Datasets:

izardy

/

malaysia-kehakiman-ejudgement

like 1

22NCVC-341-04/2013

PLAINTIF SYARIKAT STEELCON SDN BHD .... PLAINTIF F DEFENDAN KEE CHENG TECK .... DEFENDAN T

30/10/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=24731cfb-efd5-4be4-8526-8522205b3a92&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : 22NCVC-341-04/2013 BETWEEN SYARIKAT STEELCON SDN BHD .... PLAINTIFF AND KEE CHENG TECK .... DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Full trial) [1] The Plaintiff in this case had initiated this action against the Defendant for damages on the grounds of these two causes of actions: a. The tort of malicious prosecution against the Defendant’s conduct in pursuing the Winding Up Petition in 2009 in the Winding Up Action No. D1-28-344-2009 (“the first petition”) and also the Winding Up Petition in 2013 in the Winding Up Action No. 28NCC-50-02/2014 (“the second petition”). b. The tort of abuse of process against the Defendant’s conduct in pursuing both of the first petition and the second petition. [2] In its Statement of Claim the Plaintiff had pleaded that pursuant to the alleged tortious conducts of the Defendant mentioned in paragraphs 1(a) and (b) above, the Plaintiff had suffered losses (including loss of profits and/or loss of reputation or goodwill of the Plaintiff company) and therefore claimed the following reliefs: (i) Damages to be assessed not exceeding RM5 million to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. (ii) Interest on the damages at the rate and from the date as determined assessed by this Court to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. (iii) Further and/or such other reliefs as may be given by this Court as deemed fair and just in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant. [3] Now, before the two causes of actions of the Plaintiff may be addressed, it is pertinent that the background underlying this present action be understood for a proper and just appreciation of the case. The following are the salient facts which had been submitted by both of the parties in their evidence and also the agreed facts which was filed. 3.1 The Defendant had first obtained a Judgment Debt against the Defendant in 2007 from the Tawau High Court dated 4.10.2007 which held that the Plaintiff is indebted to the Defendant a sum of RM496,589.61 together with pre-Judgment interest at the rate of four per centum (4%) per annum from 13th March 2000 the date of the Writ of Summons to 4th October 2007 the date of Judgment pursuant to Section 11 Civil Law Act, 1956 and statutory interest at the rate of eight per centum (8%) per annum from 5th October 2007 to the date of payment and the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff his costs to be taxed (“the Judgment Debt”) in suit No. T(22) 8 of 2000. 3.2 The Plaintiff had subsequent to the Judgment Debt proceeded to appeal against the decision at the Court of Appeal which was later dismissed on 20.9.2011. Following the dismissal of the Appeal, the Plaintiff then had applied for a stay of execution of the Judgment Debt which also was later dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 14.5.2012. The Plaintiff then had applied for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision in upholding the Judgment Debt and even this application was dismissed and leave was not granted. 3.3 Stemming from the Judgment Debt, the Defendant had first issued a Statutory Notice of Demand under Section 218 of the Companies Act against the Plaintiff and proceeded to file the first petition in the year 2009. However, the first petition was later struck off for abuse of process under Order 18 Rule 19(1)(b) and/or (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of the High Court on the ground that the Defendant (the Petitioner in the first petition) had initiated the petition notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff (the Respondent in the first petition) was still solvent. The Defendant consequently applied to appeal against the decision to strike off the petition but however, the Defendant himself later had withdrawn his appeal. 3.4 Also on the basis of the Judgment Debt, the Defendant again had issued another Statutory Notice of Demand under Section 218 of the Companies Act against the Plaintiff and proceeded to file the second petition in the year 2014. However, the second petition was also dismissed on the same reason that the Plaintiff (the Respondent in the second petition) was still a solvent company on 25.6.2014 by the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. 3.5 The Judgment debt at any time was never settled by the Plaintiff in the present case. 3.6 The Plaintiff in the present case had initiated this action for the tort of malicious prosecution and/or tort of abuse of process based on the two Winding Up Petitions initiated by the Defendant namely the first and the second petitions. [4] Before this Court would proceed to make its findings, the Court would first delve into the submissions of both the Plaintiff’s and the Defendant’s cases. The Plaintiff’s Case [5] On the perusal of the Plaintiff’s Opening Submission and its Submission in Reply, the Plaintiff’s case had been submitted as follows: The Claim on tort of malicious prosecution 5.1 The Plaintiff on the outset submitted that both of the first and second petitions were dismissed on the same ground that the petition was filed notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff remains a solvent company. 5.2 The Plaintiff sought to prove all the necessary elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, which can be branched out into four elements which are: 1st element - The Plaintiff was successful in the earlier proceedings brought by the Defendant. In proving this element, the Plaintiff submitted that the Plaintiff indeed had been successful in not only one but two earlier proceedings which were brought by the Defendant against it. Those earlier proceedings are namely the first and second petitions which were subsequently dismissed by the High Court. 2nd element - The Defendant had instituted the earlier proceedings (the two petitions) without any reasonable and/or probable cause. The Plaintiff had submitted that there was a want of reasonable and/or probable cause on the submission that the two petitions were filed blatantly notwithstanding the Defendant’s knowledge and admission of the Plaintiff’s solvency and ability to pay its debts. The Plaintiff submitted that it is established in law that the petitions were wrongful petitions on the ground that the petitions were filed when there was ample evidence which proves that the Plaintiff was solvent and were able to pay their debts at the time the petitions were filed. It must be noted that this proposition of law was not contested and was agreed to be relevant in the present case, as even the Defendant in hindsight was attempting to prove that the Plaintiff was in actuality unable to pay its debts. The Plaintiff had referred to a number of cases supporting its proposition. First of which is a decision by our then Supreme Court in the case of Si & Si Sdn Bhd V Hazrabina Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 CLJ 657 which had affirmed the decision in the case of The Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co V Syre [1883] 11 QBD 674 which had held: “…that as at the time of presenting the petition the company was an existing and going concern, and had valuable property and was solvent, unless other facts could be shown, there was a want of reasonable and probable cause for presenting the petition…” The Plaintiff also referred to the case of Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd V Krishnan Moorthy Veerappan [2010] 7 CLJ 385 where the Court had held the following: “Section 218(1)(e) of the Companies Act 1965 requires the Court to wind up a company which was unable to pay as opposed to unwilling to pay its debts.” To which the Plaintiff had submitted evidences in supporting its contention: Firstly, it was submitted that there were numerous evidences in PW-3’s witness statement which were left unchallenged. Particularly on PW-3’s testimony that amidst the Plaintiff’s principle objection that the Plaintiff is indeed solvent, the Defendant knew or ought to have known that the Plaintiff was solvent and able to pay its debts. Furthermore, the conduct of the Defendant himself in withdrawing his appeal against the striking out of the first petition should be perceived as an admission of the correctness of that decision and the decision should remain binding and final against the Defendant as it was uncontested or was not appealed against. Even in respect of the second petition, the Plaintiff had sent letters to the Defendant expressing the same objection that it is solvent. Nonetheless, the Defendant chose to ignore the Plaintiff objection and proceeded to file the second petition. Hence, even during the first petition, and even at the second petition’s stage, the Defendant had blatantly filed the two petitions having or ought to have full knowledge that the Plaintiff was indeed solvent was able to pay its debts. Secondly, it was also submitted that the two petitions were also dismissed for the same reason that the Plaintiff was proven to be solvent and was able to pay its debts. The dismissal of the first petition was even admitted and accepted by the Defendant as he had not appealed against the dismissal of the first petition. Thirdly, the Plaintiff submitted that even the Defendant’s own witnesses had admitted to have knowledge that the Plaintiff was solvent and able to pay its debts and that the Defendant was pursuing for Winding Up only for the sake of saving cost and convenience to corner the Plaintiff to pay the judgment debt. This Court in reference to the Notes of Evidence (“NOE”) reproduces these excerpts which the Court found relevant to the Plaintiff’s submission at page 123 of the NOE: “KEE Saya Winding Up because he is a big company. He is a big company, he will not allow me to Winding Up. He will pay me, he will make a point to pay me but he still stubborn, he don’t want to pay me…” “HMS Encik Kee, saya cakap sama Encik Kee punya niat. Saya tunjukkan, sebelum fail Winding Up Encik Kee sudah tahu dia ada duit boleh bayar. Betul? KEE Memang saya tahu. Ya. That’s why.” 3rd element - The Defendant had conducted himself in malice in the sense that there was some indirect or improper motive in him taking or continuing with the two petitions. There the proof of malice had been submitted in two-folds, in that there was malice in filing the first petition and also that there was malice in filing the second petition. The Plaintiff had submitted that malice in this case before the Court was the blatant conduct of the Defendant in pursuing the two petitions in complete disregard of the law and also the decision of the High Court in dismissing the first petition. It was further submitted that the unjustified petitions had cornered the Plaintiff to lose face as it was advertised to have been petitioned for Winding Up following the proper procedures of a Winding Up Petition. The conduct of the Defendant in cornering the Plaintiff to be injured while knowing full well that they are not lawfully justified to petition for Winding Up can be inferred as malice as the Defendant had chosen, amidst all other modes of execution readily available to the Defendant, to petition for Winding Up which was unavailable to them which puts the Plaintiff under unnecessary peril. The Plaintiff had referred to the case of Quartz Hill Gold Mining Company (Supra page 6) which had made the following observation by Brett M.R. on the injurious nature of a Winding Up petition if maliciously or unjustly pursued: “It is not like an action charging a merchant with fraud, where the evil done by bringing the action is remedied at the same time that the mischief is published, namely at the trial… In my opinion it is more like bankruptcy action and the very touch stone of this point is that the petition to wind up is by force of law made public before the company can defend itself against the imputations against it; for the petitioner is bound to publically advertise the petition 7 days before it is to be heard and adjudicated upon.” The Plaintiff had also referred to the case of Cadiz Waterworks v Barnett [1874] C.283 which had held the following: “He thinks if he can make it public, if he presents this petition, that it would be so injurious to the company that, rather than submit to it, they will settle with him. Cases have been cited to show that this Court will not interfere with serving a debtors summons, and will not interfere with serving a debtors summons and will not interfere with various other processes; but a Winding Up is a totally different thing. How does it begin? Petition presented, then advertise in the London Gazette, from the London Gazette copied into a great number of newspapers which have a large circulation in England, and I suppose also in Spain. What is the result? Here is a company perfectly solvent, which has a fair prospect, as far as I have heard, of being successful, and you have it advertised in every paper in England that there is a petition presented to wind them up, a petition which it must be known perfectly well to the petitioner never can succeed. For what purpose is it presented? Why, simply because the petitioner thinks he will by such means obtain his demand-and, for all I can see, it may be a very unjust demand.” The Plaintiff further submitted to define ‘malice’ as per the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary which defines malice as the intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act (in the present case, the Defendant’s alleged unjustified petitions against the Plaintiff) or reckless disregard of the law or of a person’s legal rights (in the present case, the alleged reckless disregard of the law that a Winding Up petition may not be filed if there were proof that the Respondent is solvent). The Plaintiff had also referred to the case opinion by the Court in the case of Malz v Rosen [1966] All ER 10 on evidence of malice: “per Curiam: if a person gives the police an account which he knows to be untrue, that fact in itself would be strong evidence of the ingredient of malice necessary for a successful action for malicious prosecution…” The Plaintiff had likened the conduct of the Defendant in filing the two petitions knowingly that the Plaintiff was solvent while attempting to prove the fact that the Plaintiff was insolvent as giving an untrue account of the Plaintiff’s solvency to the Court to the conduct of giving the police an untrue account. The Plaintiff further referred to the case of Johnson v Emerson [1871] 6 Exch.329 in proving malice: “I apprehend that the mere fact of the Defendant taking the proceedings with the knowledge and belief that they could not be properly taken, would be some evidence of malice.” “... that the proceeding of the Defendant was false and malicious ... is the same thing that a reasonable and sensible knowing the facts and circumstances which the Defendant did, would have formed the conclusion that the proceeding was groundless. They also means that it was malicious. Malice in a legal sense means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause and excuse ... and I quite agree that if an attorney, knowing a proceeding in bankruptcy to be groundless, presented a petition either from the motive of gain to himself or in obedience to the instructions of an oppressive and vindictive client, it would be in law a malicious act.” 4th element - The Plaintiff had suffered losses from the malicious prosecution. Here the Plaintiff had vigorously relied on the testimony of its witnesses and the audited accounts of the Plaintiff in proving the loss of business suffered by the Plaintiff due to the Defendant’s alleged malicious prosecution. The Plaintiff had referred to the case of Onkarmal & Anor v Banwarilal & Ors AIR 1962 Raj 127 which was decided by the Rajasthan High Court in 1961. The Rajasthan High Court had dealt with a claim for general damages in the sense of “disgrace, humiliation, physical discomfort and mental suffering”. With regard to this head of damages the Rajasthan High Court had held: “…where the Plaintiff claims general damages, it is not necessary for him to prove such damages specifically, the reason is that general damages are considered at law to be pecuniary reparation for the damage which is presumed to follow from the injury, and therefore, which is not required to be separately averred or proved.” The Claim on tort of abuse of process 5.3 The Plaintiff also sought to prove a case for tort of abuse of process. Here, the submission on this cause of action mostly mirrors the submission for the tort of malicious prosecution. The Plaintiff mainly submits on the impropriety of the two petitions for want of reasonable and/or probable cause. It was submitted that again, the Defendant had never appealed against the decision of the High Court in 2009 by Zaharah Binti Ibrahim J. in dismissing the first petition which reads: “I was satisfied that the Respondent at the time of the presentation of the Petition was a solvent company. A petition to wind up a solvent company is an abuse of the process of the Court…” Similarly, with regard to the second petition, the petition had been dismissed in 2014 on the same ground that the Court had found that the Plaintiff was solvent company. And the Defendant had persisted with the second petition even after the Plaintiff had disputed the same issue on solvency against the Defendant vide letters which were admitted to have been received by the Defendant but was ignored. As for the proof of damages suffered, the Plaintiff submits the same should apply as per the quantum of damages submitted in proving its case of malicious prosecution. The Defendant’s case [6] It must be noted at the outset that the submission offers little contest to the law relied upon by the Plaintiff. The defence’s submission is mostly constructed to disprove the elements sought to be proven by the Plaintiff. This Court is minded that the Defendant in his submission had focused mainly to disprove the allegation of abuse of process from their conduct of filing the two petitions. And flowing from the disproval of the allegation of abuse of process, it boils down to the disproval of the tort of malicious prosecution as well as in disproving the abuse of process, it disproves one of the elements of malicious prosecution sought to be proven by the Plaintiff. This Court is also minded that the Defendant had persistently contended that his conduct was incited by the reluctance of the Plaintiff to settle the judgment sum which had stood for many years. 6.1 In disproving the malicious intent alleged by the Plaintiff against the Defendant’s conduct the Defendant firstly submits that the motives in which the petitions were filed is an irrelevant consideration and that it is an accepted prima facie rule that an unpaid creditor has a right to file a Winding Up petition whatever his motives are. 6.2 On the outset to this submission this Court is minded the counsel for the Defendant had quoted the case relied upon to its full extent by omitting the word other and quoted “motives” instead of the supposed “other motives”. The precedent concerned and the excerpt so quoted was in the case of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lian Seng Properties [1991] 1 MLJ 95: “(b) prima facie a creditor who is not paid has a right to file a petition for a winding-up order whatever may be his other motives” (emphasis added) The Defendant then submitted that the case above was also applied in the more recent case of Pioneer Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Celini Corporation Sdn Bhd [1998] 3 MLJ 810 in which the Supreme Court had dealt with an appeal against the striking off of a Winding Up petition by the trial Court on the ground that the petition was “stage managed”. Justice Abdul Malik Ishak in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court had held: “It is a correct statement of the law to say and I so say that prima facie, the petitioner as a creditor who is not paid has a right to file a petition for winding-up, whatever the motives may be. The Court is not concerned about the motives of the petitioner here in winding-up the Respondent”. In reliance of these two cases the Defendant submits that it is the prima facie right of the petition to file the petitions. The Plaintiff has no business in questioning the motives behind the conduct of the Defendant in filing the petitions and hitherto the Court may not infer abuse of process and/or malicious intent from the conduct of the Defendant in filing the two petitions in 2009 and 2014. 6.3 The Defendant in submitting against the Plaintiff’s allegation of tort of abuse of process had submitted that the conduct of the Defendant in filing the two petitions was a valid legal redress and was not an abuse of process. a. Firstly, in disproving the tort of abuse of process, the Defendant submits that he indeed has a cause to file the two petitions against the Plaintiff. It was submitted that the Defendant had long been ran on a negative cash flow in that the Plaintiff is running on borrowings since the company itself cannot run by itself on its positive income and had to depend on borrowings. In supporting this contention, the Defendant had produced a table of the Plaintiff’s audited account from years 2008 till 2012. The Defendant also referred to the admission of PW3 in the Notes of Evidence (“NOE”) at page 64 line 31-32: “LCL Negative cash flow? AVATAR But we have been. I have been operating the company since 1977 and we have never had a positive cash flow because.” Based on this evidence, the Defendant purported to refer to the case of Pioneer Concrete v Celini Corp (Supra page 16) which had laid down the test of “commercial insolvency” in the determination of a judgment debtor’s ability to pay its debts. The relevant excerpt of the judgment delivered by Abdul Malik Ishak is: “It is germane to mention that the test of commercial insolvency is simple. It is this. Whether the company is unable to meet its current debts as they fall due? A company may have substantial wealth which cannot be realized immediately and if that happens the company is said to be unable to pay its debts within the purview and ambit of s 218(1)(e) of the Companies Act 1965 and this is so even though on liquidation the company will be able to meet all its liabilities...”(emphasis added) The Defendant further submits that the fact that the assets of the Plaintiff might exceed its liability does not infer that the Plaintiff is solvent and able to pay its debts. It is incumbent instead for the Plaintiff to prove that it has immediate realizable wealth at the time the debt falls due. The Defendant referred to the case of BMC Construction Sdn Bhd v Dataran Rentas Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 MLJ 356: “And in dealing with ‘commercial insolvency’, that is, of a company being unable to meet current demands upon it, the Federal Court in Sri Hartamas followed the Privy Council in the case of Malayan Plant (Pte) Ltd v Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 53, and cited the following observations from Buckley on the Companies Act (13th Ed) at p 460: In such a case it is useless to say that if its assets are realized there will be ample to pay twenty shillings in the pound: this is not the test. A company may be at the same time insolvent and wealthy. It may have wealth locked up in investments not presently realizable; but although this be so, yet if it have not assets available to meet its current liabilities it is commercially insolvent and may be wound up.” (see also Hotel Royal & TD Bhd v Tina Travel & Agencies Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 MLJ 21) b. It was also briefly submitted that generally, inability to pay debt is proved by service of the statutory notice under Section 218 of the Companies Act 1965 and the subsequent failure to comply with any such statutory notice. c. In furtherance to disprove any abuse of process, the Defendant submitted that as a judgment creditor, it is well within the discretion and rights of the judgment creditor to elect whatever mode of execution that is most expedient to him. The Defendant relied on the case of Pembinaan dan Pemaju Mahajiwa (Selangor) SDN V ASM Development Sdn Bhd [2003] 4 MLJ 633 in which Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ (as he then was) had held: “It is true that the appellant did not appeal against the order of the SAR striking out the first suit. But, that is a matter for the appellant to decide. The appellant had an option whether to try to save the first suit or to abandon it and file a fresh suit. Indeed, upon an objection being raised, if it is true that the first suit was commenced without authority, the appellant could on its own accord, discontinue the action and file a fresh one. That clearly would not be an abuse of the process of the Court. To sum up, on the facts of this case, where the appellant had two options before it, the fact that it chooses one and not the other, is not an abuse of the process of the Court.” d. The Defendant further sought to disprove abuse in disputing the element of initiating the action for some other purpose other than to attain genuine redress. (see Malaysian Building Society Bhd v Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin Bin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425) It was submitted that since there is no mal-intent and the Defendant was well within its rights to petition for Winding Up, his conduct in filing the two petitions were conducts purposed for the genuine redress to recover the judgment owed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant. e. The Defendant reiterates the fact that the Plaintiff may not contest the second petition as the judgment debt had stood even after the line of appeals of the Plaintiff which was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal and even the Federal Court. The Plaintiff had persisted to not settle the judgment debt even after it was made clear all along that the Plaintiff owed monies against the Defendant. f. The Defendant also in his submission in reply had contended that the underlying reason behind the withdrawal of his appeal against the dismissal of the first petition was that the Defendant’s previous solicitors had done so for practical reasons in that notwithstanding the probability of succeeding on the issue of solvency, the petition might also fail on other procedural non-compliance. g. With regard to the contention of malice of the advertisement under the petitions, the Defendant in his reply had submitted that as the Defendant had the rights to lawfully pursue the petitions, the advertisement and gazetting of the petition is a mandatory procedure which needs to be complied. Failing to do so would be a deliberate non-compliance of the petition’s procedures. In this contention, the Defendant had invited the attention of the Court to the case of Azman & Tay Associates v Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 390 HC. The Court in this case dealt with an appeal against the trial judge’s decision to dismiss an application to injunct the advertisement of a Winding Up petition against the Respondent. In dismissing the appeal, Vincent Ng J. had held at page 396 of the decision: “I dismissed the ex parte application in encl 5 solely for the reason that I was of the considered view that this Court cannot injunct the petitioners from exercising their statutory right – and indeed a mandatory requirement – to advertise the petition, under r 24 of the Companies (Winding Up) Rules 1972…” h. The Defendant also submitted that a demarcation must be drawn with the findings of the dismissal of the first petition and the Plaintiff’s cause of action in tort of abuse of process. The demarcation sought to be drawn was the fact that the dismissal of the first petition was merely a finding of abuse under Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of High Court and not in any manner a finding of liability on the tort of abuse of process. Here the Defendant referred the Court to the case of Si & Si Sdn Bhd v Hazrabina Sdn Bhd (Supra page 6) whereby the court in that case had held that a petition may be struck off for abuse of process, but damages from such abuse must be pursued in a separate suit. i. Thus, it was submitted that even if the Defendant be bound by the decision of the dismissal of the first petition, the dismissal only pertains to a finding of an abuse of process, and not a tort of abuse of process. j. The Defendant then follows to imbue some doubts over the Plaintiff’s case in that the Plaintiff was lacking in candour when the Plaintiff, against their own testimony on proper accounting practice, had never disclosed the judgment debt in any of its audited accounts. The Defendant invited this Court to refer to the NOE with regards to the testimonies of PW1 and PW3: LCL Can you please check? Let us start from the audited accounts for 2008. Mr Isma, can you please refer to Bundle B pages 53 until 83. Bundle B, 53 onwards. ISMA 2008 don’t have LCL 2008, never disclosed. ISMA Yes, never disclosed. LCL Look at 2009, it’s from page 84 to 115. ISMA Also not disclosed. LCL Also not disclosed. 2010 at pages 116 to 147. ISMA Also don’t have. LCL 2011 at pages 148 to 179. ISMA Don’t have. I confirm that. (00:17:48) LCL Okay now, 2012, that is found in the B1, the next bundle, Bundle B1, pages 64 to 100. ISMA Also don’t have.” k. And lastly, the Defendant sought to disprove the damages alleged to have been suffered by the Plaintiff. The Defendant submits that the nexus attempted to be drawn by the Plaintiff was done vide the letters inter alia: (i) An unsigned letter dated 13.7.2009 from Gasco Pte Ltd to the Plaintiff. In which the Defendant submits that this letter and it contents were in totality documentary hearsay as the maker of the letter was not called to testify as a witness before the Court. Even if it were to be considered, the content of the letter merely shows concerns over the first petition and a request by the author to take action to resolve the matter. (ii) A letter dated 15.7.2009 from Independent Technology Sendirian Berhad to the Plaintiff. In which the same objection was raised that the document is entirely documentary hearsay whereby the maker of the letter was not called to testify. Even if it were to be considered, the letter merely expressed the author’s concern on the Plaintiff’s ability to undertake and perform the project with them. (iii) With regard to the second petition, a letter dated 6.5.2013 from RHB Bank to the Plaintiff. Similarly, the same objection of documentary hearsay is raised in that the maker of the letter was not called as a witness. Even if the letter were to be comprehended, the content only indicates that the Plaintiff’s application for credit facilities was declined on the reason of “history of credit default, management risk concern and unresolved civil suit”. Thus, the decline was on a multitude reasons and not necessarily the petition per se. l. It is interesting to note that the Plaintiff had not at all referred to these letters in proving its damages allegedly suffered but relied mainly in the audited accounts of the Plaintiff to prove its losses. The Defendant then relied upon the decision delivered by Thomson CJ in a Civil Appeal, in the case of Lee Sau Kong v Leow Cheng Chiang (1961) 27 MLJ 17. The case dealt with general damages in the sense of loss of business and profits. With regard to that claim, the Court had held: “With regard to the claim for damages, I would preface what I have to say by quoting the following passage… “Plaintiff must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write it down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the Court, saying: ‘This is what I have lost; I ask you to give me these damages.’ They have to prove it.” m. Lastly, the Defendant submits that in lieu of the Plaintiff’s failure in proving his damages, the Plaintiff, if in the event of successfully proving their action, should only be awarded nominal damages. The Defendant had referred to the decision of Thomson CJ in the case of Lee Sau Kong v Leow Cheng Chiang (Supra page 25) in which the Court had held: “With regard to the claim for damages I would preface what I have to say by quoting the following passage from the judgment of Lord Goddard in the case of Bonham Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Ltd: “Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the Court, saying: “This is what I have lost; I ask you to give me these damages.” They have to prove it.” In furtherance to their submission, the Defendant then relied upon the case of Hock Huat Iron Foundry (Suing As A Firm) v Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ CA where Abdul Malek Ahmad JCA (as he then was) held: “When damages is shown but the amount is not proved, the Court will usually award nominal damages. The trial judge was correct in concluding that the loss had not been proved sufficiently by the Defendant and was right in giving judgment for RM 10 as nominal damages for the loss of interest on project investment and loss of income on investment.” The Findings of the Court [7] The first issue that this Court shall deal with is the elements of malicious prosecution sought to be proven by the Plaintiff. A. Whether the earlier proceedings had been in the favour of the Plaintiff 7.1 Firstly, with regard to the element that the earlier proceedings must be decided in the favour of the Plaintiff, it goes without saying that this element had been proven. It was already undisputed that the two petitions were dismissed against the Defendant and these dismissals were indeed in the Plaintiff’s favour. Thus the Court finds that the first element in proving malicious prosecution is proven by the Plaintiff. B. Whether the two petitions were initiated with a want of reasonable and/or probable cause of action 7.2 The crux of the debate between the two parties in in fact, is the issue of whether the two petitions filed by the Defendant was indeed without reasonable and/or probable cause and such determination would determine whether there was indeed an abuse of process and whether the second element in proving malicious prosecution had been proven by the Plaintiff. 7.3 In answering this issue, there are other sub-issues which must be determined before any findings could be made as to whether or not the petitions were initiated without reasonable and/or probable cause of action. 7.4 This Court is minded that the main factor to be determined in answering this issue is to determine whether or not the Plaintiff solvent and had the ability to pay his debts. B(i) Whether the contention that the Plaintiff was subsisting on negative cash flow needed to be specifically pleaded? 7.5 Along the Plaintiff’s submission in reply, the Plaintiff had raised an objection against the Defendant’s contention in regards of the Plaintiff’s alleged negative cash flow in that the said contention was not pleaded. Upon perusing the Defendant’s statement of defence, the Court finds that the contention had sufficiently been pleaded. Although it was worded in reference to the failure of complying with the statutory notice under the petition, the contention of the inability of the Plaintiff to pay its debts was already pleaded. Anything else to the effect of proving or disproving the Plaintiff’s ability to pay debts are supporting facts. Even the Plaintiff themselves sought to prove the solvency through their own sets of facts and evidence. The contention by the Defendant on the Plaintiff’s negative cash flow also brings forth the same effect; in that it ought to prove or disprove the solvency and ability of the Plaintiff to pay its debts. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the contention on negative cash flow need not be specifically pleaded. B(ii) Whether the conduct of the Defendant in withdrawing their appeal against the first petition is an admission and/or acceptance to the solvent state of the Plaintiff? 7.6 It was persistently reiterated in the Plaintiff’s submission that the dismissal of the first petition on the ground of the Plaintiff’s solvency remained uncontested. Not only was it not appealed against, the Defendant had in fact withdrawn his appeal against the dismissal. 7.7 In the Defendant’s submission in reply, the Defendant had sought to justify his conduct in withdrawing the appeal against the first petition in that the withdrawal was done on the advice of the Defendant’s solicitors then. It was withdrawn on the supposed reason that even if the Defendant may be successful in his appeal on the issue of solvency, the appeal might fail because of other procedural non-compliance. 7.8 In consideration of the submissions of both of the parties, this Court is of the view that notwithstanding the underlying reason behind the Defendant’s withdrawal (which was void of any supporting evidence) the fact remains that the decision was uncontested. The conscious decision of the Defendant to not appeal against the decision infers the acceptance and agreement of the Defendant to the dismissal and its grounds. B(iii) Whether the Defendant as judgment creditor was justified in law to opt for Winding Up petitions in lieu of other modes of executions? 7.9 Although this is more relevant to the determination of the tort of abuse of process, this Court finds relevance of this issue to determine whether or not the petitions filed by the Defendant had reasonable and/or probable cause of action. This is because, if it was found that the Defendant had unlawfully opted for execution vide Winding Up petitions, it equally may infer malicious intent in that the Defendant had pursued the two petitions in complete disregard of the law (as had been submitted by the Plaintiff in their submissions) 7.10 The Defendant had relied closely to the case of Pembinaan dan Pemaju Mahajiwa (Selangor) SDN V ASM Development Sdn Bhd (Supra page 19). The relevance sought to be applied by the Defendant was that the decision of this Court had held that it is not an abuse of process for the Defendant to opt for one mode of execution when it had two options before it. For the convenience of reference, the excerpt relied upon is reproduced here: “It is true that the appellant did not appeal against the order of the SAR in striking out the first suit. But that is a matter for the appellant to decide. The appellant had an option to whether to try to save the first suit or to abandon it and file a fresh suit…To sum up, on the facts of this case, where the appellant had two options before it, the fact that it chooses one and not the other, is not an abuse of the process of the Court. 7.11 This Court does not at all intend to contra the decision of the Federal Court in the case above. However, this Court is of the considered view that even in the application of this case, the case does nothing to support the Defendant’s contention. 7.12 The case relied upon was regarding a case which was struck out because of a non-compliance of a Court order, which is totally different from this case. In the present case before the Court, the two petitions was not merely struck out because of a non-compliance of direction, but instead an act of abuse of process itself. It begs to be vastly different from the Federal Court decision. The present case before the Court was struck off for the want of cause of action, not mere non-compliance. It was decided in the first petition in 2009 that it was an abuse of process. And to re-agitate the matter in the same manner in the second petition (which indeed was dismissed for the same reason) is indeed again, a further abuse. A blatant abuse in fact, to go against the judgment which was admitted and filing the same action in Court notwithstanding the earlier decision. 7.13 This Court is in agreement with the Federal Court that it would not be an abuse of process if the Defendant were to opt for one option available to him amidst other options which were also available to him. However, if one of the options is unavailable to be utilized (because the company is solvent) it is incumbent of the Defendant to employ other methods of execution and not persistently and blatantly pursuing for a remedy unavailable to them. In the present case, the abuse committed is not at all on the issue of opting for Winding Up petitions in lieu of other modes of execution, but instead on the issue that the Defendant had opted, out of many modes of execution, the mode of execution which was lawfully unavailable to them. 7.14 The decision of the Federal Court had already intimated that the factum of abuse depends on facts of each case. And this Court finds that the conduct the Defendant here, in pursuing an option knowing that it was an abuse of process, is indeed an abuse of process and therefore was unjustified in opting to pursue the two Winding Up petitions. B(iv) Whether the Plaintiff was indeed solvent and able to pay his debts at the time the two petitions were filed against them? 7.17 This Court is minded that there are various evidences and contentions which were laid down by both of the parties in proving or disproving the Plaintiff’s solvency. The Court shall delve into each submission and address them separately, before making a final finding on the solvency of the Plaintiff. Whether negative cash flow is proof of insolvency and/or inability to pay debt. 7.18 First, this Court will address the Defendant’s contention on the Plaintiff’s state of account, in that it was admitted to be on a negative cash flow. Upon perusal of the NOE it was indeed admitted that the Plaintiff indeed was subsisting on a negative cash flow from the year 2008 till 2012. And upon the test of commercial insolvency, although the Plaintiff may have more assets than its liabilities, it doesn’t necessarily connote that it is solvent and able to pay its debts. The Plaintiff must have immediate realizable assets to pay its debts when it falls due. This contention is earlier elaborated at para 5.2 of this decision. (See Pioneer Concrete v Celini Corp (Supra page 16); BMC Construction Sdn Bhd v Dataran Rentas Sdn Bhd (Supra page 18); Hotel Royal TD Bhd v Tina Travel & Agencies Sdn Bhd (Supra page 19).) 7.19 From the outset, it needs to be noted that this Court does not intend to contra the decisions of the cases mentioned above. This Court does not at all dispute the proposition of law regarding the test of commercial insolvency. Nonetheless, merely agreeing to the proposition of law, does not mean that the Defendant have proven their case. From the submissions of both parties, the propriety of the test of commercial insolvency is not at any time an issue. 7.20 Nonetheless, this Court is in agreement with the Plaintiff in its submission in reply that none of the cases relied upon by the Defendant stipulate that the fact of subsistence vide negative cash flow is cogent proof of insolvency and/or inability to pay its debts. All it proves is that at the time being of negative cash flow, the company was running on borrowings. Just the mere fact the Plaintiff subsists on borrowings does not at all effectively proof that it cannot pay its debts. Many businesses utilise borrowings such as loans and credit facilities in running their businesses with genuine trade. Businesses undertake loans to run their trade. A negative cash flow does not indicate an inability to pay. Even the case laws do not indicate as such at all. Thus, the Defendant’s contention hitherto is void of any support. 7.21 Adding to the same effect, the solvency of the Plaintiff had already been upheld twice in the dismissal of the first and the second petitions. It is more probable that these two dismissals are correct rather than the unsupported assertion of insolvency based on negative cash flow as submitted by the Defendant. Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that the subsistence of the Plaintiff on negative cash flow does not prove its insolvency or inability to pay its debts. Whether there was an admission of the Plaintiff’s solvency and ability to pay its debts by the Defendant’s own witnesses. 7.22 The Plaintiff had referred the Court to the NOE with regards to the Defendant’s witnesses’ testimonies. For the sake of convenience, the excerpt of the NOE at page 123 which the Court finds relevance is reproduced here: “KEE Saya Winding Up because he is a big company. He is a big company, he will not allow me to Winding Up. He will pay me, he will make a point to pay me but he still stubborn, he don’t want to pay me…” “HMS Encik Kee, saya cakap sama Encik Kee punya niat. Saya tunjukkan, sebelum fail Winding Up Encik Kee sudah tahu dia ada duit boleh bayar. Betul? KEE Memang saya tahu. Ya. That’s why.” 7.23 This is the evidence of DW1 who is the Defendant himself. It is utterly vivid that the Defendant himself knows of the solvency of the Plaintiff to pay its debts. He had admitted so twice in the above iteration. DW1 stated that the Plaintiff was a “big company” and that “he will make a point to pay me”. And when queried on his knowledge before filing the Winding Up petition if he had known the Plaintiff had the money to pay, DW1 had answered in the affirmative; in that he indeed knew full and well, prior to the filing of the Winding Up petition, that the Plaintiff is able and has the money to pay its debts. Thus it is the finding of this Court that it was indeed admitted by the Defendant himself that the Plaintiff was solvent and had the capability to pay its debts. Finding of the Court on the solvency and ability to pay debt of the Plaintiff. 7.24 Upon due and proper consideration of all the above determinations, it is this Court’s considered view that the Plaintiff is indeed solvent and able to pay its debts at the time the Defendant had filed the two petitions against the Plaintiff. Finding of the Court on the absence of reasonable and/or probable cause of action in the filing of the two petitions by the Defendant 7.25 Following the earlier finding in para 7.21, since the Plaintiff is found to be solvent and able to pay its debts at the time of the two petitions were filed, it is this Court’s finding that the two petitions were wrongfully presented and this is void of reasonable and/or probable cause, and indeed was an abuse of process of the Court. This Court finds valuable reliance to the case of Si & Si Sdn Bhd V Hazrabina Sdn Bhd (Supra page 6) in which the Court in that case had held: “…that as at the time of presenting the petition the company was an existing and going concern, and had valuable property and was solvent, unless other facts could be shown, there was a want of reasonable and probable cause for presenting the petition…” (See also Pacific & Orient Insurance) C. Whether the conduct of the Defendant in filing the petition actuated by malice or improper motive. 7.26 In perusing the Plaintiff’s submissions, in simpler terms, the Plaintiff defines malice in two contexts; 7.27 In that firstly, the conduct of the Defendant in filing the two petitions were actuated by malice in the sense of an improper motive other than to seek genuine redress of the Court. The Plaintiff had likened this improper motive to the conduct of the Defendant in blatantly filing the two Winding Up petitions knowing full well that that option was not only unavailable to them, but also injurious to the Plaintiff’s business. This Court would reiterate its earlier finding that indeed the Defendant had filed the two petitions with the said knowledge prior to the filing of the petitions. The Plaintiff first had submitted to demonstrate the injurious nature of a Winding Up petition in reliance of the case of Quartz Hill Gold Mining Company Eyre (Supra page 6) where the Court had opined that bankruptcy actions (in the present case the two petitions) would cause serious imputations against the Respondent even before the Respondent would have the opportunity to defend itself because of the procedure of advertisement and gazetting. The Plaintiff further submits, in light of the injurious nature of the petitions, the blatant conduct of the Defendant had befall upon them unnecessary peril. 7.28 Even more so malicious, when the petitions were filed knowing that it was wrongfully presented. This Court is in further agreement with the Plaintiff in reliance to the case of Cadiz Waterworks v Barnett (Supra page 10) in which the Court in that case had held that if a petition was presented knowing it will fail (alike the Defendant in this case as per the earlier finding) it may well be an utterly unjust demand. This Court is also in further agreement with the Plaintiff in reference to the case of Johnson v Emerson (Supra page 12) which had held that an action of a Defendant in taking proceedings with the knowledge and belief that they could not be properly taken, would be some evidence of malice. 7.29 Mirroring such action is the blatant conduct of the Defendant in taking the two petitions knowing that it could not be properly taken. As per the earlier finding, even PW1 admitted that he knew at the time before the petitions were filed, that the company would make a point and would be able to pay him. Even more so with regards to the second petition, the Defendant had completely ignored the Plaintiff’s letter disputing their statutory notice of demand on the ground of solvency and ability to pay its debts. And additionally, this Court finds that in wrongfully petitioning for Winding Up, knowing that the Plaintiff was solvent is a conduct of giving the Court an untrue account of the Plaintiff’s solvency. And as per the case of Malz v Rosen (Supra page 11), such conduct may be proof of malice. Pursuing for the petitions knowing full well it will fail begs to draw the inference that, payment and compensation was not the motive of the Defendant. Instead, not only for the sake of convenience, as the process of advertisement and gazetting may be injurious, the Defendant had filed the petition to put the Plaintiff in such injury. The Court is of the considered view that the Defendant had not genuinely sought for genuine redress and had conducted himself in malice. 7.30 Secondly, the Defendant’s conduct was in reckless disregard of the law and the rights of the Plaintiff. In echoing the finding above, as the Defendant had opted for the petitions knowing full well that he is not legally entitled to (as the Plaintiff was solvent) is vividly a conduct in utter disregard of the law. 7.31 This Court also intends to address the submission of the Defendant in this issue. The Court is minded that the Defendant had at length argued that the question of motive is not at all relevant with regards to an unpaid creditor who prima facie, has the right to file winding-up petitions notwithstanding his motives. The Defendant had referred to the case of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lian Seng Properties (Supra page 15) and also the case of Pioneer Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Celini Corporation Sdn Bhd (Supra page 16). 7.32 This Court is of the considered view that this is merely a prima facie rule. Though indeed an unpaid creditor may lodge a petition to wind up, however being a prima facie rule, it must also be considered with other relevant rules of law of insolvency. And that law is that, a Winding Up petition should not be lodged in the circumstance that the debtor is still solvent. This Court does not intend to contra the decision of the Supreme Court. Even with the application of the cases above, it does not at all go to the favour of the Defendant. This is because as the precedent have stated, this is merely a prima facie rule. It is not an absolute right. The right may be disputed if there are valid grounds to dispute it. And the factum of the present case DOES disprove the right. Because in all of the cases relied upon by the Defendant, the petitioner had the rights to petition. 7.33 But in this case, the petitioner from the outset does NOT have the right to petition. The Defendant’s witnesses themselves had admitted that they knowingly are aware of the Plaintiff as big company who is capable but reluctant to pay. And that he only pursued Winding Up because it is the cheapest and accessible remedy to get his monies. 7.34 This Court is minded that the Defendant had submitted that they hold no malice in advertising the petition as it is a mandatory procedure in a Winding Up petition and that not doing so would be a blatant procedural non-compliance. The Defendant had relied on the decision of Vincent Ng J. In the case of Azman & Tay Associates v Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd (Supra page 21) 7.35 With regard to this contention by the Defendant, this Court, firstly, do agree with the proposition of law referred to. Nevertheless, although it is indeed a statutory requirement, from the outset, the statutory right to proceed for the Winding Up petition was already absent for the Defendant. To pursue the same knowing that it is unlawful to do so, is proof of malice. Finding of the Court on the tort of malicious prosecution 7.36 In appreciation of the foregoing findings above, the Court finds that the Plaintiff had successfully proven its case on the tort of malicious prosecution. 7.37 The next issue for determination of this Court is whether the Plaintiff had suffered damages arising from the Defendant’s malicious prosecution. D. Whether the Plaintiff had suffered damages arising from the Defendant’s malicious prosecution 7.38 The parties had referred to two different decisions which had delved into the claim of general damages. So to speak, the Plaintiff had relied upon the Rajasthan High Court decision in the case of Onkarmal & Anor v Banwarilal & Ors (Supra page 13) and the Defendant relied upon the case of Lee Sau Kong v Leow Cheng Chiang (Supra page 25). 7.39 After perusing these two cases put forth by the parties, the Court finds more assistance and relevance to the case of Lee Sau Kong as referred to by the Plaintiff. This is on the ground that firstly, it is a case decided by our own Court Civil Appeal - (Malaya) rather than the distant case decided in the High Court Rajasthan. Thomson CJ’s decision in Lee Sau Kong’s states the legal position in Malaysia. Secondly and most importantly, the case of Onkarmal & Anor v Banwarilal & Ors (Supra page 13) dealt with a claim in general damages from the act of wrongful confinement. This is verily different from the case before the Court here. Of course it would be seemingly impossible to quantify general damages so suffered from the act of wrongful confinement. In contrast, the case of Lee Sau Kong is indeed more relevant to the present case as the Court there had dealt with general damages in the sense of loss of business or profits (which is most definitely the case in the present case before the Court today). 7.40 Not only that, although it was submitted by the Plaintiff that general damages need not be specifically proven, the Plaintiff itself had attempted to prove its loss of business through its audited accounts. It seems to indicate that the Plaintiff itself agree that in its head of general damages, it still requires evidence to substantiate its claim. 7.41 What is more perplexing is the fact that the Plaintiff, against its own evidence to prove nexus of the damages to the conduct of the Defendant through numerous letters from its trade (see para 6.3 (k) of this decision) had not at all submitted on these letters. The Plaintiff mainly had only referred to the testimonies of its own witnesses and the audited accounts. This begs the indication that the Plaintiff itself had shun away from its duty of proving the nexus between the damages allegedly suffered and the conduct of the Plaintiff. 7.42 This Court is in total agreement with the Defendant in his submissions against the numerous letters mentioned above in that they are documentary hearsay (as none of the authors of the said letters were called to testify) and that even the letters were to be admissible, the contents prove very little nexus between the damages allegedly suffered to the conduct of the Defendant. 7.43 Now this Court is also minded that the Plaintiff submitted that the figures of loss of business from the audited accounts and its witnesses had not been challenged by the Defendant and should be deemed as an admission. Nonetheless, even though they are unchallenged, these evidences can only go so far to prove that the company suffered losses without any proof of nexus to link the losses to the conduct of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff might lose business for multifaceted reasons. The absence of proof any nexus to link the Defendant’s conduct to the loss does not at all prove the Plaintiff’s claim. 7.44 This Court needs to emphasis here, the losses alleged to be suffered from the petitions were actually motivated by the Plaintiff’s own reluctance to settle the judgment debt. Although the Court finds that the petitions were indeed an abuse of process, the fact stands that the two petitions came about (though abusively) out of the Plaintiff’s own refusal to pay. The Plaintiff cannot deny its own doing in motivating the Defendant to file the petitions. It is incumbent upon the Plaintiff to actually pay the judgment debt. The judgment debt had undergone numerous applications and appeals and even then the judgment debt still stands and still unpaid until today. Thus, although the petitions were wrongfully presented, the Court would not allow the Plaintiff to profit from a wrong which the Plaintiff itself had indirectly contributed to. 7.45 Therefore, upon due and proper consideration of the submissions above, this Court is in agreement with the Defendant that in failing to prove its losses or the extent of its losses attributable to the wrongful presentation of the two petitions by the Defendant, the Plaintiff should only be entitled to nominal damages. This Court does not deny that the Plaintiff had not suffered damages but the Court does not find any cogent evidence in proving the extent of damages suffered attributed to the Defendant’s wrongful presentation of the two petitions and thus the Plaintiff should only be entitled to nominal damages. (See Hock Huat Iron Foundry (Suing As A Firm) v Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd (Supra page 26). Finding of Court on the tort of abuse process [8] The second cause of action of the Plaintiff was for the tort of abuse against the Defendant’s conduct in filing the two petitions. Now from the outset, this Court is in agreement with the Defendant that merely depending on the decision of the dismissal of the first petition in 2009, does little to prove the elements of the tort of abuse of process. Indeed in perusing the dismissal of the first petition, the first petition was dismissed for abuse of process under Order 18 rule 19(1)(b) and/or (c) and/or (d) and not for the tort of abuse of process. The decision even goes to the extent to refer to the case of Si & Si v Hazrabina Sdn Bhd (Supra page 6) which had held that upon a petition being struck out, damages must be sued by way for an entirely separate suit. But equally so, merely submitting that the dismissal was not for tort of abuse of process, does not automatically rule out the tort of abuse of process. The fact remains that upon the earlier finding of this Court, the two petitions were wrongfully presented and is indeed an abuse of process. [9] Nonetheless, this Court finds valuable assistance to the decision of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in the case of Malaysia Building Society Bhd v Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin Ungku Mohamed (Supra page 20) at page 438 which was referred to by the Defendant. The Court there had laid down the elements to prove the tort of abuse of process which are namely: The process complained of must have been initiated 9.1 Reiterating the earlier finding of this Court above with regard to the tort of malicious prosecution, this Courts finds that indeed the process (being the two petitions) complained of have indeed been initiated. Thus the first element indeed had been proven. The process initiated was purposed other than the purpose to obtain genuine redress. In other words, it was aimed to produce a result not intended by the invocation of the process 9.2 Similar to the earlier findings above on the issue of the tort of malicious prosecution, the Court finds that indeed when the Defendant had opted to file the two petitions, with prior knowledge, knowing full and well that the Plaintiff was solvent, and that the petition would fail, the Defendant had not pursued the petitions for genuine redress and/or the result intended from a bankruptcy proceeding. A Winding Up action is purposed to seek redress in the circumstance of the Respondent concerned is indeed insolvent. And for the Defendant to pursue the petition knowing that the Plaintiff was solvent, clearly indicates that they had not pursued the two petitions for genuine redress intended under the invocation of the process (being the petitions and/or the bankruptcy actions). Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the second element of the tort of abuse of process had been proven. 9.3 Upon the immediately preceding findings above, the Court finds that the Plaintiff had proven their case and that the Defendant is liable for the tort of abuse of process in wrongfully presenting the two petitions. 9.4 Now, having found that the Defendant is liable for the tort of abuse of process in wrongfully presenting the two petitions, the next issue to be determined is whether the Plaintiff had suffered some damage or injury in consequence to the conduct of the Defendant. Whether the Plaintiff had suffered some damage or injury in consequence to the conduct of the Defendant 9.5 Again, as similarly found in the findings above with regards to the tort of malicious prosecution, this Court draws the same finding that the Plaintiff although may have suffered damages from the wrongful conduct of the Defendant (being the presentation of the two petitions), had not adduced cogent evidence to prove the extent of damages suffered attributable to the conduct of the Defendant. As such, the Plaintiff would only be entitled to nominal damages. Other issues (i) The issue of non-disclosure of the judgment debt in the audited accounts [10] This Court is minded that the Defendant had raised the issue of the Plaintiff withholding the judgment debt in their audited accounts. Alluding to this issue, the Court is of the opinion that the issue is of little significance to the case. Even if there was lack of candour in the accounting practice of the Plaintiff, it does not at all prove that the Plaintiff was solvent or otherwise at the time the two petitions were filed. The Defendant had not adduced any cogent evidences or figures to prove that with the inclusion or disclosure of the judgment debt in the audited accounts, it will prove that the Plaintiff was insolvent and unable to pay its debts. Thus, this Court shall not delve further into this issue. (ii) The issue of set-off and/or counterclaim [11] Along the submissions of both of the parties, the parties had contended on the underlying reason of the Plaintiff in withholding the payment of the judgment and whether the withholding of the payment justified in law. Again, this Court finds little significance of this issue in the case before the Court. The present case deals with the propriety of the initiation of two Winding Up petitions in the face of the fact of the solvency of the Respondent (in the present case, the Plaintiff). This Court shall not delve into the reasons or justification behind the non-payment as it is to the opinion of this Court that it does little significance to prove or disprove the case of the Plaintiff. Merely because the Plaintiff had withheld payment of the judgment debt (whether justly or unjustly) does not justify the Defendant to wrongfully present the two Winding Up petitions. Conclusion [12] This Court earlier in its judgment had found the Defendant liable for both the tort of malicious prosecution and the tort of abuse of process in the Defendant’s conduct in wrongfully presenting the two Winding Up petitions against the Plaintiff while having full prior knowledge that the Plaintiff was at that time, solvent and able to pay its debts. Nevertheless, although the Defendant is found liable, the Court also finds that the Plaintiff had failed to produce cogent evidence to prove the damages or injury or the extent of damages or injury caused by the Defendant’s tortious conduct and thus, the Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages. [13] It is trite law that trial court’s power to grant nominal damages is a discretionary one. It is also trite that this discretionary power must be judicially exercised by the court. In the present case, this Court had earlier emphasised and again this Court reiterates that both petitions filed by the Defendant were actually motivated by the Plaintiff’s own reluctance to settle the judgment debt. Although the petitions were wrongfully presented, this Court would not allow the Plaintiff to profit from a wrong which the Plaintiff itself had indirectly contributed to. This Court is also mindful that the judgment debt is still unpaid and still owing to the Defendant. The act of the Plaintiff in refusing and neglecting to settle the Defendant’s judgment debt which was validly obtained from the court of law must be given utmost consideration and cannot be ignored. On the facts of this case, this Court is of the view that the Plaintiff’s conduct in ignoring the judgment debt todate is a flagrant disrespect of the law on the part of the Plaintiff. Therefore, in these circumstances, this Court allows the Plaintiff’s claim and awards with nominal damages of RM10.00. On the issue of costs [14] On similar grounds as stated in paragraph 13 above, this Court is of the view that an order directing each party to bear his own costs would be an appropriate and just order. t.t ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 30th day of October, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Faizah, Mahinder & Co. Harminder Singh, Avtar Singh For the Defendant - Tetuan Chan Leong & Co Dato’ Lee Chan Leong, Emily Siew Ee Mei 50

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-341-04/2013

PLAINTIF SYARIKAT STEELCON SDN BHD .... PLAINTIF F DEFENDAN KEE CHENG TECK .... DEFENDAN T

30/10/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=24731cfb-efd5-4be4-8526-8522205b3a92&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : 22NCVC-341-04/2013 BETWEEN SYARIKAT STEELCON SDN BHD .... PLAINTIFF AND KEE CHENG TECK .... DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Full trial) [1] The Plaintiff in this case had initiated this action against the Defendant for damages on the grounds of these two causes of actions: a. The tort of malicious prosecution against the Defendant’s conduct in pursuing the Winding Up Petition in 2009 in the Winding Up Action No. D1-28-344-2009 (“the first petition”) and also the Winding Up Petition in 2013 in the Winding Up Action No. 28NCC-50-02/2014 (“the second petition”). b. The tort of abuse of process against the Defendant’s conduct in pursuing both of the first petition and the second petition. [2] In its Statement of Claim the Plaintiff had pleaded that pursuant to the alleged tortious conducts of the Defendant mentioned in paragraphs 1(a) and (b) above, the Plaintiff had suffered losses (including loss of profits and/or loss of reputation or goodwill of the Plaintiff company) and therefore claimed the following reliefs: (i) Damages to be assessed not exceeding RM5 million to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. (ii) Interest on the damages at the rate and from the date as determined assessed by this Court to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. (iii) Further and/or such other reliefs as may be given by this Court as deemed fair and just in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant. [3] Now, before the two causes of actions of the Plaintiff may be addressed, it is pertinent that the background underlying this present action be understood for a proper and just appreciation of the case. The following are the salient facts which had been submitted by both of the parties in their evidence and also the agreed facts which was filed. 3.1 The Defendant had first obtained a Judgment Debt against the Defendant in 2007 from the Tawau High Court dated 4.10.2007 which held that the Plaintiff is indebted to the Defendant a sum of RM496,589.61 together with pre-Judgment interest at the rate of four per centum (4%) per annum from 13th March 2000 the date of the Writ of Summons to 4th October 2007 the date of Judgment pursuant to Section 11 Civil Law Act, 1956 and statutory interest at the rate of eight per centum (8%) per annum from 5th October 2007 to the date of payment and the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff his costs to be taxed (“the Judgment Debt”) in suit No. T(22) 8 of 2000. 3.2 The Plaintiff had subsequent to the Judgment Debt proceeded to appeal against the decision at the Court of Appeal which was later dismissed on 20.9.2011. Following the dismissal of the Appeal, the Plaintiff then had applied for a stay of execution of the Judgment Debt which also was later dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 14.5.2012. The Plaintiff then had applied for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision in upholding the Judgment Debt and even this application was dismissed and leave was not granted. 3.3 Stemming from the Judgment Debt, the Defendant had first issued a Statutory Notice of Demand under Section 218 of the Companies Act against the Plaintiff and proceeded to file the first petition in the year 2009. However, the first petition was later struck off for abuse of process under Order 18 Rule 19(1)(b) and/or (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of the High Court on the ground that the Defendant (the Petitioner in the first petition) had initiated the petition notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff (the Respondent in the first petition) was still solvent. The Defendant consequently applied to appeal against the decision to strike off the petition but however, the Defendant himself later had withdrawn his appeal. 3.4 Also on the basis of the Judgment Debt, the Defendant again had issued another Statutory Notice of Demand under Section 218 of the Companies Act against the Plaintiff and proceeded to file the second petition in the year 2014. However, the second petition was also dismissed on the same reason that the Plaintiff (the Respondent in the second petition) was still a solvent company on 25.6.2014 by the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. 3.5 The Judgment debt at any time was never settled by the Plaintiff in the present case. 3.6 The Plaintiff in the present case had initiated this action for the tort of malicious prosecution and/or tort of abuse of process based on the two Winding Up Petitions initiated by the Defendant namely the first and the second petitions. [4] Before this Court would proceed to make its findings, the Court would first delve into the submissions of both the Plaintiff’s and the Defendant’s cases. The Plaintiff’s Case [5] On the perusal of the Plaintiff’s Opening Submission and its Submission in Reply, the Plaintiff’s case had been submitted as follows: The Claim on tort of malicious prosecution 5.1 The Plaintiff on the outset submitted that both of the first and second petitions were dismissed on the same ground that the petition was filed notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff remains a solvent company. 5.2 The Plaintiff sought to prove all the necessary elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, which can be branched out into four elements which are: 1st element - The Plaintiff was successful in the earlier proceedings brought by the Defendant. In proving this element, the Plaintiff submitted that the Plaintiff indeed had been successful in not only one but two earlier proceedings which were brought by the Defendant against it. Those earlier proceedings are namely the first and second petitions which were subsequently dismissed by the High Court. 2nd element - The Defendant had instituted the earlier proceedings (the two petitions) without any reasonable and/or probable cause. The Plaintiff had submitted that there was a want of reasonable and/or probable cause on the submission that the two petitions were filed blatantly notwithstanding the Defendant’s knowledge and admission of the Plaintiff’s solvency and ability to pay its debts. The Plaintiff submitted that it is established in law that the petitions were wrongful petitions on the ground that the petitions were filed when there was ample evidence which proves that the Plaintiff was solvent and were able to pay their debts at the time the petitions were filed. It must be noted that this proposition of law was not contested and was agreed to be relevant in the present case, as even the Defendant in hindsight was attempting to prove that the Plaintiff was in actuality unable to pay its debts. The Plaintiff had referred to a number of cases supporting its proposition. First of which is a decision by our then Supreme Court in the case of Si & Si Sdn Bhd V Hazrabina Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 CLJ 657 which had affirmed the decision in the case of The Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co V Syre [1883] 11 QBD 674 which had held: “…that as at the time of presenting the petition the company was an existing and going concern, and had valuable property and was solvent, unless other facts could be shown, there was a want of reasonable and probable cause for presenting the petition…” The Plaintiff also referred to the case of Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd V Krishnan Moorthy Veerappan [2010] 7 CLJ 385 where the Court had held the following: “Section 218(1)(e) of the Companies Act 1965 requires the Court to wind up a company which was unable to pay as opposed to unwilling to pay its debts.” To which the Plaintiff had submitted evidences in supporting its contention: Firstly, it was submitted that there were numerous evidences in PW-3’s witness statement which were left unchallenged. Particularly on PW-3’s testimony that amidst the Plaintiff’s principle objection that the Plaintiff is indeed solvent, the Defendant knew or ought to have known that the Plaintiff was solvent and able to pay its debts. Furthermore, the conduct of the Defendant himself in withdrawing his appeal against the striking out of the first petition should be perceived as an admission of the correctness of that decision and the decision should remain binding and final against the Defendant as it was uncontested or was not appealed against. Even in respect of the second petition, the Plaintiff had sent letters to the Defendant expressing the same objection that it is solvent. Nonetheless, the Defendant chose to ignore the Plaintiff objection and proceeded to file the second petition. Hence, even during the first petition, and even at the second petition’s stage, the Defendant had blatantly filed the two petitions having or ought to have full knowledge that the Plaintiff was indeed solvent was able to pay its debts. Secondly, it was also submitted that the two petitions were also dismissed for the same reason that the Plaintiff was proven to be solvent and was able to pay its debts. The dismissal of the first petition was even admitted and accepted by the Defendant as he had not appealed against the dismissal of the first petition. Thirdly, the Plaintiff submitted that even the Defendant’s own witnesses had admitted to have knowledge that the Plaintiff was solvent and able to pay its debts and that the Defendant was pursuing for Winding Up only for the sake of saving cost and convenience to corner the Plaintiff to pay the judgment debt. This Court in reference to the Notes of Evidence (“NOE”) reproduces these excerpts which the Court found relevant to the Plaintiff’s submission at page 123 of the NOE: “KEE Saya Winding Up because he is a big company. He is a big company, he will not allow me to Winding Up. He will pay me, he will make a point to pay me but he still stubborn, he don’t want to pay me…” “HMS Encik Kee, saya cakap sama Encik Kee punya niat. Saya tunjukkan, sebelum fail Winding Up Encik Kee sudah tahu dia ada duit boleh bayar. Betul? KEE Memang saya tahu. Ya. That’s why.” 3rd element - The Defendant had conducted himself in malice in the sense that there was some indirect or improper motive in him taking or continuing with the two petitions. There the proof of malice had been submitted in two-folds, in that there was malice in filing the first petition and also that there was malice in filing the second petition. The Plaintiff had submitted that malice in this case before the Court was the blatant conduct of the Defendant in pursuing the two petitions in complete disregard of the law and also the decision of the High Court in dismissing the first petition. It was further submitted that the unjustified petitions had cornered the Plaintiff to lose face as it was advertised to have been petitioned for Winding Up following the proper procedures of a Winding Up Petition. The conduct of the Defendant in cornering the Plaintiff to be injured while knowing full well that they are not lawfully justified to petition for Winding Up can be inferred as malice as the Defendant had chosen, amidst all other modes of execution readily available to the Defendant, to petition for Winding Up which was unavailable to them which puts the Plaintiff under unnecessary peril. The Plaintiff had referred to the case of Quartz Hill Gold Mining Company (Supra page 6) which had made the following observation by Brett M.R. on the injurious nature of a Winding Up petition if maliciously or unjustly pursued: “It is not like an action charging a merchant with fraud, where the evil done by bringing the action is remedied at the same time that the mischief is published, namely at the trial… In my opinion it is more like bankruptcy action and the very touch stone of this point is that the petition to wind up is by force of law made public before the company can defend itself against the imputations against it; for the petitioner is bound to publically advertise the petition 7 days before it is to be heard and adjudicated upon.” The Plaintiff had also referred to the case of Cadiz Waterworks v Barnett [1874] C.283 which had held the following: “He thinks if he can make it public, if he presents this petition, that it would be so injurious to the company that, rather than submit to it, they will settle with him. Cases have been cited to show that this Court will not interfere with serving a debtors summons, and will not interfere with serving a debtors summons and will not interfere with various other processes; but a Winding Up is a totally different thing. How does it begin? Petition presented, then advertise in the London Gazette, from the London Gazette copied into a great number of newspapers which have a large circulation in England, and I suppose also in Spain. What is the result? Here is a company perfectly solvent, which has a fair prospect, as far as I have heard, of being successful, and you have it advertised in every paper in England that there is a petition presented to wind them up, a petition which it must be known perfectly well to the petitioner never can succeed. For what purpose is it presented? Why, simply because the petitioner thinks he will by such means obtain his demand-and, for all I can see, it may be a very unjust demand.” The Plaintiff further submitted to define ‘malice’ as per the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary which defines malice as the intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act (in the present case, the Defendant’s alleged unjustified petitions against the Plaintiff) or reckless disregard of the law or of a person’s legal rights (in the present case, the alleged reckless disregard of the law that a Winding Up petition may not be filed if there were proof that the Respondent is solvent). The Plaintiff had also referred to the case opinion by the Court in the case of Malz v Rosen [1966] All ER 10 on evidence of malice: “per Curiam: if a person gives the police an account which he knows to be untrue, that fact in itself would be strong evidence of the ingredient of malice necessary for a successful action for malicious prosecution…” The Plaintiff had likened the conduct of the Defendant in filing the two petitions knowingly that the Plaintiff was solvent while attempting to prove the fact that the Plaintiff was insolvent as giving an untrue account of the Plaintiff’s solvency to the Court to the conduct of giving the police an untrue account. The Plaintiff further referred to the case of Johnson v Emerson [1871] 6 Exch.329 in proving malice: “I apprehend that the mere fact of the Defendant taking the proceedings with the knowledge and belief that they could not be properly taken, would be some evidence of malice.” “... that the proceeding of the Defendant was false and malicious ... is the same thing that a reasonable and sensible knowing the facts and circumstances which the Defendant did, would have formed the conclusion that the proceeding was groundless. They also means that it was malicious. Malice in a legal sense means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause and excuse ... and I quite agree that if an attorney, knowing a proceeding in bankruptcy to be groundless, presented a petition either from the motive of gain to himself or in obedience to the instructions of an oppressive and vindictive client, it would be in law a malicious act.” 4th element - The Plaintiff had suffered losses from the malicious prosecution. Here the Plaintiff had vigorously relied on the testimony of its witnesses and the audited accounts of the Plaintiff in proving the loss of business suffered by the Plaintiff due to the Defendant’s alleged malicious prosecution. The Plaintiff had referred to the case of Onkarmal & Anor v Banwarilal & Ors AIR 1962 Raj 127 which was decided by the Rajasthan High Court in 1961. The Rajasthan High Court had dealt with a claim for general damages in the sense of “disgrace, humiliation, physical discomfort and mental suffering”. With regard to this head of damages the Rajasthan High Court had held: “…where the Plaintiff claims general damages, it is not necessary for him to prove such damages specifically, the reason is that general damages are considered at law to be pecuniary reparation for the damage which is presumed to follow from the injury, and therefore, which is not required to be separately averred or proved.” The Claim on tort of abuse of process 5.3 The Plaintiff also sought to prove a case for tort of abuse of process. Here, the submission on this cause of action mostly mirrors the submission for the tort of malicious prosecution. The Plaintiff mainly submits on the impropriety of the two petitions for want of reasonable and/or probable cause. It was submitted that again, the Defendant had never appealed against the decision of the High Court in 2009 by Zaharah Binti Ibrahim J. in dismissing the first petition which reads: “I was satisfied that the Respondent at the time of the presentation of the Petition was a solvent company. A petition to wind up a solvent company is an abuse of the process of the Court…” Similarly, with regard to the second petition, the petition had been dismissed in 2014 on the same ground that the Court had found that the Plaintiff was solvent company. And the Defendant had persisted with the second petition even after the Plaintiff had disputed the same issue on solvency against the Defendant vide letters which were admitted to have been received by the Defendant but was ignored. As for the proof of damages suffered, the Plaintiff submits the same should apply as per the quantum of damages submitted in proving its case of malicious prosecution. The Defendant’s case [6] It must be noted at the outset that the submission offers little contest to the law relied upon by the Plaintiff. The defence’s submission is mostly constructed to disprove the elements sought to be proven by the Plaintiff. This Court is minded that the Defendant in his submission had focused mainly to disprove the allegation of abuse of process from their conduct of filing the two petitions. And flowing from the disproval of the allegation of abuse of process, it boils down to the disproval of the tort of malicious prosecution as well as in disproving the abuse of process, it disproves one of the elements of malicious prosecution sought to be proven by the Plaintiff. This Court is also minded that the Defendant had persistently contended that his conduct was incited by the reluctance of the Plaintiff to settle the judgment sum which had stood for many years. 6.1 In disproving the malicious intent alleged by the Plaintiff against the Defendant’s conduct the Defendant firstly submits that the motives in which the petitions were filed is an irrelevant consideration and that it is an accepted prima facie rule that an unpaid creditor has a right to file a Winding Up petition whatever his motives are. 6.2 On the outset to this submission this Court is minded the counsel for the Defendant had quoted the case relied upon to its full extent by omitting the word other and quoted “motives” instead of the supposed “other motives”. The precedent concerned and the excerpt so quoted was in the case of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lian Seng Properties [1991] 1 MLJ 95: “(b) prima facie a creditor who is not paid has a right to file a petition for a winding-up order whatever may be his other motives” (emphasis added) The Defendant then submitted that the case above was also applied in the more recent case of Pioneer Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Celini Corporation Sdn Bhd [1998] 3 MLJ 810 in which the Supreme Court had dealt with an appeal against the striking off of a Winding Up petition by the trial Court on the ground that the petition was “stage managed”. Justice Abdul Malik Ishak in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court had held: “It is a correct statement of the law to say and I so say that prima facie, the petitioner as a creditor who is not paid has a right to file a petition for winding-up, whatever the motives may be. The Court is not concerned about the motives of the petitioner here in winding-up the Respondent”. In reliance of these two cases the Defendant submits that it is the prima facie right of the petition to file the petitions. The Plaintiff has no business in questioning the motives behind the conduct of the Defendant in filing the petitions and hitherto the Court may not infer abuse of process and/or malicious intent from the conduct of the Defendant in filing the two petitions in 2009 and 2014. 6.3 The Defendant in submitting against the Plaintiff’s allegation of tort of abuse of process had submitted that the conduct of the Defendant in filing the two petitions was a valid legal redress and was not an abuse of process. a. Firstly, in disproving the tort of abuse of process, the Defendant submits that he indeed has a cause to file the two petitions against the Plaintiff. It was submitted that the Defendant had long been ran on a negative cash flow in that the Plaintiff is running on borrowings since the company itself cannot run by itself on its positive income and had to depend on borrowings. In supporting this contention, the Defendant had produced a table of the Plaintiff’s audited account from years 2008 till 2012. The Defendant also referred to the admission of PW3 in the Notes of Evidence (“NOE”) at page 64 line 31-32: “LCL Negative cash flow? AVATAR But we have been. I have been operating the company since 1977 and we have never had a positive cash flow because.” Based on this evidence, the Defendant purported to refer to the case of Pioneer Concrete v Celini Corp (Supra page 16) which had laid down the test of “commercial insolvency” in the determination of a judgment debtor’s ability to pay its debts. The relevant excerpt of the judgment delivered by Abdul Malik Ishak is: “It is germane to mention that the test of commercial insolvency is simple. It is this. Whether the company is unable to meet its current debts as they fall due? A company may have substantial wealth which cannot be realized immediately and if that happens the company is said to be unable to pay its debts within the purview and ambit of s 218(1)(e) of the Companies Act 1965 and this is so even though on liquidation the company will be able to meet all its liabilities...”(emphasis added) The Defendant further submits that the fact that the assets of the Plaintiff might exceed its liability does not infer that the Plaintiff is solvent and able to pay its debts. It is incumbent instead for the Plaintiff to prove that it has immediate realizable wealth at the time the debt falls due. The Defendant referred to the case of BMC Construction Sdn Bhd v Dataran Rentas Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 MLJ 356: “And in dealing with ‘commercial insolvency’, that is, of a company being unable to meet current demands upon it, the Federal Court in Sri Hartamas followed the Privy Council in the case of Malayan Plant (Pte) Ltd v Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 53, and cited the following observations from Buckley on the Companies Act (13th Ed) at p 460: In such a case it is useless to say that if its assets are realized there will be ample to pay twenty shillings in the pound: this is not the test. A company may be at the same time insolvent and wealthy. It may have wealth locked up in investments not presently realizable; but although this be so, yet if it have not assets available to meet its current liabilities it is commercially insolvent and may be wound up.” (see also Hotel Royal & TD Bhd v Tina Travel & Agencies Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 MLJ 21) b. It was also briefly submitted that generally, inability to pay debt is proved by service of the statutory notice under Section 218 of the Companies Act 1965 and the subsequent failure to comply with any such statutory notice. c. In furtherance to disprove any abuse of process, the Defendant submitted that as a judgment creditor, it is well within the discretion and rights of the judgment creditor to elect whatever mode of execution that is most expedient to him. The Defendant relied on the case of Pembinaan dan Pemaju Mahajiwa (Selangor) SDN V ASM Development Sdn Bhd [2003] 4 MLJ 633 in which Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ (as he then was) had held: “It is true that the appellant did not appeal against the order of the SAR striking out the first suit. But, that is a matter for the appellant to decide. The appellant had an option whether to try to save the first suit or to abandon it and file a fresh suit. Indeed, upon an objection being raised, if it is true that the first suit was commenced without authority, the appellant could on its own accord, discontinue the action and file a fresh one. That clearly would not be an abuse of the process of the Court. To sum up, on the facts of this case, where the appellant had two options before it, the fact that it chooses one and not the other, is not an abuse of the process of the Court.” d. The Defendant further sought to disprove abuse in disputing the element of initiating the action for some other purpose other than to attain genuine redress. (see Malaysian Building Society Bhd v Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin Bin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425) It was submitted that since there is no mal-intent and the Defendant was well within its rights to petition for Winding Up, his conduct in filing the two petitions were conducts purposed for the genuine redress to recover the judgment owed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant. e. The Defendant reiterates the fact that the Plaintiff may not contest the second petition as the judgment debt had stood even after the line of appeals of the Plaintiff which was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal and even the Federal Court. The Plaintiff had persisted to not settle the judgment debt even after it was made clear all along that the Plaintiff owed monies against the Defendant. f. The Defendant also in his submission in reply had contended that the underlying reason behind the withdrawal of his appeal against the dismissal of the first petition was that the Defendant’s previous solicitors had done so for practical reasons in that notwithstanding the probability of succeeding on the issue of solvency, the petition might also fail on other procedural non-compliance. g. With regard to the contention of malice of the advertisement under the petitions, the Defendant in his reply had submitted that as the Defendant had the rights to lawfully pursue the petitions, the advertisement and gazetting of the petition is a mandatory procedure which needs to be complied. Failing to do so would be a deliberate non-compliance of the petition’s procedures. In this contention, the Defendant had invited the attention of the Court to the case of Azman & Tay Associates v Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 390 HC. The Court in this case dealt with an appeal against the trial judge’s decision to dismiss an application to injunct the advertisement of a Winding Up petition against the Respondent. In dismissing the appeal, Vincent Ng J. had held at page 396 of the decision: “I dismissed the ex parte application in encl 5 solely for the reason that I was of the considered view that this Court cannot injunct the petitioners from exercising their statutory right – and indeed a mandatory requirement – to advertise the petition, under r 24 of the Companies (Winding Up) Rules 1972…” h. The Defendant also submitted that a demarcation must be drawn with the findings of the dismissal of the first petition and the Plaintiff’s cause of action in tort of abuse of process. The demarcation sought to be drawn was the fact that the dismissal of the first petition was merely a finding of abuse under Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of High Court and not in any manner a finding of liability on the tort of abuse of process. Here the Defendant referred the Court to the case of Si & Si Sdn Bhd v Hazrabina Sdn Bhd (Supra page 6) whereby the court in that case had held that a petition may be struck off for abuse of process, but damages from such abuse must be pursued in a separate suit. i. Thus, it was submitted that even if the Defendant be bound by the decision of the dismissal of the first petition, the dismissal only pertains to a finding of an abuse of process, and not a tort of abuse of process. j. The Defendant then follows to imbue some doubts over the Plaintiff’s case in that the Plaintiff was lacking in candour when the Plaintiff, against their own testimony on proper accounting practice, had never disclosed the judgment debt in any of its audited accounts. The Defendant invited this Court to refer to the NOE with regards to the testimonies of PW1 and PW3: LCL Can you please check? Let us start from the audited accounts for 2008. Mr Isma, can you please refer to Bundle B pages 53 until 83. Bundle B, 53 onwards. ISMA 2008 don’t have LCL 2008, never disclosed. ISMA Yes, never disclosed. LCL Look at 2009, it’s from page 84 to 115. ISMA Also not disclosed. LCL Also not disclosed. 2010 at pages 116 to 147. ISMA Also don’t have. LCL 2011 at pages 148 to 179. ISMA Don’t have. I confirm that. (00:17:48) LCL Okay now, 2012, that is found in the B1, the next bundle, Bundle B1, pages 64 to 100. ISMA Also don’t have.” k. And lastly, the Defendant sought to disprove the damages alleged to have been suffered by the Plaintiff. The Defendant submits that the nexus attempted to be drawn by the Plaintiff was done vide the letters inter alia: (i) An unsigned letter dated 13.7.2009 from Gasco Pte Ltd to the Plaintiff. In which the Defendant submits that this letter and it contents were in totality documentary hearsay as the maker of the letter was not called to testify as a witness before the Court. Even if it were to be considered, the content of the letter merely shows concerns over the first petition and a request by the author to take action to resolve the matter. (ii) A letter dated 15.7.2009 from Independent Technology Sendirian Berhad to the Plaintiff. In which the same objection was raised that the document is entirely documentary hearsay whereby the maker of the letter was not called to testify. Even if it were to be considered, the letter merely expressed the author’s concern on the Plaintiff’s ability to undertake and perform the project with them. (iii) With regard to the second petition, a letter dated 6.5.2013 from RHB Bank to the Plaintiff. Similarly, the same objection of documentary hearsay is raised in that the maker of the letter was not called as a witness. Even if the letter were to be comprehended, the content only indicates that the Plaintiff’s application for credit facilities was declined on the reason of “history of credit default, management risk concern and unresolved civil suit”. Thus, the decline was on a multitude reasons and not necessarily the petition per se. l. It is interesting to note that the Plaintiff had not at all referred to these letters in proving its damages allegedly suffered but relied mainly in the audited accounts of the Plaintiff to prove its losses. The Defendant then relied upon the decision delivered by Thomson CJ in a Civil Appeal, in the case of Lee Sau Kong v Leow Cheng Chiang (1961) 27 MLJ 17. The case dealt with general damages in the sense of loss of business and profits. With regard to that claim, the Court had held: “With regard to the claim for damages, I would preface what I have to say by quoting the following passage… “Plaintiff must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write it down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the Court, saying: ‘This is what I have lost; I ask you to give me these damages.’ They have to prove it.” m. Lastly, the Defendant submits that in lieu of the Plaintiff’s failure in proving his damages, the Plaintiff, if in the event of successfully proving their action, should only be awarded nominal damages. The Defendant had referred to the decision of Thomson CJ in the case of Lee Sau Kong v Leow Cheng Chiang (Supra page 25) in which the Court had held: “With regard to the claim for damages I would preface what I have to say by quoting the following passage from the judgment of Lord Goddard in the case of Bonham Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Ltd: “Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the Court, saying: “This is what I have lost; I ask you to give me these damages.” They have to prove it.” In furtherance to their submission, the Defendant then relied upon the case of Hock Huat Iron Foundry (Suing As A Firm) v Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ CA where Abdul Malek Ahmad JCA (as he then was) held: “When damages is shown but the amount is not proved, the Court will usually award nominal damages. The trial judge was correct in concluding that the loss had not been proved sufficiently by the Defendant and was right in giving judgment for RM 10 as nominal damages for the loss of interest on project investment and loss of income on investment.” The Findings of the Court [7] The first issue that this Court shall deal with is the elements of malicious prosecution sought to be proven by the Plaintiff. A. Whether the earlier proceedings had been in the favour of the Plaintiff 7.1 Firstly, with regard to the element that the earlier proceedings must be decided in the favour of the Plaintiff, it goes without saying that this element had been proven. It was already undisputed that the two petitions were dismissed against the Defendant and these dismissals were indeed in the Plaintiff’s favour. Thus the Court finds that the first element in proving malicious prosecution is proven by the Plaintiff. B. Whether the two petitions were initiated with a want of reasonable and/or probable cause of action 7.2 The crux of the debate between the two parties in in fact, is the issue of whether the two petitions filed by the Defendant was indeed without reasonable and/or probable cause and such determination would determine whether there was indeed an abuse of process and whether the second element in proving malicious prosecution had been proven by the Plaintiff. 7.3 In answering this issue, there are other sub-issues which must be determined before any findings could be made as to whether or not the petitions were initiated without reasonable and/or probable cause of action. 7.4 This Court is minded that the main factor to be determined in answering this issue is to determine whether or not the Plaintiff solvent and had the ability to pay his debts. B(i) Whether the contention that the Plaintiff was subsisting on negative cash flow needed to be specifically pleaded? 7.5 Along the Plaintiff’s submission in reply, the Plaintiff had raised an objection against the Defendant’s contention in regards of the Plaintiff’s alleged negative cash flow in that the said contention was not pleaded. Upon perusing the Defendant’s statement of defence, the Court finds that the contention had sufficiently been pleaded. Although it was worded in reference to the failure of complying with the statutory notice under the petition, the contention of the inability of the Plaintiff to pay its debts was already pleaded. Anything else to the effect of proving or disproving the Plaintiff’s ability to pay debts are supporting facts. Even the Plaintiff themselves sought to prove the solvency through their own sets of facts and evidence. The contention by the Defendant on the Plaintiff’s negative cash flow also brings forth the same effect; in that it ought to prove or disprove the solvency and ability of the Plaintiff to pay its debts. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the contention on negative cash flow need not be specifically pleaded. B(ii) Whether the conduct of the Defendant in withdrawing their appeal against the first petition is an admission and/or acceptance to the solvent state of the Plaintiff? 7.6 It was persistently reiterated in the Plaintiff’s submission that the dismissal of the first petition on the ground of the Plaintiff’s solvency remained uncontested. Not only was it not appealed against, the Defendant had in fact withdrawn his appeal against the dismissal. 7.7 In the Defendant’s submission in reply, the Defendant had sought to justify his conduct in withdrawing the appeal against the first petition in that the withdrawal was done on the advice of the Defendant’s solicitors then. It was withdrawn on the supposed reason that even if the Defendant may be successful in his appeal on the issue of solvency, the appeal might fail because of other procedural non-compliance. 7.8 In consideration of the submissions of both of the parties, this Court is of the view that notwithstanding the underlying reason behind the Defendant’s withdrawal (which was void of any supporting evidence) the fact remains that the decision was uncontested. The conscious decision of the Defendant to not appeal against the decision infers the acceptance and agreement of the Defendant to the dismissal and its grounds. B(iii) Whether the Defendant as judgment creditor was justified in law to opt for Winding Up petitions in lieu of other modes of executions? 7.9 Although this is more relevant to the determination of the tort of abuse of process, this Court finds relevance of this issue to determine whether or not the petitions filed by the Defendant had reasonable and/or probable cause of action. This is because, if it was found that the Defendant had unlawfully opted for execution vide Winding Up petitions, it equally may infer malicious intent in that the Defendant had pursued the two petitions in complete disregard of the law (as had been submitted by the Plaintiff in their submissions) 7.10 The Defendant had relied closely to the case of Pembinaan dan Pemaju Mahajiwa (Selangor) SDN V ASM Development Sdn Bhd (Supra page 19). The relevance sought to be applied by the Defendant was that the decision of this Court had held that it is not an abuse of process for the Defendant to opt for one mode of execution when it had two options before it. For the convenience of reference, the excerpt relied upon is reproduced here: “It is true that the appellant did not appeal against the order of the SAR in striking out the first suit. But that is a matter for the appellant to decide. The appellant had an option to whether to try to save the first suit or to abandon it and file a fresh suit…To sum up, on the facts of this case, where the appellant had two options before it, the fact that it chooses one and not the other, is not an abuse of the process of the Court. 7.11 This Court does not at all intend to contra the decision of the Federal Court in the case above. However, this Court is of the considered view that even in the application of this case, the case does nothing to support the Defendant’s contention. 7.12 The case relied upon was regarding a case which was struck out because of a non-compliance of a Court order, which is totally different from this case. In the present case before the Court, the two petitions was not merely struck out because of a non-compliance of direction, but instead an act of abuse of process itself. It begs to be vastly different from the Federal Court decision. The present case before the Court was struck off for the want of cause of action, not mere non-compliance. It was decided in the first petition in 2009 that it was an abuse of process. And to re-agitate the matter in the same manner in the second petition (which indeed was dismissed for the same reason) is indeed again, a further abuse. A blatant abuse in fact, to go against the judgment which was admitted and filing the same action in Court notwithstanding the earlier decision. 7.13 This Court is in agreement with the Federal Court that it would not be an abuse of process if the Defendant were to opt for one option available to him amidst other options which were also available to him. However, if one of the options is unavailable to be utilized (because the company is solvent) it is incumbent of the Defendant to employ other methods of execution and not persistently and blatantly pursuing for a remedy unavailable to them. In the present case, the abuse committed is not at all on the issue of opting for Winding Up petitions in lieu of other modes of execution, but instead on the issue that the Defendant had opted, out of many modes of execution, the mode of execution which was lawfully unavailable to them. 7.14 The decision of the Federal Court had already intimated that the factum of abuse depends on facts of each case. And this Court finds that the conduct the Defendant here, in pursuing an option knowing that it was an abuse of process, is indeed an abuse of process and therefore was unjustified in opting to pursue the two Winding Up petitions. B(iv) Whether the Plaintiff was indeed solvent and able to pay his debts at the time the two petitions were filed against them? 7.17 This Court is minded that there are various evidences and contentions which were laid down by both of the parties in proving or disproving the Plaintiff’s solvency. The Court shall delve into each submission and address them separately, before making a final finding on the solvency of the Plaintiff. Whether negative cash flow is proof of insolvency and/or inability to pay debt. 7.18 First, this Court will address the Defendant’s contention on the Plaintiff’s state of account, in that it was admitted to be on a negative cash flow. Upon perusal of the NOE it was indeed admitted that the Plaintiff indeed was subsisting on a negative cash flow from the year 2008 till 2012. And upon the test of commercial insolvency, although the Plaintiff may have more assets than its liabilities, it doesn’t necessarily connote that it is solvent and able to pay its debts. The Plaintiff must have immediate realizable assets to pay its debts when it falls due. This contention is earlier elaborated at para 5.2 of this decision. (See Pioneer Concrete v Celini Corp (Supra page 16); BMC Construction Sdn Bhd v Dataran Rentas Sdn Bhd (Supra page 18); Hotel Royal TD Bhd v Tina Travel & Agencies Sdn Bhd (Supra page 19).) 7.19 From the outset, it needs to be noted that this Court does not intend to contra the decisions of the cases mentioned above. This Court does not at all dispute the proposition of law regarding the test of commercial insolvency. Nonetheless, merely agreeing to the proposition of law, does not mean that the Defendant have proven their case. From the submissions of both parties, the propriety of the test of commercial insolvency is not at any time an issue. 7.20 Nonetheless, this Court is in agreement with the Plaintiff in its submission in reply that none of the cases relied upon by the Defendant stipulate that the fact of subsistence vide negative cash flow is cogent proof of insolvency and/or inability to pay its debts. All it proves is that at the time being of negative cash flow, the company was running on borrowings. Just the mere fact the Plaintiff subsists on borrowings does not at all effectively proof that it cannot pay its debts. Many businesses utilise borrowings such as loans and credit facilities in running their businesses with genuine trade. Businesses undertake loans to run their trade. A negative cash flow does not indicate an inability to pay. Even the case laws do not indicate as such at all. Thus, the Defendant’s contention hitherto is void of any support. 7.21 Adding to the same effect, the solvency of the Plaintiff had already been upheld twice in the dismissal of the first and the second petitions. It is more probable that these two dismissals are correct rather than the unsupported assertion of insolvency based on negative cash flow as submitted by the Defendant. Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that the subsistence of the Plaintiff on negative cash flow does not prove its insolvency or inability to pay its debts. Whether there was an admission of the Plaintiff’s solvency and ability to pay its debts by the Defendant’s own witnesses. 7.22 The Plaintiff had referred the Court to the NOE with regards to the Defendant’s witnesses’ testimonies. For the sake of convenience, the excerpt of the NOE at page 123 which the Court finds relevance is reproduced here: “KEE Saya Winding Up because he is a big company. He is a big company, he will not allow me to Winding Up. He will pay me, he will make a point to pay me but he still stubborn, he don’t want to pay me…” “HMS Encik Kee, saya cakap sama Encik Kee punya niat. Saya tunjukkan, sebelum fail Winding Up Encik Kee sudah tahu dia ada duit boleh bayar. Betul? KEE Memang saya tahu. Ya. That’s why.” 7.23 This is the evidence of DW1 who is the Defendant himself. It is utterly vivid that the Defendant himself knows of the solvency of the Plaintiff to pay its debts. He had admitted so twice in the above iteration. DW1 stated that the Plaintiff was a “big company” and that “he will make a point to pay me”. And when queried on his knowledge before filing the Winding Up petition if he had known the Plaintiff had the money to pay, DW1 had answered in the affirmative; in that he indeed knew full and well, prior to the filing of the Winding Up petition, that the Plaintiff is able and has the money to pay its debts. Thus it is the finding of this Court that it was indeed admitted by the Defendant himself that the Plaintiff was solvent and had the capability to pay its debts. Finding of the Court on the solvency and ability to pay debt of the Plaintiff. 7.24 Upon due and proper consideration of all the above determinations, it is this Court’s considered view that the Plaintiff is indeed solvent and able to pay its debts at the time the Defendant had filed the two petitions against the Plaintiff. Finding of the Court on the absence of reasonable and/or probable cause of action in the filing of the two petitions by the Defendant 7.25 Following the earlier finding in para 7.21, since the Plaintiff is found to be solvent and able to pay its debts at the time of the two petitions were filed, it is this Court’s finding that the two petitions were wrongfully presented and this is void of reasonable and/or probable cause, and indeed was an abuse of process of the Court. This Court finds valuable reliance to the case of Si & Si Sdn Bhd V Hazrabina Sdn Bhd (Supra page 6) in which the Court in that case had held: “…that as at the time of presenting the petition the company was an existing and going concern, and had valuable property and was solvent, unless other facts could be shown, there was a want of reasonable and probable cause for presenting the petition…” (See also Pacific & Orient Insurance) C. Whether the conduct of the Defendant in filing the petition actuated by malice or improper motive. 7.26 In perusing the Plaintiff’s submissions, in simpler terms, the Plaintiff defines malice in two contexts; 7.27 In that firstly, the conduct of the Defendant in filing the two petitions were actuated by malice in the sense of an improper motive other than to seek genuine redress of the Court. The Plaintiff had likened this improper motive to the conduct of the Defendant in blatantly filing the two Winding Up petitions knowing full well that that option was not only unavailable to them, but also injurious to the Plaintiff’s business. This Court would reiterate its earlier finding that indeed the Defendant had filed the two petitions with the said knowledge prior to the filing of the petitions. The Plaintiff first had submitted to demonstrate the injurious nature of a Winding Up petition in reliance of the case of Quartz Hill Gold Mining Company Eyre (Supra page 6) where the Court had opined that bankruptcy actions (in the present case the two petitions) would cause serious imputations against the Respondent even before the Respondent would have the opportunity to defend itself because of the procedure of advertisement and gazetting. The Plaintiff further submits, in light of the injurious nature of the petitions, the blatant conduct of the Defendant had befall upon them unnecessary peril. 7.28 Even more so malicious, when the petitions were filed knowing that it was wrongfully presented. This Court is in further agreement with the Plaintiff in reliance to the case of Cadiz Waterworks v Barnett (Supra page 10) in which the Court in that case had held that if a petition was presented knowing it will fail (alike the Defendant in this case as per the earlier finding) it may well be an utterly unjust demand. This Court is also in further agreement with the Plaintiff in reference to the case of Johnson v Emerson (Supra page 12) which had held that an action of a Defendant in taking proceedings with the knowledge and belief that they could not be properly taken, would be some evidence of malice. 7.29 Mirroring such action is the blatant conduct of the Defendant in taking the two petitions knowing that it could not be properly taken. As per the earlier finding, even PW1 admitted that he knew at the time before the petitions were filed, that the company would make a point and would be able to pay him. Even more so with regards to the second petition, the Defendant had completely ignored the Plaintiff’s letter disputing their statutory notice of demand on the ground of solvency and ability to pay its debts. And additionally, this Court finds that in wrongfully petitioning for Winding Up, knowing that the Plaintiff was solvent is a conduct of giving the Court an untrue account of the Plaintiff’s solvency. And as per the case of Malz v Rosen (Supra page 11), such conduct may be proof of malice. Pursuing for the petitions knowing full well it will fail begs to draw the inference that, payment and compensation was not the motive of the Defendant. Instead, not only for the sake of convenience, as the process of advertisement and gazetting may be injurious, the Defendant had filed the petition to put the Plaintiff in such injury. The Court is of the considered view that the Defendant had not genuinely sought for genuine redress and had conducted himself in malice. 7.30 Secondly, the Defendant’s conduct was in reckless disregard of the law and the rights of the Plaintiff. In echoing the finding above, as the Defendant had opted for the petitions knowing full well that he is not legally entitled to (as the Plaintiff was solvent) is vividly a conduct in utter disregard of the law. 7.31 This Court also intends to address the submission of the Defendant in this issue. The Court is minded that the Defendant had at length argued that the question of motive is not at all relevant with regards to an unpaid creditor who prima facie, has the right to file winding-up petitions notwithstanding his motives. The Defendant had referred to the case of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lian Seng Properties (Supra page 15) and also the case of Pioneer Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Celini Corporation Sdn Bhd (Supra page 16). 7.32 This Court is of the considered view that this is merely a prima facie rule. Though indeed an unpaid creditor may lodge a petition to wind up, however being a prima facie rule, it must also be considered with other relevant rules of law of insolvency. And that law is that, a Winding Up petition should not be lodged in the circumstance that the debtor is still solvent. This Court does not intend to contra the decision of the Supreme Court. Even with the application of the cases above, it does not at all go to the favour of the Defendant. This is because as the precedent have stated, this is merely a prima facie rule. It is not an absolute right. The right may be disputed if there are valid grounds to dispute it. And the factum of the present case DOES disprove the right. Because in all of the cases relied upon by the Defendant, the petitioner had the rights to petition. 7.33 But in this case, the petitioner from the outset does NOT have the right to petition. The Defendant’s witnesses themselves had admitted that they knowingly are aware of the Plaintiff as big company who is capable but reluctant to pay. And that he only pursued Winding Up because it is the cheapest and accessible remedy to get his monies. 7.34 This Court is minded that the Defendant had submitted that they hold no malice in advertising the petition as it is a mandatory procedure in a Winding Up petition and that not doing so would be a blatant procedural non-compliance. The Defendant had relied on the decision of Vincent Ng J. In the case of Azman & Tay Associates v Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd (Supra page 21) 7.35 With regard to this contention by the Defendant, this Court, firstly, do agree with the proposition of law referred to. Nevertheless, although it is indeed a statutory requirement, from the outset, the statutory right to proceed for the Winding Up petition was already absent for the Defendant. To pursue the same knowing that it is unlawful to do so, is proof of malice. Finding of the Court on the tort of malicious prosecution 7.36 In appreciation of the foregoing findings above, the Court finds that the Plaintiff had successfully proven its case on the tort of malicious prosecution. 7.37 The next issue for determination of this Court is whether the Plaintiff had suffered damages arising from the Defendant’s malicious prosecution. D. Whether the Plaintiff had suffered damages arising from the Defendant’s malicious prosecution 7.38 The parties had referred to two different decisions which had delved into the claim of general damages. So to speak, the Plaintiff had relied upon the Rajasthan High Court decision in the case of Onkarmal & Anor v Banwarilal & Ors (Supra page 13) and the Defendant relied upon the case of Lee Sau Kong v Leow Cheng Chiang (Supra page 25). 7.39 After perusing these two cases put forth by the parties, the Court finds more assistance and relevance to the case of Lee Sau Kong as referred to by the Plaintiff. This is on the ground that firstly, it is a case decided by our own Court Civil Appeal - (Malaya) rather than the distant case decided in the High Court Rajasthan. Thomson CJ’s decision in Lee Sau Kong’s states the legal position in Malaysia. Secondly and most importantly, the case of Onkarmal & Anor v Banwarilal & Ors (Supra page 13) dealt with a claim in general damages from the act of wrongful confinement. This is verily different from the case before the Court here. Of course it would be seemingly impossible to quantify general damages so suffered from the act of wrongful confinement. In contrast, the case of Lee Sau Kong is indeed more relevant to the present case as the Court there had dealt with general damages in the sense of loss of business or profits (which is most definitely the case in the present case before the Court today). 7.40 Not only that, although it was submitted by the Plaintiff that general damages need not be specifically proven, the Plaintiff itself had attempted to prove its loss of business through its audited accounts. It seems to indicate that the Plaintiff itself agree that in its head of general damages, it still requires evidence to substantiate its claim. 7.41 What is more perplexing is the fact that the Plaintiff, against its own evidence to prove nexus of the damages to the conduct of the Defendant through numerous letters from its trade (see para 6.3 (k) of this decision) had not at all submitted on these letters. The Plaintiff mainly had only referred to the testimonies of its own witnesses and the audited accounts. This begs the indication that the Plaintiff itself had shun away from its duty of proving the nexus between the damages allegedly suffered and the conduct of the Plaintiff. 7.42 This Court is in total agreement with the Defendant in his submissions against the numerous letters mentioned above in that they are documentary hearsay (as none of the authors of the said letters were called to testify) and that even the letters were to be admissible, the contents prove very little nexus between the damages allegedly suffered to the conduct of the Defendant. 7.43 Now this Court is also minded that the Plaintiff submitted that the figures of loss of business from the audited accounts and its witnesses had not been challenged by the Defendant and should be deemed as an admission. Nonetheless, even though they are unchallenged, these evidences can only go so far to prove that the company suffered losses without any proof of nexus to link the losses to the conduct of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff might lose business for multifaceted reasons. The absence of proof any nexus to link the Defendant’s conduct to the loss does not at all prove the Plaintiff’s claim. 7.44 This Court needs to emphasis here, the losses alleged to be suffered from the petitions were actually motivated by the Plaintiff’s own reluctance to settle the judgment debt. Although the Court finds that the petitions were indeed an abuse of process, the fact stands that the two petitions came about (though abusively) out of the Plaintiff’s own refusal to pay. The Plaintiff cannot deny its own doing in motivating the Defendant to file the petitions. It is incumbent upon the Plaintiff to actually pay the judgment debt. The judgment debt had undergone numerous applications and appeals and even then the judgment debt still stands and still unpaid until today. Thus, although the petitions were wrongfully presented, the Court would not allow the Plaintiff to profit from a wrong which the Plaintiff itself had indirectly contributed to. 7.45 Therefore, upon due and proper consideration of the submissions above, this Court is in agreement with the Defendant that in failing to prove its losses or the extent of its losses attributable to the wrongful presentation of the two petitions by the Defendant, the Plaintiff should only be entitled to nominal damages. This Court does not deny that the Plaintiff had not suffered damages but the Court does not find any cogent evidence in proving the extent of damages suffered attributed to the Defendant’s wrongful presentation of the two petitions and thus the Plaintiff should only be entitled to nominal damages. (See Hock Huat Iron Foundry (Suing As A Firm) v Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd (Supra page 26). Finding of Court on the tort of abuse process [8] The second cause of action of the Plaintiff was for the tort of abuse against the Defendant’s conduct in filing the two petitions. Now from the outset, this Court is in agreement with the Defendant that merely depending on the decision of the dismissal of the first petition in 2009, does little to prove the elements of the tort of abuse of process. Indeed in perusing the dismissal of the first petition, the first petition was dismissed for abuse of process under Order 18 rule 19(1)(b) and/or (c) and/or (d) and not for the tort of abuse of process. The decision even goes to the extent to refer to the case of Si & Si v Hazrabina Sdn Bhd (Supra page 6) which had held that upon a petition being struck out, damages must be sued by way for an entirely separate suit. But equally so, merely submitting that the dismissal was not for tort of abuse of process, does not automatically rule out the tort of abuse of process. The fact remains that upon the earlier finding of this Court, the two petitions were wrongfully presented and is indeed an abuse of process. [9] Nonetheless, this Court finds valuable assistance to the decision of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in the case of Malaysia Building Society Bhd v Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin Ungku Mohamed (Supra page 20) at page 438 which was referred to by the Defendant. The Court there had laid down the elements to prove the tort of abuse of process which are namely: The process complained of must have been initiated 9.1 Reiterating the earlier finding of this Court above with regard to the tort of malicious prosecution, this Courts finds that indeed the process (being the two petitions) complained of have indeed been initiated. Thus the first element indeed had been proven. The process initiated was purposed other than the purpose to obtain genuine redress. In other words, it was aimed to produce a result not intended by the invocation of the process 9.2 Similar to the earlier findings above on the issue of the tort of malicious prosecution, the Court finds that indeed when the Defendant had opted to file the two petitions, with prior knowledge, knowing full and well that the Plaintiff was solvent, and that the petition would fail, the Defendant had not pursued the petitions for genuine redress and/or the result intended from a bankruptcy proceeding. A Winding Up action is purposed to seek redress in the circumstance of the Respondent concerned is indeed insolvent. And for the Defendant to pursue the petition knowing that the Plaintiff was solvent, clearly indicates that they had not pursued the two petitions for genuine redress intended under the invocation of the process (being the petitions and/or the bankruptcy actions). Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the second element of the tort of abuse of process had been proven. 9.3 Upon the immediately preceding findings above, the Court finds that the Plaintiff had proven their case and that the Defendant is liable for the tort of abuse of process in wrongfully presenting the two petitions. 9.4 Now, having found that the Defendant is liable for the tort of abuse of process in wrongfully presenting the two petitions, the next issue to be determined is whether the Plaintiff had suffered some damage or injury in consequence to the conduct of the Defendant. Whether the Plaintiff had suffered some damage or injury in consequence to the conduct of the Defendant 9.5 Again, as similarly found in the findings above with regards to the tort of malicious prosecution, this Court draws the same finding that the Plaintiff although may have suffered damages from the wrongful conduct of the Defendant (being the presentation of the two petitions), had not adduced cogent evidence to prove the extent of damages suffered attributable to the conduct of the Defendant. As such, the Plaintiff would only be entitled to nominal damages. Other issues (i) The issue of non-disclosure of the judgment debt in the audited accounts [10] This Court is minded that the Defendant had raised the issue of the Plaintiff withholding the judgment debt in their audited accounts. Alluding to this issue, the Court is of the opinion that the issue is of little significance to the case. Even if there was lack of candour in the accounting practice of the Plaintiff, it does not at all prove that the Plaintiff was solvent or otherwise at the time the two petitions were filed. The Defendant had not adduced any cogent evidences or figures to prove that with the inclusion or disclosure of the judgment debt in the audited accounts, it will prove that the Plaintiff was insolvent and unable to pay its debts. Thus, this Court shall not delve further into this issue. (ii) The issue of set-off and/or counterclaim [11] Along the submissions of both of the parties, the parties had contended on the underlying reason of the Plaintiff in withholding the payment of the judgment and whether the withholding of the payment justified in law. Again, this Court finds little significance of this issue in the case before the Court. The present case deals with the propriety of the initiation of two Winding Up petitions in the face of the fact of the solvency of the Respondent (in the present case, the Plaintiff). This Court shall not delve into the reasons or justification behind the non-payment as it is to the opinion of this Court that it does little significance to prove or disprove the case of the Plaintiff. Merely because the Plaintiff had withheld payment of the judgment debt (whether justly or unjustly) does not justify the Defendant to wrongfully present the two Winding Up petitions. Conclusion [12] This Court earlier in its judgment had found the Defendant liable for both the tort of malicious prosecution and the tort of abuse of process in the Defendant’s conduct in wrongfully presenting the two Winding Up petitions against the Plaintiff while having full prior knowledge that the Plaintiff was at that time, solvent and able to pay its debts. Nevertheless, although the Defendant is found liable, the Court also finds that the Plaintiff had failed to produce cogent evidence to prove the damages or injury or the extent of damages or injury caused by the Defendant’s tortious conduct and thus, the Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages. [13] It is trite law that trial court’s power to grant nominal damages is a discretionary one. It is also trite that this discretionary power must be judicially exercised by the court. In the present case, this Court had earlier emphasised and again this Court reiterates that both petitions filed by the Defendant were actually motivated by the Plaintiff’s own reluctance to settle the judgment debt. Although the petitions were wrongfully presented, this Court would not allow the Plaintiff to profit from a wrong which the Plaintiff itself had indirectly contributed to. This Court is also mindful that the judgment debt is still unpaid and still owing to the Defendant. The act of the Plaintiff in refusing and neglecting to settle the Defendant’s judgment debt which was validly obtained from the court of law must be given utmost consideration and cannot be ignored. On the facts of this case, this Court is of the view that the Plaintiff’s conduct in ignoring the judgment debt todate is a flagrant disrespect of the law on the part of the Plaintiff. Therefore, in these circumstances, this Court allows the Plaintiff’s claim and awards with nominal damages of RM10.00. On the issue of costs [14] On similar grounds as stated in paragraph 13 above, this Court is of the view that an order directing each party to bear his own costs would be an appropriate and just order. t.t ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 30th day of October, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Faizah, Mahinder & Co. Harminder Singh, Avtar Singh For the Defendant - Tetuan Chan Leong & Co Dato’ Lee Chan Leong, Emily Siew Ee Mei 50

