m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v7

SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

• Model Type: Sentence Transformer
• Base model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
• Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
• Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
• Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

• Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
• Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
• Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v7")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'the role. The basic idea is that it is the role of a semantic theory to assign to each assertoric sentence a mental state which it serves to express in virtue of the fact that being in that mental state is the assertability condition for that sentence. The full story begins with atomic sentences, assigning beliefs to the descriptive sentences and some sort of noncognitive state to the normative sentences. More complex sentences involving sentential connectives assign a more complex mental state to these more complex constructions, with the exact nature of the complex state depending on a function contributed by the connective and arguments contributed by the semantic values of the atomic sentences. It is only after these states have been determined as the semantic values of the sentences that certain types of sentences, the descriptive sentences, get associated with propositions—the propositions that are the objects of the beliefs which those sentences express. This means that expressivists are committed to a certain order of explanation being the correct one for natural language descriptive sentences. It isn’t that descriptive natural language sentences express beliefs because they express the propositions which are the contents of the beliefs that they are therefore apt to express. It is rather that they express these propositions because they are the contents of the mental states that are the appropriateness conditions for asserting those sentences (29–35). The Frege‐Geach Problem Peter Geach and John Searle famously highlighted noncognitivist shortcomings at providing a general',
    'semantics for moral language.2 Noncognitivists had, at the time of this complaint, told us what free‐standing assertive utterances of simple declarative moral sentences meant by telling us about the noncognitive state that such utterances expressed, or the speech act they were used to perform.3 But without more it is not obvious how to extend their suggestions to embedded uses of these same expressions in more complex constructions. These complexes can be accepted by speakers who do not have the attitude which would be expressed were the embedded sentence to be used unembedded. Thus one simple extension of the noncognitivist story for simple declarations—that the embedded sentence expresses the very same attitude as its unembedded counterpart—seems to be ruled out from the start. Yet a criterion of adequacy for completing the noncognitivist story is that it explain the logical relations between different moral sentences. And the obvious way to accomplish that is for sentences to contribute the same contents to utterances whether they occur embedded or by themselves. This is why Geach thought it relevant to emphasize what he called “The Frege Point”: “A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition.” Contemporary expressivists such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn have taken this challenge especially seriously. Their central idea is that we can make the most headway in understanding all the features of moral discourse by beginning with an account',
    "Humean metaphor of projection). The realist fiction is understood as a philosophical miscon ception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in uttering a moral sentence competent speakers do not assert the moral proposition expressed but rather convey by means of it the noncognitive attitude centrally involved in moral acceptance. Moral fictionalism is this alternative to standard noncognitivism. Moral fiction alism is noncognitivism without nonfactualism. Not only does the distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism and nonfactualism raise the logical possibility of moral fictionalism, but it also makes clear the general form of argument required to establish its truth. To establish the truth of moral fictionalism, it suffices to: (1) argue for the psychological claim of noncognitivism. (2) argue against expressivist nonfactualism. Indeed, this was the argumentative strategy that I pursued in Moral Fictionalism. I am not going to talk about my case for noncognitivism, but I will talk about the problem that formed the basis of my case against expressivist nonfactualism. 2. The Frege-Geach Problem The Frege-Geach problem was first raised by Ross (1939: 33-34) and independently by Geach (1958, 1960, 1965) and Searle (1962, 1969) and was originally directed at expressivist proposals such as Ayer's emotivism: It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do",
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Evaluation

Metrics

Triplet

• Dataset: nomic
• Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.97
dot_accuracy	0.03
manhattan_accuracy	0.968
euclidean_accuracy	0.97
max_accuracy	0.97

Triplet

• Dataset: nomic
• Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.9785
dot_accuracy	0.0215
manhattan_accuracy	0.979
euclidean_accuracy	0.9785
max_accuracy	0.979

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

• Size: 10,000 training samples
• Columns: anchor, positive, and negative
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	anchor	positive	negative
  type	string	string	string
  details	min: 263 tokens mean: 330.21 tokens max: 483 tokens	min: 278 tokens mean: 331.97 tokens max: 529 tokens	min: 271 tokens mean: 330.7 tokens max: 480 tokens

