marshal_byteswap (&_dbus_header_signature_str, 0, header->byte_order, new_order, &header->data, 0); header->byte_order = new_order; }

dbus-marshal-header.c

CVE-2011-2200

The _dbus_header_byteswap function in dbus-marshal-header.c in D-Bus (aka DBus) 1.2.x before 1.2.28, 1.4.x before 1.4.12, and 1.5.x before 1.5.4 does not properly handle a non-native byte order, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (connection loss), obtain potentially sensitive information, or conduct unspecified state-modification attacks via crafted messages.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2200

ghostscript

79cccf641486a6595c43f1de1cd7ade696020a31

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=79cccf641486

None

gs_nulldevice(gs_gstate * pgs) { int code = 0; if (pgs->device == 0 || !gx_device_is_null(pgs->device)) { gx_device *ndev; code = gs_copydevice(&ndev, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device, pgs->memory); if (code < 0) return code; /* * Internal devices have a reference count of 0, not 1, * aside from references from graphics states. to sort out how the icc profile is best handled with this device. It seems to inherit properties from the current device if there is one */ rc_init(ndev, pgs->memory, 0); if (pgs->device != NULL) { if ((code = dev_proc(pgs->device, get_profile)(pgs->device, &(ndev->icc_struct))) < 0) return code; rc_increment(ndev->icc_struct); set_dev_proc(ndev, get_profile, gx_default_get_profile); } if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0) if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0) gs_free_object(pgs->memory, ndev, "gs_copydevice(device)"); } return code; }

None

CVE-2018-16863

It was found that RHSA-2018:2918 did not fully fix CVE-2018-16509. An attacker could possibly exploit another variant of the flaw and bypass the -dSAFER protection to, for example, execute arbitrary shell commands via a specially crafted PostScript document. This only affects ghostscript 9.07 as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16863

ghostscript

5516c614dc33662a2afdc377159f70218e67bde5

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=5516c614dc33

None

zrestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p) { os_ptr op = osp; alloc_save_t *asave; bool last; vm_save_t *vmsave; int code = restore_check_operand(op, &asave, idmemory); if (code < 0) return code; if_debug2m('u', imemory, "[u]vmrestore 0x%lx, id = %lu\n", (ulong) alloc_save_client_data(asave), (ulong) op->value.saveid); if (I_VALIDATE_BEFORE_RESTORE) ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p); ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p); /* Check the contents of the stacks. */ { int code; if ((code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, asave, false)) < 0 || (code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, asave, true)) < 0 || (code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, asave, false)) < 0 ) { osp++; return code; } } /* Reset l_new in all stack entries if the new save level is zero. */ /* Also do some special fixing on the e-stack. */ restore_fix_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, asave, false); }

None

CVE-2018-16863

It was found that RHSA-2018:2918 did not fully fix CVE-2018-16509. An attacker could possibly exploit another variant of the flaw and bypass the -dSAFER protection to, for example, execute arbitrary shell commands via a specially crafted PostScript document. This only affects ghostscript 9.07 as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16863

NetworkManager

78ce088843d59d4494965bfc40b30a2e63d065f6

https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager/commit/?id=78ce088843d59d4494965bfc40b30a2e63d065f6

libnm-util: remove some left-over debugging code

destroy_one_secret (gpointer data) { char *secret = (char *) data; /* Don't leave the secret lying around in memory */ g_message ("%s: destroying %s", __func__, secret); memset (secret, 0, strlen (secret)); g_free (secret); }

nm-setting-vpn.c

CVE-2011-1943

The destroy_one_secret function in nm-setting-vpn.c in libnm-util in the NetworkManager package 0.8.999-3.git20110526 in Fedora 15 creates a log entry containing a certificate password, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information by reading a log file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1943

libxfont

d1e670a4a8704b8708e493ab6155589bcd570608

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d1e670a4a8704b8708e493ab6155589bcd570608

None

PatternMatch(char *pat, int patdashes, char *string, int stringdashes) { char c, t; if (stringdashes < patdashes) return 0; for (;;) { switch (c = *pat++) { case '*': if (!(c = *pat++)) return 1; if (c == XK_minus) { patdashes--; for (;;) { while ((t = *string++) != XK_minus) if (!t) return 0; stringdashes--; if (PatternMatch(pat, patdashes, string, stringdashes)) return 1; if (stringdashes == patdashes) return 0; } } else { for (;;) { while ((t = *string++) != c) { if (!t) return 0; if (t == XK_minus) { if (stringdashes-- < patdashes) return 0; } } if (PatternMatch(pat, patdashes, string, stringdashes)) return 1; } } case '?': if (*string++ == XK_minus) stringdashes--; break; case '\0': return (*string == '\0'); patdashes--; stringdashes--; break; } return 0; default: if (c == *string++) break; return 0; } }

None

CVE-2017-13720

In the PatternMatch function in fontfile/fontdir.c in libXfont through 1.5.2 and 2.x before 2.0.2, an attacker with access to an X connection can cause a buffer over-read during pattern matching of fonts, leading to information disclosure or a crash (denial of service). This occurs because '\0' characters are incorrectly skipped in situations involving ? characters.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-13720

ghostscript

b575e1ec42cc86f6a58c603f2a88fcc2af699cc8

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=b575e1ec42cc86f6a58c603f2a88fcc2af699cc8

None

gs_call_interp(i_ctx_t **pi_ctx_p, ref * pref, int user_errors, int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object) { ref *epref = pref; ref doref; ref *perrordict; ref error_name; int code, ccode; ref saref; i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p; int *gc_signal = &imemory_system->gs_lib_ctx->gcsignal; *pexit_code = 0; *gc_signal = 0; ialloc_reset_requested(idmemory); again: /* Avoid a dangling error object that might get traced by a future GC. */ make_null(perror_object); o_stack.requested = e_stack.requested = d_stack.requested = 0; while (*gc_signal) { /* Some routine below triggered a GC. */ gs_gc_root_t epref_root; *gc_signal = 0; /* Make sure that doref will get relocated properly if */ /* a garbage collection happens with epref == &doref. */ gs_register_ref_root(imemory_system, &epref_root, (void **)&epref, "gs_call_interp(epref)"); code = interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, -1); i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p; gs_unregister_root(imemory_system, &epref_root, "gs_call_interp(epref)"); if (code < 0) return code; } code = interp(pi_ctx_p, epref, perror_object); i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p; if (!r_has_type(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid)) { *perror_object = i_ctx_p->error_object; make_t(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid); } /* Prevent a dangling reference to the GC signal in ticks_left */ /* in the frame of interp, but be prepared to do a GC if */ /* an allocation in this routine asks for it. */ *gc_signal = 0; set_gc_signal(i_ctx_p, 1); if (esp < esbot) /* popped guard entry */ esp = esbot; switch (code) { case gs_error_Fatal: *pexit_code = 255; return code; case gs_error_Quit: *perror_object = osp[-1]; *pexit_code = code = osp->value.intval; osp -= 2; return (code == 0 ? gs_error_Quit : code < 0 && code > -100 ? code : gs_error_Fatal); case gs_error_InterpreterExit: return 0; case gs_error_ExecStackUnderflow: /****** WRONG -- must keep mark blocks intact ******/ ref_stack_pop_block(&e_stack); doref = *perror_object; epref = &doref; goto again; case gs_error_VMreclaim: /* Do the GC and continue. */ /* We ignore the return value here, if it fails here * we'll call it again having jumped to the "again" label. * Where, assuming it fails again, we'll handle the error. */ (void)interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, (osp->value.intval == 2 ? avm_global : avm_local)); i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p; make_oper(&doref, 0, zpop); epref = &doref; goto again; case gs_error_NeedInput: case gs_error_interrupt: return code; } /* Adjust osp in case of operand stack underflow */ if (osp < osbot - 1) osp = osbot - 1; /* We have to handle stack over/underflow specially, because */ /* we might be able to recover by adding or removing a block. */ switch (code) { case gs_error_dictstackoverflow: /* We don't have to handle this specially: */ /* The only places that could generate it */ /* use check_dstack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */ /* so if` we get this error, it's a real one. */ if (osp >= ostop) { if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0) return ccode; } /* Skip system dictionaries for CET 20-02-02 */ ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, min_dstack_size, &saref); if (ccode < 0) return ccode; ref_stack_pop_to(&d_stack, min_dstack_size); dict_set_top(); *++osp = saref; break; case gs_error_dictstackunderflow: if (ref_stack_pop_block(&d_stack) >= 0) { dict_set_top(); doref = *perror_object; epref = &doref; goto again; } break; case gs_error_execstackoverflow: /* We don't have to handle this specially: */ /* The only places that could generate it */ /* use check_estack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */ /* so if we get this error, it's a real one. */ if (osp >= ostop) { if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0) return ccode; } ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, 0, &saref); if (ccode < 0) return ccode; { uint count = ref_stack_count(&e_stack); uint limit = ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack) - ES_HEADROOM; if (count > limit) { /* * If there is an e-stack mark within MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK of * the new top, cut the stack back to remove the mark. */ int skip = count - limit; int i; for (i = skip; i < skip + MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK; ++i) { const ref *ep = ref_stack_index(&e_stack, i); if (r_has_type_attrs(ep, t_null, a_executable)) { skip = i + 1; break; } } pop_estack(i_ctx_p, skip); } } *++osp = saref; break; case gs_error_stackoverflow: if (ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, o_stack.requested) >= 0) { /* We can't just re-execute the object, because */ /* it might be a procedure being pushed as a */ /* literal. We check for this case specially. */ doref = *perror_object; if (r_is_proc(&doref)) { *++osp = doref; make_null_proc(&doref); } epref = &doref; goto again; } ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, 0, &saref); if (ccode < 0) return ccode; ref_stack_clear(&o_stack); *++osp = saref; break; case gs_error_stackunderflow: if (ref_stack_pop_block(&o_stack) >= 0) { doref = *perror_object; epref = &doref; goto again; } break; } if (user_errors < 0) return code; if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) < 0) return code; /* out-of-range error code! */ /* * For greater Adobe compatibility, only the standard PostScript errors * are defined in errordict; the rest are in gserrordict. */ if (dict_find_string(systemdict, "errordict", &perrordict) <= 0 || (dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0 && (dict_find_string(systemdict, "gserrordict", &perrordict) <= 0 || dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0)) ) return code; /* error name not in errordict??? */ doref = *epref; epref = &doref; /* Push the error object on the operand stack if appropriate. */ if (!GS_ERROR_IS_INTERRUPT(code)) { /* Replace the error object if within an oparray or .errorexec. */ *++osp = *perror_object; errorexec_find(i_ctx_p, osp); } goto again; }

interp.c

CVE-2018-16542

In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use insufficient interpreter stack-size checking during error handling to crash the interpreter.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16542

ghostscript

241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d

None

gs_main_finit(gs_main_instance * minst, int exit_status, int code) { i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; gs_dual_memory_t dmem = {0}; int exit_code; ref error_object; char *tempnames; /* NB: need to free gs_name_table */ /* * Previous versions of this code closed the devices in the * device list here. Since these devices are now prototypes, * they cannot be opened, so they do not need to be closed; * alloc_restore_all will close dynamically allocated devices. */ tempnames = gs_main_tempnames(minst); /* by the time we get here, we *must* avoid any random redefinitions of * operators etc, so we push systemdict onto the top of the dict stack. * We do this in C to avoid running into any other re-defininitions in the * Postscript world. */ gs_finit_push_systemdict(i_ctx_p); /* We have to disable BGPrint before we call interp_reclaim() to prevent the * parent rendering thread initialising for the next page, whilst we are * removing objects it may want to access - for example, the I/O device table. * We also have to mess with the BeginPage/EndPage procs so that we don't * trigger a spurious extra page to be emitted. */ if (minst->init_done >= 2) { gs_main_run_string(minst, "/BGPrint /GetDeviceParam .special_op \ {{ <</BeginPage {pop} /EndPage {pop pop //false } \ /BGPrint false /NumRenderingThreads 0>> setpagedevice} if} if \ serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse \ .systemvar exec", 0 , &exit_code, &error_object); } /* * Close the "main" device, because it may need to write out * data before destruction. pdfwrite needs so. */ if (minst->init_done >= 2) { int code = 0; if (idmemory->reclaim != 0) { code = interp_reclaim(&minst->i_ctx_p, avm_global); if (code < 0) { ref error_name; if (tempnames) free(tempnames); if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) { char err_str[32] = {0}; name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name); memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name)); emprintf2(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", err_str, code); } else { emprintf1(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", code); } #ifdef MEMENTO_SQUEEZE_BUILD if (code != gs_error_VMerror ) return gs_error_Fatal; #else return gs_error_Fatal; #endif } i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* interp_reclaim could change it. */ } if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL) { gx_device *pdev = i_ctx_p->pgs->device; const char * dname = pdev->dname; if (code < 0) { ref error_name; if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) { char err_str[32] = {0}; name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name); memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name)); emprintf3(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) on closing %s device.\n", err_str, code, dname); } else { emprintf2(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d closing %s device.\n", code, dname); } } rc_decrement(pdev, "gs_main_finit"); /* device might be freed */ if (exit_status == 0 || exit_status == gs_error_Quit) exit_status = code; } /* Flush stdout and stderr */ gs_main_run_string(minst, "(%stdout) (w) file closefile (%stderr) (w) file closefile \ serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse .systemexec \ systemdict /savedinitialgstate .forceundef", 0 , &exit_code, &error_object); } gp_readline_finit(minst->readline_data); i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* get current interp context */ if (gs_debug_c(':')) { print_resource_usage(minst, &gs_imemory, "Final"); dmprintf1(minst->heap, "%% Exiting instance 0x%p\n", minst); } /* Do the equivalent of a restore "past the bottom". */ /* This will release all memory, close all open files, etc. */ if (minst->init_done >= 1) { gs_memory_t *mem_raw = i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory; i_plugin_holder *h = i_ctx_p->plugin_list; dmem = *idmemory; code = alloc_restore_all(i_ctx_p); if (code < 0) emprintf1(mem_raw, "ERROR %d while the final restore. See gs/psi/ierrors.h for code explanation.\n", code); i_iodev_finit(&dmem); i_plugin_finit(mem_raw, h); } /* clean up redirected stdout */ if (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 && (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout) && (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstderr)) { fclose(minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2); minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 = (FILE *)NULL; } minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_is_redirected = 0; minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_to_stderr = 0; /* remove any temporary files, after ghostscript has closed files */ if (tempnames) { char *p = tempnames; while (*p) { unlink(p); p += strlen(p) + 1; } free(tempnames); } gs_lib_finit(exit_status, code, minst->heap); gs_free_object(minst->heap, minst->lib_path.container.value.refs, "lib_path array"); ialloc_finit(&dmem); return exit_status; }

None

CVE-2018-16541

In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use incorrect free logic in pagedevice replacement to crash the interpreter.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16541

ghostscript

b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498

None

zsetcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p) { os_ptr op = osp; es_ptr ep; const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs); gs_client_color cc; int n_comps, n_numeric_comps, num_offset = 0, code, depth; PS_colour_space_t *space; /* initialize the client color pattern pointer for GC */ cc.pattern = 0; /* check for a pattern color space */ if ((n_comps = cs_num_components(pcs)) < 0) { n_comps = -n_comps; if (r_has_type(op, t_dictionary)) { ref *pImpl, pPatInst; code = dict_find_string(op, "Implementation", &pImpl); if (code != 0) { code = array_get(imemory, pImpl, 0, &pPatInst); if (code < 0) return code; n_numeric_comps = ( pattern_instance_uses_base_space(cc.pattern) ? n_comps - 1 : 0 ); } else n_numeric_comps = 0; } else n_numeric_comps = 0; num_offset = 1; } else n_numeric_comps = n_comps; /* gather the numeric operands */ code = float_params(op - num_offset, n_numeric_comps, cc.paint.values); if (code < 0) return code; /* The values are copied to graphic state and compared with */ /* other colors by memcmp() in gx_hld_saved_color_equal() */ /* This is the easiest way to avoid indeterminism */ memset(cc.paint.values + n_numeric_comps, 0, sizeof(cc.paint.values) - sizeof(*cc.paint.values)*n_numeric_comps); code = get_space_object(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &space); if (code < 0) return code; if (space->validatecomponents) { code = space->validatecomponents(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, cc.paint.values, n_numeric_comps); if (code < 0) return code; } /* pass the color to the graphic library */ if ((code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc)) >= 0) { if (n_comps > n_numeric_comps) { istate->pattern[0] = *op; /* save pattern dict or null */ } } /* Check the color spaces, to see if we need to run any tint transform * procedures. Some Adobe applications *eg Photoshop) expect that the * tint transform will be run and use this to set up duotone DeviceN * spaces. */ code = validate_spaces(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &depth); if (code < 0) return code; /* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */ /* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */ check_estack(5); /* A place holder for data potentially used by transform functions */ ep = esp += 1; make_int(ep, 0); /* Store the 'depth' of the space returned during checking above */ ep = esp += 1; make_int(ep, 0); /* Store the 'stage' of processing (initially 0) */ ep = esp += 1; make_int(ep, 0); /* Store a pointer to the color space stored on the operand stack * as the stack may grow unpredictably making further access * to the space difficult */ ep = esp += 1; *ep = istate->colorspace[0].array; /* Finally, the actual continuation routine */ push_op_estack(setcolor_cont); return o_push_estack; }

None

CVE-2018-16513

In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use a type confusion in the setcolor function to crash the interpreter or possibly have unspecified other impact.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16513

ghostscript

0edd3d6c634a577db261615a9dc2719bca7f6e01

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=0edd3d6c634a577db261615a9dc2719bca7f6e01

None

ztype(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p) { os_ptr op = osp; ref tnref; int code = array_get(imemory, op, (long)r_btype(op - 1), &tnref); if (code < 0) return code; if (!r_has_type(&tnref, t_name)) { /* Must be either a stack underflow or a t_[a]struct. */ check_op(2); { /* Get the type name from the structure. */ if (op[-1].value.pstruct != 0x00) { const char *sname = gs_struct_type_name_string(gs_object_type(imemory, op[-1].value.pstruct)); int code = name_ref(imemory, (const byte *)sname, strlen(sname), (ref *) (op - 1), 0); if (code < 0) return code; } else return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow); } r_set_attrs(op - 1, a_executable); } else { ref_assign(op - 1, &tnref); } pop(1); return 0; }

ztype.c

CVE-2018-16511

An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24. A type confusion in "ztype" could be used by remote attackers able to supply crafted PostScript to crash the interpreter or possibly have unspecified other impact.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16511

savannah

ba6b44f6745b14dce414761a8e4b35d31b176bba

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=ba6b44f6745b14dce414761a8e4b35d31b176bba

None

fd_read_body (const char *downloaded_filename, int fd, FILE *out, wgint toread, wgint startpos, wgint *qtyread, wgint *qtywritten, double *elapsed, int flags, FILE *out2) { int ret = 0; #undef max #define max(a,b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b)) int dlbufsize = max (BUFSIZ, 8 * 1024); char *dlbuf = xmalloc (dlbufsize); struct ptimer *timer = NULL; double last_successful_read_tm = 0; /* The progress gauge, set according to the user preferences. */ void *progress = NULL; /* Non-zero if the progress gauge is interactive, i.e. if it can continually update the display. When true, smaller timeout values are used so that the gauge can update the display when data arrives slowly. */ bool progress_interactive = false; bool exact = !!(flags & rb_read_exactly); /* Used only by HTTP/HTTPS chunked transfer encoding. */ bool chunked = flags & rb_chunked_transfer_encoding; wgint skip = 0; /* How much data we've read/written. */ wgint sum_read = 0; wgint sum_written = 0; wgint remaining_chunk_size = 0; #ifdef HAVE_LIBZ /* try to minimize the number of calls to inflate() and write_data() per call to fd_read() */ unsigned int gzbufsize = dlbufsize * 4; char *gzbuf = NULL; z_stream gzstream; if (flags & rb_compressed_gzip) { gzbuf = xmalloc (gzbufsize); if (gzbuf != NULL) { gzstream.zalloc = zalloc; gzstream.zfree = zfree; gzstream.opaque = Z_NULL; gzstream.next_in = Z_NULL; gzstream.avail_in = 0; #define GZIP_DETECT 32 /* gzip format detection */ #define GZIP_WINDOW 15 /* logarithmic window size (default: 15) */ ret = inflateInit2 (&gzstream, GZIP_DETECT | GZIP_WINDOW); if (ret != Z_OK) { xfree (gzbuf); errno = (ret == Z_MEM_ERROR) ? ENOMEM : EINVAL; ret = -1; goto out; } } else { errno = ENOMEM; ret = -1; goto out; } } #endif if (flags & rb_skip_startpos) skip = startpos; if (opt.show_progress) { const char *filename_progress; /* If we're skipping STARTPOS bytes, pass 0 as the INITIAL argument to progress_create because the indicator doesn't (yet) know about "skipping" data. */ wgint start = skip ? 0 : startpos; if (opt.dir_prefix) filename_progress = downloaded_filename + strlen (opt.dir_prefix) + 1; else filename_progress = downloaded_filename; progress = progress_create (filename_progress, start, start + toread); progress_interactive = progress_interactive_p (progress); } if (opt.limit_rate) limit_bandwidth_reset (); /* A timer is needed for tracking progress, for throttling, and for tracking elapsed time. If either of these are requested, start the timer. */ if (progress || opt.limit_rate || elapsed) { timer = ptimer_new (); last_successful_read_tm = 0; } /* Use a smaller buffer for low requested bandwidths. For example, with --limit-rate=2k, it doesn't make sense to slurp in 16K of data and then sleep for 8s. With buffer size equal to the limit, we never have to sleep for more than one second. */ if (opt.limit_rate && opt.limit_rate < dlbufsize) dlbufsize = opt.limit_rate; /* Read from FD while there is data to read. Normally toread==0 means that it is unknown how much data is to arrive. However, if EXACT is set, then toread==0 means what it says: that no data should be read. */ while (!exact || (sum_read < toread)) { int rdsize; double tmout = opt.read_timeout; if (chunked) { if (remaining_chunk_size == 0) { char *line = fd_read_line (fd); char *endl; if (line == NULL) { ret = -1; break; } else if (out2 != NULL) fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2); remaining_chunk_size = strtol (line, &endl, 16); xfree (line); if (remaining_chunk_size == 0) { ret = 0; fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2); xfree (line); } break; } } rdsize = MIN (remaining_chunk_size, dlbufsize); } else rdsize = exact ? MIN (toread - sum_read, dlbufsize) : dlbufsize; if (progress_interactive) { /* For interactive progress gauges, always specify a ~1s timeout, so that the gauge can be updated regularly even when the data arrives very slowly or stalls. */ tmout = 0.95; if (opt.read_timeout) { double waittm; waittm = ptimer_read (timer) - last_successful_read_tm; if (waittm + tmout > opt.read_timeout) { /* Don't let total idle time exceed read timeout. */ tmout = opt.read_timeout - waittm; if (tmout < 0) { /* We've already exceeded the timeout. */ ret = -1, errno = ETIMEDOUT; break; } } } } ret = fd_read (fd, dlbuf, rdsize, tmout); if (progress_interactive && ret < 0 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) ret = 0; /* interactive timeout, handled above */ else if (ret <= 0) break; /* EOF or read error */ if (progress || opt.limit_rate || elapsed) { ptimer_measure (timer); if (ret > 0) last_successful_read_tm = ptimer_read (timer); } if (ret > 0) { int write_res; sum_read += ret; #ifdef HAVE_LIBZ if (gzbuf != NULL) { int err; int towrite; gzstream.avail_in = ret; gzstream.next_in = (unsigned char *) dlbuf; do { gzstream.avail_out = gzbufsize; gzstream.next_out = (unsigned char *) gzbuf; err = inflate (&gzstream, Z_NO_FLUSH); switch (err) { case Z_MEM_ERROR: errno = ENOMEM; ret = -1; goto out; case Z_NEED_DICT: case Z_DATA_ERROR: errno = EINVAL; ret = -1; goto out; case Z_STREAM_END: if (exact && sum_read != toread) { DEBUGP(("zlib stream ended unexpectedly after " "%ld/%ld bytes\n", sum_read, toread)); } } towrite = gzbufsize - gzstream.avail_out; write_res = write_data (out, out2, gzbuf, towrite, &skip, &sum_written); if (write_res < 0) { ret = (write_res == -3) ? -3 : -2; goto out; } } while (gzstream.avail_out == 0); } else #endif { write_res = write_data (out, out2, dlbuf, ret, &skip, &sum_written); if (write_res < 0) { ret = (write_res == -3) ? -3 : -2; goto out; } } if (chunked) { remaining_chunk_size -= ret; if (remaining_chunk_size == 0) { char *line = fd_read_line (fd); if (line == NULL) { ret = -1; break; } else { if (out2 != NULL) fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2); xfree (line); } } } } if (opt.limit_rate) limit_bandwidth (ret, timer); if (progress) progress_update (progress, ret, ptimer_read (timer)); #ifdef WINDOWS if (toread > 0 && opt.show_progress) ws_percenttitle (100.0 * (startpos + sum_read) / (startpos + toread)); #endif }

None

CVE-2017-13090

The retr.c:fd_read_body() function is called when processing OK responses. When the response is sent chunked in wget before 1.19.2, the chunk parser uses strtol() to read each chunk's length, but doesn't check that the chunk length is a non-negative number. The code then tries to read the chunk in pieces of 8192 bytes by using the MIN() macro, but ends up passing the negative chunk length to retr.c:fd_read(). As fd_read() takes an int argument, the high 32 bits of the chunk length are discarded, leaving fd_read() with a completely attacker controlled length argument. The attacker can corrupt malloc metadata after the allocated buffer.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-13090

drm

9f1f1a2dab38d4ce87a13565cf4dc1b73bef3a5f

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc/commit/?id=9f1f1a2dab38d4ce87a13565cf4dc1b73bef3a5f

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc/commit/?id=9f1f1a2dab38d4ce87a13565cf4dc1b73bef3a5f

None

struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector) { const char *connector_name = connector->name; char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL; struct edid *edid; if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0') return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); /* * If there are multiple edid files specified and separated * by commas, search through the list looking for one that * matches the connector. * * If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep * the last one found one as a fallback. */ fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL); edidstr = fwstr; while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) { if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname)) continue; edidname = colon + 1; break; } if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */ fallback = edidname; }

None

CVE-2019-12382

An issue was discovered in drm_load_edid_firmware in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid_load.c in the Linux kernel through 5.1.5. There is an unchecked kstrdup of fwstr, which might allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash). NOTE: The vendor disputes this issues as not being a vulnerability because kstrdup() returning NULL is handled sufficiently and there is no chance for a NULL pointer dereference

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12382

haproxy

7ec765568883b2d4e5a2796adbeb492a22ec9bd4

https://github.com/haproxy/haproxy

https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commit;h=7ec765568883b2d4e5a2796adbeb492a22ec9bd4

None

void buffer_slow_realign(struct buffer *buf) { /* two possible cases : * - the buffer is in one contiguous block, we move it in-place * - the buffer is in two blocks, we move it via the swap_buffer */ if (buf->i) { int block1 = buf->i; int block2 = 0; if (buf->p + buf->i > buf->data + buf->size) { /* non-contiguous block */ block1 = buf->data + buf->size - buf->p; block2 = buf->p + buf->i - (buf->data + buf->size); } if (block2) memcpy(swap_buffer, buf->data, block2); memmove(buf->data, buf->p, block1); if (block2) memcpy(buf->data + block1, swap_buffer, block2); } buf->p = buf->data; }

None

CVE-2015-3281

The buffer_slow_realign function in HAProxy 1.5.x before 1.5.14 and 1.6-dev does not properly realign a buffer that is used for pending outgoing data, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information (uninitialized memory contents of previous requests) via a crafted request.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3281

savannah

3f872fe60463a931c5c766dbf8c36870c0023e88

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=quagga.git;a=commitdiff;h=3f872fe60463a931c5c766dbf8c36870c0023e88

