Datasets:

elihoole
/

asrs-aviation-reports

acn_num_ACN stringlengths 6 7	Time_Date stringlengths 6 6	Time.1_Local Time Of Day stringclasses 6 values	Place_Locale Reference stringlengths 0 12	Place.1_State Reference stringlengths 0 2	Place.3_Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles stringlengths 0 6	Place.4_Altitude.AGL.Single Value stringlengths 0 7	Place.5_Altitude.MSL.Single Value stringlengths 0 8	Environment_Flight Conditions stringclasses 5 values	Environment.1_Weather Elements / Visibility stringlengths 0 65	Environment.2_Work Environment Factor stringclasses 12 values	Environment.3_Light stringclasses 5 values	Environment.4_Ceiling stringlengths 0 5	Aircraft 1_ATC / Advisory stringlengths 0 43	Aircraft 1.1_Aircraft Operator stringlengths 0 36	Aircraft 1.2_Make Model Name stringlengths 0 69	Aircraft 1.4_Crew Size stringclasses 7 values	Aircraft 1.5_Operating Under FAR Part stringclasses 29 values	Aircraft 1.6_Flight Plan stringclasses 6 values	Aircraft 1.7_Mission stringlengths 0 47	Aircraft 1.8_Nav In Use stringlengths 0 77	Aircraft 1.9_Flight Phase stringlengths 0 81	Aircraft 1.10_Route In Use stringlengths 0 43	Aircraft 1.11_Airspace stringlengths 0 51	Aircraft 1.12_Maintenance Status.Maintenance Deferred stringclasses 3 values	Aircraft 1.13_Maintenance Status.Records Complete stringclasses 3 values	Aircraft 1.14_Maintenance Status.Released For Service stringclasses 3 values	Aircraft 1.15_Maintenance Status.Required / Correct Doc On Board stringclasses 3 values	Aircraft 1.16_Maintenance Status.Maintenance Type stringclasses 3 values	Aircraft 1.17_Maintenance Status.Maintenance Items Involved stringlengths 0 53	Aircraft 1.18_Cabin Lighting stringclasses 5 values	Aircraft 1.21_Crew Size Flight Attendant.Number Of Crew stringclasses 15 values	Component_Aircraft Component stringlengths 0 58	Component.2_Aircraft Reference stringclasses 5 values	Component.3_Problem stringclasses 26 values	Aircraft 2_ATC / Advisory stringlengths 0 22	Aircraft 2.1_Aircraft Operator stringlengths 0 31	Aircraft 2.2_Make Model Name stringlengths 0 70	Aircraft 2.4_Crew Size stringclasses 8 values	Aircraft 2.5_Operating Under FAR Part stringclasses 17 values	Aircraft 2.6_Flight Plan stringclasses 5 values	Aircraft 2.7_Mission stringlengths 0 27	Aircraft 2.9_Flight Phase stringlengths 0 41	Aircraft 2.10_Route In Use stringlengths 0 37	Aircraft 2.11_Airspace stringlengths 0 44	Person 1_Location Of Person stringlengths 0 37	Person 1.1_Location In Aircraft stringlengths 0 32	Person 1.2_Reporter Organization stringlengths 0 29	Person 1.3_Function stringlengths 0 69	Person 1.4_Qualification stringlengths 0 216	Person 1.5_Experience stringlengths 0 238	Person 1.6_Cabin Activity stringlengths 0 51	Person 1.7_Human Factors stringlengths 0 163	Person 1.8_Communication Breakdown stringlengths 0 166	Person 1.10_ASRS Report Number.Accession Number stringlengths 6 7	Person 2_Location Of Person stringlengths 0 37	Person 2.1_Location In Aircraft stringclasses 23 values	Person 2.2_Reporter Organization stringclasses 23 values	Person 2.3_Function stringlengths 0 65	Person 2.4_Qualification stringlengths 0 170	Person 2.5_Experience stringlengths 0 199	Person 2.7_Human Factors stringlengths 0 163	Person 2.8_Communication Breakdown stringlengths 0 100	Person 2.10_ASRS Report Number.Accession Number stringlengths 0 10	Events_Anomaly stringlengths 0 405	Events.1_Miss Distance stringlengths 0 32	Events.2_Were Passengers Involved In Event stringclasses 3 values	Events.3_Detector stringlengths 0 126	Events.4_When Detected stringlengths 0 76	Events.5_Result stringlengths 0 417	Assessments_Contributing Factors / Situations stringlengths 0 183	Assessments.1_Primary Problem stringclasses 19 values	Report 1_Narrative stringlengths 11 12k	Report 1.1_Callback stringlengths 0 3.96k	Report 2_Narrative stringlengths 0 12k	Report 1.2_Synopsis stringlengths 30 959
1574675	201808	0601-1200	SNA.Airport	CA			5000.0				Daylight		TRACON SCT	Air Carrier	B737-700	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger	FMS Or FMC; GPS	Initial Approach		Class C SNA																						Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	Pilot Flying; First Officer	Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Type 1900		Situational Awareness		1574675	Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	Captain; Pilot Not Flying	Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 357	Situational Awareness		1574727.0	Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance			Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance	Human Factors	Human Factors	SNA RNP-Z to Runway 20R. The FMC was properly programmed and MCP panel [was] in LNAV/VNAV PATH. Upon crossing KLEVR at 5000 FT IAF; we set zeros in the altitude alerter. The aircraft did not descend to cross MNNIE at 4400 FT; next mandatory altitude. I noticed level flight and immediately selected Vertical Speed to try and meet MNNIE at 4400 feet. About the same time; SoCal Approach asked us if we were descending and flying the RNP-Z. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) said 'yes' but asked if we could be cleared the Visual Approach to try and mitigate any problems. SoCal said 'no problem' and gave us a 'heading of 030 and descend to 3000 FT; call the field in sight.' As Pilot Flying (PF); the field was on my side and we had it in sight and called - in sight. At that point we were cleared for the visual and told to contact SNA Tower. The rest of the approach and landing were uneventful and we landed safely on 20R. With short distances between waypoints and mandatory descending altitude restrictions; pilots should be quicker to notice any anomaly and react quickly to stay in/on VNAV PATH even if aircraft does not do it automatically.		We were cleared for the RNP RNAV Z 20R Approach and level at 5000 feet. We were in visual conditions; and just using the approach for ease of use. We had zeros set after the initial approach fix and in LNAV/VNAV PATH. After crossing KLEVR; the aircraft did not descend. We noticed it quickly; and the Pilot Flying intervened by using Vertical Speed to catch the profile. Very shortly after we began to intervene; ATC asked us if we were doing the RNP Z Approach. I told him we were; but the aircraft wasn't doing what we were wanting or expecting it to do; and I asked if he could vector us for the visual approach. He gave us a heading and altitude to fly. He asked if we had the airport; which we did; and he cleared us for the visual. We landed without incident. In the future; I need to monitor more closely; and not let the good weather lull me into complacency. If we're cleared for an approach; I will monitor it better.	B737-700 flight crew reported failing to make a crossing restriction on the RNP-Z Runway 20R approach to SNA.
1224894	201412	0601-1200	MSY.Airport	LA		1000.0		VMC			Daylight		Tower MSY	Air Carrier	EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Final Approach		Class B MSY														UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle							Class B MSY	Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	Pilot Not Flying; Captain						1224894										Conflict NMAC	Horizontal 300; Vertical 0		Person Flight Crew	In-flight	General None Reported / Taken	Human Factors	Human Factors	On base to final turn to runway 1 in MSY at approximately 1;000 feet AGL; we passed within 100 yards (estimated) of an unmanned aerial drone. The drone was headed west at our altitude and made a quick turn to the south to avoid us. The drone was a fixed wing; single propeller type commercial unit. It passed off our right wing. I was the non pilot flying in the left seat. My First Officer was focused on avoiding a helicopter that had been pointed out to us; so she didn't get as good of a look at the drone as I did. She did; however; get a good enough look at it to determine that it was in fact an aircraft. We did not take evasive action because the encounter happened so fast I initially wasn't sure what we had seen. However; after taking a closer look out the right window; I was able to determine the drone was headed away from us and would be no factor. I reported this drone encounter to MSY tower; and subsequently followed up with a phone call to the TRACON after landing to relay the specifics. Increase awareness of those who operate drone aircraft in the vicinity of commercial airports as to airspace regulations and possible collision hazards with commercial aircraft. FAA needs to take action to regulate drone operations; especially within controlled airspace.			Captain reports sighting of a drone at 1;000 feet during approach to Runway 1 at MSY. No evasive action is taken by the reporter; but the drone appears to turn away.