Tika 2.6.0

22-695-2008

PLAINTIF 1. CHAN GUAN SENG 2. CHAN WANG SOON DEFENDAN GALE FORCE SDN BHDPIHAK KETIGAMALAYAN BANKING BERHAD

29/09/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bd4e4dc5-4a95-4050-b99f-7c700df7b2d5&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO. MT3- 22-695-2008 ANTARA 1. CHAN GUAN SENG 2. CHAN WANG SOON PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN GALE FORCE SDN BHD DEFENDAN DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD PIHAK KETIGA ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (PERINTAH-PERINTAH BERTARIKH 15.08.2014) [1] Plaintif-plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memfailkan Notis Rayuan untuk merayu terhadap dua perintah yang telah diberikan oleh mahkamah ini pada 15.08.2014. Perintah-perintah tersebut adalah : (i) menolak dan membatalkan permohonan Plaintif-plaintif di bawah Aturan 21 Kaedah 6 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM) untuk menarikbalik permohonan mereka di dalam Lampiran B yang difailkan pada 24.06.2014 memohon di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM bagi menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula dan memberikan kos sebanyak RM 2000.00 kepada Pihak Ketiga; (ii) telah menolak permohonan Plaintif-plaintif untuk menarik balik Lampiran B tersebut, mahkamah ini telah mengarahkan Plaintif-plaintif untuk meneruskan permohonan mereka di Lampiran B dan seterusnya membenarkan permohonan Plaintif-plaintif untuk menarik balik atau memberhentikan tuntutan mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga, tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula. Tiada apa-apa perintah mengenai kos diberikan berkenaan permohonan ini. [2] Untuk lebih jelas lagi atas sebab apa mahkamah ini memberikan perintah-perintah tersebut, fakta latarbelakang yang merangkumi kedua-dua permohonan oleh Plaintif-plaintif ini daripada kertas kausa, molek diperturunkan di bawah ini. 2.1 Plaintif-plaintif ((i) Chan Guan Eng, (ii) Chan Wan Soon) adalah dua orang individu yang juga adalah merupakan pemegang-pemegang saham Strawberry Park Resort Sdn. Bhd. Plaintif Kedua juga adalah Pengarah Urusan bagi sebuah syarikat bernama Hartaya Sdn. Bhd. (Hartaya). 2.2 Defendan (Gale Force Sdn. Bhd.) adalah sebuah syarikat yang ditubuhkan di Malaysia dan mempunyai alamat berdaftar di Lot 6.05, Level 6, KPMG Tower, 8 First Avenue, Bandar Utama Petaling Jaya, 47800 Selangor. 2.3 Pihak Ketiga (Malayan Banking Berhad) pula adalah sebuah institusi kewangan dan perbankan yang telah menjadi pihak di dalam tindakan ini atas Perintah perletakkan hak bertarikh 09.02.2001 yang mana menurut perintah ini, hak-hak dan kepentingan-kepentingan Philleoallied Bank (M) Bhd diletakkan kepada Pihak Ketiga. 2.4 Philleoallied Bank (M) Bhd telah memberi beberapa kemudahan kewangan ‘Term Loans’ kepada Hartaya (Penghutang Prinsipal) dan setakat 31.12.2001, Hartaya telah dikatakan terhutang kepada Pihak Ketiga sebanyak RM30,447,951.75. 2.5 Plaintif-plaintif (kedua-dua Plaintif) telah bersesama dan berasingan menjamin kemudahan-kemudahan kewangan tersebut dengan menyempurnakan tiga (3) perjanjian gerenti (Perjanjian-perjanjian Gerenti tersebut) dengan Pihak Ketiga. 2.6 Hartaya telah gagal membuat pembayaran balik hutang-hutang di bawah kemudahan kewangan yang diberikan dan ini menyebabkan Pihak Ketiga telah menguatkuasakan hak mereka terhadap perjanjian-perjanjian gerenti tersebut dengan pengisuan surat tuntutan bertarikh 01.03.2002. 2.7 Kedua-dua Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa pada 20.11.2005, suatu perjanjian penyelesaian telah dimasukkan di antara Pihak Ketiga dan kedua-dua Plaintif di mana dengan kedua-dua Plaintif membuat pembayaran sebanyak RM2 juta kepada Pihak Ketiga, pembayaran sebanyak RM2 juta tersebut telah melepaskan kesemua tanggungjawab kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penjamin-penjamin terhadap kemudahan kewangan yang telah diberikan kepada Hartaya. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa pembayaran RM2 juta tersebut telah pun dibuat kepada Pihak Ketiga. 2.8 Melalui Guaman Sivil D1-24-161-2007, suatu Perintah Perletakkanhak telah dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur pada 04.06.2007 di mana semua jumlah terhutang oleh Hartaya dan apa-apa liabiliti ke atas hutang-hutang tersebut terhadap Pihak Ketiga telah diletakkanhak kepada pihak Defendan. 2.9 Atas perletakkan hak tersebut, Defendan kemudiannya pada telah mengeluarkan satu Surat Tuntutan bertarikh 09.04.2008 terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penjamin bagi kemudahan kewangan yang diberikan kepada Hartaya. 2.10 Ekoran daripada pengisuan surat tuntutan oleh Defendan bertarikh 9.4.2008 tersebut, pada 30.04.2008 kedua-dua Plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan di dalam guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini (22-695-2008) memohon antara lain relif-relif berikut ; (a) Satu deklarasi bahawa pembayaran jumlah sebanyak RM2,000,000.00 oleh Plaintif-plaintif kepada Malayan Banking Berhad merupakan penyelesaian yang penuh dan muktamad sebarang liabiliti di bawah Gerenti-gerenti itu yang berkenaan dengan kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan itu; (b) Satu deklarasi bahawa oleh kerana penyelesaian itu, Plaintif-plaintif tidak terhutang Defendan dalam jumlah RM49,432,360.85 atau sama sekali; (c) Kos . 2.11 Di dalam pernyataan tuntutan mereka, kedua-dua Plaintif telah menentang dan mencabar surat tuntutan bertarikh 09.04.2008 yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan terhadap mereka atas alasan-alasan berikut : (a) jaminan-jaminan yang kedua-dua Plaintif masuki bagi menjamin kemudahan- kemudahan kewangan yang diberikan kepada Hartaya adalah suatu demand guarantee dan Pihak Ketiga telahpun menuntut terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penjamin bagi jumlah terhutang yang tidak dibayar Hartaya melalui surat tuntutan bertarikh 01.03.2002 maka kausa tindakan telah bermula terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif dari tarikh pengisuan surat tuntutan ini, yakni 01.03.2002. Oleh itu kedua-dua Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa had masa untuk membawa tindakan terhadap kedua-dua mereka luput pada 01.03.2008. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa tuntutan Defendan terhadap mereka melalui Notis Tuntutan bertarikh 09.04.2008 adalah dihalang oleh had masa. (b) terdapat perjanjian penyelesaian bertarikh 20.11.2005 yang telah dimasuki oleh Pihak Ketiga dan kedua-dua Plaintif di mana dengan pembayaran RM2 juta oleh kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Pihak Ketiga telah menyelesaikan segala tanggungjawab mereka ke atas keberhutangan Hartaya dan mereka telahpun terlepas daripada segala tanggungjawab sebagai penjamin-penjamin Hartaya. Justeru, Defendan tidak lagi mempunyai kausa menurut undang-undang untuk menuntut terhadap kedua-dua mereka sebagai penjamin. 2.12 Defendan pula pada bulan September 2011, telah memulakan tindakan terhadap Hartaya (Penghutang Prinsipal) dan kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai pemegang saham-saham tertentu di dalam Syarikat Strawberry Park Resort Sdn. Bhd. melalui Guaman Sivil No. 22NCC-1449-09-2011. 2.13 Kemudian daripada itu, Defendan pula di dalam menentang tuntutan kedua-dua Plaintif di dalam guaman ini telah memfailkan pernyataan pembelaan serta memfailkan tuntutan balas terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif dengan menuntut bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif adalah bertanggungjawab dan bertanggungan terhadap hutang-hutang Hartaya berjumlah RM49,432,360.85 kepada Defendan. 2.14 Ekoran daripada tuntutan balas tersebut itu, Plaintif telah menjadikan Pihak Ketiga sebagai Pihak Ketiga melalui Notis Pihak Ketiga bertarikh 11.10.2011. 2.15 Pada 10.11.2011, atas permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif, mereka telah memperolehi perintah Saman Minta Arahan-Arahan Ketiga yang antara lain memerintah berikut : 1. Plaintif-plaintif (Defendan-defendan dalam Tuntutan Balas) menyampaikan pernyataan tuntutannya kepada Pihak Ketiga tersebut dalam masa 21 hari dari tarikh ini, dan Pihak Ketiga hendaklah membuat akuan dalam masa 21 hari; 2. Plaintif-plaintif (Defendan-defendan dalam Tuntutan Balas) dan Pihak Ketiga masing-masing bertukar-tukar senarai dokumen dalam tempoh 14 hari selepas pliding-pliding ditutup; 3. Pihak Ketiga tersebut adalah bebas hadir di perbicaraan tindakan ini, dan mengambil bahagian sebagaimana yang diarahkan oleh Hakim, dan terikat dengan keputusan perbicaraan itu; 4. Soal kebertanggungjawaban Pihak Ketiga tersebut untuk menggantirugi Plaintif-plantif (Defendan-defendan dalam Tuntutan Balas) hendaklah dibicarakan dalam perbicaraan tindakan ini. 2.16 Kedua-dua Plaintif kemudiannya pada 04.07.2012 telah memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian tindakan Plaintif-plaintif terhadap Defendan tanpa perintah kos dan tanpa kebebasan memfailkan semula. 2.17 Walaupun kedua-dua Plaintif telah memberhentikan tindakan mereka terhadap Defendan, kedua-dua Plaintif telah seterusnya memfailkan pernyataan tuntutan terpinda terhadap Pihak Ketiga pada 23.11.2012 yang antara lain memohon perintah-perintah deklarasi seperti berikut : 1. Satu deklarasi bahawa pembayaran jumlah sebanyak RM2,000,000,00 oleh Plaintif-plaintif kepada Malayan Banking Berhad merupakan penyelesaian yang penuh dan muktamad sebarang liabiliti dibawah Gerenti-gerenti itu yang berkenaan dengan kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan itu; 2. Satu deklarasi bahawa oleh kerana penyelesaian itu, Plaintif-plaintif tidak terhutang kepada Defendan dalam jumlah sebanyak RM49,432,360.85 atau sama sekali; 3. Satu deklarasi bahawa Tuntutan Defendan terhadap Plaintif-plaintif adalah dihadkan oleh masa; 4. Satu deklarasi bahawa tuntutan Pihak Ketiga terhadap Plaintif-plaintif adalah dihapuskan oleh sebab persetujuan dan penyelesaian; (a) satu deklarasi bahawa pada masa material atau semua masa, Pihak Ketiga merupakan fidusiari Plaintif-plaintif, dan Pihak Ketiga telah melanggar tanggungjawab fidusiarinya kepada Plaintif-plaintif (b) satu deklarasi bahawa pada semua masa material atau semua masa, Pihak Ketiga telah bertindak secara cuai terhadap Plaintif-plaintif; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa pada semua masa material atau semua masa, Pihak Ketiga mempunyai satu tanggungjawab berjaga-jaga terhadap Plaintif-plaintif, dan ia telah melanggar tanggungjawab berjaga-jaga tersebut. 5. Satu perintah bahawa :- (a) Pemberi Pinjaman Pihak Ketiga secara keseluruhannya menanggung rugi Plaintif-plaintif dan setiap satu daripada mereka untuk semua jumlah, liabiliti dan kos yang dituntut dalam Tuntutan Balas yang difailkan oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif-plaintif; (b) Bahawa pemberi Pinjaman Pihak Ketiga membayar kerugian am kepada Plaintif-plaintif untuk ; (i) Pelanggaran tanggungjawab sebagai pemegang amanah konstruktif dan/atau pelanggaran tanggungjawab sebagai fidusiari Plaintif-plaintif; (ii) Kecuaiannya terhadap Plaintif-plaintif; (iii) Salah nyata kepada Gale Force Sdn Bhd; (iv) Pelanggaran tanggungjawab berjaga-jaga terhadap Plaintif-plaintif; dan, (v) Pelanggaran tanggungjawab untuk tidak mendedahkan kepada Plaintif-plaintif. 2.18 Sebagai menentang tuntutan kedua-dua Plaintif, Pihak Ketiga telah memfailkan pernyataan pembelaan terpinda pada 21.12.2012 yang memplidkan antara lain bahawa : (i) terdapatnya Perjanjian Jualbeli bertarikh 17.01.2007 di antara pihak Defendan dan Pihak Ketiga bahawa Defendan telah membeli hutang-hutang terakru di bawah pinjaman yang terhutang ‘(non-performing loan)’ oleh Hartaya kepada Pihak Ketiga melalui Perintah Peletakkanhak bertarikh 30.05.2007. Segala hutang-hutang terakru Hartaya dan liabiliti-liabiliti ke atasnya dipindahkan kepada Defendan. (ii) kewujudan perjanjian Penyelesaian bertarikh 20.11.2005 yang dinyatakan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif telah dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh Pihak Ketiga dan menegaskan sebaliknya bahawa sebenarnya pada 17 haribulan Oktober 2005, Penghutang Prinsipal melalui suratnya telah meminta Pihak Ketiga menimbangkan cadangan penebusan sebanyak RM23 juta bagi hartanah yang terkandung di bawah H.S (D) 2512 PT3232 Mukim Kijal, Kemaman, Terengganu (hartanah tersebut) sebagai penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad pinjaman yang belum dijelaskan oleh penghutang prinsipal kepada Pihak Ketiga. (iii) Pihak Ketiga telah mengeluarkan surat bertarikh 22.11.2005 yang bersetuju bahawa jumlah terhutang RM26.2 juta dibayar sepenuhnya pada atau sebelum 28 Februari 2006 dengan cara berikut : (i) Penebusan berjumlah RM23 juta bagi Hartanah tersebut (“Jumlah Penebusan”); dan (ii) Baki sebanyak RM3.2 juta akan dibayar oleh Plaintif-plaintif sebagai Penjamin. (iv) namun pada 24.11.2005, Plaintif Kedua sebagai Pengarah Urusan peminjam prinsipal (Hartaya) memohon untuk mengurangkan jumlah pembayaran secara ansuran. (v) menurut Pihak Ketiga, setakat 4 Jun 2007 (tarikh kuatkuasa Perintah Letakhak 2007), jumlah penebusan untuk Hartanah tersebut masih belum dibayar kepada Pihak Ketiga. Pihak Ketiga menyatakan bahawa perjanjian-perjanjian gerenti yang disempurnakan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif dan gadaian atas hartanah tersebut masih belum dilepaskan dan boleh dikuatkuasakan di sisi undang-undang. 2.19 Pihak Ketiga telah menafikan bahawa tiada pada bila-bila masa pun liabiliti-liabiliti kedua-dua Plaintif telah dilepaskan oleh Pihak Ketiga dan liabiliti-liabiliti tersebut telahpun diletakkanhak kepada Defendan melalui perjanjian perletakkanhak bertarikh 30.05.2007. 2.20 Selain daripada permohonan untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan mereka, kedua-dua Plaintif di dalam guaman ini telah juga membuat dua permohonan lain yakni : (i) pada 15.03.2012 untuk menyatukan tindakan ini dan tindakan 22NCC-1149-09/2011 tetapi telah menarikbalik permohonan pada 22.03.2012. (ii) pada 27.04.2012 untuk perintah menjadikan Pihak Ketiga sebagai Pihak (joinder) tetapi setelah Pihak Ketiga memfailkan Afidavit Balasan, kedua-dua Plaintif telah menarikbalik permohonan pada 04.10.2012 dan mahkamah telah memerintahkan kos RM2,000 dibayar kepada Pihak Ketiga. [3] Kini, setelah rentetan-rentetan permohonan demi permohonan difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif di mahkamah ini, kedua-dua Plaintif berhasrat pula menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga. [4] Kronologi sebelum perbicaraan permohonan di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM perlu dinyatakan di sini bagi memberi suatu gambaran jelas mengenai tindak-tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif : (i) pengurusan kes ini telah dipanggil di hadapan Penolong Kanan Pendaftar (PKP) pada 28.01.2014 dan kes ini telah ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan penuh pada 20 dan 27 Jun 2014 dan tarikh pengurusan kes untuk arahan-arahan lanjut bagi perbicaraan seterusnya ditetapkan pada 20.02.2014. (ii) pada 20.02.2014, apabila kes dipanggil untuk pengurusan kes, PKP telah mengarahkan pemfailan dokumen-dokumen oleh pihak-pihak dan tarikh pengurusan kes seterusnya ditetapkan pada 01.04.2014. (iii) pada tarikh 01.04.2014, apabila kes dipanggil untuk pengurusan kes, PKP telah dimaklumkan bahawa terdapatnya permohonan daripada kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan terpinda. Permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan terpindanya telah ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan dan telah ditolak oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 08.05.2014. (iv) pada 08.06.2014, setelah permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutannya ditolak oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, kedua-dua Plaintif telah memfailkan permohonan untuk menarikbalik tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga pada 18.06.2014 (Permohonan Pertama) dua hari sebelum kes dijadualkan untuk perbicaraan penuh pada 20.06.2014. (v) apabila kes dipanggil pada 20.06.2014 untuk perbicaraan penuh, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah dimaklumkan bahawa terdapatnya permohonan pertama difailkan dan atas alasan itu perbicaraan penuh telah ditangguhkan. (vi) pada 25.06.2014, kes telah dipanggil semula untuk pengurusan kes dan PKP telah dimaklumkan bahawa satu lagi permohonan baru untuk menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif pada 24.06.2014 (permohonan kedua) dengan Perakuan Segera difailkan. (vii) pada tarikh tersebut, PKP antara-lain telah membuat arahan mengenai permohonan kedua dan menetapkan permohonan kedua dibicarakan pada 11.08.2014 dan juga melapangkan tarikh perbicaraan pada 27.06.2014. Tarikh perbicaraan penuh yang baru telah ditetapkan pada 25 hingga 27 September 2014. (viii) peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah juga menarikbalik permohonan pertama dan penarikanbalik permohonan pertama ini telah dibenarkan oleh PKP. Pada 23.07.2014, apabila kes dipanggil untuk Pengurusan Kes, peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah tidak hadir, namun peguam Pihak Ketiga yang hadir telah memaklumkan bahawa peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah tersilap tarikh dan kes kemudian ditetapkan untuk pengurusan kes pada 11.08.2014, manakala permohonan kedua ini akan didengar oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 15.08.2014. [5] Pada 11.08.2014, apabila kes ini dipanggil di hadapan PKP bagi pengurusan permohonan kedua, peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah memaklumkan bahawa mereka ingin menarikbalik permohonan kedua di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM dan berhasrat untuk meneruskan perbicaraan penuh. Permohonan untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua ini telah dibantah dengan kerasnya oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga dan peguam Pihak Ketiga memohon mahkamah memberi arahan supaya permohonan untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua dibuat secara rasmi oleh kedua-dua Plaintif. [6] PKP telah mengarahkan supaya peguam kedua-dua Plaintif memfailkan permohonan rasmi bagi menarikbalik permohonan kedua difailkan sebelum 15.08.2014 kerana permohonan kedua telah ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan di hadapan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 15.08.2014. [7] Peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah hanya memfailkan permohonan rasmi untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua pada 14.08.2014 dan mahkamah ini hanya telah dimaklumkan mengenainya pada petang 14.08.2014 melalui surat peguamcara yang telah dialamatkan kepada setiausaha hakim di mana antara lain kandungan surat itu menyatakan bahawa sesalinan advanced copy telah disampaikan kepada peguam Pihak Ketiga bagi membolehkan Pihak Ketiga meneliti kandungan tersebut dan bersedia untuk bicara pada 15.08.2014. [8] Pada hari yang sama juga, peguam Pihak Ketiga telah menulis surat kepada mahkamah bahawa mereka telah diserahkan dengan permohonan yang tidak dimeterai pada jam 4.30 petang 13.08.2014 yang Afidavit Sokongan permohonan belum diikrarkan lagi. Peguam Pihak Ketiga telah menerima arahan dari Pihak Ketiga untuk membalas Afidavit Sokongan tersebut selepas ianya dikrarkan dan memaklumkan akan hadir pada 15.08.2014 untuk mendapatkan arahan lanjut mahkamah bagi menjawab Afidavit Sokongan kedua-dua Plaintif bagi permohonan tersebut. Prosiding pada 15.08.2014 - (i) Permohonan di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM. [9] Pada 15.08.2014, apabila permohonan kedua kedua-dua Plaintif untuk dipanggil untuk perbicaraan dengan kehadiran peguam kedua-dua Plaintif dan peguam Pihak Ketiga, peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah bangun dan memaklumkan kepada mahkamah ini bahawa mereka telahpun memfailkan permohonan rasmi di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua dan memohon mahkamah ini membicarakan permohonan Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM terlebih dahulu. [10] Peguam Pihak Ketiga telah membantah permohonan Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM dibicarakan oleh mahkamah kerana ianya telah difailkan terlalu lewat dan mereka hanya telah menerima permohonan termeterai tersebut pada 14.08.2014 yakni suatu masa yang terlalu singkat dan tidak membolehkan mereka untuk memfailkan Afidavit Balasan untuk membantah permohonan tersebut. [11] Menurut peguam Pihak Ketiga juga, ini bukanlah kali pertama kedua-dua Plaintif berbuat demikian tetapi sebelum daripada ini, kedua-dua Plaintif telah berbuat perkara yang sama pada permohonan bertarikh 15.03.2012, permohonan 27.04.2012 dan juga permohonan bertarikh 18.06.2014. Di samping itu, adalah dihujahkan seterusnya oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga bahawa adalah tidak adil sekiranya mahkamah ini membicarakan permohonan ini, kerana Pihak Ketiga belum sempat lagi memfailkan afidavit bagi menentang permohonan tersebut dan apatah permohonan ini telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif apabila Pihak Ketiga telah menyatakan yang mereka tidak membantah permohonan menarikbalik tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga tetapi penarikanbalik hendaklah dibenarkan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfail semula. [12] Mahkamah ini tidak pada bila-bila masa pun menetapkan permohonan Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM ini ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan pada 15.08.2014. Mahkamah ini telah meneliti nota prosiding di hadapan PKP pada 11.08.2014 dan mendapati bahawa arahan yang telah diberikan kepada kedua-dua Plaintif adalah untuk kedua-dua Plaintif memfailkan permohonan rasmi di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM sebelum 15.08.2014. PKP kemudiannya telah menetapkan permohonan kedua ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan pada 15.08.2014. [13] Sewajarnya permohonan ini tidak harus dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah ini atas alasan-alasan berikut : (a) permohonan telah difailkan terlalu lewat ‘at the eleventh hour’ yakni sehari sebelum tarikh perbicaraan permohonan kedua. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah sedia maklum bahawa permohonan rasmi ini adalah bertujuan menarikbalik permohonan kedua yang ditetapkan pada 15.08.2014. Peguam kedua-dua Plaintif sememangnya sedar permohonan mereka untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua adalah ditentang keras oleh Pihak Ketiga. Di dalam keadaan sedemikian, mereka sewajarnya sedar sebarang permohonan yang difailkan akan pastinya memerlukan Pihak Ketiga untuk menjawab Afidavit Sokongan bagi menentang permohonan. (b) tentangan mengenainya telah dizahirkan oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga kepada peguam kedua-dua Plaintif di hadapan PKP pada 11.08.2014. Jelas kedua-dua Plaintif memang mengetahui bahawa Pihak Ketiga pastinya akan memerlukan masa memfailkan afidavit balasannya. Dengan pemfailan lewat ini, sudah pastinya ia akan menafikan hak Pihak Ketiga untuk menentang permohonan dengan memfailkan Afidavit Balasan dan ini menimbulkan kesan prejudis dan ketidakadilan kepada Pihak Ketiga. (c) peguam kedua-dua Plaintif sememangnya juga sedar bahawa permohonan rasmi yang mereka failkan ini adalah menurut Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM yang mana mereka memohon untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua yang difailkan pada 24.06.2014 yang telahpun diserahkan kepada Pihak Ketiga. Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM memperuntukkan bahawa suatu pihak yang telah mengambil keluar suatu notis permohonan dalam suatu kausa atau perkara tidak boleh menariknya balik tanpa kebenaran Mahkamah. Mengetahui situasi tersebut, dan dengan masa yang sangat genting dan singkat, kedua-dua Plaintif sepatutnya memfailkan permohonan untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua pada hari tersebut juga atau paling tidak pun pada 12.08.2014 itu, tetapi kedua-dua Plaintif tidak berbuat demikian. Sebaliknya telah memfailkan permohonan termeterai pada 14.08.2014 dan berharap mahkamah membicarakannya pada 15.08.2014. [14] Bagi mahkamah ini, perbuatan peguam kedua-dua Plaintif adalah suatu perbuatan yang tidak menunjukkan keseriusan terhadap permohonan tersebut dan menunjukkan cubaan memperlekehkan proses undang-undang. Malahan tindakan menarikbalik permohonan ini bukanlah perbuatan kedua-dua Plaintif buat kali pertama, tetapi kali ketiga selepas permohonan pada 15.03.2012, 27.04.2012 dan penarikanbalik permohonan pada 18.06.2014. Perbuatan kedua-dua Plaintif telah menunjukkan rasa ketidakhormatan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap prosedur dan telah bertindak menurut kesesuaian diri mereka “their own whims and fancies” dan ini tidak boleh dibenarkan oleh mahkamah. Di dalam hal ini, suka mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes : The Ka Wah Bank Ltd v Low Chung Song & Ors [1998] 6 MLJ 384. Mahkamah ini sedar akan kes Ka Wah Bank adalah berbeza mengikut fakta kes. Namun begitu, dasar dan alasan penghakiman mahkamah tinggi dalam kes itu adalah berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang sesuai dan selari untuk digunapakai dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini. Dalam kes Ka Wah, mahkamah tinggi telah berhadapan dengan tindak-tanduk Defendan yang diputuskan sebagai tindakan dengan sengaja melengah-lengahkan prosedur mahkamah. Tindakan melengah-lengahkan oleh Defendan dalam kes itu adalah pada tarikh 22.11.1988, pihak Defendan telah mefailkan permohonan (Lampiran 89) untuk satu perintah perlanjutan masa untuk memfailkan afidavit mengesahkan senarai dokumen dan untuk mengenepikan penghakiman ingkar terhadap mereka. Namun begitu, setelah Lampiran 89 difailkan, pihak Defendan langsung tidak melakukan apa-apa tindakan lanjut untuk memajukan lagi permohonan mereka. Malah, selepas pemfailan Lampiran 89, pihak Defendan telah bersetuju dengan permohonan pihak Plaintif untuk tarikh-tarikh ditetapkan untuk membicarakan isu penaksiran ganti rugi. Plaintif juga telah meneruskan untuk menetapkan kes untuk perbicaraan untuk isu liabiliti dan ganti rugi. Pihak Defendan langsung tidak melakukan apa-apa tindakan lanjut untuk memastikan tarikh ditetapkan untuk pendengaran Lampiran 89 mereka. Hanya selepas hampir 9 tahun, pada 21.3.1997, pihak Defendan telah memfailkan satu lagi permohonan (Lampiran 154) yang sama seperti Lampiran 89 mereka. [15] Mahkamah ini ingin mengingatkan bahawa mahkamah ini sedar bahawa mahkamah tinggi dalam kes Ka Wah ini berhadapan dengan satu kelewatan sehingga hampir 9 tahun. Namun, mahkamah dalam kes Ka Wah telah membuat keputusan bukan semata-mata atas tempoh kelewatan, tetapi lebih kepada tindakan pihak Defendan yang menunjukkan bahawa Defendan sebenarnya tidak bersungguh-sungguh untuk membawa tindakan mereka ke mahkamah dan bertindak untuk melengah-lengahkan prosedur mahkamah. Mahkamah tinggi dalam kes Ka Wah telah merujuk kepada kes Wallersteiner: “He has made default time after time. He failed to give proper discovery. He failed to deliver proper defence. He failed to set the action down for trial. It would suit him well if it dragged on forever. It is obvious that he was not at all keen that the action should come to trial. It would suit him well if it dragged on forever… All things considered, it must have been plain to Dr Wallersteiner that his best strategy was to conduct this action as if it were a war of attrition. If he fought it long enough, he might be able to break Mr. Moir’s nerve, exhaust his limited resources, make him give up trying, so that the case would never come to trial. By this means the public would never got to know the truth. His misdeeds would never come up to receive their just penalty… Such was, I believe, the state of mind of Dr Wallersteiner. He would not, of course, confess it. But his whole conduct throughout these proceedings warrants the inference. To my mind his action was an abuse of the process of the court. His defaults in the course of the proceedings were all of a pattern. They were 'intentional and contumelious', to use Diplock LJ's words in Allen v McAlpine [1968] 1 All ER 556; [1968] 2 QB 259… I would add this. Even if his conduct were not to be castigated as an abuse of the process, nevertheless the delays for which he was responsible were inordinate and inexcusable and were such as seriously to prejudice the course of justice.” [16] Mahkamah tinggi dalam merujuk kepada kes Wallersteiner, telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “Against this backdrop of the facts as disclosed in the pleadings and the time over which the Defendants have taken steps to protect their conceived rights or interests, one can only conclude, inescapably at that, that the acts of the Defendants, like those of Dr Wallersteiner, were an abuse of the process of the court; that their defaults in the course of the proceedings were all of a pattern, intentional and contumelious; and that they were using the process of the court not to get justice but to thwart it. In the face of such a situation, the court would be abdicating its duty and function if it allowed its coercive power to be abused in the manner sought by allowing the unmeritorious and self-serving application of these indolent Defendants to stand.” [17] Menerapkan alasan penghakiman di atas dalam kes ini, tindak-tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif dalam kes ini jelas menunjukkan satu corak atau “pattern” yang menunjukkan ketidakseriusan kedua-dua Plaintif dalam tindakan mereka dalam mahkamah ini. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah seperti yang dihujahkan oleh peguambela terpelajar bagi pihak Pihak Ketiga telah bertukar-tukar kausa tindakan mengikut situasi yang timbul. Kedua-dua Plaintif juga telah memfailkan permohonan-permohonan pada waktu-waktu yang sangat hampir dengan waktu akhir yang ditetapkan. Permohonan-permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif juga telah memaksa mahkamah untuk melapangkan tarikh perbicaraan untuk beberapa kali. Maka, jelas dapat diperlihatkan daripada tindak-tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif, terdapat satu corak atau “pattern” yang menunjukkan ketidakhormatan kedua-dua Plaintif dengan tindak-tanduk mereka yang memperlekehkan dan melengah-lengahkan prosedur mahkamah dan tindakan mereka terjumlah sebagai satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. [18] Atas alasan di atas mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM tidak patut dipertimbangkan dan ianya hendaklah ditolak/dibatalkan. Mahkamah ini seterusnya membatalkan permohonan tersebut dengan kos RM2,000.00 dibayar kepada Pihak Ketiga. Prosiding pada 15.08.2014 - (ii) Permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM. [19] Mahkamah ini seterusnya telah mengarahkan peguam kedua-dua Plaintif meneruskan dengan permohonan kedua. [20] Pada dasarnya permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga tidak dibantah oleh Pihak Ketiga, namun Pihak Ketiga telah menghujahkan bahawa penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga hendaklah dibenarkan tanpa kebebasan memfailkan semula. [21] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Afidavit Sokongan kedua-dua Plaintif bagi memohon tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga ditarikbalik atau dihentikan dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula. Alasan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk menarikbalik tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga telah dinyatakan di perenggan 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, dan 9 Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Chan Wan Soon. Untuk kemudahan kefahaman, perenggan-perenggan tersebut diturunkan di sini: “4. Saya dinasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa permohonan ini adalah berdasarkan sebab-sebab yang berikut – a. Plaintif-plaintif mempunyai 2 kausa tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga, iaitu :- (i) pada tahun 2007, apabila Pihak Ketiga telah meletakhak secara tidak sah liabiliti Plaintif-plaintif di bawah Guaranti-guaranti tersebut kepada Gale Force Sdn. Bhd; dan (ii) pada tahun 2012, setelah Plaintif-plaintif membayar jumlah sebanyak RM4 juta kepada Gale Force Sdn. Bhd (Defendan yang dinamakan di atas) berikutan dengan satu perjanjian yang ditunjukkan di dalam surat bertarikh 29.03.2012 daripada Gale Force Sdn Bhd kepada Plaintif-plaintif dan 4 lagi. Salinan surat bertarikh 29.03.2012 daripada Defendan kepada Plaintif-plaintif dan 4 lagi kini dikemukakan dan ditunjukkan kepada saya bertanda “CWS-1” 5. Saya dinasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif terhadap Gale Force Sdn Bhd adalah berdasarkan kausa tindakan pertama yang dinyatakan di perenggan 4(a)(i) di atas. Apabila Gale Force Sdn Bhd telah memfailkan satu tuntutan balas terhadap Plaintif-plaintif, Plaintif-plaintif telah membawa Pihak Ketiga sebagai satu pihak kepada tuntutan tersebut untuk mengindemnifikasi Plaintif-plaintif terhadap apa-apa tuntutan balas Gale Force Sdn Bhd. 6. Saya dinasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa situasi kes ini telah berubah semenjak Plaintif-plaintif memfailkan pernyataan Tuntutan terhadap Pihak Ketiga. 7. Pada atau sekitar 29.03.2012, Plaintif-plaintif telah memasuki satu perjanjian penyelesaian dengan Gale Force Sdn Bhd, di mana Plaintif-plaintif telah membayar Gale Force Sdn Bhd sejumlah RM4 juta untuk menyelesaikan semua pertikaian di antara mereka, dalam Guaman yang tersebut di atas dan Guaman Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur No. 22NCC-1449-09/2011. 8. Oleh yang demikian, saya dinasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa Plaintif-plaintif mempunyai satu kausa tindakan yang baru terhadap Pihak Ketiga. 9. Saya dianasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa Plaintif-plaintif telah membuat satu permohonan untuk meminda pernyataan Tuntutannya terhadap Pihak Ketiga, tetapi permohonan ini telah ditolak pada 08.05.2014, atas alasan bahawa kausa tindakan tersebut wajar dibawa dalam satu tindakan baru.” [22] Daripada pembacaan perenggan-perenggan tersebut, mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa hanya terdapat satu alasan yang dibangkitkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif untuk menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula yakni terdapatnya satu kausa tindakan yang baru terhadap Pihak Ketiga apabila satu Perjanjian Penyelesaian telah dimasuki oleh kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan bagi penyelesaian muktamad Guaman Sivil 22NCC-1449-09/2011 dengan pembayaran jumlah wang RM4 juta oleh kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Defendan. Namun kausa tindakan ini tidak dapat diplidkan dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda mereka kerana permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan terpinda telah ditolak oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 08.05.2014. [23] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam kedua-dua Plaintif bahawa kausa tindakan mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga adalah berpaksikan perlakuan Pihak Ketiga yang meletakkanhak kepada Defendan hutang-hutang yang tidak wujud dan telah menyebabkan kedua-dua Plaintif mengalami kerugian. [24] Adalah dihujahkan seterusnya oleh peguam kedua-dua Plaintif bahawa atas perlakuan Pihak Ketiga tersebut, telah timbul kausa-kausa tindakan antaranya seperti pemecahan tanggungjawab fidusiari, pemecahan tanggungjawab pemegang amanah konstruktif dan kecuaian kesalahnyataan. Justeru itu, menurut peguam kedua-dua Plaintif, permohonan ini adalah satu permohonan yang suci hati atau sesuatu yang bona fide. [25] Sebaliknya sebagai balasan, peguam Pihak Ketiga telah menghujahkan bahawa kebenaran penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga hendaklah dibenarkan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula atas alasan-alasan berikut : (i) permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif adalah tidak bona fide dan bersifat mala fide. (ii) kedua-dua Plaintif tidak mempunyai alasan sebenar untuk memfailkan semula tindakan mereka. (iii) jika kebebasan memfailkan semula dibenarkan, ini akan mengakibatkan ketidakadilan kepada Pihak Ketiga. [26] Peguam Pihak Ketiga telah menghujahkan bahawa semenjak tahun 2011 apabila Pihak Ketiga dijadikan sebagai Pihak Ketiga dalam tindakan di antara kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan, Pihak Ketiga telah terpaksa mempertahankan permohonan-permohonan interlokutori yang bertubi-tubi difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif. Permohonan- permohonan ini termasuklah permohonan-permohonan pindaan kepada pernyataan tuntutan, permohonan untuk penyatuan, permohonan untuk dijadikan sebagai pihak Defendan dan sebagainya. Menurut peguam Pihak Ketiga lagi, tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif bukan sahaja setakat memfailkan pelbagai permohonan-permohonan tetapi di saat-saat akhir, permohonan-permohonan yang difailkan telah ditarikbalik. [27] Di samping itu juga menurut peguam Pihak Ketiga, tarikh bicara yang ditetapkan pada 20 dan 27 Jun 2014 telah terpaksa ditangguhkan atas alasan terdapat permohonan untuk penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga difailkan pada 18.06.2014 dan tarikh bicara 20.06.2014 telah dilapangkan. Seterusnya kedua-dua Plaintif telah menarikbalik permohonan bertarikh 18.06.2014 dan memfailkan permohonan yang sama pada 24.06.2014 yakni permohonan di hadapan mahkamah ini yang telah menyebabkan tarikh perbicaraan penuh pada 27.06.2014 sekali lagi dilapangkan. [28] Peguam Pihak Ketiga telah juga menghujahkan bahawa sebenarnya kedua-dua Plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan yang sebenarnya terhadap Pihak Ketiga. Ini telah menjadi lebih nyata apabila kedua-dua Plaintif telah menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan mereka terhadap Defendan telah dibenarkan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula. Peguam Pihak Ketiga seterusnya menghujahkan lagi bahawa dalam keadaan ini, sebenarnya kedua-dua Plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga pada peringkat ini. Malahan menurut peguam Pihak Ketiga lagi, daripada kronologi kes jelas memperlihatkan bahawa kausa-kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif sering bertukar-tukar dan berbeza-beza menurut keadaan atau situasi yang timbul. Keputusan Mahkamah [29] Undang-undang berkaitan penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan sama ada dengan kebebasan mamfailkan semula ataupun tidak adalah mantap dan jelas. Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM memperuntukkan berikut : “3. (1) Kecuali sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh kaedah 2, suatu pihak tidak boleh memberhentikan suatu tindakan (sama ada yang dimulakan oleh writ atau selainnya) atau tuntutan balas, atau menarik balik mana-mana tuntutan tertentu yang dibuat oleh pihak itu dalam tindakan, tanpa kebenaran Mahkamah, dan Mahkamah yang mendengar suatu permohonan bagi pemberian kebenaran itu boleh memerintahkan tindakan atau tuntutan balas diberhentikan, atau mana-mana tuntutan tertentu dibuat untuk tuntutan itu dibawa atau dibuat atas apa-apa terma tentang kos, pembawaan suatu tindakan selanjutnya atau selainnya sebagaimana yang difikirkan adil.” [30] Berdasarkan peruntukan Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM di atas, jelas bahawa sesuatu pihak tidak boleh memberhentikan tindakan (sama ada yang dimulakan oleh writ atau selainnya) tanpa kebenaran Mahkamah. Justeru itu, bagi perkara pemberhentian atau penarikanbalik tindakan, kuasa memberi kebenaran atau tidak adalah kuasa budi bicara mahkamah. [31] Di dalam penggunaan kuasa budi bicara mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini merujuk kepada beberapa otoriti sebagai panduan. Di dalam kes Tan Eng Hoe v Liang Hooi Keng [1961] 27 MLJ 119, Mahkamah Rayuan dengan merujuk kepada penghakiman Chitty L.J di dalam kes Fox v Star Newspaper Co [1898] 1 QB 636, Hakim Ong bagi pihak Mahkamah Rayuan telah berkata berikut di muka surat 120 : “… as to discontinuance, it is again well settled that it lies entirely within the Judge’s discretion whether or not to allow a Plaintiff to discontinue with the right of bringing another action. The object of Order 26 rule 1 is that “after the proceedings hae reached a certain stage the Plaintiff, who has brought his adversary into Court, shall not be able to escape by a side door and avoid the contest … and it is for the Judge to say whether the action shall be discontinued or not and upon what terms” (per Chitty L.J. in Fox v. Star Newspaper Co.)” [32] Begitu juga di dalam kes Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Berhad [2000] 1 CLJ 503, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam penggunaan kuasa budibicara telah menimbangkan sama ada memberi atau menolak kebenaran untuk menarikbalik tindakan, telah antara lain memutuskan seperti berikut : “[1] Under O.21 r. 3(1) Rules of High Court 1980, the court has a discretion whether to grant or refuse leave for discontinuance. When confronted with an exercise of a discretionary power by a lower court, an appellate court certainly has the power to review such exercise by the lower court. [2] The Learned judge has failed to consider the prejudice and the disadvantage contented to have been suffered by the appellant and the fact that the appellant would be deprived of a defence which was available to them if an order in terms of said application was granted. The learned judge has thereby “excluded matters that it ought to have taken into account” ” [33] Manakala di dalam kes Hanyo Sdn. Bhd v Marplan Sdn Bhd 7 Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 51, Hakim Lim Beng Choon setelah menganalisa dan memberi pertimbangan kepada prinsip-prinsip yang diutarakan oleh tiga kes yang berkaitan dengan penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan ini yakni kes-kes, (i). Costanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd & Anor [1981] A C 557, (ii). Covell Mathews & Partners v French Wools Ltd [1977] 2 AII ER 591, dan (iii). Oversea Union Finance Ltd v Lim Joo Chong [1971] 2 MLJ 124. Di muka surat 63 dan 64, penghakimannya, beliau telah berkata berikut : “The principles that can be extracted from the aforementioned cases are that the court would not compel a Plaintiff to continue his action against a Defendant if he does not want to do so provided no injustice is cause to the Defendant. Injustice would be caused to the Defendant if : (1) the discontinuance was made with ulterior motive to obtain a collateral advantage as in the case of Costanho v Brown & Root Ltd; (2) the discontinuance was not made bona fide by the Plaintiff but it was made in order to obtain an advantage to which he has no right to retain since he has ceased to be dominis litis as the defendant has perfectly good defence – see Oversea Union Finance Ltd v Lim Foo Chong; (3) by the discontinuance of the action the defendant would be deprived of an advantage which he has already gained in the ligitation – see Covell Matthews & Partners v Freanch Wools Ltd.” [34] Berpandukan kepada otoriti-otoriti yang dinyatakan di atas dan berbalik kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, apa yang jelas, kes di hadapan mahkamah ini telah dimulakan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif pada seawal tahun 2008 lagi dan pada mulanya hanya melibatkan Defendan sahaja. Melihat kepada kronologi kes ini, saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Pihak Ketiga bahawa pelbagai permohonan demi permohonan telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif semenjak Pihak Ketiga ditarik masuk oleh kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai Pihak Ketiga. Selain daripada permohonan-permohonan untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan, kedua-dua Plaintif telah memfailkan beberapa permohonan lain yang kemudiannya telah ditarikbalik oleh kedua-dua Plaintif. Begitu juga dengan permohonan untuk menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga di hadapan mahkamah ini. Permohonan ini bukanlah permohonan yang pertama yang difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif tetapi ianya permohonan kali kedua kerana permohonan yang sama telahpun difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif pada 18.06.2014 yang kemudiannya ditarikbalik di hadapan PKP setelah tarikh perbicaraan penuh pada 20.06.2014 dilapangkan. [35] Tindakan atau tindak-tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif bukan sahaja setakat memfailkan permohonan-permohonan yang kemudiannya ditarikbalik, tetapi juga telah bertukar-tukar kausa tindakan pada peringkat yang berbeza menurut keadaan atau situasi yang timbul. Sepertimana yang dihujahkan oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga bahawa kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif adalah berbeza-beza menurut peringkat dan ianya bergantung kepada senario yang timbul. Saya bersependapat dengan peguam Pihak Ketiga mengenai hal ini. Keadaan ini jelas jika merujuk kepada kronologi dan peringkat kes. Untuk kemudahan kefahaman, saya gariskan peringkat-peringkat tersebut seperti berikut : Peringkat 1 Pada awalnya, semasa kedua-dua Plaintif memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan pada tahun 2008, kedua-dua Plaintif telah memohon deklarasi terhadap tuntutan Defendan terhadap mereka dengan mendakwa bahawa apabila Pihak Ketiga mengeluarkan Notis Tuntutan terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif pada 01.03.2002 untuk jumlah keberhutangan Hartaya berjumlah RM30, 447. 951.75, satu Perjanjian Penyelesaian telah dimasuki antara kedua-dua Plaintif dan Pihak Ketiga yang mana dengan pembayaran wang berjumlah RM2 juta kepada Pihak Ketiga, segala liabiliti kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penggerenti kepada pinjaman yang diberikan kepada Hartaya diselesaikan dengan pembayaran wang RM2 juta tersebut. Kedua-dua Plaintif tiada liabiliti ke atas keberhutangan Hartaya kepada Defendan atas pernyataan bahawa kausa tindakan terhadap mereka bermula pada 01.03.2002 dan luput 01.03.2008. Maka Notis Tuntutan Defendan bertarikh 09.04.2008 dinafikan kerana tuntutan Defendan dihalang had masa. Peringkat 2 Selepas Notis Tuntutan Defendan bertarikh 9.4.2008, Defendan seterusnya telah memulakan tindakan sivil di dalam guaman No. 22NCC-1449-09/2011 pada bulan September 2011 di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur, menuntut terhadap Hartaya dan kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai pemegang-pemegang saham Strawberry Park Resort Sdn Bhd atas perletakkan hak dan hutang-hutang Hartaya oleh Pihak Ketiga kepada Defendan atas perintah perletakkan hak bertarikh 30.05.2007. Di mana kemudian daripada itu, Defendan telah pula memfailkan Tuntutan Balas terhadap tuntutan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Defendan di hadapan mahkamah ini. Seterusnya, kedua-dua Plaintif telah mengeluarkan Notis Pihak Ketiga untuk menjadikan Pihak Ketiga sebagai pihak untuk mengimdemnifikasi mereka atas apa-apa tuntutan yang kena bayar oleh kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Defendan. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah kemudiannya memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian untuk memberhentikan tindakan mereka terhadap Defendan. Apabila kedua-dua Plaintif memfailkan Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga, tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga adalah berasaskan kepada Perjanjian Penyelesaian pada tahun 2005 (20.11.2005) yang mana perletakkanhak keberhutangan oleh Pihak Ketiga dan Defendan tidak mempunyai apa-apa kesan kerana Perjanjian Penyelesaian tersebut menyelesaikan segala keberhutangan kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Pihak Ketiga, maka Defendan tidak mempunyai kuasa di sisi undang-undang untuk menuntut terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif ataupun mengeluarkan surat tuntutan bertarikh 09.04.2008. Melalui pernyataan tuntutan terpinda ini pula kedua-dua Plaintif telah menuntut terhadap Pihak Ketiga ke atas kausa-kausa tindakan yakni (i) Pelanggaran Tanggungjawab Sebagai Pemegang Amanah Konstruktif, (ii) Pelanggaran Tanggungjawab Sebagai Fidusiari Plaintif-plaintif, (iii) Salah Nyata Cuai Pihak Ketiga, (iv) Pelanggaran Kewajipan Berhati-Hati dan (v) Kemungkiran Kewajipan Untuk Mendedahkan Sifat Berhati-Hati Dan Kuantum Liabiliti-Liabiliti Yang Diletakhak Terhadap Gale Force Sdn Bhd. Di dalam kedua-dua peringkat tadi, kausa-kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif berbeza-beza mengikut peringkat demi peringkat. Secara kesimpulannya, saya bersetuju dengan apa yang dihujahkan oleh Peguam Pihak Ketiga mengenai kausa-kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga yang mana kausa-kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif adalah multi fold, diversified dan wide ranging seperti berikut : · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 01.03.2002 · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 01.03.2008 · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 20.11.2005 · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 30.05.2007 · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 09.04.2008 · Kausa tindakan mistatement · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 09.02.2001 Peringkat 3 Ini tidak berhenti setakat itu sahaja. Apabila Pihak Ketiga memfailkan pernyataan pembelaannya pada 21.12.2012 dan menafikan sebarang perjanjian penyelesaian yang didakwa oleh kedua-dua Plaintif pada tahun 2005 tersebut, kedua-dua Plaintif seterusnya telah memfailkan satu lagi permohonan untuk meminda sekali lagi pernyataan tuntutan terpinda mereka pada 15.02.2014 bertujuan kononnya untuk menambah satu lagi kausa tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga atas satu lagi fakta yakni bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan telah mencapai satu Perjanjian Penyelesaian bagi penyelesaian pertikaian di antara kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan. Namun demikian permohonan untuk meminda Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda telah tidak dibenarkan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. [36] Kini apabila permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda Pernyataan Tuntutan mereka telah tidak dibenarkan, maka mereka telah berhasrat untuk menarikbalik tindakan mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga. Namun apabila Pihak Ketiga membantah tindakan ini ditarikbalik atau dihentikan dengan kebenaran memfailkan semula, mereka cuba menarikbalik permohonan di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 3 KKM dengan memfailkan permohonan di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM dengan alasan hendak meneruskan perbicaraan. [37] Fakta yang sangat jelas adalah bahawa tindakan terhadap Defendan telah pun diberhentikan atau ditarikbalik oleh kedua-dua Plaintif tanpa kebenaran memfailkan semula. Pihak Ketiga telah ditarik ke dalam kancah pertikaian di antara kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan untuk jumlah yang terhutang oleh Hartaya yang dijamin oleh kedua-dua Plaintif. Apabila kedua-dua Plaintif telah menarikbalik tuntutannya terhadap Defendan, tiada lagi asas tuntutan yang tinggal untuk kedua-dua Plaintif meneruskan tindakan ini terhadap Pihak Ketiga. [38] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa bukan sahaja tiada lagi apa yang tinggal untuk diteruskan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif, malahan segala dakwaan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga seperti pemertanggungjawaban fidusiari, pelanggaran tanggungjawab berjaga-jaga terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif, salahnyataan cuai dan sebagainya tidak lagi boleh berdiri kerana tuntutan balas Defendan atas keberhutangan Hartaya atau liabiliti kedua-dua Plaintif tersebut sebagai penjamin atau penggerenti telahpun diselesaikan oleh kedua-dua pihak. Jelas disini bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif tidak lagi mempunyai asas tindakan atau kausa tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah kehilangan dominis litis kerana Pihak Ketiga mempunyai pembelaan yang baik untuk menentang tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadapnya. Justeru, apabila kedua-dua Plaintif memohon untuk memberhentikan tindakan ini dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula, ia jelas satu permohonan yang tidak suci hati atau mala fide. [39] Di samping itu, tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif bukan sahaja mala fide, malahan segala tindak-tanduk mereka di dalam kes ini jelas kelihatan memperlekehkan proses dan prosedur undang-undang dan adalah menjadi pandangan mahkamah ini, ianya merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses undang-undang yang tidak boleh dibenarkan oleh mahkamah ini. [40] Keadaan dan fakta-fakta yang merangkumi kes ini adalah satu kes yang sesuai untuk mahkamah ini memberikan kebenaran untuk memberhentikan tindakan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula. Sekiranya tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif diberhentikan dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula, pastinya menimbulkan ketidakadilan kepada Pihak Ketiga yang akan dinafikan pembelaan yang baik di dalam menafikan tuntutan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadapnya. [41] Di samping itu juga, tindak tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif sememangnya tidak bona fide dan mempunyai motif tersembunyi untuk memfailkan tindakan baru terhadap Pihak Ketiga sedangkan mereka sendiri telah menarikbalik tindakan terhadap Defendan yang telah pun diletakkanhak atas semua keberhutangan Hartaya dan liabiliti kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penjamin ataupun penggerenti. [42] Mahkamah dengan ini telah membenarkan bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif memberhentikan atau menarikbalik tindakan mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga dan memandangkan ini merupakan permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif, mahkamah berpandangan bahawa adalah wajar permohonan ini dibenarkan tanpa kebenaran untuk pemfailan semula dan tanpa apa-apa perintah mengenai kos. t.t. ……………………………………………….. (DATUK AZIMAH OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh pada 29 September 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Philip Choong & Co K. N. Geetha & Shalini Ragunath Peguamcara Pihak Ketiga - Tetuan Adnan Sundra & Low Melisa Tai & P. Y. Kam 39

