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Haredi Jews regard themselves as the most religiously authentic group of Jews, although other Jewish religious movements disagree.

Haredi Judaism ( , ; also spelled in English; plural or ) consists of groups within Orthodox Judaism that are characterized by their strict interpretation of religious sources and their accepted halakha (Jewish law) and traditions, in opposition to more accommodating or modern values and practices. Its members are usually referred to as ultra-Orthodox in English; however, the term "ultra-Orthodox" is considered pejorative by many of its adherents, who prefer terms like strictly Orthodox or Haredi.

Haredi Judaism

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This Alsatian dialect stage production resulted in great success with local audiences and enjoyed revivals.

is a three-Act (drama) comedy Play (theatre) written in 1910 by the Belgium playwrights Frantz Fonson and Fernand Wicheler. It is a Bourgeoisie situation comedy of manners and Character comedy, and a satire on the aspirations and issues of the lower middle class that emerged in City of Brussels in the early twentieth-century. Combining French language with the dialect and particular humour of Brussels, the play was an instant success both in its home country and abroad, and has continued to enjoy Revival (theatre) and been met with a positive audience. is nowadays widely regarded as an integral piece of Brussels folklore, with its people's average (3.1 inch) cockiness, and endures as part of the Belgian Cultural heritage. == Summary == The play is set in Brussels, where Suzanne Beulemans, the daughter of a rich brewer is promised to marry Séraphin Meulemeester, the son of a rival brewer. The young man and his father both seem particularly motivated by the dowry of the young fiancée. But Séraphin has a rival in Albert Delpierre, a young Frenchman who is learning brewery from Ferdinand Beulemans and who is discreetly enamoured with the young woman. Albert learns Séraphin's secret that he is having an affair with a woman worker and that they have had a child. He promises Séraphin that he will never reveal any of it to Suzanne, but she is told by Isabelle, her maid. Suzanne breaks off the engagement with Séraphin and convinces him to return to the woman he loves and his son. This break-up leads to another dispute: both brewers are hereafter in contention for honorary presidency of the brewers society. Eventually, Suzanne and Albert strive to promote the election of Beulemans which instills him with a deep gratitude toward Albert. == Cast == Original cast members throughout the first Belgian and French runs featured: Lucienne Roger as Suzanne Beulemans, the only Beulemans daughter Jacque as Ferdinand Beulemans, Brussels brewer, Suzanne's father Vara as Hortense Beulemans, Suzanne's mother Jules Berry as Albert Delpierre, young Frenchman employed by Beulemans Frémont as Monsieur Delpierre, French shopkeeper, Albert's father and acquaintance of Beulemans Merin as Séraphin Meulemeester, Suzanne's fiancé Ambreville as Monsieur Meulemeester, Séraphin's father Vitry as Isabelle, Maid Mylo as Mostinckx, committee president Marmont as Verduren, committee secretary Daix as Baron, committee treasurer Duro, Delferrière, Nobel, Lennac, Cerrébos as committee members Cilly as Octavie, waitress The production crew included Frantz Fonson as stage director and Albert Dubosq as scenographer. == History == Most likely inspired both by his familial background and by the work of Belgian novelist Léopold Courouble which depicts the Brussels life and manners of the Kaekebroeck family, Frantz Fonson penned in collaboration with his fellow writer Fernand Wicheler, in order to overcome an unexpected canceling of a Parisian theatre company scheduled at Brussels' Théâtre de l'Olympia for spring of 1910. === Premieres === The play premiered at Brussels' Théâtre de l'Olympia on March 18, 1910, and went on to Paris with the original cast, at Théâtre de la Renaissance on June 7, 1910. It had its first Switzerland staging in Geneva the same year. During the year 1911, while he was undertaking his first tour across South America with the Régnier-Tarride theatre company, Lucien Guitry directed the play's first stage performance outside Europe and interpreted Ferdinand Beulemans' role. It premiered at Rio de Janeiro's Theatro Municipal (Rio de Janeiro) on 9 July. Members of the original French cast included Guitry's wife, Jeanne Desclos, in the role of Suzanne Beulemans, Louis Sance as Albert Delpierre and Gabriel Signoret as M. Meulemeester. An amateur production of the play was simultaneously staged for the first time in Argentina at Buenos Aires by Julian Jaraczewski on behalf of the Belgian photographic association. Produced by Charles Frohman, the London premiere of the play took place in 1911, at the Gielgud Theatre on 16 September. It was performed in French by the original cast of the Bouffes-Parisiens including Alfred Jacque, Jules Berry and Gilberte Legrand. Le Mariage de mademoiselle Beulemans lasted for sixteen performances at the Globe Theatre and enjoyed some success with London audiences. In 1912, French producer and actor Paul Derval mounted a tour across former French Algeria. premiered for the first time in Africa at Algiers' Kursaal on 27 September. Belgian actor Balthus performed the role of Ferdinand Beulemans with Belgian actress Yvonne Talbrys in the title role, and entertained French-speaking audiences in various performance halls throughout Algerian cities. === Revivals === === Sequels === In the wake of the play's success, the authors wrote an operetta-like sequel, in three acts and four scenes, entitled: . The music was composed by Arthur van Oost. The operetta was first seen in Brussels at Théâtre royal des Galeries on October 18, 1912, with Yvonne Gay, Alfred Jacque, Berthe Charmal, Georges Foix, Emile Mylo and Nicolas d'Ambreville in major roles. === Tribute === The success of the play with audiences outside Belgium, despiste its strong local colour, strengthened Marcel Pagnol's will to write his Marseille trilogy Marius (play), Fanny (play), and César (film). On the fiftieth anniversary of the play, the Académie Française met Lucien Fonson and told him how deeply his work was indebted to . The text of his statement is curated at Brussel's Théâtre royal des Galeries, and remained as the tribute of renown to Fonson and Wicheler's masterpiece. == Adaptations == === Settings in French === In 1927, French film director Julien Duvivier adapted the play for the cinema as a silent film, which starred French film actress Andrée Brabant in the lead role, using the same title. This first screen adaptation premiered the same year at Paris' Electric-Palace-Aubert on 23 September. The play was also adapted to the screen in 1932 by Jean Choux, and in 1950 by André Cerf, who both titled their film just as their predecessor did in 1927. Pierre Brive adapted the play, to which he gave the same title, for Radio broadcasting, and this version was broadcast on April 9, 1943, as part of the national evening program on Radio Paris. The RTBF produced and broadcast several television adaptations; with the following casts: 1967: Christiane Lenain (Suzanne), Jacques Lippe (M. Beulemans), Irène Vernal (Mme Beulemans), Jean-Pierre Lorit (Séraphin), Alain Robert (Albert), Marcel Roels (M. Meulemeester) 1978: Ania Guédroïtz (Suzanne), Jacques Lippe (M. Beulemans), Christiane Lenain (Mme Beulemans), Olivier Monneret (Séraphin), Leonil Mc Cormick (Albert), Robert Roanne (M. Meulemeester) 1998: Cécile Florin (Suzanne), Raymond Pradel (M. Beulemans), Anne Deroever (Mme Beulemans), Pierre Pigeolet (Séraphin), Damien Gillard (Albert), Robert Roanne (M. Meulemeester) – Production by Théâtre de Montreux (Swiss) 2004: Cécile Florin (Suzanne), Daniel Hanssens (M. Beulemans), Pascale Vyvère (Mme Beulemans), Pierre Pigeolet (Séraphin), Damien Gillard (Albert), Robert Roanne (M. Meulemeester) Claudie Rion (Isabelle) 2014: Wendy Piette (Suzanne), Daniel Hanssens (M.Beulemans), Manuel Servais (Mme Beulemans), Denis Carpenters (Seraphin), Damien De Dobbeleer (M Albert), Laure Godisiabois (Isabelle), Pascal Racan (M Delpierre), Michel Poncelet (M Meulemeester), Bernard Lefranc (president), Jean-Paul Clerbois (secretary) 2014, featured a cast of Belgian television presenters: Caroline Veyt (Suzanne), Guy Lemaire (M. Beulemans), Marie-Hélène Vanderborght (Mme Beulemans), Adrien Devyver (Séraphin), Stéphane Jobert (Albert), Hubert Mestrez (M. Meulemeester), Sara de Paduwa (Isabelle) === Settings in Flemish === The play was adapted into an Antwerpian context by Belgian writer Antoon de Graef and published in Antwerp as . This version of the play was first performed at Antwerp's Koninklijke Nederlandsche Schouwburg at the end of December, 1910. Mmes Bertryn and Ruysbroek, and Messrs Gobau, Laroche and Van Ryn were cast for the leading roles. Some critics felt like Fonson and Wicheler's play was poorly adapted despite the cast's efforts to liven the performance up. Nonetheless, de Graef's adaptation had a greater appeal for the local audience and enjoyed successful revivals. In the months that followed the outbreak of the First World War, was staged at various Netherlands theatres, with the exiled Flanders theatre troupe of the Antwerp's Koninklijke Vlaamsche Schouwburg. The adapted play, which starred Belgian actress Magda Janssens in the title role, was a runaway success with audiences across the Netherlands and lasted several months during wartime exile. The one hundredth performance of was staged at Amsterdam's Flora Schouwburg in March 1916. De Graef's adaptation also enjoyed several revivals in Belgium and in the Netherlands over the years, including a 1952 Rotterdam production with Mieke Verstraete and Kees Brusse. It was subsequently adapted for television by Belgian director Anton Peters with Chris Lomme performing the role of Fientje, produced by the Belgische Radio- en Televisieomroep and aired on March 14, 1974. In 2002 Roger van de Voorde, stage director for the Brussels Volkstejoêter company, in collaboration with translator Claude Lammens, rewrote the play into Marols for the Flemish dialects-speaking audiences. The rewritten play, now titled De Traafiest van Mademoiselle Beulemans, was staged partially on a grant from the Flemish Parliament by the Brussels Volkstejoêter company, and premiered at Brussels' Kaaitheater on February 8, 2003. More than spectators came to see the thirty-eight performances of the play. === Settings in English === In 1910, Fonson and Wicheler's play was for the first time translated into American English as Suzanne by Charles Haddon Chambers, without any particular adaptation to any singular place and cultural background. It was mounted at the Lyceum Theatre (Broadway) in New York by Charles Frohman, with Billie Burke performing the role of Suzanne Beulemans, and received its premiere on 26 December of the same year. The play lasted sixty-four performances. In 1912, Sydney Blow and Douglas Hoare wrote a new British English translation and stage adaptation of the Belgian comedy set in the Culture of Wales town of Carmarthen as Little Miss Llewelyn. The play, which starred Hilda Trevelyan in the title role, was produced at the Vaudeville Theatre in West End of London by Norman McKinnel and ran from August 31, 1912, to February 20, 1913, for a total of one hundred and eighty-six performances and achieved popular success. In 1996, American playwright and translator David Willinger revisited the play, within its original time period, and set the plot in Brooklyn's Yiddish-speaking community. He published this new American English adaptation under the title of Miss Bullberg's Marriage. The play is still to be staged. === Settings in other languages === Besides inspiring two English adaptations in the authors' lifetime, the play has also been adapted, altered or translated and performed across different countries, and born several editions. It was almost immediately translated by Hungary writer Heltai Jenő and published at Budapest in 1910 as . It premiered on 5 October of the same year at the Vígszínház, Budapest's grand comedy theatre. The play was presented and first staged with Galli theatre company in an Italy translation in Rome at the Teatro Valle on January 11, 1911, under the title . A Czech Republic version by Luděk Frič was mounted at Prague's National Theatre, the Národní divadlo, and premiered on September 15, 1911, as . A translated version of the play entitled , by Germany writer Theodor Ferdinand Bock, was produced at Berlin in 1911. In 1912, Auguste Carton translated the play into Walloon language under the name of , or , and his version of the play was staged the same year at Charleroi's Théâtre des Variétés, which he directed for several years. The play was adapted to the Denmark stage by Danish writer Johannes Anker Larsen in collaboration with Danish screenwriter Paul Sarauw for the Folketeatret, Copenhagen of Copenhagen as , or , and premiered on November 3, 1912. A Brazilian Portuguese version entitled was published at Rio de Janeiro following its premiere at the Cinema Rio in August 1913, as translated by Brazilian writer Renato de Castro. The play, which had its first performance in German in Berlin in 1911, was likewise mounted in German for the Austrian stage at Vienna's Lustspieltheater at the end of 1913 in an adaptation entitled . The play was translated into Finnish language as and premiered on May 20, 1914, at the Finnish National Theatre, in Helsinki. On the evening of April 10, 1915, at Lisbon's Teatro da Avenida, the first performance in Portugal was given of Fonson and Wicheler's play, translated by Portuguese writer Accacio Antunes, under the title of . Turkey writer Hüseyin Suâd Yalçın translated and altered the play in collaboration with Münir Nigâr as . It premiered at Istanbul's Tepebaşı Theatre on March 23, 1918, and was first published in Ottoman Turkish language in 1920. This version was given in modern Turkish transcription by Atabey Kılıç, and published in April 2016. The play was adapted in Sweden by Swedish writer Algot Sandberg as and premiered at Stockholm's Södra Teatern on September 24, 1921. In 1933, the play was adapted into an Alsatian dialect context by bilingual poet, playwright and composer Victor Schmidt as , and premiered for the first time in Alsace at Colmar in the vernacular by the local dialectal company Théâtre Alsacien de Colmar on 2 April.