1134202	201312	1201-1800	ZZZ.ARTCC	US			2600.0	IMC	Fog; Rain; 0.5		Daylight	300	Center ZZZ	Personal	SR22	1.0	Part 91	IFR	Personal		Final Approach	Direct	Class B ZZZ; Class C ZZZ; Class D ZZZ									PFD	X	Malfunctioning											Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Personal	Pilot Flying; Single Pilot	Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 100		Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness		1134202										Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence		N	Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification	Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure; Weather	Aircraft	I climbed to my filed altitude of 5;000 FT; and was right at the top of the clouds. It was kind of bumpy and the temperature was 50+/-. Departure asked me if I wanted 6;000 FT and I accepted. At that point I was in the clear the temperature was 46 +/-. I was expecting the ILS 2L into ZZZ1 and received weather and briefed the approach as necessary. The FPD flashed and I wasn't sure if I had blinked or if it really did. At this point I was VFR on top and all flight instruments were reading correctly. [Center] told me to expect the ILS 10...and I went ahead and made the following change in the aircraft and once again briefed the approach. I was cleared to descend to 4;000 FT and did so without incident. I once again noticed the PFD flickered.... I felt the PFD and it seemed really hot so I figured due to the heat it was messing with the screen. I turned on the fresh air vents and made sure the heat was also turned off in the plane. I was then cleared for the ILS 10 and asked to descend to 2;500 FT which they then corrected to 2;600 FT. The aircraft captured the ILS as it should and I slowed the aircraft to 130 KTS about 10 miles out; and continued to slow the aircraft to the flap range. I was switched to the Tower frequency and I was cleared to land. I went ahead and switched my MFD to the checklist page and did my pre-landing checklist. When I brought up the map screen again I noticed the aircraft was to the right of the ILS localizer. At this time I also noticed the aircraft was in a left turn shown by the PFD attitude indicator; however; the standby indicator showed a right turn. At this point I knew I had a problem. Almost at this exact time the Tower asked me to check my altimeter setting because they had a low altitude report. I then received a check attitude warning annunciator on the PFD. I was not sure what attitude indicator was giving me correct information at that time. At this point the PFD attitude indicator was almost 90 to the left and I quickly decided that it was the wrong one. I felt the aircraft buffet and I knew I was in an autopilot stall. I disconnected the autopilot; I got the nose down and the power in. I struggled not to try to follow it [attitude indicator] because it is so big and right in front of me. I let Tower know I was going missed; but at that time I realized my heading indicator was incorrect as well. Tower wanted me to make a right turn to 180 and maintain 3;000 FT. I knew where VFR conditions were and that was where I needed to get. After regaining control of the aircraft using my three standby instruments; I asked to climb to 5;000 FT. I struggled with my heading because of the compass location in the aircraft. As I was climbing to VFR conditions I was going through my checklist for failures. When I broke out I went ahead and reset everything hoping that it would right itself but it did not. I went ahead and reduced power to conserve fuel and climbed so I could keep leaning out my aircraft. The entire Midwest was low IMC. After running through my entire checklist and determining that I could safely make a GPS approach I asked Center for anyone with minimums good enough for a GPS approach. I chose ZZZ2 and using GPS and my standby instruments; I safely landed with my PFD red X'd out.			SR22 pilot became disoriented on approach in IMC when PFD began displaying erroneous attitude information. After entering stall buffet and receiving ATC and aircraft low altitude alerts; pilot regained control by using standby attitude instruments; returned to VFR and; with ATC assistance; preceded to an uneventful landing at an alternate field.
1222074	201411	1201-1800	CWA.Airport	WI	20.0		4000.0		Icing; Snow; 0.5		Daylight	300	Center ZMP	Personal	Baron 58/58TC	1.0	Part 91	IFR	Personal		Descent	Vectors	Class E ZMP									Pitot/Static Ice System	X	Failed											Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Personal	Single Pilot	Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 700		Situational Awareness		1222074										Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical			Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action	Aircraft	Aircraft	I had my pitot heat checked prior to winter and on prior flights. I was above icing at 10;000 ft. As I descended into minimal icing below 8000 ft. the pitot heat failed and the pitot tube iced up. I lost airspeed indication. This is a minor event with GPS ground speed on 2 GPS units to compensate. However within moments the AHRS started to malfunction and started intermittently cutting off heading information. Then at times it gave other error messages; flagged erroneous attitude indications and started falsely indicating 'dangerous' attitudes even during normal standard rate turns in the holding pattern. At one or two points the entire glass panel instrument display gave a fault and sit off all instruments (attitude; heading; HSI; glide slope; altimeter; etc.) requiring use of backup instruments. I was able to fly and complete the ILS approach using the intermittent indications; the GPS's (2) and backup indicators to minimums (300 ft.; 1/2) uneventfully. I contacted the avionics shop who advised me that loss of PITOT input ALONE can cause complete loss of AHRS FUNCTION; all modalities. The pitot tube was replaced and on the next flight I have had no problem. If this is true and loss of a pitot tube input can cause complete loss of the AHRS - loss of heading; attitude; HSI; altimeter; other vital indicators - especially in low IFR - this can become a very dangerous situation!! This is very bad engineering design without proper failsafe design. Loss of airspeed should allow a default mode that preserves indications of attitude; airspeed; the HSI; etc.!!!! This fault of the DESIGN could become life threatening to the pilot from what used to be a TRIVIAL problem in the past. The engineers can redesign this to have bester failsafe performance!			BE58 pilot experiences pitot heat failure descending through icing conditions at 8000 feet. Within moments the AHRS begins to malfunction along with other components of the glass panel display. Backup instruments and GPS ground speed are used perform an ILS approach to landing. The reporter is informed by his avionics shop that loss of pitot input can cause loss of AHRS function. He believes that the system should be designed to operate normally with loss of pitot input.
1733019	202003	1801-2400	ZDV.ARTCC	CO			32000.0		Turbulence				Center ZDV	Air Carrier	B737-800		Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Cruise		Class A ZDV																						Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	First Officer	Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument			Situational Awareness		1733019										Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence			Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control	Airspace Structure; Weather	Weather	At 32000 ft. just north of PUB the aircraft experienced Moderate to Severe turbulence. About 10 minutes before the incident the aircraft was in continuous light chop due to cloud tops. Seatbelt sign was on and PA was made by Pilot Monitoring and Pilot Flying reduced thrust to Mach .76. Pilot Monitoring contacted ATC for rides above; at about that time the airspeed began to show a decreasing trend and the Pilot Flying added power to adjust; airspeed continued to decrease and the Pilot Flying added even more power. At about that time the turbulence started and the right wing dropped and aircraft bank angles showed in excess of 50 degrees kicking off autopilot. Airspeed loss was an excess of 30-40 kts. whereby Pilot Flying applied max power. Barber poles came together however no overspeed or stall warning occurred. The aircraft lost at least 500 ft. during upset recovery with no excessive force to the aircraft. After recovery Pilot Monitoring requested an immediate climb due to Moderate to Severe turbulence up to 36000 ft. and was given 33000 ft. ATC gave us a frequency change and got an immediate climb to 36000 ft.; with no further incident. During upset recovery aircraft lost at least 500 ft. This is an approximate guess by the pilots since the loss of airspeed and power at firewall along with excessive bank angles were in the primary scan. ATC gave an immediate climb clearance and crew complied. No further action was taken. Keep seat belt sign on when crossing know turbulent areas like over the Rockies; even when weather radar; and ATC aren't reporting anything. Keep the Flight Attendant's informed and always give those important PA's to passengers 'when seated to keep those seatbelts securely fastened in case we hit any unexpected turbulence'. Because it really does happen!			B737 First Officer reported unexpected moderate to severe turbulence caused a temporary loss of control.
1000676	201203	0601-1200	ZZZ.ARTCC	US			24000.0	VMC			Dawn		Center ZZZ	Air Carrier	Dash 8-200	2.0	Part 121				Cruise		Class A ZZZ									Pressurization System	X	Malfunctioning											Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	Pilot Flying; Captain	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)					1000676										Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical			Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem	Aircraft	Aircraft	The First Officer performed the cruise checklist when directed to. He noticed the differential pressure to be about 5.5 PSI and the cabin altitude climbing past 10;000 FT at FL240. With no master warning or warning light we descended to FL200. The differential pressure lowered and the cabin altitude read below 8;000 FT.			DHC8-100 Captain experiences a high cabin altitude at FL240 with no associated cabin altitude warning. Flight descends to FL200 and cabin altitude descends below 8;000 FT.