Tika 2.6.0

22-695-2008

PLAINTIF 1. CHAN GUAN SENG 2. CHAN WANG SOON DEFENDAN GALE FORCE SDN BHDPIHAK KETIGAMALAYAN BANKING BERHAD

29/09/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bd4e4dc5-4a95-4050-b99f-7c700df7b2d5&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO. MT3- 22-695-2008 ANTARA 1. CHAN GUAN SENG 2. CHAN WANG SOON PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN GALE FORCE SDN BHD DEFENDAN DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD PIHAK KETIGA ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (PERINTAH-PERINTAH BERTARIKH 15.08.2014) [1] Plaintif-plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memfailkan Notis Rayuan untuk merayu terhadap dua perintah yang telah diberikan oleh mahkamah ini pada 15.08.2014. Perintah-perintah tersebut adalah : (i) menolak dan membatalkan permohonan Plaintif-plaintif di bawah Aturan 21 Kaedah 6 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM) untuk menarikbalik permohonan mereka di dalam Lampiran B yang difailkan pada 24.06.2014 memohon di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM bagi menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula dan memberikan kos sebanyak RM 2000.00 kepada Pihak Ketiga; (ii) telah menolak permohonan Plaintif-plaintif untuk menarik balik Lampiran B tersebut, mahkamah ini telah mengarahkan Plaintif-plaintif untuk meneruskan permohonan mereka di Lampiran B dan seterusnya membenarkan permohonan Plaintif-plaintif untuk menarik balik atau memberhentikan tuntutan mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga, tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula. Tiada apa-apa perintah mengenai kos diberikan berkenaan permohonan ini. [2] Untuk lebih jelas lagi atas sebab apa mahkamah ini memberikan perintah-perintah tersebut, fakta latarbelakang yang merangkumi kedua-dua permohonan oleh Plaintif-plaintif ini daripada kertas kausa, molek diperturunkan di bawah ini. 2.1 Plaintif-plaintif ((i) Chan Guan Eng, (ii) Chan Wan Soon) adalah dua orang individu yang juga adalah merupakan pemegang-pemegang saham Strawberry Park Resort Sdn. Bhd. Plaintif Kedua juga adalah Pengarah Urusan bagi sebuah syarikat bernama Hartaya Sdn. Bhd. (Hartaya). 2.2 Defendan (Gale Force Sdn. Bhd.) adalah sebuah syarikat yang ditubuhkan di Malaysia dan mempunyai alamat berdaftar di Lot 6.05, Level 6, KPMG Tower, 8 First Avenue, Bandar Utama Petaling Jaya, 47800 Selangor. 2.3 Pihak Ketiga (Malayan Banking Berhad) pula adalah sebuah institusi kewangan dan perbankan yang telah menjadi pihak di dalam tindakan ini atas Perintah perletakkan hak bertarikh 09.02.2001 yang mana menurut perintah ini, hak-hak dan kepentingan-kepentingan Philleoallied Bank (M) Bhd diletakkan kepada Pihak Ketiga. 2.4 Philleoallied Bank (M) Bhd telah memberi beberapa kemudahan kewangan ‘Term Loans’ kepada Hartaya (Penghutang Prinsipal) dan setakat 31.12.2001, Hartaya telah dikatakan terhutang kepada Pihak Ketiga sebanyak RM30,447,951.75. 2.5 Plaintif-plaintif (kedua-dua Plaintif) telah bersesama dan berasingan menjamin kemudahan-kemudahan kewangan tersebut dengan menyempurnakan tiga (3) perjanjian gerenti (Perjanjian-perjanjian Gerenti tersebut) dengan Pihak Ketiga. 2.6 Hartaya telah gagal membuat pembayaran balik hutang-hutang di bawah kemudahan kewangan yang diberikan dan ini menyebabkan Pihak Ketiga telah menguatkuasakan hak mereka terhadap perjanjian-perjanjian gerenti tersebut dengan pengisuan surat tuntutan bertarikh 01.03.2002. 2.7 Kedua-dua Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa pada 20.11.2005, suatu perjanjian penyelesaian telah dimasukkan di antara Pihak Ketiga dan kedua-dua Plaintif di mana dengan kedua-dua Plaintif membuat pembayaran sebanyak RM2 juta kepada Pihak Ketiga, pembayaran sebanyak RM2 juta tersebut telah melepaskan kesemua tanggungjawab kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penjamin-penjamin terhadap kemudahan kewangan yang telah diberikan kepada Hartaya. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa pembayaran RM2 juta tersebut telah pun dibuat kepada Pihak Ketiga. 2.8 Melalui Guaman Sivil D1-24-161-2007, suatu Perintah Perletakkanhak telah dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur pada 04.06.2007 di mana semua jumlah terhutang oleh Hartaya dan apa-apa liabiliti ke atas hutang-hutang tersebut terhadap Pihak Ketiga telah diletakkanhak kepada pihak Defendan. 2.9 Atas perletakkan hak tersebut, Defendan kemudiannya pada telah mengeluarkan satu Surat Tuntutan bertarikh 09.04.2008 terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penjamin bagi kemudahan kewangan yang diberikan kepada Hartaya. 2.10 Ekoran daripada pengisuan surat tuntutan oleh Defendan bertarikh 9.4.2008 tersebut, pada 30.04.2008 kedua-dua Plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan di dalam guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini (22-695-2008) memohon antara lain relif-relif berikut ; (a) Satu deklarasi bahawa pembayaran jumlah sebanyak RM2,000,000.00 oleh Plaintif-plaintif kepada Malayan Banking Berhad merupakan penyelesaian yang penuh dan muktamad sebarang liabiliti di bawah Gerenti-gerenti itu yang berkenaan dengan kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan itu; (b) Satu deklarasi bahawa oleh kerana penyelesaian itu, Plaintif-plaintif tidak terhutang Defendan dalam jumlah RM49,432,360.85 atau sama sekali; (c) Kos . 2.11 Di dalam pernyataan tuntutan mereka, kedua-dua Plaintif telah menentang dan mencabar surat tuntutan bertarikh 09.04.2008 yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan terhadap mereka atas alasan-alasan berikut : (a) jaminan-jaminan yang kedua-dua Plaintif masuki bagi menjamin kemudahan- kemudahan kewangan yang diberikan kepada Hartaya adalah suatu demand guarantee dan Pihak Ketiga telahpun menuntut terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penjamin bagi jumlah terhutang yang tidak dibayar Hartaya melalui surat tuntutan bertarikh 01.03.2002 maka kausa tindakan telah bermula terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif dari tarikh pengisuan surat tuntutan ini, yakni 01.03.2002. Oleh itu kedua-dua Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa had masa untuk membawa tindakan terhadap kedua-dua mereka luput pada 01.03.2008. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa tuntutan Defendan terhadap mereka melalui Notis Tuntutan bertarikh 09.04.2008 adalah dihalang oleh had masa. (b) terdapat perjanjian penyelesaian bertarikh 20.11.2005 yang telah dimasuki oleh Pihak Ketiga dan kedua-dua Plaintif di mana dengan pembayaran RM2 juta oleh kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Pihak Ketiga telah menyelesaikan segala tanggungjawab mereka ke atas keberhutangan Hartaya dan mereka telahpun terlepas daripada segala tanggungjawab sebagai penjamin-penjamin Hartaya. Justeru, Defendan tidak lagi mempunyai kausa menurut undang-undang untuk menuntut terhadap kedua-dua mereka sebagai penjamin. 2.12 Defendan pula pada bulan September 2011, telah memulakan tindakan terhadap Hartaya (Penghutang Prinsipal) dan kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai pemegang saham-saham tertentu di dalam Syarikat Strawberry Park Resort Sdn. Bhd. melalui Guaman Sivil No. 22NCC-1449-09-2011. 2.13 Kemudian daripada itu, Defendan pula di dalam menentang tuntutan kedua-dua Plaintif di dalam guaman ini telah memfailkan pernyataan pembelaan serta memfailkan tuntutan balas terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif dengan menuntut bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif adalah bertanggungjawab dan bertanggungan terhadap hutang-hutang Hartaya berjumlah RM49,432,360.85 kepada Defendan. 2.14 Ekoran daripada tuntutan balas tersebut itu, Plaintif telah menjadikan Pihak Ketiga sebagai Pihak Ketiga melalui Notis Pihak Ketiga bertarikh 11.10.2011. 2.15 Pada 10.11.2011, atas permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif, mereka telah memperolehi perintah Saman Minta Arahan-Arahan Ketiga yang antara lain memerintah berikut : 1. Plaintif-plaintif (Defendan-defendan dalam Tuntutan Balas) menyampaikan pernyataan tuntutannya kepada Pihak Ketiga tersebut dalam masa 21 hari dari tarikh ini, dan Pihak Ketiga hendaklah membuat akuan dalam masa 21 hari; 2. Plaintif-plaintif (Defendan-defendan dalam Tuntutan Balas) dan Pihak Ketiga masing-masing bertukar-tukar senarai dokumen dalam tempoh 14 hari selepas pliding-pliding ditutup; 3. Pihak Ketiga tersebut adalah bebas hadir di perbicaraan tindakan ini, dan mengambil bahagian sebagaimana yang diarahkan oleh Hakim, dan terikat dengan keputusan perbicaraan itu; 4. Soal kebertanggungjawaban Pihak Ketiga tersebut untuk menggantirugi Plaintif-plantif (Defendan-defendan dalam Tuntutan Balas) hendaklah dibicarakan dalam perbicaraan tindakan ini. 2.16 Kedua-dua Plaintif kemudiannya pada 04.07.2012 telah memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian tindakan Plaintif-plaintif terhadap Defendan tanpa perintah kos dan tanpa kebebasan memfailkan semula. 2.17 Walaupun kedua-dua Plaintif telah memberhentikan tindakan mereka terhadap Defendan, kedua-dua Plaintif telah seterusnya memfailkan pernyataan tuntutan terpinda terhadap Pihak Ketiga pada 23.11.2012 yang antara lain memohon perintah-perintah deklarasi seperti berikut : 1. Satu deklarasi bahawa pembayaran jumlah sebanyak RM2,000,000,00 oleh Plaintif-plaintif kepada Malayan Banking Berhad merupakan penyelesaian yang penuh dan muktamad sebarang liabiliti dibawah Gerenti-gerenti itu yang berkenaan dengan kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan itu; 2. Satu deklarasi bahawa oleh kerana penyelesaian itu, Plaintif-plaintif tidak terhutang kepada Defendan dalam jumlah sebanyak RM49,432,360.85 atau sama sekali; 3. Satu deklarasi bahawa Tuntutan Defendan terhadap Plaintif-plaintif adalah dihadkan oleh masa; 4. Satu deklarasi bahawa tuntutan Pihak Ketiga terhadap Plaintif-plaintif adalah dihapuskan oleh sebab persetujuan dan penyelesaian; (a) satu deklarasi bahawa pada masa material atau semua masa, Pihak Ketiga merupakan fidusiari Plaintif-plaintif, dan Pihak Ketiga telah melanggar tanggungjawab fidusiarinya kepada Plaintif-plaintif (b) satu deklarasi bahawa pada semua masa material atau semua masa, Pihak Ketiga telah bertindak secara cuai terhadap Plaintif-plaintif; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa pada semua masa material atau semua masa, Pihak Ketiga mempunyai satu tanggungjawab berjaga-jaga terhadap Plaintif-plaintif, dan ia telah melanggar tanggungjawab berjaga-jaga tersebut. 5. Satu perintah bahawa :- (a) Pemberi Pinjaman Pihak Ketiga secara keseluruhannya menanggung rugi Plaintif-plaintif dan setiap satu daripada mereka untuk semua jumlah, liabiliti dan kos yang dituntut dalam Tuntutan Balas yang difailkan oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif-plaintif; (b) Bahawa pemberi Pinjaman Pihak Ketiga membayar kerugian am kepada Plaintif-plaintif untuk ; (i) Pelanggaran tanggungjawab sebagai pemegang amanah konstruktif dan/atau pelanggaran tanggungjawab sebagai fidusiari Plaintif-plaintif; (ii) Kecuaiannya terhadap Plaintif-plaintif; (iii) Salah nyata kepada Gale Force Sdn Bhd; (iv) Pelanggaran tanggungjawab berjaga-jaga terhadap Plaintif-plaintif; dan, (v) Pelanggaran tanggungjawab untuk tidak mendedahkan kepada Plaintif-plaintif. 2.18 Sebagai menentang tuntutan kedua-dua Plaintif, Pihak Ketiga telah memfailkan pernyataan pembelaan terpinda pada 21.12.2012 yang memplidkan antara lain bahawa : (i) terdapatnya Perjanjian Jualbeli bertarikh 17.01.2007 di antara pihak Defendan dan Pihak Ketiga bahawa Defendan telah membeli hutang-hutang terakru di bawah pinjaman yang terhutang ‘(non-performing loan)’ oleh Hartaya kepada Pihak Ketiga melalui Perintah Peletakkanhak bertarikh 30.05.2007. Segala hutang-hutang terakru Hartaya dan liabiliti-liabiliti ke atasnya dipindahkan kepada Defendan. (ii) kewujudan perjanjian Penyelesaian bertarikh 20.11.2005 yang dinyatakan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif telah dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh Pihak Ketiga dan menegaskan sebaliknya bahawa sebenarnya pada 17 haribulan Oktober 2005, Penghutang Prinsipal melalui suratnya telah meminta Pihak Ketiga menimbangkan cadangan penebusan sebanyak RM23 juta bagi hartanah yang terkandung di bawah H.S (D) 2512 PT3232 Mukim Kijal, Kemaman, Terengganu (hartanah tersebut) sebagai penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad pinjaman yang belum dijelaskan oleh penghutang prinsipal kepada Pihak Ketiga. (iii) Pihak Ketiga telah mengeluarkan surat bertarikh 22.11.2005 yang bersetuju bahawa jumlah terhutang RM26.2 juta dibayar sepenuhnya pada atau sebelum 28 Februari 2006 dengan cara berikut : (i) Penebusan berjumlah RM23 juta bagi Hartanah tersebut (“Jumlah Penebusan”); dan (ii) Baki sebanyak RM3.2 juta akan dibayar oleh Plaintif-plaintif sebagai Penjamin. (iv) namun pada 24.11.2005, Plaintif Kedua sebagai Pengarah Urusan peminjam prinsipal (Hartaya) memohon untuk mengurangkan jumlah pembayaran secara ansuran. (v) menurut Pihak Ketiga, setakat 4 Jun 2007 (tarikh kuatkuasa Perintah Letakhak 2007), jumlah penebusan untuk Hartanah tersebut masih belum dibayar kepada Pihak Ketiga. Pihak Ketiga menyatakan bahawa perjanjian-perjanjian gerenti yang disempurnakan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif dan gadaian atas hartanah tersebut masih belum dilepaskan dan boleh dikuatkuasakan di sisi undang-undang. 2.19 Pihak Ketiga telah menafikan bahawa tiada pada bila-bila masa pun liabiliti-liabiliti kedua-dua Plaintif telah dilepaskan oleh Pihak Ketiga dan liabiliti-liabiliti tersebut telahpun diletakkanhak kepada Defendan melalui perjanjian perletakkanhak bertarikh 30.05.2007. 2.20 Selain daripada permohonan untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan mereka, kedua-dua Plaintif di dalam guaman ini telah juga membuat dua permohonan lain yakni : (i) pada 15.03.2012 untuk menyatukan tindakan ini dan tindakan 22NCC-1149-09/2011 tetapi telah menarikbalik permohonan pada 22.03.2012. (ii) pada 27.04.2012 untuk perintah menjadikan Pihak Ketiga sebagai Pihak (joinder) tetapi setelah Pihak Ketiga memfailkan Afidavit Balasan, kedua-dua Plaintif telah menarikbalik permohonan pada 04.10.2012 dan mahkamah telah memerintahkan kos RM2,000 dibayar kepada Pihak Ketiga. [3] Kini, setelah rentetan-rentetan permohonan demi permohonan difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif di mahkamah ini, kedua-dua Plaintif berhasrat pula menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga. [4] Kronologi sebelum perbicaraan permohonan di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM perlu dinyatakan di sini bagi memberi suatu gambaran jelas mengenai tindak-tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif : (i) pengurusan kes ini telah dipanggil di hadapan Penolong Kanan Pendaftar (PKP) pada 28.01.2014 dan kes ini telah ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan penuh pada 20 dan 27 Jun 2014 dan tarikh pengurusan kes untuk arahan-arahan lanjut bagi perbicaraan seterusnya ditetapkan pada 20.02.2014. (ii) pada 20.02.2014, apabila kes dipanggil untuk pengurusan kes, PKP telah mengarahkan pemfailan dokumen-dokumen oleh pihak-pihak dan tarikh pengurusan kes seterusnya ditetapkan pada 01.04.2014. (iii) pada tarikh 01.04.2014, apabila kes dipanggil untuk pengurusan kes, PKP telah dimaklumkan bahawa terdapatnya permohonan daripada kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan terpinda. Permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan terpindanya telah ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan dan telah ditolak oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 08.05.2014. (iv) pada 08.06.2014, setelah permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutannya ditolak oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, kedua-dua Plaintif telah memfailkan permohonan untuk menarikbalik tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga pada 18.06.2014 (Permohonan Pertama) dua hari sebelum kes dijadualkan untuk perbicaraan penuh pada 20.06.2014. (v) apabila kes dipanggil pada 20.06.2014 untuk perbicaraan penuh, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah dimaklumkan bahawa terdapatnya permohonan pertama difailkan dan atas alasan itu perbicaraan penuh telah ditangguhkan. (vi) pada 25.06.2014, kes telah dipanggil semula untuk pengurusan kes dan PKP telah dimaklumkan bahawa satu lagi permohonan baru untuk menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif pada 24.06.2014 (permohonan kedua) dengan Perakuan Segera difailkan. (vii) pada tarikh tersebut, PKP antara-lain telah membuat arahan mengenai permohonan kedua dan menetapkan permohonan kedua dibicarakan pada 11.08.2014 dan juga melapangkan tarikh perbicaraan pada 27.06.2014. Tarikh perbicaraan penuh yang baru telah ditetapkan pada 25 hingga 27 September 2014. (viii) peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah juga menarikbalik permohonan pertama dan penarikanbalik permohonan pertama ini telah dibenarkan oleh PKP. Pada 23.07.2014, apabila kes dipanggil untuk Pengurusan Kes, peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah tidak hadir, namun peguam Pihak Ketiga yang hadir telah memaklumkan bahawa peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah tersilap tarikh dan kes kemudian ditetapkan untuk pengurusan kes pada 11.08.2014, manakala permohonan kedua ini akan didengar oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 15.08.2014. [5] Pada 11.08.2014, apabila kes ini dipanggil di hadapan PKP bagi pengurusan permohonan kedua, peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah memaklumkan bahawa mereka ingin menarikbalik permohonan kedua di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM dan berhasrat untuk meneruskan perbicaraan penuh. Permohonan untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua ini telah dibantah dengan kerasnya oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga dan peguam Pihak Ketiga memohon mahkamah memberi arahan supaya permohonan untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua dibuat secara rasmi oleh kedua-dua Plaintif. [6] PKP telah mengarahkan supaya peguam kedua-dua Plaintif memfailkan permohonan rasmi bagi menarikbalik permohonan kedua difailkan sebelum 15.08.2014 kerana permohonan kedua telah ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan di hadapan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 15.08.2014. [7] Peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah hanya memfailkan permohonan rasmi untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua pada 14.08.2014 dan mahkamah ini hanya telah dimaklumkan mengenainya pada petang 14.08.2014 melalui surat peguamcara yang telah dialamatkan kepada setiausaha hakim di mana antara lain kandungan surat itu menyatakan bahawa sesalinan advanced copy telah disampaikan kepada peguam Pihak Ketiga bagi membolehkan Pihak Ketiga meneliti kandungan tersebut dan bersedia untuk bicara pada 15.08.2014. [8] Pada hari yang sama juga, peguam Pihak Ketiga telah menulis surat kepada mahkamah bahawa mereka telah diserahkan dengan permohonan yang tidak dimeterai pada jam 4.30 petang 13.08.2014 yang Afidavit Sokongan permohonan belum diikrarkan lagi. Peguam Pihak Ketiga telah menerima arahan dari Pihak Ketiga untuk membalas Afidavit Sokongan tersebut selepas ianya dikrarkan dan memaklumkan akan hadir pada 15.08.2014 untuk mendapatkan arahan lanjut mahkamah bagi menjawab Afidavit Sokongan kedua-dua Plaintif bagi permohonan tersebut. Prosiding pada 15.08.2014 - (i) Permohonan di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM. [9] Pada 15.08.2014, apabila permohonan kedua kedua-dua Plaintif untuk dipanggil untuk perbicaraan dengan kehadiran peguam kedua-dua Plaintif dan peguam Pihak Ketiga, peguam kedua-dua Plaintif telah bangun dan memaklumkan kepada mahkamah ini bahawa mereka telahpun memfailkan permohonan rasmi di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua dan memohon mahkamah ini membicarakan permohonan Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM terlebih dahulu. [10] Peguam Pihak Ketiga telah membantah permohonan Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM dibicarakan oleh mahkamah kerana ianya telah difailkan terlalu lewat dan mereka hanya telah menerima permohonan termeterai tersebut pada 14.08.2014 yakni suatu masa yang terlalu singkat dan tidak membolehkan mereka untuk memfailkan Afidavit Balasan untuk membantah permohonan tersebut. [11] Menurut peguam Pihak Ketiga juga, ini bukanlah kali pertama kedua-dua Plaintif berbuat demikian tetapi sebelum daripada ini, kedua-dua Plaintif telah berbuat perkara yang sama pada permohonan bertarikh 15.03.2012, permohonan 27.04.2012 dan juga permohonan bertarikh 18.06.2014. Di samping itu, adalah dihujahkan seterusnya oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga bahawa adalah tidak adil sekiranya mahkamah ini membicarakan permohonan ini, kerana Pihak Ketiga belum sempat lagi memfailkan afidavit bagi menentang permohonan tersebut dan apatah permohonan ini telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif apabila Pihak Ketiga telah menyatakan yang mereka tidak membantah permohonan menarikbalik tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga tetapi penarikanbalik hendaklah dibenarkan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfail semula. [12] Mahkamah ini tidak pada bila-bila masa pun menetapkan permohonan Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM ini ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan pada 15.08.2014. Mahkamah ini telah meneliti nota prosiding di hadapan PKP pada 11.08.2014 dan mendapati bahawa arahan yang telah diberikan kepada kedua-dua Plaintif adalah untuk kedua-dua Plaintif memfailkan permohonan rasmi di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM sebelum 15.08.2014. PKP kemudiannya telah menetapkan permohonan kedua ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan pada 15.08.2014. [13] Sewajarnya permohonan ini tidak harus dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah ini atas alasan-alasan berikut : (a) permohonan telah difailkan terlalu lewat ‘at the eleventh hour’ yakni sehari sebelum tarikh perbicaraan permohonan kedua. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah sedia maklum bahawa permohonan rasmi ini adalah bertujuan menarikbalik permohonan kedua yang ditetapkan pada 15.08.2014. Peguam kedua-dua Plaintif sememangnya sedar permohonan mereka untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua adalah ditentang keras oleh Pihak Ketiga. Di dalam keadaan sedemikian, mereka sewajarnya sedar sebarang permohonan yang difailkan akan pastinya memerlukan Pihak Ketiga untuk menjawab Afidavit Sokongan bagi menentang permohonan. (b) tentangan mengenainya telah dizahirkan oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga kepada peguam kedua-dua Plaintif di hadapan PKP pada 11.08.2014. Jelas kedua-dua Plaintif memang mengetahui bahawa Pihak Ketiga pastinya akan memerlukan masa memfailkan afidavit balasannya. Dengan pemfailan lewat ini, sudah pastinya ia akan menafikan hak Pihak Ketiga untuk menentang permohonan dengan memfailkan Afidavit Balasan dan ini menimbulkan kesan prejudis dan ketidakadilan kepada Pihak Ketiga. (c) peguam kedua-dua Plaintif sememangnya juga sedar bahawa permohonan rasmi yang mereka failkan ini adalah menurut Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM yang mana mereka memohon untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua yang difailkan pada 24.06.2014 yang telahpun diserahkan kepada Pihak Ketiga. Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM memperuntukkan bahawa suatu pihak yang telah mengambil keluar suatu notis permohonan dalam suatu kausa atau perkara tidak boleh menariknya balik tanpa kebenaran Mahkamah. Mengetahui situasi tersebut, dan dengan masa yang sangat genting dan singkat, kedua-dua Plaintif sepatutnya memfailkan permohonan untuk menarikbalik permohonan kedua pada hari tersebut juga atau paling tidak pun pada 12.08.2014 itu, tetapi kedua-dua Plaintif tidak berbuat demikian. Sebaliknya telah memfailkan permohonan termeterai pada 14.08.2014 dan berharap mahkamah membicarakannya pada 15.08.2014. [14] Bagi mahkamah ini, perbuatan peguam kedua-dua Plaintif adalah suatu perbuatan yang tidak menunjukkan keseriusan terhadap permohonan tersebut dan menunjukkan cubaan memperlekehkan proses undang-undang. Malahan tindakan menarikbalik permohonan ini bukanlah perbuatan kedua-dua Plaintif buat kali pertama, tetapi kali ketiga selepas permohonan pada 15.03.2012, 27.04.2012 dan penarikanbalik permohonan pada 18.06.2014. Perbuatan kedua-dua Plaintif telah menunjukkan rasa ketidakhormatan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap prosedur dan telah bertindak menurut kesesuaian diri mereka “their own whims and fancies” dan ini tidak boleh dibenarkan oleh mahkamah. Di dalam hal ini, suka mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes : The Ka Wah Bank Ltd v Low Chung Song & Ors [1998] 6 MLJ 384. Mahkamah ini sedar akan kes Ka Wah Bank adalah berbeza mengikut fakta kes. Namun begitu, dasar dan alasan penghakiman mahkamah tinggi dalam kes itu adalah berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang sesuai dan selari untuk digunapakai dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini. Dalam kes Ka Wah, mahkamah tinggi telah berhadapan dengan tindak-tanduk Defendan yang diputuskan sebagai tindakan dengan sengaja melengah-lengahkan prosedur mahkamah. Tindakan melengah-lengahkan oleh Defendan dalam kes itu adalah pada tarikh 22.11.1988, pihak Defendan telah mefailkan permohonan (Lampiran 89) untuk satu perintah perlanjutan masa untuk memfailkan afidavit mengesahkan senarai dokumen dan untuk mengenepikan penghakiman ingkar terhadap mereka. Namun begitu, setelah Lampiran 89 difailkan, pihak Defendan langsung tidak melakukan apa-apa tindakan lanjut untuk memajukan lagi permohonan mereka. Malah, selepas pemfailan Lampiran 89, pihak Defendan telah bersetuju dengan permohonan pihak Plaintif untuk tarikh-tarikh ditetapkan untuk membicarakan isu penaksiran ganti rugi. Plaintif juga telah meneruskan untuk menetapkan kes untuk perbicaraan untuk isu liabiliti dan ganti rugi. Pihak Defendan langsung tidak melakukan apa-apa tindakan lanjut untuk memastikan tarikh ditetapkan untuk pendengaran Lampiran 89 mereka. Hanya selepas hampir 9 tahun, pada 21.3.1997, pihak Defendan telah memfailkan satu lagi permohonan (Lampiran 154) yang sama seperti Lampiran 89 mereka. [15] Mahkamah ini ingin mengingatkan bahawa mahkamah ini sedar bahawa mahkamah tinggi dalam kes Ka Wah ini berhadapan dengan satu kelewatan sehingga hampir 9 tahun. Namun, mahkamah dalam kes Ka Wah telah membuat keputusan bukan semata-mata atas tempoh kelewatan, tetapi lebih kepada tindakan pihak Defendan yang menunjukkan bahawa Defendan sebenarnya tidak bersungguh-sungguh untuk membawa tindakan mereka ke mahkamah dan bertindak untuk melengah-lengahkan prosedur mahkamah. Mahkamah tinggi dalam kes Ka Wah telah merujuk kepada kes Wallersteiner: “He has made default time after time. He failed to give proper discovery. He failed to deliver proper defence. He failed to set the action down for trial. It would suit him well if it dragged on forever. It is obvious that he was not at all keen that the action should come to trial. It would suit him well if it dragged on forever… All things considered, it must have been plain to Dr Wallersteiner that his best strategy was to conduct this action as if it were a war of attrition. If he fought it long enough, he might be able to break Mr. Moir’s nerve, exhaust his limited resources, make him give up trying, so that the case would never come to trial. By this means the public would never got to know the truth. His misdeeds would never come up to receive their just penalty… Such was, I believe, the state of mind of Dr Wallersteiner. He would not, of course, confess it. But his whole conduct throughout these proceedings warrants the inference. To my mind his action was an abuse of the process of the court. His defaults in the course of the proceedings were all of a pattern. They were 'intentional and contumelious', to use Diplock LJ's words in Allen v McAlpine [1968] 1 All ER 556; [1968] 2 QB 259… I would add this. Even if his conduct were not to be castigated as an abuse of the process, nevertheless the delays for which he was responsible were inordinate and inexcusable and were such as seriously to prejudice the course of justice.” [16] Mahkamah tinggi dalam merujuk kepada kes Wallersteiner, telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “Against this backdrop of the facts as disclosed in the pleadings and the time over which the Defendants have taken steps to protect their conceived rights or interests, one can only conclude, inescapably at that, that the acts of the Defendants, like those of Dr Wallersteiner, were an abuse of the process of the court; that their defaults in the course of the proceedings were all of a pattern, intentional and contumelious; and that they were using the process of the court not to get justice but to thwart it. In the face of such a situation, the court would be abdicating its duty and function if it allowed its coercive power to be abused in the manner sought by allowing the unmeritorious and self-serving application of these indolent Defendants to stand.” [17] Menerapkan alasan penghakiman di atas dalam kes ini, tindak-tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif dalam kes ini jelas menunjukkan satu corak atau “pattern” yang menunjukkan ketidakseriusan kedua-dua Plaintif dalam tindakan mereka dalam mahkamah ini. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah seperti yang dihujahkan oleh peguambela terpelajar bagi pihak Pihak Ketiga telah bertukar-tukar kausa tindakan mengikut situasi yang timbul. Kedua-dua Plaintif juga telah memfailkan permohonan-permohonan pada waktu-waktu yang sangat hampir dengan waktu akhir yang ditetapkan. Permohonan-permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif juga telah memaksa mahkamah untuk melapangkan tarikh perbicaraan untuk beberapa kali. Maka, jelas dapat diperlihatkan daripada tindak-tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif, terdapat satu corak atau “pattern” yang menunjukkan ketidakhormatan kedua-dua Plaintif dengan tindak-tanduk mereka yang memperlekehkan dan melengah-lengahkan prosedur mahkamah dan tindakan mereka terjumlah sebagai satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. [18] Atas alasan di atas mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM tidak patut dipertimbangkan dan ianya hendaklah ditolak/dibatalkan. Mahkamah ini seterusnya membatalkan permohonan tersebut dengan kos RM2,000.00 dibayar kepada Pihak Ketiga. Prosiding pada 15.08.2014 - (ii) Permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM. [19] Mahkamah ini seterusnya telah mengarahkan peguam kedua-dua Plaintif meneruskan dengan permohonan kedua. [20] Pada dasarnya permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga tidak dibantah oleh Pihak Ketiga, namun Pihak Ketiga telah menghujahkan bahawa penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga hendaklah dibenarkan tanpa kebebasan memfailkan semula. [21] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Afidavit Sokongan kedua-dua Plaintif bagi memohon tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga ditarikbalik atau dihentikan dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula. Alasan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk menarikbalik tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga telah dinyatakan di perenggan 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, dan 9 Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Chan Wan Soon. Untuk kemudahan kefahaman, perenggan-perenggan tersebut diturunkan di sini: “4. Saya dinasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa permohonan ini adalah berdasarkan sebab-sebab yang berikut – a. Plaintif-plaintif mempunyai 2 kausa tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga, iaitu :- (i) pada tahun 2007, apabila Pihak Ketiga telah meletakhak secara tidak sah liabiliti Plaintif-plaintif di bawah Guaranti-guaranti tersebut kepada Gale Force Sdn. Bhd; dan (ii) pada tahun 2012, setelah Plaintif-plaintif membayar jumlah sebanyak RM4 juta kepada Gale Force Sdn. Bhd (Defendan yang dinamakan di atas) berikutan dengan satu perjanjian yang ditunjukkan di dalam surat bertarikh 29.03.2012 daripada Gale Force Sdn Bhd kepada Plaintif-plaintif dan 4 lagi. Salinan surat bertarikh 29.03.2012 daripada Defendan kepada Plaintif-plaintif dan 4 lagi kini dikemukakan dan ditunjukkan kepada saya bertanda “CWS-1” 5. Saya dinasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif terhadap Gale Force Sdn Bhd adalah berdasarkan kausa tindakan pertama yang dinyatakan di perenggan 4(a)(i) di atas. Apabila Gale Force Sdn Bhd telah memfailkan satu tuntutan balas terhadap Plaintif-plaintif, Plaintif-plaintif telah membawa Pihak Ketiga sebagai satu pihak kepada tuntutan tersebut untuk mengindemnifikasi Plaintif-plaintif terhadap apa-apa tuntutan balas Gale Force Sdn Bhd. 6. Saya dinasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa situasi kes ini telah berubah semenjak Plaintif-plaintif memfailkan pernyataan Tuntutan terhadap Pihak Ketiga. 7. Pada atau sekitar 29.03.2012, Plaintif-plaintif telah memasuki satu perjanjian penyelesaian dengan Gale Force Sdn Bhd, di mana Plaintif-plaintif telah membayar Gale Force Sdn Bhd sejumlah RM4 juta untuk menyelesaikan semua pertikaian di antara mereka, dalam Guaman yang tersebut di atas dan Guaman Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur No. 22NCC-1449-09/2011. 8. Oleh yang demikian, saya dinasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa Plaintif-plaintif mempunyai satu kausa tindakan yang baru terhadap Pihak Ketiga. 9. Saya dianasihati dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa Plaintif-plaintif telah membuat satu permohonan untuk meminda pernyataan Tuntutannya terhadap Pihak Ketiga, tetapi permohonan ini telah ditolak pada 08.05.2014, atas alasan bahawa kausa tindakan tersebut wajar dibawa dalam satu tindakan baru.” [22] Daripada pembacaan perenggan-perenggan tersebut, mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa hanya terdapat satu alasan yang dibangkitkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif untuk menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula yakni terdapatnya satu kausa tindakan yang baru terhadap Pihak Ketiga apabila satu Perjanjian Penyelesaian telah dimasuki oleh kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan bagi penyelesaian muktamad Guaman Sivil 22NCC-1449-09/2011 dengan pembayaran jumlah wang RM4 juta oleh kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Defendan. Namun kausa tindakan ini tidak dapat diplidkan dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda mereka kerana permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan terpinda telah ditolak oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada 08.05.2014. [23] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam kedua-dua Plaintif bahawa kausa tindakan mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga adalah berpaksikan perlakuan Pihak Ketiga yang meletakkanhak kepada Defendan hutang-hutang yang tidak wujud dan telah menyebabkan kedua-dua Plaintif mengalami kerugian. [24] Adalah dihujahkan seterusnya oleh peguam kedua-dua Plaintif bahawa atas perlakuan Pihak Ketiga tersebut, telah timbul kausa-kausa tindakan antaranya seperti pemecahan tanggungjawab fidusiari, pemecahan tanggungjawab pemegang amanah konstruktif dan kecuaian kesalahnyataan. Justeru itu, menurut peguam kedua-dua Plaintif, permohonan ini adalah satu permohonan yang suci hati atau sesuatu yang bona fide. [25] Sebaliknya sebagai balasan, peguam Pihak Ketiga telah menghujahkan bahawa kebenaran penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga hendaklah dibenarkan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula atas alasan-alasan berikut : (i) permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif adalah tidak bona fide dan bersifat mala fide. (ii) kedua-dua Plaintif tidak mempunyai alasan sebenar untuk memfailkan semula tindakan mereka. (iii) jika kebebasan memfailkan semula dibenarkan, ini akan mengakibatkan ketidakadilan kepada Pihak Ketiga. [26] Peguam Pihak Ketiga telah menghujahkan bahawa semenjak tahun 2011 apabila Pihak Ketiga dijadikan sebagai Pihak Ketiga dalam tindakan di antara kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan, Pihak Ketiga telah terpaksa mempertahankan permohonan-permohonan interlokutori yang bertubi-tubi difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif. Permohonan- permohonan ini termasuklah permohonan-permohonan pindaan kepada pernyataan tuntutan, permohonan untuk penyatuan, permohonan untuk dijadikan sebagai pihak Defendan dan sebagainya. Menurut peguam Pihak Ketiga lagi, tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif bukan sahaja setakat memfailkan pelbagai permohonan-permohonan tetapi di saat-saat akhir, permohonan-permohonan yang difailkan telah ditarikbalik. [27] Di samping itu juga menurut peguam Pihak Ketiga, tarikh bicara yang ditetapkan pada 20 dan 27 Jun 2014 telah terpaksa ditangguhkan atas alasan terdapat permohonan untuk penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga difailkan pada 18.06.2014 dan tarikh bicara 20.06.2014 telah dilapangkan. Seterusnya kedua-dua Plaintif telah menarikbalik permohonan bertarikh 18.06.2014 dan memfailkan permohonan yang sama pada 24.06.2014 yakni permohonan di hadapan mahkamah ini yang telah menyebabkan tarikh perbicaraan penuh pada 27.06.2014 sekali lagi dilapangkan. [28] Peguam Pihak Ketiga telah juga menghujahkan bahawa sebenarnya kedua-dua Plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan yang sebenarnya terhadap Pihak Ketiga. Ini telah menjadi lebih nyata apabila kedua-dua Plaintif telah menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan mereka terhadap Defendan telah dibenarkan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula. Peguam Pihak Ketiga seterusnya menghujahkan lagi bahawa dalam keadaan ini, sebenarnya kedua-dua Plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga pada peringkat ini. Malahan menurut peguam Pihak Ketiga lagi, daripada kronologi kes jelas memperlihatkan bahawa kausa-kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif sering bertukar-tukar dan berbeza-beza menurut keadaan atau situasi yang timbul. Keputusan Mahkamah [29] Undang-undang berkaitan penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan sama ada dengan kebebasan mamfailkan semula ataupun tidak adalah mantap dan jelas. Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM memperuntukkan berikut : “3. (1) Kecuali sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh kaedah 2, suatu pihak tidak boleh memberhentikan suatu tindakan (sama ada yang dimulakan oleh writ atau selainnya) atau tuntutan balas, atau menarik balik mana-mana tuntutan tertentu yang dibuat oleh pihak itu dalam tindakan, tanpa kebenaran Mahkamah, dan Mahkamah yang mendengar suatu permohonan bagi pemberian kebenaran itu boleh memerintahkan tindakan atau tuntutan balas diberhentikan, atau mana-mana tuntutan tertentu dibuat untuk tuntutan itu dibawa atau dibuat atas apa-apa terma tentang kos, pembawaan suatu tindakan selanjutnya atau selainnya sebagaimana yang difikirkan adil.” [30] Berdasarkan peruntukan Aturan 21 kaedah 3(1) KKM di atas, jelas bahawa sesuatu pihak tidak boleh memberhentikan tindakan (sama ada yang dimulakan oleh writ atau selainnya) tanpa kebenaran Mahkamah. Justeru itu, bagi perkara pemberhentian atau penarikanbalik tindakan, kuasa memberi kebenaran atau tidak adalah kuasa budi bicara mahkamah. [31] Di dalam penggunaan kuasa budi bicara mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini merujuk kepada beberapa otoriti sebagai panduan. Di dalam kes Tan Eng Hoe v Liang Hooi Keng [1961] 27 MLJ 119, Mahkamah Rayuan dengan merujuk kepada penghakiman Chitty L.J di dalam kes Fox v Star Newspaper Co [1898] 1 QB 636, Hakim Ong bagi pihak Mahkamah Rayuan telah berkata berikut di muka surat 120 : “… as to discontinuance, it is again well settled that it lies entirely within the Judge’s discretion whether or not to allow a Plaintiff to discontinue with the right of bringing another action. The object of Order 26 rule 1 is that “after the proceedings hae reached a certain stage the Plaintiff, who has brought his adversary into Court, shall not be able to escape by a side door and avoid the contest … and it is for the Judge to say whether the action shall be discontinued or not and upon what terms” (per Chitty L.J. in Fox v. Star Newspaper Co.)” [32] Begitu juga di dalam kes Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Berhad [2000] 1 CLJ 503, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam penggunaan kuasa budibicara telah menimbangkan sama ada memberi atau menolak kebenaran untuk menarikbalik tindakan, telah antara lain memutuskan seperti berikut : “[1] Under O.21 r. 3(1) Rules of High Court 1980, the court has a discretion whether to grant or refuse leave for discontinuance. When confronted with an exercise of a discretionary power by a lower court, an appellate court certainly has the power to review such exercise by the lower court. [2] The Learned judge has failed to consider the prejudice and the disadvantage contented to have been suffered by the appellant and the fact that the appellant would be deprived of a defence which was available to them if an order in terms of said application was granted. The learned judge has thereby “excluded matters that it ought to have taken into account” ” [33] Manakala di dalam kes Hanyo Sdn. Bhd v Marplan Sdn Bhd 7 Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 51, Hakim Lim Beng Choon setelah menganalisa dan memberi pertimbangan kepada prinsip-prinsip yang diutarakan oleh tiga kes yang berkaitan dengan penarikanbalik atau pemberhentian tindakan ini yakni kes-kes, (i). Costanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd & Anor [1981] A C 557, (ii). Covell Mathews & Partners v French Wools Ltd [1977] 2 AII ER 591, dan (iii). Oversea Union Finance Ltd v Lim Joo Chong [1971] 2 MLJ 124. Di muka surat 63 dan 64, penghakimannya, beliau telah berkata berikut : “The principles that can be extracted from the aforementioned cases are that the court would not compel a Plaintiff to continue his action against a Defendant if he does not want to do so provided no injustice is cause to the Defendant. Injustice would be caused to the Defendant if : (1) the discontinuance was made with ulterior motive to obtain a collateral advantage as in the case of Costanho v Brown & Root Ltd; (2) the discontinuance was not made bona fide by the Plaintiff but it was made in order to obtain an advantage to which he has no right to retain since he has ceased to be dominis litis as the defendant has perfectly good defence – see Oversea Union Finance Ltd v Lim Foo Chong; (3) by the discontinuance of the action the defendant would be deprived of an advantage which he has already gained in the ligitation – see Covell Matthews & Partners v Freanch Wools Ltd.” [34] Berpandukan kepada otoriti-otoriti yang dinyatakan di atas dan berbalik kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, apa yang jelas, kes di hadapan mahkamah ini telah dimulakan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif pada seawal tahun 2008 lagi dan pada mulanya hanya melibatkan Defendan sahaja. Melihat kepada kronologi kes ini, saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Pihak Ketiga bahawa pelbagai permohonan demi permohonan telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif semenjak Pihak Ketiga ditarik masuk oleh kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai Pihak Ketiga. Selain daripada permohonan-permohonan untuk meminda pernyataan tuntutan, kedua-dua Plaintif telah memfailkan beberapa permohonan lain yang kemudiannya telah ditarikbalik oleh kedua-dua Plaintif. Begitu juga dengan permohonan untuk menarikbalik atau memberhentikan tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga di hadapan mahkamah ini. Permohonan ini bukanlah permohonan yang pertama yang difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif tetapi ianya permohonan kali kedua kerana permohonan yang sama telahpun difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif pada 18.06.2014 yang kemudiannya ditarikbalik di hadapan PKP setelah tarikh perbicaraan penuh pada 20.06.2014 dilapangkan. [35] Tindakan atau tindak-tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif bukan sahaja setakat memfailkan permohonan-permohonan yang kemudiannya ditarikbalik, tetapi juga telah bertukar-tukar kausa tindakan pada peringkat yang berbeza menurut keadaan atau situasi yang timbul. Sepertimana yang dihujahkan oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga bahawa kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif adalah berbeza-beza menurut peringkat dan ianya bergantung kepada senario yang timbul. Saya bersependapat dengan peguam Pihak Ketiga mengenai hal ini. Keadaan ini jelas jika merujuk kepada kronologi dan peringkat kes. Untuk kemudahan kefahaman, saya gariskan peringkat-peringkat tersebut seperti berikut : Peringkat 1 Pada awalnya, semasa kedua-dua Plaintif memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan pada tahun 2008, kedua-dua Plaintif telah memohon deklarasi terhadap tuntutan Defendan terhadap mereka dengan mendakwa bahawa apabila Pihak Ketiga mengeluarkan Notis Tuntutan terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif pada 01.03.2002 untuk jumlah keberhutangan Hartaya berjumlah RM30, 447. 951.75, satu Perjanjian Penyelesaian telah dimasuki antara kedua-dua Plaintif dan Pihak Ketiga yang mana dengan pembayaran wang berjumlah RM2 juta kepada Pihak Ketiga, segala liabiliti kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penggerenti kepada pinjaman yang diberikan kepada Hartaya diselesaikan dengan pembayaran wang RM2 juta tersebut. Kedua-dua Plaintif tiada liabiliti ke atas keberhutangan Hartaya kepada Defendan atas pernyataan bahawa kausa tindakan terhadap mereka bermula pada 01.03.2002 dan luput 01.03.2008. Maka Notis Tuntutan Defendan bertarikh 09.04.2008 dinafikan kerana tuntutan Defendan dihalang had masa. Peringkat 2 Selepas Notis Tuntutan Defendan bertarikh 9.4.2008, Defendan seterusnya telah memulakan tindakan sivil di dalam guaman No. 22NCC-1449-09/2011 pada bulan September 2011 di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur, menuntut terhadap Hartaya dan kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai pemegang-pemegang saham Strawberry Park Resort Sdn Bhd atas perletakkan hak dan hutang-hutang Hartaya oleh Pihak Ketiga kepada Defendan atas perintah perletakkan hak bertarikh 30.05.2007. Di mana kemudian daripada itu, Defendan telah pula memfailkan Tuntutan Balas terhadap tuntutan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Defendan di hadapan mahkamah ini. Seterusnya, kedua-dua Plaintif telah mengeluarkan Notis Pihak Ketiga untuk menjadikan Pihak Ketiga sebagai pihak untuk mengimdemnifikasi mereka atas apa-apa tuntutan yang kena bayar oleh kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Defendan. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah kemudiannya memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian untuk memberhentikan tindakan mereka terhadap Defendan. Apabila kedua-dua Plaintif memfailkan Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga, tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga adalah berasaskan kepada Perjanjian Penyelesaian pada tahun 2005 (20.11.2005) yang mana perletakkanhak keberhutangan oleh Pihak Ketiga dan Defendan tidak mempunyai apa-apa kesan kerana Perjanjian Penyelesaian tersebut menyelesaikan segala keberhutangan kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Pihak Ketiga, maka Defendan tidak mempunyai kuasa di sisi undang-undang untuk menuntut terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif ataupun mengeluarkan surat tuntutan bertarikh 09.04.2008. Melalui pernyataan tuntutan terpinda ini pula kedua-dua Plaintif telah menuntut terhadap Pihak Ketiga ke atas kausa-kausa tindakan yakni (i) Pelanggaran Tanggungjawab Sebagai Pemegang Amanah Konstruktif, (ii) Pelanggaran Tanggungjawab Sebagai Fidusiari Plaintif-plaintif, (iii) Salah Nyata Cuai Pihak Ketiga, (iv) Pelanggaran Kewajipan Berhati-Hati dan (v) Kemungkiran Kewajipan Untuk Mendedahkan Sifat Berhati-Hati Dan Kuantum Liabiliti-Liabiliti Yang Diletakhak Terhadap Gale Force Sdn Bhd. Di dalam kedua-dua peringkat tadi, kausa-kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif berbeza-beza mengikut peringkat demi peringkat. Secara kesimpulannya, saya bersetuju dengan apa yang dihujahkan oleh Peguam Pihak Ketiga mengenai kausa-kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga yang mana kausa-kausa tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif adalah multi fold, diversified dan wide ranging seperti berikut : · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 01.03.2002 · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 01.03.2008 · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 20.11.2005 · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 30.05.2007 · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 09.04.2008 · Kausa tindakan mistatement · Kausa tindakan timbul pada 09.02.2001 Peringkat 3 Ini tidak berhenti setakat itu sahaja. Apabila Pihak Ketiga memfailkan pernyataan pembelaannya pada 21.12.2012 dan menafikan sebarang perjanjian penyelesaian yang didakwa oleh kedua-dua Plaintif pada tahun 2005 tersebut, kedua-dua Plaintif seterusnya telah memfailkan satu lagi permohonan untuk meminda sekali lagi pernyataan tuntutan terpinda mereka pada 15.02.2014 bertujuan kononnya untuk menambah satu lagi kausa tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga atas satu lagi fakta yakni bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan telah mencapai satu Perjanjian Penyelesaian bagi penyelesaian pertikaian di antara kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan. Namun demikian permohonan untuk meminda Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda telah tidak dibenarkan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. [36] Kini apabila permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif untuk meminda Pernyataan Tuntutan mereka telah tidak dibenarkan, maka mereka telah berhasrat untuk menarikbalik tindakan mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga. Namun apabila Pihak Ketiga membantah tindakan ini ditarikbalik atau dihentikan dengan kebenaran memfailkan semula, mereka cuba menarikbalik permohonan di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 3 KKM dengan memfailkan permohonan di bawah Aturan 21 kaedah 6 KKM dengan alasan hendak meneruskan perbicaraan. [37] Fakta yang sangat jelas adalah bahawa tindakan terhadap Defendan telah pun diberhentikan atau ditarikbalik oleh kedua-dua Plaintif tanpa kebenaran memfailkan semula. Pihak Ketiga telah ditarik ke dalam kancah pertikaian di antara kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan untuk jumlah yang terhutang oleh Hartaya yang dijamin oleh kedua-dua Plaintif. Apabila kedua-dua Plaintif telah menarikbalik tuntutannya terhadap Defendan, tiada lagi asas tuntutan yang tinggal untuk kedua-dua Plaintif meneruskan tindakan ini terhadap Pihak Ketiga. [38] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa bukan sahaja tiada lagi apa yang tinggal untuk diteruskan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif, malahan segala dakwaan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga seperti pemertanggungjawaban fidusiari, pelanggaran tanggungjawab berjaga-jaga terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif, salahnyataan cuai dan sebagainya tidak lagi boleh berdiri kerana tuntutan balas Defendan atas keberhutangan Hartaya atau liabiliti kedua-dua Plaintif tersebut sebagai penjamin atau penggerenti telahpun diselesaikan oleh kedua-dua pihak. Jelas disini bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif tidak lagi mempunyai asas tindakan atau kausa tindakan terhadap Pihak Ketiga. Kedua-dua Plaintif telah kehilangan dominis litis kerana Pihak Ketiga mempunyai pembelaan yang baik untuk menentang tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadapnya. Justeru, apabila kedua-dua Plaintif memohon untuk memberhentikan tindakan ini dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula, ia jelas satu permohonan yang tidak suci hati atau mala fide. [39] Di samping itu, tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif bukan sahaja mala fide, malahan segala tindak-tanduk mereka di dalam kes ini jelas kelihatan memperlekehkan proses dan prosedur undang-undang dan adalah menjadi pandangan mahkamah ini, ianya merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses undang-undang yang tidak boleh dibenarkan oleh mahkamah ini. [40] Keadaan dan fakta-fakta yang merangkumi kes ini adalah satu kes yang sesuai untuk mahkamah ini memberikan kebenaran untuk memberhentikan tindakan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula. Sekiranya tindakan kedua-dua Plaintif diberhentikan dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula, pastinya menimbulkan ketidakadilan kepada Pihak Ketiga yang akan dinafikan pembelaan yang baik di dalam menafikan tuntutan kedua-dua Plaintif terhadapnya. [41] Di samping itu juga, tindak tanduk kedua-dua Plaintif sememangnya tidak bona fide dan mempunyai motif tersembunyi untuk memfailkan tindakan baru terhadap Pihak Ketiga sedangkan mereka sendiri telah menarikbalik tindakan terhadap Defendan yang telah pun diletakkanhak atas semua keberhutangan Hartaya dan liabiliti kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai penjamin ataupun penggerenti. [42] Mahkamah dengan ini telah membenarkan bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif memberhentikan atau menarikbalik tindakan mereka terhadap Pihak Ketiga dan memandangkan ini merupakan permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif, mahkamah berpandangan bahawa adalah wajar permohonan ini dibenarkan tanpa kebenaran untuk pemfailan semula dan tanpa apa-apa perintah mengenai kos. t.t. ……………………………………………….. (DATUK AZIMAH OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh pada 29 September 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Philip Choong & Co K. N. Geetha & Shalini Ragunath Peguamcara Pihak Ketiga - Tetuan Adnan Sundra & Low Melisa Tai & P. Y. Kam 39

Tika 2.6.0

21NCVC-2-01/2013

PLAINTIF 1. CECILIA YIIN SUK KIONG .... PLAINTIF FS 2. ERIC BASILE TING CHANG KAI DEFENDAN 1. CITIBANK BERHAD 2. CHIN LIAN LIAN 3. PHILIP YIIN CHUNG LEONG .... DEFENDAN TS 4. ZULKARNAIN BIN ABD KADIR (Yang menjalankan amalan atas nama dan gaya UTAS KRISTAL ENTERPRISE) 5. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH PETALING

12/09/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6e5f354d-b21c-4086-aa53-13fa3ed2e1c5&Inline=true

Failed Extraction

21NCVC-2-01/2013

PLAINTIF 1. CECILIA YIIN SUK KIONG .... PLAINTIF FS 2. ERIC BASILE TING CHANG KAI DEFENDAN 1. CITIBANK BERHAD 2. CHIN LIAN LIAN 3. PHILIP YIIN CHUNG LEONG .... DEFENDAN TS 4. ZULKARNAIN BIN ABD KADIR (Yang menjalankan amalan atas nama dan gaya UTAS KRISTAL ENTERPRISE) 5. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH PETALING

12/09/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6e5f354d-b21c-4086-aa53-13fa3ed2e1c5&Inline=true

Failed Extraction

22NCVC-995-08/2012

PLAINTIF AXENS DEFENDAN 1. MISSION BIOFUELS SDN BHD 2. KNM PROCESS SYSTEMS SDN BHD

05/09/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=224c35af-654f-422f-b934-77538b14ac90&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : 22 NCVC-995-08/2012 BETWEEN AXENS .... PLAINTIFF AND 1. MISSION BIOFUELS SDN BHD .... DEFENDANTS 2. KNM PROCESS SYSTEMS SDN BHD GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Full trial) [1] In the present case, the Plaintiff, a French limited company by the name of Axens had commenced an action against the First and the Second Defendants, both of which are Malaysian companies incorporated under the laws of Malaysia. [2] In its Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff sought out to claim for the following reliefs: i) A declaration that the services provided by the Plaintiff were to the benefit of the 1st and/or 2nd Defendant(s); ii) A declaration that the 1st and/ or 2nd Defendant(s) are liable to the Plaintiff for sums due pursuant to the services provided by the Plaintiff; iii) Judgment against the 1st and 2nd Defendants for the sum of USD791,278.43; iv) In the alternative to (ii) and (iii) above, the Honourable Court shall make a determination of indebtedness of the Defendants and ascertain whether judgment for the sum of USD791,278.43 shall be entered as against the 1st or 2nd Defendant; v) Contractual Interest at the rate set out by the EURIBOR-3M plus 2% from the due date of the invoices until the date of Judgment; vi) Further Interest at the rate of 4% on the crystallized Judgment sum (including interest as set out in prayer (v) above) until full realization; vii) The determination of costs be made in line with the final determination of liability by the Honourable Court; and viii) Such further and the other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit and proper. [3] In the alternative, the Plaintiff had also pleaded in its Statement of Claim that the First and the Second Defendants have jointly and severally benefitted from the Plaintiff’s services and thus seeks that judgment be entered against both the First and Second Defendants on the basis of quantum meruit. [4] The facts that gave rise to the Plaintiff’s action against both the Defendants from the pleadings and also the evidence adduced during the trial are as follows: 4.1 The Plaintiff, a company incorporated under the laws of France having its registered office at 89, Boulevard Franklin Roosevelt, F-92508, Rueil-Malmaison Cedex, France is an international provider of technologies, catalysts, absorbents, specialized equipment and services in the hydrocarbon industry. 4.2 The First Defendant, a Malaysian company by the name of Mission Biofuels Sdn Bhd has its registered address at Suite 50-4-1, 4th Floor, C-26-05, 3 Two Square, No.2, Jalan 19/1, 46300 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. 4.3 The Second Defendant, KNM Process System & Sdn Bhd having its registered address at 15, Jalan Dagang SB 4/1, Taman Sungai Besi Indah, 43300, Seri Kembangan, Selangor Darul Ehsan is a leading turnkey system provider for the oil and gas, petrochemicals, mineral power, environment, renewable energy, biotechnology Industries and also specializes in equipment manufacturing. 4.4 The First Defendant was desirous to obtain the design, engineering, procurement, manufacture, supply, erection, construction, completion, testing and commissioning of a Continuous Acid Conditioning and Silica Pre-treatment, FFA Pre-treatment and Methyl Esther Tansesterification Plant with biodiesel output of 750 tpd (250,000 tpa) and 98% pure technical grade glycerine output of 82 tpd (27.308 tpa) with associated balance of plant at Kuantan Port, Malaysia which includes the Plaintiff’s Esterfip-H process for a Biodiesel Production Unit (“the Biodiesel Plant”). 4.5 To achieve its desire of owning a biodiesel plant as described above, on 25.7.2007, the First Defendant had entered into an Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Commissioning Contract (EPCC) with the Second Defendant. 4.6 By this EPCC, the Second Defendant was appointed as the contractor by the First Defendant to build and construct the Biodiesel Plant. The works to be carried out by the Second Defendant is described in the EPCC as follows: “works” means all the plant to be provided, all the works required in connection with the design, engineering, procurement, manufacture, transport, installation, construction, commissioning, start up, demonstration and testing of the biodiesel plant and all other works to be done by the contractor under the contract and shall include those as detailed in Appendix 1 any changes made to such works in accordance with this contract. 4.7 In order to procure the technology, the relevant and necessary license and also the license rights for the Biodiesel Plant, on the same day, the First Defendant and the Plaintiff had entered into a Technology Transfer Agreement N*07/3071 (TTA) wherein the Plaintiff is to provide amongst others, basic design, licence rights, technical guarantees and related start-up Technical Assistance for the performance test of the Biodiesel Production Unit. 4.8 In furtherance to these EPCC and TTA agreements, also on the same day, the Plaintiff, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant had entered into another agreement, a tripartite agreement called the Transfer Agreement N* 07/3071/T (TA). 4.9 The recital of the TA specifically mentioned that the First Defendant had selected the Plaintiff’s Esterfip-H process for its biodiesel production plant and consequential to such recital, there were two agreements entered between the parties namely, i. The Process Book Supply Agreement (PBSA) executed between the Second Defendant and the Plaintiff. ii. TTA agreement between the First Defendant and the Plaintiff. These two agreements are attached as Appendix 1 to the TA. 4.10 The TA primarily provides for the assignment of all obligations and rights under the TTA from the First Defendant to the Second Defendant. However, the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant was on a periodic term and this is provided under Article 2 which reads: Article 2 – Effective date – Termination 2.1 This Agreement shall become binding upon the Parties on the date of the last signature hereafter and that date shall be the effective date of this Agreement. 2.2 After the successful performance test period of the Unit, as defined in the TTA, or after four (4) years after the effective date, whichever occurs First, this agreement shall stand assigned by KNM to MISSION BIOFUELS, who will accept said assigned and who will henceforth become the only contracting party vis-a-vis AXENS as well as the only responsible party, this responsibility including the obligations to pay any sum remaining due at the date of the assignment. 4.11 The financial terms in relation to the Plaintiff’s services is provided under Article 8 of the TTA under the heading of “Financials”. Article 8 basically envisages that the Plaintiff will be paid in two components namely, for the licence royalty and the Start Up Technical Assistance (Start Up services). Article 8.1 specifically provides that the full licence rights or the royalty are at a fixed sum of USD 1,355,000.00 while Article 8.2 under the heading “Assistance and Services” provides for the manner of payments to be made to the Plaintiff in respect of their assistance and services rendered under Article 7.4 and 7.5 namely for assistance during the initial stages of operation of the Licence unit and upon further request of services by the First Defendant. The manner of invoicing for the purposes of payment to the Plaintiff is stipulated under Article 8.3 which states: 8.3 Payment – invoicing a) In its invoices, LICENSOR shall designate the payer (LICENSEE) as follows: MISSION BIOFUELS Sdn Bhd Suite 50-4-1, 4th Floor Wisma UOA Damansara 50 Jalan Dungun 50490 b) LICENSOR shall transmit the invoices to the following address: i) if it concerns royalties under Article 8.1 M. Swaminathan Managing Director MISSION BIOFUELS Sdn Bhd Suite 50-4-1, 4th Floor Wisma UOA Damansara 50 Jalan Dungun 50490 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia ii) if it concerns assistance and services under Article 8.2: M. Swaminathan Managing Director MISSION BIOFUELS Sdn Bhd Suite 50-4-1, 4th Floor Wisma UOA Damansara 50 Jalan Dungun 50490 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 4.12 It is not in dispute that even though the agreements were executed on 25.7.2007, the Plaintiff had only conducted a site investigation in January 2009 and nothing had happened since then. The Plaintiff had only returned to the site at the end of August 2009 and began its site operation at the end of October 2009. 4.13 The Plaintiff had thereafter proceeded to carry out its obligations under the TTA and subsequently had successfully completed its scope of works. In pursuance to the TTA, the Plaintiff had accordingly issued invoices for both the royalty and the Start Up services. It is not in dispute that the payments of royalties for the licence were fully settled by the Second Defendant. 4.14 The Plaintiff’s complaint is with regard to the Start Up services’ invoices. According to the Plaintiff, pursuant to Article 8.3 of the TTA, the Plaintiff had issued invoices for the Start Up services to the First Defendant. The First Defendant had made payments up to three initial invoices which were sent to them. However there were no more payments made by the First Defendant for the subsequent five (5) invoices. 4.15 Whilst the remaining invoices remain unpaid, the Plaintiff had demanded payment of the unpaid invoices from both the Defendants resulting in a series of communications between the parties via letters and emails. Through these exchanges of communications, both the Defendants had disputed the responsibility of settling the five unpaid invoices. The First Defendant stands on the position that by virtue of the TA, the TTA is assigned to the Second Defendant and thus any claims arising therefrom must be paid by the Second Defendant. On the contrary, the Second Defendant in turn had contended that there was a successful performance test period of the Unit as defined under the TTA on 30.3.2010, and with this successful performance test, the obligations and rights under the TTA has been novated or reassigned to the First Defendant. [5] Faced with this dilemma, the Plaintiff filed this action. [6] The First and the Second Defendants stood by their respective positions stated in their letter denying responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for its services. Both the Defendants had asserted against each other on the liability to pay the Plaintiff and this is clearly reflected in their counterclaims. The First Defendant’s counterclaim against the Second Defendant is reproduced below: (a) A declaration that all the rights and obligations under the Technology Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 entered into between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant and which has been assigned to the Second Defendant by the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 between the Plaintiff, First Defendant and Second Defendant has not been reassigned to the First Defendant as the Second Defendant has not achieved the Final Performance Acceptance. (b) A declaration that the Second Defendant is liable to pay all amount claimed by the Plaintiff in this action. (c) A declaration that the First Defendant is entitled to be indemnified and/or reimbursed by the Second Defendant in respect of all or any amount which the First Defendant may be held liable to pay to the Plaintiff in this action. (d) Payment by the 2nd Defendant to the 1st Defendant as follows:- i) USD 69,363.28 together with the interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from 28.01.2010 or at such rate and from such time as determined by this Honourable Court to the date of full settlement; ii) USD 298,744.85 together with interest thereon at the rate of 5% per annum from 28.01.2010 or at such rate from such time as determined by this Honourable Court to the date of full settlement; (e) Damages to be assessed by the Court [7] The Second Defendant counterclaimed for following reliefs against the First Defendant: (a) A declaration that pursuant to the Technology Transfer Agreement N 07/3071 (“the TTA”) dated 25.7.2007 read with the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 (“the Transfer Agreement”) entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all the obligations of the Second Defendant have been assigned to the First Defendant and henceforth becomes the only contracting party vis-a vis the Plaintiff as well as being the only responsible party to pay any sum due to the Plaintiff. (b) In the alternative, a declaration that pursuant to the Technology Transfer Agreement N 07/3071 (‘the TTA”) dated 25.7.2007 read together with the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 (“the Transfer Agreement”) entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all the obligations of the Second Defendant have been novated to the First Defendant and henceforth become the only contracting party via-a-vis the Plaintiff as well as being the only responsible party to pay any sums due to the Plaintiff. (c) General damages to be assessed; (d) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the decreed sum allowed by this Honourable Court from the date of the Counterclaim until full realisation. [8] It is pertinent to note that the dispute between the First and the Second Defendants on the issues of completion and delays of the Biodiesel Plant are live issues in the arbitration proceeding. [9] The trial of this case had proceeded where five witnesses had testified. The Plaintiff called its Director of Services and Engineering Support Department Jean Marie Le Cacher de Bonneville (PW1). PW1 was the Director of Axens Technical Assistance from 2006 to 28.2.2013. The First Defendant had called two witnesses. They were, Swaminathan a/l S. Mahalingam (DW1) who is the Group Chief Executive Officer of the First Defendant and Norhisham bin Abdul Rahman (DW2) the Group Financial Controller while the Second Defendant had its Project Director for the Biodiesel Plant project, Selva Kumar Rasiah (DW3) testified for the Second Defendant. [10] There was a long Iist of issues raised by the parties in the Statement of Issues to be Tried filed. However, the issues can be summarised into four core issues as follows: i. Pursuant to the TA and the TTA, who is liable or responsible to the Plaintiff for the sums claimed in the invoices issued by the Plaintiff, whether the First or the Second Defendant or both the Defendants can be made liable to pay the invoices issued by the Plaintiff on a joint and severable basis? ii. Whether the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant is still in subsistence or has come to an end and had reverted back to the First Defendant after the lapse of 4 years even though the Second Defendant has not achieved the Final Performance Test period of the Unit as defined under TTA. iii. In the event that the party who is liable to pay the Plaintiff is not ascertainable, can the Plaintiff be entitled to be paid on the basis of quantum meruit? iv. Whether the First Defendant and the Second Defendant are entitled to the reliefs claimed in their respective counterclaims. [11] The above four issues primarily centred around the construction of the TA and the TTA with regard to the assignment of the TTA in relation to the payment for the Start Up services. [12] However in the course of the trial, there were documents (letters and emails) contained in the Common Bundle of Documents which were referred to the witnesses that gave rise to the following issues: a) Whether the Agreement Letter between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant dated 8.6.2009, pleaded by the First Defendant can be relied upon by the First Defendant to support its case. b) Whether Estoppel can be raised against the First Defendant and the Plaintiff with regard to their conducts in respect of the payments of the three earlier invoices issued by the Plaintiff. c) Whether was there a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff in respect of the Start Up services. d) Whether the EPCC entered between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant is in the form of Turnkey contract at a fixed lump sum price. Submission by the counsel for the Plaintiff [13] At the outset, Mr. James Monteiro, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff had brought to this Court’s attention about the legal dispute between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant which is still pending before the arbitrator to which the Plaintiff is not a party. And thus, he had contended that the dispute between the parties before this Court is purely factual dispute and not a legal one. [14] The counsel for the Plaintiff had submitted that the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants is based on the unpaid invoices for the Start Up services rendered by the Plaintiff in pursuance to the TTA. He contended that the TTA being an annexure to the TA, should for all intent and purposes forms a part of the TA. The learned counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that the main purpose of the TA entered between the Plaintiff, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant was to transfer the First Defendant’s obligations under the TTA to the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant had accepted the obligations and rights related thereto. These obligations and rights have been transferred to the Second Defendant is inclusive of the obligation to pay the Plaintiff for its services. However by virtue of Article 1 of the TA, after either the successful performance of the unit or after 4 years whichever is sooner, all these obligations will be transferred back to the First Defendant. [15] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff also submitted that since the Plaintiff had completed the scope of works spelt out under the TTA to the satisfaction of both the Defendants, both Defendants have thereby benefitted from the Plaintiff’s works that entitles the Plaintiff to be paid in in full. [16] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that the Plaintiff should not be deprived of any payment or monies lawfully due to it when both the Defendants have acknowledged that the there is an amount due to the Plaintiffs but deliberately refused to pay as one party puts the liability to pay on the other party. [17] It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the total amount of the five invoices of USD 791,278.43 was not challenged by both the Defendants in their pleadings and in their evidence submitted before this Court. Both the Defendants only raised the issue on who has the obligation to pay the Plaintiff and they were passing the buck to each other. In view of this, the Plaintiff therefore urges this Court to make a finding that both the Defendants are jointly and/or severally liable to the Plaintiff. In this contention, the counsel for the Plaintiff relies on two authorities. ( See i. Chuang Uming (Pte) v Setron Ltd and Anor Appeal [1999] SGCA 77 on which the Singapore Court of Appeal had relied on the findings of the Canadian Supreme Court, Appeals Division in the case of Nowlan v Brunswick Construction Ltd [1973] 34 DLR (3d) 422 and Victoria University of Manchester v Hugh Wilson & Ors [1984] 2 Con LR 43. It was held in Nowlan’s case that “… Where there are concurrent torts, concurrent breaches of contract or a breach of contract and a concurrent tort both contributing to the same damage, whether or not the damage would have occurred in the absence of either cause, the liability is a joint and several liability and either party causing or contributing to the damage is liable for the whole damage to the person aggrieved …” ii. Malaysian Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Choo Ah Kow v Yeoh Yew Thiam [1989] 1 MLJ 187.) [18] In alternative, the counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that in the event this Court finds difficulty in asserting the obligations under the TTA, since the Plaintiff had provided the Start Up services to both the Defendants non-gratuitously and both the Defendants have benefitted from the services, therefore the Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated on the basis of quantum meruit. In support of this proposition the counsel for the Plaintiff relies on section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 and the case of Foo Song Mee v Ho Kiau Seng [2011] SGCA 45. Submission by the counsel for the First Defendant [19] Mr Leong Wai Hong, the learned counsel for the First Defendant, on the other hand argued that the First Defendant has no obligation or responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for the remaining unpaid invoices as the unpaid invoices were for services rendered by the Plaintiff directly to the Second Defendant and not to the First Defendant. The learned counsel further argued that by virtue of the TA, the TTA has been assigned to the Second Defendant and since the Second Defendant had accepted the assignment, the Second Defendant had also accepted all obligations and rights under the TTA from the First Defendant. Until and unless one of the two circumstances described under Article 2.2 of the TA occurs, the termination clause has not yet come into operation. Until then, the obligations and rights shall still remain with the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant have benefitted from the Plaintiff’s Start Up services and therefore, the Second Defendant is responsible to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services. Submission by the counsel for the Second Defendant [20] On the contrary, Mr T. Kuhendran, the counsel for the Second Defendant had submitted that there was a successful performance test period of the Unit, as defined in the TTA on 30.3.2010, hence the TTA has been novated or shall stand reassigned from the Second Defendant to the First Defendant, who will henceforth become the only contracting party with the Plaintiff as well as the only responsible party to pay sums remaining due to the Plaintiff. Alternatively, he also argued that since the relevant four years had lapsed on 27.7.2011, any obligation to pay the Start Up services rendered by the Plaintiff is on the First Defendant. On the issue of novation, the learned counsel finds reliance on section 63 of the Contract Act 1950 and several cases, namely the cases of Toeh Kee Keong v Tambu Mining Co. Ltd [1968] 1 MLJ 39, Mawar Awal (M) Sdn Bhd v Kepong Management Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 MLJ 132 and Polygram Records Sdn Bhd v The Search & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 127. The law [21] First and foremost, this Court must be reminded that the law and the principles relating to construction of contract is trite and settled. 21.1 In the case of Royal Selangor Golf Club v Anglo Oriental (M) Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 995, Lim Beng Choon J. in considering disputes of the parties in respect of a contract had adopted the general principles of construction of a contract as enunciated in the case of National Coal Board v Win Neil & Son (St. Helen) [1948] 1 All ER 555 which accordingly had held : “The First two issues involve the construction of the contract. I bear in mind the principles of construing a contract. The relevant ones for the purpose of this case are : (1) construction of a contract is a question of law; (2) where the contract is in writing the intention of the parties must be found within the four walls of the contractual documents; it is not legitimate to have regard to extrinsic to have regard to extrinsic evidence (there is, of course, no such evidence in this case); (3) a contact must be constructed construed as at the date it was made: it is not legitimate to construe it in the light of what happened years or even days later; (4) the contract must be construed as a whole, and also, so far as practicable, to give effect to every part of it. In Central Bank of India v. Harford Fire Insurance Co Ltd. AIR [1965] SC 1288, the Supreme Court of India lays stress on the Second principle advocated in the Wm Neill & Sons (St Helens) Ltd case when it says at p.1290: Now it is commonplace that it is the Court’s duty to give effect to the bargain of the parties according to their intention and when that bargain is in writing the intention is to be looked for in the words used unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If those words are clear, there is very little that the Court has to do. The Court must give effect to the plain meaning of the words however much it many dislike the result 21.2 In the case of Jainarain Singh & Anor v The State of Bihar & Ors AIR 1980 Patna 24 it was held that the words used in the contract must be interpreted literally and without the aid of the principles of natural justice. 21.3 In the case of Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya ( A Firm) v Koperasi Serbaguna Sungei Glugor Berhad [2009] 2 AMR 50, Abdul Malik Ishak, JCA from the available authorities had in para 17 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, with regard to construction of a contract where the language employed is clear, had made the following propositions: (a) the Court must give effect to the plain meaning of the words, no matter how distasteful the result may be (The Central Bank of India Ltd. Amritsrar v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [1965] AIR Vol. 52, 1288 SC); (b) where the language in the document is unambiguous and clear, the real nature of the document is to be determine solely by looking at its contents, uninfluenced by any intention of the parties ((Nawab Major Sir) Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh and Others [1936] AIR Vol. 23, 171 PC); (c) when the minds of the parties are expressed in an unambiguous manner, the Court cannot override the declared intention of the parties unequivocally expressed (K. Appukuttam Panicker and Another v. S.K.R.A.K.R Athappa Chettiar and Others [1966] AIR Vol.53, 303 Kerala); and (d) there is no scope, at all, for drawing upon hypothetical considerations or the supposed intention of the parties when the words contained in the contract are clear and unambiguous (The Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros. [1959] AIR Vol. 46, 1362 SC). Decision of the Court Issues (i) and (ii) will be dealt with together The TA and the TTA [22] The TA can be found at page 45 to 47 of the Agreed Bundle (Bundle B). It is a simple and straight forward three pages document including the title page which is the first page. The preamble of the TA appears on the second page, while page 3 contains the assignment terms and the signatures of the representative of the Plaintiff, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. Now, Article 1 of the TTA is simply worded in this manner: Article 1 – Assignment of the TTA The TTA between the MISSION BIOFUELS and AXENS is assigned from MISSION BIOFUELS to KNM who accepts to endorse all obligations and rights related thereto. [23] The title to Article 1 of the TA states of the assignment of the TTA. Article 1 stipulates that the TTA between the First Defendant and the Plaintiff is assigned from the First Defendant to the Second Defendant who thereafter accepts to endorse all obligations and rights related to the TTA. The words or the language used in Article 1 is succinctly precise and clear. There is no ambiguity or doubt whatsoever as to the meaning or effect of the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant by the First Defendant. Therefore, with the assignment, it truly means that the Second Defendant has agreed and consented to accept all obligations and rights under the TTA from the First Defendant. The Second Defendant is therefore bound by all the terms contained in the TTA in its entirety including Article 8. This Court had earlier mentioned in this judgment that the payment for the Start Up services is specifically covered under Article 8.2. under the heading “Assistance and Services”. It is so obvious that at the time when the Second Defendant consented to the assignment and accepted the TTA, the Second Defendant must have also accepted the obligation and/or the responsibility to pay the Plaintiff in respect of the Start Up services. [24] Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that there is no argument that the obligation or responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services was vested on the Second Defendant from the time when the TA was executed. [25] Nonetheless, the assignment of the TTA under Article 1 is on a periodic term or definite time because the TA also contains a provision for termination of the assignment. Article 2.2 provides that if any one of the occasions spelt out in Article 2.2 were to occur (whichever occurs first) the assignment comes to an end and the TTA shall be reverted back to the First Defendant. Therefore, from the clear language of the terms in the TTA, the natural conclusion is that the Second Defendant’s obligation or responsibility to pay the Start Up services to the Plaintiff arises or begins from the date of the TA was executed until one of the two occasions spelt out in Article 2.2 occurs (whichever occurs first). [26] Having established the fact above, this Court now turns to the most pivotal issue for determination, that is which one of the two Defendants is responsible to pay the Plaintiff for the unpaid invoices for the sum of USD 791,278.43 or shall both the Defendants be made liable jointly or severally? In delving into this determination, this Court shall first refer back to the Plaintiff’s claim. The sum of USD 791,278.43, being the basis of the Plaintiff’s action against both the Defendants were from invoices for the Start Up services issued by the Plaintiff for the period between January 2010 and May 2010. For ease of reference, the details of the five (5) unpaid invoices are tabulated and reproduced in the table below: No. Invoice No. Issuance Date Due Date Amount (USD) 1 90003577 18/01/2010 17/02/2010 252,720.00 2 90004117 16/03/2010 15/04/2010 156,639.34 3 90004120 16/03/2010 15/04/2010 141,629.09 4 90004121 16/03/2010 15/04/2010 48,744.00 5 90004771 20/05/2010 19/06/2010 191,546.00 Total 791,278.43 [27] It can be clearly seen from the table above that the date of the five invoices ranges from January 2010 until May 2010. In an ordinary course of business, invoices are normally issued after services were rendered or goods had been delivered to the client or customer. Looking at the date of these invoices were issued, one irresistible conclusion to be made would be that the Start Up works must have been carried out before the date indicated on the invoices. In other words, the five unpaid invoices were issued by the Plaintiff after rendering its services. This position is confirmed by PW1 during the cross-examination by the counsel for the First Defendant. In his evidence PW1 had also stated that the Plaintiff had completed its site activity at the end of March 2010. To this end, we shall now examine the financial term in relation to the Start Up services as provided in Article 8.2 of the TTA. Article 8 reads: 8.2 Assistance and services. LICENSEE shall bear LICENSOR’s expenditures when rendering services under articles 7.4 and 7.5 as follows. a) A per diem fee (“Base Daily Rate”) shall be paid to LICENSOR per each employee and each day spent out of customary place of employment. This Base Daily Rate is one thousand five hundred US Dollar (US$ 1,500) based on INDEX as specified in Article 1 – hereof. This amount is firm but subject to escalation. The Base Daily Rate will be multiplied by the INDEX RATIO for the month immediately preceding the First month of the calendar year during which LICENSOR provides the services. [28] From sub Article (a) it is abundantly clear that for the Start Up services rendered, each employee of the Plaintiff will be paid a per diem fee at a Base Daily Rate of USD1500 based on INDEX each day spent out of the customary place of employment. Therefore, this confirms that the invoices have been issued after the Plaintiff’s employees have rendered their services at the customary place of employment which is the Biodiesel Plant’s site. In addition to that, these invoices were issued with supporting time sheets and the time sheets for the five unpaid invoices are at pages 1 to 24 Bundle B2. Close scrutiny of the time sheets reveals that the Start Up services rendered by each of the Plaintiff’s employees were for the months of November 2009, December 2009, January 2010, February 2010 and March 2010. It is pertinent to note that the time sheets at pages 21 to 24 also indicate that the last travel day for the Plaintiff’s employees was on 1.4.2010. This supports the fact that there were no more Start Up services when the Plaintiff’s employees had completed their site activities and left the site. [29] This Court had earlier concluded that the obligation or responsibility to pay the Plaintiff the Start Up services rests on the Second Defendant from the date the TA was executed until the occurrence of one of the two occasions spelt out under Article 2.2 whichever occurs first. The next question to be determined is whether at time the Start Up services were rendered by the Plaintiff in respect of the unpaid invoices, was the TTA still remained assigned with the Second Defendant or has the assignment been terminated and TTA had reverted back to the First Defendant. [30] On the termination of the assignment of the TTA, this Court is mindful of the fact that the dispute between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant over completion and delays of the Biodiesel Plant are live issues at the arbitration. The dispute invariably concerns proper commissioning and acceptance of the biodiesel plant. Thus, the issue whether or not there was a successful performance test as defined in the TTA is not a matter to be determined by this Court. [31] The next question is, has the assignment of the TTA been terminated by virtue of the expiration of the four (4) years from the effective date? The effective date was the date when the TA was executed in which is 25.7.2007. The four years period will lapse on 25.7.2011. This being the case, the five unpaid invoices were issued for the Start Up services provided by Plaintiff during the subsistence of the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant. It is therefore this Court’s judgment that the Start Up services rendered by the Plaintiff was for the benefit of the Second Defendant. After all, it was the intention of parties when executing the agreements on 25.7.2007 that the assigning of the TTA to the Second Defendant was for the sole purpose of facilitating the Second Defendant as the main contractor to carry out the Second Defendant’s obligations expressly set out or defined in the EPCC namely the construction of a complete Biodiesel Plant which is ready to be operated by the First Defendant. [32] For completeness sake, this Court shall also delve into the successful performance test not so much to ascertain or determine whether or not there was a successful performance test on 30.3.2010. But instead to consider and deliberate on the date claimed by the Second Defendant being the date of the successful performance test namely the date 30.3.2010. Bearing in mind that there could not be an earlier date than 30.3.2010. Now, assuming that the Second Defendant’s contention on the successful performance test is accepted, taking the date of 30.3.2010, the assignment will then come to an end after the 30.3.2010. If there is any novation or reassignment of the TTA to the First Defendant as contended by the learned counsel for the Second Defendant, the earliest date of novation or reassignment of the TTA to the First Defendant would be after 30.3.2010. This Court had concluded earlier that the Start Up services were clearly services rendered by the Plaintiff during the months of November 2009 until March 2010. Thus, the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant would still continue to subsist until 30.3.2010. Therefore, it is also this Court’s judgment that even assuming that there was a successful performance test (if any) the unpaid invoices were due against the Second Defendant notwithstanding the successful performance test period (if any) as the five unpaid invoices were for services rendered and became due (as per the time sheets) against the Second Defendant at a time even before the successful performance test period. According to the time sheets also, the Start Up services were rendered even before the successful performance test period (if any). [33] Thus, it is this Court’s judgment that even after taking into consideration that if there was successful performance test period on the 30.3.2010, the sums claimed by the Plaintiff in the five unpaid invoices was already due during the subsistence of the TTA assignment to the Second Defendant that is before the successful performance test period (if any). [34] Based on the above mentioned reasons, it is this Court’s Judgment that the Second Defendant is the party responsible to pay the Plaintiff for the unpaid invoices in respect of the Start Up services rendered by the Plaintiff. Whether both the Defendants can be made liable to pay the invoices issued by the Plaintiff on a joint and several basis. [35] It is patently clear from the financial terms under the TTA that the parties in the present case had never intended to have the effect of joint and/or several liability. Under the TTA, the financial terms (Article 8) are clearly and precisely set out upon the party responsible for any payments in respect of services rendered by the Plaintiff. There is no ambiguity in the financial terms. In so far as the Start Up services is concerned, the TTA specifically provides the obligation to pay on one single party. More so, in the present case there were no joint promises made between the First Defendant and Second Defendant to pay the Start Up services jointly or severally. Therefore, it is this Court’s considered view that there can be no joint and several responsibility for the payments for the Start Up services. Whether the Agreement Letter between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant dated 8.6.2009 pleaded by the First Defendant and can be relied upon by the First Defendant to support its case. [36] On behalf of the First Defendant, it was also contended that in addition to the TA and the TTA, the Second Defendant’s responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services was also clearly spelt out and provided in the Agreement Letter dated 8.6.2009 (pages 58-60, Bundle B) between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant. The learned counsel contended that this is evidenced when PW1 testified, he had told the Court that there was a long silence after 27.7.2007’s agreements. On 16.1.2009, the Plaintiff did send an email dated 16.1.2009 to the Second Defendant enclosing together a Draft Agreement dated 15.1.2009 (pages1-4, Bundle B) summarizing the general arrangements and conditions concerning the Start Up scope of works and its financial terms. In this email the Plaintiff had requested the Second Defendant to give its comments on the Draft Agreement so that an agreement can be reached by both parties and be signed thereafter. DW1 had admitted signing the Agreement Letter (Agreement Letter). The Second Defendant had in the Agreement Letter agreed and confirmed the terms set out by the Plaintiff in respect of the Start Up services. It was the submission of the counsel for the First Defendant that this Agreement Letter was a renegotiation between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant in respect of the Start Up services and its financial terms. [37] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff had objected to any reference made to the Agreement Letter on the ground that the Agreement Letter was never pleaded by the First Defendant in its pleadings. The counsel for the Plaintiff argued that the position taken by the First Defendant from the beginning that the Second Defendant had not yet achieved the successful performance test. The learned counsel further submitted that the First Defendant must not be allowed to rely on the Agreement Letter. On this note, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff referred this Court to several authorities. (See i. RHB Bank Bhd (substituting Kwong Yik Bank Bhd) v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd, [2010] 2 MLJ 188. ii. The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157. iii. Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Jalinan Waja Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 322). [38] The counsel for the Second Defendant, on the other hand had submitted to this Court that the Agreement Letter is merely procedural and operational. He argued that the basis on which the invoices raised by the Plaintiff are based on the TTA and TA and not the Agreement Letter. It was further submitted by the counsel for the Second Defendant that this is consistent with all the correspondence between the parties which only refers to the TTA and the TA. According to the learned counsel, the First Defendant vide its own letters or its solicitors’ letters also acknowledged the fact that the Plaintiff’s claim is based on the TTA and the TA. Even the Plaintiff itself had never referred to the Agreement Letter. The Court’s finding on the Agreement Letter [39] With regard to the Agreement Letter and also the Draft Agreement, this Court is in the agreement with the counsel for the First Defendant that it is the First Defendant’s stand from the beginning that the First Defendant has no obligation to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services pursuant to the TA. The Agreement Letter and the Draft Agreement are consistent with the TA and the TTA and they are in actual fact supporting evidence to support the First Defendant’s position and thus, need not be pleaded. [40] In the event this Court is wrong to conclude that the Agreement Letter is within the pleaded case of the First Defendant, this Court seeks assistance from the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Emas Bestari Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 1 CLJ 316. In this case, Abdul Wahab Patail, JCA on behalf of the Court of Appeal had this to say at page 326 paragraphs 26 to 27 on objection not pleaded case of a party: “(26) The objection that a matter has not been pleaded is not the ground for the objection. It is a general description of the nature of the objection. But whether the objection is sustainable is decided by the grounds for the objection. Such grounds arise from the nature of the matter. Hence, if the matter raised is only a question of fact, but the evidence relied upon in respect of it are already admitted in evidence before the Court, which means the other party is not taken by surprise. Protestations or affectations of surprise “because it was not pleaded” in such case holds no merit. Only if it is shown that the matter raised relied upon facts not pleaded and therefore the party making the objection did not have the opportunity of addressing the truth and accuracy of description of that fact, may the objection hold merit and be sustained. ... [41] Abdul Wahab Patail JCA further referred to the Federal Court case of Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, 4th Division & Anor v. Hamit Matusin & Ors [1994] 3 CLJ 567, in deliberation over objections as to matters not pleaded at variance with pleadings: “The underlying well-known rationale for requiring such material facts to be pleaded is of course, to prevent the opposing party from being taken by surprise by evidence which departs from pleaded material facts, for such evidence if allowed, will prejudice and embarrass or mislead the opposing party. If a party is taken by surprise, he must object there and then at the point of time when such evidence emerges, for such evidence to be disregarded by the Court, and the Court will then uphold such timely objection. The Court will generally however grant an adjournment if requested on suitable terms as to costs etc. for the pleading to be amended by the party seeking to adduce such evidence. One must bear in mind the need for an orderly adversary system of a Court trial, not a chaotic harangue in a market place. A party is not taken by surprise when the circumstances actually indicate so, e.g. when such evidence is the very evidence sought to be relied on by him from the outset, or when he fails to object to such evidence then and there as this Court now seeks to emphasize. [27] After elaborating on the point further, His Lordship concluded: Therefore a Court inevitably ought to enquire, when there is a failure to object to such evidence when it is adduced, whether it is such a radical departure, if not, it is a mere variation, modification or a development, then the impropriety of admission of such evidence at variance with the pleadings is deemed to be waived and the defect in such pleadings cured.” [42] In the present case, such objection against the inclusion of the Agreement Letter was not even made in a timely manner. The objection was only made in the written submission of the Plaintiff. Adding to that effect, the Plaintiff had never put to the attention of the Court of their objection at the time the Agreement Letter was actually and indeed included in the Common Bundle of Documents. The objection was unheard of until the Written Submission was filed. It is altogether implausible to say that the Plaintiff was taken by surprise in any manner. They had the opportunity to address the Agreement Letter, even accepted its inclusion of the Agreement Letter and even with that, not even an iota of objection was raised. Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that, in light of the Plaintiff’s failure to object against the Agreement Letter being adduced at the time the Agreement Letter had surfaced to the attention of the parties and the Court, even if in the instance, the Agreement Letter was beyond the First Defendant’s pleaded case, the objection shall fail and the Court shall consider the First Defendant’s contention on the Agreement Letter. [43] A fair reading of the entire Agreement Letter together with Article 8.2 of the TTA would support the conclusion that the Agreement Letter was the renegotiation of the financial terms in respect of the Start Up services between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant. This Court finds that the recital of Article 8.2 reads as Assistance and Services. This Court had earlier referred and discussed sub Article (a) of Article 8.2 which provides the rate to be paid to each of the Plaintiff’s employees when rendering their services at the site. Further examination of Article 8.2, sub Article (g) reads this: g) LICENSEE shall pay directly to LICENSOR personnel all living expenses of LICENSOR personnel including food and First class hotel accommodation and supply at LICENSEE’s sole charge all necessary office space and associated facilities including secretarial services, telephone, telex, etc. and local independent transportation facilities as [44] Sub Article (g) clearly covered the living expenses of the Plaintiff’s employees such as accommodation, air tickets, transportation and food. PW1 and DW3 confirmed all the living expenses were paid by the Second Defendant. To this Court, if the Second Defendant’s contention is true that the First Defendant is responsible to pay for the Start Up services, living expenses being part of Assistance and Services, the Second Defendant would have requested the First Defendant to pay for these living expenses or claimed reimbursement on whatever amount had been expended to them. This was not so in the present case. The Second Defendant had accepted the responsibility to pay the living expenses instead. This runs contrary to the Second Defendant’s own evidence that the Second Defendant is only responsible to pay the Plaintiff for the licence royalty and the basic engineering under the PBSA but it paid for the living expenses without any complaint. Furthermore, to accept the Second Defendant’s contention that the First Defendant will bear the Start Up services in respect of the invoices issued while the Second Defendant pays the living expenses under sub Article (g) of Article 8.2 would not be the true intention and interpretation of Article 8.2 for the true meaning of Assistance and Services. To this Court’s mind, Article 8.2 must be read in its entirety from Article 8.2(a) to (k) and not by any preferential selection. Hence, this Court finds that the Agreement Letter between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant confirms the position on the responsibility of the Second Defendant to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services during the subsistence of the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant. Whether was there a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services [45] As regards to the contention that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff, both the counsel for the Plaintiff and the First Defendant have urged this Court not to pay any credence to this point raised by the Second Defendant as it was not pleaded. This Court is in fact of the similar view with the First Defendant and the Plaintiff, that after all, the argument of the Second Defendant on this supposed separate agreement was not at all within the corners of their pleaded case. It was clearly not pleaded. A close perusal of the Second Defendant’s pleading would reveal that they have only pleaded that, by virtue of the successful performance test, the TTA was novated or was reassigned back to the First Defendant. If at all, the Second Defendant’s pleaded case is closely hinged upon the reassignment pursuant to the Transfer Agreement (TA). Any other facts not to the effect of proving such reassignment in pursuance of the TA must be specifically pleaded as it is a ground totally separate from the pleaded case on reassignment. Similarly, the Second Defendant’s contention on this separate agreement is not at all related to the TA or even all other agreements between the parties. This alleged separate agreement is not even remotely related to the reassignment pleaded by the Second Defendant. It is a contention which is clearly separate and distinct from the Second Defendant’s pleaded contention on the reassignment of the TTA pursuant to the TA. Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that the existence of a separate agreement must be specifically pleaded which the Second Defendant had failed to do. However, in the Second Defendant’s bid to establish that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff, the counsel for Second Defendant had referred witnesses to documents (letters and emails) contained in the Common Bundle Of Documents during the trial. The witnesses (PW1, DW1 and DW3) did not dispute the letters and the emails. In fact, they had admitted writing and sending the letters and the emails during the exchange of communications. Relying on the case of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Emas Bestari Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 1 CLJ 316, this Court shall now deal with this issue. [46] On behalf of the Second Defendant it was also submitted that there was a separate agreement between the parties in respect of the payments to the Plaintiff for the Start Up services and the royalty. According to the learned counsel, the agreement was that the First Defendant will bear the cost for the assistance and services by the Plaintiff during the erection, installation, commissioning start up and testing of the Biodiesel Plant, whereas the Second Defendant will bear the cost for the royalty and also the cost of basic engineering fees arising from the PBSA. It was because of this agreement or arrangement that the Plaintiff had sent the invoices for the Start Up services to the First Defendant in which the First Defendant had proceeded to pay the first three invoices. In respect of the licence for the royalty and the basic engineering fee according to the PBSA, the Plaintiff had only sent the invoices for these two items to the Second Defendant to which the Second Defendant had settled in full. The counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff was and is aware of such agreement between the Defendants and that explains the sending of the Start Up services’ invoices to the First Defendant. [47] To further support its contention that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services, the Second Defendant had also relied on Article 8 of the EPCC and the exchange of communications between the parties arising from the Letters of Demand issued by the Plaintiff to both the Defendants demanding payment of the unpaid invoices. The learned counsel had referred to this Court to some of the passages in the letters and the emails. [48] For ease of reference, the passages quoted by the Second Defendant’s counsel in respect of the letters and emails are reproduced here: a) The 1st Defendant’s emails dated 3.5.2010 (page 95, Bundle B) to the Plaintiff :- “We confirm receipt of the outstanding invoices which had been forwarded to KNM for their verification. Upon receipt of the verification, the payment will be effected immediately.” b) The 1st Defendant’s email dated 3.6.2010 (page 94, Bundle B) to the Plaintiff:- “Mission will proceed to pay the November and December invoices. The other months will be paid once the relevant information/ documents are received for verification by KNM. c) The 1st Defendant’s email dated 16.12.2009 (page 119, Bundle B) to the Second Defendant: “ Dear Selva, Can you please verify that these invoices are ok for payment. We do not have details of when they were here or what there were actually doing as it was arrange directly by KNM. d) Letter dated 18.5.2011 (pages 91-93, Bundle B) from the Plaintiff to the 2nd Defendant: “Up until now these invoices were paid by Mission Biofuels based on the agreement between KNM and Mission Biofuels, according to which KNM used to check the validity of our invoices and Mission Biofuels used to pay them.” [49] In reply to Second Defendant’s assertion that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants in respect of payments to the Plaintiff, the counsel for the Plaintiff had argued that this arrangement or agreement between the Defendants and the supporting arguments have not been pleaded by the Second Defendant. The counsel further submitted that this new position by the Second Defendant is an afterthought and should not be given an iota of credence by this Court. The learned counsel had cited these cases in support of his contention: i. RHB Bank Bhd (substituting Kwong Yik Bank Bhd) v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd, [2010] 2 MLJ 188. ii. The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157. iii Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Jalinan Waja Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 322. [50] The First Defendant’s counsel had strenuously denied the existence of any separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff. Firstly, it was argued that that the Second Defendant did not plea its allegation on such separate agreement. Secondly, the Defendant did not produce to this Court any documentary evidence to support such assertion. Thirdly, the Second Defendant’s reliance on the recital of Article 8 of the EPCC to prove the existence of such agreement is totally wrong and misconceived. Fourthly, in the absence of any documentary evidence to substantiate the existence of the separate agreement, the Second Defendant should have produced oral evidence instead, and at least call either Ir. Lee Swee Eng, the Second Defendant’s Group Managing Director or Mr. Terry Chew the Second Defendant’s Director of Group Contract Documentation as witnesses. According to the learned counsel for the First Defendant, these two persons would be able to confirm the existence of such agreement. It was further argued by the counsel for the First Defendant that the failure to call either one of them attracted the invocation of adverse presumption under section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Second Defendant. The counsel for the First Defendant had referred this Court to the two cases on this matter. ( See Chan Yoke Lan (Administrator of the estate of Chong Yoke Fah, Deceased) v Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Sdn, Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 303 and Datin Peggy Taylor v Udachin Development Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 CLJ.) [51] As regards to the passages of letters and emails referred by the Second Defendant’s counsel, the counsel for the First Defendant had submitted that the passages quoted by the counsel for the Second Defendant was not quoted in full by the counsel for the Second Defendant. In respect of the Plaintiff’s letter dated 18.5.2011, the full contents of the paragraph reads this way: “As you surely understand, Axens does not want to take part into discussion between KNM and Mission BIofuels... You may thus understand that the only recourse Axens has, is to stick to the legal wording and check who is its legal and contractual debtor. Legally speaking, it indeed appears that your company, KNM is our direct debtor since KNM has been assigned all rights and obligations under the above agreement by the Transfer Agreement dated April 25th, 2007...” (emphasis added) [52] According to the counsel for the First Defendant the contents of the 18.5.2011’s letter is consistent with PW1’s evidence that the First Defendant had agreed to pay the Plaintiff on behalf of the Second Defendant as a result of being pressured or cornered by the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff had threatened to abandon the site activity if payments are not made. [53] The counsel for the First Defendant had further submitted that similarly with the two emails dated 3.5.2010 and 3.6.2010, they were not quoted in full by the counsel for the Second Defendant to reflect the actual contents. According to the counsel for the First Defendant, the two emails are actually attachments to the Plaintiff’s letter in which the Plaintiff had clearly stated that the Second Defendant is its direct debtor because of the assignment. [54] The learned counsel also submitted that likewise, the First Defendant’s email dated 16.12.2009 was also not fully quoted by the Second Defendant’s counsel. The content of the email in full reads: “Dear Selva, Can you please verify that these invoices are ok for payment. We do not have details of when they were here or what there were actually doing as it was arrange directly by KNM. As discussed MBSB will pay these and other such invoices. The apportionment of the amounts between KNM and MBSB will be discussed and finalised later at handover. Our view is that MBSB should not pay for anything beyond the normal time required. Axens has confirmed that the normal time required is 1 week for inspection and 4 weeks for commissioning and performance tests. Best regards, Nathan Mahalingam Group Managing Director” (emphasis added) [55] This Court agrees with the counsel for the First Defendant that the Second Defendant’s failure to call either Ir. Lee Swee Eng or Mr. Terry Chew, warranted the invocation of adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Second Defendant. This Court opines that the Second Defendant having asserted that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff, had not produced any document to prove the existence of a separate agreement. The most logical option in this situation is to call either Ir Lee Swee Eng, its Group Managing Director or Mr Terry Chew, its Director of Group Contract Documentation as a witness. Ir Lee Swee Eng as a Group Managing Director must have been involved in the negotiation of such agreement (if any) and he should be able to shed some light over the alleged agreement between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. Mr. Terry Chew who is responsible for any contract or agreement entered by the Second Defendant would be in the position to enlighten this Court of such agreement (if any). Thus, notwithstanding whether or not the fact on the separate agreement was pleaded or otherwise, this Court is of the considered view that the Second Defendant had failed to prove the existence of such alleged separate agreement. Whether Estoppel can be raised against the First Defendant and the Plaintiff with regard to their conducts in respect of the payments of the three earlier invoices issued by the Plaintiff. [56] It was also argued on behalf of the Second Defendant that the conduct of the First Defendant in making the payment of the three invoices amounting to USD 368,103.13 had clearly led all the parties to believe that the First Defendant will make payment for the entire Start Up services to the Plaintiff. It was also further submitted for the Second Defendant that if there was no such agreement between the Defendants, the First Defendant should have protested against the invoices and informed the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant that the First Defendant is not obliged to pay the Plaintiff in respect of the Start Up Services and that the invoices should be addressed to the Second Defendant at an earlier stage that is on the receipt of the First invoice from the Plaintiff. However, the First Defendant did nothing of that sort but instead proceeded to pay the Start Up services’ invoices for January, February, June, July and August 2009. And therefore, the First Defendant and the Plaintiff should be estopped from claiming the outstanding payments for the invoices in respect of Start Up services from the Second Defendant. On the issue of estoppel, the counsel for the Second Defendant had relied on the Federal Court’s decision in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malayan Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 3 MLJ 331 and few other cases namely, i. Asia General Equipment and Supplied Sdn Bhd & Ors v Mohd Sari bin Datuk OKK Hj Anuar & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 49. ii. Mohamed Ismail bin Mohamed Shariff v Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin & Ors [2013] 2 MLJ 605. iii. Yoong Sze Fatt v Pengkalen Securities Sdn Bhd [2011 4 MLJ 805.) [57] Upon close examination and evaluation on the letters and also the emails in totality, this Court is inclined to conclude that the First Defendant’s payments in respect of the three earlier invoices for the Start Up services were made on behalf of the Second Defendant. The email dated 16.12.2009 had clearly indicated that there were discussions between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant prior to the payments of the three earlier invoices and it was agreed between them that whatever amount had been paid by the First Defendant will be apportioned between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. The apportionment will be discussed and finalised at the handover of the Biodiesel Plant to the First Defendant. The arrangement was agreed upon by all the parties, and therefore, there is no issue of estoppel here. [58] Another argument raised by the Second Defendant’s counsel is regarding the invoices that were sent to the First Defendant which demonstrated the First Defendant’s responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services. On this issue, this Court is in agreement with the First Defendant counsel’s contention that merely because the invoices issued under the name of the First Defendant and were sent to the First Defendant does not make the First Defendant liable to pay the Plaintiff. PW1 when he was being cross examined by counsels for the Defendants had actually explained that it was the Plaintiff’s internal “SAP” system which causes the invoices to be sent automatically to the First Defendant pursuant to Article 8.3 of the TTA. In view of the Court’s finding on the core issues, this Court is of the view that this issue here is of little significance. Whether the EPCC entered between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant is in the form of Turnkey contract at a fixed lump sum price. [59] Now, the next issue to be determined is whether the EPCC is a Turnkey contract as submitted by the First Defendant’s counsel. It was argued on behalf of the First Defendant that the EPCC being a Turnkey contract, a fixed lump sum contract at the price of RM122 million, the Second Defendant is obligated under the EPCC to hand over or deliver to the First Defendant a complete Biodiesel Plant in working order without any overrun costs. The counsel further submits, the RM 122 million fixed price lump sum set out in the EPCC is payable to the Second Defendant as the contractor, who in turn must take all the necessary steps including hiring subcontractors and paying them. The RM122 million are to be paid to the Second Defendant in three parts, namely: Part A: Price of RM875,000/- (Malaysian Ringgit Eight Hundred & Seventy Five Thousand only) representing the fixed sum payable by the Second Defendant to the Plaintiff under the PSBA : Part B: Price of RM4,742,500/- (Malaysian Ringgit Four Million Seven Hundred Forty Two Thousand Five Hundred only) representing the fixed sum payable by the Second Defendant to the Plaintiff under the TTA; and Part C: Price of RM116,382,500 (Malaysian Ringgit One Hundred Sixteen Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Five Hundred only). [60] In ascertaining the essence and definition of a Turnkey contract, this Court finds valuable assistance to the decision of Zakaria Yatim J. in the case of Highmark (M) Sdn Bhd v Pacto Malaysia Sdn Bhd [1987] 2 MLJ 85. In his decision, Zakaria Yatim J.(as he then was) had delved into the definition of Turnkey contract. His deliberation on the definition of a Turnkey contract is as follows: “……The question that arises here is what is a “turnkey contract?” In the United States, the Circuit Court of Appeals in Retsal Drilling Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 127 F 2d 355 @ 357 defined a turnkey job as a job wherein “ the driller of an oil well undertake to furnish everything and does all the work required to complete the well, place it on production and turn it, over ready to ‘turn the key and start the oil running into the tanks.” One eminent writer, recently described “turnkey” as – “... a contract where the essential design emanates from, or is supplied by, the Contractor and not the owner, so that the legal responsibility for the design, suitability and performance of the work after completion will be made to rest ... with the contractor ... ‘Turnkey’ is treated as merely signifying the design responsibility as the contractor’s.” Duncan Wallace QC, Contracts for Industrial Projects, Paper presented at a Seminar on Building and Civil Engineering Claims held in Kuala Lumpur in February, 1984, p. 3. The turnkey system, however, may be modified. The owner may engage consultants to do the foundation or sub-structure designs leaving only the superstructures the subject of the lump sum turnkey arrangements. This is known as a “mixed-turnkey” contracts. See Duncan Wallace QC, Construction Contract from the Point of View of the Owner p. 6.” In light of these literature, Zakaria Yatim J. had concluded the following: It is clear, therefore, that, in its pure form the turnkey contractor is responsibility for the design and planning rests with the contractors. On completion of the work, the contractor hands over the completed job to the owner. Sometimes the owner engages consultants to do the foundation and substructure designs. The contractor is only responsible for the planning, construction and supervision of the rest of the construction work. In order to determine what is the nature of a particular turnkey job, it is necessary to look at the relevant contracts between the parties concerned. [61] Now, reverting back to the present case, to ascertain whether or not the EPCC was in actual fact a Turnkey contract, the terms of the EPCC must be examined. Looking at Article 4, Article 5 and Article 13.1 of the EPCC, it is vividly clear that the EPCC was a Turnkey contract. The Second Defendant as a matter of fact was appointed by the First Defendant as a turnkey contractor in connection with the construction of the biodiesel plant. This also evidenced in the wording of Article 13 the EPCC itself. The title to Article 13 reads “Contractor’s Obligation”. This means that the Second Defendant’s obligation towards the construction the biodiesel plant is to the extent that the plant should be completed and be handed over in a working order to the First Defendant. Article 13.1 reads inter alia: 13.1 Works to be Performed Except as otherwise expressly set forth in this Contract, the Contractor shall perform or cause to be performed all the Works, on a fixed price lumpsum basis in accordance with the provisions of this Contract including: i) all engineering design, procurement and manufacturing required for a completely engineered Biodiesel Project; ii) Transportation of plant & equipment up to Site, port of entry clearance and handling works in Malaysia required in connection with the completion of the Biodiesel Project; iii) construction infrastructure works, civil and structural construction, mechanical and electrical erection and installation works and commissioning, start-up and testing of the Biodiesel Project, including obtaining the relevant licensing and Consents. iv) provision of all necessary labour, construction fuels, chemicals, utilities, tools, Contractor’s Equipment, supplies and other consumables and works (other than materials, equipment and supplies provided by Purchaser’s suppliers or Purchaser all as outlined in Clause 11.8); and; v) making good any defects or deficiencies in the Works in accordance with the obligations of the Contractor pursuant to Clause 36 hereof. The Contractor shall be responsible for completing the Works and achieving the final Performance Acceptance by the agreed Time for Completion and demonstrating the capability of the Biodiesel Project to achieve the Performance Guarantees failing which the Contractor shall be liable for and pay to the Purchaser applicable liquidated damages for delay and performance shortfall pursuant to Clause 34 and 35, as the case may be. (emphasis added) [62] From the wording of Article 13.1, clearly the EPCC between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant was indeed a pure Turnkey contract. Issue iii [63] This Court will now deal with the issue of claim on quantum meruit. The legal position for quantum meruit is well established. It is sufficient for this Court to refer to the case of Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya V. Koperasi Serbaguna Sungai Glugor Bhd [2009] 1CLJ 786. In this case, the Court of Appeal at paragraph 39 of its judgment had deliberated on circumstances in which quantum meruit cannot arise as a remedy and consequently had held the following: [39] According to the case of Gilbert & Partners (a firm) v. Knight [1968] 2 All ER 248, CA, a claim on a quantum meruit cannot arise if there is an existing contract between the parties to pay an agreed sum. The facts in Gilbert & Partners (a firm) v. Knight (supra) may briefly be stated as follows. There, a surveyor agreed to prepare drawings, arrange tenders and supervise works pertaining to alteration, the cost of which be estimated at roughly £600, for a fee of £30. The employer ordered extra work which brought the total cost to £2,283 but the surveyor did not, while the work was going on, tell the employer that he would require further fees. The Court held that the surveyor would be bound by the existing agreement to perform services for £30 and could not recover a reasonable sum on a new implied contract [64] In the present case, the TTA which was assigned under the TA to the Second Defendant by the First Defendant for a periodic term and the Agreement Letter clearly contained provisions on the financial terms, the obligation to pay the Plaintiff, the manner of payment as well as the amount that the Plaintiff should be paid for its services. Hence, payment on the basis of quantum meruit cannot arise. Issue iv [65] The First Defendant in counterclaiming against the Second Defendant sought for a declaration that: all the rights and obligations under the Technology Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 entered into between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant which has been assigned to the Second Defendant by the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 between the Plaintiff, First Defendant and Second Defendant, had not been reassigned to the First Defendant as the Second Defendant had not achieved the Successful Performance Test. [66] On contrary, the Second Defendant counterclaims against the First Defendant for a declaratory order to declare that: a) pursuant to the Technology Transfer Agreement N*07/3071 (“the TTA”) dated 25.7.2007 read with the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 (“the Transfer Agreement”) entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all the obligations of the Second Defendant have been assigned to the First Defendant and henceforth becomes the only contracting party vis-a vis the Plaintiff as well as being the only responsible party to pay any sum due to the plaintiff, or b) In the alternative, a declaration that pursuant to the Technology Transfer Agreement N 07/3071 (‘the TTA”) dated 25.7.2007 read with the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 (“the Transfer Agreement”) entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all the obligations of the Second Defendant have been novated to the First Defendant and henceforth become the only contracting party via-a-vis the Plaintiff as well as being the only responsible party to pay any sums due to the Plaintiff. [67] The counterclaims above sought by parties are in the form of a declaration. The granting of declaratory reliefs is purely an exercise of discretionary powers vested into Courts. The principle is well settled and well established. (See i. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. ii. Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 657. iii. Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1979] 2 MLJ 101. iv. Hanson v Radcliffe Urban District Council [1922] All ER.) [68] Although the Court reserves unfettered discretion in granting declaratory reliefs, the Court can only exercise such discretion to declare one party’s rights over another party or parties only if they can prove that they have such rights against or over the other party or parties. In the present case, the rights asserted by both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant are in respect of the assignment or reassignment of the TTA under Article 1 and Article 2 of the TA. The TTA entered between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant provides the terms in which the obligations and rights of the Plaintiff and the First Defendant were spelt out in respect of the technology and procurement of relevant licences necessary for the biodiesel plant. To facilitate the Second Defendant’s obligation to the First Defendant under the EPCC, the TTA was assigned to the Second Defendant vide the TA. The assertion of rights of the First Defendant against the Second Defendant or vice versa is only in respect of the issue whether or not the assignment has been terminated and the TTA had been reassigned or reverted back to the First Defendant. Whether or not the assignment has been terminated or has come to an end depends upon the occurrence of either one of the two occasions spelt out under the TA namely by expiration of four years from the effective date or the successful performance test defined under the TTA. [69] It is an established fact that the dispute arising from the EPCC between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant are currently in arbitration and the arbitration disputes are with regard to the proper commissioning and acceptance of the biodiesel plant. Therefore, the determination of whether or not there was a successful performance test may not be decided at this juncture as the rights asserted by both parties are still being adjudicated before the arbitrator. There are no determinable rights as of yet for this Court to grant a declaration for or against any of the parties based on the parties’ counterclaims. Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that there can be no declaratory order as to this issue. [70] In regards to the expiration of the four years from the effective date, this Court is of the considered view that this contention is a non-issue on the ground that this Court had concluded earlier that the disputed sums under the five unpaid invoices were sums due even before the expiration date after the lapsing four years. [71] The First Defendant in its counterclaim also sought for a declaration that the First Defendant is entitled to be indemnified and/or reimbursed by the Second Defendant in respect of all or any amount which the First Defendant may be held liable to pay to the Plaintiff in this action. In this respect the First Defendant seeks for a declaration that the payment which had been made to the Plaintiff for the three earlier invoices amounting to USD 368,108.13 should be indemnified and/or reimbursed by the Second Defendant. [72] It is the judgment of this Court that no declaration can be granted in respect of the monies that had been paid by the First Defendant for the payment of the three earlier invoices to the Plaintiff for the simple reason that the First Defendant is bound by the arrangement or agreement that those payments were made on behalf of the Second Defendant. The First Defendant also agreed that the apportionment of the amounts between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant will be discussed and finalized later at the hand-over of the Biodiesel Plant. The First Defendant cannot now claim for the sum to be indemnified or reimbursed at this juncture. Furthermore, the rights to the sum of monies do not arise until it has been discussed and finalised at the handover. Thus, this Court is of the view that the Fist Defendant is not entitled to the declaration sought in respect the sum of monies paid for the three earlier invoices. [73] Based on the aforementioned reasons, this Court makes the following orders; (a) a declaration that the services provided by the Plaintiff in respect of the sum USD 791,278.43 were to benefit of the Second Defendant. (b) a declaration that the Second Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for sums due pursuant to the services provided by the Plaintiff. (c) judgment be entered against the Second Defendant for the sum USD 791,278.43. (d) contractual interest at the rate set out by EURIBOR-3M plus 2% from the date of the invoices until the date of judgment. (e) further interest at the rate of 4% the crystallised judgment (including interest as set out in order (d) above) until full realisation. (f) the First Defendant’s counterclaims are dismissed with costs. (g) the Second Defendant’s counterclaims are dismissed with costs. On the issue of Costs [74] This Court has taken cognizance of the submissions of all respective parties upon the issue of costs. Upon that, this Court awards costs to the amount RM 60,000.00 to the Plaintiff to be paid by the Second Defendant and also costs of RM 30,000 to the First Defendant also to be paid by the Second Defendant. t.t ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 5th day of September, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan James Monteiro James Monteiro, John Skelchy and Vishal Kumar For the First Defendant - Tetuan Skrine Leong Wai Hong,Claudia Cheah and Angela Yap For the Second Defendant - Tetuan Zul Rafique & Partners T. Kuhendran, Koo Ai Ling and Judy Song 19