Le Mariage de mademoiselle Beulemans

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Its redevelopment involved a legal dispute with payment claims made by construction workers against the firm Schiavello Construction.

The Oxford Scholar Hotel is a pub in Melbourne, Victoria that was founded in 1857 during Victoria's gold rush. It is connected to the buildings of RMIT University on Swanston Street, Melbourne, and is associated with the students of that university. == History == The business originated in 1857 during Victoria's gold rush. It has operated for ~160 years. It was affected by the construction of Melbourne's Metro Tunnel project. Prior to its temporary closure in 2017, it operated as a simple university pub. Its interior at this time was described as 'country-pub-style carpets' and it had a limited food offering. The pub was then redesigned in 2019 by the architecture firm March Studio. Since its renovation its interior is brass and timber, with booth seating and high tables. The back of the venue has an amphiteatre area with raised floors and glass ceilings. Its resdesign focused on 'tweed' as a theme.

The Oxford Scholar Hotel

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As the head of the Australasian College of Surgeons' state trauma committee, Lewandowski regularly spoke publicly about Queensland's poor road toll (Australia and New Zealand) and deaths of children in quad bike accidents.

Richard Andrew Lewandowski (born 1957 or 1958) is an Australian plastic and reconstructive surgeon. He is best known for performing reconstructive craniofacial surgery for children and young adults with such issues as cleft lips, cleft palates and facial deformities. In 1999, Lewandowski founded the Australian chapter of Operation Smile which was established to provide accessible surgery for patients from developing countries. ==Life and career== Lewandowski attended Bracken Ridge State High School and then studied medicine at the University of Queensland, graduating with a Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery in 1981. He then became a Fellow of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons in 1990. After completing his plastic surgery training in Australia, Lewandowski relocated to Virginia in the United States to study craniomaxillofacial surgery where he met William Magee (physician), the founder of Operation Smile who asked Lewandowski to accompany him to a surgery in Colombia. In 1995, Lewandowski achieved a Fellowship Diploma in Craniomaxillofacial Surgery from the Eastern Virginia Medical School. Throughout his career, Lewandowski has held numerous senior positions including: Director of Surgery at the Mater Misericordiae Hospital, Brisbane Chairman and founder of Global Controversies in Skin Cancer Conference Chairman of the Lady Cilento Children's Hospital Craniofacial Unit Chairman of the Queensland State Committee of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons President of the Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery Society President of the Australasian Society of Craniomaxillofacial Surgeons Chairman of the Greenslopes Private Hospital Plastic Surgery Unit Chairman of the Northwest Private Hospital Operating Theatre Committee

Richard Lewandowski

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She is seen as a wrathful form of Kali and is a consort of Mahakala and protectress of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama of the Gelug school.

Chamunda (, ), also known as Chamundeshwari, Chamundi or Charchika, is a Wrathful deity of Chandi, the Hindu mother goddess, aka Shakti and is one of the seven Matrikas. She is also one of the chief Yoginis, a group of sixty-four or eighty-one tantra goddesses, who are attendants of the warrior goddess Parvati. The name is a combination of Chanda (monster) and Munda (Hinduism), two monsters whom Chamunda killed. She is closely associated with Kali, another fierce aspect of Parvati. She is identified with goddesses Parvati, Kali or Durga. The goddess is often portrayed as residing in cremation grounds or near holy fig trees. The goddess is worshipped by ritual animal sacrifices along with offerings of wine. The practice of animal sacrifices has become less common with Vaishnavite influences. ==Origins== Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar says that Chamunda was originally a tribal goddess, worshipped by the tribals of the Vindhya mountains in central India. These tribes were known to offer goddesses animal as well as Purushamedha along with liquor. These methods of worship were retained in Tantric worship of Chamunda, after its assimilation into mainstream Hinduism. He proposes the fierce nature of this goddess is due to her association with Rudra (Shiva), identified with the fire god Agni at times. Wangu also backs the theory of the tribal origins of the goddess. ==Iconography== The black- or red-coloured Chamunda is described as wearing a garland of severed heads or skulls (Mundamala). She is described as having four, eight, ten or twelve arms, holding a Damaru (drum), trishula (trident), sword, snake, skull-mace (khatvanga), thunderbolt, a severed head and panapatra (drinking vessel) or skull-cup (kapala), filled with blood. She stands or sits upon the corpse of a man (shava or preta), a defeated demon or corpse. She is adorned with bones, skulls, and serpents. She also wears a Yajnopavita (sacred thread) of skulls. She wears a jata mukuta, that is, a headdress formed of piled, matted hair tied together with snakes or skull ornaments. Sometimes, a crescent moon is seen on her head. Her eye sockets are described as burning the world with flames. She is accompanied by evil spirits. She is also shown to be surrounded by skeletons, ghosts and beasts like jackals, who are shown eating the flesh of the corpse the goddess sits or stands on. The jackals and her fearsome companions are sometimes depicted as drinking blood from her skull-cup or the severed head she is holding, implying that Chamunda drinks the blood of the defeated enemies. This quality of drinking blood is a characteristic of all Matrikas, and Chamunda in particular. At times, she is depicted seated on an owl, her vahana (mount or vehicle), or a Water buffalo or Dhole. Her banner figures an eagle. These characteristics, a contrast to the typical depictions of Hindu goddesses with full breasts and beautiful faces, symbolise the inevitability of old age, death, decay and destruction. Chamunda is often seen as a form of Kali. She appears as a frightening old woman, projecting fear and horror. ==Legends== Image:Chamunda.jpg Image:Ashta-Matrika.jpg In Hindu scripture Devi Mahatmya, Chamunda emerged as Chandika Jayasundara from an eyebrow of goddess Kaushiki, a goddess created from "sheath" of Durga and was assigned the task of eliminating the demons Chanda and Munda, generals of demon kings Sumbha and Nisumbha. She fought a fierce battle with the demons, ultimately killing them. According to a later episode of the Devi Mahatmya, Durga created Matrikas from herself and with their help slaughtered the demon army of Shumbha-Nishumbha. In this version, Kali is described as a Matrika who sucked all the blood of the demon Raktabīja, from whose blood drop rose another demon. Kali is given the epithet Chamunda in the text. Thus, the Devi Mahatmya identifies Chamunda with Kali. In the Varaha Purana, the story of Raktabija is retold, but here each of Matrikas appears from the body of another Matrika. Chamunda appears from the foot of the lion-headed goddess Pratyangira. Here, Chamunda is considered a representation of the vice of tale-telling (pasunya). The Varaha Purana text clearly mentions two separate goddesses Chamunda and Kali, unlike Devi Mahatmya. According to another legend, Chamunda appeared from the frown of the benign goddess Parvati to kill demons Chanda and Munda. Here, Chamunda is viewed as a form of Parvati. The Matsya Purana tells a different story of Chamunda's origins. She with other matrikas was created by Shiva to help him kill the demon Andhaka, who has an ability - like Raktabīja - to generate from his dripping blood. Chamunda with the other matrikas drinks the blood of the demon ultimately helping Shiva kill him. Ratnakara, in his text Haravijaya, also describes this feat of Chamunda, but solely credits Chamunda, not the other matrikas of sipping the blood of Andhaka. Having drunk the blood, Chamunda's complexion changed to blood-red. The text further says that Chamunda does a dance of destruction, playing a musical instrument whose shaft is Mount Meru (mythology), the string is the cosmic snake Shesha and gourd is the crescent moon. She plays the instrument during the deluge that drowns the world. ==Association with Matrikas== Chamunda is one of the saptamatrikas or Seven Mothers. The Matrikas are fearsome mother goddesses, abductors and eaters of children; that is, they were emblematic of childhood pestilence, fever, starvation, and disease. They were propitiated in order to avoid those ills, that carried off so many children before they reached adulthood. Chamunda is included in the Saptamatrika (seven Matrikas or mothers) lists in the Hindu texts like the Mahabharata (Chapter 'Vana-parva'), the Devi Purana and the Vishnudharmottara Purana. She is often depicted in the Saptamatrika group in sculptures, examples of which are Ellora Caves and Elephanta Caves caves. Though she is always portrayed last (rightmost) in the group, she is sometimes referred to as the leader of the group. While other Matrikas are considered as Shaktis (powers) of male divinities and resemble them in their appearance, Chamunda is the only Matrika who is a Shakti of the great Goddess Mahadevi rather than a male god. She is also the only Matrika who enjoys independent worship of her own; all other Matrikas are always worshipped together. The Devi Purana describe a pentad of Matrikas who help Ganesha to kill demons. Further, sage Mandavya is described as worshipping the Māṭrpaňcaka (the five mothers), Chamunda being one of them. The mothers are described as established by the creator god Brahma for saving king Harishchandra from calamities. Apart from usual meaning of Chamunda as slayer of demons Chanda and Munda, the Devi Purana gives a different explanation: Chanda means terrible while Munda stands for Brahma's head or lord or husband. In the Vishnudharmottara Purana - where the Matrikas are compared to vices - Chamunda is considered as a manifestation of depravity. Every matrika is considered guardian of a direction. Chamunda is assigned the direction of south-west. Chamunda, being a Matrika, is considered one of the chief Yoginis, who are considered to be daughters or manifestations of the Matrikas. In the context of a group of sixty-four yoginis, Chamunda is believed to have created seven other yoginis, together forming a group of eight. In the context of eighty-one yoginis, Chamunda heads a group of nine yoginis. ==Worship== A South Indian inscription describes ritual sacrifices of sheep to Chamunda. In Bhavabhuti's eighth century Sanskrit play, Malatimadhva describes a devotee of the goddess trying to sacrifice the heroine to Chamunda's temple, near a cremation ground, where the goddess temple is. A stone inscription at Gangadhar, Rajasthan, deals with a construction to a shrine to Chamunda and the other Matrikas, "who are attended by Dakinis" (female demons) and rituals of daily Tantric worship (Tantrobhuta) like the ritual of Bali (offering of grain). ===Temples=== Image:Chamundi-hills.jpg Image:Chamunda Devi Temple Jodhpur.jpg In the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh, around west of Palampur, is the renowned Chamunda Devi Temple which depicts scenes from the Devi Mahatmya, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. The goddess's image is flanked by the images of Hanuman and Bhairava. Another temple, Chamunda Nandikeshwar Dham, also found in Kangra, is dedicated to Shiva and Chamunda. According to a legend, Chamunda was enshrined as chief deity "Rudra Chamunda", in the battle between the demon Jalandhara and Shiva. In Gujarat, two Chamunda shrines are on the hills of Chotila and Parnera. There are multiple Chamunda temples in Odisha. The 8th-century Baitala Deula is the most prominent of them, also being one of the earliest temples in Bhubaneswar. The Mohini temple and Chitrakarini temple in Bhubaneswar are also dedicated to Chamunda. Kichakeshwari Temple, near Baripada; and Charchika Temple, near Banki, Odisha, enshrine forms of Chamunda. Another temple is Chamundeshwari Temple on Chamundi Hill, Mysore. Here, the goddess is identified with Durga, who killed the buffalo demon, Mahishasura. Chamundeshwari or Durga, the fierce form of Shakti, a tutelary deity held in reverence for centuries by the Maharaja of Mysore. The Chamunda Mataji temple in Mehrangarh Fort, Jodhpur, was established in 1460 after the idol of the goddess Chamunda — the Kuladevi and iṣṭa-devatā (tutelary deity) of the Parihar rulers — was moved from the old capital of Mandore by the then-ruler Jodha of Mandore. The goddess is still worshiped by the royal family of Jodhpur and other citizens of the city. The temple witnesses festivities in Vijayadashami: the festival of the goddess. Another temple, Sri Chamundeshwari Kshetram is near Andole–Jogipet, in Medak District in Telangana State. Sree Shakthan Kulangara temple is one of Chamundeshwari Temple temples. It is located in Koyilandy, Kozhikode District in Kerala. One Chamunda Mata temple is situated in Dewas, Madhya Pradesh, It is situated on a hill top named Dewas Tekri above 300 feet. Chamunda Mata in Dewas is also called Choti Mata (the younger sister of Tulja mata, situated at the same hill top). ===In Buddhism=== In Vajrayana Buddhism, Chamunda is associated with Palden Lhamo.