None

new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter) { u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; struct msg_register_event *emsg; int len; emsg = (struct msg_register_event *) buf; len = sizeof (struct msg_register_event) + filter->num_areas * sizeof (struct in_addr); emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask); emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin; emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas; return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len); }

ospf_api.c

CVE-2013-2236

Stack-based buffer overflow in the new_msg_lsa_change_notify function in the OSPFD API (ospf_api.c) in Quagga before 0.99.22.2, when --enable-opaque-lsa and the -a command line option are used, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a large LSA.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2236

openssl

cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d

Fix leak with ASN.1 combine. When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as this will leak any additional components in the parent. This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures. CVE-2015-3195. Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using libFuzzer. PR#4131 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL; const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb; const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q; unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */ unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass; char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt; long tmplen; int i; int otag; int ret = 0; ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval; if (!pval) return 0; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) asn1_cb = 0; switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) { /* * tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template * because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this * isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item * template in the template itself. */ if ((tag != -1) || opt) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE); goto err; } return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it->templates, opt, ctx); } return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: p = *in; /* Just read in tag and class */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL, &p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* Must be UNIVERSAL class */ if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ if (opt) return -1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL); goto err; } /* Check tag matches bit map */ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ if (opt) return -1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG); goto err; } return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: /* Use new style d2i */ ef = it->funcs; return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT: /* we must resort to old style evil hackery */ cf = it->funcs; /* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */ if (opt) { int exptag; p = *in; if (tag == -1) exptag = it->utype; else exptag = tag; /* * Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (ret == -1) return -1; } /* * This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the * underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one * present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back * afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes * this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which * will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy * the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we * should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the * buffer. */ if (tag != -1) { wp = *(unsigned char **)in; imphack = *wp; if (p == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } *wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) | it->utype); } ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len); if (tag != -1) *wp = imphack; if (ptmpval) return 1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; if (*pval) { /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { tt = it->templates + i; pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt); asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it); } } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */ p = *in; for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); /* * We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised. */ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx); /* If field not present, try the next one */ if (ret == -1) continue; /* If positive return, read OK, break loop */ if (ret > 0) break; /* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */ errtt = tt; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */ if (i == it->tcount) { /* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */ if (opt) { /* Free and zero it */ ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); return -1; } ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE); goto err; } asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it); if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; *in = p; return 1; case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: p = *in; tmplen = len; /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */ if (tag == -1) { tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; } /* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst, &p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) { len = tmplen - (p - *in); seq_nolen = 1; } /* If indefinite we don't do a length check */ else seq_nolen = seq_eoc; if (!cst) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED); goto err; } if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; /* Free up and zero any ADB found */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); } } /* Get each field entry */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) goto err; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); /* Have we ran out of data? */ if (!len) break; q = p; if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { if (!seq_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC); goto err; } len -= p - q; seq_eoc = 0; q = p; break; } /* * This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be * omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still * data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it * increases efficiency in some cases. */ if (i == (it->tcount - 1)) isopt = 0; else isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL); /* * attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL */ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx); if (!ret) { errtt = seqtt; goto err; } else if (ret == -1) { /* * OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field. */ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); continue; } /* Update length */ len -= p - q; } /* Check for EOC if expecting one */ if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); goto err; } /* Check all data read */ if (!seq_nolen && len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* * If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we * may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL * and clear any that are. */ for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) goto err; if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) { ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); } else { errtt = seqtt; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING); goto err; } } /* Save encoding */ if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it)) goto auxerr; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; *in = p; return 1; default: return 0; } auxerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR); auxerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR); err: ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); if (errtt) ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name, ", Type=", it->sname); }

None

CVE-2015-3195

The ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE implementation in crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zh, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0t, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1q, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2e mishandles errors caused by malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE data, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory by triggering a decoding failure in a PKCS#7 or CMS application.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3195

openssl

d8541d7e9e63bf5f343af24644046c8d96498c17

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=d8541d7e9e63bf5f343af24644046c8d96498c17

Add PSS parameter check. Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server enabling client authentication. Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug. CVE-2015-3194 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) { const unsigned char *p; int plen; RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; *pmaskHash = NULL; if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) return NULL; p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data; plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length; pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen); if (!pss) return NULL; if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) { ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter; if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1 && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { p = param->value.sequence->data; plen = param->value.sequence->length; *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); } } return pss; }

None

CVE-2015-3194

crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1q and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2e allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an RSA PSS ASN.1 signature that lacks a mask generation function parameter.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3194

openssl

c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e

Add PSS parameter check. Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server enabling client authentication. Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug. CVE-2015-3194 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg) { const unsigned char *p; int plen; if (alg == NULL) return NULL; if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) return NULL; if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) return NULL; p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data; plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length; return d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); }

None

CVE-2015-3194

crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1q and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2e allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an RSA PSS ASN.1 signature that lacks a mask generation function parameter.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3194

openssl

d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72

bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix carry propagating bug (CVE-2015-3193). Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e7c078db57908cbf16074c68034977565ffaf107)

int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_one(a); BN_one(b); BN_zero(c); if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n"); return 0; } BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0); if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) return (0); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " ^ "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, d); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx); BN_sub(e, e, d); BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx); if (!BN_is_zero(b)) { fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_zero(c); if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus " "succeeded\n"); return 0; } BN_set_word(c, 16); if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus " "succeeded\n"); return 0; } BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0); if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) return (00); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " ^ "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, d); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx); BN_sub(e, e, d); BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx); if (!BN_is_zero(b)) { fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return (1); }

None

CVE-2015-3193

The Montgomery squaring implementation in crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2e on the x86_64 platform, as used by the BN_mod_exp function, mishandles carry propagation and produces incorrect output, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive private-key information via an attack against use of a (1) Diffie-Hellman (DH) or (2) Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (DHE) ciphersuite.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3193

savannah

4d4f992826a4962790ecd0cce6fbba4a415ce149

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=libtasn1.git;a=commit;h=4d4f992826a4962790ecd0cce6fbba4a415ce149

None

_asn1_ltostr (long v, char *str) { long d, r; char temp[LTOSTR_MAX_SIZE]; int count, k, start; if (v < 0) { str[0] = '-'; start = 1; v = -v; } else start = 0; count = 0; do { d = v / 10; r = v - d * 10; temp[start + count] = '0' + (char) r; count++; v = d; } while (v); for (k = 0; k < count; k++) str[k + start] = temp[start + count - k - 1]; str[count + start] = 0; return str; }

parser_aux.c

CVE-2015-2806

Stack-based buffer overflow in asn1_der_decoding in libtasn1 before 4.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2806

ghostscript

671fd59eb657743aa86fbc1895cb15872a317caa

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=671fd59eb657743aa86fbc1895cb15872a317caa

None

token_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, scanner_state * pstate, bool save) { os_ptr op = osp; int code; ref token; /* Note that gs_scan_token may change osp! */ pop(1); /* remove the file or scanner state */ again: gs_scanner_error_object(i_ctx_p, pstate, &i_ctx_p->error_object); break; case scan_BOS: code = 0; case 0: /* read a token */ push(2); ref_assign(op - 1, &token); make_true(op); break; case scan_EOF: /* no tokens */ push(1); make_false(op); code = 0; break; case scan_Refill: /* need more data */ code = gs_scan_handle_refill(i_ctx_p, pstate, save, ztoken_continue); switch (code) { case 0: /* state is not copied to the heap */ goto again; case o_push_estack: return code; } break; /* error */ }

None

CVE-2017-11714

psi/ztoken.c in Artifex Ghostscript 9.21 mishandles references to the scanner state structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PostScript document, related to an out-of-bounds read in the igc_reloc_struct_ptr function in psi/igc.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11714

savannah

79972af4f0485a11dcb19551356c45245749fc5b

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=79972af4f0485a11dcb19551356c45245749fc5b

None

ft_smooth_render_generic( FT_Renderer render, FT_GlyphSlot slot, FT_Render_Mode mode, const FT_Vector* origin, FT_Render_Mode required_mode ) { FT_Error error; FT_Outline* outline = NULL; FT_BBox cbox; FT_UInt width, height, height_org, width_org, pitch; FT_Bitmap* bitmap; FT_Memory memory; FT_Int hmul = mode == FT_RENDER_MODE_LCD; FT_Int vmul = mode == FT_RENDER_MODE_LCD_V; FT_Pos x_shift, y_shift, x_left, y_top; FT_Raster_Params params; /* check glyph image format */ if ( slot->format != render->glyph_format ) { error = Smooth_Err_Invalid_Argument; goto Exit; } /* check mode */ if ( mode != required_mode ) return Smooth_Err_Cannot_Render_Glyph; outline = &slot->outline; /* translate the outline to the new origin if needed */ if ( origin ) FT_Outline_Translate( outline, origin->x, origin->y ); /* compute the control box, and grid fit it */ FT_Outline_Get_CBox( outline, &cbox ); cbox.xMin = FT_PIX_FLOOR( cbox.xMin ); cbox.yMin = FT_PIX_FLOOR( cbox.yMin ); cbox.xMax = FT_PIX_CEIL( cbox.xMax ); cbox.yMax = FT_PIX_CEIL( cbox.yMax ); width = (FT_UInt)( ( cbox.xMax - cbox.xMin ) >> 6 ); height = (FT_UInt)( ( cbox.yMax - cbox.yMin ) >> 6 ); bitmap = &slot->bitmap; memory = render->root.memory; width_org = width; height_org = height; /* release old bitmap buffer */ if ( slot->internal->flags & FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP ) { FT_FREE( bitmap->buffer ); slot->internal->flags &= ~FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP; } /* allocate new one, depends on pixel format */ pitch = width; if ( hmul ) { width = width * 3; pitch = FT_PAD_CEIL( width, 4 ); } if ( vmul ) height *= 3; x_shift = (FT_Int) cbox.xMin; y_shift = (FT_Int) cbox.yMin; x_left = (FT_Int)( cbox.xMin >> 6 ); y_top = (FT_Int)( cbox.yMax >> 6 ); #ifdef FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING if ( slot->library->lcd_filter_func ) { FT_Int extra = slot->library->lcd_extra; if ( hmul ) { x_shift -= 64 * ( extra >> 1 ); width += 3 * extra; pitch = FT_PAD_CEIL( width, 4 ); x_left -= extra >> 1; } if ( vmul ) { y_shift -= 64 * ( extra >> 1 ); height += 3 * extra; y_top += extra >> 1; } } #endif bitmap->pixel_mode = FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY; bitmap->num_grays = 256; bitmap->width = width; goto Exit; slot->internal->flags |= FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP; /* set up parameters */ params.target = bitmap; params.source = outline; params.flags = FT_RASTER_FLAG_AA; #ifdef FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING /* implode outline if needed */ { FT_Vector* points = outline->points; FT_Vector* points_end = points + outline->n_points; FT_Vector* vec; if ( hmul ) for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ ) vec->x *= 3; if ( vmul ) for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ ) vec->y *= 3; } /* render outline into the bitmap */ error = render->raster_render( render->raster, &params ); /* deflate outline if needed */ { FT_Vector* points = outline->points; FT_Vector* points_end = points + outline->n_points; FT_Vector* vec; if ( hmul ) for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ ) vec->x /= 3; if ( vmul ) for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ ) vec->y /= 3; } if ( slot->library->lcd_filter_func ) slot->library->lcd_filter_func( bitmap, mode, slot->library ); #else /* !FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING */ /* render outline into bitmap */ error = render->raster_render( render->raster, &params ); /* expand it horizontally */ if ( hmul ) { FT_Byte* line = bitmap->buffer; FT_UInt hh; for ( hh = height_org; hh > 0; hh--, line += pitch ) { FT_UInt xx; FT_Byte* end = line + width; for ( xx = width_org; xx > 0; xx-- ) { FT_UInt pixel = line[xx-1]; end[-3] = (FT_Byte)pixel; end[-2] = (FT_Byte)pixel; end[-1] = (FT_Byte)pixel; end -= 3; } } } /* expand it vertically */ if ( vmul ) { FT_Byte* read = bitmap->buffer + ( height - height_org ) * pitch; FT_Byte* write = bitmap->buffer; FT_UInt hh; for ( hh = height_org; hh > 0; hh-- ) { ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch ); write += pitch; ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch ); write += pitch; ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch ); write += pitch; read += pitch; } } #endif /* !FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING */ FT_Outline_Translate( outline, x_shift, y_shift ); if ( error ) goto Exit; slot->format = FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_BITMAP; slot->bitmap_left = x_left; slot->bitmap_top = y_top; Exit: if ( outline && origin ) FT_Outline_Translate( outline, -origin->x, -origin->y ); return error; }

None

CVE-2009-0946

Multiple integer overflows in FreeType 2.3.9 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to large values in certain inputs in (1) smooth/ftsmooth.c, (2) sfnt/ttcmap.c, and (3) cff/cffload.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0946

savannah

0545ec1ca36b27cb928128870a83e5f668980bc5

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=0545ec1ca36b27cb928128870a83e5f668980bc5

None

cff_charset_load( CFF_Charset charset, FT_UInt num_glyphs, FT_Stream stream, FT_ULong base_offset, FT_ULong offset, FT_Bool invert ) { FT_Memory memory = stream->memory; FT_Error error = CFF_Err_Ok; FT_UShort glyph_sid; /* If the the offset is greater than 2, we have to parse the */ /* charset table. */ if ( offset > 2 ) { FT_UInt j; charset->offset = base_offset + offset; /* Get the format of the table. */ if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( charset->offset ) || FT_READ_BYTE( charset->format ) ) goto Exit; /* Allocate memory for sids. */ if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( charset->sids, num_glyphs ) ) goto Exit; /* assign the .notdef glyph */ charset->sids[0] = 0; switch ( charset->format ) { case 0: if ( num_glyphs > 0 ) { if ( FT_FRAME_ENTER( ( num_glyphs - 1 ) * 2 ) ) goto Exit; for ( j = 1; j < num_glyphs; j++ ) charset->sids[j] = FT_GET_USHORT(); FT_FRAME_EXIT(); } /* Read the first glyph sid of the range. */ if ( FT_READ_USHORT( glyph_sid ) ) goto Exit; /* Read the number of glyphs in the range. */ if ( charset->format == 2 ) { if ( FT_READ_USHORT( nleft ) ) goto Exit; } else { if ( FT_READ_BYTE( nleft ) ) goto Exit; } /* Fill in the range of sids -- `nleft + 1' glyphs. */ for ( i = 0; j < num_glyphs && i <= nleft; i++, j++, glyph_sid++ ) charset->sids[j] = glyph_sid; } } break; default: FT_ERROR(( "cff_charset_load: invalid table format!\n" )); error = CFF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; goto Exit; }

None

CVE-2009-0946

Multiple integer overflows in FreeType 2.3.9 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to large values in certain inputs in (1) smooth/ftsmooth.c, (2) sfnt/ttcmap.c, and (3) cff/cffload.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0946

netfilter

2ae1099a42e6a0f06de305ca13a842ac83d4683e

https://git.netfilter.org/conntrack-tools

https://git.netfilter.org/iptables/commit/iptables/xshared.c?id=2ae1099a42e6a0f06de305ca13a842ac83d4683e

None

void add_param_to_argv(char *parsestart, int line) { int quote_open = 0, escaped = 0, param_len = 0; char param_buffer[1024], *curchar; /* After fighting with strtok enough, here's now * a 'real' parser. According to Rusty I'm now no } else { param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar; for (curchar = parsestart; *curchar; curchar++) { if (quote_open) { if (escaped) { param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar; escaped = 0; continue; } else if (*curchar == '\\') { } switch (*curchar) { quote_open = 0; *curchar = '"'; } else { param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar; continue; } } else { continue; } break; default: /* regular character, copy to buffer */ param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar; if (param_len >= sizeof(param_buffer)) xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, case ' ': case '\t': case '\n': if (!param_len) { /* two spaces? */ continue; } break; default: /* regular character, copy to buffer */ param_buffer[param_len++] = *curchar; if (param_len >= sizeof(param_buffer)) xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, "Parameter too long!"); continue; } param_buffer[param_len] = '\0'; /* check if table name specified */ if ((param_buffer[0] == '-' && param_buffer[1] != '-' && strchr(param_buffer, 't')) || (!strncmp(param_buffer, "--t", 3) && !strncmp(param_buffer, "--table", strlen(param_buffer)))) { xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, "The -t option (seen in line %u) cannot be used in %s.\n", line, xt_params->program_name); } add_argv(param_buffer, 0); param_len = 0; }

None

CVE-2019-11360

A buffer overflow in iptables-restore in netfilter iptables 1.8.2 allows an attacker to (at least) crash the program or potentially gain code execution via a specially crafted iptables-save file. This is related to add_param_to_argv in xshared.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11360

accountsservice

f9abd359f71a5bce421b9ae23432f539a067847a

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/accountsservice/commit/?id=f9abd359f71a5bce421b9ae23432f539a067847a

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/accountsservice/commit/?id=f9abd359f71a5bce421b9ae23432f539a067847a

None

user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon, User *user, GDBusMethodInvocation *context, gpointer data) { g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL; g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL; g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL; guint32 mode; GFileType type; guint64 size; filename = g_strdup (data); if (filename == NULL || *filename == '\0') { g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL; g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL; g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL; g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free); dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL); dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path); if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) && !g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) { throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message); return; } goto icon_saved; } file = g_file_new_for_path (filename); info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE "," G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE "," G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE, return; }

None

CVE-2018-14036

Directory Traversal with ../ sequences occurs in AccountsService before 0.6.50 because of an insufficient path check in user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb() in user.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14036

xserver

215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c

http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=xorg/xserver

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c

dix: Disallow GenericEvent in SendEvent request. The SendEvent request holds xEvent which is exactly 32 bytes long, no more, no less. Both ProcSendEvent and SProcSendEvent verify that the received data exactly match the request size. However nothing stops the client from passing in event with xEvent::type = GenericEvent and any value of xGenericEvent::length. In the case of ProcSendEvent, the event will be eventually passed to WriteEventsToClient which will see that it is Generic event and copy the arbitrary length from the receive buffer (and possibly past it) and send it to the other client. This allows clients to copy unitialized heap memory out of X server or to crash it. In case of SProcSendEvent, it will attempt to swap the incoming event by calling a swapping function from the EventSwapVector array. The swapped event is written to target buffer, which in this case is local xEvent variable. The xEvent variable is 32 bytes long, but the swapping functions for GenericEvents expect that the target buffer has size matching the size of the source GenericEvent. This allows clients to cause stack buffer overflows. Signed-off-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>

ProcSendEvent(ClientPtr client) { WindowPtr pWin; WindowPtr effectiveFocus = NullWindow; /* only set if dest==InputFocus */ DeviceIntPtr dev = PickPointer(client); DeviceIntPtr keybd = GetMaster(dev, MASTER_KEYBOARD); SpritePtr pSprite = dev->spriteInfo->sprite; REQUEST(xSendEventReq); REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xSendEventReq); /* libXext and other extension libraries may set the bit indicating * that this event came from a SendEvent request so remove it * since otherwise the event type may fail the range checks * and cause an invalid BadValue error to be returned. * * This is safe to do since we later add the SendEvent bit (0x80) * back in once we send the event to the client */ stuff->event.u.u.type &= ~(SEND_EVENT_BIT); /* The client's event type must be a core event type or one defined by an extension. */ if (!((stuff->event.u.u.type > X_Reply && stuff->event.u.u.type < LASTEvent) || (stuff->event.u.u.type >= EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE && stuff->event.u.u.type < (unsigned) lastEvent))) { client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type; return BadValue; } if (stuff->event.u.u.type == ClientMessage && stuff->event.u.u.detail != 8 && stuff->event.u.u.detail != 16 && stuff->event.u.u.detail != 32) { } if (stuff->destination == PointerWindow) pWin = pSprite->win; else if (stuff->destination == InputFocus) { WindowPtr inputFocus = (keybd) ? keybd->focus->win : NoneWin; if (inputFocus == NoneWin) return Success; /* If the input focus is PointerRootWin, send the event to where the pointer is if possible, then perhaps propogate up to root. */ if (inputFocus == PointerRootWin) inputFocus = GetCurrentRootWindow(dev); if (IsParent(inputFocus, pSprite->win)) { effectiveFocus = inputFocus; pWin = pSprite->win; } else effectiveFocus = pWin = inputFocus; } else dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->destination, client, DixSendAccess); if (!pWin) return BadWindow; if ((stuff->propagate != xFalse) && (stuff->propagate != xTrue)) { client->errorValue = stuff->propagate; return BadValue; } stuff->event.u.u.type |= SEND_EVENT_BIT; if (stuff->propagate) { for (; pWin; pWin = pWin->parent) { if (XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin, &stuff->event, 1)) return Success; if (DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin, &stuff->event, 1, stuff->eventMask, NullGrab)) return Success; if (pWin == effectiveFocus) return Success; stuff->eventMask &= ~wDontPropagateMask(pWin); if (!stuff->eventMask) break; } } else if (!XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin, &stuff->event, 1)) DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin, &stuff->event, 1, stuff->eventMask, NullGrab); return Success; }

None

CVE-2017-10971

In the X.Org X server before 2017-06-19, a user authenticated to an X Session could crash or execute code in the context of the X Server by exploiting a stack overflow in the endianness conversion of X Events.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10971

xserver

8caed4df36b1f802b4992edcfd282cbeeec35d9d

http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=xorg/xserver

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=8caed4df36b1f802b4992edcfd282cbeeec35d9d

Xi: Verify all events in ProcXSendExtensionEvent. The requirement is that events have type in range EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE..lastEvent, but it was tested only for first event of all. Signed-off-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>

ProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client) { int ret; DeviceIntPtr dev; xEvent *first; XEventClass *list; struct tmask tmp[EMASKSIZE]; REQUEST(xSendExtensionEventReq); REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSendExtensionEventReq); if (stuff->length != bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xSendExtensionEventReq)) + stuff->count + (stuff->num_events * bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xEvent)))) return BadLength; ret = dixLookupDevice(&dev, stuff->deviceid, client, DixWriteAccess); if (ret != Success) return ret; if (stuff->num_events == 0) return ret; /* The client's event type must be one defined by an extension. */ first = ((xEvent *) &stuff[1]); if (!((EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE <= first->u.u.type) && (first->u.u.type < lastEvent))) { client->errorValue = first->u.u.type; return BadValue; } list = (XEventClass *) (first + stuff->num_events); return ret; ret = (SendEvent(client, dev, stuff->destination, stuff->propagate, (xEvent *) &stuff[1], tmp[stuff->deviceid].mask, stuff->num_events)); return ret; }

None

CVE-2017-10971

In the X.Org X server before 2017-06-19, a user authenticated to an X Session could crash or execute code in the context of the X Server by exploiting a stack overflow in the endianness conversion of X Events.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10971

openssl

9a0db453ba017ebcaccbee933ee6511a9ae4d1c8

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

http://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=9a0db453ba017ebcaccbee933ee6511a9ae4d1c8

Fix alternate chains certificate forgery issue During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error. Patch provided by the BoringSSL project. CVE-2015-1793 Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; int bad_chain = 0; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; int depth, i, ok = 0; int num, j, retry; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; if (ctx->cert == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); return -1; } cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that * the first entry is in place */ if (ctx->chain == NULL) { if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); ctx->last_untrusted = 1; } /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); depth = param->depth; for (;;) { /* If we have enough, we break */ if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take * note of it and, if appropriate, use the * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code * later. */ /* If we are self signed, we break */ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) break; /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); if (xtmp != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); ctx->last_untrusted++; x = xtmp; num++; /* * reparse the full chain for the next one */ continue; } } break; } /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ j = num; /* * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we * complain. */ do { /* * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. */ i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { /* we have a self signed certificate */ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { /* * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid * possible impersonation. */ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->error_depth = i - 1; if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); bad_chain = 1; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } else { /* * We have a match: replace certificate with store * version so we get any trust settings. */ X509_free(x); x = xtmp; (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); ctx->last_untrusted = 0; } } else { /* * extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); ctx->last_untrusted--; num--; j--; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); } } /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ for (;;) { /* If we have enough, we break */ if (depth < num) break; /* If we are self signed, we break */ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) break; ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) return ok; if (ok == 0) break; x = xtmp; if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } num++; } /* * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking */ retry = 0; if (j == ctx->last_untrusted && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { while (j-- > 1) { xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); if (ok < 0) goto end; /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ if (ok > 0) { /* * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later */ X509_free(xtmp); /* * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an * alternate chain */ while (num > j) { xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); X509_free(xtmp); num--; ctx->last_untrusted--; } retry = 1; break; } } } } while (retry); /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; ctx->current_cert = x; } else { sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); num++; ctx->last_untrusted = num; ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; chain_ss = NULL; } ctx->error_depth = num - 1; bad_chain = 1; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; /* Check name constraints */ ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); /* * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. */ ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ if (ctx->verify != NULL) ok = ctx->verify(ctx); else ok = internal_verify(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; #endif /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; if (0) { end: X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); } if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); return ok; }

None

CVE-2015-1793

The X509_verify_cert function in crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1n, 1.0.1o, 1.0.2b, and 1.0.2c does not properly process X.509 Basic Constraints cA values during identification of alternative certificate chains, which allows remote attackers to spoof a Certification Authority role and trigger unintended certificate verifications via a valid leaf certificate.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1793

savannah

cb07844454d8cc9fb21f53ace75975f91185a120

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/commit/?id=cb07844454d8cc9fb21f53ace75975f91185a120

None

pax_decode_header (struct tar_sparse_file *file) { if (file->stat_info->sparse_major > 0) { uintmax_t u; char nbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND]; union block *blk; char *p; size_t i; off_t start; #define COPY_BUF(b,buf,src) do \ { \ char *endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \ char *dst = buf; \ do \ { \ if (dst == buf + UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND -1) \ { \ ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: numeric overflow in sparse archive member"), \ file->stat_info->orig_file_name)); \ return false; \ } \ if (src == endp) \ { \ set_next_block_after (b); \ b = find_next_block (); \ src = b->buffer; \ endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \ } \ while (*dst++ != '\n'); \ dst[-1] = 0; \ } while (0) start = current_block_ordinal (); set_next_block_after (current_header); start = current_block_ordinal (); set_next_block_after (current_header); blk = find_next_block (); p = blk->buffer; COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p); if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (size_t))) } file->stat_info->sparse_map_size = u; file->stat_info->sparse_map = xcalloc (file->stat_info->sparse_map_size, sizeof (*file->stat_info->sparse_map)); file->stat_info->sparse_map_avail = 0; for (i = 0; i < file->stat_info->sparse_map_size; i++) { struct sp_array sp; COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p); if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t))) { ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"), file->stat_info->orig_file_name)); return false; } sp.offset = u; COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p); if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t))) { ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"), file->stat_info->orig_file_name)); return false; } sp.numbytes = u; sparse_add_map (file->stat_info, &sp); } set_next_block_after (blk); file->dumped_size += BLOCKSIZE * (current_block_ordinal () - start); } return true; }

None

CVE-2019-9923

pax_decode_header in sparse.c in GNU Tar before 1.32 had a NULL pointer dereference when parsing certain archives that have malformed extended headers.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9923

ghostscript

961b10cdd71403072fb99401a45f3bef6ce53626

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=961b10cdd71403072fb99401a45f3bef6ce53626