990198	201201	0001-0600	ZZZ.Airport	US		0.0							Tower ZZZ	Air Carrier	MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Landing	Visual Approach	Class B ZZZ												Tower ZZZ	Air Carrier	A320	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger	Landing	None	Class B ZZZ	Facility ZZZ.Tower		Government	Handoff / Assist; Local	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified					990198										ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical			Person Air Traffic Control		Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach	Human Factors; Procedure; Airport	Human Factors	While working the Handoff position; I observed an A320; on landing roll Runway XXL; roll past the G3 exit. Exits G2 and G1 were occupied; leaving no 'normal' exits available. The A320 could have been instructed to turn left onto Taxiway Hotel; away from the terminal area. I advised the Local Controller that I thought he should send an MD80 around. The MD80 executed a go-around on his own. The FLM was notified. In the process of reviewing the QAR; the Quality Assurance office determined that the MD80 had passed the landing threshold; without being sent around; while the A320 was still on the runway; resulting in an Operator Error. Recommendation: turn the A320 left onto the open taxi; MAKE SURE the Local Controller heard my recommendation to send the MD80 around; cross the previous 'arrived' aircraft sooner; allowing the exits to be available.			Tower Controller described a go around event when two taxiway exits were blocked and the Local Controller elected not to use a turn off opposite the terminal.
1330846	201601	1801-2400	ZZZ.ARTCC	US			33000.0	VMC			Night			Air Carrier	MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Cruise		Class A ZZZ									Engine	X	Failed											Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	First Officer; Pilot Not Flying	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)					1330846										Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical			Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition	Aircraft	Aircraft	We were at cruise flight at FL330. Approx. 30 minutes into cruise flight; in smooth air; we experienced a relatively intense shudder in the aircraft. During this shudder; an audible bang could be heard; although it wasn't very loud in the cockpit. The captain and I both immediately noticed that the N1 and N2 indications for the #2 engine were both rolling back; and the EGT was immediately maxed out. We both agreed that we had lost the right engine; and with the shudder; bang; and high EGT; we suspected engine damage. We [notified ATC] and started a descent. The flight attendants immediately started chiming; and I asked them to standby; as we were trying to deal with the situation.After we started the descent; I began going through the QRH. Upon completion of the checklist; I contacted dispatch and informed them that we were diverting which had already been coordinated with ATC. Our dispatcher was very helpful. He did a great job coordinating with and our station operations. He also gave us the weather.After returning from speaking with dispatch I called back to the flight attendants. It had probably been ten minutes at this point since I had asked them to standby and I commended them for their professionalism. They had obviously been calling up to tell us about the odd engine noise and vibration they heard and after they were asked to standby; they immediately went into action preparing the cabin for landing. By the time I called back to them they were already seated and ready to land.I informed them that we had an engine failure; were diverting and would be on the ground in 15 minutes; and that we didn't anticipate needing to evacuate. Next I briefed the passengers; and informed them that we had an issue with one of our engines; and gave them the same info regarding the landing airport and time remaining. We completed the single engine approach to landing checklist; and the single engine landing checklist.The Captain made a beautiful landing; and the rollout and taxi to the gate were uneventful. Emergency services were standing by on the ramp when we landed and they followed us to our parking spot. I want to compliment Captain on the job he did handling this emergency. He was calm and composed throughout; and did a great job getting the plane safely on the ground.As a line pilot; I don't want to assume that I know our maintenance practices; however; it seems that we push the engines on our fleet past the point that they should be run. Our operations program allows us to operate engines at a higher temperature simply because they can't operate under normal takeoff power settings without exceeding temperature limitations. This seems to be causing our engines to fail more often.			Flight crew experienced an engine failure during cruise. They diverted to a nearby suitable field followed by a normal landing.
1420737	201701	1201-1800	PRC.Tower	AZ			6000.0	VMC			Daylight		Tower PRC		Small Transport	1.0	Part 91	None	Training		Initial Approach	Visual Approach	Class D PRC												Tower PRC	FBO	Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear	1.0	Part 91	None	Training	Initial Approach	Visual Approach	Class D PRC	Facility PRC.Tower		Government	Local	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified	Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6		Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown	Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew	1420737										ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC	Vertical 200		Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented	Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Airport	Human Factors	I was working the Local 1 position; training in progress. The traffic pattern was getting unwieldy; so I took over and started to clean up the sequence. Aircraft X was number 1 on 3 mile final Runway 3R. Three aircraft were on the downwind; extended to follow Aircraft X. I saw what I thought was Aircraft Y cut out Aircraft X; but realized it was Aircraft X appearing to be on right base Runway 3R; inside the downwind. I re-cleared Aircraft X; and that was when Aircraft Z advised NMAC with Aircraft X.The pilot of Aircraft X should have advised me what he was doing; especially if it was safety related (birds; for instance). I could have at the very least called traffic.			PRC Local Controller observed an aircraft that had been established on final maneuvered on its own to a base leg position on a conflicting course with downwind traffic.
1415992	201701	1201-1800	ELP.Airport	TX			5500.0	VMC			Daylight		TRACON ELP	Air Carrier	B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Final Approach	Visual Approach	Class C ELP																						Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	First Officer; Pilot Not Flying	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Type 1420		Communication Breakdown; Confusion	Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew	1415992										ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance			Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification	Human Factors; Procedure	Procedure	We were cleared for Visual Approach to Runway 22 at ELP. The ILS to Runway 22 was NOTAM'd out of service. High on final; PF began a left S-turn. BIF (Biggs AAF) prevented turns to the right. ELP Tower indicated that left S-turn was approved; and MAY have used the word 'east' during the garbled transmission. Tower transmitted; at least once; possibly twice; to other company call sign (not our callsign) to climb to 7000 with no response. To clarify the previous call; the PM transmitted 'call sign'. Tower transmitted to (Other Company call sign) to climb 7000 followed by something garbled. Unsure that our landing permission was still valid; the PM asked to 'Verify (call sign) is still cleared to land on 22'. Tower responded: '(call sign) climb to 7000.' No standard phraseology was used to indicate that our landing clearance was cancelled; to go around or to perform a missed approach.PF initiated go-around at approximately 5000 MSL/1500 AGL. Runway heading pointed directly towards the Mexican border and Ciudad Juarez. A turn to the left was not prudent due to traffic on approach to other runway at ELP. A turn to the right was not prudent due to the 7900 terrain west of ELP and BIF. During the entire event; no TA or RA warning was received. PM repeatedly requested a turn and was again cleared to climb to 7000 and to contact Departure; with no frequency given. PM requested frequency and never received a Tower response. Now; heads down in the cockpit during the Missed Approach procedure; the PM located the Approach frequency on the ILS 22 page; which happened to be the standby frequency on the COMM 1 Radio. (Usually this frequency would have already been replaced with the Ground frequency; but due to task saturation; this had not yet occurred.) El Paso Departure directed a climb to 9000; then a right turn to heading 350. An uneventful downwind; vectors to the Visual Approach and landing on Runway 22 followed.Clear communications are paramount. When in doubt; verify any ambiguous directions. My initial concern was the border that we were approaching. Many with military backgrounds are extra cautious when it comes to international borders; especially as some are more critical than others. Neither the Captain nor ATC seemed to share my concerns; as border crossings are common in this area; where El Paso Approach handles traffic into airports on both sides of the border.			B737 First Officer reported very confusing ATC communications while on a visual approach to ELP Runway 22.
