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Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Eugene A. Hayber, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which affirmed the decision of the defendant, the department of consumer protection, real estate commission, ordering him to pay restitution, in the amount of $16,000 with interest, to third parties, and to pay a civil penalty of $2000. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that his failure to disburse funds that he was holding in escrow was improper absent proof that the parties to the escrow agreement had authorized in writing the disbursal of such funds. The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly concluded that he was not a party to the escrow agreement at issue in this case. We disagree with the plaintiffs claims. Our examination of the record and briefs and our consideration of the arguments of the parties persuades us that the judgment should be affirmed. The issues were resolved properly in the court's complete and well reasoned memorandum of decision. See Hayber v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, Real Estate Commission, 49 Conn. Sup. 192, 866 A.2d 732 (2004). Because that memorandum of decision fully addresses the arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt it as the proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See Smith v. Trinity United Methodist Church of Springfield, Massachusetts, 263 Conn. 135, 136, 819 A.2d 225 (2003). The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion BERDON, J. The defendant, Chiyoko T. Quasius, appeals from the trial court's judgment dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Robert T. Quasius, awarding the plaintiff alimony and dividing the assets of the marriage. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff did not violate the automatic stay provisions of Practice Book § 25-5. We disagree and affirm the judgment. The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking the dissolution of his marriage to the defendant, an equitable division of the marital assets and other relief. After evaluating the evidence and the credibility of the parties, the court found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, divided the marital assets and ordered the payment of alimony by the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant filed this appeal. Pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5, the defendant filed a motion for articulation, in which she asked the trial court to articulate, among other things, whether it concluded that the plaintiff had violated the automatic order provisions of Practice Book § 25-5 by sustaining considerable losses in the stock market. The court explained that the testimony, exhibits, affidavits and especially the credibility of the witnesses supported the orders set forth in its memorandum of decision. Pursuant to Practice Book § 66-7, the defendant timely filed a motion for review by this court of the trial court's articulation. We granted the defendant's motion for review but denied the relief requested. First we set forth our standard of review. "A fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a trial court may exercise broad discretion in awarding alimony and dividing property as long as it considers all relevant statutory criteria." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kunajukr v. Kunajukr, 83 Conn. App. 478, 481, 850 A.2d 227, cert, denied, 271 Conn. 903, 859 A.2d 562 (2004). "An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bijur v. Bijur, 79 Conn. App. 752, 758, 831 A.2d 824 (2003). "This standard of review reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the opportunity to view the parties first hand and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, in which such personal factors such as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties axe so significant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kunajukr v. Kunajukr, supra, 481-82. The court found that "any investments by the plaintiff were a continuation of prior activities of which the defendant was aware and had information readily available. Furthermore, the defendant made no efforts to stop the investments and provided no proof that the losses were caused by anything other than a decline in the market or that similar losses would not have occurred if no trades [had] been made." (Emphasis added.) In response to the defendant's motion for articulation, the court explained that the decision "was based upon all of the testimony, exhibits and sworn financial affidavits presented at trial. The credibility of the witnesses played an important part in the court's decision." On the basis of the facts presented, the court made a reasonable conclusion that the plaintiffs unprofitable stock market trades fell within the "usual course of business" exception to the automatic order. The defendant failed to present any evidence that would have permitted the court to conclude that the plaintiff incurred the losses due to activity expressly stayed by the automatic order. The two financial affidavits submitted by the plaintiff, one dated February 22, 2001, and the other dated September 26, 2002, revealed more than $96,000 in losses in the stock market, but as indicated in the court's memorandum of decision, the defendant did not present any evidence that the losses were the result of anything other than a decline in the market. After considering the record, briefs and arguments of the parties, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the plaintiffs unsuccessful stock market trades did not violate the automatic orders. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Practice Book § 25-5 (a) provides in relevant part: "The following automatic orders shall apply to both parties, with service of the automatic orders to be made with service of process of a complaint for dissolution of marriage . (1) Neither party shall sell, transfer, encumber . . . conceal, assign, remove, or in any way dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or an order of a judicial authority, any property, individually or jointly held by the parties, except in the usual course of business or for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with this action . . . ." Practice Book § 25-5 (a) sets forth the procedure and substance of the automatic order at issue in this case. See footnote 1.

Opinion MIHALAKOS, J. The plaintiff Kyle D. Pitts appeals from the judgment in favor of the defendant, Joao M. DeCosta, that was rendered by the trial court on a verdict that was directed in the defendant's favor. Specifically, Pitts argues that the court improperly denied his request to amend the substitute complaint to add an additional claim based on strict liability pursuant to General Statutes § 29-402 (c) (2). The defendant maintains that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the amendment and suggests three alternate grounds for affirming the judgment, namely, that (1) the proposed amendment was barred by the statute of limitations, (2) the proposed cause of action, founded on § 29-402 (c) (2), is not applicable to the facts of this case and (3) the proposed amendment is barred by General Statutes § 52-592. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. In 1997, the defendant owned a three-family house in Hartford. A three car garage, which was in disrepair and had a sagging roof, was located next to the residence. In April, 1997, the defendant decided to demolish the twenty foot high garage and made an agreement with Robert Lizotte regarding the demolition. The defendant agreed to pay Lizotte $500 to demolish the garage. Lizotte hired Pitts, Kimberly Kelly and three other workmen. On April 9, 1997, the demolition began. The workers first removed the clapboards from the garage. Shortly thereafter, Pitts entered the garage and hit the middle beam with a sledgehammer. Almost immediately, the structure made a groaning noise and the roof of the garage began to collapse. Both Pitts and Lizotte were injured when the garage collapsed on them. Kelly allegedly injured her back using a jack to lift the garage to free Lizotte. The plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against the defendant by a complaint dated April 2, 1999. The complaint alleged that the defendant was hable for common-law negligence. A judgment of nonsuit, however, was entered against Pitts in February, 2000. On February 16, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit identical to the first pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute. A substitute complaint filed on September 11, 2003, removed certain elements of damages, but the action remained essentially the same. On September 15, 2003, before the start of the evidence, the plaintiffs requested a jury instruction on § 29-402 (c) (2). The court refused to charge on this statute, stating that it was too late to interject the statutory claim into the proceeding. On September 16,2003, evidence in the jury trial began. The plaintiffs rested their case on September 17, 2003, and the defendant proceeded with his case after moving for a directed verdict. The defendant rested his case that same day. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was argued on September 18, 2003. At the hearing, Pitts requested permission to amend the substitute complaint and filed the proposed amendment. The court denied his request to amend and granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because there was no evidence of causation or specific defect in the building of which the defendant had any knowledge. On September 24, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the directed verdict, which the court denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. Pitts contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his request to amend the substitute complaint to add a statutory cause of action. He asserts that the amendment would not have prejudiced the defendant, nor would it have delayed the trial or misled the parties. Instead, Pitts suggests that permitting the amendment would have enforced Connecticut public policy of imposing liability on owners who fail to hire registered demolition contractors. He also contends that the proposed amendment did not constitute a new cause of action. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court. "The law is well-settled that belated amendments to the pleadings rest in the sound discretion of the trial court." Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 216, 455 A.2d 857 (1983). "While our courts have been liberal in permitting amendments . . . this liberality has limitations. Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to be considered in passing on a motion to amend are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the amendment. . . . The motion to amend is addressed to the trial court's discretion which may be exercised to restrain the amendment of pleadings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay of the trial." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beckman v. Jalich Homes, Inc., 190 Conn. 299, 302-303, 460 A.2d 488 (1983). "On rare occasions, this court has found an abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining whether an amendment should be permitted . . . but we have never found an abuse of discretion in denying an amendment on the eve of trial, long after the conclusion of pretrial proceedings." (Citations omitted.) Lawson v. Godfried, 181 Conn. 214, 216, 435 A.2d 15 (1980). In this case, the court ruled that "it was a little bit late in the game" to inject a relatively complex permit issue into the case. Moreover, the court explained that there was no mention of this issue until the plaintiffs filed a request to charge shortly before trial. Even though the plaintiffs filed a substitute complaint as late as September 11, 2003, it did not include the statutory claim. Pitts waited until after he and the other the plaintiffs had presented their evidence before requesting the amendment. In addition, the court stated, "I do think filing an amended complaint at this time alleging a different cause of action could . . . give a whole new meaning [to] conforming the pleadings to the proof. I mean, ordinarily, conforming the pleadings to the proof [are] things like . . . [the] color of a car was wrong, the date was off by a day or your right knee instead of your left knee, things like that. So, I do have to deny the request to file a substituted complaint for a couple of more causes of action after the conclusion of evidence." The court then noted that the cause of action alleged in the proposed amendment might not have applied to the facts of this case. The court suggested that the additional discovery and research should have been done before the trial began. We agree with the court and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. In this case, the event that caused the harm occurred in 1997. The trial did not begin until 2003 as a result of several delays and judgments of nonsuit having been entered against each plaintiff in the case. Pitts and the other plaintiffs already had finished presenting their evidence when Pitts attempted to amend the substitute complaint. Raising a new issue and adding a new claim in the middle of the trial likely would have prolonged the trial. Furthermore, as the court pointed out, it is unclear whether the statute would even apply to the defendant, an issue necessitating additional evidence and research. We conclude, therefore, that the denial of the request to amend the complaint was not an abuse of discretion. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Kimberly Kelly and the administrator of Robert Lizotte's estate were also plaintiffs in the trial court and purportedly joined the appeal. Because they did not offer the proposed amendment at issue in this appeal, they are not aggrieved by the denial of the request to amend, which is the only ruling challenged on appeal. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed as to those plaintiffs. General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 29402 (c) (2) provides in relevant part: "The [certificate of registration for demolition business requirement] of this section shall not apply to . the demolition of a single-family residence or out building by an owner of such structure if it does not exceed a height of thirty feet, provided the owner shall be present on site while such demolition work is in progress, shall be held personally liable for any injury to individuals or damage to public or private property caused by such demolition, and provided further such demolition shall be permitted only with respect to buildings which have clearance from other structures, roads or highways equal to or greater than the height of the structure subject to demolition. The local building official may require additional clearance when deemed necessary for safety." General Statutes § 52-592 (a) provides in relevant part,: "If any action, commenced within the time limited by law, has failed one or more times to be tried on its merits because . a judgment of nonsuit has been rendered . . . the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action . . . for the same cause at any time within one year after the determination of the original action or after the reversal of the judgment." A judgment of nonsuit was also entered against Lizotte in February, 2000. A judgment of nonsuit was entered against Kelly in March, 2000. Lizotte had died in October, 2000, and the administrator of his estate was named as a plaintiff in the second action. See footnote 3.

Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion BERDON, J. The plaintiff Mary G. Barton, the zoning enforcement officer of the town of Watertown, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her administrative appeal. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that she did not (1) have standing to appeal and (2) sufficiently plead the issue of aggrievement. We find that the plaintiff, as the zoning enforcement officer, has standing to bring this appeal and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court. This appeal arises from the approval by the defendant zoning board of appeals of the town of Watertown (board) of a variance to the Watertown zoning regulations. The defendant C.A.D.S., LLC (C.A.D.S.), owns property at 29 State Street, Watertown. It sought permission to sell and recondition used cars and to prepare new cars on the subject property. The zoning regulations permit the preparation of new cars on the subject property, but prohibit used car dealerships. Watertown Zoning Regs., § 33. C.A.D.S. sought the variance to permit the sale of used cars on the subject property. After a public hearing on the application, the board approved the variance. The plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8 (b), appealed from the board's deci sion to the Superior Court. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs appeal, claiming that she lacked standing to challenge the approval of the variance. In other words, the defendants claimed that the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the granting of the variance. The court granted the motions to dismiss. "The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is . . . well established. In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brook-ridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 610-11, 793 A.2d 215 (2002). "If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause. . . . A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 429, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). In Dupuis v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 308, 310, 206 A.2d 422 (1965), our Supreme Court, considering both classical and statutory aggrievement, concluded that the latter satisfies the issue of standing and permits a plaintiff building inspector to pursue an appeal under § 8-8. "[T]o be [classically aggrieved] within the meaning of . . . [what is now General Statutes § 8-8] . . . one must be found to have been specially and injuriously affected in his property or other legal rights. Section 8-8 also provides for an appeal to the courts by [someone who is statutorily aggrieved, i.e.] any officer, department, board or bureau of any municipality, charged with the enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of . . . [the zoning board of appeals.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupuis v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 310. Turning to the zoning regulations, § 72.2 provides in relevant part that the "regulations shall be enforced by the Zoning Enforcement Officer . . . ." Section 71.2 of the regulations provides in relevant part that "[t]he Zoning Board of Appeals shall have the authority to hear and decide upon any appeal where it is alleged that there is an error in the order, requirements, decision or determination of the Zoning Enforcement Officer. ." The plaintiff, as the zoning enforcement officer, was "charged with enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of [a zoning board of appeals]. ." General Statutes § 8-8 (a) (1); see also Dupuis v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 310. As the official who enforces the zoning regulations, she must implement the board's decision to grant the variance to C.A.D.S. Thus, in her official capacity as zoning enforcement officer, the plaintiff falls within one of the categories of aggrieved persons listed in § 8-8 (a) (1) and has standing to appeal from the board's approval of the variance. See Dupuis v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 310. Because the plaintiff is charged with enforcement of the board's decisions, she is statutorily aggrieved and has standing to appeal from the board's decision to grant the variance to C.A.D.S. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Although the planning and zoning commission of the town of Watertown is a party to this action, it never filed an appeal. Accordingly, in deciding this appeal, we consider Mary G. Barton to be the sole appellant. Because we agree with the plaintiffs argument as to her first claim, we do not reach the merits of the second claim. C.A.D.S. owns and operates a new and used car dealership on nearby property, which is not a subject of this case. General Statutes § 8-8 (b) provides in relevant part that "any person aggrieved by any decision of a board . . . may take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which the municipality is located. . . ." General Statutes § 8-8 (a) (1) provides in relevantpart: " 'Aggrievedperson' means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality charged with enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of the board. . . ."

Opinion SCHALLER, J. The plaintiff, John A. Gomes, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he was not entitled to coverage under the underinsured motorist policy endorsement issued by the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) construed General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to those employees of a named insured who are injured while "occupying" a covered motor vehicle, rather than construing it to require such coverage to any person insured under the liability portion of the policy, (2) concluded that the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity rule provided by § 38a-336 (f) does not apply to him because he was not "occupying" a covered motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute and (3) failed to conclude that because he was a named insured under his employer's policy, he was not barred from collecting underinsured motorist coverage by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured on January 11, 2001, while working in his capacity as a volunteer fire policeman for the Pawcatuck fire district (district). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he responded to an emergency call, parked his vehicle at a nearby intersection and began directing traffic to carry out his assigned duties. He further alleged that while standing in the middle of the road directing traffic, he was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by the tortfeasor, Stanley Prachniak, and was seriously injured. The plaintiff applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from the district for his injuries. The plaintiff also recovered $100,000 from Prachniak's insurance carrier for the injuries he sustained. The plaintiff brought the present action to collect on the underinsured motorist coverage provided by a policy issued to him by Allstate Insurance Company and by a policy issued to the district by the defendant. On January 28, 2003, the defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the defendant's policy. In support of its motion, the defendant argued that General Statutes § 31-284 (a), the workers' compensation exclusivity provision, limited the plaintiff to the remedies provided by the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The defendant further argued that the underin-sured motorist coverage exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision provided by § 38a-336 (f) was inapplicable to the plaintiff because he was not occupying a covered motor vehicle at the time of the accident. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion and argued that when interpreted in light of legislative intent, the exception provided by § 38a-336 (f) was applicable regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that the exception was applicable because he was occupying or using a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. In addition to these arguments, at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that pursuant to Agosto v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 239 Conn. 549, 687 A.2d 1267 (1996), and Hansen v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 239 Conn. 537, 687 A.2d 1262 (1996), the terms of the uninsured and underinsured motorist endorsement were ambiguous and that, therefore, the policy must be construed to provide coverage regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. On June 26, 2003, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision provided by § 38a-336 (f) was not applicable because the plaintiff was "in the middle of an intersection directing traffic when struck" and was not occupying a covered vehicle as "defined by the policy to mean 'in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.' " The court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiffs recovery was limited to those remedies provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. The court subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. On July 10, 2003, the plaintiff filed this appeal. On July 16,2003, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation in which he sought to have the court address his argument that § 38a-336 (f) was applicable regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. The court denied the motion. On November 5, 2003, the plaintiff filed a second motion for articulation regarding the reasons for the court's apparent rejection of the argument based on Agosto that he made during the hearing. The plaintiff stated: "In light of the absence of any indication that the trial court addressed [the] Agosto argument, the plaintiff requests that an articulation be granted in order to create a proper record for this appeal." On November 13, 2003, the court denied the motion. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for review of the court's November 13, 2003 decision denying the motion for articulation. We granted the plaintiffs motion for review and, citing Agosto, ordered the court to "articulate whether the plaintiff was entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits as an insured as opposed to 'as an occupant' of a covered motor vehicle." The order also directed that the articulation include the factual and legal bases for the court's decision. The court articulated its decision, explaining that, at the time it issued its decision, it had considered the issue before it to be whether the plaintiff was occupying a covered vehicle rather than whether ambiguity of the policy language entitled the plaintiff to coverage. After reviewing Agosto and Hansen, the court concluded that the policy language was ambiguous and that accordingly, the plaintiff "is entitled to coverage under the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage policy of the defendant." In the final sentence of its articulation, the court stated that it "therefore, reverses itself and denies the motion for summary judgment." The defendant filed a motion for review in which it asked this court to vacate the trial court's articulation on the ground that it had exceeded its authority by reversing its prior summary judgment ruling when responding to this court's order for articulation. We granted the motion and ordered stricken the final sen tence of the trial court's articulation reversing its prior ruling. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that when the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, it improperly concluded that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was not entitled to coverage under the uninsured and underinsured motorist policy endorsement. Before addressing his specific claims, we set forth the applicable standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See also Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 83, 856 A.2d 372 (2004). "Our review of the trial court's decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 450, 820 A.2d 258 (2003). In addition, because this appeal involves questions of statutory construction, we set forth our well established principles of statutory interpretation. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wasko v. Manella, 269 Conn. 527, 534, 849 A.2d 777 (2004). "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relation ship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." General Statutes § l-2z; see also Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120, 129, 848 A.2d 451 (2004). When we must consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of a statute, we look "to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wasko v. Manella, supra, 535. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, over which our review is plenary. Bengtson v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 86 Conn. App. 51, 56, 859 A.2d 967 (2004), cert, denied, 272 Conn. 922, 867 A.2d 837 (2005). I The plaintiff claims that the court improperly construed § 38a-336 (f) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to those employees of a named insured who are injured while "occupying" a covered motor vehicle, rather than construing it to require such coverage to any person insured under the liability portion of the policy. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that a conflict exists between § 38a-336 (a) (1), which mandates uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for any person insured under the liability portion of an automobile insurance policy, and § 38a-336 (f), which limits such coverage to those employees injured while "occupying" a covered motor vehicle. The plaintiff further contends that an absurd and unworkable result will occur if § 38a-336 (f) is construed as limiting uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage to those employees "occupying" a covered motor vehicle. The plaintiff argues that the conflicting statutes should be harmonized with the public policy underlying mandatory uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, by interpreting § 38a-336 (f) as requiring uninsured and underinsured motorist endorsements to provide coverage to any person insured under the liability portion of the policy. We disagree. "As with all issues of statutory inteipretation, we look first to the language of the statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Starks v. University of Connecticut, 270 Conn. 1, 10, 850 A.2d 1013 (2004). Section 38a-336 (f) provides: "Notwithstanding subsection (a) of section 31-284, an employee of a named insured injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment shall be covered by such insured's otherwise applicable uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage." (Emphasis added.) "In determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction." Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 260 Conn. 21, 42, 792 A.2d 835 (2002). Section 38a-336 (f) provides an exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 (a). This "exclusivity rule" provides that the exclusive remedy for workers injured in the course and scope of employment is provided by the Workers' Compensation Act and that the "injured [workers are] therefore barred from bringing, in most cases, common law actions against their employers for job-related injuries whether predicated on common law tort, statute, or contract." A. Sevarino, Connecticut Workers' Compensation After Reforms (3d Ed. 2002) § 4.32.3, p. 521; see also Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 265 Conn. 21, 25-26, 826 A.2d 1117 (2003); Sorban v. Sterling Engineering Corp., 79 Conn. App. 444, 449, 830 A.2d 372, cert, denied, 266 Conn. 925, 835 A.2d 473 (2003). The text of § 38a-336 (f) expressly provides an exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity rule contained in § 31-284 (a) by allowing an injured employee to collect benefits from his or her employer's uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance coverage. The text, however, plainly and unambiguously limits the applicability of the exception to those employees injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle. "In construing the meaning of a statute . . . courts do not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for it . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 57 Conn. App. 589, 599, 749 A.2d 682, cert, denied, 253 Conn. 926, 754 A.2d 796 (2000). The plaintiff contends, however, that construing § 38a-336 (f) according to its plain and unambiguous meaning will lead to the absurd and unworkable result of limiting coverage required by § 38a-336 (a) (1). General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (1) provides in relevant part: "Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage, in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334 . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underin-sured motor vehicles . . . because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom. . . ," (Emphasis added.) Thus, by its terms, § 38a-336 (a) (1) requires that each automobile liability policy provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to a class of persons that is coextensive with that insured under the liability section of the policy. Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 225 Conn. 257, 267, 622 A.2d 572 (1993). We are not persuaded that construing § 38a-336 (f) to limit the uninsured and underinsured motorist exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision to only those employees injured while occupying a covered vehicle will lead to an absurd or unworkable result. We are mindful that our uninsured and underinsured motorist statute "is remedial in nature and designed to protect people injured by [uninsured and underinsured] motorists . . . [and that] remedial statutes should be construed liberally in favor of those whom the law is intended to protect." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gohel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 61 Conn. App. 806, 815, 768 A.2d 950 (2001); see also Willoughby v. New Haven, 254 Conn. 404, 440, 757 A.2d 1083 (2000) (McDonald, C. J., dissenting) (legislative intent underlying uninsured and underinsured motorist statute is to provide protection to broadest number of accident victims). We must also consider the remedial purpose of the workers' compensation statutory scheme, including the exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 (a), to which § 38a-336 (f) provides an exception. "The Workers' Compensation Act . . . provides the sole remedy for employees and their dependents for work-related injuries and death. . Its purpose is to provide a prompt, efficient, simple and inexpensive procedure for obtaining benefits related to employment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pietraroia v. Northeast Utilities, 254 Conn. 60, 74, 756 A.2d 845 (2000). "Under the Workers' Compensation Act, both the employer and the employee have relinquished certain rights to obtain other advantages. The employee no longer has to prove negligence on the part of the employer, but, in return, he has to accept a limited, although certain, recovery. . . . The employer, in turn, guarantees compensation to an injured employee in return for the exclusivity of the workers' compensation liability to its employees." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 451. "In return for the attempt to guarantee, through workers' compensation insurance, that the injured worker will continue to receive enough income and medical care to enable the injured worker to exist without being a burden to others, the insured employer is released from [other rights and] claims of . . . liability pursuant to [§] 31-284 (a)." A. Sevarino, supra, § 1.03, p. 14. The exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 (a) manifests a legislative policy decision that a limitation on remedies is an appropriate trade-off for the benefits provided by workers' compensation. Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 220-21, 752 A.2d 1069 (2000). Prior to the enactment of § 38a-336 (f), our Supreme Court held that the workers' compensation exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 (a) precluded an employee injured while operating the employer's vehicle in the course of employment from seeking uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits directly from a self-insured employer; Bouley v. Norwich, 222 Conn. 744, 761, 610 A.2d 1245 (1992); or from the employer's insurance carrier. CNA Ins. Co. v. Colman, 222 Conn. 769, 773-74, 610 A.2d 1257 (1992). In 1993, the General Assembly legislatively overruled Bouley and Colman when it enacted § 38a-336 (f). In Reliance Ins. Co. v. American Casually Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, 238 Conn. 285, 679 A.2d 925 (1996), in holding that § 38a-336 (f) applied retroactively, our Supreme Court stated that the statute was "intended to be clarifying legislation and, as such, must be accepted as a declaration of the legislature's original intent pertaining to the interplay between the uninsured motorist provision of . . . § 38a-336 and the workers' compensation exclusivity provision of § 31-284." (Emphasis added.) Id., 291. Although the plaintiff urges this court to harmonize what he contends to be a continuing conflict between the statutory mandate of uninsured and underinsured coverage and the impact of the workers' compensation exclusivity provision, we decline to do so because we conclude that the legislature appropriately resolved the conflict when it enacted § 38a-336 (f). We presume that the legislature acted with knowledge of the existence and contents of both § 31-284 (a) and § 38a-336 (a) (1). We also presume that it was mindful of the remedial purposes behind both the uninsured and underinsured motorist statute and the Workers' Compensation Act and intended to create a consistent body of law. See Commissioner v. Freedom of Information Commission, 204 Conn. 609, 621, 529 A.2d 692 (1987) (legislature presumed to enact statutes with knowledge of existing statutes and with intention of creating consistent body of law); see also Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003) (legislature always presumed to have created harmonious and consistent body of law). On the basis of the language of § 38a-336 (f), it is apparent that the legislature addressed the interplay between the uninsured and underinsured motorist statute and the Workers' Compensation Act by providing a limited exception to the exclusivity provision. The legislature could have chosen to allow the Bouley and Colman decisions to stand, or it could have chosen to provide a broader exception to the exclusivity provision. Instead, the legislature chose to harmonize the conflicting statutory schemes by providing an exception, while limiting its applicability to those employees "injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 38a-336 (f). "There is no question that the legislature may, by the language it uses in a statute or a section of a statute, demonstrate its intent that it be limited or restricted." Taravella, v. Stanley, 52 Conn. App. 431, 440, 727 A.2d 727 (1999). Even if we were to agree with the plaintiff that consideration of extratextual evidence of the meaning of § 38a-336 (f) is warranted in this case, we note that the legislative history the plaintiff presented would be insufficient to override the plain and unambiguous text of the statute. The plaintiff argues that the legislature intended to provide coverage for all employees without regard to occupancy and that "use of statutory language suggesting any restriction on that right must be dismissed as accidental." The plaintiff further argues that absent any legislative history showing that the legislature expressly intended to limit the applicability of the exception to the exclusivity rule to those employees injured while occupying a covered vehicle, we should ignore the plain and unambiguous text of the statute. These arguments are wholly inconsistent with our well established principles of statutory interpretation. When searching for the legislative intent of the meaning of a statute, we always begin with an examination of the statutory language because it "is the most important factor to be considered . . . ." State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 563, 816 A.2d 562 (2003); see also General Statutes § l-2z ("[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself'). When we proceed to consideration of extratex-tual evidence, our inquiry usually confirms that the legislative intent was accurately expressed in the text of the statute. State v. Courchesne, supra, 574. Even when extratextual evidence indicates a different intent from that revealed by the plain and unambiguous meaning of the text, we require it to be sufficiently persuasive before we will "conclude that the legislature intended a different meaning" from the text. Id. As discussed, the text of § 38a-336 (f) is plain and unambiguous and strongly suggests that the legislature intended to limit applicability of the exception to those employees injured while occupying a covered vehicle. We find nothing in the legislative history that persuades us that the legislature intended a meaning contrary to this plain and unambiguous text. We disagree that the legislative history cited by the plaintiff shows an obvious legislative intent that would override the plain meaning of the statute. The legislative history simply reveals discussion regarding the basic purpose of the statute and the reasons underlying its enactment. The mere absence of discussion regarding the limitation of the applicability of the exclusivity exception is insufficient to persuade us that the legislature did not intend the plain meaning of the statute. See Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 29, 818 A.2d 37 (2003) (where legislative history is silent regarding legislature's intent in enacting statute, party cannot rely on it to support interpretation contrary to plain and unambiguous text of statute). We conclude that the court properly construed § 38a-336 (f) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to those employees of a named insured who are injured while "occupying" a covered motor vehicle. II We next address the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity rule provided by § 38a-336 (f) does not apply to him because he was not "occupying" a covered motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the term "occupying" should be interpreted broadly in order to implement the purpose of § 38a-336 (f), which he argues is to ensure that employees are not barred from the coverage provided by the uninsured and under-insured motorist statute. Accordingly, the plaintiff argues that the term "occupying" as used in § 38a-336 (f) should be interpreted to include any situation in which an employee is injured while within reasonable physical proximity to a covered motor vehicle and actively engaged in the use of that vehicle. The plaintiff therefore urges this court to reject the "physical contact" test and adopt the "use and proximity" test for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether the employee was injured while occupying a covered vehicle. We disagree with these arguments. In its memorandum of decision, when discussing whether the term "occupying" as used in § 38a-336 (f) applied to the plaintiff, the court stated: "Occupying is defined by the policy to mean 'in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.' In the present case the plaintiff was not getting in, or out of a covered vehicle when he was injured . The plaintiff was not physically touching the covered vehicle and, in fact, was in the middle of an intersection directing traffic when struck . These facts are not in dispute. General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) applies only to those injured 'while occupying a covered motor vehicle . . . .' Accordingly, because the plaintiff was not in, upon, getting in, out or off a [covered] motor vehicle at the time of the injury, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted." Presumably because § 38a-336 (f) does not define "occupying," the court, understandably, turned to the policy definition. Although this definition may prove instructive, it does not control our interpretation of the meaning of "occupying" as used in § 38a-336 (f). When a statute does not define a term, we "look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in the dictionary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tele Tech of Connecticut Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 270 Conn. 778, 798, 855 A.2d 174 (2004); see also General Statutes § 1-1 (a) ("[i]n the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language"); New England Pipe Corp. v. Northeast Corridor Foundation, 271 Conn. 329, 336, 857 A.2d 348 (2004). Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides several definitions of "occupy," including, "to fill up (a place or extent)," and "to hold possession of [something]." We are also guided by the definition of "occupying" contained in another statute. General Statutes § 38a-363 (c) provides: " 'Occupying' a vehicle means to be in or upon or entering into or alighting from the vehicle." This definition is not controlling because § 38a-336 © is not one of the specifically enumerated sections to which § 38a-363 applies. When, however, one statute does not define a term, we may use the definition set forth in another section of the General Statutes concerning the same subject matter to inform our understanding of the term's meaning. See State v. Ramos, 271 Conn. 785, 792, 860 A.2d 249 (2004). In addition to the definitions noted, we are guided by our case precedent regarding interpretation of the meaning of "occupying" and other related language used in uninsured and underinsured motorist policy provisions. In Testone v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 126, 127-29, 328 A.2d 686 (1973), the plaintiff, a tow track operator injured when a disabled car he was attaching was struck by an uninsured vehicle, attempted to obtain uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer of the tow truck and the insurer of the disabled vehicle. Both policies defined "occupying" as "in or upon or entering into or alighting from" a covered vehicle. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 131, 134. Our Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because he was not occupying a covered vehicle as the term was defined in the policies. Id., 132, 134. In concluding that the plaintiff was not occupying the tow truck, the court stated that "[t]he fact that the plaintiff was near his employer's wrecker when injured is of no significance." Id., 131. In concluding that the plaintiff was not occupying the disabled vehicle, the court stated that because "[t]he plaintiff was not in physical contact with the [disabled] vehicle . it cannot be said that he was 'upon' that vehicle." Id., 134. When drawing these conclusions, the court cited with approval several cases that have interpreted similar policy language as meaning that "actual physical contact with the insured vehicle affords coverage . . . ." Id., 133. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howe, 31 Conn. App. 132, 133-34, 623 A.2d 1031, cert, denied, 226 Conn. 911, 628 A.2d 983 (1993), the claimant, who had been a passenger in an insured vehicle when it was involved in a minor accident, was in the process of returning to the vehicle following a discussion with the occupants of the other vehicle when a third vehicle struck the vehicle in which she had been a passenger, causing it to strike and seriously injure her. The insurance policy defined an "insured person" for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage as "[a]ny person while in, on, getting into or out of' a covered vehicle. Id., 133. In applying this language to the facts of the case, the court expressly relied on the Testone court's approval of the premise that actual physical contact with the insured vehicle affords coverage. The court concluded that "[i]t is clear that coverage is compelled under the circumstances of this case where, at the time of the accident, the [claimant] was in physical contact with the car and she intended to and was taking steps to reenter the vehicle after only a brief interruption in her travels related to the operation of the vehicle." Id., 140. Testone and Allstate Ins. Co. place Connecticut courts among those of several states that "have predicated determinations about whether an individual was 'occupying' an insured vehicle on there being some 'physical contact' with the vehicle." 1 A. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance (2d Ed. Rev. 2004) § 5.2, p. 238 (noting that " 'physical contact' test has not been adopted in most states"). We reiterate that the Testone and Allstate Ins. Co. decisions relied on the "physical contact" test when determining whether the language used in uninsured and underin-sured motorist policy provisions entitled the claimant to coverage. In this case, the defendant argues that we must also use the "physical contact" test for determining whether the term "occupying" as used in § 38a-336 (f) applies to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, urges adoption of the broader "use and proximity" test. As the name implies, under this test, "judges usually examine the facts to determine (1) whether the injury occurred while the claimant was in a zone or area that was within reasonable proximity to the insured vehicle, or (2) whether the claimant was injured while engaged in a task related to the operation, maintenance, or use of the vehicle. If either of these conditions is found to exist, judges usually conclude that claimants are entitled to coverage." 1 A. Widiss, supra, § 5.2, p. 238. Underlying the expansive interpretation of coverage terms embodied by this approach are (1) the rule of construction that where terms are ambiguous the policy is to be construed against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, and (2) the policy choice of maximizing statutorily mandated uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Id., 260. We decline the invitation to adopt the "use and proximity" test for three reasons. First, in consideration of the common meaning of the word and the more expansive definitions provided in § 38a-363 (c), we conclude that "occupying" as used in § 38a-336 (f) is not ambiguous. Second, as discussed in part I, we conclude that the legislature expressed its policy decision regarding the scope of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage available to employees when it enacted § 38a-336 (f), which expressly limits such coverage to those employees injured while "occupying" a covered vehicle. An expansive interpretation of "occupying" would undermine the legislature's declaration of its intent regarding the interplay of the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation laws and the uninsured motorist laws. Third, we are compelled to follow our Supreme Court's express approval of the "physical contact" test in Testone v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 165 Conn. 134, despite the fact that it was applied in the context of interpreting policy rather than statutory language. In this case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff was not physically touching the covered vehicle and, in fact, was in the middle of an intersection directing traffic when struck. As such, the plaintiff cannot be said to have been occupying a covered vehicle under the com monly approved usage of the term and in light of the "physical contact" test. We conclude that the court properly determined that the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity rule provided by § 38a-336 (f) does not apply to the plaintiff because he was not occupying a covered motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute. Ill Finally, we address the plaintiffs claim that as a named insured under his employer's policy, he is not barred from collecting underinsured motorist coverage by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision. Specifically, he argues that pursuant to Agosto v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 239 Conn. 549, and Hansen v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 239 Conn. 537, the language in the "who is an insured" provision of the uninsured and underinsured motorist endorsement is ambiguous and therefore must be construed to provide coverage to the plaintiff as an insured, regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle. The plaintiff contends that although he collected workers' compensation benefits from his employer, the exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 is inapplicable because he is claiming benefits as an insured "against his own insurer" and not merely against his employer's insurer. Although the defendant concedes that the plaintiff is a named insured, it argues that the workers' compensation exclusivity provision nonetheless bars the plaintiffs claim for underinsured motorist coverage under his employer's policy unless the exception provided by § 38a-336 (f) is applicable. We agree with the defendant. In Hansen, the plaintiffs decedent, who was killed while riding a snowmobile that collided with an underin-sured motor vehicle, was a shareholder and the sole paid employee of a closely held corporation. Hansen v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 239 Conn. 538-40. Our Supreme Court concluded that the commercial automobile liability insurance policy issued to the corporation which contained individual oriented language in the policy along with family member oriented language in the uninsured motorist endorsement "injected confusion and uncertainty into the coverage afforded by the policy," and therefore was ambiguous. Id., 548. The court resolved the ambiguity against the insurer and held that the plaintiff was entitled to coverage under the uninsured motorist endorsement. Id., 548-49. In Agosto, which was a companion case of Hansen, the plaintiffs decedent, a state police trooper, was killed during a traffic stop when he was struck by another vehicle while outside of his police cruiser. Agosto v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 239 Conn. 550. Although the policy in the case was issued to a state governmental entity, as opposed to a corporation, our Supreme Court saw no reason to distinguish the case from Hansen because "[t]he same problematic language exists here." Id., 552. The court stated: "On the basis of our reasoning in Hansen, the defendant in the present case should not have issued an uninsured motorist endorsement containing language referring to individuals and family members when the named insured was a governmental entity." Id. As in Hansen, the court resolved the ambiguity in the policy language against the insurer and held that the plaintiff's decedent was entitled to coverage. Id. In this case, the uninsured and underinsured motorist endorsement included in the commercial automobile insurance policy issued to the district contains language identical to the endorsements at issue in Hansen and Agosto. The coverage provision of the endorsement states in relevant part: "We will pay all sums the 'insured' is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an 'uninsured motor vehicle.' The damages must result from 'bodily injury' sustained by the 'insured' caused by an 'accident.' . . ." The "who is an insured" provision of the endorsement provides a list that includes the following: "1. You. 2. If you are an individual, any 'family member.' 3. Anyone else 'occupying' a covered 'auto' . . . ." The plaintiff argues that we should follow Agosto and Hansen, and hold that this language, which is contained in a commercial policy issued to a fire district, is ambiguous and therefore must be construed to provide coverage to the plaintiff as an insured, regardless of whether he was occupying a covered auto. The defendant argues that this case is distinguishable from Hansen and Agosto because, unlike the insurers in those cases, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff is a named insured under the policy and did not attempt to disclaim coverage on that basis. The defendant also contends that we are not bound by Agosto because it has raised an argument not addressed in that case, namely, that the plaintiff, even as a named insured, is not entitled to coverage because he cannot overcome the workers' compensation exclusivity provision. The plaintiff argues that the claim for underinsured motorist coverage in Agosto should have been subject to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 because, although not stated in the decision, it is likely that the plaintiffs decedent, a state trooper, had recovered workers' compensation benefits from his employer. The Agosto decision, however, does not discuss the workers' compensation exclusivity provision or the exception contained in § 38a-336 (f). The plaintiff argues that this absence of discussion suggests that the decedent's status as a named insured overrode any need to question whether he was barred by the exclusivity provision. We cannot assume, however, that the exclusivity provision is not a bar to the plaintiff in this case simply because our Supreme Court did not address the issue in a factually similar case. The plaintiff applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from the district for his injuries. The plaintiff is now claiming coverage under his employer's insurance. He argues that, pursuant to Hansen and Agosto, he qualifies as an insured under the underin-sured motorist endorsement and that, pursuant to the employee coverage extension endorsements, he qualifies as a named insured under the liability coverage portion of the policy. Thus, the issue is whether, absent an exception, § 31-284 bars the plaintiff from claiming underinsured motorist coverage under his employer's policy despite the fact that he is a named insured. We conclude that it does. Section 31-284 (a) provides in relevant part: "All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the [workers' compensation insurance] requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation." Although the policy provides protection for the plaintiff, the policy is not, as he argues, his own insurance policy. It is his employer's policy. It is irrelevant that he is a named insured under the policy. Section 31-284 bars all claims made by employees against their employers for injuries sustained in the course of employment other than claims for remedies provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. Thus, the exclusivity provision bars the plaintiff from claiming underinsured motorist coverage under his employer's policy, unless an exception applies. As discussed in part I, § 38a-336 (f) provides a limited exception to the exclusivity provision for those employees "injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment . . . .''In part II, however, we concluded that this exception does not apply to the plaintiff under the facts of this case. We conclude that the workers' compensation exclusivity provision bars the plaintiff from collecting undeiin-sured motorist coverage under his employer's policy, even though the plaintiff is a named insured. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The plaintiff also named Allstate Insurance Company as a defendant, but it was not a party to the motion for summary judgment that is the subject of this appeal. Accordingly, the term "defendant" refers only to Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company. "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morris v. Congdon, 85 Conn. App. 555, 558, 858 A.2d 279 (2004), cert, granted on other grounds, 272 Conn. 913, 866 A.2d 1284 (2005). General Statutes § 31-284 (a) provides in relevant part: "All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation." General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) provides: "Notwithstanding subsection (a) of section 31-284, an employee of a named insured injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment shall be covered by such insured's otherwise applicable uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage." See Practice Book § 66-5. See Practice Book § 66-7. Although our order was not explicit, it is well established that an articulation is not an opportunity for the trial court to substitute a prior decision. See Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Systems, 86 Conn. App. 270, 284, 860 A.2d 779 (2004), cert, denied, 272 Conn. 919, 866 A.2d 1286 (2005), citing Koper v. Koper, 17 Conn. App. 480, 484, 553 A.2d 1162 (1989). The remaining portion of the articulation, however, provides the necessary record upon which we review this claim. See footnote 3. Section 38a-334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, entitled "Minimum Provisions for Protection Against Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists," provides in relevant part: "(a) Coverage. The insurer shall undertake to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident involving the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. This coverage shall insure the occupants of every motor vehicle to which the bodily injury liability coverage applies. . . ." We also note that the legislature's exclusion of those employees injured as nonoccupants from the applicability of the exception to the exclusivity provision and thereby from uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage cannot be viewed as inadvertent in view that our law "has long recognized that [such] coverage may apply to non-occupants of motor vehicles." J. Berk & M. Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage (3d Ed. 2004) § 3.7, p. 256; see also Harvey v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 188 Conn. 245, 250, 449 A.2d 157 (1982) (insured's status at time of injury "whether passenger, pedestrian, or driver" is irrelevant to recovery under statutorily mandated coverage). In addition, General Statutes § 38a-363 (h) provides in relevant part: " 'Pedestrian' means any person not occupying a vehicle . . . ." "General Statutes § 38a-363 and 38a-336 (f) both are contained in chapter 700, which is entitled "Property and Casualty Insurance." The Testone court concluded further that "intent to enter a vehicle alone is not 'entering' a vehicle within the meaning of the insurance policy." Testone v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 165 Conn. 134. In its articulation, the court addressed this issue for the first time and concluded that pursuant to Agosto v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 239 Conn. 549, and Hansen v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 239 Conn. 537, the policy language in this case is ambiguous and that therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to coverage. The court then reversed its previous ruling granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. An articulation is not an opportunity for atrial court to substitute anew decision. See Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Systems, 86 Conn. App. 270, 284, 860 A.2d 779 (2004), cert, denied, 272 Conn. 919, 866 A.2d 1286 (2005). We must now determine whether the court's initial ruling in favor of the defendant was proper in light of Agosto and Hansen. In addition, at oral argument, the plaintiff claimed that the exclusivity provision is inapplicable in this case because pursuant to General Statutes § 31-284 (a), the policy endorsements extending coverage to volunteers and employees as insureds represented an agreement between the plaintiff and the district to provide additional compensation beyond the workers' compensation remedies. In relevant part, § 31-284 (a) provides that "nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation." We decline to address this issue on the basis of the long settled rule that this court does not consider claims that are raised for the first time at oral argument and that are, consequently, inadequately briefed. See Blatchley v. Mintz, 81 Conn. App. 782, 785 n.2, 841 A.2d 1203, cert, denied, 270 Conn. 901, 853 A.2d 519 (2004).

Opinion WEST, J. The defendant, Robert Arrington, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulting in the death of another in violation of General Statutes § 14-222a. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) violated his right to cross-examine a witness about her pending or contemplated civil action against him and (2) misled the jury with its instruction on proximate cause. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On July 10, 2000, the victim, her sister and two children were traveling in the right lane of Interstate 91, about ten to fifteen feet behind the rear tire of a truck in the center lane, when the truck, driven by the defendant, veered into the victim's lane without signaling. The victim made a hard right turn toward the breakdown lane to avoid a collision and lost control of her vehicle. The vehicle rolled over several times, killing the driver. At trial, defense counsel asked the victim's sister on cross-examination whether she had hired an attorney due to her injuries from the accident. The court sustained the state's objection. The jury found the defendant guilty of negligent homicide in violation of § 14-222a. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as needed. I The defendant's first claim is that the court improperly precluded his cross-examination regarding the victim's sister's pending or contemplated civil action against him. He argues that her testimony was materially different from that of the other eyewitness, William Dietz, a truck driver whose vehicle was in the center lane behind the defendant's truck when the collision occurred. We disagree. With respect to matters pertaining to control over cross-examination, every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling, and our standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. Menna v. Jaiman, 80 Conn. App. 131, 140, 832 A.2d 1219 (2003). "Although the outright denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for motive, bias and interest implicates the constitutional protection of the confrontation clause, such a denial is subject to harmless error analysis. . A new trial is therefore required only if the exclusion of the proffered evidence is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. "Whether such error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a number of factors, such as the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 253-54, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), on appeal after remand, 234 Conn. 683, 663 A.2d 339 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140, 116 S. Ct. 972, 133 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1996). We conclude that denying the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the victim's sister with respect to bias was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Both she and Dietz, who witnessed the accident while driving behind the defendant's truck, testified that the defendant had veered into the victim's lane. Only Dietz testified that the defendant moved into the victim's lane without using a signal. Pursuant to § 14-222a, the jury reasonably could have found the defendant negligent for having veered into the victim's lane, without signaling, and having caused the victim to turn her steering wheel hard to avoid an accident. The testimony of the victim's sister was not materially different from that of Dietz on that issue. We therefore conclude that the error was harmless because Dietz's testimony provided all the material facts to establish the defendant's negligence in veering into the victim's lane without signaling. II The defendant next claims that the court improperly instructed the jury on proximate cause. He argues that the court failed to charge the jury that his negligence, to be considered a proximate cause, must have contributed in a direct manner, and unbroken sequence, to the resulting death, and that his conduct could not have been superseded by an efficient, intervening cause that produced the victim's death. We disagree. The defendant failed to preserve his claim at trial and now requests review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). We will review the defendant's claim because the record is adequate for review and he has raised a claim of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 308, 630 A.2d 593 (1993) (following established rule that claimed improper jury instruction on element of charged offense appealable even if not raised at trial). We conclude, however, that the defendant has failed to show that the alleged violation clearly exists and clearly deprived him of a fair trial. "[Wjhether a jury instruction is improper is gauged by considering the instruction in its entirety, and with reference to the facts and evidence in the case, so as to determine whether it fairly presented the case to the jury so that no injustice was done under established legal rules." State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106, 120, 659 A.2d 683 (1995). "[W]hen several factors contribute, in a chain of events, to cause a victim's injury . . . the defendant's conduct must have been a cause that necessarily set in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. In short, a jury instruction with respect to proximate cause must contain, at a minimum, the following elements: (1) an indication that the defendant's conduct must contribute substantially and materially, in a direct manner, to the victim's injuries; and (2) an indication that the defendant's conduct cannot have been superseded by an efficient, intervening cause that produced the injuries." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 121. "We emphasize that . . . the requirement of language in the jury instructions regarding an efficient, intervening cause is not ironclad. It arises in those cases in which the evidence could support a finding by the jury that the defendant's conduct was overcome by an efficient, intervening cause, or in which the evidence regarding proximate causation was such that, based on the doctrine of efficient, intervening cause, the jury could have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt." (Citation omitted.) Id., 121 n.8. "The doctrine of intervening cause . . . refers to a situation in which the defendant's conduct is a 'but for' cause, or cause in fact, of the victim's injury, but nonetheless some other circumstance subsequently occurs — the source of which may be an act of the victim, the act of some other person, or some nonhuman force — that does more than supply a concurring or contributing cause of the injury, but is unforeseeable and sufficiently powerful in its effect that it serves to relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility for his conduct. . . . Thus, the doctrine serves as a dividing line between two closely related factual situations: (1) where two or more acts or forces, one of which was set in motion by the defendant, combine to cause the victim's injuries, in which case the doctrine will not reheve the defendant of criminal responsibility; and (2) where an act or force intervenes in such a way as to reheve a defendant, whose conduct contributed in fact to the victim's injuries, from responsibility, in which case the doctrine will apply." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 124-25. Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the omission of an instruction on the doctrine of efficient, intervening cause was not improper. The defendant cites his theory at trial that certain actions of the victim contributed to, or caused, the accident, including the rate of speed at which she drove her vehicle, the manner in which she turned the steering wheel, her use of the breakdown lane and her application of the brakes. The rate of speed of the victim's vehicle at the time of the defendant's act of veering into her path was a preexisting state of affairs, not an event that occurred subsequent to the defendant's negligent act that was sufficiently powerful to relieve him of criminal responsibility. Furthermore, the victim's defensive reactions of turning her steering wheel, utilizing the breakdown lane and applying her brakes were set in motion by the defendant's negligence in veering into her lane. Therefore, an instruction on the doctrine of efficient, intervening cause was unnecessary. Finally, although the charge may not have expressly stated that the connection between the defendant's conduct and the victim's death had to be "direct," the jury could not have been misled to reach an improper result. Under those facts, if the jury believed that the defendant's conduct had contributed both substantially and materially to the victim's death, as the court instructed, then it necessarily also had to believe that his conduct contributed in a direct manner to the same result. No other acts of negligence existed to diminish the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the victim's death. Therefore, the instruction on proximate cause was fairly and accurately presented, and the jury could not have been misled. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The state concedes that the court improperly precluded the cross-examination, but argues that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. "[A]s a general rule cross-examination of the prosecuting witness should be allowed to show the pendency, existence and status of civil action against the accused arising out of the same set of circumstances as those which served as the basis of the criminal prosecution. . . . This is not to say the refusal to admit such evidence has not been held, in the proper circumstances, to be harmless error." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Milum, 197 Conn. 602, 610, 500 A.2d 555 (1985). We note that it was improper to preclude the cross-examination, and we apply harmless error analysis. General Statutes § 14-222a provides: "Any person who, in consequence of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, causes the death of another person shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than six months or both." The court instructed the jury on proximate cause as follows: "Negligence is a proximate cause of an injury or death if it was a substantial factor in bringing that injury or death about. Negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about an injury or death if it contributes materially to the production of the injury or the death." The doctrine of superseding cause recently has been abandoned in cases in which "a defendant claims that its tortious conduct is superseded by a subsequent negligent act or there are multiple acts of negligence." Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 439 n.16, 820 A.2d 258 (2003). The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that its conclusion did not "necessarily affect the doctrine of superseding cause in the area of criminal law. See State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106, 124-25, 659 A.2d 683 (1995)." Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 439 n.16. Accordingly, we continue to recognize the doctrine in this criminal appeal.

Opinion FOTI, J. The defendant, Michael L. Burton, appeals from the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure and from the denial of his motion to open and vacate that judgment. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly rendered the default judgment of strict foreclosure in violation of Practice Book § 17-32 (b). We conclude that the appeal is moot and must, therefore, be dismissed. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the defendant's claims. On July 24, 2002, the plaintiff, Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, filed this action against the defendant, seeking foreclosure of the mortgage on the defendant's real property. The defendant subsequently filed a pro se appearance, but did not file any pleadings. Consequently, on August 29, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure to plead and a motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. On September 11, 2002, the court clerk granted the motion for default. On September 16, 2002, the court granted the plaintiffs motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and sent notice of its judgment on September 17, 2002. The court set the law day for October 15, 2002, and, because the defendant did not redeem on that day, title vested in the plaintiff. On November 27, 2002, the defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to open and to vacate the judgment of strict foreclosure. On February 7, 2003, after a hearing, the court denied the defendant's motion to open and sent notice of its denial on February 19, 2003. On February 28, 2003, the defendant filed this appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure and from the denial of his motion to open and to vacate the judgment of strict foreclosure. On May 27, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. This court denied that motion on June 25, 2003. Additional facts and procedural history relevant to the defendant's claims will be set forth as necessary. "Mootness implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this court. . . . [I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . If no practical relief can be afforded to the parties, the appeal must be dismissed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 54 Conn. App. 164, 167, 734 A.2d 589 (1999). Here, notice of the court's judgment of strict foreclosure was sent on September 17, 2002, which began the twenty day appeal period as well as a twenty day automatic stay. See Practice Book § 63-1 and 61-11. Both the appeal period and the automatic stay expired on October 7, 2002. The court set the law day for October 15, 2002, and, because the defendant did not redeem on that day and because the automatic stay had expired, title vested in the plaintiff. If title vested absolutely at that time, there would be no practical relief that this court can grant, which would render this appeal moot. See Barclays Bank of New York v. Ivler, 20 Conn. App. 163, 167, 565 A.2d 252, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 792 (1989). We recognize, however, that the question of mootness is intertwined with the only issue raised on appeal, whether title vested properly in the plaintiff. The defendant claims that title did not vest absolutely because a procedural error (1) caused an improper entry of the default judgment and (2) was an adequate ground for opening the judgment. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court did not wait the requisite fifteen days after entering the default to render the judgment of strict foreclosure pursuant to Practice Book § 17-32 (b). Because this same procedural error underlies both of the defendant's claims, we will address the claims jointly. The resolution of the defendant's claim of procedural error requires this court to examine Practice Book § 17-32 (b) and 17-33 (b), which pertain to when a judgment may be entered where a defendant is in default for failure to plead. That examination requires us to apply our well settled principles of statutory construction. See Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 61, 818 A.2d 14 (2003). "Statutory construction is a question of law and therefore our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Original Grasso Construction Co. v. Shepherd, 70 Conn. App. 404, 415, 799 A.2d 1083, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 932, 806 A.2d 1065 (2002). Section 17-32 (b) provides in relevant part that "[a] claim for a hearing in damages or motion for judgment shall not be filed before the expiration of fifteen days from the date of notice of issuance of the default under this subsection." Section 17-33 (b), however, provides in relevant part that "the judicial authority, at or after the time it renders the default, notwithstanding Section 17-32 (b), may also render judgment in foreclosure cases . . . provided the plaintiff has also made a motion for judgment . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Although the phrase "notwithstanding Section 17-32 (b)" was added as part of the 2003 revision of our rules of practice, which was after the date at issue in this appeal, the commentary to Practice Book § 17-33 (b) makes it clear that this amendment "was made for clarity." Here, the defendant claims that Practice Book § 17-32 (b) is controlling and that it required the court to wait at least fifteen days after the default before it could enter a default judgment against him. He further argues that the amendment to Practice Book § 17-33 (b), which clearly places the issues raised in this appeal within the realm of Practice Book § 17-33 (b) and not Practice Book § 17-32 (b), is inapplicable because the trial court rendered judgment on the default in this case prior to the effective date of the amendment. Such an argument is without merit. Our objective in interpreting a rule of practice is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters. See State v. Tinsley, 59 Conn. App. 4, 17, 755 A.2d 378, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 938, 761 A.2d 765 (2000); see also State v. Pare, 253 Conn. 611, 622, 755 A.2d 180 (2000). The amendment to Practice Book § 17-33 (b) was for clarification purposes and did not substantively change the meaning and intent behind the provision. Accordingly, we must conclude that the provisions of Practice Book § 17-33 (b) apply notwithstanding the fifteen day requirement of Practice Book § 17-32 (b) even when, as here, the effective date of the amendment occurred after the date at issue. In this case, the plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure to plead and a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure on August 29, 2002. The court clerk then granted the motion for default on September 11, 2002, and the court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure on September 16, 2002. Because this is a foreclosure proceeding, Practice Book § 17-33 (b), which allows a court to render judgment "at or after the time it renders the default," is applicable. As a result, under Practice Book § 17-33 (b), the court properly rendered the judgment even though it did so only five days after the default was entered. We therefore conclude that because there was no procedural error in the entry of the default, the court properly rendered judgment of strict foreclosure and properly denied the motion to open the judgment. Because there was no procedural error, as the defendant claims there was, which would have resulted in an improper rendering of the judgment of strict foreclosure and the denial of the motion to open the judgment, we conclude that title vested properly and absolutely in the plaintiff following the law day on October 15, 2002, because the automatic stay had expired. As a result, there is no practical relief that this court can grant the defendant. We therefore conclude that the defendant's claims are moot and dismiss this appeal. The appeal is dismissed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The defendant's appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure, which he filed more than five months after the judgment was rendered, is untimely. The plaintiff, however, did not file a motion to dismiss on that ground, thereby waiving any objection to the appeal's timeliness. We therefore will consider the defendant's claim. See Savage v. Savage, 25 Conn. App. 693, 694 n.1, 596 A.2d 23 (1991). The plaintiff also filed a motion for reconsideration en banc on July 7, 2003, which this court denied on October 15, 2003. Although the defendant's motion to open would have extended the appeal period pursuant to Practice Book § 63-1 (c), and, therefore, the automatic stay pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (a), he did not file his motion until November 27,2002, which was after the original appeal period and automatic stay had expired and after title had already vested in the plaintiff. Furthermore, the defendant did not file this appeal until February 28, 2003, which prevented the continuation of the stay pursuant to § 61-11 (a). Specifically, the defendant argues that such procedural error is an adequate ground for opening a judgment of strict foreclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 49-15, which prohibits the opening of a judgment of strict foreclosure when "title has become absolute in any encumbrancer," because such error in the entry of the default judgment prevented title from vesting absolutely in the plaintiff. The defendant also claims that the judgment should be opened because he did not receive notice of the court's entry of the judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendant recognizes, however, that "the limited scope of appellate review applicable to that factual finding [by the trial court] will prevent him from being able to successfully challenge that finding on appeal. " The defendant concedes that "under Practice Book § 17-33 (b), as amended, a trial court may simultaneously consider a motion for default for failure to plead and a motion for judgment upon that default . . . ." The date at issue in this appeal is September 17, 2002, which is the date that notice of the court's rendering of the judgment of strict foreclosure was sent. The effective date of the amendment to Practice Book § 17-33 (b) was January 1, 2003. Although we recognize that we are not bound by the commentary to Practice Book § 17-33 (b), we agree with it and, therefore, conclude that the 2003 amendment was for clarification purposes only. Because no procedural error exists in this matter, we need not address whether procedural error is an adequate ground to open a judgment of strict foreclosure under General Statutes § 49-15.