None

xps_encode_font_char_imp(xps_font_t *font, int code) { byte *table; /* no cmap selected: return identity */ if (font->cmapsubtable <= 0) return code; table = font->data + font->cmapsubtable; switch (u16(table)) { case 0: /* Apple standard 1-to-1 mapping. */ return table[code + 6]; case 4: /* Microsoft/Adobe segmented mapping. */ { int segCount2 = u16(table + 6); byte *endCount = table + 14; byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2; byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2; byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2; int i2; for (i2 = 0; i2 < segCount2 - 3; i2 += 2) { int delta, roff; int start = u16(startCount + i2); continue; delta = s16(idDelta + i2); roff = s16(idRangeOffset + i2); if ( roff == 0 ) { return ( code + delta ) & 0xffff; /* mod 65536 */ return 0; } if ( roff == 0 ) { return ( code + delta ) & 0xffff; /* mod 65536 */ return 0; } glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((code - start) << 1)); return (glyph == 0 ? 0 : glyph + delta); } case 6: /* Single interval lookup. */ { int firstCode = u16(table + 6); int entryCount = u16(table + 8); if ( code < firstCode || code >= firstCode + entryCount ) return 0; return u16(table + 10 + ((code - firstCode) << 1)); } case 10: /* Trimmed array (like 6) */ { int startCharCode = u32(table + 12); int numChars = u32(table + 16); if ( code < startCharCode || code >= startCharCode + numChars ) return 0; return u32(table + 20 + (code - startCharCode) * 4); } case 12: /* Segmented coverage. (like 4) */ { int nGroups = u32(table + 12); byte *group = table + 16; int i; for (i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) { int startCharCode = u32(group + 0); int endCharCode = u32(group + 4); int startGlyphID = u32(group + 8); if ( code < startCharCode ) return 0; if ( code <= endCharCode ) return startGlyphID + (code - startCharCode); group += 12; } return 0; } case 2: /* High-byte mapping through table. */ case 8: /* Mixed 16-bit and 32-bit coverage (like 2) */ default: gs_warn1("unknown cmap format: %d\n", u16(table)); return 0; } return 0; } /* * Given a GID, reverse the CMAP subtable lookup to turn it back into a character code * We need a Unicode return value, so we might need to do some fixed tables for * certain kinds of CMAP subtables (ie non-Unicode ones). That would be a future enhancement * if we ever encounter such a beast. */ static int xps_decode_font_char_imp(xps_font_t *font, int code) { byte *table; /* no cmap selected: return identity */ if (font->cmapsubtable <= 0) return code; table = font->data + font->cmapsubtable; switch (u16(table)) { case 0: /* Apple standard 1-to-1 mapping. */ { int i, length = u16(&table[2]) - 6; if (length < 0 || length > 256) return gs_error_invalidfont; for (i=0;i<length;i++) { if (table[6 + i] == code) return i; } } return 0; case 4: /* Microsoft/Adobe segmented mapping. */ { int segCount2 = u16(table + 6); byte *endCount = table + 14; byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2; byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2; byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2; int i2; if (segCount2 < 3 || segCount2 > 65535) return gs_error_invalidfont; byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2; byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2; byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2; int i2; if (segCount2 < 3 || segCount2 > 65535) return gs_error_invalidfont; for (i2 = 0; i2 < segCount2 - 3; i2 += 2) if (roff == 0) { glyph = (i + delta) & 0xffff; } else { glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((i - start) << 1)); } if (glyph == code) { return i; } } } if (roff == 0) { glyph = (i + delta) & 0xffff; } else { glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((i - start) << 1)); } if (glyph == code) { return i; ch = u16(&table[10 + (i * 2)]); if (ch == code) return (firstCode + i); } } return 0; case 10: /* Trimmed array (like 6) */ { unsigned int ch, i, length = u32(&table[20]); int firstCode = u32(&table[16]); for (i=0;i<length;i++) { ch = u16(&table[10 + (i * 2)]); if (ch == code) return (firstCode + i); } } return 0; case 12: /* Segmented coverage. (like 4) */ { unsigned int nGroups = u32(&table[12]); int Group; for (Group=0;Group<nGroups;Group++) { int startCharCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12)]); int endCharCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12) + 4]); int startGlyphCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12) + 8]); if (code >= startGlyphCode && code <= (startGlyphCode + (endCharCode - startCharCode))) { return startGlyphCode + (code - startCharCode); } } } return 0; case 2: /* High-byte mapping through table. */ case 8: /* Mixed 16-bit and 32-bit coverage (like 2) */ default: gs_warn1("unknown cmap format: %d\n", u16(table)); return 0; }

None

CVE-2017-9740

The xps_decode_font_char_imp function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9740

ghostscript

937ccd17ac65935633b2ebc06cb7089b91e17e6b

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=937ccd17ac65935633b2ebc06cb7089b91e17e6b

None

static void gx_ttfReader__Read(ttfReader *self, void *p, int n) { gx_ttfReader *r = (gx_ttfReader *)self; const byte *q; if (!r->error) { if (r->extra_glyph_index != -1) { q = r->glyph_data.bits.data + r->pos; r->error = (r->glyph_data.bits.size - r->pos < n ? gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfont) : 0); if (r->error == 0) memcpy(p, q, n); unsigned int cnt; for (cnt = 0; cnt < (uint)n; cnt += r->error) { r->error = r->pfont->data.string_proc(r->pfont, (ulong)r->pos + cnt, (ulong)n - cnt, &q); if (r->error < 0) break; else if ( r->error == 0) { memcpy((char *)p + cnt, q, n - cnt); break; } else { memcpy((char *)p + cnt, q, r->error); } } } } if (r->error) { memset(p, 0, n); return; } r->pos += n; }

None

CVE-2017-9727

The gx_ttfReader__Read function in base/gxttfb.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9727

ghostscript

7755e67116e8973ee0e3b22d653df026a84fa01b

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=7755e67116e8973ee0e3b22d653df026a84fa01b

None

static void Ins_MDRP( INS_ARG ) { Int point; TT_F26Dot6 distance, org_dist; point = (Int)args[0]; if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp1.n_points ) ) { /* Current version of FreeType silently ignores this out of bounds error * and drops the instruction, see bug #691121 return; } /* XXX: Is there some undocumented feature while in the */ /* twilight zone? */ org_dist = CUR_Func_dualproj( CUR.zp1.org_x[point] - CUR.zp0.org_x[CUR.GS.rp0], CUR.zp1.org_y[point] - CUR.zp0.org_y[CUR.GS.rp0] ); /* single width cutin test */ if ( ABS(org_dist) < CUR.GS.single_width_cutin ) { if ( org_dist >= 0 ) org_dist = CUR.GS.single_width_value; else org_dist = -CUR.GS.single_width_value; } /* round flag */ if ( (CUR.opcode & 4) != 0 ) distance = CUR_Func_round( org_dist, CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] ); else distance = Round_None( EXEC_ARGS org_dist, CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] ); /* minimum distance flag */ if ( (CUR.opcode & 8) != 0 ) { if ( org_dist >= 0 ) { if ( distance < CUR.GS.minimum_distance ) distance = CUR.GS.minimum_distance; } else { if ( distance > -CUR.GS.minimum_distance ) distance = -CUR.GS.minimum_distance; } } /* now move the point */ org_dist = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] - CUR.zp0.cur_x[CUR.GS.rp0], CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] - CUR.zp0.cur_y[CUR.GS.rp0] ); CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp1, point, distance - org_dist ); CUR.GS.rp1 = CUR.GS.rp0; CUR.GS.rp2 = point; if ( (CUR.opcode & 16) != 0 ) CUR.GS.rp0 = point; }

None

CVE-2017-9726

The Ins_MDRP function in base/ttinterp.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9726

dbus

166978a09cf5edff4028e670b6074215a4c75eca

http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=dbus/dbus

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus-glib/commit/?id=166978a09cf5edff4028e670b6074215a4c75eca

None

dbus_g_proxy_manager_filter (DBusConnection *connection, DBusMessage *message, void *user_data) { DBusGProxyManager *manager; if (dbus_message_get_type (message) != DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL) return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED; manager = user_data; dbus_g_proxy_manager_ref (manager); LOCK_MANAGER (manager); if (dbus_message_is_signal (message, DBUS_INTERFACE_LOCAL, "Disconnected")) { /* Destroy all the proxies, quite possibly resulting in unreferencing * the proxy manager and the connection as well. */ GSList *all; GSList *tmp; all = dbus_g_proxy_manager_list_all (manager); tmp = all; while (tmp != NULL) { DBusGProxy *proxy; proxy = DBUS_G_PROXY (tmp->data); UNLOCK_MANAGER (manager); dbus_g_proxy_destroy (proxy); g_object_unref (G_OBJECT (proxy)); LOCK_MANAGER (manager); tmp = tmp->next; } g_slist_free (all); #ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS if (manager->proxy_lists != NULL) g_warning ("Disconnection emitted \"destroy\" on all DBusGProxy, but somehow new proxies were created in response to one of those destroy signals. This will cause a memory leak."); #endif } else { char *tri; GSList *full_list; GSList *owned_names; GSList *tmp; const char *sender; /* First we handle NameOwnerChanged internally */ if (dbus_message_is_signal (message, DBUS_INTERFACE_DBUS, "NameOwnerChanged")) { DBusError derr; dbus_error_init (&derr); if (!dbus_message_get_args (message, &derr, DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &name, DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &prev_owner, DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &new_owner, DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)) { /* Ignore this error */ dbus_error_free (&derr); } else if (manager->owner_names != NULL) { dbus_g_proxy_manager_replace_name_owner (manager, name, prev_owner, new_owner); } } } }

None

CVE-2013-0292

The dbus_g_proxy_manager_filter function in dbus-gproxy in Dbus-glib before 0.100.1 does not properly verify the sender of NameOwnerChanged signals, which allows local users to gain privileges via a spoofed signal.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0292

ghostscript

3ee55637480d5e319a5de0481b01c3346855cbc9

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=3ee55637480d5e319a5de0481b01c3346855cbc9

None

xps_select_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font, int idx) { byte *cmapdata, *entry; int pid, eid; if (idx < 0 || idx >= font->cmapsubcount) return; cmapdata = font->data + font->cmaptable; entry = cmapdata + 4 + idx * 8; pid = u16(entry + 0); eid = u16(entry + 2); font->cmapsubtable = font->cmaptable + u32(entry + 4); font->usepua = (pid == 3 && eid == 0); }

xpsfont.c

CVE-2017-9620

The xps_select_font_encoding function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document, related to the xps_encode_font_char_imp function.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9620

ghostscript

c53183d4e7103e87368b7cfa15367a47d559e323

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c53183d4e7103e87368b7cfa15367a47d559e323

None

xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr) { /* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */ int table_length; int table_offset; ulong format; uint numGlyphs; uint glyph_name_index; const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */ /* guess if the font type is not truetype */ if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType ) { pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data); return 0; } else { return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph); } }

None

CVE-2017-9619

The xps_true_callback_glyph_name function in xps/xpsttf.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (Segmentation Violation and application crash) via a crafted file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9619

ghostscript

3c2aebbedd37fab054e80f2e315de07d7e9b5bdb

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf

http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=3c2aebbedd37fab054e80f2e315de07d7e9b5bdb

None

xps_load_sfnt_name(xps_font_t *font, char *namep) { byte *namedata; int offset, length; /*int format;*/ int count, stringoffset; int found; int i, k; found = 0; strcpy(namep, "Unknown"); offset = xps_find_sfnt_table(font, "name", &length); if (offset < 0 || length < 6) { gs_warn("cannot find name table"); return; } /* validate the offset, and the data for the two * values we're about to read */ if (offset + 6 > font->length) { gs_warn("name table byte offset invalid"); return; } namedata = font->data + offset; /*format = u16(namedata + 0);*/ count = u16(namedata + 2); stringoffset = u16(namedata + 4); if (stringoffset + offset > font->length || offset + 6 + count * 12 > font->length) { gs_warn("name table invalid"); return; } if (length < 6 + (count * 12)) { gs_warn("name table too short"); return; } for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { byte *record = namedata + 6 + i * 12; int pid = u16(record + 0); int eid = u16(record + 2); int langid = u16(record + 4); int nameid = u16(record + 6); length = u16(record + 8); offset = u16(record + 10); /* Full font name or postscript name */ if (nameid == 4 || nameid == 6) { if (found < 3) { memcpy(namep, namedata + stringoffset + offset, length); namep[length] = 0; found = 3; } } if (pid == 3 && eid == 1 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-2, US */ { if (found < 2) { unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset; int n = length / 2; for (k = 0; k < n; k ++) { int c = u16(s + k * 2); namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?'; } namep[k] = 0; found = 2; } } if (pid == 3 && eid == 10 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-4, US */ { if (found < 1) { unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset; int n = length / 4; for (k = 0; k < n; k ++) { int c = u32(s + k * 4); namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?'; } namep[k] = 0; found = 1; } } } }

None

CVE-2017-9618

The xps_load_sfnt_name function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9618

altlinux

ffe7058c70253d574b1963c7c93002bd410fddc9

http://git.altlinux.org/people/ldv/packages/?p=pam

http://git.altlinux.org/people/ldv/packages/?p=pam.git;a=commit;h=Linux-PAM-1_1_2-2-gffe7058c70253d574b1963c7c93002bd410fddc9

None

check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user, int noent_code, int debug) { char path[PATH_MAX]; struct passwd *pwd; { char path[PATH_MAX]; struct passwd *pwd; FILE *fp; int i, save_errno; uid_t fsuid; /* Check this user's <sense> file. */ pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user); if (pwd == NULL) { } /* Figure out what that file is really named. */ i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense); if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) { pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "name of user's home directory is too long"); return PAM_SESSION_ERR; } fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid); fp = fopen(path, "r"); return PAM_SESSION_ERR; } fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid); fp = fopen(path, "r"); save_errno = errno; setfsuid(fsuid); if (fp != NULL) { char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp; /* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) { other_user, path); } fclose(fp); return PAM_PERM_DENIED; } else { /* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */ errno = save_errno; switch (errno) { case ENOENT: if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) { if (debug) { pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "%s does not exist, ignoring", path); } } else { if (debug) { pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "%s does not exist, failing", path); } } return noent_code; default: if (debug) { pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "error opening %s: %m", path); } return PAM_PERM_DENIED; } } }

None

CVE-2010-4707

The check_acl function in pam_xauth.c in the pam_xauth module in Linux-PAM (aka pam) 1.1.2 and earlier does not verify that a certain ACL file is a regular file, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) via a special file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-4707

gnupg

5a22de904a0a366ae79f03ff1e13a1232a89e26b

http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg

https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=commit;h=5a22de904a0a366ae79f03ff1e13a1232a89e26b

None

_gcry_ecc_eddsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey, gcry_mpi_t r_r, gcry_mpi_t s, int hashalgo, gcry_mpi_t pk) { int rc; mpi_ec_t ctx = NULL; int b; unsigned int tmp; unsigned char *digest = NULL; gcry_buffer_t hvec[3]; const void *mbuf; size_t mlen; unsigned char *rawmpi = NULL; unsigned int rawmpilen; unsigned char *encpk = NULL; /* Encoded public key. */ unsigned int encpklen; mpi_point_struct I; /* Intermediate value. */ mpi_point_struct Q; /* Public key. */ gcry_mpi_t a, x, y, r; memset (hvec, 0, sizeof hvec); if (!mpi_is_opaque (input)) return GPG_ERR_INV_DATA; /* Initialize some helpers. */ point_init (&I); point_init (&Q); a = mpi_snew (0); x = mpi_new (0); y = mpi_new (0); r = mpi_new (0); ctx = _gcry_mpi_ec_p_internal_new (skey->E.model, skey->E.dialect, 0, skey->E.p, skey->E.a, skey->E.b); b = (ctx->nbits+7)/8; if (b != 256/8) { rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL; /* We only support 256 bit. */ goto leave; } rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_compute_h_d (&digest, skey->d, ctx); if (rc) goto leave; _gcry_mpi_set_buffer (a, digest, 32, 0); /* Compute the public key if it has not been supplied as optional parameter. */ if (pk) { rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_decodepoint (pk, ctx, &Q, &encpk, &encpklen); if (rc) goto leave; if (DBG_CIPHER) log_printhex ("* e_pk", encpk, encpklen); if (!_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&Q, ctx)) { rc = GPG_ERR_BROKEN_PUBKEY; goto leave; } } else { _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&Q, a, &skey->E.G, ctx); rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_encodepoint (&Q, ctx, x, y, 0, &encpk, &encpklen); if (rc) goto leave; if (DBG_CIPHER) log_printhex (" e_pk", encpk, encpklen); } /* Compute R. */ mbuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &tmp); mlen = (tmp +7)/8; if (DBG_CIPHER) log_printhex (" m", mbuf, mlen); hvec[0].data = digest; hvec[0].off = 32; hvec[0].len = 32; hvec[1].data = (char*)mbuf; hvec[1].len = mlen; rc = _gcry_md_hash_buffers (hashalgo, 0, digest, hvec, 2); if (rc) goto leave; reverse_buffer (digest, 64); if (DBG_CIPHER) log_printhex (" r", digest, 64); _gcry_mpi_set_buffer (r, digest, 64, 0); _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, r, &skey->E.G, ctx); if (DBG_CIPHER) log_printpnt (" r", &I, ctx); /* Convert R into affine coordinates and apply encoding. */ rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_encodepoint (&I, ctx, x, y, 0, &rawmpi, &rawmpilen); if (rc) goto leave; if (DBG_CIPHER) log_printhex (" e_r", rawmpi, rawmpilen); /* S = r + a * H(encodepoint(R) + encodepoint(pk) + m) mod n */ hvec[0].data = rawmpi; /* (this is R) */ hvec[0].off = 0; hvec[0].len = rawmpilen; hvec[1].data = encpk; hvec[1].off = 0; hvec[1].len = encpklen; hvec[2].data = (char*)mbuf; hvec[2].off = 0; hvec[2].len = mlen; rc = _gcry_md_hash_buffers (hashalgo, 0, digest, hvec, 3); if (rc) goto leave; /* No more need for RAWMPI thus we now transfer it to R_R. */ mpi_set_opaque (r_r, rawmpi, rawmpilen*8); rawmpi = NULL; reverse_buffer (digest, 64); if (DBG_CIPHER) log_printhex (" H(R+)", digest, 64); _gcry_mpi_set_buffer (s, digest, 64, 0); mpi_mulm (s, s, a, skey->E.n); mpi_addm (s, s, r, skey->E.n); rc = eddsa_encodempi (s, b, &rawmpi, &rawmpilen); if (rc) goto leave; if (DBG_CIPHER) log_printhex (" e_s", rawmpi, rawmpilen); mpi_set_opaque (s, rawmpi, rawmpilen*8); rawmpi = NULL; rc = 0; leave: _gcry_mpi_release (a); _gcry_mpi_release (x); _gcry_mpi_release (y); _gcry_mpi_release (r); xfree (digest); _gcry_mpi_ec_free (ctx); point_free (&I); point_free (&Q); xfree (encpk); xfree (rawmpi); return rc; }

ecc-eddsa.c

CVE-2017-9526

In Libgcrypt before 1.7.7, an attacker who learns the EdDSA session key (from side-channel observation during the signing process) can easily recover the long-term secret key. 1.7.7 makes a cipher/ecc-eddsa.c change to store this session key in secure memory, to ensure that constant-time point operations are used in the MPI library.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9526

openssl

62e4506a7d4cec1c8e1ff687f6b220f6a62a57c7

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=62e4506a7d4cec1c8e1ff687f6b220f6a62a57c7

Don't try and verify signatures if key is NULL (CVE-2013-0166) Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.

int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_MD_CTX ctx; unsigned char *buf_in=NULL; int ret= -1,inl; int mdnid, pknid; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */ { if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); goto err; } ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(&ctx, it, asn, a, signature, pkey); /* Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we * exit straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying * verification routine handles all verification. */ if (ret != 2) goto err; ret = -1; } else { const EVP_MD *type; type=EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid); if (type == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); goto err; } /* Check public key OID matches public key type */ if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } } inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it); if (buf_in == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf_in,inl)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl); OPENSSL_free(buf_in); if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&ctx,signature->data, (size_t)signature->length) <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } /* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked * public information */ /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */ ret=1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return(ret); }

None

CVE-2013-0166

OpenSSL before 0.9.8y, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0k, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1d does not properly perform signature verification for OCSP responses, which allows remote OCSP servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an invalid key.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0166

openssl

66e8211c0b1347970096e04b18aa52567c325200

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=66e8211c0b1347970096e04b18aa52567c325200

Don't try and verify signatures if key is NULL (CVE-2013-0166) Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.

int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_MD_CTX ctx; const EVP_MD *type; unsigned char *buf_in=NULL; int ret= -1,i,inl; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm); type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i)); if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it); if (buf_in == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl); OPENSSL_free(buf_in); if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data, (unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } /* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked * public information */ /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */ ret=1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return(ret); }

None

CVE-2013-0166

OpenSSL before 0.9.8y, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0k, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1d does not properly perform signature verification for OCSP responses, which allows remote OCSP servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an invalid key.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0166

openssl

ebc71865f0506a293242bd4aec97cdc7a8ef24b0

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=ebc71865f0506a293242bd4aec97cdc7a8ef24b0

Don't try and verify signatures if key is NULL (CVE-2013-0166) Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.

int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_MD_CTX ctx; const EVP_MD *type = NULL; unsigned char *buf_in=NULL; int ret= -1,inl; int mdnid, pknid; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */ if (type == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); goto err; } /* Check public key OID matches public key type */ if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it); if (buf_in == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl); OPENSSL_free(buf_in); if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data, (unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } /* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked * public information */ /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */ ret=1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return(ret); }

None

CVE-2013-0166

OpenSSL before 0.9.8y, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0k, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1d does not properly perform signature verification for OCSP responses, which allows remote OCSP servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an invalid key.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0166

samba

10c3e3923022485c720f322ca4f0aca5d7501310

https://github.com/samba-team/samba

https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=10c3e3923022485c720f322ca4f0aca5d7501310

s3: smbd: Don't loop infinitely on bad-symlink resolution. In the FILE_OPEN_IF case we have O_CREAT, but not O_EXCL. Previously we went into a loop trying first ~(O_CREAT|O_EXCL), and if that returned ENOENT try (O_CREAT|O_EXCL). We kept looping indefinately until we got an error, or the file was created or opened. The big problem here is dangling symlinks. Opening without O_NOFOLLOW means both bad symlink and missing path return -1, ENOENT from open(). As POSIX is pathname based it's not possible to tell the difference between these two cases in a non-racy way, so change to try only two attempts before giving up. We don't have this problem for the O_NOFOLLOW case as we just return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND mapped from the ELOOP POSIX error and immediately returned. Unroll the loop logic to two tries instead. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12572 Pair-programmed-with: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>

static NTSTATUS fd_open_atomic(struct connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp, int flags, mode_t mode, bool *file_created) { NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; bool file_existed = VALID_STAT(fsp->fsp_name->st); *file_created = false; * We're not creating the file, just pass through. */ return fd_open(conn, fsp, flags, mode); }

None

CVE-2017-9461

smbd in Samba before 4.4.10 and 4.5.x before 4.5.6 has a denial of service vulnerability (fd_open_atomic infinite loop with high CPU usage and memory consumption) due to wrongly handling dangling symlinks.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9461

openssl

d0666f289ac013094bbbf547bfbcd616199b7d2d

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=d0666f289ac013094bbbf547bfbcd616199b7d2d

evp: prevent underflow in base64 decoding This patch resolves RT ticket #2608. Thanks to Robert Dugal for originally spotting this, and to David Ramos for noticing that the ball had been dropped. Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int seof= -1,eof=0,rv= -1,ret=0,i,v,tmp,n,ln,exp_nl; unsigned char *d; n=ctx->num; d=ctx->enc_data; ln=ctx->line_num; exp_nl=ctx->expect_nl; /* last line of input. */ if ((inl == 0) || ((n == 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF))) { rv=0; goto end; } /* We parse the input data */ for (i=0; i<inl; i++) { /* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream alot */ if (ln >= 80) { rv= -1; goto end; } /* Get char and put it into the buffer */ tmp= *(in++); v=conv_ascii2bin(tmp); /* only save the good data :-) */ if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) { OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data)); d[n++]=tmp; ln++; } else if (v == B64_ERROR) { rv= -1; goto end; } /* have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last * input line. seof will point to the character that * holds it. and eof will hold how many characters to * chop off. */ if (tmp == '=') { if (seof == -1) seof=n; eof++; } if (v == B64_CR) { ln = 0; if (exp_nl) continue; } /* eoln */ if (v == B64_EOLN) { ln=0; if (exp_nl) { exp_nl=0; continue; } } exp_nl=0; /* If we are at the end of input and it looks like a * line, process it. */ if (((i+1) == inl) && (((n&3) == 0) || eof)) { v=B64_EOF; /* In case things were given us in really small records (so two '=' were given in separate updates), eof may contain the incorrect number of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the count */ eof = 0; if (d[n-1] == '=') eof++; if (d[n-2] == '=') eof++; /* There will never be more than two '=' */ } if ((v == B64_EOF && (n&3) == 0) || (n >= 64)) { /* This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input * lines. We process the line and then need to * accept the '\n' */ if ((v != B64_EOF) && (n >= 64)) exp_nl=1; if (n > 0) { v=EVP_DecodeBlock(out,d,n); n=0; if (v < 0) { rv=0; goto end; } ret+=(v-eof); } else eof=1; v=0; } /* This is the case where we have had a short * but valid input line */ if ((v < ctx->length) && eof) { rv=0; goto end; } else ctx->length=v; if (seof >= 0) { rv=0; goto end; } out+=v; } }

None

CVE-2015-0292

Integer underflow in the EVP_DecodeUpdate function in crypto/evp/encode.c in the base64-decoding implementation in OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted base64 data that triggers a buffer overflow.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0292

openssl

77c77f0a1b9f15b869ca3342186dfbedd1119d0e

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=77c77f0a1b9f15b869ca3342186dfbedd1119d0e

Multiblock corrupted pointer fix OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection. However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack. CVE-2015-0290 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { const unsigned char *buf = buf_; int tot; unsigned int n, nw; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK unsigned int max_send_fragment; #endif SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); int i; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); tot = s->s3->wnum; s->s3->wnum = 0; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } /* * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and * report the error in a way the user will notice */ if (len < tot) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return (-1); } /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (wb->left != 0) { i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot); if (i <= 0) { /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */ } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK /* * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the * compromise is considered worthy. */ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && len >= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) && s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { unsigned char aad[13]; EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; int packlen; /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) max_send_fragment -= 512; if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, max_send_fragment, NULL); if (len >= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8; else packlen *= 4; wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen); if(!wb->buf) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } wb->len = packlen; } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ wb->buf = NULL; return tot; } n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ wb->buf = NULL; break; } if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } } if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); else nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8); aad[8] = type; aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); aad[11] = 0; aad[12] = 0; mb_param.out = NULL; mb_param.inp = aad; mb_param.len = nw; packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ wb->buf = NULL; break; } mb_param.out = wb->buf; mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; mb_param.len = nw; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) return -1; s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { int j = 6; while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; } wb->offset = 0; wb->left = packlen; s->s3->wpend_tot = nw; s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; s->s3->wpend_type = type; s->s3->wpend_ret = nw; i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); if (i <= 0) { if (i < 0) { OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); wb->buf = NULL; } s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } if (i == (int)n) { OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ wb->buf = NULL; return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } } else #endif if (tot == len) { /* done? */ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); return tot; } n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n > s->max_send_fragment) nw = s->max_send_fragment; else nw = n; i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); if (i <= 0) { /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } }

None

CVE-2015-0290

The multi-block feature in the ssl3_write_bytes function in s3_pkt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a on 64-bit x86 platforms with AES NI support does not properly handle certain non-blocking I/O cases, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (pointer corruption and application crash) via unspecified vectors.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0290

openssl

b717b083073b6cacc0a5e2397b661678aff7ae7f

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b717b083073b6cacc0a5e2397b661678aff7ae7f

Free up ADB and CHOICE if already initialised. CVE-2015-0287 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL; const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb; const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q; unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */ unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass; char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt; long tmplen; int i; int otag; int ret = 0; ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval; if (!pval) return 0; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb; else asn1_cb = 0; switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) { /* * tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template * because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this * isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item * template in the template itself. */ if ((tag != -1) || opt) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE); goto err; } return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it->templates, opt, ctx); } return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: p = *in; /* Just read in tag and class */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL, &p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* Must be UNIVERSAL class */ if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ if (opt) return -1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL); goto err; } /* Check tag matches bit map */ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ if (opt) return -1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG); goto err; } return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: /* Use new style d2i */ ef = it->funcs; return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT: /* we must resort to old style evil hackery */ cf = it->funcs; /* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */ if (opt) { int exptag; p = *in; if (tag == -1) exptag = it->utype; else exptag = tag; /* * Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (ret == -1) return -1; } /* * This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the * underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one * present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back * afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes * this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which * will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy * the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we * should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the * buffer. */ if (tag != -1) { wp = *(unsigned char **)in; imphack = *wp; if (p == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } *wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) | it->utype); } ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len); if (tag != -1) *wp = imphack; if (ptmpval) return 1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; /* Allocate structure */ if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx); /* If field not present, try the next one */ if (ret == -1) continue; /* If positive return, read OK, break loop */ if (ret > 0) break; /* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */ errtt = tt; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */ if (i == it->tcount) { /* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */ if (opt) { /* Free and zero it */ ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); return -1; } ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE); goto err; } asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it); *in = p; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; return 1; case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: p = *in; tmplen = len; /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */ if (tag == -1) { tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; } /* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst, &p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) { len = tmplen - (p - *in); seq_nolen = 1; } /* If indefinite we don't do a length check */ else seq_nolen = seq_eoc; if (!cst) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED); goto err; } if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; /* Get each field entry */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; /* Get each field entry */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; } /* * This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be * omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still * data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it * increases efficiency in some cases. */ if (i == (it->tcount - 1)) isopt = 0; else isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL); /* * attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL */ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx); if (!ret) { errtt = seqtt; goto err; } else if (ret == -1) { /* * OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field. */ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); continue; } /* Update length */ len -= p - q; } /* Check for EOC if expecting one */ if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); goto err; } /* Check all data read */ if (!seq_nolen && len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* * If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we * may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL * and clear any that are. */ for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) goto err; if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) { ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); } else { errtt = seqtt; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING); goto err; } } /* Save encoding */ if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it)) goto auxerr; *in = p; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; return 1; default: return 0; }

