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CHAPMAN, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF TEXAS, et al. v. HOUSTON WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION et al.
No. 77-719.
Argued October 2, 1978
Decided May 14, 1979
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 623. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 646. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in all but n. 2 of which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 672. Brennan and Marshall, JJ., filed a separate statement, post, p. 676.
David H. Young, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 77-719. With him on the brief were John L. Hill, Attorney General, David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, and Steve Bicker-staff, Assistant Attorney General. Theodore A. Gardner argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 77-5324.
Jeffrey J. Skarda argued the cause for respondents in No. 77-719. With him on the briefs were Henry A. Freedman, Michael B. Trister, and John Williamson. Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for respondents in No. 77-5324. With him on the brief were John J. Degnan, Attorney General, and Richard M. Hluchan, Deputy Attorney General.
Together with No. 77-5324, Gonzalez, Guardian v. Young, Director, Hudson County Welfare Board, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 77-719 were filed by Solicitor General McCree and Sara Sun Beale for the United States; and by Robert B. O’Keefe for East Texas Legal Services, Inc.
Rornld Y. Amemiya, Attorney General, and Michael A. Lilly and Charleen M. Aina, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Hawaii as amicus curiae in No. 77-719.
Mr. Justice BrenNAN and Mr. Justice Marshall do not join footnote 2.
Me. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States District Courts have Jurisdiction over civil actions claiming a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States or by Acts of Congress providing for equal rights or for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. The question presented by these cases is whether that jurisdiction encompasses a claim that a state welfare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the Social Security Act. We conclude that it does not.
In the Social Security Amendments of 1967, Congress authorized partial federal funding of approved state programs providing emergency assistance for certain needy persons. In February 1976, Julia Gonzalez, the petitioner in No. 77-5324, requested the Hudson County, N. J., Welfare Board to pay her $163 in emergency assistance funds to cover her rent and utility bills. The Board denied her request because petitioner and her children were not “in a state of homelessness” as required by the relevant New Jersey regulations.
Petitioner brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that the emergency payment was “necessary to avoid destitution” within the meaning of § 406 (e)(1) of the federal Social Security Act, and she was therefore entitled to the payment notwithstanding the more stringent New Jersey regulation. In her federal complaint she sought damages of $163 and an injunction commanding the New Jersey Welfare Director to conform his administration of the State’s emergency assistance program to federal statutory standards. In essence, petitioner claimed that the New Jersey officials had deprived her of a right to emergency assistance protected by §406 (e)(1) of the Social Security Act.
The District Court held that the complaint stated a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Without deciding whether the “secured by the Constitution” language in § 1343 (3) should be construed to include Supremacy Clause claims, the District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction under both subparagraphs (3) and (4) of § 1343. But in doing so, the court did not explain whether it was § 1983 or § 406 (e) (1) of the Social Security Act that it viewed as the Act of Congress securing “equal rights” or “civil rights.” On the merits, the District Court found no conflict between the state regulation and the federal statute and entered summary judgment for respondents.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not address the merits because it concluded that the District Court should have dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals first noted that § 1983 “is not a jurisdictional statute; it only fashions a remedy.” 560 F. 2d 160, 164 (1977). Nor could jurisdiction be founded on 28 U. S. C. § 1331, the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, since the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000. The court recognized that when a constitutional claim is of sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction, a district court has power to consider other claims which might not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. But it concluded that the constitutional claim must involve more than a contention that the Supremacy Clause requires that a federal statute be given effect over conflicting state law. It then went on to hold that the Social Security Act is not an Act of Congress securing either “equal rights” or “civil rights” as those terms are used in § 1343. And those terms, the court concluded, limit the grant of federal jurisdiction conferred by § 1343 even if § 1983 creates a remedy for a broader category of statutory claims.
The petitioners in No. 77-719 are Commissioners of the Texas Department of Human Resources, which administers the State’s program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Respondents represent a class of AFDC recipients who share living quarters with a nondependent relative. Under the Texas regulations, the presence in the household of a nondependent person results in a reduction in the level of payments to the beneficiaries even if their level of actual need is unchanged. In a suit brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, respondents claimed that the Texas regulations violate § 402 (a)(7) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(7), and the federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
The District Court upheld the Texas regulations. While respondents’ appeal was pending, this Court decided Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338. On the-authority of that case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Following earlier Fifth Circuit cases, the Court of Appeals concluded that federal jurisdiction was conferred by the language in 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (4) describing actions seeking relief “under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights . . . .” The court reasoned that statutory rights concerning food and shelter are “ ‘rights of an essentially personal nature,’ ” Houston Welfare Rights Org. v. Vowell, 555 F. 2d 1219, 1221 n. 1 (1977); that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides a remedy which may be invoked to protect such rights; and that § 1983 is an Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights within the meaning of that jurisdictional grant.
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between that conclusion and the holding of the Third Circuit in No. 77-5324. 434 U. S. 1061. We have previously reserved the jurisdictional question we decide today, see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533-534, n. 5. We preface our decision with a review of the history of the governing statutes.
I
Our decision turns on the construction of the two jurisdictional provisions, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4), and their interrelationship with 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the Social Security Act. As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is the source of both the jurisdictional grant now codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) and the remedy now authorized by 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Section 1 authorized individual suits in federal court to vindicate the deprivation, under color of state law, “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.” No authorization was given for suits based on any federal statute.
In 1874, Congress enacted the Revised Statutes of the United States. At that time, the remedial and jurisdictional provisions of § 1 were modified and placed in separate sections. The words “and laws,” as now found in § 1983, were included in the remedial provision of Rev. Stat. § 1979, and two quite different formulations of the jurisdictional grant were included in Rev. Stat. §§ 563 and 629. The former granted the district courts jurisdiction of all actions to redress a deprivation under color of state law of any right secured by the Constitution or “by any law of the United States.” The latter defined the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and included the limiting phrase — “by any law providing for equal rights” — which is now found in § 1343 (3).
In the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress abolished circuit courts and transferred their authority to the district courts. The Code’s definition of the jurisdiction of the district courts to redress the deprivation of civil rights omitted the broad language referring to “any law of the United States” which had defined district court jurisdiction under § 563, and provided instead for jurisdiction over claims arising under federal laws “providing for equal rights” — the language which had been used to describe circuit court jurisdiction under § 629, and which is now a part of § 1343 (3). No significant change in either the remedial or jurisdictional language has been made since 1911.
Subsection 4 of § 1343, providing jurisdiction for claims “under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote,” is of more recent origin. Part III of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, as proposed, authorized the Attorney General to institute suits for injunc-tive relief against conspiracies to deprive citizens of the civil rights specified in 42 U. S. C. § 1985, which includes voting rights. Part III conferred jurisdiction on the United States district courts to entertain proceedings instituted pursuant to this section of the Act. While the substantive authorization of suits by the Attorney General was defeated, the amendment of § 1343, which had been termed a technical amendment to comply with the authority conferred by Part III, was enacted into law.
With the exception of this most recent enactment, the legislative history of the provisions at issue in these cases ultimately provides us with little guidance as to the' proper resolution of the question presented here. Section 1 of the 1871 Act was the least controversial provision of that Act; and what little debate did take place as to § 1 centered largely on the question of what protections the Constitution in fact afforded. The relevant changes in the Revised Statutes were adopted virtually without comment, as was the definition of civil rights jurisdiction in the 1911 Code. The latter provision was described as simply merging the existing jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts, a statement which may be read either as reflecting a view that the broader “and laws” language was intended to be preserved in the more limited “equal rights” language or as suggesting that “and laws” was itself originally enacted with reference to laws providing for equal rights, and was never thought to be any broader.
Similar ambiguity is found in discussions of the basic policy of the legislation. While there is weight to the claim that Congress, from 1874 onward, intended to create a broad right of action in federal court for deprivations by a State of any federally secured right, it is also clear that the prime focus of Congress in all of the relevant legislation was ensuring a right of action to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal laws enacted pursuant thereto.
We cannot say that any of these arguments is ultimately right or wrong, or that one policy is more persuasive than others in reflecting the intent of Congress. It may well be that, at least as to § 1343 (3), the Congresses that enacted the 1871 Act and its subsequent amendments never considered the question of federal jurisdiction of claims arising under the broad scope of federal substantive authority that emerged many years later. This does not mean that jurisdiction cannot be found to encompass claims nonexistent in 1871 or 1874, but it cautions us to be hesitant in finding jurisdiction for new claims which do not clearly fit within the terms of the statute.
II
The statutory language suggests three different approaches to the jurisdictional issue. The first involves a consideration of the words “secured by the Constitution of the United States” as used in § 1343. The second focuses on the remedy authorized by § 1983 and raises the question whether that section is a statute that secures “equal rights” or “civil rights” within the meaning of § 1343. The third approach makes the jurisdictional issue turn on whether the Social Security Act is a statute that secures “equal rights” or “civil rights.” We consider these approaches in turn.
1. The Supremacy Clause
Under § 1343 (3), Congress has created federal jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to redress the deprivation under color of state law “of any right, privilege or immunity secured [1] by the Constitution of the United States or [2] by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Claimants correctly point out that the first prepositional phrase can be fairly read to describe rights secured by the Supremacy Clause. For even though that Clause is not a source of any federal rights, it does “secure” federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law. In that sense all federal rights, whether created by treaty, by statute, or by regulation, are “secured” by the Supremacy Clause.
In Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, the Court was confronted with an analogous choice between two interpretations of the statute defining the jurisdiction of three-judge district courts. The comprehensive language of that statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), could have been broadly read to encompass statutory claims secured by the Supremacy Clause or narrowly read to exclude claims that involve no federal constitutional provision except that Clause. After acknowledging that the broader reading was consistent not only with the statutory language but also with the policy of the statute, the Court accepted the more restrictive reading. Its reasoning is persuasive and applicable to the problems confronting us in this case.
“This restrictive view of the application of § 2281 is more consistent with a discriminating reading of the statute itself than is the first and more embracing interpretation. The statute requires a three-judge court in order to restrain the enforcement of a state statute 'upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute.’ Since all federal actions to enjoin a state enactment rest ultimately on the Supremacy Clause, the words 'upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute’ would appear to be superfluous unless they are read to exclude some types of such injunctive suits. For a simple provision prohibiting the restraint of the enforcement of any state statute except by a three-judge court would manifestly have sufficed to embrace every such suit whatever its particular constitutional ground. It is thus quite permissible to read the phrase in question as one of limitation, signifying a congressional purpose to confine the three-judge court requirement to injunction suits depending directly upon a substantive provision of the Constitution, leaving cases of conflict with a federal statute (or treaty) to follow their normal course in a single-judge court.” Swift & Co. v. Wickham, supra, at 126-127 (footnotes omitted).
Just as the phrase in § 2281 — “upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute” — would have been superfluous unless read as a limitation on three-judge-court jurisdiction, so is it equally clear that the entire reference in § 1343 (3) to rights secured by an Act of Congress would be unnecessary if the earlier reference to constitutional claims embraced those resting solely on the Supremacy Clause. More importantly, the additional language which describes a limited category of Acts of Congress — -those “providing for equal rights of citizens” — plainly negates the notion that jurisdiction over all statutory claims had already been conferred by the preceding reference to constitutional claims.
Thus, while we recognize that there is force to claimants’ argument that the remedial purpose of the civil rights legislation supports an expansive interpretation of the phrase “secured by the Constitution,” it would make little sense for Congress to have drafted the statute as it did if it had intended to confer jurisdiction over every conceivable federal claim against a state agent. In order to give meaning to the entire statute as written by Congress, we must conclude that an allegation of incompatibility between federal and state statutes and regulations does not, in itself, give rise to a claim “secured by the Constitution” within the meaning of § 1343 (3).
2. Section 1983
Claimants next argue that the “equal rights” language of § 1343 (3) should not be read literally or, if it is, that § 1983, the source of their asserted cause of action, should be considered an Act of Congress “providing for equal rights” within the meaning of § 1343 (3) or “providing for the protection of civil rights” within § 1343 (4). In support of this position, they point to the common origin of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and this Court’s recognition that the latter is the jurisdictional counterpart of the former. Since broad language describing statutory claims was used in both provisions during the period between 1874 and 1911 and has been retained in § 1983, and since Congress in the Judicial Code of 1911 purported to be making no changes in the existing law as to jurisdiction in this area, the “equal rights” language of § 1343 (3) must be construed to encompass all statutory claims arising under the broader language of § 1983. Moreover, in view of its origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and its function in modern litigation, § 1983 does “provid [e] for the protection of civil rights” within the meaning of § 1343 (4).