Opinion FOTI, J. The defendant, Florencio P. Punsalan, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after he entered a plea of guilty, convicting him of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-49 and 53a-54a, sexual assault in a spousal relationship in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70b (b), kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), and attempt to commit arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-49 and 53a-lll (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Connecticut constitutions, and (2) the court improperly entered a standing criminal restraining order. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's appeal. On October 10, 2001, the defendant pleaded guilty to a four count substitute information. On March 22, 2002, the court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years imprisonment with ten years of special parole. The court also entered a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40e, precluding the defendant from having any contact with his minor children. Additional facts and procedural history relevant to the defendant's claims will be set forth as necessary. I The defendant first claims that the imposition of a twelve year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Connecticut constitutions. Specifically, the defendant claims that because of his medical condition, he should have been sentenced to home confinement. We do not agree. The following additional facts are relevant to the defendant's claim. In March, 1999, while released on bond, the defendant suffered paraplegia as a result of an automobile accident. On October 9, 2001, following his guilty plea, the defendant was taken into custody. At his sentencing on March 22, 2002, the defendant, who submitted testimony from his physician, argued for a sentence of home confinement because of his medical condition and related needs. The court, how ever, sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twelve years incarceration with ten years of special parole. Taking into account the defendant's medical condition, the court further ordered that the mittimus state the following: "The court advises the following medical treatment for the defendant. First, regular physical therapy; second, timely monitoring and replacement of medication for the defendant's stomach pump; number three, Botox shots on a regular basis every three months; four, regular and timely treatment of all illnesses, especially urinary tract infections." The defendant now argues for home confinement because he claims that as a paraplegic, he will not receive adequate medical care while in sentenced confinement. The defendant bases his argument on his contention that he did not receive adequate care while in presen-tence confinement. "It is well established that an unconditional plea of guilty, made intelligently and voluntarily, operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings. . In general, the only allowable challenges after a plea are those relating either to the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea or the exercise of the trial court's jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nelson, 76 Conn. App. 472, 474, 819 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 913, 826 A.2d 1156 (2003). In the present case, the defendant pleaded guilty to all counts of the information and does not challenge, on appeal, the court's jurisdiction, the plea agreement, the pleas or whether his sentence is within the statutory limits. Consequently, his claim of cruel and unusual punishment is not properly brought as a direct appeal from the sentencing court. See id. The defendant bases his claim on what he alleges was a worsening of his condition while he was in presen- tence confinement. He argues that because he received inadequate medical treatment from the department of correction prior to sentencing, the department of correction likewise will fail to provide him with adequate care during his sentenced confinement, which, therefore, would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The defendant, in effect, is asking this court to speculate as to how he will be treated when he begins his sentence by looking to his treatment in presentence confinement. This court cannot undertake such a task. See State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 121-22, 249 A.2d 245 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927, 89 S. Ct. 1783, 23 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1969). In Williams, the defendant claimed cruel and unusual punishment because while he "was confined in jail awaiting trial and unable to furnish bail, the jail physician denied him proper medication for his claimed ailments . . . ." Id., 120-21. Our Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile courts have entertained claims of mistreatment of various sorts, usually made by prisoners in proceedings such as habeas corpus or for an injunction, we have found no instance in which mistreatment of the sort claimed here prior to trial has been entertained as a ground for attacking, on appeal, a judgment rendered within the limits of the statute punishing the offense." Id., 121-22. Here, as in Williams, the defendant is asking this court to change, based purely on speculation, a sentence imposed within the statutory limits and the plea agreement. We cannot engage in such speculation. In further support of this court's refusal to entertain such a claim by speculating as to how the defendant might be treated while in sentenced confinement, it is relevant that the sentencing court specifically ordered that the mittimus reflect the defendant's medical requirements, including his need for physical therapy, Botox injections and maintenance of his stomach pump. Because such an order was not in place when the defendant was in presentence confinement, which is the period of time that the defendant asks this court to use in speculating about the treatment he could expect to receive while he is in sentenced confinement, we see no basis on which to entertain a claim of cruel and unusual punishment in an appeal from the sentencing court. This appeal is not an appropriate means by which the defendant can claim cruel and unusual punishment. Consequently, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the court was proper. II The defendant next claims that the court improperly entered a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to § 53a-40e precluding him from having any contact with his minor children. Specifically, the defendant argues that § 53a-40e does not allow the court to enter such a restraining order for the benefit of anyone except the victim. We do not agree. The defendant's claim requires this court to interpret § 53a-40e. "Statutory construction . . . presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . According to our long-standing principles of statutory construction, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. . In construing a statute, common sense must be used, and courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Regency Savings Bank v. Westmark Partners, 70 Conn. App. 341, 344-45, 798 A.2d 476 (2002). Furthermore, "we will . in a given case, follow what may be regarded as the plain meaning of the language, namely, the meaning that, when the language is considered without reference to any extratextual sources of its meaning, appears to be the meaning and that appears to preclude any other likely meaning." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Courch-esne, 262 Conn. 537, 577, 816 A.2d 562 (2003). Section 53a-40e (a) provides in relevant part that if a person is convicted of a violation of one of the enumerated offenses against a "family or household member . . . the court may, in addition to imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a, if the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal restraining order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal restraining order which shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown." General Statutes § 53a-40e (a). Section 53a-40e (b) further provides that "[s]uch standing criminal restraining order may include but is not limited to enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 53a-40e (b). Although research of the scant legislative history provides little insight into the issue presented, it can be ascertained from the language itself that such an order precluding the defendant from having contact with his minor children is within the scope of the statute. As seen by the clear limitation in subsection (a) to crimes against a "family or household member," the statute's overarching goal is to prevent domestic violence. Furthermore, the language of the statute asks the court, in entering such an order, to consider not only what will best serve the victim, but also to consider what will best serve the public, thereby demonstrating that the statute aims to protect more than just the victim. Last, the language of the statute indicating that a criminal restraining order may include, "but is not limited" to the three options listed in subsection (b), makes clear that there are many options available to a court in entering a criminal restraining order beyond the three listed. Consequently, although we will not go as far as to say that a court has unlimited options in making a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to § 53a-40e, we conclude that the situation presented here, where those protected by the order are the minor children of the victim and the defendant, is clearly a situation within the scope of the statute. Children living in the home of a victim of sexual assault and attempted murder should be afforded the same protection of a standing criminal restraining order as their victim mother. For all of those reasons, we conclude that the court's standing criminal restraining order precluding the defendant from contacting his minor children is within the scope of § 53a-40e. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The defendant's claim more properly is brought, for example, in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of his confinement. The defendant does not challenge the court's authority to impose such a restraining order insofar as it applies to the victim. The defendant was convicted of two of the enumerated offenses required by § 53a-40e: Attempt to commit murder in violation of § 53a-54a, and sexual assault in a spousal relationship in violation of § 53a-70b (b).

Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion DRANGINIS, J. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether, in a prosecution under General Statutes § 22-363, also known as our "nuisance dog" statute, the state must prove the identity of the specific dog or dogs causing the nuisance. We hold that it does not and, accordingly, reverse the judgments of the trial court. The court found the following facts. The defendant, Frederick Acker, is the operator of a commercial kennel known as the Animal Adoption Network, Inc. The kennel is located in a residential neighborhood in Monroe, is licensed to board fifty dogs and has harbored up to thirty dogs at various times. The defendant lives in a house on the property and supervises the daily operation of the kennel. From 1999 to 2001, more than 130 complaints were lodged against the kennel for excessive dog barking. The state charged the defendant with nineteen separate counts of nuisance. In July, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge in Docket Number CR 171445, which the parties agreed would control the disposition of the other files. On August 15, 2002, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the state did not have sufficient evidence to prove which specific dog or dogs had engaged in excessive barking. This appeal followed. "Statutory construction is a question of law and therefore our review is plenary. . . . [0]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Rapoport, 80 Conn. App. 111, 119, 833 A.2d 926 (2003). "A statute is enacted as a whole and must be read as a whole rather than as separate parts or sections. . . . Similarly, when the court engages in statutory analysis, it considers] the statute as a whole . . . [and reconciles] its . . . parts . to render a reasonable overall interpretation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Esposito v. Waldbaum's, Inc., 78 Conn. App. 472, 478, 827 A.2d 747 (2003). In interpreting § 22-363, we start by examining the language of the statute, which provides in relevant part that "[n]o person shall own or harbor a dog or dogs which is or are a nuisance by reason of . . . excessive barking . . . [or] is or are a source of annoyance to any sick person residing in the immediate vicinity. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The first sentence of the statute, by its terms, prohibits human conduct, that is, the owning or harboring of a nuisance dog or dogs. It confirms the common-law recognition that dogs that are not properly controlled by their owners or keepers can be a nuisance. See Herbert v. Smyth, 155 Conn. 78, 81, 230 A.2d 235 (1967). By utilizing the ancient grammar school exercise of diagramming a sentence, one must conclude that the word "person" is the subject of the sentence, and that the words "own" and "harbor" are the verbs. The words "dog" or "dogs" are the direct object of the verbs, and the phrase, "which is or are a nuisance by reason of . . . excessive barking," is a restrictive clause modifying the direct object, that is, which dogs may not be owned or harbored, i.e., dogs that are a nuisance because they bark excessively. The sanction of restraining or disposing pertains only to a dog or to dogs that are a nuisance due to excessive barking, as required by Scudder v. Greenwich, 127 Conn. 71, 14 A.2d 728 (1940). The stat ute recognizes the right of neighbors to the peaceful enjoyment of their property by prohibiting a person from owning or harboring a dog or dogs that bark excessively. The statute, however, may not be enforced to interfere with the property rights of a dog owner with respect to a kennel of properly licensed dogs. Id., 74. The statute requires that we distinguish between dogs that bark and dogs that bark so much that they become a nuisance. It does not mean that the offending dog must be identified as Fido, Fifi or Filly.* To require the identification of a dog by name, license tag number or any other method of specific identification would render the statute unenforceable in instances such as this. We will not presume that the legislature enacts meaningless legislation, nor will we construe a statute in such a manner to render it meaningless. See State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578, 602-603, 758 A.2d 327 (2000). For example, an indoor kennel or one surrounded by vegetation would make it impossible to see the dogs, much less identify the offending dogs. Enforcement of the statute would be rendered impossible if we were to construe the statute to require the specific identification of the nuisance dog or dogs. The state argues that the defendant improperly relied on the legislative histoiy of § 22-363 to support his contention that in any prosecution pursuant to the statute, the state should identify the specific dog or dogs causing a nuisance. After examining the legislative history, we agree with the state. Section 22-363 was enacted in 1925 and was amended, most notably for our analysis, in 1953 and 1969. The 1953 amendment added the requirement that all offending dogs be specifically identified, but created an exemption to that requirement for kennels. Following a minor change in 1957, the statute underwent a major revision in 1969, resulting essentially in the current version of § 22-363. Among other things, the legislature deleted the specificity requirement, thus making the exemption for kennels unnecessary. Because the legislative history is silent as to the legislature's intent concerning those deletions, the defendants cannot rely on it to support a contrary interpretation. See Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 29, 818 A.2d 37 (2003). Accordingly, the defendant's "[rjeliance on [the] legislative silence is misplaced. It is a basic tenet of statu tory construction that we rely on the intent of the legislature as that intent has been expressed. . . . Indeed, to rely on the absence of legislative history . . . would turn the process of statutory construction on its head. More importantly, we would be exceeding our constitutional limitations by infringing on the prerogative of the legislature to set public policy through its statutory enactments." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 79, 836 A.2d 224 (2003). The judgments are reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law. In this opinion the other judges concurred. General Statutes § 22-363 provides: "No person shall own or harbor a dog or dogs which is or are a nuisance by reason of vicious disposition or excessive barking or other disturbance, or, by such barking or other disturbance, is or are a source of annoyance to any sick person residing in the immediate vicinity. Violation of any provision of this section shall be an infraction for the first offense and such person shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both for each subsequent offense and the court or judge may make such order concerning the restraint or disposal of such dog or dogs as may be deemed necessary." The trial court granted the state's motion to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 54-96. The trial court relied on Scudder v. Greenwich, supra, 127 Conn. 71, to find that the statute required the defendant to identify the specific dog or dogs that were barking. We conclude that Scudder is instructive in preventing the arbitrary seizure and disposal of a dog or dogs, but that it does not impose a requirement on the state to identify the offending dog or dogs to prove a violation of General Statutes § 22-363. Scudder is distinguishable both procedurally and substantively from this matter. In Scudder, after a hearing to resolve complaints lodged against the plaintiffs' licensed kennel, the town selectmen ordered that the kennel be limited to harboring only ten dogs older than three months. The trial court enjoined the enforcement of the order because the numerical limit was arbitrary and exceeded 1he selectmen's statutory authority. Id., 73. Our Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court, finding that "the order, under the statute, must concern a specific dog or dogs is the only reasonable conclusion." Id., 74. It left to the complainants, however, the option to redress their claim of nuisance under the common law. See Commonwealth v. Ferreri, 30 Mass. App. 966, 968, 572 N.E.2d 585 (1991), a similar case, in which the court stated: "It was not incumbent upon the Commonwealth to show that the dogs in the defendant's possession on the dates of the complaints were identical in being and number to the dogs which were the subject of the removal order." General Statutes (1953 Rev.) § 1849d provides: "If any person makes complaint in writing to the selectmen of a town, a borough warden or the chief of police of a city that any dog or dogs owned or harbored within such town, borough or city is or are a nuisance by reason of vicious disposition or excessive barking or other disturbance, or that any such dog or dogs, by such barking or other disturbance, is or are a source of annoyance to any sick person residing in the immediate vicinity, such selectmen, borough warden or chief of police shall investigate such complaint and may make such order concerning the restraint or disposal of such dog or dogs as may be deemed necessary. Any person owning or harboring such dog or dogs who fails to comply with such order shall be fined not more than twenty-five dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both, and the dog warden having jurisdiction may, after notice to the owner, capture and confine or kill such dog or dogs or return it or them to its or their owner or harborer, as may be directed by such selectmen, borough warden or chief of police. This section shall apply only with respect to a dog or to dogs individually and specifically identified in such complaint or order, provided such requirement of identification shall not apply in the case of any kennel when, on complaint, notice and hearing, such selectmen, borough warden or chief of police finds that such identification cannot be had and that the public health and safety is endangered by reason of the maintenance of such kennel." (Emphasis added.)

Opinion WEST, J. The defendant, Leon Greene, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court subsequent to his plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 2 la-278 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion to dismiss and his motion to suppress certain information. In support of his claim, the defendant contends (1) that the information contained in the warrant application was both insufficient and stale, and therefore did not present a substantial factual basis to support the issuing judge's determination that probable cause existed, and (2) that the court's refusal to order the disclosure of the dates of the police informant's controlled purchases of the narcotics at issue violated the defendant's due process rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are pertinent to our resolution of the defendant's appeal. On December 27, 2000, Sergeant Frank Koshes and Sergeant Scott O'Connor of the Waterbury police department filed an affidavit and application for a warrant to search the home and person of the defendant at 38 Santoro Street in Waterbury. The affidavit contained the following relevant information. In September, 2000, a confidential, reliable informant advised the officers that the defendant and his neighbor, Alfonso Madrid of 40 Santoro Street, were partners in the business of selling crack cocaine. The informant stated that drugs were kept at both 38 and 40 Santoro Street, and that he had seen quantities for sale in both apartments. During the week of September 25, 2000, the informant advised the officers that the defendant had a supply of crack cocaine for sale. The informant met with the officers and was searched to ensure that he or she was not in possession of any narcotics or money. The informant was provided with Waterbury police funds to purchase drugs from the defendant in his home. Police surveillance was established outside of the defendant's apartment. The informant entered the defendant's apartment, purchased an undisclosed quantity of crack cocaine from the defendant and immediately returned to the officers with the drugs. During the week of December 23, 2000, the informant participated in a second controlled buy, this time in Madrid's apartment. While the sale was taking place, the defendant entered Madrid's apartment and provided additional crack cocaine to complete the transaction. That tip was corroborated by the fact that the surveillant officers witnessed the defendant leave his apartment and enter Madrid's apartment while the informant was inside. Following the controlled buy in Madrid's apartment, the informant reported that the defendant had a "stash" of crack cocaine for sale in his apartment as well. In addition to containing information about the two controlled buys, the application provided that within the first two weeks of December, 2000, the officers had received information from the New London police department that the defendant was bringing large amounts of cocaine from Waterbury to New London on a regular basis for distribution to New London narcotics dealers. The affiants, experienced narcotics investigators, also set forth their knowledge that in addition to drugs, narcotics dealers require cutting agents, scales, weapons, counter surveillance equipment and various other items to operate a narcotics distribution network effectively. Upon presentation of the affidavit and application, a warrant was issued on December 27, 2000, to search the defendant and his home for narcotics and other specified items. The warrant was executed on December 28, 2000, and drugs, weapons and other items were seized from the defendant's apartment. The defendant was arrested and charged by substitute information with one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of § 21a-278 (a) and two counts of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) (1). The court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, and the state filed a second substitute information charging him with one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of § 21a-278 (a). The defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere conditioned on his right to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a and Practice Book § 61-6, and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. This appeal ensued. I The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant because the information contained in the warrant application was both insufficient and stale. We disagree. Whether the court properly found that the facts submitted were enough to support a finding of probable cause is a question of law and is subject to plenary review on appeal. State v. Buddhu, 264 Conn. 449, 459, 825 A.2d 48 (2003). We uphold the validity of a search warrant if the affidavit at issue presented a substantial factual basis for the issuing judge's conclusion that probable cause existed. State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 642, 620 A.2d 746 (1993). The issuing judge is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented. State v. Johnson, 219 Conn. 557, 563, 594 A.2d 933 (1991). "When a magistrate has determined that the warrant affidavit presents sufficient objective indicia of reliability to justify a search and has issued a warrant, a court reviewing that warrant . . . should defer to the reasonable inferences drawn by the magistrate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buddhu, supra, 459. Probable cause to search exists if (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity or will assist in a particular apprehension or conviction and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items sought to be seized will be found in the place to be searched. State v. DeChamplain, 179 Conn. 522, 528-29, 427 A.2d 1338 (1980). In determining the existence of probable cause to conduct a search, the issuing judge assesses all of the information set forth in the warrant affidavit and should make a "practical, nontechnical decision whether there is a fair probability" that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 552, 594 A.2d 917 (1991). We view the information in the affidavit in the light most favorable to upholding the issuing judge's determination of probable cause. State v. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207, 216, 613 A.2d 224 (1992). "In a doubtful or marginal case . . . our constitutional preference for a judicial determination of probable cause leads us to afford deference to the issuing [judge's] determination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, supra, 219 Conn. 565. A With regard to the defendant's claim that the information in the warrant application was insufficient, his supporting arguments are threefold: (1) the warrant application did not provide details "of the sort typically included in affidavits," including the price, quantity and location of the drugs; (2) the application did not establish that the informant had personal knowledge that the defendant had a "stash" of drugs in his apartment during the controlled buy in December, 2000, and (3) the issuing judge should not have considered the information obtained from the New London police department because it did not provide the basis of knowledge, nor did it indicate where in Waterbury the defendant allegedly was keeping the drugs. We address the defendant's supporting arguments in turn, viewing the allegations in the affidavit and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to a finding of probable cause. See State v. Duntz, supra, 223 Conn. 216. With regard to the defendant's first supporting argument, we look to what was, as opposed to what was not, included in the warrant affidavit. The affidavit alleged that the informant had purchased drugs on a prior occasion from the defendant in his apartment. The affidavit further provided that the informant had participated in a controlled buy, at which time he again purchased drugs from the defendant in his home while police officers monitored the apartment from the outside. Moreover, the affidavit provided that less than ten days before the issuance of the warrant, the informant had purchased drugs from both the defendant and Madrid in Madrid's apartment during a second controlled buy. In the face of all of those representations, we conclude that the issuing judge's finding of probable cause was not unreasonable simply because the affidavit did not state the price, quantity or location of the drugs. The three drug transactions between the informant and the defendant provided the issuing judge with a reasonable basis to infer that drugs would again be found on the person or in the apartment of the defendant. We next address the defendant's second and third supporting arguments that the issuing judge should not have considered the statements regarding the defendant's "stash" of drugs and his drug business in New London. Regardless of whether the suspicions engendered by the tips would have independently justified the issuance of a warrant, "the magistrate was not required to disregard the tip[s] altogether, but could consider whether the tip[s] and the investigation together 'bridged the gap' between mere suspicion and probable cause." State v. Johnson, supra, 219 Conn. 565. Consequently, we conclude that the inclusion in the warrant application of those two pieces of information did not render the probable cause finding per se unreasonable. B The defendant further argues that the warrant was invalid by asserting that the information contained in the warrant application regarding the two controlled buys was too remote in time from the actual search and was therefore stale. The defendant argues that due to the passage of time, there was no probable cause to believe that the items listed in the warrant would be found in his home or on his person on December 27, 2000. We disagree. "The determination of probable cause to conduct a search depends in part on the finding of facts so closely related to the time of the issuance of the warrant as to justify a belief in the continued existence of probable cause at that time. . . . Although it is reasonable to infer that probable cause dwindles as time passes, no single rule can be applied to determine when information has become too old to be reliable. . . . Consequently, whether a reasonable likelihood exists that evidence identified in the warrant affidavit will be found on the subject premises is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buddhu, supra, 264 Conn. 465. "The likelihood that the evidence sought is still in place depends on a number of variables, such as the nature of the crime, of the criminal, of the thing to be seized, and of the place to be searched. . . . [W]hen an activity is of a protracted and continuous nature the passage of time becomes less significant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 465-66. In this case, the information contained in the warrant affidavit regarding the two controlled buys was not so remote in time as to render a finding of probable cause unreasonable. The business of dealing in illegal drugs often involves a course of conduct that continues over a long period of time; State v. Ralston, 7 Conn. App. 660, 682, 510 A.2d 1346, cert. granted on other grounds, 201 Conn. 808, 515 A.2d 380 (1986) (appeal withdrawn October 31, 1986); and is usually considered to be a regenerating activity. State v. Brown, 14 Conn. App. 605, 615, 543 A.2d 750, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 283 (1988). The affidavit in this case alleged that the informant had knowledge that the defendant kept a supply of crack cocaine for sale in his home. The affidavit set forth the details of two controlled buys during which the informant purchased drugs from the defendant, one of which took place in the defendant's apartment and the other in Madrid's apartment no more than ten days prior to the issuance of the warrant. In addition, the affidavit set forth the experienced narcotics investigators' knowledge that narcotics dealers need a supply of drugs as well as other items used to cut, weigh, sell and protect the drugs. Viewing those facts in the light most favorable to upholding the determination of the issuing judge, we conclude that the judge could have reasonably inferred that the defendant was engaged in the continuous business of selling illegal drugs and used his apartment as a "secure operational base." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 180, 770 A.2d 471 (warrant less likely to be stale when defendant's home is "secure operational base" rather than merely "criminal forum of convenience" [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002, 122 S. Ct. 478, 151 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2001). In light of those facts as set forth in the affidavit, the passage of time does not compel the conclusion that the information contained in the warrant affidavit was stale. We conclude that the issuing judge made a reasonable determination that probable cause existed on the basis of the information contained in the warrant application. II The defendant next claims that the court improperly denied his motions to suppress and to dismiss in violation of his state and federal due process rights because the failure to provide him with the dates of the controlled buys deprived him of the ability to make the necessary showing to compel a Franks hearing. The defendant advances his claim entirely with arguments that the court improperly denied his motions for disclosure. As such, we do not review his claim. General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: "When a defendant, prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress or motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may file an appeal . The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied the motion to suppress or the motion to dismiss. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Although the defendant's claim is cast as a challenge to the court's denials of his motions to suppress and to dismiss, his claim is, in reality, a challenge to the court's denial of his motion for disclosure. The defendant himself rephrased his claim in his brief to this court and asserted that "the trial court's rulings denying disclosure of the dates of the alleged buys . . . violated [his] right to due process . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Such a claim is not reviewable pursuant to § 54-94a, nor is it a rare exception mandating review pursuant to State v. Revelo, 256 Conn. 494, 503, 775 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052, 122 S. Ct. 639, 151 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2001). Although the defendant requests Golding review of his claim, to grant such review would be to render the restrictions of § 54-94a meaningless. As such, we will not review his claim. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978), a defendant is entitled to challenge the veracity of an affidavit or testimony given in support of an application for a search warrant. State v. Glenn, 47 Conn. App. 706, 708, 707 A.2d 736 (1998), aff'd, 251 Conn. 567, 740 A.2d 856 (1999). If a defendant wants a Franks hearing to challenge the truthfulness of an affidavit underlying a warrant, he must (1) make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit and (2) show that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause. State v. Bangulescu, 80 Conn. App. 26, 33, 832 A.2d 1187 (2003). The defendant filed a motion for disclosure requesting that the court order the disclosure of "[a]ny and all documents, records and/or information pertaining to the specific dates" of the controlled buys. The court denied his motion. In State v. Revelo, supra, 256 Conn. 503, our Supreme Court stated that "in the absence of a showing of good cause, an appellate court should decline to review an issue that has not been raised in accordance with the provisions of § 54-94a. . . . [S]uch good cause is likely to be established only infrequently." The court concluded, however, that that case presented one of the "rare exceptions to the general rule of unreviewability"; id.; because the defendant's due process claim gave rise to an important issue and the undisputed facts of that case established a constitutional violation. Id., 503-504. See State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

Opinion PER CURIAM. In this criminal appeal from his conviction of sexual assault in the third degree, the defendant, Arthur Esposito, claims that (1) the evidence was insuf ficient for the jury to have found him guilty and (2) the trial court's instructions to the jury relieved the state of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following relevant facts. At approximately 4 a.m. on November 11, 2000, as the female victim was walking home, she encountered the defendant, whom she did not know. As he began to talk to her, she attempted to ignore him and continued on her way at a faster pace. The defendant then ran after the victim and grabbed her from behind. In doing so, he placed one hand on her breast and used his other hand to cover her mouth. The defendant then attempted to force the victim into a driveway between houses. To prevent her from crying out, he put his fingers in her mouth. The victim bit his fingers, causing him to let go and flee. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was apprehended. I The defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of sexual assault in the third degree. We review the defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim by construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and, in doing so, we determine whether, on the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Berger, 249 Conn. 218, 224, 733 A.2d 156 (1999). General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other person or a third person . . . ." The term "sexual contact," in turn, is defined in relevant part as "any contact with the intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person . . . ." General Statutes § 53a-65 (3). Although the defendant concedes for the purpose of this appeal that there was sufficient evidence to establish that he grabbed the victim's breast, he contends that the evidence legally was insufficient for the jury to have found that he did so for the purpose of sexual gratification or to degrade or to humiliate the victim. We disagree. It is axiomatic that a jury may infer intent from behavior. As our Supreme Court previously has stated, it is difficult to prove intent because "direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn. 229, 239-40, 745 A.2d 800 (2000). In this instance, the record amply supports the jury's conclusion that after first trying to get the victim's attention by calling to her, and then chasing her, the defendant grabbed the victim by the breast while attempting to prevent her from calling out, either for the purpose of sexual gratification or to degrade or to humiliate her. II The defendant next claims that the court improperly instructed the jury on the element of intent in the offense of sexual assault in the third degree. Specifi cally, the defendant claims that the instruction was improper in that it relieved the state of its burden of proving specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt because the court implied that in order to prove that he intended to gratify himself sexually or to cause humiliation to the victim, the state merely had to prove that he grabbed the victim's breast. We are not persuaded. At the outset, we note that the defendant did not raise his claim at trial and now seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). He neither submitted a request to charge outlining the elements of the offense, nor excepted to the court's charge. Because the record is adequate for our review and the defendant's claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right, we will review his claim. See State v. Williamson, 206 Conn. 685, 708, 539 A.2d 561 (1988) ("[i]t is . . . constitutionally axiomatic that the jury be instructed on the essential elements of the crime charged"). "[U]nder . . . Golding, a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved constitutional claim of instructional error only if, considering the substance of the charge rather than the form of what was said, [i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled. . [A] jury instruction is constitutionally adequate if it provides the jurors with a clear understanding of the elements of the crime charged, and affords them proper guidance for their determination of whether those elements were pre sent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ingram, 73 Conn. App. 246, 251, 807 A.2d 1023 (2002). Here, the defendant cannot demonstrate that it was reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the court's instruction, as our careful review of the entire charge discloses that the court did, in fact, articulate and correctly charge on each essential element of the offense of sexual assault in the third degree, and the court did not, at any point in its instructions, suggest to the jurors that they could find "sexual contact," as statutorily defined, solely from the act of grabbing the victim's breast. We therefore conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that a constitutional violation clearly exists that clearly deprived him of a fair trial. Accordingly, his claims fails under Golding's third prong. The judgment is affirmed. At trial, the defendant was charged with kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a), sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) (1) (A), assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1) and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a). Although the defendant was convicted of all charged offenses, he has challenged only his conviction on the sexual assault charge. Golding held that a defendant may prevail on a constitutional claim unpreserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: "(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40.

O'Connell, J. This is the plaintiff's appeal from a defendants' judgment in an action, tried to the court, for a real estate commission. The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in concluding (1) that a real estate broker who earns a commission pursuant to an agreement that complies with General Statutes § 20-325a must in addition demonstrate that the written agreement complies with General Statutes § 20-325b, (2) that the statements of the named defendant did not constitute a judicial admission that the real estate commission at issue was due, (3) that the defendants were not equitably estopped from asserting the protection of General Statutes § 20-325a and 20-325b as a defense to the plaintiffs claim, and (4) that the defendants were not liable under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. We find no error. The plaintiff was a licensed real estate broker in the full-time employ of the Uniroyal Corporation as a real estate specialist. The defendants, two of whom were socially acquainted with the plaintiff, owned acreage situated partially in Middlebury and partially in South-bury. The defendants asked the plaintiff to seek a buyer for their property. After obtaining permission from Uniroyal, the plaintiff and the defendants discussed the matter in greater detail, the result of which was an exclusive listing agreement executed by all parties on November 30,1981. This agreement set an asking price of $590,000 and a 10 percent commission for the plaintiff. The agreement, however, did not conform to General Statutes § 20-325b concerning notice as to the negotiability of an agent's commission. See footnote 2, supra. By its terms, this agreement expired on May 30,1982, and as of that date the plaintiff's efforts had not produced a buyer, nor were they more successful during a purported oral six-month extension of the listing agreement. Sometime after the expiration of the "oral extension" the plaintiff learned of a prospect developed by another broker. Working in conjunction with the other broker, an option was signed on May 13,1983. This option was ultimately exercised and a closing took place on March 28,1985. In this option, the defendants acknowledged the services of the plaintiff and the cobroker as the sole brokers involved in the transaction. At the closing, the defendants, acting on advice of counsel, refused to pay the plaintiff any commission whatsoever, giving rise to this action. The action was tried to the court on a four count amended complaint. The first count was in fraud; the second count alleged a breach of the listing agreement and the option; the third count was based on an offer of compromise; and the fourth count alleged estoppel against the defendants from raising a defense of a flaw in the listing agreement. Judgment was rendered for the defendants on all counts. We find no error. I General Statutes § 20-325a (b) is dispositive of this appeal. This statute expressly prohibits the bringing of an action for a real estate commission unless the services were rendered pursuant to a written contract (i.e., a listing agreement). Howland v. Schweir, 7 Conn. App. 709, 713, 510 A.2d 215 (1986). The trial court specifically found that the plaintiffs efforts were unavailing during the original six-month term or in the six-month "oral extension." This finding is fatal to the plaintiff's case. When the plaintiff continued rendering services after the end of the agreement or the "extension" thereof, those services were performed "without the benefit of a proper listing agreement and were thus performed at his peril." Id., 715. Therefore, once the agreement expired, the plaintiff could not recover for any services rendered beyond that date. II The plaintiff seeks to circumvent the real estate listing statute by arguing (1) that the defendants are equitably estopped from raising the defense of the plaintiff's noncompliance with General Statutes § 20-325a and 20-325b, and (2) that the court should impose liability on the defendants because they have been unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's services. General Statutes § 20-325a has been strictly construed and enforced. Thornton Real Estate v. Lobdell, 184 Conn. 228, 230-31, 439 A.2d 964 (1981); Howland v. Schweir, supra. The scenario arising most commonly in cases of real estate commission claims, when there has not been compliance with the listing statute, as here, presents a fact pattern in which a real estate owner allegedly reaps the benefits of a broker's services without paying for them. To allow recovery on either of the plaintiffs legal theories in the present case would nullify § 20-325a and emasculate the state's real estate sales licensing system. See generally General Statutes § 20-311 through 20-329bb. We find no merit in the plaintiff's claim that the defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting the defense of noncompliance with General Statutes § 20-325a. " 'Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed . as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.' " Brock v. Cavanaugh, 1 Conn. App. 138, 141-42, 468 A.2d 1242 (1984), quoting Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232, 241, 413 A.2d 834 (1979). It is a long standing tenet of the law of equitable estoppel that a party requesting such relief cannot contribute to the hardship claimed, through his own ignorance of the essential facts of the matter in question. "There could be no duty resting upon [the defendant] to communicate facts to the plaintiff of which he was ignorant only by his own negligence. One setting up an estoppel in pais, is himself bound to the exercise of good faith and due diligence to know the truth." Huntley v. Holt, 58 Conn. 445, 450, 20 A. 469 (1890); 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel & Waiver § 80, and cases cited therein. This plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker since 1958, should have been aware of the strict legal prerequisites to obtaining a broker's commission in a real estate sale as set forth in the laws governing such transactions. We cannot apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in a case in which the party requesting the relief claims ignorance of the laws governing his profession, when such ignorance of the law is the primary cause of his need for such relief. Thus, we conclude that equitable estoppel does not apply in the present case. The plaintiff attempts to support his unjust enrichment argument by drawing an analogy to the statute of frauds. General Statutes § 52-550a. This argument and the cases cited in support thereof, are of no aid to the plaintiff. The statute of frauds analogy has been specifically addressed and discredited by the Supreme Court in clear and unambiguous language: "[Real estate] listing contracts are governed exclusively by section 20-325a; such contracts do not fall within our statute of frauds." (Emphasis added.) William Pitt, Inc. v. Taylor, 186 Conn. 82, 84, 438 A.2d 1206 (1982). Further, with regard to the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief, Justice Parskey, while on the Superior Court bench, analyzed a quantum meruit claim in a case in which a listing agreement proved faulty. Good v. Paine Furniture Co., 35 Conn. Sup. 24, 27-28, 391 A.2d 741 (1978). Justice Parskey's search of the precedents from other jurisdictions led him to note that "statutes comparable to § 20-325a (b) which have been enacted in other jurisdictions have been strictly construed by the courts. Thus, licensed real estate brokers who have failed to produce evidence of written brokerage agreements which comply with statutes such as § 20-325a (b) have been precluded from recovering in quantum meruit. Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal. App. 2d 229, 237-38; Peacock Realty Company v. E. Thomas Crandall Farm, Inc., 108 R.I. 593, 596." Good v. Paine Furniture Co., supra, 27-28. We agree with this analysis. In view of the grounds of our disposition of this appeal, we do not reach the plaintiffs other claims of error. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. "[General Statutes] Sec. 20-325a. actions to recover commissions ARISING OUT OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, (a) No person who ÍS not licensed under the provisions of this chapter, and who was not so licensed at the time he performed the acts or rendered the services for which recovery is sought, shall commence or bring any action in any court of this state, after October 1,1971, to recover any commission, compensation or other payment in respect of any act done or service rendered by him, the doing or rendering of which is prohibited under the provisions of this chapter except by persons duly licensed under this chapter. "(b) No person, licensed under the provisions of this chapter, shall commence or bring any action in respect of any acts done or services rendered after October 1,1971, as set forth in subsection (a), unless such acts or services were rendered pursuant to a contract or authorization from the person for whom such acts were done or services rendered. To satisfy the requirements of this subsection any such contract or authorization shall (1) be in writing, (2) contain the names and addresses of all the parties thereto, (3) show the date on which such contract was entered into or such authorization given, (4) contain the conditions of such contract or authorization and (5) be signed by the owner or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner only by a written document executed in the manner provided for conveyances in section 47-5, and by the real estate broker or his authorized agent. "(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person excepted from the provisions of this chapter by section 20-329 with respect to any acts performed by him which are included in such exception." "[General Statutes] Sec. 20-325b. certain real estate agreements TO CONTAIN NOTICE REGARDING COMMISSIONS. REQUIREMENTS. Each written agreement which fixes the compensation to be paid to a real estate broker for the sale of real property shall contain the following statement in not less than ten point boldface type or in a manner which otherwise stands out significantly from the text immediately preceding any provision of such agreement relating to compensation of the broker: "NOTICE: THE AMOUNT OR RATE OF REAL ESTATE COMMISSION IS NOT FIXED BY LAW, THEY ARE SET BY EACH BROKER INDIVIDUALLY AND MAY BE NEGOTIABLE BETWEEN THE SELLER AND BROKER." We need not pass upon the trial court's apparent recognition of the validity of an oral extension of a written real estate agreement. General Statutes § 20-325a. The trial court found that there was no factual basis for the first count, alleging fraud, and that finding'has not been appealed. The third count, alleging an offer of compromise, was voluntarily abandoned by the plaintiff at trial. The trial court's memorandum construed the fourth count as a claim for unjust enrichment stating: "Although the words are not used, the essence of this count is that by accepting the benefit of the plaintiff's work they will be unjustly enriched if they do not compensate him."

O'Connell, J. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction of two counts of risk of injury to a minor, in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. The charges stemmed from the sexual abuse of the defendant's son, C, and daughter, R, ages six and three and one-half respectively, at the time of the crimes. The defendant claims the trial court erred (1) in admitting hearsay testimony regarding R's identification of the defendant as her assailant, (2) in determining that the defendant's son was competent to testify, and (3) in its instruction to the jury on circumstantial evidence. We find no error. The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On the evening of October 29,1984, the defendant brought R, who spoke only Spanish, to the emergency room at Danbury Hospital, suffering from a copious vaginal discharge. Such an abnormal discharge suggested two potential causes: a foreign body within the vagina causing an infection; or venereal disease, particularly gonorrhea. Attempts at an examination to determine whether a foreign body was present were inconclusive, and tests for gonorrhea required forty-eight hours to render conclusive results. The defendant took the child home before the cause of the discharge could be determined but brought her back the following evening. Upon R's return to the hospital, the examining physician enlisted the aid of a Spanish-speaking security guard to take R's medical history. Out of the presence of the defendant and the doctor, R indicated to the security guard, without speaking but by nodding her head, that she had not placed foreign objects inside her body, that she had been molested and that the molesting individual was her father. The security guard attempted to have the child repeat her responses in the presence of the treating physician but she refused. The defendant ultimately agreed to admit R to the hospital that night. The culture taken from R tested positive for a strain of gonorrhea for which the defendant had been treated only two days earlier. The trial court found that R was unavailable to testify because she had stopped responding to questions regarding the relationship with her father and as the trial approached, began to experience nightmares and incidents of vomiting. At trial, the hospital security guard testified concerning his conversation with the child. After a hearing on the issue of competency, the court allowed C, the defendant's son, to testify. C testified that the defendant had sexually molested both children. I The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence R's nonverbal "statements" identifying him as her assailant. He claims that the admission of this hearsay evidence was both an erroneous evidentiary ruling and a violation of his right of confrontation under both the state and federal constitutions. We disagree. A The state contends that R's identification of her father as her assailant falls within three exceptions to the hearsay rule: (1) as a statement made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis; (2) as an excited utterance; and (3) as a statement which is admissible under the residual hearsay exception. We find the statement admissible under the first of the three exceptions and need not determine whether the remaining exceptions apply. Connecticut recognizes nonverbal communications as hearsay statements. Hine et al., Appeal from Probate, 68 Conn. 551, 557-58, 37 A.2d 384 (1897); C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (1986 Sup.) § 11.2, pp. 146-47. Connecticut also recognizes a long standing exception to the hearsay rule which allows into evidence statements made by a patient to a physician for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment. Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 272, 274, 205 A.2d 773 (1964); Gilmore v. American Tube & Stamping Co., 79 Conn. 498, 504, 66 A. 4 (1907); B. Holden & J. Daly, Connecticut Evidence (1988 Sup.), § 100c, p. 985; Tait & LaPlante, supra. This case requires us to determine (1) whether the "statements" made by R fall within the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule, and (2) whether such statements which actually identify an assailant are admissible under that same exception. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (4), which is virtually identical to the rule established in Connecticut case law, has given rise to a line of cases making the exception applicable to cases involving physical or sexual abuse of children. The court in United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), utilized a two part test to determine whether hearsay statements should have been admitted under the medical treatment exception. "First, [was] the declarant's motive consistent with the purpose of [obtaining medical treatment]; and second, [was] it reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment." Id., 84. Such a test ensures that the information being allowed into evidence was rendered with a guarantee of trustworthiness sufficient to justify an exception to the hearsay rule. Both criteria are satisfied in the present case. R, the young abuse victim, was told by the Spanish-speaking security guard that he was questioning her to aid in the doctor's treatment. The security guard testified that R understood what she was being told. She was aware that she had a problem that needed medical attention, and was not coached as to expected replies. There is no indication that R's responses were motivated by any reason other than the need for treatment. As to the second prong of the Iron Shell test, the information sought was relevant to treatment and was reasonably relied upon by the treating physician. Given the limited number of potential causes for R's infection, the uncertainty of the diagnosis at the time of R's questioning and the absence of other possible sources of infection, it was reasonable for the treating physician to rely upon the information gleaned from R's conversation with the security guard. While statements regarding causation or identification are not generally allowed into evidence under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule; see Tait & LaPlante, supra, § 11.12c; the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has carved an exception out of this restriction which we adopt today. In United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), the court applied the medical treatment exception to the identification by an eleven year old sexual assault victim, of her stepfather as her abuser. While acknowledging that the court in United States v. Iron Shell, supra, found that statements to a treating physician regarding identity of an assailant " 'would seldom, if ever' be reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis"; United States v. Renville, supra, 436, quoting United States v. Iron Shell, supra, 84; the Renville court made an exception for cases in which the party being identified as the assailant in a sexual abuse case was a member of the victim's household: "We believe that a statement by a child abuse victim that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate household presents a sufficiently different case from that envisaged by the drafters of rule 803 (4) [so] that it should not fall under the general rule. Statements by a child abuse victim to a physician during an examination that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate household are reasonably pertinent to treatment." (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Renville, supra, 436. The Renville rationale applies in the present case. First, the injury in question is not purely somatic. It is beyond dispute that child abuse results in emotional and psychological, as well as physical, injury. An aspect of these less apparent, but equally devastating forms of injury, may be directly linked with the identity of the abuser. While the identity of a party causing an injury is rarely germane to medical treatment, "the exact nature and extent of psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often depend on the identity of the abuser." United States v. Renville, supra, 437. "The psychological sequelae of sexual molestation by a father, other relative, or family friend may be different and require different treatment than those resulting from abuse by a stranger. . . . Furthermore, effective treatment may require that the victim avoid contact with the abuser, not just to prevent further abuse, but also to facilitate recovery from past abuse." (Citations omitted.) State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 200, 735 P.2d 801, 810 (1987). In the present case, the fact that R's abuser was her father could have had untold adverse emotional and psychological effects, subject to successful diagnosis and treatment only with the physician's knowledge of the assailant's identity. Second, although a statement regarding fault is not ordinarily relevant to prevention of recurrence, in cases of sexual abuse in the home, there is a direct correlation between identity and recurrence. Because child abuse cases often reveal a pattern of continued abuse, information regarding identity is often necessary to diagnose the extent and likelihood of further harm to the victim. United States v. Renville, supra. "Information that the abuser is a member of the household is therefore 'reasonably pertinent' to a course of treatment which includes removing the child from the home." Id., 438. We therefore conclude that in cases of sexual abuse in the home, hearsay statements made in the course of medical treatment which reveal the identity of the abuser, are reasonably pertinent to treatment and are admissible. B The defendant also claims that the admission of the hearsay statements violated his constitutional confron- tation rights. The existence of numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule indicate that the right to confrontation is not absolute under all circumstances. State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 695, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987). The U.S. Supreme Court holds that dispensing with in-court confrontation is permitted if two conditions are met: (1) if the declarant's in-court testimony is unavailable, and (2) if the declarant's out-of-court statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). The trial court properly found that R was unavailable to testify because of severe and repeated adverse physical and psychological reactions to attempts to prepare her for trial. In Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court also held that the second prong of the test, the indicia of reliability, "can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Ohio v. Roberts, supra. This second requisite is satisfied by our conclusion that R's "statements" to the security guard fall within the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. See State v. Robinson, supra (statement of five-year old sexual abuse victim to physician regarding abuse and the identity of her abuser admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803 (4) and, therefore, not a violation of the confrontation clause). "We note, moreover, that the [United States] Supreme Court has construed the confrontation clause in a pragmatic fashion, recognizing the need to balance the rights of the accused against the public's 'strong interest in effective law enforcement.' Ohio v. Roberts, [supra, 64], That interest is nowhere stronger than in the case of defenseless child abuse victims. " (Emphasis added.) United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1447 (8th Cir. 1986). Applying the protections established by the United States Supreme Court to the facts of the present case, we conclude that the admission of R's communications did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights. II The defendant next assigns error to the trial court's determination of C's competency to testify. It is beyond dispute that the age of a witness is not the decisive factor in determining his competency; State v. Stankowski, 184 Conn. 121, 139, 439 A.2d 918 (1981); and that this determination is a matter in which the trial court is granted substantial discretion. State v. Martin, 189 Conn. 1, 9, 454 A.2d 256, cert, denied, 461 U.S. 933, 103 S. Ct. 2098, 77 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1983). A trial court's ruling will be disturbed only upon a finding of clear abuse of that discretion or an error of law. State v. Barkal, 8 Conn. App. 313, 315, 512 A.2d 972, cert, denied, 201 Conn. 812, 517 A.2d 630 (1986). Our review of the record in the present case indicates no abuse of discretion or error of law. The trial court's unusually thorough inquiry was more than adequate for its evaluation of the child's maturity and its effect on his ability to receive accurate sensory impressions, to recall and narrate events and the subject matter of his testimony, and to appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth. See State v. Barkal, supra. The trial court's determination that C was competent to testify was therefore proper. Ill The defendant's final claim of error concerns the trial court's jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence. The defendant alleges that the instruction impermissibly diluted the state's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, each essential element of the offenses charged, because it stated that an inference to be drawn need only be reasonable and logical. The defendant alleges the charge should have also required the jury to find that any inference drawn be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the defendant's failure to object or take exception to the instruction, we will review the claim, "because it implicates the fundamental constitutional right that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Silano, 204 Conn. 769, 772, 529 A.2d 1283 (1987); State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 327 A.2d 576 (1973). Our disposition of this issue is controlled by the holding in State v. Silano, supra. There, our Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in giving a virtually identical instruction on inferences and circumstantial evidence. The defendant's claim in that case was the same as that made in the present case, namely, that the instruction diluted the standard of proof borne by the state. State v. Silano, supra. The court held otherwise. "We do not perceive the same potential for confusion of the jury in the 'reasonable' and 'logical' language that we have found in the 'more probable than not' phrase. We note that three recent Appellate Court decisions have rejected claims that an instruction permitting a jury to draw 'reasonable and logical' inferences is improper. State v. Widget, [11 Conn. App. 47, 525 A.2d 548 (1987)]; State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683, 691-92, 525 A. 2d 528 (1987); State v. Wright, 9 Conn. App. 275, 280-82, 518 A.2d 658 (1986). 'The statement that inferences should be reasonable and logically drawn is not, in and of itself, erroneous. In fact, such an instruction, it has previously been recognized,.is "entirely proper." State v. Wright, supra, 282; see State v. Tatem, 194 Conn. 594, 598, 483 A.2d 1087 (1984); D. Borden & L. Orland, Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions § 2.5, pp. 43-44.' State v. Wylie, supra, 691." State v. Silano, supra, 774 With regard to circumstantial evidence, the trial court in the present case expressly instructed the jury that "[wjhether or not to draw an inference or a conclusion of fact and whether it's proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as I've stated before, is entirely up to you." Cf. State v. Wylie, supra, 691-92. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Although the defendant makes his claim under both article first, § 8 of the constitution of Connecticut and the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, "he offers no separate analysis of the Connecticut constitution as a basis for different treatment of the federal and state constitutional claims. We decline to undertake such analysis." State v. Foshay, 12 Conn. App. 1, 14 n.10, 530 A.2d 611 (1987). Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (4) provides: "The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment — Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." We note also that although under the federal rule, a witness' unavailability need not be proven for the exception to apply, the trial court found that R was in fact unavailable. The fact that R's nonverbal communications were made to a security-guard and not directly to the treating physician does not change our holding in this case. The comments of the advisory committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "[u]nder the exception the statement need not have been made to a physician. Statements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers or even members of the family ought be included." (Emphasis added.) Fed. R. Evid. 803 (4), advisory committee's note. We also note that neither the defendant nor the state has addressed this aspect of the issue in their briefs. This case was tried before the effective date of Public Acts 1985, No. 85-587 which amended General Statutes § 54-86h, substantially altering child witness competency determinations in cases where a "child . is a victim of assault, sexual assault or abuse . . . . " The court charged the jury, with regard to inferences, as follows: "In passing upon the facts which you must find it is your duty first to consider all the evidence in this case bearing upon the issue presented and you may also draw such proper inferences from the facts as you may have found proved already and infer from those facts those conclusions which are reasonable and logical. If you find underlying facts have been proven, it's up to you and you alone to determine whether these underlying facts reasonably and logically lead to an inference or a conclusion of fact."

Borden, J. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-136, and larceny in the second degree in violation of § 53a-123. He claims that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to suppress the victim's out-of-court and in-court identifications of the defendant, (2) in summarizing in its charge to the jury only the evidence favorable to the state on the disputed issue of identity, (3) in instructing the jury regarding drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence, and (4) in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence, based on his claim of double jeopardy. We find no reversible error. The jury could have reasonably found the following facts: On the afternoon of January 7,1985, Mary Ellen Rockwell exited from a New Haven restaurant owned by her and entered an adjacent alley, carrying three bags containing cash, check and credit card proceeds totalling more than $3500. In the alley, Rockwell observed an individual crouching behind a nearby dumpster. The individual approached Rockwell, pushed her to the ground, took the bags, and ran away. Although a nylon stocking was pulled over the robber's face, Rockwell was able to give the police a description of her assailant's age, height, race, build, facial features, and clothing. Three days later, the police took Rockwell to the parking lot at the defendant's place of employment and simply told her to observe individuals at that location. After a number of individuals, including about seven white males, entered the parking lot, the defendant, a white male, arrived at the location. Thereupon, Rockwell identified the defendant as her assailant. I The defendant contends that the identification procedure used by the police at his place of employment was unnecessarily suggestive and the resulting identification was unreliable. He also claims that the victim's in-court identification of him was tainted by the out-of-court identification and should have been suppressed. We disagree. In order to succeed on his motion to suppress the identification evidence, the defendant was required to prove (1) that the identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive, and (2) that the resulting identification was not reliable in the totality of the circumstances. State v. Boucino, 199 Conn. 207, 218-19, 506 A.2d 125 (1986). The defendant argues that the challenged identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive for a variety of reasons. Our Supreme Court has upheld the validity of "public place" identifications similar to that used in the present case. See, e.g., State v. Ruiz, 202 Conn. 316, 320-23, 521 A.2d 1025 (1987); State v. Amarillo, 198 Conn. 285, 291-93, 503 A.2d 146 (1986). As in Ruiz, the defendant here has failed "to specify any action of the police that can fairly be charac terized as misconduct related to the identification"; State v. Ruiz, supra, 320; "[h]e does not maintain that the officers accompanying [the witness] did anything to induce her to select the defendant from the many people she observed as she sat in the parked car." Id. "Therefore, although the victim believed that she was [present in the parking lot] to view a possible suspect, she was not presented with the defendant in a manner suggesting that the police believed him to be her assailant. The defendant was viewed . . . in a public place. The police officers] escorting] the victim . . . did not direct any attention to the defendant nor ask the victim any questions concerning the defendant." State v. Amarillo, supra, 292. Accordingly, the identification procedure used here was not impermissibly suggestive, and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the victim's in-court and out-of-court identifications. II The defendant's second claim of error merits little discussion. While summarizing the evidence in the course of its charge to the jury, the court stated: "But, at any rate, at the parking lot at Porto's, as I recall her testimony, [the victim] recognized the defendant Anthony De Matteo as the person who in fact robbed her." The defendant contends that this portion of the instruction constitutes error because it "unfairly and unnecessarily highlighted the state's evidence." For all of the reasons set forth in State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 464-67, 464 A.2d 829 (1983), we likewise conclude that "[t]he charge was a quite proper and balanced exercise of the judicial function of instructing the jury on the respective functions of court and jury. . . . The instructions, read in their entirety, did not direct or advise the jury on how to decide the matter, and fairly presented the case to the jury in such a way that no injustice was done to the defendant." Id., 467; see also State v. Avila, 13 Conn. App. 120, 123-24, 534 A.2d 913 (1987) (per curiam). Ill In his third claim of error, the defendant challenges the court's instruction to the jury regarding circumstantial evidence, claiming that the instruction unconstitutionally diluted the state's burden to prove all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the defendant failed to object or except to this instruction at trial, we review this claim under the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 327 A.2d 576 (1973), because it implicates a fundamental constitutional right. State v. Hufford, 205 Conn. 386, 406, 533 A.2d 866 (1987); State v. Biggs, 13 Conn. App. 12, 20, 534 A.2d 1217 (1987). Affording the defendant's claim the appropriate scope of review; see, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673, 690-92, 535 A.2d 345 (1987); State v. Hufford, supra, 407-408; State v. Robinson, 204 Conn. 207, 210-11, 527 A.2d 694 (1987) (per curiam); State v. Mullings, 202 Conn. 1, 12-14, 519 A.2d 58 (1987); State v. Biggs, supra, 21-23; State v. Walker, 9 Conn. App. 373, 376-77, 519 A.2d 83 (1986); State v. Farrar, 7 Conn. App. 149, 152-56, 508 A.2d 49, cert, denied, 200 Conn. 805, 512 A.2d 229 (1986); we find that this claim is controlled by State v. Farrar, supra, in which a •nearly identical charge was challenged on appeal. As in Farrar, "[w]e conclude, therefore, that although it was error for the court to charge as it did, considering the overall charge and its likely effect on the jury, it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled. . . . The error, therefore, was not reversible." (Citation omitted.) Id., 156. IV In his final claim of error, the defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant was sentenced to seven years for larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (3), and three years for robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-136, with the sentences to run con secutively. In his motion, the defendant claimed that "multiple punishment for larceny [in the second degree] and robbery [in the third degree] arising out of the same set of facts is a violation of the double jeopardy protection of [the] Connecticut and the United States Constitution^]." "The double jeopardy prohibition [of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution] applies to the states because of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. State v. McCall, 187 Conn. 73, 89, 444 A.2d 896 (1982). Double jeopardy attaches where multiple punishments are imposed for the same offense in a single trial. Id. The question to be resolved is whether the two offenses charged are actually one. It must be determined, by an examination of the statutes, the information, and the bill of particulars, if any, and exclusive of the evidence introduced, whether proof of the violation of one statute requires proof of the violation of the other statute. If the elements of the greater offense include all of the elements of the lesser offense, then double jeopardy attaches. Id., 91; see also State v. Amaral, 179 Conn. 239, 425 A.2d 1293 (1979). '[T]he test-to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.' Blockburgerv. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932)." State v. Harris, 11 Conn. App. 397, 402-403, 527 A.2d 724, cert, denied, 205 Conn. 801, 529 A.2d 719 (1987). The defendant argues that a conviction for robbery presupposes the commission of a larceny, and that therefore the larceny conviction here did not require proof of any additional fact which the robbery conviction did not. We disagree. The defendant correctly points out that a conviction for robbery presupposes the commission of a larceny. This, however, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that double jeopardy principles have been violated. See State v. Boucino, supra, 222-24; see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-4), 1 Conn. App. 642, 645, 474 A.2d 485 (1984) (evidence insufficient to sustain conviction of larceny in the second degree held sufficient to sustain conviction of robbery in the third degree). Rather, we must examine the statutes and the information charging the defendant with these crimes to determine whether each charge requires proof of a fact which the other does not. In making this determination, we are concerned with theoretical possibilities, and do not focus on the evidence presented. State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 60-63, 301 A.2d 547 (1972); State v. Harris, supra, 402-403. It is clear that § 53a-123 (a) (3) and § 53a-136 each require proof of a fact which the other does not. Larceny from the person pursuant to § 53a-123 (a) (3) requires an actual trespass to the person of another; it is a conceptually separate and distinct offense from simple larceny, which requires only proof of a taking of property with intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-4), supra, 645. In State v. Crowe, 174 Conn. 129, 134, 384 A.2d 340 (1977), our Supreme Court aligned itself with those courts which define a larceny "from the person" as "requir[ing] a taking from the actual person," as opposed to "a taking of property in the possession and control of the owner. . In our view, larceny from the person requires an actual trespass to the person of the victim. Because of the trespass to the person, the offense is a serious crime in itself so that the value of the property stolen does not enter into the magnitude of the crime. On the other hand, the removal of the property from the presence or control of the victim lacks such a trespass and is insufficient to constitute larceny from the person. We are, therefore, in accord with the rule that larceny from the person is a separate and distinct offense from that of simple larceny." Id. The larceny which underlies a conviction for robbery in the third degree, however, only requires proof of a simple larceny together with the use or threatened use of force. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-4), supra. Larceny in the second degree, as charged in the state's long form information, required proof that the defendant "with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person . . . wrongfully took, obtained and withheld property from the person of Mary Ellen Rockwell . . . ." Robbery in the third degree, as charged in that information, required proof that the defendant "did use physical force upon Mary Ellen Rockwell in the course of committing a larceny for the purpose of compelling the owner of property to deliver up that property. . . ." Under this information, it was possible, in the course of committing a larceny, to "use physical force upon Mary Ellen Rockwell" for the purpose of compelling her "to deliver up" her property, without also taking property from her person. For example, one can imagine a scenario in which the defendant, in the course of committing a larceny from Rockwell, used physical force upon her for the purpose of compelling her to deliver up property of hers which was in her presence or control but which was not taken from her person. Thus, under this information, the conviction of larceny in the second degree required proof of a fact, namely, a taking from the actual person of the victim as opposed to a taking from her presence and control, which the conviction of robbery in the third degree did not require. Accordingly, the defendant's convictions for larceny in the second degree and robbery in the third degree were not constitutionally defective, and the separate sentences imposed for those offenses were proper. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The court instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence as follows: "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that you must have direct evidence supporting a fact. You may apply the rule of circumstantial evidence. This rule involves the offering of evidence of facts from which you are asked to infer the existence of another fact or a set of facts. Such an inference may be made provided two elements in the application of this rule are satisfied. "First, that the fact from which you are asked to draw the inference has itself been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and secondly, that the inference asked to be drawn is not only logical and reasonable, but is strong enough so that you can find that it is more probable than not that the fact to be inferred is true. "It is your right to draw inferences if you conclude that the facts you find proven reasonably establish other facts by reason and logic and are not the result of speculation, surmise or guesswork. "If from the facts you find proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you reasonably do infer other facts, you may then use the facts so inferred as a basis for a further inference that other facts exist, including the facts going to establish the guilt or the innocence of the defendant." General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (3) provides in pentinent part: "(a) A person is guilty of larceny in the second degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and: . (3) the property, regardless of its nature or value, is taken from the person of another . . . ." "Larceny" is defined in General Statutes § 53a-119 as follows: "A person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner. . . ." "A person is guilty of robbery in the third degree when he commits robbery." General Statutes § 53a-136 (a). "Robbery" is defined in General Statutes § 53a-133 as follows: "A person commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for the purpose of: (1) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or (2) compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny." The defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence and his preliminary statement of issues to this court both base this claim on federal and state constitutional grounds. In his brief, however, the defendant only refers to the federal constitution with respect to this claim of error. We therefore consider any claim of error based on state constitutional grounds to be abandoned. Pepe v. New Britain, 203 Conn. 281, 282 n.l, 524 A.2d 629 (1987).

Per Curiam. The appellants challenge a judgment rendered by the trial court removing the plaintiff as a coexecutor of the decedent's estate on the ground that the facts found by the trial court were erroneous. An appellate court may not retry facts and its duty upon review of such a claim is limited to a determination of whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous in this respect or otherwise contrary to law. Practice Book § 4061; Damora v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 113, 441 A.2d 61 (1981); Ram Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. A.B.C. Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2 Conn. App. 54, 56, 475 A.2d 341 (1984). It is the province of the trial court to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence. Edgewood Construction Co. v. West Haven Redevelopment Agency, 170 Conn. 271, 272, 365 A.2d 819 (1976); Essex Savings Bank v. Leeker, 2 Conn. App. 98, 102, 476 A.2d 1071 (1984). This court cannot find facts or draw conclusions from primary facts found, but can only review such findings to determine whether they could legally, logically and reasonably be found and whether the trial court could thereby conclude as it did. Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 676-77, 443 A.2d 486 (1982); Hallmark of Farmington v. Roy, 1 Conn. App. 278, 280-81, 471 A.2d 651 (1984). Our review of the record and briefs, with particular attention to the trial court's exhaustive and carefully drawn memorandum of decision, indicates that the factual findings of the court are fully supported by the evidence and its legal conclusions are legally and logically sound. There is no error.