None

CVE-2015-0287

The ASN1_item_ex_d2i function in crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a does not reinitialize CHOICE and ADB data structures, which might allow attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid write operation and memory corruption) by leveraging an application that relies on ASN.1 structure reuse.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0287

openssl

c3c7fb07dc975dc3c9de0eddb7d8fd79fc9c67c1

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=c3c7fb07dc975dc3c9de0eddb7d8fd79fc9c67c1

Fix ASN1_TYPE_cmp Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server enabling client authentication. CVE-2015-0286 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b) { int result = -1; if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type) return -1; switch (a->type) { case V_ASN1_OBJECT: result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object); break; case V_ASN1_NULL: result = 0; /* They do not have content. */ break; case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED: case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE: case V_ASN1_SET: case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING: case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING: case V_ASN1_T61STRING: case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING: case V_ASN1_IA5STRING: case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING: case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING: case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING: case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING: case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING: case V_ASN1_OTHER: default: result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr, (ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr); break; } return result; }

None

CVE-2015-0286

The ASN1_TYPE_cmp function in crypto/asn1/a_type.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a does not properly perform boolean-type comparisons, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid read operation and application crash) via a crafted X.509 certificate to an endpoint that uses the certificate-verification feature.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0286

openssl

e1b568dd2462f7cacf98f3d117936c34e2849a6b

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=e1b568dd2462f7cacf98f3d117936c34e2849a6b

Prevent handshake with unseeded PRNG Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are: - Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the user has not seeded manually - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not SSL_client_methodv23) - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA) If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the output may be predictable. For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will succeed on an unpatched platform: openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA CVE-2015-0285 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; int i; unsigned long l; int al = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int j; SSL_COMP *comp; #endif buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || !sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) goto err; } if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ int options = s->options; /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) { if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); goto err; } /* * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. */ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); goto err; } /* * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features. */ s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; } else { /* * We only support one version: update method */ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; } s->client_version = s->version; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p = s->s3->client_random; /* * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { size_t idx; i = 1; for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { if (p[idx]) { i = 0; break; } } } else i = 1; if (i) ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /*- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can * choke if we initially report a higher version then * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports * 1.0. * * Possible scenario with previous logic: * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret * containing version 1.0. * * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. */ *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* Session ID */ if (s->new_session) i = 0; else i = s->session->session_id_length; *(p++) = i; if (i != 0) { if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); p += i; } /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; } /* Ciphers supported */ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH /* * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we * use TLS v1.2 */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; #endif s2n(i, p); p += i; /* COMPRESSION */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++) = 1; #else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) j = 0; else j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); *(p++) = 1 + j; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); *(p++) = comp->id; } #endif *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions */ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #endif l = p - d; ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l); s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); err: return (-1); }

None

CVE-2015-0285

The ssl3_client_hello function in s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a does not ensure that the PRNG is seeded before proceeding with a handshake, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by sniffing the network and then conducting a brute-force attack.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0285

lxde

bc8c3d871e9ecc67c47ff002b68cf049793faf08

https://git.lxde.org/gitweb/?p=lxde/pcmanfm

https://git.lxde.org/gitweb/?p=lxde/pcmanfm.git;a=commit;h=bc8c3d871e9ecc67c47ff002b68cf049793faf08

None

static void get_socket_name(SingleInstData* data, char* buf, int len) { const char* dpy = g_getenv("DISPLAY"); char* host = NULL; int dpynum; if(dpy) { const char* p = strrchr(dpy, ':'); host = g_strndup(dpy, (p - dpy)); dpynum = atoi(p + 1); } else dpynum = 0; g_snprintf(buf, len, "%s/.%s-socket-%s-%d-%s", g_get_tmp_dir(), data->prog_name, host ? host : "", dpynum, g_get_user_name()); }

None

CVE-2017-8934

PCManFM 1.2.5 insecurely uses /tmp for a socket file, allowing a local user to cause a denial of service (application unavailability).

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8934

lxde

56f66684592abf257c4004e6e1fff041c64a12ce

https://git.lxde.org/gitweb/?p=lxde/pcmanfm

https://git.lxde.org/gitweb/?p=lxde/menu-cache.git;a=commit;h=56f66684592abf257c4004e6e1fff041c64a12ce

None

static void get_socket_name( char* buf, int len ) { char* dpy = g_strdup(g_getenv("DISPLAY")); if(dpy && *dpy) { char* p = strchr(dpy, ':'); for(++p; *p && *p != '.' && *p != '\n';) ++p; if(*p) *p = '\0'; } g_snprintf( buf, len, "%s/.menu-cached-%s-%s", g_get_tmp_dir(), dpy ? dpy : ":0", g_get_user_name() ); g_free(dpy); }

menu-cache.c

CVE-2017-8933

Libmenu-cache 1.0.2 insecurely uses /tmp for a socket file, allowing a local user to cause a denial of service (menu unavailability).

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8933

savannah

7f2e4f4f553f6836be7683f66226afac3fa979b8

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=7f2e4f4f553f6836be7683f66226afac3fa979b8

None

_bdf_parse_glyphs( char* line, unsigned long linelen, unsigned long lineno, void* call_data, void* client_data ) { int c, mask_index; char* s; unsigned char* bp; unsigned long i, slen, nibbles; _bdf_parse_t* p; bdf_glyph_t* glyph; bdf_font_t* font; FT_Memory memory; FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok; FT_UNUSED( call_data ); FT_UNUSED( lineno ); /* only used in debug mode */ p = (_bdf_parse_t *)client_data; font = p->font; memory = font->memory; /* Check for a comment. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) { linelen -= 7; s = line + 7; if ( *s != 0 ) { s++; linelen--; } error = _bdf_add_comment( p->font, s, linelen ); goto Exit; } /* The very first thing expected is the number of glyphs. */ if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPHS ) ) { if ( ft_memcmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "CHARS" )); error = BDF_Err_Missing_Chars_Field; goto Exit; } error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; p->cnt = font->glyphs_size = _bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); /* Make sure the number of glyphs is non-zero. */ if ( p->cnt == 0 ) font->glyphs_size = 64; /* Limit ourselves to 1,114,112 glyphs in the font (this is the */ /* number of code points available in Unicode). */ if ( p->cnt >= 0x110000UL ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "CHARS" )); error = BDF_Err_Invalid_Argument; goto Exit; } if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs, font->glyphs_size ) ) goto Exit; p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPHS; goto Exit; } /* Check for the ENDFONT field. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 ) { /* Sort the glyphs by encoding. */ ft_qsort( (char *)font->glyphs, font->glyphs_used, sizeof ( bdf_glyph_t ), by_encoding ); p->flags &= ~_BDF_START; goto Exit; } /* Check for the ENDCHAR field. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 ) { p->glyph_enc = 0; p->flags &= ~_BDF_GLYPH_BITS; goto Exit; } /* Check whether a glyph is being scanned but should be */ /* ignored because it is an unencoded glyph. */ if ( ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) && p->glyph_enc == -1 && p->opts->keep_unencoded == 0 ) goto Exit; /* Check for the STARTCHAR field. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 ) { /* Set the character name in the parse info first until the */ /* encoding can be checked for an unencoded character. */ FT_FREE( p->glyph_name ); error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; _bdf_list_shift( &p->list, 1 ); s = _bdf_list_join( &p->list, ' ', &slen ); if ( !s ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG8, lineno, "STARTCHAR" )); error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; goto Exit; } if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( p->glyph_name, slen + 1 ) ) goto Exit; FT_MEM_COPY( p->glyph_name, s, slen + 1 ); p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH; FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG1, lineno, s )); goto Exit; } /* Check for the ENCODING field. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) ) { /* Missing STARTCHAR field. */ FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "STARTCHAR" )); error = BDF_Err_Missing_Startchar_Field; goto Exit; } error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); /* Normalize negative encoding values. The specification only */ /* allows -1, but we can be more generous here. */ if ( p->glyph_enc < -1 ) p->glyph_enc = -1; /* Check for alternative encoding format. */ if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 && p->list.used > 2 ) p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 ); FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG2, p->glyph_enc )); /* Check that the encoding is in the Unicode range because */ sizeof ( unsigned long ) * 32 ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "ENCODING" )); error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; goto Exit; } /* Check whether this encoding has already been encountered. */ /* If it has then change it to unencoded so it gets added if */ /* indicated. */ if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 ) { if ( _bdf_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc ) ) { /* Emit a message saying a glyph has been moved to the */ /* unencoded area. */ FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG12, p->glyph_enc, p->glyph_name )); p->glyph_enc = -1; font->modified = 1; } else _bdf_set_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc ); } if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 ) { /* Make sure there are enough glyphs allocated in case the */ /* number of characters happen to be wrong. */ if ( font->glyphs_used == font->glyphs_size ) { if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs, font->glyphs_size, font->glyphs_size + 64 ) ) goto Exit; font->glyphs_size += 64; } glyph = font->glyphs + font->glyphs_used++; glyph->name = p->glyph_name; glyph->encoding = p->glyph_enc; /* Reset the initial glyph info. */ p->glyph_name = 0; } else { /* Unencoded glyph. Check whether it should */ /* be added or not. */ if ( p->opts->keep_unencoded != 0 ) { /* Allocate the next unencoded glyph. */ if ( font->unencoded_used == font->unencoded_size ) { if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->unencoded , font->unencoded_size, font->unencoded_size + 4 ) ) goto Exit; font->unencoded_size += 4; } glyph = font->unencoded + font->unencoded_used; glyph->name = p->glyph_name; glyph->encoding = font->unencoded_used++; } else /* Free up the glyph name if the unencoded shouldn't be */ /* kept. */ FT_FREE( p->glyph_name ); p->glyph_name = 0; } /* Clear the flags that might be added when width and height are */ /* checked for consistency. */ p->flags &= ~( _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK | _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK ); p->flags |= _BDF_ENCODING; goto Exit; } /* Point at the glyph being constructed. */ if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 ) glyph = font->unencoded + ( font->unencoded_used - 1 ); else glyph = font->glyphs + ( font->glyphs_used - 1 ); /* Check whether a bitmap is being constructed. */ if ( p->flags & _BDF_BITMAP ) { /* If there are more rows than are specified in the glyph metrics, */ /* ignore the remaining lines. */ if ( p->row >= (unsigned long)glyph->bbx.height ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK ) ) { FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG13, glyph->encoding )); p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK; font->modified = 1; } goto Exit; } /* Only collect the number of nibbles indicated by the glyph */ /* metrics. If there are more columns, they are simply ignored. */ nibbles = glyph->bpr << 1; bp = glyph->bitmap + p->row * glyph->bpr; for ( i = 0; i < nibbles; i++ ) { c = line[i]; if ( !sbitset( hdigits, c ) ) break; *bp = (FT_Byte)( ( *bp << 4 ) + a2i[c] ); if ( i + 1 < nibbles && ( i & 1 ) ) *++bp = 0; } /* If any line has not enough columns, */ /* indicate they have been padded with zero bits. */ if ( i < nibbles && !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) ) { FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG16, glyph->encoding )); p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK; font->modified = 1; } /* Remove possible garbage at the right. */ mask_index = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp ) & 7; if ( glyph->bbx.width ) *bp &= nibble_mask[mask_index]; /* If any line has extra columns, indicate they have been removed. */ if ( i == nibbles && sbitset( hdigits, line[nibbles] ) && !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) ) { FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG14, glyph->encoding )); p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK; font->modified = 1; } p->row++; goto Exit; } /* Expect the SWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) goto Missing_Encoding; error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH; goto Exit; } /* Expect the DWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) goto Missing_Encoding; error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; glyph->dwidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_SWIDTH ) ) { /* Missing SWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */ /* the scalable width from the device width. */ FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG9, lineno )); glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv( glyph->dwidth, 72000L, (FT_Long)( font->point_size * font->resolution_x ) ); } p->flags |= _BDF_DWIDTH; goto Exit; } /* Expect the BBX field next. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) goto Missing_Encoding; error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; glyph->bbx.width = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); glyph->bbx.height = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 ); glyph->bbx.x_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[3], 0, 10 ); glyph->bbx.y_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[4], 0, 10 ); /* Generate the ascent and descent of the character. */ glyph->bbx.ascent = (short)( glyph->bbx.height + glyph->bbx.y_offset ); glyph->bbx.descent = (short)( -glyph->bbx.y_offset ); /* Determine the overall font bounding box as the characters are */ /* loaded so corrections can be done later if indicated. */ p->maxas = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.ascent, p->maxas ); p->maxds = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.descent, p->maxds ); p->rbearing = (short)( glyph->bbx.width + glyph->bbx.x_offset ); p->maxrb = (short)FT_MAX( p->rbearing, p->maxrb ); p->minlb = (short)FT_MIN( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->minlb ); p->maxlb = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->maxlb ); if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_DWIDTH ) ) { /* Missing DWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */ /* the device width to the glyph width. */ FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG10, lineno )); glyph->dwidth = glyph->bbx.width; } /* If the BDF_CORRECT_METRICS flag is set, then adjust the SWIDTH */ /* value if necessary. */ if ( p->opts->correct_metrics != 0 ) { /* Determine the point size of the glyph. */ unsigned short sw = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv( glyph->dwidth, 72000L, (FT_Long)( font->point_size * font->resolution_x ) ); if ( sw != glyph->swidth ) { glyph->swidth = sw; if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 ) _bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->umod, font->unencoded_used - 1 ); else _bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->nmod, glyph->encoding ); p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH_ADJ; font->modified = 1; } } p->flags |= _BDF_BBX; goto Exit; } /* And finally, gather up the bitmap. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 ) { unsigned long bitmap_size; if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_BBX ) ) { /* Missing BBX field. */ FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "BBX" )); error = BDF_Err_Missing_Bbx_Field; goto Exit; } /* Allocate enough space for the bitmap. */ glyph->bpr = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp + 7 ) >> 3; bitmap_size = glyph->bpr * glyph->bbx.height; if ( glyph->bpr > 0xFFFFU || bitmap_size > 0xFFFFU ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG4, lineno )); error = BDF_Err_Bbx_Too_Big; goto Exit; } else glyph->bytes = (unsigned short)bitmap_size; if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->bitmap, glyph->bytes ) ) goto Exit; p->row = 0; p->flags |= _BDF_BITMAP; goto Exit; } FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG9, lineno )); error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; goto Exit; Missing_Encoding: /* Missing ENCODING field. */ FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "ENCODING" )); error = BDF_Err_Missing_Encoding_Field; Exit: if ( error && ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) ) FT_FREE( p->glyph_name ); return error; }

None

CVE-2012-5670

The _bdf_parse_glyphs function in FreeType before 2.4.11 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and crash) via vectors related to BDF fonts and an ENCODING field with a negative value.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-5670

savannah

07bdb6e289c7954e2a533039dc93c1c136099d2d

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=07bdb6e289c7954e2a533039dc93c1c136099d2d

None

_bdf_parse_glyphs( char* line, unsigned long linelen, unsigned long lineno, void* call_data, void* client_data ) { int c, mask_index; char* s; unsigned char* bp; unsigned long i, slen, nibbles; _bdf_parse_t* p; bdf_glyph_t* glyph; bdf_font_t* font; FT_Memory memory; FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok; FT_UNUSED( call_data ); FT_UNUSED( lineno ); /* only used in debug mode */ p = (_bdf_parse_t *)client_data; font = p->font; memory = font->memory; /* Check for a comment. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) { linelen -= 7; s = line + 7; if ( *s != 0 ) { s++; linelen--; } error = _bdf_add_comment( p->font, s, linelen ); goto Exit; } /* The very first thing expected is the number of glyphs. */ if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPHS ) ) { if ( ft_memcmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "CHARS" )); error = BDF_Err_Missing_Chars_Field; goto Exit; } error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; p->cnt = font->glyphs_size = _bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); /* Make sure the number of glyphs is non-zero. */ if ( p->cnt == 0 ) font->glyphs_size = 64; /* Limit ourselves to 1,114,112 glyphs in the font (this is the */ /* number of code points available in Unicode). */ if ( p->cnt >= 0x110000UL ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "CHARS" )); error = BDF_Err_Invalid_Argument; goto Exit; } if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs, font->glyphs_size ) ) goto Exit; p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPHS; goto Exit; } /* Check for the ENDFONT field. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 ) { /* Sort the glyphs by encoding. */ ft_qsort( (char *)font->glyphs, font->glyphs_used, sizeof ( bdf_glyph_t ), by_encoding ); p->flags &= ~_BDF_START; goto Exit; } /* Check for the ENDCHAR field. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 ) { p->glyph_enc = 0; p->flags &= ~_BDF_GLYPH_BITS; goto Exit; } /* Check whether a glyph is being scanned but should be */ /* ignored because it is an unencoded glyph. */ if ( ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) && p->glyph_enc == -1 && p->opts->keep_unencoded == 0 ) goto Exit; /* Check for the STARTCHAR field. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 ) { /* Set the character name in the parse info first until the */ /* encoding can be checked for an unencoded character. */ FT_FREE( p->glyph_name ); error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; _bdf_list_shift( &p->list, 1 ); s = _bdf_list_join( &p->list, ' ', &slen ); if ( !s ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG8, lineno, "STARTCHAR" )); error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; goto Exit; } if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( p->glyph_name, slen + 1 ) ) goto Exit; FT_MEM_COPY( p->glyph_name, s, slen + 1 ); p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH; FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG1, lineno, s )); goto Exit; } /* Check for the ENCODING field. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) ) { /* Missing STARTCHAR field. */ FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "STARTCHAR" )); error = BDF_Err_Missing_Startchar_Field; goto Exit; } error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); /* Normalize negative encoding values. The specification only */ /* allows -1, but we can be more generous here. */ if ( p->glyph_enc < -1 ) p->glyph_enc = -1; /* Check for alternative encoding format. */ if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 && p->list.used > 2 ) p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 ); FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG2, p->glyph_enc )); /* Check that the encoding is in the Unicode range because */ /* otherwise p->have (a bitmap with static size) overflows. */ if ( p->glyph_enc > 0 && (size_t)p->glyph_enc >= sizeof ( p->have ) * 8 ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "ENCODING" )); error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; } /* Check whether this encoding has already been encountered. */ /* If it has then change it to unencoded so it gets added if */ /* indicated. */ if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 ) { if ( _bdf_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc ) ) { /* Emit a message saying a glyph has been moved to the */ /* unencoded area. */ FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG12, p->glyph_enc, p->glyph_name )); p->glyph_enc = -1; font->modified = 1; } else _bdf_set_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc ); } if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 ) { /* Make sure there are enough glyphs allocated in case the */ /* number of characters happen to be wrong. */ if ( font->glyphs_used == font->glyphs_size ) { if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs, font->glyphs_size, font->glyphs_size + 64 ) ) goto Exit; font->glyphs_size += 64; } glyph = font->glyphs + font->glyphs_used++; glyph->name = p->glyph_name; glyph->encoding = p->glyph_enc; /* Reset the initial glyph info. */ p->glyph_name = 0; } else { /* Unencoded glyph. Check whether it should */ /* be added or not. */ if ( p->opts->keep_unencoded != 0 ) { /* Allocate the next unencoded glyph. */ if ( font->unencoded_used == font->unencoded_size ) { if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->unencoded , font->unencoded_size, font->unencoded_size + 4 ) ) goto Exit; font->unencoded_size += 4; } glyph = font->unencoded + font->unencoded_used; glyph->name = p->glyph_name; glyph->encoding = font->unencoded_used++; } else /* Free up the glyph name if the unencoded shouldn't be */ /* kept. */ FT_FREE( p->glyph_name ); p->glyph_name = 0; } /* Clear the flags that might be added when width and height are */ /* checked for consistency. */ p->flags &= ~( _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK | _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK ); p->flags |= _BDF_ENCODING; goto Exit; } /* Point at the glyph being constructed. */ if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 ) glyph = font->unencoded + ( font->unencoded_used - 1 ); else glyph = font->glyphs + ( font->glyphs_used - 1 ); /* Check whether a bitmap is being constructed. */ if ( p->flags & _BDF_BITMAP ) { /* If there are more rows than are specified in the glyph metrics, */ /* ignore the remaining lines. */ if ( p->row >= (unsigned long)glyph->bbx.height ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK ) ) { FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG13, glyph->encoding )); p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK; font->modified = 1; } goto Exit; } /* Only collect the number of nibbles indicated by the glyph */ /* metrics. If there are more columns, they are simply ignored. */ nibbles = glyph->bpr << 1; bp = glyph->bitmap + p->row * glyph->bpr; for ( i = 0; i < nibbles; i++ ) { c = line[i]; if ( !sbitset( hdigits, c ) ) break; *bp = (FT_Byte)( ( *bp << 4 ) + a2i[c] ); if ( i + 1 < nibbles && ( i & 1 ) ) *++bp = 0; } /* If any line has not enough columns, */ /* indicate they have been padded with zero bits. */ if ( i < nibbles && !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) ) { FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG16, glyph->encoding )); p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK; font->modified = 1; } /* Remove possible garbage at the right. */ mask_index = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp ) & 7; if ( glyph->bbx.width ) *bp &= nibble_mask[mask_index]; /* If any line has extra columns, indicate they have been removed. */ if ( i == nibbles && sbitset( hdigits, line[nibbles] ) && !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) ) { FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG14, glyph->encoding )); p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK; font->modified = 1; } p->row++; goto Exit; } /* Expect the SWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) goto Missing_Encoding; error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH; goto Exit; } /* Expect the DWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) goto Missing_Encoding; error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; glyph->dwidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_SWIDTH ) ) { /* Missing SWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */ /* the scalable width from the device width. */ FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG9, lineno )); glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv( glyph->dwidth, 72000L, (FT_Long)( font->point_size * font->resolution_x ) ); } p->flags |= _BDF_DWIDTH; goto Exit; } /* Expect the BBX field next. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 ) { if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) goto Missing_Encoding; error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); if ( error ) goto Exit; glyph->bbx.width = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 ); glyph->bbx.height = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 ); glyph->bbx.x_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[3], 0, 10 ); glyph->bbx.y_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[4], 0, 10 ); /* Generate the ascent and descent of the character. */ glyph->bbx.ascent = (short)( glyph->bbx.height + glyph->bbx.y_offset ); glyph->bbx.descent = (short)( -glyph->bbx.y_offset ); /* Determine the overall font bounding box as the characters are */ /* loaded so corrections can be done later if indicated. */ p->maxas = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.ascent, p->maxas ); p->maxds = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.descent, p->maxds ); p->rbearing = (short)( glyph->bbx.width + glyph->bbx.x_offset ); p->maxrb = (short)FT_MAX( p->rbearing, p->maxrb ); p->minlb = (short)FT_MIN( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->minlb ); p->maxlb = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->maxlb ); if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_DWIDTH ) ) { /* Missing DWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */ /* the device width to the glyph width. */ FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG10, lineno )); glyph->dwidth = glyph->bbx.width; } /* If the BDF_CORRECT_METRICS flag is set, then adjust the SWIDTH */ /* value if necessary. */ if ( p->opts->correct_metrics != 0 ) { /* Determine the point size of the glyph. */ unsigned short sw = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv( glyph->dwidth, 72000L, (FT_Long)( font->point_size * font->resolution_x ) ); if ( sw != glyph->swidth ) { glyph->swidth = sw; if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 ) _bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->umod, font->unencoded_used - 1 ); else _bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->nmod, glyph->encoding ); p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH_ADJ; font->modified = 1; } } p->flags |= _BDF_BBX; goto Exit; } /* And finally, gather up the bitmap. */ if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 ) { unsigned long bitmap_size; if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_BBX ) ) { /* Missing BBX field. */ FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "BBX" )); error = BDF_Err_Missing_Bbx_Field; goto Exit; } /* Allocate enough space for the bitmap. */ glyph->bpr = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp + 7 ) >> 3; bitmap_size = glyph->bpr * glyph->bbx.height; if ( glyph->bpr > 0xFFFFU || bitmap_size > 0xFFFFU ) { FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG4, lineno )); error = BDF_Err_Bbx_Too_Big; goto Exit; } else glyph->bytes = (unsigned short)bitmap_size; if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->bitmap, glyph->bytes ) ) goto Exit; p->row = 0; p->flags |= _BDF_BITMAP; goto Exit; } FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG9, lineno )); error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; goto Exit; Missing_Encoding: /* Missing ENCODING field. */ FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "ENCODING" )); error = BDF_Err_Missing_Encoding_Field; Exit: if ( error && ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) ) FT_FREE( p->glyph_name ); return error; }

None

CVE-2012-5669

The _bdf_parse_glyphs function in FreeType before 2.4.11 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors related to BDF fonts and an incorrect calculation that triggers an out-of-bounds read.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-5669

savannah

8fcf61523644df42e1905c81bed26838e0b04f91

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grep.git/commit/?id=8fcf61523644df42e1905c81bed26838e0b04f91