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-995-08/2012

PLAINTIF AXENS DEFENDAN 1. MISSION BIOFUELS SDN BHD 2. KNM PROCESS SYSTEMS SDN BHD

05/09/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=224c35af-654f-422f-b934-77538b14ac90&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : 22 NCVC-995-08/2012 BETWEEN AXENS .... PLAINTIFF AND 1. MISSION BIOFUELS SDN BHD .... DEFENDANTS 2. KNM PROCESS SYSTEMS SDN BHD GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Full trial) [1] In the present case, the Plaintiff, a French limited company by the name of Axens had commenced an action against the First and the Second Defendants, both of which are Malaysian companies incorporated under the laws of Malaysia. [2] In its Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff sought out to claim for the following reliefs: i) A declaration that the services provided by the Plaintiff were to the benefit of the 1st and/or 2nd Defendant(s); ii) A declaration that the 1st and/ or 2nd Defendant(s) are liable to the Plaintiff for sums due pursuant to the services provided by the Plaintiff; iii) Judgment against the 1st and 2nd Defendants for the sum of USD791,278.43; iv) In the alternative to (ii) and (iii) above, the Honourable Court shall make a determination of indebtedness of the Defendants and ascertain whether judgment for the sum of USD791,278.43 shall be entered as against the 1st or 2nd Defendant; v) Contractual Interest at the rate set out by the EURIBOR-3M plus 2% from the due date of the invoices until the date of Judgment; vi) Further Interest at the rate of 4% on the crystallized Judgment sum (including interest as set out in prayer (v) above) until full realization; vii) The determination of costs be made in line with the final determination of liability by the Honourable Court; and viii) Such further and the other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit and proper. [3] In the alternative, the Plaintiff had also pleaded in its Statement of Claim that the First and the Second Defendants have jointly and severally benefitted from the Plaintiff’s services and thus seeks that judgment be entered against both the First and Second Defendants on the basis of quantum meruit. [4] The facts that gave rise to the Plaintiff’s action against both the Defendants from the pleadings and also the evidence adduced during the trial are as follows: 4.1 The Plaintiff, a company incorporated under the laws of France having its registered office at 89, Boulevard Franklin Roosevelt, F-92508, Rueil-Malmaison Cedex, France is an international provider of technologies, catalysts, absorbents, specialized equipment and services in the hydrocarbon industry. 4.2 The First Defendant, a Malaysian company by the name of Mission Biofuels Sdn Bhd has its registered address at Suite 50-4-1, 4th Floor, C-26-05, 3 Two Square, No.2, Jalan 19/1, 46300 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. 4.3 The Second Defendant, KNM Process System & Sdn Bhd having its registered address at 15, Jalan Dagang SB 4/1, Taman Sungai Besi Indah, 43300, Seri Kembangan, Selangor Darul Ehsan is a leading turnkey system provider for the oil and gas, petrochemicals, mineral power, environment, renewable energy, biotechnology Industries and also specializes in equipment manufacturing. 4.4 The First Defendant was desirous to obtain the design, engineering, procurement, manufacture, supply, erection, construction, completion, testing and commissioning of a Continuous Acid Conditioning and Silica Pre-treatment, FFA Pre-treatment and Methyl Esther Tansesterification Plant with biodiesel output of 750 tpd (250,000 tpa) and 98% pure technical grade glycerine output of 82 tpd (27.308 tpa) with associated balance of plant at Kuantan Port, Malaysia which includes the Plaintiff’s Esterfip-H process for a Biodiesel Production Unit (“the Biodiesel Plant”). 4.5 To achieve its desire of owning a biodiesel plant as described above, on 25.7.2007, the First Defendant had entered into an Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Commissioning Contract (EPCC) with the Second Defendant. 4.6 By this EPCC, the Second Defendant was appointed as the contractor by the First Defendant to build and construct the Biodiesel Plant. The works to be carried out by the Second Defendant is described in the EPCC as follows: “works” means all the plant to be provided, all the works required in connection with the design, engineering, procurement, manufacture, transport, installation, construction, commissioning, start up, demonstration and testing of the biodiesel plant and all other works to be done by the contractor under the contract and shall include those as detailed in Appendix 1 any changes made to such works in accordance with this contract. 4.7 In order to procure the technology, the relevant and necessary license and also the license rights for the Biodiesel Plant, on the same day, the First Defendant and the Plaintiff had entered into a Technology Transfer Agreement N*07/3071 (TTA) wherein the Plaintiff is to provide amongst others, basic design, licence rights, technical guarantees and related start-up Technical Assistance for the performance test of the Biodiesel Production Unit. 4.8 In furtherance to these EPCC and TTA agreements, also on the same day, the Plaintiff, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant had entered into another agreement, a tripartite agreement called the Transfer Agreement N* 07/3071/T (TA). 4.9 The recital of the TA specifically mentioned that the First Defendant had selected the Plaintiff’s Esterfip-H process for its biodiesel production plant and consequential to such recital, there were two agreements entered between the parties namely, i. The Process Book Supply Agreement (PBSA) executed between the Second Defendant and the Plaintiff. ii. TTA agreement between the First Defendant and the Plaintiff. These two agreements are attached as Appendix 1 to the TA. 4.10 The TA primarily provides for the assignment of all obligations and rights under the TTA from the First Defendant to the Second Defendant. However, the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant was on a periodic term and this is provided under Article 2 which reads: Article 2 – Effective date – Termination 2.1 This Agreement shall become binding upon the Parties on the date of the last signature hereafter and that date shall be the effective date of this Agreement. 2.2 After the successful performance test period of the Unit, as defined in the TTA, or after four (4) years after the effective date, whichever occurs First, this agreement shall stand assigned by KNM to MISSION BIOFUELS, who will accept said assigned and who will henceforth become the only contracting party vis-a-vis AXENS as well as the only responsible party, this responsibility including the obligations to pay any sum remaining due at the date of the assignment. 4.11 The financial terms in relation to the Plaintiff’s services is provided under Article 8 of the TTA under the heading of “Financials”. Article 8 basically envisages that the Plaintiff will be paid in two components namely, for the licence royalty and the Start Up Technical Assistance (Start Up services). Article 8.1 specifically provides that the full licence rights or the royalty are at a fixed sum of USD 1,355,000.00 while Article 8.2 under the heading “Assistance and Services” provides for the manner of payments to be made to the Plaintiff in respect of their assistance and services rendered under Article 7.4 and 7.5 namely for assistance during the initial stages of operation of the Licence unit and upon further request of services by the First Defendant. The manner of invoicing for the purposes of payment to the Plaintiff is stipulated under Article 8.3 which states: 8.3 Payment – invoicing a) In its invoices, LICENSOR shall designate the payer (LICENSEE) as follows: MISSION BIOFUELS Sdn Bhd Suite 50-4-1, 4th Floor Wisma UOA Damansara 50 Jalan Dungun 50490 b) LICENSOR shall transmit the invoices to the following address: i) if it concerns royalties under Article 8.1 M. Swaminathan Managing Director MISSION BIOFUELS Sdn Bhd Suite 50-4-1, 4th Floor Wisma UOA Damansara 50 Jalan Dungun 50490 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia ii) if it concerns assistance and services under Article 8.2: M. Swaminathan Managing Director MISSION BIOFUELS Sdn Bhd Suite 50-4-1, 4th Floor Wisma UOA Damansara 50 Jalan Dungun 50490 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 4.12 It is not in dispute that even though the agreements were executed on 25.7.2007, the Plaintiff had only conducted a site investigation in January 2009 and nothing had happened since then. The Plaintiff had only returned to the site at the end of August 2009 and began its site operation at the end of October 2009. 4.13 The Plaintiff had thereafter proceeded to carry out its obligations under the TTA and subsequently had successfully completed its scope of works. In pursuance to the TTA, the Plaintiff had accordingly issued invoices for both the royalty and the Start Up services. It is not in dispute that the payments of royalties for the licence were fully settled by the Second Defendant. 4.14 The Plaintiff’s complaint is with regard to the Start Up services’ invoices. According to the Plaintiff, pursuant to Article 8.3 of the TTA, the Plaintiff had issued invoices for the Start Up services to the First Defendant. The First Defendant had made payments up to three initial invoices which were sent to them. However there were no more payments made by the First Defendant for the subsequent five (5) invoices. 4.15 Whilst the remaining invoices remain unpaid, the Plaintiff had demanded payment of the unpaid invoices from both the Defendants resulting in a series of communications between the parties via letters and emails. Through these exchanges of communications, both the Defendants had disputed the responsibility of settling the five unpaid invoices. The First Defendant stands on the position that by virtue of the TA, the TTA is assigned to the Second Defendant and thus any claims arising therefrom must be paid by the Second Defendant. On the contrary, the Second Defendant in turn had contended that there was a successful performance test period of the Unit as defined under the TTA on 30.3.2010, and with this successful performance test, the obligations and rights under the TTA has been novated or reassigned to the First Defendant. [5] Faced with this dilemma, the Plaintiff filed this action. [6] The First and the Second Defendants stood by their respective positions stated in their letter denying responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for its services. Both the Defendants had asserted against each other on the liability to pay the Plaintiff and this is clearly reflected in their counterclaims. The First Defendant’s counterclaim against the Second Defendant is reproduced below: (a) A declaration that all the rights and obligations under the Technology Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 entered into between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant and which has been assigned to the Second Defendant by the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 between the Plaintiff, First Defendant and Second Defendant has not been reassigned to the First Defendant as the Second Defendant has not achieved the Final Performance Acceptance. (b) A declaration that the Second Defendant is liable to pay all amount claimed by the Plaintiff in this action. (c) A declaration that the First Defendant is entitled to be indemnified and/or reimbursed by the Second Defendant in respect of all or any amount which the First Defendant may be held liable to pay to the Plaintiff in this action. (d) Payment by the 2nd Defendant to the 1st Defendant as follows:- i) USD 69,363.28 together with the interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from 28.01.2010 or at such rate and from such time as determined by this Honourable Court to the date of full settlement; ii) USD 298,744.85 together with interest thereon at the rate of 5% per annum from 28.01.2010 or at such rate from such time as determined by this Honourable Court to the date of full settlement; (e) Damages to be assessed by the Court [7] The Second Defendant counterclaimed for following reliefs against the First Defendant: (a) A declaration that pursuant to the Technology Transfer Agreement N 07/3071 (“the TTA”) dated 25.7.2007 read with the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 (“the Transfer Agreement”) entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all the obligations of the Second Defendant have been assigned to the First Defendant and henceforth becomes the only contracting party vis-a vis the Plaintiff as well as being the only responsible party to pay any sum due to the Plaintiff. (b) In the alternative, a declaration that pursuant to the Technology Transfer Agreement N 07/3071 (‘the TTA”) dated 25.7.2007 read together with the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 (“the Transfer Agreement”) entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all the obligations of the Second Defendant have been novated to the First Defendant and henceforth become the only contracting party via-a-vis the Plaintiff as well as being the only responsible party to pay any sums due to the Plaintiff. (c) General damages to be assessed; (d) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the decreed sum allowed by this Honourable Court from the date of the Counterclaim until full realisation. [8] It is pertinent to note that the dispute between the First and the Second Defendants on the issues of completion and delays of the Biodiesel Plant are live issues in the arbitration proceeding. [9] The trial of this case had proceeded where five witnesses had testified. The Plaintiff called its Director of Services and Engineering Support Department Jean Marie Le Cacher de Bonneville (PW1). PW1 was the Director of Axens Technical Assistance from 2006 to 28.2.2013. The First Defendant had called two witnesses. They were, Swaminathan a/l S. Mahalingam (DW1) who is the Group Chief Executive Officer of the First Defendant and Norhisham bin Abdul Rahman (DW2) the Group Financial Controller while the Second Defendant had its Project Director for the Biodiesel Plant project, Selva Kumar Rasiah (DW3) testified for the Second Defendant. [10] There was a long Iist of issues raised by the parties in the Statement of Issues to be Tried filed. However, the issues can be summarised into four core issues as follows: i. Pursuant to the TA and the TTA, who is liable or responsible to the Plaintiff for the sums claimed in the invoices issued by the Plaintiff, whether the First or the Second Defendant or both the Defendants can be made liable to pay the invoices issued by the Plaintiff on a joint and severable basis? ii. Whether the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant is still in subsistence or has come to an end and had reverted back to the First Defendant after the lapse of 4 years even though the Second Defendant has not achieved the Final Performance Test period of the Unit as defined under TTA. iii. In the event that the party who is liable to pay the Plaintiff is not ascertainable, can the Plaintiff be entitled to be paid on the basis of quantum meruit? iv. Whether the First Defendant and the Second Defendant are entitled to the reliefs claimed in their respective counterclaims. [11] The above four issues primarily centred around the construction of the TA and the TTA with regard to the assignment of the TTA in relation to the payment for the Start Up services. [12] However in the course of the trial, there were documents (letters and emails) contained in the Common Bundle of Documents which were referred to the witnesses that gave rise to the following issues: a) Whether the Agreement Letter between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant dated 8.6.2009, pleaded by the First Defendant can be relied upon by the First Defendant to support its case. b) Whether Estoppel can be raised against the First Defendant and the Plaintiff with regard to their conducts in respect of the payments of the three earlier invoices issued by the Plaintiff. c) Whether was there a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff in respect of the Start Up services. d) Whether the EPCC entered between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant is in the form of Turnkey contract at a fixed lump sum price. Submission by the counsel for the Plaintiff [13] At the outset, Mr. James Monteiro, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff had brought to this Court’s attention about the legal dispute between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant which is still pending before the arbitrator to which the Plaintiff is not a party. And thus, he had contended that the dispute between the parties before this Court is purely factual dispute and not a legal one. [14] The counsel for the Plaintiff had submitted that the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants is based on the unpaid invoices for the Start Up services rendered by the Plaintiff in pursuance to the TTA. He contended that the TTA being an annexure to the TA, should for all intent and purposes forms a part of the TA. The learned counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that the main purpose of the TA entered between the Plaintiff, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant was to transfer the First Defendant’s obligations under the TTA to the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant had accepted the obligations and rights related thereto. These obligations and rights have been transferred to the Second Defendant is inclusive of the obligation to pay the Plaintiff for its services. However by virtue of Article 1 of the TA, after either the successful performance of the unit or after 4 years whichever is sooner, all these obligations will be transferred back to the First Defendant. [15] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff also submitted that since the Plaintiff had completed the scope of works spelt out under the TTA to the satisfaction of both the Defendants, both Defendants have thereby benefitted from the Plaintiff’s works that entitles the Plaintiff to be paid in in full. [16] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that the Plaintiff should not be deprived of any payment or monies lawfully due to it when both the Defendants have acknowledged that the there is an amount due to the Plaintiffs but deliberately refused to pay as one party puts the liability to pay on the other party. [17] It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the total amount of the five invoices of USD 791,278.43 was not challenged by both the Defendants in their pleadings and in their evidence submitted before this Court. Both the Defendants only raised the issue on who has the obligation to pay the Plaintiff and they were passing the buck to each other. In view of this, the Plaintiff therefore urges this Court to make a finding that both the Defendants are jointly and/or severally liable to the Plaintiff. In this contention, the counsel for the Plaintiff relies on two authorities. ( See i. Chuang Uming (Pte) v Setron Ltd and Anor Appeal [1999] SGCA 77 on which the Singapore Court of Appeal had relied on the findings of the Canadian Supreme Court, Appeals Division in the case of Nowlan v Brunswick Construction Ltd [1973] 34 DLR (3d) 422 and Victoria University of Manchester v Hugh Wilson & Ors [1984] 2 Con LR 43. It was held in Nowlan’s case that “… Where there are concurrent torts, concurrent breaches of contract or a breach of contract and a concurrent tort both contributing to the same damage, whether or not the damage would have occurred in the absence of either cause, the liability is a joint and several liability and either party causing or contributing to the damage is liable for the whole damage to the person aggrieved …” ii. Malaysian Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Choo Ah Kow v Yeoh Yew Thiam [1989] 1 MLJ 187.) [18] In alternative, the counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that in the event this Court finds difficulty in asserting the obligations under the TTA, since the Plaintiff had provided the Start Up services to both the Defendants non-gratuitously and both the Defendants have benefitted from the services, therefore the Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated on the basis of quantum meruit. In support of this proposition the counsel for the Plaintiff relies on section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 and the case of Foo Song Mee v Ho Kiau Seng [2011] SGCA 45. Submission by the counsel for the First Defendant [19] Mr Leong Wai Hong, the learned counsel for the First Defendant, on the other hand argued that the First Defendant has no obligation or responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for the remaining unpaid invoices as the unpaid invoices were for services rendered by the Plaintiff directly to the Second Defendant and not to the First Defendant. The learned counsel further argued that by virtue of the TA, the TTA has been assigned to the Second Defendant and since the Second Defendant had accepted the assignment, the Second Defendant had also accepted all obligations and rights under the TTA from the First Defendant. Until and unless one of the two circumstances described under Article 2.2 of the TA occurs, the termination clause has not yet come into operation. Until then, the obligations and rights shall still remain with the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant have benefitted from the Plaintiff’s Start Up services and therefore, the Second Defendant is responsible to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services. Submission by the counsel for the Second Defendant [20] On the contrary, Mr T. Kuhendran, the counsel for the Second Defendant had submitted that there was a successful performance test period of the Unit, as defined in the TTA on 30.3.2010, hence the TTA has been novated or shall stand reassigned from the Second Defendant to the First Defendant, who will henceforth become the only contracting party with the Plaintiff as well as the only responsible party to pay sums remaining due to the Plaintiff. Alternatively, he also argued that since the relevant four years had lapsed on 27.7.2011, any obligation to pay the Start Up services rendered by the Plaintiff is on the First Defendant. On the issue of novation, the learned counsel finds reliance on section 63 of the Contract Act 1950 and several cases, namely the cases of Toeh Kee Keong v Tambu Mining Co. Ltd [1968] 1 MLJ 39, Mawar Awal (M) Sdn Bhd v Kepong Management Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 MLJ 132 and Polygram Records Sdn Bhd v The Search & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 127. The law [21] First and foremost, this Court must be reminded that the law and the principles relating to construction of contract is trite and settled. 21.1 In the case of Royal Selangor Golf Club v Anglo Oriental (M) Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 995, Lim Beng Choon J. in considering disputes of the parties in respect of a contract had adopted the general principles of construction of a contract as enunciated in the case of National Coal Board v Win Neil & Son (St. Helen) [1948] 1 All ER 555 which accordingly had held : “The First two issues involve the construction of the contract. I bear in mind the principles of construing a contract. The relevant ones for the purpose of this case are : (1) construction of a contract is a question of law; (2) where the contract is in writing the intention of the parties must be found within the four walls of the contractual documents; it is not legitimate to have regard to extrinsic to have regard to extrinsic evidence (there is, of course, no such evidence in this case); (3) a contact must be constructed construed as at the date it was made: it is not legitimate to construe it in the light of what happened years or even days later; (4) the contract must be construed as a whole, and also, so far as practicable, to give effect to every part of it. In Central Bank of India v. Harford Fire Insurance Co Ltd. AIR [1965] SC 1288, the Supreme Court of India lays stress on the Second principle advocated in the Wm Neill & Sons (St Helens) Ltd case when it says at p.1290: Now it is commonplace that it is the Court’s duty to give effect to the bargain of the parties according to their intention and when that bargain is in writing the intention is to be looked for in the words used unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If those words are clear, there is very little that the Court has to do. The Court must give effect to the plain meaning of the words however much it many dislike the result 21.2 In the case of Jainarain Singh & Anor v The State of Bihar & Ors AIR 1980 Patna 24 it was held that the words used in the contract must be interpreted literally and without the aid of the principles of natural justice. 21.3 In the case of Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya ( A Firm) v Koperasi Serbaguna Sungei Glugor Berhad [2009] 2 AMR 50, Abdul Malik Ishak, JCA from the available authorities had in para 17 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, with regard to construction of a contract where the language employed is clear, had made the following propositions: (a) the Court must give effect to the plain meaning of the words, no matter how distasteful the result may be (The Central Bank of India Ltd. Amritsrar v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [1965] AIR Vol. 52, 1288 SC); (b) where the language in the document is unambiguous and clear, the real nature of the document is to be determine solely by looking at its contents, uninfluenced by any intention of the parties ((Nawab Major Sir) Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh and Others [1936] AIR Vol. 23, 171 PC); (c) when the minds of the parties are expressed in an unambiguous manner, the Court cannot override the declared intention of the parties unequivocally expressed (K. Appukuttam Panicker and Another v. S.K.R.A.K.R Athappa Chettiar and Others [1966] AIR Vol.53, 303 Kerala); and (d) there is no scope, at all, for drawing upon hypothetical considerations or the supposed intention of the parties when the words contained in the contract are clear and unambiguous (The Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros. [1959] AIR Vol. 46, 1362 SC). Decision of the Court Issues (i) and (ii) will be dealt with together The TA and the TTA [22] The TA can be found at page 45 to 47 of the Agreed Bundle (Bundle B). It is a simple and straight forward three pages document including the title page which is the first page. The preamble of the TA appears on the second page, while page 3 contains the assignment terms and the signatures of the representative of the Plaintiff, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. Now, Article 1 of the TTA is simply worded in this manner: Article 1 – Assignment of the TTA The TTA between the MISSION BIOFUELS and AXENS is assigned from MISSION BIOFUELS to KNM who accepts to endorse all obligations and rights related thereto. [23] The title to Article 1 of the TA states of the assignment of the TTA. Article 1 stipulates that the TTA between the First Defendant and the Plaintiff is assigned from the First Defendant to the Second Defendant who thereafter accepts to endorse all obligations and rights related to the TTA. The words or the language used in Article 1 is succinctly precise and clear. There is no ambiguity or doubt whatsoever as to the meaning or effect of the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant by the First Defendant. Therefore, with the assignment, it truly means that the Second Defendant has agreed and consented to accept all obligations and rights under the TTA from the First Defendant. The Second Defendant is therefore bound by all the terms contained in the TTA in its entirety including Article 8. This Court had earlier mentioned in this judgment that the payment for the Start Up services is specifically covered under Article 8.2. under the heading “Assistance and Services”. It is so obvious that at the time when the Second Defendant consented to the assignment and accepted the TTA, the Second Defendant must have also accepted the obligation and/or the responsibility to pay the Plaintiff in respect of the Start Up services. [24] Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that there is no argument that the obligation or responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services was vested on the Second Defendant from the time when the TA was executed. [25] Nonetheless, the assignment of the TTA under Article 1 is on a periodic term or definite time because the TA also contains a provision for termination of the assignment. Article 2.2 provides that if any one of the occasions spelt out in Article 2.2 were to occur (whichever occurs first) the assignment comes to an end and the TTA shall be reverted back to the First Defendant. Therefore, from the clear language of the terms in the TTA, the natural conclusion is that the Second Defendant’s obligation or responsibility to pay the Start Up services to the Plaintiff arises or begins from the date of the TA was executed until one of the two occasions spelt out in Article 2.2 occurs (whichever occurs first). [26] Having established the fact above, this Court now turns to the most pivotal issue for determination, that is which one of the two Defendants is responsible to pay the Plaintiff for the unpaid invoices for the sum of USD 791,278.43 or shall both the Defendants be made liable jointly or severally? In delving into this determination, this Court shall first refer back to the Plaintiff’s claim. The sum of USD 791,278.43, being the basis of the Plaintiff’s action against both the Defendants were from invoices for the Start Up services issued by the Plaintiff for the period between January 2010 and May 2010. For ease of reference, the details of the five (5) unpaid invoices are tabulated and reproduced in the table below: No. Invoice No. Issuance Date Due Date Amount (USD) 1 90003577 18/01/2010 17/02/2010 252,720.00 2 90004117 16/03/2010 15/04/2010 156,639.34 3 90004120 16/03/2010 15/04/2010 141,629.09 4 90004121 16/03/2010 15/04/2010 48,744.00 5 90004771 20/05/2010 19/06/2010 191,546.00 Total 791,278.43 [27] It can be clearly seen from the table above that the date of the five invoices ranges from January 2010 until May 2010. In an ordinary course of business, invoices are normally issued after services were rendered or goods had been delivered to the client or customer. Looking at the date of these invoices were issued, one irresistible conclusion to be made would be that the Start Up works must have been carried out before the date indicated on the invoices. In other words, the five unpaid invoices were issued by the Plaintiff after rendering its services. This position is confirmed by PW1 during the cross-examination by the counsel for the First Defendant. In his evidence PW1 had also stated that the Plaintiff had completed its site activity at the end of March 2010. To this end, we shall now examine the financial term in relation to the Start Up services as provided in Article 8.2 of the TTA. Article 8 reads: 8.2 Assistance and services. LICENSEE shall bear LICENSOR’s expenditures when rendering services under articles 7.4 and 7.5 as follows. a) A per diem fee (“Base Daily Rate”) shall be paid to LICENSOR per each employee and each day spent out of customary place of employment. This Base Daily Rate is one thousand five hundred US Dollar (US$ 1,500) based on INDEX as specified in Article 1 – hereof. This amount is firm but subject to escalation. The Base Daily Rate will be multiplied by the INDEX RATIO for the month immediately preceding the First month of the calendar year during which LICENSOR provides the services. [28] From sub Article (a) it is abundantly clear that for the Start Up services rendered, each employee of the Plaintiff will be paid a per diem fee at a Base Daily Rate of USD1500 based on INDEX each day spent out of the customary place of employment. Therefore, this confirms that the invoices have been issued after the Plaintiff’s employees have rendered their services at the customary place of employment which is the Biodiesel Plant’s site. In addition to that, these invoices were issued with supporting time sheets and the time sheets for the five unpaid invoices are at pages 1 to 24 Bundle B2. Close scrutiny of the time sheets reveals that the Start Up services rendered by each of the Plaintiff’s employees were for the months of November 2009, December 2009, January 2010, February 2010 and March 2010. It is pertinent to note that the time sheets at pages 21 to 24 also indicate that the last travel day for the Plaintiff’s employees was on 1.4.2010. This supports the fact that there were no more Start Up services when the Plaintiff’s employees had completed their site activities and left the site. [29] This Court had earlier concluded that the obligation or responsibility to pay the Plaintiff the Start Up services rests on the Second Defendant from the date the TA was executed until the occurrence of one of the two occasions spelt out under Article 2.2 whichever occurs first. The next question to be determined is whether at time the Start Up services were rendered by the Plaintiff in respect of the unpaid invoices, was the TTA still remained assigned with the Second Defendant or has the assignment been terminated and TTA had reverted back to the First Defendant. [30] On the termination of the assignment of the TTA, this Court is mindful of the fact that the dispute between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant over completion and delays of the Biodiesel Plant are live issues at the arbitration. The dispute invariably concerns proper commissioning and acceptance of the biodiesel plant. Thus, the issue whether or not there was a successful performance test as defined in the TTA is not a matter to be determined by this Court. [31] The next question is, has the assignment of the TTA been terminated by virtue of the expiration of the four (4) years from the effective date? The effective date was the date when the TA was executed in which is 25.7.2007. The four years period will lapse on 25.7.2011. This being the case, the five unpaid invoices were issued for the Start Up services provided by Plaintiff during the subsistence of the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant. It is therefore this Court’s judgment that the Start Up services rendered by the Plaintiff was for the benefit of the Second Defendant. After all, it was the intention of parties when executing the agreements on 25.7.2007 that the assigning of the TTA to the Second Defendant was for the sole purpose of facilitating the Second Defendant as the main contractor to carry out the Second Defendant’s obligations expressly set out or defined in the EPCC namely the construction of a complete Biodiesel Plant which is ready to be operated by the First Defendant. [32] For completeness sake, this Court shall also delve into the successful performance test not so much to ascertain or determine whether or not there was a successful performance test on 30.3.2010. But instead to consider and deliberate on the date claimed by the Second Defendant being the date of the successful performance test namely the date 30.3.2010. Bearing in mind that there could not be an earlier date than 30.3.2010. Now, assuming that the Second Defendant’s contention on the successful performance test is accepted, taking the date of 30.3.2010, the assignment will then come to an end after the 30.3.2010. If there is any novation or reassignment of the TTA to the First Defendant as contended by the learned counsel for the Second Defendant, the earliest date of novation or reassignment of the TTA to the First Defendant would be after 30.3.2010. This Court had concluded earlier that the Start Up services were clearly services rendered by the Plaintiff during the months of November 2009 until March 2010. Thus, the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant would still continue to subsist until 30.3.2010. Therefore, it is also this Court’s judgment that even assuming that there was a successful performance test (if any) the unpaid invoices were due against the Second Defendant notwithstanding the successful performance test period (if any) as the five unpaid invoices were for services rendered and became due (as per the time sheets) against the Second Defendant at a time even before the successful performance test period. According to the time sheets also, the Start Up services were rendered even before the successful performance test period (if any). [33] Thus, it is this Court’s judgment that even after taking into consideration that if there was successful performance test period on the 30.3.2010, the sums claimed by the Plaintiff in the five unpaid invoices was already due during the subsistence of the TTA assignment to the Second Defendant that is before the successful performance test period (if any). [34] Based on the above mentioned reasons, it is this Court’s Judgment that the Second Defendant is the party responsible to pay the Plaintiff for the unpaid invoices in respect of the Start Up services rendered by the Plaintiff. Whether both the Defendants can be made liable to pay the invoices issued by the Plaintiff on a joint and several basis. [35] It is patently clear from the financial terms under the TTA that the parties in the present case had never intended to have the effect of joint and/or several liability. Under the TTA, the financial terms (Article 8) are clearly and precisely set out upon the party responsible for any payments in respect of services rendered by the Plaintiff. There is no ambiguity in the financial terms. In so far as the Start Up services is concerned, the TTA specifically provides the obligation to pay on one single party. More so, in the present case there were no joint promises made between the First Defendant and Second Defendant to pay the Start Up services jointly or severally. Therefore, it is this Court’s considered view that there can be no joint and several responsibility for the payments for the Start Up services. Whether the Agreement Letter between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant dated 8.6.2009 pleaded by the First Defendant and can be relied upon by the First Defendant to support its case. [36] On behalf of the First Defendant, it was also contended that in addition to the TA and the TTA, the Second Defendant’s responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services was also clearly spelt out and provided in the Agreement Letter dated 8.6.2009 (pages 58-60, Bundle B) between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant. The learned counsel contended that this is evidenced when PW1 testified, he had told the Court that there was a long silence after 27.7.2007’s agreements. On 16.1.2009, the Plaintiff did send an email dated 16.1.2009 to the Second Defendant enclosing together a Draft Agreement dated 15.1.2009 (pages1-4, Bundle B) summarizing the general arrangements and conditions concerning the Start Up scope of works and its financial terms. In this email the Plaintiff had requested the Second Defendant to give its comments on the Draft Agreement so that an agreement can be reached by both parties and be signed thereafter. DW1 had admitted signing the Agreement Letter (Agreement Letter). The Second Defendant had in the Agreement Letter agreed and confirmed the terms set out by the Plaintiff in respect of the Start Up services. It was the submission of the counsel for the First Defendant that this Agreement Letter was a renegotiation between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant in respect of the Start Up services and its financial terms. [37] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff had objected to any reference made to the Agreement Letter on the ground that the Agreement Letter was never pleaded by the First Defendant in its pleadings. The counsel for the Plaintiff argued that the position taken by the First Defendant from the beginning that the Second Defendant had not yet achieved the successful performance test. The learned counsel further submitted that the First Defendant must not be allowed to rely on the Agreement Letter. On this note, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff referred this Court to several authorities. (See i. RHB Bank Bhd (substituting Kwong Yik Bank Bhd) v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd, [2010] 2 MLJ 188. ii. The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157. iii. Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Jalinan Waja Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 322). [38] The counsel for the Second Defendant, on the other hand had submitted to this Court that the Agreement Letter is merely procedural and operational. He argued that the basis on which the invoices raised by the Plaintiff are based on the TTA and TA and not the Agreement Letter. It was further submitted by the counsel for the Second Defendant that this is consistent with all the correspondence between the parties which only refers to the TTA and the TA. According to the learned counsel, the First Defendant vide its own letters or its solicitors’ letters also acknowledged the fact that the Plaintiff’s claim is based on the TTA and the TA. Even the Plaintiff itself had never referred to the Agreement Letter. The Court’s finding on the Agreement Letter [39] With regard to the Agreement Letter and also the Draft Agreement, this Court is in the agreement with the counsel for the First Defendant that it is the First Defendant’s stand from the beginning that the First Defendant has no obligation to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services pursuant to the TA. The Agreement Letter and the Draft Agreement are consistent with the TA and the TTA and they are in actual fact supporting evidence to support the First Defendant’s position and thus, need not be pleaded. [40] In the event this Court is wrong to conclude that the Agreement Letter is within the pleaded case of the First Defendant, this Court seeks assistance from the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Emas Bestari Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 1 CLJ 316. In this case, Abdul Wahab Patail, JCA on behalf of the Court of Appeal had this to say at page 326 paragraphs 26 to 27 on objection not pleaded case of a party: “(26) The objection that a matter has not been pleaded is not the ground for the objection. It is a general description of the nature of the objection. But whether the objection is sustainable is decided by the grounds for the objection. Such grounds arise from the nature of the matter. Hence, if the matter raised is only a question of fact, but the evidence relied upon in respect of it are already admitted in evidence before the Court, which means the other party is not taken by surprise. Protestations or affectations of surprise “because it was not pleaded” in such case holds no merit. Only if it is shown that the matter raised relied upon facts not pleaded and therefore the party making the objection did not have the opportunity of addressing the truth and accuracy of description of that fact, may the objection hold merit and be sustained. ... [41] Abdul Wahab Patail JCA further referred to the Federal Court case of Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, 4th Division & Anor v. Hamit Matusin & Ors [1994] 3 CLJ 567, in deliberation over objections as to matters not pleaded at variance with pleadings: “The underlying well-known rationale for requiring such material facts to be pleaded is of course, to prevent the opposing party from being taken by surprise by evidence which departs from pleaded material facts, for such evidence if allowed, will prejudice and embarrass or mislead the opposing party. If a party is taken by surprise, he must object there and then at the point of time when such evidence emerges, for such evidence to be disregarded by the Court, and the Court will then uphold such timely objection. The Court will generally however grant an adjournment if requested on suitable terms as to costs etc. for the pleading to be amended by the party seeking to adduce such evidence. One must bear in mind the need for an orderly adversary system of a Court trial, not a chaotic harangue in a market place. A party is not taken by surprise when the circumstances actually indicate so, e.g. when such evidence is the very evidence sought to be relied on by him from the outset, or when he fails to object to such evidence then and there as this Court now seeks to emphasize. [27] After elaborating on the point further, His Lordship concluded: Therefore a Court inevitably ought to enquire, when there is a failure to object to such evidence when it is adduced, whether it is such a radical departure, if not, it is a mere variation, modification or a development, then the impropriety of admission of such evidence at variance with the pleadings is deemed to be waived and the defect in such pleadings cured.” [42] In the present case, such objection against the inclusion of the Agreement Letter was not even made in a timely manner. The objection was only made in the written submission of the Plaintiff. Adding to that effect, the Plaintiff had never put to the attention of the Court of their objection at the time the Agreement Letter was actually and indeed included in the Common Bundle of Documents. The objection was unheard of until the Written Submission was filed. It is altogether implausible to say that the Plaintiff was taken by surprise in any manner. They had the opportunity to address the Agreement Letter, even accepted its inclusion of the Agreement Letter and even with that, not even an iota of objection was raised. Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that, in light of the Plaintiff’s failure to object against the Agreement Letter being adduced at the time the Agreement Letter had surfaced to the attention of the parties and the Court, even if in the instance, the Agreement Letter was beyond the First Defendant’s pleaded case, the objection shall fail and the Court shall consider the First Defendant’s contention on the Agreement Letter. [43] A fair reading of the entire Agreement Letter together with Article 8.2 of the TTA would support the conclusion that the Agreement Letter was the renegotiation of the financial terms in respect of the Start Up services between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant. This Court finds that the recital of Article 8.2 reads as Assistance and Services. This Court had earlier referred and discussed sub Article (a) of Article 8.2 which provides the rate to be paid to each of the Plaintiff’s employees when rendering their services at the site. Further examination of Article 8.2, sub Article (g) reads this: g) LICENSEE shall pay directly to LICENSOR personnel all living expenses of LICENSOR personnel including food and First class hotel accommodation and supply at LICENSEE’s sole charge all necessary office space and associated facilities including secretarial services, telephone, telex, etc. and local independent transportation facilities as [44] Sub Article (g) clearly covered the living expenses of the Plaintiff’s employees such as accommodation, air tickets, transportation and food. PW1 and DW3 confirmed all the living expenses were paid by the Second Defendant. To this Court, if the Second Defendant’s contention is true that the First Defendant is responsible to pay for the Start Up services, living expenses being part of Assistance and Services, the Second Defendant would have requested the First Defendant to pay for these living expenses or claimed reimbursement on whatever amount had been expended to them. This was not so in the present case. The Second Defendant had accepted the responsibility to pay the living expenses instead. This runs contrary to the Second Defendant’s own evidence that the Second Defendant is only responsible to pay the Plaintiff for the licence royalty and the basic engineering under the PBSA but it paid for the living expenses without any complaint. Furthermore, to accept the Second Defendant’s contention that the First Defendant will bear the Start Up services in respect of the invoices issued while the Second Defendant pays the living expenses under sub Article (g) of Article 8.2 would not be the true intention and interpretation of Article 8.2 for the true meaning of Assistance and Services. To this Court’s mind, Article 8.2 must be read in its entirety from Article 8.2(a) to (k) and not by any preferential selection. Hence, this Court finds that the Agreement Letter between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant confirms the position on the responsibility of the Second Defendant to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services during the subsistence of the assignment of the TTA to the Second Defendant. Whether was there a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services [45] As regards to the contention that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff, both the counsel for the Plaintiff and the First Defendant have urged this Court not to pay any credence to this point raised by the Second Defendant as it was not pleaded. This Court is in fact of the similar view with the First Defendant and the Plaintiff, that after all, the argument of the Second Defendant on this supposed separate agreement was not at all within the corners of their pleaded case. It was clearly not pleaded. A close perusal of the Second Defendant’s pleading would reveal that they have only pleaded that, by virtue of the successful performance test, the TTA was novated or was reassigned back to the First Defendant. If at all, the Second Defendant’s pleaded case is closely hinged upon the reassignment pursuant to the Transfer Agreement (TA). Any other facts not to the effect of proving such reassignment in pursuance of the TA must be specifically pleaded as it is a ground totally separate from the pleaded case on reassignment. Similarly, the Second Defendant’s contention on this separate agreement is not at all related to the TA or even all other agreements between the parties. This alleged separate agreement is not even remotely related to the reassignment pleaded by the Second Defendant. It is a contention which is clearly separate and distinct from the Second Defendant’s pleaded contention on the reassignment of the TTA pursuant to the TA. Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that the existence of a separate agreement must be specifically pleaded which the Second Defendant had failed to do. However, in the Second Defendant’s bid to establish that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff, the counsel for Second Defendant had referred witnesses to documents (letters and emails) contained in the Common Bundle Of Documents during the trial. The witnesses (PW1, DW1 and DW3) did not dispute the letters and the emails. In fact, they had admitted writing and sending the letters and the emails during the exchange of communications. Relying on the case of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Emas Bestari Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 1 CLJ 316, this Court shall now deal with this issue. [46] On behalf of the Second Defendant it was also submitted that there was a separate agreement between the parties in respect of the payments to the Plaintiff for the Start Up services and the royalty. According to the learned counsel, the agreement was that the First Defendant will bear the cost for the assistance and services by the Plaintiff during the erection, installation, commissioning start up and testing of the Biodiesel Plant, whereas the Second Defendant will bear the cost for the royalty and also the cost of basic engineering fees arising from the PBSA. It was because of this agreement or arrangement that the Plaintiff had sent the invoices for the Start Up services to the First Defendant in which the First Defendant had proceeded to pay the first three invoices. In respect of the licence for the royalty and the basic engineering fee according to the PBSA, the Plaintiff had only sent the invoices for these two items to the Second Defendant to which the Second Defendant had settled in full. The counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff was and is aware of such agreement between the Defendants and that explains the sending of the Start Up services’ invoices to the First Defendant. [47] To further support its contention that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services, the Second Defendant had also relied on Article 8 of the EPCC and the exchange of communications between the parties arising from the Letters of Demand issued by the Plaintiff to both the Defendants demanding payment of the unpaid invoices. The learned counsel had referred to this Court to some of the passages in the letters and the emails. [48] For ease of reference, the passages quoted by the Second Defendant’s counsel in respect of the letters and emails are reproduced here: a) The 1st Defendant’s emails dated 3.5.2010 (page 95, Bundle B) to the Plaintiff :- “We confirm receipt of the outstanding invoices which had been forwarded to KNM for their verification. Upon receipt of the verification, the payment will be effected immediately.” b) The 1st Defendant’s email dated 3.6.2010 (page 94, Bundle B) to the Plaintiff:- “Mission will proceed to pay the November and December invoices. The other months will be paid once the relevant information/ documents are received for verification by KNM. c) The 1st Defendant’s email dated 16.12.2009 (page 119, Bundle B) to the Second Defendant: “ Dear Selva, Can you please verify that these invoices are ok for payment. We do not have details of when they were here or what there were actually doing as it was arrange directly by KNM. d) Letter dated 18.5.2011 (pages 91-93, Bundle B) from the Plaintiff to the 2nd Defendant: “Up until now these invoices were paid by Mission Biofuels based on the agreement between KNM and Mission Biofuels, according to which KNM used to check the validity of our invoices and Mission Biofuels used to pay them.” [49] In reply to Second Defendant’s assertion that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants in respect of payments to the Plaintiff, the counsel for the Plaintiff had argued that this arrangement or agreement between the Defendants and the supporting arguments have not been pleaded by the Second Defendant. The counsel further submitted that this new position by the Second Defendant is an afterthought and should not be given an iota of credence by this Court. The learned counsel had cited these cases in support of his contention: i. RHB Bank Bhd (substituting Kwong Yik Bank Bhd) v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd, [2010] 2 MLJ 188. ii. The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157. iii Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Jalinan Waja Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 322. [50] The First Defendant’s counsel had strenuously denied the existence of any separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff. Firstly, it was argued that that the Second Defendant did not plea its allegation on such separate agreement. Secondly, the Defendant did not produce to this Court any documentary evidence to support such assertion. Thirdly, the Second Defendant’s reliance on the recital of Article 8 of the EPCC to prove the existence of such agreement is totally wrong and misconceived. Fourthly, in the absence of any documentary evidence to substantiate the existence of the separate agreement, the Second Defendant should have produced oral evidence instead, and at least call either Ir. Lee Swee Eng, the Second Defendant’s Group Managing Director or Mr. Terry Chew the Second Defendant’s Director of Group Contract Documentation as witnesses. According to the learned counsel for the First Defendant, these two persons would be able to confirm the existence of such agreement. It was further argued by the counsel for the First Defendant that the failure to call either one of them attracted the invocation of adverse presumption under section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Second Defendant. The counsel for the First Defendant had referred this Court to the two cases on this matter. ( See Chan Yoke Lan (Administrator of the estate of Chong Yoke Fah, Deceased) v Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Sdn, Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 303 and Datin Peggy Taylor v Udachin Development Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 CLJ.) [51] As regards to the passages of letters and emails referred by the Second Defendant’s counsel, the counsel for the First Defendant had submitted that the passages quoted by the counsel for the Second Defendant was not quoted in full by the counsel for the Second Defendant. In respect of the Plaintiff’s letter dated 18.5.2011, the full contents of the paragraph reads this way: “As you surely understand, Axens does not want to take part into discussion between KNM and Mission BIofuels... You may thus understand that the only recourse Axens has, is to stick to the legal wording and check who is its legal and contractual debtor. Legally speaking, it indeed appears that your company, KNM is our direct debtor since KNM has been assigned all rights and obligations under the above agreement by the Transfer Agreement dated April 25th, 2007...” (emphasis added) [52] According to the counsel for the First Defendant the contents of the 18.5.2011’s letter is consistent with PW1’s evidence that the First Defendant had agreed to pay the Plaintiff on behalf of the Second Defendant as a result of being pressured or cornered by the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff had threatened to abandon the site activity if payments are not made. [53] The counsel for the First Defendant had further submitted that similarly with the two emails dated 3.5.2010 and 3.6.2010, they were not quoted in full by the counsel for the Second Defendant to reflect the actual contents. According to the counsel for the First Defendant, the two emails are actually attachments to the Plaintiff’s letter in which the Plaintiff had clearly stated that the Second Defendant is its direct debtor because of the assignment. [54] The learned counsel also submitted that likewise, the First Defendant’s email dated 16.12.2009 was also not fully quoted by the Second Defendant’s counsel. The content of the email in full reads: “Dear Selva, Can you please verify that these invoices are ok for payment. We do not have details of when they were here or what there were actually doing as it was arrange directly by KNM. As discussed MBSB will pay these and other such invoices. The apportionment of the amounts between KNM and MBSB will be discussed and finalised later at handover. Our view is that MBSB should not pay for anything beyond the normal time required. Axens has confirmed that the normal time required is 1 week for inspection and 4 weeks for commissioning and performance tests. Best regards, Nathan Mahalingam Group Managing Director” (emphasis added) [55] This Court agrees with the counsel for the First Defendant that the Second Defendant’s failure to call either Ir. Lee Swee Eng or Mr. Terry Chew, warranted the invocation of adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Second Defendant. This Court opines that the Second Defendant having asserted that there was a separate agreement between the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff, had not produced any document to prove the existence of a separate agreement. The most logical option in this situation is to call either Ir Lee Swee Eng, its Group Managing Director or Mr Terry Chew, its Director of Group Contract Documentation as a witness. Ir Lee Swee Eng as a Group Managing Director must have been involved in the negotiation of such agreement (if any) and he should be able to shed some light over the alleged agreement between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. Mr. Terry Chew who is responsible for any contract or agreement entered by the Second Defendant would be in the position to enlighten this Court of such agreement (if any). Thus, notwithstanding whether or not the fact on the separate agreement was pleaded or otherwise, this Court is of the considered view that the Second Defendant had failed to prove the existence of such alleged separate agreement. Whether Estoppel can be raised against the First Defendant and the Plaintiff with regard to their conducts in respect of the payments of the three earlier invoices issued by the Plaintiff. [56] It was also argued on behalf of the Second Defendant that the conduct of the First Defendant in making the payment of the three invoices amounting to USD 368,103.13 had clearly led all the parties to believe that the First Defendant will make payment for the entire Start Up services to the Plaintiff. It was also further submitted for the Second Defendant that if there was no such agreement between the Defendants, the First Defendant should have protested against the invoices and informed the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant that the First Defendant is not obliged to pay the Plaintiff in respect of the Start Up Services and that the invoices should be addressed to the Second Defendant at an earlier stage that is on the receipt of the First invoice from the Plaintiff. However, the First Defendant did nothing of that sort but instead proceeded to pay the Start Up services’ invoices for January, February, June, July and August 2009. And therefore, the First Defendant and the Plaintiff should be estopped from claiming the outstanding payments for the invoices in respect of Start Up services from the Second Defendant. On the issue of estoppel, the counsel for the Second Defendant had relied on the Federal Court’s decision in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malayan Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 3 MLJ 331 and few other cases namely, i. Asia General Equipment and Supplied Sdn Bhd & Ors v Mohd Sari bin Datuk OKK Hj Anuar & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 49. ii. Mohamed Ismail bin Mohamed Shariff v Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin & Ors [2013] 2 MLJ 605. iii. Yoong Sze Fatt v Pengkalen Securities Sdn Bhd [2011 4 MLJ 805.) [57] Upon close examination and evaluation on the letters and also the emails in totality, this Court is inclined to conclude that the First Defendant’s payments in respect of the three earlier invoices for the Start Up services were made on behalf of the Second Defendant. The email dated 16.12.2009 had clearly indicated that there were discussions between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant prior to the payments of the three earlier invoices and it was agreed between them that whatever amount had been paid by the First Defendant will be apportioned between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. The apportionment will be discussed and finalised at the handover of the Biodiesel Plant to the First Defendant. The arrangement was agreed upon by all the parties, and therefore, there is no issue of estoppel here. [58] Another argument raised by the Second Defendant’s counsel is regarding the invoices that were sent to the First Defendant which demonstrated the First Defendant’s responsibility to pay the Plaintiff for the Start Up services. On this issue, this Court is in agreement with the First Defendant counsel’s contention that merely because the invoices issued under the name of the First Defendant and were sent to the First Defendant does not make the First Defendant liable to pay the Plaintiff. PW1 when he was being cross examined by counsels for the Defendants had actually explained that it was the Plaintiff’s internal “SAP” system which causes the invoices to be sent automatically to the First Defendant pursuant to Article 8.3 of the TTA. In view of the Court’s finding on the core issues, this Court is of the view that this issue here is of little significance. Whether the EPCC entered between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant is in the form of Turnkey contract at a fixed lump sum price. [59] Now, the next issue to be determined is whether the EPCC is a Turnkey contract as submitted by the First Defendant’s counsel. It was argued on behalf of the First Defendant that the EPCC being a Turnkey contract, a fixed lump sum contract at the price of RM122 million, the Second Defendant is obligated under the EPCC to hand over or deliver to the First Defendant a complete Biodiesel Plant in working order without any overrun costs. The counsel further submits, the RM 122 million fixed price lump sum set out in the EPCC is payable to the Second Defendant as the contractor, who in turn must take all the necessary steps including hiring subcontractors and paying them. The RM122 million are to be paid to the Second Defendant in three parts, namely: Part A: Price of RM875,000/- (Malaysian Ringgit Eight Hundred & Seventy Five Thousand only) representing the fixed sum payable by the Second Defendant to the Plaintiff under the PSBA : Part B: Price of RM4,742,500/- (Malaysian Ringgit Four Million Seven Hundred Forty Two Thousand Five Hundred only) representing the fixed sum payable by the Second Defendant to the Plaintiff under the TTA; and Part C: Price of RM116,382,500 (Malaysian Ringgit One Hundred Sixteen Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Five Hundred only). [60] In ascertaining the essence and definition of a Turnkey contract, this Court finds valuable assistance to the decision of Zakaria Yatim J. in the case of Highmark (M) Sdn Bhd v Pacto Malaysia Sdn Bhd [1987] 2 MLJ 85. In his decision, Zakaria Yatim J.(as he then was) had delved into the definition of Turnkey contract. His deliberation on the definition of a Turnkey contract is as follows: “……The question that arises here is what is a “turnkey contract?” In the United States, the Circuit Court of Appeals in Retsal Drilling Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 127 F 2d 355 @ 357 defined a turnkey job as a job wherein “ the driller of an oil well undertake to furnish everything and does all the work required to complete the well, place it on production and turn it, over ready to ‘turn the key and start the oil running into the tanks.” One eminent writer, recently described “turnkey” as – “... a contract where the essential design emanates from, or is supplied by, the Contractor and not the owner, so that the legal responsibility for the design, suitability and performance of the work after completion will be made to rest ... with the contractor ... ‘Turnkey’ is treated as merely signifying the design responsibility as the contractor’s.” Duncan Wallace QC, Contracts for Industrial Projects, Paper presented at a Seminar on Building and Civil Engineering Claims held in Kuala Lumpur in February, 1984, p. 3. The turnkey system, however, may be modified. The owner may engage consultants to do the foundation or sub-structure designs leaving only the superstructures the subject of the lump sum turnkey arrangements. This is known as a “mixed-turnkey” contracts. See Duncan Wallace QC, Construction Contract from the Point of View of the Owner p. 6.” In light of these literature, Zakaria Yatim J. had concluded the following: It is clear, therefore, that, in its pure form the turnkey contractor is responsibility for the design and planning rests with the contractors. On completion of the work, the contractor hands over the completed job to the owner. Sometimes the owner engages consultants to do the foundation and substructure designs. The contractor is only responsible for the planning, construction and supervision of the rest of the construction work. In order to determine what is the nature of a particular turnkey job, it is necessary to look at the relevant contracts between the parties concerned. [61] Now, reverting back to the present case, to ascertain whether or not the EPCC was in actual fact a Turnkey contract, the terms of the EPCC must be examined. Looking at Article 4, Article 5 and Article 13.1 of the EPCC, it is vividly clear that the EPCC was a Turnkey contract. The Second Defendant as a matter of fact was appointed by the First Defendant as a turnkey contractor in connection with the construction of the biodiesel plant. This also evidenced in the wording of Article 13 the EPCC itself. The title to Article 13 reads “Contractor’s Obligation”. This means that the Second Defendant’s obligation towards the construction the biodiesel plant is to the extent that the plant should be completed and be handed over in a working order to the First Defendant. Article 13.1 reads inter alia: 13.1 Works to be Performed Except as otherwise expressly set forth in this Contract, the Contractor shall perform or cause to be performed all the Works, on a fixed price lumpsum basis in accordance with the provisions of this Contract including: i) all engineering design, procurement and manufacturing required for a completely engineered Biodiesel Project; ii) Transportation of plant & equipment up to Site, port of entry clearance and handling works in Malaysia required in connection with the completion of the Biodiesel Project; iii) construction infrastructure works, civil and structural construction, mechanical and electrical erection and installation works and commissioning, start-up and testing of the Biodiesel Project, including obtaining the relevant licensing and Consents. iv) provision of all necessary labour, construction fuels, chemicals, utilities, tools, Contractor’s Equipment, supplies and other consumables and works (other than materials, equipment and supplies provided by Purchaser’s suppliers or Purchaser all as outlined in Clause 11.8); and; v) making good any defects or deficiencies in the Works in accordance with the obligations of the Contractor pursuant to Clause 36 hereof. The Contractor shall be responsible for completing the Works and achieving the final Performance Acceptance by the agreed Time for Completion and demonstrating the capability of the Biodiesel Project to achieve the Performance Guarantees failing which the Contractor shall be liable for and pay to the Purchaser applicable liquidated damages for delay and performance shortfall pursuant to Clause 34 and 35, as the case may be. (emphasis added) [62] From the wording of Article 13.1, clearly the EPCC between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant was indeed a pure Turnkey contract. Issue iii [63] This Court will now deal with the issue of claim on quantum meruit. The legal position for quantum meruit is well established. It is sufficient for this Court to refer to the case of Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya V. Koperasi Serbaguna Sungai Glugor Bhd [2009] 1CLJ 786. In this case, the Court of Appeal at paragraph 39 of its judgment had deliberated on circumstances in which quantum meruit cannot arise as a remedy and consequently had held the following: [39] According to the case of Gilbert & Partners (a firm) v. Knight [1968] 2 All ER 248, CA, a claim on a quantum meruit cannot arise if there is an existing contract between the parties to pay an agreed sum. The facts in Gilbert & Partners (a firm) v. Knight (supra) may briefly be stated as follows. There, a surveyor agreed to prepare drawings, arrange tenders and supervise works pertaining to alteration, the cost of which be estimated at roughly £600, for a fee of £30. The employer ordered extra work which brought the total cost to £2,283 but the surveyor did not, while the work was going on, tell the employer that he would require further fees. The Court held that the surveyor would be bound by the existing agreement to perform services for £30 and could not recover a reasonable sum on a new implied contract [64] In the present case, the TTA which was assigned under the TA to the Second Defendant by the First Defendant for a periodic term and the Agreement Letter clearly contained provisions on the financial terms, the obligation to pay the Plaintiff, the manner of payment as well as the amount that the Plaintiff should be paid for its services. Hence, payment on the basis of quantum meruit cannot arise. Issue iv [65] The First Defendant in counterclaiming against the Second Defendant sought for a declaration that: all the rights and obligations under the Technology Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 entered into between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant which has been assigned to the Second Defendant by the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 between the Plaintiff, First Defendant and Second Defendant, had not been reassigned to the First Defendant as the Second Defendant had not achieved the Successful Performance Test. [66] On contrary, the Second Defendant counterclaims against the First Defendant for a declaratory order to declare that: a) pursuant to the Technology Transfer Agreement N*07/3071 (“the TTA”) dated 25.7.2007 read with the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 (“the Transfer Agreement”) entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all the obligations of the Second Defendant have been assigned to the First Defendant and henceforth becomes the only contracting party vis-a vis the Plaintiff as well as being the only responsible party to pay any sum due to the plaintiff, or b) In the alternative, a declaration that pursuant to the Technology Transfer Agreement N 07/3071 (‘the TTA”) dated 25.7.2007 read with the Transfer Agreement dated 25.7.2007 (“the Transfer Agreement”) entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all the obligations of the Second Defendant have been novated to the First Defendant and henceforth become the only contracting party via-a-vis the Plaintiff as well as being the only responsible party to pay any sums due to the Plaintiff. [67] The counterclaims above sought by parties are in the form of a declaration. The granting of declaratory reliefs is purely an exercise of discretionary powers vested into Courts. The principle is well settled and well established. (See i. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. ii. Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 657. iii. Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1979] 2 MLJ 101. iv. Hanson v Radcliffe Urban District Council [1922] All ER.) [68] Although the Court reserves unfettered discretion in granting declaratory reliefs, the Court can only exercise such discretion to declare one party’s rights over another party or parties only if they can prove that they have such rights against or over the other party or parties. In the present case, the rights asserted by both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant are in respect of the assignment or reassignment of the TTA under Article 1 and Article 2 of the TA. The TTA entered between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant provides the terms in which the obligations and rights of the Plaintiff and the First Defendant were spelt out in respect of the technology and procurement of relevant licences necessary for the biodiesel plant. To facilitate the Second Defendant’s obligation to the First Defendant under the EPCC, the TTA was assigned to the Second Defendant vide the TA. The assertion of rights of the First Defendant against the Second Defendant or vice versa is only in respect of the issue whether or not the assignment has been terminated and the TTA had been reassigned or reverted back to the First Defendant. Whether or not the assignment has been terminated or has come to an end depends upon the occurrence of either one of the two occasions spelt out under the TA namely by expiration of four years from the effective date or the successful performance test defined under the TTA. [69] It is an established fact that the dispute arising from the EPCC between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant are currently in arbitration and the arbitration disputes are with regard to the proper commissioning and acceptance of the biodiesel plant. Therefore, the determination of whether or not there was a successful performance test may not be decided at this juncture as the rights asserted by both parties are still being adjudicated before the arbitrator. There are no determinable rights as of yet for this Court to grant a declaration for or against any of the parties based on the parties’ counterclaims. Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that there can be no declaratory order as to this issue. [70] In regards to the expiration of the four years from the effective date, this Court is of the considered view that this contention is a non-issue on the ground that this Court had concluded earlier that the disputed sums under the five unpaid invoices were sums due even before the expiration date after the lapsing four years. [71] The First Defendant in its counterclaim also sought for a declaration that the First Defendant is entitled to be indemnified and/or reimbursed by the Second Defendant in respect of all or any amount which the First Defendant may be held liable to pay to the Plaintiff in this action. In this respect the First Defendant seeks for a declaration that the payment which had been made to the Plaintiff for the three earlier invoices amounting to USD 368,108.13 should be indemnified and/or reimbursed by the Second Defendant. [72] It is the judgment of this Court that no declaration can be granted in respect of the monies that had been paid by the First Defendant for the payment of the three earlier invoices to the Plaintiff for the simple reason that the First Defendant is bound by the arrangement or agreement that those payments were made on behalf of the Second Defendant. The First Defendant also agreed that the apportionment of the amounts between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant will be discussed and finalized later at the hand-over of the Biodiesel Plant. The First Defendant cannot now claim for the sum to be indemnified or reimbursed at this juncture. Furthermore, the rights to the sum of monies do not arise until it has been discussed and finalised at the handover. Thus, this Court is of the view that the Fist Defendant is not entitled to the declaration sought in respect the sum of monies paid for the three earlier invoices. [73] Based on the aforementioned reasons, this Court makes the following orders; (a) a declaration that the services provided by the Plaintiff in respect of the sum USD 791,278.43 were to benefit of the Second Defendant. (b) a declaration that the Second Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for sums due pursuant to the services provided by the Plaintiff. (c) judgment be entered against the Second Defendant for the sum USD 791,278.43. (d) contractual interest at the rate set out by EURIBOR-3M plus 2% from the date of the invoices until the date of judgment. (e) further interest at the rate of 4% the crystallised judgment (including interest as set out in order (d) above) until full realisation. (f) the First Defendant’s counterclaims are dismissed with costs. (g) the Second Defendant’s counterclaims are dismissed with costs. On the issue of Costs [74] This Court has taken cognizance of the submissions of all respective parties upon the issue of costs. Upon that, this Court awards costs to the amount RM 60,000.00 to the Plaintiff to be paid by the Second Defendant and also costs of RM 30,000 to the First Defendant also to be paid by the Second Defendant. t.t ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 5th day of September, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan James Monteiro James Monteiro, John Skelchy and Vishal Kumar For the First Defendant - Tetuan Skrine Leong Wai Hong,Claudia Cheah and Angela Yap For the Second Defendant - Tetuan Zul Rafique & Partners T. Kuhendran, Koo Ai Ling and Judy Song 19