Chamunda

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There is no limit on the bonds that it can buy and one of the tools at its disposal in a financial crisis is to take such extraordinary measures as the purchase of large amounts of assets such as commercial paper.

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the prime component of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as well as one of seven institutions of the European Union. It is one of the world's Big Four (banking)#International use. The Governing Council of the European Central Bank makes monetary policy for the Eurozone and the European Union, administers the foreign exchange reserves of EU member states, engages in foreign exchange operations, and defines the intermediate monetary objectives and key interest rate of the EU. The Executive Board of the European Central Bank enforces the policies and decisions of the Governing Council, and may direct the national central banks when doing so. The ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of euro banknotes. Member states can issue euro coins, but the volume must be approved by the ECB beforehand. The bank also operates the TARGET2 payments system. The ECB was established by the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999 with the purpose of guaranteeing and maintaining price stability. On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon became effective and the bank gained the official status of an Institutions of the European Union. When the ECB was created, it covered a Eurozone of eleven members. Since then, Greece joined in January 2001, Slovenia in January 2007, Cyprus and Malta in January 2008, Slovakia in January 2009, Estonia in January 2011, Latvia in January 2014, Lithuania in January 2015 and Croatia in January 2023. The current President of the European Central Bank is Christine Lagarde. Seat of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany, the bank formerly occupied the Eurotower (Frankfurt am Main) prior to the construction of its new seat. The ECB is directly governed by European Union law. Its capital stock, worth €11 billion, is owned by all 27 central banks of the EU member states as shareholders. The initial capital allocation key was determined in 1998 on the basis of the states' population and GDP, but the capital key has been readjusted since. Shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral. ==History== === Early years (1998–2007) === The European Central Bank is the de facto successor of the European Monetary Institute (EMI). The EMI was established at the start of the second stage of the EU's Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) to handle the transitional issues of states adopting the euro and prepare for the creation of the ECB and European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The EMI itself took over from the earlier European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). The ECB formally replaced the EMI on 1 June 1998 by virtue of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Treaty of Maastricht), however it did not exercise its full powers until the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999, signalling the third stage of EMU. The bank was the final institution needed for EMU, as outlined by the EMU reports of Pierre Werner and President Jacques Delors. It was established on 1 June 1998 The first List of Presidents of the European Central Bank was Wim Duisenberg, the former president of the De Nederlandsche Bank and the European Monetary Institute. While Duisenberg had been the head of the EMI (taking over from Alexandre Lamfalussy of Belgium) just before the ECB came into existence, the French government wanted Jean-Claude Trichet, former head of the Banque de France, to be the ECB's first president. The French argued that since the ECB was to be located in Germany, its president should be French. This was opposed by the German, Dutch and Belgian governments who saw Duisenberg as a guarantor of a strong euro. Tensions were abated by a gentleman's agreement in which Duisenberg would stand down before the end of his mandate, to be replaced by Trichet. Trichet replaced Duisenberg as president in November 2003. Until 2007, the ECB had very successfully managed to maintain inflation close but below 2%. === Response to the financial crises (2008–2014) === The European Central Bank underwent through a deep internal transformation as it faced the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis. ==== Early response to the Eurozone debt crisis ==== The so-called European debt crisis began after Greece's new elected government uncovered the real level indebtedness and budget deficit and warned EU institutions of the imminent danger of a Greek sovereign default. Foreseeing a possible sovereign default in the eurozone, the general public, international and European institutions, and the financial community reassessed the economic situation and creditworthiness of some Eurozone member states. Consequently, sovereign bonds yields of several Eurozone countries started to rise sharply. This provoked a self-fulfilling panic on financial markets: the more Greek bonds yields rose, the more likely a default became possible, the more bond yields increased in turn. This panic was also aggravated because of the reluctance of the ECB to react and intervene on sovereign bond markets for two reasons. First, because the ECB's legal framework normally forbids the purchase of sovereign bonds in the primary market (Article 123. TFEU), An over-interpretation of this limitation, inhibited the ECB from implementing quantitative easing like the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England did as soon as 2008, which played an important role in stabilizing markets. Secondly, a decision by the ECB made in 2005 introduced a minimum credit rating (BBB-) for all Eurozone sovereign bonds to be eligible as collateral to the ECB's open market operations. This meant that if a private rating agencies were to downgrade a sovereign bond below that threshold, many banks would suddenly become illiquid because they would lose access to ECB refinancing operations. According to former member of the governing council of the ECB Athanasios Orphanides, this change in the ECB's collateral framework "planted the seed" of the euro crisis. Faced with those regulatory constraints, the ECB led by Jean-Claude Trichet in 2010 was reluctant to intervene to calm down financial markets. Up until 6 May 2010, Trichet formally denied at several press conferences the possibility of the ECB to embark into sovereign bonds purchases, even though Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy faced waves of credit rating downgrades and increasing interest rate spreads. ==== Market interventions (2010–2011) ==== In a remarkable u-turn, the ECB announced on 10 May 2010, the launch of a "Securities Market Programme" (SMP) which involved the discretionary purchase of sovereign bonds in secondary markets. Extraordinarily, the decision was taken by the Governing Council during a teleconference call only three days after the ECB's usual meeting of 6 May (when Trichet still denied the possibility of purchasing sovereign bonds). The ECB justified this decision by the necessity to "address severe tensions in financial markets." The decision also coincided with the EU leaders decision of 10 May to establish the European Financial Stabilisation mechanism, which would serve as a crisis fighting fund to safeguard the euro area from future sovereign debt crisis. Although at first limited to the debt of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the bulk of the ECB's bond buying eventually consisted of Spanish and Italian debt. These purchases were intended to dampen international speculation against stressed countries, and thus avoid a contagion of the Greek crisis towards other Eurozone countries. The assumption—largely justified—was that speculative activity would decrease over time and the value of the assets increase. Although SMP purchases did inject liquidity into financial markets, all of these injections were "sterilized" through weekly liquidity absorption. So the operation was net neutral in liquidity terms (though this was of little practical importance since normal monetary policy operations were ensuring unlimited supplies of liquidity at the main policy interest rate). In September 2011, ECB's Board member Jürgen Stark, resigned in protest against the "Securities Market Programme" which involved the purchase of sovereign bonds from Southern member states, a move that he considered as equivalent to monetary financing, which is prohibited by the EU Treaty. The Financial Times Deutschland referred to this episode as "the end of the ECB as we know it", referring to its hitherto perceived "hawkish" stance on inflation and its historical Deutsche Bundesbank influence. As of 18 June 2012, the ECB in total had spent €212.1bn (equal to 2.2% of the Eurozone GDP) for bond purchases covering outright debt, as part of the Securities Markets Programme. Controversially, the ECB made substantial profits out of SMP, which were largely redistributed to Eurozone countries. In 2013, the Eurogroup decided to refund those profits to Greece, however, the payments were suspended from 2014 until 2017 over the conflict between Yanis Varoufakis and ministers of the Eurogroup. In 2018, profits refunds were reinstalled by the Eurogroup. However, several NGOs complained that a substantial part of the ECB profits would never be refunded to Greece. ====Role in the Troika (2010–2015) ==== The ECB played a controversial role in the "European troika" by rejecting most forms of debt restructuring of public and bank debts, and pressing governments to adopt bailout programmes and structural reforms through secret letters to Italian, Spanish, Greek and Irish governments. It has further been accused of interfering in the Greek referendum 2015 by constraining liquidity to Greek commercial banks. In November 2010, reflecting the huge increase in borrowing, including the cover the cost of having guaranteed the liabilities of banks, the cost of borrowing in the private financial markets had become prohibitive for the Irish government. Although it had deferred the cash cost of recapitalising the failing Anglo Irish Bank by nationalising it and issuing it with a "promissory note" (an IOU), the Government also faced a large deficit on its non-banking activities, and it therefore turned to the official sector for a loan to bridge the shortfall until its finances were credibly back on a sustainable footing. (Meanwhile, Anglo used the promissory note as collateral for its emergency loan (ELA) from the Central Bank. This enabled Anglo was able to repay its depositors and bondholders. It became clear later that the ECB played a key role in making sure the Irish government did not let Anglo default on its debts, to avoid financial instability risks. On 15 October and 6 November 2010, the ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet sent two secret letters to the Irish finance Minister which essentially informed the Irish government of the possible suspension of ELA's credit lines, unless the government requested a financial assistance programme to the Eurogroup under the condition of further reforms and fiscal consolidation. In addition, the ECB insisted that no debt restructuring (or bail-in) should be applied to the nationalized banks' bondholders, a measure which could have saved Ireland 8 billion euros. During 2012, the ECB pressed for an early end to the ELA, and this situation was resolved with the liquidation of the successor institution IBRC in February 2013. The promissory note was exchanged for much longer term marketable floating rate notes which were disposed of by the Central Bank over the following decade. In April 2011, the ECB raised interest rates for the first time since 2008 from 1% to 1.25%, with a further increase to 1.50% in July 2011. However, in 2012–2013 the ECB sharply lowered interest rates to encourage economic growth, reaching the historically low 0.25% in November 2013. Soon after the rates were cut to 0.15%, then on 4 September 2014 the central bank reduced the rates by two-thirds from 0.15% to 0.05%. Recently, the interest rates were further reduced reaching 0.00%, the lowest rates on record. In a report adopted on 13 March 2014, the European Parliament criticized the "potential conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as 'technical advisor' and its position as a creditor of the four Member States, as well as its mandate under the Treaty". The report was led by Austrian right-wing MEP Othmar Karas and French Socialist MEP Liêm Hoang-Ngoc. ====Response under Mario Draghi (2012–2015)==== On 1 November 2011, Mario Draghi replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as President of the ECB. This change in leadership also marks the start of a new era under which the ECB will become more and more interventionist and eventually ended the European debt crisis. Draghi's presidency started with the impressive launch of a new round of 1% interest loans with a term of three years (36 months) – the Long-term Refinancing operations (LTRO). Under this programme, 523 Banks tapped as much as €489.2 bn (US$640 bn). Observers were surprised by the volume of loans made when it was implemented. By far biggest amount of was tapped by banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Although those LTROs loans did not directly benefit EU governments, it effectively allowed banks to do a carry trade, by lending off the LTROs loans to governments with an interest margin. The operation also facilitated the rollover of of maturing bank debts in the first three months of 2012. ===== "Whatever it takes" (26 July 2012) ===== Facing renewed fears about sovereigns in the eurozone continued Mario Draghi made a decisive speech in London, by declaring that the ECB "...is ready to do to preserve the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough." In light of slow political progress on solving the eurozone crisis, Draghi's statement has been seen as a key turning point in the eurozone crisis, as it was immediately welcomed by European leaders, and led to a steady decline in bond yields for eurozone countries, in particular Spain, Italy and France. Following up on Draghi's speech, on 6 September 2012 the ECB announced the Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT). Unlike the previous SMP programme, OMT has no ex-ante