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The vaccine completely protects unexposed women against four HPV strains responsible for 70% of cervical cancers, which kill about 250,000 women annually.
Frazer and Zhou filed a provisional patent in June 1991 and began work on developing the vaccine within UQ. To finance clinical trials, Australian medical company CSL, and later Merck, were sold partial patents. (CSL has the exclusive license to sell Gardasil in New Zealand and Australia, Merck the license elsewhere.) GlaxoSmithKline independently used the same VLP-approach to develop Cervarix, under a later US patent, licensing Frazer's intellectual property in 2005.
In March 1999, Zhou died of hepatitis, a disease he had contracted as a young man in China. He was survived by his wife Xiao-Yi Sun and son Andreas Zhou.
In 2008, Zhou's contribution to his efforts in research, including his work with the Gardasil vaccine, were formally recognised with a commemorative service attended by over 300 people, and included a written tribute from the Australian Prime Minister of the time, Kevin Rudd in Brisbane, Australia.
= = = Mishen = = =
Mishen (, also Romanized as Mīshen and Mīshan; also known as Bīshen, Bīshīn, and Mīshīn) is a village in Kamazan-e Olya Rural District, Zand District, Malayer County, Hamadan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 1,066, in 260 families.
= = = Mishan, Iran = = =
Mishan () in Iran may refer to:
= = = Nahandar = = =
Nahandar (, also Romanized as Nehendar and Nohendar) is a village in Kamazan-e Olya Rural District, Zand District, Malayer County, Hamadan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 108, in 32 families.
= = = Siah Choqa, Hamadan = = =
Siah Choqa (, also Romanized as Sīāh Choqā, Seyah Cheqā, and Sīāh Cheqā) is a village in Kamazan-e Olya Rural District, Zand District, Malayer County, Hamadan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 117, in 28 families.
= = = Zangeneh-ye Sofla = = =
Zangeneh-ye Sofla (, also Romanized as Zangeneh-ye Soflá; also known as Zangeneh and Zangeneh-ye Pā’īn) is a village in Kamazan-e Olya Rural District, Zand District, Malayer County, Hamadan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 366, in 102 families.
= = = Penja language = = =
Penja is a possibly extinct Bantu language of southern Tanzania, near the north end of Lake Malawi.
= = = Paget Marsh Nature Reserve = = =
Paget Marsh Nature Reserve, also known as Paget Marsh, is an unspoiled marsh, forest, and nature reserve in central Bermuda. It is located next to St. Paul's Church along Middle Road in Paget Parish, to the south of Hamilton Harbour. The official reserve is protected by the Bermuda National Trust and Bermuda Audubon Society. It is also a Ramsar wetland of international importance.
The reserve's extensive peat marsh remains unchanged since the days of the first settlers. It is dotted with Bermuda cedar and "Sabal bermudana" palmetto trees. An extensive boardwalk, erected in 1999, has made the ponds, mangroves, grasslands, and forests accessible. The water bodies and forests in this area provide habitat for a variety of wildlife, especially birds.
The reserve is located in Paget Parish adjoining the St. Paul's Church at the crossing of Middle Road and Lover's Lane. It is prehistoric forest land, which covers an oval area of . The marsh has peat to depths of which is acidic and does not permit growth of many of the natural species of Bermuda, as it gets flooded during high tides. It is well preserved, whereas similar marshes in the island have become garbage dumps. To view the natural beauty of its giant ferns, palmetto fronds and delicate forest of "Carex bermudiana" Bermuda sedge in the bogs, a long, wide wooden boardwalk has been erected on floating pontoons. This boardwalk passes through the following ecosystem in the order of ecological succession: the red mangrove forest, thick browny-green wax myrtle bushes, savannah saw-grass terminating in the ancient primeval forest of Bermuda cedars and palmettos.
The discovery of the marsh is credited to Sir George Somers and his crew from England on their voyage which was shipwrecked between two reefs just off the coast of Bermuda in 1609. They were then the first to report on the dense primeval forest of cedar and palmetto found in the marsh lands of the island. Another historical incident reported is of the destructive introduction of two scale insects, "Lepidosaphes newsteadi" and "Carulaspis minima", which caused extensive damage to cedar forest between 1946 and 1951. This reduced the extent of the cedar to just one percent of what had earlier existed. However, introduction of cedar resistant to them has enabled restoration to the extent of about ten percent now. Further increase in growth has been inhibited on account of introduction of casuarina trees and other invasive plant species. Yet the reserve is reported to be the "best surviving example of native cedar, palmetto, and mangrove forests."