• Samples:

  anchor	positive	negative
  Plutarch of Athens, the teacher of Proclus' teacher, Syrianus, and argues that the demiurge is not the highest principle for Hierocles, nor does his work show any particular closeness to Christianity. However S. thinks that the One is not mentioned in the Commentary on the Golden Verses because the Commentary deals with ethics, rather than, as Hadot thought, because it is an elementary work. He suggests on p. 56 that Hierocles did differ from Plotinus in his view of man's ethical end: this was not return to the One or even full assimilation to the demiurge but rather a return to the highest level beneath the moon, which for Hierocles was the place from which the soul had fallen. The notes to the translations in Parts II and III are very full, offering a commentary on the text rather than just explanatory notes to the translations. S.'s work makes Hierocles much more accessible than before and will be required reading for anyone working on these texts. Commentaries on individual treatises of Plotinus continue to appear at a steady rate. The latest addition to the French series commentaries under I Hermann S. Schibli, Alexandria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002. P . xvi 419 60. the broader series title of 'Histoire des doctrines de l'antiquite classique' is Richard Dufour's edition of Ennead 2.1.2 Like the other volumes in the series this offers a full introduction to the treatise, a Greek text, taken from Henry and Schwyzer's OCT editio minor, a French translation and a very full commentary. Alongside it comes a reprint of the edition of	Ennead 6.6 first published in 1980 and arising out of Jean Pepin's seminar at the CNRS.3 A photographic reprint of the first edition is complemented by a final page of additional bibliography compiled by Luc Brisson. Meanwhile Pavlos Kalligas has produced another volume of his full edition of the Enneads, covering the whole of Ennead III.4 Like the previous volumes this offers a Greek text, a modern Greek translation and a full modern Greek commentary; bibliography is given both for individual treatises and in a general bibliography at the end of the volume. Two translations of a rather different kind have been published in the series CAGL (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Versiones latinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum). Both are facsimile editions of Renaissance Latin translations of the Aristotelian commentators.5 Vol. 9 contains Gauricus' translation of Ammonius' commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge and Rasarius' translation of Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories, while vol. 10 offers Hieronymus Bagolinus' translation of Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione. The translations of Ammonius are preceded by an introduction by Rainer Thiel, who covers Ammonius' life and work and the two commentaries included in the volume, and Charles Lohr, who contributes a couple of pages on Ammonius in the Latin tradition. Frans de Haas has written the introduction to the translation of Philoponus, including a discussion of Philoponus' GC commentary in the Latin tradition. Both introductions are useful but that by de	that group, are the most consistently provocative. They are unique documents in the history of philosophy, full of surprising and challenging arguments. The third part, outside the purview of this review, contains the works of some of the eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine commentators. This is material at the outermost reaches of the empire of Ancient Greek philosophy, but it is not without interest, particularly as a counterbalance to the mediaeval Latin Christian interpretations of the Greeks. The translations of Alexander by Madigan and Dooley, which continue their joint work in the publication of Metaphysics 2 and 3, reflect accurately the commentator's lapidary and somewhat pedantic style. There is an admirable consistency in vocabulary employed by the two translators. Scrupulous attention to the details of the text make these highly reliable tools. What philosophers will no doubt be interested in learning is to what extent these tools, and the other Alexander commentaries in the series, are of use in understanding Aristotle, and whether or not they have been permanently superseded by contemporary commentaries such as those in the Oxford Aristotle series. I can think of at least two reasons why the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias should be regarded by all students of Aristotle as indispensable. I shall confine my remarks to Metaphysics 4 and 5, but I believe they apply to all the rest. First, Alexander manifestly attempts to follow the arguments in their own terms. He is not so far removed from Aristotle in philosophical culture as