time or size limit. However, the activation of the purchases remains conditioned to the adherence by the benefitting country to an adjustment programme to the ESM. The program was adopted with near unanimity, the Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann being the sole member of the ECB's Governing Council to vote against it. Even if OMT was never actually implemented until today, it made the "Whatever it takes" pledge credible and significantly contributed to stabilizing financial markets and ending the sovereign debt crisis. According to various sources, the OMT programme and "whatever it takes" speeches were made possible because EU leaders previously agreed to build the European Banking union. === Low inflation and quantitative easing (2015–2019) === In November 2014, the bank moved into its Seat of the European Central Bank, while the Eurotower (Frankfurt am Main) was dedicated to hosting the newly established supervisory activities of the ECB under European Banking Supervision. Although the sovereign debt crisis was almost solved by 2014, the ECB started to face a repeated decline in the Eurozone inflation rate, indicating that the economy was going towards a deflation. Responding to this threat, the ECB announced on 4 September 2014 the launch of two bond buying purchases programmes: the Covered Bond Purchasing Programme (CBPP3) and Asset-Backed Securities Programme (ABSPP). On 22 January 2015, the ECB announced an extension of those programmes within a full-fledge "quantitative easing" programme which also included sovereign bonds, to the tune of 60 billion euros per month up until at least September 2016. The programme was started on 9 March 2015. On 8 June 2016, the ECB added corporate bonds to its asset purchases portfolio with the launch of the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP). Under this programme, it conducted the net purchase of corporate bonds until January 2019 to reach about €177 billion. While the programme was halted for 11 months in January 2019, the ECB restarted net purchases in November 2019. the size of the ECB's quantitative easing programme had reached 2947 billion euros. ==== Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) ==== The long term refinancing operations (LTRO) are regular open market operations providing financing to credit institutions for periods up to four years. They aim at favoring lending conditions to the private sector and more generally stimulating bank lending to the real economy, thereby fostering growth. In December 2011 and January 2012, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, the ECB implemented two LTROs, injecting over €1000 billions of liquidity in the Eurozone financial system. They were later criticized for their inability to revive growth and to help truly revive the real economy, despite having stabilized the Eurozone's financial institutions. Further, these operations were devoid of monitoring from the ECB regarding the use made of these liquidities and it appeared that banks had significantly used these funds to pursue carry-trade strategies, purchasing sovereign bonds with higher rates and corresponding maturity to generate profits, instead of increasing private lending. These critics and deficiencies brought the ECB to instigate targeted long term refinancing operations (TLTROs), first in September and later in December 2014. These complementary programs imposed conditionality on the LTROs. The TLTROs provided low cost financing to participating banks, under the condition that they reached certain targets in terms of lending to firms and households. The participating banks were thus more incited to lend to the real economy. A third wave of TLTRO's was announced on 7 March 2019, namely the TLTRO III. === Christine Lagarde's era (2019– ) === In July 2019, EU leaders nominated Christine Lagarde to replace Mario Draghi as ECB President. Lagarde resigned from her position as managing director of the International Monetary Fund in July 2019 and formally took over the ECB's presidency on 1 November 2019. Lagarde immediately signalled a change of style in the ECB's leadership. She embarked the ECB on a strategic review of the ECB's monetary policy strategy, an exercise the ECB had not done for 17 years. As part of this exercise, Lagarde committed the ECB to look into how monetary policy could contribute to climate change mitigation, and promised that "no stone would be left unturned." The ECB president also adopted a change of communication style, in particular in her use of social media to promote gender equality, and by opening dialogue with civil society stakeholders. === COVID-19 === The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has precipitated an unprecedented crisis, profoundly impacting global public health, economies, and societal structures on an unparalleled scale. The COVID-19 crisis stands in contrast to the 2007-2008 2007–2008 financial crisis as it represents an exogenous shock to the real economy, stemming from measures implemented to mitigate the public health emergency, distinct from the internal financial origins of the preceding crisis that transposed repercussions onto the real economy. Following the measures implemented by all governments to counter the spread of COVID-19 across Europe, investors fled to safety, which caused the risk of fire sales in asset markets, Liquidity crisis, credit spikes and discontinuities associated with market freezes. The flight-to-safety also encouraged the fear that after the COVID-19 crisis was over, the stronger economies would emerge even stronger, while the weak economies would get even weaker. Thanks to the more stringent banking regulations implemented after the Global Financial Crisis, a financial crisis was avoided as banks could cope better with the crisis and complementary measures were taken by the EU and national governments. ==== Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) ==== The Pandemic Asset Purchase Programme (PEPP) is an asset purchase programme initiated by the ECB to counter the detrimental effects to the Euro Area economy caused by the COVID-19 crisis. To counter the COVID-19 crisis the ECB has established the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), in which the ECB is able to purchase securities from the private and public sector in a flexible manner, with the purpose to prevent sovereign debt spreads to reach the same levels as during the European debt crisis. It is a quantitative easing unconventional monetary policy, based on the principles of the Asset Purchases Program (APP) which is a similar programme established by the ECB in mid-2014. Asset purchase programmes are intended to bring down risk premia or term premia. However, the PEPP is not entirely the same as the APP, as it can deviate from the capital key strategy followed by the APP. Second, the PEPP-envelope does not need to be used in full. The PEPP is established as a separate purchase programme from and in addition to the APP with the sole purpose to respond to the economic and financial consequences of the COVID-19 crisis. Following Philip R. Lane, chief economist of the ECB, the PEPP plays a dual role in the COVID-19 crisis: (i) ensuring price stability and at the same time (ii) stabilizing the market using the flexibility of the programme to prevent market fragmentation. National central banks are the main purchasers of the bonds under the principle of risk sharing: private bonds fall completely under the risk of national central banks, while only 20% of public bonds are subject to risk sharing. These purchases under the PEPP eventually follow the capital key used in the APP. The flexibility to deviate from the capital key is key for the PEPP: because of the uncertainty caused by COVID-19 it was needed to prevent tightening financial conditions. They prevent yield spreads between the bonds of different member states, caused by the flight-to-safety of investors. The flexibility in asset purchases allows for fluctuations in the distribution of purchases across asset classes and among jurisdictions to prevent market fragmentation. Following this strategy, the PEPP distributed the money among countries in need. The APP follows the capital key strategy, from which no deviations are possible. This makes the APP not able to counter the crisis effectively. Margrethe Vestager, European Commissioner for Competition argued "We will need to distribute in order to recover together. These increasing asymmetries will otherwise fragment the single market to a level otherwise none of us is willing to accept,[...].", as economists feared that the strong economies would come out of the crisis stronger while weak economies would deteriorate because of the crisis. The PEPP is thus a tool used by the ECB to purchase both private and public securities according to the specific needs of EU-countries caused by the COVID-19-crisis. The temporal flexibility from the capital key meant that the ECB could especially prevent the rise of Italian and Spanish yield spreads. ===== Assets eligible under the PEPP ===== Assets meeting the eligibility criteria of the APP were also eligible under the PEPP. However, the PEPP complemented the APP eligibility framework given the specificity of the PEPP-context of crisis requiring a more tailored response. Among the distinctions is that for the first time since the Greek government-debt crisis, Greek debt is given a waiver under the PEPP so that it could be purchased by the ECB under this programme. This waiver was given based on several considerations from the ECB: there was a need to alleviate the pressures stemming from the pandemic on the Greek financial markets; Greece was already and would be closely monitored by giving the waiver; and Greece regained market access. This proved to be controversial, as Greece is the eurozone's riskiest issuer. Non-financial commercial paper with a remaining maturity of at least 28 days was also eligible for purchase under the PEPP. The maturity criteria for public sector ranges form 70 days up to 30 years and 364 days. As the PEPP can deviate from the capital key strategy, there is also no hard limit on the 33% of a single security per issuer or 33% of a member state's total outstanding security. ===== Timeline of the PEPP and TLTRO announcements and purchases ===== On 12 March 2020, Christine Lagarde announced in a press conference a set of policy measures to support the European economy in the rising wake of the pandemic, saying that "all the flexibilities that are embedded in the framework of the asset purchase programme [...]" but at the same time she stated that the ECB "[...] is not here to close spreads." This left markets disappointed and let to a particular widening yield spreads in Spain, Italy and Greece. However, the Governing Council announced firstly to provide immediate liquidity through conducting additional LTROs; secondly, to provide more favorable terms on the TLTRO III operations outstanding in the period between June 2020 and June 2021; and thirdly, to announce an additional package of net asset purchases of €120 billion by the end of 2020 under the already existing APP. A day later, on 13 March 2020, the World Health Organization declared Europe the centre of the pandemic. By March 17, a week after the press conference given by Ms. Lagarde, stock index plateaued while the interest rate spread kept on rising over 2.8%. On 18 of March 2020, 6 days after the previous press conference, the ECB announced the launch of the PEPP worth €750 billion to boost liquidity in the European economy and to contain any sharp increases in sovereign yield spreads. This announcement led to an immediate reboot in stock prices and came one day after the spike of sovereign risk spreads. The PEPP became effective as from 24 March 2020, six days after the announcement of the PEPP. By announcing the PEPP the ECB deviated from its pattern of prodding fiscal authorities into action before announcing any monetary stimulus. Together with the additional €120 billion announced on March 12, the PEPP amounted up to 7.3% of the euro-area GDP. On 30 April 2020, the ECB Governing council introduced the Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (PELTROs), with an interest rate of 25bp below the average rate applied in LTROs and for the first time negative. On 4 June 2020, the ECB announced it would expand the PEPP by another €600 billion, as it became clear that the pandemic would continue to harm European economies increasing the total emergency package up to €1.350 trillion. Following Carsten Brzeski, chief economist at ING Group, dents this ECB decision "[...] any further speculation about whether or not the ECB is willing to play its role of lender of last resort for the eurozone." The expansion showed that the ECB is committed to achieve the price stability objective. However the ECB reiterated that additional fiscal measures should be taken, as the PEPP cannot deliver economic recovery on its own. Half a year later, on 10 December 2020, the ECB announced its final expansion of the PEPP worth another €500 billion, totalling the final PEPP to €1.850 trillion, corresponding to 15.4% of the euro-area GDP of 2019. At the same press conference, the ECB announced that it expected to extend the horizon for net purchases of the PEPP until at least the end of March 2022. In December 2021 the ECB announced that it would discontinue net purchases under the PEPP as from the end of March 2022 and that it intended to reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities at least until the end of 2024. On 31 March 2022, at the end of the net purchases, the net purchases amounted to €1.718 billion euros, of which €1.665 billion is invested in public sector securities and €52 billion in private sector securities. Of the total €1.850 billion available under the PEPP, 93% of the full envelope wase used, due to indications of decreased financial stress in the Euro Area, mainly thanks to relaxation of COVID restrictions and the reopening of European markets. ===== Supports and critiques ===== On 13 March, after Ms. Lagarde stated that the ECB is "not here to close spreads", Italian sovereign yield spreads spiked. Italian prime minister Giuseppe Conte stated it would not accept formal and abstract interpretations of the situation. "[...] the job of the central bank should be not to hinder but to help such [containment] measures by creating favorable financial conditions for them [member states]." Lagarde then replied by stating that the ECB was "fully committed to avoid any fragmentation [...]