Bieluch, J. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) and 53a-8, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (3), larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (2), and four counts of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 and 53a-8. The defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in admitting into evidence an eyewitness' in-court identification of him, (2) in denying ids pretrial motion in limine to bar the prosecution's use of the testimony of a witness who admitted that she had previously committed perjury, and (3) in allowing this witness to testify that she had previously given false testimony because she had been threatened, although the defendant was not connected to these threats. We find no error. The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On February 5, 1983, two masked men robbed the Medi Mart pharmacy on the Boston Post Road in Waterford. The two men were armed and stole cash and store merchandise, including almost one hundred wristwatches. The defendant and another man, Willie Thompson, were later arrested and charged with various crimes in connection with the robbery. The case against the defendant consisted of the seven charges of which he was convicted and addressed whether the defendant was the second armed robber. The evidence at trial included the testimony of the state's witness Tamara Vaill, an eyewitness to the robbery. Vaill testified as to her recollection of the incident including a description of the physical characteristics of the robbers. During the testimony of this witness, the state requested that the trial court order the defendant "to leave that defense table and to walk forward" towards the witness "to give the witness a chance to view him, a nontestimonial view." Following the defendant's objection, the state informed the court that the purpose of this request was to permit the witness to determine if the defendant's height and body structure were consistent with the height and body structure of one of the robbers. Over the defendant's objection, the court ordered the defendant to stand at his counsel's table. The state also called Dinah McNair, Willie Thompson's niece, as a witness. McNair had given a signed statement to the police after the 1983 robbery indicating that she had overheard the defendant and her uncle plan this and other robberies. When called to testify at the defendant's first trial, McNair had denied ever having heard the defendant and Thompson plan the robbery of the Medi Mart pharmacy in Waterford. At this retrial, McNair testified that she had in fact overheard a conversation between the defendant and her uncle, Willie Thompson, regarding a plan to rob the Medi Mart pharmacy in Waterford. McNair testified that the reason she had testified in 1983 inconsistently with her testimony at this trial was that she had been threatened with physical violence just before she testified in the first trial. The court allowed this evidence only for evaluation of the witness' credibility over the objection of the defendant, but warned the jury in these words: "I want to caution you that first of all, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that this defendant, Mr, Graham, was in any way involved with any such threats. . I allowed that evidence strictly so that you could evaluate that along with any other evidence that you might think appropriate in considering the — what weight you would give to this witness' testimony." The defendant was convicted as charged. This appeal followed after sentencing. I The defendant's first claim is that the trial court erroneously allowed an unnecessarily suggestive and unreliable in-court identification procedure when it ordered the defendant to stand at counsel table so that the witness, Tamara Vaill, could determine if his height and body structure were consistent with her previous description of the height and body structure of one of the robbers. The defendant argues that the in-court identification should not have been allowed because it was the product of a suggestive out-of-court conversation between the witness and police detectives and also because there was an insufficient foundation to show the reliability of the identification. In addition, the defendant maintains that the identification should have been excluded because its probative value was low and its prejudicial impact was high. Because we conclude that the procedure at trial was not for the purpose of identification, and because, even if it were, the identification procedure was not tainted by any impermissible out-of-court procedure and was neither unnecessarily suggestive nor unreliable, the defendant cannot prevail on this claim. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court carefully considered the state's request, and ordered the defendant to stand at counsel table only after the court was certain that the sole purpose of the state's request was to enable the witness, who had earlier in her testimony described the robbers' physical charac teristics, to compare the defendant's body structure and height with her previous description of one of the robbers. The court excused the jury as soon as the state made its request and proceeded to question the state as to the precise nature and purpose of its request. The court noted that the witness had already described the physical characteristics of the robbers and granted the state's request over the defendant's objection, saying "I think that this is something that the jury has to evaluate. I see no great difference between someone identifying the [defendant] by . . . facial characteristics when he is the only person sitting at counsel table. That is done all the time, and the jury, of course, takes that into consideration." Before the jury returned, the court once again made sure that the witness was not going to be asked to describe the robber based on her in-court observation of the defendant. The court also asked that the state lay more of a foundation "by asking [the witness] if she recalls those [physical characteristics] and whether she could identify an individual by those characteristics or identify those characteristics in an individual at this time." The court made clear that this foundation must be laid to permit the requested procedure: "If she cannot, of course that takes care of it." The court went on to explain its reasons for permitting the procedure upon a proper foundation by stating "[s]he is not going to — it is my understanding, she is not going to say Mr. Graham is the individual. She cannot. This is — she is simply going to either conclude — her testimony is simply whether or not his certain characteristics are consistent with the individual who conducted the robbery." The state thereupon commenced its voir dire examination of the witness regarding her recollection of the height and body structure of the two individuals who robbed the Medi Mart pharmacy. The court also conducted a voir dire of the witness, asking her whether she "could identify a — those physical characteristics, height and body build and — in this individual, just to the extent as to whether a person fell into that category or not." The witness replied that she could and also, in response to further questioning by the court, that she was basing her description only upon her recollection of what had occurred at the time of the robbery. The court then concluded that "the witness has demonstrated that she is capable of making or not making this identification. Not — it really is not an identification, simply testimony as to whether or not this defendant fits into the category along with maybe a million other people." In response to the defendant's objection that the probative value of the evidence was low and its prejudicial impact was high, the court stated that the evidence was not prejudicial and that its probative value was "probably in the category of not better than something like blood exclusion tests, for example. . I think it is circumstantial evidence. It would not be enough to, by itself, to warrant a conviction. It is not an identification." With the jury still out of the courtroom, the state amended its request and asked that the defendant only be required to stand at counsel table while the witness approached him for a full view. The court accepted this change, but suggested a trial run of the procedure. The defendant was ordered to stand at counsel table and the witness was allowed to stand approximately six feet away to make her observation. Once again, the court noted on the record that the procedure was merely for the stated purpose of ascertaining whether the defendant's height and body structure were consistent with those of either of the two men who robbed the Medi Mart pharmacy on February 5, 1983. After the jury returned to the courtroom, the defendant was asked to stand and the witness came down and stood approximately six feet away, looking at the defendant's height and body size. The state asked if the defendant's height and body size were similar to those of either of the two robbers. The witness responded that the defendant's height and size were consistent with the height and body size of the shorter of the two men who robbed the pharmacy. At no time during this procedure did the witness identify the defendant as one of the robbers based on her in-court observation of his physical characteristics. Even if we assume, arguendo, that this was an identification procedure, this procedure had no greater tendency to suggestiveness than an identification of an accused seated at counsel table. "Any one-on-one in-court identification of an accused conveys the message that the state has arrested and placed on trial a person it believes has committed the crime. Baker v. Hocker, 496 F.2d 615, 617 (9th Cir. 1974). That is the factor that creates the element of suggestiveness, not the extra steps taken here to allow the victim to observe the defendant thoroughly before identifying him." State v. Smith, 200 Conn. 465, 468-69, 512 A.2d 189 (1986). In State v. Smith, supra, our Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a defendant whose identity was confirmed at trial after he was ordered to walk to the area of the witness stand and to recite his name, address and the alphabet. The defendant in Smith conceded that he could be required to stand to be identified, but argued that the order that he approach the victim and speak was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to misidentification. The court, noting the absence of any unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court pretrial identification procedure, upheld the discretion of the trial court to permit the in-eourt procedure. The defendant in our case argues that an unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court identification procedure occurred by claiming that police detectives told the witness before trial that the defendant was one of the men who had committed the robbery. The defendant argues that this suggestive comment occasioned or led to the witness' testimony as to the height and body structure of the defendant. We find no evidence that any comments made by the police to the witness influenced her description of the robbers. Our review of the transcript convinces us that the witness' description was the result of her observations on the day of the robbery, and not of any comments made to her by the police. " 'The [United States] Supreme Court has not extended its exclusionary rule to in-court identification procedures that are suggestive because of the trial setting.' United States v. Domina, [784 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986)]. 'There is no constitutional requirement that an in-court identification confrontation be conducted as a lineup or be otherwise free of suggestion. An in-court testimonial identification must be excluded if it is the product of an out-of-court confrontation arranged by the state, which was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentiflcation.' Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 3 Mass. App. 387, 391, 331 N.E.2d 815 (1975). '[Without more, the mere exposure of the accused to a witness in the suggestive setting of a criminal trial does not amount to the sort of impermissible confrontation with which the due process clause is concerned.' " State v. Smith, supra, 469-70; State v. Cubano, 9 Conn. App. 548, 554-55, 520 A.2d 250 (1987). " 'The general rule regarding in-court identification of a defendant where there has been no pretrial identification is that it is admissible within the discretion of the trial court, with the weight of the identification to be determined by the jury.' " State v. Elliott, 8 Conn. App. 566, 571, 513 A.2d 1285, cert, denied, 201 Conn. 813, 517 A.2d 630 (1986), quoting State v. Frazier, 7 Conn. App. 27, 37, 507 A.2d 509 (1986). "The defendant's protection against the obvious suggestiveness in any courtroom identification confrontation is his right to cross-examination. . . . The innate weakness in any in-court testimonial identification is grounds for assailing its weight rather than its admissibility." (Citations omitted.) State v. Smith, supra, 470. The manner in which a trial court conducts an in-court identification procedure rests within that court's sound discretion. Id. In Smith, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate the defendant's due process rights in granting the state's request that the defendant approach the witness and speak in order to confirm her previous identification of him. In our case, the defendant was merely asked to stand silently at counsel table in order for the witness to ascertain whether his body structure and height were consistent with those of either of the two men who had committed the robbery in question. The witness at no time, either before trial or at trial, specifically identified the defendant as one of the robbers. Even if the procedure employed in this case is considered as an identification procedure, the trial court did not err in permitting the procedure to occur. II The defendant next claims that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his pretrial motion in limine to bar the prosecution's use of the testimony of Dinah McNair, a witness who admitted that she had falsely testified at the defendant's first trial that she had not overheard the defendant and her uncle, Willie Thompson, plan the robbery in question, when in fact she had previously given a written statement to the police stating otherwise. McNair testified at trial that her original written statement to the police after the robbery was an accurate and true statement regarding the conversation she overheard between the defendant and Thompson regarding their plan to rob the Medi Mart pharmacy in Waterford. The witness also testified that the reason she had lied at the defendant's previous trial was because she had been threatened with physical violence prior to her testimony. The court did not err in denying the pretrial motion and in admitting this testimony. The record discloses that the defendant exercised his right and opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The fact of McNair's previous perjury, and her reason for lying in court at the first trial, were clearly set out before the jury. The jury, in the proper exercise of its function, had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witness and the weight of her testimony. "The jury, as the trier of fact, determines the credibility of witnesses, and it is not the province of this court to retry the facts or to determine the weight which should have been accorded witnesses' testimony." S tate v. Findlay, 198 Conn. 328, 334, 502 A.2d 921, cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S. Ct. 2279, 90 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1986). "It is within the province of the jury to determine the credibility and the effect to be given the evidence." State v. Nicoletti, 8 Conn. App. 351, 354, 512 A.2d 235 (1986). Ill The defendant also claims that the court erred in allowing McNair to testify that she had perjured herself in the defendant's first trial because she had been threatened with physical violence prior to that testimony. The defendant objected to the admission of this testimony because, as the jury was later told by the trial court, the defendant was not connected to these threats. Evidence of threats made against a witness in a criminal prosecution is generally admissible when such threats were made with the defendant's knowledge, consent, or authorization. This type of evidence is admissible either on the theory that such conduct is inconsistent with the defendant's claim of innocence or on the theory that the conduct exhibits a consciousness of guilt. State v. Leeean, 198 Conn. 517, 534, 504 A.2d 480, cert, denied, 1176 U.S. 1184, 106 S. Ct. 2922, 91 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1986); State v. Sorbo, 174 Conn. 253, 256, 386 A.2d 221 (1978); State v. Waterman, 7 Conn. App. 326, 351, 509 A.2d 518, cert, denied, 200 Conn. 807, 512 A.2d 231 (1986). Where, however, as in our case, there is no evidence to connect the defendant with the threats, evidence of such threats is not admissible against him. State v. Sorbo, supra; State v. Waterman, supra. In this ease, however, the trial court did not err in allowing the witness to testify that she was threatened prior to her testimony in the defendant's first trial because such evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of determining her credibility, and not as probative of the defendant's guilt. The court was careful to caution the jury that there was no evidence that the defendant was in any way involved in those threats. The court also instructed the jury that the testimony of the witness was allowed "strictly so that you could evaluate that along with any other evidence that you might think appropriate in considering the — what weight you would give to this witness' testimony." These specific instructions were more than adequate to prevent the jury from connecting the defendant to the alleged threats made against the witness and from using against the defendant the evidence of those threats. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Thompson was subsequently convicted of having been one of the armed robbers in this holdup. The defendant was previously tried and convicted of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (3), burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) and 53a-8, larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (2), and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 and 53a-8. On appeal, the defendant's convictions were reversed because of evidentiary errors which occurred at trial. See State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 509 A.2d 493 (1986). This appeal addresses issues which arose from the defendant's second trial. At the defendant's firsc trial, the court declared McNair "hostile" and permitted the state to impeach her testimony with the prior inconsistent statement concerning the Medi Mart robbery. The state then was also permitted to inquire as to the other robberies mentioned by McNair in her statement to the police. Our Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in allowing the state to elicit testimony as to the defendant's involvement in othe robberies. See State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 14, 509 A.2d 493 (1986). The court's complete instruction to the jury was as follows: "I just want to caution you about that. The witness has testified that she was threatened. I want to caution you that first of all, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that this defendant, Mr. Graham, was in any way involved with any such threats. And you should not consider in any way that he was, because there is — it is absolutely nothing along those lines. I allowed that evidence strictly so that you could evaluate that along with any other evi dence that you might think appropriate in considering the — what weight you would give to this witness' testimony. "In other words, there is nothing at all to indicate that Mr. Graham was in any way involved in those threats. And so you cannot — anyway, there is no way that you can attach liability on that to him. But you can consider that in giving — considering the weight that you would afford this witness' testimony."

Daly, J. The plaintiff, Jack Greengarden, who did business as Jet Real Estate, commenced this action to recover a real estate brokerage commission from the defendant Ida Kuhn. After a trial to a jury, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the amount of $40,600 plus interest of $11,765. The defendant has appealed from the judgment, claiming that the trial court erred (1) in denying her motion for summary judgment, (2) in accepting a verdict in excess of the plaintiff's billing, and (3) in accepting a verdict which contravenes the public policy of the state. We find no error. The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On or about October 4,1982, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an open listing agreement for the sale of certain property located in Bridgeport. The property, located at the corner of Main and Vincelleth Streets, was referred to by the parties as "Merritt Canteen." The defendant owned the property, which was subject to a lease to Lorraine Shaw Koehm, who had the first option to purchase in the event that the defendant desired to sell. The contract of the plaintiff and the defendant provided that the defendant would pay a brokerage fee "of 10% of the agreed upon sales price if during the term of this Contract: "a. The LISTED PROPERTY is sold; by Jet Real Estate. "b. In the event Jet Real Estate finds a buyer, ready, willing and able to buy the listed property either for the listing price or any other price acceptable to Me/Us. "c. In the event Jet Real Estate finds a buyer ready, willing, and able to buy the listed property either for the listing price or any other price acceptable to Me/Us and if the present tenant exercises her right of 1st refusal equal to the offer presented by Jet Real Estate less the commission due Jet Real Estate." On November 1,1982, the plaintiff produced a buyer who was ready, willing and able to purchase the property on terms and conditions acceptable to the defendant. The terms and conditions were a total purchase price of $405,000, with $250,000 payable by a purchase money mortgage, the remainder to be paid in cash with the understanding that $100,000 would not be shown or disclosed on the closing documents. The plaintiff agreed to accept $30,500 as his brokerage commission in connection with the sale. Thereafter, the defendant refused to enter into the agreement and subsequently conveyed the property to Koehm for the stated price of $306,000 with $100,000 paid in cash on the day of the closing. The plaintiff instituted this action to recover his brokerage commission on April 18,1983. After a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant on May 17, 1983, was denied by the court on September 10, the case was tried to a jury. The court rendered judgment on the verdict. The defendant did not move to set aside the verdict. In her first claim of error, the defendant attempts to appeal from the denial of her motion for summary judgment. This court has held that a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable where a full trial on the merits produces a verdict against the moving party. Denby v. Voloshin Cadillac, Inc., 3 Conn. App. 181, 181-82 n.3, 485 A.2d 1360, cert. dismissed, 196 Conn. 802, 491 A.2d 1105 (1985). We see no reason, nor does the defendant suggest any, to depart from this sound policy which allows a decision based on more evidence preclude review of a decision made on less evidence. See Home Indemnity Co. v. Reynolds & Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 358, 366, 187 N.E.2d 274 (1962). "[A] motion to set aside a verdict is essential for a full review of claims of error in civil jury cases . . . ." Pietrorozio v. Santopietro, 185 Conn. 510, 515, 441 A.2d 163 (1981). Failure to file such a motion "limits our consideration of the issues raised in this appeal to ascertaining whether there has been 'plain error.' " Id.; see also Geer v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 5 Conn. App. 175, 177, 497 A.2d 999 (1985); Rozbicki v. Pelletier, 2 Conn. App. 87, 88, 476 A.2d 1069 (1984). Here, there was no motion to set aside the verdict, which impacts on the defendant's second and third claims of error. The defendant's second claim of error is that the trial court erred in accepting a verdict in excess of the plaintiffs billing. Specifically, the defendant argues that the jury was confused and, as a result, rendered its verdict in excess of the $30,500 originally claimed by the plaintiff, along with interest which had not been alleged. We find the defendant's claim unpersuasive. The plaintiff, in his amended complaint, specifically alleges damages in excess of $30,500. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff asked for damages of 10 percent of the purchase price plus 10 percent of the hidden price. The jury verdict of $40,600 comports with this allegation. As for the interest, the defendant claims that since the plaintiff did not allege interest it should not be granted. It is well established, however, that interest need not be specifically claimed in the demand for damages in order to recover. Practice Book § 140. " 'The allowance of interest as an element of damages is primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court.' " State v. Stengel, 192 Conn. 484, 487, 472 A.2d 350 (1984). There is no plain error in the trial court's determination that interest be considered for damages. The defendant's final claim is that the failure to disclose $100,000 of the purchase price by the plaintiff's buyer contravened the public policy of the state. Specifically, the defendant claims that the plaintiff's willingness to fail to disclose $100,000 of the purchase price was illegal for the purpose of avoiding tax consequences. This claim is wholly unsupported by the record. Whether the plaintiff had sustained his burden of proof was a matter for the jury to determine. "Every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the jury's verdict." B. Holden & J. Daly, Connecticut Evidence, § 35. This court has noted previously that when plain error standard of review is used "[s]uch review 'is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.' State v. Hinckley, 198 Conn. 77, 87-88, 502 A.2d 388 (1986)." Mozzer v. Bush, 11 Conn. App. 434, 438, 527 A.2d 727 (1987). In the present case, we are unable to find anything resembling plain error. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The plaintiff originally filed a cross appeal which was later withdrawn. Maltbie explains the necessity of the motion to set aside in stating: "The procedure in a jury trial has several distinct effects. First, a motion to set the verdict aside operates to delay the rendering of judgment as well as to secure judicial review of the propriety of the verdict." W. Maltbie, Connecticut Appellate Procedure § 198. Paragraph 10 of the amended complaint states: "The commission due the plaintiff in accordance with the contract authorization is ten (10%) per cent of the sales price on the sale to Lorraine Shaw Koehm which stated in the warranty deed from Ida Kuhn to Lorraine Shaw Koehm to be $306,000. There is, accordingly, due from the defendant to the plaintiff a commission in the amount of $30,600, together with ten (10%) per cent of any portion of the purchase price by Lorraine Shaw Koehm which does not appear of record."

Covello, J. This is an administrative appeal from the granting of a zoning variance. The issues presented are: (1) Within the context of the Stratford zoning regulations (a) does the word "livestock" mean more than one animal or can it mean a single animal as well; (b) can a horse reasonably be considered a "household pet"; and (2) can the intention to stable a "pleasure horse" serve as the basis for the hardship required in order to grant a zoning variance. We conclude that within the context of these regulations, "livestock" as a collective noun can mean a single animal as well as more than one animal and that a horse is not a "household pet." We further conclude that evidence of an intention to stable a "pleasure horse" is inadequate to support a finding of the hardship that must exist as the predicate to the granting of a variance. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with direction to sustain the plaintiff's appeal. On August 22,1988, the defendant Stephen V. Corti applied to the named defendant, the Stratford zoning board of appeals (ZBA), for a variance from the operation of § 4.1.5 of the town's zoning regulations as it pertains to his 1.51 acre residential parcel at 545 Peters Lane. Section 4.1.5 prohibits keeping livestock, other than household pets, on any lot less than three acres. The application for a variance stated that if approved, the property would thereafter be used for "stabling a pleasure horse." The application claimed a hardship in that: "We feel IV2 acres is sufficient area to maintain a horse." On November 1, 1988, after conducting the required public hearing, the ZBA granted the petition and voted to "waive the three acre requirement of Section 4.1.5 of the Zoning Regulations to 1.510 acres in order to stable a pleasure horse on property located in an RS-1 District." The ZBA gave no reasons for granting the variance. The plaintiff, Robert C. Kaeser, Jr., an owner of property within 100 feet of the subject parcel, appealed to the Superior Court claiming, inter alia, that "[t]he applicants have not alleged or demonstrated any hardship." As the ZBA's recording equipment had malfunctioned, the trial court permitted evidence as to what had transpired at the public hearing on Corti's application. The defendant, Mary Jean Corti, testified that at the public hearing she had told the ZBA members that: she owned a horse; she did not use it for commercial purposes; it was intended for the family's enjoyment; it was presently stabled at another location; and the family's goal was to erect a barn on the Peters Lane premises to serve as a stable for the animal. Corti tes tified that she further had told the board that she had examined the zoning regulations of other Fairfield county communities such as Fairfield, Westport, Easton and Milford and none of them had minimum acreage requirements governing the maintenance of horses. She also had pointed out to the board that the Peters Lane property virtually abutted the 265 acre Roosevelt Forest that contained "miles and miles of bridle trails." Finally, Corti testified that she had pointed out to the board that a horse was a domestic animal within the meaning of her homeowner's insurance and that she had supplied the board with dictionary definitions that distinguished a "horse" as an animal domesticated by man from "livestock" which is commonly used to describe animals intended for commercial or farming purposes. The trial court, Gray, J., concluded that "for purposes of zoning regulations, the word 'livestock' is plural in nature and its connotation clearly cannot be restricted to a single animal." This being the case, the trial court concluded: "There is no justiciable issue, given the definitions that govern Section 4.1.5, and the application for a variance must be considered, at best, meaningless, since defendants Corti were not legally required to do anything to keep their pet horse on their property." The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal. The Appellate Court granted the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal. We thereafter transferred the matter to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. The plaintiff first argues that the trial court improperly concluded that the three acre limitation referred only to situations involving more than one animal. We agree. There is substantial grammatical authority to the effect that "livestock" always connotes more than one animal. On the other hand, there is also the grammatical proposition that "livestock," like the words counsel, deer, grouse, reindeer, salmon, sheep, trout, shot, and cannon is a "collective" noun, i.e., singular in form but used with either singular or plural implications. See H. Fowler, Modern English Usage (2d Ed. 1965) pp. 94-95. We resolve this grammatical ambiguity in favor of the word's "collective" connotation and conclude that the Stratford zoning regulations refer to "livestock" in a generic sense, without a numerical implication. Such an interpretation comports with recognized principles of statutory construction. Pursuant to General Statutes § 1-1 (f), "words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things, and words importing the plural number may include the singular." See also 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands) § 47.34. Further, it seems scarcely likely that the exception for "household pets" contained within the same phrase could mean that two or more cats, dogs or canaries within a household would be an acceptable exclusion from the three acre limitation but a single cat, a single dog or a single canary within a household would not be similarly permitted. " '[S]tatutes must be construed as a whole' Hartford Principals' & Supervisors' Assn. v. Shedd, 202 Conn. 492, 506-507, 522 A.2d 264 (1987), quoting Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 198 Conn. 498, 505, 503 A.2d 1161 (1986); "with a view toward reconciling [their] separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation." University of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386, 399, 512 A.2d 152 (1986); see also Donohue v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 550, 557, 235 A.2d 643 (1967). A municipal ordinance "is subject to the same canons of construction as are applied to state statutes." Blue Sky Bar, Inc. v. Stratford, 203 Conn. 14, 19-20 n.7, 523 A.2d 467 (1987); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532, 537, 441 A.2d 30 (1981); see 1A J. Sutherland, supra, § 30.06. The Cortis argue, however, that even if the trial court's numerical rationale should fail, the three acre limitation is still inapplicable to this situation because the horse in question was a "household pet" and was therefore excluded from the operation of § 4.1.5. We disagree. Confronted again with ambiguous language that has many possible meanings, we draw upon the proposition that legislation is to be interpreted so as to give meaning to every word. Specifically, the word "household," here an adjective modifying the word "pets," connotes to us an animal reasonably capable of dwelling within a household, presumably under the same roof and living as a member of a family. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary. Because a horse, by reason of its size and other obvious considerations, is unlikely to dwell within a house, we conclude that the phrase "household pet" as set forth in § 4.1.5 means something other than such an animal. The three acre limitation therefore applies to the Cortis' horse. A determination that the trial court's reason for denial of the appeal was incorrect does not, however, end the analysis. " 'This court is not required to reverse a ruling of the trial court which reached a correct result, albeit [from] a wrong [procedural posture]. Favorite v. Miller, [176 Conn. 310, 317, 407 A.2d 974 (1978)].' " Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 237, 578 A.2d 1075 (1990). "A judgment responsive to the issues and supported by the facts should stand, even if the court's method of reaching its decision might be questionable." Malone v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 718, 723, 89 A.2d 213 (1952). We are required, therefore, to examine the merits of the variance granted to the Cortis by the ZBA. Section 21.1 of the Stratford zoning regulations authorizes the ZBA to vary the application of the town's zoning regulations "solely with respect to a parcel of land where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the district in which it is situated, a literal enforcement of such regulations would result in exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship . . . ." This language is substantially similar to the comparable provisions of General Statutes § 8-6 (3). "A variance is authority granted to the owner to use his property in a manner forbidden by the zoning regulations. . . . The power of the board to grant a variance should be used only where a situation falls fully within the specified requirements. . . . Thus, the power to grant a variance should be sparingly exercised." Allen v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 506, 510, 235 A.2d 654 (1967). "An applicant for a variance must show that, because of some peculiar characteristic of his property, the strict application of the zoning regulation produces an unusual hardship, as opposed to the general impact which the regulation has on other properties in the zone." Dolan v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 426, 430, 242 A.2d 713 (1968). "The hardship which justifies a board of zoning appeals in granting a variance must be one that originates in the zoning ordinance . . . and arises directly out of the application of the ordinance to circumstances or conditions beyond the control of the party involved." Whittaker v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 179 Conn. 650, 658, 427 A.2d 1346 (1980). "Where the claimed hardship arises from the applicant's voluntary act, however, a zoning board lacks the power to grant a variance." Id. The hardship here alleged did not arise out of "circumstances or conditions beyond the control of the party involved." The Peters Lane residence complied with the Stratford zoning regulations until the Cortis, through their voluntary act, sought to stable a horse upon the premises. It is evident from the application itself, i.e., "[w]e feel IV2 acres is sufficient area to maintain a horse," and from Mary Jean Corti's testimony to the effect that other Fairfield county communities did not have minimum acreage requirements governing the stabling of horses, that the Cortis were acting as earnest advocates for the townwide modification of the three acre limitation and were not pursuing relief from a hardship that was unique to their property. "[A variance] should not be used to accomplish what is in effect a substantial change in the uses permitted in a residence zone. That is a matter for the consideration of the zoning commission." Heady v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 139 Conn. 463, 468, 94 A.2d 789 (1953). "The power to repeal, modify or amend a zoning ordinance rests in the municipal body which had the power to adopt the ordinance, and not in the zoning board of appeals." Greenwich Gas Co. v. Tuthill, 113 Conn. 684, 694, 155 A. 850 (1931). We conclude that there is simply not the factual predicate within this record to support the ZBA's granting of a variance. The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining the plaintiffs appeal. In this opinion the other justices concurred. Section 4.1 of the Stratford zoning regulations provides in part as follows: "Section 4. ONE-FAMILY RESIDENCE DISTRICTS, RS. "4.1. USES PERMITTED. "4.1.1. ONE-FAMILY DWELLINGS. "4.1.5. Farming, forestry, truck or nursery gardening, or commercial kennels, provided that no livestock or poultry except household pets shall be kept on any lot of less than three acres. No greenhouse over 500 square feet in area shall be located on any lot of less than three acres. No building in a residence district shall be used for the housing of livestock or poultry or as a commercial kennel unless specifically approved as a special case under section 20 and subject to such conditions and regulations as the commission may impose. ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 8-8 (b) provides in part: "[A]ny person aggrieved by any decision of a [zoning] board [of appeals] may take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which the municipality is located." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 8-8 (a) provides in part: "As used in this section: "(1) 'Aggrieved person' means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes . . . any person owning land that . is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board." General Statutes § 8-8 (k) provides in part: "The court shall review the proceedings of the board and shall allow any party to introduce evidence in addition to the contents of the record if (1) the record does not contain a complete transcript of the entire proceedings before the board. ." "[Livestock: animals of any kind kept . for use or pleasure; esp: meat and dairy cattle and draft animals—opposed to dead stock." (Emphasis added.) Webster's Third New International Dictionary. "Livestock. 1. Domestic animals in general, horses, cattle, swine, etc." (Emphasis added.) Craigie & Hulbert's Dictionary of American English. "Livestock. 1. Domestic animals generally; animals of any kind kept or dealt in for use or profit." (Emphasis added.) Oxford New English Dictionary; see also Zoning Commission v. Grandieri, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 71, 208 A.2d 357 (1964). Section 21 of the Stratford zoning regulations provides: "21.1 determination OP BOARD OP ZONING APPEALS. "The board of zoning appeals shall have the power to determine and vary the application of these regulations except section 15 and those uses classified as special cases or unnamed uses in the manner provided by state statute, in harmony with their purpose and intent and with due consideration for conserving the public health, safety, convenience and welfare, solely with respect to a parcel of land where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the district in which it is situated, a literal enforcement of such regulations would result in exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship so that substantial justice will be done and the public safety and welfare secured. Such variance may be for periods as determined by the board of zoning appeals. "Before making such determination or variance the board of zoning appeals must make a written finding in the minutes of each case giving in detail: (a) The special circumstances which create the hardship for the particular parcel of land and which do not apply to other parcels in the district; (b) that the hardship did not exist when the applicant became an interested party and was not created by any act of the applicant, and (c) that the variance allowed was the minimum necessary to relieve the hardship. A copy of each variance shall be filed in the land records of the town in the town clerk's office." General Statutes § 8-6 provides in part: "powers and duties of board of APPEALS. The zoning board of appeals shall have the following powers and duties . (3) to determine and vary the application of the zoning . . . regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent and with due consideration for conserving the public health, safety, convenience, welfare and property values solely with respect to a parcel of land where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the district in which it is situated, a literal enforcement of such . . . regulations would result in exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship so that substantial justice will be done and the public safety and welfare secured . . . ."

Peters, C. J. The dispositive issue in this consolidated appeal is whether a police officer occupies the status of an invitee or of a licensee when, in the course of performing his official duties, he is injured by a defective condition on the property of a landowner. The plaintiff, Edward Furstein, a West Hartford police officer, brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries that he suffered as the result of investigating a possible burglary at a house owned by the defendant, Rita B. Hill. The town of West Hartford intervened as a plaintiff to recover sums expended in workers' compensation payments to the plaintiff. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the theory that the plaintiff had not provided a factual foundation to demonstrate her failure to comply with the duty of care owed by a landowner to a licensee. The trial court, Freed, J., denied the motion and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff reduced in amount by its finding that the plaintiff himself had been 40 percent negligent. Denying motions to set aside the verdict filed by the plaintiff, the intervening plaintiff and the defendant, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict and apportioned the award between the plaintiff and the intervening plaintiff. Each of the parties appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the consolidated appeals to this court in accordance with Practice Book § 4023. Because we conclude that the defendant's motion for directed verdict should have been granted, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts are not in dispute. On September 10, 1987, a private alarm company notified the West Hartford police department that a silent burglar alarm had been activated on property owned by the defendant, Rita B. Hill. The police department dis patched the plaintiff, police officer Edward Furstein, to investigate the alarm. The plaintiff injured his knee when a board in the deck attached to the rear of the house collapsed as he crossed the deck to inspect the sliding glass doors that provided rear access to the house. As a result of his injury, the plaintiff was unable to work for approximately six months, and suffered a permanent partial disability of the knee. At trial, the plaintiff produced evidence that the deck had been built in 1980 of untreated wood and that its general condition at the time of the plaintiffs accident in 1987 was "rotting" and "weather beaten." The plaintiff produced no direct evidence that the defendant, who lived in Florida and who did not testify at trial, had actual or constructive knowledge either of the rotted condition of the deck or of the fact that it had been built from untreated wood that would tend to rot more quickly than would chemically preserved wood. The plaintiff did not produce the defendant as a witness, either directly or by deposition, to testify regarding her knowledge of the condition of the deck. He introduced instead as an exhibit the defendant's responses to the plaintiff's interrogatories. These responses established only that the defendant owned the house at the time of the plaintiff's accident, that she acquired the property in May, 1980, that the deck was part of the original house construction in May, 1980, and that it was made of wood and was covered with a stain. The plaintiff produced no evidence that the defendant had ever been on the property, either at the time of acquisition or subsequently, or that any person acting on her behalf had any actual or constructive knowledge of the condition of the deck at the time of the plaintiff's accident. The plaintiff did not attempt to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's presence on her property at the time of the accident. Rather, he relied on the undisputed fact that the police had been summoned to the scene by an alarm company in response to an alarm system that had been installed in 1980 when the defendant acquired the property. At the close of the plaintiffs evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. She argued that the plaintiff's status on the property, under Connecticut law, was akin to that of a licensee, to whom a landowner would owe a duty of due care only if she had actual or constructive knowledge of the licensee's presence on her property. The defendant further argued that the plaintiff had presented no evidence that would support a finding that she had actual or constructive knowledge either of the defect or of the plaintiff's presence. The plaintiff argued, in opposition to the motion, that his status on the property at the time of the accident was that of an invitee, to whom the plaintiff owed a duty to inspect the premises and to maintain them in a reasonably safe condition. The trial court, Freed, J., denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict but instructed the jury that the plaintiff was a licensee. When the jury nonetheless returned a verdict, partially offset by the plaintiff's negligence, in favor of the plaintiff, the court denied all the motions to set the verdict aside and rendered judgment on the jury's verdict. On appeal, the principal issue is whether the trial court correctly charged the jury that the plaintiff was a licensee rather than an invitee. Once we have resolved that issue of law, we must examine the record to determine the factual sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's award of damages to the plaintiff. We conclude, as the defendant contends, that the trial court's charge was correct but that the court improperly denied her motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict in light of the plaintiffs failure to satisfy his burden of production regarding the defendant's knowledge of the defective condition and of the plaintiff's presence on the property. I The plaintiff's appeal is premised on the proposition that, when he entered onto the defendant's property in response to a burglar alarm triggered by an alarm system installed by the defendant, his status was that of an invitee. Our cases do not support this proposition. This court first addressed the status of a public officer who is injured on private property while lawfully present in the exercise of his duties in Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (1959). We there held that the plaintiff, a firefighter who had been injured in a fall on an icy sidewalk while present on the premises "in the performance of a public duty under a permission created by law," occupied a status "akin to that of a licensee," to whom the owners of such premises owed "no greater duty than that due a licensee." Id., 113. Roberts adopted the principle expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 345 (1), that "the liability of a possessor of land to one who enters the land only in the exercise of a privilege, for either a public or a private purpose, and irrespective of the possessor's consent, is the same as the liability to a licensee." 2 Restatement (Second), Torts (1965) § 345 (1), pp. 226-27. The conclusion reached by this court in Roberts is a form of the common law doctrine known as the "firefighter's rule." See Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills, 556 A.2d 35, 37 n.1 (R.I. 1989). Although this court has not previously addressed the scope of the applicability of the firefighter's rule, we note that no state that has adopted the rule has declined to extend it to police officers. Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347, 357 n.6, 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987); see also Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace, 308 Md. 432, 442 n.4, 520 A.2d 361 (1987); Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 84, 459 A.2d 663 (1983). Having reviewed the history and policy issues underlying the rule, we similarly conclude that the rule applies to police officers as well as to firefighters. A The firefighter's rule has well developed roots in the common law. Although the rule had its origins in a social system in which "the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries" and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly; Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); the jurisdictions that have applied the rule in recent years have offered more cogent reasons to justify its continued viability. The most compelling argument for the continuing validity of the rule is the recognition that firefighters and police officers often enter property at unforeseeable times and may enter unusual parts of the premises under emergency circumstances. Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co., supra, 368; Nared v. School District of Omaha, 191 Neb. 376, 379-80, 215 N.W.2d 115 (1974); 2 Restatement (Second), Torts (1965) § 345 (1), comment (c), p. 228. Such public officers enter the land regardless of the owner's consent; indeed, if the conditions for the exercise of their public duty exist, the owner would not be privileged to exclude them. Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 396, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951); Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 168, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963); 5 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of Torts (2d Ed. 1986) § 27.14, p. 260. Recognizing that only invitees may rely on an implied representation of safety, courts have considered it unreasonable to require landowners to undertake the same standard of care for public officers whose presence the landowners can neither predict nor interdict. "There would be an obvious hardship in holding otherwise, because landowners would then be under compulsion to keep all parts of their premises in a condition perhaps uncalled for by the normal use to which the premises are devoted." Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., supra, 397; see also 2 Restatement (Second), Torts (1965) § 345 (1), comment (c), p. 228. Several jurisdictions have explained their adoption of the firefighter's rule by recognizing the inherently hazardous nature of the public safety work performed by firefighters and police officers. Some courts have characterized this recognition as a variant of the doctrine of "assumption of the risk"; see Krauth v. Geller, 31 N. J. 270, 273-74, 157 A.2d 129 (1960); while others have noted that firefighters and police officers voluntarily choose to enter their professions knowing that they will often confront physically perilous situations created by the negligence of the public they serve. See Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 503, 777 P.2d 722 (1989). According to the courts that have relied on this rationale, the public "hires, trains, and compensates fire fighters and police officers to deal with dangerous, but inevitable situations," many of which are caused by negligence. Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co., supra, 366. "The very nature of police work and fire fighting is to confront danger. The purpose of these professions is to protect the public. . . . [T]he public should not be liable for damages for injuries occurring in the performance of the very function police officers and fire fighters are intended to fulfill." Id., 367-68. This rationale has been extended to situations, such as the one presented in this case, in which an injury results from alleged negligence that is unrelated to the cause of the safety officer's presence on the property. The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently held that a police officer who was injured when he slipped on a powdery white substance on a doughnut shop's kitchen floor while he was rendering emergency medical aid to an employee of the shop could not recover in tort against the shop's owners or operators. Rosa v. Dunkin' Donuts of Passaic, 122 N.J. 66, 583 A.2d 1129 (1991). The court reasoned that "[fjirefighters and police officers must be held to assume the risks that are to be expected in encountering the hazards and risks of their job.....Such risks properly include an ordinary act of negligence that an officer may encounter at the scene of the incident. To hold otherwise creates artificial distinctions between the negligence that occasioned one's presence and the negligence defining the scene at which one arrives . . . ." Id., 73-74. A third rationale offered by courts that have adopted the firefighter's rule is that permitting firefighters and police officers to recover in tort for occupational injuries caused by the negligence of particular members of the public whom the officer is called upon to aid would impose a double burden on the taxpayers, who already pay such officers to deal with the hazards that may result from the taxpayers' own future acts of negligence. "Exposing the negligent taxpayer to liability for having summoned the police would impose upon him multiple burdens for that protection." Berko v. Freda, supra, 87-88. To avoid this potential for double liability, in taxes and in tort, most courts have concluded that the public as a whole, rather than individual landowners, should bear the burden of the foreseeable losses incurred when firefighters or police officers are injured in the performance of their duties. As more than one court has observed, the public should compensate its safety officers both in pay that reflects the hazard of their work and in workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered when the risks inherent in the occupation materialize. Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 359-60, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1968); Krauth v. Geller, supra, 274. Reliance on workers' compensation and other forms of public compensation is also appropriate because "societal responsibility rather than possible tort recovery is the better, surer, and fairer recourse" for a public safety officer injured in the line of duty. Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc., 62 Md. App. 116, 140, 488 A.2d 523 (1985), aff'd, 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987); England v. Tasker, 129 N.H. 467, 470, 529 A.2d 938 (1987). As one court noted, "the reach of the tax collector is both broader and more persuasive than that of the premium taker." Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 360. In addition, courts have noted that society's recognition of the inherently hazardous nature of the work of public officers has frequently led to the enactment of special benefits for such workers, above and beyond the benefits ordinarily provided by workers' compensation. See Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 205, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977). Such benefits include, for instance, a statutory presumption of occupational causation for certain diseases; see General Statutes § 7-433a (creating a presumption that hypertension or heart disease is a personal injury that arose in the course of employment); and survivors' benefits for the dependents of police officers and firefighters. See General Statutes § 7-323e. In summary, both police officers and firefighters have a permission created by law to enter upon private property for an appropriate public purpose, even without the consent of the owner; both are hired and trained to confront hazards in the execution of their duties; and both are entitled to enhanced workers' compensation benefits for injuries that occur in the line of duty. We conclude, for these reasons, that the firefighter's rule adopted by this court in Roberts v. Rosenblatt, supra, applies to police officers who are injured by defective conditions on private property while the officers are present upon such property in the performance of their duties. B The plaintiff argues that even if the firefighter's rule adopted in Roberts v. Rosenblatt, supra, is broad enough to encompass police officers, it is nevertheless inapplicable to him for two reasons. First, he contends that General Statutes § 52-557a, enacted four years after this court decided Roberts v. Rosenblatt, abrogated the common law distinction between licensees and invitees. Alternatively, he contends that he was an invitee because he was present on the property in response to a notification by the defendant's agent that a burglar alarm had been set off there. We find no merit in either claim. Nothing on the face of § 52-557a supports the plaintiffs argument that the statute was intended to overturn the licensee status of public officers. The statute provides, in its entirety: "The standard of care owed to a social invitee shall be the same as the standard of care owed to a business invitee." The intent of the statute, as declared in the statement of purpose of the substitute committee bill and in the legislative debates, was "[t]o give the same protection to a person invited for occupiers [sic] pleasure as for one who is invited for his business. To enact into law the dissenting opinion in Laube vs. Stevenson, 137 Connecticut 469." Substitute Senate Bill No. 243, 1963 Sess., Connecticut General Assembly (file no. 1209). In Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951), a three-member majority of this court held that a social guest was a mere "gratuitous licensee." Id., 473. Two dissenting members of the court argued that social guests should be afforded the same protection as business invitees. Id., 477 (Jennings, J., dissenting as to social visitors "enjoying an express invitation"), and 477-78 (O'Sullivan, J., dissenting as to social visitors with either an express or an implied invitation). The plaintiff argues that remarks made during the public hearings on the proposed bill evince the intent of the legislature to abrogate the firefighter's rule. We are unpersuaded. Although the committee hearings related to the act contain an inconclusive discussion of the applicability of the proposed act to firefighters and police officers; see Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 2, 1963 Sess., pp. 335-50; the statute as ultimately enacted manifests no legislative undertaking to abrogate all distinctions between licensees and invitees, as at least one state legislature has done. The language of § 52-557a indicates rather that the législature intended to require a landowner to exercise the same standard of care toward every person whom he "invited" onto his premises, whether the owner extended such an invitation for business or for pleasure. The legislature evidently reasoned that, because the presence of social guests at a particular time and place was as foreseeable as the presence of business invitees, a landowner's duty of care to both groups should be the same. In the absence of ambiguity, the intent of the legislature is to be found not in what it meant to say but in what it did say. All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 195, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 571, 512 A.2d 893 (1986); Winchester v. Con necticut State Board of Labor Relations, 175 Conn. 349, 361, 402 A.2d 332 (1978). The defendant conceded, at oral argument in this court, that the express terms of the statute do not encompass police officers, who under certain circumstances have legal authority to enter upon private property without the owner's consent or knowledge. We conclude, therefore, that § 52-557a does not abrogate the common law of Connecticut regarding the status of firefighters and police officers. The plaintiff alternatively argues that the summons of the private alarm company "invited" him onto the property and thereby transformed his status. This contention cannot be reconciled with our observation in Roberts v. Rosenblatt that "[t]he status of the plaintiff was not dependent in any respect upon the identity of the person who sounded the alarm, be he an occupant or owner of the premises or a passerby." Roberts v. Rosenblatt, supra, 113. Other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a police officer's status on private property should not depend on such fortuitous circumstances as the means by which he receives notice that his services are required. See, e.g., Nared v. School District of Omaha, supra, 380. Acceptance of the plaintiffs contention would lead to the anomalous result that two officers, each injured by the same defective condition on private property, would have different legal rights against the landowner if one officer had responded to a report of a burglar alarm while the second had decided to investigate on his own initiative after having observed something suspicious while walking a beat. We therefore conclude that the plaintiff's status as licensee was unaffected by the manner in which he came upon the defendant's premises. Because the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the plaintiff could only recover from the defendant as a licensee, the plaintiff cannot prevail on his appeal. The other issues that he has raised cannot stand in light of our disposition of the defendant's cross appeal. II The conclusion that the defendant owed the plaintiff only the duty she would owe to a licensee does not, of itself, wholly preclude liability for any injury the plaintiff may have suffered. The defendant maintains, nevertheless, in her cross appeal, that the facts adduced by the plaintiff in this case entitled her either to a directed verdict or to an affirmative response to her motion to set aside the verdict of the jury finding her liable to the plaintiff. We agree. The duty that a landowner owes to a licensee does not ordinarily encompass the responsibility to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition, because the licensee must take the premises as he finds them. Dougherty v. Graham, 161 Conn. 248, 251, 287 A.2d 382 (1971). We have nevertheless recognized that under certain circumstances a heightened duty to the licensee can arise. Laube v. Stevenson, supra, 474. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 342, describes the duties owed to a licensee as follows: "A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if, (a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and (b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and (c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved." 2 Restatement (Second), Torts (1965) § 342, p. 210. The plaintiff in this case conceded that the defendant did not have actual knowledge of the defective condition of the deck. He was therefore required to prove that the defendant had "reason to know" of the condition that caused his injury. To satisfy his burden of production on this element, he offered only the following evidence: (1) the defendant's admission that she owned the property in question; (2) testimony about the "rotted" appearance of the wooden deck offered by the plaintiff, a fellow officer, and a carpenter who inspected the deck about two months after the plaintiff's accident; and (3) testimony by the carpenter, who had not been qualified as an expert witness, to the effect that wood "takes years" to rot. The plaintiff contends that this evidence was sufficient to establish facts from which the jury could properly impute knowledge of the deck's dangerous condition to the defendant. We disagree. To establish that the defendant in this case had "reason to know" of the defective condition of the deck, the plaintiff was required to proffer evidence that the defendant had factual information that would have led a person of reasonable intelligence to conclude that the deck's condition was dangerous. See 1 Restatement (Second), Torts (1965) § 12 (1), p. 19, and § 12, comment (a), p. 20. The evidence actually introduced by the plaintiff, however, established only that the defend ant knew, at the time of the plaintiffs accident, that the deck was approximately seven years old and was made of wood, covered with a "stain." The plaintiff did not produce evidence that the defendant, who lived in Florida, had ever even seen the deck, had played any role in its installation, or had any knowledge that it was built of "untreated" wood. He produced no evidence tending to prove that wood generally rots in seven years, from which the jury might have inferred that a reasonable person would have reason to know that the deck had deteriorated. The plaintiff similarly failed to produce any evidence that any person acting on the defendant's behalf with regard to the property at issue had any actual or constructive knowledge of the condition of the deck, or that any person had ever given the defendant any notice, prior to the plaintiff's accident, that the deck was in poor condition. The record therefore fails to reveal any factual basis from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant knew or had reason to know that the deck's condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm to licensees such as the plaintiff. See 2 Restatement (Second), Torts (1965) § 342, p. 210. Although directed verdicts are generally disfavored; Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 522, 423 A.2d 165 (1979); they are appropriate when the plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of an essential element of his cause of action. See, e.g., Teitelman v. Bloomstein, 155 Conn. 653, 657-58, 236 A.2d 900 (1967). Since the plaintiff in this case failed to present any evidence that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition of the deck, the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. We therefore reverse the judgment rendered on the jury's verdict. Our disposition of the plaintiff's appeal and the defendant's cross appeal renders moot the appeal of the intervening plaintiff from the trial court's apportionment of the damage award. It is well settled that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Patterson v. Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, 215 Conn. 553, 561-62, 577 A.2d 701 (1990); Sobocinski v. Freedom of Information Commission, 213 Conn. 126, 134-35, 566 A.2d 703 (1989); Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944). It is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions when no practical relief can follow from their determination. Patterson v. Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, supra; Sobocinski v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra; Reynolds v. Vroom, supra; see also Gormley v. Panuzio, 166 Conn. 1, 3, 347 A.2d 78 (1974). We accordingly dismiss the appeal of the intervening plaintiff, the town of West Hartford. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment for the defendant. In this opinion the other justices concurred. This rationale suggests that an exception to the rule may exist when a public officer is injured by a defective condition on a portion of the land held open to the public at a time when the public might reasonably be expected to be present, and courts have indeed recognized such an exception. This exception is noted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 345 (2), which provides that "[t]he liability of a possessor of land to a public officer or employee who enters the land in the performance of his public duty, and suffers harm because of a condition of a part of the land held open to the public, is the same as the liability to an invitee." See Brady v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 35 Ohio St. 3d 161, 163-64, 519 N.E.2d 387 (1988) (affirming reversal of a summary judgment in favor of the defendant railroad company because the plaintiff police officer was injured in a railroad right-of-way that the defendant company was statutorily obligated to keep in good repair for the benefit of all members of the public). This exception, however, provides no support to the plaintiffs claim in this case. The plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that the property involved here is "held open to the public." See 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 345 (2), supra. The evidence here demonstrated, rather, that the plaintiff's injury occurred on a deck that provided access to the rear entrance of a private residence. Although we have on occasion taken notice of remarks made during legislative hearings as bearing on the problem a statute was designed to solve; see, e.g., Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 559 n.15, 569 A.2d 518 (1990), and State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 273-74 n.8, 528 A.2d 760 (1987); in this case the remarks are too ambiguous and contradictory to be of value in determining the intent of the legislature. Illinois abrogated the common law distinction between licensees and invitees by a statute that took effect in 1984. Illinois Stat. Ann. c. 80, para. 302 (Smith-Hurd 1987) provides: "The distinction under the common law between invitees and licensees as to the duty owed by an owner or occupier of any premises to such entrants is abolished. The duty owed to such entrants is that of reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them." Although there was a period during the 1960s and 1970s in which approximately fifteen state courts abolished or modified the distinctions in entrant status as a matter of common law, few states have done so by legislative action. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 62, pp. 432-33. Commentators on torts have noted, moreover, that the judicial trend toward abrogating these distinctions seems essentially to have ended in the early 1980s. "[I]t appears that the courts are gaining a renewed appreciation for the considerations behind the traditional duty limitations toward trespassing adults, and that they are acquiring more generally a healthy skepticism toward invitations to jettison years of developed jurisprudence in favor of a beguiling legal panacea." Id., p. 434; but see Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1984) (abolishing distinctions based on entrant status). In addition to his principal claim regarding his status on the property, the plaintiff also claims that the trial court improperly: (1) charged the jury on contributory and comparative negligence; and (2) denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that the damages awarded were inadequate in light of the evidence of the plaintiff's injury. Our disposition of the issue of his status and of the defendant's cross appeal renders the plaintiff's remaining claims moot. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 12, provides the following definitions: "(1) The words 'reason to know' are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that the actor has information from which a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists. "(2) The words 'should know' are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in the performance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists." 1 Restatement (Second), Torts (1965) § 12, pp. 19-20. The comment to this section further elaborates the distinction between the phrases "reason to know" and "should know." "Both the expression 'reason to know' and 'should know' are used with respect to existent facts. These two phrases, however, differ in that 'reason to know' implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor whereas 'should know' implies that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining the fact in question." Id., comment (a), p. 20. The plaintiff contends, in response to the defendant's cross appeal, that the defendant would have known of the defective condition of the deck if she had exercised reasonable care. This contention confuses the factual basis required to establish "constructive knowledge" or a "reason to know" with the landowner's duty to inspect the property and to maintain it in a safe condition for invitees. Since we have held in Part I above that the plaintiff occupied the status of a licensee rather than that of an invitee, it follows that the defendant owed to him only the duty to warn of known dangers that is set forth in § 342 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Covello, J. This is an action in conversion. The plaintiff, B. A. Ballou and Company, Inc., alleges that the defendant, Citytrust, wrongfully appropriated the plaintiff's scrap metal while it was in the possession of a third party, Bridgeport Rolling Mills Company. The issues on appeal are: (1) who has the burden of proving whether a bailment exists; (2) whether under the circumstances presented a bailment existed; and (3) whether damages for conversion were properly calculated. We conclude that (1) the burden of proving a bailment lies with the party whose claim to ownership relies upon such a relationship, and (2) no bailment existed here. The parties stipulated as follows: the plaintiff B. A. Ballou and Company, Inc. (Ballou), manufactures jewelry. Bridgeport Rolling Mills, Inc. (Brimco), was a metal fabricator. Brimco supplied Ballou with sheets of stock brass, an alloy that Ballou used to manufacture jewelry. Ballou shipped its leftover brass back to Brimco, which commingled it with scrap brass received from other companies. Brimco then shipped the accumulated scrap to a processing mill, which added new base metal as required and reconstituted it into finished brass that Brimco thereafter kept in its inventory available for subsequent orders. The type of brass needed by a given customer varied from time to time and therefore the new brass returned to the customer by Brimco could have an entirely different composition than the scrap sent by the customer. For example, Brimco might receive brass scrap composed of 70 percent copper and 30 percent zinc and return brass composed of 85 percent copper and 15 percent zinc. The only record of the brass sent by Ballou to Brimco was a "toll metal account" that listed the weight of each base metal in a given customer's account. Because Brimco commingled the scrap metal and had it remanufactured by a third party who mixed it with new metal as needed, there was no way of determining whether any of the same scrap sent to Brimco by Ballou ever returned to Ballou as finished brass. On May 22, 1981, Brimco entered into a security agreement with the defendant Citytrust for a revolving line of credit. The loan was secured by an interest in "[a]ll inventory of the Borrower, now owned or hereafter acquired . All goods . or other property . in which Borrower has an interest . or come[s] into possession." Unknown to Ballou, Brimco consistently represented to Citytrust that it owned all the scrap metal in its possession. In June, 1987, Citytrust, as a secured creditor, took possession of Brimco's assets pursuant to the security agreement, including all metal on site. Ballou thereafter brought an action against Citytrust for its alleged conversion of Ballou's scrap metal and for violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The trial court concluded that Ballou had retained title to the scrap and that a bailment therefore existed. It accordingly rendered judgment for Ballou in the amount of $114,575. Citytrust appealed, claiming that the trial court (1) incorrectly concluded that a bailment existed, (2) improperly shifted the burden of proof to Citytrust to prove that a bailment did not exist, and (3) improperly calculated the damages. We transferred the appeal to this court in accordance with Practice Book § 4023. Citytrust first claims that the trial court improperly placed the burden of proving a necessary element of Ballou's case upon Citytrust. In order for Ballou to prevail on its conversion claim, it must demonstrate that it continued to own the scrap. Gilbert v. Walker, 64 Conn. 390, 394, 20 A. 132 (1890). Since Brimco had possession, Ballou was required to prove the existence of a bailment. It is an " 'elementary rule that whenever the existence of any fact is necessary in order that a party may make out his case . . . the burden is on such party to show the existence of such fact.' " Nikitiuk v. Pishtey, 153 Conn. 545, 552, 219 A.2d 225 (1966); Eichman v. J & J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 451, 582 A.2d 182 (1990). This rule holds true for bailment cases as well. See Wells v. Active Automobile Exchange, Inc., 99 Conn. 523, 527, 121 A.883 (1923); C. McCormick, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 337; C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed.) § 4.2.1. While the trial court arguably assigned the burden of proof of this issue to Citytrust we need not take up Citytrust's claim in this regard because we find that, under the facts as stipulated, a bailment could not have existed. Ballou claims that the toll metal account between itself and Brimco constituted a bailment. Ballou argues that, as a bailor, it retained title to the scrap metal in Brimco's possession and that Citytrust therefore became liable to it in conversion for seizing its scrap. A bailment " 'involves a delivery of the thing bailed into the possession of the bailee, under a contract to return it to the owner according to the terms of the agreement.' " Seedman v. Jaffer, 104 Conn. 222, 226, 132 A. 414 (1926), quoting Murray v. Paramount Petroleum & Products Co., 101 Conn. 238, 242, 125 A. 617 (1924). "A relationship of bailor-bailee arises when the owner, while retaining general title, delivers personal property to another for some particular purpose upon an express or implied contract to redeliver the goods when the purpose has been fulfilled, or to otherwise deal with the goods according to the bailor's directions." Moulding v. United States, 257 F.2d 56, 60 (1958). "In bailment, the owner or bailor has a general property [interest] in the goods bailed . . . ." McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Walsh, 132 Conn. 158, 162, 42 A.2d 841 (1945). The bailee, on the other hand, has mere possession of items left in its care pursuant to the bailment. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 330, 14 S. Ct. 99, 37 L. Ed. 1093 (1893). The trial court found that scrap from Ballou had been commingled with scrap from other sources and concluded that "[t]he fact that the property of the plaintiff is commingled with like property of another . . . does not necessarily force the conclusion that the transaction is not a bailment." We agree that the commingling of fungible goods alone does not defeat a bailment when the bailor specifically intended to retain ownership of a known share of the commingled goods. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. FPC, 371 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849, 88 S. Ct. 33, 19 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1967); Slaughter v. Green, 22 Va. 3, 9 (1821). A different rule, however, applies where the purpose of the bailment is to alter or remanufacture goods surrendered to the alleged bailee. The bailment in such an instance is termed "a bailment . . . locatio operis faciendi [i.e.] a bailment where work and labor . . . are to be performed upon the thing delivered to the bailee. The parties to a bailment of this character-one for their mutual benefit—enter into a contract, express or implied, or both, by which the bailee engages to perform the agreed services and return the thing bailed in its altered . . . form, and the bailor in return for the services of the bailee agrees to pay him the agreed-upon compensation." Douglass v. Hart, 103 Conn. 685, 688, 131 A. 401 (1925). In a bailment of this type, "the question of [whether a transaction constitutes a] bailment or not is determined by whether the identical article delivered to the manufacturer is to be returned to the party making the advance. Thus, where logs are delivered to be sawed into boards, or leather to be made into shoes, rags into paper, olives into oil, grapes into wine, wheat into flour, if the product of the identical articles delivered is to be returned to the original owner in a new form, it is said to be a bailment, and the title never vests in the manufacturer. If, on the other hand, the manufacturer is not bound to return the same wheat or flour or paper, but may deliver any other of equal value, it is said [not to be a bailment] . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U.S. 110, 116, 24 L. Ed. 973 (1877); see Clark v. Rosen, 126 Conn. 707, 708-10, 14 A.2d 39 (1940); Douglass v. Hart, supra, 687-88; Johnson v. Allen, 70 Conn. 738, 744-45, 40 A. 1056 (1898). In order for the instant transaction to constitute a bailment, therefore, it is necessary that the final product be composed of the identical property originally delivered. The trial court found that the scrap was commingled, that the brass returned to Ballou need not have been of the same type of alloy and that "there was no understanding or agreement that the precise thing bailed would be returned to the plaintiff." The trial court further found that if any of the original scrap metal found its way back to Ballou, "this would be solely by chance." Because there was no evidence that the property returned was the product of the property delivered, except "solely by chance," we conclude that the arrangement between Ballou and Brimco could not constitute a bailment. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter is remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendant. In this opinion the other justices concurred. Because we conclude that no bailment existed, we do not address Citytrust's claim that damages were not properly calculated. According to Blackstone, and others, a bailment "is a delivery of goods in trust, upon a contract, expressed or implied, that the trust shall be faithfully executed on the part of the bailee." 2 Blackstone's Commentaries p. 452; see I. Edwards, A Treatise on the Law of Bailments p. 33; Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed.). At one time we also adhered to this definition. Zeterstrom v. Thomas, 92 Conn. 702, 704, 104 A. 237 (1918); Samelson v. Harper's Furs, Inc., 20 Conn. Sup. 37, 39, 120 A.2d 419 (1955), aff'd, 144 Conn. 368, 131 A.2d 827 (1957). In a trust, however, the trustee has legal title to the res of the trust. G. Bogert, Trusts (5th Ed.) § 1. In a bailment, on the other hand, the bailee does not have legal title to the thing bailed, but mere possession. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 330, 14 S. Ct. 99, 37 L. Ed. 1093 (1893); McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Walsh, 132 Conn. 158, 162, 42 A.2d 841 (1945). We prefer, therefore, the definition established in Seedman v. Jaffer, 104 Conn. 222, 226,132 A. 414 (1926). See generally 1 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 5; A. Dobie, Handbook on the Law of Bailments and Carriers § 1. The trial court relied primarily upon Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. FPC, 371 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849, 88 S. Ct. 33, 19 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1967). In Public Service Electric & Gas Co., a company arranged to have gas transported through a pipeline. The court found that a bailment existed even though the company was by no means entitled to have the identical gas delivered back to it. Id., 4. Because the gas was only transported, and not altered in any form, that case is distinguishable from the type of bailment alleged here. The trial court also cited In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, Inc., 639 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1981). In Sitkin, the court found that a bailment existed when Kodak delivered film waste to Sitkin for waste processing and to extract the silver. Id., 1217. The court emphasized the facts that: (1) Sitkin did not carry the film as inventory; (2) the film was clearly imprinted with Kodak's name; and (3) the film was stored in its original cartons and kept separate from other products. Id. Sitkin, therefore, is distinguishable from the present case because there was no evidence of commingling. The trial court also relied upon General Motors Corporation v. Bristol, 690 F.2d 26, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1982), in which Judge Mansfield, in a concurring opinion, found that a bailment existed when GM Corporation shipped scrap metal to a manufacturer for processing into alloy strips under a "tolling arrangement. ' ' In Bristol, however, the written agreement clearly stated that GM Corporation retained title to the scrap in the manufacturer's possession until it was remanufactured into alloy. Id., 27. In addition, the bailee was required to return the identical scrap to GM Corporation if not processed into alloy strips. Judge Mansfield, concurring in Bristol, stated that a bailment may exist when goods are commingled and remanufactured. As support for this statement, however, he cites Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. FPC, supra, and 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bailments § 51. As noted above, Public Service Electric & Gas Co. stands only for the proposition that commingling alone does not defeat a bailment. A change in the character or nature of personalty can affect a right of ownership. Under the doctrine of accession, if the labor of one person is combined with material belonging to another, the owner of the original raw material can retain title to, and ownership of, the finished product. Atlas Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 121 Conn. 188, 192-93, 183 A. 690 (1936); Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382, 397 (1873). If, however, the identity of the item has been destroyed, its nature substantially changed, or value greatly enhanced, as between the manufacturer and the original owner, the owner loses his right of ownership and retains only an action for the value of the goods lost. Atlas Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, supra, 192-93. Similarly, in a bailment locatio operis faciendi, changes in the nature of the property bailed have the potential to affect the property interest of the bailor. The law of bailments has responded, in a manner similar to the law of property, by finding that a bailment will still exist if, as noted above, the identity of the item has not been destroyed.