Paget Marsh is now one of the 12 nature reserves and 63 parks established to protect the ecosystem of the island. It is under the joint ownership of the Bermuda National Trust and the Bermuda Audubon Society and is very well managed; the former organization holds the central part of the reserve, the latter organization has ownership of the lands on either side of the reserve. A reforestation program is being conducted by the Bermuda Department of Conservation Services.
The pond was created in the preserve, which in the 1920s was a garbage dump, at the initiative of the Audubon Society. It has become a sanctuary for resident and migratory birds and many species of wildlife. Efforts are now being made to introduce male and female species of the endemic killifish ("Fundulous bermudae"), a rare species mentioned in the "Field Book of Shore Fishes of Bermuda" (1933) by Beebe and Tee-Van. The vegetation found in the reserve includes palmetto trees, Bermuda cedars and mangrove swamp.
= = = Nunera = = =
Nunera is a small village located in surguja districtsurguja district, Chhattisgarh, India. It has a population of just over 2000 people. The village has a post office.
Nunera is a Village Panchayat under Bonakal intermediate Panchayat.
The village has two high school 1.H S School KHAMHARIYA. 2.NUNERA SHIVPUR.
= = = There's No Taste Like Home = = =
There's No Taste Like Home is a British daytime cookery show that was part of the ITV Food category on ITV in 2011.
= = = Tylomelania scalariopsis = = =
Tylomelania scalariopsis is a species of freshwater snail with an operculum, an aquatic gastropod mollusk in the family Pachychilidae.
This species occurs in Lake Poso drainage, Sulawesi, Indonesia. The type locality is the Poso River, 400 m against the river current.
The shell has 11-12 whorls.
The width of the shell is 12 mm. The height of the shell is 34 mm. The width of the aperture is 6.5 mm. The height of the aperture is 10 mm.
There are 6 concentric lines on the operculum.
= = = Tegra novaehollandiae = = =
Tegra novaehollandiae is a species of bush crickets in the tribe Cymatomerini and the subfamily Pseudophyllinae; it is native to tropical Asia.
It has also been called Tegra karnya (Willemse, 1933), Locusta novaehollandiae (Haan 1842), Tarphe novaehollandiae (Haan 1842), Tegra novae-hollandiae albostriata (de Jong), Tegra novae-hollandiae vittifemur (de Jong).
The subspecies "T. n. viridinotata" has one generation per year. It overwinters in the trunk of pear trees. Nymph and adult eat the leaves of "Glochidion puberum". The eggs are laid in pear trees.
The mottled colors and texture if "T. n. novaehollandiae" allow it to blend into the bark of the trees where it is usually found, motionless, with legs and antennae thrust out in front. Some spots
of green on the tegmina are said to resemble moss on the bark.
When its thorax is pinched, "T. n. novaehollandiae" emits two large drops of a yellow fluid from openings on the dorsal surface of its protonum, as well as smaller amounts from other apertures on its body. The fluid is also produced by the tegmina when they are compressed.
= = = Mooween State Park = = =
Mooween State Park is a public recreation area covering in the town of Lebanon, Connecticut. The state park offers hiking and mountain biking plus fishing and boating on Red Cedar Lake.
The park grounds were the home of a summer camp for boys from 1921 through 1960. The state purchased the site in 1989. Originally known as Red Cedar Lake State Park, its name was changed to Mooween in 2000 in recognition of its summer camp past.
= = = Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Unit 3 Reactor) = = =
Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (福島第一原子力発電所3号機の建設 "Fukushima Daiichi Genshiryoku Hatsudensho Sangoki no Kensetsu") was one of the reactors in operation on 11 March 2011, when the plant was struck by the tsunami produced by the Tohoku earthquake. In the aftermath, the reactor experienced hydrogen gas explosions and suffered a partial meltdown, along with the other two reactors in operation at the time the tsunami struck, unit 1 and unit 2. Efforts to remove debris and coolant water contaminated with radiation are ongoing and expected to last several decades.