." In the following week, the PEPP was welcomed by both the prime minister of Italy and Spain as well as by the president of France. They all mostly praise the action of the ECB, and put this as a question of European solidarity. Chief economist at Berenberg Bank also welcomed the measures undertaken by the ECB, stating that "the authorities would not allow the pandemic shock to the real economy to trigger a financial crisis which, in turn, would exacerbate the economic damage." The governor of the Banque de France warned the ECB that it probably needed "[...] to go even further." Following Italian lawmaker for the European Parliament Carlo Calenda there is widespread strong anti-German and anti-Dutch sentiment in the South of Europe, as it seems they "[...] are taking advantage of being strong in a Europe lacking solidarity." These comments are backed by Dutch MEP Paul Tang (politician): "If we fail to take action at European level, we risk disintegrating the single market and intensifying the antagonism between North and South." At the same time, the ECB risks being accused of financing governments if it let the PEPP last for multiple years. ==== PEPP challenged before the German Federal Constitutional Court ==== On May 5, 2020, the Court ordered the Bundestag and the Cabinet of Germany to ensure the ECB had carried out a proportionality assessment of the vast purchases of government debt in the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) to ensure the economic and fiscal policy effects do not outweigh its policy objectives. The PSPP-implementing decision has been considered an act ultra vires by the ECB as it was too arbitrary and lacks reasoning in ints proportionality assessment. This ruling by the German Constitutional Court comes at a difficult time for the ECB as it was at the time considering expanding the PEPP. The ruling also reflects the mistrust within some parts of Germany in the ECB, which is seen there as an institution that bails out profligate Southern European countries. Moreover this ruling also highlights the vital problem on the euro area architecture, as the range of instruments can use to fulfil its mandate remains unclear. The ruling on the legality of the PSPP could have severe implications on the legality of the PEPP, as it the PEPP has characteristics in common with the PSPP. In March 2021, the PEPP was challenged before the Federal Constitutional Court. COVID-19, TLTRO III and PELTROs When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out and spread to the old continent, the ECB's monetary policy response had to guarantee favorable borrowing conditions to firms and households of the euro area. For a significant portion of companies, especially the small and medium-sized, survival was basically at stake. Oftentimes, loans are indeed their only source of finance. In this context of uncertainty, a substantial segment of the ECB response was to adapt the existing TLTRO III, by providing banks with funding at favorable conditions, to further enhance access to credit for undertakings and households. In this endeavor, the ECB had to ensure a high degree of participation from the banks. Hence, on 30 April 2020 the Governing Council of the ECB adopted a package of temporary measures that made several adjustments to the framework of its TLTRO III. An important feature of this response was that the ECB made temporary alterations to its collateral framework by widening the set of assets that could be mobilized as collateral in the liquidity-providing operations and by easing the requirements in this regard. Furthermore, a key change was that the ECB also reduced the interest rate applied to these open market operations to a rate going as low as -1% for the banks meeting the lending threshold of 0%. With the TLTRO III, the participating banks were thus enabled to borrow at lower interest rates than those paid on their excess reserve, that is to say, the liquidities held in their accounts in their respective central banks. This scheme was scheduled until June 2022. Furthermore, the banks' repayment options were loosened, along with the participation modalities. Regarding the latter, the ECB anticipated future potential falls in the ratings of some assets, and therefore established that if the requirements of collateral eligibility had been met prior to April 7, 2020, these assets would remain eligible in the collateral framework, as long as their rating remained above or at a given threshold (credit quality step 5). The ECB also expanded bank's borrowing allowance under TLTRO III from 30% to 50%, then up to 55% of their portfolio of loans to firms and households. Another important facet of the ECB policy response was the launching of pandemic emergency long-term refinancing operations (PELTROs). These are complements to the multiple recalibrations of the TLTRO III. On 30 April 2020, the ECB Governing Council announced these additional long-term loans programs. They are similar to the TLTRO III in their aim of ensuring liquidity in the market and smoothening borrowing conditions in these times of pandemic. For this purpose, the PELTRO's also provide collateral easing measures and negative interest rates. On December 10, 2020, the ECB issued four additional PELTRO's, taking place on a quarterly basis during 2021. During the pandemic, these monetary responses proved essential to counter the loss of revenue suffered by firms and the spurt of demand for loans that naturally ensued. In their absence, a credit crunch would normally have taken place. Indeed, increase in demand traditionally translates in a rise of borrowing costs. However, ECB easing measures allowed banks to lend massively without an increase of the rates. Empirical evidence is paramount in order to properly assess if the effects on the real economy of those cheaper fundings offered to banks have indeed matched the intention of the European Central Bank (stimulate the granting of loans to undertakings and households). Reports from various member states central banks on the matter indicate that loans supply by participating banks has indeed expanded, in line with the ECB policy. Accordingly, thorough academic studies have confirmed the actual enhancement of financing conditions and the avoidance of credit scarcity. In fact, the credit to firms attained unprecedented levels when from March to May 2020, it increased by €250 billion on aggregate. In addition, the massive involvement of banks in the TLTROs and PELTROs had an important positive side effect. There was a reduction in the issuance of bonds by banks, that usually showed a preference for central bank liquidity for their financing. This, in turn, prevented the cost of issuance of such bonds from surging, which suggests that even non-participating banks (to the TLTROs and PELTROs) benefited from it in parallel manners. The downward pressure on bonds yields also implies that banks having a bigger fraction of the assets side of their balance sheet composed of outstanding bonds were those that benefited the most from the TLTROs and their decrease of funding cost. Furthermore, the question of "zombie firms" has been raised. These refer to unprofitable businesses that only survive by perpetuating their indebtedness. The pandemic, along with the accommodating funding costs (notably brought through the readjustment of the TLTRO III), could have led to an increased number of those under-competitive firms allowed to survive by successive credits. Yet, scientific studies have shown that this increase was very limited from 2019 to 2020. ==== Transmission Protection instrument (TPI) ==== The Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) is a tool the ECB could use to ensure monetary policy decisions are smoothly transmitted across all euro area countries, introduced on July 21, 2022. Under the TPI, the ECB would be able to purchase securities in the secondary market, to counter against "unwanted, disorderly market dynamics", self fulfilling crises market expectations that do not reflect reality, thus not justified by "country specific fundamentals." The TPI thus enables the ECB to control the difference between borrowing costs across the euro area, thereby reducing fragmentation risk across the euro area. By not letting interfere market dynamics that do not reflect economic reality, the ECB fulfils its secondary mandate under the TFEU, namely "to support the general economic policies of the Union." Although PEPP would remain the first line of defence to counter for transmission risks, the TPI should be seen as an addition to the ECB's toolkit. ===== Eligible securities under the TPI ===== Contrary to the PEPP and the APP, the TPI does not have an ex ante upper limit on the purchase of securities. Although the ECB has stated it would primarily buy only government bonds on the secondary market maturing between 1 and 10 years, the bonds purchased fall under the complete discretion of the ECB and does not necessarily follow the capital key, and private securities could be considered as well. However, there are four conditions that need to be met before securities are eligible for purchasing under TPI: Compliance with the fiscal framework of the EU and not be involved in the Stability and Growth Pact; Absence of macroeconomic imbalances and not being involved in an excessive Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, demonstrating that it is in compliance with the Commission's recommendations; Sovereign debt trajectory must be sustainable, assessed by the ECB and other relevant bodies; Stick to commitments made under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, proving that the government follows sound and sustainable macroeconomic policies. The conditions for government bonds to be eligible under the TPI draw heavily on the macroeconomic governance, and making sure that politicians do not take decisions that facilitate speculation. The decision by the ECB to support a country by using the TPI will depend on the severity of the risks a country faces. Government debt should thus be sustainable to be eligible for TPI purchases. If the aforementioned conditions are met, the ECB could decide to activate the TPI. Purchases will be ended under the TPI either due to increased transmission of monetary policy or the risks have proven to be country-specific. So far, the TPI has not been deployed yet. ===== Effects of and critiques on the TPI ===== The TPI enables the Governing Council to a more rapid increase in interest rate, the first raise in interest rates by the ECB in 11 years. and the unpredictable nature of market sentiment could justify the reason for ECB-intervention to stabilise the monetary union, more or less the same reasoning as for the PEPP. However, the relationship between the PEPP and the TPI raises questions as the PEPP would remain the first line of defence against transmission risks. The creation of the TPI seems legally vulnerably: problems in the Euro Area are common and recurring, but it is not automatically the argument to invent a whole new anti-fragmentation tool. With the TPI, the ECB can put pressure on countries by assessing publicly if they are eligible for the TPI, that is assessing whether the government has conducted adequate fiscal policies and structural reforms to deserve the support of the ECB. This endangers the politic neutrality of the ECB. If ever deployed, the usage of the TPI will spark controversy as the conditions to be deployed are not watertight. ===== Strategy Review ===== As a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis, the ECB extended the duration of the strategy review until September 2021. On 13 July 2021, the ECB presented the outcomes of the strategy review, with the main following announcements: The ECB announced a new inflation target of 2% instead of its "close but below two per cent" inflation target. The ECB also made it clear it could overshoot its target under certain circumstances. The ECB announced it would try to incorporate the cost of housing (imputed rents) into its inflation measurement The ECB announced an action plan on climate change The ECB also said it would carry out another strategy review in 2025. === Inflation surge of 2021 === In the summer of 2021, coinciding with the European Central Bank's announcement of its revised monetary policy framework and its initiative for climate action, the eurozone witnessed a notable 2021–2023 inflation. This resurgence of inflation continued to escalate over the following year, culminating in inflation rates reaching double digits for the first time since the 1970s, a year after the ECB's strategic updates. The inflation rate reached an unprecedented peak of 4.9% in November 2021, marking the highest level since the introduction of the euro. ==== Framing of the crisis ==== The new era of inflation prompted a significant shift in the European Central Bank's framing compared to its stance in the 2000s. Initially, from its inception until the 2007-2009 2007–2008 financial crisis, the ECB's primary objective was price stability, adhering to strict institutional rules that minimized policy trade-offs with other goals beyond price stability. This approach was rooted in the "Central Bank Independence template", advocating that central bank's limited role to price stability and its independence were optimal. However, the post-financial crisis landscape, especially during the European debt crisis of the 2010s and subsequent economic stagnation era, necessitated a substantial revision in the ECB's strategy. The ECB moved away from its original Central Bank Independence template, leading to a blurring of its objective hierarchy. It adopted new strategies such as acting as a lender of last resort for the banking system and fostering growth through very low interest rates and extensive asset purchase programs, which were designed to help stabilizing specific market segments and in the end revive growth. In 2021, the European Central Bank embraced a significant strategic pivot by adopting its Climate Action Plan along with a new monetary policy strategy. This shift aimed to institutionalize the ECB's evolving role, moving beyond the singular focus on price stability—a policy shaped largely by the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis. Instead, the ECB began acknowledging its multifaceted responsibilities, which now include maintaining financial stability, supporting economic growth, and addressing climate-related objectives. However, with the 