  route of influence. However. I am not interested in chartThe ing causal chronology. I suspect that feminist perspectives are sometimes partial contributors to the shifts that have occurred in aesthetics over the past two decades, though sometimes there is less influence than coincidental kinship of conclusions. My aim is to outline several feminist challenges to concepts of art and cultural value, noting their congruence with changes in similar concepts and approaches operating in aesthetics. I hope that these considerations will suggest areas where awareness of gender issues ought to prod aesthetic theory to further revisions. I begin with an observation about philosophy in general and the recent dramatic rise of interest in theories of emotions in this discipline. This new attention to emotion can be found in moral theory, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science, as well as in aesthetics. Moreover, many of these analyses are devoted to refuting the bad reputation emotions have had since antiquity and to arguing for their cognitive, moral, and aesthetic value. In this aspect of their work, the vindicators of emotion are in stride with feminist critiques of the way the concept of reason operates in traditional philosophical discourse. A deep, basic claim of feminist scholarship in virtually all its guises is that a good portion of the history and tradition of philosophy is flawed by gender bias, often because of its reliance on concepts of rationality. Rationality-as a philosophical concept-is a human trait that has been delimited by its contrast to other mental capacities,	such as appetites, desires, and emotions. Classically (and medievally and modernly) the powers of the rational mind are conceived as the highest achievement of man. There is some generic connotation to this claim (for rationality distinguishes men from beasts), but also a good dose of the specific, for rationality fully achieved is usually cast as a preeminently masculine accomplishment. Just how equal is the potential for rational activity between males and females is a point of dispute. Plato gets a lot of credit for arguing for equal mental talents in Republic V; Aristotle comes in for a lot of blame for founding a pernicious and powerful tradition that limits the rational capability of females.3 In the Renaissance there is a flurry of debate over this issue, including arguments for complete equality of rationality between the sexes.4 In spite of a history of debate on the subject, when it comes to characterizing the field generally, there is an intransigent alignment of feminine temperament with the "less rational" regions of sensation, appetite-and emotion.5 Feminist scholars have discovered gender bias in basic philosophical concepts and argued that the reliance on rationality and correlative concepts like objectivity belies the putative universal scope of philosophical claims, revealing their gendered tailoring. This has opened the way to explorations of concepts less arrogated to males. Thus many feminist philosophers have turned their attentions to studies of the emotions. Perspectives emphasizing care rather than justice are being explored in ethics, and degrees of affect and	in generation? Do women and men relate to wisdom in the same or in different ways? Do women and men have the same or different virtues? These questions, she says, correspond to four traditional areas of philosophical thought: metaphysics, natural philosophy, epistemology, and moral philosophy. Allen then shows how the answers given by the philosophers to the above questions reveal a limited number of alternative theories about the relation of the sexes. These theories are: sex unity (men and women are equal and not significantly different), sex neutrality (ignores the issue of male and female differentiation), sex polarity (men and women are different and the male is superior), reverse sex polarity (men and women are different and the female is superior), and sex complementarity (men and women are different but equal). The primary debate in the history of philosophy, Allen claims, has been between theories of sex unity, championed by Plato and the Neo-Platonists, and sex polarity, developed by Aristotle and institutionalized by the early medieval philosophers. Not until Hildegard of Bingen do we find a secure foundation for the theory of sex complementarity, a theory which, by the way, is Allen's own preference. After Hildegard, according to Allen, there was a "movement back and forth between theories of sex unity, sex complementarity, and sex polarity, without any one theory dominating Western thought ... "(361). But with the discovery of certain Aristotelian texts and their translation into Latin, and with the decision of Thomas Aquinas to use Aristotle