1351148	201604	1201-1800	CLT.Airport	NC		30.0		VMC			Daylight		Tower CLT	Air Carrier	Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Landing	Visual Approach	Class B CLT												Ground CLT	Military	Hercules (C-130)/L100/382	2.0	Part 91	IFR		Taxi			Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	Captain; Pilot Not Flying	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)					1351148										Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach			Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach	Environment - Non Weather Related	Environment - Non Weather Related	While on a visual approach to RWY 23 backed up with the ILS in VMC conditions; we were advised we were following a C130 by approximately 5 NM. The approach was stable through minimums. Below 1100 MSL; which is DH for the ILS; we received GPWS warnings about the GS. This is normal as one of the notes on the ILS chart indicate the GS is unusable below 1100 MSL. We entered the low energy regime with intentions to land. As the flare was initiated; we caught either a gust of wind or the wake from the preceding C130; causing us to balloon up approximately 50 ft above the runway with rapidly decreasing airspeed. The FO/PF called for and executed a go around. He set max thrust and I ensured max thrust was set because of our height above the runway; decreasing airspeed; and low kinetic energy. As the airplane started to accelerate; we momentarily had an engine overspeed message. I responded by reducing the thrust setting. Following ATC instructions; we climbed to 4000 on a heading. We were offered our choice of runway. I chose 18R due to our close proximity to that runway and that we would be facing a fuel situation if we did not land soon. We briefed; set up for; and ran the required checklists. As we aligned with the runway; I saw the FO was deviating from the GS. I decided to take the controls at this point. The second approach was stabilized with a normal landing.When we arrived at the gate; I called maintenance to advise them of the engine overspeed and an ITT exceedance during what I said was a go around. Shortly after getting off the phone; I started this ASAP and in describing the event; came to realize it was a balked landing; not a go around.			CRJ-200 Captain reported executing a low altitude go-around at CLT when the flight ballooned as a result of either a gust of wind or a wake turbulence encounter.
1188308	201407	0001-0600	LLBG.Airport	FO		0.0		VMC			Daylight		Tower LLBG	Air Carrier	Commercial Fixed Wing	2.0	Part 121	IFR			Taxi																								Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	Check Pilot; Captain	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)			Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion	Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC	1188308										Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway			Person Air Traffic Control	Taxi	Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action	Chart Or Publication; Human Factors	Human Factors	While taxiing in LLBG we were issued the following taxi clearance; taxi to Runway 08 via Kilo hold short of Foxtrot. The taxi chart did not appear to accurately reflect the physical layout of the post runway construction near the takeoff end of Runway 30; so we asked for verification that Taxiway F had a sign to identify it after we proceeded west bound on Taxiway K. Ground confirmed that a sign marked F. We saw the sign and stopped to hold short of Taxiway F on K. After stopping Ground Control directed us to hold our position; followed almost immediately with directions to move up to the hold short line. LLBG was landing Runway 21 and we could see an aircraft on final and the Runway 21 hold short line. Both I and the other crewmember interpreted the new clearance as to move forward to the runway hold short line short of Runway 21. After moving forward approximately 60-100 FT; Ground again told us to hold position; followed by a statement that we had passed the Taxiway F hold short line by 60 meters. The next taxi clearance was to continue on Taxiway K hold short of K4. K4 is not depicted on the chart; but did have a sign at the airport clearly marking its position. We were conducting single engine taxi and the beginning of the taxi instruction with respect to holding short Taxiway F coincided with the beginning of starting the right engine and moving toward the runway hold short line. At no time was there conflict with landing or taxiing aircraft. There was absolutely a difference in expectation between what the Controller expected base and his instructions and what we interpreted as being directed with respect to where to stop the aircraft in the vicinity of Taxiway F while taxiing of K. Ground charts that completely and accurately label and depict taxiway and runway layout. Better clarity/standardization in controller to pilot communications and vice versa. I will be back in LLBG soon and hope to see the exact area where the difference in expectation occurred and possibly even get the same taxi clearance. I did not have the benefit of being able to look behind the aircraft after the conflict was verbalized by Ground Control. If that occurs I will be in a better position to answer this question.			A crew taxiing on LLBG Taxiway K from Apron J could not identify several holding points and crossing taxiways resulting in a runway incursion. The Captain stated the commercial airport chart and pilot to controller communications were contributing factors.
1666922	201907	1801-2400	ZZZ.Airport	US				VMC			Daylight		Tower ZZZ	Air Carrier	EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Landing		Class B ZZZ																						Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	Captain; Pilot Not Flying	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine			Communication Breakdown	Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew	1666922										Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach			Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Flight Crew Landed As Precaution	Company Policy; Procedure	Company Policy	We were on the visual to Runway XX in VMC conditions in ZZZ and given a base turn with speed at our discretion. They asked us if we had the airport in sight; which we did; so they cleared us for the visual approach. At this point; we were high; and Tower asked us if we were going to 'make it' down. I said 'yes' and we began to descend; albeit very slowly. I advised my First Officer; the Flying Pilot; to click off the autopilot and hand-fly. We got configured for flaps full and ran the before landing checklist. When we turned final; perhaps around 500 feet AGL; we were still high and got pushed slightly off the centerline by the wind. Then we got a 'HIGH SPEED' aural warning (approximately four or five aural warnings before we were out of the red); reaching 171 knots; which is 6 knots faster than the limitation. While descending; we also got two 'SINK RATES'; one around 40-50' and the other around 30'. The runway was assured; and we touched down in the touchdown zone; clearing Runway XX at Taxiway A. In retrospect; I should have called for a go around after we turned final; realizing that we were still too high and not stable. As the Pilot Monitoring; it is my duty to alert the Pilot Flying of a situation where I think that a missed approach should be executed. As a Captain; I need to be more proactive in calling for a go around even if it is in an airport with such heavily prohibited areas.			EMB175 Captain reported failure to follow procedure for an unstabilized approach.
1853503	202111	0601-1200	CEW.Airport	FL		0.0		VMC	10		Daylight		CTAF CEW		Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear	1.0	Part 91	None	Utility / Infrastructure		Taxi														CTAF CEW		Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear	1.0				Landing			Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Contracted Service	Single Pilot	Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 205		Communication Breakdown	Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew	1853503										Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe			Person Ground Personnel	Taxi	Flight Crew Took Evasive Action	Human Factors	Human Factors	I had just finished my run-up at CEW (Bob Sikes Airport) and was holding short of Runway 35 for departure. Winds were reported out of the north at 5 kts. on the ASOS. Upon reaching the hold short; winds heavily favored Runway 35 (7-10 kts. on windsock out of the north). From my position; I had a clear view of both base and final for [Runway] 35; as well as the left downwind/base and final for [Runway] 17. I scanned the pattern and observed no traffic; I also had not heard any calls over the CTAF since engine start (roughly 6-7 minutes prior). I made my CTAF call announcing I would be taking Runway 35 for departure. Before I started moving; an FBO vehicle made a call announcing that there was an aircraft landing on Runway 17. Soon after; I had a visual on a [light aircraft] in his flare that was previously obscured from the glare of the sun. I never crossed the hold short line; and I thanked the vehicle over frequency; who stated that the traffic had not been making any radio calls. After the aircraft vacated the runway; I made an uneventful departure to the north. Although there was no immediate danger; it was a little too close for comfort. Personally; I have had no experience at an uncontrolled field with an aircraft not making any CTAF calls. I understand that it was within their right to do so; but I believe in this case it made an unsafe condition possible. The pilot must have not have picked up the ASOS; because he landed with a 7-10 kt. tailwind; I believe this added to the confusion. Luckily; the pilot didn't even use half of the 8;000 ft. runway; so if I had continued to line up on the runway; I would have easily been able to see him. To some degree; I fell victim to an expectancy bias. I will definitely take this as an important lesson moving forward.			Light aircraft pilot reported he was about to take the runway at CEW; a non-towered airport; when a ground observer alerted him to traffic landing opposite direction who was not communicating on CTAF frequency.