In practical effect, this argument leads to the same result as claimants’ Supremacy Clause argument: jurisdiction over all challenges to state action based on any federal ground. Although the legislative history does not forbid this result, the words and structure of the statute, as well as portions of the legislative history, support a more limited construction.
The common origin of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) unquestionably implies that their coverage is, or at least originally was, coextensive. It is not, however, necessary in this case to decide whether the two provisions have the same scope. For even if they do, there would still be the question whether the “and laws” language in § 1983 should be narrowly read to conform with the “equal rights” language in § 1343 (3), or, conversely, the latter phrase should be broadly read to parallel the former. And, in all events, whether or not we assume that there is a difference between “any law of the United States” on the one hand and “any Act of Congress providing for equal rights” on the other, the fact is that the more limited language was used when Congress last amended the jurisdictional provision. In order to construe the broad language of § 1983 to cover any statutory claim, and at the same time to construe the language of § 1343 (3) as coextensive with such a cause of action, it would be necessary to ignore entirely Congress’ most recent limiting amendment and the words of the provision as currently in force.
We cannot accept claimants’ argument that we should reach this result by holding that § 1983 is an Act of Congress “providing for equal rights” within the meaning of § 1343 (3). Unlike the 1866 and 1870 Acts, § 1 of the Civil Eights Act of 1871 did not provide for any substantive rights — equal or otherwise. As introduced and enacted, it served only to ensure that an individual had a cause of action for violations of the Constitution, which in the Fourteenth Amendment embodied and extended to all individuals as against state action the substantive protections afforded by § 1 of the 1866 Act. No matter how broad the § 1 cause of action may be, the breadth of its coverage does not alter its procedural character. Even if claimants are correct in asserting that § 1983 provides a cause of action for all federal statutory claims, it remains true that one cannot go into court and claim a “violation of § 1983” — -for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything. As Senator Edmunds recognized in the 1871 debate: “All civil suits, as every lawyer understands, which this act authorizes, are not based upon it; they are based upon the right of the citizen. The act only gives a remedy.”
Under § 1343 (3), a civil action must be both “authorized by law” and brought to redress the deprivation of rights “secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights.” Section 1983, when properly invoked, satisfies the first requirement: It ensures that the suit will not be dismissed because not “authorized by law.” But it cannot satisfy the second, since by its terms, as well as its history, it does not provide any rights at all.
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the argument that § 1983 is a statute “providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.” Standing alone, § 1983 clearly provides no protection for civil rights since, as we have just concluded, § 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all. To be sure, it may be argued that § 1983 does in some sense “provid[e] for the protection of civil rights” when it authorizes a cause of action based on the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by other Acts of Congress. But in such cases, there is no question as to jurisdiction, and no need to invoke § 1983 to meet the “civil rights” requirement of § 1343 (4); the Act of Congress which is the actual substantive basis of the suit clearly suffices to meet the requisite test. It is only when the underlying statute is no t a civil rights Act that § 1983 need be invoked by those in claimants’ position to support jurisdiction. And in such cases, by hypothesis, § 1983 does not “provid[e] for the protection of civil rights.”
To construe § 1343 (4), moreover, as encompassing all federal statutory suits, as claimants here propose, would seem plainly inconsistent with the congressional intent in passing that statute. As noted earlier, the provision’s primary purpose was to ensure federal-court jurisdiction oyer suits which the bill authorized the Attorney General to bring against conspiracies to deprive individuals of the civil rights enumerated in 42 U. S. C. § 1985. The statute, of course, is broader than that: It encompasses suits brought by private individuals as well, and thus retained some significance even after the provisions authorizing suit by the Attorney General were defeated. But to the extent that § 1343 (4) was thought to expand existing federal jurisdiction, it was only because it does not require that the claimed deprivation be “under color of any State law.” One would expect that if Congress sought not only to eliminate any state-action requirement but also to allow jurisdiction without respect to the amount in controversy for claims which in fact have nothing to do with “civil rights/’ there would be some indication of such an intent. But there is none, either in the legislative history or in the words of the statute itself.
3. The Social Security Act
It follows from what we have said thus far that § 1343 does not confer federal jurisdiction over the claims based on the Social Security Act unless that Act may fairly be characterized as a statute securing “equal rights” within § 1343 (3) or “civil rights” within § 1343 (4). The Social Security Act provisions at issue here authorize federal assistance to participating States in the provision of a wide range of monetary benefits to needy individuals, including emergency assistance and payments necessary to provide food and shelter. Arguably, a statute that is intended to provide at least a minimum level of subsistence for all individuals could be regarded as securing either “equal rights” or “civil rights.” We are persuaded, however, that both of these terms have a more restrictive meaning as used in the jurisdictional statute.
The Social Security Act does not deal with the concept of “equality” or with the guarantee of “civil rights,” as those terms are commonly understood. The Congress that enacted § 1343 (3) was primarily concerned with providing jurisdiction for cases dealing with racial equality; the Congress that enacted § 1343 (4) was primarily concerned with providing jurisdiction for actions dealing with the civil rights enumerated in 42 U. S. C. § 1985, and most notably the right to vote. While the words of these statutes are not limited to the precise claims which motivated their passage, it is inappropriate to read the jurisdictional provisions to encompass new claims which fall well outside the common understanding of their terms.
Our conclusion that the Social Security Act does not fall within the terms of either § 1343 (3) or (4) is supported by this Court’s construction of similar phrases in the removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1443. The removal statute makes reference to “any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens” and “any law providing for equal rights.” In construing these phrases in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, this Court concluded:
“The present language ‘any law providing for . . . equal civil rights’ first appeared in § 641 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. When the Revised Statutes were compiled, the substantive and removal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were carried forward in separate sections. Hence, Congress could no longer identify the rights for which removal was available by using the language of the original Civil Rights Act — ‘rights secured to them by the first section of this act.’ The new language it chose, however, does not suggest that it intended to limit the scope of removal to rights recognized in statutes existing in 1874. On the contrary, Congress’ choice of the open-ended phrase ‘any law providing for . . . equal civil rights’ was clearly appropriate to permit removal in cases involving ‘a right under’ both existing and future statutes that provided for equal civil rights.
“There is no substantial indication, however, that the general language of § 641 of the Revised Statutes was intended to expand the kinds of ‘law’ to which the removal section referred. In spite of the potential breadth of the phrase ‘any law providing for . . . equal civil rights,’ it seems clear that in enacting § 641, Congress intended in that phrase only to include laws comparable in nature to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. . . .
“. . . As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded, § 1443 ‘applies only to rights that are granted in terms of equality and not to the whole gamut of constitutional rights . . . .’ ‘When the removal statute speaks of “any law providing for equal rights,” it refers to those laws that are couched in terms of equality, such as the historic and the recent equal rights statutes, as distinguished from laws, of which the due process clause and 42 U. S. C. § 1983 are sufficient examples, that confer equal rights in the sense, vital to our way of life, of bestowing them upon all.’ New York v. Galamison, 342 F. 2d 255, 269, 271. See also Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 585-586; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 39-40; City of Greenwood v. Peacock, [384 U. S. 808,] 825.” Id., at 789-790, 792 (footnotes omitted).
In accord with Georgia v. Rachel, the Courts of Appeals have consistently held that the Social Security Act is not a statute providing for “equal rights.” See Andrews v. Maher, 525 F. 2d 113 (CA2 1975); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F. 2d 1090, 1101 (CA2 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Aguayo v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1146 (1974). We endorse those holdings, and find that a similar conclusion is warranted with respect to § 1343 (4) as well. See McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F. 2d 246, 249 (CA2 1969).
We therefore hold that the District Court did not have jurisdiction in either of these cases. Accordingly, the judgment in No. 77-5324 is affirmed, and the judgment in No. 77-719 is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
“(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
“(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4).
Jurisdiction under § 1343 (4), it should be noted, is not limited to actions against state officials or individuals acting under color of state law.
§ 206, 81 Stat. 893; see 42 U. S. C. § 606 (e) (1). The program is fully described in Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725.
“[Petitioner] resides with her two children in Jersey City, New Jersey. Each month, she receives $235.00 under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., as well as $157.00 under the Social Security Administration’s disability program for her one retarded son. On February 2, 1976, Gonzalez received and cashed both checks at a neighborhood food market. Upon leaving the store, she was accosted by a robber who stole the cash. The following day she explained her situation to the Hudson County Welfare Board, requesting $163.00 in emergency assistance funds to cover her rent and utility bills.” 560 F. 2d 160, 163 (CA3 1977).
“When because of an emergent situation over which they have had no control or opportunity to plan in advance, the eligible unit is in a state of homelessness; and the County Welfare Board determines that the providing of shelter and/or food and/or emergency clothing, and/or minimum essential house furnishings are necessary for health and safety, such needs may be recognized in accordance with the regulations and limitations in the following sections.” N. J. Admin. Code § 10:82-5.12 (1976).
Section 406 (e)(1), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 606 (e)(1), provides:
“The term 'emergency assistance to needy families with children' means any of the following, furnished for a period not in excess of 30 days in any 12-month period, in the ease of a needy child under the age of 21 who is (or, within such period as may be specified by the Secretary, has been) living with any of the relatives specified in subsection (a) (1) of this section in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, but only where such child is without available resources, the payments, care, or services involved are necessary to avoid destitution of such child or to provide living arrangements in a home for such child, and such destitution or need for living arrangements did not arise because such child or relative refused without good cause to accept employment or training for employment—
“(A) money payments, payments in kind, or such other payments as the State agency may specify with respect to, or medical care or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law on behalf of, such child or any other member of the household in which he is living, and “(B) such services as may be specified by the Secretary;
“but only with respect to a State whose State plan approved under section 602 of this title includes provision for such assistance.”
418 F. Supp. 566, 569 (1976).
Section 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
Article VI, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution provides:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
560 F. 2d, at 169.
Section 1331 (a) provides:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.”
See, e. g., King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309; Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282.
45 CFR, §§ 233.20 (a) (3) (ii) (C), 233.90 (a) (1974).
Houston Welfare Rights Org. v. Vowell, 391 F. Supp. 223 (1975).
Houston Welfare Rights Org. v. Vowell, 555 F. 2d 1219 (1977).
It will be noted that the Court of Appeals did not hold that the Social Security Act was itself an Act of Congress of the kind described in the jurisdictional statute.
The first section of “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes” reads as follows:
“That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law* statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same -rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled ‘An Act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication’; and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.” 17 Stat. 13.
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Rev. Stat. § 1979.
Subparagraph “Twelfth” of § 563 authorized district court jurisdiction “[o]f all suits at law or in equity authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States to persons within the jurisdiction thereof.”
Subparagraph “Sixteenth” of § 629 granted the circuit courts original jurisdiction “[o]f all suits authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”
36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
See § 24 (14), 36 Stat. 1092.
The sections have, of course, been renumbered.
H. R. 6127, § 121, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
Ibid. In addition to conferring federal jurisdiction, the bill also provided that such suits should be entertained without regard to exhaustion by the aggrieved party of administrative or other judicial remedies.
See H. R. Rep. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1957) (“Section 122 amends section 1343 of title 28, United States Code. These amendments are merely technical amendments to the Judicial Code so as to conform it with amendments made to existing law by the preceding section of the bill”).
The Act of 1871, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was directed at the organized terrorism in the Reconstruction South led by the Klan, and the unwillingness or inability of state officials to control the widespread violence. Section 1 of the Act generated the least concern; it merely added civil remedies to the criminal penalties imposed by the 1866 Civil Rights Act. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id., at App. 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). The focus of the heated debate was on the succeeding sections of the Act, which included provisions imposing criminal and civil penalties for conspiracies to deprive individuals of constitutional rights, and authorizing the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and use armed forces to suppress “insurrection.” §§2-5, 17 Stat. 13; see Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 220 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Thurman). See generally Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1153— 1156 (1977).
See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 577 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); Developments, supra n. 25, at 1155.
See S. Rep. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 15 (1910); H. R. Doc. No. 783, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 19 (1910).
This caution is also mandated by the settled rule that the party claiming that a court has power to grant relief in his behalf has the burden of persuasion on the jurisdictional issue, McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 189, especially when he is proceeding in a court of limited jurisdiction. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8, 11.