Cotter, J. The plaintiffs, owners of real estate in the city of Bristol, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the decision of the defendant planning commission approving a plan for a subdivision submitted by the defendants Anthony P. and Joanne P. Margonelli. The trial court found the issues for the plaintiffs and sustained the appeal, and from that judgment the defendants have appealed to this court upon the granting of certification. The portion of the proposed seventeen-lot subdivision approved by the commission, which is the subject of the appeal, is the layout of the proposed extension of Morris Avenue from its intersection with Stoneerest Drive on the north to Madison Drive on the south. If this street were to be laid out as approved, the plaintiffs' lots would be bounded by the new street along the rear of their lots as well as by the existing streets in front of their lots. Each of their lots, seven in number, would be bound by two generally parallel streets. The commission approved the subdivision providing for the development of seventeen lots by a vote of three commissioners in favor and one opposed. At the time in question, section 2.09 of the commission's subdivision regulations provided, in part, as follows: "Except in cases of unusual topography or property lines, through lots bounding on two . . . generally parallel streets will not be permitted." In planning matters the city of Bristol is acting under chapter 126, § 8-18—8-30a of the General Statutes. Pursuant to § 8-25, the commission was required, before exercising the powers granted to it, to adopt regulations covering the subdivision of land. Regulations of the city, which has adopted this chapter, must conform to the requirements of § 8-25. Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 540, 543, 545, 244 A.2d 391. The commission may only adopt a plan or regulations governing-subdivisions of land or impose conditions within the delegated authority. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission, 160 Conn. 109,115, 273 A.2d 880; 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning, § 165, 166. The planning power of the defendant commission is derived from the general statutes and a subdivision regulation enacted by it to be valid must have been adopted with positive statutory authorization. South East Property Owners & Residents Assn. v. City Plan Commission, 156 Conn. 587, 591, 244 A.2d 394; Avonside, Inc. v. Zoning $ Planning Commission, 153 Conn. 232, 236, 215 A.2d 409; 2 Yokely, Zoning Law & Practice (3d Ed.) § 12-3. The subdivision regulations upon which the commission, acting administratively, should rule must contain known and fixed standards applying to all cases of a like nature, and must conform to the principle that a regulation, like a statute, cannot be too general in its terms. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission, supra, 115-16. The test of a permissible subdivision regulation is whether "the criteria contained in the commission's regulations are as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires and are reasonably adequate and sufficient to guide the commission and to enable those affected to know their rights and obligations. American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329 U.S. 90, 105, 67 S. Ct. 133, 91 L. Ed. 103; Ours Properties, Inc. v. Ley, 198 Va. 848, 851, 96 S.E.2d 754; 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 118. Although some of the standards may be general in their terms, they . . . [must be] reasonably sufficient to identify the criteria to be evaluated in their enforcement in order to meet the many variables involved since it would be impossible to establish one standard which would adequately cover all future cases. Blakeman v. Planning Commission, 152 Conn. 303, 307, 206 A.2d 425." Forest Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 669, 680, 236 A.2d 917; Nicoli v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 171 Conn. 89, 93, 368 A.2d 24. The words "unusual topography or property lines" give broad, almost unfettered, authority to the planning commission, acting administratively, to bow down to expediency rather than serve the public welfare. We have said, for instance, that the words "practical difficulties," without additional guidelines, are in themselves insufficient to afford a guide to determine whether a variation should be granted. Delaney v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 134 Conn. 240, 244, 56 A.2d 647; Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 541, 45 A.2d 828. The facts show clearly the need for a more precise standard governing the unbridled, ambiguous and vague exception which would allow for the creation of through lots than section 2.09 of the commission's regulations provides. The total project in question covered 7.4 acres and the subdivision plan was designed for the development of seventeen lots. Because of a planned street extension the plaintiffs' properties would be bounded front and rear by streets. The plaintiffs' lots were relatively small in size, containing minimal areas of approximately 10,000 square feet. In fact, the defendants' engineer and land surveyor testified in regard to the development application at the commission hearing: "This was designed under the stipulation that this was an RB-1 zone, which means that the minimum size lots in this area would he 10,000 square feet, with an 85-foot frontage. It was designed to get the maximum economy out of this piece of land. . . . The design of the property is to try to get the maximum number of lots that you could use your property for. As you know, this area is highly praised and people like to live in this area. It is an area that the lots are saleable. You are able to build a home and there is no doubt you are certainly located to everything. The idea is that you want to get the maximum value of the property." The obligations in the regulations and the undertakings required of new subdivision developers to ensure proper street layout and the orderly development of such matters are designed to protect the public interest. Treat v. Town Plan S Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 406, 408,143 A.2d 448. Municipal planning is intended to promote the general welfare and prosperity of its people. Kiska v. Skrensky, 145 Conn. 28, 32, 138 A.2d 523. Consequently, the requirement that regulations contain known and fixed standards to be applied to all cases of a like nature reduces the likelihood of an administrative body, unsure of its prerogative, acting in a capricious manner in the exercise of its authority. It was apparent from a review of the minutes of the public hearing that alternate subdivision plans might have been designed without, of course, producing the maximum profit to the developer. The maximum possible enrichment of a particular developer is not the controlling purpose of zoning. Damick v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 158 Conn. 78, 83, 256 A..2d 428; State National Bank v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 99, 239 A.2d 528; 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning, § 36. Vague regulations which contain meaningless standards lead to ambiguous interpretations in determining the approval or disapproval of different subdivisions. Adequate, fixed and sufficient standards of guidance for the commission must be delineated in its regulations so as to avoid decisions, affecting the rights of property owners, which would otherwise be a purely arbitrary choice of the commission; such a delegation of arbitrary power is invalid. North Rollingwood Property Owners Assn. v. City Plan Commission, 152 Conn. 518, 521, 522, 209 A.2d 177; 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning, § 63, 64; annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1083, 1097, § 4. The factual situation which developed during the public hearing demonstrates the need for clear, unambiguous and fixed standards sufficient to furnish guidelines in the regulations so as to avoid a purely arbitrary choice of the commission affecting the rights of property owners. The regulations contain no criteria to guide the commission and to enable those affected to know their rights and obligations. The plaintiffs presented evidence to the commission, and to the trial court, that the proposed extension of Morris Avenue would expose their children to traffic hazards and limit the normal use of their backyards, which in some eases would be only 40 feet deep from their homes to the new street. The commission itself, by limiting the creation of through lots, recognized that through lots were normally undesirable. Since the commission intended to permit, under certain circumstances, the creation of a condition which it itself found unde sirable, our standard announced in Forest Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, and reiterated in Nicoli v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, requires it to set forth those circumstances with some precision. To require this is not "to demand detailed standards which are impracticable or impossible. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 515, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892." Forest Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 679. The discretion of a commission must be controlled by fixed standards applied to all cases of a like nature. Beach v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 141 Conn. 79, 85, 103 A.2d 814; Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park & Planning Board, 344 Mass. 329, 334, 182 N.E.2d 540. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Section 2.09 of the Bristol subdivision regulations provides in full: "Lot sizes shall be as required in the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Bristol. Layout of lots shall conform to modern standard practices, and shall be appropriate for the intended construction. Corner lots shall conform to [the] Zoning Ordinance of the City of Bristol. Side lot lines shall generally be at right angles to straight street lines, or radial to curved street lines. Except in cases of unusual topography or property lines, through lots bounding on two (2) generally parallel streets will not be permitted. No parcels, strips or other remnants of land or blocking strips of a size unsuited for a minimum lot shall be left in any subdivision." It is to be noted that "the power to grant variances to subdivision regulations does not exist pursuant to the general statutes." South East Property Owners Association v. City Planning Commission, 156 Conn. 587, 591, 244 A.2d 394.

The motion by J. Warren Upson for permission to argue and to file a brief as amicus curiae in the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County is granted to the extent that permission to file a brief as amicus curiae is granted, the brief to be filed on or before April 19,1977.

Cotter, J. The plaintiffs brought this action in two counts, breach of contract and negligence, seeking $12,500 damages arising out of their purchase of a new home which they alleged was serviced by a defective septic system. The defendant interposed a counterclaim for the reasonable value of a curtain drain thereafter installed on the premises. The jury returned a general verdict of $6000 in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant appealed from the judgment rendered thereon. In this court the defendant raises for the first time the question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas to entertain this action on the ground that § 52-6 and 52-28 of the General Statutes, which give that court concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court of civil actions wherein the matter in demand exceeds $7500 hut does not exceed $15,000, result in a material detraction from the essential characteristics of the Superior Court in derogation of article fifth, § 1, of our constitution. See Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, 130 Conn. 122, 140, 32 A.2d 547. The defendant, on the record before us, has failed to sustain its heavy burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt the constitutional invalidity of the statutory jurisdiction exercised by the trial court. Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development Corporation, 167 Conn. 111, 114, 355 A.2d 72; Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 152-53, 251 A.2d 49; Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 470, 217 A.2d 698. The defendant further claims error in admitting into evidence, as an exhibit, a pamphlet purportedly containing certain sections of the Connecticut state department of health public health code regulations (hereinafter the code) to which the defendant objected and took exception on the grounds, inter alia, that the pamphlet was not a certified copy and that the pamphlet was immaterial. Since the circumstances attending the court's ruling admitting this pamphlet are important we set them out initially. The plaintiffs introduced this pamphlet into evidence as a foundation for the testimony of George Frigon, sanitarian for the town of Ridgefield at the time of trial in 1974, who was prepared to testify that his examination of the plaintiffs' septic system revealed three violations of the code. During the plaintiffs' preliminary questioning and cross-examination Frigon stated that in 1968, the pertinent code year, he was a college student, that prior to 1971 he had been a state employee for one year, and that he had become Ridgefield's sanitarian in 1971. The pamphlet the plaintiffs introduced as an exhibit had the notation "In effect 1969" typed on the face sheet. Testimony in the case indicated that the plaintiffs' septic system had been constructed prior to December 17, 1968. The court overruled the defendant's objection that the pamphlet was not certified with the remark: "Well, that goes to the weight." General Statutes § 52-166 provides: "Any order or regulation made by any state official in the performance of his duties may be proved in any court by a copy of such order or regulation certified by the person having the legal custody of the same." For the pamphlet to be admissible without compliance with the statutory certification procedure, the plaintiffs were required to authenticate it properly. "The admission of an unauthenticated unofficial purported copy of . . . [a state regulation] is patent error." Masti-Kure Products Co. v. Appel, 161 Conn. 108, 116, 285 A.2d 346. Additionally, without a "proper attempt to obtain the best evidence of the . . . [regulation], which in this case would have been either the original . . . [regulation] or a duly-certified copy of it, there was no right to introduce secondary evidence of any sort in proof of it." Brown v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn. 290, 296, 141 A.2d 634; see McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 241. Under the circumstances of this case we cannot say that Frigon's testimony satisfied the criteria of the Masti-Kure or the Brown cases, or the statutes, for admission of this pamphlet. The court therefore erred in overruling the defendant's objection. The notation "In effect 1969" appearing on the exhibit was apparently typed to comply with General Statutes § 19-13, which provides in pertinent part: "The public health council shall establish a public health code and, from time to time, amend the same. . . . Each regulation adopted by said council shall state the date on which it shall take effect, and a copy thereof, signed by the commissioner of health, shall be filed in the office of the secretary of the state and a copy sent by said commissioner to each director of health, and such regulation shall be published in such manner as said council may determine." Since the relevance of the pamphlet rested on its containing the 1968 code provisions, with which the plaintiffs claimed the defendant was required to comply in constructing the plaintiffs' septic system, its admission was erroneous under the circumstances. The proper admissibility of this pamphlet was of crucial significance to a recovery in this action since one of the plaintiffs' theories upon which they relied was that the defendant had failed to comply with the requirements of the code in constructing the septic system. After the court admitted the pamphlet into evidence, Frigon testified from it that his examination of the plaintiffs' septic system revealed three violations of the code, and thereafter, in the course of its instructions to the jury, the court charged that such violations would be negligence per se. Under these circumstances the court's error in admitting the pamphlet into evidence was harmful. Lubenow v. Cook, 137 Conn. 611, 615-16, 79 A.2d 826. At the conclusion of the evidence and prior to the summations by counsel, the defendant filed a motion for submission of interrogatories and a motion for separate verdicts. The former motion was denied summarily; the latter motion was also denied, hut after some consideration. Exceptions were taken by the defendant with respect to both rulings. It was the duty of the court to grant the defendant's request for separate verdicts and for proper interrogatories where the complaint contained two counts since the defendant had the right to save itself from the implication of a general verdict by seeking from the jury separate verdicts and answers to proper interrogatories; its failure to do so was erroneous. Sheeler v. Waterbury, 138 Conn. 111, 114, 82 A.2d 359; Decker v. Roberts, 125 Conn. 150, 157,158, 3 A.2d 855; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 55. Since the court erred in admitting the plaintiffs' pamphlet into evidence as an exhibit, its denial of the defendant's motion for separate verdicts prejudiced the defendant in that that denial would, under our normal practice, have prevented the defendant from presenting its claim of error in the court's evidentiary ruling. Reid v. New Haven, 133 Conn. 446, 447, 52 A.2d 140; Belchak v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 632, 179 A. 95. It is unnecessary to discuss the defendant's remaining claims of error. There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Under questioning by the court Frigon stated: "That particular eopy is one of a few very rare copies of that code. And that was obtained from the state in relationship to another case. And it was accompanied by a letter from Doctor Foote, and that was '69 it was in effect. The state typed that 'In effect 1969.' Nobody else did." He went on to state that: "I know that that is the code that was in effect at that time, yes, sir," without any other supporting qualifications. The defendant objected as follows: "[Tjhere's no certification of . . . [the pamphlet] which is required by the statutes as I read them, so I have no way of verifying that what Mr. Frigon says is, in fact, true." The court charged the jury in part: "Now, in addition to the common law negligence which has been alleged, there's also been reference made to certain statutes of the State of Connecticut, and also to regulations of the State Board of Health. Now, insofar as this is concerned, under our law we refer to this as statutory negligence. And statutory negligence consists of a violation of a statute which sets up or prescribes a rule of conduct to be followed by a person in a given situation. The violation of such an applicable statute by one in a situation governed by it, of course, is negligence per se. That is, it must be found to be negligence as a matter of law."

Longo, J. This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries sustained on December 12, 1968, when the plaintiff fell into a grease pit in a garage owned by the defendant Krall Coal and Oil Co., Inc., hereinafter Krall. The plaintiff successfully claimed before a jury that his fall and the resultant injuries were caused by the failure of the defendant Pellegrino, who was acting as the agent of the defendant Krall, to warn the plaintiff of the existence of the pit. The plaintiff was awarded $9000 damages. The defendants have appealed the judgment and have assigned four errors in the court's charge to the jury. There was evidence from which the jury could have found the following facts: On December 12, 1968, the defendant Pellegrino summoned the plaintiff, who was in the business of towing and repairing motor vehicles, to the Krall garage to remove Pellegrino's car. The garage contained an office and four service bays. Pellegrino's car, its front facing the back of the garage, was parked in the third bay and covered the grease pit. The area was lit by two fluorescent lights which Pellegrino claimed to have turned on before the men entered the service bay through the main door to bay three. Pellegrino directed the plaintiff to the right front of the car and the men with the aid of Pellegrino's assistant, David G-eil, began to push the car out of the garage. After they had traveled a short distance Pellegrino looked up and realized that the plaintiff had fallen into the grease pit. The defendant Pellegrino concedes that, to the best of his knowledge, the plaintiff had never been in the garage before and had not been warned about the existence of the grease pit. The defendants first assign error to the court's refusal to charge the jury on the duty to warn of the existence of the grease pit: "With regard to that claim, it is the law and I charge you that the defendants had no duty to warn the plaintiff, if you find that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of that condition or if you find that the defendants could reasonably assume that the plaintiff knew about that condition or would observe it by a reasonable use of his faculties and senses." It is the law of this state that a request to charge which is relevant to the issues of a case and which is an accurate statement of the law must be given. Penna v. Esposito, 154 Conn. 212, 214, 224 A.2d 536; Smith v. New Haven, 144 Conn. 126, 130, 127 A.2d 829. It is, however, also the law of this state that a refusal to charge in the exact words of a request will not constitute error if the requested charge is given in substance. Smith v. New Haven, supra. Furthermore, "[i]t is a well-established rule that the charge to the jury must be read as a whole and that individual instructions are not to be judged in 'artificial isolation' from the overall charge. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S. Ct. 396, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368; State v. Balls, 167 Conn. 408, 422, 356 A.2d 147; Penna v. Esposito, 154 Conn. 212, 215, 224 A.2d 536." State v. Crawford, 172 Conn. 65, 69, 372 A.2d 154. We find that the substance of the defendants' requested charge was presented to the jury in two ways. First, the court was careful to inform the jury that the defendants were not under an absolute duty to warn the plaintiff of the existence of the grease pit. The court presented the following issue to the jury: "Whether or not a reasonable prudent man would have warned or pointed out the pit to the plaintiff is for you to decide in the first part of this case." Later, when charging the jury on the issue of the defense of contributory negligence, the court clearly pointed out that the plaintiff had a duty to act as a reasonable and prudent man and "to be alert and aware of his surrounding circumstances." The court charged further: "A plaintiff has the same duty to exercise the care of an ordinary prudent person in protecting himself against dangers and to be watchful of his own surroundings and to use his senses and faculties to see the same thing that the ordinary prudent person would under similar circumstances, or reasonably should have known were present or were likely to be present of dangers." The court emphasized that if the plaintiff were negligent in falling into the grease pit, he could not recover. It is, therefore, apparent upon examination of the whole charge that the defendants' requested charge was given in substance. The defendants next assign error in the court's refusal to charge the jury as follows: "The plaintiff had a duty to observe and appreciate danger or threatened danger and he is conclusively presumed to know and appreciate dangers which, under the same or similar circumstances, would have been known or appreciated by an ordinary prudent person." It is apparent from examination of the court's charge to the jury on the issue of contributory negligence that the defendants' only claim is that the court did not adopt the precise language of the defendants' request. The court explicitly told the jury that the plaintiff was under a "duty to exercise the care of an ordinary prudent person in protecting himself against dangers" and to be alert to his surroundings and to be aware of dangers of which the ordinary prudent person would be aware. The court's failure to adopt the exact wording of the defendants' requested charge does not constitute error. Darling v. Burrone Bros., Inc., 162 Conn. 187, 199, 292 A.2d 912; Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 155 Conn. 680, 687, 237 A.2d 360; Michaud v. Gagne, 155 Conn. 406, 410, 232 A.2d 326. The defendants next claim that the court erred in charging the jury that they could consider the plaintiff's claim for loss of earning capacity when there was insufficient evidence to support such a claim. See Davis v. P. Gambardella & Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 161 A.2d 583. The defendants specifically contend that the evidence of any loss in earning capacity was too speculative to be submitted for the jury's consideration. Their claim is based principally on testimony by the plaintiff himself that it was extremely difficult for him to attach a dollar amount to his losses and that any figure would be speculative. In support of that claim, the defendants cite the following exchange between the defendants' counsel and the plaintiff: "Q. . . . [Y]ou told me this morning and it's still your testimony, isn't it, that there is no way for you to put a dollar figure on what you claim to have lost as a result of this accident; isn't that right? A. That's right. Q. And that any figure you put on would be just speculation and a guess on your part? A. That's right, sir." The defendants also emphasize the plaintiff's admission that other factors contributed to the decline in his income in the years following the accident, including the illness of his wife which took him away from his business, the illness of his mechanic and the fact that the neighborhood became the object of a redevelopment project which eventually closed the plaintiff's business in 1972. The only evidence introduced to prove the plaintiff's lost earning capacity was his tax returns for the four years following the accident which showed a small hut steady decline in his earnings, and testimony by the plaintiff estimating his losses at "maybe at least two or three thousand dollars a year." We find that the issue of lost earning capacity was too speculative for submission to the jury. As this court stated in Ball v. Pardy Construction Co., 108 Conn. 549, 551, 143 A. 855: "He who seeks to recover damages of this nature must establish a reasonable probability that his injury did bring about a loss of earnings, and must afford a basis for a reasonable estimate by the trier, court or jury, of the amount of that loss." We required "that the evidence, with such certainty as the nature of the particular case may permit, lay a foundation which will enable the trier to make a fair and reasonable estimate." Ibid; Doeltz v. Longshore, Inc., 126 Conn. 597, 13 A.2d 505. The jury could only speculate as to the extent that the plaintiff's lost earnings were attributable to the accident; Grody v. Tulin, 170 Conn. 443, 365 A.2d 1076; and also as to the amount of any damages. See Boland v. Vanderbilt, 140 Conn. 520, 525, 102 A.2d 362; Comstock v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 77 Conn. 65, 58 A. 465. In assessing damages in a tort action, the trier "is not concerned with possibilities but with reasonable probabilities." Sheiman v. Sheiman, 143 Conn. 222, 225, 121 A.2d 285. The plaintiff's admitted inability to put a dollar figure on the amount of his lost earning capacity when combined with the illnesses of his wife and his mechanic and the imminent taldng of his property for redevelopment left the jury without sufficient guidance on the amount of his claimed loss. Since it constituted error for the court to have submitted to the jury the issue of damages pertaining to the claimed loss of earning capacity, we need not consider the defendants' final claim which attacks the accuracy of the charge on the issue of damages. There is error in part, the judgment as to liability is affirmed and the case is remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of damages. In this opinion the other judges concurred.

The defendants' petition for certification for appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County is denied.

Pee Curiam. This appeal presents an unusual and confusing situation. Edward J. Sempey was for many years employed as an officer of the Stamford police department. On June 1, 1946, he married the plaintiff Gunhild Sempey and five children were born of this marriage. On February 1, 1958, Jean Shaw married Edward Sempey and two children were born as a result of this marriage. Edward Sempey died on July 21, 1973. Gunhild Sempey brought the present action against the board of trustees of the Stamford police pension fund seeking mandamus to require the trustees to pay to her as the widow of Edward Sempey the pension to which the widow of a policeman is entitled. The trustees thereupon filed a complaint for interpleader; Practice Book §458-460; reciting that both Grunhild Sempey and Jean Sempey claimed the widow's pension and that the trustees desired to pay the pension to whichever claimant was entitled to receive it, and seeking an order from the court directing to whom payment should be made. The two claimants thereupon filed their statements of claim. Grunhild alleged her 1946 marriage to Edward Sempey, his death in 1973 and that she was his widow and entitled to the pension. Jean alleged that Grunhild and Edward Sempey were legally divorced on October 31, 1957, and she and Edward intermarried on February 1, 1958, had two children issue of this marriage and that she was the widow of Edward Sempey and entitled to the pension. By way of reply, answer and special defense, Grunhild pleaded that she and Edward were never legally divorced and that if any purported decree of divorce existed it was void and unenforceable because neither she nor Edward was domiciled in the state of the purported divorce and the courts of that state had no jurisdiction over any such purported divorce proceedings. In reply to those pleadings, Jean pleaded by way of special defense that Grunhild was guilty of laches "in that she delayed instituting any equitable action attacking the Alabama divorce decree to the prejudice of Jean Sempey." The court rendered judgment finding the issues for Jean Sempey, ordering that the widow's pension be paid to her and relieving the city of Stamford of any responsibility for pension obligations to Grunhild. From this judgment Grunhild brought the present appeal. Unfortunately, the trial court filed no memorandum of decision to which reference can he made to determine the basis of its decision and to interpret its finding. Bridgeport Pipe Engineering Co. v. DeMatteo Construction Co., 159 Conn. 242, 247, 268 A.2d 391; Kriedel v. Krampitz, 137 Conn. 532, 535, 79 A.2d 181; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 152. The finding with respect to the validity of divorce proceedings instituted by Edward Sempey in Alabama is inconsistent. The court in one finding found that "[t]he Plaintiff and Edward Sempey were legally divorced by the Alabama Court on October 31, 1957." In its conclusions the court concluded that "[o]n October 31,1957 the Circuit Court of Marion County, Alabama issued a decree of divoree purporting to dissolve the marriage of Gunhild Sempey and Edward Sempey." On the other hand, with respect to the claims of law made by the plaintiff Gunhild, the court expressly sustained her claim of law that "[t]he Circuit Court of Marion County, Alabama on October 31, 1957 had no jurisdiction over the marriage of Edward James Sempey and Gunhild Sempey and therefore the decree of divorce issued on that date was invalid." In view of the inconsistency in the finding and our inability to reconcile it from anything in the record, it appears that a new trial is necessary. Practice Book § 627. There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered.

It appearing that the defendant in the above-entitled case has failed to prosecute his appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County with proper diligence, it is, under Practice Book § 696, ordered by the Supreme Court, suo motu, that the appeal be and hereby is dismissed.

Per Curiam. This action is one in malpractice against, three physicians and a hospital. The plaintiff Rachel Taylor claims that damages sustained during surgery at the hospital were the result of the negligence of the defendants. Paragraph ten in the first and second counts of the complaint against the physicians alleged that "[a]s a result of the aforesaid, the plaintiff John Taylor, husband of Rachel Taylor, was caused the loss of companionship and consortium with his wife, the plaintiff Rachel Taylor, during the period of her hospitalization and convalescence resulting from the required repair surgery, and he was also caused economic loss as a result of medical bills and other expenses incidental and related thereto." The defendant physicians demurred to this paragraph in both counts alleging as follows: "The defendants, Stanley R. Lavietes, Gerald Krosnick and Carl M. Cassin, hereby demur to paragraph 10 of the First Count and paragraph 10 of the Second Count of plaintiffs' complaint, insofar as the plaintiff, John Taylor, makes claims for relief, as such claims are not properly includable as a cause of action." The court sustained the demurrer. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment rendered on the demurrer. The memorandum of decision is consulted to ascertain the grounds upon which the court acted. National Broadcasting Co. v. Rose, 153 Conn. 219, 226, 215 A.2d 123. In sustaining the demurrer the court relied on the case law of this state denying the right of a husband to recover for loss of consortium. Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330; Marri v. Stamford Street R. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582. The plaintiffs desire a reexamination of that doctrine by this court. It is evident that the court and the parties all have overlooked some of the pleadings in the paragraphs demurred to in that, in addition to the element of consortium, the paragraphs also include elements of damages for "medical bills and other expenses incidental and related thereto." It is undisputed that "medical bills and other expenses incidental and related" to the injuries suffered by a wife are recoverable by a husband. Hemmings v. Weinstein, 151 Conn. 502, 506,199 A.2d 687; Horton v. Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 106, 111 A.2d 675; Katz v. Cohn, 122 Conn. 338, 341, 189 A. 594; Quackenbush v. Vallario, 114 Conn. 652, 657, 159 A. 893. In demurring to the full paragraphs in the complaint, the defendants admitted any facts provable under them as alleged and if any facts which are provable in the allegations would be recoverable as elements of damages, the demurrer must of necessity fail. Broderick v. Jackman, 167 Conn. 96, 99, 355 A.2d 234; Covino v. Pfeffer, 160 Conn. 212, 214, 276 A.2d 895; Blakeslee v. Board of Water Commissioners, 106 Conn. 642, 649, 139 A. 106. As the demurrer must fail, it is unnecessary for this court to reach the loss of consortium claim. There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to overrule the demurrer and then to proceed according to law.

Loiselle, J. The plaintiff and the defendant were divorced on November 17, 1972. The defendant mother was awarded custody of her two children: Katherine, born in 1960, the issue of a prior marriage (adopted by the plaintiff in 1965), and David, born in 1965 of the marriage of the parties. On June 7, 1974, on the plaintiff's motion a state trial referee, acting as a court under General Statutes § 52-434a, awarded custody of David to the plaintiff father, with rights of visitation in the mother. The defendant appealed from the decision of the referee. Section 46-42 of the General Statutes gives courts broad authority to modify custody orders: "[I]n any controversy before the superior court as to the custody or care of minor children, the court may at any time make or modify any proper order relative to custody, care, education, visitation and support of such children and may assign the custody of any of such children to either parent, or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. In making or modifying any order with respect to custody or visitation, the court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference. . . ." A rule which has been followed in this state limits this broad statutory authority in the interests of respecting the finality of judgments. "[BJefore an order as to custody . of children may be modified there must have been a material change of circumstances after the order was issued." Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 100, 328 A.2d 691; Krasnow v. Krasnow, 140 Conn. 254, 99 A.2d 104. According to this rule, circumstances existing prior to or at the time of the initial custody order are not grounds for a change of custody unless since that order there has been a material change in circumstances which puts into question the propriety of continuing the existing custody order. Krasnow v. Krasnow, supra. If such a material change is found, the court may then consider past conduct as it hears on the present character of a parent and the suitability of that parent as custodian of the child. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 240, 104 A.2d 898. The defendant has briefed and pressed claims that the court, in changing the custody award, erred in three respects: in its finding of facts, in finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and in finding that the welfare of the child David would best be served by awarding custody to his father. Certain findings were attacked as found without evidence. The plaintiff has printed no evidence in his brief to support these findings and they are, therefore, stricken. Other portions of the draft finding are claimed to he material facts which were admitted or undisputed. These are based on testimony by the defendant herself, and in some eases, on hearsay testimony of others as to what the defendant said. The credibility of such testimony was for the court to determine, and we cannot say it was error to refuse to include these in the finding, except for the draft finding that the mother desires to retain custody, which is undisputed and material and therefore added to the finding. As corrected, the finding includes the following-facts which occurred after the initial award of custody to the defendant was made: The father remarried within two weeks of the divorce, taking David to attend the wedding on a regular visitation day, without informing the mother that David would attend the wedding, which increased the stress and pressure on the mother. In July, 1973, a male friend was seen with the mother alone at her home in the evening and early morning. From November, 1973, up to the date of the hearing, David was under treatment by a psychiatric social worker. Beginning in 1973 the defendant was also under psychiatric treatment, and her psychological health showed a marked improvement. Some time during the year before the hearing, the plaintiff and his second wife had a child. During this year the father taped conversations with David concerning David's life with his mother revealing incidents of erratic behavior on her part. In April, 1974, police personnel responding to the defendant's complaint came to her home, where they found her incoherent and loud. She was arguing with her parents about her daughter's staying with them, and the police caused the girl to go home with her grandparents. These facts cannot be said to show a "material change of circumstances" since the first custody award was made. The remarriage of the noncustodial parent by itself has been held not to justify opening the question of custody. Antedomenico v. Antedomenico, 142 Conn. 558, 115 A.2d 659. The fact that treatment is begun, when the problem being treated may have arisen earlier, cannot be held to justify opening custody, or the rule would deter the initiation of needed treatment. The family quarrel investigated by the police and the taping of conversations by the father are mere incidents, not changes in circumstances. One overnight visit by a member of the opposite sex, when it is not shown the child was even present in the home, does not constitute a change in circumstances affecting the welfare of a child. The subordinate facts in the finding as corrected do not support the conclusion of a material change in circumstances since the divorce decree. There are, however, other facts which were found by the court which argue that custody should be changed. These facts are either given without dates, or occurred over a period beginning before the initial custody order. While the divorce was pending and for some time after the decree, the defendant was under emotional stress. Between June 28,1971, and April 3, 1974, the police, in response to the defendant's complaints, were at her home on numerous occasions. She had been regularly seeing a psychiatrist in regard to her emotional problems during the three years preceding the hearing. During this period she drank excessively. She could drink a quart of bourbon nightly. She drank in the presence of her children. She had many conflicts with her parents. The children's pediatrician visited the defendant's home several times and found it to be completely unattended. He was consulted by the defendant's parents and felt a moral obligation to report what he considered instances of neglect of the children. A number of individuals who had been in the defendant's home found it dirty and untidy. Both children spent a great deal of time with their grandparents, where they were well cared for; the daughter reported she was, in effect, living with her grandparents. The defendant argues that her emotional distress, her use of alcohol, her conflicts with her parents, and the police activity at her home all predate the court's initial custody award, and thus cannot support an opening of the question of custody of the child. It is true that the police activity and the conflicts between the defendant and her parents cannot support an opening of custody because they are not relevant to the welfare of the child. Anyone may call the police with a complaint or may quarrel with relatives and. still be a fit custodian for a minor. The defendant's emotional problems, the condition of her home, her drinking and leaving her home unattended, however, are not irrelevant to the welfare of the child. There is no showing that the court which entered the original custody order considered any evidence relating to these matters. Thus the interest in the finality of judgments, which supports the common-law rule requiring a material change in circumstances to modify custody, must be balanced against the best interests of the child. On the national scene, courts are divided in their views of the relative weights accorded to these interests. Other jurisdictions have permitted custody to be modified, in the best interests of the child, either because of changes since the first decree or because of facts which may have existed earlier but were not known to the court which made the prior custody award. Clark, Domestic Relations § 17.7, p. 599; annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 623. The rule requiring a change in circumstances was first discussed by this court in Freund v. Burns, 131 Conn. 380, 40 A.2d 754, in connection with modification of a custody award by a New York court. Frewnd held only that such a change was required by New York law. In Krasnow v. Krasnow, 140 Conn. 254, 99 A.2d 104, this court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to allow a father to open the question of custody by showing he had previously made false representations as to the mother's fitness to have custody. "What the plaintiff was really asking the court to do was to reconsider a matter already disposed of and concerning which no new conditions had since occurred." Id., p. 260. Nothing in that opinion, however, suggests that the mother was truly unfit to have custody. In Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 240, 104 A.2d 898, the rule requiring a change is stated as a rule of Connecticut law, and Freund is cited as the authority, hut the holding of Sullivan is that custody could he opened because a change had occurred. Since that time the rule has been cited in numerous cases. Murphy v. Murphy, 143 Conn. 600,124 A.2d 891; Tippin v. Tippin, 148 Conn. 1, 3, 166 A.2d 448; Adamsen v. Adamsen, 151 Conn. 172, 178, 195 A.2d 418; Cleveland v. Cleveland, 161 Conn. 452, 459, 289 A.2d 909; Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 100, 328 A.2d 691; Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 737, 345 A.2d 48. In none of the opinions in these cases, however, does it appear that the rule prevented a change of custody where the best interests of the child required such a change. It is not uncommon for the parties in a dissolution of marriage to focus their attention primarily on the termination of the marriage relationship. Unfortunately, under this pressure some custody awards may be made which are not in the best interests of the child. This court has always held that the paramount consideration in custody matters is the welfare of the child. Tippin v. Tippin, supra, 4; Murphy v. Murphy, supra, 603; Krasnow v. Krasnow, supra; Mullins v. Becker, 113 Conn. 526, 528, 155 A. 705; Dunham v. Dunham, 97 Conn. 440, 443, 117 A. 504. In Antedomenico v. Antedomenico, 142 Conn. 558, 115 A.2d 659, it was held that the interests of the child were so predominant that even though the father had established a good home and was a fit parent, the child's interests were better served by remaining with the maternal grandparents where he had been well cared for. The court, in determining custody, has a "duty to use its judgment, regardless of the allegations or prayers of the parents." Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 489, 77 A. 1. The fact that factors which affect the welfare of the child have not previously been revealed to the court at the time of the original order should not prevent it from doing its duty by the child when those factors become known to it. The facts the court found, which were relevant to the child's welfare and are not shown to have been before the court which made the initial custody award, are sufficient to warrant opening the question of custody. The only remaining question is whether the court erred in deciding that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding custody to the plaintiff father. It is settled that the determination of the custody of a minor child rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its decision cannot be overridden unless it abused its discretion. Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 99 Conn. 154, 157, 121 A. 174; Morrill v. Morrill, supra, 491. In making its determination, the court had before it the following additional evidence: the family relations officer, a college graduate experienced in her work, interviewed several people who observed a warm, affectionate relationship between the child, his father and the new wife, and who believed the father's home offered a superior environment. She recommended custody in the father in a report datéd November 19, 1973. The children's pediatrician recommended custody in the father. The attorney for the child, however, who conferred with twelve different individuals acquainted with the ease, in a report dated May 9, 1974, recommended custody in the defendant. A psychiatric social worker with distinguished credentials, who had been treating David for six months, appeared at the hearing and stated that it was her professional opinion that it was not in David's best interests to be placed in a home where his stepmother had recently had a baby of her own. The court also talked to David. The trial court had the advantage of observing the parties, the child and the witnesses. There was evidence on which it could have based an award of custody to either parent. "[W]e are bound to bear in mind that the authority to exercise the judicial discretion . is not conferred upon this court, but upon the trial court, and that we are not privileged to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial court in its exercise. A mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one which discloses clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference." Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 491, 77 A. 1. The defendant complains that there is a presumption in favor of custody in the mother, citing Claffey v. Claffey, 146 Conn. 104, 148 A.2d 140, and Claffey v. Claffey, 135 Conn. 374, 64 A.2d 540. Those cases did not involve a choice between two parents as custodian, but between the mother and the father's parents. The defendant also complains that there is a presumption against modification of a custody-order, citing Freund v. Burns, 131 Conn. 380, 40 A.2d 754. There is no language in the ease regarding presumptions. Both the claimed presumption favoring the mother and the claimed presumption against modification, insofar as they may exist, are merely elements in the larger question of what is in the best interests of the child. If the child's best interests require for him to have a change in custody, it must be made; if they require for him to be placed in the custody of the father rather than the mother, that too must follow. There was evidence from which the court could have found that a change to the father's custody was in David's best interests; thus the conclusion is adequately supported by the finding. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The defendant claims that there is nothing in the findings showing that these factors had a direct relationship to the welfare of the child (that David was adversely affected by them). Findings to that effect were not necessary; a relationship may logically be inferred, although such an inference may be rebutted by a showing that the child is totally unaffected by these factors. There is a reference in the plaintiff's brief to a family relations report made at the time of the initial custody order in this case, but the defendant does not allege that the report included information adverse to her claim for custody.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County is denied.

The motion by the defendants Andrew L. Houlding and The Journal-Courier to dismiss the appeals by the plaintiffs (named plaintiff and chairman Paul Silvergleid) and the defendants (named defendant and chairman Herbert Brucker) from the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County is denied.

The defendant's motion for permission to file his supplemental brief in printed form in the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is granted.

In the above-entitled matters, it is ordered that the defendant Coman file his brief on or before November 10, 1976, and that the state file its brief or briefs in all three cases on or before January 10, 1977.

The defendant's "Motion for Assignment of Counsel to Argue Appeal Bond (Excessiveness)" in the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is dismissed. The defendant's "Motion for Progress of Filed Motion for Review to State Supreme Court P.B. Sec. 693, 694" in the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is dismissed.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 24 Conn. App. 811, is denied.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court is dismissed.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 24 Conn. App. 115, is denied.

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Session of the Superior Court is denied.

It appearing that the defendant in the above-entitled case has failed to prosecute his appeal from the Superior Court for the judicial district of Waterbury with proper diligence, it is, under Practice Book § 696, ordered by the Supreme Court, suo motu, that the appeal be and hereby is dismissed unless the defendant files on or before January 24, 1977, his brief.

House, C. J. This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Superior Court granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying a similar motion made by the plaintiff. The action was brought for a declaratory judgment to determine whether the "hit-and-run" clause in the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile insurance policy issued by the defendant was in derogation of the statutory minimum requirements for such coverage so that the plaintiff, Anita E. Rosnick, was in fact covered for injuries sustained in an accident. The facts of the case are not in dispute. On September 14, 1970, the plaintiff was driving an automobile owned by her in a westerly direction on route 84 in Hartford. As a result of a negligent changing of lanes by the driver of a tractor-trailer without warning or signal, the plaintiff was caused to swerve suddenly and collide head-on with a guardrail on the highway. As a result of this accident, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries. There was no contact or collision between the automobile driven by the plaintiff and the tractor-trailer nor was the identity of the tractor-trailer or of its driver ever determined. The defendant, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, had issued a contract of automobile liability insurance to the plaintiff in July, 1970, and it was in effect on the date of the accident in question. The policy contained an uninsured motorist provision entitled "Family Protection Coverage" which obligated the defendant to pay all sums which the plaintiff would be legally entitled to recover as damages for bodily injuries caused by the owner or operator of an "uninsured automobile." The term "uninsured automobile" was defined to include a trailer of any type and to include a "hit-and-run automobile" which, in turn, was defined to mean "an automobile which causes bodily injury to an Insured arising out of physical contact of such automobile with the Insured or with an automobile which the Insured is occupying at the time of the accident, provided: . . . there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or the owner of such 'hit-and-run automobile.' " The defendant claimed that there was no coverage for the plaintiff in this case under the terms of the policy, since there was no physical contact between the plaintiff's automobile and the motor vehicle which caused the accident. The plaintiff claimed that the policy requirement for physical contact is in derogation of the statutes of the state of Connecticut and regulations which were promulgated thereunder by the insurance commissioner and that the requirement of physical contact was void. The trial court concluded that the requirement of physical contact between the motor vehicles of a hit-and-run driver and the plaintiff contained in the uninsured motorist portion of the policy was not a restriction of the statutory mandatory uninsured motorist coverage in Connecticut and thus was not in derogation of the applicable statutes, but was actually an extension of the coverage required by the legislature in the applicable statute, § 38-175e of the General Statutes, in effect in 1970, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The plaintiff made three assignments of error, all of which relate to the principal issue at trial: Is the requirement of physical contact between the motor vehicle of a "hit-and-run" driver (specifically and accurately described as a "force-and-run" driver in the Superior Court's finding) and the plaintiff's vehicle, as provided in the uninsured motorist provisions of a standard automobile insurance policy and the policy in question, a restriction of uninsured motorist coverage made mandatory by statute and the regulations promulgated thereunder in the state of Connecticut and, thus, in derogation of the applicable statutory law or is it an appropriate extension of the coverage required by the legislature as of September 14, 1970? At the time of the accident in question, the controlling statutes were those adopted by 1967 Public Acts, No. 510, which were amended by 1969 Public Acts, No. 202, and incorporated into the General Statutes as § 38-175a through 38-175d, the relevant portions of which are printed in the footnote. The administrative regulation adopted by the insurance commissioner is § 38-175a-6, entitled "Minimum provision for protection against uninsured motorists," which provided: "The insurer shall undertake to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident involving the uninsured automobile. This coverage shall insure the occupants of every automobile to which the bodily injury liability coverage applies. 'Uninsured automobile' includes an automobile insured against liability by an insurer that is or becomes insolvent." On the date of the accident, there was in effect an automobile insurance policy with "Family Protection Coverage" issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. The policy contained a provision which, in relevant part, reads as follows: "Coverage GfFamily Protection (Damages for Bodily Injury) To pay all sums which the Insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an unin sured automobile because of bodily injury . . . sustained by tbe Insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile. . . . ' [UJninsured automobile' includes a trailer of any type and means: (a) an automobile or trailer with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is, in at least the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which the insured automobile is principally garaged, no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such automobile, or with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing the same denies coverage thereunder, or (b) a hit-and-run automobile; . . . 'hit-and-run automobile' means an automobile which causes bodily injury to an Insured arising out of physical contact of such automobile with the Insured or with an automobile which the Insured is occupying at the time of the accident, provided: . . . there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or the owner of such 'hit-and-run automobile.' " This court decided similar questions to the ones raised in this case in Weingarten v. Allstate Ins. Co., 169 Conn. 502, 363 A.2d 1055. At issue in Weingarten was the interpretation of the same statutory and regulatory provisions in question here. In Weingarten we concluded that the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions did not require coverage in situations such as the present ease where the vehicle causing the accident was "unidentified," as distinguished from "uninsured," and where there was no physical contact between it and the plaintiff's vehicle. We there stated (p. 507): "The statute and regulations do not define 'uninsured motorist' or in any way refer to what are commonly called hit-and-run operators. They merely require that every policy contain 'uninsured motorist coverage.' ' "[C]ourts cannot read into the terms of a statute something which manifestly is not there in order to reach what the court thinks would be a just result." State v. Malm, 143 Conn. 462, 467, 123 A.2d 276. Much less does the plaintiff's unfortunate circumstance justify this court's disregarding the legislative mandate that words used in statutes "shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language." General Statutes § 1-1. A due regard for the differing functions of the legislative and judicial branches of government requires that the courts refrain from rewriting, under the pretext of interpretation, the clearly expressed language of a legislative enactment which the court deems to be preferable to that which the legislation requires. "In the field of legislation, the legislature is supreme. Courts must apply legislative enactments according to their plain terms." State v. Malm, supra.' Simonette v. Great American Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 466, 471, 339 A.2d 453. An 'uninsured motorist' clearly is not the same as an 'unidentified motorist' and '[a] court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings.' Marcolini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 Conn. 280, 284, 278 A.2d 796." The facts in the Weingarten case partially differ from those in the present case in that the plaintiff's insurance policy in Weingarten did not extend unin snred motorist coverage to "hit-and-run" situations. In the present case, the insurance policy expressly extended coverage beyond the minimum statutory requirements and did include "hit-and-run" situations with an appropriate limitation for coverage of injury in the requirement of physical contact between a vehicle and the insured or a vehicle occupied by the insured at the time of the accident. There is no reason to penalize the defendant in this case because it expressly extended, with an understandable limitation, its coverage to a broader class of risk than that required by statutory or regulatory provisions. The trial court properly concluded that "[t]he requirement for 'physical contact' between the motor vehicles of a force-and-run driver and the plaintiff contained in the uninsured motorist portion of a standard automobile policy was not a restriction of the statutory mandatory uninsured motorist coverage in the State of Connecticut, thus not in derogation of the applicable statutes, but actually an extension of the coverage required by the Legislature." Under the circumstances, it properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. There is no error. In this opinion Loiselle and Barber, Js., concurred. "[General Statutes] See. 38-175a. minimum: provisions in automobile liability policies, (a) . . . [T]he insurance commissioner shall adopt regulations with respect to minimum provisions to be included in automobile liability insurance policies issued after the effective date of such regulations and covering private passenger automobiles registered or principally garaged in this state. Such regulations shall relate to the insuring agreements, exclusions, conditions and other terms applicable to the bodily injury liability, proper damage liability, medical payments and uninsured motorists coverages under such policies and shall make mandatory the inclusion of bodily injury liability, property damage liability and uninsured motorists coverages. . . "[General Statutes] See. 38-175c. uninsured motorist coverage. Every such policy shall provide insurance in accordance with such regulations, with limits for bodily injury or death not less than those specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles or of insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent prior to payment of sueh damages, because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom. . . ." "[General Statutes] Sec. 38-175d. policies deemed to provide coverage in accordance with regulations. Policies affording bodily injury liability, property damage liability and uninsured motorist coverages to which the provisions of sections 38-175a to 38-175e, inclusive, apply shall be deemed to provide insurance under sueh coverages in accordance with sueh regulations. Policies affording medical payments coverage to which the provisions of said sections apply shall be deemed to provide insurance under such coverage in accordance with sueh regulations." "[Begs., Conn. State Agencies] Sec. 38-175a-6. minimum provision for protection against uninsured motorists, (a) Coverage. The insurer shall undertake to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident involving the uninsured automobile. This coverage shall insure the occupants of every automobile to which bodily injury liability coverage applies. 'Uninsured automobile' includes an automobile insured against liability by an insurer that is or becomes insolvent. . . ." See also footnote 1 of the majority opinion.

Barber, J. The Court of Common Pleas sustained an appeal from a decision of the welfare commissioner holding that the plaintiff was ineligible for assistance from the state for her medical expenses, and the defendant has appealed to this court from the judgment rendered thereon. On April 5, 1974, the plaintiff, a patient in a convalescent home, applied for public assistance from the state of Connecticut under its title XYII medical assistance program. See General Statutes, c. 302, part IV. The plaintiff's application form stated that on May 22, 1973, her savings account with a Hartford bank in the amount of $27,427.88 had been transferred to trust accounts for her grandchildren to be used for their college expenses. The application was denied on the ground that this disposition of money was in fact a transfer of property without receipt of fair value, making the plaintiff ineligible for title XIX medical assistance. The plaintiff then requested and was given a statutory fair hearing under § 17-2a and 17-2b of the General Statutes. The fair hearing officer authorized by the welfare commissioner to conduct the hearing upheld the denial of the plaintiff's application for medical assistance, and the plaintiff appealed the fair hearing decision to the Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to § 17-2b. One of the conditions of eligibility for medical assistance is that the applicant shall not have made, "within seven years prior to the date of application for such aid, an assignment or transfer or other disposition of property without reasonable consideration." General Statutes § 17-109 (e); § 17-134e. The fair hearing officer found that the money in the bank account always had been intended for the grandchildren's college expenses; made no finding as to the creation of a trust prior to May 22, 1973, when the plaintiff transferred the money from her savings account to a designated trust fund for her grandchildren; and concluded that by this transfer the plaintiff did in fact dispose of $27,427.88 without receipt of fair value. The trial court, however, found that the facts as disclosed by the record favored the conclusion that a trust account was created by the plaintiff's husband in 1967 and, therefore, no transfer of the plaintiff's personal property was made in 1973, but rather a mere change of bank account numbers and the substitution of the plaintiff's son as trustee. The Uniform Administrative Procedure Act provides that the judicial review of an agency decision shall be confined to the record and that the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. General Statutes §4-183 (f) and (g). The trial court in this case concluded that the decision of the agency was. affected by an error of law and sustained the appeal. General Statutes §4-183 (g) (4). We, however, are not persuaded that the trial court's conclusion that a trust was created in 1967 is supported by the evidence and the applicable law. The reliable, probative and substantial evidence before the fair hearing officer indicates that on May 2, 1973, when the plaintiff's husband died, the bank account in question was held jointly by the plaintiff and her husband. After her husband's death, the plaintiff, on May 22,1973, issued a letter purporting to transfer this account to a trust account. Over a period of years, the plaintiff and her husband had three different savings accounts in their names. On February 3,1967, the plaintiff and her husband withdrew the sum of $7,500 from one bank account having a balance of $11,174.41 and placed this sum of $7,500 in a new account. On April 23, 1970, when the new account had a balance of $19,190.15, the sum of $15,000 was withdrawn and placed in a "choice passbook account" bearing a higher rate of interest. This third account was No. 019-2-00042-0 with the Hartford National Bank. On April 5, 1972, an additional sum of $4,661.15 was deposited in this account and the maturity date was extended to April 5, 1974. The passbook record on this later account discloses that no withdrawals were made until August 22, 1973, when the sum of $27,427.88 was withdrawn and the account was closed. There is evidence that the plaintiff and her husband intended to provide money for their grandchildren's college education. There is, however, no substantial evidence that the plaintiff and her husband ever did more than manifest a mere intention to create a trust at some subsequent time. One owning property can create an enforceable trust by a declaration that he holds the property as trustee for the benefit of another person. Restatement (Second), 1 Trusts § 17 (a); 1 Scott, Trusts (3d Ed.) § 17.1. An oral declaration may be sufficient to create an inter vivos trust of personal property, even without consideration and without delivery. Hebrew University Assn. v. Nye, 148 Conn. 223, 229, 169 A.2d 641; 1 Scott, op. cit. §28, 32.2. Moreover, the settlor may reserve extensive powers over the administration of a trust. DiSesa v. Hickey, 160 Conn. 250, 264, 278 A.2d 785; Cherniack v. Home National Bank & Trust Co., 151 Conn. 367, 369, 198 A.2d 58. No trust, however, is created unless the settlor presently and unequivocally manifests an intention to impose upon himself enforceable duties of a trust nature. Hebrew University Assn. v. Nye, supra; see Stamford Savings Bank v. Everett, 132 Conn. 92, 95, 42 A.2d 662; 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts, § 34. "If what has been done falls short of showing the complete establishment of a fiduciary relationship, as where the intent to become a trustee is doubtful because what was said or done is as compatible with an intent to make a future gift as with an intent to hold the legal title to property for the exclusive benefit of another, the proof fails to show more than a promise without consideration." Cullen v. Chappell, 116 F.2d 1017, 1018 (2d Cir.). In this case there was no written declaration of trust before May 22, 1973, and none of the bank accounts shows any manifestation of intent to create a trust. Section 36-110 (1) (a) of the General Statutes provides that no savings bank, state bank or national banking association "shall accept any deposit made by one person in trust for another unless the same is accompanied by a statement. signed by the depositor giving the name and residence of the beneficiary." See Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d 512. Section 36-3 provides that when a joint survivorship deposit is made or such an account is issued, the making of the deposit or the issuance of the account in such form shall, "in the absence of fraud or undue influence, or other clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, be prima facie evidence, in any action or proceeding respecting the ownership of, or the enforcement of the obligation created or represented by, such deposit or account, of the intention of all of the named owners thereof to vest title to such deposit or account, including all additions and increments thereto, in such survivor or survivors." See Grodzicki v. Grodzicki, 154 Conn. 456, 226 A.2d 656. The evidential history pertaining to the three joint savings accounts is consistent with the ordinary management of savings accounts which seeks federal deposit insurance coverage and higher interest rates and by itself affords no proper basis for an inference of manifestation of intent to create an enforceable trust. That the plaintiff or her husband might have intended to draw upon the joint accounts at some time to provide for the costs of a college education for their grandchildren does not establish that the latter had a beneficial interest in the accounts. Stamford Savings Bank v. Everett, supra. Although there is an absence of evidence establishing creation of a valid trust, there is substantial evidence that the plaintiff did in fact dispose of $27,427.88 without receipt of fair value as concluded by the fair hearing officer. There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the appeal. In this opinion the other judges concurred. "Hartford, Conn. May 22, 1973 To Whom It May Concern: I, Ida M. Hansen, being of sound mind, do transfer the total amount in account $019-2-00042-0 of the Hartford National Bank & Trust Company to a trust account to be established in the name of or names of my grandchildren. This money is to be used for college expenses only that may be incurred by my grandchildren, Jo-Ann P. Hansen, Mark J. Hansen, and Holly L. Hansen. This account will be administered by their parents, Eobert E. and Janet W. Hansen. This is done at the wishes of my late husband, Johannes E. Hansen, whose intention it was to make such a transfer prior to his death. I am fully in agreement with this wish. Ida M. Hansen" Section 17-109 (e) of the General Statutes provides that one condition of eligibility is that a person applying for assistance "has not made, within seven years prior to the date of application for such aid, an assignment or transfer or other disposition of property without reasonable consideration or for the purpose of qualifying for an award." On December 10, 1976, a memorandum of decision in the case of Buckner v. Maher was filed in the United States District Court (D. Conn.) holding that this statute creates an improper presumption and violates the federal supremacy clause. No such claim was made in this ease at any stage of the proceedings.

Per Curiam. On May 6, 1971, James Smalls was convicted in the Superior Court in Fairfield County of a violation of the state dependency producing drug law, General Statutes § 19-480. This appeal is from the denial of a petition for a new trial. The law in this state relative to new trials has been well established and recently summarized in Reilly v. State, 32 Conn. Sup. 349, 355 A.2d 324. In Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 623, 116 A.2d 433, we stated: " [T]he primary test is whether an injustice was done and whether it is probable that on a new trial a different result would be reached. Smith v. State, 141 Conn. 202, 208, 104 A.2d 761; Dortch v. State, 142 Conn. 18, 21, 110 A.2d 471. The burden of proving the probability of a different result is upon the plaintiff, and in determining that issue the trial court exercises a discretion which cannot be reviewed unless its discretionary power has been abused. State v. Goldberger, 118 Conn. 444, 457, 173 A. 216." On the record in this case, there is no evidence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. There is no error.

The defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County is granted.

It appearing that the plaintiffs in the above-entitled case have failed to prosecute their appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County with proper diligence, it is, under Practice Book § 696, ordered by the Supreme Court, suo motu, that the appeal be and hereby is dismissed.

The plaintiff's motion for judgment by default in the appeal from the Superior Court in Tolland County is granted unless the defendant files his brief on or before November 15, 1976.

It appearing that the plaintiff is represented by counsel, her pro se "Motion for Permission to File a Non-Conforming Brief and Appendix" in the appeal from the Superior Court in Litchfield County is denied.

The defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County is denied.