1825746	202107	0601-1200	SHD.Airport	VA		0.0		VMC			Daylight		CTAF SHD		Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer	2.0					Takeoff / Launch																Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer					Final Approach			Aircraft X	Flight Deck		Captain; Pilot Not Flying	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)			Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown	Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew	1825746										ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy			Person Flight Crew		General None Reported / Taken	Airport; Human Factors	Human Factors	On taxi-out to Runway 5 we made a radio call stating aircraft type and runway of intended departure. Upon reaching the hold short line we contacted Air Traffic Control for IFR clearance; and waited for release time for takeoff. Hold short line faces approach end of Runway 5; but does not allow pilot to view departure end of runway for on-coming traffic. After copying clearance we switched back to CTAF frequency and continued to monitor the frequency. Upon moving the aircraft we announced taking Runway 5 for takeoff and intended direction of departure. As we took the runway and started takeoff roll we encountered an aircraft on short final for Runway 23. This aircraft had not made any traffic calls and was difficult to see on the hazy background of the sky. Aircraft executed a missed approach and re-entered the pattern for Runway 5. I failed to make an abort decision at the appropriate time and continued with the takeoff and departure. Jeopardizing safety in the process.The cause was inadequate communication used by both aircraft; white aircraft on similar background and poor illumination of landing aircraft to be seen. Inadequate decision making by Captain of departing aircraft and failure to abort the departure. Ways to avoid this would be for all participating aircraft to be communicating effectively and for all aircraft to monitor the frequency and flow of traffic. Other avoidance measure would be to have an ATC facility present at the airport and better positioning of the hold short line for both sides of the runway to be seen.			Pilot reported NMAC during takeoff from a nontowered airport.
1050008	201211	1201-1800	BUR.Airport	CA			5000.0	Mixed			Daylight	5100	TRACON SCT	Air Carrier	B737-700	2.0	Part 121	IFR		Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 8	Descent	Vectors; STAR LYNXX8															Aerobatic	1.0		VFR					Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	First Officer; Pilot Not Flying		Flight Crew Last 90 Days 218				1050008	Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Air Carrier	Pilot Flying; Captain		Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116			1050016.0	Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude	Horizontal 500; Vertical 200		Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action	Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather	Ambiguous	While on approach to BUR; I was the Pilot Monitoring. We were issued a heading and a decent from 6;000 feet to 5;000 feet. ATC advised traffic at one o'clock and five miles. We advised traffic was not in sight due to being in and out of IMC. ATC issued another vector and advised traffic appeared to be descending and at one mile. As we broke out of the clouds; the traffic was in front of us (moving right to left) in a rapid descending left turn. Immediately the TCAS called Traffic and Descend. The Captain kicked off the autopilot and pitched down and turned hard right to avoid the traffic. We estimate that we came within 200 feet vertical and 500 feet horizontal from the other aircraft. We leveled off at 4;000 feet and 10-20 degrees from our assigned heading. I advised ATC that we maneuvered in response to an RA and remained at 4000 feet. We continued and landed in BUR with no further issues. Hard to say what could have prevented this incident. The other aircraft was not talking to ATC and made several rapid maneuvers; apparently to avoid clouds. The TCAS system worked. We responded in a timely manner to avoid a collision.		Our aircraft was on a 170 degree heading at 5;000 feet MSL. We were IMC and on a vector off of the LYNXX 8 STAR into BUR. We had previously received a TCAS TA from traffic that had leveled off at 6;000 feet MSL. Our heading had placed us over terrain that peaked at 3;800 feet MSL (Oat Mountain); which was about 13 NM NW of BUR. Simultaneously; SoCal issued a Traffic Alert for that same traffic; we entered VMC conditions and spotted the traffic (appeared to be a Stearman); a TCAS RA 'Descend; Descend;' which was followed immediately by an 'Increase Descent.' I disengaged the autopilot and autothrust and began a descent; but immediately increased descent rate with the 'Increase Descent' call from the TCAS. The non-communicating traffic appeared to be 'scud running' by starting a sharp descending turn in front of us and heading southeast. I descended to 4;000 feet MSL with an avoidance turn to a heading of 190. In the commotion; my First Officer and I never heard the 'Clear of Conflict' call; but the display was clear. We advised SoCal of the deviation and our heading/altitude. The Controller cleared us to maintain 4;000 feet MSL with a vector to intercept the ILS to Runway 8. The Controller advised us that the traffic was inbound to VNY and was going to get a talking to by the Tower. We continued the approach and landing without further incident.	B737 flight crew reports taking evasive action for a TCAS RA during descent into BUR. Clouds obscured visual contact with the other aircraft until the first TCAS resolution had been enunciated.
1457717	201706								Turbulence		Daylight			Air Carrier	A321	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger	GPS; FMS Or FMC	Cruise										4.0	Cabin Crew Seat	X												Aircraft X	Cabin Jumpseat	Air Carrier	Flight Attendant (On Duty)	Flight Attendant Current	Flight Attendant Airline Total 36; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 4; Flight Attendant Total 36; Flight Attendant Type 1	Service	Confusion; Other / Unknown		1457717										Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence			Person Flight Attendant	In-flight		Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Weather	Company Policy	My first time working on the Airbus 321 at [Company]. There are typically 3 flight attendants working the main cabin. We hit turbulence and had to immediately strap in and guess what? There are only 2 single jumpseats with seatbelts and harnesses in the rear of the aircraft. The 3rd flight attendant is out of luck. They can't get to 3L because we are trying not to kiss the ceiling. This situation MUST BE IMMMEDIATELY addressed. There needs to be double jumpseats with 4 seatbelts and harnesses available for working crew to keep them safe. All [Company] Airbus aircraft need to be retrofitted with these.			Flight Attendant reported airline's A321s are inadequately configured with jumpseats; seatbelts; and shoulder harnesses to provide safety for three flight attendants working in the aft of the aircraft during turbulence.
1827956	202108	0001-0600	ZZZ.Airport	US		0.0		VMC		Poor Lighting	Night			Corporate	MBB-BK 117 All Series		Part 91							N	N	N	N					Main Rotor Blade	X	Improperly Operated											Hangar / Base		Corporate	Technician	Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant			Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload	Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other	1827956										Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance		N	Person Maintenance	Routine Inspection	General Maintenance Action	Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure	Human Factors	During the track and balance of A/C S/N XXXX; there were issues getting the blades to fly together; blade swapping took place as well as blade replacements. I was doing the paperwork portion and trusted that the information given to me was correct. When I was told which S/N's were swapped and which were replaced. Logbook entries were made and signed off reflecting those actions. Fast forward a few weeks I was sent an RO (Repair Order) to get unserviceable blades sent out for repair. I printed out the RO's placed them in the blade boxes and got the blades sent out. Nowhere in this process did I physically check the S/N's of the blades. I trusted the mechanics to give me the correct information which was a huge mistake and I should have physically verified the P/N's and S/N's as outlined in our procedures. This is the end of my statement.Do not rely on others to verify P/N's S/N's. Physically Verify P/N's and S/N's. Double-check other mechanic work to ensure completeness and that what was said was done was actually done. Follow published guidance; policies; and procedures.			Technician reported not verifying part numbers and serial numbers prior to shipping main rotor blades out for repair.
1345134	201604	0601-1200	CLT.Airport	NC			8000.0	VMC	20		Dawn		TRACON CLT	Corporate	Falcon 900	2.0	Part 91	IFR	Passenger		Climb	SID KRITR1	Class B CLT																						Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Corporate	Captain	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 9700; Flight Crew Type 1047		Situational Awareness		1345134										Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy			Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification	Chart Or Publication; Procedure	Procedure	The Jeppesen KRITR 1 RNAV SID at KCLT has a 'Speed Restriction' box. The speed restriction box states 'Upon reaching 10;000 feet accelerate to and MAINTAIN 280 KIAS; if unable advise ATC.' It then in the same box states next 'CHARLOTTE/DOUGLAS INTL only; Accelerate to 250 KIAS; if unable; advise ATC.' This is confusing. Prior to reaching 10;000 feet we asked Charlotte Departure what airspeed they were expecting us to maintain above 10;000 feet to clarify. The Air Traffic Controller stated '280 knots' we maintained the correct speed of 280 KIAS. Problem solved for us; but this ambiguous statement could cause someone else to make an error.			Falcon 900 Captain reported some confusion of airspeed requirements on the KRITR1 RNAV SID and the statement 'Upon reaching 10;000 ft.' and 'Prior to reaching 10;000 ft.'