None

context_length_arg (char const *str, int *out) { uintmax_t value; if (! (xstrtoumax (str, 0, 10, &value, "") == LONGINT_OK && 0 <= (*out = value) && *out == value)) { error (EXIT_TROUBLE, 0, "%s: %s", str, _("invalid context length argument")); } page size, unless a read yields a partial page. */ static char *buffer; /* Base of buffer. */ static size_t bufalloc; /* Allocated buffer size, counting slop. */ #define INITIAL_BUFSIZE 32768 /* Initial buffer size, not counting slop. */ static int bufdesc; /* File descriptor. */ static char *bufbeg; /* Beginning of user-visible stuff. */ static char *buflim; /* Limit of user-visible stuff. */ static size_t pagesize; /* alignment of memory pages */ static off_t bufoffset; /* Read offset; defined on regular files. */ static off_t after_last_match; /* Pointer after last matching line that would have been output if we were outputting characters. */ /* Return VAL aligned to the next multiple of ALIGNMENT. VAL can be an integer or a pointer. Both args must be free of side effects. */ #define ALIGN_TO(val, alignment) \ ((size_t) (val) % (alignment) == 0 \ ? (val) \ : (val) + ((alignment) - (size_t) (val) % (alignment))) /* Reset the buffer for a new file, returning zero if we should skip it. Initialize on the first time through. */ static int reset (int fd, char const *file, struct stats *stats) { if (! pagesize) { pagesize = getpagesize (); if (pagesize == 0 || 2 * pagesize + 1 <= pagesize) abort (); bufalloc = ALIGN_TO (INITIAL_BUFSIZE, pagesize) + pagesize + 1; buffer = xmalloc (bufalloc); } bufbeg = buflim = ALIGN_TO (buffer + 1, pagesize); bufbeg[-1] = eolbyte; bufdesc = fd; if (S_ISREG (stats->stat.st_mode)) { if (file) bufoffset = 0; else { bufoffset = lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_CUR); if (bufoffset < 0) { suppressible_error (_("lseek failed"), errno); return 0; } } } return 1; } /* Read new stuff into the buffer, saving the specified amount of old stuff. When we're done, 'bufbeg' points to the beginning of the buffer contents, and 'buflim' points just after the end. Return zero if there's an error. */ static int fillbuf (size_t save, struct stats const *stats) { size_t fillsize = 0; int cc = 1; char *readbuf; size_t readsize; /* Offset from start of buffer to start of old stuff that we want to save. */ size_t saved_offset = buflim - save - buffer; if (pagesize <= buffer + bufalloc - buflim) { readbuf = buflim; bufbeg = buflim - save; } else { size_t minsize = save + pagesize; size_t newsize; size_t newalloc; char *newbuf; /* Grow newsize until it is at least as great as minsize. */ for (newsize = bufalloc - pagesize - 1; newsize < minsize; newsize *= 2) if (newsize * 2 < newsize || newsize * 2 + pagesize + 1 < newsize * 2) xalloc_die (); /* Try not to allocate more memory than the file size indicates, as that might cause unnecessary memory exhaustion if the file is large. However, do not use the original file size as a heuristic if we've already read past the file end, as most likely the file is growing. */ if (S_ISREG (stats->stat.st_mode)) { off_t to_be_read = stats->stat.st_size - bufoffset; off_t maxsize_off = save + to_be_read; if (0 <= to_be_read && to_be_read <= maxsize_off && maxsize_off == (size_t) maxsize_off && minsize <= (size_t) maxsize_off && (size_t) maxsize_off < newsize) newsize = maxsize_off; } /* Add enough room so that the buffer is aligned and has room for byte sentinels fore and aft. */ newalloc = newsize + pagesize + 1; newbuf = bufalloc < newalloc ? xmalloc (bufalloc = newalloc) : buffer; readbuf = ALIGN_TO (newbuf + 1 + save, pagesize); bufbeg = readbuf - save; memmove (bufbeg, buffer + saved_offset, save); bufbeg[-1] = eolbyte; if (newbuf != buffer) { free (buffer); buffer = newbuf; } } readsize = buffer + bufalloc - readbuf; readsize -= readsize % pagesize; if (! fillsize) { ssize_t bytesread; while ((bytesread = read (bufdesc, readbuf, readsize)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) continue; if (bytesread < 0) cc = 0; else fillsize = bytesread; } bufoffset += fillsize; #if defined HAVE_DOS_FILE_CONTENTS if (fillsize) fillsize = undossify_input (readbuf, fillsize); #endif buflim = readbuf + fillsize; return cc; } /* Flags controlling the style of output. */ static enum { BINARY_BINARY_FILES, TEXT_BINARY_FILES, WITHOUT_MATCH_BINARY_FILES } binary_files; /* How to handle binary files. */ static int filename_mask; /* If zero, output nulls after filenames. */ static int out_quiet; /* Suppress all normal output. */ static int out_invert; /* Print nonmatching stuff. */ static int out_file; /* Print filenames. */ static int out_line; /* Print line numbers. */ static int out_byte; /* Print byte offsets. */ static int out_before; /* Lines of leading context. */ static int out_after; /* Lines of trailing context. */ static int out_file; /* Print filenames. */ static int out_line; /* Print line numbers. */ static int out_byte; /* Print byte offsets. */ static int out_before; /* Lines of leading context. */ static int out_after; /* Lines of trailing context. */ static int count_matches; /* Count matching lines. */ static int list_files; /* List matching files. */ static int no_filenames; /* Suppress file names. */ static off_t max_count; /* Stop after outputting this many lines from an input file. */ static int line_buffered; /* If nonzero, use line buffering, i.e. fflush everyline out. */ static char const *lastnl; /* Pointer after last newline counted. */ static char const *lastout; /* Pointer after last character output; NULL if no character has been output or if it's conceptually before bufbeg. */ static uintmax_t totalnl; /* Total newline count before lastnl. */ static off_t outleft; /* Maximum number of lines to be output. */ static int pending; /* Pending lines of output. NULL if no character has been output or if it's conceptually before bufbeg. */ static uintmax_t totalnl; /* Total newline count before lastnl. */ static off_t outleft; /* Maximum number of lines to be output. */ static int pending; /* Pending lines of output. Always kept 0 if out_quiet is true. */ static int done_on_match; /* Stop scanning file on first match. */ static int exit_on_match; /* Exit on first match. */ /* Add two numbers that count input bytes or lines, and report an error if the addition overflows. */ static uintmax_t add_count (uintmax_t a, uintmax_t b) { uintmax_t sum = a + b; if (sum < a) error (EXIT_TROUBLE, 0, _("input is too large to count")); return sum; } static void nlscan (char const *lim) { size_t newlines = 0; char const *beg; for (beg = lastnl; beg < lim; beg++) { beg = memchr (beg, eolbyte, lim - beg); if (!beg) break; newlines++; } totalnl = add_count (totalnl, newlines); lastnl = lim; } /* Print the current filename. */ static void print_filename (void) { pr_sgr_start_if (filename_color); fputs (filename, stdout); pr_sgr_end_if (filename_color); } /* Print a character separator. */ static void print_sep (char sep) { pr_sgr_start_if (sep_color); fputc (sep, stdout); pr_sgr_end_if (sep_color); } /* Print a line number or a byte offset. */ static void print_offset (uintmax_t pos, int min_width, const char *color) { /* Do not rely on printf to print pos, since uintmax_t may be longer than long, and long long is not portable. */ char buf[sizeof pos * CHAR_BIT]; char *p = buf + sizeof buf; do { *--p = '0' + pos % 10; --min_width; } while ((pos /= 10) != 0); /* Do this to maximize the probability of alignment across lines. */ if (align_tabs) while (--min_width >= 0) *--p = ' '; pr_sgr_start_if (color); fwrite (p, 1, buf + sizeof buf - p, stdout); pr_sgr_end_if (color); } /* Print a whole line head (filename, line, byte). */ static void print_line_head (char const *beg, char const *lim, int sep) { int pending_sep = 0; if (out_file) { print_filename (); if (filename_mask) pending_sep = 1; else fputc (0, stdout); } if (out_line) { if (lastnl < lim) { nlscan (beg); totalnl = add_count (totalnl, 1); lastnl = lim; } if (pending_sep) print_sep (sep); print_offset (totalnl, 4, line_num_color); pending_sep = 1; } if (out_byte) { uintmax_t pos = add_count (totalcc, beg - bufbeg); #if defined HAVE_DOS_FILE_CONTENTS pos = dossified_pos (pos); #endif if (pending_sep) print_sep (sep); print_offset (pos, 6, byte_num_color); pending_sep = 1; } if (pending_sep) { /* This assumes sep is one column wide. Try doing this any other way with Unicode (and its combining and wide characters) filenames and you're wasting your efforts. */ if (align_tabs) fputs ("\t\b", stdout); print_sep (sep); } } static const char * print_line_middle (const char *beg, const char *lim, const char *line_color, const char *match_color) { size_t match_size; size_t match_offset; const char *cur = beg; const char *mid = NULL; while (cur < lim && ((match_offset = execute (beg, lim - beg, &match_size, beg + (cur - beg))) != (size_t) -1)) { char const *b = beg + match_offset; /* Avoid matching the empty line at the end of the buffer. */ if (b == lim) break; /* Avoid hanging on grep --color "" foo */ if (match_size == 0) { /* Make minimal progress; there may be further non-empty matches. */ /* XXX - Could really advance by one whole multi-octet character. */ match_size = 1; if (!mid) mid = cur; } else { /* This function is called on a matching line only, but is it selected or rejected/context? */ if (only_matching) print_line_head (b, lim, (out_invert ? SEP_CHAR_REJECTED : SEP_CHAR_SELECTED)); else { pr_sgr_start (line_color); if (mid) { cur = mid; mid = NULL; } fwrite (cur, sizeof (char), b - cur, stdout); } pr_sgr_start_if (match_color); fwrite (b, sizeof (char), match_size, stdout); pr_sgr_end_if (match_color); if (only_matching) fputs ("\n", stdout); } cur = b + match_size; } if (only_matching) cur = lim; else if (mid) cur = mid; return cur; } static const char * print_line_tail (const char *beg, const char *lim, const char *line_color) { size_t eol_size; size_t tail_size; eol_size = (lim > beg && lim[-1] == eolbyte); eol_size += (lim - eol_size > beg && lim[-(1 + eol_size)] == '\r'); tail_size = lim - eol_size - beg; if (tail_size > 0) { pr_sgr_start (line_color); fwrite (beg, 1, tail_size, stdout); beg += tail_size; pr_sgr_end (line_color); } return beg; } static void prline (char const *beg, char const *lim, int sep) { int matching; const char *line_color; const char *match_color; if (!only_matching) print_line_head (beg, lim, sep); matching = (sep == SEP_CHAR_SELECTED) ^ !!out_invert; if (color_option) { line_color = (((sep == SEP_CHAR_SELECTED) ^ (out_invert && (color_option < 0))) ? selected_line_color : context_line_color); match_color = (sep == SEP_CHAR_SELECTED ? selected_match_color : context_match_color); } else line_color = match_color = NULL; /* Shouldn't be used. */ if ((only_matching && matching) || (color_option && (*line_color || *match_color))) { /* We already know that non-matching lines have no match (to colorize). */ if (matching && (only_matching || *match_color)) beg = print_line_middle (beg, lim, line_color, match_color); /* FIXME: this test may be removable. */ if (!only_matching && *line_color) beg = print_line_tail (beg, lim, line_color); } if (!only_matching && lim > beg) fwrite (beg, 1, lim - beg, stdout); if (ferror (stdout)) { write_error_seen = 1; error (EXIT_TROUBLE, 0, _("write error")); } lastout = lim; if (line_buffered) fflush (stdout); } /* Print pending lines of trailing context prior to LIM. Trailing context ends at the next matching line when OUTLEFT is 0. */ static void prpending (char const *lim) { if (!lastout) lastout = bufbeg; while (pending > 0 && lastout < lim) { char const *nl = memchr (lastout, eolbyte, lim - lastout); size_t match_size; --pending; if (outleft || ((execute (lastout, nl + 1 - lastout, &match_size, NULL) == (size_t) -1) == !out_invert)) prline (lastout, nl + 1, SEP_CHAR_REJECTED); else pending = 0; } } /* Print the lines between BEG and LIM. Deal with context crap. If NLINESP is non-null, store a count of lines between BEG and LIM. */ static void prtext (char const *beg, char const *lim, int *nlinesp) { /* Print the lines between BEG and LIM. Deal with context crap. If NLINESP is non-null, store a count of lines between BEG and LIM. */ static void prtext (char const *beg, char const *lim, int *nlinesp) { static int used; /* avoid printing SEP_STR_GROUP before any output */ char const *bp, *p; char eol = eolbyte; int i, n; if (!out_quiet && pending > 0) prpending (beg); /* Deal with leading context crap. */ bp = lastout ? lastout : bufbeg; for (i = 0; i < out_before; ++i) if (p > bp) do --p; while (p[-1] != eol); /* We print the SEP_STR_GROUP separator only if our output is discontiguous from the last output in the file. */ if ((out_before || out_after) && used && p != lastout && group_separator) { pr_sgr_start_if (sep_color); fputs (group_separator, stdout); pr_sgr_end_if (sep_color); fputc ('\n', stdout); } while (p < beg) { char const *nl = memchr (p, eol, beg - p); nl++; prline (p, nl, SEP_CHAR_REJECTED); p = nl; } } if (nlinesp) { /* Caller wants a line count. */ for (n = 0; p < lim && n < outleft; n++) { char const *nl = memchr (p, eol, lim - p); nl++; if (!out_quiet) prline (p, nl, SEP_CHAR_SELECTED); p = nl; } *nlinesp = n; /* relying on it that this function is never called when outleft = 0. */ after_last_match = bufoffset - (buflim - p); } else if (!out_quiet) prline (beg, lim, SEP_CHAR_SELECTED); pending = out_quiet ? 0 : out_after; used = 1; } static size_t do_execute (char const *buf, size_t size, size_t *match_size, char const *start_ptr) { size_t result; const char *line_next; /* With the current implementation, using --ignore-case with a multi-byte character set is very inefficient when applied to a large buffer containing many matches. We can avoid much of the wasted effort by matching line-by-line. FIXME: this is just an ugly workaround, and it doesn't really belong here. Also, PCRE is always using this same per-line matching algorithm. Either we fix -i, or we should refactor this code---for example, we could add another function pointer to struct matcher to split the buffer passed to execute. It would perform the memchr if line-by-line matching is necessary, or just return buf + size otherwise. */ if (MB_CUR_MAX == 1 || !match_icase) return execute (buf, size, match_size, start_ptr); for (line_next = buf; line_next < buf + size; ) { const char *line_buf = line_next; const char *line_end = memchr (line_buf, eolbyte, (buf + size) - line_buf); if (line_end == NULL) line_next = line_end = buf + size; else line_next = line_end + 1; if (start_ptr && start_ptr >= line_end) continue; result = execute (line_buf, line_next - line_buf, match_size, start_ptr); if (result != (size_t) -1) return (line_buf - buf) + result; } return (size_t) -1; } /* Scan the specified portion of the buffer, matching lines (or between matching lines if OUT_INVERT is true). Return a count of lines printed. */ static int grepbuf (char const *beg, char const *lim) /* Scan the specified portion of the buffer, matching lines (or between matching lines if OUT_INVERT is true). Return a count of lines printed. */ static int grepbuf (char const *beg, char const *lim) { int nlines, n; char const *p; size_t match_offset; size_t match_size; { char const *b = p + match_offset; char const *endp = b + match_size; /* Avoid matching the empty line at the end of the buffer. */ if (b == lim) break; if (!out_invert) { prtext (b, endp, (int *) 0); nlines++; break; if (!out_invert) { prtext (b, endp, (int *) 0); nlines++; outleft--; if (!outleft || done_on_match) } } else if (p < b) { prtext (p, b, &n); nlines += n; outleft -= n; if (!outleft) return nlines; } p = endp; } if (out_invert && p < lim) { prtext (p, lim, &n); nlines += n; outleft -= n; } return nlines; } /* Search a given file. Normally, return a count of lines printed; but if the file is a directory and we search it recursively, then return -2 if there was a match, and -1 otherwise. */ static int grep (int fd, char const *file, struct stats *stats) /* Search a given file. Normally, return a count of lines printed; but if the file is a directory and we search it recursively, then return -2 if there was a match, and -1 otherwise. */ static int grep (int fd, char const *file, struct stats *stats) { int nlines, i; int not_text; size_t residue, save; char oldc; return 0; if (file && directories == RECURSE_DIRECTORIES && S_ISDIR (stats->stat.st_mode)) { /* Close fd now, so that we don't open a lot of file descriptors when we recurse deeply. */ if (close (fd) != 0) suppressible_error (file, errno); return grepdir (file, stats) - 2; } totalcc = 0; lastout = 0; totalnl = 0; outleft = max_count; after_last_match = 0; pending = 0; nlines = 0; residue = 0; save = 0; if (! fillbuf (save, stats)) { suppressible_error (filename, errno); return 0; } not_text = (((binary_files == BINARY_BINARY_FILES && !out_quiet) || binary_files == WITHOUT_MATCH_BINARY_FILES) && memchr (bufbeg, eol ? '\0' : '\200', buflim - bufbeg)); if (not_text && binary_files == WITHOUT_MATCH_BINARY_FILES) return 0; done_on_match += not_text; out_quiet += not_text; for (;;) { lastnl = bufbeg; if (lastout) lastout = bufbeg; beg = bufbeg + save; /* no more data to scan (eof) except for maybe a residue -> break */ if (beg == buflim) break; /* Determine new residue (the length of an incomplete line at the end of the buffer, 0 means there is no incomplete last line). */ oldc = beg[-1]; beg[-1] = eol; for (lim = buflim; lim[-1] != eol; lim--) continue; beg[-1] = oldc; if (lim == beg) lim = beg - residue; beg -= residue; residue = buflim - lim; if (beg < lim) { if (outleft) nlines += grepbuf (beg, lim); if (pending) prpending (lim); if ((!outleft && !pending) || (nlines && done_on_match && !out_invert)) goto finish_grep; } /* The last OUT_BEFORE lines at the end of the buffer will be needed as leading context if there is a matching line at the begin of the next data. Make beg point to their begin. */ i = 0; beg = lim; while (i < out_before && beg > bufbeg && beg != lastout) { ++i; do --beg; while (beg[-1] != eol); } /* detect if leading context is discontinuous from last printed line. */ if (beg != lastout) lastout = 0; /* Handle some details and read more data to scan. */ save = residue + lim - beg; if (out_byte) totalcc = add_count (totalcc, buflim - bufbeg - save); if (out_line) nlscan (beg); if (! fillbuf (save, stats)) { suppressible_error (filename, errno); goto finish_grep; } } if (residue) { *buflim++ = eol; if (outleft) nlines += grepbuf (bufbeg + save - residue, buflim); if (pending) prpending (buflim); } finish_grep: done_on_match -= not_text; out_quiet -= not_text; if ((not_text & ~out_quiet) && nlines != 0) printf (_("Binary file %s matches\n"), filename); return nlines; } static int grepfile (char const *file, struct stats *stats) { int desc; int count; int status; grepfile (char const *file, struct stats *stats) { int desc; int count; int status; filename = (file ? file : label ? label : _("(standard input)")); /* Don't open yet, since that might have side effects on a device. */ desc = -1; } else { /* When skipping directories, don't worry about directories that can't be opened. */ desc = open (file, O_RDONLY); if (desc < 0 && directories != SKIP_DIRECTORIES) { suppressible_error (file, errno); return 1; } } if (desc < 0 ? stat (file, &stats->stat) != 0 : fstat (desc, &stats->stat) != 0) { suppressible_error (filename, errno); if (file) close (desc); return 1; } if ((directories == SKIP_DIRECTORIES && S_ISDIR (stats->stat.st_mode)) || (devices == SKIP_DEVICES && (S_ISCHR (stats->stat.st_mode) || S_ISBLK (stats->stat.st_mode) || S_ISSOCK (stats->stat.st_mode) || S_ISFIFO (stats->stat.st_mode)))) { if (file) close (desc); return 1; } /* If there is a regular file on stdout and the current file refers to the same i-node, we have to report the problem and skip it. Otherwise when matching lines from some other input reach the disk before we open this file, we can end up reading and matching those lines and appending them to the file from which we're reading. Then we'd have what appears to be an infinite loop that'd terminate only upon filling the output file system or reaching a quota. However, there is no risk of an infinite loop if grep is generating no output, i.e., with --silent, --quiet, -q. Similarly, with any of these: --max-count=N (-m) (for N >= 2) --files-with-matches (-l) --files-without-match (-L) there is no risk of trouble. For --max-count=1, grep stops after printing the first match, so there is no risk of malfunction. But even --max-count=2, with input==output, while there is no risk of infloop, there is a race condition that could result in "alternate" output. */ if (!out_quiet && list_files == 0 && 1 < max_count && S_ISREG (out_stat.st_mode) && out_stat.st_ino && SAME_INODE (stats->stat, out_stat)) { if (! suppress_errors) error (0, 0, _("input file %s is also the output"), quote (filename)); errseen = 1; if (file) close (desc); return 1; } if (desc < 0) { desc = open (file, O_RDONLY); if (desc < 0) { suppressible_error (file, errno); return 1; } } #if defined SET_BINARY /* Set input to binary mode. Pipes are simulated with files on DOS, so this includes the case of "foo | grep bar". */ if (!isatty (desc)) SET_BINARY (desc); #endif count = grep (desc, file, stats); if (count < 0) status = count + 2; else { if (count_matches) { if (out_file) { print_filename (); if (filename_mask) print_sep (SEP_CHAR_SELECTED); else fputc (0, stdout); } printf ("%d\n", count); } else fputc (0, stdout); } printf ("%d\n", count); } status = !count; if (! file) { off_t required_offset = outleft ? bufoffset : after_last_match; if (required_offset != bufoffset && lseek (desc, required_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0 && S_ISREG (stats->stat.st_mode)) suppressible_error (filename, errno); } else while (close (desc) != 0) if (errno != EINTR) { suppressible_error (file, errno); break; } }

None

CVE-2012-5667

Multiple integer overflows in GNU Grep before 2.11 might allow context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors involving a long input line that triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-5667

kde

a90289b0962663bc1d247bbbd31b9e65b2ca000e

https://cgit.kde.org/konversation

https://cgit.kde.org/smb4k.git/commit/?id=a90289b0962663bc1d247bbbd31b9e65b2ca000e

None

ActionReply Smb4KMountHelper::mount(const QVariantMap &args) { ActionReply reply; QMapIterator<QString, QVariant> it(args); proc.setOutputChannelMode(KProcess::SeparateChannels); proc.setProcessEnvironment(QProcessEnvironment::systemEnvironment()); #if defined(Q_OS_LINUX) proc.setEnv("PASSWD", entry["mh_url"].toUrl().password(), true); #endif QVariantMap entry = it.value().toMap(); KProcess proc(this); command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString(); command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList(); #elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD) command << entry["mh_command"].toString(); command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList(); command << entry["mh_unc"].toString(); command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString(); #else #endif proc.setProgram(command); proc.start(); if (proc.waitForStarted(-1)) { bool userKill = false; QStringList command; #if defined(Q_OS_LINUX) command << entry["mh_command"].toString(); command << entry["mh_unc"].toString(); command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString(); command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList(); #elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD) command << entry["mh_command"].toString(); command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList(); command << entry["mh_unc"].toString(); command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString(); else { } if (HelperSupport::isStopped()) { proc.kill(); userKill = true; break; } else { } } if (proc.exitStatus() == KProcess::CrashExit) { if (!userKill) { reply.setType(ActionReply::HelperErrorType); reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("The mount process crashed.")); break; } else { } } else { QString stdErr = QString::fromUtf8(proc.readAllStandardError()); reply.addData(QString("mh_error_message_%1").arg(index), stdErr.trimmed()); } }

None

CVE-2017-8849

smb4k before 2.0.1 allows local users to gain root privileges by leveraging failure to verify arguments to the mount helper DBUS service.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8849

savannah

df14e6c0b9592cbb24d5381dfc6106b14f915e75

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=df14e6c0b9592cbb24d5381dfc6106b14f915e75

None

parse_encoding( T1_Face face, T1_Loader loader ) { T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser; FT_Byte* cur; FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit; PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux; T1_Skip_Spaces( parser ); cur = parser->root.cursor; if ( cur >= limit ) { FT_ERROR(( "parse_encoding: out of bounds\n" )); parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); return; } /* if we have a number or `[', the encoding is an array, */ /* and we must load it now */ if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || *cur == '[' ) { T1_Encoding encode = &face->type1.encoding; FT_Int count, n; PS_Table char_table = &loader->encoding_table; FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory; FT_Error error; FT_Bool only_immediates = 0; /* read the number of entries in the encoding; should be 256 */ if ( *cur == '[' ) { count = 256; only_immediates = 1; parser->root.cursor++; } else count = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser ); T1_Skip_Spaces( parser ); if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit ) return; /* we use a T1_Table to store our charnames */ loader->num_chars = encode->num_chars = count; if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_index, count ) || FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_name, count ) || FT_SET_ERROR( psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( char_table, count, memory ) ) ) { parser->root.error = error; return; } /* We need to `zero' out encoding_table.elements */ for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ ) { char* notdef = (char *)".notdef"; T1_Add_Table( char_table, n, notdef, 8 ); } /* Now we need to read records of the form */ /* */ /* ... charcode /charname ... */ /* */ /* for each entry in our table. */ /* */ /* We simply look for a number followed by an immediate */ /* name. Note that this ignores correctly the sequence */ /* that is often seen in type1 fonts: */ /* */ /* 0 1 255 { 1 index exch /.notdef put } for dup */ /* */ /* used to clean the encoding array before anything else. */ /* */ /* Alternatively, if the array is directly given as */ /* */ /* /Encoding [ ... ] */ /* */ /* we only read immediates. */ n = 0; T1_Skip_Spaces( parser ); while ( parser->root.cursor < limit ) { cur = parser->root.cursor; /* we stop when we encounter a `def' or `]' */ if ( *cur == 'd' && cur + 3 < limit ) { if ( cur[1] == 'e' && cur[2] == 'f' && IS_PS_DELIM( cur[3] ) ) { FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" )); cur += 3; break; } } if ( *cur == ']' ) { FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" )); cur++; break; } /* check whether we've found an entry */ if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || only_immediates ) { FT_Int charcode; if ( only_immediates ) charcode = n; else { charcode = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser ); T1_Skip_Spaces( parser ); } cur = parser->root.cursor; parser->root.cursor = cur; T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit ) return; if ( parser->root.error ) return; len = parser->root.cursor - cur; parser->root.error = T1_Add_Table( char_table, charcode, cur, len + 1 ); if ( parser->root.error ) return; char_table->elements[charcode][len] = '\0'; n++; } else if ( only_immediates ) { /* Since the current position is not updated for */ /* immediates-only mode we would get an infinite loop if */ /* we don't do anything here. */ /* */ /* This encoding array is not valid according to the type1 */ /* specification (it might be an encoding for a CID type1 */ /* font, however), so we conclude that this font is NOT a */ /* type1 font. */ parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format ); return; } } else { T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); if ( parser->root.error ) return; } T1_Skip_Spaces( parser ); } face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY; parser->root.cursor = cur; }

None

CVE-2014-9745

The parse_encoding function in type1/t1load.c in FreeType before 2.5.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a "broken number-with-base" in a Postscript stream, as demonstrated by 8#garbage.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9745

haproxy

17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06

https://github.com/haproxy/haproxy

https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.8.git;a=commit;h=17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06

None

void check_request_for_cacheability(struct stream *s, struct channel *chn) { struct http_txn *txn = s->txn; char *p1, *p2; char *cur_ptr, *cur_end, *cur_next; int pragma_found; int cc_found; int cur_idx; if ((txn->flags & (TX_CACHEABLE|TX_CACHE_IGNORE)) == TX_CACHE_IGNORE) return; /* nothing more to do here */ cur_idx = 0; pragma_found = cc_found = 0; cur_next = chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx); while ((cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next)) { struct hdr_idx_elem *cur_hdr; int val; cur_hdr = &txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx]; cur_ptr = cur_next; cur_end = cur_ptr + cur_hdr->len; cur_next = cur_end + cur_hdr->cr + 1; /* We have one full header between cur_ptr and cur_end, and the * next header starts at cur_next. */ val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Pragma", 6); if (val) { if ((cur_end - (cur_ptr + val) >= 8) && strncasecmp(cur_ptr + val, "no-cache", 8) == 0) { pragma_found = 1; continue; } } val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Cache-control", 13); if (!val) continue; p2 = p1; while (p2 < cur_end && *p2 != '=' && *p2 != ',' && !isspace((unsigned char)*p2)) p2++; /* we have a complete value between p1 and p2. We don't check the * values after max-age, max-stale nor min-fresh, we simply don't * use the cache when they're specified. */ if (((p2 - p1 == 7) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-age", 7) == 0) || ((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-cache", 8) == 0) || ((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-stale", 9) == 0) || ((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "min-fresh", 9) == 0)) { txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE; continue; } if ((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-store", 8) == 0) { txn->flags &= ~TX_CACHEABLE & ~TX_CACHE_COOK; continue; } } /* RFC7234#5.4: * When the Cache-Control header field is also present and * understood in a request, Pragma is ignored. * When the Cache-Control header field is not present in a * request, caches MUST consider the no-cache request * pragma-directive as having the same effect as if * "Cache-Control: no-cache" were present. */ if (!cc_found && pragma_found) txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE; }

None

CVE-2018-11469

Incorrect caching of responses to requests including an Authorization header in HAProxy 1.8.0 through 1.8.9 (if cache enabled) allows attackers to achieve information disclosure via an unauthenticated remote request, related to the proto_http.c check_request_for_cacheability function.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11469

savannah

18a8f0d9943369449bc4de92d411c78fb08d616c

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=18a8f0d9943369449bc4de92d411c78fb08d616c

None

parse_fond( char* fond_data, short* have_sfnt, ResID* sfnt_id, Str255 lwfn_file_name, short face_index ) { AsscEntry* assoc; AsscEntry* base_assoc; FamRec* fond; *sfnt_id = 0; *have_sfnt = 0; lwfn_file_name[0] = 0; fond = (FamRec*)fond_data; assoc = (AsscEntry*)( fond_data + sizeof ( FamRec ) + 2 ); base_assoc = assoc; /* the maximum faces in a FOND is 48, size of StyleTable.indexes[] */ if ( 47 < face_index ) return; /* Let's do a little range checking before we get too excited here */ if ( face_index < count_faces_sfnt( fond_data ) ) { assoc += face_index; /* add on the face_index! */ /* if the face at this index is not scalable, fall back to the first one (old behavior) */ if ( EndianS16_BtoN( assoc->fontSize ) == 0 ) { *have_sfnt = 1; *sfnt_id = EndianS16_BtoN( assoc->fontID ); } else if ( base_assoc->fontSize == 0 ) { *have_sfnt = 1; *sfnt_id = EndianS16_BtoN( base_assoc->fontID ); } } if ( EndianS32_BtoN( fond->ffStylOff ) ) { unsigned char* p = (unsigned char*)fond_data; StyleTable* style; unsigned short string_count; char ps_name[256]; unsigned char* names[64]; int i; p += EndianS32_BtoN( fond->ffStylOff ); style = (StyleTable*)p; p += sizeof ( StyleTable ); string_count = EndianS16_BtoN( *(short*)(p) ); p += sizeof ( short ); for ( i = 0; i < string_count && i < 64; i++ ) { names[i] = p; p += names[i][0]; } { size_t ps_name_len = (size_t)names[0][0]; if ( ps_name_len != 0 ) { ft_memcpy(ps_name, names[0] + 1, ps_name_len); ps_name[ps_name_len] = 0; ps_name[ps_name_len] = 0; } if ( style->indexes[face_index] > 1 && style->indexes[face_index] <= FT_MIN( string_count, 64 ) ) { unsigned char* suffixes = names[style->indexes[face_index] - 1]; for ( i = 1; i <= suffixes[0]; i++ ) { unsigned char* s; size_t j = suffixes[i] - 1; if ( j < string_count && ( s = names[j] ) != NULL ) { size_t s_len = (size_t)s[0]; if ( s_len != 0 && ps_name_len + s_len < sizeof ( ps_name ) ) { ft_memcpy( ps_name + ps_name_len, s + 1, s_len ); ps_name_len += s_len; ps_name[ps_name_len] = 0; } } } } } create_lwfn_name( ps_name, lwfn_file_name ); } }