“The argument that the phrase in the statute 'secured by the Constitution’ refers to rights 'created/ rather than ‘protected’ by it, is not persuasive. The preamble of the Constitution, proclaiming the establishment of the Constitution in order to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty,’ uses the word ‘secure’ in the sense of ‘protect’ or ‘make certain.’ That the phrase was used in this sense in the statute now under consideration was recognized in Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 317, 322, where it was held as a matter of pleading that the particular cause of action set up in the plaintiff’s pleading was in contract and was not to redress deprivation of the ‘right secured to him by that clause of the Constitution’ [the contract clause], to which he had ‘chosen not to resort.’ See, as to other rights protected by the Constitution and hence secured by it, brought within the provisions of R. S. § 5508, Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263; In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U. S. 532; United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383.” Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 526-527 (opinion of Stone, J.).
The three-judge court statute, including the language at issue in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, was originally enacted in 1910, 36 Stat. 557, at a time when the Judicial Code of 1911 was under active consideration.
When Swift & Co. was decided, § 2281 provided:
“An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.” (Emphasis added.)
See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 540, 543; Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 583.
The Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27, the forerunner to the Fourteenth Amendment, in its first section declared all persons born in the United States to be citizens and provided that all citizens should have the same rights to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to purchase, lease, sell, or hold property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws as is enjoyed by white citizens. The Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, which followed the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, was directed at enforcing the declared right of every citizen to vote in all elections without regard to race.
Indeed, the view that § 1 of the 1871 Act was “merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 1866] which have since become a part of the Constitution” may well explain why it was subject to the least debate of any section of that Act. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). See also id., at 429 (remarks of Rep. McHenry). Section 1 of the 1871 Act was modeled after § 2 of the 1866 Act, which provided criminal sanctions for violations of the rights declared by that Act.
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871). See also 560 F. 2d, at 169.
Where the underlying right is based on the Constitution itself, rather than an Act of Congress, § 1343 (3) obviously provides jurisdiction.
See H. R. Rep. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1957):
“Section 1985 of title 42, United States Code, often referred to as the Ku Klux Act, provides a civil remedy in damages to a person damaged as a result of conspiracies to deprive one of certain civil rights. The law presently is comprised of three subsections; the first establishes liability for damages against any person who conspires to interfere with an officer of the United States in the discharge of his duties and as a result thereof injures or deprives another of rights or privileges of a citizen of the United States; the second subsection establishes liability for damages against any person who conspires to intimidate or injure parties, witnesses, or jurors involved in any court matter or who conspires to obstruct the due process of justice in any State court made with the intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws as the result of the conspiracies for injury or deprivation of another’s rights or privileges as a citizen of the United States; the third subsection establishes liability for damages against any person who conspires to deprive another of equal protections of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or of the right to vote in elections affecting Federal offices if the result is to injure or deprive another of rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States.
“The effect of the provisions of the proposed bill on existing law as contained in title 42, United States Code, section 1985 is not to expand the rights presently protected but merely to provide the Attorney General with the right to bring a civil action or other proper proceeding for relief to prevent acts or practices which would give rise to a cause of action under the three existing subsections.”
See 103 Cong. Rec. 12559 (1957) (remarks of Sen. Case):
“My intent in proposing the idea of leaving in the bill section 122, renumbered as section 121, was to strengthen the so-called right to vote. The section would amend existing law so as to clarify the jurisdiction of the district courts in the entertainment of suits to> recover damages, or to secure equitable or other relief under any act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. . . .
“[T]he addition of a subparagraph 4 in section 1343 is not limited by the clause ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or order of any State or Territory,’ to which the preceding paragraph is subject.
“So in that sense the new subparagraph 4, which would be left in Part III, is complementary to, and is perhaps somewhat broader than existing law. So it does not limit the suit to recover damages to a case in which the injury occurs under color of law.”
Cf. Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F. 2d 569, 580 n. 39 (CA5 1969) (rights secured by the Social Security Act are “rights of an essentially personal nature”).
As to § 1343 (4), see Jones v. Alfred, H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 412 n. 1 (Civil Rights Act of 1866); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 554 (Voting Rights Act of 1965).
The removal statute was enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment; §§ 1343 (3) and (4), on the other hand, are based upon the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment which, unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, is not limited to racially based claims of inequality. As a result, while an Act of Congress must in fact deal with equal rights or civil rights to support jurisdiction under § 1343, it need not be stated only in terms of racial equality. Cf. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S., at 792. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
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116
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BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. NEAL
No. 81-1494.
Argued January 19, 1983
Decided March 7, 1983
Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., concurred in the judgment.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Margaret E. Clark.
Lenny L. Croce argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Neil G. McBride and Dean Hitt Rivkin
David M. Madway filed a brief for the National Housing Law Project as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Jan Perkins filed a brief for Oregon Legal Services Corp. as amicus curiae.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized by Title V of the Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 432, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1471 et seq. (1976 ed., and Supp. V), to extend financial and technical assistance through the Farmers Home Administation (FmHA) to low-income rural residents who seek to obtain housing. Respondent Onilea Neal, the recipient of an FmHA loan for the construction of a prefabricated house, brought this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. She alleged that defects discovered after she set up residence were partly attributable to the failure of FmHA employees properly to inspect and supervise construction of her house. This case presents the question whether respondent’s action is barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h), which precludes recovery under the Tort Claims Act for “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation. ”
I
A
The facts described in respondent’s complaint may be summarized as follows. Unable to obtain credit from other sources, Neal applied for a Rural Housing Loan from FmHA pursuant to § 502(a) of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U. S. C. § 1472(a). FmHA approved her application in June 1977. During the summer of that year, Neal received advice from S. Lain Parkison, the FmHA Supervisor for Roane County, Tenn.
On August 8, 1977, Neal contracted with Home Marketing Associates, Inc. (Home Marketing), for the construction of a prefabricated house. The contract required that Home Marketing’s work conform to plans approved by FmHA. It also granted FmHA the right to inspect and test all materials and workmanship and reject any that were defective. At the same time, Neal entered into a deed of trust with FmHA and signed a promissory note providing for repayment of the principal sum of $21,170, plus interest of 8% per annum on the unpaid principal.
Home Marketing commenced work on Neal’s house in August 1977 and finished the following month. An FmHA official, Mary Wells, inspected the site on three occasions: soon after construction began, shortly before it was concluded, and after the house was completed. Her inspection reports contained no adverse comments on the construction work. After her third inspection, Wells issued a final report, signed by Neal, which indicated that the construction accorded with the drawings and specifications approved by FmHA. Home Marketing issued a one-year builder’s warranty covering workmanship, materials, and equipment.
Neal moved into the house in 1977. During the winter, she discovered that the heat pump in the house was not working properly. She notified FmHA and Home Marketing. An inspection by Parkison, the County FmHA Supervisor, revealed that the heat pump unit was either defective or undersized. On March 22, 1978, FmHA’s State Director and other FmHA officials conducted a complete inspection and identified 13 additional defects in the construction of the house. These included deviations from plans approved by FmHA and from applicable Minimum Property Standards. The inadequacies in materials and workmanship included defects in caulking, bridging, sealing, and plumbing, and extended to all areas of the house, such as the porch, the rear door, the floor, the roof, the exterior paint, and the interior wall finish. Home Marketing refused to comply with FmHA’s request to cure these defects in accordance with the builder’s warranty.
In November 1978 respondent asked FmHA to pay for the correction of the heating system and other structural defects. It declined to do so.
B
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed Neal’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Neal v. Bergland, 489 F. Supp. 512 (1980). It found that no contractual duty to supervise the construction of respondent’s home was created either by the Federal Housing Act of 1949 and the regulations promulgated thereunder or by the various agreements between respondent and FmHA. The court concluded that regulations requiring FmHA officials to ensure that the builder adhere to the terms of its construction contract were intended solely to protect the Government’s security interest, and were not intended to make FmHA warrant the quality of construction for the benefit of those receiving rural assistance loans. Id., at 514-515. The District Court also concluded that respondent failed to state a claim against FmHA under applicable tort law. Id., at 515.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Neal v. Bergland, 646 F. 2d 1178 (CA6 1981). It agreed with the District Court that FmHA had no contractual obligation to provide Neal with technical assistance or to inspect and supervise construction of her house. Id., at 1181. However, the Court of Appeals found that respondent’s complaint stated a claim for negligence under the principle “that one who undertakes to act, even though gratuitously, is required to act carefully and with the exercise of due care and will be liable for injuries proximately caused by failure to use such care.” Id., at 1181-1182, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965). It noted that, subject to express exceptions, the Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §2674, authorizes suit against the Government for the negligence of a federal agency in performing a voluntary undertaking. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals then considered the question now before us: whether respondent’s claim “aris[es] out of. . . misrepresentation,” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h), and is therefore ex-eluded from coverage by the Tort Claims Act. Distinguishing this case from others including United States v. Neustadt, 366 U. S. 696 (1961), the court concluded that respondent’s negligence claim did not fall within this exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. The Secretary of Agriculture and other Government officials petitioned for certiorari and suggested summary reversal on the ground that the decision below cannot be reconciled with this Court’s decision in Neustadt. We granted the writ, 456 U. S. 988 (1982), and we now affirm.
II
The question before us is a narrow one. Petitioners argue only that respondent’s claim is a claim of “misrepresentation” within the meaning of § 2680(h). They do not seek review of the threshold determination that respondent’s complaint states a claim for negligence under the Good Samaritan doctrine that is otherwise actionable under 28 U. S. C. §2674. Thus, we need not decide precisely what Neal must prove in order to prevail on her negligence claim, nor even whether such a claim lies. Nor are we called on to consider whether recovery is barred by any other provision of the Tort Claims Act, including the exception for any action “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function.” §2680(a). Finally, we are not asked to determine whether the administrative remedy created by the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U. S. C. § 1479(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V), provides the exclusive remedy against the Government for damages attributable to the negligence of FmHA officials.
The scope of the “misrepresentation” exception to the Tort Claims Act was the focus of this Court’s decision in United States v. Neustadt, supra. Neustadt purchased a house in reliance on an appraisal undertaken by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) for mortgage insurance purposes. After he took up residence, cracks appeared in the ceilings and walls of his house. The cracks were caused by structural defects that had not been noticed by the FHA appraiser during the course of his inspection. Neustadt sued the Government under the Tort Claims Act to recover the difference between the fair market value of the property and the purchase price. He alleged that the FHA had negligently inspected and appraised the property, and that he had justifiably relied on the appraisal in paying a higher price for the house than he would otherwise have paid.
This Court held that the claim in Neustadt arose out of “misrepresentation” under § 2680(h). We determined initially that § 2680(h) applies to claims arising out of negligent, as well as intentional, misrepresentation. 366 U. S., at 703-706. This Court found that Neustadt’s claim that the Government had breached its “duty to use due care in obtaining and communicating information upon which [the plaintiff] may reasonably be expected to rely in the conduct of his economic affairs,” merely restated the traditional legal definition of “negligent misrepresentation” as would have been understood by Congress when the Tort Claims Act was enacted. Id., at 706-707. Finally, we examined the National Housing Act of 1934, as amended, under which the FHA had conducted its appraisal, and found nothing to indicate “that Congress intended, in a case such as this, to limit or suspend the application of the ‘misrepresentation’ exception of the Tort Claims Act.” Id., at 708-710.
We cannot agree with petitioners that this case is controlled by Neustadt. As we recognized in that decision, the essence of an action for misrepresentation, whether negligent or intentional, is the communication of misinformation on which the recipient relies. The gravamen of the action against the Government in Neustadt was that the plaintiff was misled by a “Statement of FHA Appraisal” prepared by the Government. Neustadt alleged no injury that he would have suffered independently of his reliance on the erroneous appraisal. Because the alleged conduct that was the basis of his negligence claim was in essence a negligent misrepresentation, Neustadt’s action was barred under the “misrepresentation” exception.
Section 2680(h) thus relieves the Government of tort liability for pecuniary injuries which are wholly attributable to reliance on the Government’s negligent misstatements. As a result, the statutory exception undoubtedly preserves sovereign immunity with respect to a broad range of Government actions. But it does not bar negligence actions which focus not on the Government’s failure to use due care in communicating information, but rather on the Government’s breach of a different duty.