1045727	201210	1201-1800	MRI.Airport	AK			500.0	VMC	100		Daylight	40000	Tower MRI	Government	Small Aircraft	1.0	Part 91	None	Training		Final Approach	Direct; Vectors; Visual Approach	Class D MRI												Tower MRI		Small Aircraft	1.0	Part 91					Class D MRI	Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Government	Captain; Instructor	Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 800				1045727										Conflict NMAC	Horizontal 250; Vertical 0		Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Flight Crew Took Evasive Action	Human Factors	Human Factors	Approaching Merrill Field from the northeast from the highway; we were instructed to enter the left downwind for Runway 7 and report Clark Middle School. Upon reporting we were at traffic pattern altitude of 900 FT. Tower instructed us to extend left downwind because of landing traffic at 1;800 FT. We had traffic in sight and turned left base over the downtown shoreline. We took a wide base turn because my student was flying. We were then set up for a long final approach. Landing traffic was clear the runway and we were cleared to land on Runway 7. Upon flying over the Sheraton Hotel (a notable landmark for its location to the traffic patterns of Merrill Field) we were approximately 500 FT MSL when my student called out traffic abeam to our right at our altitude. I saw the pilot of the other plane and it was close; maybe 200 FT by my perception. We immediately dove to the left. The [other aircraft] immediately banked away and to the right.Upon landing; I called the Merrill Field Tower to complain. They indicated that we were not at fault at all. The other aircraft did not listen to three instructions to follow behind us. Apparently the [other aircraft] claimed they were mistakenly following a military aircraft at Elmendorf AFB; which I think is a complete bunch of BS. I told the Tower Controller I wanted to pursue this with the FAA because I was not pleased at the other pilot's lack of situational awareness; attention on the radio; and overall flying abilities that I have never had anything like this happen before.The Tower Manager called me back; after having pulled the radar and radio tapes. He told me that the other aircraft did not listen to instruction; and that it was 1/20th of a mile (250 FT) from us on a T-Bone 90 degree intercept. I cannot believe how close this was. Assuming that plane was flying 70 KTS; we had 2 seconds before impact. I can't believe that pilot's poor attention to let something like this happen.			Small aircraft instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another small aircraft in the pattern at MRI.
993763	201202	1201-1800	ZMA.ARTCC	FL			3000.0				Daylight		Center ZMA		Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer			IFR			Initial Approach		Class E ZMA																						Facility ZMA.ARTCC		Government	Enroute	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified			Other / Unknown		993763										ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown			Person Air Traffic Control		General None Reported / Taken	Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings	Procedure	Once again the VRB RADAR was taken down for preventative maintenance in the middle of the day when it is needed most. We were very busy at sector three with numerous aircraft wanting to do practice instrument approaches. We had an aircraft that came from F11 wanting to do a practice approach at VRB and then return northward to SGJ. At some point we lost this aircraft on RADAR due to the RADAR outage. I was too busy to look closely; but it is quite possible that we had numerous non-RADAR deals with this aircraft as we had numerous aircraft on vectors at his altitude. There is no reason; other than the agency being to cheap; that this maintenance cannot be done on midnight shifts when there is no demand. Every time they take the RADAR during daylight hours it causes a severe degradation in safety and efficiency. That they continue to perform these operations during times of peak demand just shows that all the agencies talk of concern for safety is just that; talk. The VRB and MLB RADAR should never be taken offline for preventive maintenance during daylight hours.			VRB RADAR was taken down for maintenance during a busy traffic period. A ZMA Controller suggests; as a safety issue; this type of elective maintenance should be completed during late night operations.
1783079	202101		ZZZ.Airport	US										Air Carrier	Commercial Fixed Wing	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Parked; Taxi																								Gate / Ramp / Line		Air Carrier	Ramp						1783079										Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy			Person Ground Personnel	Taxi	General None Reported / Taken	Human Factors	Human Factors	Flight departed the gate showing dangerous goods unsecured. The ramp lead tried to final multiple times without the required 15 bags and this is the alert that populated in my [Software] bar.[Error Message] The flight was already showing off the gate and had been off the gate for some time before the ramp attempted to final and they attempted to final the flight 4 times without the required bags. The lead realizing the issue then went into [Load Planning Software] and manually changed the bag count which of course allowed them to final the flight.			Air Carrier Ramp personnel reported Hazmat Dangerous Goods transported without required Hazmat cargo configuration.
1591985	201810											CLR		Air Carrier	A330	2.0	Part 121		Passenger		Climb									Low	10.0														Aircraft X	Cabin Jumpseat	Air Carrier	Flight Attendant (On Duty)	Flight Attendant Current	Flight Attendant Airline Total 35; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 7; Flight Attendant Total 35; Flight Attendant Type 100				1591985										Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor		Y	Person Flight Attendant	In-flight	General Physical Injury / Incapacitation	Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related	Ambiguous	Strong burning dust odor/fumes upon climb out; near level off. Unknown passenger injury; most cabin crew had reaction to fumes. Coughing; bloody sinus discharge; headaches; dizzy; burning eyes. This event did not seem to affect me physically.			A330 Flight Attendant reported most of the cabin crew and an unknown number of passengers experienced physical effects from fumes in the cabin during climb.
1241805	201502	1201-1800	ZZZ.Airport	US		0.0					Daylight			Air Carrier	B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model		Part 121				Parked							Scheduled Maintenance	Inspection			Oxygen System/Crew	X	Improperly Operated											Hangar / Base		Air Carrier	Technician	Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant			Communication Breakdown	Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Maintenance	1241805										Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy		N	Person Maintenance	Routine Inspection	General Maintenance Action	Human Factors; Procedure	Human Factors	Upon receiving three B787 oxygen bottles. I; Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) in ZZZ inspected these bottles before putting them in service. This is normal practice in ZZZ. It was at this time I noticed one bottle was low; one was empty and the other was at 2000 psi (normal). My investigation revealed that all three bottles had damaged (bent) Gauges. ALL three is alarming to me. I have attached photos of all three bottles along with the Non-Rotable Parts tags. There needs to be an investigation to determine where the damage is occurring. And we need to check all B787s to determine if they are flying around with damaged bottles. Flight Deck Crew. Component.	Reporter stated flight crews have two oxygen bottles located in the Main Equipment Center (MEC) under the cockpit floor. Bottles are made of composite materials with a valve head on the bottle that is different from earlier composite bottles. Mechanics must shut off both bottles when servicing either bottle to prevent loss of oxygen from bottle not being serviced. Bottles have to be removed for oxygen servicing; requiring a two-person effort. No scratches or dents are allowed on any bottle.Reporter stated his air carrier went to an all metal box for transporting their oxygen bottles because they are shipped pressurized on aircraft with 2;000 pounds of pressure. The containers are designed to handle heat and bottle pressures. They recently identified the cause of the damaged oxygen gauges on the bottles to be from the plastic shipping containers that had previously been used to ship oxygen bottles by ground; but are still used for storing them. The B787 composite bottles were not secured in the plastic containers and would slide around inside. Damage to the bottle valve head and gauge was more likely to occur when the plastic box was stood up on one end. His air carrier has already accomplished a Fleet Campaign and found one bottle installed with the bent pressure gauge. Almost all of the bent; damaged bottle gauges were found to be leaking oxygen.		An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports finding three Crew Oxygen bottles with damaged (bent) pressure gauges during a Receiving Inspection procedure prior to putting the bottles in service. Concerns also raised as to where the damage had been occurring and whether other aircraft may be flying around with damaged bottles.
1424776	201702	1201-1800				700.0					Daylight			Personal	Stagger Wing 17	1.0	Part 91		Personal													Carburetor	Z												Aircraft X	Flight Deck	Personal	Pilot Flying; Single Pilot	Flight Crew Private	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 2593; Flight Crew Type 18		Troubleshooting		1424776										Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence		N	Person Flight Crew	In-flight	Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated	Weather; Aircraft	Aircraft	I was flying about 700 feet AGL; when the engine sputtered and quit (I believe it was caused by carburetor icing.) I pushed the throttle ahead full; pulled carb heat and pumped the hand pump with no results so I ended up landed in the only safe place to land that would also cause the least damage to the aircraft. I landed gear up on the snow in a swamp instead of the woods.			A Beechcraft Staggerwing pilot reported losing engine power around 700 feet and landing straight ahead with his gear up.