None

CVE-2014-9672

Array index error in the parse_fond function in base/ftmac.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or obtain sensitive information from process memory via a crafted FOND resource in a Mac font file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9672

savannah

ef1eba75187adfac750f326b563fe543dd5ff4e6

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=ef1eba75187adfac750f326b563fe543dd5ff4e6

None

pcf_get_encodings( FT_Stream stream, PCF_Face face ) { FT_Error error; FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE( face )->memory; FT_ULong format, size; int firstCol, lastCol; int firstRow, lastRow; int nencoding, encodingOffset; int i, j, k; PCF_Encoding encoding = NULL; error = pcf_seek_to_table_type( stream, face->toc.tables, face->toc.count, PCF_BDF_ENCODINGS, &format, &size ); if ( error ) return error; error = FT_Stream_EnterFrame( stream, 14 ); if ( error ) return error; format = FT_GET_ULONG_LE(); if ( PCF_BYTE_ORDER( format ) == MSBFirst ) { firstCol = FT_GET_SHORT(); lastCol = FT_GET_SHORT(); firstRow = FT_GET_SHORT(); lastRow = FT_GET_SHORT(); face->defaultChar = FT_GET_SHORT(); } else { firstCol = FT_GET_SHORT_LE(); lastCol = FT_GET_SHORT_LE(); firstRow = FT_GET_SHORT_LE(); lastRow = FT_GET_SHORT_LE(); face->defaultChar = FT_GET_SHORT_LE(); } FT_Stream_ExitFrame( stream ); if ( !PCF_FORMAT_MATCH( format, PCF_DEFAULT_FORMAT ) ) return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); FT_TRACE4(( "pdf_get_encodings:\n" )); FT_TRACE4(( " firstCol %d, lastCol %d, firstRow %d, lastRow %d\n", goto Bail; k = 0; for ( i = firstRow; i <= lastRow; i++ ) { for ( j = firstCol; j <= lastCol; j++ ) { if ( PCF_BYTE_ORDER( format ) == MSBFirst ) encodingOffset = FT_GET_SHORT(); else encodingOffset = FT_GET_SHORT_LE(); if ( encodingOffset != -1 ) { encoding[k].enc = i * 256 + j; encoding[k].glyph = (FT_Short)encodingOffset; FT_TRACE5(( " code %d (0x%04X): idx %d\n", encoding[k].enc, encoding[k].enc, encoding[k].glyph )); k++; } } } FT_Stream_ExitFrame( stream ); if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( encoding, nencoding, k ) ) goto Bail; face->nencodings = k; face->encodings = encoding; return error; Bail: FT_FREE( encoding ); return error; }

None

CVE-2014-9670

Multiple integer signedness errors in the pcf_get_encodings function in pcf/pcfread.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow, NULL pointer dereference, and application crash) via a crafted PCF file that specifies negative values for the first column and first row.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9670

savannah

602040b1112c9f94d68e200be59ea7ac3d104565

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=602040b1112c9f94d68e200be59ea7ac3d104565

None

tt_cmap8_validate( FT_Byte* table, FT_Validator valid ) { FT_Byte* p = table + 4; FT_Byte* is32; FT_UInt32 length; FT_UInt32 num_groups; if ( table + 16 + 8192 > valid->limit ) FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); if ( length > (FT_UInt32)( valid->limit - table ) || length < 8192 + 16 ) FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; is32 = table + 12; p = is32 + 8192; /* skip `is32' array */ num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); if ( p + num_groups * 12 > valid->limit ) FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; /* check groups, they must be in increasing order */ FT_UInt32 n, start, end, start_id, count, last = 0; for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ ) { FT_UInt hi, lo; start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); if ( start > end ) FT_INVALID_DATA; if ( n > 0 && start <= last ) FT_INVALID_DATA; if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT ) { if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ) FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID; count = (FT_UInt32)( end - start + 1 ); { hi = (FT_UInt)( start >> 16 ); lo = (FT_UInt)( start & 0xFFFFU ); if ( (is32[hi >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( hi & 7 ) ) ) == 0 ) FT_INVALID_DATA; if ( (is32[lo >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( lo & 7 ) ) ) == 0 ) FT_INVALID_DATA; } } else { /* start_hi == 0; check that is32[i] is 0 for each i in */ /* the range [start..end] */ /* end_hi cannot be != 0! */ if ( end & ~0xFFFFU ) FT_INVALID_DATA; for ( ; count > 0; count--, start++ ) { lo = (FT_UInt)( start & 0xFFFFU ); if ( (is32[lo >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( lo & 7 ) ) ) != 0 ) FT_INVALID_DATA; } } } last = end; }

None

CVE-2014-9669

Multiple integer overflows in sfnt/ttcmap.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted cmap SFNT table.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9669

savannah

257c270bd25e15890190a28a1456e7623bba4439

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=257c270bd25e15890190a28a1456e7623bba4439

None

tt_sbit_decoder_init( TT_SBitDecoder decoder, TT_Face face, FT_ULong strike_index, TT_SBit_MetricsRec* metrics ) { FT_Error error; FT_Stream stream = face->root.stream; FT_ULong ebdt_size; error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_CBDT, stream, &ebdt_size ); if ( error ) error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_EBDT, stream, &ebdt_size ); if ( error ) error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_bdat, stream, &ebdt_size ); if ( error ) goto Exit; decoder->face = face; decoder->stream = stream; decoder->bitmap = &face->root.glyph->bitmap; decoder->metrics = metrics; decoder->metrics_loaded = 0; decoder->bitmap_allocated = 0; decoder->ebdt_start = FT_STREAM_POS(); decoder->ebdt_size = ebdt_size; decoder->eblc_base = face->sbit_table; decoder->eblc_limit = face->sbit_table + face->sbit_table_size; /* now find the strike corresponding to the index */ { FT_Byte* p; if ( 8 + 48 * strike_index + 3 * 4 + 34 + 1 > face->sbit_table_size ) { error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); goto Exit; } p = decoder->eblc_base + 8 + 48 * strike_index; decoder->strike_index_array = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); p += 4; decoder->strike_index_count = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); p += 34; decoder->bit_depth = *p; if ( decoder->strike_index_array > face->sbit_table_size || decoder->strike_index_array + 8 * decoder->strike_index_count > face->sbit_table_size ) error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); } }

None

CVE-2014-9666

The tt_sbit_decoder_init function in sfnt/ttsbit.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 proceeds with a count-to-size association without restricting the count value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted embedded bitmap.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9666

savannah

f70d9342e65cd2cb44e9f26b6d7edeedf191fc6c

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=f70d9342e65cd2cb44e9f26b6d7edeedf191fc6c

None

tt_face_load_kern( TT_Face face, FT_Stream stream ) { FT_Error error; FT_ULong table_size; FT_Byte* p; FT_Byte* p_limit; FT_UInt nn, num_tables; FT_UInt32 avail = 0, ordered = 0; /* the kern table is optional; exit silently if it is missing */ error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_kern, stream, &table_size ); if ( error ) goto Exit; if ( table_size < 4 ) /* the case of a malformed table */ { FT_ERROR(( "tt_face_load_kern:" " kerning table is too small - ignored\n" )); error = FT_THROW( Table_Missing ); goto Exit; } if ( FT_FRAME_EXTRACT( table_size, face->kern_table ) ) { FT_ERROR(( "tt_face_load_kern:" " could not extract kerning table\n" )); goto Exit; } face->kern_table_size = table_size; p = face->kern_table; p_limit = p + table_size; p += 2; /* skip version */ num_tables = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); if ( num_tables > 32 ) /* we only support up to 32 sub-tables */ num_tables = 32; for ( nn = 0; nn < num_tables; nn++ ) { FT_UInt num_pairs, length, coverage; FT_Byte* p_next; FT_UInt32 mask = (FT_UInt32)1UL << nn; if ( p + 6 > p_limit ) break; p_next = p; p += 2; /* skip version */ length = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); coverage = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); if ( length <= 6 ) break; p_next += length; if ( p_next > p_limit ) /* handle broken table */ p_next = p_limit; /* only use horizontal kerning tables */ if ( ( coverage & ~8 ) != 0x0001 || p + 8 > p_limit ) goto NextTable; num_pairs = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); p += 6; if ( ( p_next - p ) < 6 * (int)num_pairs ) /* handle broken count */ num_pairs = (FT_UInt)( ( p_next - p ) / 6 ); avail |= mask; /* * Now check whether the pairs in this table are ordered. * We then can use binary search. */ if ( num_pairs > 0 ) { FT_ULong count; FT_ULong old_pair; old_pair = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); p += 2; for ( count = num_pairs - 1; count > 0; count-- ) { FT_UInt32 cur_pair; cur_pair = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); if ( cur_pair <= old_pair ) break; p += 2; old_pair = cur_pair; } if ( count == 0 ) ordered |= mask; } NextTable: p = p_next; } face->num_kern_tables = nn; face->kern_avail_bits = avail; face->kern_order_bits = ordered; Exit: return error; }

None

CVE-2014-9658

The tt_face_load_kern function in sfnt/ttkern.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 enforces an incorrect minimum table length, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TrueType font.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9658

savannah

f0292bb9920aa1dbfed5f53861e7c7a89b35833a

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=f0292bb9920aa1dbfed5f53861e7c7a89b35833a

None

tt_sbit_decoder_load_image( TT_SBitDecoder decoder, FT_UInt glyph_index, FT_Int x_pos, FT_Int y_pos ) { /* * First, we find the correct strike range that applies to this * glyph index. */ FT_Byte* p = decoder->eblc_base + decoder->strike_index_array; FT_Byte* p_limit = decoder->eblc_limit; FT_ULong num_ranges = decoder->strike_index_count; FT_UInt start, end, index_format, image_format; FT_ULong image_start = 0, image_end = 0, image_offset; for ( ; num_ranges > 0; num_ranges-- ) { start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); end = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); if ( glyph_index >= start && glyph_index <= end ) goto FoundRange; p += 4; /* ignore index offset */ } goto NoBitmap; FoundRange: image_offset = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); /* overflow check */ p = decoder->eblc_base + decoder->strike_index_array; if ( image_offset > (FT_ULong)( p_limit - p ) ) goto Failure; p += image_offset; if ( p + 8 > p_limit ) goto NoBitmap; /* now find the glyph's location and extend within the ebdt table */ index_format = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); image_format = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); image_offset = FT_NEXT_ULONG ( p ); switch ( index_format ) { case 1: /* 4-byte offsets relative to `image_offset' */ p += 4 * ( glyph_index - start ); if ( p + 8 > p_limit ) goto NoBitmap; image_start = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); image_end = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); if ( image_start == image_end ) /* missing glyph */ goto NoBitmap; break; case 2: /* big metrics, constant image size */ { FT_ULong image_size; if ( p + 12 > p_limit ) goto NoBitmap; image_size = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); if ( tt_sbit_decoder_load_metrics( decoder, &p, p_limit, 1 ) ) goto NoBitmap; image_start = image_size * ( glyph_index - start ); image_end = image_start + image_size; } break; case 3: /* 2-byte offsets relative to 'image_offset' */ p += 2 * ( glyph_index - start ); if ( p + 4 > p_limit ) goto NoBitmap; image_start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); image_end = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); if ( image_start == image_end ) /* missing glyph */ goto NoBitmap; break; case 4: /* sparse glyph array with (glyph,offset) pairs */ { FT_ULong mm, num_glyphs; if ( p + 4 > p_limit ) goto NoBitmap; num_glyphs = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); /* overflow check for p + ( num_glyphs + 1 ) * 4 */ if ( num_glyphs > (FT_ULong)( ( ( p_limit - p ) >> 2 ) - 1 ) ) goto NoBitmap; for ( mm = 0; mm < num_glyphs; mm++ ) FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); if ( gindex == glyph_index ) { image_start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); p += 2; image_end = FT_PEEK_USHORT( p ); break; } p += 2; } if ( mm >= num_glyphs ) goto NoBitmap; } break; case 5: /* constant metrics with sparse glyph codes */ case 19: { FT_ULong image_size, mm, num_glyphs; if ( p + 16 > p_limit ) goto NoBitmap; image_size = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); if ( tt_sbit_decoder_load_metrics( decoder, &p, p_limit, 1 ) ) goto NoBitmap; num_glyphs = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); /* overflow check for p + 2 * num_glyphs */ if ( num_glyphs > (FT_ULong)( ( p_limit - p ) >> 1 ) ) goto NoBitmap; for ( mm = 0; mm < num_glyphs; mm++ ) { FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); if ( gindex == glyph_index ) break; } if ( mm >= num_glyphs ) goto NoBitmap; image_start = image_size * mm; image_end = image_start + image_size; } break; default: goto NoBitmap; }

None

CVE-2014-9656

The tt_sbit_decoder_load_image function in sfnt/ttsbit.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not properly check for an integer overflow, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted OpenType font.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9656

savannah

3774fc08b502c3e685afca098b6e8a195aded6a0

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=3774fc08b502c3e685afca098b6e8a195aded6a0

None

ps_parser_to_token( PS_Parser parser, T1_Token token ) { FT_Byte* cur; FT_Byte* limit; FT_Int embed; token->type = T1_TOKEN_TYPE_NONE; token->start = NULL; token->limit = NULL; /* first of all, skip leading whitespace */ ps_parser_skip_spaces( parser ); cur = parser->cursor; limit = parser->limit; if ( cur >= limit ) return; switch ( *cur ) { /************* check for literal string *****************/ case '(': token->type = T1_TOKEN_TYPE_STRING; token->start = cur; if ( skip_literal_string( &cur, limit ) == FT_Err_Ok ) token->limit = cur; break; /************* check for programs/array *****************/ case '{': token->type = T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY; token->start = cur; if ( skip_procedure( &cur, limit ) == FT_Err_Ok ) token->limit = cur; break; /************* check for table/array ********************/ /* XXX: in theory we should also look for "<<" */ /* since this is semantically equivalent to "["; */ /* in practice it doesn't matter (?) */ case '[': token->type = T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY; embed = 1; token->start = cur++; /* we need this to catch `[ ]' */ parser->cursor = cur; ps_parser_skip_spaces( parser ); cur = parser->cursor; while ( cur < limit && !parser->error ) { /* XXX: this is wrong because it does not */ /* skip comments, procedures, and strings */ if ( *cur == '[' ) embed++; else if ( *cur == ']' ) { embed--; if ( embed <= 0 ) { token->limit = ++cur; break; } } parser->cursor = cur; ps_parser_skip_PS_token( parser ); /* we need this to catch `[XXX ]' */ ps_parser_skip_spaces ( parser ); cur = parser->cursor; } break; /* ************ otherwise, it is any token **************/ default: token->start = cur; token->type = ( *cur == '/' ) ? T1_TOKEN_TYPE_KEY : T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ANY; ps_parser_skip_PS_token( parser ); cur = parser->cursor; if ( !parser->error ) token->limit = cur; } if ( !token->limit ) { token->start = NULL; token->type = T1_TOKEN_TYPE_NONE; } parser->cursor = cur; } /* NB: `tokens' can be NULL if we only want to count */ /* the number of array elements */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( void ) ps_parser_to_token_array( PS_Parser parser, T1_Token tokens, FT_UInt max_tokens, FT_Int* pnum_tokens ) { T1_TokenRec master; *pnum_tokens = -1; /* this also handles leading whitespace */ ps_parser_to_token( parser, &master ); if ( master.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY ) { FT_Byte* old_cursor = parser->cursor; FT_Byte* old_limit = parser->limit; T1_Token cur = tokens; T1_Token limit = cur + max_tokens; /* don't include outermost delimiters */ parser->cursor = master.start + 1; parser->limit = master.limit - 1; while ( parser->cursor < parser->limit ) { T1_TokenRec token; ps_parser_to_token( parser, &token ); if ( !token.type ) break; if ( tokens && cur < limit ) *cur = token; cur++; } *pnum_tokens = (FT_Int)( cur - tokens ); parser->cursor = old_cursor; parser->limit = old_limit; } } /* first character must be a delimiter or a part of a number */ /* NB: `coords' can be NULL if we just want to skip the */ /* array; in this case we ignore `max_coords' */ static FT_Int ps_tocoordarray( FT_Byte* *acur, FT_Byte* limit, FT_Int max_coords, FT_Short* coords ) { FT_Byte* cur = *acur; FT_Int count = 0; FT_Byte c, ender; if ( cur >= limit ) goto Exit; /* check for the beginning of an array; otherwise, only one number */ /* will be read */ c = *cur; ender = 0; if ( c == '[' ) ender = ']'; else if ( c == '{' ) ender = '}'; if ( ender ) cur++; /* now, read the coordinates */ while ( cur < limit ) { FT_Short dummy; FT_Byte* old_cur; /* skip whitespace in front of data */ skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); if ( cur >= limit ) goto Exit; if ( *cur == ender ) { cur++; break; } old_cur = cur; if ( coords && count >= max_coords ) break; /* call PS_Conv_ToFixed() even if coords == NULL */ /* to properly parse number at `cur' */ *( coords ? &coords[count] : &dummy ) = (FT_Short)( PS_Conv_ToFixed( &cur, limit, 0 ) >> 16 ); if ( old_cur == cur ) { count = -1; goto Exit; } else count++; if ( !ender ) break; } Exit: *acur = cur; return count; } /* first character must be a delimiter or a part of a number */ /* NB: `values' can be NULL if we just want to skip the */ /* array; in this case we ignore `max_values' */ /* */ /* return number of successfully parsed values */ static FT_Int ps_tofixedarray( FT_Byte* *acur, FT_Byte* limit, FT_Int max_values, FT_Fixed* values, FT_Int power_ten ) { FT_Byte* cur = *acur; FT_Int count = 0; FT_Byte c, ender; if ( cur >= limit ) goto Exit; /* Check for the beginning of an array. Otherwise, only one number */ /* will be read. */ c = *cur; ender = 0; if ( c == '[' ) ender = ']'; else if ( c == '{' ) ender = '}'; if ( ender ) cur++; /* now, read the values */ while ( cur < limit ) { FT_Fixed dummy; FT_Byte* old_cur; /* skip whitespace in front of data */ skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); if ( cur >= limit ) goto Exit; if ( *cur == ender ) { cur++; break; } old_cur = cur; if ( values && count >= max_values ) break; /* call PS_Conv_ToFixed() even if coords == NULL */ /* to properly parse number at `cur' */ *( values ? &values[count] : &dummy ) = PS_Conv_ToFixed( &cur, limit, power_ten ); if ( old_cur == cur ) { count = -1; goto Exit; } else count++; if ( !ender ) break; } Exit: *acur = cur; return count; } #if 0 static FT_String* ps_tostring( FT_Byte** cursor, FT_Byte* limit, FT_Memory memory ) { FT_Byte* cur = *cursor; FT_UInt len = 0; FT_Int count; FT_String* result; FT_Error error; /* XXX: some stupid fonts have a `Notice' or `Copyright' string */ /* that simply doesn't begin with an opening parenthesis, even */ /* though they have a closing one! E.g. "amuncial.pfb" */ /* */ /* We must deal with these ill-fated cases there. Note that */ /* these fonts didn't work with the old Type 1 driver as the */ /* notice/copyright was not recognized as a valid string token */ /* and made the old token parser commit errors. */ while ( cur < limit && ( *cur == ' ' || *cur == '\t' ) ) cur++; if ( cur + 1 >= limit ) return 0; if ( *cur == '(' ) cur++; /* skip the opening parenthesis, if there is one */ *cursor = cur; count = 0; /* then, count its length */ for ( ; cur < limit; cur++ ) { if ( *cur == '(' ) count++; else if ( *cur == ')' ) { count--; if ( count < 0 ) break; } } len = (FT_UInt)( cur - *cursor ); if ( cur >= limit || FT_ALLOC( result, len + 1 ) ) return 0; /* now copy the string */ FT_MEM_COPY( result, *cursor, len ); result[len] = '\0'; *cursor = cur; return result; } #endif /* 0 */ static int ps_tobool( FT_Byte* *acur, FT_Byte* limit ) { FT_Byte* cur = *acur; FT_Bool result = 0; /* return 1 if we find `true', 0 otherwise */ if ( cur + 3 < limit && cur[0] == 't' && cur[1] == 'r' && cur[2] == 'u' && cur[3] == 'e' ) { result = 1; cur += 5; } else if ( cur + 4 < limit && cur[0] == 'f' && cur[1] == 'a' && cur[2] == 'l' && cur[3] == 's' && cur[4] == 'e' ) { result = 0; cur += 6; } *acur = cur; return result; } /* load a simple field (i.e. non-table) into the current list of objects */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Error ) ps_parser_load_field( PS_Parser parser, const T1_Field field, void** objects, FT_UInt max_objects, FT_ULong* pflags ) { T1_TokenRec token; FT_Byte* cur; FT_Byte* limit; FT_UInt count; FT_UInt idx; FT_Error error; T1_FieldType type; /* this also skips leading whitespace */ ps_parser_to_token( parser, &token ); if ( !token.type ) goto Fail; count = 1; idx = 0; cur = token.start; limit = token.limit; type = field->type; /* we must detect arrays in /FontBBox */ if ( type == T1_FIELD_TYPE_BBOX ) { T1_TokenRec token2; FT_Byte* old_cur = parser->cursor; FT_Byte* old_limit = parser->limit; /* don't include delimiters */ parser->cursor = token.start + 1; parser->limit = token.limit - 1; ps_parser_to_token( parser, &token2 ); parser->cursor = old_cur; parser->limit = old_limit; if ( token2.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY ) { type = T1_FIELD_TYPE_MM_BBOX; goto FieldArray; } } else if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY ) { count = max_objects; FieldArray: /* if this is an array and we have no blend, an error occurs */ if ( max_objects == 0 ) goto Fail; idx = 1; /* don't include delimiters */ cur++; limit--; } for ( ; count > 0; count--, idx++ ) { FT_Byte* q = (FT_Byte*)objects[idx] + field->offset; FT_Long val; FT_String* string = NULL; skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); switch ( type ) { case T1_FIELD_TYPE_BOOL: val = ps_tobool( &cur, limit ); goto Store_Integer; case T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED: val = PS_Conv_ToFixed( &cur, limit, 0 ); goto Store_Integer; case T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED_1000: val = PS_Conv_ToFixed( &cur, limit, 3 ); goto Store_Integer; case T1_FIELD_TYPE_INTEGER: val = PS_Conv_ToInt( &cur, limit ); /* fall through */ Store_Integer: switch ( field->size ) { case (8 / FT_CHAR_BIT): *(FT_Byte*)q = (FT_Byte)val; break; case (16 / FT_CHAR_BIT): *(FT_UShort*)q = (FT_UShort)val; break; case (32 / FT_CHAR_BIT): *(FT_UInt32*)q = (FT_UInt32)val; break; default: /* for 64-bit systems */ *(FT_Long*)q = val; } break; case T1_FIELD_TYPE_STRING: case T1_FIELD_TYPE_KEY: { FT_Memory memory = parser->memory; FT_UInt len = (FT_UInt)( limit - cur ); if ( cur >= limit ) break; /* we allow both a string or a name */ /* for cases like /FontName (foo) def */ if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_KEY ) { /* don't include leading `/' */ len--; cur++; } else if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_STRING ) { /* don't include delimiting parentheses */ /* XXX we don't handle <<...>> here */ /* XXX should we convert octal escapes? */ /* if so, what encoding should we use? */ cur++; len -= 2; } else { FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:" " expected a name or string\n" " " " but found token of type %d instead\n", token.type )); error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); goto Exit; } /* for this to work (FT_String**)q must have been */ /* initialized to NULL */ if ( *(FT_String**)q ) { FT_TRACE0(( "ps_parser_load_field: overwriting field %s\n", field->ident )); FT_FREE( *(FT_String**)q ); *(FT_String**)q = NULL; } if ( FT_ALLOC( string, len + 1 ) ) goto Exit; FT_MEM_COPY( string, cur, len ); string[len] = 0; *(FT_String**)q = string; } break; case T1_FIELD_TYPE_BBOX: { FT_Fixed temp[4]; FT_BBox* bbox = (FT_BBox*)q; FT_Int result; result = ps_tofixedarray( &cur, limit, 4, temp, 0 ); if ( result < 4 ) { FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:" " expected four integers in bounding box\n" )); error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); goto Exit; } bbox->xMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[0] ); bbox->yMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[1] ); bbox->xMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[2] ); bbox->yMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[3] ); } break; case T1_FIELD_TYPE_MM_BBOX: { FT_Memory memory = parser->memory; FT_Fixed* temp = NULL; FT_Int result; FT_UInt i; if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( temp, max_objects * 4 ) ) goto Exit; for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) { result = ps_tofixedarray( &cur, limit, (FT_Int)max_objects, temp + i * max_objects, 0 ); if ( result < 0 || (FT_UInt)result < max_objects ) { FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:" " expected %d integer%s in the %s subarray\n" " " " of /FontBBox in the /Blend dictionary\n", max_objects, max_objects > 1 ? "s" : "", i == 0 ? "first" : ( i == 1 ? "second" : ( i == 2 ? "third" : "fourth" ) ) )); error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); FT_FREE( temp ); goto Exit; } skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); } for ( i = 0; i < max_objects; i++ ) { FT_BBox* bbox = (FT_BBox*)objects[i]; bbox->xMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[i ] ); bbox->yMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + max_objects] ); bbox->xMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + 2 * max_objects] ); bbox->yMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + 3 * max_objects] ); } FT_FREE( temp ); } break; default: /* an error occurred */ goto Fail; } } #if 0 /* obsolete -- keep for reference */ if ( pflags ) *pflags |= 1L << field->flag_bit; #else FT_UNUSED( pflags ); #endif error = FT_Err_Ok; Exit: return error; Fail: error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); goto Exit; } #define T1_MAX_TABLE_ELEMENTS 32 FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Error ) ps_parser_load_field_table( PS_Parser parser, const T1_Field field, void** objects, FT_UInt max_objects, FT_ULong* pflags ) { T1_TokenRec elements[T1_MAX_TABLE_ELEMENTS]; T1_Token token; FT_Int num_elements; FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok; FT_Byte* old_cursor; FT_Byte* old_limit; T1_FieldRec fieldrec = *(T1_Field)field; fieldrec.type = T1_FIELD_TYPE_INTEGER; if ( field->type == T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED_ARRAY || field->type == T1_FIELD_TYPE_BBOX ) fieldrec.type = T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED; ps_parser_to_token_array( parser, elements, T1_MAX_TABLE_ELEMENTS, &num_elements ); if ( num_elements < 0 ) { error = FT_ERR( Ignore ); goto Exit; } if ( (FT_UInt)num_elements > field->array_max ) num_elements = (FT_Int)field->array_max; old_cursor = parser->cursor; old_limit = parser->limit; /* we store the elements count if necessary; */ /* we further assume that `count_offset' can't be zero */ if ( field->type != T1_FIELD_TYPE_BBOX && field->count_offset != 0 ) *(FT_Byte*)( (FT_Byte*)objects[0] + field->count_offset ) = (FT_Byte)num_elements; /* we now load each element, adjusting the field.offset on each one */ token = elements; for ( ; num_elements > 0; num_elements--, token++ ) { parser->cursor = token->start; parser->limit = token->limit; error = ps_parser_load_field( parser, &fieldrec, objects, max_objects, 0 ); if ( error ) break; fieldrec.offset += fieldrec.size; } #if 0 /* obsolete -- keep for reference */ if ( pflags ) *pflags |= 1L << field->flag_bit; #else FT_UNUSED( pflags ); #endif parser->cursor = old_cursor; parser->limit = old_limit; Exit: return error; } FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Long ) ps_parser_to_int( PS_Parser parser ) { ps_parser_skip_spaces( parser ); return PS_Conv_ToInt( &parser->cursor, parser->limit ); } /* first character must be `<' if `delimiters' is non-zero */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Error ) ps_parser_to_bytes( PS_Parser parser, FT_Byte* bytes, FT_Offset max_bytes, FT_ULong* pnum_bytes, FT_Bool delimiters ) { FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok; FT_Byte* cur; ps_parser_skip_spaces( parser ); cur = parser->cursor; if ( cur >= parser->limit ) goto Exit; if ( delimiters ) { if ( *cur != '<' ) { FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_to_bytes: Missing starting delimiter `<'\n" )); error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); goto Exit; } cur++; } *pnum_bytes = PS_Conv_ASCIIHexDecode( &cur, parser->limit, bytes, max_bytes ); if ( delimiters ) { if ( cur < parser->limit && *cur != '>' ) { FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_to_bytes: Missing closing delimiter `>'\n" )); error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); goto Exit; } cur++; } parser->cursor = cur; Exit: return error; } FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Fixed ) ps_parser_to_fixed( PS_Parser parser, FT_Int power_ten ) { ps_parser_skip_spaces( parser ); return PS_Conv_ToFixed( &parser->cursor, parser->limit, power_ten ); } FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Int ) ps_parser_to_coord_array( PS_Parser parser, FT_Int max_coords, FT_Short* coords ) { ps_parser_skip_spaces( parser ); return ps_tocoordarray( &parser->cursor, parser->limit, max_coords, coords ); } FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Int ) ps_parser_to_fixed_array( PS_Parser parser, FT_Int max_values, FT_Fixed* values, FT_Int power_ten ) { ps_parser_skip_spaces( parser ); return ps_tofixedarray( &parser->cursor, parser->limit, max_values, values, power_ten ); } #if 0 FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_String* ) T1_ToString( PS_Parser parser ) { return ps_tostring( &parser->cursor, parser->limit, parser->memory ); } FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Bool ) T1_ToBool( PS_Parser parser ) { return ps_tobool( &parser->cursor, parser->limit ); } #endif /* 0 */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( void ) ps_parser_init( PS_Parser parser, FT_Byte* base, FT_Byte* limit, FT_Memory memory ) { parser->error = FT_Err_Ok; parser->base = base; parser->limit = limit; parser->cursor = base; parser->memory = memory; parser->funcs = ps_parser_funcs; } FT_LOCAL_DEF( void ) ps_parser_done( PS_Parser parser ) { FT_UNUSED( parser ); } /*************************************************************************/ /*************************************************************************/ /***** *****/ /***** T1 BUILDER *****/ /***** *****/ /*************************************************************************/ /*************************************************************************/ /*************************************************************************/ /* */ /* <Function> */ /* t1_builder_init */ /* */ /* <Description> */ /* Initializes a given glyph builder. */ /* */ /* <InOut> */ /* builder :: A pointer to the glyph builder to initialize. */ /* */ /* <Input> */ /* face :: The current face object. */ /* */ /* size :: The current size object. */ /* */ /* glyph :: The current glyph object. */ /* */ /* hinting :: Whether hinting should be applied. */ /* */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( void ) t1_builder_init( T1_Builder builder, FT_Face face, FT_Size size, FT_GlyphSlot glyph, FT_Bool hinting ) { builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Start; builder->load_points = 1; builder->face = face; builder->glyph = glyph; builder->memory = face->memory; if ( glyph ) { FT_GlyphLoader loader = glyph->internal->loader; builder->loader = loader; builder->base = &loader->base.outline; builder->current = &loader->current.outline; FT_GlyphLoader_Rewind( loader ); builder->hints_globals = size->internal; builder->hints_funcs = NULL; if ( hinting ) builder->hints_funcs = glyph->internal->glyph_hints; } builder->pos_x = 0; builder->pos_y = 0; builder->left_bearing.x = 0; builder->left_bearing.y = 0; builder->advance.x = 0; builder->advance.y = 0; builder->funcs = t1_builder_funcs; } /*************************************************************************/ /* */ /* <Function> */ /* t1_builder_done */ /* */ /* <Description> */ /* Finalizes a given glyph builder. Its contents can still be used */ /* after the call, but the function saves important information */ /* within the corresponding glyph slot. */ /* */ /* <Input> */ /* builder :: A pointer to the glyph builder to finalize. */ /* */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( void ) t1_builder_done( T1_Builder builder ) { FT_GlyphSlot glyph = builder->glyph; if ( glyph ) glyph->outline = *builder->base; } /* check that there is enough space for `count' more points */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Error ) t1_builder_check_points( T1_Builder builder, FT_Int count ) { return FT_GLYPHLOADER_CHECK_POINTS( builder->loader, count, 0 ); } /* add a new point, do not check space */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( void ) t1_builder_add_point( T1_Builder builder, FT_Pos x, FT_Pos y, FT_Byte flag ) { FT_Outline* outline = builder->current; if ( builder->load_points ) { FT_Vector* point = outline->points + outline->n_points; FT_Byte* control = (FT_Byte*)outline->tags + outline->n_points; point->x = FIXED_TO_INT( x ); point->y = FIXED_TO_INT( y ); *control = (FT_Byte)( flag ? FT_CURVE_TAG_ON : FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC ); } outline->n_points++; } /* check space for a new on-curve point, then add it */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Error ) t1_builder_add_point1( T1_Builder builder, FT_Pos x, FT_Pos y ) { FT_Error error; error = t1_builder_check_points( builder, 1 ); if ( !error ) t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 ); return error; } /* check space for a new contour, then add it */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Error ) t1_builder_add_contour( T1_Builder builder ) { FT_Outline* outline = builder->current; FT_Error error; /* this might happen in invalid fonts */ if ( !outline ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_builder_add_contour: no outline to add points to\n" )); return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format ); } if ( !builder->load_points ) { outline->n_contours++; return FT_Err_Ok; } error = FT_GLYPHLOADER_CHECK_POINTS( builder->loader, 0, 1 ); if ( !error ) { if ( outline->n_contours > 0 ) outline->contours[outline->n_contours - 1] = (short)( outline->n_points - 1 ); outline->n_contours++; } return error; } /* if a path was begun, add its first on-curve point */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( FT_Error ) t1_builder_start_point( T1_Builder builder, FT_Pos x, FT_Pos y ) { FT_Error error = FT_ERR( Invalid_File_Format ); /* test whether we are building a new contour */ if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Have_Path ) error = FT_Err_Ok; else { builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Path; error = t1_builder_add_contour( builder ); if ( !error ) error = t1_builder_add_point1( builder, x, y ); } return error; } /* close the current contour */ FT_LOCAL_DEF( void ) t1_builder_close_contour( T1_Builder builder ) { FT_Outline* outline = builder->current; FT_Int first; if ( !outline ) return; first = outline->n_contours <= 1 ? 0 : outline->contours[outline->n_contours - 2] + 1; /* We must not include the last point in the path if it */ /* is located on the first point. */ if ( outline->n_points > 1 ) if ( p1->x == p2->x && p1->y == p2->y ) if ( *control == FT_CURVE_TAG_ON ) outline->n_points--; } if ( outline->n_contours > 0 ) { /* Don't add contours only consisting of one point, i.e., */ /* check whether the first and the last point is the same. */ if ( first == outline->n_points - 1 ) { outline->n_contours--; outline->n_points--; } else outline->contours[outline->n_contours - 1] = (short)( outline->n_points - 1 ); } }