Barber, J. The plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming illegal confinement on the ground that he had been denied due process when returned to confinement for violation of parole. The trial court granted the petition and ordered the plaintiff discharged from custody as a parole violator. Upon the granting of certification the defendant appealed, assigning error in the court's finding of facts, in the conclusions reached and in the overruling of the defendant's claims of law. The finding, which is not subject to any material corrections, supports the following facts: On September 24, 1970, the plaintiff was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than two or more than five years for violation of the state dependency producing drug law. He was released on parole on September 17, 1971, subject to a parole agreement he had signed. The parole agreement contained the following special condition: "You are paroled only to an in-patient narcotic treatment program at . . . [Daytop], Inc., Seymour, Connecticut. You must comply with the recommendations of the treatment staff as to your course of treatment, and you must secure the express permission of both the treatment staff and your parole officer before making any changes in this program. If for any reason this program is not developed, your case is to be reported back to the Board [of Parole] for further consideration. Failure to comply with these conditions will result in your return to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction and your case will be reported back to the Board for further consideration." The agreement does not state that any course of action other than return to custody will occur if a parolee violates the conditions of his parole. It directed the plaintiff to consult with his parole officer whenever he had problems or he did not understand what was expected of him. The plaintiff acknowledged that he had read, or had had read to him, the conditions of his parole, and that he fully understood them and agreed to abide by and strictly follow them, and he fully understood the penalties involved should he in any manner violate any of the conditions. Under the terms of his parole agreement, it was the plaintiff's responsibility to keep his parole officer informed at all times concerning his place of residence and place of employment, to secure the permission of the parole officer before changing his residence or employment, and to report any change of residence or employment to his parole officer within twenty-fonr hours of such change. During his trip to Daytop, the plaintiff's parole officer explained to him that he would have to stay at Daytop and that failure to do so would he a violation of his parole. On November 28, 1971, the plaintiff left Daytop without permission of the staff at Daytop or his parole officer. On the same day, when the plaintiff telephoned his parole officer in an effort to explain to him why he had left Daytop, his parole officer told the plaintiff that he would be taken back to prison. He was directed to return to Daytop, but he failed to do so. On December 21, 1971, a parole violation warrant was issued and mailed to the parole officer. On April 7, 1972, the Bridgeport parole office informed the plaintiff's parole officer that it had lodged the warrant with the Stamford police department. On October 14, 1974, the plaintiff was arrested by the police in Stamford on an unrelated charge and was informed that they were holding him on the parole violation warrant. In further violation of the agreed upon conditions of his parole, the plaintiff never informed his parole officer nor the parole authorities of his place of residence or employment subsequent to his leaving Daytop on November 28, 1971, and prior to his arrest on October 14, 1974. During this period, the only occasion on which the plaintiff contacted his parole officer or the parole authorities was several hours after he left Daytop, when he telephoned his parole officer and advised him that he was in Stamford. His last known address was Day-top, from which he had absconded on November 28, 1971. At the time of the plaintiff's release on parole the maximum term of the plaintiff's sentence was scheduled to expire on May 1,1974. After May 1, 1974, the plaintiff believed that he was no longer subject to parole. He did not understand that a reimprisonment warrant could be issued without his knowledge which would stop his sentence from running. It is not the policy of the division of parole to notify parolees of the existence of a warrant. The court found that during the period from December, 1971, until October, 1974, the plaintiff lived in Nor-walk'and Stamford, using his own name, and maintaining contact with his family and friends. He failed, however, to return to Daytop as directed by his parole officer. The question of the plaintiff's parole status has been referred to the board of parole for the purpose of determining whether to revoke or otherwise modify his parole. The trial court concluded that the parole officer and other law enforcement agencies failed to take reasonable steps to execute the warrant for violation of parole or give the parolee notice of its issuance and that the plaintiff could have been apprehended by the parole or other law enforcement officer, acting with reasonable diligence. The finding contains no conclusion relating to due process or other constitutional limitation. We therefore refer to the memorandum of decision in order to learn the basis for the court's decision. Waterbury v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 160 Conn. 226, 228, 278 A.2d 771. The memorandum of decision recites that "[t]his unreasonable delay in giving notice and in executing the warrant, in the light of the dead-time penalty, violates the fundamental fairness required by the procedural due process clause of the Constitution of the United States." When the conclusions of a trial court are attacked on appeal, they are reviewed to determine whether they are legally and logically supported by the facts in the finding or involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Hutenshy v. Avon, 163 Conn. 433, 437, 311 A.2d 92; Schnier v. Ives, 162 Conn. 171, 177, 293 A.2d 1. "The essence of parole is release from prison, before completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484; see Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 697 n.2, 372 A.2d 102. By statute, any inmate confined in the correctional institution at Somers, after serving not less than the minimum term of his sentence, may, in the discretion of the parole hoard, be paroled if it appears reasonably probable that the inmate will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society. General Statutes § 54-125. The statutes also provide that each order of parole shall fix the limits of the parolee's residence, and in any particular case, the hoard of parole may establish special provisions for the parole of a convict. General Statutes § 54-125, 54-126. The statutes further provide that any returned parolee who has violated his parole may he retained in the institution from which he was paroled "for a period equal to the unexpired portion of the term of his sentence at the date of the request or order for his return." (Emphasis supplied.) General Statutes § 52-128. Revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and does not require the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 480. After the issuance of an arrest warrant, "[t]he first stage [of parole revocation] occurs when the parolee is arrested and detained, usually at the direction of his parole officer. The second occurs when parole is formally revoked. There is typically a substantial time lag between the arrest and the eventual determination by the parole board whether parole should be revoked." Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 485. In considering whether the plaintiff in this case has been accorded due process, it is significant that the question of the plaintiff's parole status has been referred to the parole board for the purpose of determining whether to revoke or otherwise modify his parole and that the hearing has been continued at the plaintiff's request. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, holding that where a previously convicted probationer was not afforded either a preliminary revocation hearing or a final hearing, revocation of his probation did not meet the standards of due process prescribed in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra; see also State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 239, 363 A.2d 143. After an examination of all the subordinate facts in the finding, we are of the opinion that, they do not logically support the ultimate conclusions of the trial court and they do not establish that the plaintiff was denied due process. The plaintiff disregarded the principal rules of his parole agreement, thereby defeating the essence of parole. See Morrissey v. Brewer, supra. One of the basic conditions of the parole agreement was that the plaintiff was to remain in the in-patient narcotics treat ment program at Daytop, which he failed to do by leaving without permission. Furthermore, at no time after leaving Daytop did the plaintiff inform his parole officer of his changes of residence, yet this is an essential requirement for successful parole supervision. See Gentry v. Warden, 167 Conn. 639, 643, 356 A.2d 902. Under the terms of the parole agreement, it was the plaintiff's responsibility to keep his parole officer informed at all times concerning his place of residence, not the parole officer's duty to find him. See Gentry v. Warden, supra. A person who eludes arrest over an extended period of time lays no proper foundation for a claim that such delay caused him a denial of due process. State v. Lockman, 169 Conn. 116, 120, 362 A.2d 920. The plaintiff acknowledged, in the agreement, that he understood that his failure to comply with the conditions in any manner would be a violation of parole and would result in his return to custody. The implications of violation of parole are clearly defined in § 54-128 of the General Statutes. As provided in this statute, they include the possibility that the parole violator, upon return to custody, may be subject to the requirement that he serve a period equal to the "unexpired" portion of the term of his sentence at the date of the request or order for his return. The issuance of the arrest warrant stopped the running of the plaintiff's sentence, and the ensuing period until his return to custody became "dead time." Ibid. The plaintiff does not challenge the validity or constitutionality of § 54-128. The plaintiff is presumed to have known the provisions of this law. Such a fundamental rule is based on public policy and the principle that the acts of a person must be considered as having been done with knowledge of the law, for otherwise the law could he easily evaded. Hebb v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 150 Conn. 539, 542, 192 A.2d 206; Atlas Realty Corporation v. House, 123 Conn. 94, 101, 192 A. 564. By flagrantly violating the conditions of his parole and not returning to Daytop after being ordered to do so by his parole officer, the plaintiff assumed the calculated risk that the provisions of § 54-128 would be invoked against him. As a general policy, the division of parole does not inform parolees of an outstanding parole violation warrant before it is executed. This is grounded upon a reasonable belief that to do so would aggravate the situation, particularly by causing problems of parolees violating other conditions of their parole and absconding before arrest. The subordinate facts do not support the conclusion of the trial court that the parole officer and law enforcement agencies did not act with reasonable diligence under the circumstances. The finding is devoid of any facts indicating what action was taken by the police to execute the arrest warrant. It is presumed that the officers properly performed their duty until the contrary appears. Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 559, 568, 345 A.2d 520; Aczas v. Stuart Heights, Inc., 154 Conn. 54, 59, 221 A.2d 589. When one is charged with a crime, we have held that a delay in making an arrest does not of itself result in a denial of due process of law. To establish that a delay has produced a denial of due process, the person arrested must show that actual significant prejudice to him has resulted. State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11, 17, 364 A.2d 225; State v. Lockman, supra; State v. L'Heureux, 166 Conn. 312, 321-22, 348 A.2d 578; see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468. "[T]he issuance of a violator warrant triggers a process which, as a matter of fundamental fairness, must be pursued with reasonable diligence and with reasonable dispatch. What will constitute a reasonable time will, of necessity, vary with the facts of each case. Obviously, a violator who has succeeded in evading the authorities is in no position to complain of a delay. Even in other cases delay will not in and of itself suffice to show prejudice, except in an extreme case, and actual prejudice vel non is the focal point of the inquiry." Shelton v. United States Board of Parole, 388 F.2d 567, 574 (D.C. Cir.); see also Robb v. Norton, 394 F. Sup. 856, 858 (D. Conn.). In this case there is no finding of specific prejudice. The trial court's conclusion that there was a denial of due process is not supported by the applicable law and the subordinate facts in the finding. There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment remanding the petitioner to the custody of the defendant warden. In this opinion House, C. J., Loiselle and Longo, Js., concurred. Some of the general facts in the court's finding appear to be overly broad, but they are elsewhere modified by more specific findings and therefore it cannot be said that the broader findings of fact are in language of doubtful meaning so that their real significance does not clearly appear. It does not appear that the facts which the defendant seeks to have added to the finding are either admitted or undisputed. Practice Book § 628. "[General Statutes] See. 54-128. violation of pakole. (a) Any paroled convict or inmate who has been returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction or any institution of the department of correction for violation of his parole may be retained in the institution from which he was paroled for a period equal to the unexpired portion of the term of his sentence at the date of the request or order for his return less any commutation pr diminution of his sentence earned except that the board of parole may, in its discretion, determine that he shall forfeit any or all of such earned time, or may be again paroled by said board."

The plaintiff's "Motion to Strike Out the Assignment of Errors" of the defendant Maritime Chartering Services, Inc., in the appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County at Stamford is denied.

Per Curiam. This court has opened, on its own motion, its judgment of October 15, 1976, on the motion of the named defendants for a review of the order of the Court of Common Pleas dated May 25, 1976, terminating a stay of execution of the judgment of that court. We have done so to allow all parties to present their arguments. After considering the arguments, we affirm our decision of October 15, 1976, on the motion to review. The issue before us was a narrow one: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in terminating the stay? On a motion by the defendants for reargument of their motion for a review, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we pointed out that neither our decision nor that of the trial court contained any direction concerning the action the public utilities control authority (PUCA) is to take with regard to the 1974 rate application. We stated: "The effect of terminating the stay of execution was to give immediate effect to the trial court's decision sustaining the appeal and holding the 1974 rate schedule invalid, thus pre venting the named defendants from charging their customers under that invalidated schedule, pending a review of the trial court's decision." We did not then, and do not now, indicate what rates should he charged. These matters are not properly before this court but, in the present posture of this case, are matters for the PUCA. The merits of the decision of the Court of Common Pleas that the 1974 rates are illegal are not yet before this court. Until we have decided the appeal from that judgment, any inference that our rulings require refunds to users is unfounded and inappropriate. By the following decision, dated November 12, 1976, we denied the motion by the named defendants for reargument of their previous motion for a review of the order of the trial court dated May 25, 1976, terminating a stay of execution in the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, which motion for a review was granted and the relief sought therein denied. "Pee Cdeiam. The motion for reargument represents that the public utilities control authority (PUCA) is interpreting the trial court's decision to mean that the PUCA is under a court mandate to act promptly on the trial court's remand. "Neither the trial court's remand nor its order terminating the stay of execution contains any direction concerning the action the PUCA is to take with regard to the 1974 application. The phrase 'for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion' merely summarizes the consequences of the trial court's decision sustaining the appeal, i.e., that, the appeal having been sustained, it is the duty of the administrative agency to proceed according to law. See Bogue v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 165 Conn. 749, 756, 345 A.2d 9. That rescript contains no direction concerning when or how the PUCA is to hold its hearings. Indeed, a remand to the administrative agency with such a directive would be 'to impose the judicial will upon an administrative board' and would be invalid. See Watson v. Howard, 138 Conn. 464, 469, 86 A.2d 67; see also Norwalk Street Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 37 A. 1080 (administrative functions cannot constitutionally be vested in the courts). "Since the trial court's rescript did not purport to order the PUCA to hold hearings forthwith on the 1974 application, the termination of the stay under Practice Book § 661 did not have the effect of ordering such hearings. The effect of terminating the stay of execution was to give immediate effect to tho trial court's decision sustaining the appeal and holding the 1974 rate schedule invalid, thus preventing tho named defendants from charging their customers under that invalidated schedule, pending a review of the trial court's decision. "The motion for reargument is denied." In the decision on the motion for reargument.

Per Curiam. This action was brought by the plaintiffs for trespass and for an injunction to restrain the defendants from encroaching on the land of the plaintiffs. The defendants filed a cross complaint claiming title by adverse possession to the contested four-foot area along the boundary of the property of the parties. The court rendered judgment for the defendants on the complaint and cross eomplaint, finding that the defendants had acquired ownership of the disputed area by adverse possession. It also found that the defendants had failed to prove that they were entitled to any damages. The proof necessary to establish title by adverse possession is well settled. See Wadsworth Realty Co. v. Sundberg, 165 Conn. 457, 462, 338 A.2d 470; Robinson v. Myers, 156 Conn. 510, 517, 244 A.2d 385. As we said in the Wadsworth case (p. 463), "[i]n the final analysis, whether possession is adverse is a question of fact for the trier." The court's finding of fact is not subject to correction and the facts amply support the court's conclusion that the defendants and their predecessors in title had used the disputed area "for more than fifteen years openly, visibly, notoriously, adversely, exclusively, continuously, uninterruptedly and under a claim of right." There is no error.

Per Curiam. The petition for certification is denied, it not appearing that "there are special and important reasons" to grant certification. Practice Book § 742. We repeat what we said in State v. Chisholm, 155 Conn. 706, 707, 236 A.2d 465: "[A] denial of certification does not necessarily indicate our approval either of the result reached by the Appellate Division or of the opinion rendered by it."

The plaintiff's motion for a review of the action of the trial court in the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County is granted and the relief sought therein is denied.

The plaintiff's petitions for certification for appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County is denied.

The defendant's motion for review of the trial court's denial of his motion for a reduction of his bond in the appeal from the Superior Court in New Haven County is granted and the relief requested therein is denied.

The motion by the defendants Dunn Bus Corporation and Stephen Marlin to dismiss the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County at Stamford is granted. The motion by the defendant Ansel Gayle to dismiss the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County at Stamford is granted. The motion by the defendant Ansel Gayle to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County at Stamford is granted.

The plaintiffs' petition for certification for appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County is denied.

Callahan, J. These consolidated appeals and cross appeals were brought to this court from judgments rendered in the Superior Court on appeals brought by the plaintiffs pursuant to General Statutes § 12-422 from deficiency assessments of use taxes, penalties and interest by the defendant commissioner of revenue services (commissioner). The trial court upheld the commissioner's assessment of taxes as to all the plaintiffs but determined that they were not liable for penalties and interest. We find no error. The essential facts are not in dispute. The plaintiffs American Totalisator Company, Inc. (AmTote), DTP Royalty, Inc. (DTP), and GTECH Corporation (GTECH), at various times contracted with the state of Connecticut acting through the division of special revenue (state) to provide personal property, training, personnel and services to establish systems to enable the state to conduct its lottery, teletrack and off-track betting enterprises. In order to accomplish that purpose the plaintiffs, during the years for which deficiencies were assessed, purchased or leased computers, computer components, computer terminals, paper stock and other tangible items on which they paid no sales tax. Subsequent to conducting audits, the defendant commissioner assessed use tax deficiencies, penalties and interest against all the plaintiffs, reasoning the various items purchased were not acquired for resale but were retail purchases of equipment and material used by the plaintiffs to discharge their contractual obligations with the state. The plaintiffs disagreed with the commissioner's assessments and argued that their purchases were not retail sales as defined by General Statutes § 12-407 (3). They claimed instead that the personal property involved had been purchased for resale and consequently was not subject to the imposition of a use tax under General Statutes § 12-411. I A conclusion as to whether the personal property in question was acquired by the plaintiffs for their own use in fulfilling their agreements with the state and therefore subject to a use tax or was purchased for resale to the state and consequently not subject to the imposition of a use tax requires a determination of the true object of the contracts between the parties. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner, 176 Conn. 604, 609-10, 410 A.2d 457 (1979); United Aircraft Corporation v. Connelly, 145 Conn. 176, 184-85, 140 A.2d 486 (1958); United Aircraft Corporation v. O'Connor, 141 Conn. 530, 537-38, 107 A.2d 398 (1954); White v. Storer Cable Communications, Inc., 507 So. 2d 964, 968 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987); Culligan Water Conditioning, Etc. v. State Board of Equalization, 17 Cal. 3d 86, 96, 550 P.2d 593, 130 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1976). "The court must look to the intention of the parties to the contract to determine whether the items in a contract are held for resale or were purchased for a different purpose." White Oak Corporation v. Department of Revenue Services, 198 Conn. 413, 422, 503 A.2d 582 (1986). "That intention is to be ascertained from the language used, interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances surrounding them." United Aircraft Corporation v. O'Connor, supra, 538. A careful reading of the contracts in question leads to the inescapable conclusion that the intention of the parties in contracting and the true object of each of the contracts was the furnishing by the plaintiffs, and the retention by the state, of the plaintiffs' expertise and services to establish, implement and operate the various systems of wagering desired by the state. Nowhere in any of the contracts are the words "lease" or "rental" mentioned in relation to personal property and nowhere, other than in certain clauses giving the state the option to purchase various items at set periods, are the words "sale," "sell," or "purchase" mentioned in regard to personal property. Further, other than in the option clauses, nowhere in any of the contracts is there a price or rental figure established for the purchase or lease of any particular piece of equipment or any commodity. Rather, the contracts stipulate that the plaintiffs are to be compensated by the payment of a fee based on a percentage of the revenues generated by the particular system of wagering with which they are affiliated. See U-Need-A-Roll-Off Corporation v. New York State Tax Commission, 67 N.Y.2d 690, 691, 490 N.E.2d 840, 499 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1986); Greene & Kellogg, Inc. v. Chu, 134 App. Div. 2d 755, 756, 521 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1987). As might be expected, the involvement of the state in gaming required that it maintain significant control over its operation. The extent of that control is reflected in the contractual provisions for such things as mandated licensing requirements, placement of terminals, and security procedures. The presence of state control, however, does not convert contracts for the establishment and operation of wagering systems into contracts for the sale or lease of the personal property used in operating those systems. White Oak Corporation v. Department of Revenue Services, supra, 423. Nor does the fact that agents or licensees of the state, after training by the plaintiffs, dispensed tickets and collected money alter our view that the true object of the contracts and the primary purpose of the personal property employed was to implement the systems the plaintiffs had contracted to provide, not to effect a resale. In short, we believe that the language of the agreements between the state and the plaintiffs compel a determination that the computers, computer terminals, computer components, paper stock and other personal property that the plaintiffs claim were purchased or leased for resale, although not inconsequential in utility or cost, were incidental to the primary purpose of the contracts which was to provide the state with wagering systems. White Oak Corporation v. Department of Revenue Services, supra, 422; see Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) p. 686. It is the primary purpose for which the personal property was purchased and put to use that controls the determination of the property's taxability. Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Lindley, 12 Ohio St. 3d 68, 69, 465 N.E.2d 430 (1984); Fliteways, Inc. v. Lindley, 65 Ohio St. 2d 21, 25, 417 N.E.2d 1371 (1981). Where, as here, the primary function and purpose of the taxpayers was to provide wagering systems and the ownership, use and maintenance of certain personal property and equipment were necessary to enable them to furnish those systems, those taxpayers, not the state, were the ultimate users or consumers of that property and equipment within the meaning of the sales and use tax statutes. White Oak Corporation v. Department of Revenue Services, supra, 423; Boise Bowling Center v. State, 93 Idaho 367, 369-70, 461 P.2d 262 (1969); Appeal of AT&T Technologies, Inc., 242 Kan. 554, 561-62, 749 P.2d 1033 (1988); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State Commission, 168 Kan. 227, 232, 212 P.2d 363 (1949); Nashville Mobilephone Co. v. Woods, 655 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tenn. 1983). We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs did not purchase or lease to resell to the state the personal property for which a use tax was assessed. Rather, the property was purchased or leased for use in delivering to the state the gaming systems the plaintiffs had contracted to provide. The plaintiffs' lease or purchase of the property in question therefore was subject in each case to a use tax deficiency as determined by the commissioner and affirmed by the Superior Court. There is no error as to the use tax assessments against the plaintiffs. II The trial court determined, however, that "each of the plaintiffs had a firm and reasonably held belief in the correctness of its legal position and that none of them brought suit for delay." The trial court, therefore, rendered judgment that the defendant commissioner collect the use tax assessments against the plaintiffs without penalty or interest. The commissioner appeals that determination of the trial court. The defendant commissioner does not contend that the trial court lacked authority to forgo penalties against the plaintiffs. He does contend, however, that the trial court lacked authority to relieve the taxpayers of their obligations to pay the statutory interest due on their assessments. The commissioner's position is that the imposition of interest on delinquent taxes is not punitive but compensatory in nature, and that the trial court had no authority to waive it. We disagree. General Statutes § 12-422 provides in pertinent part: "Any taxpayer aggrieved because of any order, decision, determination or disallowance of the commissioner of revenue services under section 12-418,12-421 or 12-425 may . . . take an appeal therefrom to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain.... Said court may grant such relief as may be equitable . " (Emphasis added.) That broad statutory grant of equitable powers has been interpreted by this court to authorize the Superior Court to set aside an assessment of interest. "We agree with the plaintiff that it was within the trial court's province to consider whether to set aside the interest imposed as part of its review of the deficiency assessment; see Duval v. Brown, [31 Conn. Sup. 373, 377, 333 A.2d 63 (1974)]; Bowne v. Brown, [30 Conn. Sup. 309, 316, 313 A.2d 426 (1973)]; but we also consider the resolution of that issue to be within the court's sound discretion." H. B. Sanson, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner, 187 Conn. 581, 587-88, 447 A.2d 12 (1982); New England Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 Conn. 624, 637, 504 A.2d 506 (1986). "The determination of what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court." Allen v. Nissley, 184 Conn. 539, 546, 440 A.2d 231 (1981). The defendant in this instance has not persuaded us that the trial court's exercise of its discretion was clearly erroneous. H. B. Sanson, Inc. w. Tax Commissioner, supra, 588. The defendant also argues that an interpretation of § 12-422 that would allow a court to waive the commissioner's assessment of interest would be unconstitutional because it would constitute a delegation of the commissioner's administrative function to the judiciary. We find the defendant's reasoning in this regard difficult to follow, and we also find inapposite the case of Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49 (1968), on which it primarily relies. Article XX of the amendments to the Connecticut constitution expressly provides that the jurisdiction of the courts shall be defined by law. In effectuating that constitutional mandate, the legislature has promulgated General Statutes § 52-1, which expressly gives the Superior Court the power to "administer legal and equitable rights and apply legal and equitable remedies." That general grant of equitable powers has been further enhanced and defined by § 12-422, the statute pursuant to which these appeals were taken, which provides that the court "may grant such relief as may be equitable." The statute does not exclude assessments of interest from its equitable ambit. Since under § 12-422, the trial court was exercising de novo jurisdiction over the taxpayers' appeals and was not bound by the commissioner's previous rulings; Kimberly-Clark Corporation v. Dubno, 204 Conn. 137, 143-45, 527 A.2d 679 (1987); its determination did no more than carry out its constitutional and statutory mandates by affording equitable relief where that court deemed it appropriate. There is no error. In this opinion the other justices concurred. "[General Statutes] Sec. 12-422. appeal. Any taxpayer aggrieved because of any order, decision, determination or disallowance of the commissioner of revenue services under section 12-418, 12-421 or 12-425 may, within one month after service upon the taxpayer of notice of such order, decision, determination or disallowance, take an appeal therefrom to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, which shall be accompanied by a citation to the commissioner of revenue services to appear before said court. Such citation shall be signed by the same authority, and such appeal shall be returnable at the same time and served and returned in the same manner, as is required in case of a summons in a civil action. The authority issuing the citation shall take from the appellant a bond or recognizance to the state of Connecticut, with surety to prosecute the appeal to effect and to comply with the orders and decrees of the court in the premises. Such appeals shall be preferred cases, to be heard, unless cause appears to the contrary, at the first session, by the court or by a committee appointed by it. Said court may grant such relief as may be equitable and, if such tax has been paid prior to the granting of such relief, may order the treasurer to pay the amount of such relief, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, to the aggrieved taxpayer. If the appeal has been taken without probable cause, the court may tax double or triple costs, as the case demands; and, upon all such appeals which are denied, costs may be taxed against the appellant at the discretion of the court, but no costs shall be taxed against the state." See General Statutes § 12-415. The plaintiffs, DTP Royalty, Inc., and GTECH Corporation, also claimed refunds of sales taxes imposed on rental payments they had made to lease equipment used in pursuance of their contracts with the state. The commissioner, in assessing additional taxes, denied both requests. AmTote originally contracted with the state as to teletrack and off-track betting in 1973 and as to the daily lottery in 1977. DTP Royalty, Inc., took over the lottery from AmTote in 1980. GTECH (formerly Gaming Systems Corporation) succeeded DTP by virtue of an assignment from DTP in 1981 and subsequently by an agreement with the state in 1983. Because we believe that all the contracts have the same legal effect and lead to the same result as far as the issue in dispute is concerned, it is not necessary to treat each plaintiff or contract separately. The leasing or rental of tangible personal property is a "sale" under General Statutes § 12-407 (2) (j). General Statutes § 12-407 (3) provides in pertinent part: "definitions. Whenever used in this chapter . (3) 'Retail sale' or 'sale at retail' means and includes a sale for any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business of tangible personal property or a transfer for a consideration of the occupancy of any room or rooms in a hotel or lodging house for a period of thirty consecutive calendar days or less, or the rendering of any service described in any of the subdivisions of subsection (2) of this section. The delivery in this state of tangible personal property by an owner or former owner thereof or by a factor, if the delivery is to a consumer pursuant to a retail sale made by a retailer not engaged in business in this state, is a retail sale in this state by the person making the delivery. He shall include the retail selling price of the property in his gross receipts." "[General Statutes] Sec. 12-411. the use tax. (1) imposition and rate. An excise tax is hereby imposed on the storage, acceptance, consumption or any other use in this state of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer for storage, acceptance, consumption or any other use in this state or the acceptance or receipt of any services constituting a sale in accorance with subdivision (i) of subsection (2) of section 12-407, at the rate of seven and one-half per cent of the sales price of the property or the consideration paid for any such services. "(2) liability FOR tax. Every person storing, accepting, consuming or otherwise using in this state services or tangible personal property purchased from a retailer is liable for the tax. His liability is not extinguished until the tax has been paid to this state, except that a receipt from a retailer engaged in business in this state or from a retailer who is authorized by the commissioner, under such regulations as he may prescribe, to collect the tax and who is, for the purposes of this chapter relating to the use tax, regarded as a retailer engaged in business in this state, given to the purchaser pursuant to subsection (3) of this section is sufficient to relieve the purchaser from further liability for the tax to which the receipt refers. "(3) collection by retailer. Every retailer engaged in business in this state and making sales of services or of tangible personal property for storage, acceptance, consumption or any other use in this state, not exempted under this chapter, shall, at the time of making a sale or, if the storage, acceptance, consumption or other use is not then taxable hereunder, at the time the storage, acceptance, consumption or use becomes taxable, collect the use tax from the purchaser and give to the purchaser a receipt therefor in the manner and form prescribed by the commissioner. For the purpose of uniformity of tax collection by the retailer the tax brackets set forth in subsection (3) of section 12-408 pertaining to the sales tax shall be employed in the computation of the tax imposed by this section. . . . "(9) presumption of purchase for use; resale certificate. For the purpose of the proper administration of this chapter and to prevent evasion of the use tax and the duty to collect the use tax, it shall be presumed that services or tangible personal property sold by any person for delivery in this state is sold for storage, acceptance, consumption or other use in this state until the contrary is established. The burden of proving the contrary is upon the person who makes the sale unless he takes from the purchaser a certificate to the effect that the property is purchased for resale. . . . . "(13) presumption of purchase from retailer. It shall be presumed that tangible personal property shipped or brought to this state by the purchaser was purchased from a retailer for storage, use or other consumption in this state." If, as the plaintiffs claim, the items in question were resold to the state, an exempt entity under General Statutes § 12-412 (1), such sales would not be subject to the imposition of a sales tax. The various contracts are replete with phraseology that leads to this conclusion. To repeat it all in this opinion is impossible but representative clauses from each contract are cited as examples. (1) From AmTote's contract with the state concerning off-track betting and teletrack: (a) "WHEREAS, the Company and the State desire to provide for mutually acceptable terms and conditions concerning the establishment and operation of such a system of off-track betting, as hereinafter set forth"; (b) "Section 4.3. As and for a continuing fee for the establishment and opening of the System and the operation thereof, all to the extent provided by this Agreement, the Company shall, in addition to the revenues provided in Section 4.1, be entitled to receive a percentage of the aggregate Handle during each Operating Year which percentage shall be calculated as follows: The percentage shall be 7.5% at an annual aggregate Handle level of $50 million and shall be reduced by .034% for each full $1 million by which such annual aggregate Handle exceeds that level but does not exceed $100 million, and shall be further reduced by .019% for each full $1 million by which such annual aggregate Handle exceeds $100 million but does not exceed $300 million." (2) From AmTote's contract with the state concerning the daily lottery: (a) "WHEREAS, the Company and the State desire to provide for mutually acceptable terms and conditions concerning the establishment and operation of such a Daily Lottery, as hereinafter set forth"; (b) "Section 3.03. (a) In consideration of the services to be performed hereunder, the State shall pay the Company a weekly fee which shall be a percentage of the Gross Dollar Volume for such week, which percentage shall be determined as follows"; (3) From DTP's (formerly Datatrol) contract with the state concerning the lottery games: (a) "3.01 Datatrol shall provide, implement, operate, maintain and otherwise deliver the System for the Term and/or any Renewal Term of this Agreement, and shall do all things necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement as hereinafter provided." (b) "3.09 Datatrol shall assume full responsibility to the Division for all financial transactions and for the operation of the System including, but not limited to, validations, cancellations, calculations, collections, adjustments, and payouts made by the Terminal Agents; provided, however, that notwithstanding the foregoing Datatrol shall not be responsible for any mispayments caused solely by the error or fraud of a Terminal Agent or an employee or agent of the State." (4) From GTECH's (formerly Gaming Systems Corporation) contract with the state concerning the lottery games: (a) "3.01 GSC shall provide, implement, operate, maintain and otherwise deliver the System for the Term and/or any Renewal Term of this Agreement, and the parties shall each do all things necessary to fulfill their respective obligations hereunder." (b) "3.09 GSC shall assume full responsibility to the Division for all financial transactions and for the operation of the System, including, but not limited to, validations, cancellations, calculations, collections, adjustments and payouts made by the Terminal Agents; provided, however, that notwithstanding the foregoing, GSC shall not be responsible for any Terminal Agent delinquency or for any damages or mispayments caused solely by the error or fraud of a Terminal Agent or an employee or agent of the State." There is nothing in the record to indicate that the state ever exercised an option to purchase or that a purchase was ever considered a viable alternative by the state. Further, an option to purchase does not convert a service contract into a lease. It is the primary purpose for which the property is held that determines its taxability. Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Lindley, 12 Ohio St. 3d 68, 69, 465 N.E.2d 430 (1984). The plaintiffs place a great deal of reliance on the case oí Randall Park Jockey Club, Inc. v. Peck, 162 Ohio St. 245, 122 N.E.2d 787 (1954), as holding that possession and control of personal property by the state compels a finding that the property was leased or sold to the state. We find Randall Park Jockey Club, Inc., distinguishable from the present case. In Randall Park Jockey Club, Inc., the court was interpreting a different statute and the degree of the appellant's possession and control of the vital computer functions of the track was considerably greater than that exercised by the state's agents here. Further, insofar as that case may indicate that possession and control are the determinants of taxability, we reject it. Nor are the plaintiffs DTP and GTECH entitled to a refund on sales taxes previously paid. See General Statutes § 12-415 (4) and (5). In Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49 (1968), this court considered the constitutionality of 1967 legislation applicable to probate court administration. Article XX of the amendments to the constitution of Connecticut provides: "(COURTS.) "Section 1. Section 1 of article fifth of the constitution is amended to read as follows: "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, an appellate court, a superior court, and such lower courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law. "(SUPREME, APPELLATE AND SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, APPOINTMENT, TERMS, REMOVAL.) "Sec. 2. Section 2 of article fifth of the constitution is amended to read as follows: "The judges of the supreme court, of the appellate court and of the superior court shall, upon nomination by the governor, be appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall by law be prescribed. They shall hold their offices for the term of eight years, but may be removed by impeachment. The governor shall also remove them on the address of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly." "[General Statutes] Sec. 52-1. administration of legal and equitable rights. The superior court may administer legal and equitable rights and apply legal and equitable remedies in favor of either party in one and the same civil action so that legal and equitable rights of the parties may be enforced and protected in one action. Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law in reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail."

The defendant's motion in the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County to dismiss is denied and the case is remanded to the Superior Court to permit it to entertain a request from the plaintiff to make application to have the parole board named as an additional defendant. Abbot B. Schwebel, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state). Maxwell Heiman, special public defender, for the appellant (plaintiff). Argued October 3 decided October 3, 1974

Hull, J. This case concerns the validity of sewer service charges contractually imposed by a quasi-municipal fire district upon persons residing outside of the fire district's territorial limits. The plaintiff, Highgate Condominium Association, is the duly authorized representative of the residents of a condominium complex located within the town of Watertown, but outside the limits of the defendant Watertown Fire District (fire district). The plaintiff brought an action in the Supe rior Court seeking a judgment declaring that the annual sewer service charges imposed upon it by the fire district for the years 1982 through 1986 for the plaintiffs use of the fire district's sewage treatment facilities were excessive and illegal, and claiming injunctive relief and damages. After a trial to the court, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. We find no error. According to the stipulated facts, the fire district, a quasi-municipal corporation located within the town of Watertown, was created by a Special Act in 1913 that authorized it to construct sewers and to maintain and repair a complete system of sewage and drainage within its territorial limits. 16 Spec. Laws 863, No. 212, § 3 (1913). In addition to sewer service, the fire district provides for street lighting and for the installation and maintenance of water hydrants within its water system. The fire district is governed by a three member elected body called the Fire District Committee. In order to pay for the services it provides, the fire district imposes a tax upon property owners within its boundaries. The amount of the tax is determined by multiplying the assessed value of the various properties by a mill rate that is fixed annually by the Fire District Committee. The fire district has utilized this assessed value or "ad valorem" method of taxation to charge for the cost of its services since its inception in 1913. By Special Act in 1941, the fire district was authorized by the legislature to extend sewer service to parties residing outside of its territorial limits, but within the town of Watertown, "upon such terms and conditions as the fire district committee acting with respect to sewers . . . may determine to be fair and proper." 23 Spec. Laws 839, No. 218, § 2 (1941). In 1964, two real estate developers, John A. Errichetti and Armand M. Errichetti, were in the process of constructing several apartment houses on a fifty acre parcel of land they owned in the town of Watertown. The construction site was located approximately one quarter mile outside of the limits of the fire district. Access to an adequate sewer system was necessary before the apartment houses could be occupied. Thus, in November, 1964, the Errichettis entered into a series of agreements (Errichetti agreements) with the nearby fire district calling for, inter alia, the connection of the apartment houses to the fire district's sewer system. The fire district was authorized to enter into this "outside party" agreement pursuant to the powers extended to it by the legislature in the 1941 Special Act. In exchange for the connection to and use of the fire district's sewer system, the Errichetti agreements provided that the owners of the apartment houses would be obligated to make annual payments to the fire district in an amount equal to what they would have been required to pay in taxes to the fire district if the land and apartment houses were located within the fire district, plus 50 percent. The terms and conditions of the Errichetti agreements, including this formula for determining sewer service charges, were expressly made binding upon all successors in interest to the property. On or about August 4, 1981, the property was conveyed to Highgate Enterprises, Inc. (Highgate), a Connecticut corporation. Highgate immediately converted the apartments into the condominium form of ownership pursuant to General Statutes § 47-88b et seq., thereby creating 126 individual condominium units. All of these units are tied into and served by the fire district's sewer system. Notice to prospective purchasers that the condominium units were being conveyed subject to the terms and conditions contained in the Errichetti agreements, including the formula for computing sewer service charges, was provided in both the public offering statements and the "Declaration of Condominium" issued by Highgate during the conversion process. In making the conversion, Highgate also established the plaintiff Highgate Condominium Association pursuant to General Statutes § 47-74a. The plaintiff is the duly appointed agent of the owners of all of the condominium units and in that capacity is authorized to pay on their behalf all sewer service charges that may be due and owing the fire district. For the years 1981 through 1986, the fire district submitted the following sewer service charges to the plaintiff: Billing Date Charge August 15, 1981 $ 6,832.62 August 15, 1982 19,176.30 August 15, 1983 21.355.43 August 15, 1984 21.355.43 August 15, 1985 21.355.43 August 15, 1986 21.355.43 These annual charges were determined pursuant to the sewer service formula contained in the Errichetti agreements, i.e., the assessed value of the property (land and buildings) multiplied by the current mill rate, plus 50 percent. In 1981, prior to their conversion into condominiums, the land and apartment houses were assessed at a value of $1,265,300. For the years 1982 through 1986, the value of this same property was assessed at $2,905,500. This increase in assessed value occurred directly as a result of the conversion of the property to the condominium form of ownership in August, 1981. Of course, when this enhanced assessed value was factored into the formula for determining the plaintiffs sewer service charges for the years 1982 through 1986, it resulted in a substantial increase in the charges for those years over the charges imposed in years prior, such as 1981, when the assessed value of the property was considerably less. The plaintiff paid the sewer service charges submitted to it by the fire district for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984 under protest. For each of the years 1985 and 1986, the plaintiff made a partial payment of $7500 to the fire district, which it claims fairly and adequately compensated the fire district for the sewer services provided to the plaintiff in those years. In July, 1985, the plaintiff instituted a declaratory judgment action seeking injunctive relief and damages for the imposition of allegedly unreasonable and unlawful sewer service charges by the defendants. The relevant portions of the plaintiffs five count amended complaint dated February 17,1987, contain the following allegations. In the first count, the plaintiff claimed that "[t]he amounts charged by the defendant Fire District in August, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 are unreasonable and far in excess of the charge that would compensate the defendant Fire District for the cost of sewer services provided." In the second count, the plaintiff alleged that "[t]he sewer use charges imposed by the defendant Fire District for each of the years 1982,1983,1984,1985 and 1986 were imposed in violation of the provisions of the Special Acts which determine the authority of the defendant Fire District in that the Fire District Committee could not reasonably determine that such charges are 'fair and proper' for the sewer services provided." The third count, which was withdrawn after trial, stated that "[t]he method which the defendant Fire District uses to determine sewer use charges is arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the powers conferred upon the Fire District . . . .''The fourth count, not relevant to this appeal, was also withdrawn after trial. Finally, in the fifth count, the plaintiff claimed that "[t]he assessed value method of determining sewer use charges has never been enacted in any ordinance, regulation or resolution of the defendant Fire District. . . . Consequently, the use of the assessed value method by the defendant Fire District . is and has been unauthorized and illegal as a method of imposing sewer use charges." The case was referred to Hon. Joseph F. Morelli, state trial referee, and judgment was rendered for the defendants. With respect to the first and second counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint, in its memorandum of decision dated July 21, 1987, the trial court found that the sewer service charges imposed upon the plaintiff for the years in question were fair and reasonable and therefore not violative of the fire district's charter provisions. On the fifth count attacking the procedural validity of the sewer service formula used by the defendants to compute the plaintiff's sewer service charges, the trial court ruled that "[t]he Fire District's Charter authorizes the defendant to establish sewer charges without any direction for the need of an ordinance, regulation or resolution." The trial court also expressly upheld the substantive validity of the sewer service formula, despite the fact that the third count in the plaintiff's amended complaint, which challenged the substantive validity of the formula, had been withdrawn after trial. Additionally, the trial court appeared to offer an alternate basis for its decision in favor of the defendants, i.e., by taking title to their condominium units with notice of the sewer service formula contained in the Errichetti agreements, the plaintiff's members had "waive[d]" their right to "challenge" the validity of the formula and the sewer service charges computed thereunder. A motion for articulation filed by the plaintiff on August 19, 1987, was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the plaintiff claims the trial court erred: (1) in ruling that the plaintiff's members waived their right to challenge the validity of the sewer service formula and the charges computed thereunder; (2) in determining that the sewer service formula used by the defendants is a fair, reasonable and authorized method for determining the plaintiff's sewer service charges; (3) in disregarding sewage treatment costs submitted into evidence by the plaintiff; and (4) in finding that the sewer service charges imposed upon the plaintiff for the years 1982 through 1986 were fair and reasonable and therefore legally imposed under the fire dis trict's charter provisions. The plaintiff also assigns error to the trial court's denial of its posttrial motion for articulation. I We address first the question of whether this appeal is properly before us. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court stated: "The plaintiff is not entitled to judicial examination of the 1982-1986 imposed charges since it failed to convince the court by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to the same . . All purchasers of the condominium units [i.e., the plaintiff's members] were aware of the Errichetti agreements before title was taken; Public Offering Statements issued by Highgate Enterprises upon conversion of the Apartment Complex to condominium concept including [sic] notice by way of Declaration of Condominium. All [of the foregoing] informed purchasers [that] conveyance would be subject to the Errichetti Agreements, therefore each purchaser knowingly and voluntarily took title to the units made subject to the said terms and conditions. Not presenting a challenge at the proper time is tantamount to a waiver." We treat this ruling of the trial court as a determination on its part that the plaintiff's members were required to challenge the sewer service formula, of which they had notice prior to the purchase of their condominium units, at the time they took title to their units, and that their failure to do so constituted a waiver that now precludes them from obtaining judicial review of the validity of the formula or the sewer service charges imposed thereunder. The plaintiff contends that judicial review of its claims is not barred on the basis of its members' notice of the Errichetti agreements and it assigns error to the trial court's ruling to the contrary. The plaintiff maintains that where, as here, a claim is made that a utility dis trict is acting beyond the scope of the authority granted to it by the legislature, a court may intervene to examine the alleged unauthorized acts of the utility district and declare them legal or not. We agree. In Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 548, 427 A.2d 822 (1980), this court stated: "We have long recognized the capacity of taxpayers of towns and cities to challenge the legality of the actions of their municipal officers by seeking injunctive relief against such action. See Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 52-53, 364 A.2d 194 (1975); Bassett v. Desmond, 140 Conn. 426, 430, 101 A.2d 294 (1953); Sauter v. Mahan, 95 Conn. 311, 314, 111 A. 186 (1920); Mooney v. Clark, 69 Conn. 241, 244, 37 A. 506 (1897); New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 553, 557 (1853). Such actions may also be brought where the alleged improper action is that of a quasi-municipal corporation. See Larkin v. Bontatibus, [145 Conn. 570, 576, 145 A.2d 133 (1958)]." We further noted that "orneases in this area have required two conditions for the maintenance of actions seeking to challenge municipal conduct: (1) the plaintiff must be a taxpayer of the defendant municipal entity; and (2) the plaintiff must allege and demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct causes him to suffer 'some pecuniary or other great injury.' Bassett v. Desmond, supra, 430." Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., supra, 549. In its amended complaint dated February 17, 1987, the plaintiff repeatedly alleges that it suffered a financial injury due to the defendants' imposition of sewer service charges which the plaintiff claims were illegal. Thus, the plaintiff's amended complaint clearly complies with the second condition for standing recited in Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., supra. With regard to the first condition requiring that the plaintiff must be a taxpayer of the munic ipal entity, we find that the plaintiff's members qualify as taxpayers of the fire district for purposes of instituting this declaratory judgment action despite their residence outside of the fire district's territorial limits. The facts presented in this case clearly demonstrate that the plaintiffs members are in all significant respects the functional equivalent of taxpayers of the fire district. Further, our failure to recognize that the plaintiff and its members have standing to institute this declaratory judgment action would in effect erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny of the legality of the actions of the fire district. This we will not permit. See Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1975); State Communities Aid Assn. v. Regan, 112 App. Div. 2d 681, 682, 492 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1985). Nor is our position on the reviewability of this case altered by the fact that, at the time they took title to their condominiums, the members of the plaintiff had constructive notice of the Errichetti agreements and the formula for computing the plaintiff's annual sewer service charges contained therein. If the charges levied upon the plaintiff by the fire district are deemed to have been in violation of the fire district's charter provisions, as the plaintiff has alleged, the contractual agreements through which such illegal charges were imposed would also be, necessarily, unauthorized and thus without legal force and effect, the plaintiff's members' knowledge and acceptance of such agreements at the time of purchase notwithstanding: "The charter or statute by which the municipality is created is its organic act. Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act, make any contract, or incur any liability not authorized thereby, or by the legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are void. Thus, in the exercise of its powers, a municipal corporation is said to be confined to the circumference of those granted and may not travel beyond the scope of its charter or in excess of the granted authority." (Emphasis added.) 56 Am. Jur. 2d., Municipal Corporations § 227 (1971); see Lombardi v. Bridgeport, 194 Conn. 601, 604, 483 A.2d 1092 (1984) (agents of a city have no source of authority beyond the municipality's charter); Perretta v. New Britain, 185 Conn. 88, 92-93, 440 A.2d 823 (1981); cf. Miller v. Eighth Utilities District, 179 Conn. 589, 594, 427 A.2d 425 (1980). Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff did not waive its right to challenge the validity of the sewer service charges in question when its members took title to their condominium units with knowledge of the agreements through which such charges would be imposed. II We next consider the plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in ruling that the sewer service formula used by the defendants to compute the plaintiff's annual sewer service charges is a fair, reasonable and authorized method for determining such charges. As noted previously, the charges in question were determined by multiplying the assessed value of the plaintiff's property by the current mill rate, and then adding a 50 percent surcharge. In its brief, the plaintiff mounts two separate attacks upon the validity of this formula, the first directed at the formula's use of the assessed value of the plaintiff's property, and the second aimed at the formula's imposition of a 50 percent surcharge. We refuse to address either of these arguments on appeal, however, because of the plaintiff's withdrawal, after trial, of the third count of its amended complaint, which contained the only allegations in the amended complaint challenging the substantive validity of the sewer service formula. When the plaintiff withdrew the third count with the trial court's consent, the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised in that pleading, i.e., the substantive validity of the sewer service formula, and its conclusions on this point are therefore a nullity. See Doublewal Corporation v. Toffolon, 195 Conn. 384, 390-91, 488 A.2d 444 (1985) (judgment must ordinarily be restricted to issues reasonably within the scope of the pleadings); Gordon v. Tufano, 188 Conn. 477, 482, 450 A.2d 852 (1982) (trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine validity of promissory note on usury ground where issue had not been raised in pleadings). The resulting absence of a judgment on the issue of the substantive validity of the sewer service formula precludes this court from entertaining on appeal arguments, such as the plaintiff's, relating to that precise question. See Practice Book § 4000. Ill The plaintiff next contends that, in ruling upon the reasonableness of the sewer service charges in question, the trial court improperly disregarded evidence relating to the fire district's sewage treatment costs, evidence which the plaintiff claims the court was compelled to accept. Specifically, the plaintiff introduced into evidence a chart that it claimed accurately reflected the cost to the fire district to treat the sewage emanating from the plaintiff's condominium complex during the years 1982 through 1986. The following yearly claimed sewage treatment costs, as well as the undisputed corresponding annual sewer service charges, were submitted into evidence by the plaintiff: Year Treatment Cost Charge 1982 $ 7,661.70 $19,176.30 1983 5,737.42 21,355.43 1984 8,135.41 21,355.43 1985 10,285.60 21,355.43 1986 12,425.46 21,355.43 The plaintiff arrived at these yearly treatment costs through a series of arithmetical calculations involving information stipulated to by the parties, such as the total number of gallons of water used by the condominium complex, the total number of gallons of sewage treated by the fire district, and the total fire district budget allocable for sewage treatment, for each of the years in question. The treatment costs themselves, however, were not agreed upon by the parties, and, in fact, the defendants' expert testified that he believed they were based upon insufficient data and therefore inaccurate. The trial court, relying upon this testimony of the defendants' expert, did not accept the plaintiff's treatment cost estimates in making its determination that the sewer service charges imposed upon the plaintiff were fair and reasonable. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court's rejection of its treatment cost figures constituted reversible error. In essence, the plaintiff argues that because it calculated the treatment costs by using underlying facts that were stipulated to by the parties, the trial court was compelled to accept these costs as if they too had been agreed upon by the parties. We are unpersuaded. We do not accept the plaintiffs proposition that a fact not directly agreed upon by parties to a lawsuit may nevertheless attain the force and effect of a stipulation merely because that fact is a "byproduct" of other, underlying stipulated facts. If the plaintiff wished to be relieved of its burden of proof in this case on the issue of sewage treatment costs through an agreement of the parties, it was necessary for the plaintiff to enter into a stipulation with the defendants that expressly encompassed those costs. This it failed to do. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court was free to accept or reject the plaintiffs sewage treatment cost figures based upon all of the evidence presented, and, in view of the trial court's reliance upon the testimony of the defendants' expert questioning the accuracy of the figures, we cannot say that the trial court erred in rejecting them. Our conclusion on this point is also dispositive of the plaintiff's next claim, i.e., the trial court erred in determining that sewer service charges levied upon the plaintiff by the fire district for the years 1982 through 1986 were fair and reasonable. It is axiomatic that before a court may make a finding regarding the reasonablenss of utility rates, a party challenging those rates must prove two things: first, the amount of the charges imposed upon that party for the municipal services rendered, and second, the cost to the municipality to provide those services. See, e.g., Ansonia v. Ansonia Water Co., 101 Conn. 151, 125 A. 474 (1924). It is the differential between these two factors upon which a court's determination of reasonableness ordinarily must rest. Id. At trial, the charges imposed upon the plaintiff for the sewer services it received were not in dispute. The cost to the fire district to provide these services, however, was an issue in the case and it was the plaintiff's burden to establish this factor. The plaintiff's failure to do so, as evi denced by the trial court's rejection of the plaintiff's sewage treatment cost estimates, was fatal to the plaintiff's case in that it effectively precluded the trial court from reaching any finding with respect to the reasonableness, or unreasonableness, of the sewer service charges in question. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's determination that the plaintiff failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the sewer service charges imposed upon it by the defendants were excessive or illegal was not clearly erroneous. IV The plaintiff's final claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's posttrial motion for articulation. We have held that "where a party is dissatisfied with the trial court's response to a motion for articulation, he may, and indeed under appropriate circumstances he must, seek immediate appeal of the rectification memorandum to this court via the motion for review. Practice Book § 3082, 3108 [now § 4051,4054] . . . ." (Citations omitted.) Barnes v. Barnes, 190 Conn. 491, 493 n.2, 460 A.2d 1302 (1983). The plaintiff failed to move for review in this court of the trial court's refusal to articulate further its decision. Accordingly, we decline to address the plaintiffs assignment of error on that point. There is no error. In this opinion the other justices concurred. The Watertown fire district is the named defendant in this lawsuit. The second defendant is Duane George, who is presently the superintendent of the fire district and in that capacity is responsible for the collection of sewer service charges imposed by the fire district upon persons, such as the plaintiffs members, who reside outside of the fire district's territorial limits. General Statutes § 47-74a provides in pertinent part: "(a) When unit owners other than the declarant own more than one-third of the units in the condominium, they shall be entitled to elect not less than one-third of the members of the board of directors of the unit owners' association. Unit owners other than the declarant shall elect not less than a majority of the members of the board of directors of the unit owners' association not later than five years after the date of the recording of the original declaration, and, prior to the expiration of such five-year period, shall be entitled to elect not less than a majority of the members of the board of directors upon the happening of the earlier of the following two events: (1) Sale by declarant of sixty per cent of the units in the condominium or (2) completion of seventy-five per cent of the units in the condominium, with some such units having been sold, but no more than six units having been sold in the six-month period preceding the call for an election pursuant to subsection (b) hereof. . . . "(b) At any time after unit owners other than the declarant are entitled to elect a member or members of the board of directors of an association, the association shall call and give not less than thirty nor more forty days notice of a meeting of the unit owners for this purpose. Such meeting may be called and the notice given by any unit owner if the association fails to do so." Increases in the mill rate from 3.6 to 4.4 in 1982, and from 4.4 to 4.9 in 1983, also contributed to the plaintiffs rising sewer service charges. The fifth count of the plaintiffs amended complaint, which was not withdrawn, does in fact challenge the validity of the sewer service formula, but on specified procedural grounds only. The plaintiff makes no claim on this appeal relating to the allegations contained in the fifth count or the trial court's ruling as it pertains to that count. The trial court clearly consented to the plaintiffs withdrawal of the third and fourth counts of its complaint, as evidenced by the judgment file, signed by the trial referee, which states in pertinent part: "And thence to April 27, 1987, when the parties appeared for trial and submitted to the court a stipulation of facts with attached exhibits dated February 17, 1986, at which time the parties were at issue as to the first, second and fifth counts of plaintiff's amended complaint, the plaintiff having withdrawn the third and fourth counts thereof." Under ordinary circumstances, a formal agreement or stipulation of fact fairly entered into is controlling on the parties and the court is bound to enforce it. See, e.g., Pyne v. New Haven, 177 Conn. 456, 464, 418 A.2d 899 (1979). We have indicated previously that a trial court's findings regarding the reasonableness of utility rates is governed by a "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate review. See, e.g., Barr v. First Taxing District, 151 Conn. 53, 57, 192 A.2d 872 (1963) (court's responsibility on appeal was to determine whether trial court was obliged to find that plaintiffs had established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that utility rates were unlawfully discriminatory). We conclude that this is the standard of review applicable to the trial court's findings regarding the reasonableness of the sewer service charges at issue in this case.

MacDonald, J. The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment rendered by a state referee denying their request for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants, the mayor and the director of finance of the city of Milford, to furnish the plaintiffs certain financial data which they claimed to be necessary to enable them to discharge their duties as members of the board of finance of the city of Milford. The finding, which is not subject to correction, relates the following facts: The city of Milford is a specially chartered municipal corporation. The charter establishes the board of finance, and requires the board to present the annual budget to the board of aldermen, to recommend to the board of aldermen all transfers of appropriations in budget accounts and all issues of bonds or notes required for the management of the city business, and to recommend the tax rate. The charter also establishes a department of finance whose director is to have direct supervision over the department and the administration of the financial affairs of the city, including responsibility for the form and preparation of accounts of financial transactions for all departments of the city and quarterly and annual financial reports. In late 1971 and early 1972 the board of finance refused to act on requests of the mayor for appropriation of funds for municipal purposes on the ground that the board needed additional information in order to recommend either affirmatively or negatively to the board of aldermen. Beginning in the fall of 1971 the plaintiffs, as members of the board of finance, began requesting quarterly balance sheets relating to the various city funds and accounts, and cash flow projections. These requests were directed to the director of finance and later to the mayor. Despite these requests, quarterly balance sheets and cash flow estimates were not furnished to the board of finance. "Funds on accounts status reports" were furnished to the board of finance, but neither the auditors' reports nor the director's quarterly reports contained cash flow projections. The mayor recommended that the board of aider-men appropriate the sum of $1800 for the purpose of preparing the requested balance sheets and cash flow projections, but on September 19, 1972, the board of aldermen rejected the mayor's request. Most other towns in Connecticut do not provide the information sought by the board of finance, and the referee specifically found that it was not necessary for the board of finance to have the requested information in order to act upon business before it. The board of aldermen, not the board of finance, is the ultimate authority under the charter for the regulating of budgetary and fiscal affairs of the city, and the board of finance has no authority under the charter to direct the administration of the department of finance. On April 4, 1972, the board of aldermen commenced a mandamus action against the board of finance seeking an order directing the board of finance to submit the board's recommendations on the requests for the appropriation of funds. On the basis of the foregoing facts the referee concluded that neither the charter nor the General Statutes require the mayor or the director of finance to furnish the plaintiffs current balance sheets and cash projections, and that the reports prepared by the director of finance comply with the provisions of the charter. The referee further concluded that from the reports made available to them the plaintiffs have sufficient information to determine whether to vote affirmatively or negatively on a request presented to the board of finance. The referee overruled the plaintiffs' claims of law that a reasonable construction of the charter of the city of Milford, the General Statutes and principles of sound municipal accounting practice, considered individually or collectively, require that the city provide interim quarterly balance sheets and cash flow projections to its board of finance. "If a public official or public agency has a duty to perform a particular act and fails in the discharge of that duty, a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy for compelling performance of the act. Where the official or agency is authorized to exercise a discretionary power, mandamus does not lie. Hannifan v. Sachs, 150 Conn. 162, 167, 187 A.2d 253; see General Statutes § 52-485. Therefore, relief by way of mandamus is only available to one who has a complete and immediate right that the public act be done. State ex rel. Scala v. Airport Commission, 154 Conn. 168, 176, 224 A.2d 236; Boyko v. Weiss, 147 Conn. 183, 186, 158 A.2d 253; 55 C.J.S. Mandamus, § 53, 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus, § 55." Ballas v. Woodin, 155 Conn. 283, 284-85, 231 A.2d 273. "The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to be applied only under exceptional conditions, and is not to be extended beyond its well-established limits." Lahiff v. St. Joseph's Total Abstinence Soc., 76 Conn. 648, 651, 57 A. 692; Chatfield Co. v. Reeves, 87 Conn. 63, 64, 86 A. 750. The issuance of the writ rests in the sound discretion of the court, and that discretion will be exercised in favor of issuing the writ only where the plaintiff has a clear legal right to have done that which he seeks. State ex rel. Donahue v. Holbrook, 136 Conn. 691, 693, 73 A.2d 924. The plaintiffs have failed to present any authority for their claim that the referee erred in his denial of the writ. The city charter does not establish, for the plaintiffs, a complete and immediate right to the material they seek and such a right cannot, as the plaintiffs suggest, arise by implication. The record is devoid of any facts that would support a claim that the referee abused his discretion in denying the writ. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. At the inception of this action, the three plaintiffs were members of the board of finance. Joseph Raslavsky was later discharged. See State ex rel. Raslavsky v. Bonvouloir, 167 Conn. 357, 355 A.2d 275. The plaintiffs assign error in the referee's finding, as a fact, that the information they seek in this action is not necessary to enable the board of finance to act on business brought before it, contending that this is a conclusion rather than a fact and thus not set forth under the proper heading as required by Practice Book § 619. "Where the court reaches a decision as to the existence or nonexistence of a certain faet directly by weighing the testimony and evidence offered, the faet should, of course, simply be stated among the subordinate facts found." Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 140, p. 173. "Corrections of findings of faet will only be made .(e) Upon the finding of a material faet without evidence." Practice Book § 628. The evidence printed in the appendix to the defendant's brief amply supports the referee's finding.