In this case, unlike Neustadt, the Government’s misstatements are not essential to plaintiff’s negligence claim. The Court of Appeals found that to prevail under the Good Samaritan doctrine, Neal must show that FmHA officials voluntarily undertook to supervise construction of her house; that the officials failed to use due care in carrying out their supervisory activity; and that she suffered some pecuniary injury proximately caused by FmHA’s failure to use due care. FmHA’s duty to use due care to ensure that the builder adhere to previously approved plans and cure all defects before completing construction is distinct from any duty to use due care in communicating information to respondent. And it certainly does not “appea[r] beyond doubt” that the only damages alleged in the complaint to be caused by FmHA’s conduct were those attributable to Neal’s reliance on FmHA inspection reports. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Neal’s factual allegations would be consistent with proof at trial that Home Marketing would never have turned the house over to Neal in its defective condition if FmHA officials had pointed out defects to the builder while construction was still underway, rejected defective materials and workmanship, or withheld final payment until the builder corrected all defects.
Of course, in the absence of the “misrepresentation” exception to the Tort Claims Act, respondent could also have brought a claim for negligent misrepresentation to recover for any injury caused by her misplaced reliance on advice provided by FmHA officials and on the FmHA inspection reports. Common to both the misrepresentation and the negligence claim would be certain factual and legal questions, such as whether FmHA officials used due care in inspecting Neal’s home while it was under construction. But the partial overlap between these two tort actions does not support the conclusion that if one is excepted under the Tort Claims Act, the other must be as well. Neither the language nor history of the Act suggests that when one aspect of the Government’s conduct is not actionable under the “misrepresentation” exception, a claimant is barred from pursuing a distinct claim arising out of other aspects of the Government’s conduct. “ ‘The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.’” United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383 (1949), quoting Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). Any other interpretation would encourage the Government to shield itself completely from tort liability by adding misrepresentations to whatever otherwise actionable torts it commits.
We therefore hold that respondent’s claim against the Government for negligence by FmHA officials in supervising construction of her house does not “aris[e] out of . . . misrepresentation” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h). The Court of Appeals properly concluded that Neal’s claim is not barred by this provision of the Tort Claims Act because Neal does not seek to recover on the basis of misstatements made by FmHA officials. Although FmHA in this case may have undertaken both to supervise construction of Neal’s house and to provide Neal information regarding the progress of construction, Neal’s action is based solely on the former conduct. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment.
Regulations then in effect allowed the recipient of an FmHA loan under § 502 of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U. S. C. § 1472, to obtain new housing in one of three ways. The method undertaken by respondent, known as the “contract method” of financing new construction, involved the performance of work by a builder in accordance with a signed contract approved by FmHA. See 7 CFR § 1804.4(d) (1977). Although the FmHA “will not become a party to a construction contract nor incur any liability thereunder,” ibid., its officials were significantly involved in all phases of the construction of respondent’s house. For example, the FmHA County Supervisor was authorized to assist the borrower in selecting a contractor based on the bids or proposals and the contractor’s qualifications. § 1804.4(d)(6). He reviewed all plans and specifications, § 1804.4(a), and was required to give prior approval of any changes in the plans, § 1804.4(d), or in the contract. § 1804.4(d)(8). He was responsible for making periodic and final inspections. § 1804.4(d)(6)(i)(/). See also §§ 1808.2, 1803.5, 1804.4(g). He also had a responsibility to see that partial payments made to the contractor were properly applied against his bills for material and labor, § 1804.4(d)(7)(iv), and to determine that work was performed in compliance with all the terms and conditions of the contract before making final payment. § 1804.4(d)(7)(vii). Finally, he assisted the borrower with respect to claims arising under the builder’s warranty. § 1804.4(g)(5).
The court cited, inter alia, Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955) (Coast Guard’s failure to maintain the beacon light in a lighthouse); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 473 F. 2d 714 (CA5 1973) (negligent design and construction of a drainage ditch); and Barron v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 1077 (Haw. 1979) (failure to require a subcontractor to comply with a contract’s safety requirements).
The Court of Appeals found that respondent stated a claim against the United States under the common-law Good Samaritan doctrine which is described in § 823 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). However, the court did not expressly find that Tennessee law recognizes this doctrine, see 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), and would apply it to a private person responsible for similar negligence. See 28 U. S. C. § 2674; Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 319 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, supra. Nor did the court describe in any significant detail what respondent must show in order to prevail on her negligence claim.
Compare, e. g., Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427 (1952) (Federal Employees’ Compensation Act provides exclusive remedy for civilian employees), with United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 160 (1963) (provision allowing compensation of certain prison inmates for work-related injuries was not exclusive remedy for inmate), and United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 111 (1954) (receipt of disability payments under the Veterans Act does not bar recovery under the Tort Claims Act).
Petitioners do argue at length, however, that neither the Housing Act of 1949 nor subsequent amendments were intended to expand liability beyond that established under the Tort Claims. Act. Brief for Petitioners 22-32. Because we find that respondent’s claim under the Good Samaritan doctrine is not barred by the “misrepresentation” exception to the Tort Claims Act, we do not consider whether the Housing Act provides an alternative basis for respondent’s claim.
The Court distinguished negligent misrepresentation from the “many familiar forms of negligent misconduct [which] may be said to involve an element of ‘misrepresentation,’ [only] in the generic sense of that word.” 366 U. S., at 711, n. 26. The “misrepresentation” exception applies only when the action itself falls within the commonly understood definition of a misrepresentation claim, which “ ‘has been identified with the common law action of deceit,’ and has been confined ‘very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character, in the course of business dealings.’” Ibid,., quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts §85, pp. 702-703 (1941 ed.). Thus, the claim in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955), for damages to a vessel which ran aground due to the Coast Guard’s alleged negligence in maintaining a lighthouse, did not “aris[e] out of. . . misrepresentation” within the meaning of § 2680(h).
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(3) (1977).
Although this negligence claim may include an element of reliance on FmHA’s voluntary undertaking to supervise construction in a competent manner, this element of the claim would constitute “misrepresentation” only in the generic sense of the word. See n. 5, supra. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
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] | [
49
] |
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., et al.
No. 07-582.
Argued November 4, 2008
Decided April 28, 2009
Former Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Eric D. Miller, Thomas M. Bondy, Anne Murphy, Matthew B. Berry, Joseph R. Palmore, Jacob M. Lewis, and Nandan M. Joshi.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc., were R. Clark Wadlow, Jennifer Tatel, David S. Petron, and Quin M. Sorenson. Miguel A. Estrada, Andrew S. Tulumello, Matthew D. McGill, Richard Cotton, Susan Weiner, Robert Corn-Revere, Jonathan H. Anschell, Susanna M. Lowy, and Seth P. Waxman filed a brief for respondent NBC Universal, Inc., et al. Andrew Jay Schwartzman and Parul Desai filed a brief for respondent Center for Creative Voices in Media, Inc.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Alliance Defense Fund et al. by Benjamin W. Bull and Glen Lavy; for the American Center for Law and Justice et al. by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, John Tuskey, and Shannon D. Woodruff; for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman, David L. Llewellyn, Jr., and Edwin Meese III; for the Decency Enforcement Center for Television by Thomas B. North; for Morality in Media, Inc., by Robin S. Whitehead; for National Religious Broadcasters by Craig L. Parshall, Joseph C. Chautin III, Elise M. Stubbe, and Mark A Balkin; and for the Parents Television Council by Robert R. Sparks, Jr.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the ABC Television Affiliates Association by Wade H. Hargrove, Mark J. Prak, and David Kushner; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Marjorie Heins, Steven R. Shapiro, and Christopher A. Hansen; for the California Broadcasters Association et al. by Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gregg P. Shall; for the Center for Democracy & Technology et al. by John B. Morris, Jr., and Sophia S. Cope; for Former FCC Commissioners and Officials by Timothy K. Lewis, Carl A Solano, and Nancy Winkelman, and by Henry Getter, Newton N. Minow, and Glen O. Robinson, all pro se; for the National Association of Broadcasters et al. by Paul M. Smith, Marsha J. MacBride, Jane E. Mago, and Jerianne Timmerman; for Public Broadcasters by Robert A. Long, Jr., Jonathan D. Blake, and Jonathan L. Marcus; for Time Warner Inc. by Christopher Landau; and for the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression et al. by Robert M. O’Neil and J. Joshua Wheeler.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Academy of Pediatrics et al. by Angela J. Campbell, James N. Horwood, and Tillman L. Lay; and for Free Press et al. by Marvin Ammori.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-E.
Federal law prohibits the broadcasting of “any . . . indecent . . . language,” 18 U. S. C. § 1464, which includes expletives referring to sexual or excretory activity or organs, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). This case concerns the adequacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s explanation of its decision that this sometimes forbids the broadcasting of indecent expletives even when the offensive words are not repeated.
I. Statutory and Regulatory Background
The Communications Act of 1934,48 Stat. 1064,47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), established a system of limited-term broadcast licenses subject to various “conditions” designed “to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission,” § 301 (2000 ed.). Almost 28 years ago we said that “[a] licensed broadcaster is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.” CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367, 395 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
One of the burdens that licensees shoulder is the indecency ban — the statutory proscription against “utter[ingj any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication,” 18 U. S. C. § 1464 — which Congress has instructed the Commission to enforce between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 954, note following 47 U. S. C. § 303. Congress has given the Commission various means of enforcing the indecency ban, including civil fines, see § 503(b)(1), and license revocations or the denial of license renewals, see §§ 309(k), 312(a)(6).
The Commission first invoked the statutory ban on indecent broadcasts in 1975, declaring a daytime broadcast of George Carlin's “Filthy Words” monologue actionably indecent. In re Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F. C. C. 2d 94. At that time, the Commission announced the definition of indecent speech that it uses to this day, prohibiting “language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.” Id., at 98.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, we upheld the Commission’s order against statutory and constitutional challenge. We rejected the broadcasters’ argument that the statutory proscription applied only to speech appealing to the prurient interest, noting that “the normal definition of ‘indecent’ merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.” Id., at 740. And we held that the First Amendment allowed Carlin’s monologue to be banned in light of the “uniquely pervasive presence” of the medium and the fact that broadcast programming is “uniquely accessible to children.” Id., at 748-749.
In the ensuing years, the Commission took a cautious, but gradually expanding, approach to enforcing the statutory prohibition against indecent broadcasts. Shortly after Pacifica, 438 U. S. 726, the Commission expressed its “intension] strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding,” which “relied in part on the repetitive occurrence of the ‘indecent’ words” contained in Carlin’s monologue. In re Application of WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F. C. C. 2d 1250, 1254, ¶ 10 (1978). When the full Commission next considered its indecency standard, however, it repudiated the view that its enforcement power was limited to “deliberate, repetitive use of the seven words actually contained in the George Carlin monologue.” In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Red. 2698, 2699, ¶ 12 (1987). The Commission determined that such a “highly restricted enforcement standard . . . was unduly narrow as a matter of law and inconsistent with [the Commission’s] enforcement responsibilities under Section 1464.” In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 FCC Red. 930, ¶ 5 (1987). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld this expanded enforcement standard against constitutional and Administrative Procedure Act challenge. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F. 2d 1332 (1988) (R. Ginsburg, J.), superseded in part by Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F. 3d 654 (1995) (en banc).
Although the Commission had expanded its enforcement beyond the “repetitive use of specific words or phrases,” it preserved a distinction between literal and nonliteral (or “expletive”) uses of evocative language. In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Red., at 2699, ¶13. The Commission explained that each literal “description or depiction of sexual or excretory functions must be examined in context to determine whether it is patently offensive,” but that “deliberate and repetitive use ... is a requisite to a finding of indecency” when a complaint focuses solely on the use of nonliteral expletives. Ibid.
Over a decade later, the Commission emphasized that the “full context” in which particular materials appear is “critically important,” but that a few “principal” factors guide the inquiry, such as the “explicitness or graphic nature” of the material, the extent to which the material “dwells on or repeats” the offensive material, and the extent to which the material was presented to “pander,” to “titillate,” or to “shock.” In re Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U. S. C. §1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8002, ¶ 9, 8003, ¶ 10 (2001) (emphasis deleted). “No single factor,” the Commission said, “generally provides the basis for an indecency finding,” but “where sexual or excretory references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of indecency.” Id., at 8003, ¶ 10,8008, ¶ 17.