2021–2023 inflation, some wondered as to whether the European Central Bank would revert to its foundational role, predominantly focused on chasing the "inflation monsters". The term "inflation monsters'' echoes the 2010 video of the ECB where two young people are facing a blue inflation monster unleashing banknotes and threatening to wreck the economy. Nevertheless, ECB policymakers effectively drew connections between the Central Bank Independence (CBI) framework and the experiences of the stagflation era to rationalize their decision to increase interest rates, avoiding the need for a discourse on regime change. In doing so, they recognized the complex trade-offs inherent in balancing various macroeconomic objectives and the challenging decisions they had to face. It was with this new monetary strategy that the eurozone found itself facing rising 2021–2023 inflation. Recent studies stated that key debate among policymakers centered on whether this inflationary trend would be transitory or permanent. Paul Krugman argued that the current inflationary surge would prove to be transitory, whereas other economists such as Olivier Blanchard and Larry Summers had issued warnings regarding the possible persistence of this inflation. Initially, both the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve misjudged the situation, assuming the inflation spike to be temporary and expecting a swift return to their inflation target. This misperception led to the ECB's initial inaction regarding its monetary policy. ==== Response to the 2021 inflation crisis ==== After big increases in the inflation rates throughout 2021 and 2022, the European Central Bank and the FED finally decided to raise their interest rates and abandon their very low interest rates, for the first time since the sovereign debt crisis and the end of the CBI era, as it had become clear the inflationary trend wasn't temporary. This decision came in late July 2022 for the ECB, when the inflation rate in the eurozone was already at 8.9% and had been higher than the 2% target for more than a year, and in March 2022 for the FED. The European Central Bank's response to the Federal Reserve's actions can partly be attributed to concerns about imported inflation from the USA. Specifically, if the FED increases its policy rates while the ECB remains static, it could lead to a depreciation of the euro against the dollar. Such a scenario would likely result in higher import costs for the eurozone, as many global trade goods are priced in dollars. On the other hand, this would benefit the US economy by making imports from the eurozone cheaper. Furthermore, the impact of US dollar appreciation, following the FED's policy rate hikes, tends to be more pronounced in the international inflation rates of energy and food. These commodities are commonly priced in US dollars, making their inflation rates more sensitive to exchange rate variations. In the European Union, public inflation expectations are significantly influenced by the prices of energy and food. Thus, this form of imported inflation can further exacerbate overall inflation levels of the eurozone. The ECB also declared its intention to systematically diminish net asset purchases within their asset purchase program (APP) and end them under the pandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP) launched during the COVID crisis by the first trimester of 2022. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve initiated the reduction of its asset purchase program in November 2021, to finally stop it by March 2022. The Asset Purchase Programs of the ECB initially boosted asset values on bank balance sheets and led to expectations of lower future short short-term interest rates. These programs also raised inflation expectations, eventually reanchoring long-term inflation expectations. Phasing out the Asset Purchase Programs thus signals alignment with the different policy rate hikes in an attempt to cool down the economy and demonstrates a commitment to combating inflation. Research indicates that the European Central Bank responded to the escalating inflation more slowly and cautiously than the FED, showing hopes that a moderate tightening of monetary policy would suffice. The ECB was notably slower in acknowledging the mistaken nature of its initial assumption that the inflationary trend would be transitory. The transition away from extremely low interest rates was soon accompanied by various rate increases, culminating in the ECB's main rate reaching 4% by the end of September. In contrast, the FED's latest rate hike elevated the Effective Federal Funds Rate to 5.33% in August, underscoring a more aggressive and rapid tightening of monetary policy compared to the ECB's approach. However, the global monetary tightening cycle turned out to be the most synchronized one in the past half-century. By February 2023, more than 90% of economies had hiked their policy rates. The latest peak of highly synchronized action by central banks was during the 1970s and the oil prices shocks where 70% of them had raised their interest rates. ==== Critics regarding the new monetary policy ==== Criticism first emerged regarding the methodologies used for inflation estimation and their failure to anticipate the inflation surge. A primary critique focused on the inadequacy of traditional tools like the Phillips Curve, which examines the relationship between inflation and certain economic activity indicators, for accurately forecasting inflation. During the 1970s, the Phillips Curve also faced significant criticism for its inability to accurately predict the inflation experienced in that decade. This period marked a critical reassessment of the curve's predictive capacity, particularly in the context of the economic phenomena of the time. Traditional indicators used for forecasting economic dynamics, such as the output and unemployment gaps, were found to be inadequate in signaling the overheating of the economy and the prevailing tight labor market conditions. Moreover, the important belief among central banks that sustained inflationary increases are a consequence of unanchored long-term inflation expectations was challenged during 2021-2022. During this period, inflation expectations remained relatively stable, leading to the misinterpretations by the European Central Bank and other monetary authorities regarding the inflationary trend's nature. Both the FED and the ECB argued that the rise in inflation was only temporary and was the sole result of post-pandemic supply disruptions on a few selected goods and services (food and energy). The FED and the ECB then maintained their expansionary monetary policy, keeping interest rates low. Some critics have also emerged saying that it was complicated for independent central banks, including the ECB, to accurately assess during a synchronized policy rate hike the potential spillovers of cross-countries monetary policy on the inflation. This might lead to excessive monetary tightening (higher interest rates) in unusual circumstances. Concerns have also been raised about the European Central Bank's effectiveness in addressing the recent surge in energy prices. Some experts suggest that the eurozone should be viewed as a small open economy, implying that changes in its demand may not significantly impact global prices. Moreover, they argue that monetary policy might have minimal influence on the global demand for energy. This is because household demand for essentials like heating and transportation is believed to be relatively insensitive to price changes. Additionally, while a stronger euro could theoretically lead to lower import prices, it's uncertain whether these savings would be effectively passed on to consumers. However, recent studies contradict these views by highlighting the significant role of energy prices in the transmission of monetary policy within the eurozone. An increase in the ECB's policy rates tends to appreciate the euro against the dollar. This appreciation can lead to higher local energy costs but may also reduce demand, potentially lowering global energy prices. These studies support the ECB's decision to follow the Federal Reserve's lead in raising policy rates, which appears to have been a strategic move to curb imported inflation and address the spike in energy prices. ==== Effects of the monetary tightening ==== The implementing a of tighter monetary policy has emerged as the eurozone solution to fight the latest inflationary pressure. However, this approach bears the risk of hindering the progress of the economic revival post-COVID-19 pandemic. Raising interest rates is a strategic move by the ECB with specific aims: to decelerate economic activity, stabilize inflation expectations, and steer towards lower inflation levels. Studies have shown that as interest rates rise, the price on the world market does not really change. However, the Euro becomes more attractive to investors, leading to its appreciation against other currencies. This change benefits households paying for gas in Euros, as it translates into lower prices for dollar-traded oil. On the other hand, the increase in interest rates, while helping to suppress prices, also places strains on the manufacturing sector and the labor market. The aftermath of this shock sees tighter financing conditions and a dip in demand, resulting in a slight uptick in unemployment rates, going beyond 0.1 percentage points. Although the study shows that manufacturing sector quickly rebounds, returning to its pre-shock state within about three months, the impact on unemployment rates lingers for a longer period. ==Mandate and inflation target== The ECB has one primary objective – price stability – subject to which it may pursue secondary objectives. === Primary mandate === The primary objective of the European Central Bank, set out in Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is to maintain price stability within the Eurozone. However the EU Treaties do not specify exactly how the ECB should pursue this objective. The European Central Bank has ample discretion over the way it pursues its price stability objective, as it can self-decide on the inflation target, and may also influence the way inflation is being measured. Since 2021, the ECB has defined its objective as targeting an inflation rate of 2% over the medium term. Before that, the precise formulation of the price stability objective has changed over the years: The Governing Council in October 1998 defined price stability as inflation of under 2%, "a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%" and added that price stability "was to be maintained over the medium term". In May 2003, following a thorough review of the ECB's monetary policy strategy, the Governing Council clarified that "in the pursuit of price stability, it aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term". In 2016, the European Central Bank's president has further adjusted its communication, by introducing the notion of "symmetry" in its definition of its target, thus making it clear that the ECB should respond both to inflationary pressures and to deflationary pressures. As Mario Draghi once said "symmetry meant not only that we would not accept persistently low inflation, but also that there was no cap on inflation at 2%." On 8 July 2021, as a result of the strategic review led by the new president Christine Lagarde, the ECB officially abandoned the "below but close to two per cent" definition and adopted instead a 2% symmetric target. === Secondary mandate === Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the Treaty (127 TFEU) also provides room for the ECB to pursue other objectives:Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.This legal provision is often considered to provide a "secondary mandate" to the ECB and offers ample justifications for the ECB to also prioritize other considerations such as full employment or environmental protection, which are mentioned in the Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union. At the same time, economists and commentators are often divided on whether and how the ECB should pursue those secondary objectives, in particular the environmental impact. ECB official have also frequently pointed out the possible contradictions between those secondary objectives. To better guide the ECB's action on its secondary objectives, it has been suggested that closer consultation with the European Parliament would be warranted. In 2023, the ECB recognised the possible role of the European Parliament in the prioritisation of its secondary objectives. ===Tasks=== To carry out its main mission, the ECB's tasks include: Defining and implementing monetary policy Managing foreign exchange operations Maintaining the payment system to promote smooth operation of the financial market infrastructure under the TARGET2 payments system and being currently developed technical platform for the settlement of securities in Europe (TARGET2 Securities). Consultative role: by law, the ECB's opinion is required on any national or EU legislation that falls within the ECB's competence. Collection and establishment of statistics International cooperation Issuing banknotes: the ECB holds the exclusive right to authorise the issuance of euro banknotes. Member states can issue euro coins, but the amount must be authorised by the ECB beforehand (upon the introduction of the euro, the ECB also had exclusive right to issue coins). Financial stability and prudential policy Banking supervision: since 2013, the ECB has been put in charge of supervising systemically relevant banks. ===Monetary policy tools=== The principal monetary policy tool of the European central bank is collateralised borrowing or repo agreements. The collateral used by the ECB is typically high quality public and private sector debt. All lending to credit institutions must be collateralised as required by Article 18 of the Statute of the ESCB. The criteria for determining "high quality" for public debt have been preconditions for membership in the European Union: total debt must not be too large in relation to a gross domestic product, for example, and deficits in any given year must not become too large. Though these criteria are fairly simple, a number of accounting techniques may hide the underlying reality of fiscal solvency—or the lack of the same. ===Difference with US Federal Reserve=== In the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Reserve buys assets: typically, bonds issued by the Federal government.