Tika 2.6.0

22-1792-2009

PLAINTIF K.P. LOO ENGINEERING SDN BHD .... PLAINTIF F DEFENDAN BEKAL HIKMAT SDN BHD .... DEFENDAN T

29/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=aafb01ec-dcd9-465f-9b9f-7745c3cc3428&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : 22-1792-2009 BETWEEN K.P. LOO ENGINEERING SDN BHD .... PLAINTIFF AND BEKAL HIKMAT SDN BHD .... DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (After Full Trial) [1] The Plaintiff in this civil action is claiming for the sum of RM1,017,128.47 from the Defendant to recover the sum owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff arising from a series of transaction of goods sold and delivered (the said goods) for a period between early June 2008 to early September 2009. In addition to the outstanding sum, the Plaintiff also claims for interest at the rate of 1.5% per month on the principal sum of RM 884,586.10 from 01.10.2009 up to the date of judgment and interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the principal amount of RM884,586.10 from the date of judgment up to full settlement; [2] The Defendant, however strongly disputed the Plaintiff’s claim and in its Amended Statement of Defence, the Defendant had raised a long list of defences. The Defendant’s defence can primarily be summarized as follows; (a) denial of any knowledge or any request or any receipt of the said goods in relation to the alleged outstanding sum of RM1,017,287,47. (b) that a company by the name of Areva T&D had ordered and accepted the said goods by using the Defendant’s official purchase orders and the Defendant’s rubber stamp to acknowledge the receipt of such goods without the Defendant’s knowledge or permission or authority. (c) that the said goods were never delivered to the Defendant but instead were delivered to the address designated by a third party, and the Defendant had not benefitted from the said goods. (d) that the Plaintiff had negligently or with mala fide intent, conspired with a third party to wrongly benefit from the Defendant in the form of debts. (e) the interest of 1.5% claim was never agreed to and/or it was unilaterally imposed after the contract was entered into. (f) the alleged transaction and the alleged debt had been reported to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC). [3] The common issues which have been agreed upon by the Plaintiff and the Defendant for this court’s determination are as follows: (a) Whether the Plaintiff had sold and delivered goods to the Defendant as claimed by the Plaintiff in their Statement of Claim. (b) Whether the Defendant had at all material times acknowledged receipt of the goods sold and delivered by the Plaintiff without any objections (c) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to obtain judgment against the Defendant for:- i) the sum of RM1,017,287.47 (as at 30.09.2009), ii) interest at the rate of 1.5% per month on the principal sum of RM884,586.10 from 01.10.2009 to the date of judgment; (ii) judgment interest on the principal sum of RM884,586.10 from date of judgment to date of full settlement; (iv) costs. (d) Whether the action and investigation that is currently being undertaken by the Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM) is connected with the Plaintiff’s Invoices, Delivery Orders (DOs) and Purchase Orders (POs) for the year 2008 and 2009, and whether it has any impact or connection/relation with the Plaintiff’s action against the Defendant. [4] The Defendant had also raised an additional issue for this Court’s determination which reads: Whether the Plaintiff’s failure to bring an action against Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd (Company No.: 2156632-V) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Third Party’) or to add the third party as Second Defendant in this action has an implication against the Plaintiff? [5] Before determining the issues mentioned above, it is necessary for this Court to set out the undisputed facts which had surfaced during the trial reflecting the factual business background between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. These undisputed factual business background are relevant and essential to the issues raised in this case. They are as follows: 5.1 The Plaintiff, K.P Loo Engineering Sdn Bhd, is a Malaysian company which is involved in the manufacturing and contract manufacturing of switch gears and relay panels and operates its business at Block C, Lot 3687, 4 ½ Miles Jalan Segambut Kuala Lumpur (Block C). 5.2 The Defendant, Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd is also an incorporated company under the laws of Malaysia having its registered address at 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves, 68100, Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan. It is not in dispute that the Defendant is a Bumiputera Company and its corporate information appearing in the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM)’s register shows that the Defendant’s business is the trading of electrical and mechanical production. It is also in dispute that prior to 1.10.2008, the Defendant’s had its registered address at 17A, Jalan SG 3/10, Taman Seri Gombak, 68100, Batu Caves, Selangor. 5.3 It is not in dispute that the Defendant and a company by the name of GEC Alsthom T&D Sdn Bhd (the company’s name was later changed to Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn. Bhd) had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) on 30.10.1987. The MOU can be found at pages 1 to 4, Bundle B2. By this MOU, the Defendant and Areva had agreed to collaborate and pool their resources, skills and expertise to manufacture Medium Voltage Switchgears with the intent to supply them to Tenaga Nasional Berhad and other Industrial Projects. The intention was clearly reflected in the preamble of the MOU. It is also not in dispute that the MOU was valid for one year with an option for renewal in which the parties had continuously exercised until it was terminated in 2009. 5.4 It must be noted that at the time the said goods were transacted, the MOU was still subsisting. 5.5 The obligations of both the Defendant and of GEC Alsthom T&D Sdn Bhd (Areva) under the MOU are clearly spelt out under Clauses 1.1 and 1.2 of the MOU. For ease of reference, the two clauses are reproduced here: 1.1 GEC ALSTHOM will support BEKAL HIKMAT with the supply of parts and components for the manufacture of the switchgears. Above all, the engineering aspect will be provided by GEC ALSTHOM. 1.2 BEKAL HIKMAT will make ready a factory for the assembly and testing of the medium voltage switchgears. The activities by BEKAL HIKMAT will include:- · Assembly of cubicles · Wiring of cubicles · Testing of cubicles · Packing and delivery of MV switchgears to customers 5.6 What is intended under the MOU is simply this; Areva will support the Defendant with the supply of all parts and components for the manufacturing of the switchgears and also provide the engineering aspect of the switchgears, while the Defendant on the other hand will be responsible to make ready a factory for the assembly and testing of the medium voltage switchgears. 5.7 It is also not in dispute that the Defendant’s business operation was not conducted at the address appearing on the CCM’s register but instead at Block A, Lot 3687, 3 1/2 Miles, Jalan Segambut 51200 Kuala Lumpur (Block A). 5.8 It must also be noted that Areva T&D also operates its business at Block A, the same address as the Defendant. 5.9 It is an undisputed fact that at the material time the Defendant’s employees were stationed at Block A to run and operate the business for the Defendant. The Plaintiff’s case [6] It is the Plaintiff’s case that its claim against the Defendant is a simple and straightforward claim on a commercial transaction of goods which had been sold and delivered by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in which the Defendant had failed or refused to pay despite repeated demands had been made against them by the Plaintiff. [7] The Plaintiff had pleaded in its Statement of Claim that at the request of the Defendant, for the period between July 2008 to September 2009, the Plaintiff had delivered to the Defendant electrical components comprising of, amongst others, switchgears, panels for 11 KV switchboard, control panel, PIX End cover (electrical switchgear panel c/w bolts & nuts) (the said goods). [8] It is also the Plaintiff’s case that the business relationship between the Plaintiff goes back a long way since the year 2000 when the Plaintiff first moved into its current business premises at Block C which was prior to the material transaction in this case. [9] It is the contention of the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff and the Defendant had conducted their business relationship with a special arrangement that was put in place in respect of the manner on which the business is to be conducted or transacted. The special arrangement among others, includes the manner orders of goods are to be made, delivery of goods and invoicing for the purposes of payment. According to the Plaintiff, the business arrangement between the parties was as follows: Even though the Defendant’s business address in the CCM’s register is stated as 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves, 68100, Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan (prior to 1.10.2008, the Defendant’s registered business address was at 17A, Jalan SG 3/10, Taman Seri Gombak, 68100, Batu Caves, Selangor)(Batu Caves addresses) the business operation of the Defendant will be conducted at Block A. The Defendant will station its employees there and they were authorised by the Defendant to conduct the Defendant’s business. The Defendant’s employees’ authority extends to, among others, making orders by issuing Purchase Order, endorsing Delivery Order, acknowledging receipt of goods and receiving invoices. It is also the contention of the Plaintiff that the Defendant’s factory was at Block A and it was sharing the same address with Areva. As such, it was also the arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that the goods ordered by the Defendant through its Purchase Order should not be delivered to the Batu Caves addresses but to Block A instead. Evidence and analysis [10] Now, coming back to the Plaintiff’s claim. In support of its claim, at the trial, the Plaintiff had called six witnesses namely, Lim Fong Fun (Fennie-PW1), Loo Kok Peng (PW2), Loo Chun Hoon (PW3), Farawahida bte Abdul Rani (PW4), Faridah bte Abdul Rani (PW5) and Ng Chay Diok (PW6). PW1, PW4 and PW5 were former employees of the Defendant. [11] Through these witnesses the Plaintiff had produced documentary evidences namely Purchase Orders (PO’s) – (pages 31 to 83 of Bundle B3), Delivery Orders(DO’s) - Exhibit P4 (pages 84 to 135 of Bundle B3), and corresponding Invoices - Exhibit P8 (pages 136 to 187 of Bundle B3), and Statement of Account - Exhibit P9 (pages 28 to 30 of Bundle B3). [12] The Purchase Orders (PO’s) indicated the Defendant’s request for the said goods from the Plaintiff. The PO’s bore the Defendant-company’s letterhead with the company’s registered address stated as the Batu Caves addresses. The PO’s also contain the signatures of the Defendant’s employees who are either Faridah bt Abd Rani, Fennie (Lim Fong Fun) or Farawahida. The PO’s contained notes that the goods are to be delivered to Block A which is the factory address of the Defendant. The goods were then delivered to Block A in which the Defendant had acknowledged receipt by incorporating the Defendant’s rubber stamp together with signatures of the Defendant’s employees onto the Plaintiff’s DO’s. [13] It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff’s that the clear evidence of the existence of such special business arrangement (arrangement) can be seen from the evidence of the Plaintiff’s witnesses PW1, PW4 and PW5. It was also submitted by the Plaintiff’s counsel that from the evidence of PW1, PW4 and PW5, it is abundantly clear that they were formerly employed by the Defendant during the period the transactions were transacted (at the material time). They testified that at the material time the Defendant had specifically stationed them at Block A to run the business operation for the Defendant. According to them, their tasks among others, are, issuing purchase order, accepting delivery order and acknowledging receipt of goods. They confirmed that the PO’s were PO’s from the Defendant and the incorporation of the Defendant’s rubber stamp acknowledging the receipt of the goods were done either by one of them according to the names appearing on the DO’s. [14] In this connection, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that the Defendant did not at any time challenge the evidence of the existence of the special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant arising from the MOU. Similarly also, even the evidence that the Defendant’s employees were stationed at Block A to conduct the Defendant’s business was not challenged by the Defendant. It is also undisputed that the special business arrangement becomes the practice and convention in the business dealings between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. In fact, the counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that the Plaintiff’s evidence on the existence of the arrangement was even corroborated by the Defendant’s own witnesses namely Nasharuddin bin Shaharun Ayumi (DW1) and Azlina bt Zulkifli (DW2). DW1 and DW 2 are the current directors of the Defendant. In their evidence they had told the court that even though they have not been made directors of the Defendant during the time these transactions took place, they were fully aware and had knowledge that the Defendant’s employees were permanently stationed at Block A to operate the business of the Defendant. The Defendant’s Case [15] The Defendant had vigorously denied the Plaintiff’s claim. In its Statement of Defence, the Defendant had disputed the Plaintiff’s claim primarily on the ground that the issuance of the PO’s were made without the authority, permission and knowledge of the Defendant. A similar stand was taken in respect of the Defendant’s acknowledgement of receipt of the goods incorporated on the DO’s. On this basis, the Defendant had also raised the defence of unjust enrichment on the part of the Plaintiff. [16] At the outset, it must be noted and emphasised again that the Defendant’s line of defences pleaded in its Amended Statement of Defence in opposing the Plaintiff’s claim are that; the Defendant had never requested for the goods, the goods were never delivered to the Defendant and thus the Defendant had not received any benefit from the goods, the Defendant had no knowledge of the transactions that gave rise to the invoices issued by the Plaintiff, the issuance of the PO’s and acknowledgment incorporated on the DO’s were made without the knowledge, permission and authority of the Defendant and the Plaintiff had failed to take reasonable steps to verify the representation from the Defendant in respect of the PO’s and DO’s. Furthermore, it was also the pleaded case of the Defendant at paragraphs 21 to 26 that on or around 26.11.2013 the Malaysian Anti - Corruption Commission (MACC) had commenced an investigation on alleged corrupt practices involving the Defendant’s business transactions with the Plaintiff and some other companies. The Defendant here is also facing other civil suits on similar transactions in which other companies are also filing civil actions to recover unpaid debts from the Defendant. [17] Having briefly summarized the cases for the Plaintiff and the Defendant, this Court will now examine the issues raised in this case. This Court must state that Issues (a) and (b) are inter-related. These two issues primarily centred on documents produced by the Plaintiff, particularly the PO’s and the DO’s to prove that the goods had been ordered, purchased and delivered. These two issues can be disposed of by determining one crucial issue namely; whether there existed a special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in respect of the conduct or the manner of the business to be carried out between them. Whether there was a special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in respect of the conduct or the manner of the business to be carried out between them. [18] Firstly, it must be noted that the Defendant had not at any time challenged the PO’s and the DO’s as well as its contents. The entire defence put up in disputing the Plaintiff’s claim was that the transactions were conducted without the knowledge, permission or authority of the Defendant. The Defendant also did not dispute that the business relationship of the Defendant and the Plaintiff arose from the MOU entered between the Defendant and Areva T&D. Secondly, it was never in dispute that the Defendant’s factory was located at Block A, sharing the same address in which Areva runs its operation. The fact that the Defendant’s factory was located at Block A was even supported with the Defendant’s own document tendered by the Plaintiff. This was also confirmed by Exhibit P11. Exhibit P11 (pages 19-20, Bundle B2), is a letter (together with an attachment or lampiran) from Ministry Of Finance to the Defendant approving certain duties exemption to the Defendant. A closer perusal of P11 reveals, without a single shade of doubt that the address of the Defendant’s factory is stated as Block A‘s address. The contents of the letter is reproduced below: Ruj. Kami: (8.20)116/5/1-14242 Vol.2 (23) Tarikh : 5 Jun 2009 Tetuan, Bekal Hikmat Sdn. Bhd., Blok A, Lot 3687, Batu 3 ½, Jalan Segambut, 51200 KUALA LUMPUR Tuan, Pengecualian Duti Import Ke Atas Bahan Mentah/ Komponen Bagi Mengeluarkan Keluaran Siap Oleh Syarikat Bekal Hikmat Sdn. Bhd. Dengan hormatnya saya diarah merujuk kepada permohonan tuan yang dialamatkan kepada Lembaga Kemajuan Perindustrian Malaysia (MIDA) mengenai perkara di atas. 2. Adalah dimaklumkan bahawa Kementerian Kewangan selaras dengan peruntukan di bawah Seksyen 14(2) Akta Kastam 1967 telah bersetuju mengecualikan duti import ke atas bahan mentah/komponen bagi mengeluarkan keluaran siap seperti di LAMPIRAN I. Pengecualian ini adalah tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat seperti di LAMPIRAN “A”. 3. Tempoh pengecualian, stesen import, tempat pengilangan/penyimpanan bahan mentah/komponen dan pasaran adalah seperti dinyatakan dalam Lampiran I berkembar. Jika pasaran tidak dinyatakan, syarikat tuan bebas untuk menjadualkan keluaran siap berkaitan di pasaran tempatan/dieksport/ FIZ/LMW sekiranya keluaran tersebut merupakan input kepada keluaran FIZ/LMW berkenaan. 4. Sekiranya syarikat ingin memohon untuk lanjutan pengecualian duti import, syarikat dinasihatkan supaya mengemukakan permohonan kepada MDA tiga (3) bulan sebelum tamat tempoh pengecualian. Sekian, terima kasih. “BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA” Saya yang menurut perintah, t.t. (KHODIJAH BINTI ABDULLAH) Bahagian Analisa Cukai, b.p. Ketua Setiausaha Perbendaharaan Thirdly, the evidence of PW1, PW4 and PW5 in respect of Defendant’s conduct of business were clear and unshaken. They had testified that they were administrative clerks who were tasked to issue the PO’s and to acknowledge receipt on the DO’s. As a matter of fact, they further testified that issuing purchase order and acknowledging receipt of goods are their primary tasks authorised by the Defendant. Undeniably, PW1, PW4 and PW5 were specifically placed or stationed at the Defendant’s premises which the Defendant shared with Areva at Block A, Lot3687, 31/2 Miles, Jalan Segambut, 51200 Kuala Lumpur to conduct the business for the Defendant. Fourthly, interestingly it was also evidenced that the two Batu Caves premises are shop house lots, in which Lot 17A (the premise’s photograph can be found at page 26 of Bundle B3) with an area of 20 feet x 50 feet, was at the first floor with a monthly rental of RM900.00, while No. 61A, Jalan Sesama (the premise’s photograph can be found at page 25 of Bundle B3) was also located at the 1st Floor Factory Building with an area of 30 feet x 60 feet and the rental was at RM1000.00 monthly. The evidence revealed before this Court is that two premises are small unit shop houses which cannot possibly be a factory to accept goods supplied by the Plaintiffs such as switchgears, panels for 11 KV switchboard, control panel and what more to assemble large finished products such as Medium voltage switchgears and to store them. The products can be seen at pages 20-23, Bundle B3. In this connection, this Court is inclined to agree with the submission of the counsel for the Plaintiff that the Defendant had never received the goods from the Plaintiff at either one of the Batu Caves addresses as those two premises were too small to store the goods. This fact is consistent that the Defendant had never had a factory for purposes of this commercial dealings at the Batu Caves addresses and that the Defendant’s factory was in actual fact was at Block A, the same address with Areva’s factory address. This is consistent with the note appearing on the PO’s that goods ordered or purchased from the Plaintiff are to be delivered at Block A. [19] This special business arrangement is further supported by three other supporting documentary evidences. Interestingly some of these documents were Defendant’s own documents. Firstly, as this Court had mentioned earlier in the judgment, the Defendant was also sued by another company by the name KVC Industrial Supplies (KVC suit) for a claim similar to the present case. In the KVC suit the Defendant had defended the civil action by filing Statement of Defences and the defences were basically the same defences as in the present case. In the KVC suit trial, the former Managing Director of the Defendant, Puan Badariah binti Isman (Puan Badariah) was called to give evidence for the Defendant. Puan Badariah in her Witness Statement and her oral evidence had stated that there was an arrangement between the Defendant and Areva that the Defendant’s employees were permanently placed in the premises of Areva at Block A to conduct the Defendant’s business pursuant to the terms of the MOU and the employees were also required to act on the instructions of Areva. The relevant passages of Puan Badariah’s evidence in the Notes of Evidence in KVC Suit are as follows: Notes of Evidence in KVC Suit Pages 30,31,32,33 and 34, Bundle 34 “ABM Saya rujuk Puan kepada mukasurat 19 sehingga 27 Ikatan C1. Sepertimana yang telah ditunjukkan tadi saya katakana kepada Puan bahawa dokumen-dokumen tersebut adalah berdasarkan kepada perihal gaji bonus dan peningkatan gaji bagi pekerja-pekerja Defendan. Setuju ataupun tidak? BADARIAH Nama yang tercatit di sini bukan kesemuanya pekerja Defendan. YA Which page are you asking the question? ABM It is basically all the, from 19 to 27. But I can be more specific if the witness is. YA What was your question, sorry? ABM My question was, Yang Arif that this documents we leave to the issues concerning bonuses, increments and. YA All that don’t worry. The only relevant thing was whether they were employees. Everything else is irrelevant. What is the next question? ABM Soalan saya seterus-terusnya berkenaan dengan dokumen yang tersebut juga. Adakah dokumen-dokumen, saya katakan bahawa dokumen-dokumen ini dikeluarkan oleh syarikat Defendan? YA Must be isn’t it, it is in the Defendant’s bundle? ABM I interested to see as to what she has to say Yang Arif. YA These documents belong to Defendant is your question? ABM Belong and also issued by the Defendant. Setuju ataupun tidak Puan Badariah? BADARIAH Dikeluarkan menggunakan letterhead syarikat saya tapi diluluskan oleh pihak Areva. YA Yes, these documents, sorry what did the witness say? BADARIAH Menggunakan. YA Menggunakan letterhead. BADARIAH Letterhead Defendant tetapi kenaikan gaji diluluskan dan diarahkan oleh pihak Areva. YA Ini sebab you punya what’s the arrangement? What’s the Malay word for arrangement. Persetujuan. Itulah you punya cadangan atau arrangement dengan Areva betul? Tidak? Itu you punya arrangement dengan Areva betul? BADARIAH Betul. YA That’s their arrangement with Areva. ABM Jadi adakah Puan mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dokumen-dokumen ini? YA You see because Mr. Budiman, if you took at page 20 of C1, you see the signature of Mr. Andrew Chelliah approved, recommended. ABM Yes, Yang Arif. YA So, they work, they are employees. You can ask the witness, they are employees of the Defendant who work with her permission in the third party’s premises and wages are paid by the Defendant but their performance etc, is rated by the third party. You ask the witness. BADARIAH Betul. YA Yes, she can understand, that’s betul. Sorry, never mind. I’ll ask her later. You complete your cross. I confirm that the arrangement. Never mind, you carry on. ABM Much obliged Yang Arif. Jadi bolehkan Puan menjelaskan bagaimana Puan memiliki salinan dokumen-dokumen ini? BADARIAH Biasanya melalui faks. YA Which document? The employee one? ABM Again from pages 19 to 27, Yang Arif. Jadi dokumen-dokumen tersebut disahkan oleh Puan selaku pengarah urusan Bekal Khidmat Sdn Bhd? BADARIAH Saya sahkan dokumen ini tapi bukan. ABM Itu sahaja. Ya atau tidak? BADARIAH Ya. ABM Selaku pengarah urusan Bekal Khidmat, secara lazimnya Puan membenarkan pihak-pihak lain menggunakan letter head ataupun dokumen-dokumen kepunyaan syarikat? YA I think you should be specific. Ask whether they authorized those few employees. Faridah and all, to use the letter head of the Defendant and sign on behalf of the Defendant. That’s what it is here, ask the witness the direct question. ABM Very well Yang Arif. Adakah secara lazimnya Puan membenarkan pekerja-pekerja Puan yang dihantar di Areva? YA Who were working on the premises. ABM Di premis pihak ketiga iaitu Areva untuk menggunakan dokumen-dokumen syarikat Bekal Khidmat Sdn. Bhd.? BADARIAH Ya, tapi mereka harus merujuk kepada saya terlebih dahulu untuk setiap transaksi. YA Must get my permission, what did the witness say? ABM Must refer, employees must relate to her. YA Ask her whether she inform the Plaintiff to that effect, that they mustn’t receive any purchase order on that letter head unless they get her permission. ABM Adakah arahan untuk merujuk Puan tersebut di khusus untuk segala purchase order yang dikeluarkan oleh syarikat kepada suppliernya? BADARIAH Ya. ABM Termasuk Plaintiff? BADARIAH Ya. YA Ask her which page in the document, we can see the documents? ABM Adakah ia dinyatakan di mana-mana dokumen, arahan tersebut yang dikeluarkan oleh Puan supaya dirujuk kepada Puan terdahulu? YA Anything in writing? BADARIAH Tiada. YA Just one minute, can you ask the witness. Page 1, all the purchase orders? ABM Bundle B1, yang tebal itu. Mukasurat 1 sehingga mukasurat 166. YA Ask the witness what, is her evidence based on what she had just said that she’s not complaining about the use of the letter head. She’s only complaining that they did not raise the matter with her before they used the letter head. Is that what her evidence is? Ask her. With reference to the documents, 1 to 163. I think. ABM Jadi soalan saya. Puan rujuk pada pesan pembelian yang dikeluarkan menerusi mukasurat 1 hingga 166 tersebut di Bundle B1. Sedia maklum Puan? BADARIAH Ya. ABM Jadi, soalan ialah berkenaan dengan pengeluarkan PO ini, PO-PO tersebut saya cadangkan pada Puan masalahnya bukan hanya kepada tiada rujukan dibuat pada Puan. Saya mengatakan bahawa Puan tiada masalah menggunakan pekerja-pekerja Puan menggunakan PO-PO tersebut dan dikeluarkan kepada Plaintiff. Dalam erti kata lain. [20] This Court takes cognizance that the KVC suit was settled before the trial was completed as parties had entered into a consent judgment. [21] The second document is Exhibit D27. This document also relates to Puan Badariah. She had lodged a police report concerning the numerous civil suits faced by the Defendant. She had clearly stated in the police report that the Defendant’s employees had been permanently stationed in Areva’s premises pursuant to the terms of the MOU and the arrangement thereto was that the employees were required to act on the instructions of Areva. The relevant portions of the police report read as follows: (a) Saya adalah pengarah urusan bagi syarikat Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd (258140-k) yang beralamat di 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves,68100 Selangor Darul Ehsan. (b) Terdapat suatu Memorandum Persefahaman (“Memorandum of Understanding”) bertarikh 30.10.1997 telah dimasuki di antara GEC Alsthom T & D Sdn Bhd (yang kini dikenali sebagai “Areva T & D Malaysia Sdn Bhd” (215632-V)) dan Bekal Hikmat Sdn. Bhd di mana Areva T & D Malaysia Sdn Bhd akan membantu Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd dalam membekalkan bahagian ataupun komponen untuk pengeluaran -electrical switchgears- untuk dibekalkan kepada Tenaga Nasional Berhad dan untuk projek industri. Adalah dalam persefahaman semua pihak bahawa Areva T&D Sdn Bhd akan membekalkan kepakaran jurutera teknikal (“engineering technical expertise”) memandangkan Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd, iaitu sebuah syarikat bumiputra, tidak mempunyai pengalaman dalam industri ini. ... (j) Saya percaya pekerja-pekerja Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd seperti dinyatakan di bawah boleh membantu siasatan polis: (i) Cik Lim Fong Fun (No. K/P :811022-04-5576) (ii) Faridah binti Abd Rani (No. K/P :841224-14-5580) (iii) Farawahida binti Abd Rani ( No. K/P:790710-08-5838) (k) Secara rasminya, Cik Faridah binti Abd Rani dan Cik Farawahida binti Abd Rani adalah pekerja-pekerja Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd. Oleh kerana terdapatnya suatu “arrangement” di antara Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd bersama Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd, Cik Faridah binti Abd Rani dan Cik Farawahida binti Abd Rani telah ditempatkan di alamat tersebut untuk bekerja dengan Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd sepenuh masa. Berdasarkan “arrangement” tersebut, mereka akan menerima arahan terus daripada Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd dan bukannya dari Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd. Setiap bulan gaji mereka akan dibayar oleh Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd dan bukannya dari Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd. Bonus dan gaji mereka adalah berada dalam kuasa Areva T&D dan ditentukan oleh Areva T&D dan ditentukan oleh Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd sepenuhnya. [22] Thirdly, there were other documentary evidences produced by the Plaintiff through PW1, PW4 and PW5. These documentary evidences were also the Defendant’s document. The documents pertain to the Defendant’s employees’ salaries, approval for increments and bonuses. It is interesting to note that PW1, PW4 and PW5 despite being the Defendant’s employees, their salaries, increments and bonuses were determined by Areva and not the Defendant. This is evidenced by Exhibits P3 [(a) to (g) (pages 111 to 117), Bundle B4] and was also supported by Puan Badariah’s evidence in the KVC suit. For ease of reference, pages 111, 112, 113 are reproduced below:- Page 111 Page 112 Page 113 The relevant part of Puan Badariah’s evidence in the KVC suit is also reproduced below:- “ABM Saya rujuk Puan kepada mukasurat 19 sehingga 27 Ikatan C1. Sepertimana yang telah ditunjukkan tadi saya katakan kepada Puan bahawa dokumen-dokumen tersebut adalah berdasarkan kepada perihal gaji bonus dan peningkatan gaji bagi pekerja-pekerja Defendan. Setuju ataupun tidak? BADARIAH Nama yang tercatit di sini bukan kesemuanya pekerja Defendan. YA Which page are you asking the question? ABM It is basically all the, from 19 to 27. But I can be more specific if the witness is. YA What was your question, sorry? ABM My question was, Yang Arif that this documents we leave to the issues concerning bonuses, increments and. YA All that don’t worry. The only relevant thing was whether they were employees. Everything else is irrelevant. What is the next question? ABM Soalan saya seterus-terusnya berkenaan dengan dokumen yang tersebut juga. Adakah dokumen-dokumen, saya katakan bahawa dokumen-dokumen ini dikeluarkan oleh syarikat Defendan? [23] Based on the aforementioned evidences, it is this Court’s judgment that there are overwhelming evidences as to the existence of a special business arrangement between the Defendant and the Plaintiff in conducting their business. This Court would go as far as to say that the evidence is plainly glaring that from the MOU, the Defendant who was supposed to or obligated to make ready a factory for purposes of manufacturing the switchgears, had instead of setting up its own factory or facility, devised this special business arrangement in conducting its business. In fact, the special business arrangement had been deliberately put in place by the Defendant itself and therefore the Defendant cannot now turn against the arrangement by asserting excuses that the transaction or documentations prepared by its own employees were made without its knowledge or permission or authority. Authenticity of PO’s and Acknowledgement incorporated on the DO’s [24] The Defendant in the course of trial during the cross-examinations of the Plaintiff’s witnesses had attempted to question the authenticity of those documentations. This Court must also stress here that a large portion of the written submission be it in the main submission or the reply submissions, the counsel for the Defendant had focused his attention on the failure of the Plaintiff to bring Areva T&D as a party to this action. In doing so, the submission of the learned counsel for the Defendant revolves on the documentary evidences which had been produced by the Plaintiff. Those documentary evidences mainly being the PO’s and the acknowledgment of receipt on the DO’s. What the counsel for the Defendant had attempted to raise is referring to the authenticity of the documents which were issued by the Defendant’s employees who were stationed in Block A in which the Defendant had attempted to assert that there are contradictions of evidences between them. An example of those contradictions being the directions issued by them, the tenure of their employment with regards to their appointment, their resignations, their new employees and their relation with Areva T&D or persons who have relations with Areva. In this matter, this court reiterates again that the Defendant had raised matters which were not pleaded in their statement of defence. The authenticity of the PO’s issuance and acknowledgment of receipt on the DO’s or the authenticity of documents were never disputed by the Defendant in their defence. What was raised by the Defendant was that the issuance of these documents were made without the Defendant’s consent. The matter on the authenticity of the documents was only raised when the Plaintiff’s witnesses were cross-examined. It must be stressed here that this Court had ruled earlier in this judgment that the Plaintiff vide the documentary evidences and oral evidences of the witnesses have successfully proven that the PO’s and the incorporation of the Defendant’s acknowledgment of receipt on the DO’s had been performed or conducted by the Defendant’s own employees which were stationed in Block A where Areva also conducts its business and that the delivery to Block A was made based on the special arrangement by Defendant’s own volition. This special agreement by the Defendant and the Plaintiff had been the status quo since as early as the year 2000. This special agreement is a business practice which was established or devised by the Defendant himself and was followed by its business partner which is the Plaintiff and had consistently continued until the transaction became this dispute before this Court. It is this Court’s judgment that when one party had agreed to undertake to follow such business practice of this manner, and the other party had performed all their proper obligations pursuant to the said agreed business practice, thus, the said other party shall retain the rights to claim for all that is properly due to him. Therefore in this present case, the Defendant should not be allowed to raise anything which attempts to deflect and defeat the arrangement which the Defendant himself had willingly opted to venture, adhere to and agreed to ever since the inception of the business relations and deny their liabilities. [25] This Court is in total agreement with the Plaintiff’s counsel that the issue of the authenticity of the documents was never pleaded by the Defendant in its Statement of Defence. Therefore, the issue of authenticity must be disregarded as the Defendant is bound by its pleaded case. [26] It is trite law that parties are bound by their pleading. There is a myriad of authorities on this. (See i. RHB Bank Bhd (substituting Kwong Yik Bank Bhd) v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd, [2010] 2 MLJ 188. ii. The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157. iii. Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Jalinan Waja Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 322. iv. State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490. v. Astrovlanis Compania Naviera AS v Linard [1972] 2 QB 611, [1972] 2 All ER 647. vi. Spedding v Filzpatrick 1888 38 Ch D 410 at p 413. vii. Thomson v Birkley (1882) 31 WR 230. viii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283.) In any event, following this Court’s earlier finding on the existence of the special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the conduct of their business, the Defendant’s contention on the authenticity of the documents must also fail. Statement of account or the customer ledger [27] The counsel for the Defendant had also attempted to query the invoices and account statements by disputing Exhibit P9 (pages 28-30, Bundle B3) which were issued by the Plaintiff and submitted to this Court that the account statements which were issued by the Plaintiff should not be admitted as they are not entries in the books of account which is relevant under Section 34 of the Evidence Act 1950. It was also submitted on behalf of the Defendant that Exhibit P9 is not in adherence to Section 34 of the Evidence Act 1950 on the ground that Exhibit 9 are not account statements issued in the ordinary course of business. The counsel for the Defendant further submitted that there is in existence contradictory evidences between PW2 and P6 in the preparation of the said account statements. [28] This Court is of the considered view that Exhibit P9 which were prepared by the Plaintiff was based on the business practice which was agreed upon by both the Defendant and the Plaintiff. For all this while since the year 2000, the Defendant had never questioned or challenged the customer ledger (account statement) which were issued by the Plaintiff. To this Court, the same answer and conclusion in the matter of the PO’s and the DO’s shall also similarly apply here. All throughout this business relation between the Defendant and the Plaintiff, the Defendant had already accepted the customer ledger (account statement) and had already furnished payments to the Plaintiff. [29] Regarding the provision of Section 34 of the Evidence Act 1950 which was raised by the Defendant, this Court must reiterate again that this business practice which was performed by the Defendant and the Plaintiff from the outset is a practice not in the ordinary course of business, thus the Defendant cannot assert now that the said customer ledger is a matter not in an ordinary course of business. That cannot at all be correct. The special arrangement practiced had veered off from the ordinary course of business from the outset and both the parties especially the Defendant had willingly acceded and accepted it. There is nothing ordinary left in the course of business between the Defendant and the Plaintiff to warrant the invocation of Section 34. As found earlier, this business practice had been the status quo since the year 2000 and had remained unchallenged until this dispute arose. Notwithstanding this unordinary course of business, this Court would go as far to find that, based on the special arrangement (which was unchallenged and in fact accepted since the year 2000 until this dispute arose), it is verily more probable than not that the customer ledger (being undisputed and paid for by the Defendant) is in fact the agreed ordinary course of business to be taken in conducting their business. In the same matter, I am also in agreement with the counsel for the Plaintiff that the customer ledger which is Exhibit P10 (pages 204-210, Bundle B3) must be read together with the invoices issued by the Plaintiff in Exhibit P8 (pages 136-138, Bundle B3). Upon close scrutiny of these two exhibits, this Court indeed found that the exhibits do correspond with each other. Thereto, these entries in the customer ledger are verily relevant as they are corroborated by other supporting documents such as the PO’s, DO’s and the invoices. Contrary to the Defendant’s contention on the ordinary course of business, there are overwhelming evidences to prove that the issuance of the customer ledger is in line with the course of business arranged and agreed by the parties. [30] Succinctly put, firstly, the Defendant cannot deem the customer lodger out of the ordinary course of business since the business arrangement is already out of the ordinary. Secondly, it is more probable than not that the issuance of the customer ledger is indeed the ordinary course of business agreed by the parties in the special arrangement. Nonetheless, it needs to be emphasised here that the Plaintiff is not solely relying on the statement of account to prove its case. The Plaintiff had produced PO’s, DO’s and Invoices to prove that the goods were sold and delivered and Exhibit P9 are entries which are supported by these other documents. Adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Defendant for not calling Puan Badariah as a witness. [31] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff had urged this Court to draw an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Defendant for its failure to call the Defendant’s former Managing Director as a witness. The counsel for the Plaintiff had submitted that Puan Badariah was the Managing Director at the material time and she was called to give evidence for the Defendant in the KVC suit. The Defendant had instead called DW1 and DW2, the current directors and both of them when testified in Court had told this Court that they had only obtained their information regarding the Defendant from Puan Badariah. [32] This Court is also in total agreement with the counsel for the Plaintiff on this matter. Puan Badariah was the Defendant’s Managing Director at the material time. Hence, she was responsible in the running of the Defendant’s business at the material time and she is definitely the best, proper and capable person to enlighten this Court on the special business arrangements of the Defendant. More so, she gave evidence for the Defendant in the KVC suit. She was the person who lodged the police report on behalf of the Defendant. As a matter of fact, when DW1 and DW2 gave evidence, they had informed the Court that all of the information they had pertaining to the Defendant were obtained from Puan Badariah. For reasons known to the Defendant, Puan Badariah was not called to testify for the Defendant and there was no reason afforded by the Defendant for not calling her. To this Court, this is an obvious case to invoke the adverse inference under section 114(g) against the Defendant. Clearly the failure of calling of Puan Badariah as a witness, being an important and material witness is detrimental and in fact, fatal to the Defendant’s case. (See Munusamy V PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492 (SC)...“Held: (1) It is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but a material document by a party in his possession, or for non production of just any witness but important and material witness to the case. Adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Plaintiff for not calling Loh Choon Kiam as a witness. [33] The learned counsel for the Defendant on the other hand had also urged this Court to invoke section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 on the Plaintiff’s failure to call a person by the name of Loh Choon Kiam as its witness to prove its case. The Defendant had attempted to allege that the Defendant’s employees are supposedly the cronies to Loh Choon Kiam who is actually one of the Directors of Areva who may shed more light on the MOU which was signed by the Defendant and Areva T&D. Nonetheless, I am in agreement with the counsel for the Plaintiff that Loh Choon Kiam has no relation at all with the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff’s case. The Plaintiff’s case rests upon the documentary evidences which were issued by the Defendant itself and the Plaintiff’s other supporting documents, together with other oral evidences which were unchallenged. The narrative of the Plaintiff’s case is not at all deterred or rattled although Loh Choon Kiam was not called as a witness. Thus, it does not at all carry the effect of withholding or suppression of evidence on the part of the Plaintiff when Loh Choon Kiam was not called as witness by the Plaintiff unlike the Defendant’s own failure to call the Defendant’s Former Managing Director at the material time, Puan Badariah. The Defendant’s application for this Court to invoke the adverse inference under section 114(g) is unwarranted and this Court shall not draw such inference. Whether the action and investigation that is currently being undertaken by the Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM) is connected with the Plaintiff’s Invoices, Delivery Orders (DO’s) and Purchase Orders (PO’s) for the year 2008 and 2009, and whether it has any impact or connection/relation with the Plaintiff’s action against the Defendant. [34] In view of this Court‘s finding on the existence of the special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the conduct of their business, the above issue need not be addressed by this Court. Furthermore, it must be noted that the report to the MACC was only lodged in 2013, just a few days short of the first trial date in December 2013. This Court could not agree more with the Plaintiff’s counsel that the whole purpose of the MACC’s report was to delay the trial. If at all there were some elements of corruption in the business dealings or transaction, this would have been within the knowledge of Defendant at the commencement of suits against the Defendant by the Plaintiff in 2009. Here, it is not only the Plaintiff who is suing the Defendant to recover its debt but also some other companies filing similar claims around the same year (2009) against the Defendant. There were no conceivable reasons or justification afforded on the reason the Defendant had to wait until four years to realise that there were elements of corruption to lodge a report to the MACC. Clearly, as aptly submitted by the Plaintiff, that the lodging of report to the MACC is an afterthought on the Defendant’s part. This Court has no reason to disagree. Whether the Plaintiff’s failure to bring an action against Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd (Company No.: 2156632-V) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Third Party’) or to add the third party as Second Defendant in this action has an implication against the Plaintiff? [35] In view of this Court’s finding on the existence of the special arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the conduct of their business, the above issue also need not be addressed by this Court. [36] Nonetheless, it must be minded that the parties to the arrangement were Areva and the Defendant. The Plaintiff is just a contract manufacturing company to the Defendant. The PO’s, DO’s and Invoices give rise to the imposition of a contractual relationship and obligation only onto the Defendant and the Plaintiff and certainly not Areva. There was no privity of contract at all between the Plaintiff and Areva. Thus, the Plaintiff’s failure to bring an action against Areva would not give rise to any implication against the Plaintiff’s claim in the present case. [37] The counsel for the Defendant had also argued that even the Plaintiff itself had admitted, in paragraph 3 of its pleadings that Areva were the Defendant’s nominees and thus, Areva must be roped in into this suit. Similarly in this regard, in light of the earlier finding that the PO’s, DO’s and invoices only bind the Plaintiff to the Defendant as a contract manufacturing company, this Court finds that this argument is untenable. Areva is not at all a party to this contract and therefore is not privy to it and there is no necessity at all to bring Areva as a party in this dispute. Thus, the authorities cited therein are irrelevant to this case. [38] Coming back to the evidence of DW1 and DW2, DW1 was appointed as a director only after these transactions had taken place. Indeed, a director would be responsible in terms of liability of a company but he was only made a director in year 2011 more than a year after this present case was filed. Obviously he would not be in any position to indulge the court on the authorisation or permission and knowledge as he was not in charge of the Defendant at that point in time. Thus, I agree with the Plaintiff’s counsel that these transactions were not within the knowledge of DW1 and even more so on the question of authority or permission which should well be beyond his knowledge. [39] And in so far as the evidence of DW2 is concerned, this Court had the opportunity to observe DW2 when she gave her evidence. The most logical and probable inference that can be concluded from her evidence is that even though she is the Defendant’s director, she is merely a sleeping director, who knows nothing of the business, what more the running of it. Every questions posed to her had to be repeated so many times as she appeared to be quite lost and alien to all of the questions posed to her. Her conduct seemingly indicates that she actually did not participate in the Defendant’s business activities. This Court entirely agrees with the Plaintiff’s counsel’s submission that not much weight could be placed on her evidence. [40] In this connection, the evidence of DW3 – Mr. Lee Seng and his involvement in this case is somehow very perplexing. He was the person who lodged the report to the MACC and also the person who owns one of the Batu Caves addresses namely No. 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves, 68100, Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan. He was also the witness in the MOU. He came to court projecting himself as someone who cares about justice and wants justice to be observed. He stated in his evidence that he has no role in the Defendant’s company. Somehow or rather when he testified in court he seemed to know the business that Defendant is engaged with in great depth. I would even say that he knows the Defendant’s business inside and out even though he is not the director of the company or even a shareholder of the Defendant company. However, the business operation of the Defendant seems to be on his fingertips. Furthermore, his wife Mrs. Lee, has an obvious hold in the Defendant’s management and this can be clearly seen in Exhibit P3, pages 111 to 117 of B4 and Exhibit D14 at page 118 of B4. [41] At this juncture, this Court poses a question – who is this DW3 to the Defendant company? From the evidence adduced in court particularly the Defendant’s own evidences from its witnesses DW1 and DW2, it is reasonable to conclude that DW3 somehow has his hand in this company. In this instance, the issue regarding knowledge, authority and permission raised by the Defendant is not something the Defendant can complain. [42] This Court’s evaluation in totality of the oral evidence or testimonies of the witnesses as well as the documentary evidences, the answers to the issues (a), (b), and (c) are in the affirmative. [43] Based on the aforesaid grounds set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has established its case on the balance of probabilities and accordingly, this Court makes the following orders:- i) judgment is entered for the Plaintiff for the sum of RM1,017,287.47 (as at 30.09.2009). ii) interest at the rate of 1.5% per month on the principal sum of RM884,586.10 from 01.10.2009 to the date of judgment. iii) interest rate at the rate 5% per annum on the principal sum of RM884,586.10 from date of judgment to date of full settlement. As to the issue of costs [44] With regard to costs, this Courts orders the Defendant to pay RM35,000.00 to the Plaintiff. t.t. (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 29th day of August, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Prasad Abraham & Associates Miss Veronica Mary Anne Dominic For the Defendant - Tetuan K.F. Ee & Co. Miss Emily Hiew Yee Peng 41 image2.jpeg image3.jpeg image4.jpeg image1.png

Tika 2.6.0

22-1792-2009

PLAINTIF K.P. LOO ENGINEERING SDN BHD .... PLAINTIF F DEFENDAN BEKAL HIKMAT SDN BHD .... DEFENDAN T

29/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=aafb01ec-dcd9-465f-9b9f-7745c3cc3428&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : 22-1792-2009 BETWEEN K.P. LOO ENGINEERING SDN BHD .... PLAINTIFF AND BEKAL HIKMAT SDN BHD .... DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (After Full Trial) [1] The Plaintiff in this civil action is claiming for the sum of RM1,017,128.47 from the Defendant to recover the sum owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff arising from a series of transaction of goods sold and delivered (the said goods) for a period between early June 2008 to early September 2009. In addition to the outstanding sum, the Plaintiff also claims for interest at the rate of 1.5% per month on the principal sum of RM 884,586.10 from 01.10.2009 up to the date of judgment and interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the principal amount of RM884,586.10 from the date of judgment up to full settlement; [2] The Defendant, however strongly disputed the Plaintiff’s claim and in its Amended Statement of Defence, the Defendant had raised a long list of defences. The Defendant’s defence can primarily be summarized as follows; (a) denial of any knowledge or any request or any receipt of the said goods in relation to the alleged outstanding sum of RM1,017,287,47. (b) that a company by the name of Areva T&D had ordered and accepted the said goods by using the Defendant’s official purchase orders and the Defendant’s rubber stamp to acknowledge the receipt of such goods without the Defendant’s knowledge or permission or authority. (c) that the said goods were never delivered to the Defendant but instead were delivered to the address designated by a third party, and the Defendant had not benefitted from the said goods. (d) that the Plaintiff had negligently or with mala fide intent, conspired with a third party to wrongly benefit from the Defendant in the form of debts. (e) the interest of 1.5% claim was never agreed to and/or it was unilaterally imposed after the contract was entered into. (f) the alleged transaction and the alleged debt had been reported to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC). [3] The common issues which have been agreed upon by the Plaintiff and the Defendant for this court’s determination are as follows: (a) Whether the Plaintiff had sold and delivered goods to the Defendant as claimed by the Plaintiff in their Statement of Claim. (b) Whether the Defendant had at all material times acknowledged receipt of the goods sold and delivered by the Plaintiff without any objections (c) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to obtain judgment against the Defendant for:- i) the sum of RM1,017,287.47 (as at 30.09.2009), ii) interest at the rate of 1.5% per month on the principal sum of RM884,586.10 from 01.10.2009 to the date of judgment; (ii) judgment interest on the principal sum of RM884,586.10 from date of judgment to date of full settlement; (iv) costs. (d) Whether the action and investigation that is currently being undertaken by the Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM) is connected with the Plaintiff’s Invoices, Delivery Orders (DOs) and Purchase Orders (POs) for the year 2008 and 2009, and whether it has any impact or connection/relation with the Plaintiff’s action against the Defendant. [4] The Defendant had also raised an additional issue for this Court’s determination which reads: Whether the Plaintiff’s failure to bring an action against Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd (Company No.: 2156632-V) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Third Party’) or to add the third party as Second Defendant in this action has an implication against the Plaintiff? [5] Before determining the issues mentioned above, it is necessary for this Court to set out the undisputed facts which had surfaced during the trial reflecting the factual business background between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. These undisputed factual business background are relevant and essential to the issues raised in this case. They are as follows: 5.1 The Plaintiff, K.P Loo Engineering Sdn Bhd, is a Malaysian company which is involved in the manufacturing and contract manufacturing of switch gears and relay panels and operates its business at Block C, Lot 3687, 4 ½ Miles Jalan Segambut Kuala Lumpur (Block C). 5.2 The Defendant, Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd is also an incorporated company under the laws of Malaysia having its registered address at 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves, 68100, Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan. It is not in dispute that the Defendant is a Bumiputera Company and its corporate information appearing in the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM)’s register shows that the Defendant’s business is the trading of electrical and mechanical production. It is also in dispute that prior to 1.10.2008, the Defendant’s had its registered address at 17A, Jalan SG 3/10, Taman Seri Gombak, 68100, Batu Caves, Selangor. 5.3 It is not in dispute that the Defendant and a company by the name of GEC Alsthom T&D Sdn Bhd (the company’s name was later changed to Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn. Bhd) had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) on 30.10.1987. The MOU can be found at pages 1 to 4, Bundle B2. By this MOU, the Defendant and Areva had agreed to collaborate and pool their resources, skills and expertise to manufacture Medium Voltage Switchgears with the intent to supply them to Tenaga Nasional Berhad and other Industrial Projects. The intention was clearly reflected in the preamble of the MOU. It is also not in dispute that the MOU was valid for one year with an option for renewal in which the parties had continuously exercised until it was terminated in 2009. 5.4 It must be noted that at the time the said goods were transacted, the MOU was still subsisting. 5.5 The obligations of both the Defendant and of GEC Alsthom T&D Sdn Bhd (Areva) under the MOU are clearly spelt out under Clauses 1.1 and 1.2 of the MOU. For ease of reference, the two clauses are reproduced here: 1.1 GEC ALSTHOM will support BEKAL HIKMAT with the supply of parts and components for the manufacture of the switchgears. Above all, the engineering aspect will be provided by GEC ALSTHOM. 1.2 BEKAL HIKMAT will make ready a factory for the assembly and testing of the medium voltage switchgears. The activities by BEKAL HIKMAT will include:- · Assembly of cubicles · Wiring of cubicles · Testing of cubicles · Packing and delivery of MV switchgears to customers 5.6 What is intended under the MOU is simply this; Areva will support the Defendant with the supply of all parts and components for the manufacturing of the switchgears and also provide the engineering aspect of the switchgears, while the Defendant on the other hand will be responsible to make ready a factory for the assembly and testing of the medium voltage switchgears. 5.7 It is also not in dispute that the Defendant’s business operation was not conducted at the address appearing on the CCM’s register but instead at Block A, Lot 3687, 3 1/2 Miles, Jalan Segambut 51200 Kuala Lumpur (Block A). 5.8 It must also be noted that Areva T&D also operates its business at Block A, the same address as the Defendant. 5.9 It is an undisputed fact that at the material time the Defendant’s employees were stationed at Block A to run and operate the business for the Defendant. The Plaintiff’s case [6] It is the Plaintiff’s case that its claim against the Defendant is a simple and straightforward claim on a commercial transaction of goods which had been sold and delivered by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in which the Defendant had failed or refused to pay despite repeated demands had been made against them by the Plaintiff. [7] The Plaintiff had pleaded in its Statement of Claim that at the request of the Defendant, for the period between July 2008 to September 2009, the Plaintiff had delivered to the Defendant electrical components comprising of, amongst others, switchgears, panels for 11 KV switchboard, control panel, PIX End cover (electrical switchgear panel c/w bolts & nuts) (the said goods). [8] It is also the Plaintiff’s case that the business relationship between the Plaintiff goes back a long way since the year 2000 when the Plaintiff first moved into its current business premises at Block C which was prior to the material transaction in this case. [9] It is the contention of the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff and the Defendant had conducted their business relationship with a special arrangement that was put in place in respect of the manner on which the business is to be conducted or transacted. The special arrangement among others, includes the manner orders of goods are to be made, delivery of goods and invoicing for the purposes of payment. According to the Plaintiff, the business arrangement between the parties was as follows: Even though the Defendant’s business address in the CCM’s register is stated as 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves, 68100, Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan (prior to 1.10.2008, the Defendant’s registered business address was at 17A, Jalan SG 3/10, Taman Seri Gombak, 68100, Batu Caves, Selangor)(Batu Caves addresses) the business operation of the Defendant will be conducted at Block A. The Defendant will station its employees there and they were authorised by the Defendant to conduct the Defendant’s business. The Defendant’s employees’ authority extends to, among others, making orders by issuing Purchase Order, endorsing Delivery Order, acknowledging receipt of goods and receiving invoices. It is also the contention of the Plaintiff that the Defendant’s factory was at Block A and it was sharing the same address with Areva. As such, it was also the arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that the goods ordered by the Defendant through its Purchase Order should not be delivered to the Batu Caves addresses but to Block A instead. Evidence and analysis [10] Now, coming back to the Plaintiff’s claim. In support of its claim, at the trial, the Plaintiff had called six witnesses namely, Lim Fong Fun (Fennie-PW1), Loo Kok Peng (PW2), Loo Chun Hoon (PW3), Farawahida bte Abdul Rani (PW4), Faridah bte Abdul Rani (PW5) and Ng Chay Diok (PW6). PW1, PW4 and PW5 were former employees of the Defendant. [11] Through these witnesses the Plaintiff had produced documentary evidences namely Purchase Orders (PO’s) – (pages 31 to 83 of Bundle B3), Delivery Orders(DO’s) - Exhibit P4 (pages 84 to 135 of Bundle B3), and corresponding Invoices - Exhibit P8 (pages 136 to 187 of Bundle B3), and Statement of Account - Exhibit P9 (pages 28 to 30 of Bundle B3). [12] The Purchase Orders (PO’s) indicated the Defendant’s request for the said goods from the Plaintiff. The PO’s bore the Defendant-company’s letterhead with the company’s registered address stated as the Batu Caves addresses. The PO’s also contain the signatures of the Defendant’s employees who are either Faridah bt Abd Rani, Fennie (Lim Fong Fun) or Farawahida. The PO’s contained notes that the goods are to be delivered to Block A which is the factory address of the Defendant. The goods were then delivered to Block A in which the Defendant had acknowledged receipt by incorporating the Defendant’s rubber stamp together with signatures of the Defendant’s employees onto the Plaintiff’s DO’s. [13] It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff’s that the clear evidence of the existence of such special business arrangement (arrangement) can be seen from the evidence of the Plaintiff’s witnesses PW1, PW4 and PW5. It was also submitted by the Plaintiff’s counsel that from the evidence of PW1, PW4 and PW5, it is abundantly clear that they were formerly employed by the Defendant during the period the transactions were transacted (at the material time). They testified that at the material time the Defendant had specifically stationed them at Block A to run the business operation for the Defendant. According to them, their tasks among others, are, issuing purchase order, accepting delivery order and acknowledging receipt of goods. They confirmed that the PO’s were PO’s from the Defendant and the incorporation of the Defendant’s rubber stamp acknowledging the receipt of the goods were done either by one of them according to the names appearing on the DO’s. [14] In this connection, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that the Defendant did not at any time challenge the evidence of the existence of the special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant arising from the MOU. Similarly also, even the evidence that the Defendant’s employees were stationed at Block A to conduct the Defendant’s business was not challenged by the Defendant. It is also undisputed that the special business arrangement becomes the practice and convention in the business dealings between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. In fact, the counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that the Plaintiff’s evidence on the existence of the arrangement was even corroborated by the Defendant’s own witnesses namely Nasharuddin bin Shaharun Ayumi (DW1) and Azlina bt Zulkifli (DW2). DW1 and DW 2 are the current directors of the Defendant. In their evidence they had told the court that even though they have not been made directors of the Defendant during the time these transactions took place, they were fully aware and had knowledge that the Defendant’s employees were permanently stationed at Block A to operate the business of the Defendant. The Defendant’s Case [15] The Defendant had vigorously denied the Plaintiff’s claim. In its Statement of Defence, the Defendant had disputed the Plaintiff’s claim primarily on the ground that the issuance of the PO’s were made without the authority, permission and knowledge of the Defendant. A similar stand was taken in respect of the Defendant’s acknowledgement of receipt of the goods incorporated on the DO’s. On this basis, the Defendant had also raised the defence of unjust enrichment on the part of the Plaintiff. [16] At the outset, it must be noted and emphasised again that the Defendant’s line of defences pleaded in its Amended Statement of Defence in opposing the Plaintiff’s claim are that; the Defendant had never requested for the goods, the goods were never delivered to the Defendant and thus the Defendant had not received any benefit from the goods, the Defendant had no knowledge of the transactions that gave rise to the invoices issued by the Plaintiff, the issuance of the PO’s and acknowledgment incorporated on the DO’s were made without the knowledge, permission and authority of the Defendant and the Plaintiff had failed to take reasonable steps to verify the representation from the Defendant in respect of the PO’s and DO’s. Furthermore, it was also the pleaded case of the Defendant at paragraphs 21 to 26 that on or around 26.11.2013 the Malaysian Anti - Corruption Commission (MACC) had commenced an investigation on alleged corrupt practices involving the Defendant’s business transactions with the Plaintiff and some other companies. The Defendant here is also facing other civil suits on similar transactions in which other companies are also filing civil actions to recover unpaid debts from the Defendant. [17] Having briefly summarized the cases for the Plaintiff and the Defendant, this Court will now examine the issues raised in this case. This Court must state that Issues (a) and (b) are inter-related. These two issues primarily centred on documents produced by the Plaintiff, particularly the PO’s and the DO’s to prove that the goods had been ordered, purchased and delivered. These two issues can be disposed of by determining one crucial issue namely; whether there existed a special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in respect of the conduct or the manner of the business to be carried out between them. Whether there was a special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in respect of the conduct or the manner of the business to be carried out between them. [18] Firstly, it must be noted that the Defendant had not at any time challenged the PO’s and the DO’s as well as its contents. The entire defence put up in disputing the Plaintiff’s claim was that the transactions were conducted without the knowledge, permission or authority of the Defendant. The Defendant also did not dispute that the business relationship of the Defendant and the Plaintiff arose from the MOU entered between the Defendant and Areva T&D. Secondly, it was never in dispute that the Defendant’s factory was located at Block A, sharing the same address in which Areva runs its operation. The fact that the Defendant’s factory was located at Block A was even supported with the Defendant’s own document tendered by the Plaintiff. This was also confirmed by Exhibit P11. Exhibit P11 (pages 19-20, Bundle B2), is a letter (together with an attachment or lampiran) from Ministry Of Finance to the Defendant approving certain duties exemption to the Defendant. A closer perusal of P11 reveals, without a single shade of doubt that the address of the Defendant’s factory is stated as Block A‘s address. The contents of the letter is reproduced below: Ruj. Kami: (8.20)116/5/1-14242 Vol.2 (23) Tarikh : 5 Jun 2009 Tetuan, Bekal Hikmat Sdn. Bhd., Blok A, Lot 3687, Batu 3 ½, Jalan Segambut, 51200 KUALA LUMPUR Tuan, Pengecualian Duti Import Ke Atas Bahan Mentah/ Komponen Bagi Mengeluarkan Keluaran Siap Oleh Syarikat Bekal Hikmat Sdn. Bhd. Dengan hormatnya saya diarah merujuk kepada permohonan tuan yang dialamatkan kepada Lembaga Kemajuan Perindustrian Malaysia (MIDA) mengenai perkara di atas. 2. Adalah dimaklumkan bahawa Kementerian Kewangan selaras dengan peruntukan di bawah Seksyen 14(2) Akta Kastam 1967 telah bersetuju mengecualikan duti import ke atas bahan mentah/komponen bagi mengeluarkan keluaran siap seperti di LAMPIRAN I. Pengecualian ini adalah tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat seperti di LAMPIRAN “A”. 3. Tempoh pengecualian, stesen import, tempat pengilangan/penyimpanan bahan mentah/komponen dan pasaran adalah seperti dinyatakan dalam Lampiran I berkembar. Jika pasaran tidak dinyatakan, syarikat tuan bebas untuk menjadualkan keluaran siap berkaitan di pasaran tempatan/dieksport/ FIZ/LMW sekiranya keluaran tersebut merupakan input kepada keluaran FIZ/LMW berkenaan. 4. Sekiranya syarikat ingin memohon untuk lanjutan pengecualian duti import, syarikat dinasihatkan supaya mengemukakan permohonan kepada MDA tiga (3) bulan sebelum tamat tempoh pengecualian. Sekian, terima kasih. “BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA” Saya yang menurut perintah, t.t. (KHODIJAH BINTI ABDULLAH) Bahagian Analisa Cukai, b.p. Ketua Setiausaha Perbendaharaan Thirdly, the evidence of PW1, PW4 and PW5 in respect of Defendant’s conduct of business were clear and unshaken. They had testified that they were administrative clerks who were tasked to issue the PO’s and to acknowledge receipt on the DO’s. As a matter of fact, they further testified that issuing purchase order and acknowledging receipt of goods are their primary tasks authorised by the Defendant. Undeniably, PW1, PW4 and PW5 were specifically placed or stationed at the Defendant’s premises which the Defendant shared with Areva at Block A, Lot3687, 31/2 Miles, Jalan Segambut, 51200 Kuala Lumpur to conduct the business for the Defendant. Fourthly, interestingly it was also evidenced that the two Batu Caves premises are shop house lots, in which Lot 17A (the premise’s photograph can be found at page 26 of Bundle B3) with an area of 20 feet x 50 feet, was at the first floor with a monthly rental of RM900.00, while No. 61A, Jalan Sesama (the premise’s photograph can be found at page 25 of Bundle B3) was also located at the 1st Floor Factory Building with an area of 30 feet x 60 feet and the rental was at RM1000.00 monthly. The evidence revealed before this Court is that two premises are small unit shop houses which cannot possibly be a factory to accept goods supplied by the Plaintiffs such as switchgears, panels for 11 KV switchboard, control panel and what more to assemble large finished products such as Medium voltage switchgears and to store them. The products can be seen at pages 20-23, Bundle B3. In this connection, this Court is inclined to agree with the submission of the counsel for the Plaintiff that the Defendant had never received the goods from the Plaintiff at either one of the Batu Caves addresses as those two premises were too small to store the goods. This fact is consistent that the Defendant had never had a factory for purposes of this commercial dealings at the Batu Caves addresses and that the Defendant’s factory was in actual fact was at Block A, the same address with Areva’s factory address. This is consistent with the note appearing on the PO’s that goods ordered or purchased from the Plaintiff are to be delivered at Block A. [19] This special business arrangement is further supported by three other supporting documentary evidences. Interestingly some of these documents were Defendant’s own documents. Firstly, as this Court had mentioned earlier in the judgment, the Defendant was also sued by another company by the name KVC Industrial Supplies (KVC suit) for a claim similar to the present case. In the KVC suit the Defendant had defended the civil action by filing Statement of Defences and the defences were basically the same defences as in the present case. In the KVC suit trial, the former Managing Director of the Defendant, Puan Badariah binti Isman (Puan Badariah) was called to give evidence for the Defendant. Puan Badariah in her Witness Statement and her oral evidence had stated that there was an arrangement between the Defendant and Areva that the Defendant’s employees were permanently placed in the premises of Areva at Block A to conduct the Defendant’s business pursuant to the terms of the MOU and the employees were also required to act on the instructions of Areva. The relevant passages of Puan Badariah’s evidence in the Notes of Evidence in KVC Suit are as follows: Notes of Evidence in KVC Suit Pages 30,31,32,33 and 34, Bundle 34 “ABM Saya rujuk Puan kepada mukasurat 19 sehingga 27 Ikatan C1. Sepertimana yang telah ditunjukkan tadi saya katakana kepada Puan bahawa dokumen-dokumen tersebut adalah berdasarkan kepada perihal gaji bonus dan peningkatan gaji bagi pekerja-pekerja Defendan. Setuju ataupun tidak? BADARIAH Nama yang tercatit di sini bukan kesemuanya pekerja Defendan. YA Which page are you asking the question? ABM It is basically all the, from 19 to 27. But I can be more specific if the witness is. YA What was your question, sorry? ABM My question was, Yang Arif that this documents we leave to the issues concerning bonuses, increments and. YA All that don’t worry. The only relevant thing was whether they were employees. Everything else is irrelevant. What is the next question? ABM Soalan saya seterus-terusnya berkenaan dengan dokumen yang tersebut juga. Adakah dokumen-dokumen, saya katakan bahawa dokumen-dokumen ini dikeluarkan oleh syarikat Defendan? YA Must be isn’t it, it is in the Defendant’s bundle? ABM I interested to see as to what she has to say Yang Arif. YA These documents belong to Defendant is your question? ABM Belong and also issued by the Defendant. Setuju ataupun tidak Puan Badariah? BADARIAH Dikeluarkan menggunakan letterhead syarikat saya tapi diluluskan oleh pihak Areva. YA Yes, these documents, sorry what did the witness say? BADARIAH Menggunakan. YA Menggunakan letterhead. BADARIAH Letterhead Defendant tetapi kenaikan gaji diluluskan dan diarahkan oleh pihak Areva. YA Ini sebab you punya what’s the arrangement? What’s the Malay word for arrangement. Persetujuan. Itulah you punya cadangan atau arrangement dengan Areva betul? Tidak? Itu you punya arrangement dengan Areva betul? BADARIAH Betul. YA That’s their arrangement with Areva. ABM Jadi adakah Puan mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dokumen-dokumen ini? YA You see because Mr. Budiman, if you took at page 20 of C1, you see the signature of Mr. Andrew Chelliah approved, recommended. ABM Yes, Yang Arif. YA So, they work, they are employees. You can ask the witness, they are employees of the Defendant who work with her permission in the third party’s premises and wages are paid by the Defendant but their performance etc, is rated by the third party. You ask the witness. BADARIAH Betul. YA Yes, she can understand, that’s betul. Sorry, never mind. I’ll ask her later. You complete your cross. I confirm that the arrangement. Never mind, you carry on. ABM Much obliged Yang Arif. Jadi bolehkan Puan menjelaskan bagaimana Puan memiliki salinan dokumen-dokumen ini? BADARIAH Biasanya melalui faks. YA Which document? The employee one? ABM Again from pages 19 to 27, Yang Arif. Jadi dokumen-dokumen tersebut disahkan oleh Puan selaku pengarah urusan Bekal Khidmat Sdn Bhd? BADARIAH Saya sahkan dokumen ini tapi bukan. ABM Itu sahaja. Ya atau tidak? BADARIAH Ya. ABM Selaku pengarah urusan Bekal Khidmat, secara lazimnya Puan membenarkan pihak-pihak lain menggunakan letter head ataupun dokumen-dokumen kepunyaan syarikat? YA I think you should be specific. Ask whether they authorized those few employees. Faridah and all, to use the letter head of the Defendant and sign on behalf of the Defendant. That’s what it is here, ask the witness the direct question. ABM Very well Yang Arif. Adakah secara lazimnya Puan membenarkan pekerja-pekerja Puan yang dihantar di Areva? YA Who were working on the premises. ABM Di premis pihak ketiga iaitu Areva untuk menggunakan dokumen-dokumen syarikat Bekal Khidmat Sdn. Bhd.? BADARIAH Ya, tapi mereka harus merujuk kepada saya terlebih dahulu untuk setiap transaksi. YA Must get my permission, what did the witness say? ABM Must refer, employees must relate to her. YA Ask her whether she inform the Plaintiff to that effect, that they mustn’t receive any purchase order on that letter head unless they get her permission. ABM Adakah arahan untuk merujuk Puan tersebut di khusus untuk segala purchase order yang dikeluarkan oleh syarikat kepada suppliernya? BADARIAH Ya. ABM Termasuk Plaintiff? BADARIAH Ya. YA Ask her which page in the document, we can see the documents? ABM Adakah ia dinyatakan di mana-mana dokumen, arahan tersebut yang dikeluarkan oleh Puan supaya dirujuk kepada Puan terdahulu? YA Anything in writing? BADARIAH Tiada. YA Just one minute, can you ask the witness. Page 1, all the purchase orders? ABM Bundle B1, yang tebal itu. Mukasurat 1 sehingga mukasurat 166. YA Ask the witness what, is her evidence based on what she had just said that she’s not complaining about the use of the letter head. She’s only complaining that they did not raise the matter with her before they used the letter head. Is that what her evidence is? Ask her. With reference to the documents, 1 to 163. I think. ABM Jadi soalan saya. Puan rujuk pada pesan pembelian yang dikeluarkan menerusi mukasurat 1 hingga 166 tersebut di Bundle B1. Sedia maklum Puan? BADARIAH Ya. ABM Jadi, soalan ialah berkenaan dengan pengeluarkan PO ini, PO-PO tersebut saya cadangkan pada Puan masalahnya bukan hanya kepada tiada rujukan dibuat pada Puan. Saya mengatakan bahawa Puan tiada masalah menggunakan pekerja-pekerja Puan menggunakan PO-PO tersebut dan dikeluarkan kepada Plaintiff. Dalam erti kata lain. [20] This Court takes cognizance that the KVC suit was settled before the trial was completed as parties had entered into a consent judgment. [21] The second document is Exhibit D27. This document also relates to Puan Badariah. She had lodged a police report concerning the numerous civil suits faced by the Defendant. She had clearly stated in the police report that the Defendant’s employees had been permanently stationed in Areva’s premises pursuant to the terms of the MOU and the arrangement thereto was that the employees were required to act on the instructions of Areva. The relevant portions of the police report read as follows: (a) Saya adalah pengarah urusan bagi syarikat Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd (258140-k) yang beralamat di 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves,68100 Selangor Darul Ehsan. (b) Terdapat suatu Memorandum Persefahaman (“Memorandum of Understanding”) bertarikh 30.10.1997 telah dimasuki di antara GEC Alsthom T & D Sdn Bhd (yang kini dikenali sebagai “Areva T & D Malaysia Sdn Bhd” (215632-V)) dan Bekal Hikmat Sdn. Bhd di mana Areva T & D Malaysia Sdn Bhd akan membantu Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd dalam membekalkan bahagian ataupun komponen untuk pengeluaran -electrical switchgears- untuk dibekalkan kepada Tenaga Nasional Berhad dan untuk projek industri. Adalah dalam persefahaman semua pihak bahawa Areva T&D Sdn Bhd akan membekalkan kepakaran jurutera teknikal (“engineering technical expertise”) memandangkan Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd, iaitu sebuah syarikat bumiputra, tidak mempunyai pengalaman dalam industri ini. ... (j) Saya percaya pekerja-pekerja Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd seperti dinyatakan di bawah boleh membantu siasatan polis: (i) Cik Lim Fong Fun (No. K/P :811022-04-5576) (ii) Faridah binti Abd Rani (No. K/P :841224-14-5580) (iii) Farawahida binti Abd Rani ( No. K/P:790710-08-5838) (k) Secara rasminya, Cik Faridah binti Abd Rani dan Cik Farawahida binti Abd Rani adalah pekerja-pekerja Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd. Oleh kerana terdapatnya suatu “arrangement” di antara Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd bersama Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd, Cik Faridah binti Abd Rani dan Cik Farawahida binti Abd Rani telah ditempatkan di alamat tersebut untuk bekerja dengan Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd sepenuh masa. Berdasarkan “arrangement” tersebut, mereka akan menerima arahan terus daripada Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd dan bukannya dari Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd. Setiap bulan gaji mereka akan dibayar oleh Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd dan bukannya dari Bekal Hikmat Sdn Bhd. Bonus dan gaji mereka adalah berada dalam kuasa Areva T&D dan ditentukan oleh Areva T&D dan ditentukan oleh Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd sepenuhnya. [22] Thirdly, there were other documentary evidences produced by the Plaintiff through PW1, PW4 and PW5. These documentary evidences were also the Defendant’s document. The documents pertain to the Defendant’s employees’ salaries, approval for increments and bonuses. It is interesting to note that PW1, PW4 and PW5 despite being the Defendant’s employees, their salaries, increments and bonuses were determined by Areva and not the Defendant. This is evidenced by Exhibits P3 [(a) to (g) (pages 111 to 117), Bundle B4] and was also supported by Puan Badariah’s evidence in the KVC suit. For ease of reference, pages 111, 112, 113 are reproduced below:- Page 111 Page 112 Page 113 The relevant part of Puan Badariah’s evidence in the KVC suit is also reproduced below:- “ABM Saya rujuk Puan kepada mukasurat 19 sehingga 27 Ikatan C1. Sepertimana yang telah ditunjukkan tadi saya katakan kepada Puan bahawa dokumen-dokumen tersebut adalah berdasarkan kepada perihal gaji bonus dan peningkatan gaji bagi pekerja-pekerja Defendan. Setuju ataupun tidak? BADARIAH Nama yang tercatit di sini bukan kesemuanya pekerja Defendan. YA Which page are you asking the question? ABM It is basically all the, from 19 to 27. But I can be more specific if the witness is. YA What was your question, sorry? ABM My question was, Yang Arif that this documents we leave to the issues concerning bonuses, increments and. YA All that don’t worry. The only relevant thing was whether they were employees. Everything else is irrelevant. What is the next question? ABM Soalan saya seterus-terusnya berkenaan dengan dokumen yang tersebut juga. Adakah dokumen-dokumen, saya katakan bahawa dokumen-dokumen ini dikeluarkan oleh syarikat Defendan? [23] Based on the aforementioned evidences, it is this Court’s judgment that there are overwhelming evidences as to the existence of a special business arrangement between the Defendant and the Plaintiff in conducting their business. This Court would go as far as to say that the evidence is plainly glaring that from the MOU, the Defendant who was supposed to or obligated to make ready a factory for purposes of manufacturing the switchgears, had instead of setting up its own factory or facility, devised this special business arrangement in conducting its business. In fact, the special business arrangement had been deliberately put in place by the Defendant itself and therefore the Defendant cannot now turn against the arrangement by asserting excuses that the transaction or documentations prepared by its own employees were made without its knowledge or permission or authority. Authenticity of PO’s and Acknowledgement incorporated on the DO’s [24] The Defendant in the course of trial during the cross-examinations of the Plaintiff’s witnesses had attempted to question the authenticity of those documentations. This Court must also stress here that a large portion of the written submission be it in the main submission or the reply submissions, the counsel for the Defendant had focused his attention on the failure of the Plaintiff to bring Areva T&D as a party to this action. In doing so, the submission of the learned counsel for the Defendant revolves on the documentary evidences which had been produced by the Plaintiff. Those documentary evidences mainly being the PO’s and the acknowledgment of receipt on the DO’s. What the counsel for the Defendant had attempted to raise is referring to the authenticity of the documents which were issued by the Defendant’s employees who were stationed in Block A in which the Defendant had attempted to assert that there are contradictions of evidences between them. An example of those contradictions being the directions issued by them, the tenure of their employment with regards to their appointment, their resignations, their new employees and their relation with Areva T&D or persons who have relations with Areva. In this matter, this court reiterates again that the Defendant had raised matters which were not pleaded in their statement of defence. The authenticity of the PO’s issuance and acknowledgment of receipt on the DO’s or the authenticity of documents were never disputed by the Defendant in their defence. What was raised by the Defendant was that the issuance of these documents were made without the Defendant’s consent. The matter on the authenticity of the documents was only raised when the Plaintiff’s witnesses were cross-examined. It must be stressed here that this Court had ruled earlier in this judgment that the Plaintiff vide the documentary evidences and oral evidences of the witnesses have successfully proven that the PO’s and the incorporation of the Defendant’s acknowledgment of receipt on the DO’s had been performed or conducted by the Defendant’s own employees which were stationed in Block A where Areva also conducts its business and that the delivery to Block A was made based on the special arrangement by Defendant’s own volition. This special agreement by the Defendant and the Plaintiff had been the status quo since as early as the year 2000. This special agreement is a business practice which was established or devised by the Defendant himself and was followed by its business partner which is the Plaintiff and had consistently continued until the transaction became this dispute before this Court. It is this Court’s judgment that when one party had agreed to undertake to follow such business practice of this manner, and the other party had performed all their proper obligations pursuant to the said agreed business practice, thus, the said other party shall retain the rights to claim for all that is properly due to him. Therefore in this present case, the Defendant should not be allowed to raise anything which attempts to deflect and defeat the arrangement which the Defendant himself had willingly opted to venture, adhere to and agreed to ever since the inception of the business relations and deny their liabilities. [25] This Court is in total agreement with the Plaintiff’s counsel that the issue of the authenticity of the documents was never pleaded by the Defendant in its Statement of Defence. Therefore, the issue of authenticity must be disregarded as the Defendant is bound by its pleaded case. [26] It is trite law that parties are bound by their pleading. There is a myriad of authorities on this. (See i. RHB Bank Bhd (substituting Kwong Yik Bank Bhd) v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd, [2010] 2 MLJ 188. ii. The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157. iii. Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Jalinan Waja Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 322. iv. State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490. v. Astrovlanis Compania Naviera AS v Linard [1972] 2 QB 611, [1972] 2 All ER 647. vi. Spedding v Filzpatrick 1888 38 Ch D 410 at p 413. vii. Thomson v Birkley (1882) 31 WR 230. viii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283.) In any event, following this Court’s earlier finding on the existence of the special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the conduct of their business, the Defendant’s contention on the authenticity of the documents must also fail. Statement of account or the customer ledger [27] The counsel for the Defendant had also attempted to query the invoices and account statements by disputing Exhibit P9 (pages 28-30, Bundle B3) which were issued by the Plaintiff and submitted to this Court that the account statements which were issued by the Plaintiff should not be admitted as they are not entries in the books of account which is relevant under Section 34 of the Evidence Act 1950. It was also submitted on behalf of the Defendant that Exhibit P9 is not in adherence to Section 34 of the Evidence Act 1950 on the ground that Exhibit 9 are not account statements issued in the ordinary course of business. The counsel for the Defendant further submitted that there is in existence contradictory evidences between PW2 and P6 in the preparation of the said account statements. [28] This Court is of the considered view that Exhibit P9 which were prepared by the Plaintiff was based on the business practice which was agreed upon by both the Defendant and the Plaintiff. For all this while since the year 2000, the Defendant had never questioned or challenged the customer ledger (account statement) which were issued by the Plaintiff. To this Court, the same answer and conclusion in the matter of the PO’s and the DO’s shall also similarly apply here. All throughout this business relation between the Defendant and the Plaintiff, the Defendant had already accepted the customer ledger (account statement) and had already furnished payments to the Plaintiff. [29] Regarding the provision of Section 34 of the Evidence Act 1950 which was raised by the Defendant, this Court must reiterate again that this business practice which was performed by the Defendant and the Plaintiff from the outset is a practice not in the ordinary course of business, thus the Defendant cannot assert now that the said customer ledger is a matter not in an ordinary course of business. That cannot at all be correct. The special arrangement practiced had veered off from the ordinary course of business from the outset and both the parties especially the Defendant had willingly acceded and accepted it. There is nothing ordinary left in the course of business between the Defendant and the Plaintiff to warrant the invocation of Section 34. As found earlier, this business practice had been the status quo since the year 2000 and had remained unchallenged until this dispute arose. Notwithstanding this unordinary course of business, this Court would go as far to find that, based on the special arrangement (which was unchallenged and in fact accepted since the year 2000 until this dispute arose), it is verily more probable than not that the customer ledger (being undisputed and paid for by the Defendant) is in fact the agreed ordinary course of business to be taken in conducting their business. In the same matter, I am also in agreement with the counsel for the Plaintiff that the customer ledger which is Exhibit P10 (pages 204-210, Bundle B3) must be read together with the invoices issued by the Plaintiff in Exhibit P8 (pages 136-138, Bundle B3). Upon close scrutiny of these two exhibits, this Court indeed found that the exhibits do correspond with each other. Thereto, these entries in the customer ledger are verily relevant as they are corroborated by other supporting documents such as the PO’s, DO’s and the invoices. Contrary to the Defendant’s contention on the ordinary course of business, there are overwhelming evidences to prove that the issuance of the customer ledger is in line with the course of business arranged and agreed by the parties. [30] Succinctly put, firstly, the Defendant cannot deem the customer lodger out of the ordinary course of business since the business arrangement is already out of the ordinary. Secondly, it is more probable than not that the issuance of the customer ledger is indeed the ordinary course of business agreed by the parties in the special arrangement. Nonetheless, it needs to be emphasised here that the Plaintiff is not solely relying on the statement of account to prove its case. The Plaintiff had produced PO’s, DO’s and Invoices to prove that the goods were sold and delivered and Exhibit P9 are entries which are supported by these other documents. Adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Defendant for not calling Puan Badariah as a witness. [31] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff had urged this Court to draw an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Defendant for its failure to call the Defendant’s former Managing Director as a witness. The counsel for the Plaintiff had submitted that Puan Badariah was the Managing Director at the material time and she was called to give evidence for the Defendant in the KVC suit. The Defendant had instead called DW1 and DW2, the current directors and both of them when testified in Court had told this Court that they had only obtained their information regarding the Defendant from Puan Badariah. [32] This Court is also in total agreement with the counsel for the Plaintiff on this matter. Puan Badariah was the Defendant’s Managing Director at the material time. Hence, she was responsible in the running of the Defendant’s business at the material time and she is definitely the best, proper and capable person to enlighten this Court on the special business arrangements of the Defendant. More so, she gave evidence for the Defendant in the KVC suit. She was the person who lodged the police report on behalf of the Defendant. As a matter of fact, when DW1 and DW2 gave evidence, they had informed the Court that all of the information they had pertaining to the Defendant were obtained from Puan Badariah. For reasons known to the Defendant, Puan Badariah was not called to testify for the Defendant and there was no reason afforded by the Defendant for not calling her. To this Court, this is an obvious case to invoke the adverse inference under section 114(g) against the Defendant. Clearly the failure of calling of Puan Badariah as a witness, being an important and material witness is detrimental and in fact, fatal to the Defendant’s case. (See Munusamy V PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492 (SC)...“Held: (1) It is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but a material document by a party in his possession, or for non production of just any witness but important and material witness to the case. Adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Plaintiff for not calling Loh Choon Kiam as a witness. [33] The learned counsel for the Defendant on the other hand had also urged this Court to invoke section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 on the Plaintiff’s failure to call a person by the name of Loh Choon Kiam as its witness to prove its case. The Defendant had attempted to allege that the Defendant’s employees are supposedly the cronies to Loh Choon Kiam who is actually one of the Directors of Areva who may shed more light on the MOU which was signed by the Defendant and Areva T&D. Nonetheless, I am in agreement with the counsel for the Plaintiff that Loh Choon Kiam has no relation at all with the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff’s case. The Plaintiff’s case rests upon the documentary evidences which were issued by the Defendant itself and the Plaintiff’s other supporting documents, together with other oral evidences which were unchallenged. The narrative of the Plaintiff’s case is not at all deterred or rattled although Loh Choon Kiam was not called as a witness. Thus, it does not at all carry the effect of withholding or suppression of evidence on the part of the Plaintiff when Loh Choon Kiam was not called as witness by the Plaintiff unlike the Defendant’s own failure to call the Defendant’s Former Managing Director at the material time, Puan Badariah. The Defendant’s application for this Court to invoke the adverse inference under section 114(g) is unwarranted and this Court shall not draw such inference. Whether the action and investigation that is currently being undertaken by the Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM) is connected with the Plaintiff’s Invoices, Delivery Orders (DO’s) and Purchase Orders (PO’s) for the year 2008 and 2009, and whether it has any impact or connection/relation with the Plaintiff’s action against the Defendant. [34] In view of this Court‘s finding on the existence of the special business arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the conduct of their business, the above issue need not be addressed by this Court. Furthermore, it must be noted that the report to the MACC was only lodged in 2013, just a few days short of the first trial date in December 2013. This Court could not agree more with the Plaintiff’s counsel that the whole purpose of the MACC’s report was to delay the trial. If at all there were some elements of corruption in the business dealings or transaction, this would have been within the knowledge of Defendant at the commencement of suits against the Defendant by the Plaintiff in 2009. Here, it is not only the Plaintiff who is suing the Defendant to recover its debt but also some other companies filing similar claims around the same year (2009) against the Defendant. There were no conceivable reasons or justification afforded on the reason the Defendant had to wait until four years to realise that there were elements of corruption to lodge a report to the MACC. Clearly, as aptly submitted by the Plaintiff, that the lodging of report to the MACC is an afterthought on the Defendant’s part. This Court has no reason to disagree. Whether the Plaintiff’s failure to bring an action against Areva T&D Malaysia Sdn Bhd (Company No.: 2156632-V) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Third Party’) or to add the third party as Second Defendant in this action has an implication against the Plaintiff? [35] In view of this Court’s finding on the existence of the special arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the conduct of their business, the above issue also need not be addressed by this Court. [36] Nonetheless, it must be minded that the parties to the arrangement were Areva and the Defendant. The Plaintiff is just a contract manufacturing company to the Defendant. The PO’s, DO’s and Invoices give rise to the imposition of a contractual relationship and obligation only onto the Defendant and the Plaintiff and certainly not Areva. There was no privity of contract at all between the Plaintiff and Areva. Thus, the Plaintiff’s failure to bring an action against Areva would not give rise to any implication against the Plaintiff’s claim in the present case. [37] The counsel for the Defendant had also argued that even the Plaintiff itself had admitted, in paragraph 3 of its pleadings that Areva were the Defendant’s nominees and thus, Areva must be roped in into this suit. Similarly in this regard, in light of the earlier finding that the PO’s, DO’s and invoices only bind the Plaintiff to the Defendant as a contract manufacturing company, this Court finds that this argument is untenable. Areva is not at all a party to this contract and therefore is not privy to it and there is no necessity at all to bring Areva as a party in this dispute. Thus, the authorities cited therein are irrelevant to this case. [38] Coming back to the evidence of DW1 and DW2, DW1 was appointed as a director only after these transactions had taken place. Indeed, a director would be responsible in terms of liability of a company but he was only made a director in year 2011 more than a year after this present case was filed. Obviously he would not be in any position to indulge the court on the authorisation or permission and knowledge as he was not in charge of the Defendant at that point in time. Thus, I agree with the Plaintiff’s counsel that these transactions were not within the knowledge of DW1 and even more so on the question of authority or permission which should well be beyond his knowledge. [39] And in so far as the evidence of DW2 is concerned, this Court had the opportunity to observe DW2 when she gave her evidence. The most logical and probable inference that can be concluded from her evidence is that even though she is the Defendant’s director, she is merely a sleeping director, who knows nothing of the business, what more the running of it. Every questions posed to her had to be repeated so many times as she appeared to be quite lost and alien to all of the questions posed to her. Her conduct seemingly indicates that she actually did not participate in the Defendant’s business activities. This Court entirely agrees with the Plaintiff’s counsel’s submission that not much weight could be placed on her evidence. [40] In this connection, the evidence of DW3 – Mr. Lee Seng and his involvement in this case is somehow very perplexing. He was the person who lodged the report to the MACC and also the person who owns one of the Batu Caves addresses namely No. 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves, 68100, Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan. He was also the witness in the MOU. He came to court projecting himself as someone who cares about justice and wants justice to be observed. He stated in his evidence that he has no role in the Defendant’s company. Somehow or rather when he testified in court he seemed to know the business that Defendant is engaged with in great depth. I would even say that he knows the Defendant’s business inside and out even though he is not the director of the company or even a shareholder of the Defendant company. However, the business operation of the Defendant seems to be on his fingertips. Furthermore, his wife Mrs. Lee, has an obvious hold in the Defendant’s management and this can be clearly seen in Exhibit P3, pages 111 to 117 of B4 and Exhibit D14 at page 118 of B4. [41] At this juncture, this Court poses a question – who is this DW3 to the Defendant company? From the evidence adduced in court particularly the Defendant’s own evidences from its witnesses DW1 and DW2, it is reasonable to conclude that DW3 somehow has his hand in this company. In this instance, the issue regarding knowledge, authority and permission raised by the Defendant is not something the Defendant can complain. [42] This Court’s evaluation in totality of the oral evidence or testimonies of the witnesses as well as the documentary evidences, the answers to the issues (a), (b), and (c) are in the affirmative. [43] Based on the aforesaid grounds set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has established its case on the balance of probabilities and accordingly, this Court makes the following orders:- i) judgment is entered for the Plaintiff for the sum of RM1,017,287.47 (as at 30.09.2009). ii) interest at the rate of 1.5% per month on the principal sum of RM884,586.10 from 01.10.2009 to the date of judgment. iii) interest rate at the rate 5% per annum on the principal sum of RM884,586.10 from date of judgment to date of full settlement. As to the issue of costs [44] With regard to costs, this Courts orders the Defendant to pay RM35,000.00 to the Plaintiff. t.t. (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 29th day of August, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Prasad Abraham & Associates Miss Veronica Mary Anne Dominic For the Defendant - Tetuan K.F. Ee & Co. Miss Emily Hiew Yee Peng 41 image2.jpeg image3.jpeg image4.jpeg image1.png

Tika 2.6.0

MT5-22-758-2009

PLAINTIF HSBC BANK MALAYSIA BERHAD .... PLAINTIF F DEFENDAN 1. JEJAK MAJU RESOURCES SDN BHD 2. VIJAYALATHA A/P VELUPILLAI 3. PLUSTRANS RESOURCES SDN BHD 4. TENGKU SHAIFFULIAZAN BIN TENGKU ZAINAL ABIDIN 5. MICROVEST ENGINEERING SDN BHD 7. LIEW TENG SHUEN .... DEFENDAN TS

20/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=898d58e8-597c-481b-be78-f046bf62eff3&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : MT5-22-758-2009 BETWEEN HSBC BANK MALAYSIA BERHAD .... PLAINTIFF AND 1. JEJAK MAJU RESOURCES SDN BHD 2. VIJAYALATHA A/P VELUPILLAI 3. PLUSTRANS RESOURCES SDN BHD 4. TENGKU SHAIFFULIAZAN BIN .... DEFENDANTS TENGKU ZAINAL ABIDIN 5. MICROVEST ENGINEERING SDN BHD 7. LIEW TENG SHUEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Enclosure 60 – Application to stay proceeding [1] This is an application filed by the fifth and sixth defendants for an order for this Civil Suit to be stayed pending the disposal of the Malacca Sessions Court Criminal cases No.62-66,114,115,125-2009 (the criminal trial) and the Inquiry under Section 61 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act ( the AMLATFA) arising from the criminal trial. [2] As one of the defendants in the present case was involved in the criminal trial, the factual background and chronology of events of this civil suit and the criminal trial must be set out in order to fully understand the circumstances of the case which had led the fifth and sixth defendants to file in this application. The factual background and chronology of events revealed from the affidavits by both parties and the cause papers are as follows: a) The plaintiff is a banker running its business under the name of HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad. b) Jejak Maju Resources Sdn. Bhd, a RM2.00 company (the first defendant), Plustrans Resources Sdn Bhd (the third defendant) and Microvest Engineering Sdn Bhd (the fifth defendant) are companies having their registered offices at 5A-1, 1st Floor, Jalan Memanda 7, Ampang, 03-32, 3rd Floor, PKNS Complex, Shah Alam and No.117, Block A Damansara Intan No.1, Jalan SS 20/27, Petaling Jaya respectively. c) The second defendant (Vijayalatha a/p Velupillai) was the director of the first defendant, while the fourth defendant was the director of the third defendant and the sixth defendant is the director of the fifth defendant. d) The second defendant is also a lawyer running her own legal practice under the name of Messrs. Vellupillai & Associates. e) A Brazilian company by the name of Target Trading (Target), a valued customer to HSBC Bank Brasil S.A Banco Multiplo (HSBC Brazil) had intended to purchase “high speed diesel” from Petronas Dagangan Berhad. However, Brazil HSBC was informed that this can only be carried out through a local supply agent. f) HSBC Brazil had then contacted the plaintiff to finance the purchase of the diesel by the first defendant, the local supply agent. Thereafter, the first defendant was granted a banking facility by the plaintiff on the basis of a standby letter of credit provided to the plaintiff by HSBC Brazil. g) Subsequently, a letter of offer dated 29.4.2008 was issued by the plaintiff to the first defendant agreeing to provide banking facilities up to USD 5.4 million (the funds) to finance the purchase of the diesel. h) On 29.4.2008, the plaintiff had alleged that an instruction was received from HSBC Brazil purportedly made on behalf of Target instructing the plaintiff to transfer the sum of USD 4.55 million to a Petronas account with Malayan Banking Bhd (MBB). On the same day, the plaintiff had also received an insistent request from the first defendant to transfer the same amount into the MBB account. i) Later, the plaintiff found out that the account number belongs to the third defendant who, the second defendant claimed was a Petronas dealer. j) Upon request by the second defendant, the plaintiff had also on 2.5.2008 disbursed a sum of USD 0.75 million to the second defendant’s legal firm purportedly for shipping expenses. k) The first defendant had defaulted payment of the banking facility granted earlier. l) The plaintiff had also later discovered inter alia the following facts: (i) there was actually no transaction between the first defendant and Petronas. (ii) documents relating the to the diesel’s sale and purchase transactions were confirmed forged documents. (iii) the third defendant had paid a sum of USD 4 million to the fifth defendant. (iv) the third defendant had paid RM1 million each to the fourth defendant and a person by the name of Mohd. Fuad. vi) a sum of USD 3 million was paid by the fifth defendant to the sixth defendant. vii) the entire transaction in connection with the disbursement of USD 5.4 million by the plaintiff to the first defendant and thereafter to the rest of the defendants was a fraudulent transaction. m) On 18.6.2008, the second defendant had lodged a police report against, inter alia the fifth and sixth defendants, accusing that the fifth and sixth defendants were conspiring with the third defendant to defraud her in the sale and purchase dealings for the diesel. n) On 26.6.2008, the plaintiff lodged a police report alleging that they have been defrauded by a syndicate consisting of the above named defendants for the sum of USD 5.4 million. o) As a consequence of the police investigation, it was found that there are reasonable grounds to suspect an offence under subsection 4(1) of the AMLATFA is being committed, and the authority exercising their powers under sections 44(1) and 50(1) of the AMLATFA had seized and frozen all of the defendants’ accounts. The amount seized is approximately USD 3.327 million (the monies). p) On 21.5.2009, the plaintiff commenced the present action claiming damages for the sum of USD 5.4 million from all of the defendants for conspiracy to defraud. q) On 18.4.2011, the plaintiff had obtained a Mareva Injunction to restrain all the defendants from dealing with the funds. r) On 3.6.2009, the sixth defendant was charged at the Malacca Sessions Court for an offence under subsection 4(1)(a) of the AMLATFA. s) At the same time the fourth defendant and Mohd Fuad were charged for the predicate offence under section 420 of the Penal Code, which was to be read together with section 34 of the Penal Code. The fourth defendant and Mohd Fuad were also charged for five other offences each under subsection 4(1)(a) of the AMLATFA. t) All the criminal cases were heard together. The learned Sessions Judge on 20.9.2013, at the end of the prosecution case, had concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove a prima case against the three accused and ordered all the accused be acquitted and discharged without their defence being called. At the end of the criminal trial, the learned Sessions Judge had also made an order under section 61 (the Inquiry) of the AMLATFA for an inquiry to be conducted in respect of the monies. [3] It was the order of the Inquiry that have led the fifth and sixth defendants to file this Enclosure 60 applying for an order to stay this civil suit pending the disposal of the Inquiry. [4] The first, second and fourth defendants had failed to file their Statement of Defence, thereafter Judgment in default of defence were entered against them. [5] The plaintiff had been granted leave to proceed with the action against the third defendant which has been wound up. [6] For ease of reference, for the purposes of the stay application, the fifth and sixth defendants will be referred to as the defendants. [7] In applying for the stay order the defendants contended the following: (i) that, by virtue of Order 4 rule 1(1) Rules Of Court 2012 (ROC), this court should stay this present civil suit until the determination of the disposal of the Inquiry as both the Inquiry and the civil suit involved the same question of law and facts and the rights to relief claimed in both proceedings are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. (ii) prohibition under section 54(3) of the AMLATFA. [8] It was submitted by the counsel for the defendants that the question of law and facts as well as the rights to relief claimed for in both of the civil and criminal proceedings are the same. In support of this contention, the counsel for the defendants argued that the second defendant had testified as one of the prosecution witness in the criminal trial in which she had described and explained in detail on how the sum of USD 4.55 million was released to the defendants. Another prosecution witness by the name of Mr. Chandrasegaran had confirmed that the USD 4.55 million was released to the defendants in the manner described by the second defendant. [9] It was also submitted on behalf of the defendants that the transactions which took place in the criminal proceeding in respect of the funds were the same transactions which were alleged by the plaintiff to have occurred in this civil action. And thus, the counsel contended that the factual matrix in both criminal and civil cases is the same. [10] The counsel for the defendants had also submitted that the basic question for consideration of the Sessions Court in the Inquiry would ultimately be who the rightful owner of the monies. To determine the rightful owner of the monies, the same facts and transactions in relation to the monies need to be canvassed before the learned Sessions Judge. The counsel for the defendants further submitted that proceeding with the present civil suit would give rise to a risk of duplicity of proceedings or res judicata. More so, the plaintiff had taken steps to participate in the Inquiry. On duplicity of proceedings and res judicata he had referred to the following cases: (1) Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 Peh Swee Chin FCJ at pp 197-198; (2) JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd & Ors v Manilal & Sons (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1987] 1 MLJ 312. [11] It was also submitted by the counsel for the defendants that the present civil suit cannot continue and must be stayed by virtue of section 54(3) of the AMLATFA. The counsel submitted that section 54(3) of the AMLATFA prohibits the institution or continuation of any civil proceedings in respect of the property which has been so seized under the AMLATFA. [12] Therefore, it was submitted on behalf of the defendants that there arise special circumstances to warrant this court to exercise its unfettered discretion to grant a stay order. [13] In support of his contention, the counsel for the defendants cited several cases relating to principles guiding the courts in exercising their discretionary powers to grant or to refuse an application to stay proceedings. The cases are namely: i) Jaqdis Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 213 ii) Kosma Palma Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 iii) Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86 iv) Government of Malaysia v Datuk Haji Kadir Mohamad Mastar & another application [1993] 3 MLJ 514 [14] The plaintiff had strongly opposed the defendants’ application and forwarded several grounds in opposing it. The grounds can be summarized as follows: (i) there is no issue of multiplicity or duplicity of proceedings (ii) non - disclosure on the part of the defendants who were also acting in an inconsistent manner (iii) the civil court is the more suitable forum (iv) the application has been filed at a late stage, was made in bad faith and prejudicial to the plaintiff. Ground (i) - there is no issue of multiplicity or duplicity of proceedings [15] It was submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that the civil action filed by the plaintiff is essentially different in all aspects from the criminal proceeding. He further submitted that the two actions are different in terms of the injured party or victim, alleged wrongdoers, causes of action, factual basis in support of the complaint and the wrongdoings and the relief claimed. To convince the court, the counsel for the plaintiff in his written submission had even tabulated all the differences. Ground (ii) - non - disclosure on the part of the defendants who were also acting in an inconsistent manner [16] It was submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that both the defendants are not genuine in their application. The defendants had filed Enclosure 60 to stay this civil action on the premise that the Inquiry proceeding should be completed first to avoid duplicity of proceedings but at the same time, in contrary, the defendants had also applied to set aside the order of Inquiry made by the learned Sessions Judge disputing the basis which the Inquiry was ordered and contended that the monies ought to be returned to defendants. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendants are constantly prevaricating and had acted in an inconsistent manner. Ground (iii) - the civil court is the more suitable forum [17] The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the civil court is the more suitable forum to adjudicate the plaintiff’s claim which is based on tort of conspiracy to defraud. It was further submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that the Inquiry will only confine itself to the issue of ownership of the monies and not the commission of the tort, especially fraud. To support this contention, the counsel for the plaintiff had referred to two cases, namely Public Prosecutor v Thong Kian Oon & Ors [2012] 10 MLJ 140 and Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Pendakwaraya [2009] 8 CLJ 33. [18] It is the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff that the ultimate order that the court can make in the Inquiry is whether to release or to forfeit the monies and it does not adjudicate plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendants. Hence, it was further contended by the counsel for the plaintiff that the civil court would be the more suitable forum for adjudicating allegations of conspiracy to defraud. Ground (iv) - the application has been filed at a late stage, was made in bad faith and prejudicial to the plaintiff. [19] It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the application by the defendants was too late. The present civil action was commenced by the plaintiff in May 2009 and parties had appeared numerous times before the courts, where witness statements were exchanged between the parties. [20] The counsel for the plaintiff also contended that the defendants have taken active steps in the civil action and this application was made barely one month before this case is scheduled for hearing on the second trial date i.e. 13.2.2014. The defendants had written in to the court for an adjournment of the second trial date on the same ground as in Enclosure 60. The high court judge had adjourned the trial and instructed the defendants to file a formal application. The formal application was not filed by the defendants until two weeks before the third trial date. In addition, the present case had reached an advanced stage where the plaintiff is ready with its witnesses, three of whom are from 3 different banks and one from the United Kingdom and is scheduled for hearing for the third time on the 8th to 11th September 2014, whilst the Inquiry still has a long way to go. It was therefore contended on behalf of the plaintiff that this civil action should proceed. Decision of the court [21] The principles in relating to the exercise of court’s discretion whether to allow or refuse stay of proceedings had been well-established and well-illustrated in an abundance of authorities. The paramount consideration in allowing or refusing a stay of proceedings is the existence of special circumstances in that particular case warranting the court to exercise its discretionary powers. It is also trite that the principles to be applied in an application for stay of execution are also applicable in an application for stay of proceedings. (See; Re Hj Abdul Malik Khan; Ex P Bank Bumiputra Bhd [2006] 8 CLJ 534 ) [22] In the case of Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86, which was cited by the counsel for the defendants, Raja Azlan Shah (as His Majesty then was) had defined special circumstances in the following excerpt: “Special circumstances, as the phrase implies, must be circumstances as distinguished from ordinary circumstances. It must be something exceptional in character, something that exceeds or excels in some way that which is usual or common” [23] However, what could constitute special circumstances varies from case to another case and it depends on its own facts and the onus is on the applicants to demonstrate the existence of special circumstances to justify the grant of a stay. (See Kosma Palma Oil Mills Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257) [24] Zawawi bin Salleh (JCA) on behalf of the Court of Appeal in the case of Jagdish Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd in emphasising the unfettered court discretionary power in granting stay, had also outlined several considerations as a guideline to which the courts had considered on what constitutes special circumstances. At page 221, the Court of Appeal had said this: “...Now, what factors or principles will, and should, guide the courts in applications for a stay of an order granted by a court. These factors or principles have been reiterated in very many of cases decided by our courts. The factors or principles so enumerated are in exhaustive, and not all of them are application to every case. Each has its own peculiar principle. Some of the principles to be considered in the motions may be stated as follows; a) the courts have an unimpeded discretion to grant or refuse stay. In this, like in all other instances of discretion, the court is bound to exercise that discretion both judicially as well as judiciously and not erratically (see Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] 1 MLJ 116; Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86; b) an unsuccessful party applying for a stay must show “special circumstances”. What will constitute “special circumstances” will no doubt vary from case to case. The fact that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused is the most common one (see Kosma Palma Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Markmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257; [2003] 4 CLJ 1 and Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd &Ors (No.2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131). The application is not granted as matter of routine and it is not an automatic or mechanical relief slavishly followed after filing an appeal. In every matter or suit before a court of law, whether in its original or appellate stage of proceedings, the court will consider the competing rights of both parties including the applicant and respondent to justice; (c) there is a need to preserve the res or preservation of the subject matter of litigation. The courts have an obligation to protect the res for the purpose of ensuring that the appeal, if successful, will not be rendered nugatory (see Erinford Properties Ltd v Cheshire County Counsil [1974] 2 WLR 749). But where it is shown by affidavit evidence, say by the respondent that the res will not be destroyed or there is in fact no res, an application may not be granted. (d) where an application is an abuse of the court process, then the stay of proceedings will not be granted. A typical example of abuse of court process is where a suit is duplicated or where a party employs improper and perverse procedure to obtain an advantage undeservedly; (e) it is important to stress that initiation of a suit in a court of law demands the suit will be heard expeditiously and completed without any inhibition midway. Therefore where an application for stay of proceedings is intended to merely stop or suspend the proceedings, it will be refused. Some applications, on seeing the weakness of their client’s case, would resort to application for stay and thereby waste the time of the other party and the court. The party simply cannot resort to the interlocutory of stay proceedings on having the slightest disagreement with any ruling of a trial judge. Courts are enjoined not a encourage such unwholesome practice; and (f) an application for stay of proceedings must come with clean hands because what he is asking is an equitable relief. Equity will not assist the unclean. That is why the court has to look into the antecedents of the parties”. [25] Having considered the submission forwarded by both the parties and taking cognizance of all the well-established principles in granting stay of proceedings, I will now determine the merits of the defendants’ application. I do appreciate that the Inquiry before the Session’s Court and the civil suit in this High Court before me are of two different causes of action. The former, being an Inquiry under section 61 of the AMLATFA and the latter, under the tort of conspiracy to defraud. I am also equally minded that the underlying cause and facts behind the two actions, in actual fact rooted from the same set of facts and background. I must also bear in mind that the monies or the subject matter which was seized by the authority are monies related to both actions. [26] The essential factor in determining the propriety of a stay of proceedings is the existence of special facts and circumstances of a particular case and these special circumstances differ from case to case. And it must be noted that the considerations in determining the existence of special circumstances as laid down in Jagdish Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd is not exhaustive. [27] Assuming if I were to proceed with the civil suit and I would have to decide whether or not there was a conspiracy to defraud, consequently I would ultimately have to decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages of USD 5.4 million being the amount of monies which had been disbursed to the first defendant of which USD 4.55 million was later, either paid or remitted to the rest of the defendants. Hypothetically, if the High Court finds that there was conspiracy to defraud, the Bank would be entitled to recover the funds which had been earlier disbursed in terms of damages of USD 5.4 million from the defendants inclusive the monies. Hypothetically and equally so, if the Sessions Court Inquiry finds the monies rightfully belongs to the Bank, the Bank would also be entitled to claim for the return of the monies. Bearing in mind that the monies which were seized and frozen from all the defendants’ accounts forms part of the USD 5.4 million, which was also the subject matter for determination of the Sessions Court in the Inquiry. At the end of the Inquiry the Sessions Judge would ultimately again decide who will be the rightful and the bona fide owner of the monies. Notwithstanding the differences in the cause of action, and/or burden of proof, in my mind, the ultimate consequence and the end-result of both the High Court civil suit and the Sessions Court Inquiry would obviously concern the bona fide rights over the monies. I have said earlier and I reiterate here again that the monies in all of the defendants’ accounts which were seized and frozen forms part of the USD 5.4 million funds which the plaintiff had disbursed under the letter of credit. [28] In this situation, special circumstances would arise in which obviously there would be duplicity of decisions which would probably result in contradictory decisions by the two courts. Particularly in this case, the duplicity would be the decision between the Sessions Court Inquiry and the High Court here. I must say that both of the two actions would achieve the same effect relating to these monies in which both of the two actions would ultimately decide which party is entitled to the monies. This may give rise to two conflicting decisions on the same monies. The duplicity here is not so much on the proceedings which saw the same parties’ involvement but instead would be the preceding hypotheses, which entails the duplicity of decisions from the proceedings in which both causes of action would decide which party is entitled to the monies. [29] Thus, the ensuing effect of both decisions may contradict each other even if the two decisions derive from different causes of actions and/or burden of proof. It is my judgment that this situation falls squarely into the category of special circumstances. A stay of proceedings should be granted in order to avoid unnecessary contradictions and appeal processes. [30] In this regard, I would like to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lesco Development Corp. Sdn. Bhd. v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 184. In the case of Lesco Development, the Supreme Court had already envisaged that it is undesirable to allow a situation where two different courts would try and determine the same issues arising between the same parties relating to the same subject matter. In this case, the Supreme Court had dealt with a foreclosure proceeding which resulted in an order for sale and a claim for default of payments on the same monies claimed in the foreclosure application. The Supreme Court had held the following: (1) It is undesirable to allow a situation where two different courts would try and determine the same issues arising between the same parties relating to the same subject matter. (2) In this case the hearing of the foreclosure proceeding should have been postponed until the final disposal of the claim on the debt. (3) The order of sale should be set aside and the hearing of the foreclosure application be dealt after the final disposal of the claim on the debt. [31] Although the present case is not factually similar with the case of Lesco Development, the underlying principles of the case of Lesco Development can be mirrored to that of the present case. This is because and I reiterate again that the present case and the Sessions Court Inquiry would involve the same parties, the same facts and transactions, and the same subject matter i.e. the monies. Thus, it is equally undesirable, alike the case of Lesco Development, to have this High Court here, to try and determine the same subject matter. [32] With regard to the prohibition under section 54(3) of the AMLATFA raised by the counsel for the defendants, I am in agreement with the plaintiff’s counsel that section 54(3)of the AMLATFA is not applicable in the present case as the disputed subject matter here is monetary in nature while section 54(3)of the AMLATFA deals only with seized property under section 51 of the AMLATFA. [33] With regard to the issue of the application being filed at a very late stage of the proceeding, in bad faith and prejudicial to the plaintiff, my answer to this is that the Inquiry under section 61 of the AMLATFA only came about in September 2013 when it was ordered by the Sessions Judge at the end of the criminal trial on 20.9.2013. By this time, it is acknowledged that the civil suit has reached its advanced stage. However, the calculation of time could not be from the time the plaintiff had filed this civil suit as submitted by the plaintiff’s counsel because the Inquiry had only been ordered in September 2013. Only upon September 2013 that the defendants would have the justification to apply for a stay of proceedings. A stay order would certainly not prejudice the plaintiff as the stay order would only be putting a halt to the plaintiff’s claim in respect of the tortious liability against the defendants but not in respect of the monies. And since the plaintiff has taken step to participate in the Inquiry, the plaintiff should not complain of prejudice. [34] With regards to the defendants’ contention that the duplicity would give the plaintiff a second bite of the cherry or double jeopardy, whereby the plaintiff would unjustly be compensated twice from the two actions, which the plaintiff had replied that the decision in this high court would be accounted for in the Sessions Court Inquiry, I do not see the necessity to embark on this issue in view of my earlier findings on the existence of special circumstances in this case. [35] Based on the aforesaid reasons, the defendants’ application in Enclosure 60 is allowed with no order as to costs. Hence, this civil suit is stayed until the disposal of the Inquiry at the Malacca Sessions Court. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 20th day of August, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Benjamin Dawson, Solicitors Cik Fazillawati Jaafar For the Defendants - Tetuan K.F.Ee & Co Nur Amalina Haris for the 5th and 6th Defendant DAO/huda/sar/27814/4832 26