In 2004, the Commission took one step further by declaring for the first time that a nonliteral (expletive) use of the F- and S-Words could be actionably indecent, even when the word is used only once. The first order to this effect dealt with an NBC broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards, in which the performer Bono commented, “ ‘[T]his is really, really, f***ing brilliant.’ ” In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Red. 4975, 4976, n. 4 (2004) (Golden Globes Order). Although the Commission had received numerous complaints directed at the broadcast, its enforcement bureau had concluded that the material was not indecent because “Bono did not describe, in context, sexual or excretory organs or activities and ... the utterance was fleeting and isolated.” Id., at 4975-4976, ¶ 3. The full Commission reviewed and reversed the staff ruling.
The Commission first declared that Bono’s use of the F-Word fell within its indecency definition, even though the word was used as an intensifier rather than a literal descriptor. “[G]iven the core meaning of the ‘F-Word,’” it said, “any use of that word . . . inherently has a sexual connotation.” Id., at 4978, ¶8. The Commission determined, moreover, that the broadcast was “patently offensive” because the F-Word “is one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language,” because “[i]ts use invariably invokes a coarse sexual image,” and because Bono’s use of the word was entirely “shocking and gratuitous.” Id., at 4979, ¶ 9.
The Commission observed that categorically exempting such language from enforcement actions would “likely lead to more widespread use.” Ibid. Commission action was necessary to “safeguard the well-being of the nation’s children from the most objectionable, most offensive language.” Ibid. The order noted that technological advances have made it far easier to delete (“bleep out”) a “single and gratuitous use of a vulgar expletive,” without adulterating the content of a broadcast. Id., at 4980, ¶ 11.
The order acknowledged that “prior Commission and staff action [has] indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ . . . are not indecent or would not be acted upon.” It explicitly ruled that “any such interpretation is no longer good law.” Ibid., ¶ 12. It “clarified]... that the mere fact that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast medium is not indecent.” Ibid. Because, however, “existing precedent would have permitted this broadcast,” the Commission determined that “NBC and its affiliates necessarily did not have the requisite notice to justify a penalty.” Id., at 4981-4982, ¶ 15.
II. The Present Case
This case concerns utterances in two live broadcasts aired by Fox Television Stations, Inc., and its affiliates prior to the Commission’s Golden Globes Order. The first occurred during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, when the singer Cher exclaimed, “I’ve also had critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every year. Right. So f*** 'em.” Brief for Petitioners 9. The second involved a segment of the 2008 Billboard Music Awards, during the presentation of an award by Nicole Richie and Paris Hilton, principals in a Fox television series called “The Simple Life.” Ms. Hilton began their interchange by reminding Ms. Richie to “watch the bad language,” but Ms. Richie proceeded to ask the audience, “Why do they even call it ‘The Simple Life?’ Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada purse? It’s not so f***ing simple.” Id., at 9-10. Following each of these broadcasts, the Commission received numerous complaints from parents whose children were exposed to the language.
On March 15, 2006, the Commission released “Notices of Apparent Liability” for a number of broadcasts that the Commission deemed actionably indecent, including the two described above. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,2002 and Mar. 8,2005, 21 FCC Red. 2664 (2006). Multiple parties petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for judicial review of the order, asserting a variety of constitutional and statutory challenges. Since the order had declined to impose sanctions, the Commission had not previously given the broadcasters an opportunity to respond to the indecency charges. It therefore requested and obtained from the Court of Appeals a voluntary remand so that the parties could air their objections. 489 F. 3d 444, 453 (2007). The Commission’s order on remand upheld the indecency findings for the broadcasts described above. See In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002, and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 FCC Red. 13299 (2006) (Remand Order).
The order first explained that both broadcasts fell comfortably within the subject-matter scope of the Commission’s indecency test because the 2003 broadcast involved a literal description of excrement and both broadcasts invoked the “F-Word,” which inherently has a sexual connotation. Id., at 13304, ¶ 16,13323, ¶ 58. The order next determined that the broadcasts were patently offensive under community standards for the medium. Both broadcasts, it noted, involved entirely gratuitous uses of “one of the most vulgar, graphic, and explicit words for sexual activity in the English language.” Id., at 13305, ¶ 17, 13324, ¶ 59. It found Ms. Richie’s use of the “F-Word” and her “explicit description of the handling of excrement” to be “vulgar and shocking,” as well as to constitute “pandering,” after Ms. Hilton had playfully warned her to “‘watch the bad language.’” Id., at 13305, ¶ 17. And it found Cher’s statement patently offensive in part because she metaphorically suggested a sexual act as a means of expressing hostility to her critics. Id., at 13324, ¶60. The order relied upon the “‘critically important’ ” context of the utterances, id., at 13304, ¶ 15, noting that they were aired during prime-time awards shows “designed to draw a large nationwide audience that could be expected to include many children interested in seeing their favorite music stars,” id., at 13305, ¶ 18,13324, ¶ 59. Indeed, approximately 2.5 million minors witnessed each of the broadcasts. Id., at 13306, ¶ 18,13326, ¶ 65.
The order asserted that both broadcasts under review would have been actionably indecent under the staff rulings and Commission dicta in effect prior to the Golden Globes Order — the 2003 broadcast because it involved a literal description of excrement, rather than a mere expletive, because it used more than one offensive word, and because it was planned, 21 FCC Red., at 13307, ¶ 22; and the 2002 broadcast because Cher used the F-Word not as a mere intensifier, but as a description of the sexual act to express hostility to her critics, id., at 13324, ¶ 60. The order stated, however, that the pre-Golden Globes regime of immunity for isolated indecent expletives rested only upon staff rulings and Commission dicta, and that the Commission itself had never held “that the isolated use of an expletive . . . was not indecent or could not be indecent,” 21 FCC Red., at 13307, ¶ 21. In any event, the order made clear, the Golden Globes Order eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives could be action-ably indecent, 21 FCC Red., at 13308, ¶ 23, 13325, ¶ 61, and the Commission disavowed the bureau-level decisions and its own dicta that had said otherwise, id., at 13306-13307, ¶¶ 20, 21. Under the new policy, a lack of repetition “weights] against a finding of indecency,” id., at 13325, ¶ 61, but is not a safe harbor.
The order explained that the Commission’s prior “strict dichotomy between ‘expletives’ and ‘descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory functions’ is artificial and does not make sense in light of the fact that an ‘expletive’s’ power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory meaning.” Id., at 13308, ¶ 23. In the Commission’s view, “granting an automatic exemption for ‘isolated or fleeting’ expletives unfairly forces viewers (including children)” to take “ ‘the first blow’ ” and would allow broadcasters “to air expletives at all hours of a day so long as they did so one at a time.” Id., at 13309, ¶ 25. Although the Commission determined that Fox encouraged the offensive language by using suggestive scripting in the 2003 broadcast, and unreasonably failed to take adequate precautions in both broadcasts, id., at 13311-13314, ¶¶ 31-37, the order again declined to impose any forfeiture or other sanction for either of the broadcasts, id., at 13321, ¶ 53, 13326, ¶66.
Fox returned to the Second Circuit for review of the Remand Order, and various intervenors including CBS, NBC, and ABC joined the action. The Court of Appeals reversed the agency’s orders, finding the Commission’s reasoning inadequate under the Administrative Procedure Act. 489 F. 3d 444. The majority was “skeptical that the Commission [could] provide a reasoned explanation for its ‘fleeting expletive’ regime that would pass constitutional muster,” but it declined to reach the constitutional question. Id., at 462. Judge Leval dissented, id., at 467. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1255 (2008).
III. Analysis
A. Governing Principles
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq., which sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural correctness, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 545-549 (1978), permits (insofar as relevant here) the setting aside of agency action that is “arbitrary” or “capricious,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). Under what we have called this “narrow” standard of review, we insist that an agency “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). We have made clear, however, that “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,” ibid., and should “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned,” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 286 (1974).
In overturning the Commission’s judgment, the Court of Appeals here relied in part on Circuit precedent requiring a more substantial explanation for agency action that changes prior policy. The Second Circuit has interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act and our opinion in State Farm as requiring agencies to make clear “ ‘why the original reasons for adopting the [displaced] rule or policy are no longer dis-positive’ ” as well as “ ‘why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule.’” 489 F. 3d, at 456-457 (quoting New York Council, Assn. of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA, 757 F. 2d 502, 508 (CA2 1985); emphasis deleted). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has similarly indicated that a court’s standard of review is “heightened somewhat” when an agency reverses course. NAACP v. FCC, 682 F. 2d 993, 998 (1982).
We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no such heightened standard. And our opinion in State Farm neither held nor implied that every agency action representing a policy change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the first instance. That case, which involved the rescission of a prior regulation, said only that such action requires “a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” 463 U. S., at 42 (emphasis added). Treating failures to act and rescissions of prior action differently for purposes of the standard of review makes good sense, and has basis in the text of the statute, which likewise treats the two separately. It instructs a reviewing court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(1), and to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be [among other things]... arbitrary [or] capricious,” § 706(2)(A). The statute makes no distinction, however, between initial agency action and subsequent agency action undoing or revising that action.
To be sure, the requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 696 (1974). And of course the agency must show that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must — when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996). It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters. In such cases it is not that farther justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.
In this appeal from the Second Circuit’s setting aside of Commission action for failure to comply with a procedural requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, the broadcasters’ arguments have repeatedly referred to the First Amendment. If they mean to invite us to apply a more stringent arbitrary-and-eapricious review to agency actions that implicate constitutional liberties, we reject the invitation. The so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). We know of no precedent for applying it to limit the scope of authorized executive action. In the same section authorizing courts to set aside “arbitrary [or] capricious” agency action, the Administrative Procedure Act separately provides for setting aside agency action that is “unlawful,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), which of course includes unconstitutional action. We think that is the only context in which constitutionality bears upon judicial review of authorized agency action. If the Commission’s action here was not arbitrary or capricious in the ordinary sense, it satisfies the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard; its lawfulness under the Constitution is a separate question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge.
B. Application to This Case
Judged under the above described standards, the Commission’s new enforcement policy and its order finding the broadcasts actionably indecent were neither arbitrary nor capricious. First, the Commission forthrightly acknowledged that its recent actions have broken new ground, taking account of inconsistent “prior Commission and staff action” and explicitly disavowing them as “no longer good law.” Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Red., at 4980, ¶ 12. To be sure, the (superfluous) explanation in its Remand Order of why the Cher broadcast would even have violated its earlier policy may not be entirely convincing. But that unnecessary detour is irrelevant. There is no doubt that the Commission knew it was making a change. That is why it declined to assess penalties; and it relied on the Golden Globes Order as removing any lingering doubt. Remand Order, 21 FCC Red., at 13308, ¶23, 13325, ¶ 61.
Moreover, the agency’s reasons for expanding the scope of its enforcement activity were entirely rational. It was certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense to distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words, requiring repetitive use to render only the latter indecent. As the Commission said with regard to expletive use of the F-Word, “the word’s power to insult and offend derives from its sexual meaning.” Id., at 13323, ¶ 58. And the Commission’s decision to look at the patent offensiveness of even isolated uses of sexual and excretory words fits with the context-based approach we sanctioned in Pacifica, 438 U. S., at 750. Even isolated utterances can be made in “pander[ing,] . . . vulgar and shocking” manners, Remand Order, 21 FCC Red., at 13305, ¶ 17, and can constitute harmful '“first blow[s]’” to children, id., at 13309, ¶25. It is surely rational (if not inescapable) to believe that a safe harbor for single words would “likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive language,” Golden Globes Order, supra, at 4979, ¶ 9.
When confronting other requests for per se rules governing its enforcement of the indecency prohibition, the Commission has declined to create safe harbors for particular types of broadcasts. See In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Red., at 2699, ¶ 12 (repudiating the view that the Commission’s enforcement power was limited to “deliberate, repetitive use of the seven words actually contained in the George Carlin monologue”); In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 FCC Red., at 932, ¶ 17 (“rejecting] an approach that would hold that if a work has merit, it is per se not indecent”). The Commission could rationally decide it needed to step away from its old regime where nonrepetitive use of an expletive was per se nonactionable because that was “at odds with the Commission’s overall enforcement policy.” Remand Order, supra, at 13308, ¶ 23.
The fact that technological advances have made it easier for broadcasters to bleep out offending words further supports the Commission’s stepped-up enforcement policy. Golden Globes Order, supra, at 4980, ¶ 11. And the agency’s decision not to impose any forfeiture or other sanction precludes any argument that it is arbitrarily punishing parties without notice of the potential consequences of their action.