The was a series of equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns, and releases of radioactive materials at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, following the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011. It is the largest nuclear disaster since the Chernobyl disaster of 1986.
The plant comprises six separate boiling water reactors originally designed by General Electric (GE), and maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). At the time of the quake, Reactor 4 had been de-fueled while 5 and 6 were in the cold shutdown for planned maintenance. Immediately after the earthquake, the remaining reactors 1-3 shut down automatically, and emergency generators came online to control electronics and coolant systems. However, the tsunami following the earthquake quickly flooded the low-lying rooms in which the emergency generators were housed. The flooded generators failed, cutting power to the critical pumps that must continuously circulate coolant water through a nuclear reactor for several days in order to keep it from melting down after being shut down. As the pumps stopped, the reactors overheated due to the normal high radioactive decay heat produced in the first few days after nuclear reactor shutdown (smaller amounts of this heat normally continue to be released for years, but are not enough to cause fuel melting).
At this point, only prompt flooding of the reactors with seawater could have cooled the reactors quickly enough to prevent a meltdown. Saltwater flooding was delayed because it would ruin the costly reactors permanently. Flooding with seawater was finally commenced only after the government ordered that seawater be used, and at this point, it was already too late to prevent meltdown.
As the water boiled away in the reactors and the water levels in the fuel rod pools dropped, the reactor fuel rods began to overheat severely, and to melt down. In the hours and days that followed, Reactors 1, 2 and 3 experienced full meltdown.
In the intense heat and pressure of the melting reactors, a reaction between the nuclear fuel metal cladding and the remaining water surrounding them produced explosive hydrogen gas. As workers struggled to cool and shut down the reactors, several hydrogen-air chemical explosions occurred.
Concerns about the repeated small explosions, the atmospheric venting of radioactive gasses, and the possibility of larger explosions led to a -radius evacuation around the plant. During the early days of the accident, workers were temporarily evacuated at various times for radiation safety reasons. At the same time, seawater that had been exposed to the melting rods was returned to the sea heated and radioactive in large volumes for several months until recirculating units could be put in place to repeatedly cool and re-use a limited quantity of water for cooling. The earthquake damage and flooding in the wake of the tsunami hindered external assistance. Electrical power was slowly restored for some of the reactors, allowing for automated cooling.
Japanese officials initially assessed the accident as Level 4 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) despite the views of other international agencies that it should be higher. The level was later raised to 5 and eventually to 7, the maximum scale value. The Japanese government and TEPCO have been criticized in the foreign press for poor communication with the public and improvised cleanup efforts. On 20 March, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano announced that the plant would be decommissioned once the crisis was over.
The Japanese government estimates the total amount of radioactivity released into the atmosphere was approximately one-tenth as much as was released during the Chernobyl disaster. Significant amounts of radioactive material have also been released into ground and ocean waters. Measurements taken by the Japanese government 30–50 km from the plant showed caesium-137 levels high enough to cause concern, leading the government to ban the sale of food grown in the area. Tokyo officials temporarily recommended that tap water should not be used to prepare food for infants. In May 2012, TEPCO reported that at least 900 PBq had been released "into the atmosphere in March last year [2011] alone" although it has been said staff may have been told to lie, and give false readings to try and cover up true levels of radiation.
An "Official Use Only" report obtained by FOIA from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (3/18/2011) written one week after the tsunami hit Fukushima states, “The source term provided to NARAC was: (1) 25% of the total fuel in unit 2 released to the atmosphere, (2) 50% of the total spent fuel from unit 3 was released to the atmosphere, and (3) 100% of the total spent fuel was released to the atmosphere from unit 4.” NARAC produced a "worst case" speculative model based on these assumptions. However, this model did not include an assumption of a release from Unit 1, and the assumption of "100% of the total spent fuel was released to the atmosphere from unit 4" has since been proven incorrect with the subsequent removal of the fuel from the spent pool fuel.