  too much of a good thing that grates on the nerves, an excessive beauty that strains the ears. That this should be James' orientation toward Bergson seems strange, given that the two of them were good friends, and that James openly appreciated both the thought and the style, the form and the content, of Bergson's work. It is not necessary, however, to tum to biographical information in order to undermine Stevens' dual interpretations of James' remarks. One has merely to turn to the broader quote from James from which Stevens is quoting in order to encounter a strikingly different appearance: 0 my Bergson, you are a magician, and your book is a marvel, a real wonder in the history of philosophy.... In finishing it I found the same after-taste remaining as after finishing Madame Bovary, such a flavor of persistent euphony, as of a rich river that never foamed or ran thin, but steadily and firmly proceeded with its banks full to the brim.3 Taken thus in its completion, James' remarks are anything but pejorative. James opens with a warm and affectionate greeting. The words magician, marvel, and wonder all suggest power and greatness. James' use of imagery from the sen sory modalities of taste and hearing—"after-taste," "flavor," and "euphony"— demonstrates one aspect of his literary, poetic flair and thereby reinforces the complimentary nature of his remarks. Lastly, James compares this "persistent euphony" to one of the most prominent images in all of his work, perhaps even the metaphor for which he is	most famous—that of the river or stream, as in the stream of consciousness. And the river Bergson has created, according to James, is of a near-perfect nature, never foaming or running thin, but "steadily and firmly proceeding] with its banks full to the brim." Evidently, when one plugs this more exhaustive understanding of James' quote into the two quotes from Stevens above, one recognizes that Stevens has completely obscured, misrepresented, and disguised James' perspective on Bergson. And this disguise thereby extends not only to James' evaluation of Bergson's style but also—with regard to the first quote from Stevens—to the content of Bergson's philosophy and to the content of philosophy in general as well. My next step in this now suspiciously attuned investigation is to turn to a closer examination of the entirety of Stevens Hall 2 Stevens On Poetry-Philosophy "I am not a philosopher," Stevens writes in this philosophically rich essay posit ing the existence of poetic philosophical ideas. This first irony aside, he defines these ideas as "ideas that are inherently poetic, as, for example, the concept of the infinity of the world" which "is a poetic idea because it gives the imagina tion sudden life" (cpp, 860,851). The tide of the essay, "A Collect of Philosophy," refers to the collect, "[a] brief prayer that is used in various Western liturgies before the epistle and var ies with the day."4 The title, then, suggests that Stevens is thinking of these remarks on poetic philosophical ideas as	sublime is of a character that, while yet an aspect of nature, is an aspect in some sense superior to nature, in that it grants nature its symmetry and concord: it grants its aesthetic. The sublime, as this aesthetic of nature, is thus realized by the human process in infinitely many ways: indeed, in works of art, but in the cosmic structures of the multiverse or in the snowbound fields of rural iowa as the eagles soar and swoop and circle above. And so the divine is thus subsumed, though not consumed, within and through the sublime. The divine becomes now an artwork, its infinite expressions infinite expressions of the sublime, thus in their turn inspiring poetry and symphonies and sculptures. And as expressions of the sublime, the gods can then too be translated to be more efficacious and less oppressive expressions: the divine is freed from the darker realms of the depth dimensions of nature to become a means to achieve wholeness and completeness. complimenting corriington’s refiguring of the divine through the sublime are notions of the American poet Wallace stevens to be found in two essays, “Two or Three ideas” and “A collect of Philosophy.”12 stevens was indeed a philosopher as well as a poet: in a letter to Paul Weiss, stevens expressed his 6. ibid., 167. 7. ibid., 181. 8. ibid., 171. 9. ibid., 172. 10. ibid. 11. ibid., 181. 12. belief that philosophy is a cosmic poetry. stevens was thus very much at home in

• Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
      "triplet_margin": 0.05
  }
  

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

• Size: 500 evaluation samples
• Columns: anchor, positive, and negative
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	anchor	positive	negative
  type	string	string	string
  details	min: 271 tokens mean: 331.61 tokens max: 526 tokens	min: 277 tokens mean: 331.71 tokens max: 469 tokens	min: 279 tokens mean: 328.47 tokens max: 431 tokens

• Samples:

  anchor	positive	negative
  the cases which it is intended to include, the fact that acquaintance is in volved seems a priori evident, and not merely a statistical occurrence. I do not know what, precisely, is the logical difference between these two kinds of connection, but it seems plain that there is a difference. The kind of con nection intended in the definition is what we may call the a priori kind; and since the difficulties of the distinction belong solely to logic, we need not investigate them further at present. Theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is more difficult to define. To begin with, no definition can be satisfactory which introduces the word "knowledge," both because this word is highly ambiguous, and because every one of its possible meanings can only be made clear after much epistemological discussion. Then again, difficulties arise as regards the relations of epistemology to psychology and to logic respectively. It is obvious that much of episte mology is included in psychology. The analysis of experi ence, the distinctions between sensation, imagination, mem ory, attention, etc., the nature of belief or judgment, in 584 THE MONIST. short all the analytic portion of the subject, in so far as it does not introduce the distinction between truth and falsehood, must, I think, be regarded as strictly part of psychology. On the other hand, the distinction between truth and falsehood, which is plainly relevant to the theory of knowledge, would seem to belong to logic, though this is open to some	degree of doubt. And in any case, as soon as we reach the theory of judgment, even apart from truth and falsehood, the difficulties encountered are almost en tirely logical, and logical discoveries are what are most re quired for the progress of the subject. It can be shown1 that a judgment, and generally all thought whose expres sion involves propositions, must be a fact of a different logical form from any of the series : subject-predicate facts, dual relations, triple relations, etc. In this way, a difficult and interesting problem of pure logic arises, namely the problem of enlarging the inventory of logical forms so as to include forms appropriate to the facts of epistemology. It would seem, therefore, that it is impossible to assign to the theory of knowledge a province distinct from that of logic and psychology. Any attempt to mark out such a province must, I believe, be artificial and therefore harmful. The central problem of epistemology is the problem of distinguishing between true and false beliefs, and of find ing, in as many regions as possible, criteria of true belief within those regions. This problem takes us, through the analysis of belief and its presuppositions, into psychology and the enumeration of cognitive relations, while it takes us into logic through the distinction of truth and falsehood, which is irrelevant in a merely psychological discussion of belief. We may define epistemology in terms of this prob lem, as : The analysis of true and false belief and	assumption, that has been subjected or that can be subjected to critical evaluation and justification. In its first characterization, knowledge is trustworthy belief. It is a belief or a system of beliefs that can be logically justified. Within logical justification I include everything that may be thought relevant and adequate in logic and epistemology and scientific method. When we consider the trustworthiness of a belief apart from chains or systems of beliefs it is usual to speak of epistemology. When we consider beliefs in chains of deductive or. inductive proof or in other systematic interconnections we usually consider the subject as being logic. Yet, fundamentally, there is little difference here. In all these problems we are considering the logical evaluation or criticism of beliefs as purporting to be knowledge. Many philosophers seem to long for the good old days when they could be competent experts in the field of psychology. For better or for worse, those days are gone, probably never to return. The task of the philosopher now in this field is the same as his primary task has always been, to show what distinguishes more trustworthy from less trustworthy thought. Our beliefs, in all their groupings, are found, under critical or evaluative examination, to fall into a scale. With no pretence here of an adequate account of the matter, it seems that beliefs constitute a scale which runs from what might be called zero probability or zero evidence or zero plausibility to more and
  draws a contrast between scientific objectivity and practical reason. He takes the unfashionably sane view that science tells us about the world that is already there independent of our theories, and elaborates this in terms of the idea (taken from his earlier book on Descartes) of an "absolute" conception of reality, a conception which is to a maximum degree independent of our human or personal perspectives and their peculiarities, but which at the same time places those perspectives within the world and explains both why the world appears to them as it does and how it is possible for us to form the absolute conception itself. The way the world really is explains how we can form a correct conception of it by transcending the appearances, even if we start from distinct subjective points of view. But ethical thought is concerned with the question how we should live, not how things are. Even if this question were to admit of convergence on a single answer from different perspectives, the explanation could not be anything like the one science offers for convergence in our beliefs about what the world is like. tions and disagreements are not like perceptions caused by the action on our senses of a single external world. So the defense of objective principles in ethics requires an alternative account of how convergence on the truth is possible, as well as a theory of error to explain the evident and frequent failures of convergence. But Williams argues that there is no such alternative. Mathematics provides no better a model for	ethical truth and knowledge than science does: any account must be specifically suited to the subject matter. The question is whether any of the leading candidates has a chance of being right. Not every ethical theory tries to provide ethics with a universal and inescapable foundation. Williams also criticizes certain forms of utilitarianism and contractualism, represented by R. M. Hare, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon, which start from the motivational assumption of some form of impartiality without claiming that such impartiality is itself universally required. He argues that they are in different ways motivationally unrealistic. [About the peculiar state of moral consciousness required by indirect or two-level utilitarianism, for example, he says: "One cannot separate, except by an imposed and illusory dissociation, the theorist in oneself from the self whose dispositions are being theorized" (110).] But I want to concentrate on his objections to the two traditions of strictly foundational theory he thinks it most important to rule out: the Kantian and the Aristotelian. One tries to ground ethics in our rationality and the other, in our humanity. This means the first has somewhat more universal pretensions than the second, but both attempt to prove the authority of ethics inescapable by basing it on something essential about us. And both purport to offer an objective solution, in the form of an endorsement of certain principles and dispositions from a standpoint outside the cultural and personal contingencies of our lives-a	philsophical appetites whetted turn to a careful reading of the book itself. 