None

CVE-2017-8287

FreeType 2 before 2017-03-26 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the t1_builder_close_contour function in psaux/psobjs.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8287

savannah

f958c48ee431bef8d4d466b40c9cb2d4dbcb7791

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=f958c48ee431bef8d4d466b40c9cb2d4dbcb7791

None

t1_decoder_parse_charstrings( T1_Decoder decoder, FT_Byte* charstring_base, FT_UInt charstring_len ) { FT_Error error; T1_Decoder_Zone zone; FT_Byte* ip; FT_Byte* limit; T1_Builder builder = &decoder->builder; FT_Pos x, y, orig_x, orig_y; FT_Int known_othersubr_result_cnt = 0; FT_Int unknown_othersubr_result_cnt = 0; FT_Bool large_int; FT_Fixed seed; T1_Hints_Funcs hinter; #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE FT_Bool bol = TRUE; #endif /* compute random seed from stack address of parameter */ seed = (FT_Fixed)( ( (FT_Offset)(char*)&seed ^ (FT_Offset)(char*)&decoder ^ (FT_Offset)(char*)&charstring_base ) & FT_ULONG_MAX ); seed = ( seed ^ ( seed >> 10 ) ^ ( seed >> 20 ) ) & 0xFFFFL; if ( seed == 0 ) seed = 0x7384; /* First of all, initialize the decoder */ decoder->top = decoder->stack; decoder->zone = decoder->zones; zone = decoder->zones; builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Start; hinter = (T1_Hints_Funcs)builder->hints_funcs; /* a font that reads BuildCharArray without setting */ /* its values first is buggy, but ... */ FT_ASSERT( ( decoder->len_buildchar == 0 ) == ( decoder->buildchar == NULL ) ); if ( decoder->buildchar && decoder->len_buildchar > 0 ) FT_ARRAY_ZERO( decoder->buildchar, decoder->len_buildchar ); FT_TRACE4(( "\n" "Start charstring\n" )); zone->base = charstring_base; limit = zone->limit = charstring_base + charstring_len; ip = zone->cursor = zone->base; error = FT_Err_Ok; x = orig_x = builder->pos_x; y = orig_y = builder->pos_y; /* begin hints recording session, if any */ if ( hinter ) hinter->open( hinter->hints ); large_int = FALSE; /* now, execute loop */ while ( ip < limit ) { FT_Long* top = decoder->top; T1_Operator op = op_none; FT_Int32 value = 0; FT_ASSERT( known_othersubr_result_cnt == 0 || unknown_othersubr_result_cnt == 0 ); #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE if ( bol ) { FT_TRACE5(( " (%d)", decoder->top - decoder->stack )); bol = FALSE; } #endif /*********************************************************************/ /* */ /* Decode operator or operand */ /* */ /* */ /* first of all, decompress operator or value */ switch ( *ip++ ) { case 1: op = op_hstem; break; case 3: op = op_vstem; break; case 4: op = op_vmoveto; break; case 5: op = op_rlineto; break; case 6: op = op_hlineto; break; case 7: op = op_vlineto; break; case 8: op = op_rrcurveto; break; case 9: op = op_closepath; break; case 10: op = op_callsubr; break; case 11: op = op_return; break; case 13: op = op_hsbw; break; case 14: op = op_endchar; break; case 15: /* undocumented, obsolete operator */ op = op_unknown15; break; case 21: op = op_rmoveto; break; case 22: op = op_hmoveto; break; case 30: op = op_vhcurveto; break; case 31: op = op_hvcurveto; break; case 12: if ( ip >= limit ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " invalid escape (12+EOF)\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } switch ( *ip++ ) { case 0: op = op_dotsection; break; case 1: op = op_vstem3; break; case 2: op = op_hstem3; break; case 6: op = op_seac; break; case 7: op = op_sbw; break; case 12: op = op_div; break; case 16: op = op_callothersubr; break; case 17: op = op_pop; break; case 33: op = op_setcurrentpoint; break; default: FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " invalid escape (12+%d)\n", ip[-1] )); goto Syntax_Error; } break; case 255: /* four bytes integer */ if ( ip + 4 > limit ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " unexpected EOF in integer\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } value = (FT_Int32)( ( (FT_UInt32)ip[0] << 24 ) | ( (FT_UInt32)ip[1] << 16 ) | ( (FT_UInt32)ip[2] << 8 ) | (FT_UInt32)ip[3] ); ip += 4; /* According to the specification, values > 32000 or < -32000 must */ /* be followed by a `div' operator to make the result be in the */ /* range [-32000;32000]. We expect that the second argument of */ /* `div' is not a large number. Additionally, we don't handle */ /* stuff like `<large1> <large2> <num> div <num> div' or */ /* <large1> <large2> <num> div div'. This is probably not allowed */ /* anyway. */ if ( value > 32000 || value < -32000 ) { if ( large_int ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " no `div' after large integer\n" )); } else large_int = TRUE; } else { if ( !large_int ) value = (FT_Int32)( (FT_UInt32)value << 16 ); } break; default: if ( ip[-1] >= 32 ) { if ( ip[-1] < 247 ) value = (FT_Int32)ip[-1] - 139; else { if ( ++ip > limit ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " unexpected EOF in integer\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } if ( ip[-2] < 251 ) value = ( ( ip[-2] - 247 ) * 256 ) + ip[-1] + 108; else value = -( ( ( ip[-2] - 251 ) * 256 ) + ip[-1] + 108 ); } if ( !large_int ) value = (FT_Int32)( (FT_UInt32)value << 16 ); } else { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " invalid byte (%d)\n", ip[-1] )); goto Syntax_Error; } } if ( unknown_othersubr_result_cnt > 0 ) { switch ( op ) { case op_callsubr: case op_return: case op_none: case op_pop: break; default: /* all operands have been transferred by previous pops */ unknown_othersubr_result_cnt = 0; break; } } if ( large_int && !( op == op_none || op == op_div ) ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " no `div' after large integer\n" )); large_int = FALSE; } /*********************************************************************/ /* */ /* Push value on stack, or process operator */ /* */ /* */ if ( op == op_none ) { if ( top - decoder->stack >= T1_MAX_CHARSTRINGS_OPERANDS ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings: stack overflow\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE if ( large_int ) FT_TRACE4(( " %d", value )); else FT_TRACE4(( " %d", value / 65536 )); #endif *top++ = value; decoder->top = top; } else if ( op == op_callothersubr ) /* callothersubr */ { FT_Int subr_no; FT_Int arg_cnt; #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE FT_TRACE4(( " callothersubr\n" )); bol = TRUE; #endif if ( top - decoder->stack < 2 ) goto Stack_Underflow; top -= 2; subr_no = Fix2Int( top[1] ); arg_cnt = Fix2Int( top[0] ); /***********************************************************/ /* */ /* remove all operands to callothersubr from the stack */ /* */ /* for handled othersubrs, where we know the number of */ /* arguments, we increase the stack by the value of */ /* known_othersubr_result_cnt */ /* */ /* for unhandled othersubrs the following pops adjust the */ /* stack pointer as necessary */ if ( arg_cnt > top - decoder->stack ) goto Stack_Underflow; top -= arg_cnt; known_othersubr_result_cnt = 0; unknown_othersubr_result_cnt = 0; /* XXX TODO: The checks to `arg_count == <whatever>' */ /* might not be correct; an othersubr expects a certain */ /* number of operands on the PostScript stack (as opposed */ /* to the T1 stack) but it doesn't have to put them there */ /* by itself; previous othersubrs might have left the */ /* operands there if they were not followed by an */ /* appropriate number of pops */ /* */ /* On the other hand, Adobe Reader 7.0.8 for Linux doesn't */ /* accept a font that contains charstrings like */ /* */ /* 100 200 2 20 callothersubr */ /* 300 1 20 callothersubr pop */ /* */ /* Perhaps this is the reason why BuildCharArray exists. */ switch ( subr_no ) { case 0: /* end flex feature */ if ( arg_cnt != 3 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; if ( !decoder->flex_state || decoder->num_flex_vectors != 7 ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " unexpected flex end\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } /* the two `results' are popped by the following setcurrentpoint */ top[0] = x; top[1] = y; known_othersubr_result_cnt = 2; break; case 1: /* start flex feature */ if ( arg_cnt != 0 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) || FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 6 ) ) ) goto Fail; decoder->flex_state = 1; decoder->num_flex_vectors = 0; break; case 2: /* add flex vectors */ { FT_Int idx; if ( arg_cnt != 0 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; if ( !decoder->flex_state ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " missing flex start\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } /* note that we should not add a point for index 0; */ /* this will move our current position to the flex */ /* point without adding any point to the outline */ idx = decoder->num_flex_vectors++; if ( idx > 0 && idx < 7 ) t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, (FT_Byte)( idx == 3 || idx == 6 ) ); } break; break; case 12: case 13: /* counter control hints, clear stack */ top = decoder->stack; break; case 14: case 15: case 16: case 17: case 18: /* multiple masters */ { PS_Blend blend = decoder->blend; FT_UInt num_points, nn, mm; FT_Long* delta; FT_Long* values; if ( !blend ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " unexpected multiple masters operator\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } num_points = (FT_UInt)subr_no - 13 + ( subr_no == 18 ); if ( arg_cnt != (FT_Int)( num_points * blend->num_designs ) ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " incorrect number of multiple masters arguments\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } /* We want to compute */ /* */ /* a0*w0 + a1*w1 + ... + ak*wk */ /* */ /* but we only have a0, a1-a0, a2-a0, ..., ak-a0. */ /* */ /* However, given that w0 + w1 + ... + wk == 1, we can */ /* rewrite it easily as */ /* */ /* a0 + (a1-a0)*w1 + (a2-a0)*w2 + ... + (ak-a0)*wk */ /* */ /* where k == num_designs-1. */ /* */ /* I guess that's why it's written in this `compact' */ /* form. */ /* */ delta = top + num_points; values = top; for ( nn = 0; nn < num_points; nn++ ) { FT_Long tmp = values[0]; for ( mm = 1; mm < blend->num_designs; mm++ ) tmp += FT_MulFix( *delta++, blend->weight_vector[mm] ); *values++ = tmp; } known_othersubr_result_cnt = (FT_Int)num_points; break; } case 19: /* <idx> 1 19 callothersubr */ /* => replace elements starting from index cvi( <idx> ) */ /* of BuildCharArray with WeightVector */ { FT_Int idx; PS_Blend blend = decoder->blend; if ( arg_cnt != 1 || !blend ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; idx = Fix2Int( top[0] ); if ( idx < 0 || (FT_UInt)idx + blend->num_designs > decoder->len_buildchar ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; ft_memcpy( &decoder->buildchar[idx], blend->weight_vector, blend->num_designs * sizeof ( blend->weight_vector[0] ) ); } break; case 20: /* <arg1> <arg2> 2 20 callothersubr pop */ /* ==> push <arg1> + <arg2> onto T1 stack */ if ( arg_cnt != 2 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; top[0] += top[1]; /* XXX (over|under)flow */ known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1; break; case 21: /* <arg1> <arg2> 2 21 callothersubr pop */ /* ==> push <arg1> - <arg2> onto T1 stack */ if ( arg_cnt != 2 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; top[0] -= top[1]; /* XXX (over|under)flow */ known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1; break; case 22: /* <arg1> <arg2> 2 22 callothersubr pop */ /* ==> push <arg1> * <arg2> onto T1 stack */ if ( arg_cnt != 2 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; top[0] = FT_MulFix( top[0], top[1] ); known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1; break; case 23: /* <arg1> <arg2> 2 23 callothersubr pop */ /* ==> push <arg1> / <arg2> onto T1 stack */ if ( arg_cnt != 2 || top[1] == 0 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; top[0] = FT_DivFix( top[0], top[1] ); known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1; break; case 24: /* <val> <idx> 2 24 callothersubr */ /* ==> set BuildCharArray[cvi( <idx> )] = <val> */ { FT_Int idx; PS_Blend blend = decoder->blend; if ( arg_cnt != 2 || !blend ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; idx = Fix2Int( top[1] ); if ( idx < 0 || (FT_UInt) idx >= decoder->len_buildchar ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; decoder->buildchar[idx] = top[0]; } break; case 25: /* <idx> 1 25 callothersubr pop */ /* ==> push BuildCharArray[cvi( idx )] */ /* onto T1 stack */ { FT_Int idx; PS_Blend blend = decoder->blend; if ( arg_cnt != 1 || !blend ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; idx = Fix2Int( top[0] ); if ( idx < 0 || (FT_UInt) idx >= decoder->len_buildchar ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; top[0] = decoder->buildchar[idx]; } known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1; break; #if 0 case 26: /* <val> mark <idx> ==> set BuildCharArray[cvi( <idx> )] = <val>, */ /* leave mark on T1 stack */ /* <val> <idx> ==> set BuildCharArray[cvi( <idx> )] = <val> */ XXX which routine has left its mark on the (PostScript) stack?; break; #endif case 27: /* <res1> <res2> <val1> <val2> 4 27 callothersubr pop */ /* ==> push <res1> onto T1 stack if <val1> <= <val2>, */ /* otherwise push <res2> */ if ( arg_cnt != 4 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; if ( top[2] > top[3] ) top[0] = top[1]; known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1; break; case 28: /* 0 28 callothersubr pop */ /* => push random value from interval [0, 1) onto stack */ if ( arg_cnt != 0 ) goto Unexpected_OtherSubr; { FT_Fixed Rand; Rand = seed; if ( Rand >= 0x8000L ) Rand++; top[0] = Rand; seed = FT_MulFix( seed, 0x10000L - seed ); if ( seed == 0 ) seed += 0x2873; } known_othersubr_result_cnt = 1; break; default: if ( arg_cnt >= 0 && subr_no >= 0 ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " unknown othersubr [%d %d], wish me luck\n", arg_cnt, subr_no )); unknown_othersubr_result_cnt = arg_cnt; break; } /* fall through */ Unexpected_OtherSubr: FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " invalid othersubr [%d %d]\n", arg_cnt, subr_no )); goto Syntax_Error; } top += known_othersubr_result_cnt; decoder->top = top; } else /* general operator */ { FT_Int num_args = t1_args_count[op]; FT_ASSERT( num_args >= 0 ); if ( top - decoder->stack < num_args ) goto Stack_Underflow; /* XXX Operators usually take their operands from the */ /* bottom of the stack, i.e., the operands are */ /* decoder->stack[0], ..., decoder->stack[num_args - 1]; */ /* only div, callsubr, and callothersubr are different. */ /* In practice it doesn't matter (?). */ #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE switch ( op ) { case op_callsubr: case op_div: case op_callothersubr: case op_pop: case op_return: break; default: if ( top - decoder->stack != num_args ) FT_TRACE0(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " too much operands on the stack" " (seen %d, expected %d)\n", top - decoder->stack, num_args )); break; } #endif /* FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE */ top -= num_args; switch ( op ) { case op_endchar: FT_TRACE4(( " endchar\n" )); t1_builder_close_contour( builder ); /* close hints recording session */ if ( hinter ) { if ( hinter->close( hinter->hints, (FT_UInt)builder->current->n_points ) ) goto Syntax_Error; /* apply hints to the loaded glyph outline now */ error = hinter->apply( hinter->hints, builder->current, (PSH_Globals)builder->hints_globals, decoder->hint_mode ); if ( error ) goto Fail; } /* add current outline to the glyph slot */ FT_GlyphLoader_Add( builder->loader ); /* the compiler should optimize away this empty loop but ... */ #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE if ( decoder->len_buildchar > 0 ) { FT_UInt i; FT_TRACE4(( "BuildCharArray = [ " )); for ( i = 0; i < decoder->len_buildchar; i++ ) FT_TRACE4(( "%d ", decoder->buildchar[i] )); FT_TRACE4(( "]\n" )); } #endif /* FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE */ FT_TRACE4(( "\n" )); /* return now! */ return FT_Err_Ok; case op_hsbw: FT_TRACE4(( " hsbw" )); builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Width; builder->left_bearing.x += top[0]; builder->advance.x = top[1]; builder->advance.y = 0; orig_x = x = builder->pos_x + top[0]; orig_y = y = builder->pos_y; FT_UNUSED( orig_y ); /* the `metrics_only' indicates that we only want to compute */ /* the glyph's metrics (lsb + advance width), not load the */ /* rest of it; so exit immediately */ if ( builder->metrics_only ) return FT_Err_Ok; break; case op_seac: return t1operator_seac( decoder, top[0], top[1], top[2], Fix2Int( top[3] ), Fix2Int( top[4] ) ); case op_sbw: FT_TRACE4(( " sbw" )); builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Width; builder->left_bearing.x += top[0]; builder->left_bearing.y += top[1]; builder->advance.x = top[2]; builder->advance.y = top[3]; x = builder->pos_x + top[0]; y = builder->pos_y + top[1]; /* the `metrics_only' indicates that we only want to compute */ /* the glyph's metrics (lsb + advance width), not load the */ /* rest of it; so exit immediately */ if ( builder->metrics_only ) return FT_Err_Ok; break; case op_closepath: FT_TRACE4(( " closepath" )); /* if there is no path, `closepath' is a no-op */ if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Have_Path || builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Have_Moveto ) t1_builder_close_contour( builder ); builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Width; break; case op_hlineto: FT_TRACE4(( " hlineto" )); if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) ) goto Fail; x += top[0]; goto Add_Line; case op_hmoveto: FT_TRACE4(( " hmoveto" )); x += top[0]; if ( !decoder->flex_state ) { if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Start ) goto Syntax_Error; builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Moveto; } break; case op_hvcurveto: FT_TRACE4(( " hvcurveto" )); if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) || FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 3 ) ) ) goto Fail; x += top[0]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 ); x += top[1]; y += top[2]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 ); y += top[3]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 ); break; case op_rlineto: FT_TRACE4(( " rlineto" )); if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) ) goto Fail; x += top[0]; y += top[1]; Add_Line: if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_add_point1( builder, x, y ) ) ) goto Fail; break; case op_rmoveto: FT_TRACE4(( " rmoveto" )); x += top[0]; y += top[1]; if ( !decoder->flex_state ) { if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Start ) goto Syntax_Error; builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Moveto; } break; case op_rrcurveto: FT_TRACE4(( " rrcurveto" )); if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) || FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 3 ) ) ) goto Fail; x += top[0]; y += top[1]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 ); x += top[2]; y += top[3]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 ); x += top[4]; y += top[5]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 ); break; case op_vhcurveto: FT_TRACE4(( " vhcurveto" )); if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) || FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 3 ) ) ) goto Fail; y += top[0]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 ); x += top[1]; y += top[2]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 ); x += top[3]; t1_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 ); break; case op_vlineto: FT_TRACE4(( " vlineto" )); if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ) ) goto Fail; y += top[0]; goto Add_Line; case op_vmoveto: FT_TRACE4(( " vmoveto" )); y += top[0]; if ( !decoder->flex_state ) { if ( builder->parse_state == T1_Parse_Start ) goto Syntax_Error; builder->parse_state = T1_Parse_Have_Moveto; } break; case op_div: FT_TRACE4(( " div" )); /* if `large_int' is set, we divide unscaled numbers; */ /* otherwise, we divide numbers in 16.16 format -- */ /* in both cases, it is the same operation */ *top = FT_DivFix( top[0], top[1] ); top++; large_int = FALSE; break; case op_callsubr: { FT_Int idx; FT_TRACE4(( " callsubr" )); idx = Fix2Int( top[0] ); if ( decoder->subrs_hash ) { size_t* val = ft_hash_num_lookup( idx, decoder->subrs_hash ); if ( val ) idx = *val; else idx = -1; } if ( idx < 0 || idx >= decoder->num_subrs ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " invalid subrs index\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } if ( zone - decoder->zones >= T1_MAX_SUBRS_CALLS ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " too many nested subrs\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } zone->cursor = ip; /* save current instruction pointer */ zone++; /* The Type 1 driver stores subroutines without the seed bytes. */ /* The CID driver stores subroutines with seed bytes. This */ /* case is taken care of when decoder->subrs_len == 0. */ zone->base = decoder->subrs[idx]; if ( decoder->subrs_len ) zone->limit = zone->base + decoder->subrs_len[idx]; else { /* We are using subroutines from a CID font. We must adjust */ /* for the seed bytes. */ zone->base += ( decoder->lenIV >= 0 ? decoder->lenIV : 0 ); zone->limit = decoder->subrs[idx + 1]; } zone->cursor = zone->base; if ( !zone->base ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " invoking empty subrs\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } decoder->zone = zone; ip = zone->base; limit = zone->limit; break; } case op_pop: FT_TRACE4(( " pop" )); if ( known_othersubr_result_cnt > 0 ) { known_othersubr_result_cnt--; /* ignore, we pushed the operands ourselves */ break; } if ( unknown_othersubr_result_cnt == 0 ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " no more operands for othersubr\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } unknown_othersubr_result_cnt--; top++; /* `push' the operand to callothersubr onto the stack */ break; case op_return: FT_TRACE4(( " return" )); if ( zone <= decoder->zones ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " unexpected return\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } zone--; ip = zone->cursor; limit = zone->limit; decoder->zone = zone; break; case op_dotsection: FT_TRACE4(( " dotsection" )); break; case op_hstem: FT_TRACE4(( " hstem" )); /* record horizontal hint */ if ( hinter ) { /* top[0] += builder->left_bearing.y; */ hinter->stem( hinter->hints, 1, top ); } break; case op_hstem3: FT_TRACE4(( " hstem3" )); /* record horizontal counter-controlled hints */ if ( hinter ) hinter->stem3( hinter->hints, 1, top ); break; case op_vstem: FT_TRACE4(( " vstem" )); /* record vertical hint */ if ( hinter ) { top[0] += orig_x; hinter->stem( hinter->hints, 0, top ); } break; case op_vstem3: FT_TRACE4(( " vstem3" )); /* record vertical counter-controlled hints */ if ( hinter ) { FT_Pos dx = orig_x; top[0] += dx; top[2] += dx; top[4] += dx; hinter->stem3( hinter->hints, 0, top ); } break; case op_setcurrentpoint: FT_TRACE4(( " setcurrentpoint" )); /* From the T1 specification, section 6.4: */ /* */ /* The setcurrentpoint command is used only in */ /* conjunction with results from OtherSubrs procedures. */ /* known_othersubr_result_cnt != 0 is already handled */ /* above. */ /* Note, however, that both Ghostscript and Adobe */ /* Distiller handle this situation by silently ignoring */ /* the inappropriate `setcurrentpoint' instruction. So */ /* we do the same. */ #if 0 if ( decoder->flex_state != 1 ) { FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " unexpected `setcurrentpoint'\n" )); goto Syntax_Error; } else ... #endif x = top[0]; y = top[1]; decoder->flex_state = 0; break; case op_unknown15: FT_TRACE4(( " opcode_15" )); /* nothing to do except to pop the two arguments */ break; default: FT_ERROR(( "t1_decoder_parse_charstrings:" " unhandled opcode %d\n", op )); goto Syntax_Error; } /* XXX Operators usually clear the operand stack; */ /* only div, callsubr, callothersubr, pop, and */ /* return are different. */ /* In practice it doesn't matter (?). */ decoder->top = top; #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE FT_TRACE4(( "\n" )); bol = TRUE; #endif } /* general operator processing */ } /* while ip < limit */ FT_TRACE4(( "..end..\n\n" )); Fail: return error; Syntax_Error: return FT_THROW( Syntax_Error ); Stack_Underflow: return FT_THROW( Stack_Underflow ); }