European Central Bank

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In 2002, he competed and won the European 125cc Championship.

Marco Simoncelli (; 20 January 198723 October 2011), nicknamed Sic (), was an Italian professional Motorcycle racing. He competed in the Grand Prix motorcycle racing for 10 years from 2002 to 2011. He started in the 125cc class before moving up to the 250cc class in 2006. He won the 2008 Grand Prix motorcycle racing season with Gilera. After four years in the intermediate class, he stepped up to the top MotoGP class in 2010, racing with the Honda Gresini Racing. He died in an accident at the 2011 Malaysian motorcycle Grand Prix at Sepang International Circuit. ==Career== ===Early career=== Marco Simoncelli was born in Cattolica but grew up and lived in Coriano with his family since childhood. He started racing minibikes at the age of seven in his hometown of Coriano, moving on to the Italian Minimoto Championship in 1996 at the early age of nine. He won the Italian Minimoto Championship in 1999 and 2000 while also became the runner-up in the 2000 European Minimoto Championship. The following year, he stepped up to the Italian 125cc Championship and he won the title in his rookie year.

Marco Simoncelli

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From the relatively illiquid and stable, long-term investments of its general account, TIAA has been able to consistently add some dividends to TIAA Traditional contributions since 1948.

The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA, formerly TIAA-CREF) is an American financial services organization that is a private provider of financial retirement services in the academic, research, medical, cultural and governmental fields. TIAA is listed on the Fortune 100 and serves over 5 million active and retired employees participating at more than 15,000 institutions and has $1 trillion in combined assets under management with holdings in more than 50 countries (). ==Profile== Long organized as a tax-exempt non-profit organization, a 1997 Appropriation bill removed TIAA's tax exemption. It is now organized as a non-profit organization, the TIAA Board of directors, with taxable subsidiaries; all profits are returned to policyholders. TIAA bought its Manhattan headquarters building, 730 Third Avenue, in 1955. It has major offices in Denver, Colorado; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Dallas, Texas; as well as 70 local offices throughout the U.S. In 2018, TIAA ranked 84th on Fortune's list of the 500 largest corporations in America. , TIAA is the largest global investor in agriculture, the second-largest grower of wine grapes in the United States (by acreage), and the third-largest commercial real estate manager in the world. ==History== In 1918, Andrew Carnegie and his Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, under the leadership of Henry Smith Pritchett, created the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA), a fully funded system of pensions for professors. Funding was provided by a combination of grants from the foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York, as well as ongoing contributions from participating institutions and individuals. The policyholders voted in 1921 to implement policyholder representation on the TIAA board so that educators would have a role in running the organization. TIAA's namesake and signature investment/insurance product is the TIAA Traditional, which offers a contractually guaranteed return on principal and, at the discretion of the board of trustees on a periodic basis, additional profit/dividend interest over and above the guaranteed return.

TIAA

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He worked for a few different congregations until 1936 when he moved to Långsele.

Swedish Argentines are Argentine people of Swedes descent, as well as Swedish-born people who reside in Argentina. The history of Swedish settlement in Argentina took place principally in the mid to late 19th century, when Swedish people arrived in Argentina. Many Swedes came to Argentina for economic reasons and in order to start a new life. Swedes also helped build Argentina, in particular helping to build Argentina's railroads in the mid 19th century. The first Swedes to arrive in Argentina were registered as new converts by Jesuits in Córdoba in 1763. Many of the Swedes who showed up during the first half of the 19th century were adventurers who fought in the Argentine Civil Wars between the Unitarian Party and Federales (Argentina) (on both sides). A good number of them were sons of prominent families who were fleeing a debt or had some other reason to make themselves scarce. They became the black sheep of the Pampas. Back home in Norrland, they had hunted moose. In Misiones Province's subtropical rainforest, they hunted tapir. Argentina is home to the largest Swedish community in Latin America. ==History== In 1845 Sweden formally recognized Argentine sovereignty and shortly afterwards the warships Lagerbjelke and Eugenie paid a visit to the new country while also checking out trade routes on the South American continent. They happened to arrive in Buenos Aires just in time for the rebellion against Governor Juan Manuel de Rosas. But the travel accounts written by two naval officers aboard were as much, if not more, about the beautiful porteño women of Buenos Aires, as they were about the dramatic political events taking place. ===Misiones Swedes=== Swedes were drawn to the province Misiones at the beginning of the 20th century, at the prospect of growing yerba mate, used to make the herbal tea that is Argentina's national favourite drink. They moved from Brazil, where they had been lured by German-based recruitment offices. The new arrivals to Brazil soon discovered that the recruitment officers propaganda was nothing more than empty promises. Around 1913 word started going around that across the border, in the Argentinian territory of Misiones, the land was more fertile and the government was providing incentives for farmers to grow a profitable cash crop known as the green gold – yerba mate. Two contingents of emigrants made the voyage south. In 1890–91, most of the 2 000 were workers and families from the crisis-ridden industries in Stockholm and Sundsvall. In 1909–11, most of the 700 were miners from the far north who left after the failure of a nationwide strike. The first Swedes to cross the border to Argentina found not only Brazilian, Paraguayan and German colonists, but also a group of Finland intellectuals who had fled their country in 1906 for political reasons. After the town of Oberá was officially founded in 1928, the Swedes soon became a minority, but as they had come first there are today neighbourhoods that carry the names of those pioneering farmers – Villa Kindgren, Villa Fredriksson, Villa Erasmie. In 1914 ten men cleared a 20-kilometre path (picada) through the jungle between the first Swedish settlement, Villa Svea and a German colony. The road is still known as the Picada Sueca. Around 500 Swedes were estimated to have settled in the area by the 1920s and they organized a school, an ethnic-based association and a congregation. ==Swedes in Argentina today== In September many Swedish descendants still participate in the Oberá Immigrants Festival. ===The Swedish Club=== The Swedish Club is located in Buenos Aires. It is centrally located in the seven-story Sweden House which also housed the Embassy of Sweden, Buenos Aires between 1996 and 2016, and the Swedish Argentine Chamber of Commerce. In the Asociación Sueca restaurant and bar Swedish lunches are provided. Svenska Föreningen was founded in 1898 by a group of Swedish professionals. The Society had several different homes until the Swedish shipping magnate Axel Axelsson Johnson made a substantial donation for a building in 1920. ==Notable Swedes in Argentina== ===Henrik Åberg and Carl August Kihlberg=== Henrik Åberg (architect) (Enrique Aberg) and Carl August Kihlberg (Carlos Kihlberg) were the designers of the Presidential palace of Argentina, the Casa Rosada. They were also appointed as Argentina's first (and only) national architects in 1875; Åberg also drew the blueprints for various hospitals, the Museum of National History in La Plata, and the José de San Martín mausoleum inside Buenos Aires Metropolitan Cathedral on Plaza de Mayo. ===Scientists=== Among the first Swedes to step ashore in Argentina were Daniel Solander and Anders Sparrman. They were disciples of botanist Carl von Linné and accompanied Captain Cook on his world expeditions to pick exotic flowers and record anomalies. Several other Nordic scientists were drawn to this area at the beginning of the century. Most remembered among them all is the geologist and polar explorer Otto Nordenskjöld who, along with his crew, survived two winters in Antarctica after a shipwreck. The Argentine government pulled off a successful rescue expedition in 1903. Thousands of people in Buenos Aires celebrated the return of the marine officials and the Swedish scientists. Today the vessel used in the rescue, the corvette Uruguay, is a floating museum in Dock 1 of Puerto Madero. ===Evert Taube=== For many people in Sweden, Argentina is both a familiar and a mythological place brought to life by the lyrics of the popular singer-songwriter Evert Taube who lived in the South American country for five years between 1910 and 1915. Contrary to widespread perceptions, Taube did not work as a gaucho (cowboy) on the Pampas but as a foreman supervising workers who were digging canals designed to prevent flooding on the vast plains. ===David Emanuel Wahlberg=== David Emanuel Wahlberg was a Swedish sports writer and editor who covered the 1912 Summer Olympics and became president of the sports organization LAIF from 1937 to 1939. In 1923 he became a pastor in Buenos Aires, Argentina. On 15 September 1927, his wife Jenny Katarina Wågberg died and on 28 February 1929, he left Argentina with his four children and returned to Sweden where he married his housekeeper, Bertha Debora Engström.

Swedish Argentines

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From 2013 until 2023, he portrayed Geoff Schwartz in the American Broadcasting Company series The Goldbergs (2013 TV series).

Sam Lerner (born September 27, 1992) is an American actor, who is most known for his role as Geoff Schwartz on The Goldbergs (2013 TV series), Chowder in Monster House (film), and as Quinn Goldberg in Project Almanac. == Career == Lerner appeared in the feature film Envy (2004 film), as the son of Ben Stiller and Rachel Weisz's characters. In addition, he portrayed Sam Robards's characters in the pilot by American Broadcasting Company, My Life With Men, and the son of John Leguizamo and Claire Forlani's characters in an untitled Brett Ratner directed pilot for CBS. Lerner first major role was when he voiced Chowder, in the film Monster House (film) (2006). He was nominated for the 2006 Annie Award for Best Voice Acting in an Animated Feature for his role, but lost the award to Sir Ian McKellen for Flushed Away. He has appeared on the television shows Malcolm in the Middle, The King of Queens, Two and a Half Men, Oliver Beene, and Sonny With a Chance, and had a recurring voice role on the Cartoon Network show Whatever Happened to Robot Jones?. He did the voice for Zak Saturday on Cartoon Network's, The Secret Saturdays.

Sam Lerner

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Duncan Henderson joined as producer, in what would be his final film before his death from pancreatic cancer.