Tika 2.6.0

MT5-22-758-2009

PLAINTIF HSBC BANK MALAYSIA BERHAD .... PLAINTIF F DEFENDAN 1. JEJAK MAJU RESOURCES SDN BHD 2. VIJAYALATHA A/P VELUPILLAI 3. PLUSTRANS RESOURCES SDN BHD 4. TENGKU SHAIFFULIAZAN BIN TENGKU ZAINAL ABIDIN 5. MICROVEST ENGINEERING SDN BHD 7. LIEW TENG SHUEN .... DEFENDAN TS

20/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=898d58e8-597c-481b-be78-f046bf62eff3&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : MT5-22-758-2009 BETWEEN HSBC BANK MALAYSIA BERHAD .... PLAINTIFF AND 1. JEJAK MAJU RESOURCES SDN BHD 2. VIJAYALATHA A/P VELUPILLAI 3. PLUSTRANS RESOURCES SDN BHD 4. TENGKU SHAIFFULIAZAN BIN .... DEFENDANTS TENGKU ZAINAL ABIDIN 5. MICROVEST ENGINEERING SDN BHD 7. LIEW TENG SHUEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Enclosure 60 – Application to stay proceeding [1] This is an application filed by the fifth and sixth defendants for an order for this Civil Suit to be stayed pending the disposal of the Malacca Sessions Court Criminal cases No.62-66,114,115,125-2009 (the criminal trial) and the Inquiry under Section 61 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act ( the AMLATFA) arising from the criminal trial. [2] As one of the defendants in the present case was involved in the criminal trial, the factual background and chronology of events of this civil suit and the criminal trial must be set out in order to fully understand the circumstances of the case which had led the fifth and sixth defendants to file in this application. The factual background and chronology of events revealed from the affidavits by both parties and the cause papers are as follows: a) The plaintiff is a banker running its business under the name of HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad. b) Jejak Maju Resources Sdn. Bhd, a RM2.00 company (the first defendant), Plustrans Resources Sdn Bhd (the third defendant) and Microvest Engineering Sdn Bhd (the fifth defendant) are companies having their registered offices at 5A-1, 1st Floor, Jalan Memanda 7, Ampang, 03-32, 3rd Floor, PKNS Complex, Shah Alam and No.117, Block A Damansara Intan No.1, Jalan SS 20/27, Petaling Jaya respectively. c) The second defendant (Vijayalatha a/p Velupillai) was the director of the first defendant, while the fourth defendant was the director of the third defendant and the sixth defendant is the director of the fifth defendant. d) The second defendant is also a lawyer running her own legal practice under the name of Messrs. Vellupillai & Associates. e) A Brazilian company by the name of Target Trading (Target), a valued customer to HSBC Bank Brasil S.A Banco Multiplo (HSBC Brazil) had intended to purchase “high speed diesel” from Petronas Dagangan Berhad. However, Brazil HSBC was informed that this can only be carried out through a local supply agent. f) HSBC Brazil had then contacted the plaintiff to finance the purchase of the diesel by the first defendant, the local supply agent. Thereafter, the first defendant was granted a banking facility by the plaintiff on the basis of a standby letter of credit provided to the plaintiff by HSBC Brazil. g) Subsequently, a letter of offer dated 29.4.2008 was issued by the plaintiff to the first defendant agreeing to provide banking facilities up to USD 5.4 million (the funds) to finance the purchase of the diesel. h) On 29.4.2008, the plaintiff had alleged that an instruction was received from HSBC Brazil purportedly made on behalf of Target instructing the plaintiff to transfer the sum of USD 4.55 million to a Petronas account with Malayan Banking Bhd (MBB). On the same day, the plaintiff had also received an insistent request from the first defendant to transfer the same amount into the MBB account. i) Later, the plaintiff found out that the account number belongs to the third defendant who, the second defendant claimed was a Petronas dealer. j) Upon request by the second defendant, the plaintiff had also on 2.5.2008 disbursed a sum of USD 0.75 million to the second defendant’s legal firm purportedly for shipping expenses. k) The first defendant had defaulted payment of the banking facility granted earlier. l) The plaintiff had also later discovered inter alia the following facts: (i) there was actually no transaction between the first defendant and Petronas. (ii) documents relating the to the diesel’s sale and purchase transactions were confirmed forged documents. (iii) the third defendant had paid a sum of USD 4 million to the fifth defendant. (iv) the third defendant had paid RM1 million each to the fourth defendant and a person by the name of Mohd. Fuad. vi) a sum of USD 3 million was paid by the fifth defendant to the sixth defendant. vii) the entire transaction in connection with the disbursement of USD 5.4 million by the plaintiff to the first defendant and thereafter to the rest of the defendants was a fraudulent transaction. m) On 18.6.2008, the second defendant had lodged a police report against, inter alia the fifth and sixth defendants, accusing that the fifth and sixth defendants were conspiring with the third defendant to defraud her in the sale and purchase dealings for the diesel. n) On 26.6.2008, the plaintiff lodged a police report alleging that they have been defrauded by a syndicate consisting of the above named defendants for the sum of USD 5.4 million. o) As a consequence of the police investigation, it was found that there are reasonable grounds to suspect an offence under subsection 4(1) of the AMLATFA is being committed, and the authority exercising their powers under sections 44(1) and 50(1) of the AMLATFA had seized and frozen all of the defendants’ accounts. The amount seized is approximately USD 3.327 million (the monies). p) On 21.5.2009, the plaintiff commenced the present action claiming damages for the sum of USD 5.4 million from all of the defendants for conspiracy to defraud. q) On 18.4.2011, the plaintiff had obtained a Mareva Injunction to restrain all the defendants from dealing with the funds. r) On 3.6.2009, the sixth defendant was charged at the Malacca Sessions Court for an offence under subsection 4(1)(a) of the AMLATFA. s) At the same time the fourth defendant and Mohd Fuad were charged for the predicate offence under section 420 of the Penal Code, which was to be read together with section 34 of the Penal Code. The fourth defendant and Mohd Fuad were also charged for five other offences each under subsection 4(1)(a) of the AMLATFA. t) All the criminal cases were heard together. The learned Sessions Judge on 20.9.2013, at the end of the prosecution case, had concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove a prima case against the three accused and ordered all the accused be acquitted and discharged without their defence being called. At the end of the criminal trial, the learned Sessions Judge had also made an order under section 61 (the Inquiry) of the AMLATFA for an inquiry to be conducted in respect of the monies. [3] It was the order of the Inquiry that have led the fifth and sixth defendants to file this Enclosure 60 applying for an order to stay this civil suit pending the disposal of the Inquiry. [4] The first, second and fourth defendants had failed to file their Statement of Defence, thereafter Judgment in default of defence were entered against them. [5] The plaintiff had been granted leave to proceed with the action against the third defendant which has been wound up. [6] For ease of reference, for the purposes of the stay application, the fifth and sixth defendants will be referred to as the defendants. [7] In applying for the stay order the defendants contended the following: (i) that, by virtue of Order 4 rule 1(1) Rules Of Court 2012 (ROC), this court should stay this present civil suit until the determination of the disposal of the Inquiry as both the Inquiry and the civil suit involved the same question of law and facts and the rights to relief claimed in both proceedings are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. (ii) prohibition under section 54(3) of the AMLATFA. [8] It was submitted by the counsel for the defendants that the question of law and facts as well as the rights to relief claimed for in both of the civil and criminal proceedings are the same. In support of this contention, the counsel for the defendants argued that the second defendant had testified as one of the prosecution witness in the criminal trial in which she had described and explained in detail on how the sum of USD 4.55 million was released to the defendants. Another prosecution witness by the name of Mr. Chandrasegaran had confirmed that the USD 4.55 million was released to the defendants in the manner described by the second defendant. [9] It was also submitted on behalf of the defendants that the transactions which took place in the criminal proceeding in respect of the funds were the same transactions which were alleged by the plaintiff to have occurred in this civil action. And thus, the counsel contended that the factual matrix in both criminal and civil cases is the same. [10] The counsel for the defendants had also submitted that the basic question for consideration of the Sessions Court in the Inquiry would ultimately be who the rightful owner of the monies. To determine the rightful owner of the monies, the same facts and transactions in relation to the monies need to be canvassed before the learned Sessions Judge. The counsel for the defendants further submitted that proceeding with the present civil suit would give rise to a risk of duplicity of proceedings or res judicata. More so, the plaintiff had taken steps to participate in the Inquiry. On duplicity of proceedings and res judicata he had referred to the following cases: (1) Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 Peh Swee Chin FCJ at pp 197-198; (2) JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd & Ors v Manilal & Sons (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1987] 1 MLJ 312. [11] It was also submitted by the counsel for the defendants that the present civil suit cannot continue and must be stayed by virtue of section 54(3) of the AMLATFA. The counsel submitted that section 54(3) of the AMLATFA prohibits the institution or continuation of any civil proceedings in respect of the property which has been so seized under the AMLATFA. [12] Therefore, it was submitted on behalf of the defendants that there arise special circumstances to warrant this court to exercise its unfettered discretion to grant a stay order. [13] In support of his contention, the counsel for the defendants cited several cases relating to principles guiding the courts in exercising their discretionary powers to grant or to refuse an application to stay proceedings. The cases are namely: i) Jaqdis Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 213 ii) Kosma Palma Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 iii) Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86 iv) Government of Malaysia v Datuk Haji Kadir Mohamad Mastar & another application [1993] 3 MLJ 514 [14] The plaintiff had strongly opposed the defendants’ application and forwarded several grounds in opposing it. The grounds can be summarized as follows: (i) there is no issue of multiplicity or duplicity of proceedings (ii) non - disclosure on the part of the defendants who were also acting in an inconsistent manner (iii) the civil court is the more suitable forum (iv) the application has been filed at a late stage, was made in bad faith and prejudicial to the plaintiff. Ground (i) - there is no issue of multiplicity or duplicity of proceedings [15] It was submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that the civil action filed by the plaintiff is essentially different in all aspects from the criminal proceeding. He further submitted that the two actions are different in terms of the injured party or victim, alleged wrongdoers, causes of action, factual basis in support of the complaint and the wrongdoings and the relief claimed. To convince the court, the counsel for the plaintiff in his written submission had even tabulated all the differences. Ground (ii) - non - disclosure on the part of the defendants who were also acting in an inconsistent manner [16] It was submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that both the defendants are not genuine in their application. The defendants had filed Enclosure 60 to stay this civil action on the premise that the Inquiry proceeding should be completed first to avoid duplicity of proceedings but at the same time, in contrary, the defendants had also applied to set aside the order of Inquiry made by the learned Sessions Judge disputing the basis which the Inquiry was ordered and contended that the monies ought to be returned to defendants. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendants are constantly prevaricating and had acted in an inconsistent manner. Ground (iii) - the civil court is the more suitable forum [17] The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the civil court is the more suitable forum to adjudicate the plaintiff’s claim which is based on tort of conspiracy to defraud. It was further submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that the Inquiry will only confine itself to the issue of ownership of the monies and not the commission of the tort, especially fraud. To support this contention, the counsel for the plaintiff had referred to two cases, namely Public Prosecutor v Thong Kian Oon & Ors [2012] 10 MLJ 140 and Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Pendakwaraya [2009] 8 CLJ 33. [18] It is the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff that the ultimate order that the court can make in the Inquiry is whether to release or to forfeit the monies and it does not adjudicate plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendants. Hence, it was further contended by the counsel for the plaintiff that the civil court would be the more suitable forum for adjudicating allegations of conspiracy to defraud. Ground (iv) - the application has been filed at a late stage, was made in bad faith and prejudicial to the plaintiff. [19] It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the application by the defendants was too late. The present civil action was commenced by the plaintiff in May 2009 and parties had appeared numerous times before the courts, where witness statements were exchanged between the parties. [20] The counsel for the plaintiff also contended that the defendants have taken active steps in the civil action and this application was made barely one month before this case is scheduled for hearing on the second trial date i.e. 13.2.2014. The defendants had written in to the court for an adjournment of the second trial date on the same ground as in Enclosure 60. The high court judge had adjourned the trial and instructed the defendants to file a formal application. The formal application was not filed by the defendants until two weeks before the third trial date. In addition, the present case had reached an advanced stage where the plaintiff is ready with its witnesses, three of whom are from 3 different banks and one from the United Kingdom and is scheduled for hearing for the third time on the 8th to 11th September 2014, whilst the Inquiry still has a long way to go. It was therefore contended on behalf of the plaintiff that this civil action should proceed. Decision of the court [21] The principles in relating to the exercise of court’s discretion whether to allow or refuse stay of proceedings had been well-established and well-illustrated in an abundance of authorities. The paramount consideration in allowing or refusing a stay of proceedings is the existence of special circumstances in that particular case warranting the court to exercise its discretionary powers. It is also trite that the principles to be applied in an application for stay of execution are also applicable in an application for stay of proceedings. (See; Re Hj Abdul Malik Khan; Ex P Bank Bumiputra Bhd [2006] 8 CLJ 534 ) [22] In the case of Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86, which was cited by the counsel for the defendants, Raja Azlan Shah (as His Majesty then was) had defined special circumstances in the following excerpt: “Special circumstances, as the phrase implies, must be circumstances as distinguished from ordinary circumstances. It must be something exceptional in character, something that exceeds or excels in some way that which is usual or common” [23] However, what could constitute special circumstances varies from case to another case and it depends on its own facts and the onus is on the applicants to demonstrate the existence of special circumstances to justify the grant of a stay. (See Kosma Palma Oil Mills Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257) [24] Zawawi bin Salleh (JCA) on behalf of the Court of Appeal in the case of Jagdish Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd in emphasising the unfettered court discretionary power in granting stay, had also outlined several considerations as a guideline to which the courts had considered on what constitutes special circumstances. At page 221, the Court of Appeal had said this: “...Now, what factors or principles will, and should, guide the courts in applications for a stay of an order granted by a court. These factors or principles have been reiterated in very many of cases decided by our courts. The factors or principles so enumerated are in exhaustive, and not all of them are application to every case. Each has its own peculiar principle. Some of the principles to be considered in the motions may be stated as follows; a) the courts have an unimpeded discretion to grant or refuse stay. In this, like in all other instances of discretion, the court is bound to exercise that discretion both judicially as well as judiciously and not erratically (see Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] 1 MLJ 116; Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86; b) an unsuccessful party applying for a stay must show “special circumstances”. What will constitute “special circumstances” will no doubt vary from case to case. The fact that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused is the most common one (see Kosma Palma Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Markmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257; [2003] 4 CLJ 1 and Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd &Ors (No.2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131). The application is not granted as matter of routine and it is not an automatic or mechanical relief slavishly followed after filing an appeal. In every matter or suit before a court of law, whether in its original or appellate stage of proceedings, the court will consider the competing rights of both parties including the applicant and respondent to justice; (c) there is a need to preserve the res or preservation of the subject matter of litigation. The courts have an obligation to protect the res for the purpose of ensuring that the appeal, if successful, will not be rendered nugatory (see Erinford Properties Ltd v Cheshire County Counsil [1974] 2 WLR 749). But where it is shown by affidavit evidence, say by the respondent that the res will not be destroyed or there is in fact no res, an application may not be granted. (d) where an application is an abuse of the court process, then the stay of proceedings will not be granted. A typical example of abuse of court process is where a suit is duplicated or where a party employs improper and perverse procedure to obtain an advantage undeservedly; (e) it is important to stress that initiation of a suit in a court of law demands the suit will be heard expeditiously and completed without any inhibition midway. Therefore where an application for stay of proceedings is intended to merely stop or suspend the proceedings, it will be refused. Some applications, on seeing the weakness of their client’s case, would resort to application for stay and thereby waste the time of the other party and the court. The party simply cannot resort to the interlocutory of stay proceedings on having the slightest disagreement with any ruling of a trial judge. Courts are enjoined not a encourage such unwholesome practice; and (f) an application for stay of proceedings must come with clean hands because what he is asking is an equitable relief. Equity will not assist the unclean. That is why the court has to look into the antecedents of the parties”. [25] Having considered the submission forwarded by both the parties and taking cognizance of all the well-established principles in granting stay of proceedings, I will now determine the merits of the defendants’ application. I do appreciate that the Inquiry before the Session’s Court and the civil suit in this High Court before me are of two different causes of action. The former, being an Inquiry under section 61 of the AMLATFA and the latter, under the tort of conspiracy to defraud. I am also equally minded that the underlying cause and facts behind the two actions, in actual fact rooted from the same set of facts and background. I must also bear in mind that the monies or the subject matter which was seized by the authority are monies related to both actions. [26] The essential factor in determining the propriety of a stay of proceedings is the existence of special facts and circumstances of a particular case and these special circumstances differ from case to case. And it must be noted that the considerations in determining the existence of special circumstances as laid down in Jagdish Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd is not exhaustive. [27] Assuming if I were to proceed with the civil suit and I would have to decide whether or not there was a conspiracy to defraud, consequently I would ultimately have to decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages of USD 5.4 million being the amount of monies which had been disbursed to the first defendant of which USD 4.55 million was later, either paid or remitted to the rest of the defendants. Hypothetically, if the High Court finds that there was conspiracy to defraud, the Bank would be entitled to recover the funds which had been earlier disbursed in terms of damages of USD 5.4 million from the defendants inclusive the monies. Hypothetically and equally so, if the Sessions Court Inquiry finds the monies rightfully belongs to the Bank, the Bank would also be entitled to claim for the return of the monies. Bearing in mind that the monies which were seized and frozen from all the defendants’ accounts forms part of the USD 5.4 million, which was also the subject matter for determination of the Sessions Court in the Inquiry. At the end of the Inquiry the Sessions Judge would ultimately again decide who will be the rightful and the bona fide owner of the monies. Notwithstanding the differences in the cause of action, and/or burden of proof, in my mind, the ultimate consequence and the end-result of both the High Court civil suit and the Sessions Court Inquiry would obviously concern the bona fide rights over the monies. I have said earlier and I reiterate here again that the monies in all of the defendants’ accounts which were seized and frozen forms part of the USD 5.4 million funds which the plaintiff had disbursed under the letter of credit. [28] In this situation, special circumstances would arise in which obviously there would be duplicity of decisions which would probably result in contradictory decisions by the two courts. Particularly in this case, the duplicity would be the decision between the Sessions Court Inquiry and the High Court here. I must say that both of the two actions would achieve the same effect relating to these monies in which both of the two actions would ultimately decide which party is entitled to the monies. This may give rise to two conflicting decisions on the same monies. The duplicity here is not so much on the proceedings which saw the same parties’ involvement but instead would be the preceding hypotheses, which entails the duplicity of decisions from the proceedings in which both causes of action would decide which party is entitled to the monies. [29] Thus, the ensuing effect of both decisions may contradict each other even if the two decisions derive from different causes of actions and/or burden of proof. It is my judgment that this situation falls squarely into the category of special circumstances. A stay of proceedings should be granted in order to avoid unnecessary contradictions and appeal processes. [30] In this regard, I would like to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lesco Development Corp. Sdn. Bhd. v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 184. In the case of Lesco Development, the Supreme Court had already envisaged that it is undesirable to allow a situation where two different courts would try and determine the same issues arising between the same parties relating to the same subject matter. In this case, the Supreme Court had dealt with a foreclosure proceeding which resulted in an order for sale and a claim for default of payments on the same monies claimed in the foreclosure application. The Supreme Court had held the following: (1) It is undesirable to allow a situation where two different courts would try and determine the same issues arising between the same parties relating to the same subject matter. (2) In this case the hearing of the foreclosure proceeding should have been postponed until the final disposal of the claim on the debt. (3) The order of sale should be set aside and the hearing of the foreclosure application be dealt after the final disposal of the claim on the debt. [31] Although the present case is not factually similar with the case of Lesco Development, the underlying principles of the case of Lesco Development can be mirrored to that of the present case. This is because and I reiterate again that the present case and the Sessions Court Inquiry would involve the same parties, the same facts and transactions, and the same subject matter i.e. the monies. Thus, it is equally undesirable, alike the case of Lesco Development, to have this High Court here, to try and determine the same subject matter. [32] With regard to the prohibition under section 54(3) of the AMLATFA raised by the counsel for the defendants, I am in agreement with the plaintiff’s counsel that section 54(3)of the AMLATFA is not applicable in the present case as the disputed subject matter here is monetary in nature while section 54(3)of the AMLATFA deals only with seized property under section 51 of the AMLATFA. [33] With regard to the issue of the application being filed at a very late stage of the proceeding, in bad faith and prejudicial to the plaintiff, my answer to this is that the Inquiry under section 61 of the AMLATFA only came about in September 2013 when it was ordered by the Sessions Judge at the end of the criminal trial on 20.9.2013. By this time, it is acknowledged that the civil suit has reached its advanced stage. However, the calculation of time could not be from the time the plaintiff had filed this civil suit as submitted by the plaintiff’s counsel because the Inquiry had only been ordered in September 2013. Only upon September 2013 that the defendants would have the justification to apply for a stay of proceedings. A stay order would certainly not prejudice the plaintiff as the stay order would only be putting a halt to the plaintiff’s claim in respect of the tortious liability against the defendants but not in respect of the monies. And since the plaintiff has taken step to participate in the Inquiry, the plaintiff should not complain of prejudice. [34] With regards to the defendants’ contention that the duplicity would give the plaintiff a second bite of the cherry or double jeopardy, whereby the plaintiff would unjustly be compensated twice from the two actions, which the plaintiff had replied that the decision in this high court would be accounted for in the Sessions Court Inquiry, I do not see the necessity to embark on this issue in view of my earlier findings on the existence of special circumstances in this case. [35] Based on the aforesaid reasons, the defendants’ application in Enclosure 60 is allowed with no order as to costs. Hence, this civil suit is stayed until the disposal of the Inquiry at the Malacca Sessions Court. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 20th day of August, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Benjamin Dawson, Solicitors Cik Fazillawati Jaafar For the Defendants - Tetuan K.F.Ee & Co Nur Amalina Haris for the 5th and 6th Defendant DAO/huda/sar/27814/4832 26

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-209-04/2014

PLAINTIF ADIL JUTA SDN. BHD .... PLAINTIF F DEFENDAN TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD .... DEFENDAN T

18/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5c103f84-8b2e-448f-bf0f-b9ca0cffb148&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : 22 NCVC -209-04/2014 BETWEEN ADIL JUTA SDN. BHD .... PLAINTIFF AND TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD .... DEFENDANT JUDGMENT (Inter parte hearing) [1] The plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction against the defendant is with regards to the power conferred by the Parliament to Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) under section 38 of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 (the Act) empowering TNB to disconnect the supply of energy to any premises, if it is found by its employees that an offence has been committed under section 37 (1), 37(3), or 37 (14) of the Act. Factual Background [2] The plaintiff (Adil Juta Sdn Bhd) is involved in the prawn rearing business and its prawn ponds are located at Jalan Bagan, Sg Apong, Teluk Aru, Sabak Bernam. [3] The defendant is Tenaga Nasional Bhd (TNB), the sole provider of the supply of electricity in the country. [4] On their routine check on the plaintiff’s premises, the defendant’s employees, headed by Mohd Isyamilly bin Ideris had gone to the plaintiff’s ponds at 3.10 a.m on 19.2.2014 to conduct a meter inspection. [5] As a result of the inspection, the defendant’s team found that there were evidences to proof that the meter had been tampered with. The particulars of that finding, among others, were as follows:- i) the current reading on the meter’s display was lower than the current reading at TNB’s incoming for the three phases; ii) there were traces of glue on the body of the current transformer (CT) for the three phases; iii) there were lever marks on part of CT’s body for the three phases; iv) seals on the CT’s terminal on the three phases were tampered with and v) the stickers/safety stickers on the CT were torn as well. [6] Upon these findings, corrective action by the team and termination of the supply of electricity were necessary. Since none of the plaintiff’s employee was present at that particular time, the team decided to return to the premises later in the morning. [7] When the team arrived at 7.00 a.m. on the same day, they were refused entry by the plaintiff’s workers and were asked to come back four days later on 23.2.2014 to carry out the corrective action. [8] As scheduled, the team returned to the same premises on 23.2.2014 and proceeded to carry out the corrective action. However upon further examination, they found:- (i) there were traces of lever marks and glue on the body of the CT for the three phases; (ii) the CT for the three phases had been adjusted to a higher value of current transformer ratio when compare to the reading during the inspection on 19.2.2014; (iii) consumer (the plaintiff) had normalised the tampering of the CT; (iv) the safety stickers of the CT were torn on the three phases; and (v) seals on the CT’s terminal were counterfeited on the three phases. [9] It was during this corrective process that the defendant’s employees had discovered that the plaintiff had rectified the tampering of the CT and normalised the meter reading. [10] Two months later, on 22.4.2014, the defendant had issued Form A of the Act notifying the plaintiff that evidence of tampering were found during the inspections at the plaintiff’s premises, and consequent to that the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises will be disconnected on 23.4.2014. [11] The electricity was eventually disconnected on 23.4.2014. [12] On 24.4.2014, by way of an ex parte application, the plaintiff was granted an ad interim injunction order compelling the defendant to reinstate the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises pending the disposal of the inter parte hearing of the injunction application. The inter-parte hearing [13] The plaintiff’s application was supported by an affidavit deposed by one, Ding Tuo Tee, the plaintiff’s director. [14] In his affidavit, he averred that on 22.4.2014, he had unexpectedly received a Form A notification from the defendant. In the said notice, the plaintiff was notified that the defendant had found evidence that the meter in the plaintiff‘s premises had been tampered with and thus giving notice that the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises will be discontinued on 23.4.2014. [15] Upon receiving the notice, the plaintiff’s representative went to see the defendant’s officer and objected to the disconnection of the supply of electricity. The representative had also informed the defendant’s officer that if the supply of electricity is disconnected, it will affect the oxygen level in the ponds and the prawns will die. [16] The plaintiff’s representative denied any act of tampering and requested to be furnished the grounds for the electricity disconnection. [17] The plaintiff claimed that at the time of disconnection, the meter was in a good condition and had recorded the actual usage of electricity. [18] The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s act in disconnecting the supply of electricity was done mala fide, as it was not done to prevent abusive usage of electricity but to penalise the plaintiff. [19] The plaintiff averred that there was no reason for disconnection as there was no urgent situation which had arisen to warrant the defendant to act under section 38 of the Act. [20] In the affidavit in support of the application, the plaintiff strongly denied having any access to the meter room and contended that the meter room was exclusively under the custody and control of the defendant in which it was locked with the defendant’s padlock. [21] Furthermore, the plaintiff could not have any access to the meter room as the surrounding area of the meter room was fenced with barbed wire and locked gate. [22] The plaintiff’s director, in his affidavit also claimed that the disconnection of electricity supply was unlawful and premature as the plaintiff was never served with any claims of outstanding amount. [23] In opposing the plaintiff’s application, the defendant filed three affidavits in reply namely:- (i) Affidavit Jawapan Defendan 1 – affirmed by Chin Way Kong, the senior engineer of the defendant. He is also the supervisor to the defendant’s team who had conducted the inspection. (ii) Affidavit Jawapan Defendan 2 – affirmed by Mohd Isyamilly bin Ideris – the head of the inspection team. (iii) Affidavit Jawapan Defendan 3 – affirmed by Ahmad Sharafi bin Ismail, a member of the inspection team. [24] This court will deal with the facts deposed in all the three affidavits together with the defendant’s argument in opposing the plaintiff’s application. [25] At the outset, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that the ex parte order obtained by the plaintiff on 24.4.2014 was wrong, a nullity and should be set aside on the grounds that the affidavit in support of the plaintiff’s ex parte application for an injunction did not comply with the mandatory requirements under Order 29 r.1 (2A) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC), in particular paragraphs (c) & (d). In addition, there was also a non-disclosure of relevant and material facts on the part of the plaintiff when making the application. [26] Basically, the defendant had disputed the plaintiff’s application on the following grounds: I. the plaintiff had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under O.29 r.1 (2A) paras (c) and (d) of the ROC. II. the plaintiff had not disclosed relevant and material facts when obtaining the ex parte order. III. the plaintiff had not satisfied the court on the legal conditions for an interlocutory injunction which is mandatory in nature. Ground I - The plaintiff’s failure in complying with the mandatory requirements under O.29 r.1 (2A) para (c) and (d) of the ROC as the affidavit in support did not justify an ex parte application and did not contain clear and concise statement of any answer by the other party (or which he is likely to assert) to the claim or application; [27] It was submitted by the defendant’s counsel that the plaintiff had not complied with the mandatory requirement under O. 29 r.1 (2A) para (c) of the ROC. It was argued that the urgency, abruptness or secrecy raised by the plaintiff in its affidavit in support of the ex-parte application before the court was incomplete and was not based on full facts of the case and the actual legal position. [28] Counsel for the defendant further contended, that the defendant should have been informed of the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff and the defendant be given the opportunity to state the legal position in which the defendant had acted upon. To this contention, the defence had brought to this court’s attention the case of University Malaya Medical Centre v. Choo Chee Kon & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 278 in which it was held by the high court that, in setting aside the ex-parte injunction order :- “(1) There was merit in the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s failure to give notice was not justified. The plaintiff could have - and should have - notified the defendants on the 20 October itself of its intention to file the ex parte application on the next day, 21 October on a certificate of urgency so that the defendants could have alerted their solicitors; and so that the defendants’ counsel could appear before the court at the hearing of the ex parte application and to apply to be given the opportunity to be heard on an ex parte opposed basis. But the plaintiff’s doctors or solicitors chose not to inform the defendants of the ex parte application (see paras 20-21). (2) There was no satisfactory explanation whatsoever proffered to the court as to why the defendants were not given notice on 20 October 2004 (or at the very least on the morning of 21 October). The explanation in the plaintiff’s affidavit in support was too vague and too lames an excuse. There was clear non-compliance of O 29 r 1 (2A) (c) of the RHC which was mandatory and constituted a very serious breach of the RHC and therefore, the ex parte order must be set aside, an approach consistent with the policy behind the introduction of r 1 (2A) (see paras 23 – 27).” [29] Hence, in this connection the question to be determined is whether the application by the plaintiff falls within matters of urgency and ought to be heard ex-parte without the other party being notified to defend its action in disconnecting the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises. [30] In the affidavit in support of the ex-parte application, the plaintiff had stated that the receipt of Form A from the defendant was very unexpected and the plaintiff was not told the reasons for the disconnection of the supply of electricity. The plaintiff had also painted a picture that they are an innocent party who had been victimised or penalised by the defendant. The plaintiff also alleged that the act by the defendant was mala fide and was an abuse of the process of law. [31] It is the court’s view that the position taken by the plaintiff when obtaining the ex-parte order was very much contrary to the actual facts prior to the disconnection of the supply of electricity which were later unravelled from the three affidavits in opposition filed by the defendant in opposing the plaintiff’s application for an injunction. [32] To this, excerpts of the relevant paragraphs from the defendant’s affidavits shall be reproduced in particular paras 6, 11 and 12 of the Affidavit Jawapan Defendan (2) below: “para 6 Pada 19.2.2014 lebih kurang jam 3.10 pagi, saya yang juga merupakan ketua pemeriksa kumpulan pada ketika itu bersama-sama dengan beberapa ahli pasukan pemeriksaan antaranya Encik Faidil bin Mustapakamal telah melakukan pemeriksaan ke atas pepasangan meter/meter di premis plaintif tersebut yang mempunyai nombor akaun 0144 00561484 10, yang mana tujuan pemeriksaan ini adalah juga bagi memastikan bahawa pepasangan meter/meter di premis plaintif tersebut berada dalam keadaan yang baik. para 11 Susulan itu, saya telah sekali lagi pergi ke premis plaintif tersebut dengan diketuai oleh Encik Mohd Isyamilly bin Ideris bersama-sama beberapa ahli pasukan pemeriksaan pada hari yang sama lebih kurang jam 7.00 pagi bagi melakukan henti tugas untuk kerja-kerja tindakan pembetulan/pembaikan, walaubagaimanapun kakitangan plaintif yang ditemui telah tidak memberikan kebenaran untuk melakukannya pada masa tersebut dan memaklumkan kepada pihak kami agar datang semula pada hari Ahad, 23.2.2014 di antara jam 10.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang untuk melakukan tugasan ini. para 12 Selaras itu, pihak kami telah sekali lagi hadir ke premis plaintif tersebut pada 23.2.2014 lebih kurang jam 10.30 pagi untuk melakukan henti tugas bagi melakukan kerja-kerja tindakan pembetulan/pembaikan ke atas pepasangan meter/meter tersebut yang mana tugasan ini telah diketahui oleh Encik Mohd Isyamilly bin Ideris dan turut dihadiri oleh saya bersama-sama dengan beberapa ahli pasukan pemeriksaan yang lain iaitu Encik Norhaslam bin Nordin dan Encik Mohamad Faiz bin Md Raif.” [33] It is the court’s view that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the entire event. The plaintiff was in fact aware of the inspection exercise conducted on its premises on the 19.2.2014, had refused the defendant entry to carry out the correction work and during the lapse of four days whereby the defendant was refused entry, the plaintiff had done something on the CT and had normalised the meter. The evidence of normalisation was discovered by the defendant’s employees when they returned for correction work, in which these particular findings have been stated in paragraph 5 earlier. The plaintiff had also been notified earlier on 23.2.2014 through the defendant’s formal notices “Pemakluman Semakan Pepasangan Meter Elektrik oleh TNB” [Exhibit “TNB -10”- Affidavit Jawapan Defendan (3)] and “Surat Pemberitahuan Pengambilan Barang-Barang Kes “ [Exhibit “TNB-11 – Affidavit Jawapan Defendan (3)] which were received and signed by the plaintiff. TNB – 11 is the seizure form. The plaintiff had acknowledged in TNB-11 that the counterfeited seals on the CT’s terminals found by the defendant’s employees at the plaintiff’s premises were taken by the defendant. And thus, with this sequence of events Form A should not have come as a surprise to the plaintiff. [34] Upon this evaluation, this court finds that there were no urgency, abruptness and secrecy for the ex-parte injunction to be granted to the plaintiff. [35] It was also averred by the defence that at the time the plaintiff applied for the ex-parte injunction, the plaintiff is duty-bound to inform the court in their affidavit in support of all the material facts relating to the application and also inform the court of any defences which the defendant are likely to have in opposing the application if it was heard inter parte by the court. [36] It is the defence’s argument that the plaintiff should have deposed in their affidavit that the defendant will defend its action by relying on the provision in section 38 of the Act. [37] A perusal into the plaintiff’s affidavit in support of the ex-parte application clearly shows that the affidavit did not have any assertion to that effect. The words used in O.29 r.1 (2A) is “must” that connotes mandatory meaning, as stated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Perbadanan Nasional Insurans Sdn Bhd v Pua Lai Ong [1996] 3 MLJ at p 93 : “... The word “must” as opposed to “may” is used in the rule, and we interpret that to mean as implying a peremptory mandate as opposed to a mere direction or discretion at the word “may” implies. We equate the meaning of the word “must” as that given to the word “shall”, and for that reason the choice of the word “must” in the rule does not create the existence of any discretion or empowers the court to exercise such discretion”. [38] As such, the plaintiff had not complied with O.29 r.1 (2A) of the ROC which requires mandatory compliance and adherence. Ground II - non-disclosure of relevant material fact when obtaining the ex-parte order. [39] The counsel for the defendant further contended that the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands as they had failed to disclose that prior to both of the 19.2.2014 and 23.2.2014 inspections, there was an earlier meter inspection exercise conducted at the plaintiff’s premises in 2013 i.e. 28.11.2013 and the same finding was also discovered by the defendant; that the meter had been tampered with. [40] In support of this contention, the counsel for the defendant had referred this court to the case of Kepong Industrial Park Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Teoh Seng Aun & Ors [1999] 6 MLJ 342. It was held, inter alia; “(2) Where a plaintiff now seeks interlocutory injunctive relief on an inter parties basis, the court may in exercising its jurisdiction, take into account how innocent or culpable the non-disclosures of the plaintiff were at the time of obtaining ex-parte relief in deciding whether or not to grant the inter parties injunction. Such omissions must be deliberate (see pp 347I-348A, 348C).” [41] The fatal effect of non-disclosure of material and relevant facts when applying for an ex-parte injunction has been decided in a voluminous number of cases. The Federal Court in the case of MRK Nayar v Ponnusamy & Ors [1982] 2 MLJ 174 held that when an interlocutory injunction is sought, the balance of inconvenience will be the overriding consideration but nonetheless, once the court is satisfied that there was suppression of material facts, the question of balance of convenience does not arise. [42] It is trite law that an applicant in an ex-parte application for an injunction is legally required to and must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts when making such application. In the case of Professor Dr A Kahar Bador & Ors v N. Krishnan & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 407, Hashim Yeop A Sani J (as he then was) had made the following observation on misrepresentation or suppression of material fact at page 409: “An interlocutory injunction will not be dissolved unless the misrepresentation or suppression was of such a character as to mislead the court or if the true picture was presented the court would probably not have granted the injunction.” It has also been stated that all facts must be laid before the court and nothing should be suppressed. (see i. Lim Sung Huak & Ors v Sykt Pemaju Tanah Tikam Batu Sdn. Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 527 following R v Kengsington Income Tax Commissioners [1917] 1 KB 486, ii. Kosma Palma Oil Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257, iii. Bakmawar Sdn. Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 67) [43] This court finds, the fact that there was a repetitive occurrence of tampering in the plaintiff’s premises, though unfavourable to the plaintiff, is a relevant and material fact, therefore it should be disclosed by the plaintiff when applying for the ex-parte order. I agree with the defence’s contention that if this fact was disclosed to the judge at the hearing of the ex-parte application, it would have been a different consideration and the ex- parte injunction would have been refused. [44] On this repetitive occurrence also, this court would also like to highlight here that the plaintiff’s conduct of repetitive tampering indicates an act of disrespectful and blatant disregard of the law. The court of equity must and should not lend its hand to those who seeks equity with unclean hands. Ground III - the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the court the pre-requisites for a mandatory interlocutory injunction. [45] In applying for the interlocutory injunction, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff had fulfilled the “3 stage test” enunciated in the classic case of Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193. During his submission the learned counsel for plaintiff submitted the following:- (i) there are serious issue to be tried in this case; (ii) balance of convenience tilted in favour of the plaintiff (iii) damages would not be adequately compensated, if the injunction is not granted, plaintiff will suffer irreparable damage. [46] On behalf of the plaintiff, the counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the defendant’s act in disconnecting the supply of electricity was done mala fide. On the bona fide serious issues to be tried, he had raised two issues namely, I) the plaintiff has no access to the meter and ii) the meter was in good condition and had recorded the actual usage at the time of disconnection. [47] With regards to these issues, the plaintiff’s counsel had referred this court to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Claybricks & Tiles Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2007] 1 MLJ 217. The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the Claybricks’s case has laid down two conditions to be fulfilled by the defendant before section 38 can be invoked by the defendant. The first condition he said is that, there must be an arising or emergence of an urgent situation. Second, the act of disconnection is purposed to prevent the abuse of electricity such as stealing. [48] It is submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that in the present case, the defendant had failed to fulfil these two conditions. On the first condition, the plaintiff had argued that the defendant had waited for two (2) months after the meter inspection before disconnecting the supply of electricity. Thus, there was no emergence of an urgent situation to warrant the disconnection. While on the second condition, the counsel further submitted that the defendant’s act in disconnecting the supply of electricity in the present case is not for the purpose of preventing abusive usage of electricity such as stealing on the basis that the defendant had waited two months before disconnecting the supply. The counsel further contended that the defendant has yet to claim against the plaintiff whatever outstanding amount if there is any in which the plaintiff claimed they had no outstanding due from the plaintiff to the defendant. [49] In his reply, the counsel for defendant argued that the plaintiff is applying for a mandatory interlocutory injunction, hence the ordinary American Cyanamid guidelines governing applications for interlocutory injunctions or the Keet Gerald’s three stage test has no application in the present case. [50] In this respect, he finds support of his contention by referring this court to the case of Shamsudin Bin Shaik Jamaludin v Kenwood Electronics Technologies (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 3 MLJ 438. [51] In Shamsudin’s case, counsel for the defendant submitted that Abdul Malik bin Ishak J (as he then was) in his judgment has clearly expressed the correct statement of law in relating to the non-application of the principles propounded in the American Cyanamid case in cases of an application for an interlocutory mandatory injunction by stating :- “I have said earlier that the ordinary American Cyanamid guidelines governing application for interlocutory injunctions are not applicable to Mandatory injunctions… I cannot help but observe that in cases where the parties sought for an Interlocutory mandatory injunctions, the principles enunciated in the American Cyanamid have not been followed and at the most it was referred to in passing only…..” [52] Counsel for the defendant submitted that in order for the plaintiff to succeed in an application for a mandatory interlocutory injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy this court that this case is an exceptional and extremely rare case. He also contended that special circumstances must also exist in this case. [53] It is the defence’s argument that this case rests entirely on the operation of section 38 of the Act which had been discussed, deliberated and decided by the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional [2012] 4 CLJ 478 and the Court of Appeal in the case of Claybricks & Tiles Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2007] 1 MLJ 217. [54] The counsel for defendant submitted that the operation of section 38 has been spelt out clearly by the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific. He further submitted that the Federal Court has held that section 38 of the Act empowers the respondent to discontinue the supply of electricity based on the subjective finding of the employee of any offences found to have been committed under section 37(1) 37 (3) or section 37(4). It was further held by the Federal Court, the respondent had clearly complied with all the necessary statutory requirements of that particular section when the respondent has served the appellant not only with the letter but also two documents which were necessary pre-requisites under the Act. [55] The counsel for the defendant also referred to two other cases relating to the proper interpretation of section 38 of the Act. First, the case of Tan Yeong Kim lwn Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2000] 8 CLJ 629 and the same case which was referred by the plaintiff counsel i.e. the Claybricks’s case. [56] It was submitted further by the counsel for the defendant that in the case of Tan Yeong Kim v Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Alauddin J (as he then was) has enumerated in detail the proper reading of section 38 in which at page 634 of his judgment he said the following : “Pada penghakiman saya seksyen 38(1) ini tidak memerlukan satu pembuktian kesalahan oleh mahkamah sebagai pra-syarat sebelum kuasa pemotongan dapat dilaksanakan oleh TNB sebagai pemegang Lesen. Sayugia diingatkan bahawa TNB sebagai badan yang dipertanggungjawabkan untuk membekal tenaga elektrik ke seluruh negara seharusnya diberikuasa menjalankan tanggungjawabnya sejajar dengan peruntukan undang-undangnya iaitu Akta Bekalan Elektrik 1990 khasnya.” “Kini plaintif tidak boleh mempersoalkan kuasa yang diberikan kepada defendan berhubung pemotongan bekalan dan seterusnya kuasa defendan menuntut bayaran-bayaran yang dikenakan terhadap plaintif apabila defendan membuat kiraan semula jumlah penggunaan elektrik yang sebenarnya…” [57] It was also the submission of the counsel for the defendant that in Claybricks’s case, the Court of Appeal had clearly explained the specific operation of section 38 of the Act wherein at paragraph 8 of page 223 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, it was held as follows: “Kami perlu menyatakan di sini bahawa peruntukan Seksyen 38(1) Akta tersebut adalah jelas dan terang di mana proses mahkamah tidak diperlukan untuk menentukan sama ada sesuatu kesalahan telah dilakukan sebelum tindakan di bawah seksyen tersebut boleh diambil. Sekiranya proses pembuktian kesalahan melalui mahkamah diperlukan ianya akan mengambil masa yang lama sebelum kuasa di bawah Seksyen 38(1) dapat digunakan. Kami berpendapat seksyen 38(1) Akta tersebut telah diperuntukkan secara spesifik untuk menjaga kepentingan TNB dan membolehkan TNB bertindak cepat dan dengan itu dapat mencegah penyalahgunaan seperti pencurian bekalan elektrik yang dibekalkan oleh TNB. Jika badan perundangan berniat bahawa pembuktian kesalahan melalui mahkamah diperlukan sebelum kuasa di bawah seksyen 38(1) Akta tersebut dapat digunakan, maka peruntukan yang jelas harus dibuat mengenainya. Bagaimanapun, tiada peruntukan seperti itu dibuat. Adalah pandangan kami, tafsiran yang cuba diketengahkan oleh peguam perayu tidak dapat diterima kerana jika mahkamah ini berbuat demikian dengan memasukkan perkataannya sendiri untuk dipakai ke dalam Akta, ianya adalah bertentangan sama sekali dengan segala prinsip pentafsiran statut.” [58] What the plaintiff is seeking before this court is an order to compel the defendant to reinstate the supply of electricity to the plaintiffs’ prawn ponds. [59] In Janab’s Key to Civil Procedure, 5th Edition at page 348, the author explained the definition of mandatory injunction as orders of court which command the respondents to do some positive act and particular thing. The author had referred to Megarry J’s observation on the differences between prohibitory and mandatory injunction in the case of Westminster Brymbo Coal & Coke Co v Clayton (1867) Ch. 476; “There are important differences between prohibitory and mandatory injunction. By granting prohibitory injunction the court does no more than prevent for the future the continuance or repetition of the conduct of which the plaintiff complains. The injunction does not attempt to deal with what has happened in the past; that is left for the trial, to be dealt with by damages or otherwise... On the other hand, a mandatory injunction tends at least in part to look to the past, in that it is often a means of undoing what has already been done, so far as that is possible. Furthermore, whereas prohibitory injunction merely requires abstention from acting. A mandatory injunction requires the taking of positive steps, and may require the dismantling or destruction of something already erected or constructed. This will result in consequent wasted time, money and materials if it is established that the defendant was entitled to retain the erection.” [60] Clearly, I must say, an order compelling the defendant to re-connect the supply of electricity, means directing the defendant to do this positive act. This positive act is mandatory in nature. [61] The principles governing the exercise of courts discretionary power in the granting of an interlocutory mandatory injunction are well established. An interlocutory mandatory injunction would only be granted by the court save in an exceptional and extremely rare case, in that there are special circumstances. The case must also be unusually strong and clear in that the court must feel assured that a similar injunction would probably be granted at the trial on the ground that it would be just and equitable that the plaintiff’s interest be protected by immediate issue of an injunction, otherwise irreparable injury and inconvenience would result. (See i. Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris or Anor [1970] AC 65, ii. Wah Loong (Jelapang) Tin Mine Sdn. Bhd, v Chia Ngen Yiok [1975] 2 MLJ 109, iii. Sivaperuman v Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn. Bhd. [1979] 1 MLJ 150, iv. Tinta Press Sdn.Bhd v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd. [1987] 2 MLJ 192, v. Gibb E Go v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 271 at p 273 vi. Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340 at p 349 vii .Jakob Renner (An infant suing through his father and Next Friend, Gilbert Renner) & Ors v Scott King, Chairman of Board of Directors of the International School of Kuala Lumpur [2000] 5 MLJ 254.) [62] This court wishes to refer to Shamsudin’s case which was cited by the defendant’s counsel. In this case Abdul Malik bin Ishak J (as he then was) apart from his Lordship’s firm stand on the non-application of American Cyanamid principles in mandatory injunction application, he had further listed in clear words the three conditions to be fulfilled before an interlocutory mandatory order can be granted. The three conditions are: “(1) The application must prove by affidavit evidence that his application is an exceptional and extremely rare case which merits the order prayed for. (2) The application must show that his case is clear and one which the Court thinks ought to be decided at once in his favour. (3) The application must show a clear case for relief or a high degree of assurance that that injunction, if granted, would rightly be granted.” [63] In light of the above mentioned authorities, it is thus clear that the legal burden is on the plaintiff to satisfy this court that the plaintiff’s case is exceptional in nature and is extremely rare. The plaintiff also needs to show that its case is an unusually strong and clear case together with the existence of special circumstances in order to be entitled to such injunctive relief. [64] Does the plaintiff’s case falls within the category of exceptional and extremely rare cases? Or is the plaintiff’s case unusually strong case and were there any special circumstances in this case for this court to exercise its discretion? [65] Now, with regards to section 38 provision, the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific has read provision in the following words: “Section 38 of the Act empowers the respondent to discontinue electricity supply based on the subjective finding of its employee if any offence has been found committed under ss. 37(1), 37(3) or 37(14) of the Act. The respondent had clearly complied with all the necessary statutory requirements where it had served the appellant not only with the letter but also the two documents, which were necessary pre-requisites under the Act. In the event if the respondent was later found to have breached its obligation under the contract or its statutory obligation, the appellant may file an action against the respondent. Hence, the appellant was not without a remedy.” [66] The Court of Appeal in Claybricks’ case in preferring Alauddin J’s interpretation of section 38 in the case of Tan Yeong Kim had this to say: “.... Dalam hal perkara ini, kami lebih cenderung untuk menerima dan bersetuju dengan tafsiran dan pandangan yang dibuat dalam kes Tan Yeong Kim v Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2000] 8 CLJ 629; [2000] MLJU 447 di mana YA Hakim Alauddin (YA pada masa itu) telah menyatakan antara lain bahawa seksyen 38(1) Akta tersebut tidak memerlukan satu pembuktian kesalahan oleh Mahkamah sebagai pra-syarat sebelum kuasa pemotongan dapat dilaksanakan oleh TNB sebagai pemegang lessen. Seterusnya YA Hakim menyatakan ianya digubal sebegitu rupa untuk memberi kuasa efektif kepada TNB memberhentikan dengan segera sebarang kesalahan yang berlaku dan tidak dibiarkan berlarutan.” [67] In this regard, I am in agreement with the contention of the counsel for the defendant that the legal position or operation of section 38 had been well settled by both the Appellate Courts i.e. by the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific and the Court of Appeal in the Claybricks’ case. [68] It is the court’s view that both the cases had in clear language construed the operation of section 38 provision. The Federal Court in the WRP Asia Pacific clearly held that for the invocation of section 38 by the defendant, it merely requires a subjective finding by the defendant’s employee that an offence under section 37 has been committed. The statement of law from this decision, as this court understands it is, as long as the defendant’s employee found in any premises there appear any evidences an of offence committed under section 37(1), 37(3) or 37(14) and the documentation requirements envisaged in the Act has been fulfilled by the defendant, the defendant has every right to exercise the power conferred to it under section 38 to disconnect the supply of electricity. There is no issue of pre-conditions to be fulfilled by the defendant such as proof of the commission of offences or providing reasons for disconnecting the supply of electricity. Whilst the Court of Appeal in Claybricks’s case in its preference to accept the interpretation of section 38 in its literal and ordinary meaning by Alauddin J (as he then was), the Court of Appeal had also emphasised the correct statement of law; that section 38 is specifically provided in the interest of the TNB to enable TNB to act quickly in preventing any abuse of electricity such as stealing. [69] In this regard, with respect, it is this court’s considered view that the plaintiff counsel’s contention as well as his reading of the Court of Appeal’s judgement in Claybricks’s case is somewhat misconceived. [70] Firstly, accepting the plaintiff counsel arguments would be going against the authorities of two higher courts, one being the highest court in the land in which this court has no intention to depart from. Secondly, this court finds that the Court of Appeal in Claybricks’s case did not set out any conditions for the defendant to fulfil before invoking section 38. What the Court of Appeal actually said was this, “seksyen 38 adalah secara spesifik diperuntukan menjaga kepentingan TNB bagi membolehkan TNB bertindak cepat dan mencegah penyalahgunaan seperti kecurian”. Nowhere at all was it mentioned in the judgment of the two conditions submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff. [71] Alluding the facts of this present case and relying on the abovementioned authorities, it is this court’s judgment that the defendant’s act in disconnecting the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises cannot be said to be an act of mala fide and neither was it an abuse of the process of law. The defendant‘s act is a legitimate act within the parameters of section 38 of the Act. Hence, it is the judgment of this court that the plaintiff’s case is not exceptional or extremely rare in nature. There are also no special circumstances for this court to exercise its discretionary powers to grant an interlocutory mandatory injunction to the plaintiff. [72] In any event, the court is wrong on this approach, I will move on to consider the “3 stage test” submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff. [73] In light of the earlier findings by this court, the two issues raised by the plaintiff do not render or constitute bona fide serious issues to be tried. [74] Be that as it may, this court opines that the plaintiff’s assertion in respect of access as well as the meter condition, have been addressed by defendant in the Affidavit in Reply Defendant (3). It was stated in paragraph 12 of the affidavit that the defendant had found there was another entrance from the plaintiff’s premises to which the key or padlock does not belong to the defendant. As regards to the meter, it was stated in the same paragraph that the four days lapsed from 19.2.2013 till 23.2.2014 had given the plaintiff the opportunity to normalise the CT and restore the CT to its original position. This also answered the claim by the plaintiff on why the defendant took two (2) months to disconnect the supply of electricity. The issue of abuse of electricity does not arise after the meter of the CT had been normalised. Balance of convenience [75] It is this court’s judgment that the balance of convenience in this present case lies in favour of the defendant. Section 38 of the Act was enacted by the Parliament specifically to assist the defendant to operate in an effective and efficient manner to prevent abuse of electricity. To accede to the plaintiff’s request for an interlocutory mandatory injunctive relief when the defendant had acted within the parameters of its power, will not only result in the hindering the efficacy of the defendant’s administration and operation in curbing or preventing the abuse of electricity such as stealing, it also defeats the intention of the Parliament in enacting such provision, in which this court is not prepared to do. This court is of the view that, to do so would create a grave and substantial injustice to the defendant and the damage suffered would be irreparable. [76] It is for the plaintiff to prove that damages would not be an adequate compensation if the interlocutory mandatory injunction is not granted. However, this court finds that even in case the plaintiff was wrongly denied of his supply of electricity, the plaintiff’s losses from his prawn rearing business is indeed pecuniary and calculable in monetary terms. Thus, damages are an adequate remedy which the defendant is in the position to pay. In fact if there were any losses which could not be adequately compensated with damages, it is actually against the defendant as they had been deprived of their powers conferred by the Parliament, if the interlocutory injunction is allowed. [77] There is one pertinent issue which requires this court’s consideration. Section 38 has a proviso which provides that the period of disconnection shall not exceed three months. This proviso is also another reason why this court should not grant the injunctive relief to the plaintiff. The disconnection will lapse after three months, thus if the interlocutory mandatory injunction is granted, the plaintiff would have a benefit of having a continuing injunctive relief even after the three months period had lapsed until the disposal of the case. [78] There was another point raised by the counsel for the plaintiff with regards to the compliance of the Panduan C 1/2006 – Panduan Perkhidmatan Pengguna dan Pemasangan, Panduan dan Prosedur Pengekangan Kecurian Tenaga Elektrik issued by the defendant. A simple answer to it. This is purely an administrative guideline issued by the defendant to its employees setting out standard procedures and actions to be carried out in handling electricity stealing cases to ensure a speedy and effective settlement of such cases. This guideline is not legally binding and non-compliance of this guideline will only result to administrative actions against employees. [79] Based on the reasons above stated, the plaintiff’s application is hereby dismissed with costs of RM5, 000.00. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 18th day of August, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Bahari, Choy & Nongchik Encik C M Lai For the Defendant - Tetuan Azmi & Associates Raja Ahmad Mohzanuddin Shah & Cik Faizah Kamarudin DATUKAO/YYUSNA/HUDA/SARI/4814/6769 27

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-209-04/2014

PLAINTIF ADIL JUTA SDN. BHD .... PLAINTIF F DEFENDAN TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD .... DEFENDAN T

18/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5c103f84-8b2e-448f-bf0f-b9ca0cffb148&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR CIVIL SUIT NO : 22 NCVC -209-04/2014 BETWEEN ADIL JUTA SDN. BHD .... PLAINTIFF AND TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD .... DEFENDANT JUDGMENT (Inter parte hearing) [1] The plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction against the defendant is with regards to the power conferred by the Parliament to Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) under section 38 of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 (the Act) empowering TNB to disconnect the supply of energy to any premises, if it is found by its employees that an offence has been committed under section 37 (1), 37(3), or 37 (14) of the Act. Factual Background [2] The plaintiff (Adil Juta Sdn Bhd) is involved in the prawn rearing business and its prawn ponds are located at Jalan Bagan, Sg Apong, Teluk Aru, Sabak Bernam. [3] The defendant is Tenaga Nasional Bhd (TNB), the sole provider of the supply of electricity in the country. [4] On their routine check on the plaintiff’s premises, the defendant’s employees, headed by Mohd Isyamilly bin Ideris had gone to the plaintiff’s ponds at 3.10 a.m on 19.2.2014 to conduct a meter inspection. [5] As a result of the inspection, the defendant’s team found that there were evidences to proof that the meter had been tampered with. The particulars of that finding, among others, were as follows:- i) the current reading on the meter’s display was lower than the current reading at TNB’s incoming for the three phases; ii) there were traces of glue on the body of the current transformer (CT) for the three phases; iii) there were lever marks on part of CT’s body for the three phases; iv) seals on the CT’s terminal on the three phases were tampered with and v) the stickers/safety stickers on the CT were torn as well. [6] Upon these findings, corrective action by the team and termination of the supply of electricity were necessary. Since none of the plaintiff’s employee was present at that particular time, the team decided to return to the premises later in the morning. [7] When the team arrived at 7.00 a.m. on the same day, they were refused entry by the plaintiff’s workers and were asked to come back four days later on 23.2.2014 to carry out the corrective action. [8] As scheduled, the team returned to the same premises on 23.2.2014 and proceeded to carry out the corrective action. However upon further examination, they found:- (i) there were traces of lever marks and glue on the body of the CT for the three phases; (ii) the CT for the three phases had been adjusted to a higher value of current transformer ratio when compare to the reading during the inspection on 19.2.2014; (iii) consumer (the plaintiff) had normalised the tampering of the CT; (iv) the safety stickers of the CT were torn on the three phases; and (v) seals on the CT’s terminal were counterfeited on the three phases. [9] It was during this corrective process that the defendant’s employees had discovered that the plaintiff had rectified the tampering of the CT and normalised the meter reading. [10] Two months later, on 22.4.2014, the defendant had issued Form A of the Act notifying the plaintiff that evidence of tampering were found during the inspections at the plaintiff’s premises, and consequent to that the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises will be disconnected on 23.4.2014. [11] The electricity was eventually disconnected on 23.4.2014. [12] On 24.4.2014, by way of an ex parte application, the plaintiff was granted an ad interim injunction order compelling the defendant to reinstate the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises pending the disposal of the inter parte hearing of the injunction application. The inter-parte hearing [13] The plaintiff’s application was supported by an affidavit deposed by one, Ding Tuo Tee, the plaintiff’s director. [14] In his affidavit, he averred that on 22.4.2014, he had unexpectedly received a Form A notification from the defendant. In the said notice, the plaintiff was notified that the defendant had found evidence that the meter in the plaintiff‘s premises had been tampered with and thus giving notice that the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises will be discontinued on 23.4.2014. [15] Upon receiving the notice, the plaintiff’s representative went to see the defendant’s officer and objected to the disconnection of the supply of electricity. The representative had also informed the defendant’s officer that if the supply of electricity is disconnected, it will affect the oxygen level in the ponds and the prawns will die. [16] The plaintiff’s representative denied any act of tampering and requested to be furnished the grounds for the electricity disconnection. [17] The plaintiff claimed that at the time of disconnection, the meter was in a good condition and had recorded the actual usage of electricity. [18] The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s act in disconnecting the supply of electricity was done mala fide, as it was not done to prevent abusive usage of electricity but to penalise the plaintiff. [19] The plaintiff averred that there was no reason for disconnection as there was no urgent situation which had arisen to warrant the defendant to act under section 38 of the Act. [20] In the affidavit in support of the application, the plaintiff strongly denied having any access to the meter room and contended that the meter room was exclusively under the custody and control of the defendant in which it was locked with the defendant’s padlock. [21] Furthermore, the plaintiff could not have any access to the meter room as the surrounding area of the meter room was fenced with barbed wire and locked gate. [22] The plaintiff’s director, in his affidavit also claimed that the disconnection of electricity supply was unlawful and premature as the plaintiff was never served with any claims of outstanding amount. [23] In opposing the plaintiff’s application, the defendant filed three affidavits in reply namely:- (i) Affidavit Jawapan Defendan 1 – affirmed by Chin Way Kong, the senior engineer of the defendant. He is also the supervisor to the defendant’s team who had conducted the inspection. (ii) Affidavit Jawapan Defendan 2 – affirmed by Mohd Isyamilly bin Ideris – the head of the inspection team. (iii) Affidavit Jawapan Defendan 3 – affirmed by Ahmad Sharafi bin Ismail, a member of the inspection team. [24] This court will deal with the facts deposed in all the three affidavits together with the defendant’s argument in opposing the plaintiff’s application. [25] At the outset, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that the ex parte order obtained by the plaintiff on 24.4.2014 was wrong, a nullity and should be set aside on the grounds that the affidavit in support of the plaintiff’s ex parte application for an injunction did not comply with the mandatory requirements under Order 29 r.1 (2A) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC), in particular paragraphs (c) & (d). In addition, there was also a non-disclosure of relevant and material facts on the part of the plaintiff when making the application. [26] Basically, the defendant had disputed the plaintiff’s application on the following grounds: I. the plaintiff had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under O.29 r.1 (2A) paras (c) and (d) of the ROC. II. the plaintiff had not disclosed relevant and material facts when obtaining the ex parte order. III. the plaintiff had not satisfied the court on the legal conditions for an interlocutory injunction which is mandatory in nature. Ground I - The plaintiff’s failure in complying with the mandatory requirements under O.29 r.1 (2A) para (c) and (d) of the ROC as the affidavit in support did not justify an ex parte application and did not contain clear and concise statement of any answer by the other party (or which he is likely to assert) to the claim or application; [27] It was submitted by the defendant’s counsel that the plaintiff had not complied with the mandatory requirement under O. 29 r.1 (2A) para (c) of the ROC. It was argued that the urgency, abruptness or secrecy raised by the plaintiff in its affidavit in support of the ex-parte application before the court was incomplete and was not based on full facts of the case and the actual legal position. [28] Counsel for the defendant further contended, that the defendant should have been informed of the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff and the defendant be given the opportunity to state the legal position in which the defendant had acted upon. To this contention, the defence had brought to this court’s attention the case of University Malaya Medical Centre v. Choo Chee Kon & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 278 in which it was held by the high court that, in setting aside the ex-parte injunction order :- “(1) There was merit in the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s failure to give notice was not justified. The plaintiff could have - and should have - notified the defendants on the 20 October itself of its intention to file the ex parte application on the next day, 21 October on a certificate of urgency so that the defendants could have alerted their solicitors; and so that the defendants’ counsel could appear before the court at the hearing of the ex parte application and to apply to be given the opportunity to be heard on an ex parte opposed basis. But the plaintiff’s doctors or solicitors chose not to inform the defendants of the ex parte application (see paras 20-21). (2) There was no satisfactory explanation whatsoever proffered to the court as to why the defendants were not given notice on 20 October 2004 (or at the very least on the morning of 21 October). The explanation in the plaintiff’s affidavit in support was too vague and too lames an excuse. There was clear non-compliance of O 29 r 1 (2A) (c) of the RHC which was mandatory and constituted a very serious breach of the RHC and therefore, the ex parte order must be set aside, an approach consistent with the policy behind the introduction of r 1 (2A) (see paras 23 – 27).” [29] Hence, in this connection the question to be determined is whether the application by the plaintiff falls within matters of urgency and ought to be heard ex-parte without the other party being notified to defend its action in disconnecting the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises. [30] In the affidavit in support of the ex-parte application, the plaintiff had stated that the receipt of Form A from the defendant was very unexpected and the plaintiff was not told the reasons for the disconnection of the supply of electricity. The plaintiff had also painted a picture that they are an innocent party who had been victimised or penalised by the defendant. The plaintiff also alleged that the act by the defendant was mala fide and was an abuse of the process of law. [31] It is the court’s view that the position taken by the plaintiff when obtaining the ex-parte order was very much contrary to the actual facts prior to the disconnection of the supply of electricity which were later unravelled from the three affidavits in opposition filed by the defendant in opposing the plaintiff’s application for an injunction. [32] To this, excerpts of the relevant paragraphs from the defendant’s affidavits shall be reproduced in particular paras 6, 11 and 12 of the Affidavit Jawapan Defendan (2) below: “para 6 Pada 19.2.2014 lebih kurang jam 3.10 pagi, saya yang juga merupakan ketua pemeriksa kumpulan pada ketika itu bersama-sama dengan beberapa ahli pasukan pemeriksaan antaranya Encik Faidil bin Mustapakamal telah melakukan pemeriksaan ke atas pepasangan meter/meter di premis plaintif tersebut yang mempunyai nombor akaun 0144 00561484 10, yang mana tujuan pemeriksaan ini adalah juga bagi memastikan bahawa pepasangan meter/meter di premis plaintif tersebut berada dalam keadaan yang baik. para 11 Susulan itu, saya telah sekali lagi pergi ke premis plaintif tersebut dengan diketuai oleh Encik Mohd Isyamilly bin Ideris bersama-sama beberapa ahli pasukan pemeriksaan pada hari yang sama lebih kurang jam 7.00 pagi bagi melakukan henti tugas untuk kerja-kerja tindakan pembetulan/pembaikan, walaubagaimanapun kakitangan plaintif yang ditemui telah tidak memberikan kebenaran untuk melakukannya pada masa tersebut dan memaklumkan kepada pihak kami agar datang semula pada hari Ahad, 23.2.2014 di antara jam 10.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang untuk melakukan tugasan ini. para 12 Selaras itu, pihak kami telah sekali lagi hadir ke premis plaintif tersebut pada 23.2.2014 lebih kurang jam 10.30 pagi untuk melakukan henti tugas bagi melakukan kerja-kerja tindakan pembetulan/pembaikan ke atas pepasangan meter/meter tersebut yang mana tugasan ini telah diketahui oleh Encik Mohd Isyamilly bin Ideris dan turut dihadiri oleh saya bersama-sama dengan beberapa ahli pasukan pemeriksaan yang lain iaitu Encik Norhaslam bin Nordin dan Encik Mohamad Faiz bin Md Raif.” [33] It is the court’s view that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the entire event. The plaintiff was in fact aware of the inspection exercise conducted on its premises on the 19.2.2014, had refused the defendant entry to carry out the correction work and during the lapse of four days whereby the defendant was refused entry, the plaintiff had done something on the CT and had normalised the meter. The evidence of normalisation was discovered by the defendant’s employees when they returned for correction work, in which these particular findings have been stated in paragraph 5 earlier. The plaintiff had also been notified earlier on 23.2.2014 through the defendant’s formal notices “Pemakluman Semakan Pepasangan Meter Elektrik oleh TNB” [Exhibit “TNB -10”- Affidavit Jawapan Defendan (3)] and “Surat Pemberitahuan Pengambilan Barang-Barang Kes “ [Exhibit “TNB-11 – Affidavit Jawapan Defendan (3)] which were received and signed by the plaintiff. TNB – 11 is the seizure form. The plaintiff had acknowledged in TNB-11 that the counterfeited seals on the CT’s terminals found by the defendant’s employees at the plaintiff’s premises were taken by the defendant. And thus, with this sequence of events Form A should not have come as a surprise to the plaintiff. [34] Upon this evaluation, this court finds that there were no urgency, abruptness and secrecy for the ex-parte injunction to be granted to the plaintiff. [35] It was also averred by the defence that at the time the plaintiff applied for the ex-parte injunction, the plaintiff is duty-bound to inform the court in their affidavit in support of all the material facts relating to the application and also inform the court of any defences which the defendant are likely to have in opposing the application if it was heard inter parte by the court. [36] It is the defence’s argument that the plaintiff should have deposed in their affidavit that the defendant will defend its action by relying on the provision in section 38 of the Act. [37] A perusal into the plaintiff’s affidavit in support of the ex-parte application clearly shows that the affidavit did not have any assertion to that effect. The words used in O.29 r.1 (2A) is “must” that connotes mandatory meaning, as stated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Perbadanan Nasional Insurans Sdn Bhd v Pua Lai Ong [1996] 3 MLJ at p 93 : “... The word “must” as opposed to “may” is used in the rule, and we interpret that to mean as implying a peremptory mandate as opposed to a mere direction or discretion at the word “may” implies. We equate the meaning of the word “must” as that given to the word “shall”, and for that reason the choice of the word “must” in the rule does not create the existence of any discretion or empowers the court to exercise such discretion”. [38] As such, the plaintiff had not complied with O.29 r.1 (2A) of the ROC which requires mandatory compliance and adherence. Ground II - non-disclosure of relevant material fact when obtaining the ex-parte order. [39] The counsel for the defendant further contended that the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands as they had failed to disclose that prior to both of the 19.2.2014 and 23.2.2014 inspections, there was an earlier meter inspection exercise conducted at the plaintiff’s premises in 2013 i.e. 28.11.2013 and the same finding was also discovered by the defendant; that the meter had been tampered with. [40] In support of this contention, the counsel for the defendant had referred this court to the case of Kepong Industrial Park Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Teoh Seng Aun & Ors [1999] 6 MLJ 342. It was held, inter alia; “(2) Where a plaintiff now seeks interlocutory injunctive relief on an inter parties basis, the court may in exercising its jurisdiction, take into account how innocent or culpable the non-disclosures of the plaintiff were at the time of obtaining ex-parte relief in deciding whether or not to grant the inter parties injunction. Such omissions must be deliberate (see pp 347I-348A, 348C).” [41] The fatal effect of non-disclosure of material and relevant facts when applying for an ex-parte injunction has been decided in a voluminous number of cases. The Federal Court in the case of MRK Nayar v Ponnusamy & Ors [1982] 2 MLJ 174 held that when an interlocutory injunction is sought, the balance of inconvenience will be the overriding consideration but nonetheless, once the court is satisfied that there was suppression of material facts, the question of balance of convenience does not arise. [42] It is trite law that an applicant in an ex-parte application for an injunction is legally required to and must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts when making such application. In the case of Professor Dr A Kahar Bador & Ors v N. Krishnan & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 407, Hashim Yeop A Sani J (as he then was) had made the following observation on misrepresentation or suppression of material fact at page 409: “An interlocutory injunction will not be dissolved unless the misrepresentation or suppression was of such a character as to mislead the court or if the true picture was presented the court would probably not have granted the injunction.” It has also been stated that all facts must be laid before the court and nothing should be suppressed. (see i. Lim Sung Huak & Ors v Sykt Pemaju Tanah Tikam Batu Sdn. Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 527 following R v Kengsington Income Tax Commissioners [1917] 1 KB 486, ii. Kosma Palma Oil Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257, iii. Bakmawar Sdn. Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 67) [43] This court finds, the fact that there was a repetitive occurrence of tampering in the plaintiff’s premises, though unfavourable to the plaintiff, is a relevant and material fact, therefore it should be disclosed by the plaintiff when applying for the ex-parte order. I agree with the defence’s contention that if this fact was disclosed to the judge at the hearing of the ex-parte application, it would have been a different consideration and the ex- parte injunction would have been refused. [44] On this repetitive occurrence also, this court would also like to highlight here that the plaintiff’s conduct of repetitive tampering indicates an act of disrespectful and blatant disregard of the law. The court of equity must and should not lend its hand to those who seeks equity with unclean hands. Ground III - the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the court the pre-requisites for a mandatory interlocutory injunction. [45] In applying for the interlocutory injunction, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff had fulfilled the “3 stage test” enunciated in the classic case of Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193. During his submission the learned counsel for plaintiff submitted the following:- (i) there are serious issue to be tried in this case; (ii) balance of convenience tilted in favour of the plaintiff (iii) damages would not be adequately compensated, if the injunction is not granted, plaintiff will suffer irreparable damage. [46] On behalf of the plaintiff, the counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the defendant’s act in disconnecting the supply of electricity was done mala fide. On the bona fide serious issues to be tried, he had raised two issues namely, I) the plaintiff has no access to the meter and ii) the meter was in good condition and had recorded the actual usage at the time of disconnection. [47] With regards to these issues, the plaintiff’s counsel had referred this court to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Claybricks & Tiles Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2007] 1 MLJ 217. The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the Claybricks’s case has laid down two conditions to be fulfilled by the defendant before section 38 can be invoked by the defendant. The first condition he said is that, there must be an arising or emergence of an urgent situation. Second, the act of disconnection is purposed to prevent the abuse of electricity such as stealing. [48] It is submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that in the present case, the defendant had failed to fulfil these two conditions. On the first condition, the plaintiff had argued that the defendant had waited for two (2) months after the meter inspection before disconnecting the supply of electricity. Thus, there was no emergence of an urgent situation to warrant the disconnection. While on the second condition, the counsel further submitted that the defendant’s act in disconnecting the supply of electricity in the present case is not for the purpose of preventing abusive usage of electricity such as stealing on the basis that the defendant had waited two months before disconnecting the supply. The counsel further contended that the defendant has yet to claim against the plaintiff whatever outstanding amount if there is any in which the plaintiff claimed they had no outstanding due from the plaintiff to the defendant. [49] In his reply, the counsel for defendant argued that the plaintiff is applying for a mandatory interlocutory injunction, hence the ordinary American Cyanamid guidelines governing applications for interlocutory injunctions or the Keet Gerald’s three stage test has no application in the present case. [50] In this respect, he finds support of his contention by referring this court to the case of Shamsudin Bin Shaik Jamaludin v Kenwood Electronics Technologies (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 3 MLJ 438. [51] In Shamsudin’s case, counsel for the defendant submitted that Abdul Malik bin Ishak J (as he then was) in his judgment has clearly expressed the correct statement of law in relating to the non-application of the principles propounded in the American Cyanamid case in cases of an application for an interlocutory mandatory injunction by stating :- “I have said earlier that the ordinary American Cyanamid guidelines governing application for interlocutory injunctions are not applicable to Mandatory injunctions… I cannot help but observe that in cases where the parties sought for an Interlocutory mandatory injunctions, the principles enunciated in the American Cyanamid have not been followed and at the most it was referred to in passing only…..” [52] Counsel for the defendant submitted that in order for the plaintiff to succeed in an application for a mandatory interlocutory injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy this court that this case is an exceptional and extremely rare case. He also contended that special circumstances must also exist in this case. [53] It is the defence’s argument that this case rests entirely on the operation of section 38 of the Act which had been discussed, deliberated and decided by the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional [2012] 4 CLJ 478 and the Court of Appeal in the case of Claybricks & Tiles Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2007] 1 MLJ 217. [54] The counsel for defendant submitted that the operation of section 38 has been spelt out clearly by the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific. He further submitted that the Federal Court has held that section 38 of the Act empowers the respondent to discontinue the supply of electricity based on the subjective finding of the employee of any offences found to have been committed under section 37(1) 37 (3) or section 37(4). It was further held by the Federal Court, the respondent had clearly complied with all the necessary statutory requirements of that particular section when the respondent has served the appellant not only with the letter but also two documents which were necessary pre-requisites under the Act. [55] The counsel for the defendant also referred to two other cases relating to the proper interpretation of section 38 of the Act. First, the case of Tan Yeong Kim lwn Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2000] 8 CLJ 629 and the same case which was referred by the plaintiff counsel i.e. the Claybricks’s case. [56] It was submitted further by the counsel for the defendant that in the case of Tan Yeong Kim v Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Alauddin J (as he then was) has enumerated in detail the proper reading of section 38 in which at page 634 of his judgment he said the following : “Pada penghakiman saya seksyen 38(1) ini tidak memerlukan satu pembuktian kesalahan oleh mahkamah sebagai pra-syarat sebelum kuasa pemotongan dapat dilaksanakan oleh TNB sebagai pemegang Lesen. Sayugia diingatkan bahawa TNB sebagai badan yang dipertanggungjawabkan untuk membekal tenaga elektrik ke seluruh negara seharusnya diberikuasa menjalankan tanggungjawabnya sejajar dengan peruntukan undang-undangnya iaitu Akta Bekalan Elektrik 1990 khasnya.” “Kini plaintif tidak boleh mempersoalkan kuasa yang diberikan kepada defendan berhubung pemotongan bekalan dan seterusnya kuasa defendan menuntut bayaran-bayaran yang dikenakan terhadap plaintif apabila defendan membuat kiraan semula jumlah penggunaan elektrik yang sebenarnya…” [57] It was also the submission of the counsel for the defendant that in Claybricks’s case, the Court of Appeal had clearly explained the specific operation of section 38 of the Act wherein at paragraph 8 of page 223 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, it was held as follows: “Kami perlu menyatakan di sini bahawa peruntukan Seksyen 38(1) Akta tersebut adalah jelas dan terang di mana proses mahkamah tidak diperlukan untuk menentukan sama ada sesuatu kesalahan telah dilakukan sebelum tindakan di bawah seksyen tersebut boleh diambil. Sekiranya proses pembuktian kesalahan melalui mahkamah diperlukan ianya akan mengambil masa yang lama sebelum kuasa di bawah Seksyen 38(1) dapat digunakan. Kami berpendapat seksyen 38(1) Akta tersebut telah diperuntukkan secara spesifik untuk menjaga kepentingan TNB dan membolehkan TNB bertindak cepat dan dengan itu dapat mencegah penyalahgunaan seperti pencurian bekalan elektrik yang dibekalkan oleh TNB. Jika badan perundangan berniat bahawa pembuktian kesalahan melalui mahkamah diperlukan sebelum kuasa di bawah seksyen 38(1) Akta tersebut dapat digunakan, maka peruntukan yang jelas harus dibuat mengenainya. Bagaimanapun, tiada peruntukan seperti itu dibuat. Adalah pandangan kami, tafsiran yang cuba diketengahkan oleh peguam perayu tidak dapat diterima kerana jika mahkamah ini berbuat demikian dengan memasukkan perkataannya sendiri untuk dipakai ke dalam Akta, ianya adalah bertentangan sama sekali dengan segala prinsip pentafsiran statut.” [58] What the plaintiff is seeking before this court is an order to compel the defendant to reinstate the supply of electricity to the plaintiffs’ prawn ponds. [59] In Janab’s Key to Civil Procedure, 5th Edition at page 348, the author explained the definition of mandatory injunction as orders of court which command the respondents to do some positive act and particular thing. The author had referred to Megarry J’s observation on the differences between prohibitory and mandatory injunction in the case of Westminster Brymbo Coal & Coke Co v Clayton (1867) Ch. 476; “There are important differences between prohibitory and mandatory injunction. By granting prohibitory injunction the court does no more than prevent for the future the continuance or repetition of the conduct of which the plaintiff complains. The injunction does not attempt to deal with what has happened in the past; that is left for the trial, to be dealt with by damages or otherwise... On the other hand, a mandatory injunction tends at least in part to look to the past, in that it is often a means of undoing what has already been done, so far as that is possible. Furthermore, whereas prohibitory injunction merely requires abstention from acting. A mandatory injunction requires the taking of positive steps, and may require the dismantling or destruction of something already erected or constructed. This will result in consequent wasted time, money and materials if it is established that the defendant was entitled to retain the erection.” [60] Clearly, I must say, an order compelling the defendant to re-connect the supply of electricity, means directing the defendant to do this positive act. This positive act is mandatory in nature. [61] The principles governing the exercise of courts discretionary power in the granting of an interlocutory mandatory injunction are well established. An interlocutory mandatory injunction would only be granted by the court save in an exceptional and extremely rare case, in that there are special circumstances. The case must also be unusually strong and clear in that the court must feel assured that a similar injunction would probably be granted at the trial on the ground that it would be just and equitable that the plaintiff’s interest be protected by immediate issue of an injunction, otherwise irreparable injury and inconvenience would result. (See i. Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris or Anor [1970] AC 65, ii. Wah Loong (Jelapang) Tin Mine Sdn. Bhd, v Chia Ngen Yiok [1975] 2 MLJ 109, iii. Sivaperuman v Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn. Bhd. [1979] 1 MLJ 150, iv. Tinta Press Sdn.Bhd v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd. [1987] 2 MLJ 192, v. Gibb E Go v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 271 at p 273 vi. Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340 at p 349 vii .Jakob Renner (An infant suing through his father and Next Friend, Gilbert Renner) & Ors v Scott King, Chairman of Board of Directors of the International School of Kuala Lumpur [2000] 5 MLJ 254.) [62] This court wishes to refer to Shamsudin’s case which was cited by the defendant’s counsel. In this case Abdul Malik bin Ishak J (as he then was) apart from his Lordship’s firm stand on the non-application of American Cyanamid principles in mandatory injunction application, he had further listed in clear words the three conditions to be fulfilled before an interlocutory mandatory order can be granted. The three conditions are: “(1) The application must prove by affidavit evidence that his application is an exceptional and extremely rare case which merits the order prayed for. (2) The application must show that his case is clear and one which the Court thinks ought to be decided at once in his favour. (3) The application must show a clear case for relief or a high degree of assurance that that injunction, if granted, would rightly be granted.” [63] In light of the above mentioned authorities, it is thus clear that the legal burden is on the plaintiff to satisfy this court that the plaintiff’s case is exceptional in nature and is extremely rare. The plaintiff also needs to show that its case is an unusually strong and clear case together with the existence of special circumstances in order to be entitled to such injunctive relief. [64] Does the plaintiff’s case falls within the category of exceptional and extremely rare cases? Or is the plaintiff’s case unusually strong case and were there any special circumstances in this case for this court to exercise its discretion? [65] Now, with regards to section 38 provision, the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific has read provision in the following words: “Section 38 of the Act empowers the respondent to discontinue electricity supply based on the subjective finding of its employee if any offence has been found committed under ss. 37(1), 37(3) or 37(14) of the Act. The respondent had clearly complied with all the necessary statutory requirements where it had served the appellant not only with the letter but also the two documents, which were necessary pre-requisites under the Act. In the event if the respondent was later found to have breached its obligation under the contract or its statutory obligation, the appellant may file an action against the respondent. Hence, the appellant was not without a remedy.” [66] The Court of Appeal in Claybricks’ case in preferring Alauddin J’s interpretation of section 38 in the case of Tan Yeong Kim had this to say: “.... Dalam hal perkara ini, kami lebih cenderung untuk menerima dan bersetuju dengan tafsiran dan pandangan yang dibuat dalam kes Tan Yeong Kim v Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2000] 8 CLJ 629; [2000] MLJU 447 di mana YA Hakim Alauddin (YA pada masa itu) telah menyatakan antara lain bahawa seksyen 38(1) Akta tersebut tidak memerlukan satu pembuktian kesalahan oleh Mahkamah sebagai pra-syarat sebelum kuasa pemotongan dapat dilaksanakan oleh TNB sebagai pemegang lessen. Seterusnya YA Hakim menyatakan ianya digubal sebegitu rupa untuk memberi kuasa efektif kepada TNB memberhentikan dengan segera sebarang kesalahan yang berlaku dan tidak dibiarkan berlarutan.” [67] In this regard, I am in agreement with the contention of the counsel for the defendant that the legal position or operation of section 38 had been well settled by both the Appellate Courts i.e. by the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific and the Court of Appeal in the Claybricks’ case. [68] It is the court’s view that both the cases had in clear language construed the operation of section 38 provision. The Federal Court in the WRP Asia Pacific clearly held that for the invocation of section 38 by the defendant, it merely requires a subjective finding by the defendant’s employee that an offence under section 37 has been committed. The statement of law from this decision, as this court understands it is, as long as the defendant’s employee found in any premises there appear any evidences an of offence committed under section 37(1), 37(3) or 37(14) and the documentation requirements envisaged in the Act has been fulfilled by the defendant, the defendant has every right to exercise the power conferred to it under section 38 to disconnect the supply of electricity. There is no issue of pre-conditions to be fulfilled by the defendant such as proof of the commission of offences or providing reasons for disconnecting the supply of electricity. Whilst the Court of Appeal in Claybricks’s case in its preference to accept the interpretation of section 38 in its literal and ordinary meaning by Alauddin J (as he then was), the Court of Appeal had also emphasised the correct statement of law; that section 38 is specifically provided in the interest of the TNB to enable TNB to act quickly in preventing any abuse of electricity such as stealing. [69] In this regard, with respect, it is this court’s considered view that the plaintiff counsel’s contention as well as his reading of the Court of Appeal’s judgement in Claybricks’s case is somewhat misconceived. [70] Firstly, accepting the plaintiff counsel arguments would be going against the authorities of two higher courts, one being the highest court in the land in which this court has no intention to depart from. Secondly, this court finds that the Court of Appeal in Claybricks’s case did not set out any conditions for the defendant to fulfil before invoking section 38. What the Court of Appeal actually said was this, “seksyen 38 adalah secara spesifik diperuntukan menjaga kepentingan TNB bagi membolehkan TNB bertindak cepat dan mencegah penyalahgunaan seperti kecurian”. Nowhere at all was it mentioned in the judgment of the two conditions submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff. [71] Alluding the facts of this present case and relying on the abovementioned authorities, it is this court’s judgment that the defendant’s act in disconnecting the supply of electricity to the plaintiff’s premises cannot be said to be an act of mala fide and neither was it an abuse of the process of law. The defendant‘s act is a legitimate act within the parameters of section 38 of the Act. Hence, it is the judgment of this court that the plaintiff’s case is not exceptional or extremely rare in nature. There are also no special circumstances for this court to exercise its discretionary powers to grant an interlocutory mandatory injunction to the plaintiff. [72] In any event, the court is wrong on this approach, I will move on to consider the “3 stage test” submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff. [73] In light of the earlier findings by this court, the two issues raised by the plaintiff do not render or constitute bona fide serious issues to be tried. [74] Be that as it may, this court opines that the plaintiff’s assertion in respect of access as well as the meter condition, have been addressed by defendant in the Affidavit in Reply Defendant (3). It was stated in paragraph 12 of the affidavit that the defendant had found there was another entrance from the plaintiff’s premises to which the key or padlock does not belong to the defendant. As regards to the meter, it was stated in the same paragraph that the four days lapsed from 19.2.2013 till 23.2.2014 had given the plaintiff the opportunity to normalise the CT and restore the CT to its original position. This also answered the claim by the plaintiff on why the defendant took two (2) months to disconnect the supply of electricity. The issue of abuse of electricity does not arise after the meter of the CT had been normalised. Balance of convenience [75] It is this court’s judgment that the balance of convenience in this present case lies in favour of the defendant. Section 38 of the Act was enacted by the Parliament specifically to assist the defendant to operate in an effective and efficient manner to prevent abuse of electricity. To accede to the plaintiff’s request for an interlocutory mandatory injunctive relief when the defendant had acted within the parameters of its power, will not only result in the hindering the efficacy of the defendant’s administration and operation in curbing or preventing the abuse of electricity such as stealing, it also defeats the intention of the Parliament in enacting such provision, in which this court is not prepared to do. This court is of the view that, to do so would create a grave and substantial injustice to the defendant and the damage suffered would be irreparable. [76] It is for the plaintiff to prove that damages would not be an adequate compensation if the interlocutory mandatory injunction is not granted. However, this court finds that even in case the plaintiff was wrongly denied of his supply of electricity, the plaintiff’s losses from his prawn rearing business is indeed pecuniary and calculable in monetary terms. Thus, damages are an adequate remedy which the defendant is in the position to pay. In fact if there were any losses which could not be adequately compensated with damages, it is actually against the defendant as they had been deprived of their powers conferred by the Parliament, if the interlocutory injunction is allowed. [77] There is one pertinent issue which requires this court’s consideration. Section 38 has a proviso which provides that the period of disconnection shall not exceed three months. This proviso is also another reason why this court should not grant the injunctive relief to the plaintiff. The disconnection will lapse after three months, thus if the interlocutory mandatory injunction is granted, the plaintiff would have a benefit of having a continuing injunctive relief even after the three months period had lapsed until the disposal of the case. [78] There was another point raised by the counsel for the plaintiff with regards to the compliance of the Panduan C 1/2006 – Panduan Perkhidmatan Pengguna dan Pemasangan, Panduan dan Prosedur Pengekangan Kecurian Tenaga Elektrik issued by the defendant. A simple answer to it. This is purely an administrative guideline issued by the defendant to its employees setting out standard procedures and actions to be carried out in handling electricity stealing cases to ensure a speedy and effective settlement of such cases. This guideline is not legally binding and non-compliance of this guideline will only result to administrative actions against employees. [79] Based on the reasons above stated, the plaintiff’s application is hereby dismissed with costs of RM5, 000.00. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCVC 13 of Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 18th day of August, 2014. For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Bahari, Choy & Nongchik Encik C M Lai For the Defendant - Tetuan Azmi & Associates Raja Ahmad Mohzanuddin Shah & Cik Faizah Kamarudin DATUKAO/YYUSNA/HUDA/SARI/4814/6769 27