Shea, J. Both of these appeals arise out of a dispute between the plaintiff city of New Haven and the defendant police union, concerning a decision of the city to cease the use of full-time policemen performing extra duty for the purpose of providing security at elderly housing sites operated by the city housing authority. In the first appeal, No. 13462, the city seeks review of a claimed interlocutory ruling by the Superior Court, Hon. Joseph W. Bogdanski, state trial referee, affirming a decision of the state board of labor relations (board) that the city, on February 25, 1981, had committed an unfair labor practice by failing to bargain collectively with the union before unilaterally using part-time policemen rather than full-time officers, who are represented by the union, as security personnel for elderly housing. In the second case, No. 13463, the city has appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court, Fracasse, J., upholding the March 11,1985 decision of the board concerning compliance with its orders that were the subject of the first appeal. With respect to the first appeal, we conclude that the city is barred from further review of the 1981 board decision and, therefore, dismiss that appeal. With respect to the second appeal, we find error in the trial court's conclusion that the 1985 board decision was a proper implementation of the 1981 decision and remand for further proceedings before the agency. The findings of the board as set forth in its 1981 decision are not disputed. In August, 1979, the city began to use full-time policemen as extra duty officers to provide security at thirteen elderly housing sites operated by the New Haven Housing Authority, a separate municipal entity. This change from the preceding security arrangement at these locations occurred when $250,000 of a federal community development grant became available for that purpose. Only full-time officers were used to provide these services until June 30, 1980, when the city ceased that practice and began to use part-time policemen for that purpose. During the negotiations between the city and the union for the collective bargaining agreement executed on June 6,1980, the amount of premium pay for extra duty assignments was one of the subjects discussed. In May, 1980, after the city learned that the federal grant for the fiscal year beginning July 1,1980, would be reduced, its board of aldermen decided that none of the community development funds should be used to provide security personnel for elderly housing. The board of aldermen voted, nevertheless, to appropriate $125,000 from other city funds to help pay for such personnel. This sum was about half the amount that had been paid for the services of full-time policemen at the elderly housing sites in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980. In order to provide as many security people as possible with the limited money available, the city began to use part-time police officers, who were not members of the bargaining unit represented by the defendant union, for protection of the elderly housing sites. These officers were not entitled to receive premium pay for this service, unlike the full-time policemen who had been used for this purpose from August, 1979, to July, 1980. This change became effective on July 1,1980, and from that date until September, 1983, none of the full-time policemen represented by the union were assigned to elderly housing as extra duty. On July 7,1980, the union filed a complaint with the board alleging that the city had engaged in an unfair labor practice by assigning to others the work that had previously been performed by members of the bargaining unit without first negotiating with the union. After a hearing the board concluded that the practice for the prior eleven months of using full-time police officers to provide security services for elderly housing had become a condition of the employment of full-time offi cers, and that the city had violated its duty to bargain in good faith concerning a change in such a condition prior to implementing it. The board, however, recognized that the decisions of the board of aldermen to allocate none of the federal funds received by the city to the protection of elderly housing and to limit the appropriation for this purpose to $125,000 from general city funds were "political and managerial," and that the city was entitled to make such decisions unilaterally without prior bargaining with the union. Nevertheless, it was held that, although the city could have limited the bargaining to the $125,000 that had been appropriated, it had breached its statutory duty to bargain collectively by failing to negotiate with the union before ceasing entirely to use bargaining unit members for this employment. See General Statutes § 7-469, 7-470 (a) (4) and (c). The board issued a cease and desist order and also specified several affirmative acts to be performed by the city ancillary to that order, including the obligation to compensate the policemen who had been deprived of the elderly housing extra duty assignments. Jurisdiction over the matter was retained by the board for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation due these officers in the event that the parties should fail to reach an agreement on that issue. The city appealed the 1981 board decision to the Superior Court, which court, Hon. Joseph W. Bogdanski, state trial referee, on July 26, 1983, affirmed the conclusion reached by the board that the city had breached its statutory duty to bargain with the union before making the elderly housing assignments unavailable as extra duty for full-time policemen. No appeal was taken from this judgment. The parties returned to the board for further proceedings relating to compliance with the portion of the 1981 decision ordering the city to compensate those policemen who had been deprived of the opportunity to per form extra duty work at the elderly housing sites "for the loss they suffered." On March 11,1985, the board issued its "decision on compliance," which upheld the union's position on most of the disputed issues. The city appealed the 1985 decision to the Superior Court on the ground that the board had ruled erroneously on issues involved in the calculation of the back pay to be awarded to those policemen claiming to have suffered losses because of the termination of elderly housing extra duty assignments after July 1,1980. The court, Mancini, J., on October 25, 1985, granted motions of the defendants to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the city should have raised the issues forming the basis for the appeal at the time it had appealed from the 1981 board decision and that the city was barred by the principle of res judicata from seeking further review of those issues after the court had affirmed the 1981 decision and no appeal from that judgment had been filed. The city appealed this judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court, which set aside the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. New Haven v. Board of Labor Relations, 9 Conn. App. 546, 548, 520 A.2d 245 (1987). The Appellate Court held that "[t]he reservation by the board, in its initial decision, of the determination of the amounts due under that decision operated to exempt that aspect of this litigation from the doctrine of res judicata." Id., 547-48. On remand, the trial court, Fracasse, J., considered the appeal on its merits and on March 3,1988, affirmed the 1985 board decision, concluding that the board had not exceeded its authority to fashion an appropriate remedy for the city's violation of its duty to bargain. The court specifically rejected the contentions of the city that the total compensation award should be limited to the $125,000 appropriation concerning which the duty to bargain had been found, that the records of prior employment at the elderly housing sites for the individual officers claiming compensation should have been considered in determining the amounts they had lost, and that a deduction should be made for the earnings of each claimant from other extra duty work performed after July 1, 1980, in calculating his loss from the unavailability of the elderly housing assignments. From this judgment the city appealed to the Appellate Court claiming that: (1) the 1981 board decision establishing its liability was erroneously affirmed by the trial court; and (2) the trial court erred in affirming the 1985 board decision on compliance because the board had failed to take into account several highly significant factors for determination of the appropriate compensation for each claimant. The appeal has been transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c). I In seeking at this time review of the 1981 board decision, which not only found that the city had failed to perform its statutory duty to bargain but also ordered various relief, including a direction to compensate the officers affected, the city claims that the decision was interlocutory because of the provision retaining jurisdiction in the board to determine later the amounts of compensation due. The city relies upon several cases, not involving administrative appeals, in which we have held that a judgment resolving the issue of liability but leaving the issue of damages or other relief undecided is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies. Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84-85, 495 A.2d 1063 (1985); Pinnix v. LaMorte, 182 Conn. 342, 343, 438 A.2d 102 (1980); Palmer v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 157 Conn. 597, 253 A.2d 28 (1968). These authorities are readily distinguishable from the present case, however, because the 1981 board decision includes various forms of relief related to the violation of the duty to bargain, as well as a declaration of the manner in which the policemen affected by that breach of duty are to be compensated. The considerations underlying the requirement of finality of an agency decision as a prerequisite to judicial review are akin to those involved in the ripeness doctrine as applied to administrative rulings. "[I]ts basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967). "The cases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the 'finality' element in a pragmatic way." Id., 149. "[T]he relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow from the agency action." Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71, 91 S. Ct. 203, 27 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1970). The 1981 board decision satisfies these criteria for a final decision of an agency. No further administrative proceedings were contemplated except with respect to implementation of the compensation provision of the order, in the event that the parties were unable to reach agreement. The cease and desist provision, directing that elderly housing security assignments be given to full-time officers, the requirement that notice of the decision and order be posted and the mandate that the board be notified within thirty days of the steps taken to comply with the order would have become effective immediately in the absence of an appeal. Implicitly the city, by appealing from the 1981 order, and the board, by not seeking to dismiss that appeal as premature, recognized that it would not "disrupt the orderly process of adjudication," that "rights or obligations [had] been determined" and that "legal consequences [would] flow from the agency action." Id., 71. Furthermore, appeals from decisions of the board are governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 through 4-189. General Statutes § 4-180 of the act requires that an agency "in all contested cases shall render a final decision within ninety days following the close of evidence or the due date for filing of briefs in such proceedings." (Emphasis added.) No claim has been made that this provision has not been satisfied in the present case. It is only when a person is "aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case" that he may appeal to the Superior Court. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-183 (a). Such an appeal must be brought "within forty-five days after mailing of the notice of the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is requested, within forty-five days after mailing of the notice thereon." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-183 (b). We view our statutes as giving an agency discretion to limit in a practical way the scope of an administrative proceeding in a contested case, upon which a final decision must be rendered within the prescribed ninety day period, and, when appropriate, to reserve for further proceedings certain issues whose resolution may depend upon the outcome of those to be adjudicated initially. So long as the agency intends to render a final decision and the person taking the appeal is aggrieved by the decision rendered, the fact that other related issues are reserved for later adjudication does not necessarily detract from its finality. The reservation by the board of the issue of compensation of the individual officers, upon which no evidence had been presented at the hearing, therefore, did not render its decision interlocutory. Such a reservation was appropriate in this instance because the time required for adjudication of the numerous claims of the individual officers might well have delayed enforcement of the cease and desist order. From our determination that the board decision was final and thus appealable, it follows that the judgment of the Superior Court in 1983 affirming that decision was also final and that the city could have appealed from that judgment. General Statutes § 4-184. Its failure to do so, or to exercise the option under Practice Book § 4002 to reserve its appeal until all of the issues had been disposed of by filing a notice of such reservation, precludes it from now challenging the basis for the 1981 board decision. Accordingly, the appeal in No. 13462 is dismissed. II The city claims that the 1985 board decision on compliance is erroneous because: (1) the total amount of compensation to be paid by the city should have been limited to $125,000, the amount of the appropriation for elderly housing security; and (2) the proposed award of compensation, based solely on whether a particular officer had signed up for extra duty on a date after July 1,1980, when he knew such work was unavailable, was wholly unreasonable. We agree with the city that the 1985 decision is erroneous in these respects. A In its 1981 decision the board concluded that, although the city was faced with the need to cut in half the amount spent for elderly housing security, its duty to bargain remained, but the city could have controlled its parameters. "It could in this case, for instance, have insisted that all bargaining be conducted within the $125,000 limit set by the appropriation." In a footnote referenced to this sentence, the board declared as follows: "The seeking of additional appropriation may be a permissive subject of bargaining but it is not mandatory under the circumstances of this case." The basis for this limitation on the scope of the city's duty to bargain was the board's conclusion that the decision of the board of aldermen to appropriate $125,000 for security at elderly housing sites was "political and managerial." Although the 1981 decision in ordering relief does not expressly limit the city's liability to $125,000, the order relating to compensation directed the city only to "make whole those officers who requested the work after July 1, 1980 . . . and who were denied the opportunity to perform such work for the loss they suffered because of such denial." (Emphasis added.) We construe this directive to "make whole" as intended to compensate the affected policemen for the loss they suffered from the breach of the city's duty to bargain, which the board in 1981 concluded was limited to the $125,000 appropriation for elderly housing security. Since the city had no duty to bargain except within the amount of that appropriation, it follows that the losses suffered from the breach of that duty must reasonably be limited to that amount. The contrary view is wholly illogical and inconsistent with the 1981 board decision that the measure of compensation to the policemen should be the loss they suffered from the breach of the city's duty to bargain over the manner in which the $125,000 appropriation should be expended. We need not address the contention of the union that the authority of the board under General Statutes § 7-471 (4) (B), after finding an unfair labor practice has been committed, to "take such further affirmative action as well as effectuate the policies" of the statutes pertaining to collective bargaining, would have justified a compensation award exceeding the $125,000 limit of the city's duty to bargain, as found in the 1981 board decision. If the board at that time had intended to impose such an extraordinary remedy, we presume it would have said so expressly. We have construed the order to "make whole" the policemen who suffered losses from the city's breach of its obligation to bargain as intended to give them only the same compensation they would have received if the city had fulfilled its duty, which was limited to the amount of the appropriation. The 1985 board "decision on compliance," which found that "there has been no failure to com ply" with the cease and desist provision of the 1981 decision, did not purport to impose any additional remedy for the city's breach, but attempted merely to clarify the compensation part of the order. There is no reason for this court to give special deference to the board's 1985 interpretation of its 1981 decision, because the construction of an administrative determination finalized by a judgment of this court on appeal, as in this case, is uniquely a question of law for the court. B The 1981 board order to compensate "those officers who requested the work after July 1, 1980," referred to an exhibit consisting of the rosters that policemen interested in performing the extra duty work of providing security for elderly housing had signed each day to request an assignment at one of the thirteen locations. The practice of signing up for such work continued after the city had terminated the use of full-time policemen on July 1, 1980, and it was widely known that such assignments were no longer available. From this date of termination until September, 1983, when the city resumed the use of full-time policemen at elderly housing sites, many policemen regularly signed the roster to demonstrate their availability for these extra duty assignments, which they knew were nonexistent, in order to support their claims, which in total exceed $200,000, for losses suffered from the city's termination of this work opportunity then being pursued before the board. It appears that 82.5 percent of the claims based on these rosters were made by officers who had worked only 18 percent of the total days spent by full-time officers on elderly housing assignments when these had been available from August, 1979, to July, 1980. A large percentage of the claims were those of policemen who were union officers and had seldom, if ever, performed elderly housing work while such extra duty assignments were being offered. For example, a former president of the union, who had worked only twice at elderly housing sites during the period when such work was available, claimed $4725 for 1982 and $5278 for 1983 by virtue of signing up for such extra duty, which he knew he could not be called upon to perform. The same officer earned $4791 from other extra duty assignments in 1982 and $6900 in 1983, approximately the same amounts he had earned from such assignments in 1979,1980 and 1981. Three policemen, who had never taken elderly housing assignments when they were available, nevertheless, filed substantial claims, including one claim for $6091 by the officer in charge of the extra duty lists, for losses suffered after such work had ceased simply because they had signed the rosters for such work. The board in rendering its "decision on compliance" with its original 1981 decision did not purport to ascertain whether the policemen who had filed claims for losses resulting from the city's failure to bargain had actually suffered any financial loss. The board made no findings as to whether any of the officers involved would have accepted elderly housing assignments if they had been available on the dates when the officers' names appeared on the elderly housing duty lists. No determination of the amount due any individual officer was made. Instead of making findings concerning the individual claims of the policemen, the board made rulings upon disputes that had arisen between the city and the union as to the manner in which these individual claims should be resolved, leaving to the parties, with the assistance of an agent of the board, the determination of the actual amount to be awarded each claimant. The board's "decision on compliance" was an attempt to clarify the part of the original decision ordering compensation for those officers who had sustained losses from the city's breach of its statutory obligation. The city contended that the record of extra duty work at elderly housing sites performed by the claimant policemen during the period when such work had been available was relevant in determining the amount of the loss an officer had sustained. The board adopted the union position that such evidence was wholly irrelevant. Accordingly, the board ordered that the calculation of the amounts to be paid to the claimants should be based solely on the records that had been signed by these claimants while aware that the elderly housing security work was unavailable, except that deductions should be made where an officer actually worked elsewhere on a night that he had signed up for elderly housing duty or was unable to work because of sickness or suspension from his job on such date. The board set forth two reasons to support its ruling that the record of extra duty work that had actually been performed by the claimants at the elderly housing sites was irrelevant to the determination of the amounts of their losses from the unavailability of such work during the period July, 1980, to September, 1983: (1) the 1981 board decision had not expressly indicated that the prior work history of each claimant was to be considered; and (2) "comparison of an officer's preJuly 1,1980 history of signing up for extra duty work at the elderly housing units with his post-July 1, 1980 record of signing up would be of doubtful probative value of anything." We conclude that both these grounds for the board's ruling were erroneous. The fact that the 1981 board decision does not mention the prior work history of the claimants as a factor to be considered in calculating the losses of those officers who had been deprived of elderly housing security jobs does not indicate that the board at that time viewed such evidence as irrelevant. It is wholly speculative to draw such an inference from the absence of some express reference to such prior work history. The 1981 decision ordered the city to "make whole those officers who requested the work after July 1, 1980 . . . and who were denied the opportunity to perform such work for the loss they suffered because of such denial. " This order cannot reasonably be construed as intended to preclude the consideration of any evidence relevant to the amount of the loss the claimants had sustained. It is true that the 1981 order also contained a directive that the amount "should be computed by taking the amount of pay [the policemen] would have received for such assignment and subtracting therefrom the amount of any overtime or extra duty pay they did in fact receive during the period covered by their deprivation of the pay for elderly housing protection." This provision of the order, however, refers to the amount they "would have received for such assignment," which implicitly requires that a determination should be made whether each claimant would in fact have taken the elderly housing assignments for which he had signed. Furthermore, this computation provision does not indicate that the board in 1981 had any purpose in mind other than to "make whole" those who had been deprived of a work opportunity that they would have taken if it had been available. We find nothing in the 1981 decision that would bar the use of the records of elderly housing extra duty work performed before July 1, 1980, in deciding whether a particular claim ant would have been likely to accept such an assignment and thus had suffered a loss from its unavailability. Evidence of prior work history at elderly housing sites is relevant to ascertaining the loss sustained by each claimant, although it is not necessarily conclusive. "[A]ny fact may be proved which logically tends to aid the trier in the determination of the issue." Pitt v. Kent, 149 Conn. 351, 357, 179 A.2d 626 (1962). Records of former earnings are commonly admitted into evidence to prove losses sustained from inability to work resulting from wrongful acts. See Silverman v. Springfield Advertising Co., 120 Conn. 55, 59, 179 A. 98 (1935). This practice is so generally accepted that no further refutation is needed of the board's conclusion that the records of extra duty work at elderly housing sites performed by the claimants prior to July 1, 1980, "would be of doubtful probative value of anything." Furthermore, these records, as well as the records of earnings for other extra duty employment would be significant in assessing the credibility of each individual claim. The city ought not to be deprived of the use of these records in challenging the good faith of each claimant in the appropriate forum for resolution of the individual claims. The board ruling precluding the use of these records by whatever tribunal may ultimately decide the genuineness of each claim and the amount to be awarded, therefore, was erroneous. The trial court, in affirming the 1985 board decision, relied largely upon the deference that is ordinarily given to the factual and discretionary decisions of administrative agencies. Connecticut Hospital Assn. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 133, 140, 509 A.2d 1050 (1986). The issues in this appeal from the 1985 board decision, however, do not involve factual or discretionary determinations based upon the credibility of each claimant but present questions of law properly raised on judicial review of a decision of an administrative board. No special deference, therefore, must be paid to the two rulings of the board, issued as parameters for determining the individual claims, which we find erroneous. "[I]t is for the courts, and not for administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law." Id. In No. 13462 the appeal is dismissed; in No. 13463 there is error, the judgment' is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining the appeal and remanding the case for further proceedings before the board in accordance with this opinion. In this opinion Callahan, Covello, and Hull, Js., concurred. In the trial court, as well as before the board, the city had contended that the 1988 decision, ordering that the amounts to be awarded to the claimant policemen "should be computed by taking the amount of pay they would have received for such assignment and subtracting therefrom the amount of any overtime or extra duty pay they did in fact receive during the period covered by their deprivation of the pay for elderly housing protection," required that the earnings of the claimants from extra duty work during the period July 1,1980, to September, 1983, be deducted on an annual basis from the amounts of their claims. The board limited the deduction from such extra duty employment to instances where a policeman had been paid for extra duty work on a date that he claimed to be available for elderly housing work by virtue of signing the roster for such work on the same date. The city has not briefed any claim of error with respect to this determination. We recognize that in Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 202 Conn. 150, 520 A.2d 186 (1987), this court held that an appeal from an agency order determining that an employer had discriminated against the complainant because of her gender and awarding her back pay was not final because the precise amount of the award was not established until a subsequent agency order was issued two months later. In that case, however, it appears that the agency did not intend its first decision to be final and further proceedings before the agency related to the amount of compensation to be awarded were expressly indicated by the terms of the order. These proceedings, which involved additional evidence, continued after the appeal had been taken and culminated in a revision of the original award. The appeal was plainly premature because it interfered with an ongoing proceeding before the agency for which the parties had been requested to submit additional evidence. The parties have stipulated that, if the calculation of the amounts to be awarded the claimants is made on the basis of the 1985 board decision, the total sum to be paid by the city would be $213,887.50. The members of the panel who participated in the 1981 board decision did not participate in the 1985 decision. The panel issuing the 1985 decision, therefore, had to rely solely upon the text of the 1981 decision in ascertaining what the board intended at that time.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court is denied.

Hull, J. The dispositive issue in this case is whether the state board of labor relations erred in deciding that the positions, of tax assessor, building official, town planner, tax collector and youth counselor in the town of Southington were not department heads within the meaning of General Statutes § 7-467, as amended by Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503, and therefore were not excluded from collective bargaining with the town. We concur with the decision of the board and conclude that the Superior Court did not err in dismissing the town's appeal from the board's decision. The background of this case is as follows. On September 12, 1983, the defendant union, Local 818 of Council 4, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, filed with the defendant state board of labor relations (board) a petition seeking to represent all supervisory employees who worked for the town of Southington. On March 12, 1984, the board issued an order of election for union representation that included fourteen supervisory positions in the town, among them the five positions disputed in this case. The town challenged the eligibility of ten of the fourteen employees, claiming that they were "department heads," who were prohibited from bargaining collectively under the Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-467 et seq. The election was held on April 10,1984, and the town again challenged the ballots of certain town officials, including the disputed five positions. The challenged ballots were sealed pending a determination by the board. Hearings on the town's objections and challenges were held by the board. In its decision- (number 2451) issued on December 26, 1985, the board determined that the positions of sewer superintendent and superintendent of highways were "department heads" within the meaning of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503 (codified as General Statutes § 7-467) and therefore were excluded from the collective bargaining unit, but found that the remaining challenged positions, including the five disputed positions, were not "department heads" and thus were properly within the collective bargaining unit. Thereafter, the challenged ballots were opened and the board determined that a majority of the town's eligible supervisory employees had voted in favor of union representation. Subsequently, on January 9, 1986, the board issued another decision (number 2451-A) certifying the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the supervisors in the town. On January 29, 1986, the union demanded that the town negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for all of the employees in the supervisors' bargaining unit. At the first bargaining session, the town refused to bargain with the union over the five disputed positions. The union then filed an unfair labor practice charge against the town, with the board, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-470 (a) (4), for its refusal to bargain. On June 4,1986, the board issued decision No. 2498 ordering the town to bargain with the union over the dis puted positions. On June 26,1986, the town appealed that decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. The trial court defined the sole issue as whether the board's decision was rendered in accordance with the definition of "department head" contained in General Statutes § 7-467 (4). In affirming the board's decision and dismissing the town's appeal, the court stated that it gave "great deference" to the board's construction of the statute. The town then appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. It is particularly useful in this case to summarize the board's comprehensive and scholarly decision No. 2451. The term "department head" was not defined under MERA until the passage of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503, which became effective on October 1, 1983. During the period from 1978 to 1983, the board attempted to fashion a reasonable definition of "department head" on a case-by-case basis. In deciding whether a person was a "department head," the board had developed several guiding principles, among them: (1) the word "department" as used in MERA is a term of art referring to the largest divisions of government; (2) a person claimed to be excluded as a "department head" must exercise supervision over a substantial number of employees; (3) if a town charter identifies a division of government as a department, the board will consider that identification, but not be bound by it; and (4) the exception is to be narrowly construed. The board's decision took note of four changes from existing practice contained in Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503. First, under the act, provisions of local charters or of special acts became irrelevant to the determination of whether a division of government constitutes a "department." Second, to qualify as a "department head" under the act, a person must be directly account able to the board of selectmen or to the chief executive officer of a town. Third, the act substituted a new test for supervisory control that, instead of looking to the number of supervised employees, required that a department head must have "substantial supervisory control of a permanent nature over other municipal employees." The board stated that it had not before required that, to be a department head, an individual have a degree of supervisory control greater than that of non-department head supervisors. In view of the new act, however, the board decided that to be a department head, one must do more than merely meet the definition of supervisor, one must actually have substantial supervisory control. Finally, the board analyzed the impact of the change from its definition of a "department" as being one of the largest divisions of government to being, under the act, a "major functional division" of government. The board decided that: (1) this is an expansion of its prior definition of a "department"; (2) the concept of "major functional division" must be considered within the context of the particular municipality in question; (3) what might be a "major functional division" in a small town, may not be a "major functional division" in a large city; (4) whether a division is major must be determined in view of objective factors such as the division's budget, staff size, and control over the use of municipal resources; and (5) it is inappropriate for the board to base its decision upon its own notions of what, in relative terms, is a more or less important function of local government. The board rejected the town's argument that the local subjective view of the importance of a function should control. It found that view relevant, but only as reflected through the objective factors described above. The board then listed the following criteria for determining whether a person is a "department head" under the act: "(1) Does the person report directly to the Board of Selectmen or the Chief Executive Officer of the municipality, i.e. with no intervening level of authority? (2) Does the person exercise a degree of permanent supervisory control over other municipal employees which is greater than what is necessary to qualify the person merely as a supervisor under the Act? (3) Does the person head a division of municipal government which in terms of budget, staff size, and control of the use of municipal resources is a major functional division of that municipality's government?" The board ruled that each of these questions must be answered in the affirmative for a person to meet the definition of "department head" under the act. Applying these criteria, the board found two positions that the town had challenged to be "department heads": the sewer superintendent and the superintendent of highways. Neither position is involved in this appeal. With respect to the five disputed positions, the board found that they were not in charge of "major functional divisions" of the town. Therefore, none of the five was a "department head" and all could be included in a bargaining unit of supervisors. Specifically, the board found the following concerning each of the five positions: (1) tax assessor; three other employees; comparatively small budget; (2) building official; four other employees; comparatively small budget; (3) town planner; two other employees; budget of $69,000; (4) tax collector; four other employees; comparatively small budget; and (5) youth counselor; three other employees; comparatively small budget. Finally, the board noted that with regard to the employees holding the first four of these positions, although each performed functions that concerned considerable municipal resources, none of them controlled the use to which those resources were put. The board then ordered the challenged ballots opened. As a result of the board's decision, out of the ten ballots cast, what had been a vote of three in favor of representation and zero against, became a vote of eight in favor of representation, two void ballots, and zero opposed to representation. It was this vote in favor of representation that precipitated this litigation. After being ordered by the board to bargain with the union over the disputed positions, the town appealed to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 4-183. In upholding the board's decision, the trial court gave "great deference" to the board's interpretation of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503 and found that "[t]he interpretation of department head and functional division as utilized by the labor board does not constitute an arbitrary or capricious characterization or an abusive or unwarranted exercise of their discretion." On appeal to this court, each party cites extensive facts to buttress its position. Many of the facts claimed by the parties, however, were not found by the board or the trial court. We must therefore cull out those facts agreed upon, admitted, undisputed or contained in exhibits. Southington is governed by a council-manager form of government. The town manager is the chief executive officer of the town and is directly responsible for the management of the individual departments within the town. The town charter provides for each of the first four disputed positions, designating each such division as a department. The youth counseling department was created in 1973 after the charter was adopted. Each of the employees holding a disputed position is appointed by and reports directly to the town manager. These appointments are made without the approval of any other person or entity. The town cites numerous examples of local practices to support its claims that it has treated each of the five disputed positions as a department head, including: (a) listing of the'positions as separate departments in the annual reports and the local telephone directory; and (b) defining the positions in the town's personnel rules and regulations as those of persons responsible for directing the operations of a major organizational unit of town government. The town then cites seventeen examples of how, locally, the disputed positions carry responsibilities similar to those of a department head. The town thereafter in its brief describes the functions of each of the disputed positions to demonstrate how important each is to local government. The union, whose counterstatement of facts was adopted by the board, argues other detailed facts, not agreed upon by the parties, which it claims show that none of the disputed positions is a major functional division of the town. Contrary to the town, the union then analyzes each of the disputed positions with claimed facts that it argues tend to show that the positions in question were not those of department heads. The town employs a shotgun approach in its appeal, claiming that the labor board's decision was: (1) in violation of statutory provisions; (2) affected by error of law; (3) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; and (4) arbitrary. Although the town stated the issues in its brief in six separate paragraphs, they substantially overlap. For purposes of clarity, we will consider the all-embracing issue to be whether the labor board erred in deciding that the five disputed positions were not those of "department heads" within the meaning of General Statutes § 7-467, as amended by Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503, and therefore were not excluded from the collective bargaining unit of supervisory town employees. "The standard of judicial review of administrative agency rulings is well established. . . . The trial court may not retry the case or substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. General Statutes § 4-183 (g). . . . Rather, an agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts. Connecticut Hospital Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 133, 140, 509 A.2d 1050 (1986); Board of Aldermen v. Bridgeport Community Antennae Television Co., 168 Conn. 294, 298-99, 362 A.2d 529 (1975); Westport v. Norwalk, 167 Conn. 151, 355 A.2d 25 (1974). "On the other hand, it is the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law. N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S. Ct. 980, 13 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1965); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 487 F.2d 1143, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 94 S. Ct. 2737, 41 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1974); Connecticut Hospital Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, supra; Real Estate Listing Service, Inc. v. Real Estate Commission, 179 Conn. 128, 138-39, 425 A.2d 581 (1979). This case presents a question of law turning upon the interpretation of a statute. . . . Such a question invokes a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion." State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 717-18, 546 A.2d 830 (1988). In New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 773-74, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988), we stated: "Ordinarily, the construction and interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the courts where the administrative decision is not entitled to special deference, particularly where, as here, the statute has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny or time-tested agency interpretations." Neither the board nor the courts have previously ruled on the issue in this case. Accordingly, no special deference is due the board's construction of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503. In support of its position, the town relies almost exclusively on the legislative history of the act. "Our principal objective in construing statutory language is to ascertain the apparent intent of the legislature. Rawling v. New Haven, 206 Conn. 100, 105, 537 A.2d 439 (1988)." State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, supra, 721. "When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, we need look no further for interpretive guidance because we assume that the words themselves express the intention of the legislature. . . . When we are confronted, however, with ambiguity in a statute, we seek to ascertain the actual intent by looking to the words of the statute itself . . . the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute . . . and the purpose the statute is to serve." (Citations omitted.) Rhodes v. Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 93, 513 A.2d 124 (1986). The legislative history of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503 discloses the following. The act originated in the legislature as House Bill No. 5540. The primary purpose of the bill was to define the term "department head" for the labor board. 26 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1983 Sess., pp. 2262-63. In the House of Representatives, Representative Richard O. Belden proposed to clarify the definition of "department head" by adding to it a list of twenty-eight specifically designated department heads that would be excluded from the collective bargaining process; id., p. 2261; but that list was later deleted from the bill at the insistence of Senator Joseph H. Harper, Jr. Senator Harper stated that a definition that included such a listing of department heads to be excluded from the collective bargaining process "would supersede home rule prerogatives that municipalities currently have to define and determine their own departments." 26 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1983 Sess., p. 2651. He intended that the labor board should "determine on a cáse by case basis whether or not that entity the individual is the head of is, in fact, [a] department Id., p. 2653. The town argues that Senator Harper's remarks show a legislative intent to allow municipalities to define their own departments. When asked, however, whether his proposed definition of "department head," without the department heads expressly listed, was a broader definition, Senator Harper responded that he was "not certain whether what remains is broader." Id. Upon return of the bill with Senator Harper's amendment to the House, Representative William A. Kiner added another amendment defining a "department" as "any major functional division within a municipal organization, notwithstanding the provisions of any charter or special act to the contrary." 26 H.R. Proc., Pt. 20,1983 Sess., p. 7084. That definition of "department" was incorporated in Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503. No further illumination of legislative intent is apparent in the record. We conclude that the legislation resulted in a new statutory definition of "department head" hammered out in typical legislative fashion, reflecting various political and social viewpoints, and shedding little light on the legislative intent concerning the meaning of that term. Accordingly, we discern neither a mandate for broadening the definition of "department head," nor evidence of an intent to narrow it. For our purposes, the legislative intent is essentially neutral. We thus return to the bedrock of statutory construction, the words used by the legislature. "In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly." General Statutes § 1-1 (a). "Where a statute does not define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding expressed in the law and in dictionaries." Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183, 186, 438 A.2d 859 (1981). The town directs our attention to the definition of "department," defined as "any major functional division in a municipal organization . . . . " General Statutes § 7-467 (5). Defining the word "major" is not as difficult as the town claims. Every school boy knows the difference between the major leagues and the minor leagues. The word "major" has been defined as "greater in dignity, rank, importance or interest . . . greater in numbers, quantity or extent." Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The determination of which municipal functions are "major" is a particularly suitable task for the board, which by its very nature is sensitive to the labor-management implications of its decision and knowledgeable of the precedents in this area. The gist of the town's argument on this point is that if a function is "important" to the town it must automatically be a "major functional division" of the town within the meaning of the statute. To accept this argument would be to obliterate the statutory definition. It would subject the MERA's statutory framework for determining which supervisors may be included in the collective bargaining process to the whims of a purely local and subjective definition of what is a "department" and a "department head." To follow the town's claim to its logical conclusion, the town could designate the high school football scorekeeper a department head since, as long as he had one assistant and met the other criteria established by the board, the town could claim the department of scorekeeping as a "major functional division." The town further claims that a proper determinative of whether a municipal division is "major" must be the proportion of its municipal resources dedicated to that division. It asserts that any argument that the departments in question are not major due to small size and budget must fail. This argument is tilting at windmills. The board's decision reflects exactly the analysis that the town claims should have been made. The board made detailed findings as to each of the five disputed positions, comparing the functions, number of employees, and budget, with other positions such as superintendent of sewers and superintendent of highways, which it had already found to be major functional divi sions. Our view of this case does not in any way suggest that the five disputed positions are not important to the town of Southington, or any town. It is obvious that without a tax collector or tax assessor, for example, no town could function. But the mere necessity of such a position does not automatically make it a major functional division of the town under the statute. The town also claims that the board's decision failed to recognize the change mandated by Public Acts 1983, No. 83-503, in that prior decisions of the board referred to the "largest" departments in a municipality when determining whether a person qualified as a department head, whereas the statute now requires that a person must be the head of a "major functional division." It contends that the new definition was a conscious decision on the part of the legislature to make a substantial change in the process. We observe that the board's decision did note four changes effectuated by the amendment. We do not, however, read the legislature's action as making the substantive change in the law claimed by the town. The concept of "largeness" of a municipal function previously utilized by the board is subsumed in the term "major functional division." The removal of the relative size of a municipal function in budget and number of employees from the determination of a "major functional division" would once again render the words an empty formula. Finally, the town argues that the board's failure to exclude the five disputed positions creates an unfair and discriminatory impact on smaller and less wealthy towns. We do not consider this argument for three reasons. First, the trial court's memorandum of decision did not consider this issue. "The [appellant] . . . did not . . . seek, by motion for articulation in the trial court or this court; Practice Book § 4051,4061; to have the trial court address this issue. . . . It remains the appellant's responsibility to furnish an adequate appel late record. Practice Book § 4061. Because the deficiency of the record regarding this claim should have been remedied by the [appellant], we will not remand the case to the trial court for rectification. Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 295-96, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 714, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983). Therefore, we will not review this claim." (Citations omitted.) McLaughlin v. Bronson, 206 Conn. 267, 277-78, 537 A.2d 1004 (1988). Second, even if the issue were properly before this court, the town's claim ignores the fact that the board specifically noted this factor in its decision: "[I]t is at least apparent from the debate in the House of Representatives that this idea of 'major functional division' is intended to be considered within the context of the particular municipality in question. For instance, what might be a major functional division in a small town, may not be a major functional division in a large city." Third, this issue is precisely the type of question that is properly considered "across the street," that is, in the General Assembly. We conclude that the board's decision was not in violation of statutory provisions, affected by error of law, or clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. The court did not err in dismissing the town's appeal. There is no error. In this opinion Peters, C. J., Shea, Callahan, Glass, and Covello, Js., concurred. Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO is also a separately named defendant in this case. Access to collective bargaining under the Municipal Employee Relations Act is limited to "employees," defined by General Statutes § 7-467 (2) as follows: " 'Employee' means any employee of a municipal employer, whether or not in the classified service of the municipal employer, except elected officials, administrative officials, board and commission members, certified teachers, part-time employees who work less than twenty hours per week on a seasonal basis, department heads and persons in such other positions as may be excluded from coverage under sections 7-467 to 7-477, inclusive, in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 7-471 (Emphasis added.) "[General Statutes] Sec. 7-467. collective bargaining, definitions. When used in sections 7-467 to 7-477, inclusive: "(1) 'Municipal employer' means any political subdivision of the state, including any town, city, borough, district, district department of health, school board, housing authority or other authority established by law, and any person or persons designated by the minicipal employer to act in its interest in dealing with municipal employees; "(2) 'Employee' means any employee of a municipal employer, whether or not in the classified service of the municipal employer, except elected officials, administrative officials, board and commission members, certified teachers, part-time employees who work less than twenty hours per week on a seasonal basis, department heads and persons in such other posi tions as may be excluded from coverage under sections 7-467 to 7-477, inclusive, in accordance with subdivision (2) of secton 7-471; "(3) 'Seasonal basis' means working for a period of not more than one hundred twenty calendar days in any calendar year; "(4) 'Department head' means an employee who heads any department in a municipal organization, has substantial supervisory control of a permanent nature over other municipal employees, and is directly accountable to the board of selectmen of a town, city or borough not having a charter or special act form of government, or to the chief executive officer of any other town, city or borough; "(5) 'Department' means any major functional division in a municipal organization, notwithstanding the provisions of any charter or special act to the contrary; "(6) 'Employee organization' means any lawful association, labor organization, federation or council having as a primary purpose the improvement of wages, hours and other conditions of employment among enployees of municipal employers." "1. Did the court err in affirming the decision of the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations to include in the collective bargaining unit the five department heads (Tax Assessor, Tax Collector, Building Official, Youth Counselor and Town Planner) in the Town of Southington? "2. Did the court err in finding that Public Act 83-503 did not establish a clear mandate excluding the Town of Southington's five department heads from the collective bargaining unit? "3. Did the court err by ruling that the decision of the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations including the Town of Southington's five department heads in the collective bargaining unit was not arbitrary, capricious or an unwarranted abuse of its discretion? "4. Did the court err by failing to find that the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations acted illegally and beyond its statutory mandate by ignor ing the requirements of Public Act 83-503 and including the Town of Southington's five department heads in the collective bargaining unit? "5. Did the court err by failing to consider the disparate impact on the smaller and less wealthy towns in the State of Connecticut which resulted from the decision of the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations to include the five department heads of the Town of Southington in the collective bargaining unit? "6. Did the court err by failing to rule that the decision of the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations to include the five department heads in the Town of Southington was contrary to law and clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence?"

The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal from the Superior Court in New Haven County is granted unless the defendant complies with § 630A of the rules of practice on or before March 4,1975.

The defendant's motion to set aside the verdict of the trial court and to direct an entry of a judgment of not guilty in the appeal from the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court is denied.

Peters, C. J. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court erroneously concluded that the plaintiff Board of Pardons (board) lacked standing to contest an order of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC). The underlying controversy between the parties is the validity of an FOIC order requiring the board, in the future, to conduct its deliberations in public except under narrowly delimited circumstances. The FOIC's order resulted from its decision that the Freedom of Information Act did not, as a general matter, exempt prisoner records from public disclosure, and that the board had violated the act by considering such nonexempt materials in executive session. The trial court upheld the board's appeal from the FOIC order. Without getting to the merits of the controversy, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the board's appeal because, in the Appellate Court's view, the board was not aggrieved by the FOIC's prospective order. Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 14 Conn. App. 380, 383-84, 540 A.2d 1077 (1988). The Appellate Court held that the FOIC's order did not affect a "specific and personal interest" of the board. Id., 384. The board itself was not immediately aggrieved by the FOIC's order because that order was "purely prospective." Id., 383-84. Further, the board itself was not aggrieved by the separate interests of prisoners in the confidentiality of their records. Id., 384. We granted certification to consider this issue of standing; Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 209 Conn. 803, 548 A.2d 436 (1988); and now reverse. Only parties "aggrieved by the decision" of the FOIC have standing to take appeals to the Superior Court. General Statutes § l-21i (d). "Standing is not a tech nical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962); Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 192, 332 A.2d 78 (1973). These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of [a] direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'; Shaskan v. Waltham Industries Corporation, 168 Conn. 43, 49, 357 A.2d 472 (1975); Baker v. Carr, supra, 204; provides the requisite assurance of 'concrete adverseness' and diligent advocacy. "As long as there is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great . . . [and] need not be primarily economic." Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320-21, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); see University of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386, 389, 512 A.2d 152 (1986). In appeals pursuant to § l-21i (d), we have translated these general principles into a twofold test for aggrievement that requires a showing of: (1) a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the FOIC decision; and (2) a special and injurious effect on this specific interest. Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 198 Conn. 498, 502, 503 A.2d 1161 (1986); Local 1303 & Local 1378 v. Freedom of Information Commission, 191 Conn. 173, 176, 463 A.2d 613 (1983). The board maintains that the Appellate Court took too narrow a view of aggrievement in this case. Despite the prospective nature of the FOIC order, the board claims it has standing to appeal because it is aggrieved in two respects: the risk of criminal sanctions and the threat to the integrity of its deliberative processes. We agree with both of these claims. A genuine likelihood of criminal liability or civil incarceration is sufficient to confer standing. Maloney v. Pac, supra, 321-22; Kuser v. Orkis, 169 Conn. 66, 73, 362 A.2d 943 (1975). Because the Freedom of Information Act makes noncompliance with an FOIC order a class B misdemeanor; General Statutes § l-21k (b); the individual members of the board have a "specific and personal" interest in the validity of such an order. In the future, board members face the risk of injury, in the form of criminal prosecution and sanctions, if they fail to comply with the present FOIC order. Such a risk of prosecution establishes the requisite "specific and personal interest" of the members of the board and of the board itself as their representative. Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 616, 508 A.2d 743 (1986); Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 502. In addition, the board has a legitimate institutional interest in the integrity of its decision-making process. The board has advanced a colorable claim of injury to its own deliberative functions that transcends the inter ests of individual prisoners in the disclosure of their records. In deciding whether to grant a pardon or to commute a prison sentence, the board "depends not simply on objective factfinding, but also on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior . . . . " Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 69 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1981). In order to carry out this sensitive mission, the board claims that it needs the opportunity for confidential dialogue about every aspect of a prisoner's record. The board alleges that, as a practical matter, there is a great deal of overlap between the discussion of the records of individual prisoners, which the FOIC has ordered to be held in public, and the discussion of third party information, which even the FOIC has permitted to be conducted in executive session. The bifurcated procedure that the FOIC order mandates therefore gave rise to a colorable claim of injury to a central aspect of the board's functions. As in Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, the existence of this order "would undoubtedly have . a chilling effect on the [board] the next time it contemplated . an executive session" in order to decide whether to grant a petition for a pardon. The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the merits of the commission's appeal. In this opinion the other justices concurred. The FOIC, in its brief to this court, has taken no position on the issue of the board's aggrievement. The FOIC reminds us that the legislature expressly amended General Statutes § l-21i (d) in 1984 to enlarge the statutory scope of aggrievement beyond that which this court had held to be warranted in Local 1303 & Local 1378 v. Freedom of Information Commission, 191 Conn. 173, 176, 463 A.2d 613 (1983). General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § l-21i (d) provides in relevant part: "Any party aggrieved by the decision of said commission may appeal therefrom, in accordance with the provisions of section 4-183. The commission shall have standing to defend, prosecute or otherwise participate in any appeal of any of its decisions and to take an appeal from any judicial decision overturning or modifying a decision of the commission. If aggrievement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commission taking any such appeal, the commission shall be deemed to be aggrieved." General Statutes § l-21k (b) provides: "Any member of any public agency who fails to comply with an order of the freedom of information commission shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor and each occurrence of failure to comply with such order shall constitute a separate offense."

Arthur H. Healey, J. In this case, the defendant raises four claims of error in his trial in which the jury found him guilty of murder in violation of General Statutes § BSa-Béa. He maintains first that the court erred in admitting the probable cause hearing testimony of a witness, Victor Reyes, who invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify after the state advised him that it might charge him with perjury or false statement if Reyes carried out a claimed recantation of his earlier testimony. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred in sustaining a verdict based in the main on such probable cause hearing testimony. The third claim of error is based on the trial court's restriction of the defendant's ability to impeach the declarant Reyes by (a) denying the defendant's request to have the declarant invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury, (b) refusing to explain to the jury why the declarant of the probable cause testimony was unavailable, and (c) refusing to permit the defendant to present evidence that the declarant was advised by the state that he might be arrested for perjury or false statement if his testimony at trial repudiated his probable cause hearing testimony. Finally, the defendant claims error in the trial court's refusal to allow him to impeach the declarant by prior inconsistent statements made before the probable cause hearing, although it permitted the state to corroborate the declarant's probable cause testimony with consistent statements made before the hearing. We find error in the defendant's fourth claim and order a new trial; thus, we need not address in detail the first three claims. The facts that the jury reasonably could have found and that are relevant to the defendant's fourth claim of error must be set out at this point and will be supplemented later as necessary. At approximately 7 a.m., on Tuesday, November 25, 1986, officers from the Hartford police department responded to a report of a body in a vacant lot at 89 Walnut Street. Upon their arrival, the officers discovered the victim's body with a hole in the chest and no signs of life. Identification found on the victim identified him as Miguel R. Maldonado of New Haven. An autopsy revealed the cause of death to be a stab wound with penetration of the right lung and aorta. The medical examiner estimated the time of death at about 1 or 2 a.m. on November 25. There was a pool of blood in front of 95-97 Walnut Street and drag marks leading from the street to the embankment on the lot where the body was located. On Tuesday, November 25, 1986, as part of their investigation, the police approached Victor Reyes, who lived at 103 Walnut Street with his family. Neither Reyes, nor any family members who were interviewed at that time, admitted to any knowledge of the apparent homicide the night before. At that time, Reyes's mother, Bonnie Sanchez, told investigators that neither she nor anyone in her family had seen the incident. At some point after November 25, however, Reyes informed the police that he had observed the homicide. On December 2,1986, Reyes provided a description of the assailant to Detective James Malcolm of the Hartford police department. Reyes' described the assailant as a dark complected Hispanic or black male, standing approximately 5 feet 9 inches tall, weighing 160 pounds and wearing a tan jacket with a green scarf. On the same day, Reyes was shown an array of five "mug shots," one being a picture of the defendant taken on the day of the murder, November 25, but Reyes did not identify any of these pictures as that of the assailant. There was testimony that Reyes was then shown "[ejvery available photo" at the Hartford police department, but he failed to identify the assailant. Reyes's next attempt at identifying the assailant occurred on January 9, 1987. Malcolm showed Reyes an array of photographs of seven Hispanic males, one of which was a photograph of the defendant taken on January 9,1987. From this array, Reyes identified the photograph of the defendant as that of the assailant. The defendant was arrested that same day. On February 20, 1987, a hearing was held to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the charged offense. See General Statutes § 54-46a. Reyes testified for the state at the probable cause hearing that on the night of November 25, 1986, as he looked out his window, he saw two men arguing in the street near his house on Walnut Street. One man (the victim) had something in his hand that the second man grabbed and then the second man ran across Walnut Street. The victim yelled for help and ran after the other man. Seeing that no one was coming to help, the man with the item ran back toward the victim, and when he reached the victim, he hit him with his fist, knocking the victim down. The man then picked up the victim, carried him toward the sidewalk and stabbed him once in the chest with a knife. He then threw the victim into the vacant lot. Reyes further testified that, on January 9, 1987, he had identi fied the defendant as the assailant, and he again identified the defendant as the assailant in court at the probable cause hearing. At that hearing, the court found probable cause and thereafter the defendant pleaded not guilty and elected trial by jury. On November 17, 1987, just before the defendant's trial, Reyes told the assistant state's attorney who was to try the case and a number of other persons involved in the investigation that he had lied at the probable cause hearing about the defendant's involvement in the crime. At trial, but out of the presence of the jury, the court heard testimony that the assistant state's attorney had informed Reyes that if he were to testify at the defendant's trial and repudiate the testimony that he gave at the probable cause hearing, the state might bring perjury or false statement charges against him. Apparently, because of this, outside of the presence of the jury and with his own attorney present, Reyes invoked his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself in the defendant's trial. Thereafter, the court found Reyes to be unavailable as a witness at the defendant's trial. Accordingly, over the defendant's objection, the court admitted the transcript of Reyes's probable cause testimony in the defendant's trial after finding that testimony to be reliable. The transcript of Reyes's testimony at the probable cause hearing was then read to the jury. At trial, in order to impeach Reyes's probable cause hearing testimony, the defendant called Inspector Steven Oborski from the state's attorney's office. Oborski testified that he was present on November 17,1987, when Reyes informed the assistant state's attorney that he had lied at the probable cause hearing about the defendant's involvement in the crime. To impeach Reyes's credibility further, the defendant called Reyes's mother, Bonnie Sanchez, who testified that on February 20, 1987, just after the probable cause hearing, Reyes told her that the defendant was not the person who killed the victim. Sanchez also testified that Reyes told her on a number of occasions after the probable cause hearing that "[Torres] was not the one." Following the defendant's impeachment of Reyes's probable cause hearing testimony, the state offered testimony to rehabilitate Reyes's credibility. On cross-examination of Sanchez, the state elicited testimony that Sanchez did not tell the police that Reyes had told her that he had lied at the probable cause hearing immediately after she found this out, but did so when the police came to her house sometime later. On cross-examination of Oborski as a witness for the defense, the state elicited testimony that, on November 4,1987, he and another inspector went to Reyes's home and took him to their office where they met with the assistant state's attorney who was going to try the case for the state. In going over Reyes's testimony to be given at the trial, Reyes said that his testimony at trial "[would be] the same as the probable cause hearing, the same testimony." Oborski also testified that on November 17, 1987, Reyes again stated that he saw the defendant stab the victim on Walnut Street. In addition to these proffered consistent statements, the state also offered as evidence a signed statement that Reyes gave to the police on January 9,1987. The statement contained Reyes's description of the homicide on Walnut Street and his identification of the defendant's picture at the police station on January 9, 1987. It is the trial court's admission of this consistent written statement and two other consistent statements of Reyes made to Inspector Lawrence Skinner of the state's attorney's office, one on February 19, 1987, and the other just before the probable cause hearing on February 20, 1987, and the exclusion of cer tain inconsistent statements offered by the defendant and also made before the probable cause hearing that the defendant claims as reversible error. For the reasons set forth below, we agree that the trial court erred and that a new trial is necessary. The trial court excluded two statements offered by the defendant as inconsistent with Reyes's probable cause hearing testimony. The first was a statement by Sanchez that on the very day of the homicide, November 25, 1986, Reyes told her that the assailant was a black man wearing a long brown coat. The defendant claims this as a statement inconsistent with Reyes's identification of the defendant as the assailant because the defendant is Hispanic and because the state offered into evidence a green blood-stained army fatigue jacket that was seized from the defendant's apartment and owned by the defendant. Second, the trial court excluded a statement by Sanchez that Reyes recanted to her his photographic identification of the defendant as the assailant as soon as he returned home from the police station on January 9, 1987. The trial court excluded these statements claiming that whether the defendant was a black man or an Hispanic man, and what Reyes told his mother "about his story" regarding the identification were "not material to this case, not at issue" and hearsay. The trial court stated that only statements of Reyes made after the probable cause hearing were relevant to the case. In admitting through Sanchez the inconsistent statements made after the probable cause hearing, the trial court also asserted that the actual conversations between Reyes and Sanchez were inadmissible hearsay and that it would only admit statements by Sanchez to the effect that Reyes said that he had lied, in essence, limiting the evidence to an impeachment use. The trial court admitted these statements that Reyes said that he had lied after the probable cause hearing on the basis that they were excepted from the hearsay rule as declarations against penal interest. The trial court, initially at least, also limited the state in introducing rehabilitative evidence, after Reyes's impeachment, to consistent statements that were made after the probable cause hearing. The state also was limited to using consistent statements for their rehabilitative value only. Significantly, the state's brief says: "The state does not dispute that Reyes's prior testimony [at the probable cause hearing] was indispensable to a finding of guilt." (Emphasis added.) In oral argument before this court, the state conceded that without Reyes's probable cause testimony, there would be insufficient evidence to support a conviction. In this case, the jury never saw or heard Reyes, the only witness to the alleged homicide. Yet, this very witness was not impeached or rehabilitated on the witness stand through the use of the prior inconsistent and consistent statements. Because the witness had invoked his fifth amendment privilege not to testify against himself, the court admitted his probable cause hearing testimony in full and thus impeachment could not have been accomplished through cross-examination and questioning of the witness but only by the introduction of statements that he had made prior to trial. We find no basis for limiting such prior statements to those that were made only after the probable cause hearing. We acknowledge that a trial court has wide discretion in allowing prior inconsistent statements to impeach the testimony of a witness. G & R Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 Conn. 58, 60-61, 411 A.2d 31 (1979); State v. Villafane, 171 Conn. 644, 671, 372 A.2d 82 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1106, 97 S. Ct. 1137, 51 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1977), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S. Ct. 1456, 79 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1984), State v. Keating, 151 Conn. 592, 597, 200 A.2d 724 (1964), cert. denied sub nom. Joseph v. Connecticut, 379 U.S. 963, 85 S. Ct. 654, 13 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1965). Because out-of-court inconsistent and consistent statements are hearsay, unless such statements fit within an exception to the hearsay rule, they may not be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted but may be used only to impeach or rehabilitate a witness. State v. Villafane, supra, 672, citing 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn Rev.) § 1018; see State v. Saia, 172 Conn. 37, 46, 372 A.2d 144 (1976); State v. Addazio, 169 Conn. 416, 425-26, 363 A.2d 153 (1975); C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 7.24.3; but see State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986) ("prior written inconsistent statements, signed by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated, when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination" are admissible as substantive evidence). "The purpose of impeachment is to undermine the credibility of a witness so that the trier will disbelieve him and disregard his testimony. See generally 3A Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed. Chadbourn Rev.) § 874." State v. Maldonado, 193 Conn. 350, 362, 478 A.2d 581 (1984). Although there is a modern trend to admit prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, this trend is limited to those cases in which the witness is present in court and subject to cross-examination. C. McCormick, Evidence (3d Ed. 1984) § 34; G. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978) § 52. Therefore, because the trial court concluded that Reyes was unavailable as a witness in this case, to the extent that it admitted inconsistent statements that were not otherwise excluded from the hearsay rule, the trial court properly limited the use of the evidence to its impeachment use. Once it admitted the inconsistent statements offered by the defendant, the trial court properly admitted consistent statements offered by the state to rehabilitate Reyes's credibility. See State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 77, 530 A.2d 155 (1987); State v. Edwards, 201 Conn. 125, 155, 513 A.2d 669 (1986); State v. McCarthy, 179 Conn. 1, 18-21, 425 A.2d 924 (1979). The jury was instructed properly that these statements could only be used in the jury's assessment of Reyes's credibility and not as substantive evidence. As the state conceded at trial, in its brief, and at oral argument, there was no reason for the trial court to limit the introduction of inconsistent and consistent statements to those that were made after the probable cause hearing. Our review of the record and transcript indicates that Reyes's identification of the defendant and his testimony were essential to the state's case. This includes the state's concession that Reyes's probable cause hearing testimony was "indispensable" to a finding of guilt. It seems incongruous, therefore, that the trial court could declare that "[w]hat he saw down at the police station, [who] he picked out, what the police told him to do, that is all immaterial," and "whether [the assailant] was a black man or Spanish man with a knife, that is immaterial." (Emphasis added.) Reyes's statement to his mother on the very day of the incident that the assailant was a black man with a long brown coat, and his assertion to his mother on the very day that he identified the defendant in the photo array that he lied are highly probative of Reyes's credibility in light of his probable cause hearing testimony. The temporal proximity of the events to the date of the crime significantly enhance their probative value. Although the trial court has broad discretion in admitting inconsistent and consistent statements to impeach and rehabilitate a witness, our review of the record and transcript reveals no reason for the exclusion of the defendant's proffered inconsistent statements in this case. While the state claims that the trial court's exclusion of the inconsistent statements may have been an evidentiary error, thus leaving the defendant with the burden of proving harm; see State v. Jones, 205 Conn. 723, 732, 535 A.2d 808 (1988), citing State v. Ruth, 181 Conn. 187, 196-97, 435 A.2d 3 (1980); this error escalated to constitutional proportions when the trial court, while limiting the defendant to inconsistent statements made after the probable cause hearing on February 20, 1987, admitted three consistent statements offered by the state that were all made before the probable cause hearing. The exclusion of the defendant's proffered inconsistent statements while admitting the state's consistent statements was not evenhanded and thus violated the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Thus "the burden is on the state to prove that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, supra, 731, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S. Ct. 1283, 18 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1967). The state also contends that the trial court's error in failing to admit the inconsistent statements offered by the defendant was harmless. The state maintains that the information in the two excluded inconsistent statements already was before the jury and thus the error is not a reversible one. It is true that the general information contained in the excluded statements was presented to the jury by other means. Oborski testified that Reyes told him that he had lied at the probable cause hearing. Sanchez also testified that every time she spoke with Reyes about the murder after the probable cause hearing he said the defendant was not the person who killed the victim. Malcolm testified that Sanchez told him on November 17,1987, that Reyes had lied. Malcolm also testified that Reyes initially described the assailant as a black man or a dark complected Hispanic man, that Reyes tentatively identified a black man as the assailant, and that Reyes was unable to identify the defendant when shown his picture in an array with five pictures on December 2,1986. Also, Oborski testified that Sanchez told him on November 17,1987, that the men fighting in the street on November 25,1986, were a black man and a white man. Notwithstanding this information, the exclusion of the inconsistent statements denied the defendant a fair trial. Through the excluded statements, the defendant wanted to show that on the same day as the murder, Reyes told Sanchez that the assailant was a black man wearing a brown coat. He further wanted to show that on the same day that Reyes identified the defendant as the assailant, Reyes told Sanchez that the identification was wrong. The proximity in time of the murder and Reyes's description to Sanchez of the assailant, and of Reyes's identification of the defendant and his recantation of that identification makes this evidence highly probative in this case, where both Reyes's description and identification play a central role in the defendant's conviction. See Thomas v. Ganezer, 137 Conn. 415, 420, 78 A.2d 539 (1951). This is particularly so in light of the state's evidence that was admitted to support Reyes's identification on the same day that it occurred. Under our state and federal constitutions, " '[t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.' " State v. Mastropetre, 175 Conn. 512, 520, 400 A.2d 276 (1978), quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973); State v. Fernandez, 198 Conn. 1, 15, 501 A.2d 1195 (1985). "The ' "denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we . . . must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial." Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 [1941], rehearing denied, 315 U.S. 826, 62 S. Ct. 620, 86 L. Ed. 1222 [1942].' State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 160, 397 A.2d 89 (1978)." State v. Binet, 192 Conn. 618, 634, 473 A.2d 1200 (1984). By denying the defendant in this case the opportunity to introduce highly probative, inconsistent statements to challenge the credibility of the key witness, the trial court denied the defendant the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him. More importantly, the defendant was denied his "right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations" because the standards set down by the trial court for the admission of impeachment and rehabilitative evidence differed between the state and the defendant. While the state was permitted to introduce consistent statements made prior to the probable cause hearing, and thus much closer in time to the crime, the defendant was not permitted to introduce inconsistent statements. Without question, this action by the trial court denied the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. Although the excluded evidence may be, to some extent, cumulative, its otherwise high probative value dictates that it should have been included in the fact-finding process at trial. We are not persuaded that its exclusion was harmless error. Having found reversible error on this claim, we must set aside the judgment and order a new trial and we need not look to other claims of error. It is likely, however, that, in the event of a new trial, the trial court will be faced with an issue raised in one of the defendant's other claims in this appeal. The defendant claimed error in the trial court's admission of Reyes's probable cause hearing testimony as substantive evidence. We note here that this court and the United States Supreme Court have declared that prior testimony of an unavailable witness is admissible in a subsequent trial as an exception to the hearsay rule. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970); State v. Parker, 161 Conn. 500, 503-504, 289 A.2d 894 (1971). As long as the trial court finds the requisite "indicia of reliability" in the former testimony, such as the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant fully, the testimony is admissible. See C. McCormick, supra, § 254, p. 759; see generally comment, "Admission of Grand Jury Testimony Under the Residual Hearsay Exception," 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1033 (1985). In sum, the trial court's erroneous restriction on the use of credibility evidence to statements that were made after the defendant's probable cause hearing on February 20, 1987, compounded by the trial court's enforcement of that restriction against the defendant but not against the state, denied the defendant his due process right to a fair trial. The defendant's conviction cannot stand. There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered. In this opinion the other justices concurred. General Statutes § 53a-54a provides: "murder defined, affirmative DEFENSES. EVIDENCE OF MENTAL CONDITION. CLASSIFICATION, (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime. "(b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a), on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death of another person. "(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony." Through fingerprints, the victim later was identified as Miguel Maldonado Rivera. On November 25,1986, the Hartford police executed a search and seizure warrant at an apartment on Albany Avenue in Hartford inhabited by the defendant and two other people. The police seized a green army jacket with a red stain on it. The defendant told the police that the jacket was his. Elaine Pagliaro from the state forensic laboratory testified that the red stain on the jacket was caused by human blood, but that tests were inconclusive as to whether the blood type was that of the defendant or the victim. She also said the same of some blood-stained napkins seized at the same time. On December 2, 1986, Reyes did identify a picture of a black man as possibly that of the assailant, but he was not positive of the identification because of a beard on the man in the picture. It was determined later that the person so identified by Reyes was in the Somers correctional facility at the time of the crime. In both instances, Reyes told Skinner that he saw the defendant kill the victim. The trial court's reasoning was as follows: "The Court: You can't put in Mr. Reyes' testimony through somebody else. He has taken the Fifth Amendment. I have said that I will allow you to get before the jury what you have done. If you want to reaffirm that by the fact that he told his mother on many occasions he lied, fine. You are not going to get into actual conversations between [him] and his mother. That is hearsay and he is not subjected to cross-examination." The court allowed statements by Sanchez limited to the fact that Reyes said he had lied "because even though it was hearsay, it might be considered a declaration against penal interest," and therefore is excepted from the hearsay rule. We note that it was inconsistent for the trial court to rule that Reyes's statements to his mother were excepted from the hearsay rule as declarations against penal interest; State v. Hernandez, 204 Conn. 377, 389, 528 A.2d 794 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 200 Conn. 721, 724, 513 A.2d 653 (1986); State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431, 452, 426 A.2d 799 (1980); see generally C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 11.6; but then to limit the use of the statements to an impeachment use rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The reason for the exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against penal interest is that a person would not normally make a statement that could be injurious to himself or herself unless that person believed the statement to be true. See State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 692 n.16, 523 A.2d 451 (1987). If a statement fits within this exception, as the trial court seemed to find Reyes's statements to his mother because they implicated possible perjury or false statement liability for Reyes, the statements are deemed trustworthy and may be admitted for their truth. Therefore, it is inconsistent that the trial court would find Reyes's statements to fit within this exception and then limit their use to their impeachment value. The state sought to introduce evidence that Reyes was scared to testify against the defendant and that that may have been a reason for invoking his fifth amendment rights. The trial court excluded these statements as hearsay and only admitted statements relating to whether Reyes lied. These consistent statements were Reyes's signed statement, dated January 9, 1987, identifying the defendant as the assailant, and Reyes's two statements to Skinner on February 19 and 20, 1987, that his testimony at trial would be consistent with his probable cause hearing testimony.

Per Curiam. The plaintiffs, James J. Martin and Mary G-. Carty, former employees of the state of Connecticut, brought this action in the Court of Common Pleas against the defendants, commissioner of personnel Edward H. Simpson, commissioner of labor Jack A. Pusari, and the state retirement commission, seeking an "injunction restraining the defendants from laying off the . . . plaintiffs as of April 1, 1973." From a judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs have appealed to this court, assigning error in the conclusions of the trial court. The record in this case contains no finding of facts and no conclusions other than the judgment for the defendants. A finding is essential where error is claimed in the court's conclusions of law or fact that do not appear on the face of the record. Practice Book § 609; Robertson v. Robertson, 164 Conn. 140, 142, 318 A.2d 106; Gitlitz v. Davis, 146 Conn. 280, 281, 150 A.2d 213; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 126. The briefs of the parties in this case are based on the trial court's memorandum of decision. A memorandum of decision, however, establishes no facts and cannot take the place of the required finding. Wagner v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 153 Conn. 713, 714, 216 A.2d 182; Saraceno v. Capitol Theatre Realty Corporation, 154 Conn. 669, 672, 228 A.2d 507. Our review is thus confined to the record presented consisting of the pleadings and the judgment. The judgment merely recites that after hearing the parties the court found the issues for the defendant. "Without the subordinate facts on which the court based its rulings and conclusions, we are in no position to do other than affirm the judgment." Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Cadoux, 163 Conn. 603, 605, 316 A.2d 413. There is no error.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 17 Conn. App. 811, is denied.