A few of the plant's workers were severely injured or killed by the disaster conditions resulting from the earthquake. There were no immediate deaths due to direct radiation exposures, but at least six workers have exceeded lifetime legal limits for radiation and more than 300 have received significant radiation doses. Predicted future cancer deaths due to accumulated radiation exposures in the population living near Fukushima have ranged from none to 100 to a non-peer-reviewed "guesstimate" of 1,000. On 16 December 2011, Japanese authorities declared the plant to be stable, although it would take decades to decontaminate the surrounding areas and to decommission the plant altogether. On 5 July 2012, the parliament appointed The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) submitted its inquiry report to the Japanese parliament, while the government appointed Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company submitted its final report to the Japanese government on 23 July 2012. Tepco admitted for the first time on October 12, 2012 that it had failed to take stronger measures to prevent disasters for fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants.
Unlike the other five reactor units, reactor 3 ran on mixed core, containing both uranium fuel and mixed uranium and plutonium oxide, or MOX fuel (with the core comprising ~6% MOX fuel), during a loss of cooling accident in a subcritical reactor MOX fuel will not behave differently from UOX fuel. The key difference between plutonium-239 and uranium-235 is that plutonium emits fewer delayed neutrons than uranium when it undergoes fission.
While water-insoluble forms of plutonium such as plutonium dioxide are very harmful to the lungs, this toxicity is not relevant during a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) because plutonium is very involatile and unlikely to leave the reactor in large amounts. Plutonium dioxide has a very high boiling point. The toxic effect of the plutonium to the public under these conditions is much less than that of iodine-131 and caesium. During a loss of cooling accident, the fuel is not subject to such intense mechanical stresses, so the release of radioactivity is controlled by the boiling point of the different elements present.
Following the reactor SCRAM, operators activated the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) and the residual heat removal system and core spray systems were made available to cool the suppression pool; whether they were activated prior to the tsunami has not been made clear. The RHRS and CS pumps were knocked out of commission by the tsunami. With DC battery power remaining, the RCIC continued to keep the water level stable, and the operators switched to the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system when water level began to drop. On 13 March, the HPCI system failed, the reason for which is not completely clear due to instrumentation not being available. It is believed to be either due to loss of DC power due to depletion of batteries or to reactor pressure dropping below the level at which it can operate. Operators were unable to restart it as batteries were exhausted. After this, the operators were unable to start the RCIC system and began injecting seawater. Although it was not clear at the time, some of the fuel in Reactor 3 apparently melted around sixty hours after the earthquake (the night of the 12th to 13th).
Early on 13 March an official of the Japan Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) told at a news conference that the emergency cooling system of Unit 3 had failed, spurring an urgent search for a means to supply cooling water to the reactor vessel to prevent a meltdown of its reactor core. At 05:38 there was no means of adding coolant to the reactor, owing to loss of power. Work to restore power and to vent excessive pressure continued. At one point, the top three meters of the uranium/mixed oxide (MOX) fuel rods were not covered by coolant.
At 07:30 JST, TEPCO prepared to release radioactive steam, indicating that "the amount of radiation to be released would be small and not of a level that would affect human health" and manual venting took place at 08:41 and 09:20. At 09:25 JST on 13 March, operators began injecting water containing boric acid into the primary containment vessel (PCV) via the pump of a fire truck. When water levels continued to fall and pressure to rise, the injected water was switched to seawater at 13:12. By 15:00 it was noted that despite adding water the level in the reactor did not rise and radiation had increased. A rise was eventually recorded but the level stuck at 2 m below the top of reactor core. Other readings suggested that this could not be the case and the gauge was malfunctioning.
Injection of seawater into the primary containment vessel (PCV) was discontinued at 01:10 on 14 March because all the water in the reserve pool had been used up. Supplies were restored by 03:20 and injection of water resumed.
On the morning of 15 March, Secretary Edano announced that according to TEPCO, at one location near reactor Units 3 and 4, radiation at an equivalent dose rate of 400 mSv/h was detected. This might have been due to debris from the explosion in Unit 4.
At 12:33 JST on 13 March, the chief spokesman of the Japanese government, Yukio Edano said hydrogen gas was building up inside the outer building of Unit 3 just as had occurred in Unit 1, threatening the same kind of explosion. At 11:15 JST on 14 March, the envisaged explosion of the building surrounding Reactor 3 of Fukushima 1 occurred, owing to the ignition of built-up hydrogen gas. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of Japan (NISA) reported, as with Unit 1, the top section of the reactor building was blown apart, but the inner containment vessel was not breached. The explosion was larger than that in Unit 1 and felt 40 kilometers away. Pressure readings within the reactor remained steady at around 380 kPa at 11:13 and 360 kPa at 11:55 compared to nominal levels of 400 kPa and a maximum recorded of 840 kPa. Water injection continued. Dose rates of 0.05 mSv/h were recorded in the service hall and of 0.02 mSv/h at the plant entrance.