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

62-127-2008

PENDAKWARAYA PENDAKWA RAYA TERTUDUH WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF

05/12/2011

PN MANIRA MOHD NOR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2ae29907-2e61-4308-af01-f84ffbc302b7&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (3) DI AMPANG DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN KES NO : 62-127-2008 PENDAKWARAYA LAWAN WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN Fakta Kes/latar belakang kes a) Saksi utama dalam kes ini sepatutnya adalah pengadu iaitu Hasan bin Muda @ Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed, namun beliau telah meninggal dunia. Jadi, pendakwaan telah memilih anak kepada pengadu iaitu Abdul Malik bin Hasan @ Abdul Aziz sebagai saksi utama (SP1). Beliau juga alternate director kepada syarikat yang dilantik pada tahun 2001 oleh pengadu melalui surat perlantikan yang ditanda sebagai ID1. Pengadu dan OKT adalah dua orang pengarah kepada syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai STCSB). Melalui keterangan SP1 standard operating procedure syarikat adalah mempunyai 2 orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu. Pentadbiran syarikat dan hal ehwal kewangan dikendalikan oleh OKT dengan dibantu oleh seorang pengurus operasi iaitu En. Shafei (SP6) yang menguruskan hal ehwal teksi dan operasi dan pengadu juga turut membantu SP6 ini dalam kerja-kerja operasi sekali sekala. Seorang kerani iaitu Cik Rohana (SP7) menjaga hal ehwal kutipan dan akaun dijaga oleh En.Ahmad dan kemudiannya di ambil alih oleh En. Badros (tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi dalam kes ini). b) Pada tahun 2001 pengadu telah datang berjumpa dengan SP1 menyatakan rasa tidak puas hati beliau megenai pengurusan STCSB. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk melantik firma akauntan yang baru selain dari firma akauntan syarikat yang sedia ada untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen kewangan syarikat. Syarikat One Zero Management (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OZM) telah dilantik dan OZM telah membuat special audit review dan mengeluarkan special audit report mengenai STCSB pada tahun 2001. Berdasarkan special audit review ini didapati terdapat beberapa perkara yang melibatkan salah guna kewangan dan berdasarkan report ini SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis. Laporan polis yang dibuat adalah berdasarkan finding dalam audit special report tersebut yang ditanda sebagai P5 oleh pendakwaan. c) OKT dalam kes ini dipertuduhkan dengan empat pertuduhan asal dan sebelum pendakwaan menutup kes ini beliau telah mengemukakan empat pertuduhan pindaan iaitu:- PERTUDUHAN PIDAAN PERTAMA Bahawa kamu pada 24 April 1997 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd, No 2. Jalan Enggang Timur Tama Keramat, Hulu Kelang dalam daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan teksi bernombor daftar HW 9540 dengan nilai RM27000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya 3 menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan teksi tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEDUA Bahawa kamu pada bulan Julai 1995 di Pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Derah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 5000 unit dengan nilai RM24960.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KETIGA Bahawa kamu pada 3 April 1996 di Pejabat tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya di amanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 3000 unit dengan nilai RM17496.15 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEEMPAT Bahawa kamu pada bulan April 1996 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam daerah Ampang Jaya dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 2000 unit dengan nilai RM11267.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan sah am tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. d) Secara ringkasnya pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut adalah berkait dengan gagal memasukkan wang hasil jualan teksi dan saham HICOM ke dalam akaun syarikat. Seramai 12 orang saksi telah dipanggil oleh pendakwaan dalam kes ini. Secara ringkasnya menurut keterangan saksi-saksi yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan syarikat tersebut telah ditubuhkan pada tahun 1993 dengan dua orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu (telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 2006). Syarikat ini menjalankan operasi sewa beli teksi. Segala urusan pentadbiran diuruskan secara kolektif oleh OKT, pengadu dan SP6. Apa-apa keputusan akan dibincangkan diantara mereka bertiga dan keputusan akan dibuat secara kolektif. Tiada sebarang persetujuan bertulis 5 dibuat dari awal operasi syarikat. Kesemua secara verbal dan hubungan antara OKT dan pengadu adalah sepupu dan perniagaan lebih kepada percaya antara satu sama lain atau boleh dikatakan juga "perniagaan anak beranak". e) Pada tahun 1995 syarikat mula mengalami kerugian dan kekurangan dana untuk membayar hutang syarikat kerana masalah kegawatan ekonomi dan kegagalan pemandu teksi menjelaskan sewa pada masa yang ditetapkan dan juga masalah lain berkaitan operasi teksi. f) Pembelaan bersetuju bahawa OKT mula mendahulukan duit peribadinya bagi menampung kekurangan wang syarikat. Rujuk P5 di ms 17 dan 18, P5A (i) amount due to Directors, P5A(ii) dan P5F(ii). Perkara ini telah dibincangkan dan di dalam pengetahuan SP6 dan pengadu dan dipersetujui. (Rujuk nota keterangan di ms 72,73 dan 74) g) Pertuduhan adalah pada tahun 1997 bagi pertuduhan pertama, tahun 1995 bagi tuduhan kedua dan tahun 1996 bagi tuduhan ketiga dan keempat. Kes ini di bawa ke Mahkamah pada 24/9/2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada 22/2/2011 iaitu apabila saya mengambil alih Mahkamah Sesyen 3 ini pada 16/2/2011. Isu penting i) Samada keempat-empat pertuduhan di atas kesalahan yang sama iaitu di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan yang mana dilakukan dalam tempoh melebihi 12 bulan boleh dipertuduhkan dan dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan yang melebihi daripada tiga bilangan kesalahan. ii) Samada berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (CPC) yang boleh mengakibatkan perbicaraan menjadi tidak sah dan ini bukan semata-mata suatu diluar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan. iii) Samada wang yang diambil oleh OKT sebagai ganti wang pendahuluan yang telah didahulukan olehnya sebagai modal untuk syarikat beroperasi membawa kepada perbuatan dishonestly misappropriated and/or converted that money to her own use thereby committing criminal breach of trust merupakan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Sebelum Mahkamah membicarakan secara terperinci isu ke (iii) Mahkamah akan terlebih dahulu membincangkan isu (i) dan (ii) dalam kes ini yang membawa kepada keputusan pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT untuk keempat-empat pertuduhan. Isu (i) dan (ii) ini juga tidak ditimbulkan oleh mana-mana pihak sebelum ini namun Mahkamah menggunakan isu ini sebagai salah satu alasan untuk penghakiman tersebut. OKT dalam kes ini telah dengan jelasnya telah dibicarakan bersama untuk pertuduhan yang sama jenis kesalahannya yang melebihi tiga pertuduhan dalam tempoh masa yang melebihi 12 bulan. Ini jelas 7 berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Persoalan yang timbul adalah apakah akibatnya ataupun kesannya kepada perlanggaran peruntukan ini? Untuk tujuan ini Mahkamah menggunapakai beberapa kes yang membincangkan isu yang sama iaitu di dalam kes Subramania Iyer v King Emperor LR 28 1A 257, perayu dalam kes ini telah dipertuduhkan dengan 41 kesalahan yang didakwa berlaku dalam tempoh melebihi dua tahun. Privy Council telah mengetepikan sabitan dan memutuskan bahawa terdapat perlanggaran kepada peruntukan seksyen 234(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah India 1898 ( seksyen 164(1) CPC) dan ia adalah tidak sah (illegal) dan tidak boleh dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 537 ( seksyen 422 CPC). Lord Halsbury LC said: "Their Lordships are unable to regard the disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial as a mere irregularity. Such a phrase as irregularity is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time, and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law could have been joined together in one indictment. The illustration itself sufficiently shows what was meant." Prinsip dalam kes ini diguna pakai dalam kes di Malaysia iaitu dalam kes Chin Choy v Public Prosecutor (1995) MLJ 236. Dalam kes ini tertuduh telah dituduh dengan dua pertuduhan of CONSORTING contrary dengan Reg. 5 (1) of Emergency Regulations 1948, iaitu atas kesalahan memiliki sepucuk revover bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(a) of Emergency Regulation 1951 dan satu lagi kesalahan adalah being in possession of ammunition bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(b) of the same Emergency Regulation 1951. Tempoh masa kesalahan ini dilakukan adalah diantara tahun 1948 hingga 1955. Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah mengaku salah to two charges of consorting. Yet, COA Malaya mengetepikan sabitan terhadap pertuduhan milikan dan mengarahkan perbicaraan semula dijalankan. Mathew CJ rejected the prosecuiton's contention that there had been a regular trial in the following passage: " The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor has submitted that, as a plea of guilty to the charges relating to consorting was accepted and conviction recorded, the trial took place only as to the charges of possession, and to this joinder no exception can be taken. We do not agree. The appellant was required to plead to four charges which were wrongly joined, and the fact that he pleaded guilty to two of them does not cure the original irregularity. Support for this view is to be found in Krishmaswami Pillai v King-Emperor 26 Mad 125. We accordinglay quash the convictions, and order a re-trial as to the charges relating to possession contrary to regulations 4(1)(a) dan 4(1)(b) of the Emergency Regulations 1951. Kes terkini berkaitan isu ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Putrajaya iaitu di dalam kes AZAHAN MOHD AMINALLAH v PP (2005) 1 CLJ 374. Kes ini telah digunapakai dan dirujuk oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan perlanggaran seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah ini. Dalam kes diatas tertuduh telah dituduh di Mahkamah Sesyen dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 376 kanun keseksaan kerana merogol 9 anaknya yang berumur 15 tahun di sebuah ladang kelapa sawit pada tahun 1996. Dalam keterangan utamanya, pengadu mendakwa bahawa tertuduh juga telah beberapa kali merogolnya sebelum kejadian pada tahun 1996 itu. Di penutup kes pendakwaan, pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh dipinda berkaitan dengan waktu kejadian rogol tersebut, sementara tiga pertuduhan baru telah juga dikemukakan terhadapnya mengenai kesalahan serupa yang didakwa dilakukan masing-masing pada tahun 1996, 1994 dan 1991. Tertuduh kemudiannya dipanggil untuk membela diri dan beliau memilih untuk memberi keterangan dari kandang OKT dan Hakim yang bijaksana telah memutuskan di akhir kes pembelaan OKT di disabitkan atas keempat-empat pertuduhan tersebut dan dihukum penjara 18 tahun dan dua sebatan bagi setiap pertuduhan. OKT kemudiannya merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi tetapi rayuannya di tolak oleh yang arif hakim dan mengekalkan keputusan hakim sesyen. Dihadapan hakim-hakim Mahkamah Rayuan disini, alasan utama perayu adalah bahawa beliau telah dituduh dengan dan dibicarakan atas empat pertuduhan dalam satu perbicaraan di mana kesemua pertuduhan tersebut di dakwa berlaku dalam tempoh lima tahun - yang mana ianya bertentangan dengan s. 164(1) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah menyebabkan perbicaraannya menjadi tidak sah. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa rayuan adalah dibenarkan dan sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (Gopal Sri Ram) memutuskan:- " The accused's complaint - that he had been charged and tried at one trial for similar offences allegedly committed through a span of five years-was justified. Indeed, the accused was charged with committing four separate acts of rape which allegedly took place over a period of five years. This was clear violation of s.164(1) of the CPC, and the consequence was that the trial was a nullity. It was not a mere irregularity but an incurable illegality." Oleh itu dalam kes kita ini saya mengambil pendekatan yang sama dan berdasarkan kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas tadi Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap OKT yang telah dituduh dengan empat perbuatan pecah amanah di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan iaitu empat kesalahan yang serupa yang didakwa dilakukan dalam tempoh tiga tahun iaitu dari tahun 1995 hingga 1997 yang melebihi 12 bulan setiap satu dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan adalah jelas menyalahi seksyen 164(1) CPC dan kesan daripadanya mengakibatkan perbicaraan adalah tidak sah. Ia bukan semata-mata suatu luar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 422 CPC. Oleh itu Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri terhadap keempat-empat pertuduhan. Mahkamah juga mendapati perbicaraan semula kes ini adalah tidak wajar (sekiranya YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk dibicarakan semula atas isu ini) kerana ia adalah atas kekhilafan pendakwaan sendiri yang mana pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih dari cukup untuk mengkaji pertuduhan terhadap OKT dari segenap aspek memandangkan kes ini telah 11 dituduh di Mahkamah pada tahun 2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada bulan febuari 2011 iaitu pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih kurang dua tahun lebih untuk meneliti pertuduhan ini. Sekiranya alasan penghakiman saya ini diterima oleh isu ini diterima oleh Yang Arif Hakim maka isu yang seterusnya berkenaan dengan initipati pertuduhan adalah menjadi akademik. Namun untuk menguatkan lagi alasan penghakiman saya ini maka disentuh juga isu berkenaan dengan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan ini juga. Isu (iii) iaitu dari segi intipati pertuduhan yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan. Intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan adalah:- i) The accused should be entrusted with property or dominion over property - tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. ii) He should dishonestly misappropriated or convert the property to his own use.- yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Definisi berkenaan dishonestly dinyatakan dibawah seksyen 24 KK manakala seksyen 23 memberikan definisi seksyen 23 KK. Oleh itu isu utama dalam pertuduhan ini adalah samada OKT yang didakwa mengambil sejumlah RM27000.00 iaitu hasil jualan teksi (pertuduhan pindaan pertama) dan sejumlah RM53723.15 iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM (pertuduhan pindaan kedua,ketiga dan keempat) sebagai ganti bayaran balik jumlah wang yang telah didahulukan oleh OKT untuk syarikat TCSB ini membawa kepada maksud bahawa OKT telah dishonestly misappropriate and/or converted that money untuk kegunaan dan kepentingannya sendiri dan dengan itu telah melakukan kesalahan pecah amanah ini seperti yang dipertuduhkan ke atasnya di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan? Mengikut keterangan SP1 dan SP10 terlebih dahulu. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis tanpa merujuk kepada akaun pengurusan syarikat dan juga buku lejar syarikat dan gagal mendapatkan penjelasan daripada En.Badros. SP10 kredibilitinya adalah tercabar kerana memberi keterangan dalam Mahkamah dalam perasaan yang marah dan beremosi. Keterangannya hanya melalui cakap dengar dan anggapan sendiri dan melemparkan tuduhan terhadap OKT tanpa dikemukakan apa-apa bukti. Pada pandangan Mahkamah keterangan SP10 adalah seolah-olah berdendam dengan OKT dan lebih kepada seorang yang "busy body" kepada syarikat yang tidak terlibat dengan syarikat tersebut secara langsung dari awal penubuhan syarikat dan beliau hanya salah seorang keluarga kepada pengadu. (Rujuk kepada Nota keterangan mahkamah di mukasurat 103,104 berkenaan pemerhatian mahkamah terhadap demeanor saksi ini) Keterangan dari saksi yang sebegini Mahkamah seharusnya berhati-hati dalam menerima keterangan beliau kerana beliau adalah orang yang berkepentingan dalam syarikat ini. Mahkamah juga mengambil fakta bahawa saksi ini telah menghantar surat-surat aduan tentang perjalanan kes ini kepada Pejabat Peguam Negara dan juga kepada pihak BPR (Badan Pencegah Rasuah) dengan membuat tuduhan yang mengatakan Mahkamah telah menghilangkan dokumen untuk perbicaraan kes ini sehingga membawa kepada pihak BPR datang ke Mahkamah menjalankan siasatan semasa kes ini masih berjalan. Ianya mengganggu perjalanan kes ini di Mahkamah sebenarnya. Perkara-perkara 13 sebegini harus diambil kira oleh Mahkamah juga dan tambahan pula semasa beliau memberi keterangan beliau seringkali meninggikan suara dengan peguam dan tidak menjawab kepada soalan sebaliknya melemparkan soalan kembali kepada peguam. (Rujuk nota keterangan di muka surat 107,109 dan 110) Bagi tuduhan pertama yang melibatkan hasil jualan teksi HW 9540. Wang tersebut sejumlah RM27000.00 tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa beliau telah mengambilnya dengan menolak wang pendahuluan yang dibuat oleh beliau kepada syarikat di awal penubuhan syarikat TCSB dan hal ini telah dibuat dalam pengetahuan pengadu, SP6, SP7 dan En. Badros. En. Badros tidak dipanggil dipanggil oleh pendakwaan untuk memberi keterangan sedangkan beliau adalah saksi penting dalam kes ini kerana beliaulah yang menjaga akaun berkenaan dengan kutipan sewa dan hasil jualan teksi tersebut. Cek tersebut diambil di hadapan Pengadu sendiri dan dibuat catatan di dalam buku kutipan tunai oleh SP7 sepertimana yang terkadung dalam P17 mukasurat 19 iaitu “masuk ke akaun uncle wan”. TPR di mukasurat 74 nota keterangan pernah memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk mengeluarkan sapina terhadap En. Badrus dan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah, namun hanya ditawarkan sahaja kepada pembelaan setelah pendakwaan menutup kes tanpa dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. Kegagalan untuk memanggil En.Badros bagi memberi penjelasan secara terperinci berkenaan akaun jualan teksi tersebut adalah menyebabkan fatal kepada kes pendakwaan dan Mahkamah tertanya-tanya tentang perkara sebenarnya. SP1, SP2,SP6 dan SP7 menyebut tentang peranan Badros ini dalam penyediaan akaun syarikat dan kehadiran beliau juga penting untuk menjelaskan tentang buku lejer akaun di m/s 63 dan 163 dan pihak pendakwaan sebaliknya menawarkan saksi ini kepada pembelaan. Oleh itu kegagalan memanggil beliau menyebabkan Mahkamah menggunapakai peruntukan s.114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan ia menyebelahi kes pembelaan. Pengadu di dalam kes ini juga telah meninggal dunia dan hanya statement dibawah seksyen 112 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah adalah tidak membawa sebarang qualiti dalam nilai keterangannya kerana beliau tidak boleh di soal balas oleh peguambela OKT. Rujuk seksyen 405 Kanun Keseksaan. Bekenaan dengan hasil jualan saham sebanyak RM24,960 bagi pertuduhan kedua. Saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa ia telah dilaporkan dalam penyata akaun 1995 iaitu P5A(iii) dan SP8 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa sebelum dilaporkan auditor akan menyemak dokumen- dokumen sokongan namun dokumen-dokumen ini tidak di kemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Pihak pendakwaan semata-mata menjalankan kes ini dengan hanya bersandarkan P5 sahaja iaitu Report On Special Audit Review Of STCSB yang mana dokumen-dokumen asal dalam P5 kebanyakannya tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang bukti yang menunjukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi OKT. Tiada bukti yang menunjukkan juga saham tersebut dijual oleh siapa. Ini disahkan oleh SP11. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang boleh menunjukkan “misappropriation with dishonest intention” telah dilakukan oleh OKT. Bagi pertuduhan ketiga dan keempat Mahkamah sekali lagi bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi, hasil 15 jualan saham Hicom dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi tertuduh dengan jumlah keseluruhan RM28,863.00 dan ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak OKT juga. Namun ianya dibuat tanpa sebarang DISHONEST INTENTION dan tiada wrongful gain ataupun wrongful loss yang berlaku. Ini kerana mengikut keterangan SP6 semasa di soal balas oleh peguam OKT di mukasurat 73 nota keterangan mengatakan bahwa OKT telah mengambil wang tersebut dengan persetujuan pengadu dan disaksikan oleh SP6 bagi tujuan menolak hutang yang telah OKT dahulukan untuk STCSB. Perkataan yang digunakan oleh pengadu seperti yang diberitahu oleh SP6 dalam kehadirannya sendiri adalah, “bila syarikat ada duit, kamu ambil duit kamu balik.” (juga di m/s 73 Nota keterangan) Ini disahkan juga oleh SP2 seperti dalam m/s 18, P5 para(d) berkaitan withdrawals and repayments by TCSB kepada OKT. Oleh itu untuk isu (iii) ini Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan dan oleh yang demikian Mahkamah memutuskan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan memerintahkan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada keempat-empat pertuduhan pindaan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Sekian, terima kasih. Untuk pertimbagan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. MANIRA MOHD NOR HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN 3, AMPANG. BERTARIKH : 5 DISEMBER 2011.

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

62-127-2008

PENDAKWARAYA PENDAKWA RAYA TERTUDUH WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF

05/12/2011

PN MANIRA MOHD NOR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2ae29907-2e61-4308-af01-f84ffbc302b7&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (3) DI AMPANG DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN KES NO : 62-127-2008 PENDAKWARAYA LAWAN WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN Fakta Kes/latar belakang kes a) Saksi utama dalam kes ini sepatutnya adalah pengadu iaitu Hasan bin Muda @ Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed, namun beliau telah meninggal dunia. Jadi, pendakwaan telah memilih anak kepada pengadu iaitu Abdul Malik bin Hasan @ Abdul Aziz sebagai saksi utama (SP1). Beliau juga alternate director kepada syarikat yang dilantik pada tahun 2001 oleh pengadu melalui surat perlantikan yang ditanda sebagai ID1. Pengadu dan OKT adalah dua orang pengarah kepada syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai STCSB). Melalui keterangan SP1 standard operating procedure syarikat adalah mempunyai 2 orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu. Pentadbiran syarikat dan hal ehwal kewangan dikendalikan oleh OKT dengan dibantu oleh seorang pengurus operasi iaitu En. Shafei (SP6) yang menguruskan hal ehwal teksi dan operasi dan pengadu juga turut membantu SP6 ini dalam kerja-kerja operasi sekali sekala. Seorang kerani iaitu Cik Rohana (SP7) menjaga hal ehwal kutipan dan akaun dijaga oleh En.Ahmad dan kemudiannya di ambil alih oleh En. Badros (tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi dalam kes ini). b) Pada tahun 2001 pengadu telah datang berjumpa dengan SP1 menyatakan rasa tidak puas hati beliau megenai pengurusan STCSB. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk melantik firma akauntan yang baru selain dari firma akauntan syarikat yang sedia ada untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen kewangan syarikat. Syarikat One Zero Management (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OZM) telah dilantik dan OZM telah membuat special audit review dan mengeluarkan special audit report mengenai STCSB pada tahun 2001. Berdasarkan special audit review ini didapati terdapat beberapa perkara yang melibatkan salah guna kewangan dan berdasarkan report ini SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis. Laporan polis yang dibuat adalah berdasarkan finding dalam audit special report tersebut yang ditanda sebagai P5 oleh pendakwaan. c) OKT dalam kes ini dipertuduhkan dengan empat pertuduhan asal dan sebelum pendakwaan menutup kes ini beliau telah mengemukakan empat pertuduhan pindaan iaitu:- PERTUDUHAN PIDAAN PERTAMA Bahawa kamu pada 24 April 1997 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd, No 2. Jalan Enggang Timur Tama Keramat, Hulu Kelang dalam daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan teksi bernombor daftar HW 9540 dengan nilai RM27000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya 3 menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan teksi tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEDUA Bahawa kamu pada bulan Julai 1995 di Pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Derah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 5000 unit dengan nilai RM24960.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KETIGA Bahawa kamu pada 3 April 1996 di Pejabat tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya di amanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 3000 unit dengan nilai RM17496.15 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEEMPAT Bahawa kamu pada bulan April 1996 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam daerah Ampang Jaya dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 2000 unit dengan nilai RM11267.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan sah am tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. d) Secara ringkasnya pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut adalah berkait dengan gagal memasukkan wang hasil jualan teksi dan saham HICOM ke dalam akaun syarikat. Seramai 12 orang saksi telah dipanggil oleh pendakwaan dalam kes ini. Secara ringkasnya menurut keterangan saksi-saksi yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan syarikat tersebut telah ditubuhkan pada tahun 1993 dengan dua orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu (telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 2006). Syarikat ini menjalankan operasi sewa beli teksi. Segala urusan pentadbiran diuruskan secara kolektif oleh OKT, pengadu dan SP6. Apa-apa keputusan akan dibincangkan diantara mereka bertiga dan keputusan akan dibuat secara kolektif. Tiada sebarang persetujuan bertulis 5 dibuat dari awal operasi syarikat. Kesemua secara verbal dan hubungan antara OKT dan pengadu adalah sepupu dan perniagaan lebih kepada percaya antara satu sama lain atau boleh dikatakan juga "perniagaan anak beranak". e) Pada tahun 1995 syarikat mula mengalami kerugian dan kekurangan dana untuk membayar hutang syarikat kerana masalah kegawatan ekonomi dan kegagalan pemandu teksi menjelaskan sewa pada masa yang ditetapkan dan juga masalah lain berkaitan operasi teksi. f) Pembelaan bersetuju bahawa OKT mula mendahulukan duit peribadinya bagi menampung kekurangan wang syarikat. Rujuk P5 di ms 17 dan 18, P5A (i) amount due to Directors, P5A(ii) dan P5F(ii). Perkara ini telah dibincangkan dan di dalam pengetahuan SP6 dan pengadu dan dipersetujui. (Rujuk nota keterangan di ms 72,73 dan 74) g) Pertuduhan adalah pada tahun 1997 bagi pertuduhan pertama, tahun 1995 bagi tuduhan kedua dan tahun 1996 bagi tuduhan ketiga dan keempat. Kes ini di bawa ke Mahkamah pada 24/9/2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada 22/2/2011 iaitu apabila saya mengambil alih Mahkamah Sesyen 3 ini pada 16/2/2011. Isu penting i) Samada keempat-empat pertuduhan di atas kesalahan yang sama iaitu di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan yang mana dilakukan dalam tempoh melebihi 12 bulan boleh dipertuduhkan dan dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan yang melebihi daripada tiga bilangan kesalahan. ii) Samada berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (CPC) yang boleh mengakibatkan perbicaraan menjadi tidak sah dan ini bukan semata-mata suatu diluar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan. iii) Samada wang yang diambil oleh OKT sebagai ganti wang pendahuluan yang telah didahulukan olehnya sebagai modal untuk syarikat beroperasi membawa kepada perbuatan dishonestly misappropriated and/or converted that money to her own use thereby committing criminal breach of trust merupakan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Sebelum Mahkamah membicarakan secara terperinci isu ke (iii) Mahkamah akan terlebih dahulu membincangkan isu (i) dan (ii) dalam kes ini yang membawa kepada keputusan pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT untuk keempat-empat pertuduhan. Isu (i) dan (ii) ini juga tidak ditimbulkan oleh mana-mana pihak sebelum ini namun Mahkamah menggunakan isu ini sebagai salah satu alasan untuk penghakiman tersebut. OKT dalam kes ini telah dengan jelasnya telah dibicarakan bersama untuk pertuduhan yang sama jenis kesalahannya yang melebihi tiga pertuduhan dalam tempoh masa yang melebihi 12 bulan. Ini jelas 7 berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Persoalan yang timbul adalah apakah akibatnya ataupun kesannya kepada perlanggaran peruntukan ini? Untuk tujuan ini Mahkamah menggunapakai beberapa kes yang membincangkan isu yang sama iaitu di dalam kes Subramania Iyer v King Emperor LR 28 1A 257, perayu dalam kes ini telah dipertuduhkan dengan 41 kesalahan yang didakwa berlaku dalam tempoh melebihi dua tahun. Privy Council telah mengetepikan sabitan dan memutuskan bahawa terdapat perlanggaran kepada peruntukan seksyen 234(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah India 1898 ( seksyen 164(1) CPC) dan ia adalah tidak sah (illegal) dan tidak boleh dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 537 ( seksyen 422 CPC). Lord Halsbury LC said: "Their Lordships are unable to regard the disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial as a mere irregularity. Such a phrase as irregularity is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time, and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law could have been joined together in one indictment. The illustration itself sufficiently shows what was meant." Prinsip dalam kes ini diguna pakai dalam kes di Malaysia iaitu dalam kes Chin Choy v Public Prosecutor (1995) MLJ 236. Dalam kes ini tertuduh telah dituduh dengan dua pertuduhan of CONSORTING contrary dengan Reg. 5 (1) of Emergency Regulations 1948, iaitu atas kesalahan memiliki sepucuk revover bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(a) of Emergency Regulation 1951 dan satu lagi kesalahan adalah being in possession of ammunition bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(b) of the same Emergency Regulation 1951. Tempoh masa kesalahan ini dilakukan adalah diantara tahun 1948 hingga 1955. Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah mengaku salah to two charges of consorting. Yet, COA Malaya mengetepikan sabitan terhadap pertuduhan milikan dan mengarahkan perbicaraan semula dijalankan. Mathew CJ rejected the prosecuiton's contention that there had been a regular trial in the following passage: " The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor has submitted that, as a plea of guilty to the charges relating to consorting was accepted and conviction recorded, the trial took place only as to the charges of possession, and to this joinder no exception can be taken. We do not agree. The appellant was required to plead to four charges which were wrongly joined, and the fact that he pleaded guilty to two of them does not cure the original irregularity. Support for this view is to be found in Krishmaswami Pillai v King-Emperor 26 Mad 125. We accordinglay quash the convictions, and order a re-trial as to the charges relating to possession contrary to regulations 4(1)(a) dan 4(1)(b) of the Emergency Regulations 1951. Kes terkini berkaitan isu ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Putrajaya iaitu di dalam kes AZAHAN MOHD AMINALLAH v PP (2005) 1 CLJ 374. Kes ini telah digunapakai dan dirujuk oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan perlanggaran seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah ini. Dalam kes diatas tertuduh telah dituduh di Mahkamah Sesyen dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 376 kanun keseksaan kerana merogol 9 anaknya yang berumur 15 tahun di sebuah ladang kelapa sawit pada tahun 1996. Dalam keterangan utamanya, pengadu mendakwa bahawa tertuduh juga telah beberapa kali merogolnya sebelum kejadian pada tahun 1996 itu. Di penutup kes pendakwaan, pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh dipinda berkaitan dengan waktu kejadian rogol tersebut, sementara tiga pertuduhan baru telah juga dikemukakan terhadapnya mengenai kesalahan serupa yang didakwa dilakukan masing-masing pada tahun 1996, 1994 dan 1991. Tertuduh kemudiannya dipanggil untuk membela diri dan beliau memilih untuk memberi keterangan dari kandang OKT dan Hakim yang bijaksana telah memutuskan di akhir kes pembelaan OKT di disabitkan atas keempat-empat pertuduhan tersebut dan dihukum penjara 18 tahun dan dua sebatan bagi setiap pertuduhan. OKT kemudiannya merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi tetapi rayuannya di tolak oleh yang arif hakim dan mengekalkan keputusan hakim sesyen. Dihadapan hakim-hakim Mahkamah Rayuan disini, alasan utama perayu adalah bahawa beliau telah dituduh dengan dan dibicarakan atas empat pertuduhan dalam satu perbicaraan di mana kesemua pertuduhan tersebut di dakwa berlaku dalam tempoh lima tahun - yang mana ianya bertentangan dengan s. 164(1) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah menyebabkan perbicaraannya menjadi tidak sah. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa rayuan adalah dibenarkan dan sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (Gopal Sri Ram) memutuskan:- " The accused's complaint - that he had been charged and tried at one trial for similar offences allegedly committed through a span of five years-was justified. Indeed, the accused was charged with committing four separate acts of rape which allegedly took place over a period of five years. This was clear violation of s.164(1) of the CPC, and the consequence was that the trial was a nullity. It was not a mere irregularity but an incurable illegality." Oleh itu dalam kes kita ini saya mengambil pendekatan yang sama dan berdasarkan kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas tadi Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap OKT yang telah dituduh dengan empat perbuatan pecah amanah di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan iaitu empat kesalahan yang serupa yang didakwa dilakukan dalam tempoh tiga tahun iaitu dari tahun 1995 hingga 1997 yang melebihi 12 bulan setiap satu dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan adalah jelas menyalahi seksyen 164(1) CPC dan kesan daripadanya mengakibatkan perbicaraan adalah tidak sah. Ia bukan semata-mata suatu luar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 422 CPC. Oleh itu Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri terhadap keempat-empat pertuduhan. Mahkamah juga mendapati perbicaraan semula kes ini adalah tidak wajar (sekiranya YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk dibicarakan semula atas isu ini) kerana ia adalah atas kekhilafan pendakwaan sendiri yang mana pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih dari cukup untuk mengkaji pertuduhan terhadap OKT dari segenap aspek memandangkan kes ini telah 11 dituduh di Mahkamah pada tahun 2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada bulan febuari 2011 iaitu pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih kurang dua tahun lebih untuk meneliti pertuduhan ini. Sekiranya alasan penghakiman saya ini diterima oleh isu ini diterima oleh Yang Arif Hakim maka isu yang seterusnya berkenaan dengan initipati pertuduhan adalah menjadi akademik. Namun untuk menguatkan lagi alasan penghakiman saya ini maka disentuh juga isu berkenaan dengan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan ini juga. Isu (iii) iaitu dari segi intipati pertuduhan yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan. Intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan adalah:- i) The accused should be entrusted with property or dominion over property - tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. ii) He should dishonestly misappropriated or convert the property to his own use.- yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Definisi berkenaan dishonestly dinyatakan dibawah seksyen 24 KK manakala seksyen 23 memberikan definisi seksyen 23 KK. Oleh itu isu utama dalam pertuduhan ini adalah samada OKT yang didakwa mengambil sejumlah RM27000.00 iaitu hasil jualan teksi (pertuduhan pindaan pertama) dan sejumlah RM53723.15 iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM (pertuduhan pindaan kedua,ketiga dan keempat) sebagai ganti bayaran balik jumlah wang yang telah didahulukan oleh OKT untuk syarikat TCSB ini membawa kepada maksud bahawa OKT telah dishonestly misappropriate and/or converted that money untuk kegunaan dan kepentingannya sendiri dan dengan itu telah melakukan kesalahan pecah amanah ini seperti yang dipertuduhkan ke atasnya di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan? Mengikut keterangan SP1 dan SP10 terlebih dahulu. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis tanpa merujuk kepada akaun pengurusan syarikat dan juga buku lejar syarikat dan gagal mendapatkan penjelasan daripada En.Badros. SP10 kredibilitinya adalah tercabar kerana memberi keterangan dalam Mahkamah dalam perasaan yang marah dan beremosi. Keterangannya hanya melalui cakap dengar dan anggapan sendiri dan melemparkan tuduhan terhadap OKT tanpa dikemukakan apa-apa bukti. Pada pandangan Mahkamah keterangan SP10 adalah seolah-olah berdendam dengan OKT dan lebih kepada seorang yang "busy body" kepada syarikat yang tidak terlibat dengan syarikat tersebut secara langsung dari awal penubuhan syarikat dan beliau hanya salah seorang keluarga kepada pengadu. (Rujuk kepada Nota keterangan mahkamah di mukasurat 103,104 berkenaan pemerhatian mahkamah terhadap demeanor saksi ini) Keterangan dari saksi yang sebegini Mahkamah seharusnya berhati-hati dalam menerima keterangan beliau kerana beliau adalah orang yang berkepentingan dalam syarikat ini. Mahkamah juga mengambil fakta bahawa saksi ini telah menghantar surat-surat aduan tentang perjalanan kes ini kepada Pejabat Peguam Negara dan juga kepada pihak BPR (Badan Pencegah Rasuah) dengan membuat tuduhan yang mengatakan Mahkamah telah menghilangkan dokumen untuk perbicaraan kes ini sehingga membawa kepada pihak BPR datang ke Mahkamah menjalankan siasatan semasa kes ini masih berjalan. Ianya mengganggu perjalanan kes ini di Mahkamah sebenarnya. Perkara-perkara 13 sebegini harus diambil kira oleh Mahkamah juga dan tambahan pula semasa beliau memberi keterangan beliau seringkali meninggikan suara dengan peguam dan tidak menjawab kepada soalan sebaliknya melemparkan soalan kembali kepada peguam. (Rujuk nota keterangan di muka surat 107,109 dan 110) Bagi tuduhan pertama yang melibatkan hasil jualan teksi HW 9540. Wang tersebut sejumlah RM27000.00 tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa beliau telah mengambilnya dengan menolak wang pendahuluan yang dibuat oleh beliau kepada syarikat di awal penubuhan syarikat TCSB dan hal ini telah dibuat dalam pengetahuan pengadu, SP6, SP7 dan En. Badros. En. Badros tidak dipanggil dipanggil oleh pendakwaan untuk memberi keterangan sedangkan beliau adalah saksi penting dalam kes ini kerana beliaulah yang menjaga akaun berkenaan dengan kutipan sewa dan hasil jualan teksi tersebut. Cek tersebut diambil di hadapan Pengadu sendiri dan dibuat catatan di dalam buku kutipan tunai oleh SP7 sepertimana yang terkadung dalam P17 mukasurat 19 iaitu “masuk ke akaun uncle wan”. TPR di mukasurat 74 nota keterangan pernah memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk mengeluarkan sapina terhadap En. Badrus dan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah, namun hanya ditawarkan sahaja kepada pembelaan setelah pendakwaan menutup kes tanpa dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. Kegagalan untuk memanggil En.Badros bagi memberi penjelasan secara terperinci berkenaan akaun jualan teksi tersebut adalah menyebabkan fatal kepada kes pendakwaan dan Mahkamah tertanya-tanya tentang perkara sebenarnya. SP1, SP2,SP6 dan SP7 menyebut tentang peranan Badros ini dalam penyediaan akaun syarikat dan kehadiran beliau juga penting untuk menjelaskan tentang buku lejer akaun di m/s 63 dan 163 dan pihak pendakwaan sebaliknya menawarkan saksi ini kepada pembelaan. Oleh itu kegagalan memanggil beliau menyebabkan Mahkamah menggunapakai peruntukan s.114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan ia menyebelahi kes pembelaan. Pengadu di dalam kes ini juga telah meninggal dunia dan hanya statement dibawah seksyen 112 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah adalah tidak membawa sebarang qualiti dalam nilai keterangannya kerana beliau tidak boleh di soal balas oleh peguambela OKT. Rujuk seksyen 405 Kanun Keseksaan. Bekenaan dengan hasil jualan saham sebanyak RM24,960 bagi pertuduhan kedua. Saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa ia telah dilaporkan dalam penyata akaun 1995 iaitu P5A(iii) dan SP8 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa sebelum dilaporkan auditor akan menyemak dokumen- dokumen sokongan namun dokumen-dokumen ini tidak di kemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Pihak pendakwaan semata-mata menjalankan kes ini dengan hanya bersandarkan P5 sahaja iaitu Report On Special Audit Review Of STCSB yang mana dokumen-dokumen asal dalam P5 kebanyakannya tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang bukti yang menunjukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi OKT. Tiada bukti yang menunjukkan juga saham tersebut dijual oleh siapa. Ini disahkan oleh SP11. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang boleh menunjukkan “misappropriation with dishonest intention” telah dilakukan oleh OKT. Bagi pertuduhan ketiga dan keempat Mahkamah sekali lagi bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi, hasil 15 jualan saham Hicom dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi tertuduh dengan jumlah keseluruhan RM28,863.00 dan ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak OKT juga. Namun ianya dibuat tanpa sebarang DISHONEST INTENTION dan tiada wrongful gain ataupun wrongful loss yang berlaku. Ini kerana mengikut keterangan SP6 semasa di soal balas oleh peguam OKT di mukasurat 73 nota keterangan mengatakan bahwa OKT telah mengambil wang tersebut dengan persetujuan pengadu dan disaksikan oleh SP6 bagi tujuan menolak hutang yang telah OKT dahulukan untuk STCSB. Perkataan yang digunakan oleh pengadu seperti yang diberitahu oleh SP6 dalam kehadirannya sendiri adalah, “bila syarikat ada duit, kamu ambil duit kamu balik.” (juga di m/s 73 Nota keterangan) Ini disahkan juga oleh SP2 seperti dalam m/s 18, P5 para(d) berkaitan withdrawals and repayments by TCSB kepada OKT. Oleh itu untuk isu (iii) ini Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan dan oleh yang demikian Mahkamah memutuskan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan memerintahkan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada keempat-empat pertuduhan pindaan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Sekian, terima kasih. Untuk pertimbagan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. MANIRA MOHD NOR HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN 3, AMPANG. BERTARIKH : 5 DISEMBER 2011.

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

62-127-2008

PENDAKWARAYA PENDAKWA RAYA TERTUDUH WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF

05/12/2011

PN MANIRA MOHD NOR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2ae29907-2e61-4308-af01-f84ffbc302b7&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (3) DI AMPANG DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN KES NO : 62-127-2008 PENDAKWARAYA LAWAN WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN Fakta Kes/latar belakang kes a) Saksi utama dalam kes ini sepatutnya adalah pengadu iaitu Hasan bin Muda @ Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed, namun beliau telah meninggal dunia. Jadi, pendakwaan telah memilih anak kepada pengadu iaitu Abdul Malik bin Hasan @ Abdul Aziz sebagai saksi utama (SP1). Beliau juga alternate director kepada syarikat yang dilantik pada tahun 2001 oleh pengadu melalui surat perlantikan yang ditanda sebagai ID1. Pengadu dan OKT adalah dua orang pengarah kepada syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai STCSB). Melalui keterangan SP1 standard operating procedure syarikat adalah mempunyai 2 orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu. Pentadbiran syarikat dan hal ehwal kewangan dikendalikan oleh OKT dengan dibantu oleh seorang pengurus operasi iaitu En. Shafei (SP6) yang menguruskan hal ehwal teksi dan operasi dan pengadu juga turut membantu SP6 ini dalam kerja-kerja operasi sekali sekala. Seorang kerani iaitu Cik Rohana (SP7) menjaga hal ehwal kutipan dan akaun dijaga oleh En.Ahmad dan kemudiannya di ambil alih oleh En. Badros (tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi dalam kes ini). b) Pada tahun 2001 pengadu telah datang berjumpa dengan SP1 menyatakan rasa tidak puas hati beliau megenai pengurusan STCSB. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk melantik firma akauntan yang baru selain dari firma akauntan syarikat yang sedia ada untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen kewangan syarikat. Syarikat One Zero Management (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OZM) telah dilantik dan OZM telah membuat special audit review dan mengeluarkan special audit report mengenai STCSB pada tahun 2001. Berdasarkan special audit review ini didapati terdapat beberapa perkara yang melibatkan salah guna kewangan dan berdasarkan report ini SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis. Laporan polis yang dibuat adalah berdasarkan finding dalam audit special report tersebut yang ditanda sebagai P5 oleh pendakwaan. c) OKT dalam kes ini dipertuduhkan dengan empat pertuduhan asal dan sebelum pendakwaan menutup kes ini beliau telah mengemukakan empat pertuduhan pindaan iaitu:- PERTUDUHAN PIDAAN PERTAMA Bahawa kamu pada 24 April 1997 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd, No 2. Jalan Enggang Timur Tama Keramat, Hulu Kelang dalam daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan teksi bernombor daftar HW 9540 dengan nilai RM27000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya 3 menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan teksi tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEDUA Bahawa kamu pada bulan Julai 1995 di Pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Derah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 5000 unit dengan nilai RM24960.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KETIGA Bahawa kamu pada 3 April 1996 di Pejabat tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya di amanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 3000 unit dengan nilai RM17496.15 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEEMPAT Bahawa kamu pada bulan April 1996 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam daerah Ampang Jaya dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 2000 unit dengan nilai RM11267.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan sah am tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. d) Secara ringkasnya pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut adalah berkait dengan gagal memasukkan wang hasil jualan teksi dan saham HICOM ke dalam akaun syarikat. Seramai 12 orang saksi telah dipanggil oleh pendakwaan dalam kes ini. Secara ringkasnya menurut keterangan saksi-saksi yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan syarikat tersebut telah ditubuhkan pada tahun 1993 dengan dua orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu (telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 2006). Syarikat ini menjalankan operasi sewa beli teksi. Segala urusan pentadbiran diuruskan secara kolektif oleh OKT, pengadu dan SP6. Apa-apa keputusan akan dibincangkan diantara mereka bertiga dan keputusan akan dibuat secara kolektif. Tiada sebarang persetujuan bertulis 5 dibuat dari awal operasi syarikat. Kesemua secara verbal dan hubungan antara OKT dan pengadu adalah sepupu dan perniagaan lebih kepada percaya antara satu sama lain atau boleh dikatakan juga "perniagaan anak beranak". e) Pada tahun 1995 syarikat mula mengalami kerugian dan kekurangan dana untuk membayar hutang syarikat kerana masalah kegawatan ekonomi dan kegagalan pemandu teksi menjelaskan sewa pada masa yang ditetapkan dan juga masalah lain berkaitan operasi teksi. f) Pembelaan bersetuju bahawa OKT mula mendahulukan duit peribadinya bagi menampung kekurangan wang syarikat. Rujuk P5 di ms 17 dan 18, P5A (i) amount due to Directors, P5A(ii) dan P5F(ii). Perkara ini telah dibincangkan dan di dalam pengetahuan SP6 dan pengadu dan dipersetujui. (Rujuk nota keterangan di ms 72,73 dan 74) g) Pertuduhan adalah pada tahun 1997 bagi pertuduhan pertama, tahun 1995 bagi tuduhan kedua dan tahun 1996 bagi tuduhan ketiga dan keempat. Kes ini di bawa ke Mahkamah pada 24/9/2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada 22/2/2011 iaitu apabila saya mengambil alih Mahkamah Sesyen 3 ini pada 16/2/2011. Isu penting i) Samada keempat-empat pertuduhan di atas kesalahan yang sama iaitu di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan yang mana dilakukan dalam tempoh melebihi 12 bulan boleh dipertuduhkan dan dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan yang melebihi daripada tiga bilangan kesalahan. ii) Samada berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (CPC) yang boleh mengakibatkan perbicaraan menjadi tidak sah dan ini bukan semata-mata suatu diluar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan. iii) Samada wang yang diambil oleh OKT sebagai ganti wang pendahuluan yang telah didahulukan olehnya sebagai modal untuk syarikat beroperasi membawa kepada perbuatan dishonestly misappropriated and/or converted that money to her own use thereby committing criminal breach of trust merupakan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Sebelum Mahkamah membicarakan secara terperinci isu ke (iii) Mahkamah akan terlebih dahulu membincangkan isu (i) dan (ii) dalam kes ini yang membawa kepada keputusan pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT untuk keempat-empat pertuduhan. Isu (i) dan (ii) ini juga tidak ditimbulkan oleh mana-mana pihak sebelum ini namun Mahkamah menggunakan isu ini sebagai salah satu alasan untuk penghakiman tersebut. OKT dalam kes ini telah dengan jelasnya telah dibicarakan bersama untuk pertuduhan yang sama jenis kesalahannya yang melebihi tiga pertuduhan dalam tempoh masa yang melebihi 12 bulan. Ini jelas 7 berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Persoalan yang timbul adalah apakah akibatnya ataupun kesannya kepada perlanggaran peruntukan ini? Untuk tujuan ini Mahkamah menggunapakai beberapa kes yang membincangkan isu yang sama iaitu di dalam kes Subramania Iyer v King Emperor LR 28 1A 257, perayu dalam kes ini telah dipertuduhkan dengan 41 kesalahan yang didakwa berlaku dalam tempoh melebihi dua tahun. Privy Council telah mengetepikan sabitan dan memutuskan bahawa terdapat perlanggaran kepada peruntukan seksyen 234(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah India 1898 ( seksyen 164(1) CPC) dan ia adalah tidak sah (illegal) dan tidak boleh dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 537 ( seksyen 422 CPC). Lord Halsbury LC said: "Their Lordships are unable to regard the disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial as a mere irregularity. Such a phrase as irregularity is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time, and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law could have been joined together in one indictment. The illustration itself sufficiently shows what was meant." Prinsip dalam kes ini diguna pakai dalam kes di Malaysia iaitu dalam kes Chin Choy v Public Prosecutor (1995) MLJ 236. Dalam kes ini tertuduh telah dituduh dengan dua pertuduhan of CONSORTING contrary dengan Reg. 5 (1) of Emergency Regulations 1948, iaitu atas kesalahan memiliki sepucuk revover bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(a) of Emergency Regulation 1951 dan satu lagi kesalahan adalah being in possession of ammunition bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(b) of the same Emergency Regulation 1951. Tempoh masa kesalahan ini dilakukan adalah diantara tahun 1948 hingga 1955. Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah mengaku salah to two charges of consorting. Yet, COA Malaya mengetepikan sabitan terhadap pertuduhan milikan dan mengarahkan perbicaraan semula dijalankan. Mathew CJ rejected the prosecuiton's contention that there had been a regular trial in the following passage: " The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor has submitted that, as a plea of guilty to the charges relating to consorting was accepted and conviction recorded, the trial took place only as to the charges of possession, and to this joinder no exception can be taken. We do not agree. The appellant was required to plead to four charges which were wrongly joined, and the fact that he pleaded guilty to two of them does not cure the original irregularity. Support for this view is to be found in Krishmaswami Pillai v King-Emperor 26 Mad 125. We accordinglay quash the convictions, and order a re-trial as to the charges relating to possession contrary to regulations 4(1)(a) dan 4(1)(b) of the Emergency Regulations 1951. Kes terkini berkaitan isu ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Putrajaya iaitu di dalam kes AZAHAN MOHD AMINALLAH v PP (2005) 1 CLJ 374. Kes ini telah digunapakai dan dirujuk oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan perlanggaran seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah ini. Dalam kes diatas tertuduh telah dituduh di Mahkamah Sesyen dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 376 kanun keseksaan kerana merogol 9 anaknya yang berumur 15 tahun di sebuah ladang kelapa sawit pada tahun 1996. Dalam keterangan utamanya, pengadu mendakwa bahawa tertuduh juga telah beberapa kali merogolnya sebelum kejadian pada tahun 1996 itu. Di penutup kes pendakwaan, pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh dipinda berkaitan dengan waktu kejadian rogol tersebut, sementara tiga pertuduhan baru telah juga dikemukakan terhadapnya mengenai kesalahan serupa yang didakwa dilakukan masing-masing pada tahun 1996, 1994 dan 1991. Tertuduh kemudiannya dipanggil untuk membela diri dan beliau memilih untuk memberi keterangan dari kandang OKT dan Hakim yang bijaksana telah memutuskan di akhir kes pembelaan OKT di disabitkan atas keempat-empat pertuduhan tersebut dan dihukum penjara 18 tahun dan dua sebatan bagi setiap pertuduhan. OKT kemudiannya merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi tetapi rayuannya di tolak oleh yang arif hakim dan mengekalkan keputusan hakim sesyen. Dihadapan hakim-hakim Mahkamah Rayuan disini, alasan utama perayu adalah bahawa beliau telah dituduh dengan dan dibicarakan atas empat pertuduhan dalam satu perbicaraan di mana kesemua pertuduhan tersebut di dakwa berlaku dalam tempoh lima tahun - yang mana ianya bertentangan dengan s. 164(1) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah menyebabkan perbicaraannya menjadi tidak sah. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa rayuan adalah dibenarkan dan sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (Gopal Sri Ram) memutuskan:- " The accused's complaint - that he had been charged and tried at one trial for similar offences allegedly committed through a span of five years-was justified. Indeed, the accused was charged with committing four separate acts of rape which allegedly took place over a period of five years. This was clear violation of s.164(1) of the CPC, and the consequence was that the trial was a nullity. It was not a mere irregularity but an incurable illegality." Oleh itu dalam kes kita ini saya mengambil pendekatan yang sama dan berdasarkan kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas tadi Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap OKT yang telah dituduh dengan empat perbuatan pecah amanah di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan iaitu empat kesalahan yang serupa yang didakwa dilakukan dalam tempoh tiga tahun iaitu dari tahun 1995 hingga 1997 yang melebihi 12 bulan setiap satu dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan adalah jelas menyalahi seksyen 164(1) CPC dan kesan daripadanya mengakibatkan perbicaraan adalah tidak sah. Ia bukan semata-mata suatu luar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 422 CPC. Oleh itu Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri terhadap keempat-empat pertuduhan. Mahkamah juga mendapati perbicaraan semula kes ini adalah tidak wajar (sekiranya YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk dibicarakan semula atas isu ini) kerana ia adalah atas kekhilafan pendakwaan sendiri yang mana pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih dari cukup untuk mengkaji pertuduhan terhadap OKT dari segenap aspek memandangkan kes ini telah 11 dituduh di Mahkamah pada tahun 2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada bulan febuari 2011 iaitu pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih kurang dua tahun lebih untuk meneliti pertuduhan ini. Sekiranya alasan penghakiman saya ini diterima oleh isu ini diterima oleh Yang Arif Hakim maka isu yang seterusnya berkenaan dengan initipati pertuduhan adalah menjadi akademik. Namun untuk menguatkan lagi alasan penghakiman saya ini maka disentuh juga isu berkenaan dengan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan ini juga. Isu (iii) iaitu dari segi intipati pertuduhan yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan. Intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan adalah:- i) The accused should be entrusted with property or dominion over property - tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. ii) He should dishonestly misappropriated or convert the property to his own use.- yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Definisi berkenaan dishonestly dinyatakan dibawah seksyen 24 KK manakala seksyen 23 memberikan definisi seksyen 23 KK. Oleh itu isu utama dalam pertuduhan ini adalah samada OKT yang didakwa mengambil sejumlah RM27000.00 iaitu hasil jualan teksi (pertuduhan pindaan pertama) dan sejumlah RM53723.15 iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM (pertuduhan pindaan kedua,ketiga dan keempat) sebagai ganti bayaran balik jumlah wang yang telah didahulukan oleh OKT untuk syarikat TCSB ini membawa kepada maksud bahawa OKT telah dishonestly misappropriate and/or converted that money untuk kegunaan dan kepentingannya sendiri dan dengan itu telah melakukan kesalahan pecah amanah ini seperti yang dipertuduhkan ke atasnya di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan? Mengikut keterangan SP1 dan SP10 terlebih dahulu. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis tanpa merujuk kepada akaun pengurusan syarikat dan juga buku lejar syarikat dan gagal mendapatkan penjelasan daripada En.Badros. SP10 kredibilitinya adalah tercabar kerana memberi keterangan dalam Mahkamah dalam perasaan yang marah dan beremosi. Keterangannya hanya melalui cakap dengar dan anggapan sendiri dan melemparkan tuduhan terhadap OKT tanpa dikemukakan apa-apa bukti. Pada pandangan Mahkamah keterangan SP10 adalah seolah-olah berdendam dengan OKT dan lebih kepada seorang yang "busy body" kepada syarikat yang tidak terlibat dengan syarikat tersebut secara langsung dari awal penubuhan syarikat dan beliau hanya salah seorang keluarga kepada pengadu. (Rujuk kepada Nota keterangan mahkamah di mukasurat 103,104 berkenaan pemerhatian mahkamah terhadap demeanor saksi ini) Keterangan dari saksi yang sebegini Mahkamah seharusnya berhati-hati dalam menerima keterangan beliau kerana beliau adalah orang yang berkepentingan dalam syarikat ini. Mahkamah juga mengambil fakta bahawa saksi ini telah menghantar surat-surat aduan tentang perjalanan kes ini kepada Pejabat Peguam Negara dan juga kepada pihak BPR (Badan Pencegah Rasuah) dengan membuat tuduhan yang mengatakan Mahkamah telah menghilangkan dokumen untuk perbicaraan kes ini sehingga membawa kepada pihak BPR datang ke Mahkamah menjalankan siasatan semasa kes ini masih berjalan. Ianya mengganggu perjalanan kes ini di Mahkamah sebenarnya. Perkara-perkara 13 sebegini harus diambil kira oleh Mahkamah juga dan tambahan pula semasa beliau memberi keterangan beliau seringkali meninggikan suara dengan peguam dan tidak menjawab kepada soalan sebaliknya melemparkan soalan kembali kepada peguam. (Rujuk nota keterangan di muka surat 107,109 dan 110) Bagi tuduhan pertama yang melibatkan hasil jualan teksi HW 9540. Wang tersebut sejumlah RM27000.00 tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa beliau telah mengambilnya dengan menolak wang pendahuluan yang dibuat oleh beliau kepada syarikat di awal penubuhan syarikat TCSB dan hal ini telah dibuat dalam pengetahuan pengadu, SP6, SP7 dan En. Badros. En. Badros tidak dipanggil dipanggil oleh pendakwaan untuk memberi keterangan sedangkan beliau adalah saksi penting dalam kes ini kerana beliaulah yang menjaga akaun berkenaan dengan kutipan sewa dan hasil jualan teksi tersebut. Cek tersebut diambil di hadapan Pengadu sendiri dan dibuat catatan di dalam buku kutipan tunai oleh SP7 sepertimana yang terkadung dalam P17 mukasurat 19 iaitu “masuk ke akaun uncle wan”. TPR di mukasurat 74 nota keterangan pernah memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk mengeluarkan sapina terhadap En. Badrus dan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah, namun hanya ditawarkan sahaja kepada pembelaan setelah pendakwaan menutup kes tanpa dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. Kegagalan untuk memanggil En.Badros bagi memberi penjelasan secara terperinci berkenaan akaun jualan teksi tersebut adalah menyebabkan fatal kepada kes pendakwaan dan Mahkamah tertanya-tanya tentang perkara sebenarnya. SP1, SP2,SP6 dan SP7 menyebut tentang peranan Badros ini dalam penyediaan akaun syarikat dan kehadiran beliau juga penting untuk menjelaskan tentang buku lejer akaun di m/s 63 dan 163 dan pihak pendakwaan sebaliknya menawarkan saksi ini kepada pembelaan. Oleh itu kegagalan memanggil beliau menyebabkan Mahkamah menggunapakai peruntukan s.114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan ia menyebelahi kes pembelaan. Pengadu di dalam kes ini juga telah meninggal dunia dan hanya statement dibawah seksyen 112 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah adalah tidak membawa sebarang qualiti dalam nilai keterangannya kerana beliau tidak boleh di soal balas oleh peguambela OKT. Rujuk seksyen 405 Kanun Keseksaan. Bekenaan dengan hasil jualan saham sebanyak RM24,960 bagi pertuduhan kedua. Saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa ia telah dilaporkan dalam penyata akaun 1995 iaitu P5A(iii) dan SP8 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa sebelum dilaporkan auditor akan menyemak dokumen- dokumen sokongan namun dokumen-dokumen ini tidak di kemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Pihak pendakwaan semata-mata menjalankan kes ini dengan hanya bersandarkan P5 sahaja iaitu Report On Special Audit Review Of STCSB yang mana dokumen-dokumen asal dalam P5 kebanyakannya tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang bukti yang menunjukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi OKT. Tiada bukti yang menunjukkan juga saham tersebut dijual oleh siapa. Ini disahkan oleh SP11. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang boleh menunjukkan “misappropriation with dishonest intention” telah dilakukan oleh OKT. Bagi pertuduhan ketiga dan keempat Mahkamah sekali lagi bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi, hasil 15 jualan saham Hicom dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi tertuduh dengan jumlah keseluruhan RM28,863.00 dan ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak OKT juga. Namun ianya dibuat tanpa sebarang DISHONEST INTENTION dan tiada wrongful gain ataupun wrongful loss yang berlaku. Ini kerana mengikut keterangan SP6 semasa di soal balas oleh peguam OKT di mukasurat 73 nota keterangan mengatakan bahwa OKT telah mengambil wang tersebut dengan persetujuan pengadu dan disaksikan oleh SP6 bagi tujuan menolak hutang yang telah OKT dahulukan untuk STCSB. Perkataan yang digunakan oleh pengadu seperti yang diberitahu oleh SP6 dalam kehadirannya sendiri adalah, “bila syarikat ada duit, kamu ambil duit kamu balik.” (juga di m/s 73 Nota keterangan) Ini disahkan juga oleh SP2 seperti dalam m/s 18, P5 para(d) berkaitan withdrawals and repayments by TCSB kepada OKT. Oleh itu untuk isu (iii) ini Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan dan oleh yang demikian Mahkamah memutuskan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan memerintahkan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada keempat-empat pertuduhan pindaan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Sekian, terima kasih. Untuk pertimbagan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. MANIRA MOHD NOR HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN 3, AMPANG. BERTARIKH : 5 DISEMBER 2011.

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

62-127-2008

PENDAKWARAYA PENDAKWA RAYA TERTUDUH WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF

05/12/2011

PN MANIRA MOHD NOR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2ae29907-2e61-4308-af01-f84ffbc302b7&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (3) DI AMPANG DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN KES NO : 62-127-2008 PENDAKWARAYA LAWAN WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN Fakta Kes/latar belakang kes a) Saksi utama dalam kes ini sepatutnya adalah pengadu iaitu Hasan bin Muda @ Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed, namun beliau telah meninggal dunia. Jadi, pendakwaan telah memilih anak kepada pengadu iaitu Abdul Malik bin Hasan @ Abdul Aziz sebagai saksi utama (SP1). Beliau juga alternate director kepada syarikat yang dilantik pada tahun 2001 oleh pengadu melalui surat perlantikan yang ditanda sebagai ID1. Pengadu dan OKT adalah dua orang pengarah kepada syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai STCSB). Melalui keterangan SP1 standard operating procedure syarikat adalah mempunyai 2 orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu. Pentadbiran syarikat dan hal ehwal kewangan dikendalikan oleh OKT dengan dibantu oleh seorang pengurus operasi iaitu En. Shafei (SP6) yang menguruskan hal ehwal teksi dan operasi dan pengadu juga turut membantu SP6 ini dalam kerja-kerja operasi sekali sekala. Seorang kerani iaitu Cik Rohana (SP7) menjaga hal ehwal kutipan dan akaun dijaga oleh En.Ahmad dan kemudiannya di ambil alih oleh En. Badros (tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi dalam kes ini). b) Pada tahun 2001 pengadu telah datang berjumpa dengan SP1 menyatakan rasa tidak puas hati beliau megenai pengurusan STCSB. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk melantik firma akauntan yang baru selain dari firma akauntan syarikat yang sedia ada untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen kewangan syarikat. Syarikat One Zero Management (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OZM) telah dilantik dan OZM telah membuat special audit review dan mengeluarkan special audit report mengenai STCSB pada tahun 2001. Berdasarkan special audit review ini didapati terdapat beberapa perkara yang melibatkan salah guna kewangan dan berdasarkan report ini SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis. Laporan polis yang dibuat adalah berdasarkan finding dalam audit special report tersebut yang ditanda sebagai P5 oleh pendakwaan. c) OKT dalam kes ini dipertuduhkan dengan empat pertuduhan asal dan sebelum pendakwaan menutup kes ini beliau telah mengemukakan empat pertuduhan pindaan iaitu:- PERTUDUHAN PIDAAN PERTAMA Bahawa kamu pada 24 April 1997 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd, No 2. Jalan Enggang Timur Tama Keramat, Hulu Kelang dalam daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan teksi bernombor daftar HW 9540 dengan nilai RM27000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya 3 menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan teksi tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEDUA Bahawa kamu pada bulan Julai 1995 di Pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Derah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 5000 unit dengan nilai RM24960.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KETIGA Bahawa kamu pada 3 April 1996 di Pejabat tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya di amanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 3000 unit dengan nilai RM17496.15 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEEMPAT Bahawa kamu pada bulan April 1996 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam daerah Ampang Jaya dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 2000 unit dengan nilai RM11267.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan sah am tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. d) Secara ringkasnya pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut adalah berkait dengan gagal memasukkan wang hasil jualan teksi dan saham HICOM ke dalam akaun syarikat. Seramai 12 orang saksi telah dipanggil oleh pendakwaan dalam kes ini. Secara ringkasnya menurut keterangan saksi-saksi yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan syarikat tersebut telah ditubuhkan pada tahun 1993 dengan dua orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu (telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 2006). Syarikat ini menjalankan operasi sewa beli teksi. Segala urusan pentadbiran diuruskan secara kolektif oleh OKT, pengadu dan SP6. Apa-apa keputusan akan dibincangkan diantara mereka bertiga dan keputusan akan dibuat secara kolektif. Tiada sebarang persetujuan bertulis 5 dibuat dari awal operasi syarikat. Kesemua secara verbal dan hubungan antara OKT dan pengadu adalah sepupu dan perniagaan lebih kepada percaya antara satu sama lain atau boleh dikatakan juga "perniagaan anak beranak". e) Pada tahun 1995 syarikat mula mengalami kerugian dan kekurangan dana untuk membayar hutang syarikat kerana masalah kegawatan ekonomi dan kegagalan pemandu teksi menjelaskan sewa pada masa yang ditetapkan dan juga masalah lain berkaitan operasi teksi. f) Pembelaan bersetuju bahawa OKT mula mendahulukan duit peribadinya bagi menampung kekurangan wang syarikat. Rujuk P5 di ms 17 dan 18, P5A (i) amount due to Directors, P5A(ii) dan P5F(ii). Perkara ini telah dibincangkan dan di dalam pengetahuan SP6 dan pengadu dan dipersetujui. (Rujuk nota keterangan di ms 72,73 dan 74) g) Pertuduhan adalah pada tahun 1997 bagi pertuduhan pertama, tahun 1995 bagi tuduhan kedua dan tahun 1996 bagi tuduhan ketiga dan keempat. Kes ini di bawa ke Mahkamah pada 24/9/2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada 22/2/2011 iaitu apabila saya mengambil alih Mahkamah Sesyen 3 ini pada 16/2/2011. Isu penting i) Samada keempat-empat pertuduhan di atas kesalahan yang sama iaitu di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan yang mana dilakukan dalam tempoh melebihi 12 bulan boleh dipertuduhkan dan dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan yang melebihi daripada tiga bilangan kesalahan. ii) Samada berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (CPC) yang boleh mengakibatkan perbicaraan menjadi tidak sah dan ini bukan semata-mata suatu diluar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan. iii) Samada wang yang diambil oleh OKT sebagai ganti wang pendahuluan yang telah didahulukan olehnya sebagai modal untuk syarikat beroperasi membawa kepada perbuatan dishonestly misappropriated and/or converted that money to her own use thereby committing criminal breach of trust merupakan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Sebelum Mahkamah membicarakan secara terperinci isu ke (iii) Mahkamah akan terlebih dahulu membincangkan isu (i) dan (ii) dalam kes ini yang membawa kepada keputusan pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT untuk keempat-empat pertuduhan. Isu (i) dan (ii) ini juga tidak ditimbulkan oleh mana-mana pihak sebelum ini namun Mahkamah menggunakan isu ini sebagai salah satu alasan untuk penghakiman tersebut. OKT dalam kes ini telah dengan jelasnya telah dibicarakan bersama untuk pertuduhan yang sama jenis kesalahannya yang melebihi tiga pertuduhan dalam tempoh masa yang melebihi 12 bulan. Ini jelas 7 berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Persoalan yang timbul adalah apakah akibatnya ataupun kesannya kepada perlanggaran peruntukan ini? Untuk tujuan ini Mahkamah menggunapakai beberapa kes yang membincangkan isu yang sama iaitu di dalam kes Subramania Iyer v King Emperor LR 28 1A 257, perayu dalam kes ini telah dipertuduhkan dengan 41 kesalahan yang didakwa berlaku dalam tempoh melebihi dua tahun. Privy Council telah mengetepikan sabitan dan memutuskan bahawa terdapat perlanggaran kepada peruntukan seksyen 234(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah India 1898 ( seksyen 164(1) CPC) dan ia adalah tidak sah (illegal) dan tidak boleh dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 537 ( seksyen 422 CPC). Lord Halsbury LC said: "Their Lordships are unable to regard the disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial as a mere irregularity. Such a phrase as irregularity is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time, and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law could have been joined together in one indictment. The illustration itself sufficiently shows what was meant." Prinsip dalam kes ini diguna pakai dalam kes di Malaysia iaitu dalam kes Chin Choy v Public Prosecutor (1995) MLJ 236. Dalam kes ini tertuduh telah dituduh dengan dua pertuduhan of CONSORTING contrary dengan Reg. 5 (1) of Emergency Regulations 1948, iaitu atas kesalahan memiliki sepucuk revover bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(a) of Emergency Regulation 1951 dan satu lagi kesalahan adalah being in possession of ammunition bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(b) of the same Emergency Regulation 1951. Tempoh masa kesalahan ini dilakukan adalah diantara tahun 1948 hingga 1955. Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah mengaku salah to two charges of consorting. Yet, COA Malaya mengetepikan sabitan terhadap pertuduhan milikan dan mengarahkan perbicaraan semula dijalankan. Mathew CJ rejected the prosecuiton's contention that there had been a regular trial in the following passage: " The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor has submitted that, as a plea of guilty to the charges relating to consorting was accepted and conviction recorded, the trial took place only as to the charges of possession, and to this joinder no exception can be taken. We do not agree. The appellant was required to plead to four charges which were wrongly joined, and the fact that he pleaded guilty to two of them does not cure the original irregularity. Support for this view is to be found in Krishmaswami Pillai v King-Emperor 26 Mad 125. We accordinglay quash the convictions, and order a re-trial as to the charges relating to possession contrary to regulations 4(1)(a) dan 4(1)(b) of the Emergency Regulations 1951. Kes terkini berkaitan isu ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Putrajaya iaitu di dalam kes AZAHAN MOHD AMINALLAH v PP (2005) 1 CLJ 374. Kes ini telah digunapakai dan dirujuk oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan perlanggaran seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah ini. Dalam kes diatas tertuduh telah dituduh di Mahkamah Sesyen dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 376 kanun keseksaan kerana merogol 9 anaknya yang berumur 15 tahun di sebuah ladang kelapa sawit pada tahun 1996. Dalam keterangan utamanya, pengadu mendakwa bahawa tertuduh juga telah beberapa kali merogolnya sebelum kejadian pada tahun 1996 itu. Di penutup kes pendakwaan, pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh dipinda berkaitan dengan waktu kejadian rogol tersebut, sementara tiga pertuduhan baru telah juga dikemukakan terhadapnya mengenai kesalahan serupa yang didakwa dilakukan masing-masing pada tahun 1996, 1994 dan 1991. Tertuduh kemudiannya dipanggil untuk membela diri dan beliau memilih untuk memberi keterangan dari kandang OKT dan Hakim yang bijaksana telah memutuskan di akhir kes pembelaan OKT di disabitkan atas keempat-empat pertuduhan tersebut dan dihukum penjara 18 tahun dan dua sebatan bagi setiap pertuduhan. OKT kemudiannya merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi tetapi rayuannya di tolak oleh yang arif hakim dan mengekalkan keputusan hakim sesyen. Dihadapan hakim-hakim Mahkamah Rayuan disini, alasan utama perayu adalah bahawa beliau telah dituduh dengan dan dibicarakan atas empat pertuduhan dalam satu perbicaraan di mana kesemua pertuduhan tersebut di dakwa berlaku dalam tempoh lima tahun - yang mana ianya bertentangan dengan s. 164(1) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah menyebabkan perbicaraannya menjadi tidak sah. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa rayuan adalah dibenarkan dan sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (Gopal Sri Ram) memutuskan:- " The accused's complaint - that he had been charged and tried at one trial for similar offences allegedly committed through a span of five years-was justified. Indeed, the accused was charged with committing four separate acts of rape which allegedly took place over a period of five years. This was clear violation of s.164(1) of the CPC, and the consequence was that the trial was a nullity. It was not a mere irregularity but an incurable illegality." Oleh itu dalam kes kita ini saya mengambil pendekatan yang sama dan berdasarkan kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas tadi Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap OKT yang telah dituduh dengan empat perbuatan pecah amanah di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan iaitu empat kesalahan yang serupa yang didakwa dilakukan dalam tempoh tiga tahun iaitu dari tahun 1995 hingga 1997 yang melebihi 12 bulan setiap satu dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan adalah jelas menyalahi seksyen 164(1) CPC dan kesan daripadanya mengakibatkan perbicaraan adalah tidak sah. Ia bukan semata-mata suatu luar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 422 CPC. Oleh itu Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri terhadap keempat-empat pertuduhan. Mahkamah juga mendapati perbicaraan semula kes ini adalah tidak wajar (sekiranya YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk dibicarakan semula atas isu ini) kerana ia adalah atas kekhilafan pendakwaan sendiri yang mana pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih dari cukup untuk mengkaji pertuduhan terhadap OKT dari segenap aspek memandangkan kes ini telah 11 dituduh di Mahkamah pada tahun 2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada bulan febuari 2011 iaitu pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih kurang dua tahun lebih untuk meneliti pertuduhan ini. Sekiranya alasan penghakiman saya ini diterima oleh isu ini diterima oleh Yang Arif Hakim maka isu yang seterusnya berkenaan dengan initipati pertuduhan adalah menjadi akademik. Namun untuk menguatkan lagi alasan penghakiman saya ini maka disentuh juga isu berkenaan dengan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan ini juga. Isu (iii) iaitu dari segi intipati pertuduhan yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan. Intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan adalah:- i) The accused should be entrusted with property or dominion over property - tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. ii) He should dishonestly misappropriated or convert the property to his own use.- yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Definisi berkenaan dishonestly dinyatakan dibawah seksyen 24 KK manakala seksyen 23 memberikan definisi seksyen 23 KK. Oleh itu isu utama dalam pertuduhan ini adalah samada OKT yang didakwa mengambil sejumlah RM27000.00 iaitu hasil jualan teksi (pertuduhan pindaan pertama) dan sejumlah RM53723.15 iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM (pertuduhan pindaan kedua,ketiga dan keempat) sebagai ganti bayaran balik jumlah wang yang telah didahulukan oleh OKT untuk syarikat TCSB ini membawa kepada maksud bahawa OKT telah dishonestly misappropriate and/or converted that money untuk kegunaan dan kepentingannya sendiri dan dengan itu telah melakukan kesalahan pecah amanah ini seperti yang dipertuduhkan ke atasnya di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan? Mengikut keterangan SP1 dan SP10 terlebih dahulu. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis tanpa merujuk kepada akaun pengurusan syarikat dan juga buku lejar syarikat dan gagal mendapatkan penjelasan daripada En.Badros. SP10 kredibilitinya adalah tercabar kerana memberi keterangan dalam Mahkamah dalam perasaan yang marah dan beremosi. Keterangannya hanya melalui cakap dengar dan anggapan sendiri dan melemparkan tuduhan terhadap OKT tanpa dikemukakan apa-apa bukti. Pada pandangan Mahkamah keterangan SP10 adalah seolah-olah berdendam dengan OKT dan lebih kepada seorang yang "busy body" kepada syarikat yang tidak terlibat dengan syarikat tersebut secara langsung dari awal penubuhan syarikat dan beliau hanya salah seorang keluarga kepada pengadu. (Rujuk kepada Nota keterangan mahkamah di mukasurat 103,104 berkenaan pemerhatian mahkamah terhadap demeanor saksi ini) Keterangan dari saksi yang sebegini Mahkamah seharusnya berhati-hati dalam menerima keterangan beliau kerana beliau adalah orang yang berkepentingan dalam syarikat ini. Mahkamah juga mengambil fakta bahawa saksi ini telah menghantar surat-surat aduan tentang perjalanan kes ini kepada Pejabat Peguam Negara dan juga kepada pihak BPR (Badan Pencegah Rasuah) dengan membuat tuduhan yang mengatakan Mahkamah telah menghilangkan dokumen untuk perbicaraan kes ini sehingga membawa kepada pihak BPR datang ke Mahkamah menjalankan siasatan semasa kes ini masih berjalan. Ianya mengganggu perjalanan kes ini di Mahkamah sebenarnya. Perkara-perkara 13 sebegini harus diambil kira oleh Mahkamah juga dan tambahan pula semasa beliau memberi keterangan beliau seringkali meninggikan suara dengan peguam dan tidak menjawab kepada soalan sebaliknya melemparkan soalan kembali kepada peguam. (Rujuk nota keterangan di muka surat 107,109 dan 110) Bagi tuduhan pertama yang melibatkan hasil jualan teksi HW 9540. Wang tersebut sejumlah RM27000.00 tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa beliau telah mengambilnya dengan menolak wang pendahuluan yang dibuat oleh beliau kepada syarikat di awal penubuhan syarikat TCSB dan hal ini telah dibuat dalam pengetahuan pengadu, SP6, SP7 dan En. Badros. En. Badros tidak dipanggil dipanggil oleh pendakwaan untuk memberi keterangan sedangkan beliau adalah saksi penting dalam kes ini kerana beliaulah yang menjaga akaun berkenaan dengan kutipan sewa dan hasil jualan teksi tersebut. Cek tersebut diambil di hadapan Pengadu sendiri dan dibuat catatan di dalam buku kutipan tunai oleh SP7 sepertimana yang terkadung dalam P17 mukasurat 19 iaitu “masuk ke akaun uncle wan”. TPR di mukasurat 74 nota keterangan pernah memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk mengeluarkan sapina terhadap En. Badrus dan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah, namun hanya ditawarkan sahaja kepada pembelaan setelah pendakwaan menutup kes tanpa dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. Kegagalan untuk memanggil En.Badros bagi memberi penjelasan secara terperinci berkenaan akaun jualan teksi tersebut adalah menyebabkan fatal kepada kes pendakwaan dan Mahkamah tertanya-tanya tentang perkara sebenarnya. SP1, SP2,SP6 dan SP7 menyebut tentang peranan Badros ini dalam penyediaan akaun syarikat dan kehadiran beliau juga penting untuk menjelaskan tentang buku lejer akaun di m/s 63 dan 163 dan pihak pendakwaan sebaliknya menawarkan saksi ini kepada pembelaan. Oleh itu kegagalan memanggil beliau menyebabkan Mahkamah menggunapakai peruntukan s.114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan ia menyebelahi kes pembelaan. Pengadu di dalam kes ini juga telah meninggal dunia dan hanya statement dibawah seksyen 112 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah adalah tidak membawa sebarang qualiti dalam nilai keterangannya kerana beliau tidak boleh di soal balas oleh peguambela OKT. Rujuk seksyen 405 Kanun Keseksaan. Bekenaan dengan hasil jualan saham sebanyak RM24,960 bagi pertuduhan kedua. Saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa ia telah dilaporkan dalam penyata akaun 1995 iaitu P5A(iii) dan SP8 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa sebelum dilaporkan auditor akan menyemak dokumen- dokumen sokongan namun dokumen-dokumen ini tidak di kemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Pihak pendakwaan semata-mata menjalankan kes ini dengan hanya bersandarkan P5 sahaja iaitu Report On Special Audit Review Of STCSB yang mana dokumen-dokumen asal dalam P5 kebanyakannya tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang bukti yang menunjukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi OKT. Tiada bukti yang menunjukkan juga saham tersebut dijual oleh siapa. Ini disahkan oleh SP11. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang boleh menunjukkan “misappropriation with dishonest intention” telah dilakukan oleh OKT. Bagi pertuduhan ketiga dan keempat Mahkamah sekali lagi bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi, hasil 15 jualan saham Hicom dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi tertuduh dengan jumlah keseluruhan RM28,863.00 dan ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak OKT juga. Namun ianya dibuat tanpa sebarang DISHONEST INTENTION dan tiada wrongful gain ataupun wrongful loss yang berlaku. Ini kerana mengikut keterangan SP6 semasa di soal balas oleh peguam OKT di mukasurat 73 nota keterangan mengatakan bahwa OKT telah mengambil wang tersebut dengan persetujuan pengadu dan disaksikan oleh SP6 bagi tujuan menolak hutang yang telah OKT dahulukan untuk STCSB. Perkataan yang digunakan oleh pengadu seperti yang diberitahu oleh SP6 dalam kehadirannya sendiri adalah, “bila syarikat ada duit, kamu ambil duit kamu balik.” (juga di m/s 73 Nota keterangan) Ini disahkan juga oleh SP2 seperti dalam m/s 18, P5 para(d) berkaitan withdrawals and repayments by TCSB kepada OKT. Oleh itu untuk isu (iii) ini Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan dan oleh yang demikian Mahkamah memutuskan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan memerintahkan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada keempat-empat pertuduhan pindaan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Sekian, terima kasih. Untuk pertimbagan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. MANIRA MOHD NOR HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN 3, AMPANG. BERTARIKH : 5 DISEMBER 2011.