1. Williams is skeptical about the role of philosophy in ethical thought. We can think about ethics, he suggests. But philosophy cannot tell us how to do it. Neither can it play a crucial role in the process of ethical thinking. On the other hand, philosophy has had and continues to have a distorting impact on ethics because of its penchant for theory and for abstract and general thought. Much of what Williams has to say on this topic is developed around a discussion of prejudice, a phenomenon that has concerned moral theCritical Notice of Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 291 orists like R.M. Hare deeply. Williams' view is that prejudice cannot be shown to be irrational. It is wrong because it is unethical. Furthermore, the best way to deal with it is by thinking clearly using the 'thick' ethical notions made available by one's culture, not by spinning abstract ethical theories that distort the nature of ethical thought. What Williams has to say on this topic raises a serious problem. Who should be considered members of the moral community and who should not? Williams rejects the answer given to this question by utilitarians like Singer arguing that speciesism, for example, is not a mistake (118). Equally, he rejects the view that philosophical analysis of concepts like the concept of a person can be of any value, citing the abortion debate as an
  while, the traditional approach and that he had spent more time doing what he promised early in the book to do. But I suppose this is asking for an altogether different kind of book. This is a report of the second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii from June 20 to July 28, 1949. The formal papers read before the conference, supplemented by an introductory chapter by the editor and a concluding chapter of reports from the seminars of the conference, constitute the content of the volume. The addresses are presented under the three heads of methodology, metaphysics, and ethics and social philzsophy; the reports of seminars are from the same three fields of inquiry. In the subtitle, the volume is advertised as an attempt at world philosophical synthesis"a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the East and West." No claim is made that such a synthesis was achieved by the conference. According to the editor, most participants in the conference were agreed that "the most significant general results of the conference consisted in a highly developed attitude of openmindedness and cordiality, without which no synthesis of East and West will ever be possible," and that "the great single result of the Conference-and its chief contribution to world philosophy-consists of the numerous provocative and highly significant proposed syntheses, or avenues towards synthesis, of Eastern and Western philosophy" (pp. 6, 9). There is talk of "the ideal of 'orchestrated unity'" and of "the attitude of world perspective-one way of expressing the entire spirit	of the Conference." But the question remains how the former differs from eclecticism and the latter from the attitude of open-mindedness and in what sense the attainment of these ideals would give us a world philosophy. There is no question, however, that the conference succeeded in sharpening the points of agreement and the points of disagreement between oriental and occidental methods of philosophizing and conceptions of its objective. To an outsider this appears to be the most significant accomplishment of the 72 ETHICS conference, and it is, in any event, an indispensable first step toward a world philosophical synthesis. title of this book is understood "roughly the twentieth century with a little background of the nineteenth." The currents of philosophy surveyed are, primarily, British and American: neo-Hegelian idealism; pragmatism; realism, New and Critical; the theory of sense data; emergent evolution; logical positivism. Croce and Gentile are given one chapter together, and Bergson and Whitehead one chapter each. The philosophical aspects of Marxism are outlined and evaluated in a chapter of seventeen pages, while Indian thought is given a chapter of forty pages under the title of "Indian Idealism" (K. C. Bhattacharya and S. Radhakrishnan) and an Appendix of eighteen pages, abstracted from the author's article in the November, 1948, issue of the Philosophical Review, under the title "The Contributions of Modern Indian Philosophy to World Philosophy" (Aurobindo, Tagore, Gandhi). An account of "existentialism" is omitted on the ground that it "is yet a little	subject in their departments of philosophy. Why should philosophy remain so little touched by the rapid currents of modern life? The philosophic thought of India and China has been far from insignificant. The influence of these philosophies upon millions of people is quite sufficient to justify their study. Under modern circumstances, a school of philosophy which allows its students to graduate without an acquaintance with non-European philosophical thought is really an anachronism. The fact that there are now three important centers of philosophy, not merely one, sets the problem of this paper: what are the tasks a modern philosophy should undertake with regard to these nonEuropean philosophies? The first task is naturally that of searching through these philosophies for new or previously unstressed concepts or solutions to philosophical problems. The larger the number of people and the more varied their backgrounds, the more likely that all the pertinent solutions to a problem will appear. In philosophy, the East does have important contributions to make. In recent centuries the concept of divine immanence, the stimulus to which came from India, has revolutionized the philosophy of religion, and the end of its transforming power is still far from having been reached. American Transcendentalism owed much to Hindu philosophy. The philosophers of the enlightenment, especially the continental philosophers, eagerly studied what they could find of Chinese philosophy, even though it came to them in an imperfect and garbled form. Only a few years ago there

• Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
      "triplet_margin": 0.05
  }
  

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

• eval_strategy: steps
• per_device_train_batch_size: 4
• per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
• learning_rate: 1e-05
• weight_decay: 0.01
• warmup_ratio: 0.1
• batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Click to expand

• overwrite_output_dir: False
• do_predict: False
• eval_strategy: steps
• prediction_loss_only: True
• per_device_train_batch_size: 4
• per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
• per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
• per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
• gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
• eval_accumulation_steps: None
• learning_rate: 1e-05
• weight_decay: 0.01
• adam_beta1: 0.9
• adam_beta2: 0.999
• adam_epsilon: 1e-08
• max_grad_norm: 1.0
• num_train_epochs: 3
• max_steps: -1
• lr_scheduler_type: linear
• lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
• warmup_ratio: 0.1
• warmup_steps: 0
• log_level: passive
• log_level_replica: warning
• log_on_each_node: True
• logging_nan_inf_filter: True
• save_safetensors: True
• save_on_each_node: False
• save_only_model: False
• restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
• no_cuda: False
• use_cpu: False
• use_mps_device: False
• seed: 42
• data_seed: None
• jit_mode_eval: False
• use_ipex: False
• bf16: False
• fp16: False
• fp16_opt_level: O1
• half_precision_backend: auto
• bf16_full_eval: False
• fp16_full_eval: False
• tf32: None
• local_rank: 0
• ddp_backend: None
• tpu_num_cores: None
• tpu_metrics_debug: False
• debug: []
• dataloader_drop_last: False
• dataloader_num_workers: 0
• dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
• past_index: -1
• disable_tqdm: False
• remove_unused_columns: True
• label_names: None
• load_best_model_at_end: False
• ignore_data_skip: False
• fsdp: []
• fsdp_min_num_params: 0
• fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
• fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
• accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
• deepspeed: None
• label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
• optim: adamw_torch
• optim_args: None
• adafactor: False
• group_by_length: False
• length_column_name: length
• ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
• ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
• ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
• dataloader_pin_memory: True
• dataloader_persistent_workers: False
• skip_memory_metrics: True
• use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
• push_to_hub: False
• resume_from_checkpoint: None
• hub_model_id: None
• hub_strategy: every_save
• hub_private_repo: False
• hub_always_push: False
• gradient_checkpointing: False
• gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
• include_inputs_for_metrics: False
• eval_do_concat_batches: True
• fp16_backend: auto
• push_to_hub_model_id: None
• push_to_hub_organization: None
• mp_parameters:
• auto_find_batch_size: False
• full_determinism: False
• torchdynamo: None
• ray_scope: last
• ddp_timeout: 1800
• torch_compile: False
• torch_compile_backend: None
• torch_compile_mode: None
• dispatch_batches: None
• split_batches: None
• include_tokens_per_second: False
• include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
• neftune_noise_alpha: None
• optim_target_modules: None
• batch_eval_metrics: False
• eval_on_start: False
• batch_sampler: no_duplicates
• multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional

Training Logs

Epoch	Step	Training Loss	loss	nomic_max_accuracy
0	0	-	-	0.92
0.04	100	0.008	0.0111	0.918
0.08	200	0.0076	0.0097	0.926
0.12	300	0.0056	0.0086	0.934
0.16	400	0.0068	0.0081	0.938
0.2	500	0.0068	0.0075	0.944
0.24	600	0.0048	0.0072	0.95
0.28	700	0.0057	0.0072	0.948
0.32	800	0.0048	0.0063	0.956
0.36	900	0.0061	0.0052	0.962
0.4	1000	0.0055	0.0058	0.96
0.44	1100	0.0035	0.0054	0.956
0.48	1200	0.0036	0.0045	0.964
0.52	1300	0.0043	0.0045	0.964
0.56	1400	0.003	0.0066	0.948
0.6	1500	0.0036	0.0043	0.962
0.64	1600	0.0035	0.0042	0.968
0.68	1700	0.0048	0.0043	0.966
0.72	1800	0.0034	0.0036	0.972
0.76	1900	0.0025	0.0034	0.972
0.8	2000	0.0051	0.0042	0.962
0.84	2100	0.0023	0.0035	0.97
0.88	2200	0.0046	0.0040	0.968
0.92	2300	0.0038	0.0044	0.968
0.96	2400	0.0055	0.0042	0.966
1.0	2500	0.004	0.0035	0.972
1.04	2600	0.0015	0.0033	0.97
1.08	2700	0.0014	-	0.979

Framework Versions

• Python: 3.10.12
• Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
• Transformers: 4.42.4
• PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
• Accelerate: 0.32.1
• Datasets: 2.21.0
• Tokenizers: 0.19.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

TripletLoss

@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}