Eleven people were reported injured in the blast. TEPCO and NISA announced that four TEPCO employees, three subcontractor employees, and four Self-Defence-Force soldiers were injured. Six military personnel from the Ground Self Defense Force's Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, led by Colonel Shinji Iwakuma, had just arrived outside the reactor to spray it with water and were exiting their vehicles when the explosion occurred. Iwakuma later said that TEPCO had not informed them that there was a danger of a hydrogen explosion in the reactor, adding, "Tokyo Electric was desperate to stabilize (the plant), so I am not angry at them. If there is a possibility of an explosion, I would be reluctant to send my men there."
TEPCO claimed that there was a small but non-zero probability that the exposed fuel assemblies in the Unit 4 reactor could reach criticality. The BBC commented that criticality would never mean a nuclear explosion, but could cause a sustained release of radioactive materials. Criticality is usually considered highly unlikely, owing to the low "enrichment level" used in light water reactors. American nuclear engineer Arnold Gundersen, noting the much greater power and vertical debris ejection compared to the Unit 1 hydrogen blast, has theorized that the Unit 3 explosion involved a prompt criticality in the spent fuel pool material, triggered by the mechanical disruption of an initial, smaller hydrogen gas explosion in the building.
On 11 May, TEPCO released underwater robotic video from the spent fuel pool. The video appears to show large amounts of debris contaminating the pool. Based on water samples analysed, unnamed experts and TEPCO reported that the fuel rods were left "largely undamaged", and that it appears that the Unit 3 explosion was entirely related to hydrogen buildup within the building from venting of the reactor.
Around 10:00 JST on 16 March, NHK helicopters flying 30 km away videotaped white fumes rising from the Fukushima I facility. Officials suggested that the Reactor 3 building was the most likely source, and said that its containment systems may have been breached. The control room for Reactors 3 and 4 was evacuated at 10:45 JST but staff were cleared to return and resume water injection into the reactor at 11:30 JST.
At 16:12 JST, Self Defence Force (SDF) Chinook helicopters were preparing to pour water on Unit 3, where white fumes rising from the building was believed to be water boiling away from the fuel rod cooling pond on the top floor of the reactor building, and on Unit 4 where the cooling pool was also short of water. The mission was cancelled when helicopter measurements reported radiation levels of 50 mSv. At 21:06 pm JST, the government reported that major damage to Reactor 3 was unlikely but that it nonetheless remained their highest priority.
Early on 17 March, TEPCO requested another attempt by the military to put water on the reactor using a helicopter and four helicopter drops of seawater took place around 10:00 JST. The riot police used a water cannon to spray water onto the top of the reactor building and then were replaced by members of the SDF with spray vehicles. On 18 March, a crew of firemen took over the task with six fire engines each spraying 6 tons of water in 40 minutes. 30 further hyper rescue vehicles were involved in spraying operations. Spraying continued each day to 23 March because of concerns the explosion in Unit 3 may have damaged the pool (total 3,742 tonnes of water sprayed up to 22 March) with changing crews to minimise radiation exposure. Lighting in the control room was restored on 22 March after a connection was made to a new grid power supply, and by 24 March it was possible to add 35 tonnes of seawater to the spent fuel pool using the cooling and purification system. On 21 March grey smoke was reported to be rising from the southeast corner of Unit 3 – where the spent fuel pool is located. Workers were evacuated from the area. TEPCO claimed no significant change in radiation levels, and the smoke subsided later the same day.
On 23 March, black smoke billowed from Unit 3, prompting another evacuation of workers from the plant, though Tokyo Electric Power Co. officials said there had been no corresponding spike in radiation at the plant. "We don't know the reason for the smoke", Hidehiko Nishiyama of the Nuclear Safety Agency said.
On 24 March, three workers entered the basement of the turbine building and were exposed to radiation when they stepped into contaminated water. Two of them were not wearing high boots and received beta ray burns. They were hospitalized, but their injuries were not life-threatening.
From 25 March, the source of water being injected into the core was switched from seawater to freshwater.