1507525	201712	1801-2400	ZLC.ARTCC	UT			11000.0						Center ZLC	Personal	Caravan 208B	1.0	Part 91	IFR	Personal		Cruise	Direct	Class E ZLC																						Facility ZLC.ARTCC		Government	Enroute	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified	Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6		Confusion; Situational Awareness		1507525										ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy			Person Air Traffic Control	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance	Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Airspace Structure	Manuals	A Cessna Caravan; not in radar coverage; was [getting] handed off to me from a Center Sector 10 [at] 11;000 feet direct to the KSGU airport on a random route. I attempted to contact the Center sector about the aircraft as they were going through several areas of high terrain and many active military use airspaces. There wasn't an answer. Eventually they contacted me. I told them I could not take the aircraft because he was non-RADAR on a random direct route where no points on his path were displayable on my scope.The controller became agitated and asked me how he could fix it. I didn't have an answer; at that point; the rule had already been broken and I wasn't sure how he could fix it. He then got even angrier that he didn't know that he should have read the FAAH 7110.65 before he started controlling traffic; instead of asking me to explain it to him over a shout line while I was busy. I finally got the aircraft; not in radar contact; and I knew the transferring sector wasn't going to fix it; so the safest course of action was to give the aircraft to me. I made sure the aircraft was level above the highest terrain in the area and cleared him direct to a VOR within NAVAID use limitations.			ZLC ARTCC Controller reported they were handed off an aircraft below their radar coverage on a random direct route instead of an approved non radar route.
1256321	201504	1201-1800	ZAU.ARTCC	IL							Daylight		Center ZAU	Air Carrier	Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng	2.0	Part 121	IFR	Passenger		Cruise		Class A ZAU																						Facility ZAU.ARTCC		Government	Enroute; Supervisor / CIC	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified	Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.75		Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion	Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC	1256321	Facility ZAU.ARTCC		Government	Enroute; Supervisor / CIC	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified	Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.75	Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown	Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC	1256325.0	ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy			Person Air Traffic Control	In-flight	Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic	Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure	Procedure	The WIANG A/B/C military airspace went active on the radar scopes in the Northeast Area 15 minutes earlier than scheduled. I had the Squib radar controller ask me if the airspace was active because his GI (general information) said that it wasn't to go active until XX00Z. I quickly checked the SAMS website and it said that it began at XX00Z.I then attempted to contact the military position in the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) to find out what was going on. They did not answer the phone due to being overwhelmed with multiple positions combined in TMU due to lack of staffing in the TMU. As I was about to walk up to TMU to ask them about the status of the airspace; the airspace turned off the radar scopes. Then TMU called me (the Northeast Area FLM) and the North Area Front Line Manager (FLM) on the VSCS. They explained that the WIANGs were turned on by accident; that the WIANGs were not going to go active until XX00Z; and that the VOK airspace was active early at XX00 minus 15 minutes Z (which was already coordinated with the North Area and does not impact the Northeast Area).A few minutes later; TMU called and said that the WIANGs airspace actually did go active at XX00 minus 15 minutes Z and to protect for it.I believe that the coordination between Chicago ARTCC's TMU and Minneapolis ARTCC's TMU is breaking down. I also believe that the lack of staffing and fatigue in Chicago ARTCC's TMU is playing a major role in this and yesterday's situation. I do not know what training was transpiring in TMU over the past two days.This is the second day in a row where the WIANG airspace was not executed/coordinated correctly. Get more staffing in Chicago ARTCC's TMU (TMCs and STMCs)! Hire more FLM staffing in Chicago ARTCC!Have Chicago ARTCC's TMU; Minneapolis ARTCC's TMU; and the military re-evaluate the process for activating the WIANGs airspace. However it might not be a problem with the procedure; but proper staffing and training.		I (the Front Line Manager (FLM) of the Northeast Area) received a call about 3 or 4 minutes prior to the WIANG A/B/C military airspace going active from FL180 through FL240 (normal stratum) from ZAU's Traffic Management's military line. They were asking if we could extend the WIANGs airspace up to FL290. I told them that I would have to check with the controllers that it affected and to see if there was any aircraft in or about to overfly the WIANGs (240B290). TMU told me to notify the North Area once I had an answer and that they would follow through with the coordination. When I asked all the controllers; they were fine with it and there was no traffic (at that time).I walked down to the North Area (which is the next aisle down) and told the FLM that we were good with it. This FLM was not a FLM from another area; had little to no familiarity with the North Area; and was placed in the North Area to have FLM coverageMinutes later I had the trainer from the Pullman sector (#25) walk up to me at the Northeast Area desk asking about what was going on with the WIANGs. I asked him what he meant. He told me that there was two Aircraft X types about to fly through at FL250. I walked over to the Pullman (#25) and Fremont (#24) sectors and told them that the airspace was released FL180 through FL290. The trainee at the Fremont sector told me that they were just told from the North Area controller that the planes could go through at FL250. They said that a tanker only wanted FL270 through FL290 and that planes could go through at FL250 and FL260.However; we released 180B290 and that is what Minneapolis Center and the military coordinator believes was active. I ran down to the North Area and barked at them that they needed to turn the aircraft out and re-explained the situation. I then got into an argument with the controller (radar and radar associate position combined) and two other controllers. He kept saying that it was okay that the tanker was 270B290 and the remainder of the WIANGs were 180B240. I asked him how the fighters were going to get to the tanker (because VOLK Air Force Base and ZMP were the only ones controlling the airspace and talking to the fighters and tanker).The North Area FLM then re-instructed them to get those planes away from there and he said that he needed a D-side immediately. The training team at the adjacent sector ceased training on their D-Side and the trainer slid over and jumped on the D-side to help.The Aircraft X aircraft flew into the WIANG A/B/C airspace at FL250 before being issued turns to exit the airspace.Additionally; the SAMS website was not updated and the ERAM/EDST only displayed 180B240 which added to the confusion. First; the controllers need to understand that they can't arbitrarily alter airspace once it has been given away without going through proper channels. The North Area controllers by-passed management and the traffic management units of both ZMP and ZAU. I think that the North Area needs to receive a briefing; eLMS course; and/or given a presentation explaining the proper procedure for coordinating airspace. It should explain all of the parties involved and possibly a flow chart of how the request and activation process works.A mandate should be issued and followed that a FLM who has never certified on any positions in a specific area should not be put in charge of that area. I believe that the FLM-IC was not familiar with the process for activating the military airspace; the airspace of the area (in general); and the people of that area. The FLM had no respect and received much doubt and second guessing due to him not being from that area. A FLM from that area would have known all of that and would know how to speak to certain people due to their familiarity. The FLM staffing is way below guidelines and has been this way for over a year; which has led to many areas not having enough FLMs to cover their areas throughout the week(i.e. 3 FLMs in multiple areas can't cover all the shifts). Many FLMs are being moved around the facility as 'mystery guests' to different areas and areas that they have no knowledge of. I believe that the entire facility should receive a briefing; an eLMS; and/or a briefing tracker (BT) presentation about ways to recover when an aircraft is about or has already entered military airspace. Methods such as using UHF guard to call in the blind to the military fighters and tanker to warn them about the traffic; using VHF guard to issue headings to the plane to keep them away; having the scheduling office give back airspace temporarily; etc.	A Chicago Center (ZAU) Front line Manager (FLM) reports of confusion concerning a reference to a Special Use Airspace (SUA) and whether it is hot or not and tries to figure it out. Aircraft are in the area and then they are notified that it is hot and has been for about 15 minutes.