C. The Court of Appeals’ Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found the Commission’s action arbitrary and capricious on three grounds. First, the court criticized the Commission for failing to explain why it had not previously banned fleeting expletives as “harmful 'first blow[s].’ ” 489 F. 3d, at 458. In the majority’s view, without “evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful [and]... serious enough to warrant government regulation,” the agency could not regulate more broadly. Id., at 461. As explained above, the fact that an agency had a prior stance does not alone prevent it from changing its view or create a higher hurdle for doing so. And it is not the Commission, but Congress that has proscribed “any . . . indecent . .. language.” 18 U. S. C. § 1464.
There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of them. One cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some children are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all other indecency), and others are shielded from all indecency. It is one thing to set aside agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act because of failure to adduce empirical data that can readily be obtained. See, e. g., State Farm, 463 U. S., at 46-56 (addressing the costs and benefits of mandatory passive restraints for automobiles). It is something else to insist upon obtaining the unobtainable. Here it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they observe — or at least the behavior that is presented to them as normal and appropriate. Programming replete with one-word indecent expletives will tend to produce children who use (at least) one-word indecent expletives. Congress has made the determination that indecent material is harmful to children, and has left enforcement of the ban to the Commission. If enforcement had to be supported by empirical data, the ban would effectively be a nullity.
The Commission had adduced no quantifiable measure of the harm caused by the language in Pacifica, and we nonetheless held that the “government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ . . . justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.” 438 U. S., at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 640, 639 (1968)). If the Constitution itself demands of agencies no more scientifically certain criteria to comply with the First Amendment, neither does the Administrative Procedure Act to comply with the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking.
The court’s second objection is that fidelity to the agency’s “first blow” theory of harm would require a categorical ban on all broadcasts of expletives; the Commission’s failure to go to this extreme thus undermined the coherence of its rationale. 489 F. 3d, at 458-459. This objection, however, is not responsive to the Commission’s actual policy under review — the decision to include patently offensive fleeting expletives within the definition of indecency. The Commission’s prior enforcement practice, unchallenged here, already drew distinctions between the offensiveness of particular words based upon the context in which they appeared. Any complaint about the Commission’s failure to ban only some fleeting expletives is better directed at the agency’s context-based system generally rather than its inclusion of isolated expletives.
More fundamentally, however, the agency’s decision to consider the patent offensiveness of isolated expletives on a case-by-case basis is not arbitrary or capricious. “Even a prime-time recitation of Geoffrey Chaucer’s Miller’s Tale,” we have explained, “would not be likely to command the attention of many children who are both old enough to understand and young enough to be adversely affected.” Pacifica, supra, at 750, n. 29. The same rationale could support the Commission’s finding that a broadcast of the film Saving Private Ryan was not indecent — a finding to which the broadcasters point as supposed evidence of the Commission’s inconsistency. The frightening suspense and the graphic violence in the movie could well dissuade the most vulnerable from watching and would put parents on notice of potentially objectionable material. See In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their Broadcast on Nov. 11, 2001 of ABC Television Network's Presentation of Film “Saving Private Ryan,” 20 FCC Red. 4507, 4513, ¶ 15 (2005) (noting that the broadcast was not “intended as family entertainment”). The agency’s decision to retain some discretion does not render arbitrary or capricious its regulation of the deliberate and shocking uses of offensive language at the award shows under review — shows that were expected to (and did) draw the attention of millions of children.
Finally, the Court of Appeals found unconvincing the agency’s prediction (without any evidence) that a per se exemption for fleeting expletives would lead to increased use of expletives one at a time. 489 F. 3d, at 460. But even in the absence of evidence, the agency’s predictive judgment (which merits deference) makes entire sense. To predict that complete immunity for fleeting expletives, ardently desired by broadcasters, will lead to a substantial increase in fleeting expletives seems to us an exercise in logic rather than clairvoyance. The Court of Appeals was perhaps correct that the Commission’s prior policy had not yet caused broadcasters to “barrag[e] the airwaves with expletives,” ibid. That may have been because its prior permissive policy had been confirmed (save in dicta) only at the staff level. In any event, as the Golden Globes order demonstrated, it did produce more expletives than the Commission (which has the first call in this matter) deemed in conformity with the statute.
D. Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents press some arguments that the court did not adopt. They claim that the Commission failed to acknowledge its change in enforcement policy. That contention is not tenable in light of the Golden Globes Order’s specific declaration that its prior rulings were no longer good law, 19 FCC Red., at 4980, ¶ 12, and the Remand Order’s disavowal of those staff rulings and Commission dicta as “seriously flawed,” 21 FCC Red., at 13308, ¶ 23. The broadcasters also try to recharacterize the nature of the Commission’s shift, contending that the old policy was not actually a per se rule against liability for isolated expletives and that the new policy is a presumption of indecency for certain words. This description of the prior agency policy conflicts with the broadcasters’ own prior position in this case. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition for Respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al. 4 (“For almost 30 years following Pacifica, the FCC did not consider fleeting, isolated or inadvertent expletives to be indecent”). And we find no basis for the contention that the Commission has now adopted a presumption of indecency; its repeated reliance on context refutes this claim.
The broadcasters also make much of the fact that the Commission has gone beyond the scope of authority approved in Pacifica, which it once regarded as the farthest extent of its power. But we have never held that Pacifica represented the outer limits of permissible regulation, so that fleeting expletives may not be forbidden. To the contrary, we explicitly left for another day whether “an occasional expletive” in “a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy” could be prohibited. 438 U. S., at 748-750. By using the narrowness of Pacifica!s holding to require empirical evidence of harm before the Commission regulates more broadly, the broadcasters attempt to turn the sword of Pacifica, which allowed some regulation of broadcast indecency, into an administrative-law shield preventing any regulation beyond what Pacifica sanctioned. Nothing prohibits federal agencies from moving in an incremental manner. Cf. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 1002 (2005).
Finally, the broadcasters claim that the Commission’s repeated appeal to “context” is simply a smokescreen for a standardless regime of unbridled discretion. But we have previously approved Commission regulation based “on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important,” Pacifica, supra, at 750, and we find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act for mandating anything different.
E. The Dissents’ Arguments
Justice Breyer purports to “begin with applicable law,” post, at 547, but in fact begins by stacking the deck. He claims that the FCC’s status as an “independent” agency sheltered from political oversight requires courts to be “all the more” vigilant in ensuring “that major policy decisions be based upon articulable reasons.” Ibid. Not so. The independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that their freedom from Presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction. See, e. g., In re Sealed Case, 838 F. 2d 476, 507-508 (CADC) (Silbermian, J.), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988); Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2271, n. 93 (2001); Calabresi & Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L. J. 541, 583 (1994); Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1328, 1341 (1994). Indeed, the precise policy change at issue here was spurred by significant political pressure from Congress.
Justice Stevens apparently recognizes this political control by Congress, and indeed sees it as the manifestation of a principal-agency relationship. In his judgment, the FCC is “better viewed as an agent of Congress” than as part of the Executive. Post, at 540 (dissenting opinion). He nonetheless argues that this is a good reason for requiring the FCC to explain “why its prior policy is no longer sound before allowing it to change course.” Post, at 541. Leaving aside the unconstitutionally of a scheme giving the power to enforce laws to agents of Congress, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 726 (1986), it seems to us that Justice Stevens’ conclusion does not follow from his premise. If the FCC is indeed an agent of Congress, it would seem an adequate explanation of its change of position that Congress made clear its wishes for stricter enforcement, see n. 4, supra. The Administrative Procedure Act, after all, does not apply to Congress and its agencies.
Regardless, it is assuredly not “applicable law” that rule-making by independent regulatory agencies is subject to heightened scrutiny. The Administrative Procedure Act, which provides judicial review, makes no distinction between independent and other agencies, neither in its definition of agency, 5 U. S. C. § 701(b)(1), nor in the standards for reviewing agency action, § 706. Nor does any case of ours express or reflect the “heightened scrutiny” Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens would impose. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any closer scrutiny than that we have given to the Environmental Protection Agency, which is not an independent agency. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 533-535 (2007); Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 481-486 (2001). There is no reason to magnify the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the headless Fourth Branch, see Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), by letting Article III judges — like jackals stealing the lion’s kill — expropriate some of the power that Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive.
Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens rely upon two supposed omissions in the FCC’s analysis that they believe preclude a finding that the agency did not act arbitrarily. Neither of these omissions could undermine the coherence of the rationale the agency gave, but the dissenters’ evaluation of each is flawed in its own right.
First, both claim that the Commission failed adequately to explain its consideration of the constitutional issues inherent in its regulation, post, at 553-556 (opinion of Breyer, J.); post, at 542-546 (opinion of Stevens, J.). We are unaware that we have ever before reversed an executive agency, not for violating our cases, but for failure to discuss them adequately. But leave that aside. According to Justice Breyer, the agency said “next to nothing about the relation between the change it made in its prior ‘fleeting expletive’ policy and the First-Amendment-related need to avoid ‘censorship,’ ” post, at 553. The Remand Order does, however, devote four full pages of small-type, single-spaced text (over 1,300 words not counting the footnotes) to explaining why the Commission believes that its indecency-enforcement regime (which includes its change in policy) is consistent with the First Amendment — and therefore not censorship as the term is understood. More specifically, Justice Breyer faults the FCC for “not explaining] why the agency changed its mind about the line that Pacifica draws or its policy’s relation to that line,” post, at 556. But in fact (and as the Commission explained) this Court’s holding in Pacifica, 438 U. S. 726, drew no constitutional line; to the contrary, it expressly declined to express any view on the constitutionality of prohibiting isolated indecency. Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens evidently believe that when an agency has obtained this Court’s determination that a less restrictive rule is constitutional, its successors acquire some special burden to explain why a more restrictive rule is not '^constitutional. We know of no such principle.
Second, Justice Breyer looks over the vast field of particular factual scenarios unaddressed by the FCC’s 35-page Remand Order and finds one that is fatal: the plight of the small local broadcaster who cannot afford the new technology that enables the screening of live broadcasts for indecent utterances. Cf. post, at 556-561. The Commission has failed to address the fate of this unfortunate, who will, he believes, be subject to sanction.
We doubt, to begin with, that small-town broadcasters run a heightened risk of liability for indecent utterances. In programming that they originate, their down-home local guests probably employ vulgarity less than big-city folks; and small-town stations generally cannot afford or cannot attract foul-mouthed glitteratae from Hollywood. Their main exposure with regard to self-originated programming is live coverage of news and public affairs. But the Remand Order went out of its way to note that the ease at hand did not involve “breaking news coverage,” and that “it may be inequitable to hold a licensee responsible for airing offensive speech during live coverage of a public event,” 21 FCC Red., at 13311, ¶ 33. As for the programming that small stations receive on a network “feed”: This will be cleansed by the expensive technology small stations (by Justice Breyer’s hypothesis) cannot afford.
But never mind the detail of whether small broadcasters are uniquely subject to a great risk of punishment for fleeting expletives. The fundamental fallacy of Justice Breyer’s small-broadcaster gloomy scenario is its demonstrably false assumption that the Remand Order makes no provision for the avoidance of unfairness — that the single-utterance prohibition will be invoked uniformly, in all situations. The Remand Order made very clear that this is not the case. It said that in determining “what, if any, remedy is appropriate” the Commission would consider the facts of each individual case, such as the “possibility of human error in using delay equipment,” id., at 13313, ¶ 35. Thus, the fact that the agency believed that Fox (a large broadcaster that used suggestive scripting and a deficient delay system to air a prime-time awards show aimed at millions of children) “fail[ed] to exercise ‘reasonable judgment, responsibility and sensitivity,”’ id., at 13311, ¶33, and n. 91 (quoting Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Red., at 2700, ¶ 18), says little about how the Commission would treat smaller broadcasters who cannot afford screening equipment. Indeed, that they would not be punished for failing to purchase equipment they cannot afford is positively suggested by the Remand Order’s statement that “[hjolding Fox responsible for airing indecent material in this case does not. .. impose undue burdens on broadcasters.” 21 FCC Red., at 13313, ¶ 36.
There was, in sum, no need for the Commission to compose a special treatise on local broadcasters. And Justice Breyer can safely defer his concern for those yeomen of the airwaves until we have before us a case that involves one.