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court is denied.

The defendant's motion for a review of the order by the trial court dated November 15,1974, terminating the stay of execution of judgment pending appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County is granted and the relief sought therein is denied.

The defendants' petition for certification, for appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County is denied.

Hull, J. The plaintiffs, the boards of education of the towns of Avon, Cromwell and Madison, filed a petition with the defendant Connecticut state employees retirement commission (commission) requesting that the commission issue a declaratory ruling on whether the wages paid by the respective boards of education to their teachers for services rendered in connection with school-related extra duty and coaching assignments are subject to the social security tax under General Statutes § 7-452 through 7-459. The commission determined that such wages are subject to the social security tax. The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the commission's ruling. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the case to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. We find no error. A proper understanding of the issues presented in this case requires that we first discuss briefly the statutory framework of the social security system as it pertains to the claims of the parties. While participation in the social security system is mandatory for most employees in the private sector, employees of state and local governments can be brought into the system only by means of a voluntary agreement entered into by the states with the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 418 (a) (l); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1201 (a). The state of Connecticut entered into such an agreement on January 24, 1952. The agreement provides that the social security system is extended to include the employees of the Connecticut municipalities listed in the appendix to the agreement. The towns of Avon, Cromwell and Madison, within which the plaintiff boards of education are respectively located, are listed in this appendix. In Connecticut, before a municipality may be brought into the social security system under the federal-state agreement, the municipality must, by vote of its legislative body and with the approval of the commission, apply for membership in the system. General Statutes § 7-453. Upon acceptance of a municipality into the system, the municipality and the commission enter into an agreement specifying the terms and conditions of the municipality's participation in the system. General Statutes § 7-453, 7-457. Municipalities and their employees participating in the social security system are taxed in a manner virtually identical to that of private sector employers and employees: "A municipality shall deduct an amount from the wages of its employees whose services are covered under the system by federal-state agreement and shall contribute an equal amount for each employee on its own behalf so that the sum of these amounts shall be equivalent to the taxes which would be imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act . . . ." General Statutes § 7-453. The extension of the social security system to a participating municipality's employees, however, is not all-inclusive. Connecticut law provides that certain state and municipal positions that are already covered by local and state retirement systems shall be excluded from social security coverage. General Statutes § 7-454. Since retirement benefits for teachers in Con necticut are provided by the Connecticut Teachers' Retirement System; General Statutes § 10-183b et seq.; teaching positions are among those municipal positions excluded from social security coverage and taxation under General Statutes § 7-454. Specifically, § 7-454 (2) provides an exemption for "individuals in positions covered under the Connecticut state teachers' retirement [system]." Having laid the preliminary statutory groundwork for review of this appeal, we now look to the factual and procedural history of this case. The source of the controversy between the parties can be traced to Public Acts 1971, No. 185. That act revised General Statutes § 10-160 (now § 10-183b [3]), which defines a teacher's "annual salary" for purposes of the teachers' retirement system. Specifically, Public Acts 1971, No. 185 excluded from the definition of "annual salary" any sums paid to a teacher "for any extra duty assignments, coaching, unused sick leave, unused vacation or terminal pay." Compensation for these items previously had been treated as part of a teacher's annual salary and was therefore considered to be excluded from social security taxation under the exemption for teachers contained in General Statutes § 7-454 (2). Because Public Acts 1971, No. 185 directed that extra duty and coaching assignments should no longer be considered part of a teacher's annual salary for purposes of the teachers' retirement system, however, a question arose as to whether the earnings received by teachers in connection with such assignments were still exempt from social security taxation under § 7-454 (2). The commission made known its position on this matter through a November 19,1971 letter, sent to all participating municipalities, stating that due to the statutory change in the law, "services in the position of coach are covered [by social security] and wages should be reported." Apparently, the commission's recommendation went unheeded by the plaintiffs since, as a result of an audit conducted in 1984, the commission found that the plaintiffs owed back social security taxes for wages paid to their teachers for extra duty and coaching assignments. The plaintiffs disputed the commission's finding and petitioned the commission for a declaratory ruling on the issue of whether such wages were sub ject to the social security tax under General Statutes § 7-452 through 7-459. Prior to issuing its ruling, the commission conducted a formal hearing on the matter. General Statutes § 4-177 et seq. At the hearing, the plaintiffs contended that the wages paid to their teachers for services per formed in connection with extra duty and coaching positions were not subject to social security taxation on any one of three grounds. The plaintiffs claimed that: (1) they were excluded from the social security system under General Statutes § 7-452 (l) because they were independent "municipalities" that had never separately agreed to participate in the system; (2) the compensation paid for extra duty and coaching assignments fell within the statutory exemption for teacher salaries contained in § 7-454 (2); and (3) the commission's letter informing them of their taxability was invalid because of the absence of a properly promulgated regulation pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. The commission, however, was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' arguments and ruled that the wages in question were subject to the social security tax under General Statutes § 7-452 through 7-459. Having exhausted their administrative remedies, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court; General Statutes § 4-183; where they presented the same claims to the trial court. The trial court rejected each of the plaintiffs' claims and upheld the ruling of the commission. The plaintiffs' appeal to this court assigns error to the trial court's rejection of their claims. Before addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, however, we must first consider the applicable standard of review. "The standard of judicial review of administrative agency rulings is well established. Section 4-183 (g) permits modification or reversal of an agency's decision 'if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.' The trial court may not retry the case or substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. . . . Rather, an agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts." (Citations omitted.) State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 717, 546 A.2d 830 (1988). It is for the courts, however, to expound and apply governing principles of law. Id.; see also United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, 209 Conn. 381, 385-86, 551 A.2d 724 (1988); Real Estate Listing Service, Inc. v. Real Estate Commission, 179 Conn. 128, 138-39, 425 A.2d 581 (1979). This case presents questions of law turning upon the interpretation of statutes. Specifically, the dispute between the parties centers around the interpretations to be given General Statutes § 7-452 (1), which defines a "municipality" for purposes of participation in the social security system, and General Statutes § 7-454 (2), which provides a qualified exemption from social security coverage and taxation for teachers. Such questions of statutory interpretation invoke "a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion." State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, supra, 718. "Ordinarily 'the construction of a statute on an issue that has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny is a question of law on which an administrative ruling is not entitled to special deference.' " Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 Conn. 583, 599, 522 A.2d 771 (1987), quoting Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Dubno, 202 Conn. 412, 423, 521 A.2d 569 (1987). I The plaintiffs claim initially that the trial court erred in failing to conclude that they are each an independent "municipality" within the meaning of General Statutes § 7-452 (1) and therefore not subject to the social security tax since they, as "municipalities," never agreed to participate in the social security system pursuant to General Statutes § 7-453 and 7-457. The plaintiffs concede, as they must, that their argument hinges on whether they fall within the definition of "municipality" contained in § 7-452 (1). That section provides, for purposes of participation in the social security system, that a "municipality" shall include the following: "[A]ny town, consolidated town and city, consolidated town and borough, borough, fire district, school district, district department of health, regional planning agency, probate district, housing authority, flood commission . or an instrumentality of any of these, if such instrumentality is a distinct juristic entity legally separate from any of the above and its employees are not, through this relation, employees of one of the above." In its declaratory ruling, the commission rejected the plaintiffs' argument, stating that they did not fall within the definition of "municipality" under § 7-452 (1) and, consequently, that no separate agreement between the state and the plaintiffs was required to include them, and their employees, within the social security system. We agree with the commission. Boards of education, such as the plaintiffs, are conspicuously absent from the language of § 7-452 (1). In view of this statutory omission, the plaintiffs' bald assertion that the "plain meaning" of the statute includes them within its definition is utterly without merit. "[I]n the absence of ambiguity, courts cannot read into statutes, by construction, provisions which are not clearly stated . . . Finkenstein v. Administrator, 192 Conn. 104, 110, 470 A.2d 1196 (1984). Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that they qualify as municipalities under § 7-452 (1) because a board of education is the equivalent of a "school district," which is included in the definitional language of the statute. The plaintiffs cite General Statutes § 10-240 in support of their contention that the legislature intended to equate boards of education with school districts. Section 10-240 provides: "Each town shall through its board of education maintain the control of all the public schools within its limits and for this purpose shall be a school district and shall have all the powers and duties of school districts . . . ." Clearly, § 10-240 provides that "[ejach tovm . . . shall be a school district," (emphasis added) and that each town's board of education is merely the instrumentality through which the town "maintain[s] the control of all the public schools within its limits." The plain language of the statute provides that each town, not each board of education, is a school district for the purposes recited therein. We will not torture the words or sentence structure of a statute to import an ambiguity where the ordinary meaning of the language leaves no room for it. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 98, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). Thus, we conclude that a board of education is not a school district, and, accordingly, the plaintiffs do not fall within the definition of "municipality" set forth in § 7-452 (l). In a related claim, the plaintiffs assert that "a school board's employees are employees of the school board and not employees of the town." (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiffs' argument on this point is largely unarticulated. It appears, however, to be directed toward the fact that each town's social security agreement with the state provides social security coverage for municipal employees only. Thus, if the teachers working under the plaintiffs are deemed to be the plaintiffs' employees exclusively, and not employees of the towns they serve, then the teachers would not be covered under the towns' agreements to participate in the social security system and, hence, their wages, including those received for extra duty and coaching assignments, would not be subject to social security taxation. Clearly, such an argument holds true only if the teachers are considered not to be town employees. The plaintiffs, however, cite no persuasive authority in support of the proposition that public school teachers are not town employees. Their reliance on Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn. 96, 429 A.2d 820 (1980), is misplaced. In that case, a public school student sued his music teacher for the infliction of allegedly excessive corporal punishment when the student misbehaved in class. The sole issue in that case was whether the teacher was a "state employee" for purposes of Gen eral Statutes § 4-165, which grants state officers and employees immunity from personal liability. In holding that the music teacher did not have immunity under the statute, we stated that "teachers as employees of a town board of education are also not employed in the state government." Id., 100. In Sansone we did not, however, rule on the question pertinent to this case, i.e., whether teachers employed by a town board of education are also employees of the towns they serve. With regard to that question, the commission in its brief directs this court's attention to the case of Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 438 A.2d 88 (1980), which we find dispositive. In that case, the plaintiffs, the town of Cheshire and certain of its residents, sought to test the defendant's right to hold the position of councilman-at-large while also holding a teach ing position in the town's public school system. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was not legally entitled to maintain a position on the council because of a town charter provision prohibiting council members from holding another town job. The question presented was whether the defendant, in his capacity as a public school teacher, was an employee of the town of Cheshire. We stated: "[W]e have expressly held that members of a local board of education are officers of the town they serve and that the persons employed by them in the performance of their statutory functions are employees of the town. Mase v. Meriden, 164 Conn. 65, 67, 316 A.2d 754 (1972); Wallingford v. Board of Education, [152 Conn. 568, 573, 210 A.2d 446 (1965)] . Although both Mase and Wallingford involved nonprofessional employees, there is nothing in the language or the reasoning of those cases that suggests that professional persons in a school system should not also be considered employees of the town. . . . These considerations lead us to the conclusion that local boards of education act on behalf of the municipality they serve as well as in fulfillment of their state mandates and that their professional and nonprofessional employees are employees of the municipality and are subject to valid provisions of the municipal charter." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) Cheshire v. McKenney, supra, 259-60. Accordingly, we conclude that the teachers employed by the plaintiffs are also employees of the towns they serve and are thus covered under the towns' agreements to participate in the social security system. II The plaintiffs next claim that the payments made to their teachers for extra duty and coaching assignments are exempt from social security taxation under General Statutes § 7-454 (2), which provides an exclusion from social security coverage for the "services of individuals in positions covered under the Connecticut state teachers' retirement [system]." The plaintiffs argue vigorously that extra duty and coaching assignments are inherently part of the job of a teacher, and that these assignments and the earnings received therefrom thus fall within the § 7-454 (2) exemption. In its declaratory ruling, however, the commission determined that extra duty and coaching assignments are "separate positions], apart from the teacher position," and that the § 7-454 (2) exemption therefore did not apply to earnings received in connection with those assignments. We begin our analysis by noting that the § 7-454 (2) exemption extends only so far as those "positions covered" by the Connecticut Teachers' Retirement System, General Statutes § 10-183b et seq. Consequently, we look to that act to determine more precisely what "positions" it covers. In this respect, we find that General Statutes § 10-183b (3) is of controlling significance. That section defines a teacher's "annual salary," for purposes of the teachers' retirement system, as "the annual salary rate for service as a Connecticut teacher during a school year but not including unused sick leave, unused vacation, terminal pay, coaching or extra duty assignments . " (Emphasis added.) This definition is of pivotal importance because mandatory deductions for funding of the teachers' retirement system may only be taken from a teacher's "annual salary." General Statutes § 10-183n. Therefore, earnings from those items not included within the definition of "annual salary," such as extra duty and coaching assignments, are not subject to mandatory deductions for funding of the retirement system. Despite this statutory definition, the plaintiffs would have us exempt these earnings from social security taxation as well, under § 7-454 (2), thereby permitting such earnings to pass to the teachers completely free of any retirement tax at all. We find no intent on the part of the legislature to create such an anomalous situation, where a portion of a teacher's earnings would be subject neither to the social security tax nor to deductions for the teachers' retirement system. "[I]f there are two possible interpretations of a statute and one alternative proves unreasonable or produces the possibility of bizarre results, then the more reasonable alternative should be adopted." State v. Parmalee, 197 Conn. 158, 165, 496 A.2d 186 (1985). A more reasonable construction of the social security exemption contained in § 7-454 (2), and one which avoids the "bizarre result" of totally tax-free earnings, is to tailor the exemption to include only those earnings that fall within a teacher's "annual salary" as defined by § 10-183b (3). By making the § 7-454 (2) exemption coextensive with the § 10-183b (3) definition of "annual salary," the problem of a tax-free earnings loophole for teachers involved in extra duty and coaching activities is eliminated without diminishing the exemption's intended scope and effect. Accordingly, in view of the fact that compensation for extra duty and coaching assignments is expressly excluded from the definition of "annual salary" contained in § 10-183b (3), we conclude that the payments made by the plaintiffs to their teachers in connection with such services are not exempted from social security taxation under § 7-454 (2). Such earnings are, therefore, subject to the social security tax pursuant to General Statutes § 7-452 through 7-459. Ill Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the commission's November 19, 1971 letter apprising participating municipalities of the passage of Public Acts 1971, No. 185, and its effect on coaching payments to teachers, constituted an invalid "regulation" in that it was not promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. Consequently, the plaintiffs contend that this relieves them of any obligation to comply with the contents of the letter as it pertains to the payment of social security taxes. The commission, on the other hand, maintains that the letter cannot be considered a "regulation" within the meaning of the UAPA and therefore compliance with the rulemaking provisions of that act was unnecessary. We need not address the issues of whether the commission's letter constituted an attempt at rulemaking and, if so, whether the commission complied with the applicable rulemaking provisions of the UAPA, since the letter was drafted before the UAPA became effective in Connecticut. The letter was sent to the plaintiffs on or about November 19, 1971; the UAPA, however, did not become effective in Connecticut until January 1,1972. See Public Acts 1971, No. 854, § 21. Therefore, the letter was not subject to the provisions of the UAPA and any alleged noncompliance on the part of the commission with regard to that act's procedural requirements for rulemaking is immaterial. There is no error. In this opinion the other justices concurred. Title 42 of the United States Code, § 418 (a) (1) provides: "voluntary AGREEMENTS FOR COVERAGE OF STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES (a) PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT (1) The Secretary shall, at the request of any State, enter into an agreement with such State for the purpose of extending the insurance system established by this title to services performed by individuals as employees of such State or any political subdivision thereof. Each such agreement shall contain such provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this section, as the State may request." The commission is the appointed agent of the state of Connecticut in all matters relating to the social security system and the municipalities entering it. General Statutes § 5-155a (d) and 7-453. The commission is also charged by statute with the administration of the state employees retirement system; General Statutes § 5-155a (a); and the municipal employees retirement system. General Stautes § 5-155a (c). "[General Statutes] Sec. 7-453. membership in system, contributions. Any municipality of the state may, by vote of its legislative body and with the approval of the commission, apply for membership in the system or provide coverage for employees in any of the services which it may-have elected to exclude under section 7-454. The commission is appointed agent for the state and is authorized to act in such capacity in all matters relating to the system and to the municipalities entering it. All agreements to be entered into between the state and the Secretary and between the state and the municipality shall be subject to the examination and approval of the attorney general before being consummated. The commission is authorized to make regulations governing the procedure to be followed by municipalities in entering and maintaining membership in the system. A municipality shall deduct an amount from the wages of its employees whose services are covered under the system by federal-state agreement and shall contribute an equal amount for each employee on its own behalf so that the sum of these amounts shall be equivalent to the taxes which would be imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act if the services of employees covered by the agreement constituted employment as defined in that act. The commission, upon receipt of such contributions, shall, in accordance with applicable regulations, verify them for correctness and endorsement and deliver them to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. The state shall pay to the Secretary of the Treasury, at such time or times as may be prescribed under the Social Security Act, contributions equal to the taxes which would be imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act if the services covered by the agreement constituted employment within the meaning of that act." A state may permit its political subdivisions to decide whether to include the subdivisions' employees under a federal-state social security agreement. Social Security Administration Handbook § 1001. "[General Statutes] Sec. 7-454. EMPLOYEES NOT INCLUDED. In determining the municipal employees entitled to participate in the system and the extent of their participation, all service performed by an employee in the employ of any municipality which joins the system, for such employer, shall be included except as provided in this section. The following services shall be excluded: (1) Services which, in the absence of federal-state agreement, would constitute 'employment' as defined in the Social Security Act, (2) services of individuals in positions covered under the Connecticut state teachers' retirement association other than services performed by individuals to whom Section 218 (c) (3) (B) of the Social Security Act is applicable; services of individuals in policemen's or firemen's positions covered under fund A or fund B or local retirement systems and (3) services which, under the Social Security Act, may not be included in an agreement between the state and the Secretary entered into under sections 7-452 to 7-459, inclusive. Service which under the Social Security Act may be included in an agreement only upon certification by the governor in accordance with Section 218 (d) of said act shall be included if and when the governor issues, with respect to such service, a certificate to the Secretary pursuant to section 7-455. Any municipality applying for membership in the system may elect to exclude from membership in the system the following: (a) All services in any class or classes of elective positions, part-time positions or positions the compensation for which is on a fee basis, (b) student service to the fullest extent such coverage is permitted under Section 218 of the Social Security Act, (e) services performed by individuals to whom Section 218 (c) (3) (B) of the Social Security Act is applicable or (d) any services which may be optionally excluded under Section 218 (c) of the Social Security Act. Any municipality which joined the system prior to July 8, 1955, shall be deemed to have elected exclusion (c). Where any municipality covers under the agreement the services described in exclusion (c), the services of any individual thereby covered shall cease to be covered by the agreement if he thereafter becomes eligible to be a member of a retirement plan, but only if the agreement is not already applicable to such plan pursuant to Section 218 (d) of the Social Security Act. Nothing in sections 7-451 to 7-459, inclusive, shall prevent coverage under the system in accordance with Section 218 (d) (8) of the Social Security Act of services of individuals in positions covered by more than one retirement system. Where, prior to June 29, 1959, services in positions covered by a retirement system have been covered under the system, the legislative body of a municipality may request that services of individuals excluded from such coverage because such positions were covered by another retirement system be included under the system, and such services shall be covered under the system in accordance with Section 218 (d) (8) of the Social Security Act." General Statutes § 10-183b (3) provides in pertinent part: " 'Annual Salary' means the annual salary rate for services as a Connecticut teacher during a school year but not including unused sick leave, unused vacation, terminal pay, coaching or extra duty assignments, unless compensation for coaching or extra duty assignment was included in salary for which contributions were made prior to July 1, 1971." Extra duty assignments include positions such as drama coach and director of the yearbook committee. "[General Statutes] Sec. 4-176. declaratory RULINGS. Each agency may, in its discretion, issue declaratory rulings as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any regulation or order of the agency, and each agency shall provide by regulation for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions seeking such rulings. If the agency issues an adverse ruling, the remedy for an aggrieved person shall be an action for declaratory judgment under section 4-175 unless the agency conducted a hearing pur suant to sections 4-177 and 4-178 for the purpose of finding facts as a basis for such ruling, in which case the remedy for an aggrieved person shall be an appeal pursuant to section 4-183. If the agency fails to exercise its discretion to issue such a ruling, such failure shall be deemed a sufficient request by the plaintiff for the purposes of section 4-175. Rulings disposing of petitions have the same status as agency decisions or orders in contested cases." In their petition for a declaratory ruling, the plaintiffs requested that the commission rule on the following questions: "(I) Are the Petitioners independent 'municipalities' within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-452 (1) and therefore are not subject to its requirements because they never entered into an agreement to participate in the Social Security system? "(II) Are the wages paid by the Petitioners for services of teachers in coaching and extra-duty assignments excluded from the Social Security tax under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-454 (2)? "(Ill) May the Commission enforce a new statutory interpretation requiring contributions for coaching pay retroactively without following rule-making procedures under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-166 et seq., ('UAPA') despite a thirty year past practice to the contrary that enjoyed tacit legislative approval?" With regard to the appointment and payment procedures for extra duty and coaching assignments, the commission in its declaratory ruling made the following findings of fact: "Number of Stipends. In connection with extracurricular positions, in Avon there are approximately 113 'stipends,' or separate salary accounts; in Cromwell about 51; and in Madison about 70. More than one of the 'stipends' may be paid to one individual. "Appointment Procedures and Term of Appointment. Although the [plaintiffs] do not appear to follow exactly the same procedures in arranging to fill extracurricular positions, typically the school principal has the extracurricular position posted, then individuals who are teachers apply to fill the position. After looking over the applications the principal recommends an individual to the Assistant Superintendent who reviews the recommendation and, if it is approved, submits the recommendation to the Board of Education which accepts or rejects it. The appointments are annual in Avon and Cromwell, continuous, during satisfactory performance, in Madison. "Contract Forms Used. In Avon no set form of contract is used when an appointment is made to an extracurricular position. In Cromwell a form is executed. In Madison either a paragraph is added to the annual appointment letter explaining the circumstances of the appointment and the amount of compensation for the position or a separate letter is sent concerning the extracurricular position. "Payment. In Avon all those in extracurricular positions, except the part-time coach position, are paid bi-weekly as part of the check they receive as teachers. In Cromwell they typically receive separate checks at the end of each season or semester. In Madison payment is one half at the beginning of the season or semester and one half at the end of the season or semester." General Statutes § 7-452 (1) provides: " 'Municipality' means any town, consolidated town and city, consolidated town and borough, borough, fire district, school district, district department of health, regional planning agency, probate district, housing authority, flood commission or authority established by special act or other municipal association created by special law or by general law or an instrumentality of any of these, if such instrumentality is a distinct juristic entity legally separate from any of the above and its employees are not, through this relation, employees of one of the above." The plaintiffs do not make a claim that they meet the "distinct juristic entity" test set forth in General Statutes § 7-452 (1). "[General Statutes] Sec. 4-165. immunity of state officers and employees from personal liability. No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter. For the purposes of this section 'scope of employment' shall include, but not be limited to, representation by an attorney appointed by the public defender services commission as a public defender, assistant public defender or deputy assistant public defender or an attorney appointed by the court as a special assistant public defender of an indigent accused or of a child on a petition of delinquency, representation by such other attorneys, referred to in section 4-141, of state officers and employees, in actions brought against such officers and employees in their official and individual capacities, the discharge of duties as a trustee of the state employees retirement system, the discharge of duties of a commissioner of superior court hearing small claims matters or acting as a fact-finder, arbitrator or magistrate or acting in any other quasi-judicial position, and the discharge of duties of a person appointed to a committee established by law for the purpose of rendering services to the judicial department; provided such actions arise out of the discharge of the duties or within the scope of employment of such officers or employees. For purposes of this section, members or employees of the soil and water district boards established pursuant to section 22a-315 shall be considered state employees." The plaintiffs also contend that their teachers should be classified as state employees, thereby entitling them, under General Statutes § 5-158 (a) (1) (C), to an exemption from social security coverage for "part-time" positions such as coaching and extra duty assignments. This claim was not raised by the plaintiffs at any of the proceedings below. We therefore decline to address it. Practice Book § 4185; see Burnham v. Administrator, 184 Conn. 317. 322-23, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981). General Statutes § 10-183n (a) (4) provides in pertinent part: "duties of teachers' EMPLOYERS, transmission OF deductions, (a) Each employer shall . (4) deduct each month six per cent of one tenth of such teacher's annual salary rate as directed by [the teachers' retirement board] and any additional voluntary deductions as authorized by such teacher . . . . " We have examined the plaintiffs' briefly stated argument that they were denied procedural due process because "no attempt was made by the Commission to afford school districts notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the Commission's decision in 1971 to subject teachers' coaching and extra-duty pay to the social security tax." (Emphasis added.) In view of our conclusion that the plaintiffs are not "school districts," they lack standing to assert any claim on behalf of school districts allegedly affected by the commission's actions. Cf. Husti v. Zuckerman Property Enterprises, Ltd., 199 Conn. 575, 589, 508 A.2d 735 (1986) (a party may not claim that a provision is invalid because it impermissibly impinges upon the due process rights of others).

Glass, J. The paramount issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in determining that a writing purporting to be an "installment note" executed by the defendants, Pierre E. Chagnon and Marian G. Chagnon, actually represented a continuing guaranty rendering the defendants liable for debts arising from their business's open credit account with the plaintiff. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court from a judgment of $35,000 rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff cross appealed. We transferred the case to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. We find no error with respect to the defendants' appeal, or with respect to the plaintiff's claim for interest on the cross appeal. We remand the case for further articulation on the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees. The facts may be summarized as follows. The plaintiff, Associated Catalog Merchandisers, Inc., supplied merchandise to the defendants' wholesale business, Hanover Gift House (Hanover), on a "running account." In 1975, after the defendants' business encountered financial difficulties, the plaintiff proposed that the defendants sign a promissory note making them personally liable for Hanover's debt. This note was never executed. At the plaintiff's behest, however, on September 1, 1977, an instrument entitled "Installment Note" was executed by Pierre Chagnon as vice president of Hanover and by both defendants in their individual capacities. The note provided in relevant part: "For Value Received [Hanover Gift House] and/or Pierre Chagnon and/or Marion [sic] Chagnon promise to pay to the order of Associated Catalog Merchandisers, Inc. the sum of $35,000.00 (Thirty-five thousand) with interest thereon at the rate of Twelve per cent (12 %) per year, the principal and interest payable in installments as follows: October 1,1977 $1,000.00 plus accrued interest and $1,000.00 plus accrued interest every month thereafter. . In the event of default hereunder the undersigned agree to pay all costs of collection including reasonable attorney's fees." There was no evidence that either party had legal assistance in the preparation or execution of the note. The plaintiff continued to supply merchandise to Hanover for the next several years. During this period, the plaintiff applied all money received from the defendants to the open account balance. In September, 1978, the defendants sent the plaintiff a corporate check for $20,000 bearing a notation that the money should be applied to the installment note. Upon receipt of the check, however, the plaintiffs president, Richard C. Fredette, Jr., telephoned Pierre Chagnon and told him "you know better than that" and that the payment would not be applied to the note. Subsequently, Fredette directed his office manager to "white out" the notation, and credited the check to the open account balance. In December, 1980, the defendants' corporate check for $15,000 similarly was applied to reduce the open account balance without being altered. Further, in December, 1985, two other checks totaling $20,000 and bearing the notation "without prejudice" also were applied to the open account. In late 1986, Fredette discussed Hanover's large outstanding balance with Pierre Chagnon. Chagnon told Fredette that "I don't owe you anything personally and my company may not be able to pay you." Thereafter, on November 19, 1986, the plaintiff's application for an ex parte attachment on the defendants' real property located in Meriden was granted. The plaintiff's complaint dated November 24,1986, named Pierre and Marian Chagnon as defendants. In an amended complaint dated November 25, 1987, the plaintiff alleged that the installment note operated as the defendants' personal guaranty on the debt arising from the open account. The plaintiff sought $54,943.86 in money damages representing the principal on the note plus interest accruing to September 30, 1987, and also sought reasonable attorney's fees. At trial, Fredette testified that the note was "security for past or future deliveries. . . . The consideration was the future deliveries which would be assured. . . . What I gave him [by his signing the instrument] was the ability to continue to receive merchandise . . . the note was intended to be used solely as a guaranty of payments if the company was unable to make payments." Grita B. French, the plaintiff's former office manager, testified that the "defendants' company was very slow paying bills, and this was an attempt to guaranty personally the company's bills. . I whited out the check [of September, 1978,] after Mr. Fredette told Pierre Chagnon he wouldn't apply it to the note. . . . Mr. Fredette called Pierre Chagnon two minutes after he received the check and said to him 'you know better than that' . . . the note was a guaranty." Edward Symanksy, the plaintiff's former employee and director, testified that "[o]n defendants' account we thought we should get a guaranty . . . while I had frequent personal contact with defendants, I never heard them say they wanted to pay off the note." In a deposition admitted at the trial, Pierre Chagnon testified that "[w]hat we bought [with the agreement] was the ability to keep buying." The trial court issued a memorandum of decision on January 22, 1988. Relying on the foregoing evidence, it concluded that the installment note was intended to represent a guaranty rendering the defendants personally liable for $35,000. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the checks they earmarked toward satisfaction of the installment note extinguished their liability on the underlying corporate debt. It found that when the note was executed, the plaintiff was unwilling to extend the defendants further credit without assurances of their personal liability, and that the defendants in executing the note intended to induce the plaintiff to continue to supply them with merchandise on credit. The trial court rendered a judgment against the defendants for $35,000, but denied the plaintiff interest. The memorandum made no reference to the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred by (1) relying on parol evidence to interpret the installment note as a continuing guaranty, (2) rejecting the defendants' statute of limitations defense, and (3) finding the defendants personally liable without making any finding on the debt of the defendants' corporation. The plaintiff on cross appeal asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to award it interest on the $35,000 principal and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in bringing suit to enforce the defendants' liability. I The defendants claim that the trial court erred in adverting to parol evidence in its interpretation of the installment note, and, therefore, improperly reached the conclusion that the note was a continuing guaranty. They argue that the parol evidence was not admissible under any of the exceptions to the rule set forth in Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corporation, 189 Conn. 52, 56, 453 A.2d 771 (1983). They also argue that any continuing guaranty between the parties was "revoked" by the actions of Pierre Chagnon and, further, that the trial court erred in "reforming" the written agreement since the plaintiff did not seek reformation in its pleadings. " 'Whether the written contract was actually the final repository of the oral agreements and dealings between the parties depends on their intention, evidence as to which is sought in the conduct and language of the parties and the surrounding circumstances. If the evidence leads to the conclusion that the parties intended the written contracts to contain the whole agreement, evidence of oral agreements is "excluded," that is, excluded from consideration in the determination of the rights and obligations of the litigants, even though it is admitted on the issue of their intention. Cohn v. Dunn, 111 Conn. 342, 346, 149 A. 851 [1930].' Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, 150 Conn. 251, 254-55, 188 A.2d 493 (1963) . . . . " (Citations omitted.) Damora v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 113-14, 441 A.2d 61 (1981). A written agreement is "integrated" and operates to exclude evidence of the " 'alleged extrinsic negotiation' " if the subject matter of the latter " 'is mentioned, covered or dealt with in the writing . . .; if it is not, then probably the writing was not intended to embody that element . . . .'''Cohn v. Dunn, supra, 347; Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, supra, 258; 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 215; 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 1045. If the evidence, however, does not indicate that the writing is intended as an integration, i.e., "a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement"; 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 209 (1); then "the agreement is said to be 'unintegrated,' and the parol evidence rule does not apply." E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.3., p. 452. Whether the parties intended to integrate their negotiations in a writing is a question of fact for the court. Jarvis v. Cunliffe, 140 Conn. 297, 299, 99 A.2d 126 (1953); 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 210 (3). In the present case, the trial court's consideration of evidence extrinsic to the installment note to determine whether that writing was an "integration" was entirely proper. Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, supra; Cohn v. Dunn, supra. Moreover, the trial court's conclusion that the parties had agreed to a contract of continuing guaranty necessarily was predicated on a determination that the installment note did not constitute an "integration" of the parties' agreement. We are not persuaded that such a finding was clearly erroneous. Cf. Jarvis v. Cunliffe, supra. The parties in this case conducted business pursuant to the open account arrangement for a number of years prior to the execution of the installment note. In the mid-1970s, the defendants' business encountered financial difficulties, prompting the plaintiff to seek assurances that it would be paid for the merchandise it supplied on credit. In addition, the following factors are significant: the terms of the installment note did not purport to deal with the debt of the defendants' business on the open account; Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, supra; Cohn v. Dunn, supra; the note was brief and skeletal in nature; Gould v. Boston Excelsior Co., 91 Me. 214, 220, 39 A. 554 (1898); and contained no recital that it was intended to constitute the parties' final agreement; 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 1019; the parties did not seek legal advice in executing the instrument; Pierre Chagnon admitted that the purpose of the note was to enable Hanover to continue to buy merchandise from the plaintiff pursuant to their long established course of dealing; and the parties' conduct subsequent to execution of the note forcefully demonstrates that they intended the installment note to represent the defendants' continuing personal guaranty on the debt arising from the open account. See LarRob Bus Corporation v. Fairfield, 170 Conn. 397, 407-408, 365 A.2d 1086 (1976); Taft Realty Corporation v. Yorkhaven Enterprises, Inc., 146 Conn. 338, 343, 150 A.2d 597 (1959); Beach v. Beach, 141 Conn. 583, 591, 107 A.2d 629 (1954); Campbell v. Rockefeller, 134 Conn. 585, 590, 59 A.2d 524 (1948). Under these circumstances, evidence of the oral negotiations was admissible "in the determination of the rights and obligations of the litigants. . . . " Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, supra, 255. The defendants' argument that the parol evidence relied on by the trial court does not fit within any of the exceptions enumerated in Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corporation, supra, is unavailing. In Jay Realty, Inc., we observed that "[p]arol evidence is admissible (1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; (2) to prove a collateral oral agreement which does not vary the terms of the writing; (3) to add a missing term in a writing which indicates on its face that it does not set forth the complete agreement; or (4) to show mistake or fraud." Id., 56. It is clear from our discussion above, however, that those "exceptions" only come into play once it is established that the writing in issue was intended as the "final repository" or "integration," either partial or complete, of the parties' negotiations. We disagree with the defendants' assertion that because a contract of continuing guaranty remains in force only until revoked by the guarantor, the defendants' attempted payments on the note and Pierre Chagnon's discussions with Fredette revoked the guaranty. A guaranty "contract is continuing if it contemplates a future course of dealing during an indefinite period or it is intended to cover a series of transactions or a succession of credits, or if its purpose is to give to the principal debtor a standing credit to be used by him from time to time. An offer for a continuing guaranty is ordinarily effective until revoked by the guarantor or extinguished by some rule of law." Iola State Bank v. Biggs, 233 Kan. 450, 454, 662 P.2d 563 (1983); 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty § 63. To revoke a continuing guaranty, the guarantor usually must give notice of the revocation to the creditor. Gay v. Ward, 67 Conn. 147, 156, 34 A. 1025 (1895). However, "[e]ven a continuing guaranty that is, in terms, unlimited as to duration, imposes liability upon a guarantor only for such period of time as is reasonable in light of all the cir cumstances of the particular case." Monroe Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Westcor Development Corporation, 183 Conn. 348, 351, 439 A.2d 362 (1981). The interpretation of a continuing guaranty, as well as the question of its revocation, ordinarily is a question of fact. Id. In the present case, Fredette told Pierre Chagnon upon receipt of the corporate check for $20,000 in September, 1978, that the money could not be applied to reduce the defendants' personal liability on the underlying debt. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendants expressed disagreement with Fredette's position. After the parties' discussion, the defendants' company continued to acquire merchandise from the plaintiff pursuant to the open credit arrangement. In December, 1980, the defendants sent another check for $15,000 bearing the notation that it applied to the installment note. On the basis of all the evidence, including that of the parties' discussion in 1978, however, the trial court could reasonably have found that the notation on the December, 1980 check did not effectuate a revocation. Id. The same holds true for the checks sent in 1985 bearing the notation "without prejudice." Further, aside from the notations on the checks, the record does not disclose that the defendants expressly communicated a desire to revoke their guaranty until Pierre Chagnon told Fredette in late 1986 that the defendants did not consider themselves personally liable. Finally, the defendants' argument that the trial court improperly "reformed" the installment note because the plaintiff sought only money damages is misleading. In analyzing the facts, the trial court did not purport to "reform" the contract on the basis of mutual mistake or fraud. Cf. Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 531, 441 A.2d 151 (1981). Relying on the language of the written agreement, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and the parties' subsequent conduct, the trial court determined that the " 'installment note' of September 1, 1977, was not a promissory note at all, but rather the product of an unprofessional yet honest effort on the part of the plaintiff to insure that it would be paid for materials furnished." (Emphasis added.) As we observed above, this conclusion in essence indicated that the installment note was not an integration of the parties' negotiations. Since the installment note was only the "product" of the underlying guaranty agreement, the trial court was not engaged in "reformation" when it analyzed the surrounding facts to determine precisely the content of the agreement. In light of this evidence, we are unpersuaded that the trial court committed error in determining that the defendants were guarantors on the underlying corporate debt. Monroe Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Westcor Development Corporation, supra. II The defendants next claim that the trial court erred in rejecting their statute of limitations defense. They argue that under General Statutes § 42a-3-122 (l), the plaintiff's cause of action on the installment note accrued on August 2, 1980, the day after the note matured according to its terms. They claim, therefore, that the plaintiff's action was barred under General Statutes § 52-576 because it was brought in November, 1986, more than six years after its cause of action accrued. The installment note, executed on September 1,1977, provided that the interest and principal were payable in monthly installments of $1000 plus accrued interest beginning on October 1, 1977. According to the defendants, the full term of the note expired on August 1,1980, the date the thirty-fifth and final payment was due. The defendants' argument presupposes that the action was brought on the installment note and not on a continuing guaranty. The trial court's findings, however, indicate that the payment terms of the note were not controlling. The trial court found that the plaintiff's invoices did not adhere to the interest rate stated in the installment note, and further, that the parties' conduct evinced an intent to ignore the payment schedule set forth in the note. That the defendants themselves did not adhere to those terms is clear from the acknowledgment in their brief that "[i]t is manifest from this payment scheme . . . that the agreement . . . contemplated termination of the guaranty and release of the Chagnons upon payment of the final $1,000.00 installment in May, 1981." (Emphasis added.) "In the case of a continuing guaranty, the statute [of limitations] does not commence to run in favor of a guarantor until there is a default in payment by the principal, and a cause of action has accrued against the former." 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty § 121. In the present case, the defendants' guaranty existed, absent an effective revocation, for "as long as the open account was in existence." Boxed Beef Distributors, Inc. v. Rexton, Inc., 7 Conn. App. 555, 560, 509 A.2d 1060 (1986). Hanover's account with the plaintiff was not in default until late. 1986, when Pierre Chagnon informed Fredette that "I don't owe you anything personally and my company may not be able to pay you." Consequently, the plaintiff's action, brought in November, 1986, was not barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 52-576. Ill The defendants next claim that the trial court erred in finding them liable for $35,000 on the underlying debt of their corporation without any finding on the corporation's debt to the plaintiff. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court found that "[t]he agreement and the evidence lead conclusively to this court's holding that defendants are liable to plaintiff for the sum of $35,000." While the trial court's memorandum does not make express findings with respect to Hanover's debt, Hanover's aggregate liability for at least $35,000 arguably is implied by the court's conclusion as to the defendants' liability. There was evidence before the trial court of Hanover's liability in excess of $35,000. In any event, the defendants bore the burden of providing this court with an adequate record for appellate review. Practice Book § 4061. They have not sought an articulation of the trial court's findings with respect to Hanover's debt, or the basis for its failure to make any such finding. Practice Book § 4051. Because the defendants have failed to present us with an adequate record to support the factual underpinnings of their claim, we decline to review it. McLaughlin v. Bronson, 206 Conn. 267, 277-78, 537 A.2d 1004 (1988). IV The plaintiff on cross appeal argues that the trial court erred in (A) failing to establish a date on which the $35,000 guaranteed amount was due and then to award the plaintiff interest at the statutory rate until the principal was paid, and (B) failing to award reasonable attorney's fees. A The plaintiff claims that the trial court should have determined that the defendants' $35,000 debt to the plaintiff became "fixed" on November 18,1986, when the plaintiff initiated its action by filing an attachment on the defendants' realty. The plaintiff concedes that the amount collectible on a guaranty is limited to the amount of the guaranty, but argues that once the amount falls due, failure to pay it results in the guarantor's liability for interest on that amount from the date the amount falls due. It asserts, therefore, that beginning on November 18,1986, it became entitled to interest at the rate of 10 percent under General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 37-3a, yielding a total amount of damages of $39,113.12 as of the date the trial court filed its memorandum of decision, January 22, 1988. Under § 37-3a, an allowance of prejudgment interest turns on " 'whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances.' Cecio Bros., Inc. v. Feldmann, 161 Conn. 265, 275, 287 A.2d 374 (1971)." Newington v. General Sanitation Service Co., 196 Conn. 81, 90, 491 A.2d 363 (1985). Such a fact-bound determination lies within the trial court's discretion. Nor'easter Group, Inc. v. Colossale Concrete, Inc., 207 Conn. 468, 482, 542 A.2d 692 (1988); King v. Board of Education, 203 Conn. 324, 341, 524 A.2d 1131 (1987); Newington v. General Sanitation Service Co., supra; Bertozzi v. McCarthy, 164 Conn. 463, 467, 323 A.2d 553 (1973). It is obvious from the memorandum of decision that the trial court did not address whether the plaintiff was entitled to interest under § 37-3a from the date the defendants' liability became "fixed." The court's analysis was solely concerned with whether the plaintiff was entitled to interest accruing throughout the term of the guaranty agreement commencing in September, 1977. The court noted that "[i]t was the practice of plaintiff to charge the defendants interest on any outstanding balance not promptly paid," but that the "rate of interest charged varied from less than 1 per cent per month to as high as V-k per cent per month." It concluded that it was "impossible for this court to find that there was a meeting of the minds that defendants' guaranty extended beyond $35,000.00 to the extent of interest on that amount at 12 per cent per year because that was the rate expressed in the 'installment note.' " Thus, the memorandum of decision demonstrates that at trial the plaintiff sought interest at the rate of 12 percent, as set forth in the installment note, and not ten percent, based on the statutory rate of § 37-3a. Moreover, a simple comparison of the $54,943.86 sought in the complaint with the $39,113.12 asserted on the cross appeal demonstrates that the issue of interest pressed on appeal is not the same as that litigated at trial. Nothing in the record indicates that the plaintiff distinctly raised at trial the issue now argued on appeal. Neither the defendants on appeal nor the plaintiff on cross appeal ordered transcripts of the proceedings below. Cf. Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 455, 242 A.2d 757 (1968). Further, the record does not indicate that the plaintiff sought an articulation of the trial court's decision concerning interest on the judgment of $35,000. "We have repeatedly held that this court will not consider claimed errors on the part of the trial court unless it appears on the record that the question was distinctly raised at trial and was ruled upon and decided by the court adversely to the appellant's claim. See Practice Book § 3063 [now § 4185] . Moreover, it is an appellant's burden, utilizing the rules of practice, to ensure that this court is provided with an adequate appellate record. Practice Book § 3082 [now § 4051] . . . . " (Citations omitted.) Keating v. Glass Container Corporation, 197 Conn. 428, 431, 497 A.2d 763 (1985); Practice Book § 4061. Because an award of prejudgment interest under § 37-3a raises a question of fact which is not evident in the record before us, we decline to review the plaintiff's claim for interest. Practice Book § 4185. B The plaintiff next claims on cross appeal that the trial court erred in failing to allow it reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiff argues that its right to attorney's fees is expressly provided in the language of the installment note stating that "[i]n the event of default hereunder the undersigned agree to pay all costs of collection including reasonable attorney's fees." It further asserts that our review is not limited to the question whether the trial court's failure to award attorney's fees was clearly erroneous since the memorandum of decision does not at all purport to address the question of attorney's fees. The record demonstrates that the plaintiff's claim for reasonable attorney's fees was included in its prayer for relief set forth in the complaint. Thus, the claim for attorney's fees was properly before the trial court. Because the trial court failed to address this claim, we remand the case to the trial court for an articulation of this issue. Practice Book § 4061. The judgment is affirmed in all respects except on the issue of attorney's fees, on which the case is remanded to the trial court for an articulation in accordance with this opinion. In this opinion the other justices concurred. The parties in this case did not request transcripts of the proceedings below. Consequently, we must assume that the facts set out in the trial court's memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence. Cf. Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 455, 242 A.2d 757 (1968). The defendants claim that the note is a negotiable instrument under article three of the Uniform Commerical Code; General Statutes § 42a-3-104; and that in signing the note they became an "accommodation party." General Statutes § 42a-3-415 (1). Nevertheless, neither the defendants nor the plaintiff relies on any provision of the code relative to the admissibility of parol evidence. We agree with the parties that article three principles are inapplicable in this case. See EAC Credit Corporation v. King, 507 F.2d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1975) (contract of continuing guaranty not governed by Uniform Commercial Code); Liberty Bank v. Shimokawa, 2 Haw. App. 280, 282, 632 P.2d 289 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146, 102 S. Ct. 1009, 71 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1982) (continuing guaranty is not transaction governed by code). In its memorandum of decision, the trial court also concluded that the contract of continuing guaranty was not subject to the statute of frauds under the "main purpose" or "leading object" exception. The plaintiff also presses this point on appeal. The defendants, however, have not argued the applicability of the statute of frauds on appeal. Consequently, that issue is not before us. General Statutes § 42a-3-122 (1) provides: "A cause of action against a maker or an acceptor accrues (a) in the case of a time instrument on the day after maturity; (b) in the case of a demand instrument upon its date or, if no date is stated, on the date of issue." "[General Statutes] Sec. 52-576. ACTIONS FOR account or on simple or implied contracts, (a) No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section. "(b) Any person legally incapable of bringing any such action at the accruing of the right of action may sue at any time within three years after becoming legally capable of bringing the action. "(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to actions upon judgments of any court of the United States or of any court of any state within the United States, or to any cause of action governed by article 2 of title 42a." We do not agree with the plaintiff's argument that the applicable statute of limitations in this case is found in General Statutes § 42a-2-725, which establishes a four year limitation period on breach of contracts for the sale of goods. The contract at issue in this case is the continuing guaranty between the parties, and not the underlying open credit account by which the plaintiff sold goods to the defendants' business. Cf. Carpenter v. Thompson, 66 Conn. 457, 461, 465, 34 A. 105 (1895) (holding that guaranty on promissory note is subject to predecessor to General Statutes § 52-576 pertaining to action on simple contracts); see also Chatham v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 163 Ga. App. 535, 536, 295 S.E.2d 226 (1982) (applying similar statute). Moreover, because the question has not been raised, we have no occasion to consider the applicability of General Statutes § 52-581 (establishing three year limitation period on oral contracts). "[Practice Book] Sec. 4061. (Formerly Sec. 3060D). review by the SUPREME COURT "The supreme court may reverse or modify the decision of the trial court if it determines that the factual findings are clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record, or that the decision is otherwise erroneous in law. "If the supreme court deems it necessary to the proper disposition of the cause, it may remand the case for a further articulation of the basis of the trial court's factual findings or decision. "It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review." Practice Book § 4051 provides in relevant part: "Any motion seeking corrections in the transcript or the trial court record which depend on proof of matters not of record or seeking an articulation or further articulation of the decision of the trial court shall be determined by the judge of the trial court whence the appeal is taken or the reservation is made. The trial court may make such corrections or additions as are necessary for the proper presentation of the preliminary statement of issues or for the proper presentation of questions reserved; or the trial court may approve a stipulation of counsel that such a correction or addition be made, provided the motion or stipulation is presented before the appeal is ready to be assigned for hearing and only by leave of the supreme court thereafter." "[General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)] Sec. 37-3a. rate recoverable as damages. Except as provided in sections 37-3b and 52-192a, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration proceedings under chapter 909, including actions to recover money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable except as otherwise provided with respect to demand obligations in section 42a-3-122 (4) (a). Judgment may be given for the recovery of taxes assessed and paid upon the loan, and the insurance upon the estate mortgaged to secure the loan, whenever the borrower has agreed in writing to pay such taxes or insurance or both. Whenever the maker of any contract is a resident of another state or the mortgage security is located in another state, any obligee or holder of such contract, residing in this state, may lawfully recover any agreed rate of interest or damages on such contract until it is fully performed, not exceeding the legal rate of interest in the state where such contract purports to have been made or such mortgage security is located."

Loiselle, J. In 1935, the charter of the eity of Bridgeport was amended by a special act of the legislature which established a civil service commis sion, the members of which were to be appointed by the mayor. Section 1 of the act provided that " [n] ot more than two of the members shall be adherents of the same political party and no member shall hold salaried public office." In 1953, the charter of Bridgeport was further amended by another special act which added to § 1 of the 1935 special act the requirement that the mayor appoint as one of the members of the civil service commission the city employee who has been elected by all the employees of the city in the manner provided in the act. It further provided that the elected employee shall be permitted to hold paid public office or position. On October 3,1971, the then mayor of Bridgeport .appointed the relator, John B. Kennedy, a registered member of the Democratic party, as a civil service commissioner for the term of five years from October 10, 1971. At that time there were two registered democrats already serving as commissioners. On October 26, 1972, upon advice of the city attorney, the mayor who subsequently had come to office appointed the defendant, Max Frauwirth, a registered member of the Republican party, to fill out the term of office for which the relator had been appointed. At the time of the defendant's appointment there were two registered republicans serving as commissioners, one of whom was the member elected by the employees of Bridgeport. Each appointee brought a quo warranto action. The cases were tried together and judgment entered ordering that each of the defendants be ousted and excluded from office. The relator did not appeal from his ouster, but the defendant in this case appealed. Section 1 of the special act of 1935; 22 Spec. Acts, No. 407; prohibits appointment of more than two members who "shall be adherents of the same political party." The defendant claims that as the appointment of the elected employee is mandatory regardless of his political affiliation, the employee's political adherence need not be counted at the time of the mayor's discretionary appointments. No where in the special act of 1935, or in the special act of 1953; 26 Spec. Acts, No. 591; is there any language to support this claim. " 'We must construe the act as we find it, without reference to whether we think it would have been or could be improved by the inclusion of other provisions.' Murphy v. Way, 107 Conn. 633, 639, 141 Atl. 858. Courts may not by construction supply omissions in a statute, or add exceptions merely because it appears to them that good reasons exist for adding them." State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 416, 11 A.2d 856. "[S]tatutes should be construed so that no part of a legislative enactment is to be treated as insignificant and unnecessary, and there is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment." Charlton Press, Inc. v. Sullivan, 153 Conn. 103, 109, 214 A.2d 354. In applying these two special acts, if this court " 'can by any fair interpretation find a reasonable field of operation for both . . . [acts] without destroying or perverting their evident meaning and intent, it is the duty of . . . [this court] to do so, thus reconciling them and according to them concurrent effect. [Citations omitted.]' Shanley v. Jankura, 144 Conn. 694, 702, 137 A.2d 536." Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Furlong, 162 Conn. 390, 404-5, 294 A.2d 546; Daley v. Liquor Control Commission, 166 Conn. 97, 101, 347 A.2d 69. The intent that the commission be politically balanced was clearly expressed in the 1935 special act and was modified by the 1953 special act in only one respect. In making a mandatory appointment of an elected employee, the mayor necessarily must disregard that person's political adherence. In discretionary appointments, the requirement that the mayor must not appoint a person of a political party that already has two adherents on the commission is unaffected. The trial court concluded that the two special acts were not inconsistent. The following excerpt from the memorandum of decision is particularly relevant: "The rational for this conclusion can be found in the clear intent of the 1953 Act itself which was to create a mandatory appointment about which the mayor could exercise no choice for any reason whatever, which would include political affiliation. To the extent that the 1935 Act might be construed to rule otherwise, it is modified by sub-parenthesis (e) of the 1953 Act which states that any provision of any special act inconsistent with the new Act shall not remain in effect. The creation of the mandatory appointment for a city employee makes it necessary to disregard his political affiliation in order to prevent the situation from arising where a city employee might be elected under the 1953 Act but be unable to qualify because he would make a third member of the same political party on the Commission. . . . This is the only construction to which these statutes lend themselves on this issue, and is supported by the clear intent and overriding purpose of the later Act to create a seat for a city employee in no way to be hampered by the 1935 Act." The appointment of the defendant was a discretionary one, and at the time there already were two adherents to the Republican party on the commission. As the defendant was a registered republican, his appointment violated the special acts when read together. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 22 Spec. Acts, No. 407. an act amending the charter of the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT BY ESTABLISHING A CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. Section 1 provides in part: "The mayor shall appoint, on or before October 10, 1935, five persons as civil service commissioners to serve, one for five years, one for four years, one for three years, one for two years and one for one year. Each year thereafter the mayor shall appoint one person as the successor of the member wjiose term shall expire, to serve for five years. Any vacancy shall be filled by the mayor for the unexpired portion of the term. Not more than two of the members shall be adherents of the same political party and no member shall hold salaried publie office." 26 Spec. Acts, No. 591. The pertinent part of this act is as follows: "AN ACT AMENDING THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT. Section 1 of number á07 of the special acts of 1935 is amended by adding thereto the following: (a) Commencing with the appointment to the civil service commission to be made next after the passage of this act, the mayor shall appoint an employee of the city of Bridgeport as a member of the civil service commission; and the successors of this particular member shall be employees of the city of Bridgeport. In making this appointment, and the successor appointments to it, the mayor shall accept for appointment the person who shall have been elected by the employees of the city of Bridgeport. The member of the civil service commission who is also an employee of the city of Bridgeport shall be permitted to hold paid publie office or position. . (e) No provision of the general statutes or special acts inconsistent with any provision of this act shall apply to the city of Bridgeport." Parts (b), (c) and (<!) govern the procedure for nominating and electing the employee who is to serve on the commission and for filling any vacancy in the unexpired term of an employee. On appeal, the court properly refused to prepare a finding of fact as the case was submitted on a stipulation of fact. Larke v. Morrissey, 155 Conn. 163, 166, 230 A.2d 562, and cases cited. The court made a limited finding reciting its conclusions and the claims of law of the defendant. The facts recited in the text of this opinion have been drawn from the stipulation of the parties which has been printed in the record.

The defendant's motion to expedite the appeal from the Superior Court in New Haven County having been rendered moot by the adoption of the amendments to the rules of practice, effective October 15, 1974, is dismissed.

The plaintiffs' "First Motion for Review" of the order of the trial referee dated August 6, 1974, in the appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County at Stamford is granted and the relief requested therein is denied. The plaintiffs' "Second Motion for Review" of the order of the trial referee dated August 6, 1974, in the appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County at Stamford is granted and the relief requested therein is denied. The defendants' "Motion for an Order Vacating the Judgment of the Court of Common Pleas for Lack of Jurisdiction" in the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County at Stamford is denied.

Per Curiam. This is an appeal from a supplemental finding and award of the workmen's compensation commissioner for the sixth congressional district. Although the commissioner determined that the plaintiff was entitled to expenses for some medical treatments, he found that the plaintiff was not entitled to any temporary total or temporary partial weekly benefits. He found that the plaintiff left his employment on November 17,1968, to return to Puerto Rico; that he did hot indicate at that time that he was unable to work; that he did not attempt to get comparable employment and pay in this area; and that he did not prove that his average weekly wage since leaving his employment was less than his average weekly wage prior to his injury and that any reduction in his wage resulted from any physical disability relating to a previous accident on February 16, 1967. On appeal, the Superior Court found that the finding and the conclusions of the commissioner were reasonably supported by the subordinate facts. From that judgment, the plaintiff has appealed to this court. In his appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court erred in failing to correct the finding as requested and that the commissioner's conclusions were so unreasonable as to justify judicial interference. In an appeal from the action of a workmen's compensation commissioner the Superior Court does not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers only that evidence certified to it by the commissioner for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected or whether there was any evidence to support the conclusions reached. The conclusions of the commissioner cannot be reviewed when they depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. The power of the Superior Court in correcting the finding of the commissioner is analogous to that of the Supreme Court in correcting the finding of the trial court. Practice Book § 435; Balkus v. Terry Steam Turbine Co., 167 Conn. 170, 174, 355 A.2d 227; Jacques v. H. O. Penn Machinery Co., 166 Conn. 352, 363, 349 A.2d 847. A review of all the evidence certified and made part of the record discloses that there was no merit to the motion to correct. The trial court properly refused to make any corrections in the finding. "The commissioner's ultimate conclusions are tested by the subordinate facts found, and they stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to those facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them." Balkus v. Terry Steam Turbine Co., supra. We conclude that the subordinate facts amply support the conclusions reached, and that there was no incorrect application of the law. There is no error. This court will correct findings of fact only upon the refusal to find a material fact which was admitted or undisputed, or upon the finding of a material fact without evidence, or rarely, upon the finding of a fact in language of doubtful meaning so that its real significance may not clearly appear. Practice Book § 628.