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

62-127-2008

PENDAKWARAYA PENDAKWA RAYA TERTUDUH WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF

05/12/2011

PN MANIRA MOHD NOR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2ae29907-2e61-4308-af01-f84ffbc302b7&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (3) DI AMPANG DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN KES NO : 62-127-2008 PENDAKWARAYA LAWAN WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN Fakta Kes/latar belakang kes a) Saksi utama dalam kes ini sepatutnya adalah pengadu iaitu Hasan bin Muda @ Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed, namun beliau telah meninggal dunia. Jadi, pendakwaan telah memilih anak kepada pengadu iaitu Abdul Malik bin Hasan @ Abdul Aziz sebagai saksi utama (SP1). Beliau juga alternate director kepada syarikat yang dilantik pada tahun 2001 oleh pengadu melalui surat perlantikan yang ditanda sebagai ID1. Pengadu dan OKT adalah dua orang pengarah kepada syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai STCSB). Melalui keterangan SP1 standard operating procedure syarikat adalah mempunyai 2 orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu. Pentadbiran syarikat dan hal ehwal kewangan dikendalikan oleh OKT dengan dibantu oleh seorang pengurus operasi iaitu En. Shafei (SP6) yang menguruskan hal ehwal teksi dan operasi dan pengadu juga turut membantu SP6 ini dalam kerja-kerja operasi sekali sekala. Seorang kerani iaitu Cik Rohana (SP7) menjaga hal ehwal kutipan dan akaun dijaga oleh En.Ahmad dan kemudiannya di ambil alih oleh En. Badros (tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi dalam kes ini). b) Pada tahun 2001 pengadu telah datang berjumpa dengan SP1 menyatakan rasa tidak puas hati beliau megenai pengurusan STCSB. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk melantik firma akauntan yang baru selain dari firma akauntan syarikat yang sedia ada untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen kewangan syarikat. Syarikat One Zero Management (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OZM) telah dilantik dan OZM telah membuat special audit review dan mengeluarkan special audit report mengenai STCSB pada tahun 2001. Berdasarkan special audit review ini didapati terdapat beberapa perkara yang melibatkan salah guna kewangan dan berdasarkan report ini SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis. Laporan polis yang dibuat adalah berdasarkan finding dalam audit special report tersebut yang ditanda sebagai P5 oleh pendakwaan. c) OKT dalam kes ini dipertuduhkan dengan empat pertuduhan asal dan sebelum pendakwaan menutup kes ini beliau telah mengemukakan empat pertuduhan pindaan iaitu:- PERTUDUHAN PIDAAN PERTAMA Bahawa kamu pada 24 April 1997 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd, No 2. Jalan Enggang Timur Tama Keramat, Hulu Kelang dalam daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan teksi bernombor daftar HW 9540 dengan nilai RM27000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya 3 menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan teksi tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEDUA Bahawa kamu pada bulan Julai 1995 di Pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Derah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 5000 unit dengan nilai RM24960.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KETIGA Bahawa kamu pada 3 April 1996 di Pejabat tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya di amanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 3000 unit dengan nilai RM17496.15 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEEMPAT Bahawa kamu pada bulan April 1996 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam daerah Ampang Jaya dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 2000 unit dengan nilai RM11267.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan sah am tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. d) Secara ringkasnya pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut adalah berkait dengan gagal memasukkan wang hasil jualan teksi dan saham HICOM ke dalam akaun syarikat. Seramai 12 orang saksi telah dipanggil oleh pendakwaan dalam kes ini. Secara ringkasnya menurut keterangan saksi-saksi yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan syarikat tersebut telah ditubuhkan pada tahun 1993 dengan dua orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu (telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 2006). Syarikat ini menjalankan operasi sewa beli teksi. Segala urusan pentadbiran diuruskan secara kolektif oleh OKT, pengadu dan SP6. Apa-apa keputusan akan dibincangkan diantara mereka bertiga dan keputusan akan dibuat secara kolektif. Tiada sebarang persetujuan bertulis 5 dibuat dari awal operasi syarikat. Kesemua secara verbal dan hubungan antara OKT dan pengadu adalah sepupu dan perniagaan lebih kepada percaya antara satu sama lain atau boleh dikatakan juga "perniagaan anak beranak". e) Pada tahun 1995 syarikat mula mengalami kerugian dan kekurangan dana untuk membayar hutang syarikat kerana masalah kegawatan ekonomi dan kegagalan pemandu teksi menjelaskan sewa pada masa yang ditetapkan dan juga masalah lain berkaitan operasi teksi. f) Pembelaan bersetuju bahawa OKT mula mendahulukan duit peribadinya bagi menampung kekurangan wang syarikat. Rujuk P5 di ms 17 dan 18, P5A (i) amount due to Directors, P5A(ii) dan P5F(ii). Perkara ini telah dibincangkan dan di dalam pengetahuan SP6 dan pengadu dan dipersetujui. (Rujuk nota keterangan di ms 72,73 dan 74) g) Pertuduhan adalah pada tahun 1997 bagi pertuduhan pertama, tahun 1995 bagi tuduhan kedua dan tahun 1996 bagi tuduhan ketiga dan keempat. Kes ini di bawa ke Mahkamah pada 24/9/2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada 22/2/2011 iaitu apabila saya mengambil alih Mahkamah Sesyen 3 ini pada 16/2/2011. Isu penting i) Samada keempat-empat pertuduhan di atas kesalahan yang sama iaitu di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan yang mana dilakukan dalam tempoh melebihi 12 bulan boleh dipertuduhkan dan dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan yang melebihi daripada tiga bilangan kesalahan. ii) Samada berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (CPC) yang boleh mengakibatkan perbicaraan menjadi tidak sah dan ini bukan semata-mata suatu diluar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan. iii) Samada wang yang diambil oleh OKT sebagai ganti wang pendahuluan yang telah didahulukan olehnya sebagai modal untuk syarikat beroperasi membawa kepada perbuatan dishonestly misappropriated and/or converted that money to her own use thereby committing criminal breach of trust merupakan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Sebelum Mahkamah membicarakan secara terperinci isu ke (iii) Mahkamah akan terlebih dahulu membincangkan isu (i) dan (ii) dalam kes ini yang membawa kepada keputusan pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT untuk keempat-empat pertuduhan. Isu (i) dan (ii) ini juga tidak ditimbulkan oleh mana-mana pihak sebelum ini namun Mahkamah menggunakan isu ini sebagai salah satu alasan untuk penghakiman tersebut. OKT dalam kes ini telah dengan jelasnya telah dibicarakan bersama untuk pertuduhan yang sama jenis kesalahannya yang melebihi tiga pertuduhan dalam tempoh masa yang melebihi 12 bulan. Ini jelas 7 berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Persoalan yang timbul adalah apakah akibatnya ataupun kesannya kepada perlanggaran peruntukan ini? Untuk tujuan ini Mahkamah menggunapakai beberapa kes yang membincangkan isu yang sama iaitu di dalam kes Subramania Iyer v King Emperor LR 28 1A 257, perayu dalam kes ini telah dipertuduhkan dengan 41 kesalahan yang didakwa berlaku dalam tempoh melebihi dua tahun. Privy Council telah mengetepikan sabitan dan memutuskan bahawa terdapat perlanggaran kepada peruntukan seksyen 234(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah India 1898 ( seksyen 164(1) CPC) dan ia adalah tidak sah (illegal) dan tidak boleh dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 537 ( seksyen 422 CPC). Lord Halsbury LC said: "Their Lordships are unable to regard the disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial as a mere irregularity. Such a phrase as irregularity is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time, and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law could have been joined together in one indictment. The illustration itself sufficiently shows what was meant." Prinsip dalam kes ini diguna pakai dalam kes di Malaysia iaitu dalam kes Chin Choy v Public Prosecutor (1995) MLJ 236. Dalam kes ini tertuduh telah dituduh dengan dua pertuduhan of CONSORTING contrary dengan Reg. 5 (1) of Emergency Regulations 1948, iaitu atas kesalahan memiliki sepucuk revover bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(a) of Emergency Regulation 1951 dan satu lagi kesalahan adalah being in possession of ammunition bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(b) of the same Emergency Regulation 1951. Tempoh masa kesalahan ini dilakukan adalah diantara tahun 1948 hingga 1955. Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah mengaku salah to two charges of consorting. Yet, COA Malaya mengetepikan sabitan terhadap pertuduhan milikan dan mengarahkan perbicaraan semula dijalankan. Mathew CJ rejected the prosecuiton's contention that there had been a regular trial in the following passage: " The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor has submitted that, as a plea of guilty to the charges relating to consorting was accepted and conviction recorded, the trial took place only as to the charges of possession, and to this joinder no exception can be taken. We do not agree. The appellant was required to plead to four charges which were wrongly joined, and the fact that he pleaded guilty to two of them does not cure the original irregularity. Support for this view is to be found in Krishmaswami Pillai v King-Emperor 26 Mad 125. We accordinglay quash the convictions, and order a re-trial as to the charges relating to possession contrary to regulations 4(1)(a) dan 4(1)(b) of the Emergency Regulations 1951. Kes terkini berkaitan isu ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Putrajaya iaitu di dalam kes AZAHAN MOHD AMINALLAH v PP (2005) 1 CLJ 374. Kes ini telah digunapakai dan dirujuk oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan perlanggaran seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah ini. Dalam kes diatas tertuduh telah dituduh di Mahkamah Sesyen dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 376 kanun keseksaan kerana merogol 9 anaknya yang berumur 15 tahun di sebuah ladang kelapa sawit pada tahun 1996. Dalam keterangan utamanya, pengadu mendakwa bahawa tertuduh juga telah beberapa kali merogolnya sebelum kejadian pada tahun 1996 itu. Di penutup kes pendakwaan, pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh dipinda berkaitan dengan waktu kejadian rogol tersebut, sementara tiga pertuduhan baru telah juga dikemukakan terhadapnya mengenai kesalahan serupa yang didakwa dilakukan masing-masing pada tahun 1996, 1994 dan 1991. Tertuduh kemudiannya dipanggil untuk membela diri dan beliau memilih untuk memberi keterangan dari kandang OKT dan Hakim yang bijaksana telah memutuskan di akhir kes pembelaan OKT di disabitkan atas keempat-empat pertuduhan tersebut dan dihukum penjara 18 tahun dan dua sebatan bagi setiap pertuduhan. OKT kemudiannya merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi tetapi rayuannya di tolak oleh yang arif hakim dan mengekalkan keputusan hakim sesyen. Dihadapan hakim-hakim Mahkamah Rayuan disini, alasan utama perayu adalah bahawa beliau telah dituduh dengan dan dibicarakan atas empat pertuduhan dalam satu perbicaraan di mana kesemua pertuduhan tersebut di dakwa berlaku dalam tempoh lima tahun - yang mana ianya bertentangan dengan s. 164(1) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah menyebabkan perbicaraannya menjadi tidak sah. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa rayuan adalah dibenarkan dan sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (Gopal Sri Ram) memutuskan:- " The accused's complaint - that he had been charged and tried at one trial for similar offences allegedly committed through a span of five years-was justified. Indeed, the accused was charged with committing four separate acts of rape which allegedly took place over a period of five years. This was clear violation of s.164(1) of the CPC, and the consequence was that the trial was a nullity. It was not a mere irregularity but an incurable illegality." Oleh itu dalam kes kita ini saya mengambil pendekatan yang sama dan berdasarkan kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas tadi Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap OKT yang telah dituduh dengan empat perbuatan pecah amanah di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan iaitu empat kesalahan yang serupa yang didakwa dilakukan dalam tempoh tiga tahun iaitu dari tahun 1995 hingga 1997 yang melebihi 12 bulan setiap satu dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan adalah jelas menyalahi seksyen 164(1) CPC dan kesan daripadanya mengakibatkan perbicaraan adalah tidak sah. Ia bukan semata-mata suatu luar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 422 CPC. Oleh itu Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri terhadap keempat-empat pertuduhan. Mahkamah juga mendapati perbicaraan semula kes ini adalah tidak wajar (sekiranya YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk dibicarakan semula atas isu ini) kerana ia adalah atas kekhilafan pendakwaan sendiri yang mana pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih dari cukup untuk mengkaji pertuduhan terhadap OKT dari segenap aspek memandangkan kes ini telah 11 dituduh di Mahkamah pada tahun 2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada bulan febuari 2011 iaitu pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih kurang dua tahun lebih untuk meneliti pertuduhan ini. Sekiranya alasan penghakiman saya ini diterima oleh isu ini diterima oleh Yang Arif Hakim maka isu yang seterusnya berkenaan dengan initipati pertuduhan adalah menjadi akademik. Namun untuk menguatkan lagi alasan penghakiman saya ini maka disentuh juga isu berkenaan dengan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan ini juga. Isu (iii) iaitu dari segi intipati pertuduhan yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan. Intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan adalah:- i) The accused should be entrusted with property or dominion over property - tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. ii) He should dishonestly misappropriated or convert the property to his own use.- yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Definisi berkenaan dishonestly dinyatakan dibawah seksyen 24 KK manakala seksyen 23 memberikan definisi seksyen 23 KK. Oleh itu isu utama dalam pertuduhan ini adalah samada OKT yang didakwa mengambil sejumlah RM27000.00 iaitu hasil jualan teksi (pertuduhan pindaan pertama) dan sejumlah RM53723.15 iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM (pertuduhan pindaan kedua,ketiga dan keempat) sebagai ganti bayaran balik jumlah wang yang telah didahulukan oleh OKT untuk syarikat TCSB ini membawa kepada maksud bahawa OKT telah dishonestly misappropriate and/or converted that money untuk kegunaan dan kepentingannya sendiri dan dengan itu telah melakukan kesalahan pecah amanah ini seperti yang dipertuduhkan ke atasnya di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan? Mengikut keterangan SP1 dan SP10 terlebih dahulu. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis tanpa merujuk kepada akaun pengurusan syarikat dan juga buku lejar syarikat dan gagal mendapatkan penjelasan daripada En.Badros. SP10 kredibilitinya adalah tercabar kerana memberi keterangan dalam Mahkamah dalam perasaan yang marah dan beremosi. Keterangannya hanya melalui cakap dengar dan anggapan sendiri dan melemparkan tuduhan terhadap OKT tanpa dikemukakan apa-apa bukti. Pada pandangan Mahkamah keterangan SP10 adalah seolah-olah berdendam dengan OKT dan lebih kepada seorang yang "busy body" kepada syarikat yang tidak terlibat dengan syarikat tersebut secara langsung dari awal penubuhan syarikat dan beliau hanya salah seorang keluarga kepada pengadu. (Rujuk kepada Nota keterangan mahkamah di mukasurat 103,104 berkenaan pemerhatian mahkamah terhadap demeanor saksi ini) Keterangan dari saksi yang sebegini Mahkamah seharusnya berhati-hati dalam menerima keterangan beliau kerana beliau adalah orang yang berkepentingan dalam syarikat ini. Mahkamah juga mengambil fakta bahawa saksi ini telah menghantar surat-surat aduan tentang perjalanan kes ini kepada Pejabat Peguam Negara dan juga kepada pihak BPR (Badan Pencegah Rasuah) dengan membuat tuduhan yang mengatakan Mahkamah telah menghilangkan dokumen untuk perbicaraan kes ini sehingga membawa kepada pihak BPR datang ke Mahkamah menjalankan siasatan semasa kes ini masih berjalan. Ianya mengganggu perjalanan kes ini di Mahkamah sebenarnya. Perkara-perkara 13 sebegini harus diambil kira oleh Mahkamah juga dan tambahan pula semasa beliau memberi keterangan beliau seringkali meninggikan suara dengan peguam dan tidak menjawab kepada soalan sebaliknya melemparkan soalan kembali kepada peguam. (Rujuk nota keterangan di muka surat 107,109 dan 110) Bagi tuduhan pertama yang melibatkan hasil jualan teksi HW 9540. Wang tersebut sejumlah RM27000.00 tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa beliau telah mengambilnya dengan menolak wang pendahuluan yang dibuat oleh beliau kepada syarikat di awal penubuhan syarikat TCSB dan hal ini telah dibuat dalam pengetahuan pengadu, SP6, SP7 dan En. Badros. En. Badros tidak dipanggil dipanggil oleh pendakwaan untuk memberi keterangan sedangkan beliau adalah saksi penting dalam kes ini kerana beliaulah yang menjaga akaun berkenaan dengan kutipan sewa dan hasil jualan teksi tersebut. Cek tersebut diambil di hadapan Pengadu sendiri dan dibuat catatan di dalam buku kutipan tunai oleh SP7 sepertimana yang terkadung dalam P17 mukasurat 19 iaitu “masuk ke akaun uncle wan”. TPR di mukasurat 74 nota keterangan pernah memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk mengeluarkan sapina terhadap En. Badrus dan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah, namun hanya ditawarkan sahaja kepada pembelaan setelah pendakwaan menutup kes tanpa dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. Kegagalan untuk memanggil En.Badros bagi memberi penjelasan secara terperinci berkenaan akaun jualan teksi tersebut adalah menyebabkan fatal kepada kes pendakwaan dan Mahkamah tertanya-tanya tentang perkara sebenarnya. SP1, SP2,SP6 dan SP7 menyebut tentang peranan Badros ini dalam penyediaan akaun syarikat dan kehadiran beliau juga penting untuk menjelaskan tentang buku lejer akaun di m/s 63 dan 163 dan pihak pendakwaan sebaliknya menawarkan saksi ini kepada pembelaan. Oleh itu kegagalan memanggil beliau menyebabkan Mahkamah menggunapakai peruntukan s.114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan ia menyebelahi kes pembelaan. Pengadu di dalam kes ini juga telah meninggal dunia dan hanya statement dibawah seksyen 112 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah adalah tidak membawa sebarang qualiti dalam nilai keterangannya kerana beliau tidak boleh di soal balas oleh peguambela OKT. Rujuk seksyen 405 Kanun Keseksaan. Bekenaan dengan hasil jualan saham sebanyak RM24,960 bagi pertuduhan kedua. Saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa ia telah dilaporkan dalam penyata akaun 1995 iaitu P5A(iii) dan SP8 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa sebelum dilaporkan auditor akan menyemak dokumen- dokumen sokongan namun dokumen-dokumen ini tidak di kemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Pihak pendakwaan semata-mata menjalankan kes ini dengan hanya bersandarkan P5 sahaja iaitu Report On Special Audit Review Of STCSB yang mana dokumen-dokumen asal dalam P5 kebanyakannya tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang bukti yang menunjukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi OKT. Tiada bukti yang menunjukkan juga saham tersebut dijual oleh siapa. Ini disahkan oleh SP11. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang boleh menunjukkan “misappropriation with dishonest intention” telah dilakukan oleh OKT. Bagi pertuduhan ketiga dan keempat Mahkamah sekali lagi bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi, hasil 15 jualan saham Hicom dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi tertuduh dengan jumlah keseluruhan RM28,863.00 dan ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak OKT juga. Namun ianya dibuat tanpa sebarang DISHONEST INTENTION dan tiada wrongful gain ataupun wrongful loss yang berlaku. Ini kerana mengikut keterangan SP6 semasa di soal balas oleh peguam OKT di mukasurat 73 nota keterangan mengatakan bahwa OKT telah mengambil wang tersebut dengan persetujuan pengadu dan disaksikan oleh SP6 bagi tujuan menolak hutang yang telah OKT dahulukan untuk STCSB. Perkataan yang digunakan oleh pengadu seperti yang diberitahu oleh SP6 dalam kehadirannya sendiri adalah, “bila syarikat ada duit, kamu ambil duit kamu balik.” (juga di m/s 73 Nota keterangan) Ini disahkan juga oleh SP2 seperti dalam m/s 18, P5 para(d) berkaitan withdrawals and repayments by TCSB kepada OKT. Oleh itu untuk isu (iii) ini Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan dan oleh yang demikian Mahkamah memutuskan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan memerintahkan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada keempat-empat pertuduhan pindaan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Sekian, terima kasih. Untuk pertimbagan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. MANIRA MOHD NOR HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN 3, AMPANG. BERTARIKH : 5 DISEMBER 2011.

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC -719-12/2013

PLAINTIF KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF -PLAINTIF DEFENDAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN

14/08/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f792c6a1-1d33-4721-bc2d-82a217fb5c17&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO : 22 NCVC -719-12/2013 ANTARA KHAIRUDDIN BIN ABD RAHMAN DAN 4 YANG LAIN .... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF [Kesemua Plaintif Pertama sehingga Plaintif Kelima sebagai pewaris kepada Harta Pusaka NOR HAYATI BINTI MOHAMED YASSIN selaras dengan PERINTAH FARAID dari Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam Selangor] DAN MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD .... DEFENDAN KEPUTUSAN (Lampiran 9) [1] Melalui Lampiran 9, defendan di dalam kes ini memohon supaya Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 atas alasan-alasan berikut : i. Ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah (“no reasonable cause of action”); ii. ia adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan (“scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”); iii. ianya akan memprejudis, memalukan atau melewatkan (“prejudice, embarrass or delay”) perbicaraan adil tindakan ini; ATAU iv. ianya merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (“abuse of process of the Court”) [2] Namun pada dasarnya permohonan defendan ini adalah bersandarkan kepada premis bahawa kelima-lima plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang ataupun locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap defendan. [3] Untuk lebih jelas, fakta latarbelakang tuntutan plaintif diperturunkan seperti berikut : (i) Kelima-lima plaintif mempunyai pertalian kekeluargaan dengan seorang yang bernama Norhayati bt Mohamad Yunus (simati) yang telah meninggal dunia pada 26 Februari 2013. (ii) Plaintif pertama adalah suami simati, plaintif kedua pula adalah ayah kepada simati dan manakala plaintif ketiga hingga kelima adalah tiga orang anak hasil perkahwinan plaintif pertama dengan simati. (iii) Plaintif pertama dan simati semasa hayatnya telah membeli sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di Bandar Sunway yang mana dipegang di bawah Bandar Sunway, P.T No : 1337, HSD 273044. (iv) Pembelian rumah tersebut telah dibiayai sebahagiannya dengan pinjaman perumahan (pinjaman tersebut) daripada bank Malayan Banking Berhad yakni defendan. (v) Atas kegagalan pihak plaintif pertama dan simati di dalam menjelaskan ansuran pinjaman tersebut, pada 21Jun 2012 defendan telah memulakan suatu prosiding halang tebus terhadap plaintif pertama dan simati. (vi) Plaintif pertama telah mendakwa bahawa selaras dengan surat tawaran pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006, plaintif pertama dan simati telah membeli insuran hayat dan membuat bayaran MRTA premium sebanyak RM294,854.00. (vii) Plaintif pertama telah dijadikan sebagai seorang bankrap dan bagi menentang prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, plaintif pertama telah memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 29 Februari 2013. (viii) Dalam perkara prosiding halang tebus yang dimulakan oleh defendan, dan dengan kematian simati dan bersandarkan dakwaan bahawa insuran hayat MRTA telah diambil oleh kedua-dua plaintif pertama dan simati, plaintif pertama telah memohon kepada defendan supaya jumlah tuntutan insuran hayat MRTA simati difaktorkan ke dalam jumlah hutang yang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama dan simati kepada defendan. (viiii) Plaintif pertama juga mendakwa bahawa Seksyen 5.02 Lampiran Gadaian memperuntukkan kuasa kepada defendan untuk menentukan insuran hayat (“life ansurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) tetapi defendan telah enggan memfaktorkan jumlah tuntutan insuran MRTA ke dalam jumlah hutang tertunggak oleh plaintif pertama kepada defendan. (x) Justeru, berasaskan premis atau dakwaan bahawa pihak defendan telah gagal mengambil kira potongan insuran hayat MRTA dan jumlah bayaran yang telah dibuat atas pinjaman perumahan tersebut, Writ Saman dan Pernyataan ini difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk relif-relif berikut : (a) satu audit pinjaman dan bayaran yang jelas; (b) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya telah membuat bayaran premium insuran kepada defendan selaras dengan surat tawaran dari defendan bertarikh 14 Ogos 2006; (c) satu deklarasi bahawa defendan kini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk ½ bahagian atau penuh bahagian yang tertunggak kepada defendan kerana adalah defendan yang menguruskan insuran hayat (“life assurance policy or a mortgage decreasing term policy”) bagi plaintif pertama dan arwah isterinya. (xi) Kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama di dalam kapasiti pewaris kepada harta pusaka simati selaras dengan perintah faraid yang diperolehi daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor. Permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 [4] Defendan, walaubagaimana pun telah menyangkal tuntutan plaintif dan memfailkan permohonan Lampiran 9 untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) [5] Permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ini disokong oleh dua affidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Rahmat bin Abu Bakar yang merupakan Ketua Bahagian Remedial dan Litigasi defendan. [6] Kedua-dua affidavit tersebut yakni Affidavit 1 Defendan dan Affidavit 2 Defendan yang menyokong permohonan defendan menegaskan perkara-perkara berikut : (i) Plaintif pertama dan simati adalah pemilik bersama rumah tersebut dan pinjaman perumahan yang diberikan oleh defendan adalah untuk membiayai sebahagian dari harga rumah tersebut. Namun begitu, insuran hayat MRTA yang ditimbulkan plaintif pertama itu bukanlah dibeli bersama-sama oleh plaintif pertama dan simati tetapi hanya dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja. Untuk tegasan ini, defendan merujuk kepada ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan di mana antara lain mengandungi Borang-Borang Mayban Life Insurance Berhad yakni Borang Selidik Amaun Besar dan Borang Permohonan bagi Insuran Gadai Janji tempoh mengurang (MRTA). Kedua-dua borang ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa permohonan insuran hayat MRTA hanya dipohon oleh plaintif pertama sahaja dan bukannya secara bersama dengan simati. [7] Seperti yang dinyatakan awal tadi, pada dasarnya defendan telah memfailkan Lampiran 9 bagi membatalkan tindakan plaintif-plaintif berpremiskan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kapasiti di sisi undang-undang atau locus standi untuk membawa kausa tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (a) plaintif pertama seorang “undischarged bankrupt” dan tidak memperolehi sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan. (b) perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. secara alternatif (c) plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. Alasan (a) - plaintif pertama seorang undischarged bankrupt dan tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi untuk memulai tindakan [8] Adalah menjadi hujahan defendan bahawa melalui tajuk tindakan, kesemua plaintif telah membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris simati dan bukannya atas kapasiti individu ataupun secara berseorangan. Di dalam membawa tindakan bersama sebagai pewaris ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah ini kepada kes Eh Riyid v En Tek [1976] 1 MLJ 262 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bagi membawa tindakan untuk membetulkan kesilapan pada pendaftaran tanah, pewaris hendaklah membuat tuntutan bersama dengan pewaris-pewaris yang lain. Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa di dalam kes ini sememangnya tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah tuntutan bersama sebagai pewaris-pewaris kepada simati dan kesemua plaintif adalah plaintif bersama. Dalam hal yang demikian kedudukan plaintif pertama seorang bankrap memberi kesan kepada kapasiti dan kompetensi kelima mereka disisi undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan bersama terhadap defendan. [9] Dalam hal sibankrap, undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa seorang bankrap tidak boleh memulai atau membawa tindakan melainkan sanksi diperolehi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Keperluan sanksi ini bukanlah setakat suatu yang formaliti sahaja tetapi ia merupakan satu keperluan hakiki yang tidak boleh tidak. Tanpa sanksi ini, seseorang bankrap tidak mempunyai kebolehan atau keupayaan di sisi undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak kecuali sibankrap memfailkan tindakan untuk gantirugi bagi kecederaan diri sendiri. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas. Seksyen 38(1) Akta Kebankrapan 1967 jelas memperuntukan bahawa : (1) Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge – (a) the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to this person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency; [11] Terdapat begitu banyak otoriti mengenai ketidakupayaan undang-undang seorang bankrap untuk memulai tindakan undang-undang terhadap mana-mana pihak sehinggalah memperolehi sanksi daripada Jabatan Insolvensi. Rujukan kepada beberapa kes adalah memadai. (1) Di dalam kes Sabah Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bintang Tengah Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 588 telah diputuskan dengan jelas seperti berikut : (i) Once receiving and adjudication orders are made, the bankrupt’s estate vests with the OA and under Section 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the OA must first be consulted as any action intended by the bankrupt may be detrimental to his creditors. The only exception where no sanction is required from the OA is when the bankrupt files an action for damages for injury to his person or when he questions his status by filing an application under section 92(1) or 105 (1) of the Act. (ii) Section 38 (1) (a) of the Act is wide enough to include the filing of an application to set aside a default judgement. (iii) Accordingly, the third defendant must first obtain the OA’s sanction and since this was not done, he had no locus standi to file the application. (2) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v Goh Eng Hwa [2004] 1 CLJ 274 telah menekankan keperluan sanksi bagi sibankrap memulai tindakan. Di muka surat 281 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan, Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (YAA pada masa itu) telah berkata : “....All that is required to enable a bankrupt to maintain an action as provided by section 38(1)(a) of the Act is to obtain the sanction of the OA. No assignment is required. The respondent having obtained the sanction prior to his filing the counterclaim, he is competent to do so. The other point is whether the issue of locus standi should have been allowed to be raised at all during the submission, it not having been pleaded in the statement of defence. The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is “incompetent” to maintain an action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without “ the previous sanctions” then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void.... ” (3) Di dalam kes Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 43, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam mengariskan ketidakupayaan seseorang di dalam membawa tindakan apabila telah dijadikan bankrap telah berkata: “Section 38(1)(a) sets out the incompetence of an undischarged bankrupt to maintain an action. The steps taken by the customer clearly came within the ambit of maintaining an action in section 38(1)(a) and so attracted the application of section 38(1)(a)..........” [12] Bagi menjawab isu sanksi ini, peguam plaintif telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan di perenggan 6 bahawa plaintif pertama sebenarnya telahpun mendapatkan sanksi dari Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 4 September 2013 dan telah diekshibitkan sebagai ekshibit “K” di dalam affidavit tersebut. Menurutnya lagi, di dalam sanksi bertarikh 4 September 2013 tersebut nombor kes guaman telah tidak tertera kerana pada masa pengisuan sanksi ini, guaman di hadapan mahkamah ini masih belum difailkan. Justeru, menurut peguam plaintif Jabatan Insolvensi telah menggunakan nombor kes prosiding halang tebus yakni 24 F-923-06/2012 kerana ianya bersangkutan. Kemudiannya peguam telah merujuk kepada Affidavit Tambahan yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif pada 25 Jun 2014 yang mengeksibitkan sekali sanksi yang baru diterima daripada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. [13] Walaubagaimanapun, sebagai balasan kepada sanksi yang baru diperolehi plaintif-plaintif, peguam defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014 yang baru diterima oleh plaintif-plaintif ini tidak membantu plaintif-plaintif kerana kes ini telah difailkan pada tahun 2013, manakala sanksi ini bertarikh 24 Jun 2013. Peguam defendan seterusnya telah menghujahkan bahawa sanksi bertarikh 24 Jun 2013 tersebut adalah tidak jelas dan tidak secara spesifik menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dikeluarkan dengan mempunyai kesan kebelakangan yakni dari tarikh guaman difailkan. Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam defendan lagi, sanksi yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas dan spesifik akan kesan kebelakangannya tidak mengesahkan (“validate” guaman ini. [14] Bagi menyokong hujahan beliau, peguam defendan telah merujuk mahkamah kepada satu kes yang baru-baru ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan Winstech Engineering Sdn Bhd v Espl (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut : (1) The sanction given in the Director-General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013 did not specify that it was to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to apply, the ratification must be clear (see para 20) (2) There was no application for the official receiver’s sanction to be made retrospective. In short, there was no nunc pro tunc leave application. There was, therefore, no material before the court to consider and to justify the grant of nunc pro tunc leave (see para 23). (3) The argument that the respondent had not been prejudiced and that no miscarriage of justice had been caused did not arise as the applicant, on its own accord, failed to utilise the enabling provisions of the law to commence the legal proceedings. The court, in law, was not in a position to render assistance to such a litigant (see para 15 & 21). [15] Di dalam kes Winstech ini, sebelum Mahkamah Persekutuan mendengar permohonan kebenaran merayu yang difailkan pemohon, peguam responden telah memohon Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui Lampiran 8 untuk membatalkan permohonan pemohon atas alasan bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai kapasiti undang-undang atau locus standi. Menurut peguam responden, pemohon yang telah digulungkan telah memfailkan permohonan kebenaran tersebut tanpa sanksi Pegawai Penerima. Pegawai Penerima di dalam kes ini hanya telah mengeluarkan sanksi mereka lebih kurang tiga (3) bulan selepas permohonan kebenaran merayu difailkan oleh pemohon di Mahkamah Persekutuan. [16] Di dalam hal pengeluaran dan kesan kebelakang sanksi Pegawai Penerima selepas 3 bulan daripada tarikh pemfailan permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 8 perenggan 20 alasan penghakimannya menyatakan berikut : “ The sanction as per the Director General of Insolvency’s letter dated 19 August 2013, did not specify that it is to be retrospective. For the doctrine of ratification to be applicable, the ratification must be clear. Furthermore, in the present case, there is no evidence to show that there is ever any application for the sanction to be retrospective”. [17] Berbalik pula kepada kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah ini telah membuat penelitian ke atas sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 24 Jun 2014. Di dalam sanksi sememangnya nombor kes bagi guaman telah dinyatakan tetapi telah tidak terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang jelas dan spesifik bahawa sanksi mempunyai kesan kebelakang “retrospective”. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah bersependapat dengan peguam defendan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Winstech adalah mengikat kes ini, walaupun di dalam kes Winstech, isunya adalah sanksi Pegawai Penerima dan di hadapan mahkamah ini sanksi yang diperlukan oleh sibankrap adalah sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulai satu tindakan undang-undang. Pada asasnya prinsip yang terpakai adalah, bagi sanksi yang dikeluarkan di dalam keadaan kes-kes sebegini untuk mempunyai kesan kebelakang ia hendaklah jelas dan spesifik menyatakan sedemikian. [18] Perlu dinyatakan di dalam kes ini juga, sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi bukan sahaja tidak spesifik atau jelas untuk mewujudkan kesan kebelakangan tetapi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi di dalam sanksi tersebut adalah Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan plaintif pertama meneruskan tindakan. Untuk lebih jelas, ayat-ayat yang digunakan di dalam sanksi tersebut diperturunkan : “Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi telah meluluskan sanksi untuk tuan meneruskan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi Guaman No : 22NCVC-719-12/2013 dan melantik Tetuan Azian & Co. Advocates & Solicitors untuk mewakili tuan dalam tindakan guaman tersebut”. (penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [19] Mahkamah ini berpandangan, perkataan meneruskan ini bermakna bahawa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah memberi kebenaran kepada pihak sibankrap untuk meneruskan apa-apa tindakan yang telah dan sedang berjalan contohnya suatu kes telah dimulakan oleh mana-mana pihak terhadap sibankrap sebelum beliau dijadikan bankrap dan semasa kes berjalan, perintah menjadikan sibankrap telah dikeluarkan. Maka bagi kes-kes sebegini, barulah benar bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Insolvensi adalah bagi membenarkan sibankrap meneruskan tindakan tersebut. [20] Tetapi di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa daripada awalnya lagi plaintif pertama sememangnya tidak memperolehi sanksi Jabatan Insolvensi bagi membolehkan plaintif pertama memulaikan tindakan. Bersandarkan kes Winstech, adalah pandangan mahkamah ini bahawa sanksi yang dikeluarkan hendaklah jelas dan spesifik memberikan kebenaran kepada plaintif pertama memulakan tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan dan bukanlah setakat menyatakan nombor kes dan dengan hanya perkataan meneruskan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa nombor kes yang tertera dan perkataan meneruskan bagi mahkamah adalah tidak memadai untuk menunjukkan yang sanksi itu secara speksifiknya dan jelasnya memberi kesan kebelakangnya. Alasan (b) - perintah faraid yang dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah tinggi tidak memberikan plaintif-plaintif kapasiti undang-undang untuk memulakan tindakan. [21] Peguam defendan telah menghujahkan plaintif-plaintif pada setakat memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan hanya telah memperolehi perintah faraid daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. Sijil faraid yang dikeluarkan adalah hanya menentukan bahagian-bahagian atau hak-hak yang diterima oleh setiap pewaris dan tidak lebih daripada itu. Menurut peguam defendan lagi, pembahagian hak-hak waris ini tidak menimbulkan kapasiti undang-undang kepada pewaris-pewaris untuk membawa tindakan guaman ini terhadap defendan. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam defendan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 188. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memutuskan kedudukan undang-undang ini telah membuat kesimpulan berikut : “It could be concluded that in law, a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter’s estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate”. Peguam defendan juga telah merujuk kepada kes Rosman Roslan v Kassim Hj Arshad & yang lain [2005] 2 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes ini yang telah juga merujuk kepada kes Chor Phaik Har dan di muka surat 674 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan telah dinyatakan seperti berikut : “Jadi, surat kuasa tadbir adalah penting dan ia hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu dari Mahkamah Sivil sebelum seseorang benefisiari hendak memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Jika tidak, dia tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan dalam mahkamah. Oleh kerana responden-responden tidak mempunyai surat kuasa tadbir bagi mentadbir harta pusaka simati Haji Abu Bakar, maka mereka tidak berkompeten dan mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini”. [22] Justeru, adalah menjadi undang-undang yang jitu bahawa surat kuasa pentadbiran hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum seorang benefisiari atau waris boleh memulakan sesuatu tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kepentingan terhadap harta pusaka simati. Selagi surat kuasa pentabiran belum dikeluarkan pentadbiran pesaka simati tidak boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana waris atau benefisiari. [23] Malahan di dalam kes ini, di perenggan 9 Affidavit Jawapan 1 Plaintif-Plaintif bagi menentang permohonan defendan, plaintif-plaintif sendiri telah mengakui bahawa plaintif masih dalam proses memilih dan melantik seorang pentadbir. Menurut plaintif-plaintif pemfailan tindakan ini sebelum perlantikan pentadbir dibuat adalah kerana sekiranya guaman ini tidak difailkan, defendan akan menjual rumah tersebut yang merupakan asset plaintif-plaintif. [24] Maka jelaslah di sini bahawa kedudukan plaintif-plaintif pada masa ini, hanyalah setakat pewaris yang telah ditentukan bahagian- bahagian masing-masing sahaja. Pembahagian hak-hak tidak mengujudkan keupayaan ataupun kapasiti undang-undang untuk membawa tindakan terhadap defendan. Apatah lagi tindakan ini bukan dibuat secara berasingan oleh setiap plaintif tetapi merupakan tindakan bersama atas tajuk pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus. Alasan (c) - plaintif-plaintif tiada kausa tindakan terhadap defendan kerana insuran hayat MRTA bukanlah dibeli oleh simati bersama plaintif pertama tetapi oleh plaintif pertama seorang sahaja. [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti ekshibit “RAB” yang terkandung di dalam Affidavit 1 Defendan. Jelas daripada ekshibit-ekshibit ini insuran hayat MRTA ini telah dibeli oleh plaintif pertama sahaja bukannya bersama-sama simati. Justeru, insuran hayat MRTA tidak mempunyai apa-apa operasi dengan kematian simati. Insuran hayat MRTA ini tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan simati. Maka penggantungan pewaris-pewaris Norhayati binti Mohd Yunus ke atas insuran tersebut tidak timbul sama sekali. [26] Mahkamah ini juga ingin menyentuh tegasan plaintif-plaintif di perenggan 4 Affidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif berkenaan isu insuran hayat ini yang telah juga ditimbulkan oleh plaintif pertama di hadapan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 13 Disember di mana menurut mereka YA Hakim di dalam prosiding halang tebus telah bersetuju bahawa elegasi plaintif bermerit dan YA Hakim telah memberi perintah penggantungan prosiding halang tebus dalam guaman 24F-923-06/2012. [27] Perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa prosiding halang tebus dan guaman yang ada di hadapan mahkamah adalah dua tindakan yang berbeza dan berdasarkan pemakaian dan keperluan undang-undang yang berbeza. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan defendan di Lampiran 9 dengan kos RM2,000.00 kepada defendan. Justeru, Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan ini dibatalkan. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 Ogos 2014. Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Azian & Co Encik Ekbal Singh Sandhu Peguam Defendan - Tetuan J.S. Pillay & Mohd Haaziq Dato Mohd Haaziq, Encik Nizam Bashir & Encik Hasziq Hasry DatukAzimahOmar/sar/13814/3365 18

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

24-515-05/2014

PLAINTIF 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER DEFENDAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR

04/04/2014

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7fa4503e-5d3b-4161-a95d-6b014aa02c85&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO. 24-515-05/2014 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M) 1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan 28, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. ISTAQ NADZRIL BIN ABDUL KADER 2. IZZAD ZALMAN BIN ABDUL KADER 3. IZRUF QABIL BIN ABDUL KADER …PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. SURKAN BIN SANIMAN 2. PENGHUNI-PENGHUNI YANG MENDIAMI PREMIS ATAS TANAH DI BAWAH HAKMILIK NO. HS(M)1358, P.T. NO 11426, MUKIM KAJANG, DAERAH HULU LANGAT, NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan1) yang difailkan pada 7.5.2014 ini, Plaintif-Plaintif (i. Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader, ii. Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader, iii. Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader) telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk mendapatkan kembali milikan tanah yang diduduki oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(M) 1358, P.T. No. 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat milikan tanah itu dan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menduduki tanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif; (b) satu Perintah Injunksi Mandatori diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk meruntuhkan bangunan sebuah rumah yang telah dibina di atas Hartanah tersebut dan mengosongkan Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi permohonan ini diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan; (c) gantirugi am untuk ditaksirkan; (d) gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM100,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif; (e) kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [2] Secara dasarnya, Plaintif-Plaintif yang merupakan adik-beradik telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan-Defendan [i. Surkan Bin Saniman. ii. Penghuni-Penghuni Yang Mendiami Premis Atas Tanah Di Bawah Hakmilik No. HS(M)1358, P.T. No 11426, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut)] memohon Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan suatu perintah supaya milikan hartanah tersebut dikembalikan kepada mereka atas alasan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menceroboh masuk dan menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran mereka. [3] Bagi menyokong Kandungan 1 mereka, Plaintif-Plaintif (ketiga-tiga Plaintif) telah memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Istaq Nadzril Bin Abdul Kader dan Izzad Zalman Bin Abdul Kader yang mana kedua-dua mereka juga telah diberikan kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Plaintif, Izruf Qabil Bin Abdul Kader. Afidavit sokongan ini telah diikrarkan pada 7 Mei 2014 (Kandungan 2). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif yang diikrarkan pada 11.7.2014 (Kandungan 8). (iii) Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif Kedua yang diikrarkan pada 13.8.2014 (Kandungan 10). [4] Asas tuntutan ketiga-tiga Plaintif yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit-afidavit tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah tuan punya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Ketuanempunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintiff ke atas hartanah telah dibuktikan melalui Eksibit ‘D’ terkandung di dalam Kandungan 2. Eksibit ‘D’ adalah Geran Hakmilik Sementara hartanah tersebut. 4.2 Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut setelah kematian ayah mereka bernama Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman pada 18.7.2010. Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 2 membuktikan bahawa Abdul Kader Bin Mohamed Zalman (Arwah 1) merupakan tuanpunya terdahulu hartanah tersebut. 4.3 Defendan Pertama telah mendirikan sebuah rumah (rumah tersebut) di atas hartanah tersebut selepas kematian Arwah 1 tanpa kebenaran atau persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Rumah tersebut telah disewakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua. Gambar rumah tersebut, telah dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit ‘E’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [5] Melalui Notice to Vacate bertarikh 27.2.2014 (Eksibit ‘F’ di dalam Kandungan 2), ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memberikan notis kepada Defendan Pertama bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menceroboh mendirikan rumah tersebut tanpa persetujuan atau kebenaran ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan dengan yang demikian mengarahkan Defendan Pertama untuk merobohkan rumah tersebut serta menyerahkan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [6] Namun demikian, Defendan-defendan telah gagal dan ingkar mematuhi Notice to Vacate yang dikeluarkan tersebut, justeru Kandungan 1 ini difailkan. [7] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah juga membuat Laporan Polis mengenai perkara ini pada 28.4.2014 seperti di Eksibit ‘G’ di dalam Kandungan 2. [8] Defendan Pertama telah menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dengan memfailkan tiga afidavit yakni: (i) Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 26.6.2014 (Kandungan 6). (ii) Afidavit Jawapan (2) yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Pertama pada 25.7.2014 (Kandungan 9). (iii) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan Defendan Pertama pada 21.8.2014 (Kandungan 11). [9] Di dalam menentang permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Defendan Pertama telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Defendan Pertama mempunyai kepentingan benefisial setakat 1/10 bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya bernama Zabedah Binti S.M. Zalman (Arwah 2). 9.2 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah merupakan harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh S.M. Zalman yang merupakan bapa kepada 10 anak termasuk Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2. Anak-anak S.M. Zalman (Arwah 3) yang lain seperti didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama adalah (1) Abdul Arabi (2) Hussain (3) Jelani (4) Abdul Aziz (5) Abdul Mutalib (6) Abu Bakar (7) Abdul Wahab dan (8) Faridah. 9.3 Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama juga bahawa selepas kematian Arwah 3, Arwah 1 telah dijadikan pemegang amanah bagi pesaka Arwah 3 bagi pihak kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 termasuk isteri Arwah 3 yakni ibu kepada anak-anak Arwah 3 bernama Hasnah Binti Arsyad. Arwah 1 yang telah didakwa gagal menjalankan urusan pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang termasuk hartanah tersebut, telah juga dikatakan mengaku bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah kepunyaan beliau sahaja dan enggan menyerahkan hak adik-beradik yang lain ke di atas hartanah tersebut. 9.4 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa bahawa atas ketidakpuasan hati tersebut, kesemua waris-waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju untuk hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada seorang waris bernama Abdul Aziz Bin S.M. Zalman sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi kesemua waris bagi menggantikan Arwah 1. Menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, pemindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah dilaksanakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat. 9.5 Arwah 1 telah didakwa telah tidak berpuashati atas keadaan ini dan pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Abdul Aziz telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz dengan mendakwa Abdul Aziz telah mengemukakan Borang 14A secara palsu. Abdul Aziz telah kemudiannya didakwa di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang di atas tuduhan di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan (KK) yang kemudiannya dipinda kepada seksyen 469 dan seksyen 471 KK. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. 9.6 Defendan Pertama seterusnya mendakwa pada tahun 2005, setelah dinasihati oleh seorang lagi waris Arwah 3 bernama Hussain Bin Zalman, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik pula kepada anak Hussain bernama Farick Bin Hussain Pemindah milikan hartanah tersebut kepada Farick telah menjadikan Farick sebagai Pemegang amanah bagi kesemua waris Arwah 3 bagi memastikan kepentingan dan hak setiap waris dipelihara. 9.7 Seterusnya adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa pada tahun 2007, kesemua waris Arwah 3 telah bersetuju kecuali Arwah 2 menawarkan bahagian–bahagian mereka kepada Arwah 1 untuk RM30,000 setiap bahagian. 9.8 Arwah 2, menurut Defendan Pertama enggan menjual bahagian beliau kerana mahu bahagiannya diwarisi oleh Defendan Pertama dan anak-anak mereka sebagai harta pesaka beliau. 9.9 Namun demikian, menurut Defendan Pertama lagi, tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2, Farick telah menandatangani pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1. Pemindah milikan keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 telah didakwa kepada dalah termasuk 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2. 9.10 Berasaskan alasan ini, adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa beliau dan anak-anaknya mempunyai hak dan kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut setakat 1/10 bahagian. 9.11 Atas kepentingan tersebut menurut Defendan Pertama lagi beliau telah mendirikan rumah tersebut semasa Arwah 1 masih hidup tanpa bantahan Arwah 1 dan rumah tersebut telah siap sepenuhnya pada sekitar tahun 2012 selepas kematian Arwah 2. 9.12 Defendan Pertama juga mendakwa pada bulan Mac 2013, ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah membuat tawaran untuk membeli hak 1/10 yang dipegang Arwah 2 dengan harga RM60,000 tetapi beliau telah menolak tawaran tersebut. [10] Pengataan-pengataan yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dinafikan sekeras-kerasnya oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [11] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif menafikan dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka peninggalan Arwah 3. Penghujahan Peguam Ketiga-tiga Plaintif [12] Adalah dihujahkan peguam terpelajar bagi ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa hak dan ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar yang sah hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dipertikaikan seperti yang tertera di Suratan Hakmilik Eksibit ‘D’ di Kandungan 2. Dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka peninggalan datuk ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti yang kukuh. i. Pertuduhan jenayah penipuan terhadap Abdul Aziz [13] Adalah menjadi hujahan ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bagi menyokong bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, kononnya di dalam usaha menyelamatkan kepentingan adik-beradik atau waris-waris Arwah 3, Abdul Aziz telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah dan atas persetujuan waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada nama Abdul Aziz adalah suatu pengataan yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti. Sebaliknya menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, perbuatan Abdul Aziz yang mengemukakan Borang 14A palsu dan memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya telah disedari oleh Arwah 1 yang kemudiannya telah membuat laporan polis. Hasil penyiasatan ke atas laporan polis itu telah mengakibatkan Abdul Aziz dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang. Abdul Aziz kemudiannya telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaan didengar. Namun begitu, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang telah tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Majistret telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 1 atas dasar kekeluargaan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan perkara hartanah tersebut di dalam kedua-dua tindakan jenayah dan sivil di luar mahkamah. Arwah 1 telah berhasrat membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick telah kemudiannya menulis surat memohon TPR menarik balik rayuan yang difailkan. Ini ditunjukkan di dalam surat Tetuan Hazizah & Co., peguam yang mewakili Arwah 1 kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Surat ini dieksibitkan di Eksibit ‘A’ di dalam Kandungan 10. Susulan daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut (perjanjian tersebut) di antara Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilaksanakan menurut Eksibit ‘C’ di dalam Kandungan 8 yang mana Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick dengan harga pembelian sebanyak RM248,000.00. Menurut peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif, klausa 1 perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa Arwah 1 menulis kepada TPR untuk menarik balik rayuan atas keputusan Majistret di dalam kes 83-10-1993 (kes Abdul Aziz) dan menarik balik tuntutan terhadap Abdul Aziz di dalam Guaman Sivil S1-11-48-1993 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. [14] Maka, adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama hanyalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar. ii. Hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 (isteri Defendan Pertama) [15] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa dakwaan Defendan Pertama bahawa hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Farick daripada Abdul Aziz juga sebagai Pemegang Amanah bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris lain atas nasihat waris bernama Hussain adalah dinafikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kerana pemindah milikan yang dibuat oleh Abdul Aziz kepada Farick adalah satu pindahmilik biasa. Pindahmilik ini adalah bersandarkan satu perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki oleh Abdul Aziz dan Farick dalam perjualan biasa hartanah (perjanjian tersebut) dan bukanlah pemindah milikan yang terbit daripada transaksi pentadbiran pesaka ataupun sebagai pemegang amanah. [16] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif seterusnya bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai Arwah 2 yang enggan menjual haknya setakat 1/10 bahagian dan Farick yang telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 juga telah tidak disokong oleh sebarang bukti dokumentar dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [17] Adalah juga dihujahkankan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki Arwah 1 dan Farick adalah merupakah perjanjian di antara dua individu yang dibuktikan dengan bukti dokumentar di mana bukti dokumentar Eksibit ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 10 membuktikan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah transaksi terus yang melibatkan proses pembayaran dan disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang sempurna seperti yang tertera di Eksibit ‘B’ (surat peguamcara Arwah 1 kepada peguamcara Farick untuk penandatangan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, pengemukaan cek berjumlah RM248,500.00, resit rasmi bagi pembayaran harga pembelian RM248,500.00, borang rasmi penyata penyerahan Hakmilik Sementara ) di dalam Kandungan 10. Malahan di klausa 10 perjanjian tersebut tertera penyataan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah dimiliki Farick dan tidak ada individu lain yang mempunyai apa-apa tuntutan atas hartanah tersebut selain daripada Farick. iii. Pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1. [18] Pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pendudukan hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 2010 oleh Defendan Pertama semasa Arwah 1 dan Arwah 2 masih hidup dan dengan persetujuan serta kebenaran Arwah 1 adalah disangkal oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan mengenai dakwaan ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa ia merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sebarang bukti dokumentar. [19] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif, Arwah 2 sememangnya tidak ada hak atau kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka dengan ketidakwujudan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut pengataan Defendan Pertama akan kepentingan dan haknya tidak timbul dan hanyalah pengataan kosong belaka. [20] Adalah selanjutnya dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tawaran yang diberikan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama untuk membeli bahagian Arwah 2 pada harga RM60,000.00 yang didakwa Defendan Pertama adalah dinafikan. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan ini juga adalah merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. [21] Di dalam hal pengataan kosong yang tidak dibuktikan dengan bukti-bukti kukuh, peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bergantung kepada seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan. [22] Justeru itu adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan atau hak terhadap hartanah tersebut, maka pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah penceroboh dan ianya merupakan satu pendudukan yang tidak sah. Untuk hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579. Penghujahan Peguam Defendan [23] Di dalam hujahan bertulisnya, peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama telah mengulangi latar belakang kes menurut yang diperihalkan oleh Defendan Pertama di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya. Ini boleh dilihat daripada perenggan 3 sehingga perenggan 7, 9 dan 10. Atas pengataan-pengataan tersebut, adalah dihujahkan bahawa kepentingan Defendan Pertama wujud daripada 1/10 bahagian Arwah 2 dan di dalam hal yang demikian Defendan Pertama tidak memerlukan apa-apa kebenaran untuk menduduki tanah tersebut. [24] Mengenai pendudukan Defendan Pertama di atas hartanah tersebut adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa memandangkan Defendan Pertama dan Arwah 2 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1997 dengan menjalankan penternakan burung unta dan kemudiannya penternakan kambing dengan pengetahuan Arwah 1 serta apabila pembinaan rumah tersebut itu dimulakan adalah semasa Arwah 1 masih lagi hidup. Di samping pembinaan rumah tersebut itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Arwah 1 dan tidak ada pada masa bila-bila pun dibantah oleh Arwah 1. Maka adalah menjadi hujahan peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama bahawa di dalam hal ini, terdapat perjanjian yang jelas di antara Arwah 1 dan keluarga Arwah 2, yang mewujudkan harapan sah (legitimate expectation) kepada keluarga Defendan Pertama untuk kekal dengan haknya dan berada di atas hartanah tersebut secara kekal. Maka dengan ini ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah diestop untuk menuntut milikan kosong kepada bahagian tanah tersebut kerana akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) terpakai terhadap ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Bagi menguatkan hujahan ini, peguam telah bergantung kepada seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan dan beberapa otoriti. (Lihat kes i. Kim Seng Hotel And Coffee Shop v Chuah Teong Buan [1971] 1 MLJ 233. ii. D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617. iii. Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. iv. Marcel Jude A/L Ms Joseph [Practising in the name and style of Messr Marcel Jude Joseph (2000) & Co] v Messrs Jayasuriya Kah & Co (Sued as a firm) [2012] MLJU 1182. v. MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Siew Wah & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 170. vi. Sim Siok Eng v Government of Malaysia [1978] 1 MLJ 15. vii. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp (M) Bhd v Hapsah Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Action [2012] 1 MLJ 115.) Dapatan Mahkamah [25] Keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal di dalam kes ini adalah, ketiga-tiga Plaintif adalah pemilik-pemilik berdaftar yang sah bagi hartanah tersebut. Eksibit ‘A’ dan ‘B’ di dalam Kandungan 2 jelas menunjukkan ketuanpunyaan Arwah 1 terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kemudiannya dipindahmilikkan kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif atas kematian Arwah 1 yang merupakan bapa ketiga-tiga Plaintif. [26] Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah memperolehi hak ke atas hartanah tersebut daripada Arwah 1 apabila Arwah 1 meninggal dunia pada 18.7.2010. Selepas kematian Arwah 1, Plaintif Pertama telah memfailkan petisyen bagi pentadbiran harta pesaka Arwah 1 dan satu Perintah Pembahagian (Borang E) telah dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat yang telah mengeluarkan satu Perintah Pembahagian ke atas harta pesaka Arwah 1. Di Jadual 1 Perintah Pembahagian jelas menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 1 yang dibahagi-bahagikan kepada tiga (3) warisnya yakni ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah dijadikan tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada 2.9.2013. Ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif telah didaftarkan atas penurunan harta pesaka bapa mereka. Apa yang jelas dan terbukti adalah Arwah 1 telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Farick melalui perjanjian jual beli hartanah yang didokumenkan dengan suratcara-suratcara teratur dengan harga pembelian RM248,000.00. [27] Tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut diperolehi secara frod atau melalui transaksi yang tidak sah. [28] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang diturunkan oleh Arwah 3 tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [29] Begitu juga dengan pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai kononnya Arwah 1 telah dijadikan Pemegang Amanah bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3 yang kemudiannya tidak mahu membahagikan hak-hak waris yang lain. Kemudiannya Abdul Aziz pula dijadi Pemegang Amanah dengan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepada beliau. Atas ketidakpuasan hati, Arwah 1 telah membuat laporan polis terhadap Abdul Aziz. Kemudian daripada itu pula Farick pula telah menggantikan Abdul Aziz sebagai Pemegang Amanah oleh waris-waris Arwah 3 dan hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. Farick pula kemudiannya telah menjualkan hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 yang kononnya enggan menjual 1/10 bahagian. Bagi pengataan-pengataan di atas juga, dengan hormatnya saya berpandangan yang sama dengan hujahan peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan- pengataan tersebut adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata (bare essertion). [30] Saya berpandangan sebegitu bukan sahaja kerana pengataan itu tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan tetapi juga atas tidak kelogikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Saya katakan pengataan-pengataan itu tiada logiknya atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan Pertama sendiri sebenarnya tidak tahu apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan pemegang amanah apabila di dalam afidavit-afidavit beliau, beliau telah menimbulkan pengataan status pemegang amanah Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick. Sekiranya status Arwah 1, Abdul Aziz dan Farick adalah pemegang amanah yang bertukar ganti bagi menjaga kepentingan waris-waris pesaka Arwah 3 khasnya bagi hartanah tersebut itu benar, maka, soalan seterusnya bagaimana pengamanahan diamanahkan kepada mereka timbul, samada daripada surat amanah atau apa-apa dokumen lain (trust deed atau trust letter) ataupun secara konstruktif (constructive trust) . Tiada keterangan langsung mengenainya dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. Bertentangan dengan itu pula, Defendan Pertama mengatakan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pesaka yang ditinggalkan oleh Arwah 3. Kalau begitu dengan kematian Arwah 3, menurut undang-undang harta pesakanya termasuk hartanah tersebut perlu ditadbirkan di bawah Akta Harta Pesaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955. Justeru di dalam hal ini, pentadbir pesaka perlu dilantik bagi mentadbirkan pesaka Arwah 3 berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang mengenainya. ii. namun begitu, diandaikanlah benar hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3, pastinya wujud suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut pernah dimiliki Arwah 3 tetapi dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama. iii. dengan kematian Arwah 3, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut kepunyaan Arwah 3 maka hartanah tersebut menjadi harta pesaka dan pentadbiran harta pesaka memerlukan perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dan bukannya pemegang amanah bagi tujuan perintah pembahagian dikeluarkan untuk hartanah tersebut dan hartanah lain (jika ada) peninggalan Arwah 3. iv. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 dijadikan Pemegang Amanah “Pentadbir Pesaka” bagi harta pesaka Arwah 3, mestilah ada petisyen melantik beliau sebagai Pentadbir Pesaka dan suatu perintah pembahagian harta pesaka tersebut dikeluarkan. Tetapi di dalam kes ini tiada perlantikan pentadbir pesaka dikeluarkan. Begitu juga tiada perintah pembahagian dikemukakan. v. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 telah memindahmilik hartanah kepada beliau dengan menafikan waris-waris yang lain maka suratan hakmilik hartanah akan menunjukkan hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Arwah 1 selepas kematian Arwah 3 sebelum dipindahmilik kepada Abdul Aziz tetapi tiada suratan hakmilik yang menunjukkan sedemikian dikemukakan. vi. sekiranya benar Arwah 1 tidak menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pentadbir pesaka pastinya waris-waris yang lain akan memohon ke mahkamah untuk menukarnya kepada waris yang lain. Di dalam kes ini tidak ada dokumen mengenainya langsung. vii. pengataan Defendan Pertama mengenai pentadbiran pemegang amanah begitu mudah bertukar dari Arwah 1 tahun bermula tidak diketahui kepada Abdul Aziz dengan kemudiannya menukar milik tanah kepadanya dan kemudian Farick mengambil alih pada tahun 2005 dan Farick menukar milik hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 pada tahun 2007. Arwah 1 hanya telah didaftarkan sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar pada selepas Abdul Aziz dan Farick menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar. viii. Undang-undang pentadbiran pesaka adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa perlantikan pentadbir pesaka yang perlu dibuat menurut undang-undang dan suratcara-suratcara yang tertentu dan bukanlah sewenang-wenangnya bertukar ganti sebegitu. Dalam hal ini kalaulah benarlah Abdul Aziz, Farick dan Arwah 1 telah dilantik sebagai pemegang amanah ataupun pentadbir serta pesaka Arwah 3 dokumen-dokumen atau suratcara-suratcara berkenaannya mestilah wujud dan boleh dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. vii. mengenai bahagian setakat 1/10 yang didakwa oleh Defendan Pertama dibahagi-bahagikan di antara 10 waris tidak selari dengan keterangan beliau kerana isteri Arwah tidak dimasukkan sebagai waris. Kalau mengambilkira bilangan waris ianya 11 bahagian dan bukan 10 bahagian. Pengataan 10 bahagian juga bertentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif bahawa Arwah 3 mempunyai 12 orang anak tetapi 2 telah meninggal dunia, Akan tetapi walaupun dua waris telah meninggal dunia, sekiranya benar hartanah tersebut harta pesaka Arwah 3, waris-waris kepada dua waris yang telah meninggal dunia juga mempunyai hak ke atas hartanah tersebut. Maka bahagian setiap waris tidak boleh menjadi 1/10 bahagian seperti dakwaan Defendan Pertama. [31] Tambahan kepada pengataan-pengataan kosong yang tidak tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan, perlu dinyatakan juga di dalam kes ini bahawa Defendan Pertama cuba membuktikan pengataan-pengataannya dengan mengemukakan empat dokumen yakni: (i) Nota keterangan kes Jenayah No. 83-1093 di Eksibit ‘SS-4 di dalam Kandungan 11, (ii) Kertas Pertuduhan Abdul Aziz di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di 6, (iii) Catatan carian persendirian hartanah tersebut yang menunjukkan ketiga-tida Plaintif dan endorsemen-endorsemen di atas yang menunjukkan pemindah milikan tanah kepada Abdul Aziz kepada Farick, pada 9.12.2005, Farick kepada Arwah 1 pada 25.4.2007 dan Arwah 1 kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif pada 2.9.2013 di Eksibit ‘SS-2’ di dalam Kandungan 6 dan (iv) Keputusan perbicaraan di Mahkamah Majistret Kajang Eksibit ‘SS-3’ di dalam Kandungan 9. Penelitian terperinci ke atas keempat-empat dokumen-dokumen tersebut bersama dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh ketiga-tiga Plaintif saya mendapati bahawa keempat-empat dokumen tersebut menzahirkan sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama, malahan mengukuhkan lagi kes ketiga-tiga Plaintif. Ianya boleh dilihat seperti berikut: (i) Defendan Pertama mengatakan hartanah tersebut merupakan harta pesaka Arwah 3 tetapi di dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama sendiri di Eksibit ‘SS-4’ di Kandungan 6, penelitian terhadap nota prosiding menunjukkan fakta relevan bahawa hartanah tersebut diperolehi melalui lelongan awam di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan bukannya harta pesaka Arwah 3. (ii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Abdul Aziz yang merupakan pemegang amanah telah memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Farick untuk beliau meneruskan pentadbiran pesaka bercanggah dengan dokumen Eksibit ‘A’ di Kandungan 8 yang menunjukkan terdapat transaksi penjualan tanah di antara Farick dan Abdul Aziz untuk harga beliau sebanyak RM300,000.00 (iii) Pengataan Defendan Pertama bahawa Farick telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Arwah 1 tanpa pengetahuan Arwah 2 bertentangan dengan Klausa 17 Eksibit ‘C’ dalam Kandungan 8 bahawa ketuanpunyaan Farick ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah secara milik individu tanpa ada kepentingan mana-mana orang lain atau pihak ketiga. [32] Di dalam kes ini adalah sangat jelas dan ketara bahawa berdasarkan afidavit dan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Pertama gagal untuk membuktikan hak dan kepentingan Arwah 2 ke atas hartanah tersebut. Undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila Defendan Pertama membuat pengataan-pengataan mengenai hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui arwah isterinya maka beban pembuktian terletak ke atasnya membuktikan kewujudan pengataan-pengataan tersebut dengan mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan mengenainya dan bukanlah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata. Di dalam kes ini pengataan-pengataan Defendan Pertama bukan setakat pengataan-pengataan kosong, keterangan- keterangan dokumentar Defendan Pertama sendiri menyebelahi ketiga-ketiga Plaintif. Di dalam keadaan ini adalah tepat bagi saya merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 jelas memperuntukkan berikut: Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 102. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Akujanji Estopel (Promissory Estopel) [33] Mengenai isu akujanji estopel (promissory estoppel) yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan Pertama, seperti pengataan-pengataan lain, adalah dapatan saya pengataan mengenai akujanji estopel ini juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan lain dan ianya pengataan tidak berasas dan pengataan kosong semata-mata. Saya tidak dapat memberikan pertimbangan terhadapnya. Maka kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam terpelajar Defendan Pertama tidak terpakai dan tidak dapat membantu Defendan Pertama. [34] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan saya bahawa ketuanpunyaan ketiga-tiga Defendan terhadap hartanah tersebut adalah jelas terbukti dan tidak disangkalkan melalui keterangan-keterangan afidavit dan dokumentar di hadapan saya dan Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak dan kepentingan untuk berada di atas hartanah tersebut. Maka, jelas Defendan Pertama dan penghuni rumah yang mendiami rumah tersebut adalah penceroboh yang telah menduduki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan pendudukan kedua-dua Defendan adalah pendudukan yang tidak sah. (Sila lihat Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Shell Malaysia [1996] 2 MLJ 221) [35] Justeru, permohonan ketiga-tiga Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan bagi perenggan (a) dan (b) sahaja. Perenggan (c) dan (d) untuk gantirugi tidak dibenarkan kerana tidak dibuktikan. Isu kos [36] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas mengenai kos daripada kedua-dua peguam terpelajar ketiga-tiga Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah menyarankan kos sebanyak RM8000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada ketiga-tiga Plaintif. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 13 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 4hb November 2014 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hamidi Izwan & Co Encik Noramir Ahmad Bin Ibrahim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates Puan Nora Hayati Binti Ismayatim 1

Tika 2.6.0

62-127-2008

PENDAKWARAYA PENDAKWA RAYA TERTUDUH WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF

05/12/2011

PN MANIRA MOHD NOR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2ae29907-2e61-4308-af01-f84ffbc302b7&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (3) DI AMPANG DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN KES NO : 62-127-2008 PENDAKWARAYA LAWAN WAN AWANG MAHMUD BIN ABDUL LATIF ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN Fakta Kes/latar belakang kes a) Saksi utama dalam kes ini sepatutnya adalah pengadu iaitu Hasan bin Muda @ Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed, namun beliau telah meninggal dunia. Jadi, pendakwaan telah memilih anak kepada pengadu iaitu Abdul Malik bin Hasan @ Abdul Aziz sebagai saksi utama (SP1). Beliau juga alternate director kepada syarikat yang dilantik pada tahun 2001 oleh pengadu melalui surat perlantikan yang ditanda sebagai ID1. Pengadu dan OKT adalah dua orang pengarah kepada syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai STCSB). Melalui keterangan SP1 standard operating procedure syarikat adalah mempunyai 2 orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu. Pentadbiran syarikat dan hal ehwal kewangan dikendalikan oleh OKT dengan dibantu oleh seorang pengurus operasi iaitu En. Shafei (SP6) yang menguruskan hal ehwal teksi dan operasi dan pengadu juga turut membantu SP6 ini dalam kerja-kerja operasi sekali sekala. Seorang kerani iaitu Cik Rohana (SP7) menjaga hal ehwal kutipan dan akaun dijaga oleh En.Ahmad dan kemudiannya di ambil alih oleh En. Badros (tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi dalam kes ini). b) Pada tahun 2001 pengadu telah datang berjumpa dengan SP1 menyatakan rasa tidak puas hati beliau megenai pengurusan STCSB. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk melantik firma akauntan yang baru selain dari firma akauntan syarikat yang sedia ada untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen kewangan syarikat. Syarikat One Zero Management (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OZM) telah dilantik dan OZM telah membuat special audit review dan mengeluarkan special audit report mengenai STCSB pada tahun 2001. Berdasarkan special audit review ini didapati terdapat beberapa perkara yang melibatkan salah guna kewangan dan berdasarkan report ini SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis. Laporan polis yang dibuat adalah berdasarkan finding dalam audit special report tersebut yang ditanda sebagai P5 oleh pendakwaan. c) OKT dalam kes ini dipertuduhkan dengan empat pertuduhan asal dan sebelum pendakwaan menutup kes ini beliau telah mengemukakan empat pertuduhan pindaan iaitu:- PERTUDUHAN PIDAAN PERTAMA Bahawa kamu pada 24 April 1997 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd, No 2. Jalan Enggang Timur Tama Keramat, Hulu Kelang dalam daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan teksi bernombor daftar HW 9540 dengan nilai RM27000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya 3 menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan teksi tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEDUA Bahawa kamu pada bulan Julai 1995 di Pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Derah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd. iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 5000 unit dengan nilai RM24960.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KETIGA Bahawa kamu pada 3 April 1996 di Pejabat tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam Daerah Ampang Jaya, dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya di amanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 3000 unit dengan nilai RM17496.15 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN PINDAAN KEEMPAT Bahawa kamu pada bulan April 1996 di pejabat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd, No.2, Jalan Enggang Timur, Taman Keramat, Hulu Kelang, dalam daerah Ampang Jaya dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai ejen iaitu Pengarah Urusan Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd yang atas sifatnya diamanahkan dengan harta milik syarikat Tapak Cekal Sdn. Bhd iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM sebanyak 2000 unit dengan nilai RM11267.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah iaitu dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta tersebut dengan tidak memasukkan hasil jualan sah am tersebut ke dalam akaun Tapak Cekal Sdn Bhd bernombor akaun Maybank 014093-313019. Dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. d) Secara ringkasnya pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut adalah berkait dengan gagal memasukkan wang hasil jualan teksi dan saham HICOM ke dalam akaun syarikat. Seramai 12 orang saksi telah dipanggil oleh pendakwaan dalam kes ini. Secara ringkasnya menurut keterangan saksi-saksi yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan syarikat tersebut telah ditubuhkan pada tahun 1993 dengan dua orang pengarah iaitu OKT dan pengadu (telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 2006). Syarikat ini menjalankan operasi sewa beli teksi. Segala urusan pentadbiran diuruskan secara kolektif oleh OKT, pengadu dan SP6. Apa-apa keputusan akan dibincangkan diantara mereka bertiga dan keputusan akan dibuat secara kolektif. Tiada sebarang persetujuan bertulis 5 dibuat dari awal operasi syarikat. Kesemua secara verbal dan hubungan antara OKT dan pengadu adalah sepupu dan perniagaan lebih kepada percaya antara satu sama lain atau boleh dikatakan juga "perniagaan anak beranak". e) Pada tahun 1995 syarikat mula mengalami kerugian dan kekurangan dana untuk membayar hutang syarikat kerana masalah kegawatan ekonomi dan kegagalan pemandu teksi menjelaskan sewa pada masa yang ditetapkan dan juga masalah lain berkaitan operasi teksi. f) Pembelaan bersetuju bahawa OKT mula mendahulukan duit peribadinya bagi menampung kekurangan wang syarikat. Rujuk P5 di ms 17 dan 18, P5A (i) amount due to Directors, P5A(ii) dan P5F(ii). Perkara ini telah dibincangkan dan di dalam pengetahuan SP6 dan pengadu dan dipersetujui. (Rujuk nota keterangan di ms 72,73 dan 74) g) Pertuduhan adalah pada tahun 1997 bagi pertuduhan pertama, tahun 1995 bagi tuduhan kedua dan tahun 1996 bagi tuduhan ketiga dan keempat. Kes ini di bawa ke Mahkamah pada 24/9/2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada 22/2/2011 iaitu apabila saya mengambil alih Mahkamah Sesyen 3 ini pada 16/2/2011. Isu penting i) Samada keempat-empat pertuduhan di atas kesalahan yang sama iaitu di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan yang mana dilakukan dalam tempoh melebihi 12 bulan boleh dipertuduhkan dan dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan yang melebihi daripada tiga bilangan kesalahan. ii) Samada berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (CPC) yang boleh mengakibatkan perbicaraan menjadi tidak sah dan ini bukan semata-mata suatu diluar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan. iii) Samada wang yang diambil oleh OKT sebagai ganti wang pendahuluan yang telah didahulukan olehnya sebagai modal untuk syarikat beroperasi membawa kepada perbuatan dishonestly misappropriated and/or converted that money to her own use thereby committing criminal breach of trust merupakan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan. ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Sebelum Mahkamah membicarakan secara terperinci isu ke (iii) Mahkamah akan terlebih dahulu membincangkan isu (i) dan (ii) dalam kes ini yang membawa kepada keputusan pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT untuk keempat-empat pertuduhan. Isu (i) dan (ii) ini juga tidak ditimbulkan oleh mana-mana pihak sebelum ini namun Mahkamah menggunakan isu ini sebagai salah satu alasan untuk penghakiman tersebut. OKT dalam kes ini telah dengan jelasnya telah dibicarakan bersama untuk pertuduhan yang sama jenis kesalahannya yang melebihi tiga pertuduhan dalam tempoh masa yang melebihi 12 bulan. Ini jelas 7 berlaku perlanggaran kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Persoalan yang timbul adalah apakah akibatnya ataupun kesannya kepada perlanggaran peruntukan ini? Untuk tujuan ini Mahkamah menggunapakai beberapa kes yang membincangkan isu yang sama iaitu di dalam kes Subramania Iyer v King Emperor LR 28 1A 257, perayu dalam kes ini telah dipertuduhkan dengan 41 kesalahan yang didakwa berlaku dalam tempoh melebihi dua tahun. Privy Council telah mengetepikan sabitan dan memutuskan bahawa terdapat perlanggaran kepada peruntukan seksyen 234(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah India 1898 ( seksyen 164(1) CPC) dan ia adalah tidak sah (illegal) dan tidak boleh dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 537 ( seksyen 422 CPC). Lord Halsbury LC said: "Their Lordships are unable to regard the disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial as a mere irregularity. Such a phrase as irregularity is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time, and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law could have been joined together in one indictment. The illustration itself sufficiently shows what was meant." Prinsip dalam kes ini diguna pakai dalam kes di Malaysia iaitu dalam kes Chin Choy v Public Prosecutor (1995) MLJ 236. Dalam kes ini tertuduh telah dituduh dengan dua pertuduhan of CONSORTING contrary dengan Reg. 5 (1) of Emergency Regulations 1948, iaitu atas kesalahan memiliki sepucuk revover bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(a) of Emergency Regulation 1951 dan satu lagi kesalahan adalah being in possession of ammunition bertentangan dengan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 4(1)(b) of the same Emergency Regulation 1951. Tempoh masa kesalahan ini dilakukan adalah diantara tahun 1948 hingga 1955. Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah mengaku salah to two charges of consorting. Yet, COA Malaya mengetepikan sabitan terhadap pertuduhan milikan dan mengarahkan perbicaraan semula dijalankan. Mathew CJ rejected the prosecuiton's contention that there had been a regular trial in the following passage: " The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor has submitted that, as a plea of guilty to the charges relating to consorting was accepted and conviction recorded, the trial took place only as to the charges of possession, and to this joinder no exception can be taken. We do not agree. The appellant was required to plead to four charges which were wrongly joined, and the fact that he pleaded guilty to two of them does not cure the original irregularity. Support for this view is to be found in Krishmaswami Pillai v King-Emperor 26 Mad 125. We accordinglay quash the convictions, and order a re-trial as to the charges relating to possession contrary to regulations 4(1)(a) dan 4(1)(b) of the Emergency Regulations 1951. Kes terkini berkaitan isu ini telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Putrajaya iaitu di dalam kes AZAHAN MOHD AMINALLAH v PP (2005) 1 CLJ 374. Kes ini telah digunapakai dan dirujuk oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan perlanggaran seksyen 164(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah ini. Dalam kes diatas tertuduh telah dituduh di Mahkamah Sesyen dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 376 kanun keseksaan kerana merogol 9 anaknya yang berumur 15 tahun di sebuah ladang kelapa sawit pada tahun 1996. Dalam keterangan utamanya, pengadu mendakwa bahawa tertuduh juga telah beberapa kali merogolnya sebelum kejadian pada tahun 1996 itu. Di penutup kes pendakwaan, pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh dipinda berkaitan dengan waktu kejadian rogol tersebut, sementara tiga pertuduhan baru telah juga dikemukakan terhadapnya mengenai kesalahan serupa yang didakwa dilakukan masing-masing pada tahun 1996, 1994 dan 1991. Tertuduh kemudiannya dipanggil untuk membela diri dan beliau memilih untuk memberi keterangan dari kandang OKT dan Hakim yang bijaksana telah memutuskan di akhir kes pembelaan OKT di disabitkan atas keempat-empat pertuduhan tersebut dan dihukum penjara 18 tahun dan dua sebatan bagi setiap pertuduhan. OKT kemudiannya merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi tetapi rayuannya di tolak oleh yang arif hakim dan mengekalkan keputusan hakim sesyen. Dihadapan hakim-hakim Mahkamah Rayuan disini, alasan utama perayu adalah bahawa beliau telah dituduh dengan dan dibicarakan atas empat pertuduhan dalam satu perbicaraan di mana kesemua pertuduhan tersebut di dakwa berlaku dalam tempoh lima tahun - yang mana ianya bertentangan dengan s. 164(1) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah menyebabkan perbicaraannya menjadi tidak sah. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa rayuan adalah dibenarkan dan sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (Gopal Sri Ram) memutuskan:- " The accused's complaint - that he had been charged and tried at one trial for similar offences allegedly committed through a span of five years-was justified. Indeed, the accused was charged with committing four separate acts of rape which allegedly took place over a period of five years. This was clear violation of s.164(1) of the CPC, and the consequence was that the trial was a nullity. It was not a mere irregularity but an incurable illegality." Oleh itu dalam kes kita ini saya mengambil pendekatan yang sama dan berdasarkan kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas tadi Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap OKT yang telah dituduh dengan empat perbuatan pecah amanah di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan iaitu empat kesalahan yang serupa yang didakwa dilakukan dalam tempoh tiga tahun iaitu dari tahun 1995 hingga 1997 yang melebihi 12 bulan setiap satu dibicarakan dalam satu perbicaraan adalah jelas menyalahi seksyen 164(1) CPC dan kesan daripadanya mengakibatkan perbicaraan adalah tidak sah. Ia bukan semata-mata suatu luar aturan tetapi suatu ketaksahan yang tidak dapat dipulihkan dibawah seksyen 422 CPC. Oleh itu Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri terhadap keempat-empat pertuduhan. Mahkamah juga mendapati perbicaraan semula kes ini adalah tidak wajar (sekiranya YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk dibicarakan semula atas isu ini) kerana ia adalah atas kekhilafan pendakwaan sendiri yang mana pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih dari cukup untuk mengkaji pertuduhan terhadap OKT dari segenap aspek memandangkan kes ini telah 11 dituduh di Mahkamah pada tahun 2008 dan hanya mula dibicarakan pada bulan febuari 2011 iaitu pendakwaan mempunyai masa lebih kurang dua tahun lebih untuk meneliti pertuduhan ini. Sekiranya alasan penghakiman saya ini diterima oleh isu ini diterima oleh Yang Arif Hakim maka isu yang seterusnya berkenaan dengan initipati pertuduhan adalah menjadi akademik. Namun untuk menguatkan lagi alasan penghakiman saya ini maka disentuh juga isu berkenaan dengan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan ini juga. Isu (iii) iaitu dari segi intipati pertuduhan yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan. Intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan adalah:- i) The accused should be entrusted with property or dominion over property - tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. ii) He should dishonestly misappropriated or convert the property to his own use.- yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Definisi berkenaan dishonestly dinyatakan dibawah seksyen 24 KK manakala seksyen 23 memberikan definisi seksyen 23 KK. Oleh itu isu utama dalam pertuduhan ini adalah samada OKT yang didakwa mengambil sejumlah RM27000.00 iaitu hasil jualan teksi (pertuduhan pindaan pertama) dan sejumlah RM53723.15 iaitu hasil jualan saham HICOM (pertuduhan pindaan kedua,ketiga dan keempat) sebagai ganti bayaran balik jumlah wang yang telah didahulukan oleh OKT untuk syarikat TCSB ini membawa kepada maksud bahawa OKT telah dishonestly misappropriate and/or converted that money untuk kegunaan dan kepentingannya sendiri dan dengan itu telah melakukan kesalahan pecah amanah ini seperti yang dipertuduhkan ke atasnya di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan? Mengikut keterangan SP1 dan SP10 terlebih dahulu. SP1 menasihatkan pengadu untuk membuat laporan polis tanpa merujuk kepada akaun pengurusan syarikat dan juga buku lejar syarikat dan gagal mendapatkan penjelasan daripada En.Badros. SP10 kredibilitinya adalah tercabar kerana memberi keterangan dalam Mahkamah dalam perasaan yang marah dan beremosi. Keterangannya hanya melalui cakap dengar dan anggapan sendiri dan melemparkan tuduhan terhadap OKT tanpa dikemukakan apa-apa bukti. Pada pandangan Mahkamah keterangan SP10 adalah seolah-olah berdendam dengan OKT dan lebih kepada seorang yang "busy body" kepada syarikat yang tidak terlibat dengan syarikat tersebut secara langsung dari awal penubuhan syarikat dan beliau hanya salah seorang keluarga kepada pengadu. (Rujuk kepada Nota keterangan mahkamah di mukasurat 103,104 berkenaan pemerhatian mahkamah terhadap demeanor saksi ini) Keterangan dari saksi yang sebegini Mahkamah seharusnya berhati-hati dalam menerima keterangan beliau kerana beliau adalah orang yang berkepentingan dalam syarikat ini. Mahkamah juga mengambil fakta bahawa saksi ini telah menghantar surat-surat aduan tentang perjalanan kes ini kepada Pejabat Peguam Negara dan juga kepada pihak BPR (Badan Pencegah Rasuah) dengan membuat tuduhan yang mengatakan Mahkamah telah menghilangkan dokumen untuk perbicaraan kes ini sehingga membawa kepada pihak BPR datang ke Mahkamah menjalankan siasatan semasa kes ini masih berjalan. Ianya mengganggu perjalanan kes ini di Mahkamah sebenarnya. Perkara-perkara 13 sebegini harus diambil kira oleh Mahkamah juga dan tambahan pula semasa beliau memberi keterangan beliau seringkali meninggikan suara dengan peguam dan tidak menjawab kepada soalan sebaliknya melemparkan soalan kembali kepada peguam. (Rujuk nota keterangan di muka surat 107,109 dan 110) Bagi tuduhan pertama yang melibatkan hasil jualan teksi HW 9540. Wang tersebut sejumlah RM27000.00 tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa beliau telah mengambilnya dengan menolak wang pendahuluan yang dibuat oleh beliau kepada syarikat di awal penubuhan syarikat TCSB dan hal ini telah dibuat dalam pengetahuan pengadu, SP6, SP7 dan En. Badros. En. Badros tidak dipanggil dipanggil oleh pendakwaan untuk memberi keterangan sedangkan beliau adalah saksi penting dalam kes ini kerana beliaulah yang menjaga akaun berkenaan dengan kutipan sewa dan hasil jualan teksi tersebut. Cek tersebut diambil di hadapan Pengadu sendiri dan dibuat catatan di dalam buku kutipan tunai oleh SP7 sepertimana yang terkadung dalam P17 mukasurat 19 iaitu “masuk ke akaun uncle wan”. TPR di mukasurat 74 nota keterangan pernah memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk mengeluarkan sapina terhadap En. Badrus dan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah, namun hanya ditawarkan sahaja kepada pembelaan setelah pendakwaan menutup kes tanpa dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. Kegagalan untuk memanggil En.Badros bagi memberi penjelasan secara terperinci berkenaan akaun jualan teksi tersebut adalah menyebabkan fatal kepada kes pendakwaan dan Mahkamah tertanya-tanya tentang perkara sebenarnya. SP1, SP2,SP6 dan SP7 menyebut tentang peranan Badros ini dalam penyediaan akaun syarikat dan kehadiran beliau juga penting untuk menjelaskan tentang buku lejer akaun di m/s 63 dan 163 dan pihak pendakwaan sebaliknya menawarkan saksi ini kepada pembelaan. Oleh itu kegagalan memanggil beliau menyebabkan Mahkamah menggunapakai peruntukan s.114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan ia menyebelahi kes pembelaan. Pengadu di dalam kes ini juga telah meninggal dunia dan hanya statement dibawah seksyen 112 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah adalah tidak membawa sebarang qualiti dalam nilai keterangannya kerana beliau tidak boleh di soal balas oleh peguambela OKT. Rujuk seksyen 405 Kanun Keseksaan. Bekenaan dengan hasil jualan saham sebanyak RM24,960 bagi pertuduhan kedua. Saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa ia telah dilaporkan dalam penyata akaun 1995 iaitu P5A(iii) dan SP8 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa sebelum dilaporkan auditor akan menyemak dokumen- dokumen sokongan namun dokumen-dokumen ini tidak di kemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Pihak pendakwaan semata-mata menjalankan kes ini dengan hanya bersandarkan P5 sahaja iaitu Report On Special Audit Review Of STCSB yang mana dokumen-dokumen asal dalam P5 kebanyakannya tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang bukti yang menunjukkan hasil jualan saham tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi OKT. Tiada bukti yang menunjukkan juga saham tersebut dijual oleh siapa. Ini disahkan oleh SP11. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang boleh menunjukkan “misappropriation with dishonest intention” telah dilakukan oleh OKT. Bagi pertuduhan ketiga dan keempat Mahkamah sekali lagi bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bahawa berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi, hasil 15 jualan saham Hicom dimasukkan ke dalam akaun peribadi tertuduh dengan jumlah keseluruhan RM28,863.00 dan ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak OKT juga. Namun ianya dibuat tanpa sebarang DISHONEST INTENTION dan tiada wrongful gain ataupun wrongful loss yang berlaku. Ini kerana mengikut keterangan SP6 semasa di soal balas oleh peguam OKT di mukasurat 73 nota keterangan mengatakan bahwa OKT telah mengambil wang tersebut dengan persetujuan pengadu dan disaksikan oleh SP6 bagi tujuan menolak hutang yang telah OKT dahulukan untuk STCSB. Perkataan yang digunakan oleh pengadu seperti yang diberitahu oleh SP6 dalam kehadirannya sendiri adalah, “bila syarikat ada duit, kamu ambil duit kamu balik.” (juga di m/s 73 Nota keterangan) Ini disahkan juga oleh SP2 seperti dalam m/s 18, P5 para(d) berkaitan withdrawals and repayments by TCSB kepada OKT. Oleh itu untuk isu (iii) ini Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 kanun keseksaan dan oleh yang demikian Mahkamah memutuskan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan memerintahkan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada keempat-empat pertuduhan pindaan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Sekian, terima kasih. Untuk pertimbagan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. MANIRA MOHD NOR HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN 3, AMPANG. BERTARIKH : 5 DISEMBER 2011.

Tika 2.6.0