IV. Constitutionality
The Second Circuit did not definitively rule on the constitutionality of the Commission’s orders, but respondents nonetheless ask us to decide their validity under the First Amendment. This Court, however, is one of final review, “not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). It is conceivable that the Commission’s orders may cause some broadcasters to avoid certain language that is beyond the Commission’s reach under the Constitution. Whether that is so, and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional, will be determined soon enough, perhaps in this very case. Meanwhile, any chilled references to excretory and sexual material “surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern,” Pacifica, 438 U. S., at 743 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.). We see no reason to abandon our usual procedures in a rush to judgment without a lower court opinion. We decline to address the constitutional questions at this time.
The Second Circuit believed that children today “likely hear this language far more often from other sources than they did in the 1970s when the Commission first began sanctioning indecent speech,” and that this cuts against more stringent regulation of broadcasts. 489 F. 3d, at 461. Assuming the premise is true (for this point the Second Circuit did not demand empirical evidence) the conclusion does not necessarily follow. The Commission could reasonably conclude that the pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media such as cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs so as to give conscientious parents a relatively safe haven for their children. In the end, the Second Circuit and the broadcasters quibble with the Commission’s policy choices and not with the explanation it has given. We decline to “substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency,” State Farm, 468 U. S., at 43, and we find the Commission’s orders neither arbitrary nor capricious.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The statutory prohibition applicable to commercial radio and television stations extends by its terms from 6 a.m. to 12 midnight. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, however, that because “Congress and the Commission [had] backed away from the consequences of their own reasoning,” by allowing some public broadcasters to air indecent speech after 10 p.m., the court was forced “to hold that the section is unconstitutional insofar as it bars the broadcasting of indecent speech between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight.” Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F. 3d 654, 669 (1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1043 (1996).
Justice Breyer’s contention that State Farm did anything more, post, at 549-552 (dissenting opinion), rests upon his failure to observe the italicized phrase and upon a passage quoted in State Farm from a plurality opinion in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U. S. 800 (1973). That passage referred to “a presumption that [congressional] policies will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.” Id., at 807-808 (opinion of Marshall, J.). But the Atchison plurality made this statement in the context of requiring the agency to provide some explanation for a change, “so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency’s action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the agency’s mandate,” id., at 808. The opinion did not assert the authority of a court to demand explanation sufficient to enable it to weigh (by its own lights) the merits of the agency’s change. Nor did our opinion in State Farm.
Justice Bkeyer claims that “[t]he Court has often applied [the doctrine of constitutional avoidance] where an agency’s regulation relies on a plausible but constitutionally suspect interpretation of a statute.” Post, at 566. The cases he cites, however, set aside an agency regulation because, applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to the ambiguous statute under which the agency acted, the Court found the agency’s interpretation of the statute erroneous. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 174 (2001); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 507 (1979). But Justice Breyer does not urge that we issue such a holding, evidently agreeing that we should limit our review to what the Court of Appeals decided, see Part IV, infra — which included only the adequacy of the Commission’s rulemaking procedure, and not the statutory question. Rather, Justice Breyer seeks a “remand [that] would do no more than ask the agency to reconsider its policy decision in light of” constitutional concerns. Post, at 566. That strange and novel disposition would be entirely unrelated to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and would better be termed the doctrine of judicial arm-twisting or appellate review by the wagged finger.
A Subcommittee of the FCC’s House Oversight Committee held hearings on the FCC’s broadcast indecency enforcement on January 28, 2004. “Can You Say That on TV?”: An Examination of the FCC’s Enforcement with Respect to Broadcast Indecency, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. Members of the Subcommittee specifically “called on the full Commission to reverse [the staff ruling in the Golden Globes case]” because they perceived a “feeling amongst many Americans that some TV broadcasters are engaged in a race to the bottom, pushing the decency envelope in order to distinguish themselves in the increasingly crowded entertainment field.” Id., at 2 (statement of Rep. Upton); see also, e. g., id., at 17 (statement of Rep. Terry), 19 (statement of Rep. Pitts). They repeatedly expressed disapproval of the FCC’s enforcement policies, see, e. g., id., at 3 (statement of Rep. Upton) (“At some point, we have to ask the FCC: How much is enough? When will it revoke a license?”); id., at 4 (statement of Rep. Markey) (“Today’s hearing will allow us to explore the FCC’s lackluster enforcement record with respect to these violations”).
About two weeks later, on February 11, 2004, the same Subcommittee held hearings on a bill increasing the fines for indecency violations. Hearings on H. R. 3717 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. All five Commissioners were present and were grilled about enforcement shortcomings. See, e. g., id., at 124 (statement of Rep. Terry) (“Chairman Powell, ... it seems like common sense that if we had . . . more frequent enforcement instead of only a few examples of fines ... that would be a deterrent in itself”); id., at 7 (statement of Rep. Dingell) (“I see that apparently ... there is no enforcement of regulations at the FCC”). Certain statements, moreover, indicate that the political pressure applied by Congress had its desired effect. See ibid. (“I think our committee’s work has gotten the attention of FCC Chairman Powell and the Bush Administration. And I’m happy to see the FCC now being brought to a state of apparent alert on these matters”); see also id., at 124 (statement of Michael Copps, FCC Commissioner) (noting “positive” change in other Commissioners’ 'willingness to step up enforcement in light of proposed congressional action). A version of the bill ultimately became law as the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, 120 Stat. 491.
The FCC adopted the change that is the subject of this litigation on March 3,2004, about three weeks after this second hearing. See Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975.
Justice Stevens accuses us of equating statements made in a congressional hearing with the intent of Congress. Post, at 541-542, n. 3. In this opinion, we do not. The intent of the full Congress (or at least a majority of each House) is thought relevant to the interpretation of statutes, since they must be passed by the entire Congress. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7. It is quite irrelevant, however, to the extrastatutory influence Congress exerts over agencies of the Executive Branch, which is exerted by the congressional committees responsible for oversight and appropriations with respect to the relevant agency. That is a major reason why committee assignments are important, and committee chairmanships powerful. Surely Justice Stevens knows this.
The Administrative Procedure Act defines “agency” to mean “each authority of the Government of the United States,” 5 U. S. C. § 551(1), but specifically excludes “the Congress,” § 551(1)(A). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has “interpreted [this] exemption for ‘the Congress’ to mean the entire legislative branch,” Washington Legal Foundation v. United States Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F. 3d 1446, 1449 (1994); see also Ethnic Employees of Library of Congress v. Boorstin, 751 F. 2d 1405, 1416, n. 15 (CADC 1985) (holding that the Library of Congress is not an “agency” under the Act).
Justice Stevens criticizes us for “assuming that Pacifica endorsed” the enforcement at issue here. Post, at 542. We do nothing of the sort. We rely on the fact that certain aspects of the agency’s decision mirror the context-based approach Pacifica approved, supra, at 517-518, but that goes to our holding on administrative law, and says nothing about constitutionality. Justice Stevens also argues that heightened deference should be due the FCC’s prior policy because the “FCC’s initial views ... reflect the views of the Congress that delegated the Commission authority to flesh out details not fully defined in the enacting statute.” Post, at 541. We do not believe that the dead hand of a departed congressional oversight Committee should constrain the discretion that the text of a statute confers — but the point is in any event irrelevant in this appeal, which concerns not whether the agency has exceeded its statutory mandate but whether the reasons for its actions are adequate.
Justice Breyer posits that the FCC would have been required to give more explanation had it used notice-and-comment rulemaking, which “should lead us to the same conclusion” in this review of the agency’s change through adjudication. Post, at 562. Even assuming the premise, there is no basis for incorporating all of the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment procedural requirements into arbitrary-andeapricious review of adjudicatory decisions. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 545-549 (1978). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
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"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"State Agency",
"Unidentifiable",
"Office of Thrift Supervision",
"Department of Homeland Security",
"Board of General Appraisers",
"Board of Tax Appeals",
"General Land Office or Commissioners",
"NO Admin Action",
"Processing Tax Board of Review"
] | [
37
] |
CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT CO. v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
No. 76-1383.
Argued November 28-29, 1977
Decided January 23, 1978
William W. Sturges argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was William B. Pofj.
Thomas S. Martin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Abner W. Sibal, Joseph T. Eddins, and Beatrice Rosenberg.
Robert J. Hickey, G. Brockwel Heylin, Stephen A. Bokat, Stanley T. Kaleczyc, Jr., and Lawrence B. Kraus filed a brief for the National Chamber Litigation Center as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Charles A. Bane, Thomas D. Barr, Armand, Derfner, Norman Redlich, Robert A. Murphy, Richard T. Seymour, and William E. Caldwell for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law; and by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Melvyn R. Leventhal, and Eric Schnapper for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.
Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Kenneth C. McGuiness filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 706 (k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
“In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee . ...”
The question in this case is under what circumstances an attorney’s fee should be allowed when the defendant is the prevailing party in a Title VII action' — a question about which the federal courts have expressed divergent views.
I
Two years after Rosa Helm had filed a Title VII charge of racial discrimination against the petitioner Christiansburg Garment Co. (company), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notified her that its conciliation efforts had failed and that she had the right to sue the company in federal court. She did not do so. Almost two years later, in 1972, Congress enacted amendments to Title VII. Section 14 of these amendments authorized the Commission to sue in its own name to prosecute “charges pending with the Commission” on the effective date of the amendments. Proceeding under this section, the Commission sued the company, alleging that it had engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the amended Act. The company moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the Rosa Helm charge had not been “pending” before the Commission when the 1972 amendments took effect. The District Court agreed, and granted summary judgment in favor of the company. 376 F. Supp. 1067 (WD Va).
The company then petitioned for the allowance of attorney’s fees against the Commission pursuant to § 706 (k) of Title VII. Finding that “the Commission’s action in bringing the suit cannot be characterized as unreasonable or meritless/’ the District Court concluded that “an award of attorney’s fees to petitioner is not justified in this case.” A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, 550 F. 2d 949 (CA4), and we granted cer-tiorari to consider an important question of federal law, 432 U. S. 905.
II
It is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants must pay their own attorney’s fees. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240. Congress has provided only limited exceptions to this rule “under selected statutes granting or protecting various federal rights.” Id., at 260. Some of these statutes make fee awards mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs; others make awards permissive but limit them to certain parties, usually prevailing plaintiffs. But many of the statutes are more flexible, authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to either plaintiffs or defendants, and entrusting the effectuation of the statutory policy to the discretion of the district courts. Section 706 (k) of Title VII of the Civil Nights Act of 1964 falls into this last category, providing as it does that a district court may in its discretion allow an attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.
In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, the Court considered a substantially identical statute authorizing the award of attorney’s fees under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In that case the plaintiffs had prevailed, and the Court of Appeals had held that they should be awarded their attorney’s fees “only to- the extent that the respondents’ defenses had been advanced 'for purposes of delay and not in good faith.’ ” Id., at 401. We ruled that this “subjective standard” did not properly effectuate the purposes of the counsel-fee provision of Title II. Relying primarily on the intent of Congress to cast a Title II plaintiff in the role of “a 'private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority,” we held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Id., at 402. We noted in passing that if the objective of Congress had been to permit the award of attorney’s fees only against defendants who h'ad acted in bad faith, “no new statutory provision would have been necessary,” since even the American common-law rule allows the award of attorney’s fees in those exceptional circumstances. Id., at 402 n. 4.
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, the Court made clear that the Piggie Park standard of awarding attorney’s fees to a successful plaintiff is equally applicable in an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 422 U. S., at 415. See also Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U. S. 427, 428. It can thus be taken as established, as the parties in this case both acknowledge, that under § 706 (k) of Title VII a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances.
Ill
The question in the case before us is what standard should inform a district court’s discretion in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees to a successful defendant in a Title VII action. Not surprisingly, the parties in addressing the question in their briefs and oral arguments have taken almost diametrically opposite positions.
The company contends that the Piggie Park criterion for a successful plaintiff should apply equally as a guide to the award of attorney’s fees to a successful defendant. Its submission, in short, is that every prevailing defendant in a Title VII action should receive an allowance of attorney’s fees “unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” The respondent Commission, by contrast, argues that the prevailing defendant should receive an award of attorney’s fees only when it is found that the plaintiff’s action was brought in bad faith. We have concluded that neither of these positions is correct.