End of preview. Expand in Dataset Viewer.

Dataset Card for ASRS Aviation Incident Reports

Dataset Summary

This dataset collects 47,723 aviation incident reports published in the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database maintained by NASA.

Supported Tasks and Leaderboards

'summarization': Dataset can be used to train a model for abstractive and extractive summarization. The model performance is measured by how high the output summary's ROUGE score for a given narrative account of an aviation incident is when compared to the synopsis as written by a NASA expert. Models and scores to follow.

Languages

The BCP-47 code for English as generally spoken in the United States is en-US and the BCP-47 code for English as generally spoken in the United Kingdom is en-GB. It is unknown if other varieties of English are represented in the data.

Dataset Structure

Data Instances

For each instance, there is a string for the narrative account (Report 1_Narrative), a string for the synopsis (Report 1.2_Synopsis), and a string for the document id (acn_num_ACN). Some instances may have two narratives (Report 1_Narrative & Report 2_Narrative) and extended analyses produced by experts (Report 1.1_Callback & Report 2.1_Callback). Other fields contain metadata such as time, location, flight conditions, aircraft model name, etc. associated with the incident. See the ASRS Incident Reports dataset viewer to explore more examples.

{'acn_num_ACN': '1206196',
 'Report 1_Narrative': 'While taxiing company B757 aircraft from gate to Hangar line; we were cleared by Ground Control to proceed via A-T-join runway XX. After receiving subsequent clearance to T1 [then associated taxiways] to the hangar; we caught up to a dark; apparently unpowered company livery RJ (ERJ-145) near the T1 intersection.  The RJ was being towed dark with absolutely no external lighting on; a completely dark aircraft.  This situation only presented itself as we drew close to the aircraft in tow.  The towbarless tractor (supertug) was lit externally; but minimally visible from our vantage point; with a completely dark aircraft between us and the tractor.  Once the towing operation completed a turn onto taxiway T; a single green light came in view which is somehow mounted on supertug; presented a similar appearance to a green wing navigation light common on all aircraft.  To say this presented a confusing situation is an understatement. [Aircraft] operation in Noncompliance with FARs; Policy and Procedures.  This is a situation never before observed in [my] 30 plus years as a taxi mechanic at our location.  There are long established standards in place regarding external light usage and requirements; both in gate areas; as well as movement in active controlled taxiways; most with an eye on safety regarding aircraft position (nav lights) and anti-collision lights signaling running engines and/or aircraft movement.',
 'Report 1.1_Callback': '',
 'Report 2_Narrative': '',
 'Report 2.1_Callback': '',
 'Report 1.2_Synopsis': 'A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) taxiing a company B757 aircraft reports coming up on a dark; unpowered ERJ-145 aircraft with no external lighting on. Light on the towbarless Supertug tractor only minimally visible; with completely dark aircraft between their B757 and Tow tractor. Technician notes long established standards requiring Anti-Collision and Nav lights not enforced during aircraft tow.'}

The average token count for the articles and the highlights are provided below.

Feature	Number of Instances	Mean Token Count
Report 1_Narrative	47,723	281
Report 1.1_Callback	1,435	103
Report 2_Narrative	11,228	169
Report 2.1 Callback	85	110
Report 1.2_Synopsis	47,723	27

Data fields

More data explanation.

Downloads last month: 108

Edit dataset card

Homepage:

huggingface.co

Repository:

ASRS Incident Reports Summarisation code repo

Point of Contact:

Elijah Hoole

Size of downloaded dataset files:

333 MB

Size of the auto-converted Parquet files:

63 MB

Number of rows:

47,723