None

CVE-2017-8105

FreeType 2 before 2017-03-24 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the t1_decoder_parse_charstrings function in psaux/t1decode.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8105

dbus

7d65a3a6ed8815e34a99c680ac3869fde49dbbd4

http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=dbus/dbus

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=7d65a3a6ed8815e34a99c680ac3869fde49dbbd4

CVE 2010-4352: Reject deeply nested variants Add DBUS_INVALID_NESTED_TOO_DEEPLY validity problem and a test that should generate it. Previously, we rejected deep nesting in the signature, but variants allow dynamic message nesting, conditional only on the depth of the message body. The nesting limit is 64, which was also the limit in static signatures. Empirically, dynamic nesting depth observed on my Fedora 14 system doesn't exceed 2; 64 is really a huge limit. https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32321 Signed-Off-By: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> Signed-off-by: Will Thompson <will.thompson@collabora.co.uk>

validate_body_helper (DBusTypeReader *reader, int byte_order, dbus_bool_t walk_reader_to_end, const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end, const unsigned char **new_p) { int current_type; while ((current_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (reader)) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID) { const unsigned char *a; case DBUS_TYPE_BYTE: ++p; break; case DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN: case DBUS_TYPE_INT16: case DBUS_TYPE_UINT16: case DBUS_TYPE_INT32: case DBUS_TYPE_UINT32: case DBUS_TYPE_UNIX_FD: case DBUS_TYPE_INT64: case DBUS_TYPE_UINT64: case DBUS_TYPE_DOUBLE: alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (current_type); a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, alignment); if (a >= end) return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA; while (p != a) { if (*p != '\0') return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL; ++p; } if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN) { dbus_uint32_t v = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p); if (!(v == 0 || v == 1)) return DBUS_INVALID_BOOLEAN_NOT_ZERO_OR_ONE; } p += alignment; break; case DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY: case DBUS_TYPE_STRING: case DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH: { dbus_uint32_t claimed_len; a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, 4); if (a + 4 > end) return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA; while (p != a) { if (*p != '\0') return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL; ++p; } claimed_len = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p); p += 4; /* p may now be == end */ _dbus_assert (p <= end); if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY) { int array_elem_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_element_type (reader); if (!_dbus_type_is_valid (array_elem_type)) { return DBUS_INVALID_UNKNOWN_TYPECODE; } alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type); a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, alignment); /* a may now be == end */ if (a > end) return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA; while (p != a) { if (*p != '\0') return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL; ++p; } } if (claimed_len > (unsigned long) (end - p)) return DBUS_INVALID_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS; if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH) { DBusString str; _dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len); if (!_dbus_validate_path (&str, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&str))) return DBUS_INVALID_BAD_PATH; p += claimed_len; } else if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_STRING) { DBusString str; _dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len); if (!_dbus_string_validate_utf8 (&str, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&str))) return DBUS_INVALID_BAD_UTF8_IN_STRING; p += claimed_len; } else if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY && claimed_len > 0) { DBusTypeReader sub; DBusValidity validity; const unsigned char *array_end; int array_elem_type; if (claimed_len > DBUS_MAXIMUM_ARRAY_LENGTH) return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_EXCEEDS_MAXIMUM; /* Remember that the reader is types only, so we can't * use it to iterate over elements. It stays the same * for all elements. */ _dbus_type_reader_recurse (reader, &sub); array_end = p + claimed_len; array_elem_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_element_type (reader); /* avoid recursive call to validate_body_helper if this is an array * of fixed-size elements */ if (dbus_type_is_fixed (array_elem_type)) { /* bools need to be handled differently, because they can * have an invalid value */ if (array_elem_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN) { dbus_uint32_t v; alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type); while (p < array_end) { v = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p); if (!(v == 0 || v == 1)) return DBUS_INVALID_BOOLEAN_NOT_ZERO_OR_ONE; p += alignment; } } else { p = array_end; } } else { while (p < array_end) { validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p); if (validity != DBUS_VALID) return validity; } } if (p != array_end) return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_INCORRECT; } /* check nul termination */ { while (p < array_end) { validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p); if (validity != DBUS_VALID) return validity; } } break; case DBUS_TYPE_SIGNATURE: { dbus_uint32_t claimed_len; DBusString str; DBusValidity validity; claimed_len = *p; ++p; /* 1 is for nul termination */ if (claimed_len + 1 > (unsigned long) (end - p)) return DBUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS; _dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len); validity = _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (&str, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&str)); if (validity != DBUS_VALID) return validity; p += claimed_len; _dbus_assert (p < end); if (*p != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID) return DBUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE_MISSING_NUL; ++p; _dbus_verbose ("p = %p end = %p claimed_len %u\n", p, end, claimed_len); } break; case DBUS_TYPE_VARIANT: { /* 1 byte sig len, sig typecodes, align to * contained-type-boundary, values. */ /* In addition to normal signature validation, we need to be sure * the signature contains only a single (possibly container) type. */ dbus_uint32_t claimed_len; DBusString sig; DBusTypeReader sub; DBusValidity validity; int contained_alignment; int contained_type; DBusValidity reason; claimed_len = *p; ++p; /* + 1 for nul */ if (claimed_len + 1 > (unsigned long) (end - p)) return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS; _dbus_string_init_const_len (&sig, p, claimed_len); reason = _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (&sig, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&sig)); if (!(reason == DBUS_VALID)) { if (reason == DBUS_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN_OOM_ERROR) return reason; else return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_BAD; } p += claimed_len; if (*p != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID) return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_MISSING_NUL; ++p; contained_type = _dbus_first_type_in_signature (&sig, 0); if (contained_type == DBUS_TYPE_INVALID) return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_EMPTY; contained_alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (contained_type); a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, contained_alignment); if (a > end) return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA; while (p != a) { if (*p != '\0') return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL; ++p; } _dbus_type_reader_init_types_only (&sub, &sig, 0); _dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID); validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p); if (validity != DBUS_VALID) return validity; if (_dbus_type_reader_next (&sub)) return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_SPECIFIES_MULTIPLE_VALUES; _dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) == DBUS_TYPE_INVALID); } break; case DBUS_TYPE_DICT_ENTRY: case DBUS_TYPE_STRUCT: _dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID); validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p); if (validity != DBUS_VALID) return validity; if (*p != '\0') return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL; ++p; } _dbus_type_reader_recurse (reader, &sub); validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, TRUE, p, end, &p); if (validity != DBUS_VALID) return validity; } break; default: _dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid typecode in supposedly-validated signature"); break; }

None

CVE-2010-4352

Stack consumption vulnerability in D-Bus (aka DBus) before 1.4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a message containing many nested variants.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-4352

savannah

e6699596af5c5d6f0ae0ea06e19df87dce088df8

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=e6699596af5c5d6f0ae0ea06e19df87dce088df8

None

tt_size_reset( TT_Size size, FT_Bool only_height ) { TT_Face face; FT_Size_Metrics* metrics; size->ttmetrics.valid = FALSE; face = (TT_Face)size->root.face; metrics = &size->metrics; /* copy the result from base layer */ /* This bit flag, if set, indicates that the ppems must be */ /* rounded to integers. Nearly all TrueType fonts have this bit */ /* set, as hinting won't work really well otherwise. */ /* */ if ( face->header.Flags & 8 ) { metrics->ascender = FT_PIX_ROUND( FT_MulFix( face->root.ascender, metrics->y_scale ) ); metrics->descender = FT_PIX_ROUND( FT_MulFix( face->root.descender, metrics->y_scale ) ); metrics->height = FT_PIX_ROUND( FT_MulFix( face->root.height, metrics->y_scale ) ); } size->ttmetrics.valid = TRUE; if ( only_height ) return FT_Err_Ok; if ( face->header.Flags & 8 ) { metrics->x_scale = FT_DivFix( metrics->x_ppem << 6, face->root.units_per_EM ); metrics->y_scale = FT_DivFix( metrics->y_ppem << 6, face->root.units_per_EM ); metrics->max_advance = FT_PIX_ROUND( FT_MulFix( face->root.max_advance_width, metrics->x_scale ) ); } /* compute new transformation */ if ( metrics->x_ppem >= metrics->y_ppem ) { size->ttmetrics.scale = metrics->x_scale; size->ttmetrics.ppem = metrics->x_ppem; size->ttmetrics.x_ratio = 0x10000L; size->ttmetrics.y_ratio = FT_DivFix( metrics->y_ppem, metrics->x_ppem ); } else { size->ttmetrics.scale = metrics->y_scale; size->ttmetrics.ppem = metrics->y_ppem; size->ttmetrics.x_ratio = FT_DivFix( metrics->x_ppem, metrics->y_ppem ); size->ttmetrics.y_ratio = 0x10000L; } #ifdef TT_USE_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER size->cvt_ready = -1; #endif /* TT_USE_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER */ return FT_Err_Ok; }

None

CVE-2017-7864

FreeType 2 before 2017-02-02 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the tt_size_reset function in truetype/ttobjs.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7864

savannah

7bbb91fbf47fc0775cc9705673caf0c47a81f94b

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=7bbb91fbf47fc0775cc9705673caf0c47a81f94b

None

sfnt_init_face( FT_Stream stream, TT_Face face, FT_Int face_instance_index, FT_Int num_params, FT_Parameter* params ) { FT_Error error; FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory; FT_Library library = face->root.driver->root.library; SFNT_Service sfnt; FT_Int face_index; /* for now, parameters are unused */ FT_UNUSED( num_params ); FT_UNUSED( params ); sfnt = (SFNT_Service)face->sfnt; if ( !sfnt ) { sfnt = (SFNT_Service)FT_Get_Module_Interface( library, "sfnt" ); if ( !sfnt ) { FT_ERROR(( "sfnt_init_face: cannot access `sfnt' module\n" )); return FT_THROW( Missing_Module ); } face->sfnt = sfnt; face->goto_table = sfnt->goto_table; } FT_FACE_FIND_GLOBAL_SERVICE( face, face->psnames, POSTSCRIPT_CMAPS ); #ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT if ( !face->mm ) { /* we want the MM interface from the `truetype' module only */ FT_Module tt_module = FT_Get_Module( library, "truetype" ); face->mm = ft_module_get_service( tt_module, FT_SERVICE_ID_MULTI_MASTERS, 0 ); } if ( !face->var ) { /* we want the metrics variations interface */ /* from the `truetype' module only */ FT_Module tt_module = FT_Get_Module( library, "truetype" ); face->var = ft_module_get_service( tt_module, FT_SERVICE_ID_METRICS_VARIATIONS, 0 ); } #endif FT_TRACE2(( "SFNT driver\n" )); error = sfnt_open_font( stream, face ); if ( error ) return error; /* Stream may have changed in sfnt_open_font. */ stream = face->root.stream; FT_TRACE2(( "sfnt_init_face: %08p, %d\n", face, face_instance_index )); face_index = FT_ABS( face_instance_index ) & 0xFFFF; /* value -(N+1) requests information on index N */ if ( face_instance_index < 0 ) face_index--; if ( face_index >= face->ttc_header.count ) { if ( face_instance_index >= 0 ) return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument ); else face_index = 0; } if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( face->ttc_header.offsets[face_index] ) ) return error; /* check whether we have a valid TrueType file */ error = sfnt->load_font_dir( face, stream ); if ( error ) return error; #ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT { FT_ULong fvar_len; FT_ULong version; FT_ULong offset; FT_UShort num_axes; FT_UShort axis_size; FT_UShort num_instances; FT_UShort instance_size; FT_Int instance_index; FT_Byte* default_values = NULL; FT_Byte* instance_values = NULL; face->is_default_instance = 1; instance_index = FT_ABS( face_instance_index ) >> 16; /* test whether current face is a GX font with named instances */ if ( face->goto_table( face, TTAG_fvar, stream, &fvar_len ) || fvar_len < 20 || FT_READ_ULONG( version ) || FT_READ_USHORT( offset ) || FT_STREAM_SKIP( 2 ) /* reserved */ || FT_READ_USHORT( num_axes ) || FT_READ_USHORT( axis_size ) || FT_READ_USHORT( num_instances ) || FT_READ_USHORT( instance_size ) ) { version = 0; offset = 0; num_axes = 0; axis_size = 0; num_instances = 0; instance_size = 0; } /* check that the data is bound by the table length */ if ( version != 0x00010000UL || axis_size != 20 || num_axes == 0 || /* `num_axes' limit implied by 16-bit `instance_size' */ num_axes > 0x3FFE || !( instance_size == 4 + 4 * num_axes || instance_size == 6 + 4 * num_axes ) || /* `num_instances' limit implied by limited range of name IDs */ num_instances > 0x7EFF || offset + axis_size * num_axes + instance_size * num_instances > fvar_len ) num_instances = 0; else face->variation_support |= TT_FACE_FLAG_VAR_FVAR; /* * As documented in the OpenType specification, an entry for the * default instance may be omitted in the named instance table. In * particular this means that even if there is no named instance * table in the font we actually do have a named instance, namely the * default instance. * * For consistency, we always want the default instance in our list * of named instances. If it is missing, we try to synthesize it * later on. Here, we have to adjust `num_instances' accordingly. */ if ( !( FT_ALLOC( default_values, num_axes * 2 ) || FT_ALLOC( instance_values, num_axes * 2 ) ) ) { /* the current stream position is 16 bytes after the table start */ FT_ULong array_start = FT_STREAM_POS() - 16 + offset; FT_ULong default_value_offset, instance_offset; FT_Byte* p; FT_UInt i; default_value_offset = array_start + 8; p = default_values; for ( i = 0; i < num_axes; i++ ) { (void)FT_STREAM_READ_AT( default_value_offset, p, 2 ); default_value_offset += axis_size; p += 2; } instance_offset = array_start + axis_size * num_axes + 4; for ( i = 0; i < num_instances; i++ ) { (void)FT_STREAM_READ_AT( instance_offset, instance_values, num_axes * 2 ); if ( !ft_memcmp( default_values, instance_values, num_axes * 2 ) ) break; instance_offset += instance_size; } if ( i == num_instances ) { /* no default instance in named instance table; */ /* we thus have to synthesize it */ num_instances++; } } FT_FREE( default_values ); FT_FREE( instance_values ); /* we don't support Multiple Master CFFs yet */ if ( face->goto_table( face, TTAG_glyf, stream, 0 ) && !face->goto_table( face, TTAG_CFF, stream, 0 ) ) num_instances = 0; if ( instance_index > num_instances ) { if ( face_instance_index >= 0 ) return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument ); else num_instances = 0; } face->root.style_flags = (FT_Long)num_instances << 16; } #endif face->root.num_faces = face->ttc_header.count; face->root.face_index = face_instance_index; return error; }

None

CVE-2017-7857

FreeType 2 before 2017-03-08 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the TT_Get_MM_Var function in truetype/ttgxvar.c and the sfnt_init_face function in sfnt/sfobjs.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7857

poppler

5c9b08a875b07853be6c44e43ff5f7f059df666a

https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler

https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=5c9b08a875b07853be6c44e43ff5f7f059df666a

pdfunite: Fix crash with broken documents Sometimes we can't parse pages so check before accessing them Thanks to Jiaqi Peng for the report Fixes bugs #101153 and #101149

int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { int objectsCount = 0; Guint numOffset = 0; std::vector<Object> pages; std::vector<Guint> offsets; XRef *yRef, *countRef; FILE *f; OutStream *outStr; int i; int j, rootNum; std::vector<PDFDoc *>docs; int majorVersion = 0; int minorVersion = 0; char *fileName = argv[argc - 1]; int exitCode; exitCode = 99; const GBool ok = parseArgs (argDesc, &argc, argv); if (!ok || argc < 3 || printVersion || printHelp) { fprintf(stderr, "pdfunite version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION); fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", popplerCopyright); fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", xpdfCopyright); if (!printVersion) { printUsage("pdfunite", "<PDF-sourcefile-1>..<PDF-sourcefile-n> <PDF-destfile>", argDesc); } if (printVersion || printHelp) exitCode = 0; return exitCode; } exitCode = 0; globalParams = new GlobalParams(); for (i = 1; i < argc - 1; i++) { GooString *gfileName = new GooString(argv[i]); PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc(gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (doc->isOk() && !doc->isEncrypted()) { docs.push_back(doc); if (doc->getPDFMajorVersion() > majorVersion) { majorVersion = doc->getPDFMajorVersion(); minorVersion = doc->getPDFMinorVersion(); } else if (doc->getPDFMajorVersion() == majorVersion) { if (doc->getPDFMinorVersion() > minorVersion) { minorVersion = doc->getPDFMinorVersion(); } } } else if (doc->isOk()) { error(errUnimplemented, -1, "Could not merge encrypted files ('{0:s}')", argv[i]); return -1; } else { error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not merge damaged documents ('{0:s}')", argv[i]); return -1; } } if (!(f = fopen(fileName, "wb"))) { error(errIO, -1, "Could not open file '{0:s}'", fileName); return -1; } outStr = new FileOutStream(f, 0); yRef = new XRef(); countRef = new XRef(); yRef->add(0, 65535, 0, gFalse); PDFDoc::writeHeader(outStr, majorVersion, minorVersion); Object intents; Object afObj; Object ocObj; Object names; if (docs.size() >= 1) { Object catObj; docs[0]->getXRef()->getCatalog(&catObj); Dict *catDict = catObj.getDict(); catDict->lookup("OutputIntents", &intents); catDict->lookupNF("AcroForm", &afObj); Ref *refPage = docs[0]->getCatalog()->getPageRef(1); if (!afObj.isNull()) { docs[0]->markAcroForm(&afObj, yRef, countRef, 0, refPage->num, refPage->num); } catDict->lookupNF("OCProperties", &ocObj); if (!ocObj.isNull() && ocObj.isDict()) { docs[0]->markPageObjects(ocObj.getDict(), yRef, countRef, 0, refPage->num, refPage->num); } catDict->lookup("Names", &names); if (!names.isNull() && names.isDict()) { docs[0]->markPageObjects(names.getDict(), yRef, countRef, 0, refPage->num, refPage->num); } if (intents.isArray() && intents.arrayGetLength() > 0) { for (i = 1; i < (int) docs.size(); i++) { Object pagecatObj, pageintents; docs[i]->getXRef()->getCatalog(&pagecatObj); Dict *pagecatDict = pagecatObj.getDict(); pagecatDict->lookup("OutputIntents", &pageintents); if (pageintents.isArray() && pageintents.arrayGetLength() > 0) { for (j = intents.arrayGetLength() - 1; j >= 0; j--) { Object intent; intents.arrayGet(j, &intent, 0); if (intent.isDict()) { Object idf; intent.dictLookup("OutputConditionIdentifier", &idf); if (idf.isString()) { GooString *gidf = idf.getString(); GBool removeIntent = gTrue; for (int k = 0; k < pageintents.arrayGetLength(); k++) { Object pgintent; pageintents.arrayGet(k, &pgintent, 0); if (pgintent.isDict()) { Object pgidf; pgintent.dictLookup("OutputConditionIdentifier", &pgidf); if (pgidf.isString()) { GooString *gpgidf = pgidf.getString(); if (gpgidf->cmp(gidf) == 0) { pgidf.free(); removeIntent = gFalse; break; } } pgidf.free(); } } if (removeIntent) { intents.arrayRemove(j); error(errSyntaxWarning, -1, "Output intent {0:s} missing in pdf {1:s}, removed", gidf->getCString(), docs[i]->getFileName()->getCString()); } } else { intents.arrayRemove(j); error(errSyntaxWarning, -1, "Invalid output intent dict, missing required OutputConditionIdentifier"); } idf.free(); } else { intents.arrayRemove(j); } intent.free(); } } else { error(errSyntaxWarning, -1, "Output intents differs, remove them all"); intents.free(); break; } pagecatObj.free(); pageintents.free(); } } if (intents.isArray() && intents.arrayGetLength() > 0) { for (j = intents.arrayGetLength() - 1; j >= 0; j--) { Object intent; intents.arrayGet(j, &intent, 0); if (intent.isDict()) { docs[0]->markPageObjects(intent.getDict(), yRef, countRef, numOffset, 0, 0); } else { intents.arrayRemove(j); } intent.free(); } } catObj.free(); } for (i = 0; i < (int) docs.size(); i++) { for (j = 1; j <= docs[i]->getNumPages(); j++) { PDFRectangle *cropBox = NULL; if (docs[i]->getCatalog()->getPage(j)->isCropped()) cropBox = docs[i]->getCatalog()->getPage(j)->getCropBox(); Object page; docs[i]->getXRef()->fetch(refPage->num, refPage->gen, &page); Dict *pageDict = page.getDict(); Dict *resDict = docs[i]->getCatalog()->getPage(j)->getResourceDict(); if (resDict) { Object *newResource = new Object(); newResource->initDict(resDict); pageDict->set("Resources", newResource); delete newResource; } pages.push_back(page); offsets.push_back(numOffset); docs[i]->markPageObjects(pageDict, yRef, countRef, numOffset, refPage->num, refPage->num); Object annotsObj; pageDict->lookupNF("Annots", &annotsObj); if (!annotsObj.isNull()) { docs[i]->markAnnotations(&annotsObj, yRef, countRef, numOffset, refPage->num, refPage->num); annotsObj.free(); } } Object pageCatObj, pageNames, pageForm; docs[i]->getXRef()->getCatalog(&pageCatObj); Dict *pageCatDict = pageCatObj.getDict(); pageCatDict->lookup("Names", &pageNames); if (!pageNames.isNull() && pageNames.isDict()) { if (!names.isDict()) { names.free(); names.initDict(yRef); } doMergeNameDict(docs[i], yRef, countRef, 0, 0, names.getDict(), pageNames.getDict(), numOffset); } pageCatDict->lookup("AcroForm", &pageForm); if (i > 0 && !pageForm.isNull() && pageForm.isDict()) { if (afObj.isNull()) { pageCatDict->lookupNF("AcroForm", &afObj); } else if (afObj.isDict()) { doMergeFormDict(afObj.getDict(), pageForm.getDict(), numOffset); } } pageForm.free(); pageNames.free(); pageCatObj.free(); objectsCount += docs[i]->writePageObjects(outStr, yRef, numOffset, gTrue); numOffset = yRef->getNumObjects() + 1; } rootNum = yRef->getNumObjects() + 1; yRef->add(rootNum, 0, outStr->getPos(), gTrue); outStr->printf("%d 0 obj\n", rootNum); outStr->printf("<< /Type /Catalog /Pages %d 0 R", rootNum + 1); if (intents.isArray() && intents.arrayGetLength() > 0) { outStr->printf(" /OutputIntents ["); for (j = 0; j < intents.arrayGetLength(); j++) { Object intent; intents.arrayGet(j, &intent, 0); if (intent.isDict()) { PDFDoc::writeObject(&intent, outStr, yRef, 0, NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0); } intent.free(); } outStr->printf("]"); } intents.free(); if (!afObj.isNull()) { outStr->printf(" /AcroForm "); PDFDoc::writeObject(&afObj, outStr, yRef, 0, NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0); afObj.free(); } if (!ocObj.isNull() && ocObj.isDict()) { outStr->printf(" /OCProperties "); PDFDoc::writeObject(&ocObj, outStr, yRef, 0, NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0); ocObj.free(); } if (!names.isNull() && names.isDict()) { outStr->printf(" /Names "); PDFDoc::writeObject(&names, outStr, yRef, 0, NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0); names.free(); } outStr->printf(">>\nendobj\n"); objectsCount++; yRef->add(rootNum + 1, 0, outStr->getPos(), gTrue); outStr->printf("%d 0 obj\n", rootNum + 1); outStr->printf("<< /Type /Pages /Kids ["); for (j = 0; j < (int) pages.size(); j++) outStr->printf(" %d 0 R", rootNum + j + 2); outStr->printf(" ] /Count %zd >>\nendobj\n", pages.size()); objectsCount++; for (i = 0; i < (int) pages.size(); i++) { yRef->add(rootNum + i + 2, 0, outStr->getPos(), gTrue); outStr->printf("%d 0 obj\n", rootNum + i + 2); outStr->printf("<< "); Dict *pageDict = pages[i].getDict(); for (j = 0; j < pageDict->getLength(); j++) { if (j > 0) outStr->printf(" "); const char *key = pageDict->getKey(j); Object value; pageDict->getValNF(j, &value); if (strcmp(key, "Parent") == 0) { outStr->printf("/Parent %d 0 R", rootNum + 1); } else { outStr->printf("/%s ", key); PDFDoc::writeObject(&value, outStr, yRef, offsets[i], NULL, cryptRC4, 0, 0, 0); } value.free(); } outStr->printf(" >>\nendobj\n"); objectsCount++; } Goffset uxrefOffset = outStr->getPos(); Ref ref; ref.num = rootNum; ref.gen = 0; Dict *trailerDict = PDFDoc::createTrailerDict(objectsCount, gFalse, 0, &ref, yRef, fileName, outStr->getPos()); PDFDoc::writeXRefTableTrailer(trailerDict, yRef, gTrue, // write all entries according to ISO 32000-1, 7.5.4 Cross-Reference Table: "For a file that has never been incrementally updated, the cross-reference section shall contain only one subsection, whose object numbering begins at 0." uxrefOffset, outStr, yRef); delete trailerDict; outStr->close(); delete outStr; fclose(f); delete yRef; delete countRef; for (j = 0; j < (int) pages.size (); j++) pages[j].free(); for (i = 0; i < (int) docs.size (); i++) delete docs[i]; delete globalParams; return exitCode; }

None

CVE-2017-7511

poppler since version 0.17.3 has been vulnerable to NULL pointer dereference in pdfunite triggered by specially crafted documents.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7511