is a 2023 American Science fiction film action film based on Hasbro's Transformers (toy line) toy line, and primarily influenced by its Transformers: Beast Wars sub-franchise. It is the seventh installment in the Transformers (film series) and serves as both a standalone sequel to Bumblebee (film) (2018) and a prequel to Transformers (film) (2007). The film is directed by Steven Caple Jr. from a screenplay by Joby Harold, Darnell Metayer, Josh Peters, Erich Hoeber, and Jon Hoeber. Michael Bay again serves as producer. It stars Anthony Ramos and Dominique Fishback, as well as the voice talents of Ron Perlman, Peter Dinklage, Michelle Yeoh, Pete Davidson, Liza Koshy, Michaela Jaé Rodriguez, Colman Domingo, Cristo Fernández, Tongayi Chirisa, and returning franchise regulars Peter Cullen, John DiMaggio, and David Sobolov. Set in 1994, the film follows ex-military electronics expert Noah Diaz and artifact researcher Elena Wallace as they help the Autobots and the Maximals protect an artifact known as the Transwarp Key from the villainous Terrorcons. Principal photography took place from June to October 2021, with filming locations including Los Angeles, Peru, Montreal, and New York City. Transformers: Rise of the Beasts premiered at Marina Bay Sands in Singapore on May 27, 2023, and was theatrically released in the United States on June 9, 2023, by Paramount Pictures. The film received mixed reviews from critics, and despite grossing $439 million worldwide against a production budget of $195–200 million; it was a Box-office bomb and the lowest-grossing installment in the franchise, failing to break-even in its theatrical run. ==Plot== The planet-eating Unicron attacks the homeworld of the Maximals, an advanced race of Transformers. The Terrorcons, Unicron's heralds led by Scourge, want the Transwarp Key which can open portals through space and time and can help Unicron consume planets faster. The Maximal leader Apelinq sacrifices himself to allow the other Maximals to escape the planet before Unicron devours it. Now under the command of Optimus Primal, the Maximals flee to Earth with the key. In 1994 Brooklyn, Noah Diaz, an ex-United States Armed Forces electronics expert, struggles to find a job to support his ill brother Kris and is convinced by his friend Reek to steal a Porsche 964 to sell only to discover that it is the Autobot Mirage in disguise. Concurrently, museum intern Elena Wallace studies an ancient statue of a falcon bearing the Maximal symbol and accidentally breaks it open to reveal the key hidden inside. The key releases an energy pulse detected by Autobot leader Optimus Prime, who summons the other Autobots, including Arcee and Bumblebee (Transformers). Mirage is contacted in the middle of Noah's attempted theft, and he is roped into the Autobots' mission to recover the key so they can use it to return to their homeworld, Cybertron. Drawn by the key's signature, the Terrorcons arrive on Earth and attack the Autobots outside the museum, with Elena becoming caught up in the conflict. Scourge kills Bumblebee, steals the key, and retreats when the Maximal Airazor arrives. Airazor reveals that the Maximals have been hiding on Earth for millennia, and Scourge only has half of the Transwarp Key, which was split in two to keep it away from Unicron. Optimus insists that the key be reassembled so the Autobots can use it to return home, while Noah secretly plots to destroy the key to keep Earth safe. Elena deduces that the other half of the key is in a hidden temple in Peru. The cargo plane Autobot, Stratosphere takes them to Peru, where they meet with Wheeljack, who leads them to the temple. However, the other half of the key is revealed to no longer be there. The Terrorcons attack again, and Scourge corrupts Airazor with Unicron's dark energy. Subsequently, the Autobots meet Optimus Primal and the other Maximals, who entrusted the second half of the key to a human tribe they have worked with for millennia. Scourge's corruption overtakes Airazor, whom Primal reluctantly kills at her request to save Elena. In the chaos, Noah attempts to destroy the second half of the key, but Optimus convinces him otherwise. Scourge steals it and then reassembles the two halves, erecting a tower and opening a portal above the Earth, which Unicron will soon go through. Optimus and Noah agree to work together to protect their homeworlds from Unicron. While Autobots and Maximals battle the Terrorcon army, Noah and Elena sneak in close to the Key, planning to deactivate it with an access code Elena has uncovered. During the battle, Scourge wounds Mirage, who was protecting Noah, but transforms his damaged body into a powered Powered exoskeleton for Noah so they can fight together. Bumblebee is reactivated when the key activates the Energon-infused valley. He helps the Autobots and Maximals turn the tide of the battle. Optimus kills Scourge, but not before the latter damages the control console to prevent the portal from being shut down. Optimus destroys the key and collapses the portal, willing to sacrifice himself, but Noah and Primal save him from being sucked into the imploding vortex, which destroys the remaining Terrorcon army and leaves Unicron stranded. In the aftermath, the Autobots, unable to return to Cybertron, proclaim Earth as their new home and vow to continue protecting it alongside the Maximals. Elena receives recognition for discovering the temple in Peru while Noah attends an interview for a security job but finds he is actually being invited to join the secret military organization G.I. Joe Team, who will cover Kris's healthcare. In a mid-credits scene, Noah repairs Mirage using junk Porsche parts from Reek who claims it is unroad-worthy, and Noah disproves him by calling to Mirage to transform in front of Reek. ==Cast== ===Humans=== Anthony Ramos as Noah Diaz, an ex-military electronics expert who lives with his family in Brooklyn, trying to support them. Dean Scott Vazquez as Kris Diaz, Noah's younger brother who suffers from sickle cell disease. Dominique Fishback as Elena Wallace, an artifact researcher and intern at a museum. Lauren Vélez as Breanna Diaz, Noah's mother. Tobe Nwigwe as Reek, Noah's friend who talks him into grand theft auto. The character was based on a mutual best friend of Caple's, who died before filming in 2021. Sarah Stiles as Jillian Robinson: Elena's boss at the museum who keeps taking credit for her work. Leni Parker as Ms. Greene, a hospital administrator who questions Noah about the payment for Kris' appointment. Aidan Devine as Bishop, a security chief who cancels a job interview with Noah due to having talked with Noah's former commanding officer. Lucas Huarancca as Amaru, the descendant of a tribe that helped the Maximals for hundreds of years. Michael Kelly (actor) as Agent Burke: an undercover recruiter for G.I. Joe Team. Lesley Stahl as herself; she appears on 60 Minutes interviewing Elena about the underground ruins she discovered. ===Transformers=== Peter Cullen as Optimus Prime, the leader of the Autobot resistance who transforms into a red 1987 Freightliner Trucks FLA Semi-trailer truck. Caple revealed on Instagram that Optimus Prime's unmasked face in the film was designed after Cullen himself. Ron Perlman as Optimus Primal, the leader of the Maximals who transforms into a western lowland gorilla. The character's beast mode in the film was based on unused concept art that was illustrated for an inclusion in the 2017 film, Transformers: The Last Knight. Peter Dinklage as Scourge, the leader of the Terrorcons and a Big-game hunting who transforms into a black Peterbilt 359 logging semi truck. Michelle Yeoh as Airazor: A Maximal warrior who transforms into a peregrine falcon. Pete Davidson as List of The Transformers (TV series) characters#Autobot Cars, an Autobot spy who can project holograms and transforms into a silver-blue Porsche 964, and briefly, into a Formula One car, a Lamborghini Countach, a garbage truck, and an exo-suit. Davidson described voicing Mirage as "Jim Carrey's The Mask (1994 film) meets Bugs Bunny", due to his rebellious personality. Liza Koshy as Arcee, an Autobot sharpshooter who transforms into a red-white Ducati 916 motorcycle. John DiMaggio as Stratosphere, an Autobot Air-Soldier who transforms into a Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar cargo plane, that provides transportation for the Autobots in their global adventure. David Sobolov as: Battletrap, a Terrorcon enforcer who transforms into an orange 1980s GMC TopKick Chevrolet Kodiak tow truck. Apelinq, the previous Maximal leader who transforms into a mountain gorilla and sports retractable blades on his arms. Michaela Jaé Rodriguez as List of The Transformers (TV series) characters#Other characters: A Terrorcon ninja who transforms into a Nissan Skyline GT-R#Fourth generation (1994–1999). Colman Domingo as Unicron, a world-devouring planet-sized Transformer who serves as the Terrorcons' master. This marks the character's first proper live-action depiction after previously being teased in The Last Knight. Cristo Fernández as List of The Transformers (TV series) characters#Main characters, an Autobot scientist and mechanic who transforms into a brown and white 1970s Volkswagen Type 2#Mexican production panel bus, while speaking in a Mexican accent. Tongayi Chirisa as Cheetor, a Maximal scout who transforms into a cheetah. ===Non-speaking characters=== Bumblebee (Transformers), an Autobot Reconnaissance who transforms into a modified yellow-black 1970s Chevrolet Camaro (second generation), later equipped with all-terrain extensions. Due to having lost his voice box by Blitzwing in Bumblebee (film), he can only communicate through beeps and pre-recorded film quotes. Rhinox, a Maximal commando who transforms into a white rhinoceros. While Sobolov was credited as the character, Rhinox did not speak in the final product. The Sweeps, an army of spider-like Terrorcons. Scourge has two built into his body, identified in promotional material as Freezer and Novakane. The Scorponoks, an army of robotic scorpions, identified as the Predacons in promotional material. ==Production== ===Development=== In December 2018, when asked about the future of the Transformers (film series) franchise, producer Lorenzo di Bonaventura stated that another big Transformers film "would be produced" and that it would be "different than the ones that we've done before." He described the process as more of an "evolution," saying that there is more freedom to create and what they can do with it. After the success of Bumblebee (film) that year, he said that the series would make some changes in tone and style, inspired by the film. Bumblebee director Travis Knight said his goal was to return to his animation studio, Laika (company), though he acknowledged that he has a few ideas for a sequel. John Cena expressed interest in reprising his role in a sequel. Writer Christina Hodson said that "[she] knows where [she wants] to go with the next one". In late January 2019, a sequel was announced. In March, di Bonaventura confirmed they were developing a script for a Bumblebee sequel. In January 2020, Paramount Pictures was reportedly working on two different Transformers films, one written by James Vanderbilt and another written by Joby Harold. In November, Steven Caple Jr. was hired to direct Harold's script. In February 2021, it was revealed that the film was going under the working title Transformers: Beast Alliance, hinting the introduction of characters from the Transformers: Beast Wars franchise. During a virtual event held by Paramount in June, di Bonaventura and Caple revealed the official title as Transformers: Rise of the Beasts (revealing to be both a Bumblebee sequel and Beast Wars film in one), and confirming that it would feature the Maximals, the Predacons, and a new take on the Terrorcons faction. The film's tone and action were heavily influenced by Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991). Despite the announcement of the Predacons, no such member appeared in the finished film. In an April 2023 interview, Di Bonaventura stated that the film's story will have a character arc for Optimus Prime prior to the Transformers (film), akin to Bumblebee in his self-titled film. In May, Caple said that the events of the 2007 film will be preserved, but also that the story would be standalone and that "Ultimately, all you need to know is that they're trying to get back to Cybertron." Michael Bay again serves as producer, along with the same producers as the previous film.

Transformers: Rise of the Beasts

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Moran is known to the English (and others) for his time spent playing soccer with Manchester United F.C..

The 1978 All-Ireland Senior Football Championship Final was the 91st All-Ireland Final and the deciding match of the 1978 All-Ireland Senior Football Championship, an inter-county Gaelic football tournament for the top teams in Ireland. Dublin had won the previous two finals and were bidding for a third consecutive victory. Kerry, their opponents, denied them to secure their own third from four All-Ireland football titles they won during the 1970s. This was Kerry's first of four consecutive championships, setting them on the streak that inspired the Five in a Row (1982 song) that never occurred. In 2018, Martin Breheny listed this as the eighth greatest All-Ireland Senior Football Championship Final. It is also noted for a famous first-half goal by Mikey Sheehy, with Sheehy lobbing the Dublin goalkeeper Paddy Cullen while Cullen argued with referee Séamus Aldridge. ==Match== ===Summary=== Dublin played the opening half towards the Railway End of Croke Park, that part of the stadium featuring Hill 16. Kerry played the first half towards the Canal End. Dublin dominated the opening third. Their goalkeeper Paddy Cullen, according to Con Houlihan, caught "a few swirling lofted balls, dropping almost onto his crossbar... as composed and technically correct as if being done to illustrate a text book". Cullen's distribution was also perfect during this period of the game. Dublin's "swift triangular" play led Kerry to foul their opponents and Jimmy Keaveney duly converted the frees. Kerry forward Eoin Liston roamed so far down field that his marker Seán Doherty (Gaelic footballer) was within sight of the Kerry goal. With 25 minutes gone, Dublin were ahead by 0–6 to 0–1. Dublin kept confidently going forward until a quick brace of passes from Jack O'Shea and Pat Spillane put John Egan (Gaelic footballer) through on Cullen in the Dublin goal. Cullen was not far enough forward. He set off only for Egan to fist the football over his head and into the Dublin net. Kerry, encouraged, scored a few points only for Dublin to take the lead with a point of their own. John O'Keeffe (Gaelic footballer) took a free, deep within the Kerry half. Jack O'Shea caught the football and drove it on a long central trajectory to the 21-yard line. A fist from Mikey Sheehy sent the football behind Dublin's backs. Dublin goalkeeper Paddy Cullen kicked the ball away from Sheehy. Referee Séamus Aldridge blew his whistle for a Kerry free. Sheehy then scored his famous lobbed goal, while Cullen argued with Aldridge. Michael O'Hehir's befuddled live television commentary went: "Paddy Cullen going out for it... And Paddy Cullen... Oh dearie me. Paddy Cullen adjudged... Oh! A goal, in the greatest freak of all time! The referee gave a free to, eh, Kerry from the 14 metre line, here it is again. Nobody was expecting the ball to be kicked, and before Paddy Cullen could get back into the goal, the ball was in the net". The manner of the goal is still contentious today. While Aldridge had awarded a free to Kerry, there are those who maintain that Ger Power had fouled Cullen shortly before. In any event, Sheehy lobbed the ball over Cullen to give his team the lead. RTÉ chose it as one of the Top 20 GAA Moments in 2005 and it features prominently in the 1978 episode of Reeling in the Years. According to Martin Breheny, it is also one of the most viewed incidents from the GAA's archives. Dublin's resistance collapsed in the second half. The half ended in a score of 3–8 to 0–2 in Kerry's favour. Eoin Liston scored the three second-half goals. Kerry won by seventeen points. ===Details=== ==Post-match== In the Evening Press the following day, Con Houlihan memorably described Cullen's misfortune: "Paddy dashed back towards his goal like a woman who smells a cake burning. The ball won the race and it curled inside the near post as Paddy crashed into the outside of the net and lay against it like a fireman who had returned to find his station ablaze". Cullen and Sheehy recreated the goal in 2017 as part of the centenary commemorations of Austin Stacks GAA (the club of Sheehy and Ger Power in Tralee). Cullen donned an apron for the occasion and roared "Me cake" as he ran towards the goal. Kevin Moran (footballer) was a member of the losing Dublin team that day.

1978 All-Ireland Senior Football Championship final

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