A
Relying on what it terms “the plain meaning of the statute,” the company argues that the language of § 706 (k) admits of only one interpretation: “A prevailing defendant is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff.” But the permissive and discretionary language of the statute does not even invite, let alone require, such a mechanical construction. The terms of § 706 (k) provide no indication whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or a defendant should be entitled to' attorney’s fees. And a moment’s reflection reveals that there are at least two strong equitable considerations counseling an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff that are wholly absent in the case of a prevailing Title VII defendant.
First, as emphasized so forcefully in Piggie Park, the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate “a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” 390 U. S., at 402. Second, when a district court awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a violator of federal law. As the Court of Appeals clearly perceived, “these policy considerations which support the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present in the case of a prevailing defendant.” 550 F. 2d, at 951. A successful defendant seeking counsel fees under § 706 (k) must rely on quite different equitable considerations.
But if the company’s position is untenable, the Commission’s argument also misses the mark. It seems clear, in short, that in enacting § 706 (k) Congress did not intend to permit the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant only in a situation where the plaintiff was motivated by bad faith in bringing the action. As pointed out in Piggie Park, if that had been the intent of Congress, no statutory provision would have been necessary, for it has long been established that even under the American -common-law rule attorney’s fees may be awarded against a party who has proceeded in bad faith.
Furthermore, while it was certainly the policy of Congress that Title VII plaintiffs should vindicate “a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority,” Piggie Park, 390 U. S., at 402, it is equally certain that Congress entrusted the ultimate effectuation of that policy to the adversary judicial process, Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355. A fair adversary process presupposes both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense. It cannot be lightly assumed that in enacting § 706 (k), Congress intended to' distort that process by giving the private plaintiff substantial incentives to sue, while foreclosing to the defendant the possibility of recovering his expenses in resisting even a groundless action unless he can show that it was brought in bad faith.
B
The sparse legislative history of § 706 (k) reveals little more than the barest outlines of a proper accommodation of the competing considerations we have discussed. The only specific reference to § 706 (k) in the legislative debates indicates that the fee provision was included to “make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit.” During the ¿Senate floor discussions of the almost identical attorney’s fee provision of Title II, however, several Senators explained that its allowance of awards to defendants would serve “to deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation,” “to discourage frivolous suits,” and “to diminish the likelihood of unjustified suits being brought.” If anything can be gleaned from these fragments of legislative history, it is that while Congress wanted to clear the way for suits to be brought under the Act, it also wanted to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit seems to have drawn the maximum significance from the Senate debates when it concluded:
“[From these debates] two purposes for § 706 (k) emerge. First, Congress desired to 'make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit’.... But second, and equally important, Congress intended to 'deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation’ by providing that the 'prevailing party’ — be it plaintiff or defendant — could obtain legal fees.” Grubbs v. Butz, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 18, 20, 648 F. 2d 973, 975.
The first federal appellate court to consider what criteria should govern the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant was the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F. 2d 359. There a District Court had denied a fee award to a defendant that had successfully resisted a Commission demand for documents, the court finding that the Commission’s action had not been “ 'unfounded, meritless, frivolous or vexatiously brought.’ ” Id., at 363. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had not abused its discretion in denying the award. Id., at 365. A similar standard was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F. 2d 722. In upholding an attorney’s fee award to a successful defendant, that court stated that such awards should be permitted “not routinely, not simply because he succeeds, but only where the action brought is found to be unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.” Id., at 727.
To the extent that abstract words can deal with concrete cases, we think that the concept embodied in the language adopted by these two Courts of Appeals is correct. We would qualify their words only by pointing out that the term “merit-less” is to be understood as meaning groundless or without foundation, rather than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case, and that the term “vexatious” in no way implies that the plaintiff’s subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him. In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one’s belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one’s claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.
That § 706 (k) allows fee awards only to prevailing private plaintiffs should assure that this statutory provision will not in itself operate as an incentive to the bringing of claims that have little chance of success. To take the further step of assessing attorney’s fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. Hence, a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. And, needless to say, if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued such a claim in had faith, there will be an even stronger basis for charging him with the. attorney’s fees incurred by the defense.
IV
In denying attorney’s fees to the company in this case, the District Court focused on the standards we have discussed. The court found that “the Commission’s action in bringing the suit cannot be characterized as unreasonable or meritless” because “the basis upon which petitioner prevailed was an issue of first impression requiring judicial resolution” and because the “Commission’s statutory interpretation of § 14 of the 1972 amendments was not frivolous.” The court thus exercised its discretion squarely within the permissible bounds of § 706 (k). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the decision of the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 706 (k) provides in full: “In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” 78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k).
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
The Commission argued that charges as to which no private suit had been brought as of the effective date of the amendments remained "pending” before the Commission so long as the complaint had not been dismissed and the dispute had not been resolved through conciliation. The Commission supported its construction of § 14 with references to the legislative history of the 1972 amendments.
The District Court concluded that when Rosa Helm was notified in 1970 that conciliation had failed and that she had a right to sue the company, the Commission had no further action legally open to it, and its authority over the case terminated on that date. Section 14’s reference to “pending” cases was held “to be limited to charges still in the process of negotiation and conciliation” on the effective date of the 1972 amendments. 376 F. Supp., at 1074.
The District Court rejected on the merits two additional grounds advanced by the company in support of its motion for summary judgment.
The opinion of the District Court dealing with the motion for attorney’s fees is reported at 12 FEP Cases 533.
See, e. g., Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. §15; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 216 (b); Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 165, 7 U. S. C. § 210 (f); Truth in Lending Act, 82 Stat. 157, 15 U. S. C. § 1640 (a); and Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 49 Stat. 2015, 46 U. S. C. § 1227.
See, e. g., Privacy Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1897, 5 U. S. C. § 552a (g) (2) (B) (1976 ed.); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88, 42 U. S. C. §3612 (c).
See, e. g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1171, 15 U. S. C. § 77ooo (e); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 889, 897, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i (e), 78r (a); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat. 889, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V); Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U. S. C. § 1857h-2 (d); Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1244, 42 U. S. C. § 4911 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
“In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3 (b).
The propriety under the American common-law rule of awarding attorney’s fees against- a losing party who has acted in bad faith was expressly reaffirmed in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 258-259.
Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F. 2d 1040, 1045 (CA4) (finding “special circumstances” justifying no award to prevailing plaintiff); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F. 2d 722, 727 (CA2); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714, 716 (CA5); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F. 2d 421, 429-430 (CA8).
Briefs by amici have also been filed in support of each party.
This was the view taken by Judge Widener, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, 550 F. 2d 949, 952 (CA4). At least two other federal courts have expressed the same view. EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F. 2d 439, 456 (CA6); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, 558 F. 2d 742, 744 (CA5).
See n. 9, supra. Had Congress provided for attorney’s fee awards only to successful plaintiffs, an argument could have been made that the congressional action had pre-empted the common-law rule, and that, therefore, a successful defendant could not recover attorney’s fees even against a plaintiff who had proceeded in bad faith. Cf. Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Products Co. of New Jersey, 374 F. 2d 649, 651 (CA3). But there is no indication whatever that the purpose of Congress in enacting § 706 (k) in the form’that it did was simply to foreclose such' an argument.
Remarks of Senator Humphrey,, 110 Cong. Rec. 12724 (1964).
Remarks of Senator Lausche, id.., at 13668.
Remarks of Senator Pastore, id., at 14214.
Remarks of Senator Humphrey, id., at 6534.
At least three other Circuits are in general agreement. See Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F. 2d 881, 884 n. 2 (CA5); Grubbs v. Butz, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 18, 20-21, 548 F. 2d 973, 975-976; Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F. 2d 1058, 1063-1064 (CA8).
See remarks of Senator Miller, 110 Cong. Rec. 14214 (1964), with reference to the parallel attorney’s fee provision in Title II.
Initially, the Commission argued that the “costs” assessable against the Government under § 706 (k) did not include attorney’s fees. See, e. g., United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F. 2d 359, 362 (CA3); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F. 2d 1131, 1132-1133 (CA9). But the Courts of Appeals rejected this position and, during the course of appealing this case, the Commission abandoned its contention that it was legally immune to adverse fee awards under § 706 (k). 550 F. 2d, at 951.
It has been urged that fee awards against the Commission should rest on a standard different from that governing fee awards against private plaintiffs. One amicus stresses that the Commission, unlike private litigants, needs no inducement to enforce Title VII since it is required by statute to do so. But this distinction between the Commission and private plaintiffs merely explains why Congress drafted § 706 (k) to preclude the recovery of attorney’s fees by the Commission; it does not support a difference in treatment among private and Government plaintiffs when a prevailing defendant seeks to recover his attorney’s fees. Several courts and commentators have also deemed significant the Government’s greater ability to pay adverse fee awards compared to a private litigant. See, e. g., United States Steel Corp. v. United States, supra, at 364 n. 24; Heinsz, Attorney’s Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable Standard, 8 U. Toledo L. Rev. 259, 290 (1977); Comment, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Standards for Award of Attorney’s Fees to Prevailing Defendants, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 207, 228. We are informed, however, that such awards must be paid from the Commission’s litigation budget, so that every attorney’s fee assessment against the Commission will inevitably divert resources from the agency’s enforcement of Title VII. See 46 Comp. Gen. 98, 100 (1966); 38 Comp. Gen. 343, 344-345 (1958). The other side of this coin is the fact that many defendants in Title VII claims are small- and moderate-size employers for whom the expense of defending even a frivolous claim may become a strong disincentive to the exercise of their legal rights. In short, there are equitable considerations on both sides of this question. Yet § 706 (k) explicitly provides that “the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” Hence, although a district court may consider distinctions between the Commission and private plaintiffs in determining the reasonableness of the Commission’s litigation efforts, we find no grounds for applying a different general standard whenever the Commission is the losing plaintiff. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
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] | [
31
] |
"SHAUGHNESSY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. MEZEI.\n(...TRUNCATED) | "What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify th(...TRUNCATED) | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | ["Army and Air Force Exchange Service","Atomic Energy Commission","Secretary or administrative unit (...TRUNCATED) | [
26
] |
"COLE, BOSTON STATE HOSPITAL SUPERINTENDENT, et al. v. RICHARDSON\nNo. 679.\nDecided March 16, 1970\(...TRUNCATED) | "What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify th(...TRUNCATED) | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | ["Army and Air Force Exchange Service","Atomic Energy Commission","Secretary or administrative unit (...TRUNCATED) | [
116
] |
"ARCADIA, OHIO, et al. v. OHIO POWER CO. et al.\nNo. 89-1283.\nArgued October 1, 1990\nDecided Novem(...TRUNCATED) | "What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify th(...TRUNCATED) | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | ["Army and Air Force Exchange Service","Atomic Energy Commission","Secretary or administrative unit (...TRUNCATED) | [
43
] |
"MARCELLO v. BONDS, OFFICER IN CHARGE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.\nNo. 145.\nArgued Apr(...TRUNCATED) | "What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify th(...TRUNCATED) | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | ["Army and Air Force Exchange Service","Atomic Energy Commission","Secretary or administrative unit (...TRUNCATED) | [
6
] |
"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. AMERICAN TRAILER RENTALS CO.\nNo. 35.\nArgued November 10, 19(...TRUNCATED) | "What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify th(...TRUNCATED) | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | ["Army and Air Force Exchange Service","Atomic Energy Commission","Secretary or administrative unit (...TRUNCATED) | [
104
] |
"CAMP, COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY v. PITTS et al.\nNo. 72-864.\nDecided March 26, 1973\nPer Curiam.(...TRUNCATED) | "What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify th(...TRUNCATED) | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | ["Army and Air Force Exchange Service","Atomic Energy Commission","Secretary or administrative unit (...TRUNCATED) | [
16
] |
End of preview. Expand
in Dataset Viewer.
Lawma legal classification tasks
This repository contains the legal classification tasks from Lawma. These tasks were derived from the Supreme Court and Songer Court of Appeals databases. See the project's GitHub repository for more details.
Please cite as:
@misc{dominguezolmedo2024lawmapowerspecializationlegal,
title={Lawma: The Power of Specialization for Legal Tasks},
author={Ricardo Dominguez-Olmedo and Vedant Nanda and Rediet Abebe and Stefan Bechtold and Christoph Engel and Jens Frankenreiter and Krishna Gummadi and Moritz Hardt and Michael Livermore},
year={2024},
eprint={2407.16615},
archivePrefix={arXiv},
primaryClass={cs.CL},
url={https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.16615},
}
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