Cotter, J. In 1957, the plaintiffs purchased an eleven-room, colonial wood-frame house in the Federal Hill area of Bristol, located in a residence A zone which includes several of the city's outstanding homes and grounds. At the time of purchase, the plaintiffs were aware that the city owned land adjoining their property on the north and west, also zoned residence A, and that their land was subject to certain rights and easements in the city "and/or" its board of water commissioners. Both the plaintiffs' and the city's parcels of land originally had been owned by Joel Case, who sold part of his land to the plaintiffs' predecessors in title and part to The Bristol Water Company; this latter parcel of land was obtained by the city in 1911, pursuant to a special act. Two nonconforming uses were located on the city's property in 1957: an underground water tank, which had not been used since 1937, whose presence was not apparent by reason of its being covered by gravel, loam and lawn; and an above-ground tank, which had been in use since 1885, forty-five feet in height and thirty feet in diameter, located about 250 feet from the plaintiffs' property and visible from their property only in the winter. The plaintiffs were aware of the existence of these nonconforming uses when they purchased their home and understood that they existed for the benefit of the city's water department. Pursuant to a resolution of the board of finance of the city in June, 1968, at which time the location of the tank-reservoir had not been determined, the zoning board of appeals in September, 1968, granted an application to the city for a variance to erect a new tank-reservoir at the approximate site of the old underground tank. The tank-reservoir, which was completed in late 1969, was located fifty feet from the plaintiffs' property and is about twenty-four to thirty feet higher than the old above-ground tank and two and one-half times greater in diameter. It is surrounded by a cyclone fence mounted on a concrete shell which extends three-quarters of the way around its periphery and is prominently visible at all times. Upon completion of the tank-reservoir, there were then two above-ground tanks on the city's land. Before selling their home in May, 1971, and after the city had refused to negotiate under the charter, the plaintiffs in March, 1971, applied to a judge of the Superior Court, pursuant to §48 (c) and §48 (e) of the charter of the city of Bristol, to appoint three disinterested persons to ascertain the alleged resultant depreciation of the plaintiffs' land. The city demurred to the petition, claiming, inter alia, that lawful use by the defendant of its property does not give a cause of action to an adjoining property owner for alleged property value depreciation. The judge to whom the application had been made overruled the demurrer. The defendant filed an answer and, after a hearing, the court granted the plaintiffs' application and appointed a committee to assess damages. The defendant has appealed from the judgment rendered. The defendant has assigned error in the findings and conclusions of the court in which it rejected the defendant's special defenses and found that the plaintiffs did not know, or have reason to know, that a tank-reservoir would be erected on the city's residence A abutting land and that the plaintiffs did not assume that risk when they purchased their home. The defendant also contends that the court erred in finding that the plaintiffs' land and dwelling house could have been sold at a higher price if the tank-reservoir had not been constructed in such close proximity to their property. The issues of foreseeability and assumption of risk, insofar ,as they may be relevant, are ordinarily factual questions for the trier, becoming questions of law only when fair and reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion. Starkel v. Edward Balf Co., 142 Conn. 336, 342-43, 114 A.2d 199; Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 424-25, 242 A.2d 728. This proposition applies with equal force to a determination of whether actual damage has been sustained. Dimmock v. New London, 157 Conn. 9, 13, 245 A.2d 569. The facts found were supported by the evidence printed in the appendices to the briefs or were logical inferences from facts proved. Brockett v. Jensen, 154 Conn. 328, 331, 225 A.2d 190; Frechette v. John Meyer of Norwich, Inc., 164 Conn. 559, 325 A.2d 286. The conclusions must stand if they are legally and logically consistent with the facts found unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Gonsiglio v. Warden, 160 Conn. 151, 157, 276 A.2d 773. It is the claim of the defendant that the plaintiffs cannot recover consequential damages suffered by reason of the construction of the tank-reservoir unless a private property owner would have a cause of action against a private citizen on the same set of facts. The defendant's argument in its brief and its claims of law in the trial court indicate that it is attempting to analogize the facts of this ease to an eminent domain proceeding wherein the settled rule is that an abutting landowner may not ordinarily recover for depreciation to land resulting from condemnation. Benson v. Housing Authority, 145 Conn. 196, 200, 140 A.2d 320; Andrews v. Cox, 129 Conn. 475, 482, 29 A.2d 587. The city of Bristol built the tank-reservoir under the authority of its charter. The relevant sections of the charter provide, inter alia, that the city shall pay "all damages sustained by any person . by the taking of any land . or any other thing done by said city under the authority of this charter"; City of Bristol Charter, § 48 (c) (1969); and that "[sjaid city of Bristol, by its board of water commissioners . is authorized to enter upon any land . . . and to agree with the owner or owners of any property . . . which may be taken or damaged . as to the amount of compensation to be paid . . . ." City of Bristol Charter § 48 (e) (1969). Section 48 (e) further states that in the event of disagreement between the city, acting through its board of water commissioners, and the affected owner concerning the amount of compensation to be paid, either party may apply to a judge of the Superior Court to appoint three disinterested parties to examine the property "which is to be taken or damaged by said city . . . ." It also provides that these parties shall "estimate the amount of compensa tion which such owner shall receive," which may be confirmed by the judge who may then order the city to "pay the sum appraised . in full compensation for the property acquired or the injury done by said city," and that the city may proceed with the construction, after compliance with the judge's order, "without any liability to any further claim for compensation or damages . . . ." This court has construed nearly identical language in an analogous situation. We concluded that the wording of a statute, whose language was similar to the provisions in the Bristol charter, was broad since it placed "no restriction on the type of damages to be awarded" to an adjoining landowner and we permitted the recovery of consequential damages for the depreciation of his property. Edwards v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 152 Conn. 684, 688-89, 211 A.2d 679. In the Edwards case, an adjoining landowner was allowed recovery against a privately-owned public service company for the depreciation of his land which resulted from the erection of a water tank. The applicable statute, General Statutes §16-236 (Rev. 1958), similarly authorized a judge of the Superior Court to appoint three disinterested parties to appraise "all damages due any person by reason of anything done under any provision of section . . . 16-235." That section "is not a condemnation statute" but "merely establishes a method of controlling the erection, by public service companies, of water tanks and other enumerated structures." Edwards v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., supra, 688. The distinction between this and condemnation proceedings under article first, § 11, of the Connecticut constitution was recognized in Benson v. Housing Authority, supra, a case involving depreciation of the property of adjoining landowners, wherein the court noted (p. 202) that some statutes "provide a recovery for the 'taking or damage' and consequently are liberally construed to include compensation for injury akin to that charged by the plaintiffs. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) §6.4432[2]; New Haven Steam Saw Mill Co. v. New Haven, 72 Conn. 276, 285, 44 A. 233." The interpretation of a statute or charter provision which authorizes recovery of "all damages" is not of recent origin in Connecticut. In Bradley v. New York & N.H. R. Co., 21 Conn. 294, the General Assembly, by charter, authorized a railroad company to take such land as may be necessary for the proper construction of the railroad. The charter stated that the company must pay " 'all damages that may arise to any person or persons' " and provided that a judge of the Superior Court may appoint three disinterested persons to assess real estate " 'taken or injured.' " (Emphasis in original.) Id., 308. A property owner whose land abutted that taken by the railroad was allowed to recover consequential damages because the value of his land had been diminished, the court stating: "The clause . is very broad and unqualified in its terms, both as to the kinds of damage for which the company shall pay, and the persons who shall be paid; it embraces 'all damages,' and, therefore, not only those which are direct, but those also which are incidental; and 'damages to any person or persons' and therefore, those who are owners of land over which the rail-road is located, as well as those who are not." Id., 310. See Oppenheimer v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 149 Conn. 99, 102-5, 176 A.2d 63. The defendant would distinguish the action taken by the city under its charter on the grounds that the erection of the tank-reservoir was foreseeable by these plaintiffs and that the previously-cited cases dealt with privately-owned companies. We have already considered the issues of foreseeability and assumption of risk, and it need only be noted here that foreseeability was not a factor in those cases. The fact that the companies were privately-owned, such as the privately-owned public service water company in Edwards v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., supra, is not a distinguishing factor from the case at bar since the court found from the evidence presented that in erecting the water tank, the city of Bristol, through its board of water- commissioners, was engaged in a proprietary function. Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 363-66, 59 A. 487; Carta v. Norwalk, 108 Conn. 697, 702, 145 A. 158; 18 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.) § 53.103, p. 407. Under the circumstances of this ease, like obligations and duties are imposed upon a city performing proprietary functions as are imposed upon a company when governed by comparable statutory or charter language. See Taylor v. Roosevelt Irr. Dist., 71 Ariz. 254, 258-59, 226 P.2d 154, aff'd, 72 Ariz. 160, 163, 232 P.2d 107; Cole Drug Co. of Massachusetts v. Boston, 326 Mass. 199, 201, 93 N.E.2d 556; 18 McQuillan, op. cit. It follows that the plaintiffs are not limited to those damages which they could recover against a private citizen on the same set of facts, but, since the right to recover damages is a creature of statute to which a liberal construction should be given; New Haven Steam Saw Mill Co. v. New Haven, 72 Conn. 276, 285, 44 A. 229; Benson v. Housing Authority, 145 Conn. 196, 202, 140 A.2d 320; they are entitled to an opportunity to prove their claim of consequential damages for the depreciation of their property resulting from the erection of the tank-reservoir. Edwards v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 152 Conn. 684, 689, 211 A.2d 679. There is no error. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The General Assembly amended § 16-236 in 1963 (Public Act No. 349), adding "or which is in violation of any order made under . . [§ 16-235]." Edwards v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 152 Conn. 684, 211 A.2d 679, was decided under the statute as it appeared prior to this amendment. The provisions of the Bristol charter which provide that the city "shall pay all damages sustained" by the taking of land "or any other thing done by said city under the authority of this Charter" do not appear to distinguish between actions taken by the city in its governmental as opposed to its proprietary capacity. Since the trial court found that the city was performing a proprietary function when it erected the tank-reservoir, we need not consider the question of the city's liability under these provisions when it is engaging in a governmental function.

The defendants' petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Division of the Court of Common Pleas is denied.

Loiselle, J. Sometime between 6:20 p.m. on July 2, 1960, and 7:40 a.m. on July 4, 1960, thieves broke into a clothing store on Boston Post Road in Orange and absconded with money from a cash register and a safe. In connection with this crime, the defendants Aedan McCarthy and John Reid were charged as second offenders with conspiracy to break and enter, tried by a jury of twelve and convicted on these charges in the Superior Court in New Haven County. On February 10, 1961, the defendants were sentenced for a term of not less than four years and not more than twelve years in the Connecticut state prison. No appeal was taken at that time. On September 22, 1965, on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Superior Court in Hartford County ordered that the defendants be given a reasonable time in which to perfect an appeal from the 1961 conviction. McCarthy's appeal was filed on October 20, 1965; Reid's on November 5, 1965. Subsequently, the defendants were released on appeal bonds. After numerous extensions of time to file papers had been granted to the parties pursuant to § 665 of the Practice Book, as amended, the record was finally distributed on January 21, 1971. McCarthy and Reid filed their briefs on May 13 and 14, 1971, respectively. The state's brief was not filed until September 26,1974. The appeals in State v. Reid and State v. McCarthy and a motion by the defendant McCarthy to set aside the judgment were before this court at a full hearing on November 6, 1974. Because of circumstances peculiar to these cases, this court has decided, under its inherent supervisory power, to dispose of these matters under § 696 of the Practice Book, as amended. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discnss the issues raised and heard on appeal. There has been an unreasonable delay in the preparation of these appeals. While all parties may have been dilatory in the preparation of the record, it is clear that the state has unreasonably delayed this appeal by taking over three years to file its briefs. Those briefs which became due on June 13 and 14, 1971, were not filed until September 26, 1974. During this period of delay the state failed to file any timely motions for extensions of time. Moreover, the defendants failed to avail themselves of the relief afforded to a party when the other party to an appeal fails to prosecute or defend that appeal with proper diligence by moving to dismiss the appeal or set aside the judgment. Practice Book § 696, as amended. Under such circumstances, this court will make its own determination whether, from the time an appeal is filed, it is being prosecuted or defended with proper diligence. See Greene v. Cavedon, 161 Conn. 593, 281 A.2d 824; Wells v. Wells, 151 Conn. 728, 197 A.2d 943; Tuozzolo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 151 Conn. 727, 197 A.2d 942 (appeals dismissed suo motu); State v. Stanley, 157 Conn. 625, 250 A.2d 326; State v. Fenster, 151 Conn. 729, 197 A.2d 944 (criminal convictions set aside suo motu). Thus, on February 5, 1974, this court, on its own motion pursuant to § 696 of the Practice Book, as amended, called and heard the parties on the question of their lack of diligence. Our motion apparently provided the impetus for a § 696 motion by the defendant Reid, filed on March 14, 1974, requesting that the judgment be set aside and that the rendition of a judgment of not guilty be directed for the defendant. On April 2, 1974, Reid's motion was granted unless the state file its brief on or before June 3j 1974. State v. Reid, 166 Conn. 672, 317 A.2d 153. Our action also spurred the defendant McCarthy to file a $ 696 motion on October 16, 1974, to set aside the judgment and render a judgment of not guilty. That motion was assigned for hearing on the November assignment list at the same time as the hearing on the merits of the appeal was assigned. On November 6, 1974, this court heard counsel on the § 696 motion of the defendant McCarthy, reserved decision on that motion, and then proceeded to hear arguments on the appeal itself. Counsel were informed that in the event it were decided to grant the § 696 motion and dismiss the appeal this court would, of course, not render a decision on the dismissed appeal; but, in the event the § 696 motion were denied, we would then consider the merits of the appeal. It is a basic premise that the supervision and control of proceedings on appeal is in the Supreme Court from the time the appeal is filed; Practice Book § 692; Davis v. P. Gambardella & Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 368 n.1, 161 A.2d 583; and that this court has the inherent power to provide for the imposition of reasonable sanctions to compel the observance of its rules which enable the orderly and expeditious processing of appeals. LaReau v. Reincke, 158 Conn. 486, 264 A.2d 576. It cannot be overemphasized that " £[t]he work of this court is not expedited if counsel are permitted to dally for the purpose of bargaining with the opposition, for personal convenience or because other eases in hand are deemed by them to deserve preferential treatment.' . . . Chanosky v. City Building Supply Co., 152 Conn. 449, . . . 452, 208 A.2d 337." State v. Holup, 166 Conn. 471, 352 A.2d 275. Accordingly, in State v. McCarthy, this court grants the defendant's motion, which was heard on November 6,1974, under § 696 of the Practice Book. It appearing that the state has failed to defend with proper diligence against the defendant's appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court finding the defendant guilty, it is ordered that the judgment of the trial court be set aside and the case remanded with direction to render judgment of not guilty. The appeal is dismissed. In State v. Reid, it appearing that the state failed to file its brief on or before June 3, 1974, the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment and render judgment of not guilty has been granted under this court's order of April 2, 1974, and the appeal heard on November 6, 1974, is dismissed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. "[Practice Book] Sec. 665. extensions oe time The judge who tried the case, or the court in whieh it was tried, may, for good cause shown, extend the time provided for filing the appeal or filing any paper or taking any other steps necessary to perfect the appeal, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Such extensions shall only be granted upon a written motion filed in quadruplicate with the clerk of the court wherein the case was tried. The clerk shall forward one copy to the judge who heard the case, one to opposing counsel, and, where the motion is for an extension of time to file briefs under Sec. 724, one to the reporter of judicial decisions. No such motion shall be granted until the expiration of five days after it has been filed, and if during that period an adverse party notifies the judge that he desires to be heard, it shall be granted only after hearing upon due notice to the parties, provided, if the adverse party endorses his consent on the motion, it may be immediately granted. The receipt of any such motion and the ruling of the judge thereon shall be noted on the docket. The time for filing a notice of intention to appeal may not be extended. No extension of time for the filing of the appeal^ the filing of briefs, the giving of security for costs, or the payment of the entry or record fee, shall be granted unless the original motion for extension is filed before the time for taking the appeal or filing the notice of intention to appeal or filing the briefs, as the case may be, has expired and any subsequent motion is filed before the expiration of any previous extension.' Extensions of time for filing motions in this court and for filing pleadings to such motions may be granted in accordance with Sec. 687." "[Practice Book] Sec. 696. lack of diligence in prosecuting ob defending appeal If a party shall fail to prosecute an appeal with proper diligence, this court may, on motion by any other party to the appeal or of its own motion, dismiss the appeal with costs. If a party shall fail to defend against an appeal with proper diligence, this court may, on motion by any other party to the appeal or of its own motion, set aside in whole or in part the judgment under attack, with costs, and direct the entry of an appropriate final judgment by the trial court against the party guilty of the failure. If that party is a defendant in the action, the directed judgment may be in the nature of a judgment by default for such amount as may, upon a hearing in damages, be found to be due. If that party is a plaintiff in the action, the directed judgment may be one dismissing the action as to him, and said judgment shall operate as an adjudication upon the merits. The statutory provisions regarding the opening of judgments of nonsuit and by default shall not apply to a judgment directed under the provisions of this rule." The fact that the parties requested and were granted extensions of time to file papers by the trial court under § 665 of the Practice Book, as amended, does not necessarily indicate that the appeal has been diligently prosecuted. On the contrary, as stated in Chanosky v. City Building Supply Co., 152 Conn. 449, 451-52, 208 A.2d 337, "a series of such extensions may be cogent, and indeed the only necessary, evidence of a lack of proper diligence. . . . An important element . is the number, extent and merit of the extensions of time obtained for taking various steps in the appeal, either with or without the consent of opposing counsel." "[Practice Book] Sec. 724. filing and distributing briefs . . . The appellee shall file his brief within thirty days after the filing of the appellant's brief . . . ."

Cotter, J. The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of Public Act No. 248, adopted by the 1972 General Assembly, now chapter 581, § 32-32 through 32-46 inclusive of the General Statutes. The plaintiffs bring this action in their capacity as citizens, residents, and taxpayers of Connecticut. The superior court (Parskey, J.) ordered that proper notice of the pendency of the action be given to all Connecticut citizens, residents, and taxpayers by appropriate newspaper publication. Under 1972 Public Acts, No. 248, the state may provide direct financial assistance to private enterprises for the development and exploitation of products and inventions in Connecticut. The act establishes a quasi-public instrumentality designated the "Connecticut Product Development Corporation" (hereinafter referred to as "corporation" or "C.P.D.C.") to implement its provisions. General Statutes § 32-35. Its purpose is "to stimulate and encourage the development of new products within Connecticut by the infusion of financial aid for invention and innovation in situations where such financial aid would not otherwise be reasonably available from commercial sources . . . ." General Statutes § 32-39. The corporation determines on a case-by-case basis which applicants are eligible to receive financial assistance to develop qualifying products and projects after instituting a staff investigation and reviewing its report. Gen eral Statutes § 32-39, 32-40. The corporation's powers are enumerated in § 32-39, subsections (1) through (14) inclusive. The creation of the C.P.D.C. resulted from proposals emanating from a study conducted by the governor's strike force for full employment. The strike force, authorized by executive order number 8 (November 16, 1971) was charged to prepare a legislative program that will facilitate full employment and economic development in Connecticut. In the summer of 1972, the strike force submitted an action plan designed to deal with what it described as "Connecticut's growing job crisis." The plan called for legislation creating seven wholly innovative programs to respond to the overall economic and employment problems facing Connecticut in the 1970's. The C.P.D.C. proposal was one of the recommended programs. The act provides for funding by authorizing the state bond commission to issue bonds not exceeding an aggregate amount of ten million dollars to carry out its provisions. General Statutes § 32-41. The defendants Barnes Engineering Company and Kurtz Diecraft, Inc., applied to the C.P.D.C. for financial aid under the act; upon the application of the C.P.D.C., the defendant state bond commission authorized the issuance of bonds with which to provide the requested aid. Upon a stipulation of facts by the parties, the superior court has reserved the matter for the advice of this court. The plaintiffs have launched a constitutional attack upon the act. They claim, first, that contrary to the command of article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution that "no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community" it authorizes the use of public funds for a private benefit and not for a public purpose. In addition, they argue that even if the purpose of the act is sufficiently "public" in the constitutional sense, the standards which it articulates to limit the discretion granted to the officers of the C.P.D.C. are inadequate, such that the act delegates legislative power in a manner prohibited by article third, § 1, of the state constitution. I This court has long held that every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act. See, e.g., Troiano v. Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 265, 269, 231 A.2d 536, and cases cited therein. Parties challenging the constitutionality of an act in a proceeding seeking declaratory relief have the burden of showing its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission, 160 Conn. 109, 112, 273 A.2d 880; Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 470, 217 A.2d 698. When the thrust of the challenge is that the act violates article first, § 1, of the state constitution, the plaintiffs have demonstrated such invalidity if they can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation "directs the granting of an emolument or privilege to an individual or class without any purpose, expressed or apparent, to serve the public welfare thereby." Warner v. Gabb, 139 Conn. 310, 313, 93 A.2d 487; Carilli v. Pension Commission, 154 Conn. 1, 6-7, 220 A.2d 439. Confusion as to the precise meaning of such concepts as "public purpose" has often thwarted a quick determination of whether a plaintiff has met his burden in an attack upon a legislative act under article first, § 1. The modern trend, both in Connecticut and in other states with'similar constitutional provisions, has been to expand and construe broadly the meaning of "public purpose." Barnes v. New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 15, 98 A.2d 523; State ex rel. Wisconsin Dev. Authority v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 166; 227 N.W. 278, 280 N.W. 698; 63 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Funds, § 59. As one court has stated, "[a] slide-rule definition to determine public purpose for all time cannot be formulated; the concept expands with the population, economy, scientific knowledge, and changing conditions." Mitchell v. Financing Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745. See also Barnes v. New Haven, supra, 15; McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 270, 59 A.2d 142. Generally, if an act will promote the welfare of the state, it serves a public purpose. Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 292, 294 A.2d 67. In deciding whether an act serves such a purpose this court has traditionally vested the legislature with wide discretion and suggested that the latter's deter mination should not be reversed unless "manifestly and palpably incorrect." Barnes v. New Haven, supra, 15. The plaintiffs argue that any benefit to the public in the way of increased employment and tax revenue sought to be achieved through the creation .and operation of the C.P.D.C. is too remote and speculative to survive what they believe to be the demands of article first, § 1. In support of this claim, they call attention to the fact that before the state can receive any return on the money it advances to finance the risk ventures contemplated by the act, those ventures must ultimately prove their success in the marketplace; yet they contend that such success is unlikely since the projects that are eligible for the state's assistance under the act are the kind which most businessmen would characterize as commercially unattractive. They also claim that although the act requires assurances by applicants that the benefits of increased employment and revenues remain in Connecticut, there is no statutory guarantee that such assurances will be enforced. Since the appropriation of public funds to support such projects will produce no direct benefit to the people of Connecticut, the plaintiffs eon- elude the act must fail as an "exclusive public emolument" lacking a genuine "public purpose" contrary to the requirements of article first, § 1. The presence of a direct benefit to the state from the expenditure of public funds is a useful factor in aiding the court's determination of whether a legislative act serves a public purpose. Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 350, 82 A. 1030; Legat v. Adorno, 138 Conn. 134, 142, 83 A.2d 185. But other factors serve a similar function. This court has found that an act serves a public purpose under article first, $ 1, when it "promoteLs] the welfare" of the state; Tough v. Ives, supra, 292; or when the "principal reason" for the appropriation is to benefit the public. Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, 150 Conn. 333, 339, 189 A.2d 399. "The test of public use is not how the use is furnished but rather the right of the public to receive and enjoy its benefit." Barnes v. New Haven, supra, 15. The governor's strike force for full employment and the legislature which followed its recommendations in enacting 1972 Public Acts, No. 248, believed that the capital program envisioned as operating under the auspices of the C.P.D.C. would stimulate business in Connecticut by promoting the development of new kinds of products, technologies, and projects, which ordinarily do not attract conventional forms of financing. It was their considered opinion that the support of enterprises eligible for assistance under the act would result in an improved economy for the people of Connecticut by helping to keep new business in the state, to provide increased employment opportunities, and to establish a new source of public revenues. In claiming that the success of such enterprises is only "speculative," such that the ultimate benefits to be real ized by the state are "remote," the plaintiffs merely dispute the business judgment of the legislature; they have not demonstrated that in exercising its judgment the general assembly violated the principle underlying the constitutional requirement that the act servé a public purpose. The strong presumption of the act's constitutionality will not be overcome simply because the plaintiffs' economic forecasts differ from those of the legislature. Schwartz v. Kelly, 140 Conn. 176, 179, 99 A.2d 89, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 891, 74 S. Ct. 227, 98 L. Ed. 394; Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 513-14, 52 A.2d 702. The plaintiffs' claim that the act unlawfully entitles a limited class of persons to "exclusive public emoluments" falls short of its mark for another reason. They rightly suggest that the danger against which article first, § 1, seeks to protect the people of Connecticut is the possibility that the legislature will indulge in uncontrolled "giveaways" of public monies to specific persons or classes of individuals. See Lyman v. Adorno, supra, 515. Yet 1972 Public Acts, No. 248, counteracts this threat to the integrity of the public treasury. The act establishes a quasi-public corporation, the C.P.D.C., as a buffer between the legislature and the recipients of the financial support. The act seeks to benefit neither named individuals nor specific industries or enterprises, but, rather, types of projects,' technologies, inventions, and products sponsored by persons whose assistance this corporation determines would most likely redound to the public good. The corporation is authorized to funnel out and withhold funds from those projects whose development it does not feel would fulfill the ultimate goals of the act, and it may enter into contractual arrange ments or agreements whereby it may obtain rights from or in an invention or product, or proceeds in exchange for the granting of financial aid. In addition, the state bond commission acts as a further restraining influence. Section 32-41 of the General Statutes provides that only the bond commission may authorize the issuance of bonds to fund the application in accordance with the provisions of § 3-20. Section 3-20 (g) of the General Statutes provides that the commission is empowered to authorize bonds whenever it "finds that the authorization of such bonds will be in the best interests of the state." These provisions in their totality comprise a system of barriers preventing any automatic flow of public funds to preferred persons or groups. The plaintiffs have failed to sustain the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the act's constitutionality by showing beyond a reasonable doubt that it entitles successful applicants to exclusive public emoluments without any purpose to serve the public welfare thereby. Warner v. Gabb, 139 Conn. 310, 313, 93 A.2d 487. II The plaintiffs' second contention is that 1972 Public Acts, No. 248, does not contain adequate stand ards to guide the discretion of the officers of the C.P.D.C. in their administration of the program; as a result, the plaintiffs claim that an unlawful delegation of the legislative authority has resulted in contravention of article third, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution. For a legislative delegation of powers to an administrative instrumentality such as the C.P.D.C. to survive a constitutional attack, the statute in question must declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards or lay down an intelligible principle to which the instrumentality must conform. Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, supra, 341. Within these limitations, the statute may authorize the instrumentality to supply the details of its operations by passing its own rules and regulations. Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 499, 313 A.2d 53; State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 628, 13 A.2d 586. As the complexity of economic and governmental conditions has increased over the years, courts have tended to approve ever broader standards to facilitate the operational functions of administrative agencies. Forest Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 669, 679, 236 A.2d 917; note, 92 A.L.R. 400, 410. The modern trend holds that statutory standards are constitutionally sufficient so long as they are described as definitely as is reasonably practicable under the circumstances. Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 167, 106 A.2d 571; Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 342, 54 A.2d 277; State v. Jackman, 60 Wis. 2d 700, 705-6, 211 N.W. 480; 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 117. The act makes clear to the officers of the C.P.D.C. that the objective sought to be attained through the venture capital program is "the creation of new products and industry in this state, resulting in increased employment and public revenues." General Statutes § 32-33. The powers of the C.P.D.C.'s officers to enter into venture agreements are further limited by the requirement that these agreements be only "with persons doing business in Connecticut, upon such terms and on such conditions as are consistent with the purposes of this chapter, for the advancement of financial aid to such persons for the development of specific products, procedures and techniques, to be developed and produced in this state, and to condition sueh agreements upon contractual assurances that the benefits of increasing employment and tax revenues shall remain in this state and shall accrue to it." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 32-39 (2). The "products" whose development the C.P.D.C. officers are authorized to encourage through the negotiation of venture arrangements are limited to those "products, devices, techniques or processes which have advanced beyond the theoretic stage and are readily capable of being, or have been, reduced to practice." General Statutes §32-34 (5). The act does not allow novices to pass judgment on the feasibility of the applications; rather, four of the six directors of the C.P.D.C. are specifically required to "be knowledgeable, and have favorable reputations for skill, knowledge and experience, in the areas of the development of technological invention." General Statutes § 32-35 (b). Further, the corporate officers can rule on any application only after they have considered a report on the merits of each application prepared by the corporation's staff. Minimal requirements .are provided for in the act for such staff reports: at the least, they must include "such facts about the company . as its history, wage standards, job opportunities, stability of employment, past and present financial condition and structure, pro-forma income statements, present and future markets and prospects, integrity of management as well as the feasibility of the proposed product and invention to be granted financial aid, including the state of development of such product as well as the likelihood of its commercial feasibility." General Statutes § 32-40. In light of such extensive directions which the act has given to the C.P.D.C. officers as to how they are to carry out their functions, there is no merit in the plaintiffs' claim that the act fails to establish primary standards or guidelines on which the corporation can base its decisions whether to grant or deny applications. In testing the constitutionality of a statute for the adequacy of its standards, the character of the administrative action which it authorizes must be considered. Warren v. Marion County, 222 Ore. 307, 353 P.2d 257. That observation is particularly appropriate in this case. The process whereby the C.P.D.C. determines which risk ventures are more likely to succeed in the marketplace than others must of necessity allow for substantial flexibility; this need is inherent in the very subject matter with which the corporation is empowered to deal under the act. This court has stated that it is unrealistic to demand detailed standards which are impractical or impossible. Forest Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 679. To require that additional safeguards be built into 1972 Public Acts, No. 248, would be impractical. Public Act No. 248 contains adequate standards to guide the officers of the C.P.D.C. in the exercise of their discretion to determine which applicants should receive public assistance. No improper delegation of legislative power has resulted in contravention of article third, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution. Based upon the stipulated facts reserved for consideration by this court, we cannot find that the plaintiffs have sustained their burden of proving the unconstitutionality of 1972 Public Acts, No. 248. This is not to say, of course, that no remedies are available for any possible actions undertaken pursuant to the administration of the act, which may be unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful. But it is hardly necessary to point out that the act cannot be held invalid on the mere possibility that such actions will be taken. Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 172, 251 A.2d 49. We answer "No" to questions one and two of the reservation upon which advice is desired. We need not answer the remaining questions as they were not briefed. No costs will be taxed in favor of either party. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The questions upon which, adviee is desired, the answers to which are dispositive of this matter, are as follows: "(1) Is Public Act 248 of the 1972 Legislative Session of the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut unconstitutional in that it entitles Kurtz Diecraft, Inc. and Barnes Engineering Com pany, and other private individuals and corporations to exclusive public emoluments or privileges in violation of Section One of Article First of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut? "(2) Is Publie Act 248 of the 1972 Legislative Session of the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut unconstitutional in that the authority conferred by the Act upon the Connecticut Product Development Corporation is without adequate legislative standards and therefore is an unlawful delegation of legislative powers in violation of Section One of Article Third of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut?" The legislative enactment need not "contain a specific statement of the public purpose sought to be achieved by it." Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, 150 Conn. 333, 339, 189 A.2d 399. Legislative findings, however, purporting to establish the existence of a public purpose should be considered when the text of the act itself incorporates these findings, as does General Statutes $ 32-33. This is not to say, of course, that the legislature can, by mere fiat or finding, make "public" a truly "private" purpose so as to authorize an appropriation of public funds surreptitiously. Its findings and statements about what is or is not "public" cannot be binding upon the court. Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 517, 52 A.2d 702. The plaintiffs also assert that the act is unconstitutional because it denies to them the equal protection of the laws in violation of § 1 of article first of our constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. Section 1 of article first of our constitution has a meaning equivalent to that found in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States which prohibits the states from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. Barnes v. New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 14, 98 A.2d 523; Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 515, 52 A.2d 702. Since the latter claim adds nothing to the former, we limit ourselves to the argument asserted under the Connecticut constitution. State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 105-6, 90 A.2d 862.

The plaintiff's motion to set aside the judgment of the trial court and to direct a judgment against the defendant in the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is granted unless the defendant files his brief on or before December 3,1974.

The plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the defendant's "appeal" from the "Memorandum on Determination of Taking Date" is granted.

Shapiro, J. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant seeking to foreclose a judgment lien on real estate in Shelton formerly belonging to the defendant's husband, alleging, among other claims, that the defendant, at an earlier date and after attaching the premises, "recorded a Judgment of Divorce" against her husband "pursuant to Sec. 52-22 of the Connecticut General Statutes thereby vesting title to said premises in the defendant and merging the defendant's claimed attachment into the title held by her." In the defendant's answer, these claims were left to the plaintiff's proof. Also, by way of special defense and counterclaim, the defendant alleged that by virtue of her attachment and subsequently recorded judgment, the plaintiff's attachment and judgment lien should be declared a nullity, removing it "as a cloud on the legal title of the defendant." From a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff wherein "[t]he issues of liability . . . [were] resolved in favor of the plaintiff," the defendant has appealed to this court. On November 1, 1968, the defendant instituted an action against her husband, then the owner of certain realty in Shelton, claiming a legal separation or divorce, custody of and support for their minor children, alimony, counsel fees and a conveyance to her by her husband "of his interest in the real estate" located in Shelton. On that date, by direction of the writ, summons and complaint, the hus band's property was attached to the value of $25,000 and the certificate of attachment was recorded on the land records. Thereafter, by writ, summons and complaint dated December 19, 1968, the plaintiff brought an action against the husband, William C. Hurley, in which damages in the amount of $2700 were claimed, and caused an attachment, recorded on the land records on December 27, 1968, to be placed upon the Shelton premises. On April 30, 1969, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the husband in the amount of $2465 plus costs of $40.90, and on May 8, 1969, filed a judgment lien on the land records. On February 3, 1970, a judgment of divorce was granted to the defendant, awarding her custody of and support for the minor children, one dollar per year as alimony and title to an automobile, and ordering that the husband's title to the Shelton property be transferred to the defendant, the judgment reciting in part that this "shall constitute a transfer of this property under Section 52-22 of the General Statutes." The judgment was recorded on March 31, 1970. The trial court, in the case before us, concluded that the judgment lien recorded by the plaintiff related back to December 27, 1968, being the date of its attachment; that that judgment lien has priority over the attachment placed upon the premises by the defendant on November 1, 1968; and that the transfer of the property to the defendant pursuant to § 52-22 and upon recordation of the judgment on the land records did not relate back to the defendant's attachment but rather served to convey to the defendant title to the property only as of the date of the divorce decree. The defendant has assigned error in the court's refusal to reach a conclusion contained in her draft finding, in reaching the conclusions which it did reach and in rendering judgment for the plaintiff. The issue dispositive of the appeal is whether the transfer of the husband's title to the Shelton real estate under the judgment of divorce pursuant to General Statutes § 52-22 relates back to the defendant's attachment so as to take priority over the plaintiff's subsequent attachment and judgment lien. At the outset, we point out that there can be no dispute that the judgment lien .recorded by the plaintiff on May 8, 1969, related back to December 27, 1968, the date of its attachment. General Statutes § 49-44; City National Bank v. Traffic Engineering Associates, Inc., 166 Conn. 195, 199, 348 A.2d 637. General Statutes § 46-14 provides in part that a divorce action may be brought to the Superior Court "and whenever alimony is claimed, attachments to secure the same may be made by direction in the writ or by an order pending suit in the same manner as in other civil actions." "An attachment of property on mesne process is a mode of obtaining security for the satisfaction of any judgment which the plaintiff may finally recover. . . . An attaching creditor must stand upon his legal right. He claims a preference over other creditors, and he can only obtain it by complying with the statutory conditions." Morgan v. New York National Bldg. & Loan Assn., 73 Conn. 151, 152-53, 46 A. 877. General Statutes § 52-279, entitled "When attachments may be granted," provides in part: "Attachments may be granted upon all complaints containing a money demand and against the estate of the defendant, both real and personal." Section 52-285, entitled "Attachment of real estate," provides the method by which an attachment is made through means of a certificate which is completed and lodged by the officer by leaving it in the office of the town clerk of the town in which the real estate is situated, to be recorded at length in the land records. The last sentence of the statute reads: "No such certificate left in the town clerk's office for record shall have the effect of the notice of action pending provided for in section 52-325." This sentence relates to a lis pendens and its manner of application as a notice of the pendency of an action. Thus a certificate of attachment cannot be used as a notice of lis pendens. In brief, actions based upon attachments are actions in which the plaintiff seeks to satisfy a money demand out of the defendant's property. Such actions are properly labeled actions quasi in rem. They are to be distinguished from actions brought to establish or enforce previously acquired interests in the property, such as actions to quiet title, to remove a cloud on the title, to set aside a deed, or to foreclose a lien or mortgage. Such actions are properly labeled actions in rem. See 1 Stephenson, Conn. Civ. Proc. (2d Ed.) § 44, pp. 175-76. As to the commencement of a divorce action, our civil procedure makes no provision for imposing a lis pendens but allows the making of an attachment whenever alimony is claimed. Waterbury Lumber & Coal Co. v. Hinckley, 75 Conn. 187, 52 A. 739, concerned an action in which the plaintiff sought to subject the interest of two defendants in certain real estate to a lien in its favor for a money judgment for materials furnished in repair of a building. The writ directed an attachment of the defendants' property to the value of $200. In its judgment, the trial court declared that the property should be subject to the attachment lien made at the inception of the action, that such lien should be prior to the interest of either defendant, that a judgment lien predicated upon the attachment lien should be prior to the interest of either of the defendants, and that such a judgment lien might be filed against the premises and should have the same force and effect as is provided by the statutes for the filing of judgment liens. This court found error and held (p. 191): "By such attachment as may have been made in commencing this action no lien was acquired, since the complaint contained no money demand. General Statutes, §893 (Rev. 1902, §826) [now §52-279]. . In the present case no judgment for money damages was rendered, and none could have been rendered upon the complaint." As stated earlier, the defendant commenced her divorce action by attaching her husband's interest in the Shelton realty to the amount of $25,000. In her prayer for relief were included claims for alimony and "[a] conveyance to the plaintiff by the defendant of his interest in the real estate . . . ." Acting as the court in the defendant's divorce action, the referee, pursuant to this prayer for relief, made an award of alimony, limiting it, however, to the sum of one dollar per year. Also, pursuant to § 52-22, the referee ordered that title to the husband's Shelton real property be transferred to the defendant. The defendant argues in her brief that since, pursuant to § 46-14, she was allowed to attach her husband's property to secure an alimony award, it cannot be conceived how such an award would not include the transfer of title to the realty, which transfer would automatically relate back to her attachment. As authority for this claim, the defendant cites various cases outside Connecticut, relying mainly on Germania National Bank v. Duncan, 62 Okla. 144, 161 P. 1077, and Graham v. Pepple, 129 Kan. 735, 284 P. 394. In both cases, each involving the instituting of a divorce action where the wife attached her husband's real estate, the court held that the institution of the divorce action created a lis pendens upon the realty of the husband, thereby giving the wife a claim superior to claims of creditors made subsequent to the commencement of the divorce action. This is not the law in Connecticut and the defendant has failed to demonstrate otherwise. The defendant here, having commenced her divorce action by an attachment of her husband's realty, cannot claim at the same time, as she does in her brief, that this also constitutes a lis pendens. As we have already shown, these two proceedings are separate and distinct, and by statute are intended to serve different purposes. The defendant makes the further claim that an equitable lien was impressed on the property which related back to her attachment and took precedence over the plaintiff's judgment lien. In support of this contention, the defendant relies heavily upon Pezas v. Pezas, 151 Conn. 611, 201 A.2d 192. There, the defendant husband had left the state and in personam service could not be achieved. The plaintiff wife, for herself and through her as next friend for the three minor children, issue of the marriage, commenced an action seeking an equitable order for future support. The defendant's undivided one-half interest in their jointly owned real property was attached by the plaintiffs. The entire equity of redemption had an approximate value of $75,000, leaving the value of the interest of each joint owner at .about $37,500. About an hour after the plaintiffs' attachment had been placed upon the defendant's interest in the real estate, a second attachment was placed upon it by a creditor of the husband (hereinafter referred to as Transport) who recovered a judgment against him in the amount of $405,500 and then duly placed a judgment lien in that amount upon the defendant's interest in the property. Upon trial of the issues, a judgment was entered ordering periodic payments for the support of the plaintiffs, and Transport, the intervening creditor, appealed. This court held (p. 614): "In personam service on the defendant was not achieved by the plaintiffs, so that the judgment for support is collectible only from the property attached. Artman v. Artman . . . [111 Conn. 124, 127, 149 A. 246]; Smith v. Smith, 150 Conn. 15, 18, 183 A.2d 848." This court held further (pp. 616-17): "Obviously, if the plaintiffs' claim [for support] were wholly due, . it would, by virtue of the prior attachment, have taken precedence over that of Transport. See eases such as Beers v. Place, 3 Fed. Cas. 71, 72 (No. 1233); 36 Conn. 578, 581; Coit v. Sistare, 85 Conn. 573, 578, 84 A. 119. The defendant's duty to support, however, is a continuing obligation, which ordinarily exists even apart from any judgment or decree of support. Here, specific property was properly seized under the attachment, and the decree impressed an equitable lien on that property for the satisfaction of the order of support in the decree, in accordance with the procedure outlined in cases such as Artman v. Artman, 111 Conn. 124, 130, 149 A. 246, and Gimbel v. Gimbel, . . . [147 Conn. 561, 565, 163 A.2d 451]. Under these circumstances, the equitable lien, impressed on the defendant's interest in the property by the decree, related back to the original attachment and took precedence over Transport's judgment lien, which related back to an attachment subsequent to that of the plaintiffs." We find that the facts in that case, in which the court exercised its power of equity, have no resemblance to the facts confronting us in this case, nor can we .apply the law here as it pertains to Pezas. There, the whereabouts of the defendant husband were unknown and the only manner in which support payments could be accomplished was through the quasi in rem action against the defendant's interest in the jointly owned real estate. Transport, as an intervening creditor under § 52-86, defended the support action for the absent defendant husband in the expectation of protecting its own interest in the property upon which it had placed a judgment lien. As required by § 52-86, Transport indicated that it had reason to believe it was being defrauded by a recovery by the plaintiff wife. Since the husband's interest in the realty was his only available asset within the court's jurisdiction, this court's determination, on equitable grounds, was predicated on providing assurances for future support which would not be available but for the property, and as considered in the light of the amount of Transport's judgment lien. General Statutes §52-22 provides that "[a]ny court of equitable jurisdiction may pass the title to real estate by decree, without any .act on the part of the defendant, when in its judgment it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect. Such decree, having been recorded in the land records in the town where such real estate is situated, shall, while in force, be as effectual to transfer the same as the deed of the defendant." The trial court determined that such a decree "passing the title to the real estate is merely an alternative method — that it serves the same function as would a deed of conveyance duly executed by the defendant himself." In support of its position, the trial court relied on King v. Bill, 28 Conn. 593, 596. In the King case, this court based its decision on Statutes, 1854, p. 475 § 22, which contained language almost identical to that of § 52-22. As to the statutory language, the court (pp. 597-98) held that under the statute which provides that courts of equity may pass title to real estate by decree without any act of the defendant owner and that such decree shall be as effectual to transfer title as the deed of the defendant owner would be from the time of its execution, the title passes by the decree only as of the date of the decree and does not, as a legal title, relate back to the commencement of the suit. In further reference to that statute, the court in King (p. 598) said: "It thus plainly intended only to provide that a court of chancery might, at its discretion, substitute a new mode of vesting the title to land in certain cases, for the one [ordering the owner to convey title] which by the course of that court it was customary previously to adopt." It has been held to be a method more simple and direct than that of requiring the defendant owner to execute a deed. Robinson v. Cross and Pomeroy, 22 Conn. 170, 174. Insofar as the statutes prescribe the causes for which attachment may issue, they are strictly con strued; the courts have no right under the guise of liberal construction to read into an attachment statute any meaning which its words, construed according to the statutory rules, do not convey. 6 Am. Jur. 2d 565, Attachment and (Garnishment, § 7. Where the statute so provides, a' remedy by attachment is limited to actions to recover a sum of money only, and in such a case it cannot be employed as a means of recovering specific property. 7 C.J.S., Attachment, § 10. Although the record in King does not disclose that an attachment was made at the commencement of the suit, we think that it matters not. As we have already shown, under the defendant's attachment in her divorce action, she was thereby secured as to her money demand for alimony. Thereafter, the court in its judgment did make a money award of alimony. It also granted the defendant further relief as sought by her under §52-22 and thereby passed title to the Seymour realty to her, an act which did not constitute a money judgment but on the contrary provided an alternative method of relief. Under § 52-22, the passing of title to the defendant was only as effective as would have been a deed from the time of its execution. Thus, title vested in her on the date of the judgment and did not relate back to the date of her attachment. There is no error. In this opinion House, C. J., Loiselle and MacDonald, Js., concurred. The pertinent part of §52-86 reads: "Sec. 52-86. when creditor may appear and depend. In any action in which property has been attached, any person may appear and defend in the name of the defendant, upon filing in the court an affidavit that he is a creditor of the defendant and has good reason to believe, and does believe, that the amount which the plaintiff claims was not justly due at the commencement of the suit and that he is in danger of being defrauded by a recovery by the plaintiff, and upon giving bond with surety to the plaintiff, in such amount as the court approves, for the payment of such costs as the plaintiff may thereafter recover. . . ."

The defendants' petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Division of the Court of Common Pleas is denied.

The plaintiff's application for an expedited appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County is granted to the extent that this court will hear the appeal on typewritten copies of the briefs and appendices, subject to subsequent filing of such documents as provided in %72S and 724 of the Practice Book, as amended.

The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County is denied.

The application by Richard 0. Brooks for permission to file a brief as amicus curiae in the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County is granted, the brief to be filed on or before December 10, 1974, in accordance with the requirements of § 723 and 724 of the Practice Book, as amended. In the event the time for filing the defendant-appellee's brief is extended beyond that date, the brief of the amicus curiae shall then be filed on the date fixed by that extension. Richard 0. Brooks, on the application. Frank J. Dumark, in opposition. Submitted November 13 decided November 26, 1974

The plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is denied.

The motion by Henry D. Marcus to withdraw his appearance in behalf of the defendant in the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is granted.

The defendant's motion for a review of the order of the trial court on his motion to reduce his bond in the appeal from the Superior Court in New Haven County is granted; the relief sought therein and the defendant's motion to expedite consideration of the motion to review are both denied.

Per Curiam. The respondent Francisco Borges, who is the state treasurer and custodian of the state second injury and compensation assurance fund, has appealed from a decision of the compensation review division (CRD) affirming the finding of the workers' compensation commissioner as to the liability of the respondent fund to the claimant, Mary Lou Matey, but remanding the case for further proceedings before the commissioner with respect to the amount of the workers' compensation award. In his appeal the treasurer maintains that the CRD erred in concluding that the claimant was not barred from recovery by her failure to present her claim in writing to the administrator of the estate of her deceased employer, Sarah Dember, within the period allowed by our nonclaim statute, General Statutes § 45-205. Recognizing that the jurisdiction of this court to consider his appeal is implicated, the treasurer has also raised the question of whether the decision of the CRD remanding the case for further proceedings before the commissioner upon the amount of the award was a final decision of the agency from which an appeal could be taken. The treasurer maintains that his appeal is viable and the claimant does not dispute this contention. We conclude that such a decision is not final, that the appeal is premature, and that this court lacks jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. The facts found by the commissioner and affirmed by the CRD are not disputed. The claimant was a household employee of Sarah Dember and she performed such duties as cleaning, cooking, shopping, and other chores for her employer. On August 9, 1984, while on an errand for her employer, the claimant was injured in an automobile accident. Sarah Dember was aware of the accident and the resulting injury to the claimant, which had occurred in the course of the employment. Although this employment relationship was within the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, Dember had failed to insure her potential liability thereunder. On October 13, 1984, Sarah Dember died. No claim was submitted by the claimant against the estate of her deceased employer by February 14,1985, the last day allowed by the Probate Court for presenting claims. The claimant on July 8, 1985, filed her claim with the workers' compensation commissioner and also sent a copy to the attorney representing the estate of Sarah Dember. The respondent treasurer participated in the formal hearing on behalf of the second injury and compensation assurance fund established under General Statutes § 31-354 because of the fund's potential liability under General Statutes § 31-355. The estate of Sarah Dember was represented at an informal hearing before the commissioner but did not participate at the formal hearing or in any of the subsequent proceedings. The workers' compensation commissioner rejected the position advanced by the respondent treasurer that the failure to present a timely claim against the estate of her employer barred the claimant from receiving workers' compensation benefits. The commissioner found the appropriate compensation rate to be $240 per week, based upon the claimant's wages and the value of board and room provided by her employer. In resolving the issues on appeal, the CRD concluded that the filing of the notice of the claim within one year of the accident, as required by General Statutes § 31-294, was all that was necessary for workers' compensation purposes. It concluded, however, that the appeal should be sustained because the finding of the commissioner concerning the value of room and board, on which the compensation rate was partly based, had been made without any supporting testimony. The case was remanded for further proceedings "only on the specific issue of the equivalent monetary value of the weekly room and board." In the recent case of Repasi v. Jenkins Bros., 16 Conn. App. 121, 546 A.2d 965 (1988), the Appellate Court held that a decision of the CRD remanding certain issues relating to the amount of a workers' compensation award to the commissioner for more information was not a final judgment, even though the CRD had concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider other issues relating to the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. The respondent treasurer in his reply brief concedes that the case before us is "procedurally similar." He relies, however, upon the decision of this court in Santos v. Publix Theatres Corporation, 108 Conn. 159, 142 A. 745 (1928), in which it was held that a decision of the trial court correcting the finding of the compensation commissioner, who had dismissed the employee's claim, and remanding the case to the commissioner for an award in accordance with the finding as corrected, was a final judgment. When, after the commissioner had made an award in compliance with the remand, the employer again appealed, we concluded that, because the appeal did not claim that the commissioner had deviated from the remand order in making the award but claimed error only in the judgment reversing the initial denial of compensation, the second appeal should be dismissed. "There appears to be no more reason, logically, for a right of appeal from a compensation award as directed by a judgment of the Superior Court than from a judgment rendered by the latter court in conformity to the advice or mandate of this court." Id., 162-63. Santos falls into the category of cases where the further proceedings directed by the remand order are ministerial, not requiring the exercise of independent judgment or discretion and not involving additional evidence. See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 202 Conn. 150, 156-57, 520 A.2d 186 (1987). In the present case, however, the order of the CRD plainly contemplated that further evidence relating to the claimant's compensation rate would be presented and that a new finding on that issue would be made by the commissioner. A more apt precedent is Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, in which we held that an appeal from a decision of an agency was premature because, although the issue of liability had been decided, further proceedings before a hearing officer to determine the amount of the award had been ordered. In that opinion we relied upon several decisions of the federal courts in workers' compensation cases holding that such awards are not final until the amounts thereof have been determined. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Brodka, 643 F.2d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 1981); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 590 F.2d 1267, 1268 (4th Cir. 1978); United Fruit Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 546 F.2d 1224, 1225 (5th Cir. 1977). In Schieffelin & Co. v. Department of Liquor Control, 202 Conn. 405, 521 A.2d 566 (1987), in which the remand order of the trial court required the agency to conduct further evidentiary proceedings upon an unresolved issue, we also concluded that there was no final judgment. The Appellate Court also has held that a remand by the CRD for further proceedings upon an issue left undecided by a commissioner who had relied upon an alternative ground rejected by the CRD was not a final decision. Timothy v. Upjohn Co., 3 Conn. App. 162, 485 A.2d 1349 (1985). We conclude that this appeal is premature because the remand order directed further evidentiary proceedings necessary for the determination of the amount of the award in a workers' compensation case. The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 17 Conn. App. 257, is denied.

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 17 Conn. App. 243, is denied.

Covello, J. The plaintiff, James G. Malerba, brought an action against the defendant, Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna), seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in an airplane accident. The complaint contained three counts, each alleging a separate theory of recovery: (1) negligence; (2) strict product liability; and (3) breach of warranty. Cessna filed a motion for permission to serve a third party complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 117. The trial court, Nash, J., granted the motion. The third party complaint was in four counts and was directed against the aircraft's owner, Edward A. Schuler, and the aircraft's mechanic, Peter Lindblom. Counts one and two sought recovery from Schuler based upon common law principles of: (1) indemnification (first count); and (2) contribution (second count). Counts three and four sought recovery from Lindblom, again based upon common law principles of: (1) indemnification (third count); and (2) contribution (fourth count). Malerba filed a motion to strike the third party complaint in its entirety claiming "it seeks contribution [in away] . . . not recognized under Connecticut law." Schuler, a third party defendant, also filed a motion to strike addressed to the second count (the contribution claim) of the third party complaint "because its claim for contribution . . . fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted." The trial court, Stanley, J., thereafter granted both motions and ordered the third party complaint stricken in its entirety. The trial court concluded: (1) common law principles of indemnification had been "abrogated by virtue of our Product Liability Act"; General Statutes § 52-240a, 52-240b, 52-572m through 52-572r and 52-577a; and (2) the third party complaint failed to allege either of the preconditions for the initiation of a contribution action apparently required by General Statutes § 52-572o (e). Following the entry of judgment in favor of the third party defendant Schuler, Cessna appealed. We find error and remand for further proceedings. As a threshold consideration, Cessna argues that Malerba, the original plaintiff, lacked standing to challenge the third party complaint. It argues that since Malerba could not be injured or prejudiced by Cessna's claim against the third party defendants, Malerba lacked standing to challenge the legal sufficiency of Cessna's third party complaint. We disagree. "When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . ." Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 492, 400 A.2d 726 (1978). "[Standing is] ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he . is likely to suffer . . . ." Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 321, 439 A.2d 349 (1981). The question then is whether the third party complaint and the parties it draws into the action create a risk of a direct injury to the original plaintiff. Injury in this context includes procedural injury to the cause of action. Practice Book § 117 provides that the third party complaint "shall be equivalent . . . to an original . . complaint, and [the third party defendant] shall have available to him all remedies available to an original defendant . The third-party defendant may also assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiffs claim and may assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the . . . occurrence which is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff." (Emphasis added.) See Gino's Pizza of East Hartford, Inc. v. Kaplan, 193 Conn. 135, 141-43, 475 A.2d 305 (1984). It is apparent that Practice Book § 117 thus arms a third party defendant with the full panoply of procedural options available to address not only the claim of the third party plaintiff but also the claim of the original plaintiff against the original defendant. The addition of two defendants with perhaps greater insights as to both the factual and legal ramifications of the original cause of action creates at least a colorable claim of a likelihood of injury to the plaintiffs cause of action. This being the case, we conclude that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the sufficiency of the third party complaint. Cessna next claims that the trial court erred in concluding that actions for a contribution within the context of a product liability claim, must meet the provisions of General Statutes § 52-572o (e) as a precondition to the initiation of the contribution action, i.e., the entry of a judgment against the joint tortfeasors and actual payment by one of them to the original claimant or an agreement by one of the tortfeasors to pay the claimant which is thereafter fully executed. While § 52-572o (e) establishes preconditions to the initiation of a contribution action, this statute must be construed in harmony, if that is possible, with General Statutes § 52-102a (a), which authorizes the impleading of third parties by a defendant in a civil action without such preconditions. This latter provision states in relevant part: "A defendant in any civil action may move the court for permission as a third-party plaintiff to serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-102a is similar in content to General Statutes § 52-577a (b) which is the statute of limitations in product liability actions. This latter statute provides: "In any [product liability] action a product seller may implead any third party who is or may be liable for all or part of the claimant's claim, if such third party defendant is served with the third party complaint within one year from the date the cause of action brought under subsection (a) of this section is returned to court." While § 52-577a (b) omits the words "to him" which are found in § 52-102a, the failure to identify specifically to whom the impleaded third party may be liable does not preclude parallel treatment of the two statutes in view of their otherwise similar language. Link v. Shelton, 186 Conn. 623, 627, 443 A.2d 902 (1982). In Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corporation, 152 Conn. 405, 412, 207 A.2d 732 (1965), we observed that "indemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary liability is claimed to rest, while contribution involves a claim for reimbursement of a share of a payment necessarily made by the claim ant which equitably should have been paid in part by others." (Emphasis added.) It is evident that the language of § 52-102a, which describes a third party who may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the claim, refers to causes of action for indemnity and contribution respectively. Thus, while § 52-572o (e) requires some disposition of the original claim as a precondition to the initiation of a cause of action seeking contribution from a third party, § 52-102a and 52-577a (b) implicitly authorize the inclusion of such a claim in the original product liability action without any preconditions. "If the statutes appear to be repugnant, but both can be construed together, both are given effect." Hirschfeld v. Commission on Claims, 172 Conn. 603, 607, 376 A.2d 71 (1977). Such a reconciliation is especially important in dealing with provisions that are enacted as part of the same legislation. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 200 Conn. 630, 637, 513 A.2d 52 (1986). We harmonize the apparent inconsistency between the three statutes by concluding that the preconditions of § 52-572o (e) apply only to those circumstances where a party elects to pursue an independent cause of action for a contribution rather than impleading the prospectively liable third party as authorized by § 52-102a and 52-577a (b). This construction of § 52-572o (e) furthers the salutary purpose of encouraging parties to consolidate the litigation flowing from a given factual circumstance into a single judicial proceeding thereby avoiding multiplicity of actions. Our earlier analysis of § 52-102a recognized this to be the case. See Senior v. Hope, 156 Conn. 92, 96, 239 A.2d 486 (1968); see also F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 1985) § 10.18. In view of the similarity in language between § 52-102a and 52-577a (b), we see no reason why this analysis is not equally applicable to § 52-577a (b). Since these statutes implicitly authorize the initiation of con tribution actions by defendants in product liability cases, and the preconditions of § 52-572o (e) apply only to independent contribution actions, we conclude that the trial court erred in striking the second and fourth counts of the third party complaint. Cessna next claims that the court erred in striking the remaining paragraphs of the third party complaint which sought indemnification from Schuler and Lindblom. The plaintiff argues that actions for common law indemnification within the context of a product liability claim have been abrogated by the adoption of the product liability act. We disagree. As earlier discussed, there is within the language of both General Statutes § 52-102a and 52-577a (b) implicit authority for defendants to maintain both contribution and indemnification actions against third parties. Further, General Statutes § 52-572r (d) provides: "In any product liability claim for personal injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment subject to the provisions of sections 52-240a, 52-240b, 52-572m to 52-572r, inclusive, and 52-577a, brought against any third party, such third party may not maintain any action for indemnity against any person immune from liability. " (Emphasis added.) It is fairly inferrable that if indemnity actions are specifically prohibited by the product liability act against those who are otherwise immune from liability, then indemnity actions against those who are not so immune are authorized. The further question remains, however, whether as a matter of law, an indemnification action may ever be pursued against the background of a statutory comparative liability action where the trier of the first party claim against the various defendants is required to apportion liability among the plaintiff and all the defendants. In other words, does a finding that one defendant is 70 percent liable to the original plaintiff and another defendant 30 percent liable preclude any further finding that one of the defendants may be liable to the other defendant for all or a portion of the sums he or she was required to pay to the plaintiff? " 'A judgment against co-defendants creates no liability between them if none before existed. "Parties to a judgment are not bound by it, in a subsequent controversy between each other, unless they were adversary parties in the original action. If A recovers judgment against B and C upon a contract, which judgment is paid by B, the liability of C to B in a subsequent action for contribution is still an open question, because as to it no issue was made or tried in the former suit. As between the several defendants therein a joint judgment establishes nothing but their joint liability to the plaintiff. Which of the defendants should pay the entire debt, or what proportion each should pay in case each is partly liable, is still unadjudicated." Freeman on Judgments, § 23.' [Bulkeley v. House, 62 Conn. 459, 474, 26 A. 352 (1893).] The illustration given relates to a contract, but the principle is equally applicable in tort. 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th Ed.) § 422-424; see also Appell v. Schneider & Pomerantz Baking Co., 126 Conn. 16, 18, 8 A.2d 529 [1939]; Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v. Niles-Bement Pond Co., 128 Conn. 4, 8, 20 A.2d 91 [1941]. In 101 A.L.R. 105, it is said that 'the rule supported by the great weight of authority is that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action against two or more defendants is not res judicata or conclusive of the rights and liabilities of the defendants inter se in a subsequent action between them, unless those rights and liabilities were expressly put in issue in the first action, by cross complaint or other adversary pleadings, and determined by the judgment in the first action.''' (Emphasis added.) Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Musante, Berman & Steinberg Co., 133 Conn. 536, 539-40, 52 A.2d 862 (1947). The reason that the indemnity claim is not finally determined by the first party judgment lies in the fact that indemnification implicates different factual and legal considerations which may be outside of the matters determined in the first party plaintiffs claim under the product liability act. General Statutes § 52-572o (c) provides: "In determining the percentage of responsibility, the trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis, both the nature and quality of the conduct of the party." An indemnitee, however, must prove "that the negligence with which it had been found chargeable was passive or secondary, while the indemnitor had been negligent and in a manner which was active and primary." Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corporation, supra, 415. The principles are different and are articulated in a different manner. Thus, a finding that a given defendant was liable to the plaintiff does not necessarily determine whether that responsibility was based on a passive negligence which might, therefore, entitle that defendant to a full reimbursement from other defendants based upon indemnification principles. Based on the implicit language of the foregoing statutes, we conclude that common law indemnification continues as a viable cause of action in the context of product liability claims and that the comparative responsibility principles that serve as its foundation do not bar a later determination of liability as between an indemnitee and an indemnitor. The trial court therefore erred in striking the first and third counts of the third party complaint. There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings. In this opinion the other justices concurred. Practice Book § 117 provides in relevant part: "A defendant in any civil action may move the court for permission as a third-party plaintiff to serve a . . . complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." Cessna did not elect to challenge the motion's apparent failure to comply with Practice Book § 154. Section 154 provides in relevant part: "Each motion to strike . . . shall separately set forth each such claim of insufficiency and shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each such claimed insufficiency." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-572o (e) provides in relevant part: "[T]he person bringing the action for contribution either must have (1) discharged by payment the common liability within the period of the statute of limitations . . . and commenced the action for contribution within one year after payment, or (2) agreed while action was pending to discharge the common liability and, within one year after the agreement, have paid the liability and brought an action for contribution." Practice Book § 157 provides in relevant part: "[W]here an entire complaint . . . has been stricken, and the party whose pleading has been so stricken fails to file a new pleading . . . the court may . . . enter judgment against said party on said stricken complaint. ." See General Statutes § 52-240a, 52-240b, 52-572m through 52-572r and 52-577a. General Statutes § 52-572o (e) provides: "If a judgment has been rendered, any action for contribution must be brought within one year after the judgment becomes final. If no judgment has been rendered, the person bringing the action for contribution either must have (1) discharged by payment the common liability within the period of the statute of limitations applicable to the right of action of the claimant against him and commenced the action for contribution within one year after payment, or (2) agreed while action was pending to discharge the common liability and, within one year after the agreement, have paid the liability and brought an action for contribution." Cessna was also proceeding in accordance with Practice Book § 117 which authorizes a defendant to implead a third party who may be liable for a part of the claim. For a more recent discussion of this issue see 142 A.L.R. 727, wherein it is evident that this is the position held by the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue. We note that our holding in Kyrtatas v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 205 Conn. 694, 702 n.2, 535 A.2d 357 (1988), was specifically limited to its factual circumstances which are different from the procedural posture in which we find this case.